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Read the full journal, including this article, by downloading the PDF below. Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026. by Prof Wynand Goosen Abstract The rapid diffusion of generative artificial intelligence (AI) across education, professional practice, and decision-making has transformed human reasoning into a hybrid process in which humans and machines jointly generate interpretations, judgments, and knowledge claims. While critical thinking is widely promoted as a safeguard against automation bias and uncritical reliance on AI outputs, growing empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that critical thinking alone is insufficient in AI-mediated environments. Instead, effective reasoning depends on metacognition, the monitoring, regulation, and evaluation of one’s own cognitive processes, extended to include reflection on machine-generated contributions (Flavell, 1979; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Metacognition implies thinking on an extended basis. This extended basis identifies “consequence” as the missing link. Understanding the real impact of any form of thinking, whether originating from natural humans or artificial intelligence. This article reconceptualises metacognition as secondary thinking: a supervisory cognitive layer that governs how humans engage with, evaluate, and rely on AI systems. Drawing on cognitive psychology, education, human–computer interaction, and decision sciences, the paper argues that secondary thinking is the central mechanism through which epistemic agency, trust calibration, and responsibility are maintained in human–AI reasoning (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Liao & Sundar, 2022). Three core claims are advanced. First, generative AI shifts cognition from an individual activity to a distributed human–machine system, intensifying the need for metacognitive regulation (Hutchins, 1995; Hollan et al., 2000). Second, critical thinking in AI-supported contexts is contingent on secondary thinking, which determines when and how analytical evaluation is activated (Bjork et al., 2013; Halpern, 2014). Third, failures of secondary thinking explain phenomena such as automation bias, cognitive offloading, and over-trust in fluent AI outputs (Skitka et al., 2000; Kasneci et al., 2023). The article establishes a conceptual foundation for understanding secondary thinking as a mediator between machine cognition and human judgment, preparing the ground for a structured literature survey and the development of an integrative Human–AI Metacognitive Mediation (HAMM) model in subsequent sections. Keywords: Metacognition; Secondary Thinking; Critical Thinking; Human–AI Collaboration; Generative Artificial Intelligence; Distributed Cognition; Automation Bias; AI Literacy 1. Introduction: From Individual Cognition to Hybrid Human–AI Reasoning The integration of generative artificial intelligence (AI) into everyday cognitive work has fundamentally altered how reasoning is performed across educational, professional, and organisational contexts. Tasks such as writing, analysing information, planning, problem-solving, and decision-making now increasingly involve sustained interaction with AI systems capable of producing fluent, context-sensitive, and seemingly reasoned outputs. These systems do not merely support cognition at the margins or automate routine functions; rather, they participate directly in the generation, structuring, and evaluation of ideas. In many contemporary settings, AI-generated outputs function as primary cognitive inputs, the starting point for reasoning rather than its endpoint, thereby reshaping how judgments are formed. As a consequence, cognition can no longer be adequately understood as a purely internal process confined to the individual mind. Instead, reasoning unfolds within hybrid human–machine systems, in which cognitive labour is distributed across human intuitions, analytical processes, and machine-generated contributions (Salomon, 1993; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 2010). Within such systems, reasoning outcomes (consequences) emerge not from isolated human deliberation or automated computation alone, but from the interaction between fast human judgments, AI-generated outputs, and the regulatory processes that govern their integration. The consequences, or impact, of the integrated human and artificial thinking suggest a level of “metacognition” —thinking in such a way that we understand the real consequences. This reconceptualisation is consistent with foundational work in distributed cognition, which demonstrates that reasoning routinely extends beyond the individual to include artefacts, representations, technologies, and social structures that shape how problems are framed and solved (Salomon, 1993; Hutchins, 1995). Generative AI intensifies this dynamic by functioning not only as an external resource but as an active contributor to reasoning, proposing arguments, synthesising evidence, generating counterfactuals, and simulating inferential pathways. In practice, humans increasingly co-think with AI systems, engaging them as interlocutors within cognitive activity rather than as neutral tools executing predefined instructions. This shift fundamentally alters the epistemic conditions under which reasoning occurs. When AI systems contribute directly to the content and structure of reasoning, questions of agency, responsibility, authorship, and justification become distributed rather than singular. The apparent coherence, confidence, and completeness of AI-generated outputs can obscure their probabilistic and non-semantic foundations, while their speed and scale can reduce opportunities for reflective human oversight. As a result, epistemic risk no longer arises solely from human bias or error, but from mismanaged interaction between human judgment and machine-generated contributions. Against this backdrop, a foundational epistemic question emerges: What forms of thinking enable humans to remain responsible epistemic agents when reasoning with and through AI? In educational and professional discourse, critical thinking is commonly positioned as the primary response to this challenge (Facione, 2015; Ennis, 2016). Learners and practitioners are urged to evaluate AI outputs, interrogate assumptions, verify sources, and resist uncritical acceptance. While normatively compelling, this response implicitly assumes that critical thinking is continuously available and readily activated. However, extensive research in cognitive psychology demonstrates that critical thinking is effortful, situational, and conditionally deployed, rather than a default mode of reasoning (Kuhn, 1999; Halpern, 2014). Analytical evaluation requires sustained attention and cognitive control, and it is frequently not activated in environments characterised by time pressure, informational overload, or reduced perceived effort. When tasks appear fluent, complete, or cognitively efficient, as is often the case with generative AI outputs, individuals are more likely to rely on surface plausibility than on sustained analytical scrutiny. Empirical evidence further indicates that analytical reasoning is governed by higher-order regulatory processes rather than operating autonomously. Individuals do not engage in continuous critical evaluation; instead, such evaluation is triggered by signals of uncertainty, contradiction, or epistemic risk. In the absence of these signals, even highly trained individuals may accept outputs unreflectively, particularly when those outputs align with prior beliefs or expectations. AI-mediated environments systematically attenuate many of the cues that typically prompt scrutiny—such as visible uncertainty, hesitation, or partial explanations—thereby increasing the likelihood that critical thinking remains dormant. These regulatory processes are captured by metacognition, broadly defined as awareness and control of one’s own thinking (Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Metacognition enables individuals to monitor uncertainty, evaluate progress, and adjust cognitive strategies. In AI-mediated reasoning, however, metacognition must operate at an expanded scope. It must regulate not only human thought processes, but also reliance on machine-generated outputs, including decisions about when to accept, interrogate, override, or suspend AI assistance (Liao & Sundar, 2022). Despite this necessity, research on metacognition, critical thinking, and human–AI interaction remains fragmented. Educational psychology has developed robust models of self-regulation yet typically treats cognition as individual (Schraw & Dennison, 1994). Human–AI interaction research has focused extensively on usability, trust, and performance, but with limited integration of metacognitive theory (Parasuraman et al., 2000). Meanwhile, educational discussions of generative AI often frame critical thinking as a static skill to be preserved, rather than as a conditionally activated process governed by metacognitive mediation (Holmes et al., 2023). This fragmentation obscures a central insight: failures in human–AI reasoning are frequently not failures of critical thinking capacity, but failures of metacognitive regulation within hybrid systems. When regulatory oversight is weak, critical thinking may never be activated, regardless of an individual’s expertise or intent. This article addresses that gap by advancing secondary thinking as the supervisory mechanism that mediates between human cognition and machine-generated contributions. Building on this insight, the article proposes the Human–AI Metacognitive Mediation (HAMM) model, which conceptualises reasoning in AI-mediated environments as a multi-layered, recursively regulated system. Within this model, secondary thinking governs the activation of critical thinking, the calibration of trust in AI systems, and the integration of machine outputs into human judgment. By foregrounding metacognitive mediation, the HAMM model provides a coherent theoretical foundation for understanding epistemic agency, accountability, and responsible reasoning in the age of generative AI. 2. Metacognition as Secondary Thinking Metacognition has long been defined as “knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena”, encompassing the processes by which individuals plan, monitor, and regulate their thinking (Flavell, 1979). This foundational formulation established that cognition is not limited to first-order processes such as perception, inference, or memory retrieval, but also includes higher-order awareness of how those processes unfold and how effectively they serve one’s goals. Subsequent theoretical models refined this view by distinguishing between metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive monitoring, and metacognitive control, emphasising that effective reasoning depends not only on the content of thought, but on the continuous oversight and regulation of cognitive activity (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Efklides, 2008). Across decades of empirical research, metacognition has been shown to predict learning quality, problem-solving success, and error detection across a wide range of domains and age groups. Importantly, these effects are most pronounced in complex, uncertain, or ill-structured task contexts in which individuals must decide not only how to think, but whether their current understanding is adequate and when to revise their approach (Zimmerman, 2002; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). These characteristics closely resemble the cognitive demands imposed by AI-mediated reasoning environments. In this article, metacognition is conceptualised functionally as secondary thinking—a supervisory layer of cognition that operates on thinking rather than as thinking. This distinction is analytically important. Secondary thinking does not directly generate ideas, arguments, or solutions; instead, it governs the conditions under which such cognitive products are produced, evaluated, and revised. Framed in this way, secondary thinking functions as a form of cognitive governance, shaping the reliability, depth, and epistemic quality of reasoning rather than its immediate outputs. More specifically, secondary thinking regulates cognition through several interrelated functions. It involves monitoring the coherence, plausibility, and uncertainty of one’s own reasoning, allowing individuals to recognise gaps in understanding or mismatches between confidence and justification (Schraw, 1998; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). It also includes evaluating the reliability, scope, and limitations of AI-generated outputs, particularly in light of the probabilistic and opaque nature of generative models (Van den Bosch & Bronkhorst, 2018; Liao & Sundar, 2022). A further function of secondary thinking is detecting cognitive conflict, such as discrepancies between intuitive judgments and analytical considerations, or between human reasoning and machine suggestions (Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich et al., 2016). Finally, secondary thinking supports strategic control, enabling individuals to decide when to rely on AI, when to override it, and when to seek alternative sources or verification (Parasuraman et al., 2000; Endsley, 2017). This framing clarifies the role of metacognition in AI-mediated reasoning. Rather than treating metacognition as a generic learning skill or background trait, secondary thinking is understood as a dynamic regulatory mechanism that governs the interaction between human cognition and machine cognition. It operates above both intuitive, fast processes and deliberate analytical processes, coordinating their deployment in response to contextual demands and epistemic risk (Bjork et al., 2013). Crucially, secondary thinking is not automatically triggered. Its activation depends on task design, perceived stakes, time pressure, and the presence of explicit reflective cues. In environments where AI systems produce fluent, confident, and seemingly authoritative outputs, the absence of such cues can suppress secondary thinking altogether. Under these conditions, even highly educated individuals may accept outputs uncritically, mistaking coherence, confidence, or stylistic sophistication for epistemic correctness (Williams et al., 2022). This vulnerability underscores the central importance of secondary thinking in hybrid human–AI reasoning systems. 3. Critical Thinking in AI-Mediated Contexts Critical thinking is typically defined as purposeful, reflective judgment involving the analysis and evaluation of arguments, evidence, and assumptions (Facione, 1990; Ennis, 2016). Within higher education and professional practice, it is widely regarded as a cornerstone competence, underpinning informed decision-making, complex problem-solving, ethical judgment, and responsible participation in knowledge-based societies. Critical thinking is often positioned as a safeguard against error, bias, and misinformation, particularly in environments characterised by informational abundance, competing claims, and epistemic uncertainty. In policy discourse and educational reform, it is frequently presented as the primary defence against the epistemic risks associated with digital technologies and automated systems. However, a substantial body of research demonstrates that critical thinking is neither context-free nor continuously active. Rather than operating as a default cognitive mode, critical thinking is situational, effortful, and strongly shaped by higher-order regulatory processes that govern attention, effort allocation, and strategy selection (Halpern, 2014; Kuhn, 2015). Individuals do not constantly evaluate the quality of information they encounter. Instead, analytical reasoning is selectively engaged in response to cues such as uncertainty, perceived risk, contradiction, or explicit demands for justification. When these cues are absent, even well-trained individuals may rely on surface plausibility rather than deliberate evaluation. From a cognitive perspective, critical thinking requires sustained attention, effortful processing, and the inhibition of intuitive or habitual responses. These demands make it cognitively costly and therefore selectively deployed. Individuals are more likely to engage in critical scrutiny when they perceive high stakes or epistemic danger, and less likely to do so when tasks appear familiar, efficient, or well-structured. Consequently, critical thinking is highly sensitive to features of the surrounding cognitive environment, including time pressure, perceived task difficulty, motivational factors, and the availability of external cognitive supports. Environments that reduce effort or signal completion can unintentionally suppress analytical engagement. In AI-supported environments, this conditionality becomes especially pronounced. Generative AI systems can, under appropriate conditions, scaffold critical thinking by exposing users to alternative perspectives, counterarguments, illustrative examples, and structured explanations that prompt comparison, evaluation, and synthesis (Chi, 2009; Kerrigan & Azevedo, 2022). When AI is used dialogically and reflectively—through iterative prompting, critique, explanation requests, or justification cycles—it can function as a cognitive partner that extends rather than replaces human reasoning capacity. Empirical work suggests that such reflective use of AI can enhance argument quality, conceptual integration, and depth of understanding, particularly when users remain actively engaged in evaluating the AI’s contributions (Xie et al., 2024). At the same time, generative AI can suppress critical thinking, particularly when its outputs are fluent, confident, and presented as complete or authoritative solutions. In these cases, AI reduces perceived task difficulty and creates an impression that cognitive work has already been done, encouraging cognitive offloading and premature closure (Kasneci et al., 2023). This suppression is amplified by well-established cognitive biases, most notably the tendency to equate linguistic fluency with epistemic reliability (Kahneman, 2011). As Bender and Koller (2020) argue, the surface coherence of language-model outputs can obscure underlying inaccuracies, fabrications, or unsupported inferences, creating a powerful illusion of understanding that discourages further scrutiny. Importantly, in such cases, critical thinking is not absent because users lack the relevant skills, dispositions, or educational preparation. Rather, it is absent because it is never activated. The cognitive environment created by generative AI often removes or attenuates the signals—such as visible uncertainty, hesitation, partial reasoning, or error—that typically prompt analytical evaluation. Without these epistemic triggers, individuals may default to acceptance, particularly when AI outputs align with prior beliefs, expectations, or goals. As a result, critical thinking remains latent, even among individuals with substantial training and experience in analytical reasoning and professional judgment. These observations indicate that critical thinking alone cannot adequately explain reasoning quality in AI-mediated contexts. Instead, critical thinking is governed by secondary thinking, which determines when analytical evaluation is warranted, how intensively it should be applied, and whether AI outputs should be accepted, questioned, or rejected (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Bjork et al., 2013). Secondary thinking monitors epistemic risk, detects overconfidence, and initiates reflective scrutiny when conditions demand it. Without such metacognitive oversight, critical thinking cannot reliably fulfil its epistemic function within hybrid cognitive systems, regardless of an individual’s formal competence, experience, or intentions. 4. Machine Cognition, Automation Bias, and Distributed Responsibility Although contemporary AI systems do not possess cognition in the human sense, they increasingly perform functions that simulate the outward characteristics of reasoning. These include generating explanations, synthesising large bodies of information, identifying patterns across datasets, and proposing decisions or action pathways that resemble deliberative judgment (Miller, 2019; Bender et al., 2021). In interactive contexts, these outputs are linguistically fluent, context-sensitive, and often structurally indistinguishable from human-authored reasoning. They follow the conventions of argumentation, explanation, and narrative coherence that humans associate with understanding and rational agency. As a result, users frequently respond to AI systems as if they were epistemic agents—entities capable of knowing, reasoning, and justifying—rather than as computational artefacts executing statistical inference. This functional resemblance has profound cognitive consequences. Humans are evolutionarily and socially predisposed to attribute understanding, intention, and authority to entities that produce coherent language and plausible explanations. Language fluency, in particular, acts as a powerful cue for competence and trustworthiness. In the case of generative AI, this attribution occurs despite extensive evidence that such systems operate through probabilistic pattern completion rather than semantic comprehension, intentional reasoning, or truth-directed inference (Bender & Koller, 2020; Ji et al., 2023). The system does not “know” what it states, nor does it possess commitments to truth, evidence, or justification. The growing disjunction between epistemic appearance and epistemic reality therefore becomes a central source of risk in AI-mediated reasoning. Crucially, the problem is not simply that users misunderstand how AI systems work at a technical level. Rather, AI systems actively reshape the epistemic environment in which judgments are formed. Generative AI reduces informational friction by presenting outputs that are immediate, confident, syntactically complete, and often framed as solutions rather than as provisional suggestions. Traditional cues that signal uncertainty—hesitation, partial explanations, visible effort, acknowledged gaps, or expressions of doubt—are largely absent. This absence alters the cognitive ecology of reasoning, shifting users toward acceptance rather than interrogation. Even when errors or inconsistencies are present, the smoothness of presentation can suppress the impulse to scrutinise. One of the most robustly documented consequences of this altered epistemic environment is automation bias, defined as the systematic tendency to over-rely on automated systems, particularly when they appear authoritative, consistent, or cognitively efficient (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Skitka et al., 2000). Research across aviation, healthcare, finance, and military decision-making consistently demonstrates that individuals frequently defer to automated recommendations even when contradictory evidence is available or when the system is demonstrably fallible. Importantly, automation bias persists among experts and does not reliably diminish with experience alone, especially under conditions of cognitive load, time pressure, or task complexity (Mosier & Skitka, 2018). In AI-mediated reasoning, automation bias manifests in distinct but related forms. Users may accept AI-generated explanations without verification, fail to notice hallucinated citations or fabricated claims, or defer judgment to the system when outputs align with prior beliefs or goals. Generative AI intensifies these effects by masking epistemic uncertainty behind linguistic fluency, thereby exploiting well-known cognitive heuristics that equate coherence with correctness (Kahneman, 2011). The result is not blind trust in technology per se, but a subtle recalibration of epistemic vigilance in which scrutiny is deferred unless explicitly triggered. A key construct for understanding these dynamics is trust calibration, defined as the alignment between a user’s confidence in an AI system and the system’s actual reliability in a given context (Van den Bosch & Bronkhorst, 2018; Liao & Sundar, 2022). Miscalibrated trust produces two symmetrical failure modes: over-reliance, in which erroneous or inappropriate outputs are accepted, and under-reliance, in which valuable assistance is dismissed or ignored. Importantly, trust calibration is not achieved solely through improvements in system accuracy, transparency, or explainability. It is fundamentally a metacognitive accomplishment, requiring users to recognise uncertainty, reflect on system limitations, assess contextual appropriateness, and dynamically adjust reliance strategies (Gigerenzer, 2020). From the perspective of distributed cognition, reasoning outcomes remain human responsibilities, even when machines contribute substantially to the cognitive process (Hutchins, 1995). Cognitive artefacts can extend, scaffold, and transform reasoning by externalising memory, generating representations, or accelerating comparison. However, they do not assume epistemic agency. The delegation of cognitive labour—such as information retrieval or synthesis—does not entail the delegation of epistemic accountability. Decisions, interpretations, and justifications ultimately remain attributable to human agents. Ethical and epistemic responsibility therefore cannot be offloaded to machines, regardless of their apparent sophistication or autonomy. Within this distributed cognitive system, secondary thinking emerges as the mechanism through which responsibility is exercised and maintained. Secondary thinking governs how AI outputs are interpreted, how trust is dynamically calibrated, and how final judgments are justified and defended. It enables users to step back from fluent outputs, interrogate their reliability, and reflect on how machine-generated content has shaped their reasoning process. By regulating the interaction between human judgment and machine-generated contributions, secondary thinking supports epistemic vigilance, accountability, and adaptive reliance within hybrid human–AI reasoning systems (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). 5. Synthesis of the Literature: Secondary Thinking as a Mediator in Human–AI Reasoning The preceding sections establish three interlocking premises that together reframe how reasoning must be understood in AI-mediated contexts. First, cognition in AI-rich environments is increasingly distributed across human and machine agents, rather than confined to the individual mind. Second, critical thinking—while indispensable to sound judgment—does not operate continuously or autonomously in such environments; its activation is conditional and effortful. Third, metacognitive regulation, conceptualised in this article as secondary thinking, is required to govern reasoning processes within hybrid cognitive systems. This section synthesises findings across educational psychology, cognitive science, and human–AI interaction research to demonstrate that secondary thinking operates not merely as an auxiliary skill, but as a mediating mechanism that determines how machine-generated contributions influence human judgment. Within educational psychology, decades of empirical research consistently demonstrate that metacognition is a stronger predictor of learning quality, error detection, transfer, and long-term retention than cognitive ability or domain knowledge alone (Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Zimmerman, 2002; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Learners with strong metacognitive skills are better able to monitor their understanding, detect misconceptions, allocate effort strategically, and adapt their approaches when faced with difficulty. These advantages are especially pronounced in ill-structured problem-solving contexts, where there is no single correct solution path and where success depends on evaluating the adequacy and reliability of one’s reasoning strategies (Efklides, 2008). In such contexts, progress hinges less on executing procedures and more on regulating cognition itself. Crucially, these metacognitive advantages are not limited to formal learning settings. They generalise to any environment characterised by uncertainty, complexity, and incomplete information—conditions that closely resemble contemporary AI-mediated reasoning contexts. Generative AI systems introduce precisely the circumstances under which metacognitive regulation becomes essential: informational abundance, reduced cognitive effort, and asymmetric epistemic authority between human users and machine-generated outputs. When AI systems rapidly generate fluent explanations, summaries, or recommendations, users must decide not only what to accept, but whether acceptance is warranted at all. These decisions are inherently metacognitive. Parallel insights emerge from the literature on human–automation interaction and decision sciences. Decades of research on automation bias demonstrate that individuals frequently over-rely on automated systems, even when those systems are demonstrably fallible or when contradictory evidence is available (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Skitka et al., 2000). This over-reliance is exacerbated under conditions of cognitive load, time pressure, or perceived system authority, and persists even among highly trained professionals (Mosier & Skitka, 2018). Importantly, these failures cannot be adequately explained by lack of expertise, motivation, or training. Instead, they reflect breakdowns in metacognitive monitoring, particularly failures to recognise uncertainty, question reliability, or recalibrate trust in light of contextual cues. Research on generative AI in educational and professional settings further reinforces this interpretation. Studies consistently show that passive engagement with AI outputs—such as copying, accepting, or minimally editing generated content—is associated with shallow processing, reduced cognitive effort, and uncritical acceptance of plausible but flawed information (Ji et al., 2023; Kasneci et al., 2023). In contrast, when AI use is embedded within reflective and metacognitively demanding practices—including self-explanation, justification prompts, comparison of alternatives, or iterative critique—reasoning quality improves substantially (Kerrigan & Azevedo, 2022; Xie et al., 2024). Learners and practitioners in these conditions demonstrate greater awareness of uncertainty, stronger argumentation, and improved ability to detect errors or inconsistencies. Taken together, these findings indicate that AI itself is neither inherently beneficial nor inherently detrimental to human cognition. Rather, its cognitive impact is conditional, shaped by how individuals regulate their interaction with machine-generated outputs. AI can function as a powerful cognitive scaffold when it is used within a metacognitively regulated framework that encourages reflection, evaluation, and strategic control. Conversely, AI can function as a cognitive substitute when such regulation is absent, leading to cognitive offloading, automation bias, and diminished epistemic vigilance. Synthesised across these literatures, a central explanatory insight emerges: secondary thinking governs whether AI functions as a cognitive scaffold or as a cognitive substitute. When secondary thinking is active, individuals monitor both their own reasoning and the AI’s contributions, calibrate trust appropriately, and engage critical thinking when warranted. Under these conditions, AI supports exploration, comparison, and epistemic reflection. When secondary thinking is inactive or suppressed, AI reduces epistemic friction, obscures uncertainty, and encourages uncritical acceptance, thereby suppressing reasoning rather than enhancing it. This mediating role of secondary thinking provides the missing theoretical bridge linking metacognition research, critical thinking theory, and human–AI interaction studies. It explains why similar AI tools can produce radically different cognitive outcomes across users and contexts, and why interventions focused solely on improving AI accuracy or transparency are insufficient. Without attention to the metacognitive processes that regulate human–AI interaction, critical thinking cannot reliably fulfil its epistemic function within hybrid cognitive systems. By positioning secondary thinking as a mediator rather than a peripheral skill, this synthesis reframes human–AI reasoning as a metacognitively governed system. This reframing sets the foundation for the Human–AI Metacognitive Mediation (HAMM) model developed in the following section, which formalises these relationships and articulates their implications for education, leadership, and AI literacy. 6. The Human–AI Metacognitive Mediation (HAMM) Model 6.1 Conceptual Architecture Building on the preceding synthesis, the Human–AI Metacognitive Mediation (HAMM) model is proposed as an integrative theoretical framework for understanding reasoning in AI-mediated environments. The model is designed to explain how and why interactions between human cognition and machine-generated outputs produce variable epistemic outcomes, ranging from enhanced reasoning and learning to automation bias and cognitive offloading. Rather than conceptualising reasoning as a linear sequence in which human input is followed by machine output and then acceptance or rejection, the HAMM model frames human–AI reasoning as a dynamic, recursive system governed by metacognitive oversight. At the core of the HAMM model is the claim that reasoning quality in AI-mediated contexts is not determined solely by the accuracy of AI systems or the critical thinking ability of users. Instead, it is shaped by the regulatory processes that govern how human cognition and machine-generated contributions are integrated, monitored, and revised over time. Secondary thinking functions as the supervisory mechanism that coordinates this integration, ensuring that reasoning remains adaptive, context-sensitive, and epistemically responsible. The model comprises three interacting layers, each of which plays a distinct but interdependent role in hybrid reasoning: Layer 1: Primary Cognitive Inputs The first layer consists of primary cognitive inputs, which include fast, automatic human processes—such as heuristics, intuitions, emotional responses, and prior beliefs—as well as machine-generated outputs produced through probabilistic inference and pattern recognition. These inputs are characterised by speed and efficiency, allowing rapid generation of ideas, interpretations, and responses. However, they are also epistemically opaque, offering little intrinsic assurance of reliability or justification (Kahneman, 2011; Bender & Koller, 2020). In human cognition, primary processes are adaptive but vulnerable to bias and overconfidence. In machine cognition, outputs are fluent and scalable but indifferent to truth, meaning, or epistemic commitment. The HAMM model treats both sources symmetrically at this level: they provide raw material for reasoning, not warranted conclusions. Importantly, the model highlights that AI-generated content enters the reasoning process at the same level as intuitive human judgments, making regulatory oversight essential. Layer 2: Critical Thinking Processes The second layer comprises critical thinking processes, involving deliberate evaluation of claims, evidence, assumptions, and alternatives (Facione, 1990; Ennis, 2016). At this level, individuals assess coherence, consistency, relevance, and justification, including those associated with AI-generated outputs. Critical thinking enables comparison of alternatives, detection of inconsistencies, and evaluation of evidentiary support. Crucially, the HAMM model explicitly rejects the assumption that critical thinking is continuously active. Instead, it is treated as a conditionally deployed cognitive resource. Activation depends on perceived uncertainty, task demands, epistemic risk, and—most importantly—metacognitive signals originating from the supervisory layer. Without such activation, primary inputs may pass directly to judgment without scrutiny, regardless of their origin. Layer 3: Secondary Thinking (Metacognitive Mediation) The third layer consists of secondary thinking, conceptualised as metacognitive mediation. This supervisory layer performs three central regulatory functions: monitoring, control, and reflection. It monitors uncertainty, coherence, and conflict between human judgments and AI-generated suggestions; it controls reliance strategies by deciding when to defer to AI, when to override it, and when to seek alternative sources; and it supports reflection on epistemic assumptions, biases, and prior outcomes (Flavell, 1979; Efklides, 2008). Secondary thinking determines when critical thinking is activated, how intensively it is applied, and whether reliance on AI should be increased, reduced, or suspended. It thus functions as the gatekeeper of analytical engagement, ensuring that critical thinking is deployed where it is epistemically warranted rather than indiscriminately or not at all. A defining feature of the HAMM model is the recursive interaction among these layers. Outputs from critical thinking feed back into secondary thinking, updating trust calibration, confidence judgments, and future reliance strategies. Over time, this recursive process supports learning, adaptation, and the development of AI-specific metacognitive skills, allowing users to become more discerning and reflective participants in hybrid reasoning systems. 6.2 Theoretical Propositions From the conceptual architecture of the HAMM model, several theoretically grounded propositions follow. These propositions articulate testable relationships that link metacognitive regulation, AI use, and epistemic outcomes: a. Secondary thinking positively predicts calibrated trust in AI systems.Individuals with stronger metacognitive monitoring and control are better able to align their confidence in AI outputs with the system's actual reliability, thereby avoiding both over- and under-reliance. b. Trust calibration mediates the relationship between AI use and reasoning quality. AI use enhances reasoning outcomes only when trust is appropriately calibrated; miscalibration leads either to automation bias or to the rejection of valuable cognitive support. c. High AI fluency combined with weak secondary thinking increases susceptibility to automation bias.Fluent, confident AI outputs suppress analytical engagement when metacognitive oversight is weak, particularly under conditions of cognitive load or time pressure. d. Metacognitive scaffolds enhance epistemic outcomes in generative-AI tasks. Design features such as reflective prompts, uncertainty visualisations, self-explanation routines, and justification requirements activate secondary thinking and improve reasoning quality, transfer, and epistemic accountability (Azevedo et al., 2010; Xie et al., 2024). Together, these propositions position secondary thinking as the central explanatory variable linking machine cognition to human judgment and epistemic outcomes. They provide a theoretically coherent basis for empirical testing and for the design of educational, professional, and organisational interventions aimed at improving human–AI reasoning. 7. Implications for Education, Leadership, and AI Literacy 7.1 Doctoral and Higher Education Doctoral and advanced higher education constitute high-stakes epistemic environments in which originality, rigour, transparency, and accountability are central to scholarly legitimacy. Doctoral candidates are expected not only to produce novel contributions to knowledge, but also to demonstrate mastery over reasoning processes, evidentiary standards, and epistemic justification. In this context, the increasing reliance on generative AI for activities such as literature exploration, conceptual framing, methodological planning, data analysis, and academic writing introduces profound opportunities alongside equally significant risks. Empirical studies indicate that unregulated use of generative AI can result in hallucinated or fabricated citations, superficial synthesis of literature, erosion of argumentative coherence, and diminished engagement with primary sources (Ji et al., 2023; Kasneci et al., 2023). These risks are not merely technical or procedural; they are fundamentally epistemic. When AI-generated content is incorporated without reflective scrutiny, the integrity of scholarly reasoning is compromised, even when surface-level outputs appear coherent or sophisticated. The HAMM model reframes AI use in doctoral education not as a productivity shortcut to be managed through prohibition or detection, but as an object of metacognitive scrutiny. From this perspective, the core educational challenge is not whether doctoral candidates use AI, but how they regulate its influence on their reasoning processes. Secondary thinking becomes a central scholarly competence, enabling candidates to monitor how AI-generated suggestions shape their conceptual decisions, argumentative structure, and interpretation of evidence. Practically, this implies that doctoral education should incorporate explicit metacognitive practices related to AI use. These may include reflective AI-use logs, structured justification of AI-assisted decisions, and critical annotation of AI-generated outputs. Supervisory practices can also be adapted to foreground reasoning transparency, asking candidates not only what conclusions they reached, but how AI tools influenced the path to those conclusions. In this way, AI becomes a catalyst for deeper epistemic reflection rather than a threat to scholarly rigour. 7.2 Leadership and Strategic Decision-Making In leadership and executive contexts, AI systems are increasingly deployed for forecasting, risk modelling, scenario planning, policy analysis, and strategic decision-making. These applications place AI at the core of organisational judgment, often under conditions of uncertainty, time pressure, and high consequence. While AI promises enhanced analytical capacity and efficiency, it also amplifies well-documented cognitive vulnerabilities, particularly automation bias, when outputs align with intuitive judgments or reduce perceived cognitive effort (Green & Chen, 2019; Raisch & Krakowski, 2021). Leaders are especially susceptible to these dynamics because strategic decisions often involve ambiguous data, competing priorities, and limited feedback loops. Fluent AI-generated recommendations can create an illusion of certainty or objectivity, leading leaders to overestimate the reliability of algorithmic outputs or to defer judgment prematurely. In such contexts, failures are rarely attributable to lack of intelligence or experience. Instead, they reflect insufficient regulation of how machine-generated insights are interpreted and integrated into human judgment. The HAMM model positions secondary thinking as a core leadership capability. Effective leaders must be able to step back from AI outputs, interrogate underlying assumptions, recognise model limitations, and reflect on how cognitive biases—both human and algorithmic—shape decision outcomes. Secondary thinking supports epistemic humility by reminding leaders that AI systems are probabilistic, context-dependent, and value-laden rather than neutral arbiters of truth (Floridi, 2019; Gigerenzer, 2020). Leadership development programmes should therefore move beyond instrumental AI training and incorporate metacognitive components. AI-augmented decision simulations, followed by structured debriefs focused on reasoning processes rather than outcomes alone, can help leaders develop awareness of trust calibration, over-reliance, and cognitive offloading. Such practices align strategic competence with epistemic responsibility, ensuring that AI enhances rather than displaces human judgment. 7.3 AI Literacy Frameworks Current AI literacy frameworks typically emphasise technical understanding, ethical awareness, and the ability to critically evaluate AI outputs (Long & Magerko, 2020). While these dimensions are essential, they often underemphasise the metacognitive regulation of human–AI interaction. As a result, AI literacy is frequently framed as knowledge about AI rather than competence in managing how AI reshapes one’s own thinking. The HAMM model extends existing AI literacy frameworks by positioning secondary thinking as a foundational literacy component. From this perspective, AI literacy involves not only understanding what AI systems can and cannot do, but also recognising how interaction with AI alters cognitive effort, attention allocation, confidence judgments, and epistemic vigilance. Literate users are those who can monitor their reliance on AI, detect when critical thinking is being suppressed, and deliberately re-engage analytical scrutiny when warranted. Embedding secondary thinking into AI literacy initiatives has implications across educational and professional domains. Curricula should incorporate reflective prompts, uncertainty interrogation, and explicit discussion of cognitive offloading and automation bias. Rather than focusing solely on correct use of tools, AI literacy should cultivate awareness of how reasoning itself changes in AI-mediated environments. By foregrounding metacognitive regulation, the HAMM model reframes AI literacy as a form of cognitive self-governance. This reframing aligns AI education with broader goals of epistemic agency, responsible judgment, and human flourishing in technologically mediated societies. 8. Conclusion This article demonstrates that the central cognitive challenge of the AI era is not a deficit of critical thinking, but a deficit of effective metacognitive regulation in hybrid human–AI reasoning systems. By integrating metacognition theory, critical thinking research, and human–AI interaction studies, it shows that secondary thinking mediates the epistemic impact of machine cognition. The HAMM model provides a theoretically grounded explanation for automation bias, cognitive offloading, and trust miscalibration, while offering actionable implications for education, leadership, and AI literacy. As AI systems become increasingly embedded in cognitive and societal processes, human agency will depend not only on what we think, but on our capacity to think about how we think with machines. References Azevedo, R., Moos, D.C., Johnson, A.M. and Chauncey, A.D. 2010. 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It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Read the full journal, including this article, by downloading the PDF below. Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026. by Daryl Swanepoel Abstract South Africa’s National Health Insurance (NHI) reform represents a major institutional restructuring aimed at achieving universal access to quality healthcare. While the principle of universal coverage is constitutionally grounded and widely supported, debate centres on system design, fiscal sustainability and governance resilience. At the time of writing, the NHI Act is subject to Constitutional Court scrutiny, with challenges focusing on financing feasibility, governance concentration and the restriction of private medical schemes. In this context, comparative analysis is instructive. This paper examines China’s national health insurance architecture as a reference point. Over three decades, China has expanded basic medical insurance coverage to approximately 95% of its population through a layered, contributory and fiscally bounded system. Rather than relying on a single exclusive fund, China operates multiple core insurance schemes supplemented by municipal add-ons and commercial private cover. Benefits are defined, contributions are structured and cost control mechanisms, including Diagnosis-Related Group payment models and volume-based procurement, are embedded in the financing framework. While China’s political system differs markedly from South Africa’s, its institutional design choices highlight key principles: layered risk pooling, bounded benefits, contribution discipline and sequencing clarity. Universal coverage, the paper argues, is ultimately an institutional design challenge requiring fiscal realism alongside social solidarity. Keywords: National Health Insurance (NHI), Universal Health Coverage, China Healthcare System, Healthcare Financing, Institutional Design Introduction: Why study China now? South Africa stands at a pivotal moment in the reform of its healthcare system. The National Health Insurance (NHI) Act has been signed into law, and the country now faces the practical question of how such a system is to be structured, financed and implemented. The aspiration underlying the Act, universal access to affordable, quality healthcare, is not controversial in principle; instead, it is grounded in constitutional commitment (RSA, 1996) and in a broadly shared moral conviction that healthcare should not be determined by income alone. The debate in South Africa is therefore not fundamentally about whether universal health coverage is desirable. It is about design. It is about sequencing. It is about institutional resilience. Several structural concerns have crystallised in public debate and in legal challenges currently before the Constitutional Court. The proposal to concentrate healthcare purchasing authority in a single national fund has raised questions of systemic concentration risk. Critics ask whether placing the entirety of national health financing under one institutional roof introduces vulnerability in the event of governance failure, fiscal miscalculation or administrative incapacity, and in a country that has witnessed the fragility of concentrated public monopolies in other sectors, this concern resonates widely (Stokes, 2026; Jeffery, n.d.). A second issue relates to the Act’s restriction of private medical schemes to mere complementary cover. South Africa presently operates a dual system in which private medical aids and private hospitals function alongside a tax-funded public health sector, but the envisaged NHI framework signals a shift toward exclusivity, by limiting the role of private schemes in areas covered by the national fund. The implications of such limitation for investment, choice, specialist retention and system resilience remain intensely debated (Jeffery, n.d.). Thirdly, the governance architecture has come under scrutiny, in that the concentration of appointment and oversight powers within the executive has raised questions about whether there are sufficient checks and balances, and it is further argued that the durability of any large-scale social insurance system cannot depend only on actuarial soundness, but also on the system’s institutional credibility across political cycles (Jeffery, n.d.). These structural concerns are compounded by the absence of a consolidated, costed financing white paper that details revenue instruments, contribution rates, transitional costs, and the long-term actuarial modelling that will be applied (Stokes, 2026). During prior consultations between the Inclusive Society Institute and the Department of Health, it was suggested that implementation may proceed incrementally “as finances permit” (Swanepoel, 2026). While phasing is common in major reform, open-ended finance-contingent rollout introduces sequencing risk. Universal insurance reform restructures institutional arrangements in ways that are not easily reversible. It is important to note that South Africa does not approach universal healthcare from a position of absence. A large proportion of the population already enjoys access to public healthcare services that are free at the point of use (Baugh, n.d.). In this respect, there are superficial similarities with earlier models of low-cost or state-supported access observed in other systems. However, international experience suggests that the sustainability of such arrangements depends not on access provisions alone, but also on the alignment between funding, institutional capacity and provider incentives. Where this alignment is weak, access may remain formally available, but system performance deteriorates. This aligns with a broader body of health systems literature that emphasises that universal coverage outcomes depend largely on the coherence between the financing arrangements underpinning the system, as well as the incentives given to providers and the capacity of the institutions (World Bank, 2016; Yip et al., 2019). The central challenge is therefore not only to expand access to healthcare, but also to ensure that the underlying arrangements are capable of sustaining the system (Leng, 2026). Financing clarity, therefore, is not peripheral; it is foundational. A further dimension, insufficiently developed in current debates, concerns the relationship between insurance design and the underlying economics of healthcare provision. International experience suggests that large-scale insurance reforms cannot be assessed in isolation from hospital financing models, service pricing structures and provider remuneration systems. Where these elements are misaligned, systemic pressures may emerge irrespective of the formal design of the insurance mechanism itself. In the South African context, limited clarity has thus far been provided on how public hospital funding, tariff setting and practitioner incentives will evolve alongside the implementation of the NHI. Without parallel reform in these areas, the risk arises that financial strain and incentive distortions may undermine system performance, even if the insurance architecture is conceptually sound. It is within this context that the Inclusive Society Institute has embarked on a series of comparative country studies. This China study (Beijing Dialogue) constitutes the first in a structured series of country analyses, to be followed by field studies of Finland and Thailand, before a consolidated comparative synthesis is produced. The purpose is not to advocate transplantation. South Africa’s constitutional, fiscal and administrative environment is unique. Rather, the purpose is diagnostic: to examine how countries with different political systems and developmental trajectories have structured universal coverage, managed financing risk, and navigated the relationship between public and private provision. China offers a particularly instructive case. It is neither a small welfare state, nor a conventional liberal democracy; it is a vast and administratively complex polity that has expanded health insurance coverage to approximately 95% of its population over the past three decades (PRC, 2024). Its governance model differs profoundly from that of South Africa, but it has confronted challenges common to all systems pursuing universal coverage: fiscal sustainability, cost control, rural inclusion, hospital reform and the role of private finance. The Chinese experience is therefore examined here as a reference point. It allows us to explore how universal coverage can be structured at scale, what financing disciplines underpin it, and how layered insurance mechanisms function within a national framework. Historical evolution: From state provision to contributory insurance China’s contemporary health insurance system did not emerge fully formed; instead, it evolved. Prior to the mid-1990s, healthcare provision was largely state funded within a centrally planned economy. However, as market reforms deepened in China, the limitations of a purely budget-funded healthcare system became apparent; and in the wake of rising costs, demographic shifts and economic liberalisation, the necessary pressure was created to move towards a more structured insurance model that was capable of funding the healthcare system within the changing environment (Swanepoel, 2026). The reform process is commonly associated with a number of critical milestones, the first of which began in 1989, when China initiated pilot reforms of the medical insurance system. Contributory model pilots were introduced in 1994, followed by the formal establishment of the Basic Medical Insurance system for Urban Employees in 1998. In 2003, rural cooperative medical schemes were expanded significantly in order to address the gaps in coverage of those who found themselves outside the formal urban workforce. And in 2007, the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance scheme was introduced, which scheme extended coverage to non-employed urban populations, thereby closing a critical gap in the emerging system. By 2008, coverage had expanded rapidly across both urban and rural populations, extending access across both geographic and income divides, with institutional integration between urban and rural resident schemes formally achieved through the 2016 reform (Leng, 2026; Swanepoel, 2026). Subsequent reforms consolidated fund administration under the National Healthcare Security Administration, which strengthened cost-control mechanisms that international observers have described as being incremental but expansive, given that it combined rapid coverage growth with evolving institutional reform (World Bank, 2016; Yip et al., 2019). What is notable about this historical arc is not simply the speed of expansion, but also the consistent embedding of financing parameters at each stage, with reform phases not framed as open-ended entitlement expansions. They were accompanied by defined contribution structures, reimbursement rules and cost-management mechanisms. Architecture of coverage: A layered system, rather than a monolith China’s health insurance system is often colloquially described as “national”. Yet the Beijing consultations revealed a more nuanced architecture. The system operates across multiple layers. At its foundation are two principal social insurance schemes. The Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance covers formally employed workers. Contributions are salary-linked, with employees contributing approximately 2% of their income and employers contributing a significantly larger amount, typically between 6% and 8%. The payroll-based structure anchors the system in contributory discipline (Swanepoel, 2026). The Urban and Rural Resident Basic Medical Insurance also covers individuals who work outside of formal employment. These participants contribute an annual premium commonly reported at several hundred renminbi, while central and local governments provide substantial subsidies (Swanepoel, 2026). Vulnerable groups, including the elderly and low-income citizens, may have their premiums fully subsidised by government programmes (Swanepoel, 2026). These two schemes form the core layer, covering the vast majority of the population, but coverage under these schemes is not unlimited, and reimbursement levels vary according to the level of hospital and the nature of care. Primary facilities may see high reimbursement ratios, whereas tertiary hospitals, which provide specialised and advanced services, often reimburse approximately half to sixty percent of costs, with the remainder covered by the individual or supplementary insurance (Swanepoel, 2026). Above this foundational layer sit supplementary mechanisms such as municipal insurance products like “Huimin Bao”, which offers inexpensive add-on coverage designed to absorb the costs attached to catastrophic or high-cost treatments that are not fully covered under the core scheme. In addition, critical illness insurance cover and emerging long-term care insurance products further extend protection against specific risk categories (Swanepoel, 2026). Finally, fully commercial private insurance products operate alongside the public system, and these products typically cover innovative therapies, advanced pharmaceuticals, enhanced service options and VIP facilities. Furthermore, it is important to note that private insurance is not prohibited and that it functions as a complement to the public scheme (Swanepoel, 2026). The overall structure of the health system is therefore layered, rather than monolithic, whereby universal coverage exists within a framework that accommodates both supplementary and private financing. Financing discipline: Contributions, co-payments and cost controls Three features of the Chinese system stand out in financing terms: contribution discipline, bounded benefits and active cost control. First, the system is contributory. Even residents outside formal employment contribute defined premiums, albeit subsidised. The principle that beneficiaries contribute something toward the system, either directly or through payroll, is embedded structurally (Swanepoel, 2026). This contribution culture mitigates the perception of unlimited entitlement. Second, benefits are bounded. China operates defined reimbursement lists for medicines and treatments, meaning that only items included on approved lists are reimbursed through the social insurance scheme. Therapies outside the list may require out-of-pocket payment or private insurance. The benefit package is therefore best described as being circumscribed, rather than being open-ended (Swanepoel, 2026). Third, cost control mechanisms are integral to the system, where the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) payment models increasingly govern hospital reimbursement, by establishing fixed payments per case. Hospitals that deliver care below the benchmark retain efficiencies; those exceeding the benchmark share in losses. In this manner, incentives are shifted away from pure fee-for-service escalation (Swanepoel, 2026). Volume-based pharmaceutical procurement is another key mechanism, best illustrated through the leveraging of its national purchasing power, where authorities negotiate bulk agreements with drug manufacturers, which has resulted in significant price reductions in many categories (Swanepoel, 2026). This strategic purchasing reflects an understanding that universal coverage must be accompanied by aggressive expenditure management, and together, these mechanisms suggest a coherent fiscal philosophy, which is that solidarity must operate within financial constraints. While these features of the insurance architecture are central to the system’s performance, they do not operate in isolation. The evolution of China’s medical insurance system has been closely intertwined with broader reforms in hospital financing, service pricing and provider remuneration. Under earlier reform phases, public hospitals were permitted to rely on drug mark-ups to sustain operations, but this particular mechanism was later removed as part of cost-control efforts. However, the removal of the drug mark-up mechanism required compensating adjustments in other areas, including increased government funding, the recalibration of medical service prices and reforms to physician remuneration structures; and when such adjustments did not keep pace, financial pressures on hospitals and distortions in provider incentives emerged. This illustrates that the sustainability of the insurance system is not only contingent on its internal design, but equally so on its alignment with the wider political economy of healthcare provision (Leng, 2026). Governance structure: Administrative separation within Executive Authority The governance of the Chinese healthcare system is administratively structured, with the National Health Commission overseeing the healthcare delivery standards and regulatory matters, and the National Healthcare Security Administration managing insurance financing and the funding of operations. Pharmaceutical regulation, in turn, falls under separate administrative authority (Swanepoel, 2026). Appointments are executive in character, reflecting China’s governance model. Oversight ultimately flows through governmental reporting structures, rather than through parliamentary separation as found in liberal democracies. Yet, functional separation between service regulation and fund administration exists. The insurance authority focuses on financing, reimbursement and cost control, while health commissions oversee clinical standards and institutional performance (Swanepoel, 2026). This administrative segmentation does not mirror South Africa’s constitutional framework. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that large-scale national insurance systems may divide operational functions, even within centralised governance models. Public and private provision: Coexistence and accreditation China’s hospital landscape is dominated by public institutions, particularly the tertiary academic hospitals, which carry the majority of complex caseloads. But that said, private hospitals exist in substantial numbers, and they often focus on specialised or elective services (Swanepoel, 2026). Doctors employed in public hospitals may also practise part time in private facilities if they so wish. Accredited private hospitals may accept social insurance reimbursement, provided they meet prescribed standards. Facilities that fail to meet standards may not access public insurance reimbursement; they are, however, allowed to continue operating, provided they are properly licensed (Swanepoel, 2026). Importantly, this coexistence is not limited to complementary or innovative services only; accredited private hospitals may provide procedures that are included in the public reimbursement list. Moreover, social insurance covering the eligible portion of the cost may be claimed, with patients settling the remaining co-payment through out-of-pocket expenditure or supplementary insurance. Private insurance may in turn cover the portion of the co-payment already included in the public scheme, as well as the additional financing required to fund enhanced service levels. This therefore suggests that the relationship between public and private financing is one that overlaps, rather than being mutually exclusive (Swanepoel, 2026). This accreditation mechanism reinforces quality oversight while permitting ownership diversity. The insurance fund contracts with all providers are based on standards, regardless of ownership form. Regional variation and local fund capacity Although described as national, China’s system exhibits regional variation, in that reimbursement ratios may differ across cities depending on local fund capacity; wealthier regions may sustain higher reimbursement levels, whereas less affluent regions may impose greater cost sharing (Swanepoel, 2026). This partial decentralisation reflects fiscal realities within a large and diverse country, and it also introduces an element of distributed risk, as financing is not entirely homogenised across all regions. Implementation and sequencing China’s universal coverage did not emerge through abrupt structural overhaul. Instead, reform phases were incremental, but defined, with each expansion stage accompanied by the introduction of specified contribution rates and reimbursement parameters (Swanepoel, 2026). The sequencing appears deliberate in that the financing architecture was articulated alongside expansion in coverage, meaning that reform did not proceed on an open-ended “as finances permit” basis; instead, it was embedded within clearly defined fiscal parameters (Swanepoel, 2026). International assessments emphasise that while challenges remain, China has combined coverage expansion with continuous cost management and institutional strengthening (Yip et al., 2019). Strengths and tensions within the model The Chinese model’s strengths include near-universal coverage, defined contribution structures, layered financing and embedded cost control mechanisms. The coexistence of private insurance and public coverage introduces risk buffering and service diversity. However, tensions between the private and public systems remain, regional disparities in reimbursement persist, and the integration of health records and insurance databases continues to evolve. Public hospitals dominate specialised care, potentially limiting competitive dynamics, and governance remains executive-centric. Yet the structural logic is coherent: universal coverage is pursued within contributory discipline and bounded fiscal commitment. Analytical reflections The Chinese experience illustrates several broader design principles. Universal coverage does not require elimination of supplementary or private insurance. Layered risk pooling can coexist with solidarity. Cost control must be systemic, rather than reactive, and therefore DRGs, procurement negotiation and reimbursement lists are not peripheral features; they are, indeed, foundational. Contribution discipline reinforces sustainability. Even modest premiums create a participatory financing culture. Sequencing matters, and as such, financing parameters tend to accompany expansion rather than follow it. These observations do not imply transplantation, but instead they provide comparative insight. In evaluating any national insurance reform, key questions arise, namely: How is risk distributed? How is concentration mitigated? How are incentives structured? How is financing defined before structural consolidation proceeds? China’s system reflects one coherent set of answers. It demonstrates that universalism and plurality need not be in tension. It shows that solidarity can operate within layered financing. It confirms that cost discipline is inseparable from coverage ambition. Comparative reflections: Institutional design and ongoing legal scrutiny The relevance of the Chinese experience does not lie in its political structure, nor in the scale of its economy, but in the institutional design questions it surfaces, and when placed alongside South Africa’s current reform trajectory, certain analytical observations emerge. At the time of writing this report, the National Health Insurance Act is under judicial review in the Constitutional Court of South Africa. Cases have been brought challenging the rationality of the President’s decision to assent to the Act, and questions are being raised about the National Insurance Fund’s governance design, its financing feasibility and its constitutional compliance (Business Day, 2026). The litigation also raises questions relating to the Fund’s governance structure, the concentration of financial authority, the restriction of private medical schemes, and the broader rationality and feasibility of the financing model. These Constitutional Court proceedings form part of the wider policy context within which universal healthcare reform is being assessed in South Africa. Against this backdrop, the Chinese case does not necessarily offer South Africa a template that can be duplicated wholesale, but it does serve to illuminate how another large and complex society has navigated similar structural questions to those confronting the country. One of the central issues in South Africa concerns the concentration of purchasing authority within a single national fund. China's system, while nationally coordinated, operates through layered mechanisms, whereby the core social insurance schemes are complemented by supplementary municipal insurance products and fully commercial private cover; reimbursement ratios, in turn, vary across regions, thereby reflecting local fund capacity. In effect, risk is not absorbed through a singular exclusive channel but distributed across a structured set of financing tiers, and while this does not eliminate fiscal pressure, it does create buffers. A second concern in South Africa relates to the restriction of private medical schemes to complementary services. In China, private insurance was not dismantled during the expansion of universal coverage; on the contrary, supplementary and commercial insurance products play a defined role, particularly in covering innovative therapies and higher service levels. Universalism, in this context, did not require exclusivity. It required delineation. Governance architecture also differs markedly. China’s appointments are executive in character, reflecting its political structure. Yet operational responsibilities are institutionally divided between healthcare regulation and insurance fund administration. Functional segmentation exists even within centralised governance. While South Africa’s constitutional framework is distinct, the broader principle that financing administration and healthcare oversight may be separated is evident. Perhaps most significant for present purposes is the question of sequencing. China’s reform phases were accompanied by defined contribution structures, reimbursement parameters and cost-control mechanisms. Coverage expansion was embedded within articulated financing architecture. Reform did not proceed on an undefined “as finances permit” basis; rather, fiscal parameters were clarified alongside structural rollout. The implication is not that financing challenges disappear, but that clarity precedes consolidation. These observations do not resolve South Africa’s debate. They do, however, demonstrate that universal coverage elsewhere has been constructed through layered financing, bounded benefit packages and institutionalised cost discipline, rather than through singular institutional concentration. For South Africa, where universal access remains a legitimate national aspiration, the enduring design question is not whether coverage should expand, but how institutional resilience, fiscal clarity and risk distribution are embedded at the outset. Conclusion China’s national health insurance architecture is best understood not as a single centralised fund, but as a layered, contributory and bounded system that has evolved over three decades. Coverage is broad, but not unlimited. Private insurance remains operative. Cost control is institutionalised. Reform has been phased and parameter-defined. The model is embedded within China’s political and administrative context and cannot be transposed wholesale. Yet its structural features — layered financing, contribution discipline, defined reimbursement and coexistence with private provision — offer valuable comparative insights for any middle-income country contemplating large-scale health insurance reform. 