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Articles Click on the article title below to read: Beyond rhetoric: Africa-US relations and the search for a rapprochement Dr Efem N. Ubi A critical assessment of Africa-US relations: Lessons from Tanzania Dr Francis A.S.T. Matambalya US-Africa relations: Policy and governance priorities from Kenya's perspective Dr Robert Kabage US-West Africa relations: Strategic dynamics and evolving priorities Dr Assi J.C. Kimou US-South Africa relations and the Trump doctrine Dr Sizo Nkala

The webinar  held on Wednesday, 6 August 2025 on the Local Government Inclusive Growth Index (LGIGI). Was hosted by Infrastructure South Africa in collaboration with the University of Johannesburg, gathered a group of stakeholders committed to advancing equitable development at the municipal level. The session was led by Professor Daniel Meyer, who presented the outcomes and rationale behind establishing a comprehensive index to measure not only economic prosperity but also the overall well-being and inclusion within local communities.   At the virtual gathering, Prof Meyer explored how the LGIGI can serve as a valuable tool for policymakers, decision-makers and community members alike. By identifying persistent inequalities and tracking community progress, the index empowers stakeholders to make informed decisions, allocate resources more effectively and hold leaders accountable for ensuring that growth is truly inclusive. The interactive discussion highlighted the importance of collaborative efforts from all sectors to foster sustained and meaningful economic progress, ultimately aiming for thriving and equitable municipalities across the nation.

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2025 Image credit: OpenAI. Africa-U.S. Relations. 2025. Digital illustration.   by Dr Efem N. Ubi Abstract   The relationship between the United States (US) and Africa has been the subject of considerable debate, with questions about whether it is driven by genuine strategic interests or merely rhetorical commitments. This analysis examines these dynamics, with a focus on the strategic value of Africa in US global power calculations. As great power competition intensifies across Africa, this paper challenges the persistent gap between the US’s diplomatic rhetoric and its strategic prioritisation of Africa. While US officials often emphasise the importance of Africa, operational policy reflects outdated paradigms that undervalue the continent's pivotal role in global power dynamics. This paper interrogates whether Africa holds genuine strategic value in US global power calculations or remains a shallow concern. The article critically examines US trade, security, and diplomatic engagements, comparing them with Africa’s relationships with other advanced and emerging economies. Analysis reveals how the emerging economies have more concretely recognised Africa's strategic value, translating this recognition into sustained engagement that threatens US influence. The article further highlights gaps between policy pronouncements and actual strategic interests in US-Africa engagements. It argues that the US must move beyond rhetorical commitments to Africa and fundamentally reassess its strategic value through a multidimensional lens that recognises Africa's critical importance in the global system. This repudiation requires abandoning outdated foreign policy paradigms that marginalise Africa and embracing a partnership model that acknowledges Africa's unique position in a multipolar world.   Keywords: US-Africa Relations, Power Calculations, Rhetoric vs. Reality, Multilateralism, Sovereignty, Strategic Value, Rapprochement Introduction   Despite acknowledging Africa's growing significance, the United States' (US) strategic engagement with Africa reveals a notable discrepancy between diplomatic rhetoric and actual prioritisation. This is more evident along two key fronts. Firstly, there is a decline in this relationship, as demonstrated by diminishing trade, security cooperation, and diplomatic initiatives when compared to those with China and other emerging powers. Secondly, the dynamics of the relationship reflect an imbalanced hierarchy, characterised by a superordinate and subordinate status. Africa remains secondary in US planning, which hinders partnerships and risks strategic losses to rivals. This disconnect necessitates a more profound and nuanced understanding of US-Africa relations within the current global power dynamics. There is no gainsaying that China and the emerging economies’ expanding global presence further complicates the strategic dimensions of the relationship between the US and Africa (Fulford, 2018).   Notably, Africa has become central in several ways after appearing on the periphery of world history for much of the 19th and 20th centuries. While it is essential to acknowledge China's strategic interests in Africa, particularly concerning the substantial volume and quality of resources required to support a continuous development agenda domestically, we cannot ignore its competition with the United States for exclusive spheres of influence in Africa (Yu, 2022). Africa's strategic importance has increased due to global power competition, particularly between the United States, China, Russia, and the emerging economies. The sheer volume of Africa's strategic value, particularly its resource base, shows its importance. Africa boasts a vast array of strategic mineral wealth. Many of the critical resources of modern society either come directly from the continent or can only be extracted with their assistance (UNEP, N.d.).   However, the questions are: Why is Africa so undermined? What is the US's interest in Africa? Does Africa hold genuine strategic value in US global power calculations or remain a shallow concern? What should be the prognosis towards a rapprochement that will reengineer the relations towards mutual benefit? These are critical questions that this article will examine. The article examines the essential elements that will shape a recalibrated US-Africa partnership model, fostering mutual interests and acknowledging Africa's unique place. Using specific metrics in no precise order, such as security, trade, economic development, etc., this article investigates and evaluates the actual strategic value of Africa within US global power calculations, to bridge critical gaps, enhance understanding, inform policy, and promote a more nuanced, equitable, and effective US-Africa relationship in a rapidly evolving global order.   Historicising US-Africa Relations   US-Africa relations, although multifaceted, span historical, economic, and security dimensions. Historically, the United States' relations with Africa date back to the founding days of the US, the Atlantic slave trade, and the Cold War (Magu, 2018; Nyang, 2005). Regardless of the numerous characteristics that define the relationship between the US and Africa, it is evident that a significant portion of the global population predominantly associates both regions with their Black communities, as well as the political and military dynamics that emerged during the Cold War era (Nyang, 2005) when it became a primary objective of US policy to prevent ideological and political penetration of the region by communism (Ohaegbulam, 1992).   Although successive US administrations have often blamed each other for paying insufficient attention to the needs of the African continent, it is argued that US policy towards Africa is an afterthought (Institute for Democratic Governance, 2014). Africa began to gain prominence in US foreign policy in 1958, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the Bureau of African Affairs within the Department of State. This initiative took place during the Cold War, a period when Africa was viewed as an ideological battleground, with the US seeking to counter the Soviet Union's influence on the continent (Oyebade, 2018). During the Cold War, the US's approach to Africa, as noted by Daniel and Nagar (2016), primarily focused on countering the spread of communism. While this strategy involved supporting various regimes, including those in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia, it often compromised important democratic principles and hindered socioeconomic development. Following 1945, the US positioned itself as an anti-colonial force, striving to advance its own interests while challenging Soviet influence on the continent. This complex dynamic highlights the need for a deeper understanding of how US policies could have more effectively aligned with fostering democracy and development in Africa (Daniel & Nagar, 2016) .   The end of the Cold War led to the US initially reducing its focus on Africa, as it no longer needed to counter Soviet influence on the continent. This shift was characterised by a decrease in diplomatic presence and foreign aid, as well as a diminished focus on economic engagement (Çelik, 2022). According to Hamid, in the post-Cold War era, the US has struggled to establish a coherent African strategy, appearing reactionary compared to China's proactive economic diplomacy. This shift has led to a lack of political resolve and a diminished focus on promoting democratic governance and stability in the region (Lellou, 2024). Despite rhetorical support for democracy and economic development, the policies of Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama remained focused on securitisation. They often supported autocratic regimes, undermining the stated goals of promoting democracy and development. It was not until the early 2000s, following terrorist attacks and the discovery of energy reserves, that US military operations and engagement increased under the Bush administration. Subsequently, interest waned again during the Obama and Trump administrations, with China and the EU surpassing the US as key trade partners (Dagne, 2002). And picked up again under President Biden’s administration. Like every other relationship, the US-Africa relations have seen moments of conflict and moments of reconciliation. The US's oft-shifting rhetoric continues to have a detrimental impact on African nations (Adebajo, 2018).   The fluctuating engagement clearly demonstrates the urgent need to scrutinise the specific policy frameworks that have directed US interactions with Africa, as these frameworks serve as pivotal instruments of influence. The key policy frameworks that have decisively shaped the US-Africa relationship over the years include the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). These initiatives are crucial for understanding and strengthening US-Africa relations. The Challenges with US-Africa Relations   1.              US-Africa Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Africa   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was enacted in 2000 to increase trade and investment between the US and eligible sub-Saharan African countries by reducing tariffs on exports, thereby boosting African exports to the US (Zenebe et al, 2014). However, due to structural inequities, the Act has had limited success in diversifying trade. Many nations benefiting from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) continue to rely mainly on exporting raw materials, resulting in an overall trade volume that remains relatively low compared to other US trading partners. In 2016, testifying before the United States International Trade Commission on deepening the US-Africa trade and investment relationship, Joshua Meltzer opined that “the United States trade relationship with sub-Saharan Africa remains underdeveloped” and has been declining since 2011 (Meltzer, 2016).  Currently, only approximately 1.5% of US exports are to sub-Saharan Africa. It is worth noting that the US and China remain the primary trading partners of numerous African countries.   Depending on the administration, trade between the US and Africa has fluctuated continuously. US-Africa trade was US$100 billion in 2008 but dropped to US$41 billion in 2018. By 2024, trade had increased to US$71.6 billion; however, the uncertainty of 2025 will determine US-Africa trade under President Trump's second term. Compared to China, recent statistics indicate that Africa is China's fastest-growing trade partner, outpacing the growth of China's trade with Latin America and other Asian regions. China has established approximately 2,000 enterprises in Africa, involving a total investment of US$6 billion. China also accounts for 20% of Africa's trade (up from 10% in 2008). In 2024, trade between China and Africa was US$295.5 billion. With this tremendous trade flow, China has taken an increasingly larger chunk of Africa’s external trade, except in the petroleum sector, where the traditional former colonial powers and the United States still maintain strong monopolies. However, it is essential to note that any economic fluctuations or increases in tariffs in these countries will be felt throughout the global supply chain, with Africa being the most affected.   Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa came from a diverse array of source countries. Top investors include China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United States, and India, among others. China, India, and the UAE collectively account for at least 34% of FDI and play a crucial role in driving job creation, capital investment, and project count in many African countries (Sita et al, 2024). Regarding the US, it contributes approximately 13% of Africa’s total investment (Trends, 2024).   In 2017, US foreign direct investment in Africa totalled approximately US$50.4 billion. It decreased to US$43.2 billion in 2019 and scaled up again in 2023 to US$56.29 billion (Tierney, 2025). On the contrary, Chinese FDI in Africa as of 2004 was US$135 million. In 2006, it rose to US$37 billion. In 2012, inflows reached an estimated US$46 billion. Thus, between 2014 and 2018, China invested funds of more than US$72 billion in Africa, creating over 137,000 jobs, making it the largest foreign direct investment contributor to Africa in terms of total capital invested (Afrix, 2025). In 2023 alone, China's FDI capital stock in Africa reached approximately US$42.1 billion. From the data presented, it is clear to see the vast disparity in trade between the two most powerful global economies and Africa. It further demonstrates that there is a problem in US-Africa relations. Figure 1 Source:  China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI), 2025.   The year 2025 marks the expiration of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), presenting an opportunity for both Africa and the United States to reassess and potentially renegotiate the terms of their trade relationship with a more technical and pragmatic focus. Although AGOA primarily emphasises economic engagement through trade preferences, the outcomes have varied. Furthermore, the United States' policy toward Africa encompasses a broader spectrum that extends beyond mere commercial interactions to include security considerations as well.   2.              The Complexities of US Foreign Aid to Africa   US aid is administered by the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), typically allocated from global accounts or programme, such as humanitarian aid, or provided through contributions to multilateral organisations like the United Nations. It is observed that Africa receives approximately US$8 billion annually in aid from the United States, making it the largest recipient of US assistance. In 2022, the top ten recipients of non-emergency aid managed by the State Department and USAID were Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa. However, 70% of annual non-humanitarian aid to Africa is directed towards health programmes, with HIV/AIDS assistance taking the most significant portion of US support for the continent. Other funding initiatives aim to boost agricultural productivity and economic development, enhance security, and promote democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG), as well as improve access to quality education and social services (Congressional Research Service, 2023). Nevertheless, the pressing question remains: How effective has US aid truly been for Africa? Have the promises made been fully realised? Aside from the State Department and USAID, the US government has established other agencies, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), for distributing aid to Africa.    The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an independent US foreign aid agency, aims to promote economic development and good governance in developing countries. Established in 2004, it links aid to governance and policy performance to encourage policy improvements. MCC grants are "compacts" to countries that meet specific criteria, providing substantial funding for infrastructure projects and policy reforms. This promotes economic development in Africa, creating a conducive environment for private sector investment and sustainable growth (US Agency of International Development, N.d.). The effectiveness of the MCC is a subject of ongoing debate and evaluation as well. The MCC's eligibility criteria emphasise neoliberal reforms, utilising scorecards with indicators that promote policies such as economic freedom, good governance, investing in people, and combating corruption (Millennium Change Corporation, 2021). However, many African countries are excluded due to the high eligibility standard. Critics have also noted that MCC projects prioritise US corporate contractors over local firms. Additionally, the competitive bidding process favours large US companies, limiting local businesses' capacity for development and potentially leading to projects that are not fully aligned with local needs. Sometimes, these aids undermine a country’s sovereignty, as seen in the case of Tanzania, where MCC was suspended because the country decided to proceed with an election rerun in Zanzibar that MCC disagreed with (Cooke & Hubner, 2016). Nevertheless, MCC can be described as fairly effective. The degree of effectiveness varies according to the experience of different African countries. The initiative represents a shift towards performance-based aid, but its long-term impact on Africa's development remains to be fully assessed.   Since 2001, the United States has significantly increased its development aid to Africa, with a notable rise in financial commitments and strategic initiatives. The US foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, managed by the State Department and USAID, saw a 340% increase, amounting to an additional US$5.5 billion, alongside US$3.8 billion through Millennium Challenge Account compacts. However, while these figures suggest a robust commitment, they often mask a disconnect between stated objectives and actual impact, contributing to the broader rhetoric-reality gap that undermines US strategic engagement in Africa. Programmes like the Prosperous Africa Initiative have targeted economic sectors such as agribusiness, with efforts to improve technological capabilities in agriculture, as seen in Kenya and Nigeria (Mysheta et al, 2022). However, the effectiveness of this agricultural aid remains contested, with limited evidence of achieving the structural economic transformation necessary for sustainable development.   This inconsistency highlights the challenges the US faces in translating its financial commitments into meaningful strategic influence on the continent (Ssozi et al, 2017). Despite the increase in aid, persistent issues such as poor governance, corruption, and dependency on assistance pose significant obstacles to its effectiveness (Momah, 2018). Often, this aid ends up supporting authoritarian regimes, which complicates efforts to promote the very democracy and human rights (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004) that it was intended to safeguard. Furthermore, the extensive flow of aid into Africa does not necessarily lead to tangible outcomes, as evidenced by the varied experiences of different countries (O’Connell & Soludo, 2001). Dr Akinwumi Adesina, President of the African Development Bank, emphasised that “Africa is not going to be developed by aid; it will be developed through investment”. Therefore, it is essential to create opportunities for the private sector to play a role in addressing some of the continent’s most pressing challenges and contribute to Africa’s key development priorities (Schneidman & Signé, 2018).   Thus, a closer examination of US-Africa aid relations reveals a crisis of intention that is primarily influenced by political interests, prioritisation, and strategic objectives. US foreign aid to Africa faces numerous challenges that necessitate careful consideration. In that stead, a nuanced understanding of local contexts is a sine qua non for an effective aid strategy. By prioritising an informed, responsive, and comprehensive approach that emphasises the empowerment and governance challenges faced by African nations, the US can more effectively address the unique issues these nations encounter, while enhancing the overall impact of foreign aid programmes in achieving long-term development goals.   3.              The US Security Cooperation with Africa without Security   In the realm of security, the United States has faced criticism for its reliance on a military-centric strategy, which can destabilise fragile democracies and potentially provoke proxy wars (Kagwanja, 2006). In response, the US has increasingly emphasised the importance of African-led solutions to security challenges, focusing on partnerships with African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This approach aims to enhance regional security and stability through coordinated efforts, thereby reducing the necessity for direct US intervention (Chido, 2013). Counterterrorism initiatives in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa, have become a central component of the US security strategy. While these efforts have advanced peace processes, they have also intensified insecurity due to their military-centric nature. The integration of counterterrorism into Africa's security agenda has been impeded by inadequate funding and poor coordination with international initiatives (Kagwanja, 2006). Furthermore, the state-centric orientation of these initiatives often undermines human security and has inadvertently enabled predation (Solomon, 2013).   The establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 represents another critical aspect of US-Africa relations that complements and sometimes complicates economic partnerships. AFRICOM is a US military command responsible for military relations with African nations, to promote regional security, stability, and cooperation. Its significance lies in its reflection of Africa's growing strategic importance to the United States, particularly in the areas of counterterrorism, maritime security, and resource protection (Khlopov, 2021). AFRICOM's presence signifies a shift towards a more proactive US military engagement on the continent, underscoring US global power calculations and its desire to maintain influence amidst increasing competition from other global actors, while also generating debate about its impact on African sovereignty and the nature of US-Africa partnerships.   The establishment of AFRICOM has sparked considerable debate over its actual impact, challenging the validity of its claims regarding security enhancement and development support. Critics argue that its militaristic tactics frequently thwart meaningful progress, revealing a stark contrast between its rhetoric and the reality on the ground (Nyiayaana, 2022). Waddington (2013) believes that AFRICOM's benefit to Africa is not mere rhetoric. He states that AFRICOM has conducted joint training exercises that enhance military capabilities, focus on regional security, counter organised crime and maritime piracy, and address militant Islamist extremism, thereby significantly influencing the continent's security architecture (Waddington, 2013). Fah (2010) takes a contrary view, noting that AFRICOM's purported benefits to Africa, such as enhancing peace and security, are seen mainly as rhetoric because local peace-building efforts are undermined (Fah, 2010). Keenan (2008) shared Fah's view, opining that its militarisation has led to increased insecurity, repression, and destabilisation, contradicting the purported humanitarian security-development discourse (Keenan, 2008). Others have argued that it reflects a self-serving US policy focused on terrorism and energy security. Genuine support for African solutions is crucial to overcoming scepticism and aligning US actions with African interests (N’Diaye & Africa, 2009).   