REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL - Regional Union representation as a pathway to legitimacy and effectiveness

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October 2025

Author: Daryl Swanepoel

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The enduring centrality of the Security Council

1.2 The deadlock of reform

1.3 Beyond state-centric reform

1.4 Theoretical significance

1.5 Research questions and contribution

1.6 Structure of the paper

2 THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

2.1 Origins: San Francisco and the Great Power Compromise

2.2 Early functioning and criticism

2.3 The 1965 enlargement

2.4 Cold War stagnation

2.5 Post-Cold War resurgence of reform

2.6 Kofi Annan and the High-Level Panel

2.7 Lessons from history

3 CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS AND THE PERSISTENT DEADLOCK

3.1 The G-4 proposal: Expanding permanent membership

3.2 The African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus

3.3 The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) Group

3.4 Other proposals and coalitions

3.5 The Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN)

3.6 Structural sources of deadlock

3.7 Implications for alternative models

4 REGIONAL UNION REPRESENTATION: CONCEPT, THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS,

COMPARATIVE PRECEDENTS AND DESIGN OPTIONS

4.1 Conceptual foundations

4.2 Normative rationale

4.3 Theoretical foundations

4.4 Comparative precedents

4.5 Design options

4.6 Advantages of regional representation

4.7 Challenges and criticisms

4.8 Why this proposal matters

5 LEGAL ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL UNION REPRESENTATION

5.1 The Charter as a living constitution

5.2 Membership and representation

5.3 Precedents of representation beyond states

5.4 Voting and the Veto

5.5 Regional arrangements under Chapter VIII

5.6 Amendment procedure

5.7 Possible amendment text

5.8 Legal objections and responses

5.9 Precedents of Charter amendment

5.10 Conclusion of legal analysis

6 CASE STUDIES OF REGIONAL ROLES IN SECURITY GOVERNANCE

6.1 The African Union in Somalia: AMISOM and beyond

6.2 The European Union in the Balkans: Crisis management and integration

6.3 NATO and the Libyan intervention: Resolution 1973

6.4 ASEAN and Myanmar: Regional diplomacy under strain

6.5 ECOWAS and West African interventions

6.6 Synthesis of case studies

6.7 Critiques of regional involvement

6.8 Implications for Security Council reform

7 POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF REGIONAL UNION REPRESENTATION

7.1 The P5: Guardians of privilege

7.2 Africa: Between Ezulwini and pragmatism

7.3 Asia-Pacific: Diversity and division

7.4 Latin America and the Caribbean

7.5 The Arab World and Middle East

7.6 Europe: Between status quo and EU ambitions

7.7 Middle Powers and UFC States

7.8 Civil society and academic voices

7.9 Negotiation strategies

7.10 Comparative feasibility

7.11 Conclusion on feasibility

8 IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP AND RISKS

8.1 Phased implementation

8.2 Diplomatic strategy

8.3 Risks and mitigation

8.4 Long-Term implications

REFERENCES

ANNEXURE A: DRAFT AMENDMENT TEXT

ANNEXURE B: DRAFT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The enduring centrality of the Security Council

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has since its inception occupied a unique, central and enduring place in the global order. Having been conceived in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, it was designed as the organ of “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN, 1945). More than any other body of the United Nations, the Security Council represents the attempt to translate power politics into institutionalised governance. Unlike the General Assembly (GA), where each state has one vote, the Council privileges a handful of powers through permanent membership and the veto. In doing so, it reflects not only a legal order, but also a political reality, namely that global security cannot be maintained without the consent and participation of the strongest states.

Yet, nearly eight decades after its creation, the Council is increasingly criticised as anachronistic. Its composition reflects the geopolitical balance of 1945, not that of the twenty-first century. Africa, despite comprising more than a quarter of UN membership, lacks permanent representation. Asia, home to more than half the world’s population and several rising powers, has only one permanent seat, that is China. Latin America and the Caribbean are excluded from permanent membership altogether. Europe, by contrast, retains two permanent seats alongside representation among the elected members.

The legitimacy crisis is not merely symbolic. The Security Council derives its authority not only from the Charter, but also from perceptions of fairness and representation. If large parts of the membership feel excluded, compliance with Council decisions may erode and the institution risks irrelevance. “No action can be coherently described as legitimate if it is not socially recognised as rightful” (Morris & Wheeler,2007).

1.2 The deadlock of reform

Reform of the Security Council has been on the UN agenda for decades. The last and only structural enlargement was in 1965, when membership was expanded from 11 to 15 (UN, 1963). Since then, the United Nations itself has more than tripled in size, but the Council remains frozen.

Successive reform initiatives have stalled. The G-4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) have pressed for permanent seats, while the African Union has demanded two permanent African seats through the Ezulwini Consensus (AU, 2005). Opposing them, the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group, led by Italy and Pakistan, has argued against permanent expansion, proposing instead additional elected seats. The Arab Group, the L.69 coalition and others have advanced variations.

The Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) established in 2008 were meant to forge compromise. Yet, they have produced little more than restatements of entrenched positions (UNGA. 2009). The structural reason for this deadlock lies in Article 108 of the Charter, which states that any amendment requires a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the Member States, including all five permanent members. Because the P5 have little incentive to dilute their privileges, and because rivalries among aspirant states prevent consensus, reform has become a Sisyphean task.

1.3 Beyond state-centric reform

Most reform debates are framed in state-centric terms, which suggests individual states “deserve” permanent membership? Should new great powers such as India or Brazil be added? Should Africa’s largest states, Nigeria, South Africa or Egypt, be elevated? These questions are divisive. They pit neighbours against each other, inflame regional rivalries and make consensus impossible.

This paper proposes an alternative model, namely that instead of granting permanent seats to individual states, the Council should allocate five new seats to regional unions. Likely candidates include:

• The African Union (AU),

• The European Union (EU),

• An organisation representing the Americas (OAS or CELAC),

• An Asia-Pacific grouping centred on ASEAN or a broader consortium,

• The League of Arab States or another body for West Asia.

These seats would be held by the regional organisation itself, with internal procedures determining which member state would serve as representative at any given time. Such an approach builds upon the logic of Chapter VIII of the Charter, which already recognises the role of regional arrangements in peace and security and aligns institutional design with the reality that regional organisations are indispensable to contemporary conflict management.

1.4 Theoretical significance

The proposal contributes to debates on legitimacy and institutional design in international organisations. As Jan Aart Scholte (2011) has argued, legitimacy has both input dimensions - who is represented, who participates - and output dimensions - effectiveness of problem-solving. Current reform proposals tend to emphasise input legitimacy by expanding permanent seats. Yet, output legitimacy, that is how well the Council can respond to crises, depends heavily on regional actors, who provide troops, funding and political cover.

From the perspective of institutional design theory, the proposal reflects what Robert Keohane and David Victor (2011) call “regime complexes”, being overlapping global and regional arrangements. The UNSC has always functioned in such a regime complex, relying on NATO, the AU, the EU, ASEAN and others. Giving these organisations formal seats would institutionalise what is already de facto practice.

1.5 Research questions and contribution

This article asks three core questions:

• What is the historical trajectory of Security Council reform and why has it stalled?

• How could regional union representation address the Council’s legitimacy and effectiveness deficits?

• What legal and political changes would be required in order to implement such a reform under the UN Charter?

In answering these questions, the paper contributes both to policy debates and to academic scholarship on institutional legitimacy, global governance and regionalism.