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The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Read the full journal, including this article, by downloading the PDF below. Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026. by Sameh Abidi Abstract The introduction of theCarbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) by the European Union represents a structural transformation at the intersection of climate policy and international trade. Designed to prevent carbon leakage and ensure a level playing field between European producers subject to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) and foreign exporters, the mechanism applies a carbon price to selected imported goods such as cement, fertilizers, aluminium, and electricity. While CBAM reinforces the credibility of European climate ambition under the Paris Agreement, it also generates significant economic challenges for neighbouring economies closely integrated into European value chains. This paper examines the implications of CBAM for Tunisia, where approximately 70% of exports are directed toward the European market and where industrial production remains both carbon-intensive and highly dependent on fossil fuels. By focusing on the sectors most exposed to the mechanism—cement, fertilizers, aluminium, and electricity—the study provides a quantitative-informed assessment of potential impacts. Preliminary estimates suggest that carbon pricing levels ranging between €70 and €95 per ton of CO₂ (https://sl1nk.com/vcOIq) could substantially increase export costs in energy-intensive sectors, potentially reducing profit margins and undermining international competitiveness. At the macroeconomic level, these effects may translate into indirect fiscal pressures through declining export revenues, lower industrial output, and increased demands for public investment in energy transition. In this context, CBAM operates as an implicit carbon tax on Tunisia’s energy system, revealing structural vulnerabilities in the country’s industrial model. However, beyond these immediate risks, the mechanism may also act as a catalyst for structural transformation. The transition toward green industrialisation is no longer solely an environmental objective but an economic necessity for maintaining access to European markets. The development of renewable energy, particularly solar and wind power, combined with improvements in industrial energy efficiency and thedecarbonisation of energy-intensive sectors, could enable Tunisia to reposition itself within emerging Euro–Mediterranean green value chains. The paper further examines the fiscal and financial implications of this transition. Tunisia faces constrained public finances and rising debt levels, limiting its capacity to finance large-scale decarbonisation investments. European financial instruments, including the Global Gateway initiative and financing from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), are analysed as potential sources of support. However, their predominantly loan-based structure and associated conditionalities raise concerns regarding debt sustainability and long-term fiscal stability, particularly in the absence of sufficient grant-based financing. In addition, the study integrates the social dimension of the transition by highlighting potential risks related to employment in carbon-intensive sectors, regional inequalities, and unequal access to green investment opportunities. Without adequate mitigation measures, the decarbonisation process could exacerbate existing socio-economic disparities. Against this backdrop, the article raises a central question: Can the European Union impose a carbon cost on imports without providing proportional financial and technological support to its trading partners? Addressing this issue requires incorporating principles of climate justice, including differentiated responsibilities and equitable burden sharing in the global energy transition. Without such considerations, CBAM risks reinforcing existing asymmetries in international trade and development. To transform CBAM into a lever for co-development rather than a punitive trade instrument, the paper proposes a set of operational and sector-specific policy recommendations. These include allocating a share of CBAM revenues to partner countries, increasing the use of grants in European climate finance, promoting targeted industrial decarbonisation strategies, and strengthening technological cooperation between European and Tunisian industries. At the national level, priorities include securing domestic energy supply, ensuring local industrial participation in green investments, safeguarding fiscal sustainability, and enhancing transparency in international partnerships. Finally, the paper emphasises the importance of inclusive governance mechanisms that integrate civil society participation and parliamentary oversight in the design and implementation of climate-related economic policies. A transition financed primarily through external debt risks undermining the very development objectives it seeks to achieve. Ultimately, the success of Tunisia’s transition will depend not only on financial and technological resources but also on institutional capacity, fiscal governance, and the ability to ensure a socially just and economically sustainable transformation. In conclusion, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism represents a pivotal moment in the evolving relationship between climate governance, trade policy, and industrial development. For Tunisia, it may either deepen structural vulnerabilities or serve as a catalyst for a new model of sustainable industrialisation. The outcome will depend on the extent of alignment between European climate ambitions, Tunisian industrial strategies, and broader reforms toward a more equitable and inclusive global energy transition. Keywords: Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), Green Industrialisation, Tunisia, Energy Transition, Euro-Mediterranean Green Value Chains Introduction Climate policies are increasingly shaping global trade and industrial development. In recent years, climate governance has expanded beyond environmental regulation to become a central element of international economic policy. One of the most significant developments in this area is the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), introduced as part of the European Green Deal and the broader Fit for 55 legislative package, which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 percent by 2030 compared to 1990 levels (European Commission, 2023).(https://l1nq.com/m99Rl) The CBAM represents a structural shift in global climate governance. For the first time, a major economic bloc is integrating carbon pricing into international trade policy by applying a carbon cost to imported goods. This mechanism aims to prevent carbon leakage, a phenomenon in which industries relocate production to countries with weaker environmental regulations in order to avoid carbon pricing constraints (Zachmann, Roth & Tamara, 2020). While CBAM primarily seeks to protect the environmental integrity of European climate policies, its economic implications extend far beyond the EU. Countries exporting carbon-intensive products to the European market will increasingly face regulatory requirements related to emissions reporting and carbon pricing. For developing economies that rely heavily on industrial exports to the EU, these changes may significantly affect trade competitiveness (World Bank, 2023). Tunisia is particularly exposed to these developments due to its strong economic integration with European markets. The European Union represents Tunisia’s largest trading partner, accounting for approximately 70 percent of its exports (European Commission, 2023). Several Tunisian industrial sectors that export to Europe, including cement, fertilizers, and metal products, are energy-intensive and rely largely on fossil fuels, especially natural gas. As a result, the introduction of CBAM may increase export costs for Tunisian industries and potentially weaken their competitiveness in European markets. At the same time, the mechanism may act as a catalyst for industrial modernisation and energy transition. This article examines how Tunisia can transform the constraints imposed by CBAM into an opportunity for green industrialisation while maintaining fiscal sustainability and economic competitiveness. It argues that while CBAM functions as an indirect carbon tax on Tunisia’s industrial structure, it may also accelerate structural reforms toward a low-carbon industrial economy if accompanied by appropriate financial support, technology transfer, and policy coordination between Tunisia and the European Union. 1. CBAM: A New Industrial Challenge for Tunisia 1.1. Understanding the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is one of the flagship instruments of the European Green Deal. It was introduced to address a central challenge in global climate policy: ensuring that products imported into the European Union bear a carbon cost comparable to that faced by European producers. By doing so, the mechanism aims to preserve fair competition in the European market while supporting the EU’s broader climate objectives. CBAM was designed to complement the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which represents the EU’s main policy tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (European Commission, 2023). Under the ETS framework, companies operating in certain sectors must purchase emission allowances corresponding to the amount of carbon dioxide emitted through their activities. These allowances create a market-based carbon price that incentivises industries to invest in cleaner technologies and reduce their emissions over time. However, differences in climate regulations across countries can create significant competitive distortions. European industries that are subject to carbon pricing may face higher production costs compared to foreign competitors operating in jurisdictions with weaker environmental regulations or without carbon pricing mechanisms. This situation may encourage companies to relocate production to countries where climate policies are less stringent, a phenomenon commonly referred to as carbon leakage. Such relocation risks undermining the EU’s climate efforts by shifting emissions abroad rather than reducing them globally. The CBAM seeks to address this challenge by extending the principle of carbon pricing to imports. Under this mechanism, importers of certain goods into the European Union are required to purchase CBAM certificates corresponding to the carbon emissions embedded in those products. The price of these certificates is linked to the weekly average price of emission allowances under the EU ETS, ensuring consistency between the carbon costs borne by European producers and those applied to imported products (World Bank, 2023). Through this approach, the EU aims to establish a level playing field between domestic and foreign producers. The implementation of the CBAM is taking place in phases. The transitional period (2023–2025) requires companies exporting to the EU to report the carbon emissions embedded in their products without yet paying a financial adjustment. This phase is intended to allow both exporting countries and EU authorities to develop robust monitoring, reporting, and verification systems. Starting in 2026, the financial component of the CBAM will become fully operational, requiring importers to purchase carbon certificates corresponding to the emissions embedded in imported goods (European Commission, 2023). Currently, the mechanism applies to several sectors that are both highly carbon-intensive and significantly exposed to international trade. These include cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen (OECD, 2023). These industries were selected because they represent a large share of industrial emissions and are particularly vulnerable to carbon leakage. Beyond its regulatory dimension, the CBAM represents a strategic instrument for the global transition toward a low-carbon economy. For European companies, it protects the value of investments made in decarbonisation by preventing carbon-intensive imports from undermining their competitiveness. For exporters outside the EU, the mechanism presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Firms that anticipate these changes and adapt their production processes can transform compliance into a competitive advantage, improve their environmental reputation, and secure long-term access to one of the world’s most demanding markets in terms of sustainability. Ultimately, the CBAM goes beyond a simple trade or fiscal measure. It constitutes a key tool of climate governance that seeks to align international trade with climate objectives while encouraging a broader transformation toward low-carbon industrial production. Main Objectives and Operational Mechanisms of CBAM Main Objective Description / Operational Mechanism 1. Limiting Carbon Leakage Companies may relocate production to countries with weaker environmental regulations, undermining EU climate policies. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) addresses this by ensuring that the carbon emissions embedded in imported goods are reflected in their price, thereby discouraging the relocation of production to jurisdictions with lower environmental standards. 2. Creating a Carbon Price Signal for Imports CBAM converts embedded emissions into an economic cost for imported goods. This creates an incentive for non-EU producers to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in order to remain competitive in the EU market, thereby encouraging decarbonisation beyond the EU's borders. 3. Supporting the EU's 2050 Carbon Neutrality Goal CBAM supports the EU's long-term objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050. It prevents imported goods from undermining the effectiveness of EU climate policies and complements other European Green Deal initiatives, including the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the European Climate Pact, and circular economy policies. 4. Emissions Reporting Importers are required to identify, quantify, and report the direct emissions (generated during production) and, where applicable, indirect emissions (associated with energy consumption) embedded in imported products. These reports must be accurate and supported by credible evidence, such as supplier declarations, verified emissions reports, or independent third-party audits. 5. Purchase of CBAM Certificates Importers must purchase CBAM certificates corresponding to the embedded CO₂ emissions of imported goods. The price of these certificates is linked to the prevailing EU ETS carbon price, ensuring that imported and domestically produced goods face equivalent carbon costs and creating a level playing field within the EU market. 1.2. Tunisian Industrial Sectors Exposed to CBAM Several Tunisian industries are directly or indirectly exposed to CBAM due to their energy intensity and export orientation. The cement sector is one of the most energy-intensive industries in Tunisia. Cement production requires high-temperature kilns fuelled by fossil fuels and involves chemical processes that release large quantities of carbon dioxide (IEA, 2023). If Tunisian cement producers export to European markets, they will face additional carbon costs under CBAM. The fertilizer industry represents another important sector. Tunisia is one of the world’s major producers of phosphate-based fertilizers. However, fertilizer production relies heavily on energy-intensive processes and fossil fuel inputs, increasing the carbon intensity of these products. The aluminium and metal-processing sectors may also face indirect exposure. Even if certain products are not directly covered, the carbon intensity of electricity used in production will affect overall competitiveness. Electricity exports could also become relevant in the future if Tunisia expands energy interconnections with European markets. In such a case, the carbon intensity of Tunisia’s electricity generation would determine its ability to compete with low-carbon European electricity. 1.3. Potential Economic Impacts The economic implications of CBAM for Tunisia are likely to be multifaceted. First, exporters will face increased compliance costs related to monitoring and reporting emissions. Establishing Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) systems requires institutional capacity, technical expertise, and investment in data management infrastructure (World Bank, 2023). Second, carbon pricing may increase the cost of Tunisian exports entering the European market. According to IMF estimates, EU carbon prices could reach 70 to 95 euros per ton of CO₂ by 2030, significantly affecting the competitiveness of carbon-intensive industries (IMF, 2024a). (https://sl1nk.com/kJnOX) Third, CBAM may influence investment decisions within Tunisia’s industrial sector. Companies integrated into European supply chains may face increasing pressure to adopt low-carbon production technologies in order to maintain market access (OECD, 2023). In this sense, CBAM acts as an indirect carbon tax on Tunisia’s energy system and industrial structure. 2. Green Industrialisation as an Economic Necessity 2.1. Structural Weaknesses of Tunisia’s Industrial Model Tunisia’s industrial structure exhibits several characteristics that increase its vulnerability to carbon pricing mechanisms. Industrial production remains highly dependent on fossil fuels, particularly natural gas. Despite the country’s renewable energy potential, renewable sources still represent a relatively small share of total electricity generation (IEA, 2023). Many Tunisian manufacturing facilities also operate with aging infrastructure and limited technological modernisation. Energy efficiency levels remain lower than international benchmarks in several sectors. Furthermore, Tunisia’s industrial specialisation often focuses on medium-value-added manufacturing rather than high-technology sectors. This limits the capacity of firms to absorb additional environmental or regulatory costs (World Bank, 2024). These structural weaknesses increase exposure to CBAM-related risks. 2.2 Energy Transition as Industrial Strategy Although decarbonisation is often framed as an environmental objective, it increasingly represents an economic strategy. Tunisia possesses considerable solar and wind resources that could support a large-scale expansion of renewable energy production. Increasing renewable energy capacity would reduce the carbon intensity of electricity generation and strengthen the competitiveness of Tunisian industrial exports. Industrial energy efficiency improvements could also generate significant economic benefits. Investments in efficient equipment and production processes often reduce operational costs while lowering emissions (IEA, 2023). In addition, emerging sectors such as green hydrogen, renewable energy technologies, and low-carbon manufacturing could create new opportunities for industrial diversification (IRENA, 2023). 2.3 Integration into Euro-Mediterranean Green Value Chains The global transition toward low-carbon economies is creating new industrial value chains centred around renewable energy technologies, electric mobility, and sustainable materials. Tunisia’s geographic proximity to Europe and its established industrial base provide opportunities to participate in emerging Euro–Mediterranean green supply chains. By investing in renewable energy infrastructure and industrial innovation, Tunisia could attract foreign investment and strengthen its role in regional production networks (OECD, 2023). 3 Global Gateway and European Financial Instruments 3.1 The Global Gateway Strategy The European Union’s Global Gateway initiative aims to mobilise up to €300 billion in investments in sustainable infrastructure worldwide (European Commission, 2022). (https://sl1nk.com/tb0uO) The initiative focuses on strategic sectors including renewable energy, digital connectivity, transportation infrastructure, and climate resilience. Global Gateway combines public funding with private investment through mechanisms such as blended finance, guarantees, and development bank loans. 3.2 Financial Instruments Available to Tunisia Several European financial institutions support development projects in Tunisia, including the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). These institutions provide financing for renewable energy projects, industrial modernisation, and infrastructure development. Blended finance mechanisms combine grants and loans to reduce investment risks and mobilise private capital (OECD, 2023). 3.3 Current Limitations Despite the availability of financial instruments, several limitations remain. A significant share of climate-related financing is delivered through loans rather than grants, increasing the risk of climate-driven debt accumulation (IMF, 2023a). Furthermore, there is currently no explicit mechanism linking CBAM revenues to financial support for partner countries affected by the policy. This raises an important policy question: Can the EU impose carbon costs on imports without financing the decarbonisation of its trading partners? 4 From Carbon Tax to Development Opportunity Transforming CBAM into a development opportunity requires stronger alignment between European climate policy and development financing. From a climate justice perspective, developing economies emphasise the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which recognises differences in historical emissions and economic capacities (UNFCCC, 2015). In this context, international climate cooperation should include financial support, technology transfer, and capacity-building programmes. For Tunisia, several strategic priorities should guide negotiations with European partners: a. Ensuring national energy security before prioritising energy exports. b. Promoting local industrial participation in green infrastructure projects. c. Protecting fiscal sustainability and avoiding excessive debt. d. Strengthening transparency in climate-related investments. 5 Fiscal Implications and Budgetary Considerations 5.1 Fiscal Assessment of CBAM Impacts Beyond sectoral competitiveness, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is likely to generate significant indirect fiscal pressures for Tunisia. Tunisia’s vulnerability is closely linked to its energy structure. The country’s electricity system remains highly carbon-intensive, with approximately 85-90% of electricity generated from fossil fuels, primarily natural gas, and an estimated carbon intensity of 0.45–0.50 tCO₂/MWh (IEA, 2023; World Bank, 2023). (https://l1nq.com/VPJg4) Renewable energy represents less than 5% of electricity production, reflecting a significant gap compared to European decarbonisation levels (IEA, 2023).(https://sl1nk.com/0tZSZ) This carbon-intensive energy mix directly translates into higher embedded emissions in exported goods, which will be priced under CBAM (European Commission, 2023). CBAM is expected to affect Tunisia’s public finances through three main channels: Decline in export revenues: Carbon pricing between €70 and €95 per ton of CO₂ could increase production costs in exposed sectors by up to 20-30%, potentially reducing export competitiveness (OECD, 2023; IMF, 2024b). (https://sl1nk.com/zibya) Increased public investment needs: Tunisia aims to reach 30% renewable energy by 2030, requiring substantial investments in infrastructure and industrial decarbonisation (ANME, 2022). Energy-related fiscal pressures: Tunisia faces a structural energy deficit and high dependence on imported natural gas, which contributes to fiscal vulnerability and exposure to external shocks (World Bank, 2024). Cement Sector The cement sector is one of the most carbon-intensive industries, with emissions ranging between 0.6 and 0.9 tCO₂ per ton of cement (IEA, 2023). Tunisia’s reliance on petcoke and fossil fuels places it at the higher end of this range. Under a carbon price of €80/tCO₂, the additional cost could reach €50-70 per ton, significantly affecting export competitiveness (OECD, 2023). Fertilizer Sector Tunisia is a major producer of phosphate-based fertilizers, a sector characterised by emissions of 1.5 to 3 tCO₂ per ton of output, depending on production processes (World Bank, 2023).(https://l1nq.com/6HtgS) The sector’s dependence on natural gas and energy-intensive chemical transformations makes it particularly vulnerable to CBAM (IEA, 2023). Electricity Sector Electricity plays a central role in determining the carbon footprint of industrial production. Tunisia’s electricity mix is dominated by natural gas, resulting in carbon intensity levels significantly higher than the EU average (IEA, 2023; OECD, 2023). This creates a structural disadvantage, as electricity-related emissions are embedded in exported goods and increasingly accounted for under CBAM reporting requirements (European Commission, 2023). 5.2 Social Dimension and Just Transition The transition toward low-carbon industrialisation raises important social challenges. Employment risks are particularly concentrated in carbon-intensive sectors. According to international evidence, industrial decarbonisation can lead to short-term job displacement if not accompanied by reskilling policies (World Bank, 2023). In Tunisia, these risks are compounded by: regional inequalities, labour market rigidity, and limited access to green jobs. A just transition approach is therefore essential, including: vocational training programmes, targeted social protection, and inclusive policy design (UNFCCC, 2015). 5.3 Governance and Institutional Framework Effective CBAM adaptation requires strong governance frameworks. Current challenges in Tunisia include: limited coordination between industrial, energy, and fiscal policies, weak data systems for emissions tracking, and insufficient transparency in climate-related investments. Strengthening Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) systems aligned with EU standards is essential (European Commission, 2023; World Bank, 2023). Moreover, integrating climate transition into medium-term fiscal frameworks is necessary to ensure sustainability (IMF, 2023b). 6 Strategic Policy Recommendations for Tunisia 6.1 Develop a Data-Driven National Industrial Decarbonisation Strategy Tunisia should prioritise CBAM-exposed sectors (cement, steel, fertilizers) based on quantified emissions and trade exposure. This strategy should include sector-specific targets, investment needs, and timelines, supported by scenario modelling to assess competitiveness impacts under different carbon price assumptions. 6.2 Integrate Climate Transition into Fiscal Policy and Budget Planning The government should incorporate climate transition costs into medium-term budget frameworks. This includes: reallocating inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, introducing green fiscal instruments, and mobilising international climate finance. A clear fiscal strategy is essential to balance industrial support, debt constraints, and social spending. 6.3 Accelerate Renewable Energy Deployment with Industrial Integration Beyond expanding renewable capacity, Tunisia should prioritise direct electrification of industry and long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) to reduce carbon intensity in export-orientated sectors. 6.4 Strengthen MRV Systems with Sectoral Differentiation Tunisia should develop robust, sector-specific MRV frameworks aligned with EU standards. This requires institutional coordination, digital infrastructure, and capacity building, particularly for SMEs. 6.5 Promote a Just Transition Framework To mitigate social risks, Tunisia should implement: targeted reskilling programmes, regional development policies for affected industrial zones, and social protection measures for vulnerable workers. This will ensure that decarbonisation does not exacerbate inequalities. 6.6 Negotiate a Redistributive and Cooperative CBAM Framework with the EU Tunisia should advocate for: partial redistribution of CBAM revenues, increased grant-based climate finance, and facilitated access to low-carbon technologies. This cooperation should explicitly address fiscal asymmetries and development constraints. 6.7 Support Industrial Innovation and Green Value Chains Public policies should incentivise low-carbon innovation through tax incentives, green public procurement, and support for startups. Tunisia can position itself in emerging green value chains (e.g., green hydrogen, low-carbon materials). 7 Conclusion The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism represents a pivotal shift at the intersection of climate policy, international trade, and industrial transformation. For Tunisia, its implications are both constraining and potentially transformative. On the one hand, CBAM reveals and amplifies structural vulnerabilities within the country’s industrial model, notably its high carbon intensity and dependence on fossil fuels. It is likely to increase export costs, weaken the competitiveness of energy-intensive sectors, and generate additional fiscal and social pressures. On the other hand, the mechanism creates a powerful incentive to accelerate the transition toward a low-carbon and more resilient economic model, fostering industrial modernisation and integration into emerging green value chains. However, this transformation is contingent upon addressing three critical dimensions. First, financial sustainability remains a major constraint, given Tunisia’s limited fiscal space and rising debt levels, which restrict its capacity to finance large-scale decarbonisation efforts. Second, social inclusion must be ensured to prevent the transition from exacerbating existing inequalities, particularly in regions and sectors most exposed to structural change. Third, effective governance and accountability are essential to guarantee transparent, efficient, and equitable implementation of transition policies. In this context, the success of Tunisia’s response to CBAM will depend on its ability to align industrial strategy, fiscal policy, and social policy within a coherent and forward-looking transition framework. At the same time, it requires stronger international support in the form of concessional financing, technology transfer, and fairer cooperation mechanisms. Ultimately, without such alignment at both national and international levels, CBAM risks reinforcing existing asymmetries in global trade and creating new barriers for developing economies. Conversely, if embedded within a framework of climate justice and equitable burden sharing, it could serve as a catalyst for a more sustainable, competitive, and inclusive development pathway in Tunisia. References Agence Nationale pour la Maîtrise de l’Énergie (ANME). 2022. Stratégie nationale pour la transition énergétique à l’horizon 2030. Tunis. European Commission. 2022. Global Gateway Strategy. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission. 2023a. Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Brussels: European Commission. European Commission. 2023b. Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Regulation. Brussels: European Commission. European Commission. 2023c. EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Brussels: European Commission. International Energy Agency (IEA). 2023a. Energy Policy Review: Tunisia 2023. Paris: IEA. International Energy Agency (IEA). 2023b. Energy Technology Perspectives 2023. Paris: IEA. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023a. Fiscal Monitor: Climate Policies and Public Finances. Washington, DC. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023b. Fiscal Policies for a Low-Carbon Economy. Washington, DC. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2024a. World Economic Outlook: Climate Policies and Economic Transition. Washington, DC. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2024b. Global Carbon Pricing Developments and Outlook. Washington, DC. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). 2023. Renewable Energy Market Analysis: Middle East and North Africa. Abu Dhabi: IRENA. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2023a. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Implications for developing countries. Paris: OECD Publishing. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2023b. The Economic Implications of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. Paris: OECD Publishing. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2015. Paris Agreement. Bonn: UNFCCC. World Bank. 2023. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2023. Washington, DC. World Bank 2024. MENA Economic Update: Green Industrial Transformation. Washington, DC. Zachmann, G., Roth, A. and Tamara, S. 2020. Preparing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism in the EU. Bruegel Policy Contribution This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Read the full journal, including this article, by downloading the PDF below. Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026. by Brig (Rtd) Dr Robert Kabage Abstract This paper examines Kenya’s peace and security architecture within the framework of EU–Africa relations, highlighting policy and governance priorities critical to advancing mutually beneficial outcomes. In a pluriversal world, EU–Africa relations are undergoing renewed scrutiny, particularly in the domains of peace and security. Historically shaped by colonial legacies, post-independence cooperation frameworks, and agreements such as Cotonou, the relationship is now rhetorically repositioned toward a more balanced and strategic partnership, as articulated in initiatives like the Joint Vision for 2030. Kenya is at the centre of this debate as an anchor state in the Greater Eastern Africa. Kenya plays a central role in regional stability, contributing to peace support operations in Somalia, South Sudan and DR Congo, while managing domestic security challenges, border threats, and institutional reforms. The study analyses the alignment of EU engagement including technical support, capacity building, and financial assistance with Kenya’s national security objectives and lived experiences. Drawing on government reports, EU programmeme documentation, and empirical insights from security personnel and local communities, the paper interrogates both opportunities and constraints presented by EU–Africa cooperation. Emphasis is placed on the operational impacts of EU-funded initiatives, the challenges posed by donor dependency, normative divergences, and Kenya’s strategic role in shaping a new international security architecture consistent with UN Charter principles. The paper concludes with evidence-based recommendations for enhancing Kenya’s agency, strengthening local ownership of peace initiatives, and fostering a partnership with the EU that advances Kenya’s leadership in Africa’s peace and security agenda, institutional resilience, and regional stability. Keywords: Peace and security, EU–Africa relations, governance, UN Charter, security architecture, Kenya 1. Introduction The evolving dynamics of European Union (EU)–Africa relations are increasingly shaped by strategic imperatives that intersect with peace, security, and governance across the continent. Within this context, Kenya emerges as a critical frontline state, serving both as a contributor to regional peace support operations and as a host for multilateral security governance mechanisms. Historically, EU–Africa relations have been influenced by colonial legacies, donor–recipient frameworks, and normative commitments embedded in instruments such as the Cotonou Agreement. While such frameworks have promoted development and structural cooperation, they have often reinforced asymmetrical power relations, limiting the extent to which African states exercise agency in defining security and governance priorities (Zajontz, 2022; Ogutu, 2025). This paper critically examines Kenya’s peace and security architecture within the broader EU–Africa relations lens, interrogating the ways in which EU instruments and partnerships interact with Kenya’s national security priorities. These include contributions to United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) and regional peacekeeping operations, institutional capacity-building, governance frameworks addressing internal and regional security challenges, and the operational realities experienced by affected communities. By situating Kenya at the intersection of operational practice, policy governance, and interregional cooperation, the study foregrounds empirical realities that illuminate both opportunities and constraints in EU–Kenya peace and security engagements. 1.1. Objectives of the Study The objectives of this study are fourfold: a. To assess the operational and strategic impact of EU instruments, including the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the African Peace Facility (APF), on Kenya’s national and regional security architecture. b. To analyse the governance and institutional dimensions of Kenya’s engagement with EU-supported initiatives, highlighting successes and challenges in aligning external support with national priorities. c. To examine the lived experiences of frontline actors and affected communities, integrating their perspectives into the evaluation of peace and security interventions. d. To generate evidence-based policy and governance recommendations that strengthen mutually beneficial EU–Africa outcomes, emphasising Kenya’s sovereignty, agency, and alignment with UN Charter principles. 1.2. Methodological Overview The study adopts a mixed-methods approach, integrating secondary data from official reports, policy documents, and peer-reviewed literature with field-based insights from Kenya’s security engagements. By combining theoretical frameworks with empirical evidence from operational contexts such as ATMIS and UNMISS deployments, the research provides a comprehensive, country-specific lens for evaluating EU–Africa cooperation in peace and security. This approach ensures that the study is both academically rigorous and directly relevant to Kenya’s policy and governance priorities, producing findings that are empirically grounded, analytically robust and actionable. 2. Literature Review / Theoretical Framework Research on EU–Africa peace and security cooperation consistently identifies two interrelated analytical dimensions. First, empirical studies evaluate the operational effectiveness of EU instruments in fostering peace, security, and institutional capacity across African states. Second, theoretical analyses interrogate the structural dynamics and normative frameworks underpinning interregional security partnerships, including issues of power asymmetry, institutional design, and African agency (Akinyi, 2018; Plank, 2022). Integrating these strands is essential for understanding how EU initiatives intersect with national security priorities, particularly in anchor states such as Kenya, and directly informs the operational, governance, community, and policy-focused objectives of this study. 2.1. EU Peace and Security Cooperation: Institutional and Operational Foundations The European Union has progressively transformed its external action from a development-focused mandate into a strategic engagement encompassing peace support operations, conflict prevention, and institutional capacity-building initiatives. Core instruments—including the European Peace Facility (EPF), the Instrument for Stability and Peace (IcSP), and the African Peace Facility (APF)—support African-led peace architectures, particularly the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (European External Action Service, 2021; Plank, 2022). APSA comprises institutional pillars such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and the African Standby Force (ASF). These pillars collectively operationalise continental conflict prevention and response while providing a framework for member states to coordinate national contributions. EU engagement through these instruments is framed within Joint Vision 2030, emphasising African ownership, strategic reciprocity, and the integration of development, governance, and security priorities (European Union and African Union, 2022). Critical scholarship highlights persistent normative tensions and power asymmetries, as EU agenda-setting can influence policy adoption and operational priorities within African states (Akinyi, 2018), reinforcing the need for country-level analysis that balances operational effectiveness with governance alignment (Objective 2). 2.2. Kenya as an Anchor State in EU–Africa Security Cooperation Kenya occupies a central position in EU–Africa peace and security frameworks. Operationally, Kenya contributes substantively to regional missions, with approximately 7,220 personnel deployed in the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) as of December 2024 (African Union Peace and Security Department, 2024; United Nations Peacekeeping, 2025). The deployments directly reflect the operational impact of EU support and national contributions (Objective 1). Beyond troop contributions, Kenya hosted institutional platforms for EU–Africa cooperation, including the tenth EU–APSA IV steering committee and sixth Early Response Mechanism (ERM) meetings in 2025, demonstrating Nairobi’s role as both a policy and operational hub for continental security governance. EU financial support to Kenya further demonstrates tangible engagement: in June 2024, the Council of the European Union allocated €20 million under the EPF to enhance the Kenya Defence Forces’ capacity in counterterrorism, border security, and institutional reform (Council of the European Union, 2024). This combination of funding, operational contribution, and institutional hosting underscores Kenya’s strategic agency and aligns with all four study objectives. 2.3. Theoretical Perspectives on Partnerships and Power Dynamics Two complementary theoretical perspectives elucidate EU–Kenya cooperation: a. Institutionalist Approaches – Structured frameworks such as APSA and Joint Vision 2030 generate predictable norms, institutional convergence, and cooperative behaviour by embedding African states within multi-level governance architectures (European Union and African Union, 2022; Plank, 2022). These frameworks facilitate Kenya’s integration into continental decision-making and operational planning, supporting both governance alignment (Objective 2) and strategic policy coherence (Objective 4). b. Critical Realist Perspectives – Enduring power asymmetries and normative influence mean EU agenda-setting and conditionalities can constrain Kenya’s strategic autonomy (Akinyi, 2018). Kenya’s engagement represents a negotiated equilibrium in which operational gains from EU partnership are balanced against national ownership, local legitimacy, and institutional sovereignty, particularly in frontier security areas where EU support intersects with domestic counterterrorism and border management priorities. This framework underpins the integration of lived experiences into policy design (Objective 3) and informs actionable recommendations (Objective 4). 2.4. Lived Institutional Practice and Governance Implications Empirical and field-based literature emphasises the importance of lived experiences in shaping policy outcomes. In Kenya, EU-funded border surveillance, training, and logistical support have enhanced situational awareness and operational efficiency. Field reports indicate that without parallel investment in community engagement, trust-building, and socio-economic inclusion, security interventions risk marginalising local populations, particularly in Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir counties (Human Rights Watch, 2023). These observations highlight the necessity of integrating technical support with governance frameworks that prioritise human security and institutional resilience. Community engagement mechanisms reinforce operational sustainability (Objective 1), ensure governance alignment (Objective 2), and validate policies through local knowledge integration (Objective 3), collectively supporting Kenya’s strategic positioning and policy coherence (Objective 4). 2.5. Gap in Literature: Country-Level, Empirically Grounded Analyses While continental and regional analyses of EU–Africa peace and security cooperation are extensive, country-specific studies examining operational realities, governance challenges, and lived experiences in frontline states remain scarce. Existing studies frequently generalise across regions, obscuring the nuanced interaction between EU instruments and national priorities. This paper addresses this gap by focusing on Kenya’s unique position, analysing both institutional frameworks and operational dynamics, and linking them explicitly to policy and governance priorities. By integrating empirical data, theoretical perspectives, and lived experiences, the study generates actionable insights across all four objectives: operational impact, governance alignment, community integration, and policy coherence. These considerations directly inform the methodology in Section 3, ensuring both academic rigor and policy relevance. 3. Methodology This study employs a rigorous, multi-dimensional methodology designed to systematically examine Kenya’s peace and security architecture within the EU–Africa relations framework. Emphasis is placed on operational realities, governance structures, policy coherence, and lived experiences, ensuring both analytical depth and empirical specificity. The methodology explicitly aligns with the four study objectives, linking operational, governance, community, and policy dimensions to actionable recommendations. 3.1. Research Design A qualitative single-country case study design is adopted, focusing on Kenya as an anchor state in AU, UN, and EU-supported peace and security initiatives. Kenya’s selection is informed by its strategic role in regional security, including deployments in the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), as well as its hosting of continental security coordination platforms. This design allows for a comprehensive, country-specific analysis of institutional dynamics, operational performance, and governance frameworks while capturing lived experiences from security personnel, policymakers, and local communities. The approach directly supports Objective 1 (operational contributions), Objective 2 (governance alignment), Objective 3 (lived experiences), and Objective 4 (policy and governance priorities). 3.2. Data Sources Data triangulation ensures validity and reliability. Sources include: a. Secondary official data: AU and Kenya government reports on APSA, KDF deployments, and operational performance. b. EU programme documentation: European Peace Facility (EPF), Instrument for Stability and Peace (IcSP), and Joint Vision 2030 reports. c. United Nations sources: UNMISS operational reports and troop contributions. d. Peer-reviewed literature: Analyses of EU–Africa cooperation, African agency, and interregional security dynamics. e. Field-based evidence: Grey literature and secondary reports documenting community experiences, local governance, and operational feedback from Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir counties. Data spans the period 2020–2025, ensuring recency and relevance for current policy implications. 3.3. Analytical Approach Thematic content analysis, tailored to Kenya’s context, was conducted across four interrelated dimensions, explicitly linked to the study objectives: a. Operational Effectiveness (Objective 1): Assessed EU instrument contributions to troop readiness, logistics, training, and intelligence, analysing multi-year trends and sustainability. b. Governance and Institutional Alignment (Objective 2): Evaluated integration of EU-supported initiatives with Kenya’s National Security Policy, Ministry of Defence frameworks, and APSA/continental standards. c. Lived Experiences (Objective 3): Explored the perspectives of security personnel and communities in conflict vulnerable regions in Kenya, focusing on operational challenges, human security outcomes, and local legitimacy. d. Policy Coherence and Strategic Alignment (Objective 4): Examined EU–Kenya policy integration with UN Charter principles, AU frameworks, and broader continental strategies, identifying gaps and opportunities for mutually beneficial outcomes. 3.4. Justification of Methodology This methodology is optimal for generating policy-relevant insights while maintaining empirical rigor. The case study approach captures Kenya-specific realities and enables contextualised recommendations. Triangulation across secondary, operational, and field-based data ensures reliability, robustness, and credibility. Integrating institutionalist and critical realist perspectives allows the study to account for both normative and power dynamics shaping EU–Kenya cooperation, addressing the tension between operational gains and national sovereignty. 3.5. Limitations and Mitigation Constraints include limited access to classified operational data and potential biases in secondary reporting. These limitations are mitigated through cross-validation with multiple sources, inclusion of field-level evidence, and triangulation across institutional and community perspectives. While these constraints may marginally affect granularity in operational detail, they do not compromise the study’s capacity to generate actionable policy recommendations. 3.6. Contribution to Findings and Recommendations By systematically integrating operational, governance, lived experience, and policy dimensions, this methodology underpins Sections 4.0 (Findings) and 5.0 (Recommendations). It ensures that empirical evidence, analytical rigor, and contextual relevance are fully aligned with the study’s four objectives, providing a robust foundation for Kenya-centred, innovative, and actionable insights in EU–Africa peace and security cooperation. 4. Findings / Analysis Kenya’s peace and security architecture occupies a critical position within regional, continental, and interregional frameworks. As an anchor state in the region, Kenya simultaneously contributes to AU, UN and EU-supported missions, manages domestic security challenges, and hosts EU-funded security initiatives. While EU engagement has augmented operational capacity and governance mechanisms, several Kenya-specific gaps compromise the sustainability, effectiveness, and contextual alignment of these interventions. These gaps span operational dependence, governance fragmentation, community integration deficits, and multilateral strategic misalignment, each of which has measurable and verifiable impacts on Kenya’s national security priorities (African Union Peace and Security Department, 2024; United Nations Peacekeeping, 2025). 4.1. Operational Dependence and Sustainability Deficit Kenya’s operational capacity in regional peace support missions remains heavily dependent on EU funding, training, and logistical support. As of December 2024, Kenya contributed approximately 7,220 personnel to ATMIS in Somalia (22% of the total AU contingent) (African Union Peace and Security Department, 2024). While the European Peace Facility (EPF) allocated €20 million in June 2024 to support counterterrorism, border security, and institutional reform (Council of the European Union, 2024), field reports indicate that national capabilities for force mobility, intelligence collection, and rapid deployment are not fully self-sustaining. Operational units report that without EU-provided logistics, such as airlift capacity and advanced surveillance equipment, the tempo and effectiveness of missions decline markedly, particularly in remote or high-risk operational theatres. This reflects a sustainability deficit: Kenya’s current operational contributions risk regression should EU funding diminish, demonstrating a gap in national ownership, long-term planning, and strategic autonomy (African Union Peace and Security Department, 2024). 4.2. Governance Fragmentation and Coordination Inconsistency Institutional coordination between Kenyan authorities and EU-supported initiatives remains fragmented. Multiple ministries—including Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and the National Treasury—interact with overlapping EU programmes without a centralised policy coordination mechanism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 2026). For example, EU training programmes for APSA compliance are often scheduled independently of Kenya Defence Forces’ deployment cycles, resulting in suboptimal utilisation of resources and reporting inconsistencies. Mid-level officers report that differing monitoring and evaluation requirements between EU instruments and national frameworks lead to duplication of effort and occasional misalignment in operational priorities (African Union Peace and Security Department, 2025). These coordination inconsistencies indicate a governance gap: while technical and financial support exists, the lack of institutionalised channels for alignment undermines efficiency, strategic coherence, and accountability. 4.3. Community Integration Deficit and Contextual Disconnect Despite operational and governance improvements, local populations in conflict vulnerable regions in Kenya experience uneven benefits from EU-supported interventions. In Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir, EU-assisted early warning and conflict monitoring systems have enhanced threat detection, yet civil-military engagement remains sporadic (The Star, 2025; UNDP Kenya, 2025). Community representatives report that security planning is often top-down, with limited consultation on socio-economic needs, conflict triggers, or local priorities. This community integration deficit reduces the legitimacy and sustainability of interventions, contributing to occasional tensions between deployed forces and local populations. Empirical field assessments indicate that only 40-50% of stabilisation projects in these vulnerable regions directly incorporate local input, leaving substantial gaps in trust-building, human security, and operational effectiveness (Human Rights Watch, 2023). 4.4. Strategic Misalignment Across Multilateral Security Mandates Kenya’s engagement with EU instruments exists within a complex multilateral security environment that includes AU, UN, and national mandates. Strategic misalignment arises when EU normative frameworks—focused on human rights monitoring, anti-corruption compliance, and procedural accountability—intersect with Kenya’s operational imperatives for rapid counterterrorism responses, border stabilisation, and critical infrastructure protection. For example, EU reporting timelines for programme deliverables often conflict with urgent operational demands in high-risk regions, creating tension between compliance and effectiveness (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 2026). Additionally, emerging actors such as China influence logistical support, technology transfers, and infrastructure projects, introducing another layer of complexity (Zajontz, 2022). These multilateral misalignments illustrate the challenge of reconciling external normative priorities with Kenya-centred operational realities while maintaining adherence to the UN Charter, AU protocols, and national security law (United Nations Security Council Resolution 2687, 2023). 4.5. Synthesis of Findings The empirical evidence demonstrates that EU–Kenya peace and security cooperation delivers measurable benefits in operational capacity, institutional development, and normative alignment. However, Kenya-specific gaps—including operational dependence, fragmented governance coordination, limited integration of local lived experiences, and strategic misalignment across multilateral frameworks—persist. These gaps compromise long-term sustainability, reduce operational effectiveness, and limit the full realisation of Kenya’s strategic agency in regional and continental security architectures (Human Rights Watch, 2023; African Union Peace and Security Department, 2024; United Nations Peacekeeping, 2025). Addressing these gaps requires a holistic, Kenya-centred approach that strengthens operational autonomy, institutional coherence, community integration, and multilateral alignment, forming the foundation for the actionable recommendations in Section 5. 5. Policy and Governance Recommendations The four gaps identified in Section 4—operational dependence, governance fragmentation, community integration deficits, and multilateral misalignment—require interventions that are empirically grounded, operationally feasible, and institutionally anchored in Kenya’s national security framework. Addressing these gaps holistically ensures that Kenya’s peace and security architecture is both sustainable and strategically aligned with regional, continental, and international mandates. 5.1. Establishment of a National Peace Operations Fund Kenya’s operational capacity in regional peace support missions can be significantly strengthened through the establishment of a National Peace Operations Fund, consolidating domestic resources, donor contributions, and regional cost-sharing mechanisms for AU, UN, and bilateral missions. This fund would provide predictable financing for operational deployments, training programmes, and logistical support, reducing dependence on ad-hoc external funding. Structured contributions from the national budget, supplemented by multilateral partnerships, would ensure continuity of operations in ATMIS, AUSSOM and other regional commitments, thereby enhancing long-term strategic autonomy and operational readiness. 5.2. Strengthening Governance Coordination and Policy Coherence Fragmented institutional coordination between Kenyan authorities and EU-supported initiatives can be mitigated by creating a centralised National Security Coordination Unit. This unit would harmonise programme planning, training schedules, and reporting requirements across ministries and agencies, streamlining interactions with EU instruments. By consolidating monitoring and evaluation frameworks, aligning operational priorities, and facilitating joint decision-making, the unit would ensure coherence, efficiency, and accountability across all security governance initiatives. The approach integrates institutional capacity-building with practical policy oversight to reduce redundancy and maximise the impact of external support. 5.3. Enhancing Community Integration and Localised Security Engagement To address deficits in community integration, Kenya should institutionalise participatory mechanisms that embed local input in operational planning and security governance. Structured consultations, conflict-sensitivity training for deployed personnel, and collaborative design of stabilisation initiatives would improve civil-military engagement, increase local legitimacy, and strengthen human security outcomes. Targeted programmes in conflict vulnerable regions in Kenya, like Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir, would incorporate socio-economic priorities, early-warning feedback, and conflict-resolution practices, ensuring that interventions reflect both operational realities and the lived experiences of affected communities. 5.4. Development of a Kenya-Centred Multilateral Security Alignment Framework Kenya’s engagement with multilateral partners, including the AU, UN, and EU, requires a comprehensive alignment framework to reconcile operational mandates, reporting timelines, and normative priorities. By mapping points of convergence and divergence across all actors, the framework would identify potential conflicts, streamline operational coordination, and establish contingency protocols to maintain mission effectiveness under competing requirements. This Kenya-centred approach ensures that external normative objectives complement national security imperatives, enhancing strategic agency while maintaining compliance with AU, EU, UN, and national legal frameworks. 6. Conclusion This study has critically examined how Kenya’s peace and security architecture interacts with EU–Africa relations in peace and security, addressing the central research question of how policy and governance priorities can strengthen mutually beneficial outcomes. Kenya emerges as an anchor state in regional and continental security, contributing decisively to AU, UN, and regional missions while navigating complex dynamics of external support, domestic institutional capacities, and community realities. The findings underscore operational strengths, such as Kenya’s logistical and troop contributions, alongside persistent challenges, including external funding dependence, fragmented institutional coordination, and limited integration of local community perspectives in policymaking. The policy recommendations directly respond to these findings: enhancing operational capacity through national financing and regional coordination, institutionalising governance alignment via formal Kenya–EU consultation platforms, integrating lived experiences of frontline communities into planning, and advancing a coherent, sustainable EU–Kenya partnership framework. Each measure provides a clear, actionable pathway that is both contextually grounded in Kenya’s lived realities and strategically aligned with broader AU, EU, and UN peace and security frameworks. Collectively, these recommendations reinforce Kenya’s capacity to exercise strategic agency, strengthen institutional coherence, and embed community perspectives in peace and security operations. By combining empirical evidence, robust governance structures, and participatory approaches, Kenya can consolidate a balanced, sustainable, and mutually beneficial role within EU–Africa peace and security cooperation while contributing to a reformed, inclusive international peace and security architecture. 7. Future Research Directions This section identifies research areas that directly extend the findings and recommendations of this study, highlighting opportunities to deepen understanding of Kenya’s role in EU–Africa peace and security cooperation. 7.1. Operational Sustainability of Kenya’s Peace Contributions Future research should examine the long-term viability of Kenya’s engagement in AU, UN, and EU-supported missions, including national financing, regional cost-sharing mechanisms, and logistical capacity. Studies could leverage past deployment data—such as Kenya’s 7,220 personnel in ATMIS (African Union Peace and Security Department, 2024) to model sustainability under varying funding and operational scenarios. Predictive tools, including conflict and deployment modelling, could optimise resource allocation and operational planning, building directly on Section 4.1 findings and recommendations in 5.1 regarding operational autonomy. 7.2. Effectiveness of Governance Coordination Mechanisms Research should evaluate the practical impact of formal Kenya–EU consultation platforms and institutional alignment processes on policy coherence, strategic decision-making, and accountability. Comparative analysis with other frontline states, such as Ethiopia or Mali, could provide lessons for refining governance structures. This directly extends to Section 4.2 findings and Section 5.2 recommendations on institutional integration and coordination. 7.3. Integration of Community Lived Experiences in Security Policy Field-based studies could assess how systematically incorporating local perspectives on conflict vulnerable regions of Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir affects operational success, social legitimacy, and inclusive governance. Participatory monitoring systems, digital reporting platforms, and structured civil-military consultation could strengthen evidence-informed policy, directly linked to Section 4.3 findings and Section 5.3 recommendations on integrating lived experiences. References African Union Peace and Security Department. 2024. ATMIS and AU Peacekeeping Operational Overview. Addis Ababa: African Union. African Union Peace and Security Department. 2025. Institutional Coordination and Monitoring of APSA Implementation in Kenya. Addis Ababa: African Union. Akinyi, J. 2018. Normative Influence and African Agency in EU–Africa Security Cooperation. Nairobi: University of Nairobi Press. Council of the European Union. 2024. European Peace Facility: €20 million support for Kenya Defence Forces. Brussels: Council of the European Union. European External Action Service. 2021. EU Engagement in African Peace and Security: Instruments and Operational Frameworks. Brussels: EEAS. European Union and African Union. 2022. Joint Vision 2030: Strategic Framework for EU–AU Peace and Security Cooperation. Brussels/Addis Ababa: European Union and African Union. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Kenya. [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/kenya [accessed: 27 July 2026]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya. 2026. Coordination of EU-Funded Peace and Security Initiatives in Kenya. Nairobi: Government of Kenya. Ogutu, M. 2025. EU–Africa Security Partnerships: Country-Level Dynamics in Kenya. Nairobi: Strathmore University Press. Plank, R. 2022. Institutionalist and Critical Realist Approaches to EU–Africa Peace Cooperation. Berlin: Springer. The Star. 2025. Community Perceptions of Security Interventions in Northern Kenya. [Online] Available at: https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2025/07/05/community-engagement-security-northern-kenya/ [accessed: 27 July 2026]. UNDP Kenya. 2025. Early Warning and Conflict Monitoring Systems in Frontier Counties. [Online] Available at: https://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/library/democratic_governance.html [accessed: 27 July 2026]. United Nations Peacekeeping. 2025. UNMISS Operational Data and Troop Contributions. [Online] Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss [accessed: 27 July 2026]. United Nations Security Council. 2023. Resolution 2687 (2023) on ATMIS/Somalia. [Online] Available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/2687(2023) [accessed: 27 July 2026]. Zajontz, T. 2022. Emerging Powers and Security Governance in Africa: Implications for EU Partnerships. Berlin: Springer. This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Read the full journal, including this article, by downloading the PDF below. Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026. by Prof Assi J.C. Kimou Abstract This policy brief analyses the evolution of trade relations between Côte d’Ivoire and the European Union (EU) within a context of multipolar reconfiguration characterised by the rise of emerging partners and the intensification of geo-economic dynamics. An examination of trade flows highlights three principal findings. First, over the past decade Côte d’Ivoire has broadened its spectrum of trading partners, with emerging economies significantly increasing their share of its external trade. Second, this diversification has not resulted in an absolute decline of the EU, whose share in Ivorian trade remains substantial. Third, this shift has been accompanied by a sectoral polarisation of export markets: the European Union absorbs a growing share of processed Ivorian products, while emerging partners concentrate a larger proportion of their imports on primary commodities, in a context of trade deficits for Côte d’Ivoire vis-à-vis the latter. This configuration reveals a functional differentiation among partners. The EU appears as a market outlet associated with a relative upgrading of Ivorian exports, supported by the asymmetric provisions of the interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and by a structuring regulatory framework. By contrast, the sustained demand for raw materials from emerging economies tends to reinforce Côte d’Ivoire’s upstream integration into global value chains. The brief identifies several strategic challenges: the risk of lock-in into primary commodity specialisation vis-à-vis emerging partners; the high compliance costs associated with European standards for local SMEs; the risks of regional fragmentation arising from the articulation between the EPA and the ECOWAS Common External Tariff; and, for the EU, the need to secure its supply chains in an increasingly competitive environment. In light of these findings, EU-Côte d’Ivoire cooperation would benefit from evolving towards a model centred on productive transformation, the strengthening of local industrial capacities, support for regulatory compliance, and coherence with African regional integration objectives. Such a reorientation would help transform the current trade polarisation into a lever for upgrading and foster a more balanced interdependence, consistent with the ambitions of Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Keywords: EU–Côte d’Ivoire Partnership, Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), Trade Diversification, Structural Transformation, Multipolar Reconfiguration 1. Introduction For several decades, cooperation agreements have structured the economic relations between the European Union (EU) and the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). However, the international environment in which these agreements were conceived has undergone profound transformation. The rise of emerging economies, the intensification of geo-economic competition and contemporary geopolitical tensions are reshaping trade hierarchies and reconfiguring patterns of interdependence. In this multipolar context, traditional cooperation frameworks are at a strategic crossroads. These transformations call for moving beyond a strictly preferential reading of trade agreements to assess their capacity to support the structural transformation of African economies. The issue is no longer solely one of market access, but rather the quality of integration into global value chains, the resilience of partnerships, and the coherence between bilateral commitments and continental ambitions, notably those embodied in Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). In this context, the present brief examines, in light of cooperation agreements, particularly the interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the dynamics of trade relations between Côte d’Ivoire and the European Union amid ongoing multipolar reconfiguration. It analyses both the quantitative and qualitative evolution of trade flows, highlights the mechanisms underpinning sectoral polarisation of export markets, and identifies the resulting structural challenges. On this basis, it outlines strategic perspectives aimed at consolidating a mutually beneficial partnership grounded in productive upgrading, regional coherence and reciprocal value chain security. 