The US approach to humanitarian interventions also reveals a gap between rhetoric and action. Following the Cold War, there was a shift from realist principles to more pluralist notions in foreign policy rhetoric, with an emphasis on morality in humanitarian interventions. However, this shift has been inconsistent and case-specific, lacking a comprehensive framework for foreign policy (Prins, 2016). This inconsistency suggests that while rhetoric may emphasise humanitarian concerns, actual interventions are often driven by strategic interests. Presidential rhetoric also plays a crucial role in legislative actions. For example, President Obama's rhetoric in his State of the Union addresses was consistent in credit claiming and symbolic use. Yet, his legislative requests often required congressional cooperation, leading to partial success in policy implementation (Hoffman & Howard, 2012). This suggests that while rhetoric can influence agendas and highlight priorities, actual policy outcomes ultimately depend on legislative processes and cooperation. In the economic domain, presidential rhetoric serves as a tool for economic leadership, influencing public perception and economic behaviour. However, the effectiveness of this rhetoric is constrained by the need for cooperation from other political institutions and the fragmented nature of the American political system (Wood, 2004). This highlights a potential gap between the optimistic economic rhetoric and the practical challenges of policy implementation.   US-Africa Rapprochement: A Desideratum   The relationship between the United States and Africa has been a topic of significant debate lately. These discussions focus on perspectives regarding US relations with Africa. Historically, the United States’ policy towards Africa has vacillated between periods of engagement, indifference, and neglect, often influenced by broader geopolitical considerations. The US-Africa relationship dates back to the Atlantic slave trade and intensified during the Cold War. During the Cold War, the US was primarily concerned with containing communism, which significantly influenced its interactions with African nations. The focus shifted in the post-Cold War era, but the engagement remained sporadic, raising questions about the depth of the US commitment to Africa (Cumbo, 2013). Despite high expectations, particularly during the Obama administration, US-Africa relations have often been characterised by continuity rather than transformative change. For instance, the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit was seen as a pivotal moment, yet it essentially resulted in firmer rhetoric rather than substantial policy shifts. The approach has been described as "smart continuity", focusing on logistics, intelligence, and development rather than revolutionary policy change (Touo, 2021).   The US must acknowledge that as the world undergoes a significant transformation marked by profound geopolitical uncertainty, African nations are actively forging new alliances and redefining their relationships. They are moving decisively beyond traditional aid models to embrace partnerships that do not undermine them but prioritise locally driven development that asserts their strategic autonomy. This shift is characterised by a concerted effort to establish African-defined frameworks. We must acknowledge here that a certain level of estrangement has developed between the US and many countries in Africa, except for those with whom the US has strategic partnerships. There is growing speculation that, by the conclusion of President Trump’s second term, numerous countries in Africa and around the world may experience a strained relationship with the United States if diplomatic efforts are not managed effectively. While not directly tied to US-Africa relations, recent analyses, such as a piece in the Wall Street Journal , suggest that “Trump is Trashing America’s Reputation”. Additionally, a commentary from The Economist  has stated that “Trump’s erratic policy is harming the reputation of American assets”. Steve Dunne, writing for The Conversation , noted that “Throughout the first 100 days of his second term, Trump … has devastated—perhaps irreparably—economic confidence in the US” (Poast, 2025).   Irrespective, Africa never ceases to matter in US foreign policy. US-Africa relations still hold great potential, regardless of the impending challenges. For instance, Mr Biden lucidly captured this when he noted that “African voices, African leadership, African innovation all are critical to addressing the most pressing global challenges ... Africa belongs at the table in every room where global challenges are being discussed and, in every institution, where discussions are taking place” and that “the United States is all in on Africa's future". To demonstrate the importance of Africa to the US, the Biden administration organised a US-Africa summit in December 2022, eight years after the first Summit, which took place in 2014.   The summit, which had delegations from 49 African countries and the African Union, alongside members of civil society and the private sector, came at a time when US-Africa relations had deteriorated to an all-time low, during the first term administration of President Donald Trump, who had a condescending attitude towards African countries and their leaders. While the summit is seen from some quarters as a US guarantee to mend its relationship with Africa, for some others, the summit is also seen as an alleged US obsession to contain China and other emerging powers in the continent, predisposing the essence of the summit within the ambit of extant rivalry and competition between the US and China for Africa. Lest we forget, Africa’s recent explosive demographic growth, accelerating urbanisation, natural and human resources endowment, and economic potentials make the African continent a region of interest to many countries – the more reason, one sees the active participation of powers like China, Russia, and other advanced and emerging economies in a robust engagement with the continent, economically and politically, which on the contrary has come to overshadow US influence and its longstanding relationship with Africa.   Notwithstanding, under the President Biden administration, numerous efforts have been made to seek a rapprochement between the US and Africa, especially after Donald Trump's first term, which was established as one of the worst eras in US-Africa relations. For instance, Biden's 2022 US-Africa summit led to several commitments and planned initiatives aimed at further enhancing the US partnership with Africa in addressing challenges such as conservation, climate change, clean energy transition, supply chain security, investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation. At the summit, Biden pledged to invest at least US$55 billion in Africa in areas such as trade, investment, and energy. There was also a proposed support for the African Union's admission as a permanent member of the G20 (Group of 20). The African Union was eventually admitted as a member in 2023 at the G20 meeting held in New Delhi, India. There was also another promise by the US to invest US$500 million in a key West African port in Benin, aimed at reducing transportation costs. Other commitments include US$350 million, which would be spent on boosting the digital economy. The administration launched the next phase of the Young African Leadership Initiative (YALI) with over US$100 million to build the capacity of young African leaders for the continent’s development. The administration further spearheaded the next phase of AGOA through the Washington AGOA Forum, led by the United States Trade Representative, Katherine Tai (Alorh, 2024).   A memorandum of understanding has been established with the African Continental Free Trade Area, which seeks to "unlock new opportunities for trade and investment" between the United States and Africa, valued at US$3.4 trillion. This agreement aims to promote equitable, sustainable, and inclusive trade. Additionally, during President Biden’s visit to Angola in December 2024, he announced the provision of over US$1 billion in humanitarian assistance to address food insecurity and other urgent needs faced by refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and affected communities across 31 African countries. This commitment builds on the pledge made during the 2022 US-Africa Summit to support African partners in addressing food insecurity. It is worth noting that the visit to Angola marked the first visit of a US president to Sub-Saharan Africa since 2015 (FPC Briefing, 2024). President Biden's approach generally aimed to enhance existing US-Africa relations and ongoing programmes. This includes initiatives such as Prosper Africa, launched in 2018, which seeks to increase two-way trade between African nations and the United States. Additionally, the Clinton-era Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) provides African apparel manufacturers with preferential access to the US market, while the Power Africa initiative, started by President Obama, focuses on connecting millions of Africans to the electricity grid, among other efforts.   The whole effort surreptitiously shows how desperate the US was to restore its relationship with the continent. The central question remains: to what end? Was President Biden's initiative to mend US-Africa relations truly sincere? In other words, did these efforts effectively repair the relationship, or were they merely a strategy for the US to reposition itself in the emerging competition for Africa, particularly in light of Europe’s declining influence and the intensifying rivalry among global powers for Africa's strategic resources, both natural and human?   Despite President Biden's commitment to high-level engagement and the strengthening of commercial ties with Africa, significant challenges persist that hinder the establishment of stronger US-Africa relations, which would guarantee mutual benefits. At the same time, US officials have consistently emphasised the importance of Africa and reaffirmed their commitment to supporting democratic institutions on the continent, advancing lasting peace and security, promoting economic growth, trade, and investment, and supporting sustainable development. On the contrary, operational policy undermines and undervalues the continents in the international system; this was no different from the Biden administration. It further undermines the notion that the powerful and industrialised US, with its success, should serve as a source of inspiration and imitation for other African countries.   This situation leads us to consider the prospects for the current administration, often referred to as Trump 2.0, in terms of its approach to US-Africa relations. If the Biden administration has not fulfilled its commitment to resetting US-Africa relations based on an equal partnership, it definitely will not take place under President Donald Trump's second term in office. The reasons are not far-fetched. The US-Africa policy does not change. It remains the same irrespective of the administration in place. Some of the reasons advanced for this are that the US takes unilateral decisions on Africa without consulting Africans. In his first term, the Donald Trump administration launched an Africa policy that seeks both primacy and partnership on the continent. The US consistently undermines African agencies by pressuring African countries constantly to take a position, even if it is anathema to their survival. This disposition is unlikely to change in his second-term administration. The probabilities remain that the US-Africa relationship in the next four years under Trump will be one of superordinate versus subordinate, and this disposition is expected to have significant and enduring implications for both parties involved (Schneidman & Signé, 2018).   And finally, the imminent superpower rivalry is trivialising and undermining Africa. A point which the Biden administration’s US-Africa strategy noted, where he claimed that China views Africa as “an important arena to challenge the rules-based international order, advance its own narrow commercial and geopolitical interests, undermine transparency and openness, and weaken US relations with African peoples and governments” (Global Times, 2022). Recently, Africa has become a hotspot of superpower rivalry and competition. The question is, competition over what? Is it to have access to strategic resources or to control governments in this sphere? Even if it is to control governments, to what end? Indeed, this rivalry is undermining Africa’s development, and it is indisputable to state that the US and other superpowers view Africa as a resource to be divided among themselves.   Conclusion   To successfully navigate the complexities of a multipolar world, the United States should focus on strengthening economic partnerships and ensuring consistent diplomatic engagement. The United States needs to embrace multilateralism and a new global governance that is both effective and efficient. In particular, its foreign policy towards Africa needs to evolve from traditional aid models toward emphasising tangibility like trade, foreign direct investment, infrastructure development, and technology transfer. By concentrating on enhancing local value chains and supporting African nations in developing their manufacturing capabilities, the US can foster sustainable growth. Africa's significance extends beyond its rich natural resources; its potential for innovation and influence on global norms and institutions underscores its strategic importance in the world today.   For instance, during his first term, Donald Trump's foreign policy rhetoric often diverged from the actual strategies implemented, especially regarding counterterrorism efforts. His rhetoric primarily aimed to evoke a sense of crisis to galvanise domestic support rather than accurately reflecting or legitimising his administration’s strategies (Hall, 2020). Therefore, in his second term, we expect Mr Donald Trump to bear the considerable responsibility of actively and proactively re-strategising US foreign policy engagements with Africa. In particular, there is a need for the US to recalibrate its approach, shifting away from its superordinate and subordinate dispositions when dealing with Africa. What Africa needs right now is a mutually beneficial relationship based on mutual respect and shared interests, one that respects African sovereignty. By adopting this new paradigm of partnership, the US can cultivate a more sustainable and mutually beneficial relationship with Africa in an increasingly multipolar world.   References   Adebajo, A. 2018. Africa and the United States: A History of Malign Neglect, In: Nagar, D. and Mutasa, C. 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The Impact of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): An Empirical Analysis of Sub-Saharan African Agricultural Exports , 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, Minneapolis, Minnesota 170590, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2025 Image credit: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID:1695883136   by Dr Francis A.S.T. Matambalya   Abstract   The article offers a glimpse of Africa-US relations, with particular reference to Tanzania. It highlights the dynamics of Tanzania’s integration into the international system, evolution and scope of Tanzania-US relations, positive and negative experiences of cooperation between the two countries, and challenges hindering the development of relations to full potential. The findings show that Africa-US relations predate Africa’s formal colonisation by European imperialist powers. Historically, the US has been, inter alia, a key party in transatlantic trade, including the infamous slave trade. Also, Americans came to Africa as colonisers, explorers and missionaries. Hence, the US is perceived as both a benevolent and malevolent power. During the colonial period, the US – itself an offshoot of the European imperialist system – was an ardent perpetrator of imperialism, and a coloniser. In the post-colonial era, Africa-US relations evolved further espousing cultural, economic, political, and social dimensions. Benefits for Africa include some benevolent action through development assistance, and cooperation in peace and security matters. Contrarily, many examples manifest the US’s malevolent hegemony, including sidelining decisions by African institutions, being party to conflicts on the continent, divergent interests in international fora, resource-greediness, etc. The analysis of the aforementioned issues provides inputs for the design of strategic interventions for strengthening and making Africa-US relations mutually beneficial and respectful. This paper recommends that the architecture of Tanzania-US relations should embrace a mapping of gaps in the framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development in Africa. Consequently, support should focus on building the framework conditions for development, in the areas of governance, diverse non-financial resource capacities, and financial resource capacities. These measures are seen not only as preconditions for meaningful Africa-US relations, but also for achieving strategic autonomy of African countries. This paper is derived from research of the Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre on studies of the dynamics of the international system titled Africa’s Past and Present International Positioning.   Keywords:  colonialism, framework conditions for development, governance institutional frameworks, imperialism, strategic autonomy. Introduction   Arguably several factors shape a state’s foreign policy, and accordingly, foreign relations. Pertinent domestic factors include the country’s culture, history, economic situation, political situation, public opinion, interests and clout of specific power groups, etc. External factors manifest the geo-economics and geo-politics of the day. A blend of these factors determines a country’s hard and soft power, and its ability and method to leverage them in dealing with other actors (state and non-state) in the global system (Dayasanka, 2023; Petrič, 2013).   In this connection, a proficient assessment of Tanzania-US relations requires revisiting several annals on pertinent issues. Besides epochal philosophies, other key records relate to Tanzania’s integration in the global system, within the broad context of Africa’s imperial conquest. Empirical literature offers insights into these issues.   From this backdrop, this paper portrays Africa-US relations, with particular reference to Tanzania. To understand these relations, not only does this paper dwell on the contemporary situation, but it also delves into the past, in order to connect it to the present, and to instructively project the future. Within the constraints of the paucity of research, this paper highlights the subject, leitmotif, and concrete manifestations and outcomes of the relations.   The multidimensional assessment situates the Africa-US relations within its historical context, tracing its dawn to trans-Atlantic slave trade, which preceded the official founding of the US and most African polities. [1]   A major risk of modern scholarly writing is to find oneself echoing the ideas of other people and making no or little contribution through one’s own original perceptions and understanding of the subject matter. To avoid this trap, the author first wrote this paper out of personal normative understanding of the world through exposure to various cultures and intercultural relations. These original perceptions and understandings were then blended with data and information gathered through desk and field research of pertinent issues. The paper systematically fuses lessons from literature and field research.   Background   Tenets of globalisation that created colonial African polities   Today’s African polities are by and large the creation of European powers, as per the Berlin Conference. The process destroyed several existing African nation-states, subsuming them in newly created polities.   Imperialism [2] is the philosophical foundation, guiding societal interactions between the victor and the vanquished. Thus, it is the doctrinaire basis of the making of African colonial polities and governing them. The victor controls the vanquished through various channels: administrative, cultural, diplomatic, economic, military, political, and legal and regulatory. The victor unilaterally engineers and manages the interactions of these spheres to serve its imperial interests.   Moreover, imperialism created and leveraged at least three major instruments to achieve and sustain total control and ‘ripping-off’ of the vanquished. Within this context racial hierarchy  served as an instrument for rationalising discrimination, denial of human rights and dignity to Africans. It was missing word(s) deliberate attack on humanness, identity, self-esteem, physical wellbeing, and mental wellbeing of the vanquished, who were designated as creatures of inferior status. Various means were used to enforce the racial hierarchy code. Already during the 7th century, the Arab conquers of North Africa received higher pay than their Berber colleagues who served in the Arab army (Warmington & Brett, 2024). The British created a special rank for Africans, the effendi , to save the ‘superior’ European soldiers from the ‘embarrassment’ of saluting ‘inferior’ Africans.   Collective exploitation of Africa and the Africans by imperial conquerors acted as an instrument for underlining racial superiority and ensuring broader support in conqueror societies. This justified the exploitation of the vanquished (inferior creatures) by all individual and institutional members of the conqueror race (superior creatures). Colonial powers as ‘hegemons’ in their colonies curtailed the say of the vanquished in societal affairs. The vanquished became irrelevant in the domestic and global arenas. The victors architectured the polities; exercised sovereignty over both domestic and foreign affairs; disrupted traditional political systems; designed and conditioned the elite system to serve colonisers’ interests; dictated victor-vanquished societies built on alien hegemony, power imbalance, multidimensional oppression, and exploitation; institutionalised inequality and parallel societies; formed cosmopolitan societies; and created African diaspora societies.    Primordial globalisation and the making of Tanzania   Commensurate with the general process of the making of present-day African polities, the territory that today bears the name Tanzania has a long history of interactions with external actors and integration into the international system. Starting long before the territory existed in its current configuration, the interactions occurred within and across cultural, economic, political, and social dimensions. A blend of domestic and external forces drove the interactions.   In this context, the subject territory has gone through a roller-coaster of experiences. Intense foreign exploration of present-day Tanzania began in the 7th century, spearheaded by Arabs and Persians, followed by the Portuguese in the 15th century. Up to the 15th century, the interactions were amongst sovereign entities. Key markers include peaceful interactions with ancient Chinese explorers and traders; and largely peaceful relations with Arabia and Europe, though they were based on mercantilist trade, including forceful establishment of trading posts.   The late 15th century presents a turning point. It was the beginning of an extended period of subjugation by slave traders from Arabia, and conquerors from Arabia and Europe. From then onwards subjugation besides mercantilism, conquest, slave trade, landgrab, and colonialism perpetrated by Arabs (through limited territorial conquest and landgrab, colonialism, mercantilism, slave trade) and Europeans (through full territorial conquest and landgrab, colonialism, mercantilism, and limited slave trade) defined the interactions.   Zanzibar was taken by the Portuguese in 1503, who ruled until 1756. Elsewhere, by 1525 the Portuguese had subdued the entire coast of East Africa, including the present-day Tanzania mainland. The Sultanate of Oman seized Zanzibar from Portugal in 1756, and the Arabs ruled the island until 12 April 1964, when they were toppled through a popular revolution by the indigenous African population.   Moreover, in the implementation of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) resolutions on the control of African resources, the British established control over Zanzibar to protect the Arab colonisers (and knighted the Island’s five imperial rulers). Simultaneously, the German Empire eventually established control over what is now mainland Tanzania – which it named Deutsch Ost-Africa (DOA), i.e., German East Africa. Notably, the formalisation of colonial rule in Tanganyika came some 88 years after Zanzibar had been completely subdued by the Arabs. After the defeat of the German empire in World War I, and as per the Versailles Agreement (1919), DOA became a Trust Territory of the League of Nations, administered by the British. The territory’s name was changed to Tanganyika. Tanganyika became Trust Territory of the United Nations Organization (UNO) after World War II, while the United Kingdom (UK) retained the governance mandate of the same.   