1.6 Structure of the paper

The article proceeds in eight parts. Section 2 traces the historical trajectory of Security Council reform, from San Francisco in 1945 to the enlargement of 1965 and the post-Cold War debates. Section 3 surveys the current proposals and explains the deadlock. Section 4 then introduces the regional union proposal, situating it in comparative practice and theoretical frameworks whereas Section 5 provides a detailed legal analysis of the Charter. Section 6 presents case studies of regional organisations in security governance and Section 7 examines political feasibility. Finally, Section 8 outlines an implementation roadmap. Annexes provide draft Charter amendments and a model General Assembly resolution.

2 THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF

SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

2.1 Origins: San Francisco and the Great Power

Compromise

The Security Council was born in 1945 as part of the larger architecture of the United Nations, having formed part of the design at the San Francisco Conference; and its creation reflected the lessons of the League of Nations, whose inability to enforce peace stemmed in part from the absence of the United States and the reluctance of great powers to submit to collective authority. The architects of the UN were determined not to repeat these mistakes.

From the outset, it was accepted that the new organisation could only succeed if the world’s most powerful states, the victors of the Second World War, were fully invested in its operation. The P5 powers made it clear that their participation was conditional on special privileges, with prominent “internationalist” power brokers such as Senator Arthur Vandenberg, for example making it clear: support for US membership in a postwar organisation was contingent on a veto (Throntveit, 2017). The US Secretary of State Edward Stettinius told smaller states in San Francisco that the veto was “the price of great power participation.” Similarly, Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko warned that without unanimity among the major powers, “there would be no organisation (Office of the Historian, N.d.).”

The compromise enshrined in the Charter created a dual structure of membership: five permanent members (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States), each with veto power, and six non-permanent members elected for two-year terms. The veto was codified in Article 27(3), which required “the concurring votes of the permanent members” for substantive decisions. This arrangement institutionalised what was called the “Yalta formula,” reflecting the power realities of the time.

Smaller states protested, but their resistance was overruled, since the deal was justified according to the great states and necessary for effectiveness: no enforcement action would succeed if opposed by a great power. Yet, it was also criticised as an undemocratic concession. The seeds of the Council’s legitimacy problem were planted at its birth.

2.2 Early functioning and criticism

During its early decades, the Security Council functioned as an arena for Cold War rivalry. The Soviet Union used the veto 106 times between 1946 and 1965, blocking Western initiatives (Scharf, 2023). The Council was often paralysed and legitimacy was less a matter of representativeness than of functionality.

Nevertheless, representation soon emerged as an issue. Newly independent states from Asia and Africa, admitted to the UN in the 1950s and 1960s, noticed their absence from the Council. With only six elected seats, representation was heavily skewed toward Europe and the Americas. The imbalance became untenable as the General Assembly swelled in membership.

2.3 The 1965 enlargement

By the early 1960s, the UN membership had grown to over 110 states, with many of them being from Africa. Pressure mounted for enlargement of the Council and in 1991 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1991 (UN, 1963), which proposed amending the Charter so as to increase the Council membership from 11 to 15 members, thereby expanding non-permanent seats from six to ten. The amendment entered into force in 1965 after ratification by all permanent members (UN, N.d.).

The enlargement was framed as a response to decolonisation. African and Asian states gained more frequent opportunities to sit on the Council, while the Latin American and Western European groups preserved their shares. Yet, the reform was modest and it left untouched the permanent membership and the veto, thus reinforcing the hierarchical structure of 1945.

This experience demonstrates two enduring lessons. The first being that Charter amendments are possible when there is overwhelming political consensus and the second being that reforms are likely to be incremental and aimed at addressing representational imbalances without altering the fundamental privileges of the P5.

2.4 Cold War stagnation

Between 1965 and 1990, reform debates largely receded and the Council was often paralysed by superpower rivalry. The United States and the Soviet Union wielded their vetoes to block each other’s initiatives and most peacekeeping operations were improvised under Chapter VI of the Charter, which urges the pacific settlement of disputes, rather than being enforced actions under Chapter VII, which deals with actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. In this context, questions of legitimacy and representation were overshadowed by concerns about functionality.

Nevertheless, occasional calls for reform emerged, particularly from developing states. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) frequently criticised the dominance of the P5. Yet, without momentum in the General Assembly and with the Cold War stalemate paralysing the Council, serious reform efforts were postponed.

2.5 Post-Cold War resurgence of reform

The end of the Cold War transformed the Security Council. Suddenly freed from superpower deadlock, the Council authorised an unprecedented wave of peacekeeping operations and enforcement actions. New operations resumed in 1988, when the USSR dramatically altered its foreign policy position toward the world body. Since the thawing of the Cold War, the UN has undertaken fifty- eight peacekeeping operations. The Council became the most active it had ever been (Weiss & Daws, 2018).

Yet, this activism exposed legitimacy deficits. The Council authorised intervention in the Gulf War via Resolution 678, 1990 (UN, 1990), imposed sweeping sanctions on Iraq, and launched humanitarian operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Critics charged that the Council was unrepresentative: permanent members made decisions affecting the developing world without their participation. The Rwandan genocide in 1994, in particular, demonstrated both the Council’s centrality and its failure.

In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace highlighted the growing role of regional organisations in conflict management (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). This marked the beginning of a normative shift, namely that legitimacy required not only broader state representation, but also institutional cooperation with regional actors.

2.6 Kofi Annan and the High-Level Panel

By the early 2000s, reform was back on the agenda. Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which in 2004 issued its landmark report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (Annan 2004). The panel proposed two models:

• Model A: six new permanent seats (without veto) and three new elected seats.

• Model B: eight new renewable four-year seats and one new two-year seat.

Both models aimed to increase representation without altering the P5 veto. Annan endorsed the need for enlargement, stating that the Council “must be broadly representative of the realities of power in today’s world.”

Yet, the proposals failed. The G-4 campaigned vigorously for Model A, while the African Union advanced the Ezulwini Consensus, demanding two permanent seats with veto. The Uniting for Consensus group opposed permanents altogether. But the P5 remained ambivalent, unwilling to risk their privileges and by 2005, the reform momentum collapsed.

2.7 Lessons from history

This history yields several lessons. Firstly, reforms are politically possible only when they avoid threatening P5 prerogatives and secondly, expansions framed in state-centric terms invariably inflame regional rivalries, which prevents consensus. Thirdly, legitimacy deficits persist despite reform inertia, which is leading to the Council’s authority being undermined.

It is within this context of repeated failure that alternative models is gaining traction and so, by shifting the focus from individual states to collective regional organisations, reform could sidestep the rivalries that have doomed past initiatives.

3 CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS AND

THE PERSISTENT DEADLOCK

The issue of Security Council reform has occupied the agenda of the United Nations for decades, but while broad consensus exists that the Council must become more representative, accountable and legitimate, how to achieve the reform has proven elusive. The debates have coalesced around several competing proposals, the most prominent ones being those that are advanced by the G-4, the African Union and the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group, but there are also additional coalitions, such as the L.69 group and the Arab Group, which have added further complexity. Together, these positions illustrate both the depth of demand for reform and the reasons for its intractability.

3.1 The G-4 proposal: Expanding permanent

membership

3.1.1 Origins and rationale

The so-called G-4, being Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, have long aspired to permanent seats. Their proposal emerged prominently in the 1990s and early 2000s, gaining momentum alongside the High-Level Panel report in 2004. The G-4 argue that their economic weight, population size, regional leadership and contributions to UN peacekeeping and financing entitle them to permanent representation (Von Freiesleben, 2015).