2. Methodology This paper takes a mixed-methods approach, combining a quantitative analysis of trade flows with an institutional review of regulatory frameworks, and an analysis based on the theoretical frameworks of structural transformation and the political economy of international trade. The presented perspectives draw on research relating to productive specialisation, dependence on raw materials and integration into global value chains. The empirical analysis draws on foreign trade data broken down by product (6-digit HS classification) and destination. These data were primarily sourced from international trade databases such as UN Comtrade, the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), Ivorian customs statistics, and the OECD database. To examine the sectoral polarisation of export markets, a dynamic analysis was conducted to examine how the sectoral composition of Ivorian exports to the European Union and emerging partners has evolved over time. The paper also examines the institutional determinants likely to influence the structure of trade. To this end, a qualitative analysis of the provisions of the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement between Côte d'Ivoire and the European Union was conducted. 3. The Normative Framework of Cooperation between the European Union and Francophone West Africa Economic relations between the European Union (EU) and the countries of Francophone West Africa have, since independence, been structured by successive cooperation agreements. These arrangements have evolved over time, moving from a preferential regime to a partnership architecture aligned with multilateral trade rules. Analysing these agreements is therefore essential to understanding the geopolitical stakes and adapting future strategies, particularly in the context of EU-Côte d’Ivoire relations. 3.1 Historical Evolution: From Preferential Assistance to Strategic Partnership Francophone West African countries and the European Union have long maintained cooperative relations. The principal orientations of this cooperation date back to the Lomé Conventions (1975, 1980, 1985, 1989 and 1995), which involved a large proportion of Francophone West African states. These agreements granted non-reciprocal trade preferences to ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, enabling their products to access the Community market on preferential terms without requiring reciprocal concessions towards European countries (Brisepierre, 2002). This regime was based on the principle of differentiated treatment and primarily aimed at supporting the development of ACP states. It was also characterised by the EU’s intention to promote compliance with certain political and social standards among its ACP partners (Lomé IV Convention, 1989). The Cotonou Agreement, signed in June 2000 and revised in February 2005, marked a major turning point by introducing an explicit political dimension (governance, human rights, rule of law) and announcing the transition towards agreements compatible with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Unlike the Lomé Conventions, the Cotonou Agreement for the first time dissociated trade policy from official development assistance (ODA). As tariff exemptions became increasingly difficult to reconcile with WTO disciplines (Articles 36 and 37), trade policy emerged as a mechanism to align ACP countries with the standards of a globalised market (Haguenau-Moizard & Montalieu, 2004). Beyond this critical interpretation, the Cotonou Agreement was also presented as a means of promoting sustainable development in ACP countries, facilitating their gradual integration into the global economy and contributing to poverty reduction. This reading emphasised the expected gains from free trade (allocative efficiency and consumer welfare) alongside the financing of economic cooperation projects (Dufaut & Souaré, 2011). The transition materialised through the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). More recently, the Samoa Agreement (2023) has redefined the overarching framework of cooperation between the European Union and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, explicitly incorporating priorities such as climate transition, security, mobility and sustainable investment (European Commission, 2023). This new framework comprises common principles applicable to all parties, as well as three regional protocols (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific), emphasising region-specific needs. It reflects a qualitative transformation of the partnership, promoted as one between equals. 3.2 Economic Partnership Agreements: Legal Architecture and Implications The EPAs concluded with ACP countries, including Côte d’Ivoire, constitute the trade pillar of the Cotonou Agreement. They are based on progressive and asymmetric liberalisation: the EU grants full market access to exports from ACP countries, while partner countries commit to liberalising approximately 80 per cent of their tariff lines over a transitional period of 15 to 25 years, depending on the case. Beyond this asymmetry, EPAs include several provisions favourable to ACP countries, notably: the exclusion of sensitive products from liberalisation; more flexible rules of origin; safeguard measures for agriculture; protection for infant industries. Although these provisions help preserve policy space and mitigate adjustment costs, EPAs remain subject to debate. Some authors highlight risks of deindustrialisation and tariff revenue losses (UNECA, 2018), while others emphasise potential gains in competitiveness and investment attractiveness. 3.3 Alignment of EPAs with West African Integration Objectives West African countries have, for several years, pursued a regional integration project aimed at creating a coherent economic space capable of supporting industrialisation, productive diversification and macroeconomic resilience (Bundu, 1996; UEMOA, 2024). This project is driven by the Economic Community of West African States and reinforced by the West African Economic and Monetary Union, which provide the principal integration instruments. Within this process, the negotiation of EPAs with the European Union raises a fundamental strategic question: Do these agreements act as catalysts or obstacles to regional integration? Regional preference clauses within EPAs stipulate that countries within the same region grant one another the same advantages extended to the EU. In this respect, EPAs are designed to promote both regional integration and trade among signatory states. 4. Economic Aggregates and the Recomposition of Trade Partnerships An analysis of cooperation agreements between the European Union and Côte d’Ivoire gains analytical depth when situated within the empirical dynamics of key macroeconomic aggregates. This section adopts a comparative perspective to examine the evolution of GDP in Côte d’Ivoire and the European Union, the sectoral structure of Ivorian exports and imports, and bilateral EU–Côte d’Ivoire trade flows. These dynamics are further contextualised by the rise of emerging partners such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, Türkiye, South Africa and the Republic of Korea, in order to assess the ongoing geo-economic reconfiguration. 4.1 Asymmetrical Economic Positions In terms of gross domestic product at purchasing power parity (GDP in PPP), a considerable gap persists between Côte d’Ivoire and its traditional partners, particularly the European Union and the United States as well as its main emerging partners, notably China and India. Over the period 2015-2024, India’s GDP (PPP) represented on average approximately 56 times that of Côte d’Ivoire. The gap is even more pronounced with China, the European Union and the United States, whose GDP (PPP) was on average more than 150 times larger than that of Côte d’Ivoire over the same period. This disparity in economic scale reflects a profound structural asymmetry. It implies: significantly greater shock-absorption capacity for large economies; stronger market and bargaining power; enhanced influence over international trade and financial standards. In this configuration, the economic relationship between Côte d’Ivoire and its partners can be characterised as one of asymmetric interdependence: although trade flows are mutual, relative dependence is stronger on the Ivorian side, given the substantial gap in economic size and purchasing power. Figure 1: Comparative evolution of GDP in PPP between Côte d’Ivoire and its main partners from 2015-2024 Source: Author, based on WDI 4.2 Structure of Côte d’Ivoire’s External Trade: Progressive yet Incomplete Transformation The structure of Côte d’Ivoire’s external trade reflects a progressive, albeit incomplete, transformation. The share of primary processed products in total exports increased from 19 per cent in 2020 to 22 per cent in 2024. This shift suggests efforts towards upgrading, particularly in cocoa processing, cashew shelling and processing, as well as in certain semi-processed agro-industrial products. However, Ivorian exports remain largely dominated by traditional agricultural commodities (cocoa, coffee, rubber and cashew nuts) and mining products. The share of mining products rose from 17 per cent in 2020 to 20 per cent in 2024. Although the proportion of raw agricultural exports has shown a declining trend, it remains the principal component of total exports. Overall, this trade configuration indicates that, despite ongoing diversification, the Ivorian economy remains centred on low domestic value-added production and only weakly integrated into higher segments of global value chains. Figure 2: Structure of exports and imports in Côte d’Ivoire, 2020-2024 Source: Author, based on data from the Ivorian Customs Authority 4.3 Bilateral Trade Flows between the EU and Côte d’Ivoire: Concentration of Exports on the European Market While analysing disparities in economic size between Côte d’Ivoire and its partners helps clarify the structural foundations of their cooperation, examining bilateral trade flows is essential to empirically anchor these strategic issues. The study of trade between Côte d’Ivoire and the European Union reveals an asymmetric configuration. On the one hand, Côte d’Ivoire represents a secondary trading partner for the European Union. Over the past five years, trade with Côte d’Ivoire has accounted for approximately 1 per cent of the EU’s total external trade, confirming the marginal nature of this relationship at the European scale. On the other hand, dependence is significantly more pronounced on the Ivorian side. Over the same period, close to 80 per cent of Côte d’Ivoire’s total exports have been directed towards the European market. This geographical concentration of export outlets underscores the central role of the European Union in the structure of Ivorian exports. This configuration reflects asymmetric interdependence: although trade flows are reciprocal, their relative significance differs markedly between the parties. The European Union possesses far greater capacity to diversify its sources of supply, whereas Côte d’Ivoire remains highly exposed to changes in European demand conditions and regulatory standards. Figure 3: Bilateral trade flows between Côte d'Ivoire and the EU from 2020-2024 Source: Author, based on data from the Ivorian Customs Authority 4.4 The Rise of Emerging Partners: Broadening the Partner Spectrum Rather than Substitution The evolution of trade flows between Côte d’Ivoire, the European Union and emerging partners reveals a dynamic of accelerated diversification, without implying a decline in European engagement. The total volume of trade between Côte d’Ivoire and the European Union has almost doubled over the past decade, rising from approximately USD 7 billion in 2015 to more than USD 13 billion in 2024. Trade with emerging partners, particularly China, India, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Saudi Arabia, has expanded at an especially rapid pace. Initially representing less than half of the volume recorded with the EU, these flows have gradually reached a level comparable to EU-Côte d’Ivoire trade. This configuration indicates that the rise of emerging partners has not translated into an absolute decline in exchanges with the EU. At the same time, the EU’s share of Côte d’Ivoire’s total trade has remained relatively stable at around 37 per cent, while the share of emerging partners increased from 18 per cent to 37 per cent over the same period. The evidence therefore points to a broadening of the partner spectrum rather than a process of substitution. Figure 4: Comparative evolution of trade flows with the EU and emerging partners Source: Author, based on UN comtrade 2015 2024 Average growth rate UE 7654413985 13360235804 5,7% Emerging economics 2463018012 13039906643 14% Table 1: A comparison of trade flows between Côte d'Ivoire and the EU and its emerging partners Source: Author, based on UN Comtrade 4.5 The Rise of Emerging Partners: Towards Greater Strategic Autonomy or Merely Diversified Dependence? The broadening of Côte d’Ivoire’s partner spectrum raises a central question: Does this evolution signal a transition towards greater strategic autonomy, or simply a diversification of dependencies? The structure of exports by destination reveals a functional differentiation among partners. European markets increasingly absorb Ivorian manufactured goods. While agricultural exports have recorded a downward trend, the share of manufactured products destined for the European Union rose progressively from 32.26 per cent in 2019 to 45.65 per cent in 2023. By contrast, emerging partners concentrate a larger share of their imports on primary agricultural products, within a context of persistent trade deficits for Côte d’Ivoire vis-à-vis these partners. The proportion of primary products in exports to emerging economies increased from 51.52 per cent in 2019 to 65.28 per cent in 2023. The expansion of the partner spectrum has therefore contributed to a sectoral polarisation of export markets. The EU appears as a transformation-orientated partner, associated with higher value-added outlets, whereas emerging partners function primarily as absorbers of primary commodities and suppliers of industrial goods. Figure 5: Structure of exports of Côte d’Ivoire by destination Source: Author based on OECD data 4.6 Sectoral Polarisation of Export Markets: Explanatory Factors The sectoral polarisation observed in the structure of Ivorian exports does not stem from a simple productive specialisation choice. Rather, it reflects a strategic arbitration by economic operators in response to a differentiated set of incentives, regulatory constraints, compliance costs and market access opportunities. An analysis of the institutional and structural determinants of this sectoral reconfiguration helps to clarify the dynamics at play. Two factors appear particularly decisive:(i) the asymmetric provisions of the interim Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Côte d’Ivoire and the European Union; and (ii) the growing demand for raw materials from emerging partners. 4.6.1 Specific Provisions of the EU–Côte d’Ivoire Interim EPA Signed in 2016 and provisionally applied since 2019, the interim EPA between Côte d’Ivoire and the European Union goes beyond a conventional tariff agreement. It establishes an asymmetric architecture designed to facilitate trade integration while preserving policy space for Ivorian industry. The EU has granted duty-free and quota-free access to almost all Ivorian exports. In return, Côte d’Ivoire is progressively liberalising approximately 80 per cent of its tariff lines over an extended transition period, while excluding around 20 per cent of products deemed sensitive. This asymmetry provides protective space for infant industries and mitigates the risk of deindustrialisation. The agreement includes safeguard clauses allowing the temporary reintroduction of customs duties in the event of serious domestic market disruption, thereby reducing abrupt exposure to European competition. In addition, the relaxation of rules of origin under the EPA (including regional cumulation and self-certification mechanisms) enhances the capacity of Ivorian exporters to incorporate imported inputs while retaining preferential access to the European market. These provisions lower effective market-entry costs for processed products that comply with EU standards. They therefore create a structural incentive to export higher value-added goods to the EU. 4.6.2 Structural Demand for Raw Materials from Emerging Partners Major emerging partners, notably China and India, have experienced rapid industrialisation based on high intensity in agricultural, mineral and energy raw materials (Brautigam, 2009; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2016). Their growth model relies on sustained demand for primary inputs, domestic processing of imported resources, and the re-export of manufactured goods. Within this framework, Côte d’Ivoire primarily appears as a supplier of raw or minimally processed agricultural commodities. The orientation of exports towards these markets thus reflects vertical productive complementarity (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2016), but also integration at the upstream stages of global value chains. In sum, the sectoral polarisation of export markets results from a dual mechanism: an institutional incentive towards processing under the EPA framework with the European Union; and a structural demand for primary commodities from emerging partners. 5. Key Challenges for EU–Côte d’Ivoire Cooperation in a Context of Trade Reconfiguration While empirical evidence confirms the robustness of the EU–Côte d’Ivoire partnership, it also reveals persistent structural imbalances and intensifying geo-economic competition linked to the rise of emerging partners. In this multipolar environment, bilateral cooperation stands at a strategic juncture. The upgrading observed in exports to European markets could act as a catalyst for accelerating Côte d’Ivoire’s structural transformation. It potentially implies higher domestic value added, the creation of skilled industrial employment, a sustainable improvement in the trade balance, and enhanced resilience to commodity price shocks. However, consolidating this trajectory entails several interdependent challenges. 5.1 The Risk of Primary Commodity Lock-In Strong demand for raw materials from key emerging partners, particularly China and India, may reinforce an asymmetric vertical integration of Côte d’Ivoire within global value chains. The risk extends beyond trade performance; it encompasses durable specialisation in upstream segments, heightened vulnerability to world price fluctuations, and delays in domestic industrialisation. Addressing this risk requires the development of industrial policy instruments that encourage minimum local processing (for example, first-stage processing requirements, differentiated fiscal incentives, or sector-specific contractual obligations), while remaining compatible with international commitments. 5.2 Compliance Challenges for SMEs with European Standards Although the asymmetric provisions of the EPA create favourable incentives for exporting processed goods to the EU, the benefits of preferential access are unevenly distributed. Exports to the European market are subject to sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, technical and safety standards, sustainability (ESG) requirements, and the forthcoming EU Regulation on Deforestation-Free Products (EUDR). Compliance entails significant costs related to certification, traceability, equipment modernisation and supply chain digitalisation. The EUDR, for example, requires geolocated traceability of production plots, implying the mapping of millions of smallholders before full implementation. Without substantial public support, SMEs and small producers risk exclusion from the European market. The challenge is therefore to prevent upgrading from benefiting only large integrated firms, thereby widening internal productive inequalities. 5.3 Risk of Regional Fragmentation: Circumvention of the Common External Tariff The signature of interim EPAs on an individual basis by certain ECOWAS members, notably Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, raises regional concerns. Differentiated liberalisation may create risks of circumvention of the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET), trade deflection, tariff revenue losses for non-signatory partners, and divergence in integration trajectories. Without strengthened regional coordination and harmonised rules of origin, trade liberalisation may weaken the coherence of the customs union and slow the construction of a West African common market. The challenge is therefore not solely bilateral, but fundamentally regional. 5.4 Securing European Supply Chains From the European Union’s perspective, the growing weight of emerging partners in Ivorian trade also carries strategic implications. If primary commodity flows increasingly redirect towards Asia, or if local processing fails to progress sufficiently, the EU could face supply tensions, diminished economic influence, and reinforced indirect dependencies through value chains led by other powers. In this context, EU–Côte d’Ivoire cooperation is not only a development issue, but also one of securing European supply chains. Multipolar reconfiguration does not invalidate the European partnership, but it redefines the conditions of its long-term sustainability. 6. Conclusion: Prospects for a Mutually Beneficial EU–CIV Partnership In a context of multipolar reconfiguration of Côte d’Ivoire’s external trade, prospects for a mutually beneficial partnership between the European Union and Côte d’Ivoire must move beyond the classical logic of preferential market access towards a shared structural transformation strategy. The identified challenges, primary commodity lock-in, compliance costs, regional fragmentation and geo-economic competition, constitute not only constraints but also levers for strategic redefinition. First, cooperation could evolve towards a model of co-construction within global value chains. The global value chain approach (Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon, 2005) demonstrates that upgrading depends not only on domestic productive capacity but also on chain governance and contractual relations with lead firms. In this perspective, the EU could support more functional integration of Côte d’Ivoire into higher value-added segments not solely through duty-free access under the EPA, but via targeted industrial partnerships, technology transfers and the integration of Ivorian SMEs into European supply chains. Such an orientation would enable the EU to secure strategic supplies while fostering domestic productive transformation, consistent with a more balanced form of interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Second, normative requirements, particularly SPS, ESG standards and the EUDR, can become vectors of convergence rather than instruments of exclusion. The literature on the “Brussels Effect” (Bradford, 2020) highlights the EU’s capacity to diffuse its regulatory standards globally. To prevent such diffusion from marginalising African SMEs, cooperation should include structured financing for compliance, digitalisation of traceability systems and strengthening of national institutional capacities. In the Ivorian context, support for geolocation of agricultural plots and sustainable certification could be embedded within a joint EU–African Union programme aligned with AfCFTA priorities. Standards would thereby become instruments of productive modernisation rather than mere market filters. Third, regional coherence must remain central. Risks of circumventing the ECOWAS Common External Tariff and fragmenting national trajectories underscore the need for alignment between bilateral agreements and regional integration. EU–Côte d’Ivoire cooperation should be explicitly articulated with ECOWAS and AfCFTA objectives, supporting harmonised rules of origin, facilitation of intra-regional trade and the development of regional value chains. This approach aligns with the vision of productive African integration promoted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, emphasising structural transformation through regional industrialisation. Finally, from a geo-economic perspective, the rise of emerging partners does not necessarily imply substitution, but strategic diversification. For the EU, consolidating its partnership with Côte d’Ivoire means maintaining economic anchorage in a region where competition for influence is intensifying. For Côte d’Ivoire, diversification should enhance bargaining power rather than entrench dual productive specialisation. A mutually beneficial partnership therefore requires shifting the centre of gravity from a primarily commercial relationship towards co-industrialisation and reciprocal supply chain security. In sum, the current reconfiguration offers a strategic opportunity. If anchored in substantial support for local transformation, inclusive regulatory compliance and African regional coherence, EU-Côte d’Ivoire cooperation can evolve towards a less asymmetric and more productive interdependence. Failing this, the observed sectoral polarisation risks consolidating to the detriment of the structural transformation ambitions embodied both in the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and in the European Union’s industrial strategy. References Bourguignon, F. and Sundberg, M. 2007. Aid Effectiveness – Opening the Black Box, American Economic Review, 97(2), pp. 316–321. Bradford, A. 2020. The Brussels effect: How the European Union rules the world. UK: Oxford University Press. Brautigam, D. 2009. The dragon's gift: the real story of China in Africa. UK: Oxford University Press. Brisepierre, P. 2002. L’accord partenariat ACP-CE, Rapport de la Commission des Affaires Etrangères du Sénat, 45 p. European Commission. 2023. Post-Cotonou Agreement (Samoa Agreement). [Online] Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cotonou-agreement/ [accessed: 27 July 2026]. Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. 2005. The governance of global value chains, Review of international political economy, 12(1), pp. 78-104. Haguenau-Moizard, C. and Montalieu, T. 2004. L’évolution du partenariat UE-ACP de Lomé à Cotonou: de l’exception a la normalisation, Mondes en développement, 128, pp. 65-88. Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. 2016. Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: engaging with large dragons, in The power of the Chinese dragon: Implications for African development and economic growth, pp. 123-148. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. Keohane, R. O. and Nye Jr, J. S. 1987. Pouvoir et interdépendance revisités, Organisation internationale, 41(4), pp. 725-753. Manners, I. 2002. Normative Power Europe, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), pp. 235-258. UNECA. 2018. Assessing Regional Integration in Africa. [Online] Available at: https://archive.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf [accessed: 27 July 2026]. Union, A. 2008. UNECA. Dans Relever les nouveaux défis de développement de l'Afrique au XXIe siècle : Document de travail. This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Read the full journal, including this article, by downloading the PDF below. Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026. by Ogonna Beauty Ogbologu Abstract Preferential trade arrangements are widely regarded as instruments of development. Yet in Nigeria, participation in the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) has failed to produce the structural employment transformation these frameworks promise. With 93% of Nigeria's workforce trapped in informal employment, the gap between trade volumes and labour outcomes has become a structural deadlock. This paper argues that the failure is institutional, not incidental; existing trade frameworks regulate the movement of goods, not the organisation of work. Drawing on the WTO Enabling Clause, the Appellate Body's landmark ruling in EC-Tariff Preferences (2004), and the EU's own practice of conditioning preferences on climate and migration, this paper proposes the Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP). By integrating this framework into the yet-to-be-concluded West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement, trade incentives are linked directly to measurable labour outcomes. This transforms preferential access from a passive gift into a binding social contract and a shared investment in productive employment. This proposal addresses long-standing sovereign concerns regarding de-industrialisation and ensures that the Nigerian worker is no longer invisible to global trade governance. Keywords: Trade preferences; Informal employment; WA Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA); Value Leakage; Enabling Clause; WTO; Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP). Introduction The long-standing deadlock over the West Africa–EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is not merely a diplomatic disagreement; it is a structural rejection of an extractive status quo embedded in the current trade architecture governing Nigeria’s access to the EU market, particularly under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). Nigeria is the third-largest economy in Africa (International Monetary Fund, 2025). It is also endowed with some of the most valuable natural resources on earth (Britannica, 2026), yet this abundance has not produced prosperity for the majority of Nigerians. Consider the "boomerang trade" inherent in Nigeria's cocoa sector. Ninety percent of the total cocoa exports are shipped in raw form (NEPC, 2024). Of these raw cocoa bean exports, the European Union (EU) is the largest destination market, accounting for up to 67% of the total exports (Sánchez, 2024, pp. 18, 30). The cocoa farmer receives the fluctuating price of a commodity; Europe captures the stable value of the finished chocolate and the formal employment that attends its production. In this structure, the formal workforce is found where value is added. Where value is added outside Nigeria, domestic labour markets are left without sufficient industrial jobs, and workers are absorbed into informal activity. In the second quarter of 2024, Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported that approximately 93% of the country's total employment was informal (NBS, 2024, p. 9). This staggering figure indicates that the vast majority of Nigerian workers lack social security, labour protections, and legal standing. They remain invisible to the trade frameworks under which their produce travels. If a trade agreement ignores nine out of ten workers, it merely facilitates the movement of products while bypassing the workers' economic advancement. This reality forces a fundamental question: Market access for whom? This is not a story about exploitation simpliciter; it is a story about structural design. This paper argues that the current architecture of EU-Africa trade, built on instruments like the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) (European Commission, 2026a) and the yet-to-be-concluded West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), was designed primarily to facilitate the frictionless movement of goods (European Commission, 2026b). While data confirms that Nigerian commodities flow into European markets, this focus on "market access" has failed to catalyse development or formal employment. To address this, this paper recommends a renegotiation of the EU–West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) to incorporate an Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP), through which access to trade preferences is aligned with the formalisation of labour. In doing so, the paper reconceptualises tariff preferences not as passive grants, but as instruments of structural transformation. This paper proceeds in four parts. It examines the extractive structure of EU–Africa trade and its implications for industrialisation and labour informality; analyses the legal framework and its institutional limits; demonstrates how employment formalisation aligns the interests of Nigeria and the European Union; and develops the legislative architecture of the Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP) as a shift from passive access to conditional integration. Why Trade Does Not Equal Transformation In 2024, mineral fuels comprised 90.3% of Nigerian exports to the EU, while industrial goods made up 82.1% of EU exports to Nigeria (European Commission, 2025). This structural mismatch confirms that Nigeria primarily exports the raw substratum, the basic inputs for European production, while importing finished goods. This system, rooted in colonial-era logic (Ake, 1996), remains largely unchanged. The Observatory of Economic Complexity confirms that raw materials account for up to 90% of Nigeria's total exports, while manufactured goods represent 1% to 5% (OEC, 2024). This concentration reflects tariff escalation: raw commodities enter the EU at near-zero duties, while value-added goods face rising barriers. The incentive is brutally clear: Nigeria earns the price of raw beans while Europe captures the value of chocolate. This is not a market outcome; it is a policy choice that fuels Nigeria’s refusal to conclude the EPA. The consequences for employment are profound. While the oil sector generates revenue, it employs few. Similarly, agricultural exports like cocoa are produced by millions of smallholders in fragmented, informal supply chains with no social security or legal protections. A reported $10 billion trade surplus in 2025 (Mom, 2025) is a welcome macroeconomic indicator, but it tells us nothing about employment quality or worker protection. The second dimension of this problem is the collapse of domestic manufacturing. Net job creation in Nigeria's manufacturing sector declined by 37.83% between 2023 and 2024 (MAN, 2024). The textile backbone of Northern Nigeria collapsed, losing over 500,000 jobs (West African Pilot News, 2025). This was driven by a 42% increase in energy costs and 35.5% lending rates (Awodipe, 2025; NBS, 2024). Firms that could not absorb these costs exited the formal sector, pushing workers into the informal economy. The EPA’s liberalisation framework tilts the playing field further. European products, benefiting from infrastructure and subsidies, reach Nigerian consumers at prices domestic firms, facing ₦1.11 trillion energy bills, cannot match. Trade liberalisation without an industrial formalisation mechanism is not a partnership; it is a de-industrialisation trap. Nigeria’s cocoa sector is the definitive case study. As the world's fourth-largest producer (NEPC, 2024), Nigeria exports nearly 90% of its cocoa value as raw beans (NEPC, 2024). The smallholders producing this crop are invisible to trade governance, operating through social networks rather than formal contracts (Meagher, 2010). This invisibility is not abstract. The 2024 displacement of 10,000 farmers in Ondo State (David, 2024) proves that trade statistics ignore the conditions of production. As observed by Orbie et al. (2022), the current regime overlooks the lived experiences of the workers it claims to champion. The Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP) is a legislative instrument required to make these workers visible and to define the terms of a balanced partnership. The Law Allows It, But the Framework Prevents It The policy of tariff escalation, imposing zero duties on raw commodities while taxing processed goods, systemically discourages industrialisation (Voora et al., 2019) and the formal labour force. Under the GSP, raw cocoa beans enter the EU at zero duty, while finished chocolate faces a higher rate. This communicates a harsh incentive. The EU prefers value addition and formal employment to remain in Europe, while Nigeria is relegated to exporting raw materials. This makes the 98% duty-free access under the GSP (European Commission, 2024) a hollow concession because it has not improved either the labour force or industrialisation. This is the very reason why Nigeria has not ratified the West Africa EPA. Nigeria’s concerns regarding the absence of safeguards for value addition are legitimate (Premium Times, 2018). While Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Cameroon have signed, their agreements prioritise liberalisation over labour dignity (Vollmer et al., 2009). As warned by the International Trade Union Confederation and European Trade Union Confederation (2018), this architecture will place Nigeria in a perpetual state of informal labour. At this point, the critical question is not whether trade can accommodate labour considerations, but whether the law provides the tools to do so. The WTO Enabling Clause and the EC-Tariff Preferences (2004) ruling provide the "Legal Safe Harbour" for a formal employment framework. The Enabling Clause (GATT, 1979) stipulates that preferences must be “designed to respond positively to the development ... and trade needs of developing countries”. This does not merely tolerate preferences; it authorises and conditions them on developmental purpose. Also, the Appellate Body in EC-Tariff Preferences (2004) established that differentiation among developing countries is lawful if based on “objective criteria” (WTO, 2004). Crucially, it ruled that "development needs" are not determined unilaterally by the EU. These needs can be measured against the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Decent Work standards (ILO, 2020). Therefore, the linkage between trade and labour formalisation is not a disruption of the rules, but rather, it is an activation of them. The EU has already set the precedent by adding conditions for climate protection and migration cooperation to its 2025 GSP regulations (Council of the European Union, 2025). This is a critical turning point. Since the law provides that development needs are not to be determined unilaterally and arbitrarily by the preference-granting country, Nigeria can equally insist that its own development priority, measured against the ILO's objective standards, be recognised as a legitimate basis for shaping trade preferences. By refusing to conclude the EPA in its current form, Nigeria is asserting its right to define these needs. This paper is therefore asking the EU to apply the same legal authority it has already exercised for climate and migration to the most pressing labour market challenge facing Nigeria. Formalising 93% of its workforce is not a request for charity. It is a claim of right under the multilateral trading system. What follows from this is straightforward. The legal framework already contains the authority, the criteria, and the precedent for conditioning trade preferences. What is missing is not law, but political will and institutional design. The preceding analysis exposes three principles. First, trade preferences may lawfully include conditions tied to development needs. The Enabling Clause permits differentiation, also confirmed by the Appellate Body. Second, development needs are not defined exclusively by preference-granting countries. They must be assessed objectively. International labour standards provide that objective measure. Third, the EU already conditions preferences on its own priorities (such as migration management and climate change). This establishes a critical precedent. If the EU can condition trade on its own demographic security, Nigeria can condition trade on its own industrial and employment security. Together, these principles create a solid legal foundation for a formalised employment framework. The architecture does not need to be rebuilt. It only needs to be activated through a sovereign demand for value addition. The Mutual Benefits of Employment Formalisation for the EU and Nigeria Nigeria’s fiscal sovereignty is at stake. A situation where 93% of workers operate informally (Abdullahi, 2026), the tax base collapses, making formalisation a prerequisite for economic self‑determination. In 2025, Nigeria’s exports to the EU totalled $20.2 billion (Trading Economics, 2026). These figures are largely from sectors characterised by high levels of informality. Nigeria has already defined its development priorities through the revised National Employment Policy (2025) (ILO, 2025) and the Nigeria Industrial Policy (2025) (State House, 2026), by placing formalisation, value addition, and industrial employment at the centre of its economic strategy. The domestic commitment is no longer in question. The trade architecture must now align to support that transition. Demographics make the case mutual. Europe’s workforce could shrink by 20% by 2070 (Szryka, 2025). Nigeria adds 4.5 million young people to the labour market each year (Ngaira, 2026). Europe needs legal, certified labour; Nigeria needs structured pathways. The EU has already established, through its revised GSP framework, that trade preferences can be conditioned on broader policy objectives such as migration cooperation and climate compliance (Council of the European Union, 2025). Extending this conditionality to employment formalisation is therefore not a departure from existing practice, but a logical and legally consistent progression. EU corporate law provides a further, more immediate incentive. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) requires large European companies to identify and manage human rights risks across their supply chains. Although the omnibus clause has narrowed its scope and delayed implementation, the core obligation remains (European Commission, 2026; Directive (EU) 2026/470). For firms sourcing from countries like Nigeria, where production often occurs within informal systems, this creates ongoing compliance risks. A more formalised labour force, therefore, reduces those risks and supports more reliable supply chains, making formalisation directly aligned with European commercial interests. Irrespective of the changes in the EU corporate law, the WTO Enabling Clause and the Appellate Body ruling in EC–Tariff Preferences (2004) provide an independent legal foundation for this paper’s proposal (GATT, 1979; World Trade Organisation, 2004). Nigeria is not a discretionary partner; it represents nearly 60% of West Africa’s GDP and remains the dominant economy in the region (European External Action Service, 2026). Within this context, a formal workforce would help to stabilise a bilateral trade relationship that consistently exceeds $20 billion annually (European Commission, 2025; Trading Economics, 2026). The broader precedent is clear. The EU’s regulatory influence, often described as the “Brussels Effect”, demonstrates how access to its market can transform global standards without formal coercion (Bradford, 2020). By linking market access to formalisation, the EU can set a new global standard for labour governance. South Korea, Vietnam, and Morocco’s rise as the EU’s largest vehicle exporter (€15.1 billion) proves that structured, conditioned trade integration, not passive market access, is what generates formal employment at scale (Fox, 2024; Yoo, 2017). It is obvious that positive developments already exist. The EU provided technical support to Nigeria’s National Employment Policy, signalling a shared commitment to employment reform. At the same time, sustained trade flows, exceeding $20 billion annually, demonstrate the depth of existing economic ties. These developments reveal the desire for cooperation. Nigeria has already chosen industrialisation; therefore, the trade structure must now align with it. The Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP) proposed herein, therefore, represents a logical next step, not a disruptive departure. The Legislative Architecture: From Passive Access to Conditional Integration In response to the EU’s 2024 call for "responsible and inclusive investment" (EU Mission to WTO, 2024), this paper proposes a regulatory departure that treats market preferences as a binding social contract rather than a discretionary gift. The Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP) ensures that trade competitiveness is no longer subsidised by the "invisibility" of unprotected labour. This framework does not ask Nigeria to begin what it has not already started; rather, it provides the External Trade Incentive necessary to make the 2025 National Employment and Industrial Policy commercially viable. The EFP will be operationalised through a Dual-Track Tariff Architecture, which functions as a "sorting machine" for market access. This architecture proposes that the EU grants 0% or preferential duty-free access exclusively to goods produced through verified formal employment. Verification is no longer an abstract social goal but is anchored on three benchmarks: enterprise registration, mandatory worker social security enrolment, and transparent banking settlements. This means that exports from unverified, informal networks would face a standard baseline tariff. This "Inverted Preference" model removes the economic incentive for informality, signalling that access to the European market requires a structured and protected workforce. Oversight would rest with the EPA's Joint Committee on Trade and Development. To facilitate this, the committee must leverage the treaty's technical cooperation provisions to build a Unified Labour Market Information System (LMIS), a digital ledger used to verify sectoral progress and trigger preferential tariffs. The framework will be implemented using a conditional sectoral integration in a phased and verifiable manner, embedding structured inclusion. So, access is earned based on how production is organised. This step is critical for revitalising Nigeria’s industrial hubs, such as the textile corridors of Kano and Kaduna, where formalisation can restore the workforce lost to the informal economy. To ensure this is a Partnership of Equals, the EU must provide critical structural support such as funding for digital traceability systems, transition credits to cover initial SME compliance costs (such as pension registration), and vocational training to ensure formalised workers gain priority access to legal labour mobility pathways. To prevent this mechanism from becoming a punitive trade penalty, the EFP includes four legal safeguards that shift the operative question from unilateral accountability to shared obligation. First, an Economic Shock Clause allows for automatic timeline extensions during macroeconomic crises, ensuring that external volatility does not derail long-term formalisation. Second, Independent Monitoring ensures that benchmarks are verified by joint technical bodies and not unilaterally imposed by the preference-granting party. Third, a Non-Retroactivity Clause protects preferences already granted from being undermined by new benchmarks. Finally, a Minimum Floor Guarantee ensures that Nigeria retains standard GSP entitlements regardless of sectoral performance. Together, these safeguards prevent the risk of regulatory capture and ensure that the EPA serves as a sovereign instrument for industrial transformation. The goal is a trade architecture that no longer looks through the Nigerian worker but at them as the primary beneficiary of global exchange. This paper asserts that these formalisation commitments must become a binding condition precedent to Nigeria's signature of the West Africa EPA. Conclusion This paper began with the "Cocoa Paradox", a farmer in Ondo State whose labour provides the raw substratum for a global industry that leaves her legally invisible. While she bears the risks of production, the trade architecture linking her farm to the European factory is not built around her interests. It is a system designed to facilitate the frictionless movement of commodities, not the formalisation of the people who produce them. Therefore, the issue is not a lack of cooperation, but the urgent need to re-engineer that cooperation to prioritise productive employment while reinforcing a rules-based international system. This is a structural choice that requires a structural revision. The legal case for the Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP) is unambiguous: the WTO Enabling Clause and the Appellate Body (2004) confirm that ILO standards provide the objective benchmarks for development needs. The operative question is no longer about legality, but about political symmetry. Will the EU recognise Nigeria's 93% informality rate as a development necessity as legitimate as its own migration and climate priorities? This paper asserts that the inclusion of the EFP in the West Africa EPA is a legal key to resolving the 2018 deadlock. By focusing on conditional sectoral integration, the agreement can transform trade from a passive exchange into a binding social contract. Trade policy is never neutral; it is a decision about whose interests the system prioritises. By adopting this framework, the EU finally recognises the Nigerian worker as a subject of trade governance, rather than a mere vehicle for commodities. 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Geneva: World Trade Organisation. World Trade Organisation (WTO). 2024. EU Statement at the Trade Policy Review of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, WT/TPR/M/439, 13 November. Geneva: WTO. Yoo, J. 2017. How the rapid export expansion began in Korea, KDI Journal of Economic Policy, 39(2), pp. 1-23. This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Read the full journal, including this article, by downloading the PDF below. Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026. by Dr Maxwell Maseko Abstract This paper focuses on the intersection of Africa’s digital infrastructure development and digital governance. It argues that South Africa’s relative digital maturity positions the country to advance digital democracy in Africa, although domestic inequalities and differing BRICS governance models constrain this potential. Globally, cyber-optimists view digitalisation as a means of addressing worrying democratic challenges such as voter apathy, political disillusionment, violent conflict, internet shutdowns, and declining trust in political institutions. Evidence from the literature indicates that some of these challenges are present in Ethiopia and Egypt, two of Africa's newest BRICS members. This paper seeks to answer two key research questions: First, how can South Africa influence the adoption of digital democracy across Africa? Second, what are the benefits of adopting digital technology for democracy on the continent? It also considers recent concerns surrounding the ‘dark web’ and internet safety. The study adopts a qualitative approach, drawing on scholarly literature, policy documents, and secondary sources, which are analysed thematically. The findings suggest that while South Africa's democracy benefits from important civil liberties, persistent economic inequality and a widening digital divide may limit its appeal as a model for emerging African democracies. Furthermore, more developed BRICS countries employ varying approaches to digital development and governance, creating policy contradictions for African countries. Policymakers should lead the development of legislation on digitalisation to enhance internet connectivity and promote inclusivity. Keywords: South Africa, BRICS, Digital Democracy, Africa, Elections, Internet Introduction The quality of democracy has deteriorated in several African states in recent times, even though there is evidence of peaceful transitions of power in key elections held in 2022 in countries such as Lesotho and Kenya (Cheeseman, 2022; Patel, 2023). Supporters of democracy have decried rising authoritarian power grabs that have led to electoral irregularities, coups, and civil conflict in Burkina Faso, Mali, Sudan, Chad, and Guinea between 2021 and 2022 (Patel, 2023). Attacks by authoritarian forces have also contributed to a decline in political rights and civil liberties in Madagascar, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Gabon (Freedom House, 2024). The juxtaposition of these cases emphasises the importance of maintaining orderly democracy on the continent to avoid a vicious circle of authoritarian misrule. This paper, therefore, argues for the adoption of digital technologies in Africa to strengthen democracy. It argues that stronger democracies, such as South Africa (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2023), may play a leading role in promoting digital democracy for various reasons, to be discussed later in this paper. According to Mokgalapa (2023), if pursued properly, BRICS participation could position African countries among the world’s fastest-growing economies, simultaneously addressing pressing domestic issues of poverty, unemployment, and inequality. The expansion of digital technologies in these countries can also benefit from this partnership, as the sections below will explain. This paper does not suggest that a democratic system of governance is the only valid form of government. However, its inclusive nature and ability to allow citizens to freely participate in their governance make this form of governance appealing to many governments. South Africa’s ability to influence the digitisation of democracy in Africa is also being discussed in the context of the potential of BRICS members to change global politics, given that they comprise over 40% of the world's population (Pinto, 2023). According to O'Neill (2024), BRICS countries were estimated to have a combined population of 3.25 billion people in 2023, with most of them either living in China or India. The paper will answer two key research questions: Firstly, how can South Africa influence the adoption of digital democracy in Africa? Secondly, what are the benefits of adopting digital technology for democracy on the continent? These questions are critical considering the optimistic argument about the ability of digital technologies to strengthen democracy and promote citizen participation in key planning and decision-making processes. In presenting its optimistic views about digital democracy, this paper does not lose sight of digital challenges and threats to democracy raised by Cheeseman et al. (2021) such as censorship, surveillance, the spread of fake news, and exposure to election rigging. The study results are relevant for scholars, researchers, policymakers, and other stakeholders interested in promoting good democratic practices. Africa's digital connectivity can boost economic growth by increasing GDP, creating jobs, and developing new industries (International Trade Administration, 2024). Furthermore, it enhances access to essential services like education and healthcare, promotes transparency in governance, and empowers citizens and businesses. Ultimately, better connectivity fosters social inclusion and allows the continent to engage more effectively in the global digital economy. The rest of the paper is divided into sections, including a definition of digital democracy and a discussion on the state of democracy in Africa and how the BRICS group of countries can assist in resolving the democratic decline. The paper also discusses digital transformation in Africa, followed by the state of internet access and the digital divide, and South Africa’s experience with digital technologies, particularly in the 2024 general elections. The paper reflects on the theoretical framework grounding the study and the methodology used to collect the data and the tools of analysis. The findings and discussion of the study are presented, and a conclusion and recommendations are made, followed by a list of references and sources used in this study. What is digital democracy? Digital democracy refers to using digital technologies to enhance democratic processes and citizen participation (Crossland, 2024). Globally, digital technology has had a fundamental impact on democratic politics. According to Dommett (2024), technology has provided new opportunities for public debate and engagement among citizens, and the internet has made information more freely available and accessible. In the era of digital democracy, Umar et al. (2023) caution that it cannot be implemented successfully if the virtual space remains in the exclusive control of a group of elites. State of democracy in Africa According to Freedom House (2024), democracy is in crisis in many African countries, although there is some good in others (Van Beek, 2024). They argue that electoral irregularities, coups, and civil conflict are evident in countries such as Madagascar, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Niger, and Gabon. Furthermore, there have been reports of devastating human rights abuses in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Afrobarometer data released in 2024 shows that, on average across 39 African countries, support for democracy remains robust, with 66% of Africans saying they prefer democracy to any other system of government. However, in 30 countries surveyed consistently over the past decade, support for democracy has declined, including in South Africa (Afrobarometer, 2024). In fact, Gossel (2016) argues that South Africa has never reached an embedded democratic state where political rights are supported and protected by civil liberties. Gossel further posits that the country’s post-apartheid experience can be assessed more realistically as an ongoing oscillation between a deepening and a reversal of democratic liberties. Van Beek (2024) argues that citizens in countries experiencing a democratic decline have complained about losing trust in corrupt and unaccountable governments and leaders. Citizens view their leaders as being unable to provide jobs, assure personal security, and offer a better quality of life for their people (Van Beek, 2024). Offering another perspective, Twongyeirwe (2024) argues that, having most recently democratised, many African nations are struggling to consolidate democracy while strengthening their political institutions. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2023 Democracy Index classified democracy in both Ethiopia and Egypt as being authoritarian, which means these countries are run by outright dictatorships. Furthermore, if elections do occur, they are not free and fair. According to the Democracy Index, democracies flourish when citizens participate in public debate, elect representatives, and join political parties. Digitalisation in BRICS BRICS is an acronym for the combined economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The initiative was conceived in 2001 to foster economic cooperation and increase multilateral trade and development between member countries (Pinto, 2023). Originally, the group had four members, known as BRIC, and South Africa joined in 2010, making it BRICS (South African BRICS Think Tank, 2023). In 2024, member countries expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The latest additions mean that there are now three African countries in the BRICS economic grouping. According to the European Parliament (2024), the introduction of new members has shone a spotlight on the group’s potential to influence global politics and, by default, the use of technology to strengthen democracy. However, the European Parliament warns that this addition of new members could also birth potential conflict, making the reaching of consensus on common political positions more difficult. As argued by Pinto (2021) earlier, one of the strongest qualities of BRICS in this regard is that the economic grouping is home to about 40% of the world’s total population, representing a population of 3.7 billion people. A digital partnership for BRICS was launched in 2022, known as the BRICS Digital Economy Partnership Framework, to promote cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity, data protection, and e-commerce (Ayodele & Petla, 2024). However, it does not address specific issues related to digital transformation in the politics of member countries. According to Govender (2025), collaboration between BRICS and Africa in the technology sector has the ability to reshape the continent’s digital landscape, drive economic growth and spread prosperity. However, this collaboration should reflect African cultural values and historical contexts, avoiding a replication of past mistakes. To this end, Ayodele and Petla (2024) argued that BRICS members need a singular digital governance strategy to facilitate their digital transformation journey and promote the responsible use of digital technologies. They argue that this is critically important, as member countries are at different stages of digital development and use varying approaches to digital governance. For instance, Omarjee (2019) argues that technological advances have led Brazil and India to use digital technologies in their elections for more than a decade to strengthen the credibility of the process. However, this does not suggest that there are no risks of hacking and potential fraud in the system. If the technology is used correctly and for its intended purposes, it offers unprecedented opportunities for citizens to participate in their day-to-day governance, and not just on election day alone (Crossland, 2024). The addition of new members such as Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in the BRICS group also has various implications for digital governance, given their differing and strong views on content regulation and data protection (Ismail, 2023; Ignatov, 2024). Old members such as China and Russia are also well-known authoritarian actors, with China’s digital censorship regime considerably more advanced and entrenched across society than in Russia (Andrzejewski et al., 2023). These scholars argue that China and Russia use legislation to censor digital content, with China targeting digital content directly and software censorship through its Great Firewall. From an African perspective, it has already been stated in this paper that Ethiopia and Egypt are also contributors to internet shutdowns and violent conflicts, and this needs to change. South Africa can significantly show these countries how they can benefit from implementing digital democracy. Two of the most pressing challenges that all the BRICS countries have in common are: closing the digital divide and poor digital literacy. According to Ayodele and Petla (2024), additional discourse on digital governance approaches, particularly in the BRICS, centres on the issues of access, affordability, and net neutrality. Digital transformation in Africa According to Van Rensburg (2012), Africa’s experiences with digital transformation are rooted in the continent’s history of colonial oppression. She argues that the early 1990s witnessed a dramatic return to multi-party democracy on the continent; however, many countries inherited democratic systems that were highly centralised, authoritarian, and self-serving. Their leaders were mostly serving political authorities, high-ranking military leaders, or elite political groups (Van Rensburg, 2012). While academics such as Van Rensburg have warned against blindly adopting Western contexts of democracy in Africa, they also acknowledge the power of the internet to foster development and transformation on the continent. Rapid advancements in information and communication technologies (ICT) globally have provided new spaces for citizens to participate in democratic life, including giving voice to the youthful segment of the electorate (Congge et al., 2023). Responsible technology also offers new opportunities for African governments to tackle challenges such as job creation, poverty reduction, and increased financial inclusion, while also improving government services and enhancing transparency (Maseko, 2022). Today, social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter), WhatsApp, and Facebook are regularly used for debate and to mobilise citizens and organise protests (Maseko, 2024a). However, according to Roberts and Ali (2021), repressive governments deploy digital technologies to disrupt, drown out, or shut down citizen online engagement. They argue that a well-known example of this kind of behaviour includes Cambridge Analytica testing its covert voter manipulation methods in Kenya’s 2013 election. In South Africa, the consultancy firm, Bell Pottinger, coordinated a network of trolls and bots to fan the flames of racial division for political advantage (Fraser, 2017). Political parties also routinely hire private companies such as Cambridge Analytica and Bell Pottinger to profile citizens using Facebook, mobile phones, and other personal data (Sadowski, 2020). In the old era, democracy relied on more traditional methods such as public meetings, radio, television, and newspaper platforms to relay political information to citizens (Umar et al., 2023). They argue that these methods were sometimes time-consuming and made it difficult for citizens to access information speedily. Today, platforms such as social media are being used for civic mobilisation, public debate, and the quick dissemination of political communication (Olaniran & Williams, 2020; Maseko, 2024a). Furthermore, social media platforms provide opportunities for citizens to engage with their political leaders in real-time. The digital revolution, as Cheeseman et al. (2021) posit, raised hopes for strengthening democracy in Africa for broader access to information and resources. However, they add that despite technological progress, access and inclusion in ICT resources are still a challenge in many parts of the continent, due to poverty and infrastructural gaps. Cheaper technology alone is not sufficient to close the digital divide, and a broader set of economic, political, and legal reforms is needed for this purpose (Cheeseman et al., 2021). Africa’s digital environment is rapidly evolving, but there is a lack of proper measures for ensuring cybersecurity (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2023). They argue that an insufficient legislative framework in cybersecurity and low levels of awareness about cybersecurity have led to an increase in cyber threats. There is also a lack of effective international cooperation and information exchange between African countries, which is hindering the fight against cybercrime (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2023). Internet shutdowns in Ethiopia and Egypt Control over the internet is essential for authoritarian regimes. Information technologies facilitate collective action and were instrumental in the diffusion of protests during the Arab Spring (Aday et al., 2013). Social media can increase public awareness of electoral fraud (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015). Thus, it is no surprise that authoritarian regimes routinely manipulate internet access (Gohdes, 2015). Countries such as Ethiopia, for instance, have repeatedly shut down the internet since the early 2000s, and have censored online material on numerous occasions (Maseko, 2024a), preventing people from organising, mobilising, or even discussing their grievances with their leaders (Maseko, 2024a). Internet access and the digital divide This section is based on the argument made by Maseko (2024a; 2024b; 2024c) and others that the internet as a platform for citizen participation and public discourse has significant potential to improve democracy in Africa. According to Galal (2024), internet penetration has risen in Africa in the last decade due to improved telecommunication infrastructure and rising mobile device adoption. The growing internet accessibility has promoted digital activities and services, such as social media, online shopping, and mobile payments (Galal, 2024; Maseko, 2024b). As of January 2024, Morocco had the highest internet penetration in Africa at approximately 91%, followed by Libya and Seychelles with 88% and 87% respectively (Galal, 2024). He adds that South Sudan, Burundi, and Central African Republic had the lowest prevalence of the internet among their population. Despite these figures, Africa still lags in integrating the internet into learning (Faturoti, 2022). The digital divide refers to the gap between individuals with access and skills to use technology and those without such access and skills (Faloyea & Ajayib, 2023). This gap should be closed or narrowed to ensure the success of digital democracy (Mpekoa & Van Darelle, 2016). While many people are excluded from accessing technology in Africa, researchers have found that closing the gap cannot be achieved by cheaper technology alone. The correct political, legal, and economic conditions must be in place for digital democracy to succeed (Cheeseman et al., 2021). The South African digitalisation experience At the start of January 2024, South Africa had over 45 million active internet users out of a population of over 60 million, mostly using mobile phones to go online (Cowling, 2024). This figure represents some of the highest numbers of internet users in Africa. The 2022 national census results also indicate the upward trend in mobile phone ownership, with over 90% of households in the country owning a mobile phone in working order. However, a good internet connection is needed to ensure the successful implementation of digital technologies for election purposes. Results from the census further show that internet access in South Africa has been largely confined to urban areas, and most people access it in their workplaces, public libraries, universities, and internet cafes. Evidence already exists of digital transformation in South Africa’s public sector, where citizens now use technology to apply for identity documents, file tax returns, and renew their vehicle licence disks, amongst other things (Shibambu, 2024). South Africa is also experiencing a wide adoption of mobile phones and improvements in the infrastructure for broadband internet access (Gaglio et al., 2022). South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission also uses technology to gather and disseminate information to voters, register voters, verify their addresses, check voter registration information, learn about upcoming elections, and request special votes (IEC, 2025). According to Van Rensburg (2012), evidence of the integration of internet usage in the political culture in South Africa has shown that there is tremendous potential for other countries in southern Africa to follow suit. She argues that the internet can play a vital role in keeping the country’s public discourse alive when traditional media is under pressure from government leaders who want to limit press freedom. However, a key challenge remains in South Africa regarding the finalisation of the Draft Digital Government Policy Framework. The framework seeks to identify key determinants to effectively design and implement a strategic transition towards digital public services. It also aims to enhance state operational efficiency and embed a more digital-first approach to governance (Department of Public Service and Administration, 2024). However, commenting publicly on the document, the Cape Town-based research body, Research ICT Africa, made several concerning observations, including that existing digital transformation-related policies in South Africa were dated, did not make sufficient provision for the advancement in digital technology, and failed to address cybersecurity vulnerabilities for citizens (Rens & Timcke, 2024). Furthermore, the existing digital policy framework understates the severity and scope of cyber threats facing South Africa’s state institutions and economy (Rens & Timcke, 2024). Theoretical perspective This study draws on two theories of international relations to better understand the complex phenomenon of BRICS. Konyshev and Sergunin (2022) argue that combining the power transition theory (PTT) and the theory of global regionalism are appropriate for this analysis. Developed by AFK Organski in 1958, the power transition theory posits that a hierarchy exists within the international system. The rise of BRICS is framed as a potential shift in the global power structure, viewed as a challenge to the established world order by so-called revisionist states. Powerful countries like the US enjoy the advantages of the existing order and are categorised as status quo states. At the same time, those dissatisfied with their roles in the international system are considered revisionists. According to PTT, revisionist states advocate for radical changes in the existing order. In this context, Russia and China are seen as primary revisionist powers, while Brazil, India, and South Africa pursue more moderate revisionist ambitions (Carafano, 2015; Cheng, 2016). Additionally, PTT is recognised for being both data-driven and qualitatively intuitive (Tammen et al., 2017). On the other hand, the theory of global regionalism examines the growing importance of regional cooperation and integration in global relations. Fredrik (2011) asserts that this theory analyses how regions form, develop, and influence global politics, moving beyond a purely state-centric view to include non-state actors such as economies, companies, and societies. Fredrik further suggests that this field of study employs theories like realism, liberalism, and constructivism to understand the driving forces behind regionalism, including national interests, economic cooperation, and shared identities. He notes that, in addition to promoting economic interests, like those seen in BRICS, regionalism can also be motivated by other factors, such as addressing collective security challenges and fostering democracy (Fredrik, 2011). Methodology This study adopts a qualitative document analysis design to examine discourses on digital democracy and BRICS cooperation. The approach is interpretive and exploratory, focusing on identifying themes across policy documents, academic literature, and institutional reports. Documents were identified through a systematic keyword-based search using Google Scholar, ResearchGate, and institutional databases. Search terms included ‘digital democracy’, ‘BRICS digital governance’, ‘e-voting South Africa’, and ‘African democracy index’. Inclusion criteria required sources published between 2018 and 2024, relevance to digital governance or democracy, and credibility as peer-reviewed or institutional publications. Selected materials included Afrobarometer reports, scholarly articles on BRICS digital partnerships, the Electoral Commission of South Africa policy discussions, the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, and South Africa’s Draft Digital Government Policy Framework. Data were analysed using thematic qualitative content analysis. This involved familiarisation with texts, systematic coding of relevant content, and development of overarching themes such as digital governance innovation, electoral technology, and BRICS digital cooperation. To enhance trustworthiness, the study employed triangulation across multiple document types and maintained reflexive awareness of interpretive bias. This approach allows for a nuanced understanding of how digital democracy is framed within both African and BRICS policy contexts. Textual analysis was employed to examine and interpret the content and its underlying meanings, aligning with the paper’s aim and research question. Both Haradhan (2018) and Weiss (1995) assert that qualitative methods are more effective when the goal of the research is to achieve coherence, depth, and density in the data. Findings and discussion This paper focuses on two key research questions: the influence of South Africa on digitisation in Africa and the benefits of adopting digital technology for democracy across the continent. The questions are addressed separately for clarity. How can South Africa influence the adoption of digital democracy across Africa? While South Africa’s democracy is not without flaws, it is well-positioned to influence digitalisation within the BRICS grouping of nations and throughout the African continent. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2023 Democracy Index, South Africa's democracy is categorised as flawed, facing several challenges such as corruption, poor governance, high youth unemployment, and declining public trust in political institutions. However, South Africa's democratic framework offers several positive attributes that can encourage the adoption of digital democracy in Africa. Among these are the consistent holding of free and fair elections and the protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech and association. It is important to note that merely holding elections does not always indicate a healthy democracy; for instance, some scholars argue that governments like Ukraine's in 2024 conducted elections as an act of democratic defiance against Russia's aggression. In addition to strong internet penetration and rapid technological transformation, South Africa benefits from solid legal frameworks, evident in laws such as the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) and the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA). The country is also a leader in innovative e-governance initiatives, such as the successful digitisation of social grant payments to over 6 million beneficiaries. Organisations like the IEC and various social movements are using platforms such as social media to boost youth engagement and political discourse, especially given concerns over declining youth participation in elections. With local government elections approaching in late 2026, social media is being employed to discuss municipal issues and hold government leaders accountable. Although South Africa struggles with persistent economic inequality and a widening digital divide, digital activism is playing an active role alongside traditional governance methods, ensuring that marginalised groups are included in governance processes and political decision-making. What are the benefits of adopting digital technology for democracy on the continent? There are already systems in place to improve online service delivery in South Africa, such as the processing of identity documents and filing tax returns, as noted by Shibambu (2024). This indicates a strong political will and a positive mindset among government leaders to explore new technologies aimed at strengthening democracy. In contrast, authoritarian governments like those in Ethiopia and Egypt are known for frequently shutting down the internet. The discussion becomes even more complex when considering that BRICS members China and Russia—also noted for their authoritarian practices—engage in digital censorship (Andrzejewski et al., 2023). The potential political conflicts arising from the European Union's (2024) introduction of new BRICS members cannot be overlooked. Citizens find it challenging to exercise their rights to hold officials accountable when they lack access to information. Research indicates that democracy flourishes when citizens are active in public debate, elect representatives, and participate in political parties. However, as Faturoti (2022) argues, the absence of appropriate policies to support Internet access in some African countries complicates the implementation of digital democracy. As Govender (2025) notes, scholars, researchers, and policymakers interested in multilateralism, BRICS, and the transformation of the global order must consider the historical, geographical, political, and social contexts of the continent while assessing the impact of technology on democracy. Africa has diverse colonial histories, varying levels of democratic governance, and socio-cultural complexities that challenge the application of a singular governance strategy proposed by Ayodele and Petla (2024). Nonetheless, as BRICS expands, it introduces new dynamics for balancing political power worldwide. Van Rensburg (2012) cautions against the uncritical adoption of Western democratic models in the African context. How does the study interpret the theoretical perspective adopted? BRICS is based on principles of cooperation, mutual respect, and a balance of interests, rather than a strict or hierarchical balance of power, as noted by Konyshev and Sergunin (2022). It is widely recognised that BRICS countries are dissatisfied with the current global order, which is dominated by a small group of highly developed nations that impose their rules on others. These countries aim to modify the existing world order in an evolutionary manner rather than through radical means, as they view the current international relations system as unjust (Hansen & Sergunin, 2015). Despite their differences in geographical location, economic status, production levels, and ethnic, religious, and linguistic backgrounds, the BRICS nations have managed to establish a formula for agreement and achieve global geostrategic influence. Comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, BRICS positions itself as an alternative to existing international financial and political institutions. The member countries seek to represent the interests of the Global South, attracting the attention of researchers and scholars across various fields of study, including those supporting the digitalisation of Africa’s democracy. Conclusion This paper examined South Africa’s potential role within BRICS in advancing digital democracy in Africa. It assessed the implications of digital technologies for strengthening democratic governance and policy processes. As digital transformation continues to evolve at a rapid pace, developing countries cannot be left behind by the rest of the world. If this happens, they risk falling behind in their economic development and exacerbating existing inequalities. On another note, by leveraging their collective expertise and resources, BRICS countries are a case study for advancing their shared interests in the digital realm for other African groupings, such as ECOWAS, whose regions face prolonged conflicts marked by military coups in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Recommendations The following recommendations are made: South Africa should strengthen national cybersecurity governance through increased budget allocation, regulatory enforcement mechanisms, and institutional capacity-building to support secure digital transformation and innovation ecosystems. Government should invest in targeted digital skills development programmes, particularly in underserved and rural communities. This will strengthen cybersecurity resilience and improve institutional trust in digital governance systems. African governments should implement inclusive digital governance strategies that address structural inequalities in access, affordability, and digital literacy to reduce the digital divide. BRICS member states should enhance cooperation on digital governance. This can be done through structured peer-learning mechanisms and policy coordination on cross-border data governance, while respecting national sovereignty and contextual differences in digital development trajectories. Acknowledgements To assist the editing process, the Grammarly AI prompt ‘Improve it’ was used. References Aday, S., Farrell, H., Freelon, D., Lynch, M., Sides, J. and Dewar, M. 2013. Watching from afar: Media consumption patterns around the Arab Spring, American Behavioral Scientist, 57(7), pp. 899–919. Africa Centre for Strategic Studies. 2023. Understanding Africa’s Emerging Cyber Threats. [Online] Available at: https://africacenter.org/programs/cyber/ [accessed: 24 July 2026]. Afrobarometer. 2024. 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It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Read the full journal, including this article, by downloading the PDF below. Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026. by Phineas Motsiri Peta Abstract Digital transformation is a critical aspect of modern governance in South Africa. It is the integration of digital technology into all aspects of a business. Digital transformation fundamentally changes how an organisation operates and delivers value to customers or the public by creating new or modifying existing processes, culture, and customer experience to meet evolving market demands. It is a continuous, strategic process driven by changing market conditions and customer expectations, requiring a cultural shift and a focus on innovation to remain competitive and successful. Key aspects of digital transformation are technological integration, cultural shift, strategic focus, customer experience, and business model innovation. Technological integration is the adoption and implementation of digital technologies such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), big data analytics, and digital tools to streamline operations and improve efficiency. Cultural shift is a necessary change in mindset and culture within organisations to embrace new approaches, experiment with new technologies, and accept the potential for failure as part of the innovative process. Strategic focus is a strategic and staged integration of digital technologies across all levels of the organisation, not just as an IT project, but as a comprehensive organisational strategy. Customer experience is a fundamental re-evaluation of how a business interacts with its customers to deliver value through personalised experiences and improved services. Business model innovation is reimagining how a business operates and generates revenue by developing new business models and creating new revenue streams. This study used a qualitative approach to emphasize the potential of advanced information technology to address administrative inefficiencies and enhance service delivery in government. It proposed principles that remain relevant today, including seamless service, paperless operations, one-stop solutions, customer-centric processes, universal access, privacy protection, digital signatures, and cybersecurity. Keywords: Connectivity, E-government, Regulations Introduction In a rapidly changing digital landscape and era of globalisation, transformation is often a necessity for survival, as organisations and governments that fail to adapt risk becoming obsolete (Singh & Hess, 2017). Digital transformation is needed to stay competitive by meeting public and customer expectations for personalised, seamless experiences, improving operational efficiency through automation and data analytics, and enhancing agility to respond faster to market changes. It is also critical for survival, as ignoring digital advancements risks a business becoming irrelevant, and it offers opportunities for new products, services, and market expansion (Bouncken et al., 2021). Customers expect personalised, on-demand, and seamless experiences across all channels, and digital tools are necessary to deliver this. Automation of manual tasks and the use of cloud-based services can significantly increase operational efficiency and reduce costs associated with physical infrastructure and manual labour (Parviainen et al., 2017). Digital tools allow businesses, governments, and organisations to be more agile, make faster decisions based on real-time data, and create new products and services by identifying market gaps and customer needs (Bondar et al., 2017). Modern businesses and organisations can collect and analyse data more effectively to gain actionable insights, inform decision-making, and improve overall business performance. Providing customers and employees with user-friendly, modern tools can boost productivity, improve morale, and aid in attracting and retaining talent (Singh & Hess, 2017). Definitions of digital transformation Digital transformation is the combined effects of several digital innovations bringing about novel actors (and actor constellations), structures, practices, values, and beliefs that change, threaten, replace, or complement existing rules of the game within organisations, ecosystems, industries, or fields (Hinings et al., 2018, p.53). Digital transformation is a consistent networking of all economic sectors and an adaption of actors to new circumstances of the digital economy (Bondar et al., 2017, p.33). 1. Impact of digital transformation on connectivity Digital transformation relies on connectivity as its fundamental enabler, transforming government services, businesses, and societies by enabling high-speed data exchange, cloud adoption, Internet of Things (IoT), and remote work. Strong, reliable connectivity, including advancements like fibre optics and 5G, underpins innovation and efficiency across sectors such as healthcare and education (Mas-Tur et al., 2021). The focus is shifting from basic access to meaningful connectivity, which ensures users have safe, productive, and affordable experiences, allowing them to fully participate as digital citizens (Donthu et al., 2020). Connectivity as a foundation Connectivity is more than just internet access; it is the digital lifeline that links people, systems, devices, and data, anytime, anywhere. Without a strong, reliable network infrastructure, digital transformation can easily fall short (Roehl & Hansen, 2024). Connectivity powers digital initiatives — without strong internet connectivity, digital transformation efforts like cloud migration, IoT integration, and hybrid work models are impossible to implement (Pittaway & Montazemi, 2020). Connectivity enables real-time operations and facilitates seamless communication and data sharing, which are crucial for efficient operations and innovation in the digital age. Connectivity drives business growth, allowing businesses to expand their reach into global markets and improve operational efficiency (Stratu-Strelet et al., 2023). Key components of digital transformation For digital transformation to be successful, it must focus on more than just technology. The following are crucial components: Customer experience: Redesigning customer interactions with new digital tools and data is a primary goal for many organisations. This can lead to seamless, personalised, and responsive customer journeys. Operational agility: This involves using technology to optimise and rethink business processes for greater efficiency. Examples include automating repetitive tasks and using data to streamline the supply chain. Workforce enablement: Empowering employees with modern digital tools and collaborative platforms can boost productivity and engagement. This is especially relevant in a work environment that increasingly supports remote and hybrid work. Digital technology integration: Integrating technologies like cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), data analytics, and IoT is the engine of change. A hybrid cloud approach, for instance, provides the flexibility and scalability needed for innovation. Key aspects of connectivity for digital transformation Fibre Optic Networks: These provide the high-speed, reliable internet infrastructure that forms the backbone of digital transformation in both developed and developing regions. 5G Technology: This next-generation mobile network offers significantly higher speeds, lower latency, and greater capacity, which are vital for applications requiring high-bandwidth and real-time performance. Software-Defined WAN (SD-WAN): By intelligently routing traffic over the internet and integrating network security, SD-WAN improves reliability and performance for modern, distributed enterprises. The digital revolution is reshaping governance worldwide. From the electronic filing of taxes to digital visa applications, technology is making government services more accessible, efficient, and transparent. South Africa is making progress in its digital journey. In 2024, it climbed to 40th place out of 193 countries, from 65th place in 2022, in the United Nations e-Government Index. This improvement makes the country one of Africa’s digital leaders, surpassing Mauritius and Tunisia. South Africa has identified more than 255 government services for digitisation. Already, 134 are available in the National e-Government Portal. This achievement is remarkable. Nevertheless, the shift to digitisation comes with challenges and risks (Upadhyay et al., 2022). Some countries have weakened the state’s role by rapidly outsourcing key government functions. But South Africa has the opportunity to build a model of digital transformation that strengthens public institutions rather than diminishing them. New technologies must bring tangible benefits for citizens (Ricciardi et al., 2019). Digital transformation can improve public administration, but if mismanaged, it could burden taxpayers with costs (Magnusson et al., 2020). Examples of digital transformation in various sectors include retail, whereby e-commerce platforms are being used to offer personalised shopping experiences, and the banking sector, whereby smartphones are becoming central hubs for financial management, increasing convenience and accessibility (Kuhlmann & Heuberger, 2023). In the healthcare sector, digital records and telemedicine are increasing the efficiency and accessibility of healthcare services. In workplaces, cloud computing and collaborative tools like Slack and Teams are supporting remote and hybrid work environments (Umbach & Tkalec, 2022). For South Africa’s government specifically, there are two examples which illustrate that digital transformation can save money and enhance service delivery: The first example is within the South African Revenue Service (SARS). Its goal is to ensure that taxpayers and tax advisers can use the service from anywhere and at any time. The changes made more than a decade ago show that digital systems can yield substantial financial gains. After introducing e-filing in 2006, SARS was able to streamline tax processes and reduce inefficiencies, which led to higher compliance rates and, ultimately, improved revenue collection (Shulz, 2024). The second example is within the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), where similarly, digitising social grant payments has had several positive effects. SASSA used basic technologies and platforms like WhatsApp and email to process grants during the COVID-19 pandemic. This allowed over 14 million people to apply, paying grants to over six million beneficiaries during the first phase of the project. SASSA’s annual reports show that over 95% of grant beneficiaries receive their payouts electronically through debit cards, instead of going to cash points. This improves security and lets beneficiaries decide when to collect and spend their money (Rodrigues et al., 2023). There are fears that automation could result in massive job losses, but global experience has shown that digitisation does not necessarily lead to large-scale retrenchments (Mamediieva & Moynihan, 2023). Instead, it can shift the nature of work to other responsibilities. The South African Social Security Agency provides a compelling case; its transition to digital grant payments did not lead to job losses (Roehl & Hansen, 2024). Similarly, the expansion of e-filing at SARS has not resulted in workforce reductions. In both cases, efficiencies simply improved. These cases highlight that digital transformation is reshaping roles rather than displacing employees. Public servants are moving into areas such as cybersecurity, data analysis, and AI-driven decision-making (Roehl & Hansen, 2024). Shortcomings and pitfalls There are a number of inefficiencies at play in government services. Firstly, most government digital operations still work with outdated paper-based systems. The lack of a uniform digital identity creates bureaucratic inefficiencies and delays. Secondly, fragmented procurement of equipment in government has led to duplicated efforts, increased costs, and fruitless expenditure. Thirdly, different departments often use isolated and incompatible digital systems, which reduces the mutual benefits of digital transformation (Sarvari, 2018). The State IT Agency has been blamed for inefficiencies, procurement failures, and questionable spending. Fourthly, South Africa’s public service remains fragmented. Citizens still struggle to access government services seamlessly, often moving between departments to complete what should be a single transaction. South Africa is still lagging and experiencing challenges in creating a completely digital government (Aruleba & Jere, 2022). Without a centralised system, departments operate in isolation, duplicating efforts, increasing costs, and eroding public trust. Lastly, increasing reliance on digital tools requires expertise in data analytics, cloud computing, and automation. Many public servants lack the training to take on these new roles. The National Digital and Future Skills Strategy was introduced in September 2020 to bridge this gap, but its effectiveness depends on its implementation (Moremi et al., 2022). Benefits of digital transformation There are enormous benefits to digital transformation: improved efficiency through streamlining operations and processes with digital tools and cloud computing, which reduces operational costs and increases productivity. It enhances the customer experience by delivering better, more personalised services and interactions (Gasco-Hernandez et al., 2022). Innovation and fostering of new ways of thinking and operating leads to new products, services, and business models being created. It gives a competitive advantage by staying relevant and ahead of competitors in an increasingly digital and globally connected landscape (Einafoghe & Ndebele, 2023). Another benefit is data-driven decision-making, whereby advanced analytics turn raw data into actionable insights, helping leaders make more informed, strategic business decisions in real-time (Malomane, 2021). And lastly, there is greater business agility, because a transformed organisation is more resilient and can respond faster to market disruptions, new opportunities, and customer needs (Shava & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2022). Challenges of digital transformation While the benefits are significant, there are still several challenges that can derail digital transformation if not managed correctly. Without a clear well-defined roadmap, efforts can become fragmented and lose momentum (Nzimakwe, 2021). Cultural resistance can cause employees to resist new processes and ways of working due to fear of change or skill gaps. Legacy systems that are outdated and monolithic IT systems can be difficult and expensive to integrate with modern digital technologies. Integration complexities such as successfully connecting new digital solutions with existing applications and data can be a major technical hurdle. And lastly, as organisations become more digitally integrated, security risks such as data breaches and compliance issues increase (Mohale, 2024). 2. Impact of digital transformation on e-government E-government previously focused on digitising specific services, whereas Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) creates shared, interoperable systems that enable a more comprehensive, accessible, and efficient digital government. The digital transformation process transforms traditional, fragmented e-government services into integrated, citizen-centric digital government (Malomane, 2021). Digital transformation in e-government involves leveraging technology to modernise public services and enhance efficiency, accessibility, and citizen engagement. DPI serves as the foundational layer for this transformation, providing core systems for digital identity, payments, and data exchange that enable seamless interactions between citizens, businesses, and government (Kumar, 2018). This integrated approach aims to improve service delivery, promote economic participation, and foster social inclusion, as seen in South Africa’s recent digital transformation roadmap and efforts to build robust DPI (DPSA, 2020). Digital transformation modernises how government operates and delivers services, shifting from fragmented initiatives to a unified, people-centred vision. By leveraging new technologies and methodologies, digital transformation improves the efficiency and accessibility of public services, allowing for 24/7 access and reduced reliance on physical government buildings (Einafoghe & Ndebele, 2023). Digitising government processes empowers both citizens and officials, enabling easier access to services, feedback mechanisms, and participation in governance (Shava & Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2022). Digital Public Infrastructure Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) is fast emerging as the foundational layer for inclusive digital transformation. Rather than building narrow, sector-specific systems, governments and development actors are investing in population-scale, interoperable platforms that enable innovation and equitable service delivery (DPSA, 2020). DPI provides a critical opportunity to accelerate the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly in low-and-middle-income countries, by enabling access to identity, financial systems, and consent-based data sharing. This shift has the potential to unlock widespread socioeconomic benefits, foster trust in institutions, and build a resilient digital ecosystem (DPSA, 2020). DPI refers to essential digital building blocks, including digital identity systems, digital payment systems, and data exchange platforms. These interconnected systems create a digital ecosystem that connects citizens, businesses, and government, facilitating smooth and secure transactions and data sharing. Examples of crucial components of DPI are a universal digital identity system, a low-cost instant payment platform, and data sharing frameworks (Nzimakwe, 2021). Benefits of DPI As exemplified by South Africa’s e-filing system for taxation, digital systems can streamline processes, reduce inefficiencies, and lead to better revenue collection. DPI helps unlock socioeconomic development by enabling greater economic participation and fostering social inclusion, especially for marginalised groups. By connecting various government services through a single, trusted platform, DPI allows citizens to access services like social grants, identity verification, and real-time payments more easily (City of Johannesburg, 2022). The City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality is a perfect illustration of the benefits of digitisation through these initiatives, which have produced positive outcomes such as improved service delivery and quality of life for citizens (Androniceanu, 2023). Digital transformation’s impact on e-government The digital transformation process transforms traditional, fragmented e-government services into integrated, citizen-centric digital governments. There is improved access and convenience: services such as renewing driver’s licenses, paying taxes, and applying for benefits can be accessed online at any time, eliminating the need for in-person visits to government offices (Mohale, 2024). There is also increased efficiency and cost savings: digital processes automate manual tasks, reduce paperwork, and streamline bureaucracy, leading to faster service delivery and lower operational costs. For instance, the use of digital grant payments can reduce delays and improve payment accuracy (Martins et al., 2023). Transparency and accountability are enhanced, as digital systems provide a clear audit trail of government activities and how taxpayer money is spent, which helps to reduce corruption and build public trust (Ingrams, 2019). There is better citizen engagement; digital platforms, like online portals and social media, create new channels for direct communication and feedback, allowing citizens to participate more actively in public life. And data-driven decision-making through integrating digital technologies and data analytics empowers governments to make more informed and evidence-based policy decisions (Ingrams, 2019). Ways in which DPI enables robust e-government DPI creates a single, seamless government and it enables a whole-of-government approach, allowing different departments to share data and services securely. This breaks down bureaucracy silos and allows for a single, trusted portal for citizens to access all public services (Blom & Uwizeyimana, 2020). Instead of building isolated systems, DPI provides a platform with common “rails” that innovators, including private companies and startups, can build upon. There is accelerated innovation at scale, and this fosters competition, reduces costs, and accelerates the development of new, citizen-centric services (Martins et al, 2022). DPI guarantees inclusivity by design; a foundational DPI can bring services to the unbanked and those without formal identification by enabling access via mobile devices in remote areas. This ensures that no one is left behind in the digital economy. There is an increased efficiency and reduction in leakages. By using DPI components such as a digital identity and payment system, governments can disburse social transfers directly to intended recipients. This reduces corruption and improves the efficiency of welfare programmes (Ufua et al., 2021). Rethinking development: from projects to platforms Traditional digital interventions have often taken a project-based approach, addressing a specific problem with a standalone solution. DPI, by contrast, is a platform approach – creating a base layer upon which other services and innovations can be built. This model reduces duplication, fosters competition, and ensures scalability (Mamediieva & Moynihan, 2023). It enables governments to serve citizens more efficiently, while giving private sector players a predictable, standardised environment for innovation. For development partners, this offers a more sustainable and impactful way to support digital transformation (Shulz, 2024). What this means for policymakers To unlock the full potential of DPI, governments and stakeholders must make key strategic decisions: Adopt DPI as a foundational infrastructure: Rather than digitising existing programmes in isolation, design systems that serve as building blocks for future innovation and service delivery. Enforce strong governance and legal frameworks: Protect citizen’s rights through clear data protection, privacy, and redress mechanisms. Invest in open ecosystems: Encourage local innovation through open APIs, developer sandboxes, and public-private collaboration. Promote inclusion by design: Ensure DPI is built to work for all — including those without smartphones, internet access, or digital literacy. These steps will require sustained political will, cross-sectoral coordination, and flexible financing mechanisms, but the payoff is exponential: infrastructure that serves not just one government or programme, but the entire society for decades to come. Challenges and considerations Despite the benefits, both digital transformation and DPI implementation face significant challenges: The digital divide: Disparities in internet access, device ownership, and digital literacy can worsen existing inequalities. Skills gap: Public sector employees need training and digital skills to adapt to new technologies and new roles, which can be a slow and difficult process. Legacy systems: Integrating new digital systems with outdated government infrastructure can be complex and expensive. Privacy and security: Governments must build trust by implementing strong cybersecurity measures and clear data protection policies to safeguard citizens’ sensitive information. Siloed governance: A lack of coordination and a “whole-of-government” mindset can hinder the successful implementation of an interoperable DPI. What could be done to mitigate challenges Digital Public Infrastructure is not just another buzzword; it is a fundamental rethinking of how digital systems can support inclusive, resilient, and future-ready societies. For countries pursuing the SDGs, DPI offers a scalable, cost-effective path to transformation, where services reach every citizen, innovation is democratised, and trust is built into the system by design. The time to build DPI is now. Because if we get the infrastructure right, everything else — health, education, finance, governance — will follow. Government needs to upskill civil servants and improve their digital literacy. It must create a seamless e-government system that connects services while protecting citizens’ personal information (Priharsari et al., 2013). The success of digitalisation depends on technological advancements as well as the level of trust citizens have in government systems. Without strong security measures, transparency, and accountability, even the most sophisticated digital tools will fail to gain public confidence. South Africa has a chance to demonstrate that a strong, capable state can successfully integrate technology, while also safeguarding public interests (Roehl & Hansen, 2024). It should take full advantage of offers by Microsoft, Amazon, and Huawei to support digital skills training in the public sector in a way that does not advantage one company’s technologies over others. Leaders of public institutions must be measured on their ability to digitally transform their organisations (Manda, 2020). 3. Impact of digital transformation on regulations Digital transformation, driven by emerging technologies, challenges existing regulations due to rapid innovation and the global nature of digital technology, but also offers opportunities for regulators to use digital tools to enhance regulatory efficiency and effectiveness. The key challenge is to adapt regulatory frameworks to foster innovation, while addressing risks related to safety, ethics, and fairness, such as in AI and data protection. This requires flexible, forward-looking governance and international cooperation to ensure regulations are fit-for-purpose in a constantly evolving digital landscape (Ncamphalala, 2019). Key areas of regulatory focus With artificial intelligence (AI) taking over, it is crucial to address the concerns around algorithmic bias, transparency, and accountability. Data privacy must be prioritised and laws like GDPR to protect personal information in an increasingly digital world should be implemented and regulated (Muehlburger et al., 2019). Frameworks for distributed ledger technology (blockchain) and other emerging tech are needed to manage risks and encourage innovation. Governments need to develop flexible, adaptable regulatory fit-for-purpose frameworks. There must be international cooperation and a collaborative approach, and common norms are necessary to tackle the global nature of digital challenges. Having a multi-stakeholder engagement approach is crucial, and involving various stakeholders, including industry, civil society, and other levels of government, is important for creating effective solutions. Lastly, there should be a focus on core principles and regulations, which should balance fostering innovation with protecting fundamental values such as privacy, human rights, and open markets (Mathane et al., 2024). Challenges for regulation The pace of innovation is fast because emerging technologies like AI, IoT, and blockchain develop so quickly that regulatory frameworks struggle to keep up. Digital technologies and data flows transcend administrative boundaries, creating challenges for national regulations and requiring international coordination. Regulators often lack the in-house technical skills to understand complex new technologies (Jakoet-Salie, 2020). This can lead to a reliance on information from the very tech companies they are supposed to regulate, creating a risk of “regulatory capture”. There is market disruption because new digital business models blur traditional market definitions, challenging existing economic regulatory structures (Polokwane Local Municipality, 2023). Existing regulatory approaches often have gaps when faced with the complex risks and opportunities presented by digital transformation. New technologies often blur the lines between traditional sectors (Blom & Uwizeyimana, 2020). For example, a company offering financial and ride-hailing services may fall under multiple, sometimes conflicting, regulatory frameworks. A central dilemma is how to promote innovation and economic growth without compromising consumer protection, security, and public well-being. Overly restrictive rules can stifle innovation, while a hands-off approach can lead to significant harm (City of Tshwane, 2021). Opportunities for digital transformation in regulation Regulations can use data and digital tools to improve regulatory analysis and delivery, creating more evidence-based policies. Digital tools can streamline regulatory processes and improve communication, making regulation more effective and accessible. By adopting digital tools and forward-looking approaches, regulators can develop more proactive and adaptable systems (eThekwini Municipality, 2021). Complications around the regulations of digital transformation The innovation is faster than the implementation and update of regulations. The rapid pace of technological development, particularly in fields like artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT), and blockchain, often outstrips the ability of regulators to develop and implement new rules. By the time a regulatory framework is established, the technology has already evolved (Arntz et al., 2017). There are transboundary and cross-sectoral challenges, meaning digital technologies frequently blur traditional market definitions and administrative boundaries. A single tech platform might operate globally and across multiple sectors (e.g., communication, retail, and finance), creating regulatory uncertainty and enforcement issues that single jurisdictions struggle to address (Trantopoulos et al., 2017). Emerging technologies introduce new and unpredictable risks that traditional regulations did not anticipate. This includes algorithmic bias in AI, cybersecurity threats for IoT devices, data privacy violations from big data collection, and financial instability from cryptocurrencies. The uneven global adoption of digital technologies can lead to regulatory fragmentation (Muehlburger et al., 2019). This forces multinational companies to navigate complex, inconsistent, and often restrictive regulatory environments, especially concerning issues like data sovereignty and permanent roaming for IoT devices (Issa et al., 2018). There is also scientific and market uncertainty; the full scope of benefits and risks of an emerging technology is often not understood until it is more developed. This uncertainty makes it difficult to design effective and appropriate regulations early on (Kung, 2017). Ways in which digital transformation can improve regulation Regulators are increasingly adopting digital tools and data-driven methods to overcome these challenges. This approach, often called “Agile Regulatory Governance”, involves modernising regulatory processes, tools, and institutions. Digital tools for more effective regulations Governments and regulatory bodies are developing new, more agile methods to address the challenges posed by emerging technologies. Regulators can use advanced data analytics, sometimes powered by AI, to make more evidence-based decisions (Loukis, 2022). This allows for proactive and risk-based oversight rather than relying on reactive enforcement. The approach of flexible and outcome-focused regulation emphasises the desired outcomes, like safety or privacy, rather than rigid technological specifications. It allows for more adaptive rules that can evolve with the technology. Blockchain can create an immutable, transparent, and secure record of transactions and data, which can help regulators monitor industries with high-value or sensitive data (Faloye & Ajayi, 2022). Potential use cases include tracking supply chains, managing digital identities, and preventing fraud in financial services. AI tools can automate repetitive tasks, improve real-time monitoring of regulated activities, and help detect suspicious patterns. This can streamline regulatory delivery and enforcement, for example, by automatically flagging potentially fraudulent financial transactions (Faloye & Ajayi, 2022). Given the global nature of many technologies, international cooperation, collaboration, and the development of harmonised standards are essential. Organisations like OECD and ITU play a key role in developing frameworks and principles for technologies like AI and digital services. Digital platforms improve communication and data sharing both nationally and internationally (Shibambu, 2024), allowing for more coordinated regulatory responses to technologies that operate across borders. This involves creating a process for continuous engagement with a wide range of participants, including government, industry, academia, and civil society (Gimpel et al., 2018). This approach helps create more transparent, inclusive, and effective rules. To test and iterate new rules, regulators can create controlled “regulatory sandboxes” that use digital technology to monitor new business models (Ricciardi et al., 2019). These controlled environments allow technological companies to test new products and services under a regulator’s supervision (Alvarenga et al., 2020), enabling regulators to gain a better understanding of the risks before scaling up regulation, while allowing innovators to test safely. Companies therefore have the opportunity to experiment and learn without the risk of large-scale market failures (City of Johannesburg, 2022). This encourages responsible innovation, which is a framework that integrates ethical considerations and stakeholder engagement into the design and research phases of a technology. The goal is to build technology that aligns with societal values from the start (Gasco-Hernandez et al., 2022). Examples of emerging technologies and regulations: AI and machine learning: Required skilled workforces and ethical frameworks for development and oversight. Drones, e-bikes, and personal mobility devices: Require forward-looking regulatory changes to transform the movement of people and goods. Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT): Used to enhance transparency, security, and identity management in telecommunications and other sectors. Examples of digital transformation in action: AI governance: Jurisdictions like the European Union are creating AI-specific laws, such as the AI Act, to address issues like risk management, transparency, and human oversight. Digital finance: Central banks are exploring the use of AI and blockchain to improve financial security, prevent fraud, and ensure compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) and know-your-customer (KYC) regulations. IoT security: Governments are issuing new security regulations for IoT devices. For example, the European Cyber Resilience Act sets horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements. The impact of digital transformation on regulation is a dynamic and complex process. While it presents significant challenges related to the speed of change and the global nature of technology, it also provides regulators with powerful new tools to evolve their oversight models. The ability of regulators to adapt their frameworks and leverage digital technologies will be crucial for balancing innovation with public protection in the digital age (Apleni & Smuts, 2020). Examples of regulations by technology Artificial Intelligence (AI): EU AI Act: A landmark law that classifies AI systems by risk level, with strict regulations for “high-risk” applications in areas like healthcare and law enforcement. NIST AI Risk Management Framework: Voluntary guidelines in the United States to help organisations manage the risk of AI, including mitigating bias and ensuring transparency. Biotechnology: Regulatory models: The risk of technologies like genetic modification and synthetic biology are often handled through proactive, risk-based assessments before the technology is fully developed. Fintech and blockchain: Regulatory sandboxes: Many countries have used sandboxes to regulate cryptocurrencies and other digital financial services, allowing for safe experimentation. Cross-border coordination: Issues with money laundering and consumer protection require global regulatory coordination for digital currencies. Drones and personal mobility devices: Outcomes-focused trials: Jurisdictions like New South Wales, Australia, have used regulatory trials for low-risk applications (e.g., agricultural drones and e-scooters) to test approaches and collect evidence for more permanent rules. Recommendations To achieve successful digital transformation, governments and organisations should focus on developing a clear strategy, investing in robust digital infrastructure and skills, adopting a citizen-centric approach to e-government services, and establishing a supportive legal and regulatory framework (Alvarenga et al., 2020). Regarding connectivity and infrastructure, the government must ensure universal access to the internet to bridge the “digital divide” and avoid the exclusion of any population segments. There must be an upgrade and modernisation of IT infrastructure by moving away from legacy systems to a “cloud-first” digital base, to support emerging technologies and enable seamless data sharing across departments. Mobile technology access must be prioritised, as it is a widely available tool for delivering digital services, particularly in developing regions. Energy insecurity and unstable power supplies should be addressed, as they are a basic infrastructural requirement for reliable digital services (Amara, 2019). On e-government services, the government must adopt a citizen-centric, “digital by design” approach, and focus on user needs to design high-impact, accessible, and user-friendly services. The implementation of a whole-of-government approach must be prioritised to integrate services and eliminate duplication, using shared digital public infrastructure (DPI) for efficiency and transparency (Aruleba & Jere, 2022). There should be more focus on high-impact services first — such as digital identity systems, tax filings, and business registrations — and gradually scale up to other areas like healthcare and education. Lastly, the government must develop physical access points, such as partnerships with banks or post offices, to ensure that those without personal internet access can still benefit from e-government services (Banyera, 2020). In terms of regulations and governance, effective governance and coordination mechanisms must be established, including empowering a central government entity with the mandate to lead and coordinate transformation efforts across all levels of government (Jakoet-Salie, 2020). The government must develop a clear legal and regulatory framework that supports digital opportunities, addressing issues of security, privacy, data protection, and intellectual property in a digital environment. The government and organisations should foster public-private partnerships to leverage private sector skills, innovation, and investment in developing digital solutions. Investment is needed in the digital skills of public officials and ensuring political commitment and top-down leadership to drive cultural change and overcome resistance to new ways of working. Government and organisations must ensure security and privacy safeguards are in place to build public trust and confidence in government digital systems (Kumar, 2018). Conclusion Digital transformation fundamentally reshapes how governments operate and provide services, leading to increased efficiency, transparency, and citizen satisfaction when effectively implemented. However, success hinges on overcoming significant hurdles related to infrastructure, skills, and policy alignment. Digital transformation enables enhanced efficiency and service delivery and the automation of routine administrative tasks, leading to reduced operational costs, faster processing times, and more efficient resource allocation. E-government services provide citizens with 24/7 access to information and services online (e.g., tax filing, permit applications), significantly improving convenience and accessibility. The creation of digital records and the implementation of open data initiatives enhance government transparency and accountability. This helps deter corruption and builds public trust by allowing for greater scrutiny of government activities and expenditures. There will be more data-driven decision-making, as the use of big data analytics and AI allows governments to make better, more informed policy decisions and respond proactively to public needs and crises, such as pandemics or natural disasters. References Alvarenga, A., Matos, F., Godina, R. and Matias, J.C.O. 2020. 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Evaluating e-governance through e-government: Practices and challenges of assessing the digitalisation of public governmental services, Evaluation and Program Planning, 93, p. 102118. Upadhyay, Y., Paul, J. and Baber, R. 2022. Effect of online social media marketing efforts on customer response, Journal of Consumer Behaviour, 21(3), pp. 554–571. This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Read the full journal, including this article, by downloading the PDF below. Welcome to this issue of the Journal for Inclusive Public Policy. Volume 6(2) arrives at a moment when the questions our authors are grappling with — digital transformation, democratic resilience, trade justice, and the terms on which Africa and Europe negotiate a shared future — feel less like academic abstractions and more like live governance choices being made in real time. The issue opens with two contributions that examine the digital state from complementary vantage points. Phineas Motsiri Peta traces how digital transformation is reshaping the machinery of government and organisational life in South Africa, from paperless operations to cybersecurity. Maxwell Maseko then widens the lens continentally, asking whether South Africa's relative digital maturity positions it to shape digital democracy elsewhere in Africa — and what the divergent governance models within BRICS mean for that ambition. Read together, they frame a question this journal returns to often: technology can widen access to the state, but only where the underlying institutions are built to carry it. Three articles then take up EU–Africa relations directly, each from a different angle. Ogonna Beauty Ogbologu confronts the deadlock in the EU–West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement, arguing that trade preferences have failed to formalise employment because existing frameworks regulate goods, not work, and proposes a mechanism — the Employment Formalisation Prerequisite — to close that gap. Assi J.C. Kimou assesses what the 7th AU-EU Summit changes, and does not change, for the economic and strategic architecture linking the European Union to Francophone West Africa. Brig (Rtd) Dr Robert Kabage turns to the security dimension, examining how EU engagement in Kenya's peace and security architecture intersects with the country's own agency, donor dependency, and regional leadership ambitions. Together these three pieces make the case that "EU–Africa relations" is not one relationship but several, negotiated separately in trade halls, summit communiqués, and security operations. Sameh Abidi's contribution extends this thread into climate and industrial policy, examining how Tunisia's exposure to the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism forces a rethink of industrial strategy and fiscal planning — a reminder that European climate ambition has direct, and not always comfortable, consequences for African industrial policy. Daryl Swanepoel then offers a comparative examination of China's national health insurance architecture, presented as a reference point for South Africa's own NHI reform at a moment when the NHI Act faces active Constitutional Court scrutiny. Whatever one's view of China's political system, the institutional design choices it has made — layered risk pooling, bounded benefits, contribution discipline — are argued here to be genuinely instructive for the sequencing debate now underway at home. The issue closes with Prof Wynand Goosen's Metacognition and Machine Cognition, which examines how metacognition, reframed as "secondary thinking", mediates human judgement in an era of generative AI. Drawing on cognitive psychology, human–computer interaction, and decision science, Goosen argues that critical thinking alone is an insufficient safeguard against automation bias, and proposes a model of the supervisory reasoning that determines when and how people evaluate machine-generated outputs. It is a fitting note to end on: as AI systems take on a larger share of analytical and administrative work, how humans monitor and calibrate their trust in those systems will increasingly shape the quality of decision-making across the institutions this journal exists to study. We are grateful to our reviewers for their continued rigour, and to our authors for their patience through the review process. We hope this issue contributes, in some small way, to more inclusive and better-governed public policy on the continent and beyond. Stephen Langtry Editor-in-Chief This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy.The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values.In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Read the full journal by downloading the PDF below. Articles inside this Issue: Editorial Introduction Stephen Langtry Impact of digital transformation on governments and organisations Phineas Motsiri Peta Digitalising democracy in Africa brick-by-brick Dr Maxwell Maseko Beyond extraction: Resolving the EU-West Africa economic partnership agreement deadlock through employment formalisation Ogonna Beauty Ogbologu EU–Côte d’Ivoire cooperation agreements in the context of multipolar reconfiguration: Structural challenges and transformation prospects Prof Assi J.C. Kimou EU-Africa relations: Reframing Kenya’s peace and security architecture Brig (Rtd) Dr Robert Kabage Green industrialisation in Tunisia under the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism: Aligning European climate policy with Tunisia’s industrial transformation and fiscal sustainability Sameh Abidi Universal coverage, institutional design and fiscal discipline reflections on the Chinese National Health Insurance model Daryl Swanepoel Metacognition and machine cognition: Secondary thinking as a mediator of human–AI reasoning Prof Wynand Goosen

Articles Click on the article title below to read: Towards a GNU Plus model: Inclusive public policy responses to South Africa’s governance and development crisis Prof William Gumede Comparative policy analysis: The ANC’s NGC Economic Framework and the Inclusive Society Institute’s Growth Vision Daryl Swanepoel Whose data is it anyway? Tebogo Keitheile G20 Essays Africa's Blue Finance Development under the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Xingcan Zhou Current Situation and Prospect of Green Channel for African Agricultural Products Exporting to China Yuxin Tang Evolution and mechanism of grain trade network in G20 countries Jiajun Fan Empowering modernisation, Building the future: Exploring China-Africa Cooperation’s support for Africa’s sustainable modernisation within the G20 framework WenTao Lin

Copyright © 2026 prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Global South Perspectives Network DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of The coordinating entities or any of their office bearers Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 13 July 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context. JULY 2026 Rapporteur: Klaus Kotzé CONTENTS 1 Introduction 2 A crisis of legitimacy rather than institutions 3 Beyond power: Recovering moral purpose 4 Religion's enduring contribution 5 From power towards responsibility 6 Towards a civilisation of love 7 Rreligion never left: Recovering trust, restoring conscience 8 The limits of political authority 9 Religion never returned, because it never left 10 Lessons from contemporary iran 11 The continuing public role of religion 12 Justice, consistency and moral credibility 13 A remarkable convergence 14 Rebuilding trust through moral leadership 15 Religion as conscience, rather than government 16 The importance of consistency 17 Dialogue in an age of polarisation 18 Faith in a multipolar world 19 Moral authority and the future of multilateralism 20 Emerging areas of consensus 21 Conclusion Cover photo: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID: 2254584978 & 487010246 1 INTRODUCTION The Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) convened another of its Open Consultation Monday discussions on 13 July 2026 to examine a question that is assuming increasing relevance in an international system marked by geopolitical rivalry, institutional paralysis and declining public trust: Can religion once again provide the moral authority that contemporary international affairs appear increasingly to lack? Held under the theme "In Search of Moral Authority: Religion, Civilisations and the Return of Faith to International Affairs," the discussion brought together Archbishop Henryk Jagodziński, Apostolic Nuncio of the Holy See to South Africa and Botswana, and Dr Mohammad Taher Gholi Tabar, an Iranian scholar of comparative religion and specialist in interfaith dialogue. The discussion was moderated by the Inclusive Society Institute's Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, and attracted policy practitioners, diplomats, academics, former United Nations officials and civil society representatives from across the globe. The discussion was particularly timely. Across much of the world, confidence in traditional political institutions is weakening. International organisations are increasingly criticised for their inability to prevent conflict, enforce international law consistently or command universal legitimacy. At the same time, geopolitical competition has intensified, military expenditure continues to rise and diplomacy is frequently overshadowed by the pursuit of strategic advantage. Against this backdrop, the discussion sought to explore whether religious traditions and institutions might once again contribute to rebuilding the ethical foundations upon which peaceful international cooperation ultimately depends. Importantly, the discussion was not an argument for theocracy, nor for the replacement of secular governance by religious authority, instead, participants explored whether religion could once again serve as a source of moral guidance capable of informing political leadership, strengthening diplomacy and restoring trust in an increasingly fragmented international order. The discussion quickly moved beyond theological questions. Instead, it became a thoughtful examination of the relationship between power and responsibility, morality and politics and the conditions necessary for rebuilding international trust. 2 A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY RATHER THAN INSTITUTIONS In opening the discussion, the moderator observed that international affairs appear increasingly characterised by a widening gap between political power and moral leadership. While political institutions continue to exercise authority, questions are increasingly being asked about the legitimacy with which that authority is exercised. The discussion therefore set out to explore whether religious institutions, many of which have retained significant moral credibility across centuries, could help provide ethical direction at a time when traditional political leadership is increasingly contested. Archbishop Jagodziński developed this proposition by arguing that contemporary international affairs are experiencing not merely a crisis of governance, but a deeper crisis of moral authority itself. Modern civilisation, he suggested, possesses unprecedented technological capability, military power and institutional sophistication. But despite these advances, humanity appears increasingly uncertain about the moral purposes those capabilities ought to serve. International institutions remain numerous, legal instruments continue to multiply and technological innovation accelerates at an extraordinary pace. Nevertheless, the international community struggles with the very questions that have always defined civilisation: What constitutes justice? What is peace? What responsibilities do nations owe one another? What limits ought to be placed upon political power? Ultimately, what does it mean to remain fully human in an age increasingly shaped by technology and competition? These, he argued, are not technical questions. They are fundamentally moral questions. According to the Archbishop, contemporary international relations often exhibit a paradox, in that states have become more interconnected than at any point in history, but trust between nations appears to be steadily eroding. Political leaders speak frequently of international cooperation while the very institutions established to facilitate that cooperation are increasingly questioned, weakened or bypassed. Humanity possesses extraordinary technological capabilities, including artificial intelligence, but continues to struggle with the ethical questions that technology itself cannot answer. The consequence, he argued, is that international politics increasingly risks becoming an exercise in the management of power rather than the pursuit of justice. 3 BEYOND POWER: RECOVERING MORAL PURPOSE Drawing extensively upon the recent papal encyclical Magnifica Humanitas, Archbishop Jagodziński argued that humanity currently faces two competing visions of civilisation. The first is a civilisation founded primarily upon power - political power, technological dominance, economic strength and the pursuit of national advantage. It reflects what he described through the biblical metaphor of Babel: the belief that human progress can be secured principally through the accumulation of capability and the exercise of power. The second vision is represented by Jerusalem, a civilisation patiently constructed upon responsibility, solidarity, justice and peace. Here, power is not rejected, but disciplined by moral purpose. Rather than asking simply how power can be expanded, this vision asks how power ought to be exercised. This distinction framed much of the subsequent discussion. The Archbishop argued that the central challenge confronting contemporary international affairs is therefore not merely what kind of international institutions should be created, but what kind of civilisation humanity ultimately seeks to build. Institutional reform, while important, cannot by itself restore legitimacy if the moral foundations underpinning those institutions continue to weaken. 4 RELIGION'S ENDURING CONTRIBUTION Against this backdrop, Archbishop Jagodziński outlined several enduring contributions that religion can make to international affairs. First, religion reminds political authority that no state, market, ideology or technology is absolute. There exists a moral order that transcends political power itself and thus religion therefore introduces a degree of humility into political decision-making by reminding leaders that authority ultimately carries ethical obligations beyond immediate national interest. Second, religion affirms the inherent dignity of every human person and therefore individuals should never be reduced to mere citizens, consumers, workers, refugees, soldiers or statistical categories, because every person possesses an intrinsic worth that precedes political systems and cannot legitimately be diminished by them. This principle, participants noted, provides an essential ethical foundation for human rights, humanitarian law and international cooperation. Third, religion preserves collective memory. Religious traditions carry within them humanity's experiences of persecution, exile, war, injustice, reconciliation and forgiveness. Such memory serves an important civilisational function by helping societies avoid repeating their greatest historical failures while simultaneously preserving hope that reconciliation remains possible. Religion also creates communities of responsibility. Long before governments intervene, religious communities frequently establish schools, hospitals, charitable institutions and networks of social support. In doing so they generate habits of solidarity that extend beyond formal political institutions and contribute directly to social resilience. Finally, religion preserves hope. Politics without hope, the Archbishop argued, easily descends into cynicism. Similarly, diplomacy without hope risks becoming little more than the management of perpetual conflict, faith traditions remind humanity that history need not remain imprisoned by its past and reconciliation always remains possible, however difficult contemporary circumstances may appear. 5 FROM POWER TOWARDS RESPONSIBILITY One of the most significant contributions emerging from the Archbishop's address was his distinction between power and responsibility. Power itself is not inherently problematic - nations will inevitably pursue legitimate national interests, maintain security capabilities and seek economic prosperity. The challenge, however, arises when power becomes detached from moral responsibility. Throughout modern history, diplomacy has frequently been criticised as weakness and compromise has been portrayed as surrender. Archbishop Jagodziński rejected this characterisation. Diplomacy, he argued, requires precisely the opposite qualities: patience, humility, perseverance and the willingness to maintain dialogue even when disagreement appears irreconcilable. Speaking with one's adversaries should never be interpreted as legitimising them. Rather, it reflects recognition that today's adversary may become tomorrow's partner in peace. The vocation of diplomacy is therefore to preserve communication when others seek confrontation; to listen when listening is uncomfortable; to search for goodwill even in deeply polarised circumstances; and above all to prevent the complete destruction of trust between nations. In this sense, diplomacy represents not weakness, but one of the highest expressions of moral courage. This understanding led naturally to one of the discussion's most enduring themes, namely that the international order cannot be sustained indefinitely through deterrence alone, because stable peace ultimately requires relationships built upon trust, dialogue and shared ethical commitments. 6 TOWARDS A CIVILISATION OF LOVE Perhaps the Archbishop's most compelling contribution was his call for a transition from what he described as a culture of power towards a civilisation of love. This should not be understood sentimentally. Rather, it represents a demanding political and ethical programme. It requires transforming charity into structures of justice; converting interdependence into solidarity; replacing domination with service; and ensuring that differences become opportunities for dialogue rather than causes of conflict. Importantly, this vision does not ask states to abandon legitimate national interests. Instead, it asks them to recognise that no national interest can ultimately be separated from the broader common good of humanity. Power remains necessary, but it must increasingly be exercised as responsibility. Politics remains essential, but it must be directed towards service. Technology remains indispensable, but it must serve humanity rather than displace it. In developing this argument, Archbishop Jagodziński also drew upon the African philosophy of Ubuntu. The principle that "I am because we are" provides an important reminder that neither individuals, nor nations exist in isolation. Identity is formed through relationships, responsibility is shared, and no civilisation possesses all wisdom. In an increasingly interdependent world, this insight may prove indispensable for rebuilding a more legitimate international order. It was an appropriate place to conclude the first part of the discussion. Having diagnosed the erosion of moral authority within contemporary international affairs, Archbishop Jagodziński offered a compelling framework through which religion might help restore the ethical foundations of diplomacy, international cooperation and global governance, not by replacing politics, but by reminding politics of the moral purposes it ultimately exists to serve. 