Outcomes of Tanzania’s primordial integration in the global system   Some of the enduring outcomes of centuries of interactions between domestic and external forces are the development of Kiswahili, superimposition of alien culture, formation of cosmopolitan societies, formation of polities, and racialised relations.   The key factors that favoured the development of Kiswahili include: colonial governance institutions (administration, army, and police); colonial economic set-up (plantations, mines, labour, and settlements); communication between indigenous people and foreigners (e.g., European-African communication); mass communication (education, literacy campaigns, and mass media); and spread of religions (especially major foreign religions) [3] (Batibo, 1989). The impact of a common lingua franca lies in the fact that not only does it streamline communication, but it also reinforces shared societal (national) values and creates a more cohesive and efficient governance of diverse societal matters.   In contrast to Kiswahili, the superimposition of alien culture over more than 100 local African cultures was distinctly detrimental, and is the strategy used to inflict the most damage to African societies. Cultural hegemony sought to erase the African identity, because culture is a society’s software. African traditional systems and values, and their institutions, were designated as ‘inferior’ and ‘outdated’ and systematically destroyed. Thus, Tanzania, became part of culturally mutilated Africa, compartmentalised religiously (between Christianity and Islam) and linguistically (Anglophone, Arab, Francophone, and Lusophone).   Obviously, current borders of Tanzania as a polity are also attributed to the Arab, British, and German colonisers, and did not consider cultural, economic, political, and social relations amongst the local people.   In Tanzania too, colonialism established a code of relations, built on parallel societies of the victor and the vanquished, and characterised by power imbalance between the two. At the centre of this social construct was multidimensional suppression (in all societal spheres). Organisationally, DOA became an integral part of the imperial master country, Germany.   Colonialism inevitably induced the formation of cosmopolitan society in Tanzania – culturally, ethnically, and racially. Over centuries, the territory absorbed people from other African territories, Asia, and Europe. A notable feature of this is the divide between indigenous and non-indigenous factions of society, defined along such lines as economic wellbeing, political participation, etc. In some cases, contradictory interests (cultural and political) manifested the divide (Lindermann, 2023).   Demise of colonialism and formation of the United Republic of Tanzania   The territory’s indigenous people had to endure prolonged periods of struggle for the liberation of Africa and Africans, for Tanzania to become what it is today.   On 9 December 1961, the UK handed independence to the Tanganyika African Union (TANU), which had won the elections.   In Zanzibar, the UK decided to bypass the Afro Shiraz Party (ASP), which had won the election. In 1963, it handed over ‘independence’ to the colonial Sultan, who had dominated the isles for more than 200 years. Six weeks after the Zanzibar revolution, Tanganyika (governed by TANU) and Zanzibar (governed by ASP) united to form the United Republic of Tanzania (URT), in an arrangement that reserved substantial autonomy for Zanzibar.   On 5 February 1977, TANU and ASP united to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Also, in 1992, a multiparty system was re-introduced in the country, and CCM has continued to dominate the URT’s politics to date.   Tanzania international engagement as a post-colonial state   The international relations that Tanzania could forge are closely linked to what it became as a post-colonial state (in the cold war era). In this regard, three fundamental positions show how the country sought to position itself globally: it assumed the role of a centre for African liberation, pursued de facto strategic sovereignty in foreign policy, and became a key player in pan-African activism.   As a centre for African liberation, it became a leading voice for, and host of African liberation struggles, serving as the headquarters of the OAU’s liberation committee, supporting exiled movements and refugees from across the continent (including severing diplomatic relations with the UK from 1965-1968 over UDI).   In pursuance of de facto strategic sovereignty in foreign policy, Tanzanian foreign policy was distinctly ‘value-based’ and non-partisan, as opposed to being ideologically veiled. Through the policy of Ujamaa and self-reliance, Tanzania was in many ways doing things in a totally different way from the rest of the world (CSS, 2024). Achievements included persuading Commonwealth members to reject the readmission of apartheid South Africa, partnering with China (including building the TAZARA from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia in 1970-1975 and campaigning successfully for China’s 1971 re-admission to the UN), and becoming the first country south of the Sahara where East Germany had a diplomatic mission.   As a key player in pan-African activism, which reached fever pitch in the 1960s and 1970s, Tanzania was a prominent hub for Pan-Africanism. The country attracted Pan-Africanist supporters of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Diaspora Africans from the US and the Caribbean, including activists and scholars, made pilgrimages to Tanzania, to learn about and support the nation, and some even to stay. Obviously, some of the positions that Tanzania took contradicted the choices of the US, especially in relation to working with China and the Eastern Bloc or opposing colonialism and white supremacy. Except for Kennedy, no other US President encouraged African liberation (CSIS, 2024). Also, the US only outlawed racial discrimination in 1964, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of the same year: meaning that prior to that, white supremacy policies were still official.   Overview of Tanzania-US relations   Basic knowledge on several issues is helpful in grasping the dynamics and patterns of Tanzania-US relations, so as to form a plausible opinion about them. This paper explicates the framework of the relations (i.e., conceptual and theoretical grounding, determinant factors, philosophical foundations), their genesis and epochs, their avenues/tiers of relations, and their outcomes.   Conceptual and theoretical grounding   Some knowledge of the concepts and theories of foreign policy and foreign relations is helpful in understanding the dynamics and patterns of Tanzania-US relations. These are briefly introduced hereunder.   As concepts, foreign policy and foreign relations are portmanteau terms, with no single commonly agreed definitions. Many scholars have attempted to define these two concepts. In this paper, foreign policy is understood to mean a deliberate system of guidelines that guide the dealings between a given state with other states. A state’s foreign relations are shaped by its foreign policy. Foreign relations refer to multidimensional inter-country interactions in cultural, diplomatic, economic, political, and social spheres. Implicitly, a country’s foreign policy guides its foreign relations. Several theories offer a framework for understanding the patterns and dynamics of interactions between and amongst societies – in the context of states – in the global system.   The theory of realism emphasises the centrality of ‘power politics’ and ‘national interests’ in the architecture of international relations (Morgenthau, 1949; Waltz, 1979). The theory of liberalism emphasises international cooperation and interdependence, and mutual benefits (Voltaire, Locke, Smith, and German thinker Immanuel Kant). The theory of constructivism argues that states’ identities, and (shared) norms and ideas, shape their foreign policy decisions (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; Finnemore, 1996, 2003). Factors shaping foreign policy and relations   Several factors determine a state’s foreign policy (and by extension, foreign relations). Broadly expressed, foreign policy and foreign relations are determined by the intermingling of domestic factors and external factors.   Domestic factors include those within a state’s cultural, economic, political, and social spheres. In this paper, they reflect relations within the society and how these impact the development concerns, interests, opportunities, voice in public opinion, and concrete shaping of and benefits from development actions.   External factors emanate from the global system and reflect the power and actions of actors in that system. Accordingly, a country’s position in the global system is determined by affinity or distance (cultural, diplomatic, economic, historical, natural, political, and social) between itself and other actors (both state and non-state) in the global system. They too impact on a country via interactions at various levels: bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral.   The interplays between external and internal factors determine the blend and brand of states’ ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’, and the prospects to leverage them in dealing with other actors in the global system (Dayasanka, 2023; Petrič, 2013).   Genesis and epochs of the relations   The territories that now constitute the US and the African Continent have had interactions, even before their extant configurations. These relations have evolved from the period when Africa was not yet colonised, to the colonial and post-colonial era in Africa.   From very early times, US looked to Africa for cheap resource inputs in its economy. From the 1500s to 1865, slave trade and slavery were compelling facts of the US economy, and many individual Americans and institutions enjoyed its ‘fruits’. Key corporate profiteers include banks (e.g., predecessors of Citibank, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, etc.); shipping companies; slave trading firms, and several corporate conglomerates, e.g., the Lehman Brothers.   Relations did not favour Africa under colonialism either. Not only was the US part of the Global North, but it was also a key player and determinant of the geo-economical and geopolitical dynamics and patterns. After World War II, it became a key superpower and leader of the Western World, which thrived on imperialism.   During the post-colonial era, Tanzania – a relatively early achiever of independence (in 1961) – became the hub for African liberation. The primary focus of its international engagement became African liberation. This stance put the country in a strategic confrontation with the supporters of the global colonial system.   Avenues of interactions   Tanzania and the US interact bilaterally and in multilateral fora. They established diplomatic ties in 1961 and have since nominally maintained cordial bilateral relations. Moreover, both belong to several multilateral organisations, e.g., the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), United Nations System, and World Trade Organization (WTO). Also, they interact through the US’s cooperation with the African Union (AU); and African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), specifically, East African Community (EAC), and Southern African Development Community (SADC).   Additionally, Tanzanian interests are impacted by unilateral decisions of self-proclaimed and non-inclusive institutions of global governance, e.g., the G-7, G-20, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in which the US is a key player. Ideally, any African perspective of the agenda of these institutions must address the colonial and neo-colonial history and the imbalances they institutionalised against Africa. In reality, this can only be a pipe dream, because the foundational purpose of these institutions is not necessarily aligned with African concerns and interests.   Since 1961, the US and Tanzania have been, at least nominally, sovereign development partners. The partnership has been relatively broad-based, espousing all societal dimensions, i.e., cultural, economic, political, and social.   The US’s support has focused particularly on: economic growth and development, education services, trade development, environmental protection, energy services, healthcare, and democratic governance.   Outcomes of the interactions   The US has had a cross-dimensional impact on Tanzania. In the cultural sphere, today, 63% of the total population practices Christianity, making it the largest religion in Tanzania (CIA Fact Book, in 2023). The diffusion of Christianity in Tanzania is attributed to, amongst other people, American Christian missionaries, who have been involved in spreading Christianity in the country since the 19th century. The American missionaries worked alongside European missionaries and indigenous teachers to establish churches and schools, and to translate the Bible into Kiswahili.   The two countries have maintained bilateral diplomatic relations continuously since 1961. This is significant considering that the country’s diplomatic ties with its former colonisers broke up from February 1965 with West Germany over the East Germany issue, and from 1965-1968 with the UK over the UDI issue. Moreover, both countries belong to a number of international organisations, including the United Nations System, Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), and World Trade Organization. In contrast to relative achievements in bilateral diplomacy, there is little evidence that the two countries have been strategic partners in international fora.   In the economic sphere, the two countries maintain some ties. To highlight, 6.3% of the US’s total exports of US$ 15,843,060,000 to Africa in 2018 went to Tanzania. In the same year, 0.3% of the US’s total imports of US$ 25,078,450,000 from Africa in 2018 came from Tanzania. Moreover, the US has supported Tanzania to attract private investments. Overall, the share of Africa in US world trade was about 1.06% (USDC, 2018). In 2022, the top ten countries (Cayman Islands, China, Canada, UK, Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, South Africa, and France) accounted for 76.4% of total FDI inflows. The US was not amongst the top ten (NBS, BOT & TIC, 2024: 26). [4]   In the political sphere, the US has provided development assistance to Tanzania for capacity-building to encourage democratic governance.   The two countries have also maintained strategic relations in the areas of peace and security, a later addition to the Tanzania-US partnership. Since 2000, the two countries have been engaged in military cooperation (embracing counterterrorism, protection of territorial integrity, and engagement in peacekeeping operations; Professional Military Education (PME); military intelligence; maritime security; and countering the trafficking of illicit goods and narcotics. Tanzania’s National Defense College (NDC) routinely invites the US’s diplomats, as guest lectures in its Security and Strategic Studies Course, which aims at equipping policymakers with knowledge and skills on the management of peace, security and stability at national, regional and global levels.   Positive experiences   The Basis   To understand the benefits to Tanzania from its relations with the US, it is useful to begin by introducing the basis of those benefits, i.e., the legal and regulatory frameworks (LRFs) permitting them, and the organisational framework to manage the development assistance.   The most relevant of the LRFs is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, a US Public Law 87–195 that was approved on 4 September 1961. It is ‘an Act to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and external security, and for other purposes’.   Governance institution for US assistance   On 3 November 1961, the Kennedy administration established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to implement the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and administer economic foreign assistance programmes USAID’s programmes are broadly defined and embrace: alleviating poverty, improving health, providing economic support (including through supporting economic growth and capacity to participate in world trade). Nominally, the Agency’s work is correctly focused: seeking to build resilience in beneficiary communities so that they can thrive independently (CRS, 2025). US support takes into account the US’s international interests, commercial and otherwise (CRS, 2025).   In 2004 the US established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The Agency pursues poverty reduction through economic growth, focusing on countries with good economic policies and the potential for development. The Agency supports country-led projects and offers grants. Tanzania was one of the 32 African countries out of 63 that were eligible to submit proposals for funding under this arrangement (CRS, 2025).   Assistance programmes   Even before the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Peace Corps was the first development assistance programme, from which Tanzania and other African countries benefitted. Since the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, there have been several other programmes, as outlined hereunder.   Peace Corps   The Kennedy administration established the Peace Corps as a development assistance programme. To this effect, President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10924 on 1 March 1961, ‘challenging young Americans to serve humanity by working for peace and development in countries around the world’.   The Peace Corps’ goals include supporting existing economic assistance programmes, assisting beneficiary countries to meet their needs for skilled workers, and fostering understanding between Americans and people of other nations.   Tanganyika became one of the first countries to benefit from the initiative. The first batch of 50 volunteers departed for Tanganyika on 28 August 1961. Since then, over 3,200 volunteers have served in Tanganyika and Tanzania, working in education, agriculture, health, promoting world peace and friendship. In 2024, there were 50 Peace Corps in the country.   Special and differential treatment   Tanzania is eligible, under World Trade Organization (WTO) rule, for special and differential treatment (SDT) concerning market access (MA) to the US. Two of the most important arrangements are the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).   The GSP is a unilateral preferential trade policy (PTP) that provides duty-free access (DFA) to the US market for the more than 5,000 products from designated developing countries, currently 169.   AGOA is also a PTP, providing DFA to the US market for eligible sub-Saharan African countries, currently 32. It covers over 1,800 products, besides those under GSP. Since its enactment in 2000, it is the core of US economic ties with Africa.   Prosper Africa   ‘Prosper Africa’ was established in 2019 by the Trump Administration as a trade and investment promotion initiative. It brings together 17 US Government agencies to connect US and African businesses (i.e., buyers, investors, suppliers). It eases US companies’ access to US Government investment and export support tools. Support to Africa is indirect, i.e., African companies can find export opportunities to the US and attract investment. This market-driven programme is adversarial to the state-backed approaches of China and Russia.   President Biden reinvigorated ‘Prosper Africa’ with an additional US$80 million for investments in infrastructure, clean energy, and healthcare.   Negative experiences   For centuries, Africa’s interests have been hurt by its status as a battleground for superpower conflicts, looking for resources. From this backdrop, the country’s negative experiences emanating from its interactions with the US – which are hinted at in section two – are basically the same as for the rest of Africa. For analytical illumination, these experiences can be broken into three broad categories: experiences expressing the legacy of imperialist world vision, experiences driven by ideological hysteria, and experiences associated with Africa’s stance.5 [5]   Experiences expressing the legacy of imperialist world vision   Since the US is an off-shoot state of European imperial projects, its relations with Africa have been strongly influenced by the imperialistic global vision. The legitimisation of double standards in LRFs permitted a long list of interrelated evils perpetrated on Africa: plundering, depopulating (through slave trade and conquest wars), landgrabbing, colonisation, frustrating liberation efforts, siphoning resources (without evidence of an enduring exhibit of positive engagement), strategically undermining sovereignty, providing ‘below threshold’ (symbolic) assistance, being party to creating and enhancing negative structural legacies (based on racial hierarchy), being party to engineering erratic nation-building, and perpetuating marginalisation in international fora.   Most of the issues referred to in the previous paragraph are relatively clear.   Nevertheless, here are a few examples to illustrate the facts:   Between 1501 (global population was 450 million) and 1867 (global population was 1.2 billion), 13 million Africans were trafficked as slaves across the Atlantic Ocean. At least two million of them, ca. 10-15%, died during their passage. By comparison, the two nuclear bombs dropped on Japan by the US killed 70,000 to 135,000 people in Hiroshima; and 60,000 to 80,000 people in Nagasaki. At least 13 US presidents owned slaves. Paradoxically, men who, on the political podiums, advocated for individual freedom also enslaved people (for example, Historian Edmund S. Morgan). Further noteworthy is that by 1900, Africa’s population had shrunk to only 96,000,000 people, ca. 6% of the global population at the time (Manning, 2013: 7). Though a major power of the time, the US was present at the Berlin Conference, alongside the Austria-Hungarian Empire, Belgium, Kingdom of Denmark, British Empire, French Empire, German Empire, Italy, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kingdom of Portugal, Russian Empire, Kingdom of Spain, Kingdom of Sweden-Norway, and Ottoman Empire (Turkey). In 1822, the US established a colony in Liberia. It named its capital Monrovia (in honour of President James Monroe, who had contributed more US Government money to support the colonisation project). Liberia unilaterally declared independence in 1847 and was recognised by the US on 27 July 1967.   These intrusions left behind enduring negative effects, because, to a large extent, they created appendage economies that lacked strategic autonomy, and the framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development.   Experiences driven by ideological hysteria   Ideological considerations have been the basis for the US to frustrate positive change, taking sides in conflicts, opposing Africa’s interests in international fora, and targeting African countries with hostile measures.   An example of frustrating positive change includes frustrating African liberation efforts (by siding with the coloniser of their reactionary domestic agents). The motive was to position itself against USSR/Russia, other Eastern Bloc States, China, and Cuba, which supported Africa’s liberation. The second example relates to land reforms. The US knows very well that indigenous people did not voluntarily give land to any conqueror, yet it covertly and overtly opposes land reforms, e.g., in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Besides, the US has traditionally been comfortable with revolutionary political leaders like Tanzania’s John Pombe Joseph Magufuli, Patrice Emery Lumumba (Congo), and Sylvanus Olympio (Togo).   Also, within the context of the Cold War, the US has historically taken sides in lethal conflicts in Africa, e.g., civil wars, coup d’états, liberation wars, and other forms of standoffs.   Another sticky issue is the practice by the US of leveraging its clout to blockade African interests in international fora. An example concerning Tanzania is the vetoing of Salim Ahmed Salim as UN Secretariat General on 27 October 1981. It used its veto three times in one day to deny him the position.   On hostile measures, the US repeatedly imposes travel bans for Africans and provides frequent travel advisories against Africa. In 2020, USDA imposed a visa ban on Tanzania (alongside Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan). Also, as recent as 5 September 2024, the USDA issued a travel advisory against Tanzania, ‘due to crime, terrorism, and targeting of LGB persons’.   