Germany and Japan, as the world’s third- and fourth-largest economies, are among the largest contributors to the UN budget and international peace operations. India is the world’s most populous democracy and a major troop contributor to UN peacekeeping. Brazil presents itself as the leading power in Latin America. Collectively, the G-4 claim that without their inclusion, the Council lacks legitimacy.

3.1.2 The proposal

The G-4 propose expanding the Council to 25 members, which they propose doing through the addition of six new permanent seats and four non-permanent seats. Two permanent seats would go to Africa and the G-4 states themselves would occupy the others. The new permanent members would not initially have veto rights, though they support extending veto rights after a review period (McDonald & Stewart, 2010).

3.1.3 Support and opposition

The G-4 have attracted substantial support, including from the United Kingdom and France, who have publicly endorsed their candidacies. The L.69 group of developing countries also tends to back expansion that includes them. However, strong opposition has prevented progress (Von Freiesleben, 2015)..

The fiercest resistance comes from regional rivals. Pakistan opposes India, arguing that Indian permanent membership would destabilise South Asia; Italy opposes Germany, fearing loss of influence within Europe; Argentina and Mexico oppose Brazil’s claim to represent Latin America; and China opposes Japan’s candidacy, citing historical grievances. The United States has been cautious, supporting Japan, but equivocal on the others (von Freiesleben, 2015)..

3.1.4 Assessment

The G-4 proposal has the advantage of aligning with the principle of “responsibility and capability,” rewarding those who contribute most. Yet, it fails the political test of consensus, because by elevating specific states, it inflames rivalries and deepens divisions and even if adopted in the GA, it would likely fail at the ratification stage, as P5 and regional rivals could withhold approval.

3.2 The African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus

3.2.1 Origins

The Ezulwini Consensus, which was adopted in 2005 in Swaziland (now Eswatini), articulates Africa’s common position. It reflects decades of frustration at Africa’s exclusion from permanent membership, despite being the continent most often on the Council’s agenda. As the AU has emphasised, “Africa constitutes more than one quarter of UN membership, but has no permanent seat on the Security Council” (African Union 2005).

3.2.2 Content of the proposal

The Ezulwini Consensus demands:

• Two permanent seats for Africa, with all privileges of current permanents, including veto power.

• Two additional non-permanent seats for Africa.

• If veto power is not abolished, Africa insists it must be extended to new permanents to avoid creating second-class members.

3.2.3 Support and internal tensions

The AU’s position is formally united and endorsed by all African states. The Common African Position has been reaffirmed repeatedly at AU Summits, however, unity masks deep internal divisions. For example, which states would occupy the permanent seats, remains contested. Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt are the strongest contenders, but rivalries prevent consensus and smaller states worry that empowering the big three would marginalise them.

Outside Africa, Ezulwini is supported in principle by many developing countries, but the insistence on veto extension has alienated others. The UFC group, in particular, rejects any expansion of veto power. The P5, too, have no appetite for more veto-wielding states.

3.2.4 Assessment

Ezulwini highlights the principle of equitable geographic representation and rectifying historical injustice, however, its maximalist demands, permanent seats with veto, render it politically unviable. Moreover, it is unlikely the P5 would agree to extend the veto power and many Member States oppose creating new veto holders. Yet, Ezulwini remains diplomatically powerful, as no African state will publicly deviate from it, ensuring Africa speaks with one voice even as internal consensus on candidates is absent.

3.3 The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) Group

3.3.1 Origins and membership

The Uniting for Consensus group, also known as the “Coffee Club,” emerged in the 1990s to counter the G-4 push. Its founding members included Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, South Korea and Argentina. Today, it includes a range of other countries as well, mostly middle powers and regional rivals of the G-4 aspirants.

3.3.2 Proposal

The UFC rejects the idea of new permanent members and instead, it advocates expanding the number of non-permanent seats, including the creation of longer-term seats with the possibility of immediate re-election as this would allow major states to serve more frequently, without granting them permanent privileges (Von Freiesleben, 2015).

3.3.3 Rationale

The UFC argues that permanent membership contradicts democratic principles, because by locking in privilege indefinitely, it entrenches inequality. They argue that expansion should instead be more flexible, allowing rotation and accountability and they also argue that new permanent members would exacerbate rivalries, particularly in volatile regions.

3.3.4 Assessment

The UFC position has considerable support, particularly from states wary of empowering regional rivals, who argue that it is consistent with the democratic critique of permanent membership. However, it offers little to those pushing for greater recognition of rising powers or Africa’s historical grievances. It also does not address the question of legitimacy as effectively as enlargement of permanents

3.4 Other proposals and coalitions

3.4.1 The L.69 Group

The L.69 is a coalition of developing countries from Africa, Latin America, Asia and   the Pacific advocating for expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats. They tend to align with the G-4, but emphasise the need for equitable representation of the Global South (ISI, 2020).

3.4.2 The Arab Group

The Arab Group insists on permanent representation for Arab states, citing their collective population, regional significance and frequent presence on the Council’s agenda and their position intersects with Africa’s demands, since many Arab states are also African Union members (BNA, 2018).

3.4.3 The Small Island Developing States (SIDS)

SIDS emphasise the need for more equitable rotation of elected seats, ensuring that small states can access the Council and while they lack the numbers to drive reform, their moral argument for inclusivity has resonance (ROJ, 2022).

3.5 The Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN)

In 2008, the General Assembly established the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) as a formal process to consolidate reform discussions (UNGA, 2008). The IGN is structured around five “key issues”:

• Categories of membership,

• The question of the veto,

• Regional representation,

• The size and working methods of the Council,

• The Council’s relationship with the General Assembly.

(UN, N.d.)

Despite more than a decade of meetings, the IGN has failed to produce a consolidated negotiating text. Instead, sessions have been characterised by repetition of entrenched positions and no written draft has ever emerged, which reflects the inability to bridge divides.

3.6 Structural sources of deadlock

Several structural factors explain the persistent stalemate:

• Any Charter amendment, for example, requires ratification by all five permanent members and the P5 have little incentive to dilute their privileges and are content with the status quo.

• The candidacy of specific states triggers opposition from neighbours, as has been seen with India and Pakistan, Brazil and Argentina/Mexico, Germany and Italy, and Japan  and China.

• In turn, while the Ezulwini Consensus on the face presents a united front, internal African rivalries prevent agreement on candidates, thereby undermining and weakening the bloc’s leverage.

• Normative arguments for equity also clash with pragmatic political realities, such as, for example, the demands for the extension of the veto, which create unbridgeable divides.

As Vargas Toro (2008) observes, every reform proposal to date has been “nice in principle, but, in practice it does not work.” The IGN has become a ritualistic process, keeping the issue alive, but perpetually unresolved.

3.7 Implications for alternative models

The failure of state-centric proposals highlights the potential of alternative models. If debates about which state deserves a permanent seat are structurally irresolvable, shifting the focus to regional organisations could break the logjam. By representing entire regions, rather than individual states, the reform would reduce rivalries and broaden legitimacy.

In this light, the proposal for regional union representation does not merely offer another option, indeed it responds directly to the structural causes of deadlock identified above.

4 REGIONAL UNION REPRESENTATION:

CONCEPT, THEORETICAL

FOUNDATIONS, COMPARATIVE

PRECEDENTS AND DESIGN OPTIONS

4.1 Conceptual foundations

The proposal to introduce regional union representation in the Security Council marks a conceptual departure from the state-centric model of international governance, because since the founding of the UN in 1945, membership and representation in its organs have been strictly limited to sovereign states. And even though being a supranational organisation with extensive competences, the European Union only has  observer status in the UN General Assembly (Verbeek, 2022). The Security Council, in particular, has been jealously guarded as the preserve of states.