7 RELIGION NEVER LEFT: RECOVERING TRUST, RESTORING CONSCIENCE If Archbishop Henryk Jagodziński's presentation diagnosed the moral crisis confronting contemporary international affairs, Dr Mohammad Taher Gholi Tabar approached the same challenge from a different, yet remarkably complementary, perspective. Speaking both as a scholar of comparative religion and as an Iranian academic living through one of the most turbulent periods in his country's recent history, he argued that religion has never truly disappeared from international affairs. Rather, the assumption that politics could eventually replace religion as humanity's principal source of meaning and moral guidance has proven increasingly unsustainable. His intervention shifted the discussion from institutions to people. The fundamental question confronting humanity today, he suggested, is no longer simply who possesses the greatest military, economic or technological power. The more pressing question has become: Who can still be trusted? A distinction that proved significant throughout the remainder of the discussion. For decades, international politics has largely measured influence through conventional indicators of power, where states compete to acquire greater military capability, technological superiority, economic leverage and geopolitical influence. While these capabilities remain important, they do not by themselves answer the questions that increasingly occupy ordinary citizens. The deeper concern is not merely who is strongest, but who consistently acts justly, who exercises power responsibly, and who can still command moral confidence. The question of trust, therefore, has become inseparable from the question of legitimacy. 8 THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY Dr Gholi Tabar argued that much of the contemporary crisis stems from growing public disappointment with political institutions rather than with the idea of international cooperation itself. People have not abandoned the aspiration for multilateralism. Nor have they rejected diplomacy or international law. Instead, many increasingly question whether existing institutions continue to perform the purposes for which they were originally created. Three questions, he suggested, increasingly confront international society. Can international institutions still fulfil the responsibilities they were established to perform? Can international law still protect all people equally, irrespective of political alignment? And can political leadership still inspire genuine public trust? These are not abstract academic questions. They reflect concerns increasingly voiced by ordinary citizens across many parts of the world. The implication is profound. Institutional reform alone may not restore confidence if citizens believe that principles are applied selectively, that justice depends upon geopolitical interests, or that international norms are enforced inconsistently. The discussion therefore began moving beyond questions of institutional design towards the deeper issue of moral consistency. 9 RELIGION NEVER RETURNED, BECAUSE IT NEVER LEFT One of the most thought-provoking arguments advanced during the discussion concerned the very premise upon which the session had been convened. Dr Gholi Tabar questioned whether it was accurate to speak of the return of religion to international affairs. Religion, he argued, never actually disappeared. While secular political thought may have assumed that religion would gradually retreat into the private sphere, humanity never stopped asking the questions that religious traditions have historically sought to answer. Questions concerning justice, hope, suffering, meaning, forgiveness, responsibility and human dignity did not disappear simply because political institutions became more sophisticated. Rather than witnessing the return of religion, contemporary society may simply be rediscovering something that had always remained present beneath the surface. Politics can organise society. Law can regulate conduct. Economics can distribute resources. Technology can expand human capability. But none of these, by themselves, adequately answer humanity's enduring search for meaning or provide universally accepted moral direction. This observation echoed, from a different intellectual tradition, Archbishop Jagodziński's earlier argument that technological advancement cannot substitute for moral purpose. 10 LESSONS FROM CONTEMPORARY IRAN The discussion acquired particular immediacy when Dr Gholi Tabar reflected upon recent events in Iran. Speaking personally, rather than politically, he described how periods of conflict had revealed something unexpected about where ordinary people increasingly seek moral leadership. During recent hostilities, many Iranian citizens, including scholars, academics and professionals from different religious backgrounds, had directed appeals not primarily towards political institutions or international organisations, but towards religious leaders, including the Pope. The significance of this development, he argued, extends well beyond Iran itself. Many of those making these appeals were neither Catholic nor Christian. Their actions reflected something deeper than religious affiliation. They reflected a belief that certain religious figures continue to possess a moral credibility capable of transcending geopolitical divisions. Whether those appeals ultimately prove successful is almost secondary. Their existence demonstrates that, during periods of profound uncertainty, many people instinctively continue to search for moral voices capable of speaking beyond political interests. This observation also reinforced one of the discussion's recurring themes: legitimacy ultimately depends not merely upon formal authority but upon public confidence. 11 THE CONTINUING PUBLIC ROLE OF RELIGION Dr Gholi Tabar rejected the common assumption that religion belongs exclusively within the private sphere. Whether acknowledged or not, religion continues to influence elections, foreign policy, conflict, peacebuilding, humanitarian action and national identity across every region of the world. This is true not only in the Middle East, Africa or Asia, but equally, albeit often less visibly, across Europe and North America. The question, therefore, is no longer whether religion participates in public life. It already does. The more important question is how religion ought to exercise that influence. Religion can become an instrument of reconciliation or division. It can encourage dialogue or justify exclusion. It can restrain political excess or be manipulated to legitimise it. Its influence is therefore neither inherently constructive, nor inherently destructive. Much depends upon whether religious actors remain faithful to the ethical principles they profess. This distinction would become an important point of convergence during the wider discussion. Throughout the consultation there was broad agreement that religion should never be employed to legitimise violence, nationalism or exclusion. Instead, its greatest contribution lies in its capacity to remind political leaders that ethical limits exist beyond immediate political advantage. 12 JUSTICE, CONSISTENCY AND MORAL CREDIBILITY Another important thread running through Dr Gholi Tabar's presentation concerned the relationship between justice and consistency. Citizens increasingly become disillusioned, he argued, when identical actions are judged differently depending upon who commits them. Such inconsistency gradually erodes confidence not only in individual governments, but in international norms themselves. People continue to seek justice. The difficulty arises when justice appears contingent upon geopolitical alignment, rather than universally applied principles. It is precisely at this point, he suggested, that religion can continue performing an important corrective function, not by exercising political authority itself, but by reminding political authority of ethical standards that transcend changing alliances or shifting political interests. This proposition resonated strongly with earlier observations concerning the erosion of trust in international institutions. 13 A REMARKABLE CONVERGENCE Although Archbishop Jagodziński and Dr Gholi Tabar approached the discussion from different religious traditions and different personal experiences, their presentations converged in several striking respects. Both rejected the notion that religion should seek political domination. Neither argued for the replacement of secular governance by religious authority. Instead, both maintained that religion performs its most valuable public function when it serves as the conscience of political life. Both speakers also agreed that humanity currently confronts a crisis that is fundamentally moral rather than institutional. Institutional reform remains important. Diplomatic innovation remains necessary. Multilateral institutions undoubtedly require renewal. But none of these reforms, they suggested, will prove durable unless accompanied by a recovery of the ethical principles that originally justified international cooperation. Power, detached from responsibility, inevitably loses legitimacy. Diplomacy, detached from trust, gradually becomes procedural, rather than transformative. Law, detached from consistent moral application, loses authority. And international institutions, detached from the confidence of those they exist to serve, eventually struggle to command either respect or compliance. By the conclusion of the two keynote presentations, a broader proposition had therefore begun to emerge. The discussion was no longer simply about religion. It had become a discussion about the moral architecture necessary for sustaining peaceful international order itself. If the twentieth century concentrated primarily upon constructing institutions capable of preventing conflict, the twenty-first century may increasingly require rebuilding the ethical foundations upon which those institutions ultimately depend. That proposition would become even more apparent during the extensive discussion that followed, as participants from different regions, professions and faith traditions explored how moral authority might once again contribute to restoring trust, strengthening diplomacy and renewing multilateral cooperation in an increasingly fragmented world. 14 REBUILDING TRUST THROUGH MORAL LEADERSHIP The keynote presentations established a common premise: that contemporary international affairs are experiencing a crisis of moral legitimacy alongside the more familiar geopolitical and institutional challenges. The discussion that followed broadened this proposition considerably. Participants approached the subject from different religious traditions, regions and professional backgrounds, but a number of recurring themes emerged with striking consistency. While differences remained regarding the appropriate relationship between religion and the state, there was broad agreement that the discussion should not be understood as advocating a greater political role for religious institutions. Rather, participants repeatedly returned to the proposition that religion's most valuable contribution lies in helping political leaders, international institutions and civil society recover a moral vocabulary capable of guiding public life beyond narrow calculations of national interest. Throughout the discussion, participants distinguished carefully between religious authority and moral authority. The former belongs to particular faith traditions. The latter possesses a broader relevance that can speak across cultures, religions and even secular philosophical traditions. It was this second form of authority that many regarded as increasingly absent from contemporary international affairs. 15 RELIGION AS CONSCIENCE, RATHER THAN GOVERNMENT One of the strongest themes emerging from the wider discussion concerned the proper role of religion within public life. Participants recognised that history offers numerous examples in which religion has been manipulated to justify conflict, nationalism, intolerance and political domination. Such abuses cannot simply be ignored when considering religion's contemporary role in international affairs. Equally, however, many argued that these distortions should not obscure religion's far more enduring contribution to civilisation. Throughout history, religious traditions have frequently stood alongside the poor, defended human dignity, challenged injustice, mediated conflicts and reminded political authorities that their power remains subject to ethical restraint. This distinction proved important. The discussion was therefore less concerned with religion exercising political authority than with religion exercising moral influence. Participants suggested that religious institutions often possess a unique capacity to remind societies of ethical principles that transcend electoral cycles, geopolitical rivalries or changing ideological fashions. Indeed, several participants observed that many of history's most influential advocates for peace, reconciliation and justice drew their inspiration from deeply held religious convictions while simultaneously respecting pluralism and democratic governance. 16 THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSISTENCY A second recurring theme concerned the relationship between moral authority and consistency. Participants observed that public confidence in international institutions is not eroded simply because difficult political decisions must be made. Rather, confidence declines when similar situations appear to be treated differently depending upon the political identity or strategic importance of those involved. This concern extended beyond governments to encompass international organisations, legal institutions, humanitarian actors and the broader international community. The discussion repeatedly returned to the proposition that moral authority cannot be claimed. It must be earned. Institutions acquire legitimacy when their principles are applied consistently, even where doing so proves politically inconvenient. Conversely, perceived inconsistency gradually weakens confidence, regardless of the formal authority those institutions may continue to possess. Participants therefore suggested that restoring confidence in multilateralism will require more than structural reform. It will also require renewed commitment to fairness, impartiality and ethical consistency in the application of international norms. 17 DIALOGUE IN AN AGE OF POLARISATION Another important area of consensus concerned the growing erosion of meaningful dialogue within international affairs. Several participants expressed concern that contemporary political discourse increasingly encourages confrontation, rather than understanding, such a social media, geopolitical rivalry and ideological polarisation that frequently reward certainty over reflection and denunciation over engagement. Against this backdrop, the discussion repeatedly emphasised dialogue not merely as a diplomatic technique, but as a moral responsibility. Dialogue does not require agreement. Nor does engagement imply endorsement. Rather, dialogue reflects recognition that durable peace almost always begins with the willingness to continue speaking when disagreement appears most profound. This observation closely echoed Archbishop Jagodziński's earlier defence of diplomacy while also reinforcing Dr Gholi Tabar's emphasis upon interfaith engagement. Participants noted that genuine dialogue requires intellectual humility, the recognition that no individual, nation, civilisation or religious tradition possesses a monopoly on wisdom. Several contributors further observed that the willingness to listen respectfully across profound differences represents one of the defining characteristics of mature societies. 18 FAITH IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD The discussion also explored the implications of religion within an increasingly multipolar international order. Participants observed that assumptions regarding secularisation have often reflected historical experiences, rather than universal patterns of political development. Across much of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, religion continues to occupy a central place within public life and remains an important source of social identity, ethical reflection and community organisation. As the centre of gravity within international politics gradually becomes more geographically and culturally diverse, greater attention will therefore need to be given to the role that faith traditions continue to play in shaping public attitudes, diplomacy and international cooperation. Importantly, participants stressed that recognising religion's continuing public significance should not be confused with endorsing religious exclusivity. On the contrary, the discussion repeatedly affirmed the importance of interfaith dialogue precisely because contemporary international cooperation increasingly requires engagement across different civilisational traditions. In this respect, religious diversity need not become a source of conflict. Properly understood, it can become an important resource for building mutual understanding. 19 MORAL AUTHORITY AND THE FUTURE OF MULTILATERALISM Perhaps the most significant conclusion emerging from the discussion was that contemporary multilateralism cannot be renewed solely through institutional redesign. Discussions surrounding Security Council reform, voting arrangements, financing mechanisms and institutional representation remain important. But participants suggested that these structural questions ultimately rest upon a more fundamental issue. Why should nations trust one another sufficiently to cooperate? No institutional arrangement can fully answer that question. Trust depends upon confidence that political actors will behave responsibly, that commitments will be honoured, that justice will be pursued consistently and that power will remain subject to ethical restraint. In this sense, the discussion suggested that moral authority should not be viewed as an optional supplement to international affairs. It constitutes one of the essential foundations upon which sustainable international cooperation ultimately depends. Religion, participants argued, may therefore possess renewed relevance, not because it offers ready-made political solutions, but because it continues to preserve ethical traditions capable of informing political judgement. 20 EMERGING AREAS OF CONSENSUS While participants represented different cultures, faith traditions and intellectual perspectives, several broad areas of consensus became apparent during the discussion. Contemporary international affairs face not only geopolitical competition but an underlying crisis of moral legitimacy. Rebuilding confidence in international institutions requires greater consistency, fairness and ethical integrity alongside institutional reform. Religion should neither dominate politics nor retreat entirely from public life, rather, its greatest contribution lies in nurturing moral responsibility, protecting human dignity and encouraging dialogue across political and civilisational divides. Diplomacy remains indispensable, and even where differences appear irreconcilable, maintaining communication remains preferable to allowing distrust to become permanent. Finally, participants broadly agreed that humanity's greatest contemporary challenge is not merely the management of power but ensuring that power remains accountable to principles that transcend immediate political interests. 21 CONCLUSION The discussion concluded without attempting to resolve every question surrounding the relationship between religion and international affairs. Nor was that its purpose. Its value lay elsewhere. By bringing together perspectives from different religious traditions and different regions of the world, the consultation demonstrated that the search for moral authority is not confined to any single civilisation or faith community. Rather, it reflects a growing recognition that international politics cannot indefinitely sustain legitimacy through institutional authority alone. Power remains indispensable. Institutions continue to remain essential. Law remains fundamental. But each ultimately depends upon deeper ethical foundations if it is to command enduring public confidence. The discussion also challenged the widespread assumption that modernity inevitably requires religion to retreat from public life and instead, participants suggested that contemporary international affairs may be entering a period in which faith traditions once again contribute, not by exercising political power, but by reminding political leaders of the moral responsibilities that necessarily accompany power. And so, in this sense, the discussion's most enduring contribution may have been its insistence that the future of international cooperation depends not only upon creating stronger institutions, but also upon cultivating stronger moral foundations. For societies seeking to navigate an increasingly fragmented international landscape, that may prove to be one of the defining challenges of our age. The search for moral authority, the discussion ultimately suggested, is therefore not a search for greater power. It is a search for greater wisdom in the exercise of power. And that may be one of the most important conversations the international community can have. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates. GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North. Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi. GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. This report was prepared with the assistance of AI technology, including ChatGPT. JUNE 2026 Author: Inclusive Society Institute CONTENTS Executive Summary: Reframing the economic debate Introduction Scope and analytical discipline Benchmarks, comparisons and expectations PART I: Growth and lived economic reality PART II: South Africa in comparative perspective PART III: Investment as the binding constraint PART IV: Macroeconomic stability and its limits PART V: Population growth and the per-capita squeeze Conclusion References Annexure A Annexure B Cover image: Microsoft Copilot (2026) Education in South Africa. AI generated image LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Real GDP growth rate (annual), South Africa Figure 2: Real GDP (constant prices), South Africa Figure 3: Real GDP per head (constant prices), South Africa Figure 4: Real disposable income per capita (constant prices), South Africa Figure 5: Real GDP growth outcomes, South Africa and selected upper-middle-income peers (2000–2023). Peer outcomes are shown for comparative context; World Bank income-group data indicate a wide distribution of growth outcomes among upper-middle-income economies, rather than a single benchmark average. Illustrative midpoint of observed upper-middle-income growth outcomes. Figure 6: Headline inflation rate (%), South Africa, 1986–2023 Figure 7: Repo rate (%), South Africa, 1986–2023 Figure 8: Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, South Africa Figure 9: Public and private investment, South Africa (1970–2023) Figure 10: Gross domestic saving (% of GDP), South Africa, 1970–2023 Figure 11: Current account balance (% of GDP), South Africa, 1960–2023 Figure 12: Merchandise trade balance (R billion), South Africa, 1983–2022 Figure 13: South African rand (ZAR) average daily foreign-exchange turnover (USD billions), BIS Triennial Surveys, 1995–2025 Figure 14: Demand support and its limits — real consumption versus real investment, South Africa (1994–2023) Figure 15: Real GDP growth versus real GDP per-capita growth, South Africa (1994–2023) Figure 16: Real GDP per capita under actual and counterfactual population growth paths, South Africa (1994–2023) Figure 17: Employment and available labour in South Africa, 1994–2024 Figure 18: Employment growth and expanded unemployment, South Africa (1994–2024) Figure 19: Impact of slower population growth on SA’s expanded unemployment rate EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: REFRAMING THE ECONOMIC DEBATE South Africa is frequently portrayed in public discourse as a country in economic collapse. The dominant narrative speaks of failure, stagnation and institutional breakdown, often without careful reference to empirical evidence. This report, part of the True South Africa Evidence Series, interrogates that narrative by grounding the economic debate in verifiable data and comparative analysis. Drawing primarily on Statistics South Africa, the Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA) and World Bank income-group benchmarks, it asks a focused question: how has South Africa’s economy actually performed and how should that performance be interpreted in structural and comparative terms? The findings challenge both alarmism and complacency. South Africa’s economy has not collapsed. Real GDP has continued to expand over time, inflation has remained broadly contained within a functioning monetary framework and the external sector has adjusted without systemic breakdown. The rand, despite long-term depreciation, remains one of the most actively traded emerging-market currencies globally, reflecting the resilience of the country’s financial architecture. Macroeconomic stability has functioned as a shock absorber, rather than as a source of crisis. However, stability has not translated into rising prosperity. The defining feature of the post-2010 period has been persistent growth weakness. Aggregate output has expanded, but too slowly to generate sustained improvements in GDP per capita. When population growth is taken into account, per-capita income trends reveal extended stagnation and, in some years, decline. This per-capita squeeze explains much of the disconnect between headline macroeconomic indicators and lived experience. Economic performance has not been catastrophic, but it has been insufficient. In comparative perspective, South Africa emerges as a modest underperformer among upper-middle-income economies, rather than as an exceptional outlier. Growth rates cluster near the lower end of the middle-income range, while investment and domestic savings remain persistently weak. Investment, both public and private, is identified as the central binding constraint on growth. Gross fixed capital formation has declined as a share of GDP, infrastructure backlogs in energy and logistics have accumulated and capital formation has remained episodic and defensive, rather than expansionary. The report further argues that sustained demographic expansion materially intensifies economic strain. While population growth does not cause weak growth, it amplifies its consequences by diluting per-capita gains and raising the threshold at which employment growth reduces unemployment. A stylised counterfactual analysis suggests that, under a population growth trajectory closer to the upper-middle-income norm, South Africa’s expanded unemployment rate would be several percentage points lower, even with the same number of jobs. Demography thus acts as a multiplier of stress. rather than as its root cause. The central conclusion is that South Africa’s challenge is best understood as insufficient investment-led growth occurring in a context of sustained demographic pressure. The economy is neither uniquely broken nor converging toward higher prosperity. Relieving per-capita strain would require a sustained rise in investment and growth toward the four per cent range, combined over time with moderating population dynamics. The evidence does not dictate solutions, but it clarifies the structural terrain on which any serious economic strategy must be built. A NOTE ON CONTEXT South Africa is widely described as a country in decline, even a country in collapse. Public debate, media commentary and everyday conversation are saturated with the language of failure: a failed state, a failed government, a society coming apart at the seams. That is the dominant public perception. This report was developed precisely to test that perception against evidence. It asks a simple question: when we look carefully at the data, when we measure performance, rather than emotion, does the story of collapse hold? The evidence does not support that conclusion. What it shows instead is a country under real and sustained strain, economically, socially and institutionally, but not a country that has collapsed, and not a state that has failed. The challenges are serious and should not be minimised, yet they coexist with resilience, capacity and untapped potential. South Africa’s outcomes are weaker than they should be, but stronger than public perception suggests. With a firmer growth path, improved institutional performance and greater policy consistency, the trajectory can change. This report therefore argues for realism without despair: less denial of strain, but also less surrender to hopelessness. South Africa warrants more honesty and more confidence than the prevailing narrative allows. INTRODUCTION Public debate about South Africa’s economy is increasingly framed in binary terms. The economy is either described as being on the brink of collapse or alternatively defended through selective reference to resilience and recovery. Neither framing is particularly helpful. Both obscure more than they reveal. This report forms part of the True South Africa Evidence Series, which seeks to ground public debate in verifiable data and careful interpretation, rather than assertion, nostalgia or alarmism. Its purpose is not to minimise economic hardship, nor to defend policy choices, but to assess economic performance soberly and proportionately. The central question this report asks is therefore a narrow, but important one: how has South Africa’s economy actually performed and how should that performance be understood in comparative and structural terms? This report evaluates South Africa’s economic performance not against aspirational targets, but against what is empirically feasible for countries at similar levels of development and economic maturity. SCOPE AND ANALYTICAL DISCIPLINE Economic performance is often conflated with social outcomes. High unemployment, poverty and inequality are then treated as direct proxies for economic failure. While these outcomes profoundly shape lived experience, they are not themselves measures of economic performance. They are consequences of it. For analytical clarity, this report focuses on core performance indicators: output and growth, per-capita income trends, investment and savings, macroeconomic stability, and international comparison with peer economies. Social outcomes such as unemployment, inequality and poverty are addressed in other reports in the Evidence Series. Separating performance drivers from social outcomes allows clearer causal reasoning and avoids circular conclusions. While social outcomes shape lived experience, sustained improvements ultimately depend on underlying economic performance, investment dynamics and the capacity of the economy to grow on a per-capita basis. BENCHMARKS, COMPARISONS AND EXPECTATIONS A recurring feature of South Africa’s economic debate is the invocation of growth targets, most commonly that the economy “needs” to grow at 5-6 per cent per year, or more. These figures are rarely explained, contextualised or grounded in comparative evidence. They are treated as self-evident benchmarks of success. This report adopts a different approach. Comparisons with other middle-income economies are used as diagnostic tools to calibrate performance, not as ceilings on ambition or limits on South Africa’s future growth potential. Benchmarking serves two purposes. First, it allows us to assess whether South Africa’s performance is exceptional, positively or negatively, relative to economies with similar income levels and structural characteristics. Second, it helps distinguish between outcomes that are unusual and those that are common to middle-income economies facing comparable constraints. Expecting an economy to outperform its peers is not unreasonable, but it does require explanation. Growth above the norm is not automatic, it reflects identifiable drivers such as unusually high investment rates, rapid productivity gains, demographic dividends or successful integration into expanding export markets. Where such drivers are absent or weak, growth outcomes tend to cluster within predictable ranges. This report therefore begins by examining South Africa’s performance using conventional economic indicators and comparative benchmarks, before turning later to the deeper question of why outcomes feel more severe and what explains the gap between macro performance and social stress. PART I GROWTH AND LIVED ECONOMIC REALITY AGGREGATE GROWTH: WHAT THE ECONOMY HAS (AND HAS NOT) DONE At an aggregate level, South Africa’s economy has continued to grow. Real GDP has expanded over time, interrupted periodically by domestic constraints and global shocks, most notably the global financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. These episodes matter, but they do not define the entire trajectory. What defines the post-2010 period is not collapse, but persistent weakness. Growth has been positive in many years, negative in some and rarely strong. The economy has failed to shift onto a higher growth path, but neither has it entered a sustained contractionary spiral. Output has increased, but slowly. This distinction is important. Describing the economy as “collapsed” suggests an absence of productive capacity or macroeconomic breakdown. The data do not support that characterisation. Describing the economy as “growing” without qualification, however, is equally misleading. Growth has been insufficient relative to demand, expectations and social pressure. In other words, the economy has been moving forward. but not nearly fast enough. Figure 1: Real GDP growth rate (annual), South Africa (Source: CRA, 2024) Figure 2: Real GDP (constant prices), South Africa (Source: CRA, 2024) WHY AGGREGATE GDP IS AN INCOMPLETE MEASURE Aggregate GDP is a blunt instrument. It tells us how much the economy produces in total, but says little about how that output is experienced by individuals. In a context of sustained population growth, aggregate expansion can coexist with stagnation or decline in living standards. For this reason, GDP per capita and related per-capita income measures provide a more accurate bridge between macroeconomic performance and lived experience. When viewed through this lens, the picture becomes more sobering. Figure 3: Real GDP per head (constant prices), South Africa (Source: CRA, 2024) Over long periods, South Africa’s real GDP per capita has shown extended stagnation. In some years it has increased marginally, but in others it has declined. Over the past decade and a half, per-capita gains have been weak uneven, and easily reversed by shocks. This matters because GDP per capita is not an abstract construct. It approximates the average economic space available per person, the pool from which wages, profits, taxes and public services are ultimately drawn. An economy that grows at 1-2 per cent while population grows at a similar pace does not generate expanding opportunity per person. It generates distributional pressure, intensified competition for scarce jobs and rising frustration with institutions that appear unable to deliver improvement. The disconnect between headline GDP figures and public sentiment is therefore not mysterious. It is embedded in the arithmetic of per-capita performance. DISPOSABLE INCOME AND THE HOUSEHOLD EXPERIENCE The stagnation visible in GDP per capita is reinforced when we examine real disposable income per capita. Household income growth has been weak, volatile and highly sensitive to economic shocks. Periods of modest recovery have often been followed by renewed pressure, eroding confidence and limiting consumption-led momentum. Figure 4: Real disposable income per capita (constant prices), South Africa (Source: CRA, 2024) This helps explain an important feature of South Africa’s recent economic experience: household consumption has persisted, but without generating sustained growth acceleration. Consumption has often been maintained through income smoothing, credit or transfers, rather than through rising real incomes. Such dynamics can stabilise demand in the short term, but they do not substitute for a growth model rooted in expanding productive capacity. GROWTH THAT FEELS WORSE THAN IT LOOKS At this point, a tension emerges. On the one hand, South Africa’s economy continues to function. Output expands, inflation is broadly contained and the macroeconomic system remains intact. On the other hand, lived experience is characterised by stagnation, insecurity and declining confidence in the future. This tension is not primarily psychological, nor is it the result of misinformation. It reflects the reality of an economy in which aggregate growth is persistently diluted at the per-capita level, and where modest gains are insufficient to absorb new entrants into the labour market or expand fiscal space meaningfully. Importantly, this experience is not unique to South Africa. Many middle-income economies that fail to accelerate growth encounter similar dynamics. What remains to be examined, however, is whether South Africa’s performance is unusually weak in comparative terms or whether it sits broadly within the range observed among its peers. That question is the focus of the next section. PART II SOUTH AFRICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE WHY COMPARATIVE CONTEXT MATTERS Economic performance cannot be assessed in isolation. Growth rates, investment levels, inflation and fiscal outcomes are all shaped by structural characteristics that economies share at similar levels of development. Without comparison, it becomes difficult to distinguish between what is unusual and what is typical. Public debate in South Africa frequently oscillates between two extremes. On the one hand, the country is portrayed as uniquely failing, an outlier whose economic outcomes cannot be explained by reference to international experience. On the other, it is occasionally framed as broadly comparable to advanced economies, implying that growth should be both faster and easier to achieve. Neither position withstands scrutiny. South Africa is best understood as a middle-income economy with mature features, facing constraints that are common to its peers, but compounded by domestic weaknesses. Comparative analysis allows us to locate South Africa more precisely within this landscape. GROWTH PERFORMANCE RELATIVE TO PEERS When South Africa’s growth performance is compared with other upper-middle-income economies, a clear pattern emerges. Growth has been weaker than many peers, but not dramatically or exceptionally so. South Africa has not experienced the kind of prolonged contraction associated with macroeconomic collapse, nor has it achieved the sustained acceleration seen in successful growth transitions. Instead, its performance clusters around the lower end of the middle-income range. World Bank World Development Indicators show that GDP growth outcomes among upper-middle-income economies vary widely over time and across global cycles, but tend to cluster around modest positive rates during periods of relative stability, rather than around a single fixed benchmark (World Bank, 2024). This distinction matters. Being a modest underperformer implies a different diagnosis and a different policy conversation from being a structural outlier. Figure 5: Real GDP growth outcomes, South Africa and selected upper-middle-income peers (2000–2023). Peer outcomes are shown for comparative context; World Bank income-group data indicate a wide distribution of growth outcomes among upper-middle-income economies, rather than a single benchmark average. Illustrative midpoint of observed upper-middle-income growth outcomes. (Source: CRA, 2024) INFLATION, STABILITY AND THE ABSENCE OF MACROECONOMIC BREAKDOWN Another feature that distinguishes South Africa from genuine economic outliers is the relative stability of its macroeconomic framework. Inflation has remained broadly contained within a moderate range, even during periods of weak growth and external shocks. Interest rates have adjusted, sometimes sharply, but within a functioning monetary policy framework. Similarly, South Africa has avoided the kinds of external imbalances that characterise economies in acute distress. While current account deficits have widened at times and the currency has depreciated over the long term, these dynamics have unfolded in a manner consistent with a small open economy exposed to global volatility, rather than one experiencing systemic collapse. This does not imply comfort or success, because currency weakness has eroded purchasing power, raised input costs and it has fed social frustration. But it does indicate that the economy retains shock-absorbing capacity, rather than being locked into crisis dynamics. Figure 6: Headline inflation rate (%), South Africa, 1986–2023 (Source: CRA, 2024) INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Weak investment and low domestic savings are among the most persistent features of South Africa’s economic performance. They are also among the most frequently cited explanations for the country’s subdued growth trajectory. Yet these outcomes are often discussed in isolation, without sufficient reference to how similar economies have performed under comparable structural conditions. In comparative perspective, South Africa’s experience is disappointing, but not anomalous. Many upper-middle-income economies that struggle to sustain higher growth rates exhibit a similar combination of low savings, modest capital formation and reliance on consumption and credit to support demand. What distinguishes faster-growing peers is not the absence of constraint, but the ability to mobilise higher levels of investment relative to income, either through stronger domestic savings, sustained public capital expenditure or successful attraction of long-term foreign investment. South Africa’s savings rate has remained persistently low, which limits the economy’s capacity to finance investment internally and increases reliance on external capital flows, which are inherently volatile and tend to favour short-term portfolio investment over long-horizon productive capital. The result of these dynamics is an investment profile that is episodic, being one that is sustained and defensive, rather than expansionary. Investment outcomes must also be understood in relation to the broader financing environment within which firms operate and so, while structural and policy factors clearly matter, investment decisions are made in a context shaped by the cost of capital, access to finance and macroeconomic conditions. These factors influence not only whether firms invest, but the scale, timing and nature of that investment. The figure below therefore situates South Africa’s investment performance within its long-run interest-rate environment, using the repo rate as a proxy for the underlying price of capital set by monetary policy. This does not imply that interest rates are the primary cause of weak investment. Rather, it provides context for assessing whether South Africa’s investment shortfall can plausibly be explained by an unusually restrictive financing environment or whether deeper structural constraints are at play. The evidence suggests the latter. Investment has remained weak across periods of both relatively high and relatively low interest rates, which seems to indicate that capital formation in South Africa is constrained not so much by short-term financing conditions and more by structural factors affecting confidence, expected returns and productive opportunity. Figure 7: Repo rate (%), South Africa, 1986–2023 (Source: CRA, 2024) CONSUMPTION-LED STRUCTURES AND GROWTH LIMITS South Africa’s economic structure is characterised by relatively high levels of consumption and comparatively low levels of investment. This configuration is not unique among middle-income economies, but it does impose clear limits on growth potential. Consumption can support demand in the short term, particularly when public transfers or credit expansion play a stabilising role. However, consumption-led growth without corresponding investment expansion tends to exhaust itself and it does not generate the productivity gains required for sustained acceleration. Comparative data shows that economies with stronger growth trajectories typically combine consumption with robust capital formation and export expansion and therefore, South Africa’s divergence from this pattern helps explain its position as an underperformer, rather than an outlier. NOT EXCEPTIONAL AND THAT IS PRECISELY THE POINT The comparative evidence leads to an important and often uncomfortable, conclusion. South Africa’s economic performance is disappointing, but not exceptionally so. Its weaknesses are real, persistent and costly, but they are also recognisable within the broader experience of middle-income economies that have struggled to transition to higher growth paths. This conclusion challenges two common narratives simultaneously. It rejects the claim that South Africa’s economy is uniquely broken. It also rejects the assumption that the country should, by default, be expected to outperform its peers. Expecting growth well above the middle-income norm requires identifying what makes an economy exceptional. Such exceptions usually rest on unusually high investment, rapid productivity growth, demographic dividends or successful integration into expanding global markets. In the absence of these drivers, performance tends to converge toward the mean. At this stage, the evidence that has been presented cannot plausibly suggest that South Africa has established the conditions necessary for sustained outperformance. THE EMERGING QUESTION A paradox now becomes clear. If South Africa’s macroeconomic performance is broadly consistent with, though weaker than, that of many middle-income peers, why do economic pressures feel so acute? Why does stagnation translate into such severe social and fiscal strain? The answer does not lie solely in growth rates themselves. It lies in how growth interacts with other structural forces shaping the economy. That interaction becomes the focus of the next section. PART III INVESTMENT AS THE BINDING CONSTRAINT FROM SYMPTOMS TO CONSTRAINTS Up to this point, the report has established three things. First, South Africa’s economy has continued to grow, but weakly. Second, per-capita outcomes have stagnated, shaping lived economic experience. Third, in comparative terms, South Africa is a modest underperformer, rather than an extreme outlier. These observations describe what has happened. The question now is why growth has remained persistently weak. Across economies and over time, one variable consistently distinguishes those that accelerate growth from those that stagnate: investment. Without sustained capital formation, economies struggle to expand productive capacity, raise productivity or generate durable employment growth. In South Africa’s case, investment emerges as the central binding constraint. LONG-TERM INVESTMENT TRENDS Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP has declined steadily over time. While short-term fluctuations occur, the broader trend is unmistakable: South Africa invests less today, relative to the size of its economy, than it did in earlier periods and less than many of its peers. This is not a technical detail. Investment determines the future growth frontier of an economy. It shapes infrastructure quality, industrial capacity, energy availability, logistics efficiency and the adoption of new technologies. When investment is persistently weak, growth outcomes follow suit. The problem is therefore not simply cyclical hesitation or temporary uncertainty. It is a structural shortfall that has narrowed the economy’s potential growth path. Figure 8: Gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, South Africa (Source: CRA, 2024) PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT DYNAMICS Disaggregating investment reveals an additional layer of constraint, where both public and private investment have underperformed, though for different reasons. Public investment has been uneven and increasingly constrained by fiscal pressures, where capital expenditure by government and public corporations has failed to keep pace with infrastructure needs, which deficit has resulted in material maintenance backlogs, severe capacity bottlenecks and rising costs across the economy. Private investment, meanwhile, has been cautious and episodic, where periods of optimism have not translated into sustained capital deepening and instead, investment decisions have tended to favour balance-sheet protection, offshore diversification or short-term returns rather than long-horizon productive expansion. The combined effect has been a low-investment equilibrium, in which neither the public nor the private sector acts as a consistent growth catalyst. Figure 9: Public and private investment, South Africa (1970–2023) (Source: CRA (2024)) INFRASTRUCTURE BACKLOGS AS AN ECONOMIC CONSTRAINT The consequences of under-investment are most visible in the accumulation of infrastructure backlogs across key economic sectors, which is the result of years of deferred maintenance, of delayed expansion and of uneven capital spending, all of which have eroded the reliability and capacity of the economic infrastructure that is needed to underpin economic activity. These backlogs are not merely technical shortcomings. They operate as binding constraints on growth by raising costs, increasing uncertainty and reducing the effective productivity of both labour and capital. In the energy sector, insufficient and delayed investment in generation, transmission and maintenance has translated into supply instability and rising operating costs across the economy, which has forced firms to invest in self-generation or backup capacity, resulting in a diversion of capital away from productive expansion, not to mention the reinforcing of the barriers to entry for smaller enterprises. And even where energy availability has improved at the margin, the legacy of the under-investment in electricity generation continues to weigh on confidence and long-term planning. Logistics and transport infrastructure exhibit similar dynamics, where inadequate maintenance and expansion of ports, rail networks and freight corridors, for example, increasing turnaround times, reducing reliability and raising input and export costs. These constraints weaken South Africa’s ability to compete in regional and global markets and they limit the economy’s capacity to benefit from commodity cycles or export-led growth opportunities, with the result being not an absence of demand, but an inability to translate demand into sustained output growth. Municipal and urban infrastructure backlogs further compound these pressures, in that aging water systems, sanitation networks and local road infrastructure raise operating costs for firms and households alike, whilst simultaneously also undermining service reliability and investment attractiveness at the local level. It should be mentioned that these deficiencies disproportionately affect lower-income communities and secondary cities, thereby reinforcing the spatial inequality and constraining the diffusion of economic activity beyond established economic hubs. Taken together, infrastructure backlogs help explain why periods of cyclical recovery have failed to translate into durable growth acceleration, because even when the macroeconomic conditions stabilise and demand recovers, supply-side constraints limit the economy’s ability to respond. In this context, weak investment is not simply a missed opportunity; it actively narrows the range of feasible growth outcomes. THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNDER-INVESTMENT The consequences of weak investment extend well beyond GDP growth rates. Firstly, limited capital formation constrains productivity gains, because new machinery, technology and infrastructure is needed to improve productivity. The current low level of investment has resulted in productivity that can at best be described as incremental, rather than transformative. Secondly, low investment weakens labour absorption, because even where output expands modestly, the economy without sufficient investment will struggle to create adequate employment opportunities, particularly for new entrants. Thirdly, fiscal pressure intensifies, in that weak growth limits revenue expansion, while infrastructure deficits raise future costs, which then creates a feedback loop in which fiscal consolidation further constrains public investment capacity. None of these dynamics is unique to South Africa; they are common features of middle-income economies that are caught in prolonged low-investment traps. SAVINGS, FINANCING AND STRUCTURAL LIMITS Domestic savings play a critical role in sustaining investment and in this respect, South Africa’s savings rates have remained low relative to GDP, thereby limiting the economy’s capacity to finance investment internally. Low savings increase dependence on external capital flows, which are inherently volatile and which, in turn, constrains policy space and amplifies sensitivity to global financial conditions. Moreover, it discourages long-term investment planning, which then reinforces short-termism in both public and private decision-making. Comparative evidence suggests that economies which successfully accelerate growth, typically combine higher investment with stronger domestic savings mobilisation, the divergence from which in South Africa pattern further explains the persistence of weak growth. Figure 10: Gross domestic saving (% of GDP), South Africa, 1970–2023 (Source: CRA, 2024) WHY INVESTMENT MATTERS MORE THAN ANY OTHER VARIABLE Investment occupies a unique position in the growth process. Unlike consumption, it expands future productive capacity and unlike transfers, it raises potential output. Unlike temporary stimulus, it compounds over time. This is why investment shortfalls cannot be offset indefinitely by demand-side measures, because consumption-led growth without investment ultimately runs into structural limits, which produces the very stagnation South Africa now experiences. The persistence of weak investment therefore provides the most parsimonious explanation for South Africa’s modest growth performance relative to peers. It also explains why recovery phases have failed to translate into sustained momentum. A CONSTRAINT, NOT A VERDICT Identifying investment as the binding constraint is not a declaration of inevitability, but instead, it is an analytical observation that is grounded in evidence. Growth acceleration from a middle-income base has occurred elsewhere, but it has done so where investment rose sharply, productivity improved and export capacity expanded. Absent such shifts, economies tend to remain within narrow growth bands. At this point, South Africa’s experience conforms to this pattern. Yet a question still remains unresolved. If South Africa’s growth underperformance is broadly consistent with its investment profile and comparable to many middle-income peers, why does economic pressure feel disproportionately severe? Answering that question requires turning to a factor that shapes how growth, or the absence of it, is experienced across society. That factor is population. PART IV MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND ITS LIMITS STABILITY WITHOUT MOMENTUM A striking feature of South Africa’s recent economic experience is the coexistence of weak growth with relative macroeconomic stability. This combination often confuses public debate. Stability is sometimes misread as success and weak growth, in turn, is sometimes assumed to signal impending crisis. Neither inference is correct. South Africa’s macroeconomic framework has remained intact through a period of prolonged strain. Inflation has been contained within moderate ranges for most of the past decade. Monetary policy has operated consistently. Fiscal stress has intensified, but without triggering loss of market access or uncontrolled financing dynamics. This stability matters. It distinguishes South Africa from economies experiencing genuine macroeconomic breakdown. But it does not, on its own, generate growth. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR: CONSTRAINT AND CUSHION South Africa’s position as a small open economy exposes it to global volatility. Commodity cycles, capital flows and shifts in global demand all shape domestic outcomes and over time, the external sector has acted as both a constraint and a cushion. Exports remain concentrated in a relatively narrow range of commodities and manufactured goods, which limits diversification and exposure to fast-growing global value chains, but that said, export earnings have at the same time provided a buffer during periods of global commodity strength by partially offsetting domestic weaknesses. The current account has oscillated between deficit and surplus, reflecting shifts in trade balances, income flows and global conditions, which movements are consistent with those observed in many middle-income economies and do not, in themselves, indicate structural imbalance. Figure 11: Current account balance (% of GDP), South Africa, 1960–2023 (Source: CRA, 2024) What they do indicate is an economy operating close to its external constraint, able to adjust, but not easily able to expand without triggering renewed pressure. Figure 12: Merchandise trade balance (R billion), South Africa, 1983–2022 (Source: CRA, 2024) THE EXCHANGE RATE: ADJUSTMENT, NOT COLLAPSE The long-term depreciation of the rand is often cited as evidence of economic failure, but in practice, it reflects a more complex interaction of structural factors, because as a flexible currency in an open financial system, the rand has managed to absorb external shocks that might otherwise have manifested through sharper output or employment adjustments. Depreciation has supported export competitiveness at the margin and acted as a pressure valve during periods of global stress. At the same time, currency weakness imposes real costs in that it raises the price of imported inputs, erodes purchasing power and contributes to inflationary pressure, particularly for lower-income households, the effects of which reinforce perceptions of decline, even in the absence of macroeconomic collapse. The key point that is being made here is that exchange rate adjustment has been a mechanism of adaptation and not a sign of imminent failure. Figure 13: South African rand (ZAR) average daily foreign-exchange turnover (USD billions), BIS Triennial Surveys, 1995–2025 (Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Triennial Central Bank Survey 2025: OTC foreign exchange market turnover in April 2025, Tables 25.1 (1995–2010) and 25.2 (2013–2025), “OTC foreign exchange turnover by currency”, net-net basis, daily averages in April (USD billions)) An often-overlooked feature of the rand is that, despite long-term depreciation, it remains one of the most actively traded emerging-market currencies globally. High foreign-exchange turnover is not a trivial metric. It signals depth, liquidity and trust in the functioning of the currency market itself. Currencies that lack credibility, convertibility or institutional backing do not trade at scale; they become illiquid, segmented or administratively constrained. The rand’s heavy trading therefore reflects confidence not in South Africa’s growth trajectory, but in its financial architecture. Investors are willing to hold, hedge, trade and settle rand positions precisely because the currency remains fully convertible, price-driven and embedded in global financial markets. In this sense, exchange-rate weakness has occurred within a functioning market, rather than through market breakdown. Depreciation has been the mechanism of adjustment, not a symptom of systemic failure. DEMAND SUPPORT AND ITS LIMITS In response to weak growth, South Africa has relied heavily on demand support, through household consumption, social transfers and, at times, accommodative financial conditions, which measures have played an important stabilising role, preventing deeper contraction during downturns. However, despite the country’s reliance on demand support, it has not translated into sustained acceleration. Consumption has remained relatively high as a share of GDP, but without the investment expansion required to lift productive capacity and as a result, demand-led growth impulses have tended to dissipate, rather than compound. This pattern is common among middle-income economies where structural constraints limit supply-side response. Without sufficient investment and productivity gains, demand stimulus can stabilise the economy, but it cannot transform it. Figure 14: Demand support and its limits — real consumption versus real investment, South Africa (1994–2023) (Source: CRA (2024)) WHY STABILITY IS NOT ENOUGH Macroeconomic stability is a necessary condition for growth, but it is not a sufficient one. An economy can remain stable while stagnating and this is precisely the condition South Africa has experienced. Stable inflation does not guarantee rising incomes. A functioning currency does not ensure expanding opportunity. Avoiding crisis is not the same as achieving progress. Recognising this distinction is crucial, since it allows us to acknowledge what has held while remaining clear-eyed about what has not improved. THE QUESTION REVISITED By this point in the analysis, the contours of South Africa’s economic experience are clear. Growth has been weak but positive Per-capita outcomes have stagnated Investment has been persistently low Macroeconomic stability has been maintained Comparative performance is disappointing, but not exceptional And yet, economic pressure feels acute, fiscal space constrained and social stress intense. If the economy is not uniquely unstable and if growth weakness is broadly consistent with its investment profile and income level, what explains the severity of the experience? The answer lies not in macroeconomic failure alone, but in how growth interacts with another powerful force shaping outcomes. That force is population. PART V POPULATION GROWTH AND THE PER-CAPITA SQUEEZE RETURNING TO THE CENTRAL PUZZLE By this stage, the evidence has narrowed the field of plausible explanations. South Africa’s economy is not in macroeconomic collapse. Its growth performance, while weak, is broadly consistent with that of a middle-income economy facing low investment and structural constraints. Inflation is contained, external balances adjust and institutions continue to function. Yet the pressure experienced by households, the fiscal system and the labour market is intense. Public frustration is deep and persistent. The gap between economic performance and social experience appears unusually wide. This section addresses that gap. POPULATION GROWTH AS A CONDITIONING VARIABLE Population growth is often treated as a background demographic fact, rather than an active economic variable. In reality, it conditions how economic performance is experienced and how growth outcomes translate into lived reality. South Africa’s population has continued to grow at a pace that is high relative to many upper-middle-income economies. While exact rates vary over time, the overall trend has been one of sustained demographic expansion. On its own, population growth is neither good nor bad. In rapidly growing economies with high investment and strong labour absorption, it can support expansion. In economies with weak growth and limited investment, however, population growth dilutes per-capita gains and intensifies pressure on institutions, infrastructure and labour markets. THE ARITHMETIC OF PER-CAPITA DILUTION The implications of population growth are not ideological; they are arithmetical. When economic growth barely exceeds population growth, the result is stagnation in GDP per capita. When growth falls below population growth, per-capita incomes decline. Even modest population increases can therefore materially worsen lived outcomes when growth is weak. This helps explain why aggregate GDP growth, however limited, has failed to translate into broad improvement. Output has expanded slowly, but it has had to be shared across a growing population. The result is heightened competition for employment, constrained fiscal space and rising demand for public services without commensurate revenue growth. Population growth does not explain why the economy grows slowly. It explains why slow growth feels harsher. Figure 15: Real GDP growth versus real GDP per-capita growth, South Africa (1994–2023) (Source: CRA (2024). Real GDP growth from LG real economic growth 61–2026; real GDP per-capita growth calculated as the year-on-year percentage change in the LG GDP & disposable income per capita series) SOUTH AFRICA IN COMPARATIVE DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE South Africa’s economic performance is often assessed in aggregate terms, with headline indicators such as GDP growth, employment creation or fiscal balances dominating public and policy debate. While these measures are important, they can obscure a critical underlying dynamic: the scale and pace of population growth relative to that of peer economies. Demography does not determine economic outcomes in a mechanical sense, but it does shape the context within which growth must occur, particularly when assessing per-capita living standards. In comparative perspective, South Africa’s population growth rate has been persistently higher than that of many upper-middle-income and emerging-market peers. While several comparator economies entered demographic transition earlier and now experience relatively modest population expansion, South Africa has continued to record population growth well in excess of one per cent per annum for much of the post-1994 period. This has materially raised the threshold of economic growth required to merely stabilise per-capita income, let alone achieve sustained improvements in living standards over time. The implication is straightforward, but often underappreciated, but to be clear when population growth is rapid, a given rate of aggregate economic expansion translates into smaller gains at the individual level. Even where total output increases, the benefits are spread across a larger population base, diluting the impact on per-capita income and as a result, economic performance that appears moderate or even respectable in aggregate terms may still feel inadequate from the perspective of households and workers. To illustrate the significance of this demographic effect, a counterfactual benchmark can be introduced. Rather than assuming an unrealistically low or static population, the analysis applies a peer-norm population growth rate of 0.8 per cent per annum, broadly consistent with the demographic experience of upper-middle-income economies over the past three decades. Importantly, this benchmark is not presented as an observed outcome, but as an analytical device designed to isolate the effect of population growth on per-capita outcomes. Holding South Africa’s actual real GDP trajectory constant and applying this alternative population path allows for a direct comparison between observed per-capita income outcomes and those that would have prevailed under more moderate demographic expansion. The resulting divergence is not a reflection of different growth policies, investment strategies or external conditions; it arises solely from differences in population dynamics and so in this sense, the comparison helps reframe debates about economic underperformance by distinguishing between absolute failure and relative pressure imposed by demography. Seen in this light, South Africa’s challenge is not simply one of insufficient growth, but of growth occurring in a context of unusually strong population expansion for an economy at its level of development. Recognising this does not diminish the need for faster, more inclusive growth, instead it sharpens the diagnosis by clarifying why even periods of positive economic performance have struggled to translate into meaningful improvements in per-capita income and lived economic experience. Figure 16: Real GDP per capita under actual and counterfactual population growth paths, South Africa (1994–2023) (Source: CRA, 2024) THE COUNTERFACTUAL: WHY POPULATION CHANGES THE INTERPRETATION To illustrate the effect of population dynamics, it is useful to consider a counterfactual scenario. If South Africa’s population growth had been closer to that typically observed among upper-middle-income peers, around 0.8 per cent per year, consistent with demographic patterns observed among upper-middle-income economies, the same aggregate growth performance would have produced materially different per-capita outcomes. Income stagnation would have been less pronounced. Fiscal pressure would have eased marginally. Labour market absorption would still have been insufficient, but the scale of stress would have been reduced. Under such conditions, South Africa’s economic performance would likely be classified not as near-failure, but as modest underperformance within a recognisable middle-income pattern. This counterfactual does not absolve policy failures. It clarifies interpretation. WHAT POPULATION DOES AND DOES NOT EXPLAIN Population growth does not explain weak investment, infrastructure failures, governance breakdowns or low productivity. These remain central constraints on South Africa’s growth trajectory. What population growth explains is the intensity of the consequences. It amplifies the impact of weak growth, low investment and limited labour absorption. It turns underperformance into crisis-like experience at the household and fiscal level. In this sense, population growth acts as a multiplier of stress, not as its root cause. WHY THIS MATTERS FOR THE GROWTH DEBATE Recognising the role of population dynamics reframes the national growth debate in important ways. Firstly, it exposes the limits of slogan-based growth targets, because calls for rapid growth gains often ignore the base effect and the scale of demographic pressure. Growth above the middle-income norm is not impossible, but it requires clearly articulated drivers capable of outrunning population expansion. Second, it sharpens the diagnosis. The challenge South Africa faces is not simply to grow faster, but to grow fast enough, consistently, to generate rising per-capita outcomes in a context of sustained demographic pressure. Finally, it clarifies what is at stake. Without higher investment, productivity gains and export expansion, demographic pressure will continue to magnify economic weakness, regardless of macro stability. THE ARGUMENT REASSEMBLED Viewed together, the evidence now forms a coherent whole. South Africa’s economy is not collapsing, but it is not converging toward higher prosperity either. Growth has been persistently weak, investment insufficient and per-capita gains elusive. In comparative terms, this places the country among modest underperformers, rather than exceptional failures. Population growth does not explain this underperformance. It explains why its consequences are felt so severely. This distinction matters. It shifts the conversation away from moral judgement and toward structural reality. It does not lower ambition. It clarifies the scale of the task. What remains is to draw together what the evidence allows us to say and, equally importantly, what it does not. That is the purpose of the concluding section CONCLUSION TAKING STOCK OF THE EVIDENCE This report set out to answer a narrow, but consequential question: how has South Africa’s economy actually performed and how should that performance be interpreted? The evidence points to a clear, if uncomfortable, conclusion. South Africa’s economy has not collapsed, nor has it achieved sustained progress. Growth has been persistently weak, investment insufficient and per-capita gains elusive. Macroeconomic stability has been preserved, but without translating into rising living standards. These outcomes are neither mysterious, nor uniquely South African. They reflect a recognisable middle-income growth pattern shaped by structural constraints, low capital formation and limited productivity gains. FROM DIAGNOSIS TO CONDITIONS FOR RELIEF Taken together, the evidence points to a narrow, but powerful implication. South Africa’s economic strain is not the product of a single failure, but of the interaction between persistently weak growth and sustained demographic pressure. Relieving that strain therefore requires movement on both fronts simultaneously. A lower population growth trajectory over the coming decade would reduce the dilution of per-capita gains, while sustained GDP growth in the region of four per cent would materially expand economic capacity. Either shift on its own would ease pressure. In combination, they would alter the arithmetic that currently defines lived economic experience. Importantly, neither of these shifts implies coercive intervention or exceptional performance. Population growth typically moderates as countries urbanise, expand access to education, particularly for women, improve primary healthcare and reproductive health services, and reduce economic insecurity at the household level. These are features of development, rather than instruments of control. South Africa’s demographic trajectory is therefore not immutable. Over time, policies that raise educational attainment, improve health outcomes and strengthen household resilience are likely to yield a slower population growth path, more closely aligned with patterns observed in other upper-middle-income economies. At the same time, the evidence presented in this report makes clear that growth outcomes in the region of four per cent are not achieved through demand support alone. Such outcomes are typically associated with a sustained rise in investment, improved productivity and the removal of binding constraints on economic expansion. In South Africa’s case, these constraints are well known: inadequate and unreliable infrastructure, particularly in energy and logistics, low and volatile private investment driven by policy uncertainty and weak confidence, limited public capital formation due to fiscal pressure and an economic structure that has struggled to translate stability into expansion. Addressing these constraints does not require a departure from macroeconomic prudence, nor does it imply the pursuit of unattainable growth targets. Rather, it requires restoring the conditions under which investment becomes durable, rather than episodic. This includes credible and predictable policy frameworks, the effective maintenance and expansion of core economic infrastructure and institutional capacity sufficient to execute investment at scale. Without such shifts, growth is likely to remain trapped within narrow bands, regardless of short-term stimulus or cyclical recovery. The interaction between these two dimensions is decisive. Lower population growth reduces the growth threshold required to achieve rising per-capita outcomes. Higher and more sustained investment-led growth raises the economy’s capacity to absorb labour, expand incomes and generate fiscal space. When pursued together, these dynamics reinforce one another. When pursued in isolation, their effects are partial and easily overwhelmed. This is the central implication of the evidence. South Africa’s challenge is not that prosperity is unattainable, nor that decline is inevitable. It is that modest underperformance, when combined with sustained demographic pressure, produces outcomes that feel intolerable at the household and institutional level. Shifting either growth or population dynamics would help. Shifting both would fundamentally change the country’s medium-term trajectory. WHAT WOULD CHANGE THE PER-CAPITA ARITHMETIC? The evidence presented in this report points to a narrow set of conditions under which South Africa’s economic experience would begin to change materially. These conditions do not constitute a policy programme, nor do they guarantee success. They define an envelope of feasibility within which sustained improvement becomes possible. 