Tanzania’s relations with the US happen in the context of an Africa that lacks a coherent continental policy towards the US. There is no unity of concern, interest, or action in its dealings with the US. In reality, African countries predominantly engage with them individually rather than collectively (IDEG, 2014). Given the limited bargaining power of small countries like Tanzania, this consolidates and prolongs unbalanced Africa-US relations.   Moreover, in the manifestation of dependency syndrome, the African elite associate Africa-US relations with ‘the US trying to do well for Africa’ rather than ‘Africa and the US doing something good together’ (IDEG, 2014).   Sticky issues eroding the outcomes of Tanzania-US partnership   An obvious outcome of Tanzania-US relations is that instead of enabling the country to develop strategic autonomy and resilience, they have contributed towards perpetuating and even worsening dependency. In this regard, the imperialistic foundation of the relations erodes the outcomes by promulgating a mindset of servitude in partner countries, pursuing the US’s self-centric interests and dominance (culturally, economically, politically, and socially).   Promulgating a mindset of servitude   In realpolitik, imperialism is perhaps the strongest constituency in a country like Tanzania. Its pressure is omnipresent and bears heavily on the elite, whose society is subject to imposition of alien values (cultural, economic, political, and social). In response to this pressure and as a coping mechanism to bear the risks of imperialism, often the elite opt to collaborate with the imperial power. This has, in turn, led to two consequences. First, imperialism is blamed for promulgating a mindset of servitude in peripheral countries, blocking strategies. Second, this conduct exposes Africa-US relations to criticism, because on many occasions, it has appeared to promulgate a mindset of servitude by frightening the elite and eroding their confidence (e.g., putting them on travel ban lists), leading to the elite invariably being branded as aristocratic, despotic, undemocratic, unpatriotic, etc.   Self-centric interests and dominance   Inter-superpower antagonism – e.g., between the USSR and US – shows that each superpower perceives its societal values to be the best not only for itself, but for everyone else (Ogunbambi, 1982). Moreover, superpowers have been ready to inflict heavy damage challengers, to defend their assumed ‘value supremacy’.   On the one hand, the US is perceived to be extremely self-centred, with foreign affairs ‘seldom an issue of concern’ (Taşpınar, 2010). On the other hand, the US has a strong influence in Tanzania, cutting across all societal dimensions. It projects its ‘value supremacy’ through various channels: corporate (i.e., economic) activities, education, film, media, music, political interactions, religion, etc. However, the architecture of Tanzania-US and EAC-US bilateral economic agreements (in the areas of trade and investments) has been criticised by local scholars for being heavily US-centric (Pay & Gitonga-Mutethia, 2021).   In the political arena, Tanzania is subject to the bipartisan agreement commitment (of the Democrats and Republicans) to advancing US geopolitical interests in Africa (Gnanguênon, 2024; Lellou, 2024).   Overall, the US’s engagement in Tanzania is usually overtly or covertly adversarial to China and Russia. Its architecture is more concerned with containing the influence of these adversaries than assisting the country achieve concrete development objectives related to building strategic autonomy and resilience.   To exacerbate the limitations, the depth of support has largely remained under the threshold of required resources and US’s capacity to support: scarce financial resources have been spread thin (i.e., across far too many initiatives); cooperation outcomes have been person-based, hence stronger during certain periods (e.g., in the 1960s during the Kennedy administration) than others; and conditions of access to grants have been used to spy on local institutions.   Reflections for building mutually beneficial relations   Strategic action to strengthen and make Africa-US relations mutually beneficial and respectful should be guided by at least three basic considerations: the essentiality of resetting the relations, need for US to become a benevolent strategic partner of Africa, and strategic focus on the architecture of the relations.   Essentiality of resetting and leveraging Africa-US relations   ‘Positive’ Africa-US relations are essential for two reasons: lessons from Africa’s legacy as a backwater of the world, and the fitness of the US as a partner. As explained in the previous chapters, at least parts of Africa and the African people, whether within the African continent or in the diaspora, have largely been a backwater of the world since the Middle Ages. Moreover, as delineated in chapter 2, especially in subsection 2.2 to 2.5, the circumstances, in the postcolonial African polities, implied that they would not have much leverage in international affairs. Unsurprisingly, today Tanzania, alongside other African countries, is still a backwater of the world.   Also, given its capabilities, the US can be a positive game changer in Africa’s development, in the same way it did for Western Europe after World War II, and with other friendly countries – e.g., South Korea [6] , Taiwan, etc. – thereafter. It can assist Africa to set up effective framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development. A measure of ideal partnership would be the support from the US to bolster strategic autonomy and resilience.   Tanzania lags behind in terms of framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development. Consistent with the fundamental logic of building its own capacities, Tanzania needs to be strategically less reliant by building and enhancing critical capacities for development. In this context, issues related to peace and security are seen as necessary outcomes of the development achieved.   In terms of strategic focus, the new Africa-US relations should break from the traditional North-South relations, driven by imperialistic ideals and fictitious commitments. It should be modelled as a Partnership for Building Strategic Autonomy (PBSA), capable of catalysing transformative development in Africa.   Its aims should be to consolidate good governance institutional frameworks; enhance their productive resource capacities; address the development restraints linked to historical injustices (to create a level playing field for all societal groups); strengthen (African) strategic alliances; strengthen the enforcement of governance ethics; and leverage the African diaspora.   Measures to build mutually beneficial relations   To expedite the process of transforming to a higher level of development, Tanzania needs to build resilience so that it can thrive independently. Most importantly, it needs to embark on a path to strategic autonomy.   However, inter-societal interdependencies are not only inexorable but appropriate, and genuine allies should nurture them. Hence, strategic autonomy does not mean binary choice between dependence and independence or between engagement and decoupling. It is more about mutually beneficial and respectful interdependencies (Helwig & Sinkkonen, 2022).   Building Tanzania’s strategic autonomy can be achieved through international cooperation with viable partners, in which case a benevolent partner of the calibre of the US can play a strategically vital role.   Therefore, the prime concern in assessing Tanzania-US relations was to understand the character and impact of the foreign policy pursued by the US, and, in consequence, to propose the kind of cooperation measures that ought to be adopted by the two partner countries. The key question was: Is the US’s foreign policy imperialistic or not? Invariably, does it contribute to creating the necessary conditions for strategic autonomy in Tanzania, or suppress them?   Based on the reflections in the previous sections, this section describes a Partnership for Building Strategic Autonomy (PBSA), defined as a capacity development project focusing on four broad pillars: capacities for good governance, FiR capacities, productive resource capacities, and flanking measures. These capacities are preconditions for achieving both strategic autonomy, and a conducive environment for sustainable peace, security, and stability.   Consolidating good governance institutional frameworks   Governance is certainly one of the major failings in Tanzania and other African countries. [7] It is innately linked with poor development performances across all spheres of society. The several factors that erode the effectiveness of the governance institutional frameworks (GIFs) are linked to, inter alia, legal and regulatory frameworks (LRFs), governance organisational frameworks (GOFs), professional competency deficiencies of policy and lawmakers (PLMs) and policy and law implementors (PLIs) [8] , and leadership deficiencies of the political elite [9] .   Hence, it is necessary that the US-Tanzania partnership supports a new era and vision of African governance; in which these handicaps are addressed systematically and sustainably.   Well-designed LRFs should promote a ‘rule of adhocracy’ [10] , instead of the prevailing ‘rule of bureaucracy’, using lessons from Tanzania’s tea industry survey 2023 as a case study (TBT, 2024).   The governance organisational frameworks (GOFs) [11] determine organisational efficiency. Particular focus should be on countering the proliferation of state actors (e.g., government agencies, authorities, etc.) in general, and ‘weed institutions’, in particular. Given its knowledge, skills capital, and experience, the US could show the way in pursuing the appropriate reforms, ranging from scaling down to eliminating entire organisations, in order to promote governance efficiency.   The professional competence of the elite is critical in achieving and safeguarding the strategic autonomy of a given entity. Hence their strategy should involve professionalising technical leadership of policy and lawmakers (PLMs) and policy and law implementors (PLIs) from both the public and private sectors. This requires building institutional capacities for (deepening) good conduct, and professional competency and confidence of the elite on a continuous basis.   Political leadership is a vital determinant of a society’s strength. At every epoch, good leadership has been responsible for driving performance through strategic thought, mobilization, and action. Africa too has had its share of brilliant leaders. Thus, PBSA should make Tanzania build a governance system that ensures continuity and safeguards the development dynamics initiated by visionary leaders. Concrete measures can focus on strengthening institutions for nation-building (e.g., establishing non-partisan national endowments for democracy), institutions for democratic development (i.e., strong, independent judiciaries, free and fair electoral systems, media freedom, and a robust civil society).   Productive resource capacities   Productive resource capacities (PRCs) determine a country's ability to produce goods and services, ultimately driving economic growth and development. This refers to both FiR capacities and NFiR capacities.   Although financial development is essential for economic performance (King & Levine, 1993), Tanzania lacks it (ACBF, 2015; Allen et al., 2012; Baltagi et al., 2009; King & Levine, 1993; Rajan & Zingales, 2003). Overall, the capacity concerning challenge is high (the highest category) in 17.8% of African countries, including Tanzania (ACBF, 2015). Boosting the country’s FiR capacities requires addressing corruption, deficient LRFs, fiscal unsustainability, illicit financial flows, and revenue collection anomalies.   The PBSA should address the various NFiR capacities to unleash Tanzania’s development potential and make Tanzania-US relations bear mutually beneficial outcomes. This underlines the need for Tanzania to create robust productive capacities targeting at least five dimensions: entrepreneurship, knowledge and skills, organisations (institutions), physical infrastructure, and technology.   Flanking measures   In addition to consolidating GIFs, and building PRCs, several measures are critical for addressing genuine concerns related to the societal configuration in Tanzania and other African countries, so as to fully unleash and capitalise on the potential for development. Key measures are mitigating development restraints linked to historical injustices, strengthening African strategic alliances, and strengthening the enforcement of governance ethics.    Addressing development restraints linked to historical injustices   The imperialistic racial hierarchy system introduced by colonisers throughout Africa created castes in societies. The system of race-based castes institutionalised cultural, economic, political, and social discrimination. In this arrangement, the people of African descent were marginalised in their own countries and throughout the world.   Thus, recognising and supporting corrective action against historical injustices is crucial not only for honouring and upholding the dignity of the people of African descent, but also for broadly unleashing the development potential embedded in the various societal groups in African countries.   In this regard, counteracting the societal distortions caused by the system of race-based castes and affirmative action system can help. Key to this is access to opportunities: business and economic, education, health care, and political ones.   As the US was quick to come up with the Marshall Plan to reconstruct the European economies after World War II, it should also acknowledge the historical and contemporary adverse effects of slave trade and imperialism on people of African descent and commit itself to addressing the structural legacies attributed to imperialism and colonialism [12] .   Strengthening African strategic alliances   The barriers to African strategic autonomy are also compounded by several other factors. One example is what Pay and Gitonga-Mutethia (2021) refer to as the ‘collateral damage' caused by national action that disregards the collective African dimension. An example is Kenya ignoring its legal commitments under regional economic communities (RECs) and bilaterally signing a trade agreement with the EU and US, instead of doing it under the umbrella of the East African Community (EAC) Common Market.   Another example is the resistance by African polities to cede power to supra-national institutions (that they have themselves created), which is one of the main reasons for the relative dysfunctionality of African RECs, compared to RECs from other regions of the World.   The two factors alluded to in the previous paragraphs imply a lack of African strategic alliances. The US has plenty of experience in effective management of strategic alliances. Hence, a reset of the Africa-US partnership should also focus on strengthening intra-African strategic alliances, as well as strategic alliances between Africa and other regions, beyond the usual rhetoric and symbolism.   Strengthening the enforcement of governance ethics                   Governance ethics is a major concern regarding the conduct of the African elite. In an expression of frustration, critics have designated the African elite as ‘corruptocracies’, ‘chaosocracies’, and ‘terrorocracies’ (Van Wyk, 2007). They blame them for deficiencies in patriotism and commitment to societal interests.   The perceptions of corruption illuminate the scope of the challenge. In spite of a stark cross-country contrast, the continent as a whole ranks poorly on the global corruption index. In 2023, only five countries had scores of 50 or above, i.e., Seychelles (71), Cabo Verde (64), Botswana (56), Rwanda (51), and Mauritius (51). [13] Tanzania’s score was 40. The pan-African score of 33 was the lowest of any major region in the world (Statista, 2024).   In order to achieve genuine change, with the assistance of their international partners including the US, Africa must build the right institutional frameworks for the development of a cadre of competent, conscious, devoted, and patriotic political stewards at all levels.   Leveraging the African diaspora   The US has what all other imperialist states lack: a huge African diaspora. This is a resource that can serve as an inter-societal bridge for engagement (Lellou, 2024). For what can it be leveraged? For Tanzania’s renewal and transformation towards strategic sovereignty and resilience, in a similar manner to the pan-African movement of the 1960s and 1970s.   For example, the large African communities in the US can be involved in creating connections that enhance mutually beneficial and respectable cooperation in all societal spheres: cultural, economic, political, and social. Conclusions and the way forward   Concluding observations   This paper set out to examine Africa-US relations, with particular reference to Tanzania. Concerning Africa as a whole, it illuminated the organisation of African societies before colonial conquest, systematic conquest of Africa, and tenets of primordial globalisation that impacted the making of African elites.   Referring to Tanzania, the paper revisited several issues, including the chronology of its integration into the international system, lasting outcomes of its integration into the international system, genesis and setting of relations with the US, evolution and scope of those relations, impact (positive and negative) of the relations on the country, and challenges hindering the development of relations to full potential.   The overall verdict is that contrary to diplomatic rhetoric, Africa-US relations have not been mutually beneficial and respectful, a challenge enduring to-date. A perennial underdog in the global system, Africa has served the pursuits of imperialistic powers, including the US. The US has dealt with Africa in an antagonistic, lop-sided, and truculent manner, and has not prioritised mutually beneficial relations. The US’s view of the world through the lens of a superpower has determined its African policy, contributing to plunder, depopulation, landgrab, colonisation, conflict perpetration, counter-liberation efforts, economic exploitation and provision of ‘below threshold’ assistance, clashing of interests, blockading, and undermining sovereignty. Its relations are still clearly exploitative.   Hence, by most measures, Africa-US interactions have generated overwhelmingly negative experiences, linked to imperialistic excesses, ideological hysteria, and a dependence mindset and syndrome of the African elite.   The overall impact of these negative experiences is the marginalisation of Africa, placing it on the periphery of global affairs. The experiences have created scepticism about US’s discourteous involvement in African affairs.   Nevertheless, Africa-US interactions have not been a complete zero-sum game for Africa. Several positive outcomes can be attributed to their relations. They include the creation of LRFs to manage development assistance; and establishment of assistance programmes, e.g., Peace Corps, SDT related to trade, and Power Africa, which are outlined in section 4.   Therefore, specifically, the paper recommends a reset of Africa-US relations, to ensure that they deliver results based on mutual benefits and respect. The relationship should be built on a new approach that distinguishes the new Africa-US policy from the previous one in vision, content, and action. In these new relations, the US should recognise Africa’s polities as sovereign entities, support them in building strategic autonomy and resilience, and advocate for their genuine interests in fair treatment in the global arena by all bilateral and multilateral partners.   Way forward   This research paper contends that despite past and contemporary challenges, resetting the US’s engagement in Africa, though not insurmountable, is a tough task. Business as usual will not be able to turn around the trend.   Therefore, a new strategy – built on the belief of ‘humanity is one and indivisible’ as propagated by Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere – must emphasise engagement at all levels focused on mutually beneficial and respectful outcomes. 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[2] Imperialism considers itself to have an absolute moral right and considers it the duty of the nation to exploit other nations. Africa was exploited by a collective European nation that perpetrated imperialism. [3] Other factors include: demographic imbalance (compelling minorities to learn Kiswahili); historical identity; symbols of national, racial, and cultural identity; immigration and nomadism; social prestige; traditional trade and settlements; and urbanisation. [4] In 2022, Tanzanian shares of global FDI inflows and Africa FDI inflows were 1% and 2.5% respectively (NBS, BOT % TIC, 2024: 12). Moreover, from 2019 to 2022, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) accounted for 31.9% of FDI inflows. The US was not amongst the top ten (NBS, BOT & TIC, 2024: 26). [5] The readiness for the US to interact positively and constructively with Tanzania is presumably eroded by a lack of ‘cultural and ideological affinity’. [6] The US played a crucial role in South Korea's economic transformation, providing comprehensive assistance in embracing grants, loans, technical assistance, investments, and preferential treatment in trade (with the US absorbing most of the country’s exports). [7] Both GIFs and GOFs aim to establish structures and processes for effective decision-making, accountability, and transparency. GIFs focus on broader societal structures (i.e., LRFs and norms that govern a society or a particular sector); while GOFs focus on specific entities or groups (e.g., government entities, corporate entities, CSOs, etc.). [8]  Due to lack of professional development frameworks (PDFs) capable of producing competent professionals. [9] Due to lack of institutionalised frameworks for producing competent political stewards. [10] In an organisational management setting, adhocracy culture describes a model that fosters decentralisation, individual initiative, and organic decision-making. It deviates from a rigid system of authority or procedures, by focusing on consistently adapting methods by giving employees who are closest to the action permission to do their work and solve problems as they see fit. [11]  The GOFs focus on the internal structures and processes within a specific entity. [12]  In 2019, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the fundamental rights of people of African descent. The resolution called for a comprehensive perspective on colonialism and slavery acknowledging their historical and contemporary adverse effects on people of African descent. However, being largely symbolic, these measures have not translated into practical and effective instruments for addressing the structural legacies attributed to colonialism. A note on the US: While being able to very quickly come up with the Marshall Plan to reconstruct the European economies after World War II, it has not even acknowledged the historical and contemporary adverse effects of slave trade and imperialism on people of African descent. Therefore, there is no commitment to addressing the structural legacies attributed to colonialism. [13] Implicitly, in spite of some achievements, there is still widespread corruption because the court system is one of the most corrupt institutions, routinely covering up heinous crimes committed by various branches of the elite. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2025 Image credit: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID:1679934878   by Dr Robert Kabage   Abstract   From the periods of colonialism, the slave trade, the Cold War until now, United States (US) engagements with Africa have been, as any other nation would do, steered by its national and strategic interests. The inauguration of Donald Trump as US President on 20 January 2025 marked a significant shift in the US’s foreign policy. The administration’s “America First” policy, which emphasises US national interests, economic protectionalism, and reduced foreign intervention, is disrupting America’s foreign policy in a significant way. Many countries, including Kenya and others in Africa, are forced to realign their bilateral relations with those of the US, in order to maximise mutual benefits. Apart from planning to cut or restructure US civilian foreign aid and development assistance under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which has disrupted various humanitarian and development programmes in Kenya, Africa, and indeed globally, the new policy seeks to reduce or completely withdraw US budgets from many multilateral engagements such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and Paris Agreement, among others. On the military front, many members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe, who have traditionally relied on the US for their security guarantees, have been compelled to rethink their military strategy, with a reduced role of the US in mind. By reviewing existing literature and policy documents such as the new Executive Orders by President Trump, this paper concludes that, indeed, the US seeks to prioritise its national interests over multilateral engagements seen as not directly benefitting the country. It recommends that Kenya and Africa should realign their priorities in relation to the US, even as they seek to explore alternative financing and relations with other states.   