The idea advanced here is that the Council’s representational deficit cannot be solved by simply adding more states. Doing so inflames rivalries, creates hierarchies among states and risks ossifying inequalities. Instead, representation should be extended to regional organisations, which are increasingly the central actors in peace and security governance.

Under this model, the five permanent members (P5) would remain. The ten elected non-permanent members would also remain. But five additional seats would be created, each allocated to a regional union designated by the General Assembly. Likely candidates include:

• The African Union (AU), representing Africa.

• The European Union (EU), representing Europe.

• An organisation representing the Americas, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).

• An Asia-Pacific grouping, possibly ASEAN, SAARC or a composite arrangement.

• The League of Arab States, representing West Asia and North Africa.

Each regional union would decide internally which member state would physically occupy the seat at a given time. This could be rotational, elective or delegated to the regional secretariat. Crucially, the seat would belong to the organisation, not the individual state.

4.2 Normative rationale

The normative case for regional representation rests on three pillars, namely, legitimacy, effectiveness and fairness.

4.2.1 Legitimacy

The Council’s legitimacy depends on both input and output dimensions (Scholte 2011). Input legitimacy concerns who participates in decision-making. Currently, the Council underrepresents vast constituencies: Africa, Latin America, the Arab world, South Asia. Regional seats would ensure that these constituencies have a permanent voice.

Output legitimacy concerns the effectiveness of outcomes. Decisions are more likely to be respected and implemented when they are perceived as legitimate. By incorporating regional perspectives, the Council would craft more balanced and widely accepted resolutions.

4.2.2 Effectiveness

Regional organisations are indispensable to contemporary peace operations. The AU has deployed tens of thousands of troops in Somalia, the EU has led missions in the Balkans and Africa, ASEAN has mediated in Myanmar and NATO has implemented enforcement operations under UNSC mandates. Yet, these actors lack formal seats at the Council and therefore, by institutionalising their voices, coordination would be improved, duplication reduced and enforcement strengthened.

4.2.3 Fairness

Permanent seats for individual states inevitably raise questions of fairness, because why India and not Pakistan, why Brazil and not Argentina, and why Germany and not Italy? Regional representation circumvents these rivalries, because it elevates the collective, rather than individual actors. This promotes fairness and avoids zero-sum contests.

4.3 Theoretical foundations

4.3.1 Institutional legitimacy theory

According to international relations scholars, institutions derive legitimacy from participation and accountability (Hurd 1999). The UNSC suffers from a legitimacy gap because its composition is frozen in time. Regional representation broadens participation and embeds accountability within regional constituencies.

4.3.2 Nested governance and regime complexes

Keohane and Victor (2011) describe international institutions as “regime complexes”: overlapping, loosely coupled arrangements rather than neat hierarchies. The UNSC already operates within such a regime complex, relying on NATO, the AU, EU and others. Giving regional organisations formal seats institutionalises this nested governance, aligning form with function.

4.3.3 Constructivist perspectives

Constructivist theories emphasise the social legitimacy of institutions (Finnemore and Barnett, 2004). Regional representation affirms the identity and agency of regions, recognising them as collective actors. It reflects the diffusion of authority in a multipolar world where regions are central nodes of governance.

4.4 Comparative precedents

4.4.1 The European Union in international organisations

The EU provides the strongest precedent. It has exclusive competence in trade policy, and the European Commission negotiates on behalf of its members in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The EU also speaks as a bloc in climate negotiations and within the UN, Resolution 65/276 (UN, 2011) granted the EU enhanced observer rights, which includes their ability to speak, submit proposals and reply, though not vote.

This demonstrates that non-state entities can be accommodated procedurally in UN organs, though full voting membership has not yet been granted.

4.4.2 The African Union and regional peacekeeping

The AU has repeatedly deployed troops with UNSC authorisation, notably in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia. In 2008, the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) became the largest peacekeeping mission in the world. The AU’s Peace and Security Council has become a vital regional counterpart. Yet, Africa has no permanent voice in the UNSC (Security Council Report, 2011).

4.4.3 The Arab League and regional diplomacy

The League of Arab States has mediated conflicts in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. In 2011, its call for action in Libya was pivotal in persuading the UNSC to adopt Resolution 1973 (UN, 2011), authorising “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. Without Arab League endorsement, Western states would have faced accusations of neo-imperialism.

4.4.4 ASEAN and regional legitimacy

ASEAN has limited enforcement capacity, but considerable regional legitimacy. It played a central role in the Cambodian peace process in the 1980s-90s and has been engaged in Myanmar’s crises and while it has been criticized for consensus-based diplomacy, ASEAN exemplifies how regional actors can confer legitimacy on interventions.

4.5 Design options

4.5.1 Selection of representatives

Regional unions would determine their representatives internally. Options include:

• Rotation, where member states will rotate every one or two years.

• Election, where the regional union elects a state to serve.

• Delegation, where the union’s secretariat appoints a representative.

The GA could also set minimum standards for transparency and inclusiveness in these processes.

4.5.2 Voting rights

Regional representatives would have the same voting rights as elected members, but no veto, which preserves the P5 prerogatives while expanding voice.

An alternative innovation could be a collective veto, where regional representatives could only exercise a blocking vote if the entire union agreed, but whilst this would enhance legitimacy, it is politically complex.

4.5.3 Accountability mechanisms

Regional representatives could be required to submit annual reports to the General Assembly in which they have to explain their voting records and decision-making processes, which too would strengthen accountability and transparency.

4.5.4 Conflict of interest rules

To address potential conflicts, regional representatives should abstain when the dispute directly involves the regional organisation or one of its member states, which principle already exists in Article 27(3) of the Charter in that it requires parties to a dispute to abstain.

4.6 Advantages of regional representation

• Broader legitimacy is promoted in that each seat represents dozens of states, thereby expanding inclusivity.

• Conflict is better managed in that it will avoid zero-sum rivalries among aspirant states.

• Operational effectiveness will be improved in that coordination with regional peacekeeping will be strengthened.

• Greater flexibility will be promoted in that regional unions can adapt representation to evolving dynamics.

• Preservation The P5 Veto is preserved in that it does not challenge the core prerogatives of the great powers and therefore making it more politically feasible.

4.7 Challenges and criticisms

Ambiguity of Representation: Which organizations qualify as “regional unions”? Should they be universal (like the AU) or selective (like ASEAN)?

• There are internal rivalries that need to be considered. For example, some regions have multiple competing organisations (OAS vs. CELAC; ASEAN vs. SAARC). And the GA would therefore need to adjudicate recognition.

• There are capacity gaps, with some unions having limited institutional capacity (e.g., Arab League, SAARC). This raises doubts about effectiveness.

• Then there’s African Concerns, where, for example, the Ezulwini Consensus demands state-based permanents and therefore the AU as a seat might be perceived as diluting that claim.

• Legal innovation will be required, because the granting of voting rights to non-state actors will require a Charter amendment and may provoke resistance from sovereigntist states.

4.8 Why this proposal matters

Despite challenges, regional representation may be the only realistic way forward, because it preserves the veto, avoids rivalries, aligns with Charter provisions on regional organisations and enhances legitimacy. As Edward Luck (2006) observes, reform must be politically viable, not merely normatively desirable. By shifting the debate from states to regions, this proposal offers a pragmatic escape from decades of deadlock.