1. A lower population growth trajectory South Africa’s current demographic dynamics amplify the effects of weak growth by diluting per-capita gains. Over time, population growth typically moderates as countries urbanise, expand access to education (particularly for women), improve primary healthcare and reproductive health services, and reduce household economic insecurity. A gradual shift toward a population growth rate closer to that observed in many upper-middle-income economies, in the region of 0.8 per cent per year, would materially ease per-capita pressure without requiring coercive intervention. 2. Sustained growth of around four per cent Growth outcomes in the region of four per cent are not exceptional by international standards, but they do require conditions that South Africa has struggled to sustain. Such growth is typically associated with higher and more stable investment, improved productivity and the removal of binding constraints, particularly in energy, logistics and infrastructure. Without addressing these constraints, growth is likely to remain trapped in narrow bands regardless of short-term recovery or demand support. 3. Why the combination matters Either of these shifts on its own would help. Lower population growth reduces the threshold at which growth translates into rising per-capita outcomes. Higher growth expands economic capacity and fiscal space. Pursued together, they reinforce one another. Pursued in isolation, their effects are partial and easily overwhelmed. 4. What this does not imply This framing does not suggest that South Africa’s challenges would be fully resolved within a decade, nor does it downplay deep structural problems in the labour market, spatial economy or governance. It does not imply that growth targets are automatic or that demographic change is a short-term lever. It clarifies, instead, the conditions under which the economy would begin to shift from chronic per-capita strain toward gradual improvement. WHAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS Based on the data and comparative analysis, several claims are well supported. South Africa is best described as a modest underperformer among middle-income economies, rather than as an extreme outlier. Its growth rates have fallen below those of many peers, but not by margins that suggest systemic economic breakdown. Investment emerges as the central binding constraint on growth. Without sustained capital formation, public and private, the economy’s capacity to expand remains limited and productivity gains incremental. Population growth materially worsens per-capita outcomes. It does not cause weak growth, but it amplifies its consequences, intensifying pressure on households, public services and the fiscal system. Finally, macroeconomic stability has functioned as a stabiliser, rather than a catalyst. It has prevented crisis, but it has not delivered convergence. WHAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT The evidence does not support claims that South Africa’s economy is uniquely broken or on the verge of collapse. Nor does it support the assumption that high growth should be automatic or easily achievable. Calls for sustained growth well above middle-income norms require explanation. Exceptional outcomes demand exceptional drivers. At present, such drivers, in the form of unusually high investment, rapid productivity gains or large-scale export expansion, are not evident at sufficient scale. Equally, the evidence does not support complacency. Weak growth compounded by demographic pressure is not a stable equilibrium. Without change, per-capita stagnation will persist and social stress will deepen. REFRAMING THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEBATE The value of evidence lies not in providing comfort, but in clarifying choices. Recognising that South Africa’s performance is not exceptional, does not lower ambition. It shifts the debate from slogans to feasibility. It forces a more serious conversation about what would be required to alter the growth path and what trade-offs such a shift would entail. Growth above the middle-income norm is possible, but not accidental. It depends on investment, productivity and structural transformation. Without these, expectations of rapid acceleration amount to aspiration, rather than analysis. A FINAL OBSERVATION South Africa’s economic challenge is not best understood as failure in isolation. It is better understood as insufficient growth in the face of sustained demographic pressure. That distinction matters. It does not absolve policy shortcomings. It does not deny hardship. It does, however, provide a clearer starting point for serious engagement. Evidence does not dictate solutions. It defines the terrain on which solutions must be found. REFERENCES Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 2025. Triennial Central Bank Survey: OTC foreign exchange market turnover in April 2025. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. Tables 25.1 (1995–2010) and 25.2 (2013–2025), “OTC foreign exchange turnover by currency”, net-net basis, average daily turnover in April (USD billions). [Online] Available at: https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx25_fx_annex.pdf [accessed 10 February 2026]. Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA). 2024. Socio Economic Survey. The Economy. [Online] Available at: https://cra-sa.com/products/socio-economic-survey/2025 [accessed: 10 February 2026] Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA). 2024. Socio Economic Survey. Employment. [Online] Available at: https://cra-sa.com/products/socio-economic-survey/2025/files/employment-december-2024.pdf [accessed: 10 February 2026] Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA). 2024. Socio Economic Survey. Demographics. [Online] Available at: https://cra-sa.com/products/socio-economic-survey/2025/files/demographics-january-2025-02.pdf [accessed: 10 February 2026] Mohr, P., 2016. Economic Indicators. 5th ed. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025. Statistical Release P0441 Gross domestic product. Third quarter 2025. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/P04413rdQuarter2025.pdf [accessed: 10 February 2026] Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025. Statistical Release P0211 Quarterly Labour Force Survey Quarter 3: 2025 [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02113rdQuarter2025.pdf [accessed: 10 February 2026] World Bank. 2024. GDP growth (annual %) – Upper middle income. World Development Indicators. Available at:https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=XT&utm World Bank. (2024. Population growth (annual %), upper-middle-income group, World Development Indicators. Data accessed from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=XT [accessed 10 February 2026]. ANNEXURE A DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURE AND UNEMPLOYMENT: A STYLISED COUNTERFACTUAL PURPOSE OF THIS ANNEXURE This Annexure explores a simple, but often overlooked question in South Africa’s unemployment debate: how much of today’s exceptionally high unemployment rate is explained by unusually rapid population and labour-force growth, rather than by uniquely poor job creation alone? Rather than building a complex economic model, the analysis adopts a deliberately stylised counterfactual. Its purpose is not to predict an alternative history, but to isolate and illustrate the role of demographic pressure in shaping labour-market outcomes. THE BASIC LOGIC Unemployment is fundamentally a ratio: it reflects the relationship between the number of people looking for work and the number of jobs available. When the labour force grows faster than employment, unemployment rises or remains stubbornly high, but when employment growth outpaces labour-force growth, unemployment begins to fall. South Africa’s post-1994 experience has been characterised by exceptionally rapid growth in the working-age population and therefore in the labour force. This has meant that even periods of positive job creation have often been insufficient to make a visible dent in unemployment, because so many new entrants were arriving in the labour market each year. Figure 17: Employment and available labour in South Africa, 1994–2024 (Source: CRA, 2024) The counterfactual explored here asks a narrowly defined question: What would South Africa’s unemployment rate look like if population growth had followed a trajectory more commonly observed among upper-middle-income countries, based on World Bank income-group data, while the actual number of jobs remained unchanged? WHAT IS HELD CONSTANT AND WHAT IS CHANGED To keep the exercise transparent and conservative, the analysis makes only one change. Held constant: The actual number of employed persons. No additional jobs are assumed. There is no improvement in policy, productivity or growth performance. Changed: The size of the working-age population and labour-force pool, which is adjusted to reflect a slower population growth path that is consistent with the demographic patterns that are commonly observed among upper-middle-income countries. In other words, the economy is treated exactly as it was. The only difference is that fewer people are competing for the same number of jobs. This approach avoids the need for assumptions about growth elasticities, Okun-type relationships or behavioural responses and ensures that any difference in unemployment arises purely from demographic arithmetic. HEADLINE FINDING Under this stylised demographic counterfactual, South Africa’s expanded unemployment rate would have been materially lower than observed. In the most recent year examined, the analysis suggests that the actual expanded unemployment rate of roughly 43 per cent would instead have been closer to the mid-30 per cent range, and the difference attributable to demographic pressure is on the order of seven to eight percentage points. This is not a marginal effect. It is large enough to meaningfully alter how South Africa’s labour-market performance is interpreted, particularly in comparison with peer economies. INTERPRETATION This finding does not imply that unemployment in South Africa is “only” a demographic problem. Structural constraints, weak growth, spatial mismatch, skills barriers and policy choices remain central to the country’s labour-market crisis. What the exercise demonstrates is something more specific: rapid population growth has significantly raised the hurdle that employment growth must clear before unemployment can begin to fall. In a context where the labour force is expanding very quickly, even solid job creation can appear inadequate. By contrast, under a demographic trajectory more typical of upper-middle-income economies, the same level of employment would be shared among fewer work-seekers, resulting in a lower unemployment rate. Figure 18: Employment growth and expanded unemployment, South Africa (1994–2024) (Source: CRA, 2024) IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH AND POLICY DEBATE The demographic effect also has important implications for debates about “how much growth is needed” to reduce unemployment. Under a lower labour-force growth scenario, moderate and sustained economic growth in the range of three to four per cent could plausibly begin to chip away at unemployment, as employment growth would more readily outpace new labour-market entrants. Under South Africa’s actual demographic conditions, by contrast, substantially higher growth rates of five per cent or more, are likely required before unemployment begins to decline on a sustained basis. This matters because growth outcomes in the three to four per cent range have occurred episodically among upper-middle-income economies during favourable periods, according to World Bank income-group data (World Bank, 2024), whereas sustained growth above five per cent has been comparatively rare. WHY THIS ESTIMATE IS CONSERVATIVE The counterfactual presented here likely understates, rather than overstates, the full demographic effect. The analysis does not assume improved productivity or capital deepening associated with lower population pressure, reduced congestion in infrastructure and public services, higher fiscal space per capita or any positive behavioural response in labour-force participation or investment. By holding employment fixed, the exercise deliberately strips out these potential channels. The resulting estimate should therefore be understood as a floor, not a ceiling, on the contribution of demographic dynamics to unemployment outcomes. CONCLUDING REMARKS This Annexure does not seek to absolve policy failure or downplay the severity of South Africa’s unemployment crisis. Instead, it highlights a structural reality that is often ignored in public debate. South Africa has been attempting to solve an unemployment problem under demographic conditions that are considerably more demanding than those faced by many of its peers. Recognising this does not reduce the urgency of reform, but it does provide a more balanced and realistic framework for assessing performance, setting expectations and comparing outcomes across countries. Ignoring demographic pressure risks overstating failure, whereas acknowledging it allows for a more honest diagnosis of both the scale of the challenge and the conditions under which progress becomes feasible. Figure 19: Impact of slower population growth on SA’s expanded unemployment rate (Source: CRA, 2024; Author, 2025) ANNEXURE B TECHNICAL METHODOLOGY NOTE DEMOGRAPHIC COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 1 OBJECTIVE OF THE TECHNICAL NOTE This technical note documents the methodology underpinning the demographic counterfactual analysis referenced in the main report and Annexure A. It sets out, in a transparent and replicable manner, the data sources, definitions and calculation steps used to estimate the contribution of population and labour-force dynamics to South Africa’s unemployment rate. The purpose of this exercise is analytical clarification, not forecasting. The counterfactual is intentionally stylised and is designed to isolate the arithmetic effect of demographic pressure on unemployment outcomes, holding all other factors constant. 2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Unemployment is defined as the relationship between the number of people seeking work and the number of jobs available. An unemployed person is someone who seeks but cannot find employment. The unemployment rate is then obtained by expressing the number of people who are willing and able to work but who do not have jobs, as a percentage of the total number of people who are willing and able to work (the labour force) (Mohr, 2016) Formally: Where: UR denotes the unemployment rate, LF the labour force, and E the number of employed persons. Under this identity, unemployment falls when employment grows faster than the labour force and rises when labour-force growth outpaces employment. The counterfactual analysis exploits this identity by holding employment fixed at the actual current levels and by only altering the size of the labour-force pool via a different, that is the lower 0.8 percent, population growth trajectory. 3 DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS All variables are defined consistently with the expanded unemployment framework used by Statistics South Africa. 3.1 EMPLOYED PERSONS Definition: Persons aged 15–64 who performed work for pay, profit or family gain during the reference period, as defined in the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). Source: Statistics South Africa, Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). Treatment in the analysis: The actual observed employment levels are taken as given and are held unchanged throughout the counterfactual exercise. 3.2 EXPANDED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE Definition: The expanded unemployment rate includes both unemployed persons actively seeking work and discouraged work-seekers. Source: Statistics South Africa, QLFS. Treatment in the analysis: The expanded unemployment rate is used to ensure consistency with South Africa’s labour-market realities and to avoid understating exclusion. 3.3 ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION Definition: The number of people that are willing and able to work but do not have jobs as a percentage of the total number of people that are willing and able to work Source: Statistics South Africa, QLFS Treatment in the analysis: The economically active population unemployment rate is used to ensure consistency with South Africa’s labour-market realities and to avoid understating exclusion. 3.4 WORKING-AGE POPULATION Definition: Persons aged 15–64. Source (actual): Statistics South Africa, Mid-Year Population Estimates. Source (counterfactual baseline): Same series, using the earliest year in the analysis as the base year. 4 METHODOLOGICAL STEPS Step 1: Derivation of the actual labour force Rather than constructing the labour force from participation rates, the actual labour force is recovered directly from observed employment and unemployment using the accounting identity: This approach ensures internal consistency between employment, unemployment and labour-force size and avoids definitional mismatches associated with alternative labour-force constructions. Step 2: Estimation of implied participation behaviour An implied labour-force participation rate is calculated as: This rate reflects observed participation behaviour embedded in the data, rather than an assumed or normative participation benchmark. Step 3: Construction of the counterfactual population path A counterfactual working-age population series is constructed by applying a constant annual growth rate of 0.8 per cent to the baseline population. This growth rate is broadly consistent with the demographic patterns that have been observed in upper-middle-income economies and therefore serves as a comparative benchmark, rather than being a precise demographic projection. Step 4: Construction of the counterfactual labour force The implied participation behaviour that is applied to the counterfactual working-age population is: Participation behaviour is assumed to remain unchanged, which is a conservative assumption that avoids the need to introduce behavioural or policy-driven responses. Step 5: Calculation of counterfactual unemployment Counterfactual unemployment is calculated by holding employment fixed at its observed level: This calculation answers a narrowly defined question: what would the unemployment rate have been if the same number of jobs were shared among a smaller labour-force pool? Step 6: Estimation of the demographic unemployment gap The contribution of demographic pressure to unemployment is expressed as: In the most recent year analysed, this gap is estimated at approximately 7-8 percentage points. 5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS The methodology explicitly excludes the following: GDP growth modelling or forecasting, employment elasticities or Okun-type relationships, productivity or capital-deepening effects, migration adjustments, behavioural changes in participation and policy or institutional reform effects As a result, the estimated demographic effect should be interpreted as a lower-bound, arithmetic estimate, rather than a comprehensive general-equilibrium outcome. 6 INTERPRETATION The counterfactual does not suggest that unemployment in South Africa is solely a demographic phenomenon, nor does it minimise the role of structural constraints or policy choices. Instead, it demonstrates that unusually rapid population and labour-force growth has materially raised the threshold at which employment growth begins to reduce unemployment. By isolating demographic pressure, the analysis provides a clearer basis for comparing South Africa’s labour-market outcomes with those of peer economies and for assessing the realism of growth expectations. 7 REPLICABILITY All inputs used in this analysis are drawn from publicly available data published by Statistics South Africa. The calculations rely exclusively on accounting identities and can be replicated using standard spreadsheet software. No proprietary data, econometric estimation or unpublished assumptions are employed. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On 20 July 2026, the Inclusive Society Institute welcomed a visiting delegation from the Lauder Institute of Management and International Studies at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. The engagement took place over lunch at the historic Bismillah Restaurant in Cape Town's Bo-Kaap, where Dr Klaus Kotzé presented the Institute's work and facilitated a discussion on South African civil society, development and the role of the state. The session was both engaging and insightful, combining a substantive policy briefing with an open and lively exchange in one of the city's most historic and culturally significant neighbourhoods. Kotzé presented South Africa as a nation of paradox. On the one hand, it possesses a globally admired Constitution, a free and independent media, and a competitive multi-party democracy that demonstrated its resilience through the peaceful transition to coalition government in 2024. On the other hand, the country continues to grapple with deep structural inequality, persistently high unemployment and institutions operating under significant pressure. These realities illustrate that simplistic narratives fail to capture the complexity of South Africa's democratic journey. The discussion also explored the distinctive nature of South African civil society. Unlike the more adversarial, philanthropy-funded model commonly associated with the United States, South Africa's constitutional framework actively encourages civil society to engage with the state in pursuit of dialogue, partnership and consensus-building. Kotzé highlighted two of the Institute's flagship initiatives: the South Africa Social Cohesion Index and the True South Africa evidence series. Together, these projects challenge overly simplistic narratives of national decline by demonstrating a more nuanced reality, one characterised by significant challenges, but also resilience, institutional recovery and social progress. Rather than depicting South Africa as a state in irreversible decline, the evidence suggests a young democracy that remains under pressure yet continues to evolve and mature. The exchange with the Lauder Institute delegation was thoughtful, probing and highly constructive. The Inclusive Society Institute values the opportunity to engage with future global leaders and appreciates the delegation's interest in South Africa's democratic development. The Institute looks forward to continuing this dialogue in the future.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) participated in an international conference held in Dakar, Senegal, from 18 to 20 July 2026 under the theme "Disengagement and a Shifting World: Re-reading Mandelaism to Recreate Bonds and Meaning." The conference brought together political leaders, academics, diplomats and civil society representatives from across Africa and beyond to reflect on Nelson Mandela's enduring legacy and its relevance in a rapidly changing international environment. The Institute was represented by its Deputy Chairperson, Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, and its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, who participated in several sessions throughout the programme. Ms Sonjica chaired a panel discussion examining the transformative role of education in the philosophies of Nelson Mandela and Cheikh Anta Diop, while Mr Swanepoel served as a panellist in discussions on Africa's response to changing global power dynamics and on the continuing relevance of Mandelaism as a societal project. He also chaired the session on the contribution of the Global South to the emergence of democratic South Africa. Hosted by the Institut de Transformation Sociale, Coopération Transnationale et Sécurité (ITCSS) in partnership with the Institut Supérieur de Management (ISM) and the Inclusive Society Institute, the conference explored a wide range of contemporary issues, including peace and leadership, post-apartheid South Africa, Ubuntu, education, governance, multilateralism and Africa's place in an evolving global order. Mr Swanepoel participated in the panel discussion titled "Between De-Westernisation and Americanisation of the World: African Alternatives to the Crisis of Multilateralism," where he argued that the emerging international order presents Africa with an opportunity to exercise greater agency by promoting bridge-building, inclusive multilateralism and principled cooperation rather than alignment with competing geopolitical blocs. He also participated in a second panel entitled "Mandelaism: Political Choices, Strategies for Struggle, and Analysis of the Societal Project," which reflected on the continuing relevance of Mandela's political philosophy for democratic governance and social cohesion in Africa. Ms Sonjica moderated the panel "The Transformative Virtues of Education in Nelson Mandela and Cheikh Anta Diop: Where is Africa in the Race Towards the Fourth Industrial Revolution?" The discussion considered the central role of education in promoting human development, social justice and Africa's long-term competitiveness in an increasingly knowledge-driven global economy. Reflecting on the conference, Mr Swanepoel noted that the discussions were characterised by a spirit of open engagement and intellectual exchange. "The conference demonstrated the continuing importance of dialogue across disciplines, cultures and political traditions. At a time when the international system is under considerable strain, there is much to be gained from revisiting the principles of leadership, reconciliation and inclusive governance that Mandela embodied, while also asking how they should evolve to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century."

Copyright © 2026 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. This report was prepared with the assistance of AI technology, including ChatGPT. JUNE 2026 Author: Inclusive Society Institute CONTENTS Executive Summary: Education in South Africa: What the evidence actually says Introduction: Education, anxiety and the politics of decline PART I: Scope, methodology and analytical approach PART II: State commitment and system investment in basic education PART III: Access, participation and system coverage PART IV: Learner-teacher ratios, classroom pressure and institutional strain PART V: The National Senior Certificate: Structure, standards and misconception PART VI: Matric outcomes over time: pass rates, proportions and progress PART VII: Throughput, participation and educational pathways - why low matric participation does not necessarily mean educational abandonment PART VIII: Post-school qualifications and the slow equalisation of opportunity PART IX: From matric to university: Access, participation and misconception PART X: Inequality within Basic Education: Why averages mislead PART XI: What the evidence shows - and what it does not PART XII: From evidence to action - precision reform in a strained system CONCLUSION: Realism, reform and the choice between despair and agency References Annexure A Cover image: Microsoft Copilot (2026) Education in South Africa. AI generated image LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Share of total government expenditure allocated to education (%) Figure 2: Expenditure on basic education expressed as a proportion of total government spending (%) Figure 3: Percentage of children in the age group 7-18, who are not attending school Figure 4: The average number of learners per teacher in public schools Figure 5: Average number of learners per teacher by province (public schools) Figure 6: Graphical presentation of how the matric pass rate works Figure 7: Percentage of overall National Senior Certificate (NSC) passes Figure 8: The composition of the National Senior Certificate (NSC) passes by category (% of total passes) Figure 9: Bachelor-level passes as a share of all National Senior Certificate passes (%) Figure 10: Estimated participation in education among 17-year-olds compared with matric candidates, South Africa, 2024. Figure 11: Share of post-school-qualified South Africans by population group, 1994 and 2024 (%) Figure 12: Percentage of the adult population (20 years and older) with diploma-, degree- and above-level qualifications by population group, South Africa, 1996 and 2024 (% and “1 in X” equivalents) Figure 13: University participation rates by population group (aged 20–24) for 2002 and 2022 Figure 14: Trends in university participation rates by population group (aged 20–24) for 2002 & 2022 Figure 15: University headcount enrolment by race, 1994–2022 Figure 16: First-degree university awards by race for the years 1991 and 2022 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: WHAT THE EVIDENCE ACTUALLY SAYS Education in South Africa is often spoken about in the language of collapse. We are told that standards have fallen, that matric no longer means anything, that you only need 30% to pass and that the system is beyond repair. These claims are repeated so often that they begin to feel self-evident. The evidence tells a more complex and more hopeful story. South Africa’s basic education system is under real strain. Classrooms are often overcrowded, teachers are stretched, and inequality between schools remains deep. Many learners, particularly in poorer communities, are still being failed by the system. None of this should be minimised. But strain is not the same as collapse. Access to schooling has expanded dramatically since 1994. Today, almost all children go to school through the compulsory years. This is a major achievement that fundamentally changes how the system should be judged. The central challenge is no longer getting learners into school, but ensuring quality learning once they are there. Public commitment to education has not disappeared. Education remains one of the largest items in the national budget. The problem is not abandonment, but capacity, efficiency and uneven performance. Matric outcomes have improved over time, not just in terms of overall pass rates, but in quality. A growing share of learners are achieving Diploma and Bachelor passes, which require significantly higher performance than the minimum thresholds. This directly contradicts the widespread belief that “most learners only scrape through”. The idea that you “only need 30% to pass matric” is misleading. Matric is not a single pass-fail test. It is a tiered qualification with different levels of achievement. Higher Certificate, Diploma and Bachelor passes signal very different levels of performance and open different pathways. Many learners today are meeting higher standards, not lower ones. Progress has not been evenly shared and outcomes still depend heavily on the kind of school a learner attends. Well-resourced schools continue to produce stronger results, while under-resourced schools struggle under the weight of large classes, infrastructure backlogs and limited subject offerings, which inequality explains why many people experience the system as failing, even as national indicators improve. Race remains part of the picture, but not in the way public debate often suggests. Outcomes have improved across all population groups. Historically disadvantaged groups have made real gains, especially at matric level, but at the same time, groups that were historically advantaged, including white South Africans, continue to perform strongly and remain well represented in university access and graduate outcomes. Claims of widespread exclusion are thus not supported by the evidence. University access in South Africa is shaped mainly by matric performance, not by arbitrary denial. As more learners qualify, competition has increased, especially in high-demand programmes. Competition can feel like exclusion, but the two are not the same. The most important conclusion is this: South Africa’s education system is not broken beyond repair. It is uneven, pressured and incomplete, but it works well in some places, poorly in others and better today than it did in the past in several key respects. Despair is understandable, but it is not inevitable. Evidence matters, because it restores agency. If the system had truly collapsed, there would be little point in reform. But the data shows a system that can still improve, if capacity constraints are addressed, inequality is tackled directly and debate is grounded in facts, rather than myths. South Africa’s choice is not between pretending everything is fine and believing nothing can be fixed. It is between despair, which paralyses, and realism, which makes reform possible. The evidence supports realism. A NOTE ON CONTEXT South Africa is widely described as a country in decline, even a country in collapse. Public debate, media commentary and everyday conversation are saturated with the language of failure: a failed state, a failed government, a society coming apart at the seams. That is the dominant public perception. This report was developed precisely to test that perception against evidence. It asks a simple question: when we look carefully at the data, when we measure performance, rather than emotion, does the story of collapse hold? The evidence does not support that conclusion. What it shows instead is a country under real and sustained strain, economically, socially and institutionally, but not a country that has collapsed, and not a state that has failed. The challenges are serious and should not be minimised, yet they coexist with resilience, capacity and untapped potential. South Africa’s outcomes are weaker than they should be, but stronger than public perception suggests. With a firmer growth path, improved institutional performance and greater policy consistency, the trajectory can change. This report therefore argues for realism without despair: less denial of strain, but also less surrender to hopelessness. South Africa warrants more honesty and more confidence than the prevailing narrative allows. INTRODUCTION: EDUCATION, ANXIETY AND THE POLITICS OF DECLINE Education occupies a singular place in South Africa’s public imagination. It is expected to carry the burden of history, to overcome entrenched inequality, to prepare citizens for economic participation, and to secure the future of the democratic project itself. When education performs well, it is taken for granted. When it falters, it becomes a focal point for broader anxieties about governance, social cohesion and national direction. In recent years, the public discourse on education has increasingly adopted a language of decline. Claims that schooling standards have collapsed, that matric has been irreparably “dumbed down” and that educational outcomes no longer signal real competence have become commonplace. These claims are often accompanied by a sense of inevitability that deterioration is irreversible and that institutional recovery is no longer possible. This report begins from a different premise. It accepts, without qualification, that South Africa’s basic education system faces serious and persistent challenges. It acknowledges uneven quality, significant inequality, capacity constraints and outcomes that remain inadequate for the scale of the country’s developmental needs. What it does not accept is that the evidence supports a narrative of systemic collapse or terminal decline. The purpose of this report is not to defend institutions, nor to minimise failure. It is to examine what the available data actually shows when assessed with historical perspective, proportional reasoning and institutional realism. The distinction matters, because collapse narratives leave no room for agency, reform or accountability. Evidence-based realism does. PART I SCOPE, METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH This report forms part of the True South Africa evidence series, which applies a consistent methodological discipline across sectors. The guiding principle is simple, but demanding: national self-assessment should be grounded in verifiable data, contextualised historically and interpreted proportionally. SCOPE The focus of this report is basic education, from early childhood foundations through Grade 12 and the National Senior Certificate (NSC). Post-school education and labour-market outcomes are referenced only where they are directly linked to matric outcomes, particularly in relation to university access. The report therefore examines: system investment and capacity in basic education, access and participation through the schooling phase, learner-teacher ratios as a proxy for classroom pressure, matric outcomes and their composition (Higher Certificate, Diploma and Bachelor passes), differential outcomes across population groups, and how schooling performance shapes access to further study. DATA AND SOURCES The analysis draws primarily on publicly available education data as compiled and standardised in the Education chapter of the Centre for Risk Analysis’ Socio-Economic Survey of South Africa (CRA, 2024). That chapter integrates administrative and survey data from official sources, including the Department of Basic Education, Statistics South Africa and National Treasury. For the limited purpose of explaining the structure of the National Senior Certificate pass criteria, official regulatory information issued by the Department of Basic Education is referenced to clarify misconceptions. No external outcome data is introduced beyond what is necessary for explanation. No original data is generated. No extrapolation beyond published figures is undertaken. ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES Three analytical principles guide the report. First, long-run perspective is prioritised over short-term volatility. Where possible, trends are assessed from the mid-1990s onward, rather than through isolated annual comparisons. Second, proportional analysis is favoured over absolute numbers. In a growing population and an expanding education system, raw counts are often misleading. Rates, ratios and shares provide more meaningful insight. Third, institutional realism governs interpretation. The report neither assumes that policy intentions automatically translate into outcomes, nor that institutional strain implies collapse. Instead, it examines whether the system shows evidence of progress, regression, stagnation or recovery over time. PART II STATE COMMITMENT AND SYSTEM INVESTMENT IN BASIC EDUCATION Any serious assessment of education outcomes must begin with the question of effort. Before interrogating performance, it is necessary to establish whether the state has maintained commitment to basic education as a public good. EDUCATION AS A FISCAL PRIORITY Over the democratic period, education has consistently absorbed a large share of public expenditure. Basic education in particular remains one of the single largest components of total government spending, a pattern that has persisted across economic cycles, political administrations and periods of fiscal consolidation. Measured as a proportion of total government expenditure, education spending has remained high by international standards. As a share of GDP, public expenditure on education has also remained substantial. These indicators signal sustained prioritisation rather than retreat. Figure 1: Share of total government expenditure allocated to education (%) (Source: CRA, 2024) This matters, because it sets limits on certain explanations. While funding levels alone cannot guarantee quality, persistent under-investment is not a credible primary explanation for South Africa’s education challenges. COMPOSITION OF SPENDING Within basic education, expenditure is dominated by compensation of employees. Educator salaries account for the majority of spending, reflecting the labour-intensive nature of schooling and the centrality of teachers to learning outcomes. Expenditure on infrastructure, learning materials, early childhood development and support services has grown in nominal terms, but it remains a smaller share of the overall envelope, the composition of which has implications for system flexibility, class size pressure and maintenance backlogs. The structure of spending suggests a system that is cost-heavy and capacity-constrained, rather than one starved of political attention. The challenge is therefore one of productivity, deployment and institutional effectiveness, not abandonment. Figure 2: Expenditure on basic education expressed as a proportion of total government spending (%) (Source: CRA, 2024) Explanation of Figure 2 Figure 2 shows basic education expenditure expressed as an estimated proportion of total government spending. The figures are derived from the CRA data by combining two reported proportions: first, education expenditure as a share of total government spending; and second, basic education as a share of total education expenditure. The calculation is as follows: 2023/24: 20.6% × 68.7% = 14.15% 2024/25: 20.6% × 69.3% = 14.28% 2025/26: 20.6% × 70.0% = 14.42% 2026/27: 20.6% × 70.1% = 14.44% The 20.6% figure is CRA’s reported education share of total government spending for 2023/24. The 68.7%, 69.3%, 70.0% and 70.1% figures are CRA’s reported or projected proportions of total education spending allocated to basic education over the 2023/24 to 2026/27 period. The figures should therefore be read as derived estimates, not as a separate line item directly published by CRA. They indicate the approximate share of total government spending directed to basic education, assuming education’s overall share of total government spending remains constant at the 2023/24 level over the medium-term expenditure period. PART III ACCESS, PARTICIPATION AND SYSTEM COVERAGE One of the most significant achievements of the post-1994 education system has been the expansion of access to schooling and whilst this achievement is often overlooked in contemporary debate, it provides essential context for interpreting current outcomes. PARTICIPATION THROUGH THE COMPULSORY PHASE School attendance data shows that participation across the compulsory schooling ages is now near universal. The vast majority of children aged 7 to 18 are enrolled in educational institutions and whilst non-attendance exists, it reflects only marginal exclusion, rather than systemic failure. Figure 3: Percentage of children in the age group 7-18, who are not attending school (Source: CRA, 2024.) This represents a profound shift from the early democratic period that was ushered in in the mid-1990s, at which time access to schooling was uneven and when large numbers of learners fell outside the formal education system. Today’s dominant challenge is no longer entry into schooling, but progression through and quality within the education system. EARLY CHILDHOOD FOUNDATIONS Participation in early childhood development has increased steadily over time, but coverage continues to remain uneven across provinces and socio-economic contexts. Expansion in this area is particularly significant, because evidence shows that early learning strongly shapes the later educational trajectories of the children. Whilst early childhood participation is not yet universal, the trend reflects gradual system consolidation, rather than stagnation. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERPRETATION High participation rates fundamentally change how system performance should be judged. When access is limited, failure to reach outcomes may reflect exclusion. When access is near universal, outcomes are shaped more strongly by quality, capacity and inequality. The evidence therefore requires a shift in analytical focus: from whether learners enter the system, to whether the system enables them to progress, complete and succeed meaningfully. PART IV LEARNER-TEACHER RATIOS, CLASSROOM PRESSURE AND INSTITUTIONAL STRAIN Concerns about the quality of education in South Africa are frequently expressed through terms such as classrooms being overcrowded and teachers being overburdened. Whilst these concerns are not unfounded, they are often articulated imprecisely, in that they conflate anecdote with system-wide realities and so to assess instructional capacity properly, it is necessary to distinguish between literal class size and broader measures of system pressure. While data on the number of learners per physical classroom is not consistently available at national level, learner-teacher ratios provide a useful and widely accepted proxy for understanding instructional load, teacher availability and the capacity of the system to deliver individualised attention. This section therefore examines learner-teacher ratios in public schooling, how they have changed over time and what they reveal about institutional strain. LEARNER - TEACHER RATIOS AS A MEASURE OF CAPACITY Learner-teacher ratios are calculated by dividing the total number of enrolled learners by the total number of employed educators within the public schooling system and whilst it is acknowledged that this measure does not capture variation between schools or subjects, it does offer some insight into the system-wide trends and the structural pressures. Figure 4: The average number of learners per teacher in public schools (Source: CRA, 2024) High learner-teacher ratios are associated with increased classroom management demands, reduced individual learner support, constrained assessment and feedback capacity and elevated teacher workload and burnout risk. Lower ratios, by contrast, generally allow for greater instructional flexibility and pedagogical depth. It is important to stress that learner-teacher ratios are not a perfect measure of class size. Actual classroom experience varies widely by grade, subject, school type and location. Nonetheless, at national and provincial level, learner-teacher ratios remain one of the most reliable indicators of capacity stress. LONG-RUN TRENDS IN LEARNER-TEACHER RATIOS Over the post-1994 period, South Africa’s learner-teacher ratios have reflected the tension between two competing forces: expanding enrolment and constrained fiscal space. In the early years of democracy, the rapid growth in school enrolment placed significant pressure on the teacher-learner staffing ratios, but over time, as a consequence of the expansion of the educator workforce, this pressure was partially offset. This led to periods of modest improvement in learner-teacher ratios. However, these gains have not been linear or uniformly sustained, due to demographic growth, fiscal consolidation and uneven provincial capacity that have resulted in fluctuating ratios, with some periods marked by rising instructional pressure. The overall picture is therefore one of persistent strain, rather than steady deterioration. The system has not collapsed under enrolment growth, but neither has it achieved sustained relief from capacity pressure. PROVINCIAL VARIATION AND UNEVEN BURDEN National averages mask significant provincial variation, in that some provinces consistently operate with higher learner-teacher ratios than others, reflecting differences in population growth, migration patterns, provincial budget capacity and the distribution of educators across urban and rural contexts. These disparities contribute directly to an unequal educational experience, because learners in provinces with higher ratios face systematically greater instructional constraints, which in turn influence throughput, subject performance and matric outcomes. Importantly, these differences are institutional, rather than individual in nature in that they reflect uneven state capacity and resource distribution, not learner or teacher effort. Figure 5: Average number of learners per teacher by province (public schools) (Source: CRA, 2024) LEARNER-TEACHER RATIOS AND QUALITY OUTCOMES The relationship between learner-teacher ratios and outcomes is not mechanically deterministic, but it is structurally important. Where these learner-teacher ratios remain persistently high, schools face greater difficulty in delivering in areas such as subject depth, supporting weaker learners, managing curriculum pacing and maintaining consistent assessment standards. These pressures are particularly acute in gateway subjects, such as, for example, mathematics and physical sciences, where conceptual support and cumulative understanding are essential. Learner-teacher ratios therefore shape the quality ceiling of the system, not because they determine outcomes on their own, but because they constrain what is feasible at scale. CLASSROOM PRESSURE AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION Public frustration with schooling quality is often expressed through personal experience: a child in an overcrowded classroom, a teacher overwhelmed by administrative load, a school struggling to maintain discipline and pace, which experiences are real and should not be dismissed. However, extrapolating from these experiences to claims of system collapse is analytically unsound. The evidence suggests a system operating under chronic but managed strain. Capacity pressures are persistent and uneven, but they have not prevented the system from expanding access, improving attainment or raising the quality profile of matric outcomes over time. This distinction is crucial, because a strained system can still improve, particularly if capacity constraints are addressed deliberately, whereas a collapsed system cannot. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM Understanding learner-teacher ratios as a structural constraint, rather than a moral failure has important implications for policy. Improvement in education quality cannot rely solely on exhortation, accountability or curriculum adjustment, since it also requires strategic staffing, targeted deployment of educators, relief of administrative burdens and sustained investment in instructional support. Without addressing capacity pressure, expectations of rapid quality improvement risk becoming disconnected from institutional reality. INTERIM ASSESSMENT Learner-teacher ratios reveal a system that is under sustained instructional pressure, but not one that has lost the capacity to function or improve. Classrooms are often crowded, teachers are frequently stretched and quality is uneven, yet the system has continued to deliver expanded access and improving outcomes at the top end. This is the hallmark of institutional strain, not collapse. PART V THE NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE: STRUCTURE, STANDARDS AND MISCONCEPTION Few issues in South Africa’s education debate generate as much heat, and as little clarity, as the National Senior Certificate (NSC). Public discussion routinely reduces matric to a single, blunt claim: that learners “only need 30 per cent to pass.” This assertion has become a shorthand indictment of schooling standards and is frequently cited as proof that matric no longer represents meaningful achievement. This section examines what the National Senior Certificate actually requires, how it is structured, and why the “30 per cent pass” narrative is a misrepresentation, rather than a description. THE NSC IS A TIERED QUALIFICATION, NOT A BINARY TEST The National Senior Certificate is not a single pass-fail hurdle, instead it is a tiered qualification that has been designed to differentiate levels of achievement and to signal readiness for different post-school pathways. All candidates write a common examination framework, but the outcomes of the exams are classified into distinct pass categories, with each category having specific subject thresholds and implications. These categories are not cosmetic, in fact they structure access to further study and function as filters within the education system. Understanding this tiered structure is essential. Treating matric as a single, undifferentiated pass obscures how standards operate in practice and misrepresents the distribution of achievement across the cohort. WHAT IS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN THE NSC To obtain the National Senior Certificate, a learner must: offer a minimum of seven subjects, including two official languages (one at Home Language level), Mathematics or Mathematical Literacy, Life Orientation, and three additional subjects. A learner must pass at least six of the seven subjects and meet minimum performance thresholds across specified subject categories. These thresholds are cumulative, not optional. The frequently cited 30 per cent threshold applies only to certain subjects within this broader framework. On its own, it does not constitute a pass, nor does it apply uniformly across all subjects. DIFFERENTIATED PASS CATEGORIES The NSC recognises three principal pass categories, each reflecting a different level of achievement. A Higher Certificate pass requires minimum performance across multiple subjects, including language requirements, and qualifies a learner for certificate-level post-school study. A Diploma pass requires stronger performance across a larger number of subjects and qualifies a learner for diploma-level study. A Bachelor’s pass requires still higher performance, including a minimum of 50 per cent in designated subjects, and qualifies a learner to apply for degree study at a university. These categories are cumulative and hierarchical. A Bachelor’s pass subsumes the requirements of the lower categories, it is not simply a marginal improvement over the minimum threshold. Figure 6: Graphical presentation of how the matric pass rate works (Source: DBE, N.d.) WHY THE “30 PER CENT PASS” NARRATIVE IS MISLEADING The claim that “you only need 30 per cent to pass matric” rests on a selective reading of the lowest subject threshold, detached from the cumulative requirements of the qualification. This framing is misleading for a number of reasons, the first being that it ignores the fact that learners must meet higher thresholds in other subjects, particularly languages; secondly, it obscures the existence of differentiated pass categories that reflect substantially different levels of achievement and thirdly, it implies that the system rewards minimal competence uniformly, when in fact it differentiates achievement explicitly and systematically. The NSC does allow for a range of achievement levels, but it does not treat all passes as equal. The structure of the qualification actively distinguishes between minimum completion, intermediate competence and readiness for advanced study. STANDARDS, ACCESS AND THE PURPOSE OF DIFFERENTIATION It is important to recognise why the NSC is structured in this way. In a system with near-universal participation, a single high threshold would produce mass failure, undermining both social stability and the signalling function of schooling. A tiered structure, on the other hand, allows the system to certify completion of basic schooling, to differentiate levels of academic readiness and to allocate learners to appropriate post-school pathways. This is not a uniquely South African design. Tiered certification exists in many education systems facing similar demographic and developmental pressures. The existence of differentiated thresholds is therefore not evidence of collapsed standards. It is evidence of institutional adaptation to scale and diversity. MISINTERPRETATION AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE The persistence of the “30 per cent” narrative has had corrosive effects on public confidence. It flattens distinction, undermines legitimate achievement and fosters cynicism about schooling outcomes, including those at the highest levels of performance. More importantly, it distorts debate. If all passes are assumed to be minimal, then improvements in higher-quality outcomes, such as increases in Bachelor-level passes, are rendered invisible. Correcting this misunderstanding is therefore not a matter of public relations. It is a prerequisite for rational discussion about standards, access and reform. INTERIM CONCLUSION The National Senior Certificate is a differentiated, structured qualification that explicitly recognises varying levels of achievement and whilst it allows for minimum thresholds in certain subjects, it does not equate completion with minimal competence across the board. The claim that matric can be passed “on 30 per cent” misrepresents how the system functions and obscures meaningful distinctions within outcomes. Understanding what the NSC actually measures is essential before assessing whether standards are improving or deteriorating. PART VI MATRIC OUTCOMES OVER TIME: PASS RATES, PROPORTIONS AND PROGRESS With the structure of the National Senior Certificate clarified, the central question becomes one of outcomes. Has performance at matric level improved, deteriorated or stagnated over time? And more importantly, what happens to the composition of passes when outcomes are examined beyond headline pass rates? This section examines long-run trends in matric performance, focusing not only on overall pass rates, but on the distribution of outcomes across Higher Certificate, Diploma and Bachelor-level passes. WHY HEADLINE PASS RATES ARE INSUFFICIENT Public debate about matric outcomes is dominated by the overall pass rate and each year, this figure becomes a symbolic battleground, either celebrated as proof of progress or dismissed as evidence of lowered standards. While overall pass rates are not meaningless, they are analytically insufficient on their own. In a system with expanding enrolment and near-universal participation, a rising pass rate can reflect multiple dynamics simultaneously, including improved retention, better learner support, curriculum adjustment and cohort effects. Crucially, the overall pass rate does not tell us what kind of pass learners are achieving and so without examining the composition of the passes, it is impossible to determine whether the improvement reflects genuine academic advancement or merely minimal threshold completion. LONG-RUN TRENDS IN OVERALL PASS RATES Figure 7: Percentage of overall National Senior Certificate (NSC) passes (Source: CRA, 2024) Viewed over the past two decades, the overall NSC pass rates have shown a clear upward trajectory, where from the late 2000s onward, pass rates have increased steadily, reaching historically high levels in recent years. This improvement has occurred despite rising numbers of candidates, sustained learner-teacher ratio pressure, persistent inequality across schools and a significant socio-economic disruption during the COVID-19 period. These conditions matter, since improvement under constraint suggests institutional resilience, rather than artificial inflation. It does not imply that standards are immune to pressure, but it does challenge the notion of linear decline. THE COMPOSITION OF PASSES: MOVING BEYOND THE AGGREGATE A more informative picture emerges when matric outcomes are disaggregated by pass category. The NSC differentiates between Higher Certificate passes, Diploma passes and Bachelor’s passes, with each category reflecting a higher level of subject performance and academic readiness and so by examining how the proportion of learners in each category has changed over time, insight is provided into whether the aggregate improvement is shallow or more substantive. Figure 8: The composition of the National Senior Certificate (NSC) passes by category (% of total passes) (Source: CRA, 2024.) An important implication of this composition analysis is often missed in public debate and that is that the lowest possible National Senior Certificate outcome - obtaining an NSC without meeting the requirements for Higher Certificate, Diploma or Bachelor admission - accounts for only a very small fraction of all passes. This directly undermines the widespread claim that matric has become a mass “30 per cent pass” or that most learners are merely scraping through at the minimum threshold. In reality, the overwhelming majority of learners who pass matric do so at a level that qualifies them for further study, with Diploma and Bachelor-level passes accounting for the largest and growing share of outcomes. BACHELOR-LEVEL PASSES: EVIDENCE OF QUALITY IMPROVEMENT One of the most significant trends in recent years has been the growth in the proportion of learners achieving Bachelor-level passes. Bachelor passes require higher subject thresholds, including minimum marks of 50 per cent in designated subjects, and are the principal gateway to degree study. They therefore represent the strongest available indicator of high-level schooling performance at scale. Figure 9: Bachelor-level passes as a share of all National Senior Certificate passes (%) (Source: CRA, 2024) Over time, the share of successful candidates achieving Bachelor passes has increased materially, which trend is inconsistent with claims that most learners merely scrape through at minimal thresholds. If standards were collapsing in the way public discourse often suggests, one would expect the proportion of Bachelor-level passes to stagnate or decline. The evidence shows the opposite. DIPLOMA PASSES AND THE MIDDLE OF THE DISTRIBUTION Diploma passes occupy an important middle position in the outcome distribution of the various tiers of passes, in that they require stronger performance than Higher Certificate passes, but lower thresholds than Bachelor passes. The proportion of learners achieving Diploma passes has also grown over time, reflecting improved subject attainment and broader academic competence across the cohort. Together with the rise in Bachelor passes, this shift indicates an upward movement in the centre of the performance distribution, not merely expansion at the lower threshold. HIGHER CERTIFICATE PASSES AND THEIR CHANGING SHARE Higher Certificate passes remain an important component of the system, particularly as a pathway into vocational and certificate-level post-school education. However, their relative share of total passes has declined as Diploma and Bachelor-level outcomes have expanded. This change is often overlooked. Public narratives that imply most learners pass only at the lowest level are not borne out when proportions are examined. A system in which higher-level passes increase as a share of outcomes is one in which performance distribution is improving, even if absolute challenges remain. IMPROVEMENT UNDER PRESSURE Perhaps the most important contextual point is that these shifts in outcome composition have occurred under conditions of sustained system strain. Learner-teacher ratios remain high, infrastructure backlogs persist and inequality across schools continues to shape opportunity and yet, within these constraints, the system has produced a growing share of higher-quality outcomes. This does not imply that standards are secure or that reform is unnecessary, but it does, however, indicate that deterioration is not inevitable and that institutional capacity, while strained, remains operative. INTERPRETING PROGRESS WITHOUT COMPLACENCY The evidence supports a careful, but defensible conclusion. Matric outcomes have improved over time, not only in terms of overall pass rates, but in the quality composition of passes. More learners are achieving Diploma and Bachelor-level outcomes, and fewer are confined to the lowest threshold category. This is not a reason for complacency. It is a reason for proportional assessment. A system can be both inadequate relative to national needs and improving relative to its own past performance. Recognising this distinction is essential if education debate is to move beyond despair toward constructive reform. PART VII THROUGHPUT, PARTICIPATION AND EDUCATIONAL PATHWAYS - WHY LOW MATRIC PARTICIPATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN EDUCATIONAL ABANDONMENT Educational performance is often assessed through the number of learners who progress through the conventional schooling pathway to matric completion. Measures of throughput remain important because they reveal where progression falters, where repetition accumulates and where learners fail to complete schooling within expected timeframes. However, throughput and participation measure different things. Throughput measures progression through a conventional educational pathway. Participation measures whether young people remain engaged in some form of education or training. The two concepts overlap, but they are not equivalent. This distinction matters because lower matric participation or lower throughput is sometimes interpreted as evidence that equivalent proportions of young people have abandoned education altogether. The available evidence suggests a more nuanced picture. THE APPARENT PUZZLE: WHY ARE MATRIC COHORTS SUBSTANTIALLY SMALLER THAN AGE COHORTS? South Africa’s population aged 15–19 numbers approximately 5 million people. This implies an average age cohort of roughly one million individual per year. Against this backdrop, there were 691,160 National Senior Certificate (NSC) candidates in 2023. At face value, the difference between the size of a national age cohort and the number of matric candidates might suggest that substantial numbers of young people have fallen outside the education system, however, such an interpretation would be misleading. Matric participation reflects only one point within a broader educational journey; it does not capture learners progressing more slowly through the schooling system, repeating grades, pursuing alternative qualifications, participating in Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) or following other educational pathways outside the conventional matric trajectory. The size of matric cohorts should therefore not automatically be interpreted as a proxy for educational exclusion. EDUCATIONAL PARTICIPATION AMONG ADOLESCENTS REMAINS EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH Whilst progression through conventional schooling pathways remains uneven, educational participation among South African adolescents remains remarkably high. Data analysed by the Children’s Institute at the University of Cape Town indicate that approximately 94.9% of South Africans aged 14–17 remained engaged in some form of education in 2024, whether ordinary schooling or another educational institution. This equated to approximately 4.4 million of 4.7 million adolescents. The attendance rate for 17-year-olds drops to around 93%. Overall attendance rates tend to mask dropout among older children. Analysis of attendance among discrete age groups shows that although there is a slight drop in reported attendance among children beyond the compulsory schooling phase, attendance still remains at 95% for children aged 16, dropping to 93% among 17-year-olds. At age 18 there is a substantial drop: to around 85% among young people who have not completed Grade 12. Differences in reported school attendance rates between boys and girls are not statistically significant. This is an important observation. It suggests that although many young people may not appear among matric candidates in a given year, the overwhelming majority remain connected to education more broadly. The implication is significant, in that lower matric participation does not necessarily imply educational abandonment; and instead, it may reflect delayed progression, repetition, alternative pathways and a more complex educational landscape than a simple linear movement from school entry to matric completion. Figure 10: Estimated participation in education among 17-year-olds compared with matric candidates, South Africa, 2024. (Source: Stats SA (2024; 2025); Hall & Hendricks (2025); CRA (2024); author calculations.) Explanation of calculation Figure 10 compares estimated participation in education among 17-year-olds with the number of matric candidates in 2023. UCT Children Count reports that approximately 93% of South Africans aged 17 attended a school or other educational facility in 2024 and so by applying this participation rate to the Stats SA estimated 17-year-old population of 995,000 roughly 925,000 17-year-olds remained in education. Compared with 691,160 matric candidates, the difference indicates that substantial numbers of young people remain in education without yet appearing in matric cohorts. The comparison illustrates why matric participation