Keywords: America First, USAID, Trump2, Kenya, Africa Introduction   From the periods of colonialism, the slave trade, the Cold War until now, United States (US) engagements with Africa have been, as any other nation would do, steered by its national and strategic interests (Schraeder, 1994). The inauguration of Donald Trump as US President on 20 January 2025 marked a significant shift in the country’s foreign policy, and Africa will have to adjust its bilateral relations so as to strategically realign its interests with those of the US. There is no doubt that the Trump administration’s “America First” policy, which emphasises US national interests, economic protectionalism, and reduced foreign intervention, is disrupting America’s foreign policy in a significant way. The “America First” policy, which prioritises the US’s interests in peace and security, trade and international development (Trachenberg, 2024), adopted by the Trump II (Trump’s second term) administration has compelled many allies in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and Africa to reassess their bilateral and multilateral relations so as to realign them to those of the US for mutual benefits. Globally, multilateralism suffered a setback as the US withdrew from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris Agreement. In Europe, the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the continuity of its policies and practices is now in doubt, after the US took a relatively different position from many of its NATO allies in Europe, especially in relation to the Russia-Ukraine war. The US trade rivalry with China is also likely to be resurgent, as was the case with the first Trump administration, when the US sought to tame China’s increasing influence in the tech space.   For the rest of the Third World, where Africa and Kenya fall, the US’s reduction or complete stopping of development and humanitarian assistance means that many will struggle with budget deficits and must seek alternatives. For Kenya and Africa, where many programmes funded by USAID have been disrupted, African countries may have to restructure their budgets and seek alternative sources of funding, if the freeze takes longer or assistance is completely cut. While the US has been a strong partner in development and humanitarian assistance, this is likely to reduce drastically during the Trump II administration, as the US seeks to cut government spending locally and internationally.   While multipolarity has been gaining ground, as the US sought to focus more on domestic policy and reducing its multilateral engagements, multilateralism is even more strained under the Trump II administration. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are increasingly projecting their self-interest onto the UNSC, significantly weakening the ability of the Council to effectively deliver on its mandate. The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and the WHO also demonstrates the increased weakening of multilateralism under Trump II. Consequently, the profile of other global actors like Russia and China are on the rise, even as Europe and others in Asia and Africa continue to reassess and realign their interests with the US. The Trump II administration, which is right-leaning, aligns with the rise of far-right political parties in Europe, who seek to limit immigration and keep their societies in their traditional and conservative state, hence undermining the much-touted globalisation and universality of the western hegemony.   Methodological and Theoretical Note   This is a desktop research paper aimed at unpacking the preliminary scenarios that could shape the Trump II administration’s policies by systematically reviewing available literature and providing foresight into possible ways that Kenya could realign its bilateral relations with the US, so as to strategically benefit from this sudden shift of the US’s policy under Trump II. It is based on realist theory. It best explains the competitive nature of states while they seek to protect their own interests and project their power (Morgenthau, 2014: 53). It argues that states are self-interested, that the world is anarchical and therefore self-help is imminent in pursuit of self-preservation.   Although Fukuyama (2020: 298) in his End of History had predicted that history was converging at the time, and that universal political economy was imminent, his prediction failed to materialise as universality failed to take root and as states challenged western hegemony. While the end of the Cold War put realism on the defensive when the tides moved in favour of globalisation and universality of politics and economics (Williams et al, 2005), realism has powerfully bounced back after the western liberal model failed to be accepted universally, putting into question the ability of states to act together multilaterally. Consequently, the 21st century has seen a resurgence of realism, where power is slowly but steadily being concentrated at the state level, and where the liberal euphoria of universality of norms is being greatly challenged.   Key Issues   International Peace and Security   The “America First” policy, which prioritises the US’s interests in peace and security is disrupting the conventional belief within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership that the US will defend NATO members in the case of military attacks, especially from the dreaded Russia. The US under Trump II is demanding that NATO members should increase their military budgets and build the individual capacities of their militaries, and that they should not rely solely on the US for security guarantees and protection. The Trump II administration is threatening to upend the conventional position that the US’s military power was meant to protect and project the western liberal international order founded on Bretton Woods (Dombrowski, 2025: 27). A recent meeting in France of major military powers in Europe — France, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Poland — are crafting a plan for security guarantees for Ukraine, even as they seek to assert their military cooperation and capabilities without the US (Vincent, 2025: para 1 and 2).   In the case of Kenya, a Major Non-Nato Ally (MNNA) of the US designated by President Joe Biden in 2024, the country could harness its military capacities by strengthening historical military collaboration with the US especially in areas of mutual interest, like the fight against terrorism, that have led to military cooperation such as the Manda Bay and Mombasa military bases (Negash & Salih, 2023: 110). The Trump II administration has, however, demonstrated that it intends to scale down the US’s funding and involvement in military missions abroad, as demonstrated by the recent freezing of funding for Kenyan-led security missions in Haiti (Reuters, 2025: para 1). It is also not yet clear whether the Trump II administration considers the designation of Kenya as an MNNA by the Biden administration as a priority and aligning to its interests. While Kenya’s designation as an MNNA of the US may remain unchanged, the Trump II administration has a history of reversing the policies and initiatives of its predecessors, and this should not come as a surprise with regards Kenya’s MNNA status, especially in the event that it does not align with US military priorities. While Trump II may not be very enthusiastic about military multilateralism, this could provide an opportunity to pursue bilateral relations that are custom-made for Kenya-US mutual relations. Kenya could thus use its MNNA status as leverage to seek bilateral military/security cooperation with the US outside the multilateral security arrangement. It may also be strategic to seek other security cooperation arrangements with other countries, by invoking the strategic ambiguity posture of non-alignment, so as not to jeopardise the existing Kenya-US agreements.   Most importantly, Kenya ought to rethink its financing of security operations, to enhance domestic funding from its budget, which ultimately gives it more autonomy to exercise the country’s sovereignty in promoting peace and security within Kenya and in other friendly countries. At approximately 1% of the total government budget (SIPRI, 2023), Kenya’s military budget may need enhanced financial support.   Gender and Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI)   The Trump II administration has taken a more conservative view of gender and sexuality, with President Trump arguing that one can only either be male or female. According to Trump:   “It is the policy of the United States to only recognize two sexes, male and female. These sexes are not changeable and are grounded in fundamental and incontrovertible reality. Under my direction, the Executive Branch will enforce all sex-protective laws to promote this reality, and the following definitions shall govern all Executive interpretation of and application of Federal law and administration policy.” (Executive Order 14168, Section 2, Para 1)   Trump’s position on sexuality has emphasised the binary nature of sexuality as man and woman, reversing the Biden administration’s policy on sexuality, which sought to protect the fluidity and grey nature of sexuality, emphasising the protection of sexual minorities such as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer (LGBTQ) individuals. While the Trump II administration’s position on gender and sexuality aligns with Africa’s predominant conservative view on sexuality, it exposes sexual minorities to further marginalisation and discrimination. While Botswana, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, and South Africa have decriminalised same-sex relations, LGBTQ persons remain criminalised in other countries including Kenya. This shift in the US’s policy on gender and DEI means that programmes initially funded by USAID under gender and diversity could face budget cuts and freeze. This could also significantly entrench this policy shift beyond the US, and could see other countries adopting the same view, by limiting community support and tolerance for LGBTQ persons.   While LGBTQ and same sex marriage is prohibited by Kenyan law, such minority groups exist in our communities, and the Supreme Court of Kenya has ruled that queer persons have a right to associate, just like any other Kenyan, and have a right to register their support group association (Daily Nation, 2023).   Aid, Global Health and International Development   The freezing of USAID’s programmes, especially those deemed as not aligning with Trump’s policy of “America First”, is a wakeup call for Kenya and Africa, to reduce dependency and step up domestic financing especially of critical sectors like public health. In Kenya, former USAID programmes meant to combat HIV, TB, and Malaria have been negatively impacted, with effects expected to manifest in the next few months. Among other issues, President Trump has also signed an Executive Order withdrawing the US from the World Health Organization (WHO) (The White House, 2025a), signalling the US’s desire to cut back on its involvement in multilateral global health architecture led by the WHO.   The USAID’s freezing of funding for Kenya’s programmes especially in the public health sector requires urgent attention from the government of Kenya, to not only enhance its domestic budget for public health, but also to seek alternative donors as a matter of urgency in the short term. To avoid progress made in combating HIV, TB, and Malaria from being rolled back, Kenya should indeed consider this one of its top priorities. Most importantly, Kenya should in future consider funding critical sectors such as public health entirely from its consolidated fund, to avoid shocks occasioned by the unpredictability of external funding. It is also important to note that domestic funding of public health will ensure that it is Kenya’s priority areas in public health that are upheld, and not external donors’ own interests in any project they fund.   While donor countries like the US should prioritise the humanitarian needs of beneficiaries and not their own interests, as the US has done with its “America First” policy, the reality is that international development assistance has never actually sought to empower the communities they support but have instead entrenched their interests in the development projects they finance. This has led some scholars, like Dambisa Moyo in her Dead Aid, to argue that development assistance is not in fact empowering African countries and others in the South, but rather, it is making them more subservient to the countries of the North, further worsening existing inequalities that favour the West (Moyo, 2010: 1-5).   As an illustration, the Trump II administration has suspended aid to South Africa, protesting against the enactment of the Expropriation Act 13 of 2024 in South Africa, which allows the South African government to acquire land, in special instances, for public interest. According to the Trump II administration, the sanction on South Africa is meant to protect white farmers, who are supposedly in danger of their land being compulsorily acquired without compensation (The White House, 2025b). This US policy does not however address the realities of inequalities in South Africa, where black South African land was forcefully acquired during apartheid, leaving many black South Africans in abject poverty, a legacy that has continued to bedevil the rainbow nation. Aid in this case is seen as a tool for external control and manipulation for selfish interest.   Climate Action   While climate action has attracted international attention over global warming, the Trump II administration is not enthusiastic about climate action and has through an Executive Order indicated the US’s desire to be exempted from the Paris Agreement (The White House, 2025c). According to the administration, the Paris Agreement in its current form does not prioritise the interests of the US, which he claims burdens the US taxpayers to channel money into countries that do not need it, while undermining US interests in the process.   While Kenya had positioned itself as the champion of climate action in Africa, this strategic position is likely to be adversely impacted by the US’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, considering that the US was a major financier of the climate action. While the extent of the implication of US’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is yet to be fully felt, it is likely to significantly roll back progress made in the implementation of the agreement. Although the climate change debate is essential for the survival of humanity, Trump’s scepticism mirrors that of many ordinary people, the hustlers in the Kenyan sense, who are often left behind in the climate change debate and action plans. To the ordinary Mwananchi, who is not able to attend the elitist global climate summits locally and internationally to get facts and statistics, the climate change agenda may simply pass as non-existent, or having to do with the elites in society, yet the climate change ramifications mostly affect the poor and vulnerable, mostly in Africa.   In Kenya, the climate change agenda should thus continue, with a focus on making climate mitigation people-centred and grassroots-driven, without necessarily depending on the global climate financing architecture. Consequently, there is a need to model the climate change agenda from the grassroots level – the bottom-up approach as opposed to the present top-down approach. This way, the ordinary person will understand the implications of climate change and, hence, make individual behavioural changes that will help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help preserve biodiversity.   One way for Kenya to champion the climate debate is by involving its youthful populations in the climate agenda, especially because climate change will mostly impact on future and younger generations. It is for this reason that in Europe the climate action debate has gained traction by involving young and youthful environmental activists, leading to influential environmental student campaigns like the “Fridays for Future” movement, which has mobilised millions of students into climate action by pushing for political action to remedy climate change.   Through its actions, the “Fridays for Future” campaign was recognised by the United Nations Environmental Program in 2019 as a champion of the earth (UNEP, 2019). In this regard, Kenya and Africa need to consider incorporating climate change courses into the education system from the primary through to the tertiary level. Governments too must incentivise green initiatives and businesses, to ensure that they favourably compete with others as they innovatively devise climate-friendly technologies   US Immigration Policy and Africa’s Labour Export   As the world’s largest economy worth approximately US$30 trillion, followed by China with approximately US$20 trillion, the US hegemony remains a powerful force to reckon with even in an increasingly multipolar world. Trump campaigned on the slogan of “America First”, which is a nationalist view that prioritises American interests by especially cutting down on the US’s budget on multilateral institution and aid spending. Trump’s campaign, and now his administration, is also laced with strong anti-immigrant sentiments, who are often projected as “illegal immigrants and dangerous criminals”. While legal immigrants in the US have nothing to worry about, these sentiments generally project immigrants— whether legal or illegal— as unwanted and unwelcome to the US.   What has hit closer to home is the Trump administration ordering a temporary freeze on USAID activities, which could potentially upend health systems in Kenya and many other countries in Africa and beyond. Trump’s populist views in the US are not unique, as far-right political parties in Europe are also gaining ground, with seven European Union (EU) member states— Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and Slovakia now having far-right parties within government. Many other far-right parties in other EU countries have also had a strong showing in recent elections, including in Austria, France, and Germany. These parties are generally considered conservative, and they seek to promote and protect traditional institutions, customs, and values. Consequently, immigrants are perceived as interfering with these customs and values, leading to their “othering” as outsiders. In some extreme cases, far-right parties could entertain and even promote fascist and Nazist views— characterised by authoritarianism, ultra-nationalism, and dictatorship, as was the case in Nazi Germany and fascist Italy under Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini—both blamed for the ravages of the Second World War. But why should the rise of these far-right political parties and conservatism in the US and Europe call for our rethink of immigration and labour export as promoted by the current Kenyan government?   First, conservative parties are generally anti-immigration, and labour migrants are likely to face more stringent conditions before being allowed to migrate. Those who have migrated are also more likely to face legal and policy hurdles that will tend to prioritise nationals over migrants in terms of job opportunities, hence affecting their labour mobility. Secondly, entrenched conservative views and ideologies are likely to strengthen racist views, especially against Africans in the diaspora. This will make it difficult for migrant Kenyans (Africans) to be accepted and to integrate into communities where they settle. As is already the case, many will have to navigate and contend with racist-motivated hate and, sometimes, crime—remember here, the extreme case of 20 May 2020 when George Floyd, a Black-American man, was murdered in cold blood by white policeman Derek Chauvin in Minneapolis. Thirdly, labour migration will only benefit a tiny and almost negligible fraction of unemployed youths, and there is an increased need to focus on the more than 99% who will never get an opportunity to migrate. More economic stimulus packages and a more investor-friendly business and entrepreneurial environment will need to be created to encourage business start-ups to grow. Kenya’s MPESA brand is clear testament that Kenya is indeed a Silicon Savannah, and the country should focus on generating more such opportunities and beyond. Fourthly, while labour migration may appear like it is easing unemployment in the short term, it is likely to actually exacerbate unemployment and poverty levels in the long term. This is because taxpayers have spent millions of shillings to educate and train such young and promising human resources, only for them to work abroad in a clear case of brain drain and further strengthen the capacities of countries in the north, which are already benefitting from unequal trade that favours them and disadvantages Africa and Kenya. Kenya especially needs more skilled labour than the developed north does, and the current labour migration is prompted more by push and not pull factors—the lack of opportunities at home.   There is a need for the Kenyan government to think more strategically about labour migration and go beyond the normal rhetoric and politics of labour export, which gloss over the real youth bulge that is about to explode for lack of job opportunities. This is because although the average unemployment rate in Kenya stands at about 12.7%, the youths (15-34 years), comprising 35% of the Kenyan population, have the highest unemployment rate, at 67% (Federation of Kenyan Employers, 2024).   Conclusion   The Trump II administration has indeed prioritised US interests in global affairs, and multilateralism is likely to suffer the most during his reign. While the full scale of his policies is yet to fully manifest, it is clear that Africa is not his top priority, a clear divergence of US-Africa relations, and even that of US-EU relations, which have almost always aligned and remained mutual. The disruption is therefore not just limited to Kenya and Africa, but indeed the whole world.   Policy Recommendations   As Kenya and indeed Africa continues to navigate the possible implications of the Trump II administration, there are a number of recommendations for the Kenyan government and other governments in Africa:   There is a need to prioritise financing of public health from the consolidated fund, to avoid disruption caused by unpredictable external financing like the USAID freeze. There is a need for governments in Africa to diversify sources of funding and development finance, beyond the traditional US and European Union. Lessons may be drawn from looking at the East policy of the NARC administration from 2003 and the China Belt and Road Initiative, which have massively improved Africa’s infrastructure, its neo-colonial pitfalls notwithstanding. Global issues like climate mitigation action plans must be driven from the grassroots level and in a de-colonial approach, to ensure it is Afro-centric, not Eurocentric and elitist as is presently the case. Kenyan and African governments should look into ways of spurring local industries and entrepreneurship, to limit the effects of international shocks like those caused by radical shifts in US foreign policy that may negatively affect livelihoods. There is a need to create jobs locally, with export of labour only being in strategic areas to avoid brain drain and unfavourable working conditions for Africans abroad. Incentives such as tax breaks for new businesses, and regional frameworks such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) that seek to liberalise intra-African trade may spur trade and industry in Africa. Kenyan and indeed African governments must strategically realign in a multipolar world and must pragmatically explore their available options to navigate international trade and finance, including working closely with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), now BRICS+, who seek to offer an alternative to the declining and now unpredictable western-liberal hegemony.   