5 LEGAL ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL UNION

REPRESENTATION

5.1 The Charter as a living constitution

The Charter of the United Nations is often described as the “constitution of the international community” (Simma et al. 2012), because like national constitutions, it establishes institutional structures, allocates powers and enshrines basic principles. But, unlike domestic constitutions, the UN Charter is notoriously rigid and it has been amended only a handful of times since 1945, and its provisions on the Security Council are especially entrenched, reflecting the great powers’ determination to safeguard their privileges.

Any reform proposal must therefore confront the Charter head-on. The key provisions relevant to Security Council composition and functioning include:

• Article 4 restricts membership of the UN only to states.

• Article 23(1) limits the Security Council to fifteen Members of the United Nations.

• Article 27(3) which provides for decisions on substantive matters to require the concurring votes of the permanent members.

• Articles 52-54 provides for regional arrangements to be used for peace and security, but under UNSC authority.

• Article 108 states that Charter amendments must require a two-thirds GA approval and that it be ratified by two-thirds of Member States, including all P5.

• Article 109 provides for a Charter Review Conference, but it should be noted that this provision has been rarely invoked.

Of course, each of these provisions has implications for the feasibility of the regional representation proposal, but they are not insurmountable.

5.2 Membership and representation

The most fundamental barrier lies in Article 23(1), which states:

“The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations.”

The Charter clearly envisions Council members as states. Even the 1965 enlargement, which increased elected seats from six to ten, did not alter this principle. Regional organisations are not “Members of the United Nations” within the meaning of Article 4.

The General Assembly has extended procedural rights to organisations such as the European Union (Resolution 65/276, 2011), but these remain observer privileges. Voting rights in the Security Council are reserved exclusively for states.

To accommodate regional union representation, Article 23 must be amended explicitly to add “regional union members” alongside state members and therefore a new Article 23 bis would need to define what constitutes a “regional union” and how such entities are designated.

5.3 Precedents of representation beyond states

Although the Charter currently restricts Council membership to states, international practice has shown some flexibility in representation.

• The European Union in the General Assembly. Resolution 65/276 (UN, 2011) granted the EU enhanced rights, which included their ability to speak, to propose amendments and to reply, which demonstrates that the GA can innovate procedurally, though it did stop short of granting the EU a vote.

• Taiwan/China Precedent. GA Resolution 2758 (UN, 1971) recognised the People’s Republic of China as “the only lawful representative of China to the United Nations,” displacing Taiwan. This shows that representation can be politically determined by the GA without Charter amendment, though this was a matter of state identity, not organisational membership.

• 1965 Enlargement. Whilst the only precedent for formal Charter amendment relating to the Council, it demonstrates the feasibility, but also the difficulty of building consensus and securing ratification.

These precedents suggest that while procedural flexibility exists, the granting of full voting membership to non-state entities will unequivocally require a Charter amendment.

5.4 Voting and the Veto

Article 27 codifies the veto:

“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.”

After the 1965 enlargement, the threshold was raised from seven to nine, preserving the P5 veto. If regional union seats are added, the threshold must again be adjusted (e.g., from 9 to 12 if the Council expands to 20 members).

The proposal here preserves the P5 veto, but denies it to regional seats. This is both legally straightforward and politically necessary, because the P5 are highly unlikely to consent to additional veto holders.

A potential innovation is to allow regional unions a “collective veto”, that is a right to block Council action only if all members of the union agree. However, this would complicate decision-making and may weaken efficiency.

Ultimately rules should be developed to regulate the exercising of the Veto, but that will form part of a separate proposal.

5.5 Regional arrangements under Chapter VIII

The Charter already acknowledges the role of regional organisations in peace and security. Articles 52–54 provide:

• Article 52: Members are encouraged to use regional arrangements for pacific settlement of disputes.

• Article 53: Enforcement action by regional organisations requires UNSC authorisation.

• Article 54: The Council must be kept fully informed of activities under regional arrangements.

These provisions reflect the drafters’ expectation that regions would play a role in maintaining peace. In practice, the Council has repeatedly authorised operations led by NATO, the AU, ECOWAS and others.

The proposed reform builds directly on this logic. By granting regional unions formal seats, the Council would institutionalise the Chapter VIII framework, elevating regional voices from consultative to participatory.

5.6 Amendment procedure

Article 108 sets the rules for amendment:

“Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”

This means three hurdles:

• Two-thirds approval in the GA (currently 129 of 193 states).

• Ratification by two-thirds of Member States (128 of 193).

• Ratification by all five permanent members.

This last requirement is the most formidable. Any one P5 can block reform by withholding ratification.

Article 109 provides for a Charter Review Conference, but this too requires GA approval and P5 concurrence. A Review Conference has never been held since 1945.

5.7 Possible amendment text

To implement regional representation, the following amendments would be required to the Charter:

Article 23(1):

“The Security Council shall consist of five permanent members, a further ten elected members of the United Nations and five regional union members designated in accordance with Article 23 bis.”

New Article 23 bis:

“The General Assembly shall, by resolution adopted by a two-thirds majority, designate regional unions that will be entitled to hold seats on the Security Council. Each designated union shall establish procedures for selecting its representative. Regional union members shall enjoy the same rights and obligations as other non-permanent members, except that they shall not exercise the veto under Article 27.”

Article 27(2) (amended threshold):

“Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of twelve members.”

Article 27(3) (substantive matters):

“Decisions on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of twelve members including the concurring votes of the permanent members, subject to Article 23 bis.”

5.8 Legal objections and responses

5.8.1 Non-State membership

Critics will argue that allowing non-states to sit on the Council contradicts Article 4’s definition of UN membership. The response is that Charter amendment is precisely the mechanism to expand membership categories. Just as the 1965 amendment expanded elected seats, so too could a new amendment create “regional members.”

5.8.2 Sovereignty concerns

Some states may resist ceding representation to a regional union, fearing loss of sovereignty and therefore the amendment must clarify that representation is delegated voluntarily by member states, consistent with practices in the EU and AU. States would retain sovereignty while mandating their union to represent them collectively.

5.8.3 Veto equality

The AU insists that if veto exists, it must be extended to all new permanents (Ezulwini Consensus). However, this reform proposes no veto for regional seats. This is legally simpler and politically essential to gain P5 support. To reconcile with Ezulwini, the AU seat could be framed as complementary to Africa’s demand for state-based permanents.

5.8.4 Precedent for other organisations

Some fear that granting seats to regional unions would encourage other organisations (e.g., NATO, OECD, BRICS) to demand the same. To address this, the amendment must limit eligibility to regional organisations composed of states within a defined geographical area, recognised by the General Assembly as representative.

5.9 Precedents of Charter amendment

The history of Charter amendment demonstrates both the feasibility and difficulty thereof:

• The 1965 enlargement increased the SC membership from 11 to 15 and ECOSOC from 18 to 27 through GA Resolution 1991 and ratification by the P5. This shows that amendment is possible with broad consensus.

• The 1971 PRC recognition, though not an amendment, recognised the PRC through GA Resolution 2758 as the only lawful representative of China, which resolution displaced Taiwan from the UN. This demonstrates the GA’s power to determine representation questions.

• Then here were other amendments too. A 1971 amendment increased ECOSOC membership to 54 and amendments in the 1990s adjusted the size of the International Court of Justice. These show incremental changes are possible, but fundamental reforms (like the veto) remain untouched.

5.10 Conclusion of legal analysis

From a legal perspective, regional union representation is feasible, but requires amendment of Articles 23 and 27, with a new Article 23 bis. The hurdles are formidable, especially P5 ratification. Yet, compared to proposals for new state-based permanent members with vetoes, this model may be more palatable to the P5, since it expands representation without threatening their core privileges.