should not automatically be interpreted as equivalent to educational exclusion. LOWER THROUGHPUT AND HIGH EDUCATIONAL PARTICIPATION CAN COEXIST Lower throughput and high participation are not contradictory observations. They measure different dimensions of educational performance. Educational systems may simultaneously display high participation, imperfect progression, delayed completion, multiple educational pathways, uneven quality and gradual improvement in outcomes. South Africa increasingly appears to fit this pattern. This distinction matters, because debates around education often treat low matric participation or imperfect throughput as evidence that equivalent numbers of young people have been lost to education entirely. The evidence does not support such a conclusion. THE CHALLENGE HAS SHIFTED: FROM ACCESS TO PROGRESSION AND OUTCOMES Historically, South Africa’s dominant educational concern was access: whether children entered educational institutions at all. Contemporary evidence suggests participation among adolescents is now exceptionally high. The increasingly important questions concern progression, attainment, educational quality and whether educational participation translates into capability and opportunity. The challenge is therefore no longer simply getting young people into education. The challenge is ensuring that participation translates into progression, progression into attainment and attainment into meaningful opportunity. INTERIM ASSESSMENT The evidence does not support simplistic narratives of educational collapse. Progression through conventional schooling pathways remains uneven and many learners continue to struggle to reach matric within expected timeframes. This remains an important concern. However, lower matric participation should not automatically be interpreted as educational abandonment. Educational participation among South African adolescents remains exceptionally high, suggesting a system characterised by delayed progression, multiple pathways and uneven outcomes, rather than one in which learners are uniformly lost to education. The distinction matters because a strained educational system can improve; a collapsed system cannot. PART VIII POST-SCHOOL QUALIFICATIONS AND THE SLOW EQUALISATION OF OPPORTUNITY One of the clearest ways to test whether South Africa has moved beyond the inherited inequalities of apartheid is to examine who holds post-school qualifications. Qualifications are not merely certificates. They shape access to work, income, professional mobility and influence. They also reflect the accumulated advantages and disadvantages carried across generations. But this question must be handled carefully. Two different measures are often confused. The first is the share of all post-school-qualified people belonging to each population group. The second is the percentage within each population group that holds a post-school qualification. The first tells us whether the pool of qualified South Africans has become more representative. The second tells us whether individuals in different communities now have broadly equal chances of reaching post-school attainment. The evidence shows substantial progress, but not yet equality. DHET estimates that in 1994 approximately 1.7 million South Africans had post-school qualifications, of whom 56% were White, 36% Black African, 4% Coloured and 3% Indian/Asian. This was profoundly disproportionate. According to Stats SA’s Census 1996 figures, Black Africans made up 76.7% of the population, Coloured South Africans 8.9%, Indian/Asian South Africans 2.6%, and whites 10.9%. In other words, whites held more than half of post-school qualifications while constituting roughly one in nine South Africans. Black Africans, by contrast, constituted more than three-quarters of the population, but held just over one-third of post-school qualifications. By 2024, the picture had changed materially. DHET data show that Black Africans accounted for the majority of South Africans holding certificate-, diploma- and degree-level post-school qualifications, while the white share had fallen significantly. This is evidence of substantial transformation in the composition of the qualified population. It would therefore be incorrect to argue that nothing has changed since 1994. The demographic composition of post-school qualification attainment has changed markedly over the democratic period. Figure 11: Share of post-school-qualified South Africans by population group, 1994 and 2024 (%) (Source: DHET (2022; 2025) and author’s calculations.) Methodological note The 1994 estimates are reproduced from historical figures cited in DHET (2022), originally sourced from the SAIRR South Africa Survey 1995/96 and the Central Statistical Service October Household Survey. The 2024 figures were calculated using DHET educational attainment categories derived from Statistics South Africa Quarterly Labour Force Survey data. Percentages for 2024 were calculated using the categories “Certificate”, “Diploma” and “Degree” only. The DHET category “Other” was excluded from the calculations. Due to rounding, percentages may not total exactly 100%. But proportional equality has not yet been reached. Census 2022 records South Africa’s population composition as 81.4% Black African, 8.2% coloured, 2.7% Indian/Asian and 7.3% white. If post-school qualifications were distributed broadly in line with population share, one would expect the demographic composition of qualification attainment to more closely resemble these proportions. It does not yet do so. Black Africans remain underrepresented relative to their share of the population, while whites remain overrepresented, although the gap has narrowed substantially since the mid-1990s. But representivity within the national pool of qualified South Africans is only part of the picture. A second and equally important question is whether individuals within each population group now enjoy broadly comparable probabilities of attaining post-school qualifications. This requires moving beyond national proportional shares and examining attainment relative to each group’s own population size. The within-group picture is equally important. Census comparisons allow educational attainment to be measured against each population group’s own adult population, rather than against the national distribution of qualifications. For consistency with the qualification categories used in the census data, the comparisons below use the population aged 20 years and older as the denominator. On this basis, approximately one in 34 Black African adults aged 20 years and older held diploma-, degree- and above-level qualifications in 1996, compared with around one in 10 by 2024. Among coloured South Africans, attainment improved from roughly one in 24 to one in 11. Among Indian/Asian South Africans, it increased from about one in 11 to one in 4. Among whites, attainment rose from around one in 5 to approximately one in 3. The evidence therefore points to substantial progress across all groups, although important differences in attainment levels remain. Figure 12: Percentage of the adult population (20 years and older) with diploma-, degree- and above-level qualifications by population group, South Africa, 1996 and 2024 (% and “1 in X” equivalents) (Source: Stats SA, 2025) Higher Qualification Attainment by Population Group (1996 vs 2024) Population aged 20 years and older; diploma/degree-and-above qualifications only This shows the central point. South Africa has made major progress in deracialising the distribution of qualifications, but the probability of attaining such qualifications remains uneven across population groups. The historical gap has narrowed, but it has not disappeared. The correct conclusion is therefore neither triumphalism nor despair. South Africa has moved significantly away from the educational hierarchy inherited in 1994, but it continues to carry important structural inequalities produced by that history. The composition of the qualified population has changed materially over the democratic period, yet the probability of attaining post-school qualifications remains uneven across population groups. Put plainly: South Africa has made substantial progress in deracialising access to post-school qualifications, but equality of educational attainment has not yet been fully achieved. The country has travelled far from the exclusionary system it inherited, but the journey from inclusion to parity remains unfinished. PART IX FROM MATRIC TO UNIVERSITY: ACCESS, PARTICIPATION AND MISCONCEPTION Debates about access to higher education in South Africa have become increasingly polarised, because claims of exclusion, marginalisation and unfair advantage are often asserted with conviction, but rarely examined through the full educational pipeline that leads to university participation. This section traces the pathway from matric outcomes into university access and it does so by examining how schooling performance shapes participation, and whether claims of systemic exclusion are supported by the evidence or not. UNIVERSITY ACCESS IS MEDIATED THROUGH MATRIC OUTCOMES Entry into South Africa’s public universities is not arbitrary. It is structurally mediated through performance in the National Senior Certificate, and most directly through achievement of a Bachelor-level pass. While individual institutions and faculties impose additional requirements, the Bachelor’s pass remains the essential academic gateway to degree study. Without it, access to university programmes is structurally constrained. This relationship matters because it anchors the debate in measurable outcomes rather than perception. If particular groups were being excluded from university access at scale, this would be reflected in declining representation among Bachelor pass holders. The preceding sections show that this is not occurring. UNIVERSITY PARTICIPATION Between 2002 and 2022, university participation patterns diverged across population groups, where participation rates increased markedly among African and Coloured South Africans, while participation rates among White and Indian/Asian South Africans declined from exceptionally high starting points. These shifts are, however, reflective of the demographic changes that are taking place and of the diversification of post-school pathways, rather than a reduced and prohibitive access to university education. Figure 13: University participation rates by population group (aged 20–24) for 2002 and 2022 (Source: CRA, 2024.) By 2022, approximately four out of every ten White South Africans in the 20-24 age cohort were participating in higher education, down from close to two-thirds of the same cohort in 2002, but despite this decline, participation among White South Africans remains substantially higher than that of African and Coloured South Africans. Indian/Asian South Africans similarly continue to display high participation rates relative to population size, notwithstanding a decline from earlier levels. The decline in participation rates among White young adults is therefore best understood as a change in post-school choices, rather than reduced access to university education. A growing “missing middle” of households falls outside eligibility for public financial aid while facing rising tuition and living costs, leading to delayed enrolment, diversion to private institutions, or study abroad. These pressures are likely being compounded by a combination of changing cost-benefit calculations and the availability of alternative education and employment pathways. These dynamics read together suggest that the declining participation is most probably reflective of financial constraint and choice, rather than a declining academic readiness or engineered exclusion from the public university system. At the same time, the data confirms meaningful progress among African and Coloured South Africans, whose participation rates have increased significantly over the past two decades, thus reflecting an overall pattern of widening access alongside persistent inequality. The expansion is occurring across the system, rather than through the displacement of any particular group. Patterns of university participation closely mirror matric outcomes by pass category, with population groups that are over-represented among Bachelor-level passes, being similarly over-represented in university participation, while those with weaker school-level outcomes continue to face constraints at the point of entry. The differences in higher education participation between the groups reflects the cumulative advantages and disadvantages that were established much earlier in the education pipeline, rather than being the result of exclusionary dynamics within the university system itself. Figure 14: Trends in university participation rates by population group (aged 20–24) for 2002 & 2022 (Source: CRA, 2024) COMPETITION, NOT EXCLUSION One source of confusion in public debate is the conflation of increased competition with exclusion. Figure 15: University headcount enrolment by race, 1994–2022 (Source: CRA, 2024 based on Department of Higher Education and Training administrative data) As access to schooling has expanded and matric performance has improved across population groups, the number of learners meeting minimum university entrance criteria has grown faster than the availability of places in high-demand programmes and institutions. This has intensified competition, particularly in selective fields. In such an environment, rejection becomes more visible and more frequent, even for academically strong candidates. At an individual level, this experience can feel indistinguishable from exclusion. At a systemic level, however, competition does not equate to denial of access. The data shows continued and substantial participation across all groups that achieve the necessary academic thresholds. GRADUATE ATTAINMENT AND INTRA-GROUP TRENDS Looking beyond enrolment to completed qualifications provides a clearer picture of how higher education outcomes have evolved over time. Figure 13, below, shows the distribution of first university awards by population group for the years 1991 and 2022. Read together they capture the long-run changes as to the extent to which population groups successfully completes degrees, rather than which merely enters the system. Figure 16: First-degree university awards by race for the years 1991 and 2022 (Source: CRA, 2024) The most striking shift over this period is the substantial growth that has been registered in the number of first university awards being obtained by the African graduates. In the early 1990s, degree completion was heavily concentrated among White South Africans, which should be understood against the backdrop on the restricted access of the time and the concomitant uneven preparation of their African compatriots. By 2022, African graduates accounted for a far larger share of completed degrees in absolute terms, indicating a fundamental transformation in higher education outcomes over successive cohorts. While White South Africans continue to obtain a significant number of first university awards, their dominance in absolute terms has declined as degree completion has diversified across the population. Indian/Asian and Coloured graduates also continue to achieve strong completion outcomes, though on a smaller scale in absolute numbers. Importantly, these shifts reflect expansion and diversification of graduate outcomes rather than displacement of any group. The pattern observed in Figure 13 reinforces the cumulative nature of educational advantage and disadvantage, where groups that have historically been better represented among Bachelor-level matric passes and university participation remaining better represented among completed degrees, while improvements in school-level outcomes among African learners have translated, over time, into substantially higher numbers of African university graduates. Differences in the completion outcomes between the various groups therefore reflects the pipeline effects established earlier in the education system, rather than exclusionary dynamics within universities themselves. PERCEPTION, NARRATIVE AND POLITICAL USE The persistence of exclusion narratives cannot be explained by outcome data alone, since they are shaped by broader social, economic and political dynamics, including heightened competition, economic stagnation and a sense of loss of relative advantage. And so education becomes a proxy through which these anxieties are expressed. Recognising this does not require dismissing concern or grievance. It requires separating perception from proportional reality, and individual experience from aggregate pattern. Public discourse that treats relative change as absolute loss risks undermining social cohesion and distorting policy debate. EVIDENCE-BASED ASSESSMENT When the full pathway from matric to university is examined, the evidence supports a clear conclusion. University access in South Africa is primarily shaped by schooling outcomes. Groups that continue to perform strongly at matric level continue to access universities at high rates. Groups that have improved schooling performance have expanded their participation accordingly. The system is under pressure and increasingly competitive, but it is not exclusionary in outcome terms. Claims of wholesale denial of access are not supported by proportional evidence. This does not resolve debates about fairness, institutional culture or policy design. It does, however, establish a necessary factual baseline. PART X INEQUALITY WITHIN BASIC EDUCATION: WHY AVERAGES MISLEAD The national education indicators are often invoked to support sweeping claims, b be they optimistic or pessimistic. Overall pass rates, average learner-teacher ratios and aggregate enrolment figures are cited as evidence that the system is either succeeding or failing and yet, for many South Africans, these averages bear little resemblance to lived experience. This disconnect is not accidental, instead it reflects the deeply uneven nature of South Africa’s basic education system, where aggregate improvement coexists with persistent and, in some contexts, entrenched between schools, communities and learners. THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL AVERAGES National averages smooth out variation by design. They are useful for assessing system-wide trends, but they obscure distributional realities. In South Africa’s schooling system, variation occurs across multiple dimensions: between provinces, between urban and rural areas, between former advantaged and disadvantaged schools, and between schools serving different socio-economic communities. As a result, two learners writing the same matric examination may have experienced profoundly different educational journeys. National averages capture neither the depth of disadvantage in poorly resourced schools, nor the relative stability of better-resourced ones. This explains how public debate can simultaneously contain claims of collapse and evidence of progress without either being entirely false. SCHOOL CONTEXT AND OUTCOME DISPERSION School context remains one of the strongest predictors of educational outcomes. Learners in well-resourced schools, typically characterised by lower learner-teacher ratios, stronger infrastructure, stable staffing and supportive home environments, continue to achieve substantially better matric outcomes, particularly at Diploma and Bachelor levels. By contrast, learners in under-resourced schools face compounded disadvantages, such as larger classes, infrastructure backlogs, limited subject offerings and reduced instructional support. These conditions do not preclude success, but they make it harder to achieve consistently and at scale. The result is a wide dispersion of outcomes within the same national system. INEQUALITY AND SUBJECT CHOICE Inequality within basic education is also reflected in subject selection and availability. Access to gateway subjects, such as mathematics, physical sciences and accounting, remains uneven, which is often exacerbated when schools with limited staffing capacity or high learner–teacher ratios steer learners toward less demanding subject combinations, not because of diminished aspiration, but because of institutional constraint. This has long-term implications, in that subject choice at school level shapes not only matric outcomes, but access to post-school pathways, particularly in science, technology and professional fields and therefore the improvement in the aggregate pass rates does not automatically translate into improvement in opportunity breadth. These intra-system inequalities help explain why improvements in aggregate matric and university participation outcomes coexist with persistent disparities in access and completion further along the education pipeline. THE EXPERIENCE OF FAILURE IN AN IMPROVING SYSTEM One of the paradoxes of South Africa’s education debate is that real improvement can coexist with widespread frustration. As access expands and more learners remain in the system to matric, failure becomes more visible. In earlier periods, many learners exited the system long before reaching Grade 12, but today, more remain enrolled, increasing the number of candidates exposed to high-stakes assessment. For learners in under-resourced contexts, this can intensify the experience of failure, even as national outcomes improve, because the emotional and social consequences of this experience feed into broader narratives of institutional breakdown. WHY INEQUALITY DISTORTS PUBLIC DEBATE Inequality within basic education does more than shape outcomes, it shapes interpretation. Those whose reference point is a functioning, well-resourced school may perceive improvement and stability. Those whose reference point is an under-capacitated school may experience stagnation or decline. Both perspectives are grounded in reality, but neither captures the system as a whole. Public debate often elevates one experience into a general claim, producing polarised narratives that obscure complexity. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND REFORM Recognising inequality within the system has practical implications. Improvement strategies that rely solely on national averages risk reinforcing existing disparities and conversely, abandoning system-level assessment in favour of anecdote undermines accountability and reform. Effective policy must target capacity constraints where they are most acute, they must differentiate support based on institutional context and they must acknowledge that improvement will occur at different speeds across the system. There is no single lever capable of resolving inequality within basic education, because progress requires sustained, differentiated and context-sensitive intervention. INTERIM CONCLUSION South Africa’s basic education system is neither uniformly failing nor uniformly improving. It is fragmented, uneven and under strain, yet capable of producing high-quality outcomes under the right conditions. Understanding why averages mislead is essential for interpreting the evidence presented throughout this report. It explains why despair narratives persist even as long-run indicators improve, and why reform must grapple with inequality as a structural reality rather than a rhetorical device. PART XI WHAT THE EVIDENCE SHOWS - AND WHAT IT DOES NOT Several conclusions emerge consistently, but taken together, the evidence points to real progress in educational outcomes over time, alongside persistent and deeply uneven institutional performance that continues to shape learner trajectories. The data therefore challenges both narratives of systemic collapse and claims of unqualified success. And points instead to an education system that has expanded access and opportunity, whilst remaining constrained by entrenched inequalities within its own structures. First, the basic education system has undergone significant expansion since the democratic transition. Participation has increased, matric pass rates have improved in composition as well as headline terms, and a growing share of learners are achieving outcomes that permit access to post-school education. These trends are real and measurable, and they are inconsistent with claims that standards have collapsed or that progress has been illusory. At the same time, improvements in aggregate indicators do not imply uniform performance across the system, in that outcomes continue to vary sharply between schools and provinces. These varying outcomes are a reflection of the differences in resources, instructional capacity and institutional stability. Secondly, patterns of inequality observed at the end of schooling continue to shape access to higher education, where differences in university participation and completion closely mirror differences in school-level outcomes, particularly apropos the distribution of Bachelor-level passes. What the evidence does not support is the view that exclusion occurs primarily at the point of university entry and, instead, is suggests that access to and success within higher education remains strongly conditioned by the cumulative advantages and disadvantages that was established earlier in the education pipeline. Thirdly, progress and inequality coexist in ways that are easily misunderstood in public debate. Expanding access has brought many more learners into the system and raised the absolute number of successful outcomes, particularly among historically excluded groups. At the same time, the visibility of poor performance within weaker institutions has increased as the system has grown, reinforcing perceptions of decline even where long-term indicators show improvement. Section 9 has shown why lived experience and aggregate trends can diverge without contradicting one another. Fourthly, changes in post-school participation patterns should not be interpreted through a zero-sum lens, because declining participation rates among some population groups occur alongside rising participation among others and are therefore best understood in the context of the demographic change that is taking place, financial constraints of especially the missing middle and the diversification of post-school pathways. The evidence does not support claims of displacement or exclusion, instead, it points to a system in which access has widened unevenly and in which financial and institutional factors increasingly shape educational choices. The central lesson of the evidence is therefore not that the education system is failing, nor that it has completed its task, but that progress has been real, uneven and incomplete. Improvements in outcomes have been achieved, yet they remain fragile and highly dependent on institutional context and persistent inequalities within basic education continue to reproduce unequal trajectories into higher education and beyond. Any serious response must therefore focus less on headline indicators and more on the conditions under which learning takes place, such as the strengthening of institutional capacity, the improving of instructional quality in weaker schools and the addressing of the structural constraints that shape learner progression, all of which remain central challenges. Without such interventions, aggregate improvement will continue to coexist with deeply unequal outcomes. PART XII FROM EVIDENCE TO ACTION - PRECISION REFORM IN A STRAINED SYSTEM The preceding sections have established a clear and defensible picture of South Africa’s basic education system. Access has expanded dramatically since the democratic transition. Participation is now near universal through the compulsory schooling years. Matric outcomes have improved over time, not only in headline pass rates but in the quality composition of passes. At the same time, deep inequality within the system persists, learner-teacher ratios continue to impose structural pressure and outcomes remain uneven across schools, provinces and socio-economic contexts. Taken together, the evidence does not support narratives of systemic collapse, nor does it justify complacency. It points instead to a system that functions, but under sustained strain, that produces improvement, but unevenly and that retains agency, but within real institutional constraints. This section considers what follows from that evidence. It does not attempt to offer exhaustive policy prescriptions, nor does it propose reforms detached from what the data can reasonably sustain. Rather, it outlines the character and direction of reform implied by the evidence presented in this report. The central implication is simple, but demanding: reform must now shift from broad access expansion and headline indicators toward precision intervention focused on progression, quality and inequality within a functioning system. WHY REFORM MUST NOW CHANGE CHARACTER In the early democratic period, the dominant challenge in education was access. Large numbers of children were excluded from formal schooling, participation was uneven and institutional coverage was incomplete. Under those conditions, policy emphasis on enrolment, infrastructure expansion and system reach was both necessary and appropriate. The evidence presented in this report shows that this phase has largely been completed. Today, the overwhelming majority of children enter and remain in school through the compulsory years. The binding constraints have shifted. They are no longer primarily about entry, but about what happens within the system: how learners progress, what quality of learning they experience and how institutional inequality shapes outcomes long before matric. This shift in conditions requires a corresponding shift in reform logic. Policies designed for a system struggling to enrol learners are not sufficient for a system struggling to deliver consistent quality at scale. Reform must therefore become more targeted, more differentiated and more attentive to institutional context than has often been the case. FROM ACCESS TO PROGRESSION QUALITY One of the clearest messages emerging from the evidence is that participation alone is no longer an adequate measure of system performance. Near-universal access fundamentally changes the nature of the problem. In such a system, outcomes are shaped less by whether learners are present and more by the quality and continuity of learning they experience over time. This places renewed emphasis on progression quality, particularly in the middle years of schooling, where foundational gaps often widen and where subject pathways begin to narrow, which requires attention, because weaknesses accumulated in these phases constrain later performance, including matric outcomes and access to post-school opportunities. Reform efforts that focus narrowly on matric standards, pass rates or examination thresholds risk misdiagnosing the source of the problem, whereas the evidence suggests that meaningful improvement depends far more on strengthening learning earlier in the schooling trajectory than on adjusting end-point requirements. In practical terms, this implies prioritising instructional depth, curriculum pacing and learner support well before the final years of schooling, particularly in contexts where institutional capacity is weakest. LEARNER-TEACHER RATIOS AS A STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINT, NOT A SLOGAN Learner-teacher ratios emerge from the analysis as one of the most important structural constraints shaping educational quality. The evidence does not suggest that ratios determine outcomes mechanically, but it does show that persistently high ratios limit what schools can realistically achieve, especially in demanding subjects and under-resourced contexts. At the same time, national averages obscure substantial variation, in that some schools operate close to functional limits, while others do not. Therefore, by treating learner-teacher ratios as a uniform national problem risks misdirecting resources and diluting impact. The implication is that learner-teacher ratios should be treated as a management instrument and not merely a descriptive statistic or a rhetorical device and accordingly, where ratios exceed levels that allow effective instruction, particularly over sustained periods, they should trigger targeted intervention. Where ratios are more favourable, different priorities may apply. Such differentiation acknowledges institutional reality rather than denying it, and it aligns resources with constraint rather than aspiration alone. RETHINKING THROUGHPUT WITHOUT LOWERING EXPECTATIONS Throughput remains an important diagnostic indicator. It provides insight into progression through the academic school track and highlights points at which learners are delayed, diverted or lost. However, as the evidence in this report demonstrates, throughput cannot be treated as a comprehensive measure of system success or failure. Population-level data shows that large numbers of young people continue to participate in education beyond the conventional schooling pathway, including through delayed completion and post-school institutions such as TVET colleges. This does not negate the seriousness of early attrition or weak foundational learning, but it does challenge the assumption that exit from school equates to abandonment of education altogether. The implication is not to dismiss throughput concerns, but to interpret them more carefully. Throughput should be understood as a measure of efficiency within a particular track, not as a moral verdict on learners or institutions, and not as a proxy for overall human-capital formation. Recognising non-linear pathways does not lower expectations; it clarifies reality. It allows reform efforts to focus on strengthening pathways, alignment and transitions rather than assuming a single, linear educational journey for all learners. PROTECTING EXCELLENCE WHILE EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY Another important implication of the evidence concerns differentiation. The improvement in Diploma and Bachelor-level passes over time indicates that higher-quality outcomes are being achieved at increasing scale, even under conditions of strain. This directly contradicts claims that standards have collapsed or that achievement at the top end has been hollowed out. Preserving and expanding these outcomes is essential, not only for individual opportunity, but for system legitimacy. In a mass education system, differentiation is unavoidable and therefore treating all outcomes as equivalent or conflating excellence with exclusion, undermines both fairness and credibility. At the same time, differentiation must not become a justification for entrenching inequality, especially given that the evidence suggests that excellence and equity are not opposing goals, but interdependent ones. To expand equitable opportunity will require a strengthening of quality where it already exists, while systematically addressing the constraints that prevent other schools from reaching similar levels. WHAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT JUSTIFY Equally important is clarity about what the evidence does not support. It does not justify narratives of terminal decline, emergency overhaul or institutional abandonment. Nor does it support one-size-fits-all reform, whether framed in technocratic or ideological terms. The data does not indicate that minor parameter changes will transform outcomes overnight, nor that sweeping systemic redesign is either necessary or feasible. It points instead to the limits of simplistic solutions and the need for sustained, context-sensitive intervention. Recognising these limits is not a sign of policy timidity. It is a prerequisite for credible reform. FROM DIAGNOSIS TO DISCIPLINED ACTION The evidence assembled in this report restores something often lost in education debate: agency grounded in realism. A system that functions under strain can improve, but only if reform is precise, differentiated and patient. The choice confronting South Africa is no longer between despair and denial. It is between rhetorical excess and disciplined action; between abstract solutions and institutionally grounded reform. The evidence does not promise easy answers. It does, however, establish a firm basis for moving forward, not by pretending that everything is fine, nor by declaring that nothing works, but by acting deliberately on what the data shows, and on what it does not. FUTURE RESEARCH PRIORITIES IMPLIED BY THE EVIDENCE Several findings in this report point toward the limits of currently available data and highlight areas where further empirical research is required. These limits do not weaken the conclusions reached, rather, they define the boundary between what can be asserted with confidence and what must remain indicative. Most notably, while both administrative schooling data and population-based survey evidence consistently show continued youth participation in education beyond school exit, the absence of integrated longitudinal datasets restricts the ability to trace individual learners across the full education and training pipeline. As a result, patterns of delayed completion, re-entry, cross-pathway movement and transition into the labour market remain only partially understood. Future research should therefore prioritise the development and use of longitudinal or linked datasets capable of tracking learners over time, across institutional boundaries and through different educational pathways. Such research would allow for more precise estimation of throughput dynamics, the duration and outcomes of non-linear trajectories and the relative returns associated with academic and vocational routes. In addition, more granular institutional research is required to better understand how learner-teacher ratios, subject availability and staffing configurations interact with local context to shape outcomes. National averages mask significant variation and further work at school and district level would help identify where specific interventions are most likely to yield improvement. And finally, a deeper investigation is needed into the relationship between school quality, post-school participation and labour-market outcomes. While participation data indicates continued engagement with education, participation alone does not guarantee meaningful skill acquisition or economic opportunity and so understanding how different pathways translate into employment, earnings and social mobility is a necessary complement to the analysis presented here. These research priorities do not delay action, instead, on the contrary, they provide a roadmap for strengthening evidence over time, thereby ensuring that reform efforts remain grounded in observed realities, rather than assumption or ideology. Addressing these gaps is therefore integral to sustaining evidence-based policy in a system that is evolving, that is uneven and that remains under continuous pressure. CONCLUSION REALISM, REFORM AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN DESPAIR AND AGENCY South Africa’s education debate is often framed as a choice between two extremes: complacency and catastrophe. On one side sits the insistence that progress has been sufficient and criticism unfair. On the other, the conviction that the system has failed beyond redemption. Both positions are comforting in their simplicity, and both obscure more than they illuminate. The evidence examined in this report points toward a different conclusion. South Africa’s basic education system is neither a success story nor a failed state institution. It is a system under sustained strain, producing uneven outcomes, yet still capable of improvement. WHAT THE EVIDENCE DEMANDS OF US The data presented throughout this report demands intellectual honesty. It demands recognition that access to schooling has expanded dramatically and that attainment has improved over time. These gains are real and should not be dismissed, because they fall short of national aspiration. It also demands acknowledgement that inequality within the system remains deep and that quality constraints continue to limit opportunity for millions of learners. Improvement has not erased disadvantage, nor has it equalised life chances. Above all, the evidence demands rejection of fatalism. Progress under strain demonstrates that institutions retain agency. It shows that deterioration is not inevitable and that reform remains possible. THE COST OF COLLAPSE NARRATIVES Narratives of collapse carry costs that are often underestimated. They undermine public confidence in legitimate achievement, eroding the signalling value of qualifications and discouraging effort. They delegitimise institutions that, while imperfect, continue to perform essential functions. And they crowd out serious reform by replacing diagnosis with despair. Most damaging of all, collapse narratives absolve actors of responsibility. If failure is total and irreversible, there is little point in accountability or change. The evidence does not support such resignation. REFORM REQUIRES PRECISION, NOT DENIAL Equally, realism is not denial. The fact that the system functions does not mean it functions well enough. Reform requires precision. It requires attention to capacity constraints, particularly learner-teacher ratios, infrastructure deficits and uneven subject provision. It requires targeted intervention where disadvantage is most entrenched, rather than one-size-fits-all solutions. And it requires sustained commitment, not episodic reaction. None of this is easy, but none of it is futile. EDUCATION AND SOCIAL COHESION Education occupies a unique position in South Africa’s social fabric. It is both a site of hope and a source of resentment, a ladder of mobility and a mirror of inequality. Evidence-based discourse matters precisely because education is so emotionally charged. When claims of exclusion or collapse are advanced without proportional grounding, they risk inflaming division and undermining cohesion. A shared factual baseline does not resolve disagreement, but it makes disagreement productive. CHOOSING AGENCY OVER DESPAIR This report has not sought to persuade readers that South Africa’s education system is “good enough”. It has sought to show that it is not beyond repair. That distinction is the foundation of agency. It allows room for critique without nihilism, for reform without fantasy, and for hope without illusion. The choice confronting South Africa is not between optimism and pessimism. It is between despair, which paralyses, and realism, which enables action. The evidence supports realism. REFERENCES Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA). 2024. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://cra-sa.com/products/socio-economic-survey/2025/files/education-november-2024_1_-02.pdf [accessed: 14 January 2026] Department of Basic Education (DBE). N.d. NSC Examinations. [Online] Available at: https://www.education.gov.za/Curriculum/NationalSeniorCertificate%28NSC%29Examinations.aspx? [accessed: 15 January 2026] Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET). 2022. Fact Sheet: Highest Level of Educational Attainment in South Africa – June 2022. [Online]Available at: DHET Fact Sheet: Highest Level of Educational Attainment in South Africa – June 2022 [Accessed: 27 May 2026] Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET). 2025. Highest Level of Educational Attainment in South Africa, 2024. [Online] Available at: DHET Highest Level of Educational Attainment in South Africa, 2024 [Accessed: 27 May 2026] Hall, K. & Hendricks, S. 2025. School attendance. Children Count, Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town. [Online] Available at: https://childrencount.uct.ac.za/indicator.php?domain=6&indicator=15 [Accessed: 25 May 2026] Statistics South Africa (2003). Census 2001: Primary Tables South Africa – Census 1996 and 2001 Compared. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=5107 [accessed: 26 May 2026] Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2023. Census 2022 Statistical Release. Report No. P0301.4. [Online] Available at: https://census.statssa.gov.za/assets/documents/2022/P03014_Census_2022_Statistical_Release.pdf [Accessed: 28 May 2026]. Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2023. Stats in Brief 2023. Pretoria: Stats SA. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/StatsInBrief/StatsInBrief2023.pdf [accessed: 26 January 2026] Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2024. General Household Survey 2023 [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182023.pdf? [accessed: 16 January 2024] Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2024. Mid-year population estimates 2024 (Statistical Release P0302). [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022024.pdf. {accessed: 19 January 2026] Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2024. Mid-year population estimates 2024 (P0302). [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022024.pdf [Accessed: 25 May 2026] Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025. General Household Survey 2024 (Statistical Release P0318). [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182024.pdf. [accessed: 19 January 2026] Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025. General Household Survey, 2024. Statistical Release P0318. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182024.pdf [Accessed: 25 May 2026] Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025. General Household Survey 2024 (P0318). Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.[Online]. Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182024.pdf [Accessed: 27 May 2026]. ANNEXURE A DATA TABLES SUPPORTING THE ANALYSIS This annexure contains the data referenced in the report, enabling readers to verify figures, examine year-by-year trends and replicate the analysis. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) participated in the 2026 Annual Meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), hosted at NOVA University Lisbon, Portugal, from 1–3 July 2026. The conference, held under the theme "Multilateralism Under Challenge and the Future of the Pact," brought together academics, policymakers, diplomats and international practitioners to examine the future of global governance and the reform of multilateral institutions. Representing the Institute, Chief Executive Officer Daryl Swanepoel played a dual role in the programme. On behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN), the Inclusive Society Institute organised a panel discussion entitled "The Role of Middle Powers in Reshaping Multilateralism." The panel examined the growing influence of middle powers in an increasingly multipolar international system and considered how these states can contribute to strengthening international cooperation at a time when traditional multilateral institutions face mounting geopolitical pressures. In addition to organising the GSPN panel, Swanepoel presented a paper during the session "Beyond the P5: The Role of Middle Powers and BRICS in Shaping the Global Order." His presentation, entitled "From UN80 to the Chinese Global Governance Initiative: What Is Shaping the New Multilateralism the World Needs?", explored the competing and complementary ideas currently influencing the evolution of the international system. Drawing on his research, Swanepoel argued that contemporary debates on multilateral reform are increasingly being shaped by two significant initiatives. The first is the United Nations' UN80 process, which seeks to improve the effectiveness, legitimacy and institutional performance of the existing multilateral system. The second is China's Global Governance Initiative (GGI), which advances a broader vision of international governance rooted in greater inclusivity, respect for sovereignty, development-centred cooperation and enhanced representation for developing countries. The presentation contended that these initiatives should not be viewed merely as competing geopolitical projects. Rather, they reflect a broader search for a new multilateral settlement capable of responding to shifting global power realities. As the relative influence of emerging economies continues to grow, the international community faces the challenge of adapting governance structures originally designed for a very different world. A central theme of the paper was the increasingly important role that middle powers can play in bridging differences between established and emerging centres of influence. Rather than reinforcing geopolitical blocs, Swanepoel argued that middle powers are uniquely positioned to facilitate dialogue, build consensus and promote practical reforms capable of strengthening international institutions while accommodating greater diversity in political systems, development priorities and regional interests. The Inclusive Society Institute's participation forms part of its broader commitment to advancing evidence-based dialogue on international governance, global cooperation and the role of Africa and the Global South in shaping a more representative and effective multilateral system. Through its work within the Global South Perspectives Network, the Institute continues to contribute to international conversations on building a more inclusive, responsive and resilient global order.

Copyright © 2026 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. This report was prepared with the assistance of AI technology, including ChatGPT. JUNE 2026 Author: Inclusive Society Institute CONTENTS Executive summary Introduction Methodological note and data sources PART I: Qualitative improvements in health outcomes PART II: Health system capacity PART III: System efficiency and performance Conclusion References Annexure A Cover photo: Microsoft Copilot (2026) Education in South Africa. AI generated image LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Vaccination coverage of children in South Africa, 2017/18–2022/23 Figure 2: Infant mortality rate deaths of children under I yr in South Africa, 2002–2024 Figure 3: Under-five mortality rate in South Africa, 2002–2024 (per 1 000 live births). Figure 4: Life expectancy at birth in South Africa, 2002–2024 (years) Figure 5: Severe acute malnutrition case fatality rate in South Africa, 2017/18–2022/23 Figure 6: HIV prevalence among adults aged 15–49 in South Africa, 2002-2024 Figure 7: New HIV infections in South Africa, 2009–2024 Figure 8: Tuberculosis prevalence in South Africa, 1990-2019 (per 100,000 population) Figure 9: Number of people per public-sector doctor in South Africa, 2000–2023 Figure 10: Number of people per nurse in South Africa, 2000–2023 (public health system) Figure 11: Number of public-sector pharmacists in South Africa, 2000–2023 Figure 12: Number of people per public hospital bed in South Africa, 2020–2023 Figure 13: Number of ambulance service provider organisations in South Africa, 2019–2024 Figure 14: In-patient bed utilisation rate in South Africa, 2015/16–2022/23 (%) Figure 15: Average length of stay in public hospitals in South Africa, selected years 2008–2022/23 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY South Africa’s public health system is under pressure. But it is not collapsing. This report looks at health outcomes, system capacity and basic efficiency using long-term data, not headlines or anecdotes. The picture that emerges is mixed, but more positive than public debate often suggests. Health outcomes have improved. Fewer children are dying young. People are living longer. New HIV infections have fallen sharply since their peak. Tuberculosis prevalence has dropped dramatically since the early 2010s, reversing one of the country’s most serious public health crises. These gains did not happen overnight, and they are not complete. But they are real, sustained and visible across multiple indicators. The health system has expanded. There are more health workers, more infrastructure and broader emergency coverage than in the past. Capacity remains uneven and stretched in places, but the system today is larger and better resourced than it was a decade ago. The system is not grinding to a halt. Hospitals are using their beds actively, without showing signs of permanent overload. Patients are, on average, spending less time in hospital than before. These are modest indicators, but they matter. They suggest that the system is still functioning and adapting under pressure. So why does it still feel broken? Because experience is local and personal. Waiting times, overcrowding and staff shortages are felt directly. Service failures are visible and frustrating. Successes, lives saved, infections prevented, are largely invisible. Both things can be true at the same time: outcomes can improve while confidence remains low. The evidence in this report does not justify complacency. Serious problems remain, especially in quality, access and uneven performance. But it also does not support a story of total failure. The reality is more uncomfortable and more useful. South Africa’s health system has delivered meaningful progress under difficult conditions. The challenge now is not to deny that progress, nor to exaggerate success, but to build on what works, fix what doesn’t and close the gap between measured improvement and lived experience. A NOTE ON CONTEXT South Africa is widely described as a country in decline, even a country in collapse. Public debate, media commentary and everyday conversation are saturated with the language of failure: a failed state, a failed government, a society coming apart at the seams. That is the dominant public perception. This report was developed precisely to test that perception against evidence. It asks a simple question: when we look carefully at the data, when we measure performance, rather than emotion, does the story of collapse hold? The evidence does not support that conclusion. What it shows instead is a country under real and sustained strain, economically, socially and institutionally, but not a country that has collapsed, and not a state that has failed. The challenges are serious and should not be minimised, yet they coexist with resilience, capacity and untapped potential. South Africa’s outcomes are weaker than they should be, but stronger than public perception suggests. With a firmer growth path, improved institutional performance and greater policy consistency, the trajectory can change. This report therefore argues for realism without despair: less denial of strain, but also less surrender to hopelessness. South Africa warrants more honesty and more confidence than the prevailing narrative allows. INTRODUCTION Public debate about South Africa’s health system is often conducted in extremes. On one side, there are assertions of systemic collapse, failure or unsustainability. On the other, official narratives emphasise policy intent, expenditure or institutional design as evidence of progress. Both approaches risk obscuring what ultimately matters most: what the evidence says about lived health outcomes, the capacity of the system to deliver care and how effectively that capacity is translated into results. This report forms part of the True South Africa evidence series, which seeks to interrogate dominant narratives through disciplined use of empirical indicators, rather than assertion or sentiment. As with safety and crime, health outcomes evoke strong emotional responses, and justifiably so. Illness, preventable death and unequal access to care are experienced directly and personally. Yet emotion alone is an unreliable guide to diagnosis. If despair replaces analysis, it becomes difficult to distinguish between strain, uneven performance and collapse. The purpose of this report is therefore not to defend institutions, policies or outcomes, nor to minimise hardship or suffering. Its purpose is narrower and more exacting: to examine whether the health system, as reflected in the available data, shows evidence of deterioration, improvement or mixed performance across three analytically distinct dimensions, namely qualitative health outcomes, system capacity and system efficiency and performance. The structure of the report reflects this logic. Rather than beginning with conceptual framing or conclusions, the analysis proceeds indicator by indicator, allowing patterns to emerge from the data itself. Qualitative health outcomes are examined first to establish what has happened to survival, early-life protection, nutrition and chronic disease burden. Capacity indicators are then assessed to determine whether the system plausibly supports those outcomes. Finally, efficiency and performance indicators are considered to understand how well available resources are converted into results under conditions of constraint. Throughout, the analysis is intentionally confined to the data in Annexure A. No external benchmarks, counterfactuals, or policy projections are introduced. This constraint is not a limitation, but a discipline. It ensures that claims are grounded, auditable and proportionate to what the evidence can support. The report therefore does not ask whether South Africa’s health system is ideal, equitable or sufficiently resourced. It asks a more basic and prior question: what does the evidence show about how the system is functioning in practice, and how should that evidence be interpreted without exaggeration or denial? METHODOLOGICAL NOTE AND DATA SOURCES This report adopts an evidence-led approach to assessing recent trends in health outcomes, health system capacity and efficiency in South Africa. Wherever possible, analysis is based on a single consolidated health dataset (CRA, 2025), drawing on officially reported national indicators and presenting long-run trends rather than point-in-time snapshots. The underlying dataset is compiled from official administrative and statistical sources, including routine reporting systems of the National Department of Health, national surveillance programmes and population-level estimates produced by Statistics South Africa. Indicators such as child mortality, HIV prevalence, vaccination coverage and malnutrition outcomes are derived from these established reporting frameworks and reflect nationally published series, rather than newly constructed estimates. Indicators are selected to capture three distinct dimensions of system performance. First, qualitative health outcomes are assessed using mortality, survival and disease-related indicators that speak directly to population wellbeing. Second, health system capacity is examined through measures of infrastructure, personnel and service availability. Third, efficiency is explored through indicators that reflect the relationship between resources, utilisation and outcomes. In one instance, an external data source is used. To assess population longevity, the report draws on Statistics South Africa’s Mid-year Population Estimates (Statistical Release P0302) to present trends in life expectancy at birth, which provide a direct measure of how long people live on average. This source is used, because the required indicator is not available in the primary dataset and is introduced explicitly and transparently for this purpose alone. Throughout the report, graphs present national-level trends using consistent visual conventions, with data labels limited to key reference points to emphasise direction and magnitude of change, rather than short-term fluctuations. The intention is not to provide an exhaustive evaluation of the health system, but to establish an evidence-based baseline from which informed policy discussion can proceed. PART I QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN HEALTH OUTCOMES This part examines whether lived health outcomes in South Africa show evidence of improvement, deterioration or uneven performance over time. The focus is not on policy intent or institutional design, but on measurable outcomes that affect survival, resilience and everyday wellbeing, as reflected in the attached health data. The indicators selected are deliberately foundational. They capture early-life protection, preventable death, nutrition and chronic disease burden, all areas where sustained improvement cannot occur without some combination of effective healthcare delivery, improved living conditions and social protection. VACCINATION OF CHILDREN Childhood vaccination is among the clearest indicators of basic health system functioning. It reflects not only clinical capacity, but also supply chains, outreach, record-keeping and public trust in health services. Because most childhood vaccines prevent illnesses that are otherwise highly lethal or disabling, vaccination coverage operates as a leading indicator of future child survival outcomes. The data shows that vaccination coverage for children has been largely sustained at high levels over time, with some fluctuation across years and provinces and while coverage is not uniformly optimal and short-term disruptions are visible in certain periods, the overall picture is one of continued system operation, rather than collapse. Importantly, vaccination coverage does not exhibit the kind of structural decline that would be expected if primary healthcare delivery had ceased to function. Even where performance weakens, it does so unevenly, rather than universally. This suggests strain and variability, not systemic withdrawal. Vaccination outcomes therefore provide an early signal that basic preventative healthcare continues to reach a substantial proportion of children, despite broader pressures on the health system. What this indicator can tell us: whether primary healthcare delivery remains operational, whether children are protected against major preventable diseases, whether system strain has translated into service abandonment. What it cannot tell us on its own: the quality of follow-up care, nutritional status, or outcomes beyond early childhood. Figure 1: Vaccination coverage of children in South Africa, 2017/18–2022/23 (Source: CRA, 2025) INFANT MORTALITY RATE The infant mortality rate measures the number of deaths of children that are under one year of age per 1 000 live births in a given year. Infant mortality is one of the most sensitive indicators of health system effectiveness. It captures antenatal care, maternal health, birth conditions, early nutrition and postnatal support, all within the first year of life. The data show a long-term decline in infant mortality, notwithstanding periods of slower improvement or temporary stagnation. This decline is significant, because infant mortality is resistant to cosmetic improvement: it falls only when multiple components of the health and social system function together. The persistence of lower infant mortality rates over time suggests that: maternal and child health interventions have had sustained impact, early-life survival has improved relative to earlier periods, and gains have not been fully reversed, even under system strain. This does not imply that infant mortality is low by global standards, nor that disparities have been eliminated, but what it does indicate, however, is that foundational conditions for infant survival have strengthened, rather than deteriorated wholesale. What this indicator can tell us: whether early-life survival has improved, whether basic maternal and neonatal care is functioning, whether deterioration has reached catastrophic levels. What it cannot tell us on its own: outcomes beyond infancy, the distribution of survival gains across income or geography. Figure 2: Infant mortality rate deaths of children under I yr in South Africa, 2002–2024 (per 1,000 live births). (Source: CRA, 2025 dataset.) UNDER-FIVE MORTALITY RATE The under-five mortality rate measures the number of deaths of children under the age of five per 1 000 live births in a given year. Under-five mortality extends the infant mortality lens by capturing survival beyond the first year of life. It reflects immunisation effectiveness, nutrition, access to primary healthcare and timely treatment of common childhood illnesses. The data shows that the under-five mortality rate has declined alongside the infant mortality rate, which reinforces the conclusion that improvements are not confined to birth outcomes alone, in that the survival gains persist into early childhood, which is particularly sensitive to food security, sanitation and primary healthcare access. This pattern strengthens the argument that improvements are structural, rather than accidental, because if early gains were limited to neonatal care alone, under-five mortality would not follow the same trajectory. At the same time, the rate of improvement is uneven, and levels remain unacceptably high in absolute terms and therefore the indicator supports a narrative of incomplete, but real progress, rather than either success or collapse. Figure 3: Under-five mortality rate in South Africa, 2002–2024 (per 1 000 live births). (Source: (CRA, 2025).) OVERALL MORTALITY RATE Overall mortality, in turn, provides a population-wide measure of survival, which is different to the infant or under-five mortality, in that it reflects the life-expectancy across all age groups and disease categories. Within the data, overall mortality trends show stabilisation and significant improvement over time, particularly when read alongside declines in child mortality and improved HIV treatment outcomes. This is a significant finding, because overall mortality is influenced by a wide range of factors, including chronic disease, infectious disease, injury and general living conditions. Crucially, improvements in overall mortality does not only suggest better clinical care, but so too, improved baseline resilience among households, particularly at lower income levels. In the South African context, the evidence plausibly reflects improved access to basic healthcare, better management of HIV and TB diseases, and an improvement in the material conditions that reduce vulnerability to premature death. Overall mortality therefore functions as a structural signal, rather than a precise diagnostic tool, since when it improves or stabilises in tandem with child survival indicators, it supports the conclusion that lived health outcomes have strengthened in important respects. Figure 4: Life expectancy at birth in South Africa, 2002–2024 (years) (Source: Stats SA, 2024) MALNUTRITION Malnutrition sits at the intersection of health and social conditions, in that it directly affects a child’s development, their immune function and their mortality risk, whilst it also serves as a proxy for food security and household stability. The data shows that malnutrition in South Africa remains a persistent challenge, particularly among children, but that said however, trends over time do not indicate a generalised deterioration and instead, they suggest ongoing vulnerability with periods of improvement, rather than sustained collapse. When read alongside improvements in child survival, the malnutrition data points to a nuanced picture that suggests that the nutritional outcomes are not uniformly good, but neither have they worsened to levels that would negate gains in mortality reduction, which implies that extreme deprivation has been mitigated, even if not eliminated. This reinforces the interpretation that the baseline living conditions for the poorest households have improved relative to earlier periods, despite inequality and food insecurity remaining as pressing concerns. Figure 5: Severe acute malnutrition case fatality rate in South Africa, 2017/18–2022/23 (Source: CRA, 2025) NUMBER AND PROPORTION OF PEOPLE HIV-POSITIVE HIV remains one of the most significant determinants of population health in South Africa and the number and proportion of people living with HIV reflect both the historical infection patterns and the successes in the prevention and treatment efforts. The data show a large, but stabilising HIV-positive population, which is a pattern that must be interpreted carefully, because high prevalence does not automatically indicate failure. In a context of effective treatment, it can also reflect improved survival among people living with HIV. When read together with declining HIV-related mortality, expanded ART coverage and improved overall survival indicators, the HIV data support an interpretation of managed chronic disease burden, rather than uncontrolled epidemic resurgence. Figure 6: HIV prevalence among adults aged 15–49 in South Africa, 2002-2024 (Source: CRA, 2025) NEW HIV INFECTIONS Trends in new HIV infections provide a critical indicator of progress in preventing transmission and reducing the future burden of disease and in South Africa, the national trajectory shows a pronounced and sustained decline in new HIV infections over the past decade and a half. New HIV infections peaked in the late 2000s at levels exceeding 380,000 new cases per year, but from that point onwards, the trend shows a consistent downward movement, and by 2015, the number of new infections annually, had fallen to below 250,000 and by 2024 the estimated number of new infections had declined further to approximately 142,000 per year. This represents a reduction of more than 60 per cent from peak levels in 2009-2011. While year-to-year fluctuations are evident, the overall direction of change is unambiguous and suggests a sustained long-term improvement, rather than it being temporary or cyclical effect. Figure 7: New HIV infections in South Africa, 2009–2024 (Source: CRA, 2025) TUBERCULOSIS PREVALENCE Tuberculosis prevalence provides a long-run indicator of population-level disease burden and the effectiveness of prevention, detection and treatment over time. The trend for South Africa shows a clear and sustained reduction in TB prevalence over the past three decades, which followed a period of deterioration during the late 1990s and early 2000, where TB prevalence rose steadily from the mid-1990s, increasing from approximately 475 cases per 100,000 population in 1990 to a peak of around 857 per 100,000 in 2012. This period coincided with the height of the HIV epidemic, during which period the incidence of TB and its prevalence increased sharply due to immune suppression that elevated susceptibility to infection and TB reactivation. From 2012 onwards, however, the trend reversed decisively, with TB prevalence declining markedly, falling to approximately 715 per 100,000 in 2013 and continuing its downward trend to around 301 per 100,000 by 2018; and although a modest increase was observed in 2019 (coinciding with the COVID pandemic), the prevalence levels remain less than half of their peak values recorded earlier in the decade. This sustained reduction represents a significant improvement in population health outcomes and while the data does not allow for causal attribution, the decline in TB prevalence is consistent with expanded access to antiretroviral treatment, improved TB detection and treatment coverage and strengthened integration of HIV and TB services. Importantly, the trend reflects not a short-term fluctuation, but a structural shift away from the exceptionally high TB burden that characterised South Africa during the peak years of the HIV epidemic. Taken together, the TB prevalence trend points to a meaningful reduction in one of South Africa’s most persistent public health challenges, which provides strong evidence of improved health outcomes that manifested over the long term. Figure 8: Tuberculosis prevalence in South Africa, 1990-2019 (per 100,000 population) (Source: CRA, 2025) INITIAL OBSERVATION Taken together, the indicators examined in Part I point to a pattern of measurable and sustained improvement in several foundational health outcomes in South Africa, but that said, it is also true that areas of continuing vulnerability and uneven progress still remain. The evidence does not support a narrative of systemic health collapse, but neither does it suggest that gains have been uniform, complete or evenly distributed. Across early-life indicators, the data show long-run declines in infant and under-five mortality, signalling improved survival through the most vulnerable stages of life. These improvements are particularly significant, because they reflect the combined functioning of maternal care, early nutrition, immunisation and primary healthcare delivery. The persistence of these gains over time suggests structural improvement, rather than temporary or episodic success. Indicators of population-level survival reinforce this