References   Daily Nation. 2023. Supreme Court reaffirms LGBTQ right to associate . [Online] Available at: https://nation.africa/kenya/news/supreme-court-reaffirms-  lgbtq-right-to-associate-4366506  [accessed: 22 July 2025].   Dombrowski, P. 2024. Trump, Project 2025 and American Grand Strategy, Survival , 66(6): 17-32.   Federation of Kenyan          Employers. 2024. Youth Unemployment . [Online] Available at: https://www.fke-kenya.org/policy-issues/youth-employment [accessed: 22 July 2025].   Fukuyama, F. 2020. The End of History? In: The New Social Theory Reader . UK: Routledge.   Morgenthau, H.J. 2014. A realist theory of international politics, In: The Realism Reader . UK: Routledge.   Moyo, D. 2010. Dead aid: Why aid makes things worse and how there is another way for Africa . New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.   Negash, M.H. & Salih, M. 2023. The US Military Bases in the Post- 9/11 Horn of Africa, International Journal of African Renaissance Studies , 18(1): 92-117.   Reuters. 2025. Trump freezes funding for Kenya-led security mission in Haiti . [Online] Available at: https://ntvkenya.co.ke/news/trump-freezes-funding-for- kenya-led-security-mission-in-haiti/ [accessed: 22 July 2025].   Schraeder, P. 1994. United States Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change . UK: Cambridge.   Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2023. Military Expenditure (% of GDP).  [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPRT.KD [accessed: 22 July 2025].   The White House. 2025a. Executive Order Withdrawing the United States from the World Health Organization . [Online] Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-the-worldhealth-organization/ [accessed: 22 July 2025].   The White House. 2025b. Executive Order Addressing Egregious Actions of the Republic of South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/addressing-egregious-actions-of-the-republic-of-south-africa/ [accessed: 22 July 2025].   The White House. 2025c. Executive Order Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements . [Online] Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/putting-america-first-in-international-environmental-agreements/ [accessed: 22 July 2025].   Trachenberg, M. 2024. Is there Life after NATO? [Online] Available at: https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/there-life-after-nato [accessed: 22 July 2025].   UNEP. 2019. Fridays for Future Movement – Inspiration and Action . [Online] Available at: https://www.unep.org/championsofearth/laureates/2019/frida ys-future-movement [accessed: 22 July 2025].   USA Government. 2025. Executive Order 14168, Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government.   Vincent, E. 2025. Europe Allies Work on Security Guarantees for Ukraine . [Online] Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/ 03/13/european-allies-work-on-security-guarantees-for- ukraine_6739101_4.html [accessed: 22 July 2025].   Williams, M.C., Smith, S., Biersteker, T., Brown, C., Cerny, P., Grieco, J. & Groom, A.J.R. 2005. The realist tradition and the limits of international relations (Vol. 100) . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2025 Image credit: istockphoto.com | Stock illustration ID:917211566   by Dr Assi J.C. Kimou   Abstract   This paper explores the evolving nature of US-West Africa relations, with a particular focus on Côte d'Ivoire as a strategic partner. Historically marginal in American foreign policy, Africa has gained prominence due to shifting global dynamics and growing strategic interests in security and economic development. US engagement in Côte d'Ivoire is structured around key pillars: political stability, inclusive economic growth, security sector reform, and human capital development. However, this longstanding partnership is being reshaped by rising geopolitical competition from China and Russia, as well as the impact of the Trump administration's transactional foreign policy approach. The analysis identifies emerging trends in security and economic cooperation and assesses their implications for Côte d'Ivoire and the broader West African region. The paper argues that sustaining and deepening US-West Africa relations will require a recalibration of partnerships, grounded in mutual interests and responsive to regional aspirations. It concludes with a call to action, emphasising the need for improved domestic resource mobilisation, anti-corruption measures, expanded regional trade through the AfCFTA, diversified global partnerships, and continued US-Africa dialogue to strengthen trade and security cooperation.   Introduction   Africa has long been a marginal player in United States (US) foreign policy. American engagement in Africa has gone through different phases, reflecting the changing priorities of US foreign policy and global geopolitical dynamics. Today, Africa represents an increasingly strategic space for the United States, both in terms of security – especially in the fight against terrorism –and economically, with the rise in trade and investment. However, the growing presence of other international players, especially China and Russia, has complicated the geopolitical equation in Africa, challenging the traditional influence of the US on the continent.   In West Africa in general – and specifically with Côte d'Ivoire, established at the country's independence in 1960 – diplomatic relations with the United States have been built on a foundation of multidimensional cooperation, combining development, security, and governance issues. Historically marked by a certain stability, these relations have gradually evolved to adapt to regional dynamics and changes in American foreign policy.   Today, Washington is promoting a strategic vision for Côte d'Ivoire based on three key objectives: political stability, economic dynamism, and strategic alignment with American interests in West Africa.   The focus will be on, firstly, democratic consolidation, through active support for electoral processes and strengthening the rule of law. Secondly, the stimulation of inclusive economic growth, through the development of private investment, the modernisation of energy infrastructures and preferential access to the American market via the AGOA mechanism. Thirdly, reform of the security sector, with particular emphasis on the fight against terrorism and the professionalisation of the armed forces. Fourthly, the improvement of human capital through programmes in the fields of health, education, and adaptation to climate change.   Nevertheless, this historic partnership is facing growing challenges in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment. China's expansion, marked by massive investment in infrastructure, and Russia's growing influence in West Africa, notably through paramilitary actors and openly anti-Western diplomacy, are adding complexity to the strategic landscape and calling into question the traditional leadership of the United States in the region.   This situation, combined with the inauguration of Donald Trump and his more transactional approach to international relations, led to a reconfiguration of US priorities, potentially shifting Washington's policies toward West Africa – particularly in trade, investment, and security cooperation. This brief explores the contours of the US-Africa relationship, focusing on two main areas: security and economic relations, by providing tentative answers to the following questions:   What are the current trends of US-West Africa relations? What is the expected impact of the new dynamic on West African economies in general? Côte d'Ivoire particularly? What are the prospects for West Africa? 1. US Development Aid: from strong humanitarian support to aid cuts   1.1. Health system and agriculture are likely to be the most hit sectors   For decades, the US has increased support for African development through financial and technical aid in health, education, governance, and agriculture – primarily via the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Between 2000 and 2020, US development aid tripled, with significant funding for health (HIV/AIDS [via PEPFAR], malaria, and other diseases), clean water, and food security. The new US administration under the leadership of President Donald Trump cut USAID funding. Under Trump, the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), led by Elon Musk, targeted government spending, with USAID identified as inefficient. A summary of terminated USAID awards shows 68 such terminations for a total estimated cost of US$316,279,020. Separating it by sector indicates: Agriculture: US$68 million in TEC, US$41.6 million obligated; Education: US$2.5 million in TEC, US$10 million obligated; Governance: US$9.4 million in both TEC and obligated; Health: US$19.6 million in TEC, US$19.8 million obligated; Infrastructure: Minor investment (US$10 000); Technology: US$368 000; Logistics: US$200 000; and Other/Unclassified: US$216 million in TEC, US$125 million obligated (see Graph 1) (USAID, 2025). Graph 1: Terminated USAID fund   Source: Authored from USAID data.   The Fight against HIV/AIDS at stake in Côte d’Ivoire   As Côte d'Ivoire's leading bilateral partner in the health sector, the United States has invested more than US$2 billion since 2004, structuring its action around three strategic pillars: the fight against endemic diseases, the strengthening of health systems, and pandemic preparedness. This partnership has produced remarkable results in the response to the country's major health challenges. PEPFAR (Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) is the cornerstone of this cooperation, with a historic investment of US$1.7 billion since 2004, including US$111 million in 2021 alone. This crucial programme provides 75% of the antiretrovirals used in the country and enables 240,000 Ivorians living with HIV to access treatment, with an impressive viral suppression rate of 89% (214,000 patients).   There is also a sustained commitment to the fight against malaria, with annual funding of US$25 million, which has helped to reduce malaria-related mortality by 40% since 2010. At the same time, USAID's maternal and child health programmes, with funding of US$12.5 million in 2021, have led to significant improvements in the care of mothers and newborns.   In the face of pandemic threats, the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) has strengthened Côte d'Ivoire's capacity to detect and respond to epidemics. This preparedness was particularly evident during the COVID-19 crisis, with a donation of 4.8 million doses of vaccine and direct financial aid of US$13 million.   American technical expertise, embodied by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which has been present since 1987, has enabled major advances to be made. The Retro-CI laboratory, the flagship of this cooperation, became the only World Health Organization (WHO) reference centre for HIV diagnostics in West Africa in 2021, symbolising the excellence of this health partnership.   These massive, targeted investments have transformed Côte d'Ivoire's healthcare landscape, making the United States a key partner in building a more resilient healthcare system that is accessible to the entire population.   The consequences of the cessation of USAID funding are likely to reflect the results of the study conducted by the Cires Economic Policy Analysis Unit (CAPEC) (2018) to assess the economic and health benefits of investing additional funds into Côte d'Ivoire's national response to HIV, to a significant reduction in international funding. This study, titled ‘Invest now or pay later’, estimated the costs associated with interrupting the cycle of HIV transmission by 2020 .   Three simulation scenarios were adopted by the study: the Status quo scenario, showing an unchanged level of funding due to an equal compensation of the resources lost by the government; Optimistic scenario,  or a 37% increase in public funding to purse the government’s health goals for compensation despite a drop in international support; and the Pessimistic scenario,  indicating a 20% reduction in the health-related budget, a gap that is not filled by public funding. Table 1: Summary of microsimulation health-related results: 2020-2025   Source: CAPEC, 2018   In terms of health outcomes, if the government's efforts are based on the stable scenario, 4,740 lives would be saved and 17,493 new infections avoided. And if these efforts result in more than proportional funding of around 37% compared with 2016, then 42,387 lives could be saved and almost 50,000 new infections avoided.   In financial terms, moving from the stable scenario to the optimistic scenario requires average annual funding of FCFA 6.3 billion. Moving from the stable scenario to the pessimistic scenario results in a drop in funding of around FCFA 12.67 billion per year. Cumulative tax revenue losses range from FCFA 13.16 billion for the pessimistic scenario to FCFA 8.68 billion for the stable scenario and FCFA 5.67 billion for the optimistic scenario.   In all three scenarios, economic growth in Côte d'Ivoire will slow . In the status quo scenario, GDP will fall by 0.005 percentage points  between 2016 and 2019. This decline will continue until 2025 , when it will reach 0.035 points (see Graph 2). Graph 2: Tentative macroeconomic impacts of aid cuts: trend in GDP   Source: CAPEC, 2018   Military and security cooperation between the United States and Côte d'Ivoire   Security cooperation between the United States and Côte d'Ivoire is a major focus of their strategic partnership. Over the period 2020-2024, the United States has allocated an average annual budget of US$12 to 15 million dollars to strengthen the capabilities of the Ivorian security forces. This financial support is divided between several key programmes, including the IMET (International Military Education and Training) programme, which has been allocated US$2.5 million a year to train 50 to 70 Ivorian officers in the United States, and the ACOTA (African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance) programme, which has received US$3.8 million since 2020 to develop peacekeeping capabilities.   The impact of this cooperation can be measured by concrete results. Between 2015 and 2023, American programmes will have trained 5,400 members of the armed and security forces, including 1,200 women, covering a wide range of specialisations: 60% in counterterrorism, 20% in intelligence, 15% in logistics, and 5% in human rights. Côte d'Ivoire's active participation in regional exercises such as Flintlock (counterterrorism) and Obangame Express (maritime security), with 150 soldiers involved in 2023 alone, demonstrates the growing operationality of Ivorian troops. On the ground, this collaboration has produced tangible results with the securing of four strategic military bases in the north of the country, including Odienné and Bouna, and the equipping of three modern command centres. Intelligence sharing has helped to thwart 12 potential terrorist attacks between 2022 and 2023, while more than 450 weapons were seized thanks to American technical assistance between 2021 and 2023.   Performance indicators show significant progress: 18 terrorist attacks have been prevented since 2020, including six at the borders, and the response time to threats has been reduced by 40% over the same period. These advances have helped to position Côte d'Ivoire as a key player in regional stability in West Africa, confirming the effectiveness of this security partnership in the face of contemporary challenges.   2. Restrictive Immigration Policies: remittances and access to the US Higher Education system in jeopardy   Educational and cultural cooperation between the United States and West Africa is an important pillar of bilateral relations. Every year, some 50 Ivorians benefit from exchange programmes run by the US Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, notably through the prestigious Fulbright scholarships, which enable Ivorian students and researchers to study at American universities. At the same time, American teachers and academics regularly come to Côte d'Ivoire to share their expertise, creating a fruitful academic dialogue between the two nations.   Graph 3: Number of West African Students in the United States Source: Author However, an analysis of student flows over the last decade (2014-2024) reveals contrasting trends. While the West African region as a whole has seen a significant 66% increase in the number of students going to the United States, Côte d'Ivoire has seen more modest growth.   Besides limiting West African students’ access to the US higher education system, another implication of the US’s restrictive immigration policy is the number of remittances flows at stake for the region.   In West and Central Africa, remittances show overall growth, rising from around US$ 6 billion in 2014 to almost US$ 7 billion in 2023, with a notable drop in 2016 (around US$ 3.9 billion), followed by a gradual recovery up to 2023. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the amounts are much lower than in the region as a whole, fluctuating around US$ 300 to 400 million a year. A significant increase can be seen in 2021 (around US$ 750 million), followed by a return to previous levels. Nevertheless, the cost of a dire restriction will be higher due the number of African citizens expelled from the US by the new US administration.    Graph 4: Remittances of West African migrants living in the United States   Source: Author   3. Economic and Trade Relations: A Changing Dynamic 3.1. From Aid to Trade: the questioning of the AGOA close market opportunity for West African economies   US-Africa economic relations have shifted over decades, alternating between strong interest and relative neglect. Africa offers a growing market with abundant natural resources and a young, dynamic population. The US has adapted its trade strategy to encourage exchange and investment. However, trade remains limited, and competition from China and India poses major challenges.   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) , launched in 2000 under the Clinton administration, aimed to offer African countries preferential access to the US market.  It removed tariffs on certain products to boost African exports and economic growth through trade rather than aid.   AGOA helped triple non-oil exports  from Africa to the US, diversifying imports to include agriculture, textiles, and automobiles. For example, South Africa  became a top exporter, notably in the auto sector ( US$2.1 billion in 2021 ), with a 1,643.6% increase  in the first year of AGOA; Nigeria exported US$1.4 billion in 2021 , mainly oil; and Kenya , third with US$603 million , led by apparel exports.   Other beneficiaries include Ghana (plant roots, travel goods), Mauritius (chocolate, basketry), Mali (buckwheat), Mozambique (sugar, nuts, tobacco), Togo (legumes), and Madagascar, Ethiopia, Lesotho (textiles).   Despite AGOA’s benefits, trade remains focused on raw materials, especially oil. In 2021, Nigeria’s oil exports under AGOA made up most of its US trade. Only 18 African countries  have national strategies to maximise AGOA opportunities, causing regional disparities. The US International Trade Commission (ITC) notes major export gains by South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya.   A graph from USITC / Department of Commerce (www.AGOA.info)  shows total AGOA exports from 2000–2022, highlighting strong growth until 2008, followed by volatility tied to commodity prices and policy shifts.     Graph 5: AGOA beneficiaries exports to the United States   Source: USITC / Department of Commerce ( www.AGOA.info )   The US remains a key Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) player in Africa but lags behind the European Union (EU) and China in scale and diversity. US FDI is mostly in extractives (oil and mining), while others invest more in infrastructure and manufacturing. Only 13% of US FDI targets manufacturing, compared to over 40% for the EU.   Each US administration has prioritised different aspects of engagement with Africa. The Trump presidency (2017–2021) marked a shift toward transactional bilateral relations , focused on American interests  (“America First Policy”) and reducing multilateral involvement. Trump’s approach emphasised competition with China and Russia , seeking to curb their growing influence while reducing US development programmes. Trump questioned AGOA’s value to US companies and hinted at revising or replacing it with more favourable bilateral trade deals.   3.2. Cote d’Ivoire will need to resettle new market opportunities   Trade relations between the United States and Côte d'Ivoire are characterised by a structural surplus in favour of Côte d'Ivoire. Over the period from 2014 to 2025, US imports of Ivorian goods regularly exceeded exports to Côte d'Ivoire. The peak of this surplus is observed in 2019, with a total of US$924 million in imports compared with US$278 million in US exports, giving a trade surplus of US$645 million in favour of Côte d’Ivoire.   US imports from Côte d'Ivoire remained strong overall over the period, hovering around US$1 billion between 2014 and 2018. However, these imports declined in 2019 and 2020, probably due to the volatility of world commodity prices and the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. From 2021 onwards, imports resumed their growth and reached a new peak in 2024 at around US$1.05 billion. US exports to Côte d'Ivoire continued to grow. They rose from US$239 million in 2014 to US$596 million in 2024, reflecting a strengthening of bilateral economic relations. This trend reflects growing demand from the United States for capital goods, vehicles, industrial machinery, pharmaceuticals, and agri-food products. From 2023 onwards, trade flows will show a convergence of import and export volumes. By 2024, the gap between the two will have narrowed to around US$109 million.   The privileged framework of the AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) is the main lever for this economic cooperation, allowing 78 Ivorian companies to export to the United States duty-free by 2022. Côte d'Ivoire's main exports include cocoa (the country is the world's leading producer), petroleum products and agricultural by-products, which together account for more than 85% of Ivorian sales to the United States.   US investment in Côte d'Ivoire is growing steadily, with an increase of 40% between 2015 and 2020. These investments are mainly concentrated in three key sectors: energy (including hydrocarbons and renewable energies), digital technologies (innovative solutions for agriculture and health) and financial services. Several American multinationals have set up production and processing facilities in Côte d'Ivoire, taking advantage of the country's economic stability and its position as a regional hub in West Africa.   The prospects for developing this economic relationship are based on several strategic axes. Côte d'Ivoire is actively working on the local processing of its raw materials, particularly cocoa, with a view to exporting higher value-added products. At the same time, the United States is supporting the development of Côte d'Ivoire's logistics and port infrastructures, which are essential for facilitating trade. The emergence of a consumer middle class is also opening up new opportunities for American products and technologies on the Ivorian market.   The two governments are also working closely together to improve the business climate, simplify customs procedures, and promote public-private partnerships. Training programmes on American norms and standards are regularly organised for Ivorian entrepreneurs and exporters. These concerted efforts position Côte d'Ivoire as a privileged economic partner of the United States in the West African region, with promising growth prospects in the medium and long term. The complementary nature of the two economies and the positive dynamics of trade suggest that this mutually beneficial cooperation will deepen in the years to come.   Conclusion   US-Africa relations have significantly evolved, shaped by strategic interests and shifting global dynamics. Africa is now a key player in US foreign policy, especially in security and trade. Yet challenges persist – mainly in diversifying economic ties and adapting to geopolitical competition from China and Russia.   The Trump administration introduced a more transactional approach , changing the nature of cooperation. The future of US-Africa relations will depend on both sides’ ability to balance priorities in security, development, and economic partnership – while addressing global challenges collaboratively.   