The Charter’s rigidity has been a source of paralysis in reform debates, but it is not immovable. Just as the 1965 enlargement reflected the reality of decolonisation, a 21st-century amendment could reflect the rise of regionalism as a central pillar of international governance.

6 CASE STUDIES OF REGIONAL ROLES IN

SECURITY GOVERNANCE

The argument for regional union representation in the Security Council is not merely theoretical. In practice, regional organisations have long been indispensable to conflict management, peacekeeping and crisis diplomacy. Under Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Council is empowered to cooperate with such bodies, but their role has often gone beyond consultation. In many instances, they have borne the brunt of peace operations or conferred legitimacy on interventions and so by examining specific cases, the centrality of regional actors to contemporary peace and security can be highlighted.

6.1 The African Union in Somalia: AMISOM and

beyond

6.1.1 Background

Somalia has been without a functioning central government since 1991. After the failure of UN peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s (UNOSOM I and II: consecutive United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in Somalia, established to address the Somali Civil War and subsequent famine) (UN Peacekeeping, N.d.), the Security Council was reluctant to commit large-scale forces and so in 2007, faced with the growing threat of al-Shabaab terrorism, the African Union established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

6.1.2 AU-UN partnership

AMISOM was authorised by AU decision, but endorsed and supported by the Security Council through Resolution 1744 (UN, 2007). The UN provided logistical support via the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and at its height, AMISOM had deployed over 22,000 troops to Somalia (Anyadike, 2024).

This was one of the largest and most robust peace enforcement operations in the world and demonstrated Africa’s willingness to take ownership of regional security, but also its dependence on UN backing for funding and legitimacy.

6.1.3 Lessons

AMISOM underscores the paradox of Africa’s role in global security. The continent provides the largest number of troops to UN operations and deploys its own missions, yet lacks permanent representation in the Council. A permanent AU seat would institutionalise Africa’s voice, which will ensure that it is not merely a contractor, but also a co-decisionmaker.

6.2 The European Union in the Balkans: Crisis

management and integration

6.2.1 Post–Cold War context

The violent dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s tested the international community’s ability to respond effectively and whereas the EU (then the European Community) initially attempted to mediate, divisions among member states weakened its credibility. The Council eventually authorised NATO-led operations, including the use of force in Bosnia (UN, 1993) and Kosovo (UN, 1999).

6.2.2 EU operations

From the early 2000s, the EU developed its own security role under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2003, the EU launched Operation Concordia in North Macedonia, its first-ever military mission and later, mandated by Resolution 1575 (UN, 2004), it took over peacekeeping in Bosnia from NATO through EUFOR Althea. 

The EU also deployed police missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and its integration conditionality further anchored stability in the Balkans, which provision of security, eventually led to EU membership.

6.2.3 Lessons

The EU has emerged as a security actor of first resort in its neighbourhood. Its combination of military, police and economic instruments illustrates the multidimensional role regional organisations can play. A permanent EU seat on the Council would recognise this role formally, reducing duplication and ensuring alignment between Council mandates and EU implementation.

6.3 NATO and the Libyan intervention:

Resolution 1973

6.3.1 Background

The 2011 Libyan uprising posed a critical test for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, but it passed muster, because as Gaddafi’s forces advanced on Benghazi, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 (UN, 2011}, authorising “all necessary measures” to protect civilians.

6.3.2 Role of the Arab League

Crucially, the resolution was preceded by a call from the League of Arab States for international action. Without this endorsement, Western intervention would have been politically untenable and therefore the Arab League’s support provided regional legitimacy, which helped persuade China and Russia to abstain, rather than veto.

6.3.3 NATO implementation

NATO assumed command of the intervention and authorised the use of force to protect civilians in Libya. This was the first time that the Council has ever authorised the invasion of a functioning state, but while the operation achieved its immediate objective, it later became controversial for contributing to state collapse in Libya.

6.3.4 Lessons

The case illustrates two points. Firstly, regional organisations like the Arab League are pivotal in conferring legitimacy to UNSC action. Secondly, NATO’s operational capacity made implementation possible. Yet, neither body had a permanent seat at the Council table and so many argue that their formal representation could have improved deliberation and accountability.

6.4 ASEAN and Myanmar: Regional diplomacy

under strain

6.4.1 Background

Myanmar’s crises, from the 1988 crackdown to the Rohingya exodus and the 2021 military coup, have repeatedly tested the Council’s resolve, where vetoes by China and Russia have blocked robust UNSC action, which frustrated Western states and human rights advocates.

6.4.2 ASEAN’s role

ASEAN, despite its principle of non-interference, has, however, played a modest role in mediation. In 2021, it adopted a “Five-Point Consensus” (5PC) on Myanmar, calling for dialogue, cessation of violence and humanitarian aid. The gist of the 5PC consisted of (i) an immediate cessation of violence, (ii) constructive dialogue to seek a peaceful solution, (iii) a Special Envoy of ASEAN to facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, (iv) ASEAN would provide humanitarian assistance and (v) a Special Envoy to visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned (Tene, 2024) While implementation has been weak, ASEAN’s involvement highlights its status as the only body with regional legitimacy.

6.4.3 Lessons

A permanent ASEAN or Asia-Pacific seat would ensure that regional perspectives are institutionalised in Council deliberations. While ASEAN’s capacity is limited, its legitimacy as a convener is significant and thus formal representation would also force ASEAN to assume greater responsibility, which could potentially strengthening its role.

6.5 ECOWAS and West African interventions

6.5.1 Liberia and Sierra Leone

In the 1990s, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed forces (ECOMOG) to intervene in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This was of course long before the UN acted decisively, but the UNSC did eventually endorsed these missions, which therefore retrospectively recognised ECOWAS as a key regional security provider (Shiro, 2024).

6.5.2 Recent coups

More recently, ECOWAS has been central in responding to military coups in Mali, Guinea and Niger. While criticised for inconsistencies, it remains the most active regional organisation in Africa in enforcing democratic norms.

6.5.3 Lessons

ECOWAS demonstrates the potential for sub-regional organisations to act as first responders, with the UNSC providing legal cover. A permanent AU seat could channel and coordinate such efforts at the global level.

6.6 Synthesis of case studies

These cases reveal common patterns:

• Regional organisations provide operational capacity (AU in Somalia, NATO in Libya).

• Their participation confers political legitimacy (Arab League in Libya, ASEAN in Myanmar).

• They often act as the first responders (ECOWAS in Liberia, AU in Burundi).

• The UNSC relies on them and yet, it does not formally include them.

This asymmetry, that is reliance without representation, undermines legitimacy. By institutionalising regional seats, the Council would acknowledge the reality that peace and security are today co-produced by global and regional institutions.

6.7 Critiques of regional involvement

It is important to acknowledge criticisms. Regional organisations are not always impartial. The AU has been accused of shielding sitting governments from criticism, for example Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir. ASEAN has been criticised for inaction on Myanmar and NATO’s Libya operation was accused of overreach in that it moved from civilian protection to regime change.

These flaws underscore the need for accountability mechanisms. Regional seats must not become platforms for regional hegemonies, they should instead, operate under clear rules of impartiality, transparency and reporting to the GA.

6.8 Implications for Security Council reform

The case studies demonstrate both the indispensability and the imperfection of regional organisations. They already act as partners, implementers and legitimisers of Council mandates and so giving them formal seats would:

• Align form with function, because it codifies existing practice.

• Enhance legitimacy, in that it broadens participation in decisions that directly affect the particular regions.

• Improve coordination, in that it links Council mandates to regional enforcement capacities.

• It incentivise responsibility by pushing regional organisations to invest more in peace and security.

The risks of partiality and inefficiency can be managed through legal safeguards and GA oversight and thus, on balance, the benefits outweigh the drawbacks, which makes regional representation a compelling pathway for reform.

7 POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF REGIONAL

UNION REPRESENTATION

7.1 The P5: Guardians of privilege

The five permanent members (P5), being China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are the ultimate gatekeepers of Security Council reform and under Article 108 of the Charter, no amendment can enter into force without their ratification. Their interests are not identical, but they share a common reluctance to dilute their privileged status.

7.1.1 United States

The US has historically been ambivalent about Council reform. Washington has expressed rhetorical support for “modest expansion,” including Japan and India as potential permanents, but has consistently avoided firm commitments (Weiss and Daws 2018, 237), but the US would likely view regional representation with cautious pragmatism. Because on one hand, it would preserve US veto power and avoid empowering rivals like Brazil or Germany and on the other hand, it could introduce new actors, such as the AU or Arab League, that might be more critical of US foreign policy positions, particularly on Israel-Palestine or Middle East interventions. Overall, however, Washington might tolerate regional seats, so long as they lack veto power.

7.1.2 United Kingdom and France

The UK and France, as European powers, face unique legitimacy challenges. Their permanent seats are increasingly questioned, because many question why two medium-sized European states should retain veto power, while Africa and Latin America have none? Both have endorsed G-4 expansion as a way to bolster legitimacy without surrendering their own seats.

For them, an EU seat would be politically complex. While France has often championed EU external action, it would resist any arrangement that replaced its own permanent seat. The UK, particularly post-Brexit, would resist EU institutional privilege and yet, both might support regional representation in principle if it did not displace their seats. And they would likely view AU and Arab League seats positively, as these could broaden legitimacy, without threatening European prerogatives.

7.1.3 Russia

Russia has consistently opposed most reform proposals. Its primary concern is preserving veto power and preventing dilution of its influence. Moscow has been sceptical of G-4 expansion, particularly Japan and Germany, and lukewarm on African permanents. Russia may prefer regional seats, because they avoid empowering specific rivals and could dilute Western influence. However, Moscow would scrutinize the AU or EU seats for signs of Western dominance.

7.1.4 China

China is perhaps the most interesting case. Beijing strongly opposes Japan’s candidacy for a permanent seat and is wary of India’s rise. It has therefore  consistently blocked G-4 expansion. Regional union representation might appeal to China as a way to avoid state-based rivals. Beijing has cultivated strong ties with the AU and ASEAN, both of which it could influence, however, China would resist any EU seat that amplified Western voices. It might support AU and ASEAN seats and remain ambivalent on others.

7.1.5 Overall P5 outlook

In sum, the P5 would likely resist any reform that expands veto power, but they may view regional seats as a lesser evil compared to state-based permanents and since the proposal preserves their own privileges, it has a better chance of overcoming P5 resistance than the G-4 or Ezulwini demands.

7.2 Africa: Between Ezulwini and pragmatism

Africa is the most underrepresented continent on the Council. The Ezulwini Consensus (2005) demands two permanent seats with veto and two non-permanent seats. This maximalist stance reflects Africa’s exclusion since 1945, however, internal rivalries among Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt prevent agreement on which states should occupy permanent seats.

An AU seat could be framed as complementary, not substitutive, to Ezulwini. It would give Africa a permanent institutional voice without forcing states to compete. Smaller African states might prefer AU representation, fearing domination by Nigeria or South Africa. The challenge will be to persuade the AU to view this as a step forward, rather than a dilution of Ezulwini. Framing matters and therefore it should be presented as a pragmatic phase one reform, with state-based permanents to be revisited later.

7.3 Asia-Pacific: Diversity and division

Asia-Pacific is the most divided region. Aspirant powers include India, Japan, Indonesia and Australia. Rivalries, India and Pakistan, Japan and China, India and China, have paralysed consensus. ASEAN has tried to articulate a collective voice, but its consensus model has limited effectiveness.

A regional Asia-Pacific seat would sidestep these rivalries. However, the question of which body represents the region is contentious: ASEAN? SAARC? A newly created Asia-Pacific Union? Without clarity, implementation would be difficult. Still, some states may prefer a rotating regional seat to seeing rivals elevated. China, as noted, would be comfortable with an ASEAN-focused seat it can influence. India and Japan may resist, fearing it blocks their aspirations for state-based permanents.

7.4 Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America has long advocated for greater representation, but has been divided between Brazil’s G-4 ambitions and the opposition of Mexico and Argentina. Regional institutions are fragmented; the OAS includes the US and Canada, while CELAC excludes them.

A Latin American and Caribbean seat could be filled by CELAC, which claims to represent the region’s identity. This would allow inclusion without privileging Brazil or Mexico, however, the US would likely resist CELAC representation, preferring OAS. And so to reconcile these institutional rivalries will be essential.

7.5 The Arab World and Middle East

The Arab League has proven pivotal in shaping UNSC action, particularly in Libya (2011). Arab states argue they are disproportionately affected by UNSC decisions, yet  they lack permanent representation and so an Arab League seat would institutionalise their voice. However, divisions among Arab states, for example, Gulf vs. Levant vs. North Africa, could weaken effectiveness, as does the overlapping of some with AU membership, because of the questions of double representation that may be raised. Still, Arab states would likely support such a seat as recognition of their collective role.

7.6 Europe: Between status quo and EU ambitions

Europe already enjoys disproportionate representation with two P5 seats, namely the UK and France, and the frequent rotation of Germany, Italy and others. An EU seat could rationalise this, but only if it supplements, rather than replaces national seats. France might frame it as an addition, but the UK would resist. Germany would support an EU seat, but only if paired with its own permanent role.

Overall, Europe is unlikely to prioritise regional representation, because it already enjoys privileged access, but that said, an EU seat might be tolerable if it does not displace existing members.

7.7 Middle Powers and UFC States

The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group opposes new permanents and advocates longer-term elected seats. Regional representation could be a compromise, since it avoids creating new permanents, while strengthening regional voice. Italy, Pakistan, Mexico and others may cautiously support it as preferable to G-4 expansion. However, they may worry it entrenches certain organisations, for example the AU or EU, at their expense.

7.8 Civil society and academic voices

Civil society organisations have long criticised the Security Council as elitist and unrepresentative and many NGOs call for abolition or restriction of the veto, greater transparency and regional equity. And while it is true that regional representation does not address all their concerns, it would conceivably be welcomed as a step toward inclusivity. Scholars of global governance, for example Keohane, Hurd and Scholte, have increasingly emphasised the importance of regionalism. Academic opinion would likely support experimentation with regional seats as an innovative compromise.

7.9 Negotiation strategies

For the proposal to succeed, careful diplomacy will be required:

• The proposal will have to be framed as complementary and not substitutive.  Regional seats may have to be presented as an interim step that does not foreclose eventual state-based permanents.

• It will have to appeal to P5 interests, stressing that the veto is untouched and that regional seats will not challenge their prerogatives.

• Engage the AU to present the proposal as consistent with Ezulwini’s spirit of redressing underrepresentation.

• Asia-Pacific divisions need to be bridged by, for example, exploring ASEAN-led representation as a pragmatic compromise.

• Latin America will have to be managed by seeking CELAC endorsement, while engaging OAS members in order to avoid US resistance.