An analysis of relations between the United States and Côte d'Ivoire reveals a strategic partnership structured around complementary pillars of regional stability, economic cooperation, and sustainable development. The density and diversity of the areas of cooperation (health, security, economy, education) reflect Washington's clear desire to strengthen its foothold in West Africa, by relying on a partner that is considered stable, dynamic, and strategically well positioned.   The results achieved, particularly in the fight against HIV/AIDS, the strengthening of military capabilities, and the increase in trade, bear witness to a partnership with high added value for Côte d'Ivoire. However, this privileged relationship is now evolving in a more competitive international environment, marked by the rise of new players such as China and Russia, which are redefining the geopolitical balance on the continent.   As a result, the relationship between the United States and Côte d'Ivoire must deal with the growing challenges of sovereignty, diversification of partnerships, and reconfiguration of alliances. To remain attractive, American cooperation will have to be more agile, inclusive, and tailored to Côte d'Ivoire's national development aspirations. In this respect, the ability of both countries to renew the terms of their partnership – by focusing on innovation, training, and skills transfer – will be decisive in meeting the challenges of the 21st century and consolidating a more balanced and resilient bilateral relationship.   From these findings, make a call for action by:    Increasing domestic resource mobilisation through efficient tax policy enhanced domestic resource mobilisation; Fighting against corruption for efficient public resources management; Increasing regional trade under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA); Enhancing and developing new/other strategic partnership for the expansion of markets in the global economy; Keeping the dialogue open with the US to improve trade relations and security cooperation. References   Adibe, J. 2017. Issues in USA-Africa relations under Donald Trump, African Renaissance , 14(1-2): 7–15.   Belghiti, A. 2024. Les États-Unis d’Amérique et l’Afrique : une relation en redéfinition perpétuelle . [Online] Available at: https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2024-05/PP_06-24_D.%20Alaoui%20Belghiti.pdf  [accessed: 23 July 2025].   CAPEC. 2018. Modélisation du Financement de la Prise en Charge du VIH et son Impact Économique en Côte d'Ivoire . Research report for Abt Associates/USAID.   Fixter, C. 2015. The USA-Africa Command and USA Foreign Policy on Africa . [Online] Available at: https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/4557b341-86be-4a5a-9e88-e59625438ae4/content [accessed: 23 July 2025].   Forje, J.W. 2017. USA-Africa Relations under President Trump: Towards improving socioeconomic aspects of migration, integration, development and poverty alleviation policies, African Renaissance , 14(1-2): 39-65.   Shubin, V. 2017. Book Review: “USA–Africa: The Policy of President B. Obama Administration. 2009–2014” and “USA–Africa: The Policy of President B. Obama Administration. 2015–2016. Chronicle of Events” by Andrey Urnov, Revista Brasileira de Estudos Africanos , 2(4).   Simo, R. 2018. The AGOA as stepping stone for USA–Africa free trade agreements, Journal of International Trade Law and Policy , 17(3): 115–131. [Online] Available at: [accessed: 23 July 2025].   USAID. 2025. USAID Terminated Awards . [Online] Available at: https://healthpolicy-watch.news/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/USAID-Terminated-Awards_2025-03-06_Clean.pdf [accessed: 23 July 2025].   Online sources   US Department of State – Côte d’Ivoire Country Page: https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/cote-divoire https://history.state.gov/countries/cote-divoire https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-cote-divoire/ Open Doors – International Students Data: https://opendoorsdata.org/data/international-students/all-places-of-origin/ US Census Bureau – Foreign Trade Statistics: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) Resources – USITC / Dept. of Commerce: http://www.AGOA.info - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2025 Image credit: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID:1931756215   by Dr Sizo Nkala   Abstract   South Africa and the United States (US) have had a dramatic diplomatic fallout since the beginning of Donald Trump’s second term as the US President. Trump has outrageously accused the South African government of committing a genocide against its white citizens, unceremoniously dismissed the South African Ambassador to the US, slapped South Africa with a punitive trade tariff regime, snubbed South Africa’s G20 presidency, and contrived a controversial refugee resettlement programme exclusively for white Afrikaners in South Africa who claim that they are being persecuted. This paper seeks to understand the state of US-SA relations through the lens of the Trump Doctrine or Trumpism. Steeped as it towards isolationist, pro-Israeli, white supremacist, anti-globalisation and zero-sum tendencies, it should come as no surprise that South Africa has been a target of Trumpism. South Africa’s anti-Israel and pro-China and Russia foreign policy, its hosting of a significant number of American companies, and its trade surplus with the US put it at odds with the Trump Doctrine. The US-SA relationship appears to be going downhill without any off-ramp. It looks like it is going to be a four-year winter for a bilateral relationship that once stood as a model for broader US-Africa relations.   Introduction   Since his return to the White House for a second term, Donald Trump has taken the world by storm. He has turned the decades-old US foreign policy on its head through, among other ways, swinging a wrecking ball on multilateral institutions, pulling the US out of global agreements, pursuing protectionist economic policies, and tearing up traditional alliances and relationships with US allies. Countries like China, Canada, Mexico, and Ukraine, among others, have been caught in the crosshairs of the Trump administration. In Africa, South Africa has singularly drawn the ire of President Donald Trump. In less than three months of Trump’s return, South Africa has been the subject of hostile executive orders issued by the White House, has had its ambassador unceremoniously expelled on flimsy grounds, and slapped with punitive tariffs of up to 31% reserved for countries labelled ‘worst offenders’ in their trade relationships with the US. That said, this paper seeks to understand the transformation of the US-South Africa relationship through the prism of Trumpism or the Trump Doctrine. It argues that South Africa’s bilateral relationship with the US is going through the shock of the Trump doctrine, which is likely to disrupt South Africa’s trade map as it threatens the country’s US$14 billion exports to the US market. The first section delves deeper into the concept of Trumpism, while the section that follows traces the South Africa-US relationship from the demise of apartheid in 1994 to the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2019. In the third section, the paper discusses a shift in the bilateral relationship in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, highlighting growing diplomatic friction over South Africa’s foreign policy choices. The fourth and final section trains the spotlight on the trajectory of the relationship in the eventful first three months of Trump’s second administration, with Trumpism going full steam.    Understanding Trumpism   The trajectory of the US-South Africa relationship will, for at least the next four years, be shaped, as it already is, by what observers have called Trumpism or the Trump Doctrine (Anton, 2019; Bentley & David, 2021). Loosely defined, Trumpism is a shorthand reference to the set of ideas, attitudes, beliefs, personality traits, and behavioural patterns that underpin US President Donald Trump’s domestic and international politics. The ‘America First’ mantra is the primary idea from which every other element ascribed to Trumpism derives.  America First is a clarion call to end decades of America’s exploitation under the post-1945 liberal international order of which it was ironically the chief architect (Curran, 2018; Stockman, 2025). There are several foundational grievances of Trumpism. These include the de-industrialisation of America and the loss of manufacturing jobs for the country’s mostly white male working class, whose support has been indispensable in his political success, the country’s entanglement in a network of unprofitable and ill-conceived alliances and burdensome international organisations, its involvement in unwinnable wars in far flung regions of the world, partaking in exploitative trade deals, and lax border security, which has triggered an enormous influx of immigrants (Baron 2017; Curran, 2018; Milanovic, 2024).   As such, the doctrine proposes a compendium of measures as an antidote to the aforementioned ills, with a view to Making America Great Again (MAGA). Chief among these measures are economic statecraft underpinned by economic nationalism, which involves the arbitrary and unilateral imposition of tariffs on rival and friendly countries alike, renegotiation of or withdrawal from what are perceived to be unfair trade deals, and cajoling companies who depend on the US market to invest in the country (Ettinger, 2019; Kimmage, 2025; Schweller, 2018). To reduce the burden of global governance on the US, the Trump administration has pulled out of multilateral institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The US has also cut funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which it has accused of being anti-Israel and directed the State Department to review the country’s participation in the entire gamut of intergovernmental organisations, conventions, and treaties (The White House, 2025a). The rationale being that streamlining its participation in these institutions will save some money and grant the US some latitude for action which is tantamount to putting the country first (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017).   Further, Trump has questioned the wisdom of US security alliances with countries such as South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Ukraine, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). According to the Trumpian logic, these alliances are a drain on the US resources which have to be channelled towards the security of other countries. Another symbolic but nonetheless significant expression of ‘America First’ has been the ruthless liquidation of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which, since 1961, has administered the US government’s foreign assistance programmes. The Trump administration contended that the USAID was acting contrary to US national interests despite being entirely funded by American taxpayers. Further, scapegoating immigrants, especially those from poor South American countries, ramping up deportation rates and tightening border security to prevent the influx of immigrants, is a fundamental component of Trumpism (Dombrowski & Reich, 2017).   For these reasons, Trumpism has been variously described as realist, isolationist, disruptive, sovereignty-orientated, confrontational, anti-global, and unsentimental, among other things (Mahmood & Cheema, 2018; Stockman, 2025). Others have emphasised Trump’s personality traits such as unpredictability, spitefulness, narcissism, and erraticism (Bentley & David, 2021; Bew & Jones, 2018; McCarthy-Jones, 2025). Another less emphasised but equally important component of Trumpism, which is a continuity from previous administrations, is being pro-Israel. This is perhaps the only alliance which, despite its heavy exertion on the American taxpayers, has been exempt from Trump’s criticism. All these elements of the Trump Doctrine are key to understanding the Trump administration’s foreign policy decisions in general and its posture towards South Africa in particular. The next section delves deeper into the evolution of the US-South Africa relationship in the past three decades, which has contributed to placing South Africa on the wrong side of Trumpism.   Post-Apartheid US-South Africa Relations: A Background   South Africa’s relatively peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 and the compelling story of Nelson Mandela, the country’s first democratically elected president, drew a lot of goodwill from countries around the world including the United States. The US did not waste time in embracing the new South Africa, which it viewed as a potential strong example for democracy, stability, and economic prosperity in Africa – a region bedevilled by poverty, authoritarianism, and violent conflict (Bridgman, 1999; Ploch, 2011; Powell, 2001). To demonstrate its commitment to South Africa, the US offered the country a US$600 million trade, investment, and development package in May 1994. A month later it hosted the Investing in People conference, where the SA-US Business Development Community was formed to intensify economic ties (Bridgman, 1999). Early in 1995, a Bi-National Commission (BNC) was launched following Nelson Mandela’s visit to Washington in October 1994. Only Mexico, Russia, and Egypt had similar structures with the US at the time (Mills, 1999). The BNC was chaired by then US Vice President Al Gore and his South African counterpart Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. It would meet twice a year to discuss cooperation in several areas including human resources development, defence, agriculture, trade and investment, sustainable energy, and conservation, among others.   The fact that both countries committed to maintain lines of communication at such a high level demonstrated their mutual commitment to the bilateral relationship. South Africa was also one of only 10 countries to be included in the US Big Emerging Market initiative in 1995, which meant that it was to be promoted as an investment destination for US companies (James, 1995). In 1999 South Africa and the US signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).  As a result of these efforts trade between the two countries grew from US$4 billion in 1994 to US$7 billion in 2001. Economic cooperation thrived despite differences over trademark issues involving McDonald’s, Burger King, and Toys R Us, and a legal wrangle on intellectual property rights for medicines (Ostergard, 1999).   In 2000, South Africa joined the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) – a US initiative that enabled selected African countries to export a range of products to the US market duty-free. In the 21 st  century economic ties grew in leaps and bounds, which saw South Africa being the US’ largest trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa, with bilateral trade reaching US$21 billion in 2024. The US is now one of the biggest sources of foreign direct investment in South Africa, with over 600 US companies operating in various sectors of the South African economy. The US foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in South Africa stands at US$7.9 billion, while South Africa’s FDI stock in the US is US$6.25 billion (Select USA, 2024).   The two countries have also cooperated on defence and security issues. The US and South Africa worked together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in 1995. After being lobbied by the US, South Africa helped mobilise support from the Global South countries to support the extension of the NPT (Onderco & Van Wyk, 2019). Underwood (2008) notes that the US Department of Defense (DoD) helped with military education and training programmes for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in 1993 and 1994. The US-funded Project Phidisa provided treatment to members of the SANDF living with HIV/AIDS. South Africa was also part of the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Programme, conducted by the DoD to improve the peacekeeping capabilities of African militaries (ACOTA), while it has also participated in the Shared Accord exercises led by the US (Cook, 2013; Banerjee & Thomas, 2021; Underwood, 2008).   Further, the South African government approved the historic visit of the US aircraft carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, in 2008, while its navy participated in training exercises with a US guided missile destroyer, the USS Arleigh Burke in 2009 (Ploch, 2011). South Africa and the US worked together in the late 1990s in tackling terrorist groups in South Africa like People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), which had executed numerous bombing campaigns in South Africa. The US helped train South African personnel in investigating and preventing terrorism who later evolved into the once prominent but now-defunct Scorpions – a unit that was housed in the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) tasked with investigating corruption and organised crime. South Africa expedited the extradition of Khalfan Mohammed, who was one of the masterminds of the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, to the US (Firsing, 2012a). The two countries also cooperated on the global war on terror as South Africa sympathised with the US following the 9/11 attacks.   However, South Africa was not afraid to pursue an independent foreign policy that was at times at odds with the US foreign policy. Pretoria refused to drop its bilateral relations with countries such as Iran, Cuba, and Libya – which were considered anti-American (Firsing, 2012b). At the UN, South Africa has largely voted differently from the US and its allies. It has voted in favour of 99 resolutions condemning Israel, while sponsoring 41 anti-Israel resolutions. The country has abstained from 75 of the 111 non-Israel condemnatory resolutions, voted against 17 and voted in favour of only 19. It voted against resolutions on countries like Syria, China, North Korea, and Myanmar on allegations of human rights abuses (Primorac, 2024). According to Graham (2022), in its three terms (2007-2008, 2011-2012, 2019-2020) as an elected UN Security Council member South Africa aligned with China and Russia (so-called P2) in its voting patterns against the so-called P3 (the US, France, and the UK).   In 2008, South Africa voted with Russia and China to stop targeted UN sanctions on individual members of the Robert Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe. The sanctions would have included an arms embargo and the appointment of a UN Special Representative on Zimbabwe. South Africa also voted against western proposals for sanctions on Sudan and Iran, arguing that the imposition of sanctions would only serve to harden the targeted regimes. South Africa’s anti-US attitude may have been caused by the fact that the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), was still on the US terror watch list until 2008. South African government officials, including Nelson Mandela, still had to get waivers from the State Department to travel to the US (Firsing, 2012b). It was only in July 2008 that the US passed the Anti-Apartheid Visa Bill into law, which removed the ANC from the terror watch list. South Africa also strenuously opposed the establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). The former Minister of Defense, Mosiuoa Lekota, refused to meet with the first AFRICOM Commander, arguing that Africa needs African solutions to African problems (Neethling, 2015).   Aid and development assistance have also been an important part of the US-South Africa relationship for the last 30 years. The US Agency for International Development (USAID), the agency responsible for managing and distributing development assistance on behalf of the US government, set up its regional headquarters in South Africa (Primorac, 2024). Since 2001, South Africa has received over US$10 billion in aid from the US in various areas such as peace and security, food security, infrastructure, agriculture, education, governance, and health, among others. As the chart below shows, health has received 86% of the total aid, largely because of the intensity of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa, which is home to over 20% of the people living with HIV/AIDS (Mokale, 2024). Figure 1: Distribution of US development assistance in South Africa (2001-2024)   Source: ForeignAssistance.gov, 2025   Over the years, South Africa has been the largest beneficiary of the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR), having secured about US$8 billion since 2003. Under the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) the US committed to providing US$1 billion of the US$8.5 billion package meant to help South Africa reduce its dependency on coal and transition to cleaner sources of energy. The country generates more than 80% of its energy from coal. The US Power Africa programme, which was introduced by the first Trump administration in 2020, has to date supported more than 3 100 megawatts of electricity generation projects through mobilising private sector investments. The US government has disbursed US$83 million to support ICT infrastructure expansion in South Africa (Primorac, 2024). Moreover, South Africa’s Aspen Pharmacare received US support to build its vaccine manufacturing capabilities. As such, although the two countries have had significant foreign policy differences, they have managed to respectfully disagree but still maintain cordial relations. However, as the next section will show, the relationship has deteriorated in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic over serious disagreements on foreign policy choices.   Post-Covid-19: Deteriorating Relations   Since 2020, the relationship between South Africa and the US has been on a downward spiral. Differences emerged over the handling of the Covid-19 global pandemic. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa criticised the western countries for hoarding Covid-19 vaccines, leaving Africa and other regions without any supplies. The United States was one of the biggest hoarders of the Covid-19 vaccines (Chironda, 2021). Upon the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, the US and South Africa adopted different positions, with the US openly supporting Ukraine and condemning Russia while South Africa adopted a neutral position and refused to condemn or isolate Russia (Seekings & Saunders, 2022). South Africa’s decision to hold military exercises with Russia and China on the first anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine did not go down well with Washington. For the first time, the White House expressed its disapproval of South Africa’s actions, saying it was going to present a diplomatic challenge to South Africa (Carter, 2023). The South African government defended the move, saying the exercise was pre-planned and was a normal part of its relations with Russia and China. Washington demonstrated its growing frustration with Pretoria’s foreign policy when, in March 2023, some members of the US House of Representatives introduced a resolution seeking a thorough review of US-South Africa relations in light of the country’s joint military exercises with China and Russia. Although the resolution did not pass both houses of Congress at the time, it reflected a growing disillusion in Capitol Hill with South Africa’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war (Fabricius, 2023).   In an unprecedented press conference two months later, then US Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety made astonishing claims, saying that a sanctioned Russian cargo ship was loaded with ammunition and weapons at the Simon’s Town naval base in Cape Town. The Ambassador warned that “the arming of the Russians is extremely serious, and we do not consider this issue to be resolved.” However, the South African government denied the claims, saying they were not backed by any evidence (Fihlani & Moloney, 2023). Although an independent inquiry into the matter later found no evidence to support the Ambassador’s claims, it was not enough to stop the deterioration of the bilateral relationship (Gregory, 2023). Mr Brigety’s accusations seemed to have galvanised an anti-South Africa sentiment in the US Congress, which was demonstrated when a bipartisan group of US legislators wrote a letter to the Joe Biden administration in June 2023 asking it to move the AGOA Forum, which was due to be held in September of that year, from South Africa because of its deepening relationship with Russia. The legislators said they were “seriously concerned that hosting the 2023 AGOA Forum in South Africa would serve as an implicit endorsement of South Africa’s damaging support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” (Al Jazeera, 2023).   