• Create legal clarity by drafting precise amendment text so as to pre-empt sovereignty concerns.

• Follow an incremental approach by beginning with enhanced consultative roles under the current Chapter VIII, before pursuing full amendment.

7.10 Comparative feasibility

Compared to state-based permanent expansion, regional representation has notable advantages, in that:

• It is a lower threat to the P5, since the Veto is preserved and no rival permanents are created.

• Regional rivalries are reduced in that it avoids zero-sum contests among aspirant states.

• It ensures broader inclusivity in that entire regions are represented, rather than selected states.

Challenges remain, particularly African insistence on state-based permanents and institutional fragmentation in Asia-Pacific and Latin America, but on balance, the proposal has greater political viability than G-4 or Ezulwini demands, which are effectively blocked.

7.11 Conclusion on feasibility

The political landscape for Security Council reform is notoriously hostile. Yet, if reform is to occur, it must be acceptable to the P5 and broadly tolerable to the wider membership. Regional union representation, while not universally popular, offers a pragmatic compromise, in that it broadens legitimacy without undermining P5 privileges, sidesteps regional rivalries and reflects the growing role of regional organisations in global governance.

The path will undoubtedly be arduous and it will require careful framing, phased implementation and legal innovation, but compared to the deadlocked alternatives, it stands as one of the few viable reform options.

8 IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP AND

RISKS

The adoption of regional union representation in the Security Council requires more than abstract agreement. It demands a carefully sequenced political and legal strategy. Reform of the nature envisaged in this paper, will have to navigate the treacherous terrain of UN diplomacy, satisfy legal constraints under the Charter and mitigate risks of unintended consequences.

8.1 Phased implementation

8.1.1 Phase one: Procedural enhancement without Charter

amendment

The first phase would rely on procedural innovation within existing Charter provisions. Under Articles 31 and 32, the Security Council may invite non-members, including organisations, to participate in discussions without a vote. This mechanism could be expanded to grant regional organisations permanent observer status at the Council.

For example:

• The AU could be invited to all discussions on African matters.

• The EU could attend debates on European or global crises where it plays a role.

• ASEAN and the Arab League could be institutionalised as “standing invitees.”

This would not alter the Charter, but would normalise regional participation, building legitimacy and familiarity.

8.1.2 Phase two: General Assembly recognition of regional seats

The General Assembly could pass a resolution recognising five regional unions as designated consultative representatives to the Council. This would stop short of granting votes, but would formalise the role of regional organisations in Council deliberations, for which GA Resolution 65/276 (UN, 2011), which gave the EU enhanced rights, provides precedent.

8.1.3 Phase three: Charter amendment for full membership

Once procedural practices are established, a formal amendment under Article 108 could be pursued, which would:

• Expand Council membership to 20.

• Create five “regional seats” allocated to designated unions.

• Define their voting rights (no veto, equal to elected members).

• Establish conflict-of-interest abstention rules.

Gradualism increases political feasibility, since it builds habits of cooperation, before demanding legal change.

8.2 Diplomatic strategy

8.2.1 Coalition building

A successful reform campaign would require a coalition capable of cutting across traditional divides:

• African states will have to be persuaded that AU representation complements Ezulwini.

• UFC states will have to be reassured that regional seats will avoid new permanents.

• Small states need to be convinced that regional voices enhances inclusivity.

• And the P5 need to be reassured that the veto power remains untouched.

In order to break the current stalemate, the coalition should be framed as a “third way” between the G-4 and Ezulwini maximalism.

8.2.2 Sequencing negotiations

In order to ensure transparency and buy-in, negotiations should begin in the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) framework, and once consensus emerges, a draft resolution can be tabled in the General Assembly, to be followed by a Charter amendment process.

8.2.3 Engaging civil society

Civil society advocacy networks, for example, the Campaign to Stop Veto Abuse and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, could be mobilised to frame reform as a matter of legitimacy and human rights, because public pressure can help overcome diplomatic inertia.

8.3 Risks and mitigation

8.3.1 Risk of paralysis

Expanding the Council to 20 may risk slower decision-making and so to mitigate this, working methods must be streamlined through:

• Expanding the use of informal consultations.

• Clearer agenda-setting powers for the presidency.

• Digital voting mechanisms to expedite procedures.

8.3.2 Risk of regional fragmentation

Some regions have multiple organisations, for example OAS vs. CELAC. Disputes over which body qualifies could paralyse reform. The GA should establish criteria, such as universality, institutional capacity and representativeness.

8.3.3 Risk of regional hegemony

Powerful states within regions, for example, Nigeria, Brazil and India, may dominate their union’s seat and therefore safeguards, such as rotational representation and GA oversight of procedures, need to be considered.

8.3.4 Risk of P5 rejection

The greatest risk remains P5 refusal to ratify and so to mitigate then risk, reform must be framed as preserving their prerogatives, while enhancing legitimacy. And thus, emphasising that veto power remains untouched, is critical.

8.4 Long-Term implications

If the proposal were to succeed, regional representation would:

• Institutionalise nested governance and therefore make UNSC decisions more legitimate.

• Encourage regional responsibility and compelling unions to invest in security.

• Create a dynamic precedent for adapting the UN to evolving global realities.

• Far from being radical, the reform would fulfil the spirit of Chapter VIII, bringing the UN closer to its founding vision of cooperative security.

REFERENCES

African Union (AU). 2005. Ezulwini Consensus: The Common African Position on UN Reform: “The Ezulweni Consensus”. Adopted in Swaziland. [Online] Available at: http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Calendar_of_%20Events/7th%20extra%20ordinary%20session%20ECL/Ext%20EXCL2%20VII%20Report.pdf [accessed: 15 September 2025]

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ANNEXURE A

DRAFT AMENDMENT TEXT

Article 23 (Revised)

The Security Council shall consist of five permanent members, ten elected members of the United Nations, and five regional union members designated in accordance with Article 23 bis.

The General Assembly shall elect the ten non-permanent members of the United Nations for a term of two years, in accordance with equitable geographical distribution.

Regional union members shall be designated by their respective unions in accordance with Article 23 bis.

Article 23 bis (New)

The General Assembly shall, by resolution adopted by a two-thirds majority, designate regional unions entitled to hold seats on the Security Council.

A regional union shall be an intergovernmental organisation composed of sovereign states within a defined geographical region, recognised as representative by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly.

Each regional union shall establish internal procedures for selecting its representative.

Regional union members shall have the same rights and obligations as elected members, except that they shall not exercise the veto under Article 27.

Where a dispute directly involves a regional union or one of its member states, the representative shall abstain from voting in accordance with Article 27(3).

Article 27 (Revised Excerpts)

Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of twelve members

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of twelve members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.

ANNEXURE B 

DRAFT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

United Nations A/RES/XX/XXX

General Assembly

Reform of the Security Council: Regional Union Representation

The General Assembly,

Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the central role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security,

Recognising the essential contributions of regional organisations in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction,

Acknowledging the long-standing demand for equitable representation of all regions in the Security Council,

Mindful that reform requires broad political consensus and the ratification of amendments under Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter,

Decides in principle that the Security Council shall be expanded to include, in addition to its five permanent members and ten elected members, five regional union members designated under Article 23 bis;

Requests the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform to incorporate this proposal into its framework;

Adopts the amendments to Articles 23 and 27 of the Charter, as set out in Annex I, subject to ratification by Member States in accordance with Article 108;

Invites regional organisations to begin consultations on procedures for representation;

Requests the Secretary-General to provide legal and technical support to Member States;

Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals.

Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za

Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589

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