The relationship was tested again when South Africa took Israel, a staunch ally of the United States, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in December 2023 accusing it of the intention to commit genocide in its war against Hamas in Gaza. The White House through the National Security Council spokesperson, John Kirby, swiftly dismissed South Africa’s allegations, saying they were “counterproductive and completely without any basis in fact whatsoever” (Feinberg, 2024). This was the strongest public rebuke yet from a White House that had strived to choose its words carefully in expressing its displeasure over South Africa’s foreign policy choices. In June 2024, the House of Representatives voted to pass amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act, which would require the Biden administration to make a determination on whether South Africa’s foreign policy decisions undermine the US national security and foreign policy interests. The White House would also be obliged to give a full report of the country’s defence cooperation with South Africa (Fabricius, 2024). It seems the amendments were part of preparing the grounds for South Africa’s possible disqualification from AGOA, whose eligibility criteria includes that beneficiaries must not act in a manner that undermines US foreign policy and national security interests. South Africa is the biggest beneficiary of the AGOA scheme, exporting goods worth US$3 billion annually to the US under the arrangement. Nonetheless, the amendments did not make it to the final National Defense Authorization Act passed by the Democrat-controlled Senate in December 2024. South Africa had narrowly escaped yet another comeuppance in the US Capitol. But after the return of Donald Trump to the White House and the Republicans’ victory in the Senate and House of Representatives elections, South Africa’s fortunes in terms of its relationship with the US took a nosedive.   Enter Donald Trump 2.0: The Breakdown in Bilateral Relations from Domestic Politics to Foreign Policy   US-South Africa relations under the second Donald Trump administration got off to a rocky start. This is due in large part to the proximity of a small group of right-wing conservative figures such as Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, David Sacks, and Joe Pollack – who all have roots in apartheid South Africa – to the Trump administration. Elon Musk, the tech billionaire who donated almost US$280 million to Trump’s 2024 election campaign and Joe Pollak, the Senior Editor-at-Large of the ultra-conservative pro-Trump Breitbart News, who is currently touted as the next US Ambassador to South Africa, have been very vocal in their criticism of the South African government’s policies (Davis, 2024). They have both peddled unsubstantiated claims of white genocide and confiscation of property in South Africa. This is a narrative which Trump has advanced as a pretext to his hostile actions towards South Africa. While Peter Thiel, another tech billionaire who moved to apartheid South Africa as a child and reportedly supported apartheid policies as a university student in the US and co-founded Pay Pal with Musk, is not in the Trump administration, his former mentee is the current Vice President of the US James D Vance (Matthews, 2024).   As such, the rapid succession of diplomatic fallouts between South Africa and the US since Trump’s return to the White House comes as no surprise. It all started with the US President Donald Trump expressing his disapproval of South Africa’s Expropriation Act, which was signed into law by the South African President Cyril Ramaphosa on the 23 rd  of January 2025 – just three days after Trump’s return to office. The law gives the government the power to confiscate privately owned land for public purposes such as building public infrastructure and for public interests like land reform. Although the law stresses that those whose land is confiscated will be compensated at market rates, it also mentions that nil compensation may be possible in cases where land is being held for speculative purposes with no developments, the land has been abandoned by the owner, and where the value of the land is equivalent to or less than state investment in the land (South African Government, 2024).   What looked like a purely domestic issue soon made global headlines when, on the 2 nd of February, Trump posted a statement on the social media platform, Truth Social, saying that "South Africa is confiscating land and treating certain classes of people VERY BADLY. I will be cutting off all future funding to South Africa until a full investigation of this situation has been completed!" (Bartlett, 2025). This diplomatic tension showed no signs of abating when US Secretary of State Marco Rubio posted on the X platform on the 5 th  of February announcing that he “will NOT attend the G20 summit in Johannesburg. South Africa is doing very bad things. Expropriating private property. Using G20 to promote ‘solidarity, equality, and sustainability’. In other words: DEI and climate change. My job is to advance America’s national interests, not waste taxpayer money or coddle anti-Americanism” (Rubio, 2025). South Africa hosted the G20 Foreign Ministers meeting on the 20 th  of February and Secretary Rubio was not in attendance as he had indicated in his post. In apparent reference to the US, President Ramaphosa made defiant remarks in his State of the Nation Address (SONA) on the 6 th  of February, lamenting the “rise of nationalism and protectionism, the pursuit of narrow interests and the decline of common cause”. He continued, saying that “We will not be bullied” (Davis, 2025).     The plot thickened when, on the 7 th  of February, President Trump signed an Executive Order titled “Addressing the Egregious Actions of the Republic of South Africa” (The White House, 2025). The Order accused the South African government of planning to seize the land owned by the white Afrikaner ethnic group through the controversial Expropriation Bill. Apparently referring to legislation such as the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE) of 2013, the Employment Equity Act of 1998, and the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA) Act of 2024, which were passed to address the injustices of apartheid, the executive order went on to charge Ramaphosa’s administration with promoting racial discrimination policies against the white minority in South Africa in employment, education, and business and promoting hate-filled rhetoric against the said minorities. President Trump was also aggrieved by South Africa’s case against Israel in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where it accused Israel of committing a genocide in the Gaza strip in Palestine, and Pretoria’s close relations with Iran.   As a result, the order pulled the plug on US aid and assistance to South Africa. It also offered to promote the resettlement in the US of members of the Afrikaner ethnic group “escaping government-sponsored race-based discrimination, including racially discriminatory property confiscation” (The White House, 2025b).  Asked a few days later about whether he was going to attend the G20 Summit to be hosted by South Africa at the end of 2025 in light of the accusations in the executive order, President Trump said “we will see what happens, but the South African government is very bad and very dangerous to a lot of people. There are tremendous things going on including the confiscation of property and worse … much worse than that” (Forbes Breaking News, 2025). He made all these allegations without citing any evidence. In its response, the South African government expressed disappointment at the order’s factual inaccuracies and its failure to “recognise South Africa's profound and painful history of colonialism and apartheid” (South African Government, 2025b).   At the end of February 2025, the US permanently suspended all of its aid programmes to South Africa including the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which funded about 17% of South Africa’s HIV/AIDS budget (Jones & Ngcobo, 2025). The decision to permanently suspend aid in South Africa came after President Ramaphosa, together with the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, the Colombian President, Gustavo Petro, and Varsha Gandikota, the coordinator of Progressive International, published an article in the influential Foreign Policy  magazine reiterating their condemnation of Israel’s actions in Palestine, challenging Trump’s proposal to take over the Gaza strip, and committing to ensure that Israel is held accountable for its actions (Ramaphosa et al, 2025). The article confirmed that South Africa was not going to drop its case against Israel at the ICJ. Matters came to a head on the 15 th  of March 2025 when South Africa’s Ambassador to the US, Ebrahim Rasool, was declared persona non grata by Secretary Rubio after the critical remarks he made about the US government while participating in a webinar organised by a South African thinktank. Ambassador Rasool accused Donald Trump of spearheading a white supremacist movement, citing the Make America Great Again (MAGA) grouping in the US, which propelled Trump to the White House. Rubio posted on his X account, saying that Rasool was no longer welcome in the US and that he was a race-baiting politician who hates America and Donald Trump (Looker, 2025). It was the first time an ambassador was expelled between the two countries, thus marking the lowest point in their relationship.   South Africa was also one of the 57 countries to be slapped with Donald Trump’s punitive reciprocal tariffs. Trump argued that these countries’ trade surpluses with the US were due to the tariff and non-tariff barriers they impose on US exports. South Africa had a trade surplus of over US$8 billion in its bilateral trade with the US. Under the reciprocal tariffs, South Africa’s exports to the US would be subjected to a 31% tariff rate, which was going to make the country’s exports significantly less competitive. However, the reciprocal tariffs were paused for 90 days on the 9 th  of April, with the Trump administration calling on affected countries to negotiate trade deals with the US. If the state of the bilateral relationship of late is anything to go by, it is clear that South Africa will not be in the front of the queue for a trade deal with the US.   Conclusion   The Trump administration has plunged the US-South Africa bilateral relationship into an uncharted territory. From being the poster child of the US liberal international order in sub-Saharan Africa for the past 30 years as evidenced by Washington’s conscious efforts to cultivate trade, investment, and aid ties, South Africa has suddenly become a rogue state that undermines US foreign policy interests and disregards human rights in the eyes of Donald Trump. South Africa is now described in terms traditionally reserved for countries like Sudan, Angola, and Zimbabwe, which have long been the objects of America’s ire. More than anything, South Africa is paying for being on the wrong side of Trumpism. The country runs a healthy trade surplus of over US$8 billion with the US, is home to over 20% of the total US foreign direct investment stock in sub-Saharan Africa and is a major beneficiary of the US aid projects such as PEPFAR and AGOA. All these are cardinal sins in the zero-sum logic underpinning the Trump doctrine of America First. 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United States relations with South Africa: why now is a critical time to strengthen them, African Security Review , 17(1): 6-19. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On Tuesday, 29 July 2025.  Mr Daryl Swanepoel, our CEO and Mrs Berenice Marks were honoured to be invited by the Western Cape First Nations Collective Trust to attend the opening of the First Nations Heritage Centre at Riverlands, Observatory.   The opening featured an exhibition “Ancient Legacies and Modern Identities” which is a celebration of the heritage and culture of South Africa’s Foundational Peoples.   Distinguished speaker included Queen Katrina Esau, Head of the Royal House of Nǁnǂe, Mr Petrus Vaalbooi, Traditional Leader of the Kalahari Boesmans as well Chief !Garu Zenzile Khoisan, Chairman of the Western Cape First Nations Collective.   A significant highlight of the occasion was the handover of the Heritage Centre by the Developer, Mr Jody Aufrichtig to the Western Cape First Nations Collective Trust which will be the custodian of the centre and its surrounding heritage features.   On the following day Wednesday, 30 July, Mr Swanepoel and Mrs Marks met with Chief !Garu Zenzile Khoisan and Mr. Charles Quint to discuss an upcoming exhibition of the First Nations at The Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, in Jinhua, Zhejiang, China and other synergies for future cooperation.  The meeting was highly productive, and we look forward to collaborating on the China exhibition project as well as future initiatives.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) has expanded its “Taking the Constitution to the People: Know Your Rights and Responsibilities”  programme to the North West Province, with the first leg of workshops taking place in the Brits District. On 25 July 2025, Patrick Motsepe, ISI Schools Project Coordinator, conducted the workshop at Eagles College in Brits, where 45 enthusiastic Grade 11 learners took part. The workshop is designed to empower young people with a solid understanding of the history of the Republic of South Africa, how the Constitution was crafted and structured, and how it continues to shape the daily lives of citizens. Learners were taken through key aspects of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, the separation of powers, and the importance of active citizenship. The programme also emphasises that with rights come responsibilities and obligations, fostering a sense of accountability and civic duty among learners. The initiative reflects ISI’s commitment to strengthening democracy by instilling constitutional values in the younger generation. Through interactive discussions and practical examples, learners are encouraged to view themselves not only as beneficiaries of the Constitution but also as active participants in building a just and inclusive society. The North West Province will continue to benefit from these workshops in the coming months, as ISI rolls out further engagements in schools across the region. By reaching young people at grassroots level, the Institute hopes to nurture a generation that is well-informed, responsible, and committed to upholding the principles of South Africa’s democracy.

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to live up to its promise of “Taking the Constitution to the People”  through its far-reaching civic education workshops, conducted at various schools and tertiary institutions across the Gauteng and North West provinces. This initiative forms part of the Institute’s ongoing commitment to strengthen South Africa’s democracy by fostering a deeper understanding of the Constitution among the country’s youth. At the forefront of this effort is the Provincial Schools Project Coordinator, Patrick Motsepe, whose dedication and hands-on approach ensure the success of each workshop. His role is not merely administrative, he actively engages with learners, tailoring the sessions to be both informative and relatable, thus delivering on one of the Institute’s core mandates. On Friday, 25 July, his work reached another milestone when a total of 167 Grade 11 learners from the Academy for Christian Education in Brits, North West Province, attended a dynamic and interactive workshop. The session was specifically designed to equip young people, particularly those approaching voting age, with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa’s foundational legal document, the Constitution. The content of the workshop is carefully aligned with the Life Orientation and History curricula, ensuring that it supports and enhances what learners are already studying in the classroom. Topics such as values, social cohesion, human rights, and civic duties were unpacked in a manner that connected directly with the learners’ everyday experiences. By framing these constitutional principles in real-world contexts, the programme succeeded in bridging the gap between theory and practical application. According to feedback from the school, the presentation left a powerful impression. Mrs Mariska Kruger, Head of the Life Orientation Department, described it as “exactly what the doctor ordered”  — a timely, relevant, and engaging addition to the learners’ education. Her endorsement underscores the importance of this kind of civic engagement in shaping informed, responsible citizens. Workshops like this one do more than simply teach facts about the Constitution; they encourage critical thinking, promote active citizenship, and inspire young South Africans to see themselves as participants in the democratic process rather than passive observers. The sessions also provide a safe space for learners to ask questions, challenge assumptions, and explore how constitutional values apply in their own communities. Looking ahead, the Institute is committed to expanding the reach of the programme, with plans to roll out similar workshops to a growing number of schools and tertiary institutions in both Gauteng and the North West. Each event moves the Institute closer to its goal of ensuring that the principles enshrined in the Constitution are not confined to textbooks or courtrooms, but are truly understood, valued, and lived by the people. Through sustained efforts like these, the Inclusive Society Institute reaffirms its belief that democracy thrives when citizens, especially the youth, are informed, engaged, and empowered.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Mr. Daryl Swanepoel, participated in the United Nations 4 TH  International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), held in Seville, Spain, from 30 June to 3 July 2025.   Representing the ISI and the broader Global South Perspectives Network, Mr. Swanepoel actively engaged in high-level discussions focused on reforming global financial systems to better serve developing nations.   A central theme of the Institute’s participation was the urgent need for fairer climate finance. Mr. Swanepoel championed ISI’s proposals for greater financial support to help developing countries adapt to the escalating impacts of climate change, advocating for solutions grounded in equity and global responsibility [Click here for the ISI paper] .   The Institute also expressed strong support for ongoing UN-led efforts to reform the global tax system. In particular, it emphasised the importance of ensuring developing nations receive fair compensation through mechanisms to more effectively tax the ultra-wealthy and multinational corporations.   Beyond financial issues, Mr. Swanepoel took the opportunity to promote broader UN reforms, calling for an enhanced role for middle-power nations in global governance. As part of the Global South Perspectives Network delegation, he advocated for a more inclusive and representative multilateral order.   The Inclusive Society Institute remains committed to shaping global policy frameworks that reflect the needs and aspirations of the developing world.

The Inclusive Society Institute, in partnership with Daily Maverick, officially launched its Constitutional Insights by Albie Sachs  webinar series on 23 July 2025. This series builds on an earlier four-part podcast with former Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs, which reflected on the ideals, promises, and unfinished work of South Africa’s constitutional democracy. The webinars are designed to extend these reflections into live, interactive conversations with leading thinkers and practitioners, with a view to making constitutional debates more accessible to the public. The first conversation brought together respected analyst and commentator William Gumede  and renowned constitutional law scholar Prof. Pierre de Vos . Their discussion centred on one of the most fundamental and contested questions in South Africa today: What does it mean to be South African? The dialogue explored issues of identity, belonging, and citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa , reflecting on how the Constitution envisioned a united people while recognising deep diversity. Gumede and de Vos spoke to the challenges of building a shared national identity in the face of persistent inequality, lingering racial divisions, and generational differences in how democracy is experienced. They noted that belonging is not just about legal citizenship but also about whether people feel included, respected, and represented within society’s political and cultural frameworks. The speakers emphasised that the Constitution provides a foundation for shared identity through its values of dignity, equality, and freedom, but that these values must be actively lived and defended. They pointed out that the younger generation, in particular, is redefining what it means to be South African, often questioning traditional narratives of nationhood and seeking new forms of inclusion that go beyond symbolic unity. Audience engagement highlighted strong interest in how citizenship and identity intersect with everyday lived experiences — from language and education to economic opportunity and participation in political processes. This underscored the need for continuous dialogue about belonging and citizenship, not only in academic or legal spaces but within communities and among ordinary South Africans. This inaugural webinar set the tone for the rest of the series by posing difficult but essential questions about the meaning of democracy and inclusivity. The three upcoming episodes will continue this work by tackling critical themes: The role of state institutions in defending democracy The transformative power of mother tongue education What it will take to create an inclusive electoral system Through these conversations, the Constitutional Insights  series aims to spark broader public reflection on the enduring relevance of the Constitution and how it can guide South Africa toward a more inclusive and just future.

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to make significant inroads into secondary schools across the Gauteng Province, actively engaging learners in meaningful discussions and promoting the democratic values that underpin South Africa’s governance. As part of its flagship “Taking the Constitution to the People”  initiative, the Institute recently conducted a workshop that left a lasting impression on both learners and educators. On Wednesday, 23 July 2025, seventy-six learners from Curro Academy in Soshanguve participated in this dynamic civic education programme, facilitated by the Institute’s Gauteng Schools Coordinator, Mr. Patrick Motsepe. With his characteristic passion and deep knowledge, Mr. Motsepe guided the learners through a thought-provoking exploration of South Africa’s democratic Constitution — its origins, structure, and the vital rights and responsibilities enshrined in Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights. Far from being a purely theoretical exercise, the workshop offered a rich, interactive learning experience. Learners were taken on a comprehensive journey tracing the Constitution’s creation — from the negotiations that shaped its drafting to the principles that underpinned its final form. Discussions highlighted the Founding Provisions, which define South Africa’s core values, and examined how these translate into the freedoms and protections that citizens enjoy today. A central theme running through the session was the notion of responsible citizenship . Learners were encouraged to see themselves not only as beneficiaries of constitutional rights, but also as active custodians of those rights. The workshop challenged them to think critically about their role in building an inclusive, equitable, and just society — one that lives up to the spirit and letter of the Constitution. The impact of the session was evident in the lively engagement of the learners, who participated enthusiastically in discussions and posed thoughtful questions. For many, the workshop provided clarity on how constitutional principles connect directly to everyday life and community issues. The Inclusive Society Institute’s dedication to this initiative is ongoing. This event in Soshanguve forms part of a broader strategy to bring constitutional literacy to every corner of Gauteng. Similar workshops will continue to be rolled out across the province’s districts, ensuring that more young people are equipped with the knowledge and values necessary to be informed, engaged, and civically minded citizens. By embedding constitutional education into the school environment, the Institute is investing in a generation that will not only safeguard South Africa’s democratic achievements but will also drive the nation forward in the spirit of inclusivity, justice, and active participation.