conclusion, since trends in overall mortality and life expectancy at birth point to improved longevity, which implies that survival gains extend beyond childhood into adulthood. In the South African context, such improvements are difficult to achieve without better management of chronic disease, reduced premature mortality and improved baseline household resilience. Outcomes related to HIV and tuberculosis, historically among the most severe sources of morbidity and mortality, show especially important shifts. New HIV infections have declined substantially since their peak in the late 2000s, reducing future disease burden and long-term treatment demand, and at the same time, TB prevalence has fallen sharply from its early-2010s peak, representing a decisive reversal of the exceptionally high burden associated with the height of the HIV epidemic. Although neither indicator implies eradication, both point to durable improvement, rather than stagnation or regression. Nutritional indicators present a more nuanced picture in that malnutrition remains a persistent concern, particularly among children, and progress is neither uniform nor sufficient, but, that said, the absence of sustained deterioration, when read alongside improvements in child survival, it does suggest that extreme deprivation has at least been mitigated over time, even as food insecurity and inequality continue to shape health outcomes. Taken as a whole, the evidence revealed in Part I indicates real, albeit incomplete progress; where improvements are observable across multiple outcome indicators and they seem to persist over long periods. And they align across related measures, which lends them credibility. At the same time, the data reflect strain, uneven performance and ongoing risk, particularly for vulnerable groups. The appropriate conclusion at this stage is therefore neither complacency nor alarm. The evidence supports a measured, but clear finding: population-level health outcomes in South Africa have, on balance, improved over the period under review. The critical questions that follow are whether the health system’s capacity plausibly supports these outcomes, and how efficiently that capacity is being converted into results under sustained pressure, issues taken up in Parts II and III. PART II HEALTH SYSTEM CAPACITY This part examines whether South Africa’s health system has expanded, stagnated, or thinned in its ability to deliver care. Capacity here is understood in practical terms: the availability of health professionals, hospital infrastructure and emergency reach relative to population demand. Capacity indicators do not measure outcomes directly. Rather, they test whether the system plausibly could produce the outcomes observed in Part I. Where outcomes improve despite constrained capacity, strain is implied. Where capacity erodes, risks accumulate. PEOPLE-TO-DOCTOR RATIO The people-to-doctor ratio is a core indicator of clinical capacity. It reflects how thinly medical expertise is spread across the population and, by extension, the intensity of pressure placed on individual practitioners. The data shows that South Africa continues to experience a high people-to-doctor ratio, particularly in the public sector and while the absolute number of registered doctors has increased over time, population growth and uneven distribution mean that per-capita access to doctors remains constrained. Importantly, the data does not indicate a collapse in doctor availability, rather, they point to incremental increases in absolute numbers, and a significant improvement in the number of people-per-public sector doctor. Nevertheless, persistent pressure remains on public sector doctors, as does the continued reliance on nurses and primary care to absorb demand. This suggests a system that is improving, but which continues to operate under structural strain, rather than one that has lost its professional base. What this indicator can tell us: whether medical expertise is expanding relative to population, whether pressure on clinicians is intensifying or easing, whether outcomes are being achieved despite limited doctor availability. What it cannot tell us on its own: quality of care, geographic distribution, or productivity differences across facilities. Figure 9: Number of people per public-sector doctor in South Africa, 2000–2023 (Source: CRA, 2025) PEOPLE-TO-NURSE RATIO Nurses constitute the backbone of South Africa’s health system, particularly at primary healthcare level. The people-to-nurse ratio therefore provides a more realistic picture of frontline capacity than doctor counts alone. The data indicate that nursing capacity expanded meaningfully from the early 2000s through the early 2010s, reflected in a sustained reduction in the number of people per nurse in public hospitals. This improvement reached its strongest point in the mid-2010s, after which the ratio stabilised and, in more recent years, showed modest deterioration, particularly during and after the COVID-19 period. Importantly, however, current levels remain materially better than those observed two decades ago. This pattern is significant, because many essential health services, including immunisation, maternal care, HIV treatment and chronic disease management, are nurse-led. The evidence therefore suggests that the health system successfully strengthened frontline nursing capacity over time and has since been operating under sustained pressure, rather than experiencing a reversal to earlier stress levels. While shortages and uneven distribution remain, the trajectory indicates that the system has prioritised nursing output, maintained frontline service capacity, and partially compensated for doctor scarcity. This helps explain why key outcome indicators in Part I, especially child health and HIV survival, have improved despite broader system pressure. Figure 10: Number of people per nurse in South Africa, 2000–2023 (public health system) (Source: CRA, 2025) PEOPLE-TO-PHARMACIST RATIO Pharmacists play a critical role in medicine availability, treatment adherence and chronic disease management. Their presence is particularly important in systems managing large numbers of patients on long-term treatment, such as ART and TB therapy. The data shows that pharmacist capacity has grown significantly over time, though, as with other professional categories, population growth and distribution limit per-capita gains. The relevance of this indicator lies less in absolute sufficiency than in system viability. Sustained pharmacist capacity supports: large-scale medicine dispensing, continuity of treatment, and the functioning of decentralised care models. The data therefore suggest that pharmaceutical capacity has improved and been sufficient to support expanded treatment programmes, even if pressure remains high. Figure 11: Number of public-sector pharmacists in South Africa, 2000–2023 (Source: CRA, 2025) BEDS IN PUBLIC HOSPITALS Hospital beds represent static infrastructure capacity and must be interpreted carefully, because beds alone do not treat patients, since they only become meaningful when combined with staff, equipment and referral systems. The data indicates that the number of beds in public hospitals has remained relatively stable over time and that there has over the last few decades only been limited large-scale expansion thereof, but this reflects fiscal and infrastructural constraints, rather than a withdrawal of hospital service provision. Stability in bed numbers, when read alongside population growth, increased disease burden and rising demand, implies increasing intensity of use, rather than excess capacity. This finding sets up the efficiency analysis in Part III, particularly bed utilisation and length of stay. Figure 12: Number of people per public hospital bed in South Africa, 2020–2023 (Source: CRA, 2025) AMBULANCE SERVICE PROVIDERS Emergency medical services are a critical, but often overlooked component of health system capacity. One indicator is ambulance availability, which determines whether patients can access care in time, particularly in obstetric emergencies, trauma cases and rural settings. The data show the presence and distribution of ambulance service providers across provinces and whilst it is true that coverage is uneven and capacity is under pressure, the continued operation and expansion of ambulance services indicates that emergency access mechanisms remain in place. This is significant for two reasons: it supports maternal and emergency care outcomes, it links system capacity directly to time-sensitive survival indicators. Ambulance services therefore function as a reach indicator, bridging static infrastructure and lived access. Figure 13: Number of ambulance service provider organisations in South Africa, 2019–2024 (Source: CRA, 2025) INTERIM OBSERVATION The capacity indicators presented in this section point to a period of steady strengthening in several core components of South Africa’s health system. Over time, the availability of key health professionals has improved, with fewer people per doctor, nurse, and pharmacist, indicating an expansion in human resource capacity relative to population demand. These gains in professional capacity have been complemented by improvements in infrastructure and services that are required to support it. Hospital bed availability shows evidence of short-term expansion during the COVID-19 period, followed by stabilisation, while the number of ambulance service providers has increased markedly in recent years, strengthening emergency and pre-hospital care, which trends, taken together, suggest that the health system has expanded its operational footprint across both clinical and emergency response domains. While these indicators do not speak to distributional equity or service quality, they do establish a clear baseline finding: capacity constraints, though still present in absolute terms, have eased over time across multiple dimensions of the system. The central question therefore shifts from whether capacity has grown to whether existing resources are being deployed efficiently and equitably, an issue addressed in the following section. PART III SYSTEM EFFICIENCY AND PERFORMANCE This part examines how effectively South Africa’s health system converts existing capacity into outcomes. Unlike capacity indicators, which describe what the system has, efficiency indicators reveal how well the system functions under pressure: where bottlenecks emerge, where coordination succeeds or fails and where avoidable loss occurs. Efficiency does not imply cost-cutting. In this context, it refers to operational performance, how resources, staff, infrastructure and referral systems work together in practice. BED UTILISATION RATE Bed utilisation measures the proportion of available hospital beds that are occupied over time. It is a sensitive indicator of system balance. The data shows that bed utilisation rates in public hospitals are consistently high and they often approach or exceed levels that are normally associated with optimal throughput, which suggests that hospitals in South Africa are neither idle, nor dramatically underused, indeed they are operating close to capacity. High bed utilisation has two implications: The first being confirmation of the sustained demand for inpatient care; and secondly, it indicates that there is limited slack within the system to absorb shocks or surges. Importantly, utilisation levels do not point to widespread inefficiency or neglect, but instead, they do reflect a system that is under persistent load, and where capacity constraints are expressed through congestion, rather than abandonment. Figure 14: In-patient bed utilisation rate in South Africa, 2015/16–2022/23 (%) (Source: CRA, 2025) AVERAGE LENGTH OF STAY IN PUBLIC HOSPITALS The average length of stay captures how efficiently patients move through inpatient care, where shorter stays are indicate of effective treatment and/or discharge planning, whilst longer stays signal clinical complexity, discharge bottlenecks and/or referral breakdowns. The data shows that the average length of stay in public hospitals has remained relatively stable, with no evidence of dramatic escalation over time, which stability is notable given the high bed utilisation, constrained staffing and increasing disease complexity. Stable length of stay under such conditions suggests that hospitals have maintained functional throughput, even as pressure has intensified; it does not imply optimal performance, but it does argue against systemic gridlock. Figure 15: Average length of stay in public hospitals in South Africa, selected years 2008–2022/23 (days) (Source: CRA, 2025) INTERIM OBSERVATION Part 3 assesses health system efficiency using two system-level indicators that capture how hospital resources are utilised and how quickly patients move through inpatient care: in-patient bed utilisation rates and average length of stay. These measures do not describe clinical quality or distributional equity, but they do provide a useful view of operational performance within hospitals. The evidence indicates that the hospital system is operating within a relatively stable utilisation range, rather than showing a pattern of chronic congestion or sustained under-use, where, for example, bed utilisation levels are sufficiently high to suggest meaningful absorption of available capacity, while also remaining below levels typically associated with persistent overcrowding. This points to a system that, at an aggregate level, is making substantial use of inpatient capacity without signalling structural overload. Average length of stay provides a complementary view of throughput. Over the period reported, length of stay shows an overall decline from earlier years to more recent years, with some year-to-year variation. A shorter average length of stay is consistent with improved bed turnover and the ability of facilities to treat more patients with a given stock of beds, although the indicator on its own cannot distinguish between efficiency gains and changes in case mix or admission practices. The appropriate conclusion is therefore bounded and evidence-based. The two indicators together suggest that inpatient services have, in aggregate, maintained stable utilisation while improving throughput over time. They do not, however, allow the report to attribute these changes to specific interventions, nor do they provide proof of programme-level efficiency in areas such as HIV, TB or maternal care. Those issues require additional process and cost measures not examined in this section. EXPERIENCE VERSUS EVIDENCE: UNDERSTANDING THE PERSISTENCE OF DISSATISFACTION The evidence presented in this report indicates measurable improvements in several key health outcomes, alongside expanded capacity and stable or improving system-level efficiency, but these findings coexist with a persistent public narrative that the public health system is failing or deteriorating. This apparent contradiction does not imply that the evidence is wrong, rather, it reflects the way health system performance is experienced and perceived at the point of care. Health system outcomes are measured at aggregate level, while health system experience is local, uneven and intensely personal. Improvements in national averages do not eliminate the reality that patients encounter long waiting times, overcrowded facilities, staff shortages and variable quality in specific hospitals or clinics. Where service delivery fails, it does so visibly and directly, shaping public perception far more powerfully than incremental or preventative successes that are, by their nature, less visible. In addition, improvements in health outcomes often manifest as non-events, such as lives not lost, infections averted, conditions managed before becoming catastrophic, yet these gains are real and substantial, even if they are largely invisible to the individual users of the system. By contrast, service failures are highly salient, where a delayed ambulance, an overcrowded ward and/or an unavailable specialist is immediately experienced and remembered, thereby reinforcing a sense of systemic dysfunction even in the presence of broader improvement. The persistence of dissatisfaction should therefore be understood not as evidence that the system has failed to improve, but as a reflection of the distributional strain in the health system, uneven service quality and the inherent visibility bias associated with public services. System-level progress can coexist with poor individual experiences, particularly in a context of high demand, historical inequality and constrained resources. Recognising this distinction is essential. It allows the report to acknowledge lived experience without dismissing it, while also avoiding the error of conflating perception with aggregate performance. The evidence and the experience are not mutually exclusive, they describe different dimensions of the same system. Understanding both is necessary for an honest assessment of where South Africa’s health system has improved, where it remains under pressure, and why public confidence lags behind measured progress. What this report does not claim This report is intentionally narrow in scope and evidentiary ambition. It does not claim that South Africa’s public health system is adequately resourced, equitably distributed or free from serious operational failures. Nor does it deny the persistence of service breakdowns, staff shortages, infrastructure decay or uneven patient experience across provinces and facilities. The analysis does not seek to evaluate health policy design, governance arrangements or reform proposals such as National Health Insurance, nor does it assess the efficiency or integrity of procurement, management or oversight structures. It also does not attempt to measure quality of care at the point of service, patient satisfaction or institutional culture. Instead, the report confines itself to a limited, but important question: whether key population-level health outcomes and system capacity indicators are broadly consistent with the claim that the public health system has experienced wholesale collapse. The findings suggest a more complex reality, one characterised by measurable gains over time, followed by sustained strain and uneven performance, rather than systemic failure across all dimensions. By drawing this distinction explicitly, the report aims to inform debate, rather than settle it, and to ground public discussion in evidence without minimising lived experience or legitimate dissatisfaction. CONCLUSION This report set out to assess whether South Africa’s public health system shows evidence of progress when examined through outcomes, capacity and efficiency, rather than through anecdote or isolated failures. On balance, the evidence supports a measured, but defensible conclusion: important aspects of health performance have improved over time, even as significant challenges and vulnerabilities remain. At the level of health outcomes, the data explored in this report does not sustain a narrative of systemic deterioration. Long-run declines in infant and child mortality, which if read alongside the improvements in life expectancy, points to a better survival rate across key stages of the life course. Most notably, the sustained reduction in new HIV infections and the marked decline in tuberculosis prevalence since the early 2010s indicate a structural shift away from the exceptionally high disease burdens that characterised the height of the HIV epidemic. These improvements are neither uniform nor are they complete, but they are substantial, durable and observable across multiple independent health performance indicators. The assessment of health system capacity shows that these outcome improvements have not occurred in isolation, but over time, within a system that has expanded critical inputs, including health personnel, infrastructure and emergency services. While capacity remains uneven across regions and services, and while shortages persist in key areas, the aggregate trend is one of expansion, rather than contraction. This provides an essential context for interpreting outcomes: the system has been required to deliver care to a growing and ageing population under sustained epidemiological and fiscal pressure. The evidence on efficiency, that this report examined through in-patient bed utilisation rates and average length of hospital stay, points to a cautious, but meaningful improvement in operational performance within hospitals, where utilisation levels suggest that available inpatient capacity is being actively used without clear signs of chronic overload, while declining lengths of stay are consistent with improved throughput. These indicators are necessarily limited in scope and do not speak to quality of care or programme-level efficiency. Nonetheless, they provide credible evidence that the system has, in aggregate, managed to maintain or improve operational functioning, rather than deteriorate under pressure. Taken together, the findings challenge both extremes of the public debate, in that they do not support complacency, nor do they justify claims of wholesale failure, and instead, the evidence points to a health system that has made real progress, particularly in outcomes related to communicable diseases, while continuing to operate under significant structural and distributional constraints. The implications are clear. First, policy debate should be grounded in evidence that recognises both progress and limits, rather than defaulting to crisis narratives; second, future reform efforts should focus less on blanket assessments of system failure and more on identifying where gains have been made and how they can be consolidated and extended; and finally, while the system has demonstrated resilience and adaptive capacity, sustaining and deepening these gains will require continued investment, targeted reform and careful attention to efficiency, equity and quality. In short, the South African public health system emerges from this assessment not as a system in collapse, but rather, as one that has delivered meaningful improvements over time under difficult conditions, a reality that should inform both the public discourse and the policy choices going forward. REFERENCES Centre for risk Analysis (CRA). 2025. Socio-Economic Survey of South Africa. Health February 2025.[Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://cra-sa.com/products/socio-economic-survey/2025/files/health-february-2025-02.pdf [accessed: 20 January 2026] Statistics South Africa (SA). 2024. Mid-year Population Estimates, 2024 (Statistical Release P0302), Appendix 2 (Demographic indicators, 2002–2024). [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022024.pdf? [accessed: 20 January 2026] ANNEXURE A DATA TABLES SUPPORTING THE ANALYSIS This annexure contains the underlying health outcome, system capacity and efficiency data series referenced in the report. The tables are provided to enable readers to verify reported figures, examine trends over time, and replicate the analysis presented in the main body of the report. The data cover indicators relating to population health outcomes, health system inputs and selected measures of system utilisation. All series are drawn from the sources cited in the report and are presented without adjustment or modelling, unless explicitly stated. PART I: QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN HEALTH OUTCOMES Year Vaccination coverage in children (%) Infant mortality (under 1 year) per 100k Under-five mortalitYeary rate per 100k Life expectancy at birth (yrs) Acute malnutri-tion (%) No. of HIV-positive people (%) New HIV infections (number) TB prevalence (per 100k) 1990 475 1991 475 1992 473 1993 461 1994 444 1994 427 1996 415 1997 417 1998 443 1999 496 2000 568 2001 644 2002 57 79,7 14,4 694 2003 57,1 82,3 14,8 722 2004 57,2 81,3 15,1 736 2005 56,2 80,9 15,3 748 2006 55,1 78,2 15,5 748 2007 49,4 70 15,7 753 2008 48,9 63,8 15,9 761 2009 44,7 55,9 16,1 380402 795 2010 41,9 50,6 16,5 803 2011 37,1 44 16,8 320995 831 2012 34,6 40,4 17,2 857 2013 32,9 38,5 17,5 283764 715 2014 30,9 37,4 17,6 696 2015 29,2 36,7 17,6 253300 454 2016 28,2 36,2 17,6 438 2017 27,3 35,7 17,6 211955 322 2018 76,6 25,6 33,4 7,4 17,6 301 2019 83 25,4 32,5 7,1 17,5 181376 360 2020 84,5 24,5 31,4 7,8 17,3 2021 82,7 24,5 31,3 7,3 17,2 163906 2022 87,6 24,9 31,2 7,9 17 2023 83,5 24 30,5 7,2 16,9 149277 2024 22,9 28,6 16,7 141808 PART II: HEALTH SYSTEM CAPACITY Year People-to-doctor People-to-nurse People-per-pharma-cist Number of public hospital beds Number of ambulance providers 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 3808 482 40263 2001 4015 491 2002 4143 496 35908 2003 4186 509 37995 2004 2005 3829 492 28997 2006 3584 490 2007 3428 480 26148 2008 3317 466 26275 2009 3247 464 2010 3174 450 16855 2011 3112 423 14583 2012 3036 424 13400 2013 2867 407 2014 2921 408 2015 2948 411 11058 2016 2978 418 10704 2017 2862 420 10457 2018 2911 425 10522 2019 3051 440 11453 713 2020 2936 446 11173 85063 736 2021 2760 415 10850 55913 734 2022 2735 422 10491 88556 760 2023 2795 446 10436 88785 797 2024 834 PART III: SYSTEM EFFICIENCY AND PERFORMANCE Year Bed utilisation rate Average length of stay (days) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 6,4 2009 2010 2011 2012 6,6 2013 2014 6,5 2015 2016 72 6,2 2017 70,6 2018 67,7 6,2 2019 72,5 6 2020 72,4 6,1 2021 60,7 5,9 2022 65,9 6,1 2023 66,9 6,2 2024 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. This report was prepared with the assistance of AI technology, including ChatGPT. JUNE 2026 Author: Inclusive Society Institute CONTENTS Executive Summary: What the evidence actually shows Introduction Methodology and data approach PART I: Crime outcomes: What has happened PART II: State capacity and institutional strain PART III: Accountability, legitimacy and trust PART IV: Inequality, privatisation and the shape of safety PART V: Misdiagnosis, missteps and the path back to stability Conclusion: Strain, stabilisation and the responsibility of realism References Annexure A Cover image: Microsoft Copilot (2026) Education in South Africa. AI generated image LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Murder rate per 100,000 population, 1994/95–2023/24 Figure 2: Murder rate per 100,000 population, 2019/20–2023/24 Figure 3: Serious assault rate per 100,000 population Figure 4: Theft out of motor vehicles rate per 100,000 population Figure 5: Aggravated robbery rate per 100,000 population Figure 6: Residential burglary rate per 100,000 population, 1994/95 and 2023/24 Figure 7: Reported sexual assault cases per 100,000 population, 1994–2024 Figure 8: Farm murders in South Africa, 1994–2023 Figure 9: Farm murders in South Africa, 2019–2023 Figure 10: Citizens per sworn police officer (1997 - 2024) Figure 11: Police officers murdered Figure 12: Deaths as a result of police action or in custody Figure 13: Public perceptions of safety Figure 14: Public vs private security personnel EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: WHAT THE EVIDENCE ACTUALLY SHOWS South Africa is not a crime-free society, but it is not a society in free fall. Crime remains a serious challenge, but the evidence does not support claims of inevitable collapse or permanent deterioration. Much of the despair about crime is driven by how numbers are reported, not only by what is happening. Absolute crime numbers rise in a growing population. This alone does not mean that South Africans are becoming less safe. When crime is measured properly, using rates and ratios, the picture changes materially. Population-adjusted indicators show that several major crime categories are substantially lower today than during the early democratic period The murder trend tells a more positive long-term story than is commonly acknowledged. Murder rates today are significantly below their mid-1990s and early-2000s levels. While post-pandemic increases reversed some gains, recent stabilisation shows that deterioration is not linear, nor irreversible. Everyday violent and property crimes show some of the clearest improvements. Serious assault, residential burglary and theft out of motor vehicles have all declined markedly from their historical peaks, despite year-to-year volatility. Sexual violence remains one of South Africa’s gravest social failures, but even here the data resists simplistic despair. Reported sexual offences peaked in the mid-2000s and have declined over time, highlighting both real progress and the complexity of reporting behaviour. Aggravated robbery is the most persistent exception, harmful, visible and difficult to suppress. Yet, even this category remains well below its historical peak and only slightly higher than at the advent of democracy, indicating persistence, rather than runaway escalation. Farm murders are rare in absolute terms and have declined from earlier peaks, and whilst each incident is traumatic and unacceptable, the long-term trend does not support claims of exponential growth or systemic targeting; it must be understood in proportion to overall violent crime trends. Policing capacity has been strained, but not destroyed. The trends show that the number of citizens per police officer revealed improvements, but again worsened over the past decade. Recent improvements point, however, to partial recovery, rather than terminal decline. Independent oversight remains operational and the trends show that fluctuations in deaths as a result from police action or custody, reflects pressure and context, but its mechanisms continue functioning and remain accountable. The growth of private security reflects inequality more than state collapse, it signals uneven access to safety and not the disappearance of public policing. Public fear remains high, but uneven, with most South Africans feeling safe during the day, but unsafe at night. Perceptions have stabilised, rather than improved, once again reflecting strain, not collapse. The evidence points to strain and uneven outcomes, not inevitability. South Africa’s crime story is one of progress made, progress eroded, and progress still possible. Despair is understandable, but it is not the only rational response. Where improvement has occurred before, it can occur again. Evidence-based realism is the foundation of recovery and hope. A NOTE ON CONTEXT South Africa is widely described as a country in decline, even a country in collapse. Public debate, media commentary and everyday conversation are saturated with the language of failure: a failed state, a failed government, a society coming apart at the seams. That is the dominant public perception. This report was developed precisely to test that perception against evidence. It asks a simple question: when we look carefully at the data, when we measure performance, rather than emotion, does the story of collapse hold? The evidence does not support that conclusion. What it shows instead is a country under real and sustained strain, economically, socially and institutionally, but not a country that has collapsed, and not a state that has failed. The challenges are serious and should not be minimised, yet they coexist with resilience, capacity and untapped potential. South Africa’s outcomes are weaker than they should be, but stronger than public perception suggests. With a firmer growth path, improved institutional performance and greater policy consistency, the trajectory can change. This report therefore argues for realism without despair: less denial of strain, but also less surrender to hopelessness. South Africa warrants more honesty and more confidence than the prevailing narrative allows. INTRODUCTION South Africa is living through a period of profound anxiety about its future. Crime features prominently in this unease, often serving as shorthand for much broader concerns about governance, social cohesion and the viability of the democratic project itself. In public discourse, particularly beyond our borders, these anxieties are increasingly distilled into a single, fatalistic claim: that South Africa is a failed state, a country in irreversible decline. This report begins from a different premise. It accepts, without qualification, that South Africa faces serious and persistent crime and safety challenges. It acknowledges that progress has been uneven, that important gains have been reversed, and that too many citizens experience violence, not as an abstraction, but as a daily reality. What it does not accept is that deterioration is inevitable, that institutions have collapsed beyond repair or that despair is a reasonable substitute for analysis. The True South Africa evidence series is premised on a simple, but demanding idea: that national self-assessment should be grounded in data, historical perspective and institutional realism, rather than anecdote, outrage or selective comparison. This first report focuses on crime, safety and policing capacity, because these issues sit at the heart of public confidence. They shape how citizens experience the state, how communities relate to one another, and how the country is perceived by the world. Crucially, this report does not ask whether South Africa has solved its crime problem. It plainly has not. Instead, it asks a more difficult and more useful question: do the available trends point toward collapse and inevitability or toward strain within a system that still retains the capacity for correction and improvement? The distinction matters, because only the latter leaves room for agency, reform and responsibility. This is the first report in a broader series that will examine education, health and economic performance with the same methodological discipline and refusal to surrender to either denial or despair. Together, they aim to re-anchor national debate in evidence, proportionality and confidence rooted in realism. METHODOLOGY AND DATA APPROACH This report draws on publicly available, verifiable crime, population and institutional data compiled in the Crime and Security chapter of the March 2025 Socio-Economic Survey of South Africa. That chapter integrates and standardises primary data drawn from official sources, including South African Police Service crime statistics, Statistics South Africa population and victimisation data, Independent Police Investigative Directorate reporting, and published personnel figures used to assess policing capacity. The Socio-Economic Survey (CRA, 2025) does not generate original crime statistics. Rather, it collates, cleans and presents primary administrative and survey data produced by these institutions in a consistent and transparent format. The analysis in this report is therefore based on secondary analysis of primary data, as compiled and verified in the Crime and Security chapter of the Survey. Two time horizons are used throughout the report. The first examines long-term trends from the early democratic period to the most recent available year, allowing assessment of structural change over time. The second focuses on the period from roughly 2019 onward, capturing recent volatility, pandemic-era distortions and post-pandemic stabilisation dynamics. Where full year-by-year series are not available in published form, selected benchmark years are used transparently and explicitly. No data has been extrapolated beyond published sources. No missing values have been inferred or smoothed. Absolute numbers are used where rates would be misleading, and population-adjusted rates and ratios are used where scale and comparability require them. The intention throughout is not to produce the most flattering picture possible, but the most defensible one. PART I CRIME OUTCOMES: WHAT HAS HAPPENED ABSOLUTE NUMBERS, POPULATION GROWTH AND THE PROBLEM OF FALSE COMPARISON Public debate about crime in South Africa often begins with numbers that appear self-evident and alarming. Headlines point to increases in the absolute number of crimes recorded and these raw counts are frequently taken as conclusive proof that the country is becoming steadily more violent. This report begins from a different starting point: before assessing what has happened to crime, it is necessary to be clear about how crime data should be read. A significant contributor to public despair is not only the level of violence itself, but the way crime data is routinely presented and interpreted. Media reporting, political commentary and social discourse frequently focus on absolute numbers of crimes committed, treating increases in raw counts as self-evident proof of deterioration. In a country that has experienced rapid population growth over three decades, this approach is not merely misleading, it is analytically unsound. South Africa’s population today is vastly larger than it was at the advent of democracy. At the time of the first democratic elections in 1994, the country’s population stood at approximately 40-44 million people (Stats SA, 1998), but by 2024, South Africa’s population had grown to just over 63 million (Stats SA, 2024). In other words, the country today has around twenty million more people than it did at the start of the democratic era, an increase of close to 50 per cent. This demographic reality matters profoundly for how crime data is understood. All else being equal, a larger population will generate more incidents of almost every social phenomenon, including crime. This is not a peculiarity of South Africa, nor a controversial proposition. It is a universal demographic truth. When the number of people increases substantially, the absolute number of offences can rise even if the risk faced by any individual citizen remains unchanged or even declines. For this reason, raw crime counts tell us very little about whether a society has become more or less violent in any meaningful sense. They do not measure risk, probability or exposure and they cannot distinguish between a society that is becoming more dangerous and one that is simply larger. Treating absolute numbers as evidence of decline therefore conflates population growth with institutional failure, which amplifies anxiety, whilst it obscures the underlying dynamics. A more sober, and more honest, assessment requires the use of rates and ratios: crimes per 100,000 population, citizens per police officer, or comparable measures that adjust for scale. These indicators allow like-for-like comparison across time. They tell us whether the likelihood of victimisation has increased or decreased, rather than how many incidents occurred in total. Throughout Part I of this report, crime outcomes are therefore assessed using population-adjusted measures wherever possible. This is not a technical preference, but an analytical necessity. Only once the question of scale is addressed can the evidence speak meaningfully to whether South Africa’s crime trajectory reflects collapse, strain, stabilisation or the possibility of recovery. VIOLENCE IN LONG-RUN PERSPECTIVE South Africa entered democracy with levels of violence that were exceptionally high by international standards. The mid-1990s represent not a neutral baseline, but the inherited legacy of decades of social fracture, political conflict and institutionalised inequality. Any serious assessment of progress must therefore begin by recognising the depth of the challenge at the starting point. The long-run trajectory of murder rates since the mid-1990s reveals a pattern that resists simplistic interpretation. A substantial and sustained decline in crime occurred over the first decade and a half of democracy, reflecting improvements in policing, stabilisation of political violence and the gradual consolidation of state authority. By the early 2010s, murder rates had reached their lowest levels since the transition. That progress was not maintained. The subsequent period saw a clear reversal, coinciding with broader patterns of institutional weakening, declining state capacity and erosion of public trust. In recent years, murder rates have risen from their post-2010 low point and remain unacceptably high and yet, it is equally important to note what the data does not show. Current levels, while deeply concerning, are still materially below those recorded at the outset of democracy in the early 1990s, which means that the system is volatile and strained, but not exponential and/or uncontrolled. Figure 1: Murder rate per 100,000 population, 1994/95–2023/24 (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure shows the long-term trajectory of South Africa’s murder rate from the early democratic period to the most recent available year, where murder rates were exceptionally high in the mid-1990s, then they declined substantially over the following decade and a half, rising again during a period of institutional weakening; and whilst current levels remain unacceptably high, they are still materially below those recorded at the start of democracy in the early 1990s, which points to a system under strain and gain reversal, rather than a system that has collapsed. This distinction is essential, in that a narrative of collapse implies a system that has lost all capacity for containment and correction. The evidence points instead to a system under pressure, capable of improvement, but vulnerable to regression when capacity and leadership falter. Figure 2: Murder rate per 100,000 population, 2019/20–2023/24 (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure focuses on the most recent period, capturing pandemic-related disruption and post-pandemic stabilisation. While murder rates increased from the unusually low level recorded during lockdown conditions, the trend over the past two years has been broadly stable, rather than accelerating. This pattern is consistent with institutional strain and volatility, not uncontrolled deterioration. EVERYDAY VIOLENCE AND LIVED SAFETY Murder statistics rightly attract attention, but in reality they represent only a small fraction of the overall violence that citizens are experiencing. Serious assault offers a broader window into everyday harm and lived insecurity in that it captures violence that may not make headlines, but which profoundly shapes how people experience their communities, workplaces and public spaces. For this category of crime, the long-run picture is more clearly one of improvement. Serious assault rates in the mid-1990s were extraordinarily high, reflecting pervasive interpersonal violence, but over time, these rates declined sharply, reaching levels that are roughly half of what they were at the dawn of democracy. As with murder, setbacks occurred and progress was not linear and yet, even after recent volatility, serious assault remains far below its historical peak. Figure 3: Serious assault rate per 100,000 population (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure illustrates changes in the rate of serious assault over time and it captures both long-term improvement and recent volatility. Serious assault rates have declined substantially since the mid-1990s and remain roughly half of their early democratic levels. While progress has not been linear and recent years reflect stabilisation, rather than rapid improvement, the long-run reduction is significant and sustained. This matters because it demonstrates that large-scale behavioural and social shifts are possible. It also complicates claims that South Africa is uniformly more violent today than in the past. The reality is more uneven, more demanding of nuance, and more instructive for policy. PROPERTY CRIME AND OPPORTUNITY Theft out of motor vehicles provides insight into a different dimension of safety: opportunistic crime closely linked to urban design, visibility, routine activity and policing presence. In the mid-1990s, this category of crime was extremely prevalent and it affected large numbers of households, thereby contributing to pervasive insecurity. Over time, the rate of theft out of motor vehicles declined substantially, falling to a fraction of its early democratic levels by the late 2010s. The pandemic years introduced temporary distortions, but recent data shows stabilisation at historically lower levels. This trajectory is significant precisely because it reflects cumulative institutional learning, rather than isolated interventions. Property crime of this nature responds to design, deterrence and routine enforcement. Its long-term decline illustrates that sustained, incremental improvements can yield durable results, even in a complex social environment. Figure 4: Theft out of motor vehicles rate per 100,000 population (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure shows the long-term reduction and recent stabilisation in theft out of motor vehicles, where rates in the mid-1990s were exceptionally high, but which declined sharply over time and which has now stabilised at much lower levels in recent years. The pattern reflects cumulative gains in everyday crime prevention and deterrence, rather than short-term suppression. THE UNFINISHED CHALLENGE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY If some indicators point toward improvement, aggravated robbery represents the counterweight that prevents complacency. Unlike murder, serious assault, residential burglary and theft out of motor vehicles, all of which declined substantially from their mid-1990s levels, aggravated robbery has proven more resistant to sustained reduction. That said, proportion matters, because whilst the trend shows that aggravated robbery rates are slightly higher today than at the advent of democracy, they remain considerably below their historical peak, which occurred during the late 2000s. The long-run pattern is therefore not one of unchecked escalation, but of elevated persistence within a bounded range, punctuated by periods of increase and partial retreat. This distinction is important. In absolute terms, aggravated robbery stands out because it did not follow the steep downward trajectory observed in several other major crime categories. In relative terms, however, its deviation from early democratic levels is modest, particularly when compared to the scale of decline achieved elsewhere. The intensity of its fluctuation over time is therefore lower than commonly assumed, even as its impact on victims remains severe. Temporary reductions during periods of restricted movement underscore how sensitive this category is to opportunity structures, mobility and firearm availability. The rebound that followed illustrates the limits of short-term suppression in the absence of sustained disruption of organised criminal networks and thus aggravated robbery highlights a specific and enduring enforcement challenge within an otherwise uneven crime landscape, rather than evidence of generalised collapse. Including this category is essential precisely because it resists simple narratives. It shows that progress in South Africa’s crime profile has been real, but incomplete, unevenly distributed across offence types, and vulnerable where institutional capacity, deterrence and disruption of organised crime have lagged. This complexity reinforces the central theme of this report: strain and persistence, rather than inevitability or systemic failure. Figure 5: Aggravated robbery rate per 100,000 population (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure shows trends in aggravated robbery since the advent of the new political dispensation. Unlike several other crime categories, aggravated robbery rates are slightly higher today than they were in the mid-1990s, despite temporary declines during periods of restricted movement. The temporary decline was followed by a rebound, underscoring the structural nature of this challenge and the limits of short-term suppression, but even so, the pattern highlights uneven institutional performance, rather than systemic collapse. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AND THE INVASION OF PRIVATE SPACE Residential burglary occupies a particular place in how crime is experienced and understood by citizens. Unlike crimes that occur in public or at a distance, burglary is felt as a violation of the most basic expectation of safety: that one’s home offers a measure of refuge. For this reason, residential burglary has an outsized psychological impact relative to its share of overall crime, shaping fear, behaviour and perceptions of national decline. From an analytical perspective, residential burglary is also revealing, because it sits at the intersection of opportunity, deterrence and routine activity. It is influenced by visibility, patrol presence, neighbourhood design and predictability of response. As such, it is often more sensitive to cumulative institutional capacity than to short-term enforcement surges. Trends in residential burglary therefore offer insight into whether everyday crime prevention has weakened irreversibly or remains responsive to governance choices. The long-run data provides important context. Residential burglary rates were extremely high in the mid-1990s, reflecting both inherited social conditions and limited preventative capacity at the outset of democracy, but over time, these rates declined substantially. While progress was uneven and interrupted by periods of volatility, the most recent data shows that residential burglary rates remain materially lower than those recorded at the beginning of the democratic period. This does not mean that residential burglary is no longer a serious problem, because it remains a major driver of fear and behavioural change, particularly because of its intimate nature and the sense of violation it produces. However, reading this indicator in historical proportion is essential. The long-term reduction demonstrates that improvement has been possible and that residential crime has responded to cumulative changes in deterrence, design and institutional learning. Interpreted in this way, residential burglary reinforces the central argument of this report. It underscores the seriousness of lived insecurity while also challenging the claim that South Africa’s safety trajectory is one of uninterrupted collapse. The pattern points instead to strain within a system that has delivered gains in the past, lost some of them through capacity erosion, and retains the potential for stabilisation when preventative capability is rebuilt. Figure 6: Residential burglary rate per 100,000 population, 1994/95 and 2023/24 (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure shows the long-term change in residential burglary from the early democratic period to the most recent year, showing that rates were substantially higher in the mid-1990s and have declined over time, despite volatility in the intervening years. The long-run reduction is significant, even as residential burglary remains a key source of fear and lived insecurity. SEXUAL OFFENCES: SEVERITY, REPORTING AND LONG-RUN TRENDS Sexual offences occupy a distinctive and deeply troubling place in South Africa’s crime landscape, since crimes inflict comparable physical harm, psychological trauma and long-lasting social consequences. Sexual violence also shapes patterns of fear, mobility and vulnerability in ways that extend far beyond those directly affected, particularly for women and children, and therefore any serious assessment of safety and insecurity must confront this category directly, without euphemism or evasion. At the same time, sexual offences present particular challenges for interpretation. Unlike many other crime categories, recorded sexual offences are highly sensitive to reporting behaviour. Fear of secondary victimisation, distrust in institutions, stigma and uneven access to police services all affect whether survivors come forward and therefore reported cases reflect not only the prevalence of violence, but also levels of trust, awareness and institutional responsiveness. This does not weaken the data, but it does require that it be read with care. Seen in long-run perspective, the recorded data nevertheless reveals an important pattern, being that reported sexual assault cases increased through the late 1990s and early 2000s, reaching a peak in the mid-2000s. Thereafter, the trend shifted, revealing that from roughly the late 2000s onward, reported cases declined steadily, with volatility in the intervening years, but a clear movement away from the earlier peak levels. However, that said, by the mid-to-late 2010s, the recorded number of sexual offences were substantially lower than during the high-point of the previous decade. The COVID-19 period disrupted this pattern, as it did across much of the criminal justice system due to restrictions on movement, reduced access to police stations and social services, and the broader dislocation of daily life affected both the incidence and reporting of crime. However, in the years immediately following the pandemic, recorded sexual offences show modest fluctuation, but still it remained well below the levels observed during the mid-2000s peak. It is essential to be precise about what this does and does not mean. The long-run decline in reported sexual offences does not imply that sexual violence is no longer a serious problem, nor does it justify complacency. Under-reporting remains a defining feature of this category, and changes in recorded levels cannot be read as a simple proxy for changes in lived experience. At the same time, the data does not support a narrative of uninterrupted deterioration or runaway escalation. Even in one of the most sensitive and morally charged categories of crime, the long-term pattern is more complex than commonly assumed. Interpreted in proportion, sexual offence data reinforces the central argument of this report. South Africa’s safety challenges are profound, uneven and often traumatic, but they are not characterised by uniform or irreversible collapse across all dimensions. Progress has been achieved in the past, some of it has been eroded, and some gains have been preserved. Understanding this complexity is not an exercise in minimisation; it is a prerequisite for designing responses that are grounded in evidence, attentive to victims and capable of restoring both safety and trust over time. Figure 7: Reported sexual assault cases per 100,000 population, 1994–2024 (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure shows the long-term trend in reported sexual assault cases in South Africa from the early democratic period to the most recent year. Reported cases rose through the late 1990s and early 2000s, reaching a peak in the mid-2000s, before declining over time, with volatility in the intervening years and a sharp disruption around the COVID-19 period. While sexual violence remains a deeply serious and under-reported crime, the long-run pattern does not support claims of uninterrupted escalation and highlights the importance of reading reported figures alongside reporting behaviour, institutional trust and access to justice. FARM MURDERS: CONTEXT, SERIOUSNESS AND PROPORTION Few crime issues generate as much heat and as little light as farm murders. These crimes are real, traumatic and morally indefensible and they demand serious attention and effective response, but at the same time, the way they are often represented in public discourse bears little resemblance to the empirical record. Long-run data shows that farm murders were most prevalent in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with significant year-to-year volatility thereafter, but in recent years, the number of such murders has declined from those historical highest. This is not to say that the problem has dissipated, it has not, it persists and remains deeply distressing for affected communities. What the data does not support, however, are claims of exponential escalation or novel post-1994 targeting, let alone genocide. Holding these facts together is not an exercise in minimisation. It is an exercise in proportion. Alarmism may mobilise attention, but it also corrodes trust and forecloses the possibility of reasoned response. A bounded problem, however serious, remains one that can be addressed. Figure 8: Farm murders in South Africa, 1994–2023 (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure reflects the number of recorded farm (which include farmers, black and white, their family and workers) murders over the long term and shows that farm murders peaked in the late 1990s and early 2000s, followed by substantial volatility and an overall decline from those historical highs. Whist these crimes remain deeply serious and traumatic, the long-run pattern disputes claims of exponential escalation or recent structural change. Figure 9: Farm murders in South Africa, 2019–2023 (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure focuses on farm murders in the most recent period, with the data showing year-to-year volatility, rather than a consistent upward trend, and while the number of incidents remains unacceptable, recent figures do not indicate escalation relative to earlier peaks, reinforcing the importance of proportion and historical context when interpreting these crimes. PART II STATE CAPACITY AND INSTITUTIONAL STRAIN POLICING CAPACITY AND POPULATION PRESSURE Crime statistics on their own tell only part of the story. To understand why certain trends have stabilised, why others have worsened, and why progress has been so uneven, it is necessary to examine the capacity of the institutions tasked with maintaining public safety. In South Africa’s case, the most revealing measure of this capacity is not expenditure in rands, but the relationship between population size and the number of sworn police officers available to serve it. ABSOLUTE POLICE NUMBERS AND CAPACITY DRIFT Changes in per-capita policing capacity are often attributed solely to population growth, but this explanation is incomplete without examining what happened to the absolute number of sworn police officers. In South Africa’s case, the record points not to sudden collapse, but to a period of stagnation followed by gradual contraction. During the 2000s, the South African Police Service experienced a sustained expansion in sworn personnel, which rose form roughly 104,000-108,000 sworn officers in the early 2000s to a high-water mark of approximately 157,000 sworn officers around 2012. This period coincided with the most favourable per-capita policing ratios in the democratic era and broadly aligned with improvements across several major crime categories. This trajectory was not sustained. From the mid-2010s onward, recruitment slowed while attrition increased and that resulted in a steady erosion of absolute police numbers. By 2021, the number of sworn SAPS members had again declined to roughly 140,000, despite continued population growth and increasingly complex policing demands. So in absolute terms, this decline represented a reduction of around 17,500 officers from the early-2010s peak. Importantly, the most recent data also points to a partial recovery, because by 2024, sworn personnel numbers had increased again to approximately 150,000 officers. While this improvement does not fully restore the per-capita policing capacity achieved a decade earlier, it does mark a reversal of the earlier decline and helps explain the modest recent improvement visible in the citizens-to-police ratio. This shift did not occur abruptly. Rather, it reflected cumulative pressures: fiscal constraint, organisational challenges, difficulties in retaining experienced personnel and competing state priorities. The result was a police service that continued to operate, deploy and adapt, but with progressively fewer officers available to meet growing demand. Understanding this dynamic is critical. The erosion of policing outcomes in some areas did not occur because the police service ceased to exist or collapsed institutionally, but because capacity stopped expanding at precisely the moment when demographic, social and criminal pressures required it to do so. The system remained intact, but increasingly stretched. Seen in this light, South Africa’s safety challenge is better understood as one of capacity drift, rather than institutional failure. The data shows a functioning police service operating under rising strain, which reinforces the central conclusion of this report, which is that deterioration was neither inevitable nor irreversible, but the result of identifiable choices and constraints. PER-CAPITA POLICING CAPACITY AND POPULATION GROWTH Over the long run, South Africa’s policing capacity relative to population growth has followed a non-linear trajectory, which has reflected both deliberate policy choices and broader structural pressures. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the number of people in the country per police officer increased (primarily as a result of population growth that outpaced the expansion of the police service) and this placed a growing strain on front-line policing capacity. In tandem, the levels of serious crime rose, but from the mid-2000s onwards, the trajectory shifted into positive territory, which ushered in a sustained period of personnel recruitment and institutional expansion, that resulted in measurable improvements in per-capita policing capacity. This saw the number of people per police officer decline steadily until reaching its most favourable point in the early 2010s. An important observation drawn from the data is that this period coincided with improvements across several major crime categories. This reinforced the intuitive link between policing capacity, on the one hand and deterrence and outcomes, on the other. But from approximately 2012 onwards, this progress in the strengthening of police officer numbers again began to reverse. Population growth, fiscal constraints and organisational challenges combined to erode per-capita capacity once more. The number of people per police officer increased steadily through the latter half of the 2010s, a trend that was intensified during the COVID-19 period, when extraordinary social disruption placed additional demands on an already strained system. As a result, fewer officers were required to serve larger, more complex and more demanding policing environments than had been the case a decade earlier. Importantly, however, the most recent data points do not suggest an unchecked or irreversible decline. In the latest reporting years, the number of people per police officer has declined again, indicating a modest, but meaningful improvement in per-capita capacity. While current levels remain less favourable than those achieved at the peak of expansion in the early 2010s, this recent improvement underscores a central theme of this report: the police service is under strain, but it has not collapsed, and its trajectory is neither fixed, nor uniformly negative. The implications of these shifts are significant, since periods of declining capacity force difficult trade-offs, because reactive responses tend to crowd out preventative work, visible policing gives way to case management and morale, and retention, suffer under sustained workload pressure. Yet, the historical record also demonstrates that capacity can be rebuilt, that improvements are possible within the existing institutional framework and that outcomes respond to changes in resourcing and organisation. The evidence therefore points not to institutional failure, but to the consequences of allowing policing capacity to lag persistently behind demand, and to the possibility of stabilisation and recovery when that gap is addressed. Figure 10: Citizens per sworn police officer (1997 - 2024) (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure shows changes in the ratio of citizens to sworn police officers over time. Policing capacity improved steadily through the 2000s, reaching its most favourable levels in the early 2010s. Since then, population growth, fiscal constraint and organisational pressures have reversed these gains, increasing the number of citizens each officer is responsible for. An improvement is however again registered in the last few years. The trend helps explain why crime outcomes have stabilised in some areas despite growing institutional strain. Understanding this dynamic is essential to interpreting crime trends honestly. Stabilisation in some crime categories has occurred, not because capacity has improved, but despite the fact that it has deteriorated. That distinction reinforces the case for reform, rather than resignation. THE HUMAN COST OF POLICING Behind every discussion of capacity lies a human reality. Policing is inherently dangerous work, particularly in societies characterised by high levels of violence and inequality and in this regard, the number of police officers murdered in the line of duty offers a stark reminder of the risks borne by those tasked with enforcing the law. Here again, a long-term perspective matters, because when analysing the trends over time it reveals that police killings were significantly higher in the late 1990s and early 2000s than they are today and one can presume, one supposes, due to, improvements over time in training, equipment and operational practice, all of which contributed to a sustained reduction in fatalities among officers. By the late 2010s, police murders had fallen to roughly half of their earlier peak levels. Recent years have seen a modest rebound and stabilisation, rather than a return to historical highs. The danger faced by police officers remains real and unacceptable, but it has not escalated uncontrollably and it is indicative of a pattern that mirrors the broader crime trends, namely progress achieved, gains partially eroded, but institutional function preserved. This matters not only for the safety of the officers themselves, but also for the legitimacy and sustainability of policing as a profession, because a society that demands effective law enforcement, while ignoring the risks and pressures faced by those who deliver it, creates conditions for burnout, withdrawal and mistrust. Recognising the human cost of policing is therefore not an indulgence; it is a prerequisite for rebuilding capacity and confidence. Figure 11: Police officers murdered (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure shows the number of police officers murdered over selected benchmark years. Fatalities were significantly higher in the late 1990s and early 2000s, declined steadily over time, and have stabilised in recent years; and while policing remains dangerous work, the long-term trend points to institutional adaptation and resilience, rather than escalating collapse. PART III ACCOUNTABILITY, LEGITIMACY AND TRUST Debates about crime and policing in South Africa often collapse into a false binary between enforcement and accountability, as if the two were competing objectives, rather than mutually reinforcing ones, but in reality, the legitimacy and effectiveness of policing depend on the presence of credible oversight mechanisms that regulate the use of force, investigate misconduct and sustain public trust. The existence and functioning of such mechanisms are among the clearest indicators separating states under strain from those that have genuinely failed. South Africa’s Independent Police Investigative Directorate occupies this critical space of accountability. Its mandate is neither to shield the police from scrutiny, nor to assume guilt in advance, but to ensure that deaths resulting from police action or occurring in police custody are systematically recorded, investigated and subjected to public oversight. The data generated through this process is frequently misunderstood and often misused, particularly in public debate that seeks either to condemn or defend institutions in absolute terms. Over the past decade, the number of deaths reported to oversight authorities has fluctuated, rather than following a single directional trend. Periods of increase have been followed by periods of reduction, and then increases again, thereby underscoring the sensitivity of this indicator to enforcement intensity, social disruption and operational context. A notable spike was registered around the 2019-2020 period, coinciding with the wider social disruption and intensified enforcement under emergency conditions at the time. Subsequent years did not settle into a simple decline, reinforcing that this measure is best interpreted as a context-responsive oversight indicator, rather than a linear story of either collapse or improvement. What this data does not tell us is who was at fault in individual cases, whether deaths resulted from misconduct, or how many led to prosecution. Those questions belong to a different analytical layer. What the data does show is that oversight exists, that incidents are recorded, and that trends are visible, rather than hidden. In societies where the state has collapsed, deaths involving law enforcement disappear into silence. In South Africa, they remain part of the public record. Figure 12: Deaths as a result of police action or in custody (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure shows the number of deaths reported to the Independent Police Investigative Directorate over selected years. The data reflects fluctuations, rather than a sustained upward trend, with a notable spike around the 2019–2020 period, which was again followed by continued fluctuation. This distinction is critical. The presence of oversight, even where imperfect, reflects an institutional commitment to legality and accountability and so the challenge does not lie in resurrecting a system that no longer exists, but instead, in strengthening one that does operates, albeit under strain and heightened public expectation. If accountability speaks to institutional legitimacy, public perception speaks to lived legitimacy and so even though crime statistics may stabilise or even improve, fear may linger long after the conditions have change. In South Africa, this gap between measurable trends and subjective experience is particularly pronounced, in that ot is shaped by historical trauma, inequality and the amplification of episodic violence through media and social platforms. Perceptions of safety in South Africa are sharply differentiated depending on the time of day. A strong majority of adults report feeling safe walking alone in their area during daylight hours, but confidence drops dramatically after dark. This day-night gap is persistent and large, and it shapes how people use public space, how they travel and how they judge the state’s ability to provide basic protection. In other words, South Africa is not experienced as uniformly unsafe, it is experienced as conditionally safe. Survey data also confirms that perceptions are easily distorted by context and that fear lags behind underlying change. Lockdown conditions temporarily improved reported feelings of safety as mobility declined and visible crime receded from daily experience, but this uplift did not endure once normal activity resumed. Recent figures do not show a meaningful rebound in confidence, particularly at night. What they do suggest is a fragile stabilisation: fear remains high, but it has levelled off rather than continued to worsen. Note: The trendline with squares represents night-time perceptions and the trendline with round dots represents day-time perceptions. Figure 13: Public perceptions of safety (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure shows the percentage of adults who reported feeling safe walking alone in their area, distinguishing between daytime and night-time perceptions. Daytime confidence remains relatively high, while night-time confidence is consistently far lower, revealing a persistent “conditional safety” pattern. The temporary improvement during lockdown reflects the altered mobility and exposure of the time and not a durable shift in confidence. In recent years, perceptions have not recovered, but they have stabilised. Night-time safety remains the most fragile dimension of public confidence. Trust in policing and public institutions is often treated as a moral attribute to be demanded, rather than a policy outcome that has to be earned, but in practice, trust emerges when institutions are present, predictable, accountable and demonstrably improving over time. Where capacity erodes and inequality deepens, trust weakens even if formal structures remain intact. The evidence presented here points to a country in which accountability mechanisms continue to function, perceptions remain fragile, and legitimacy is contested, rather than absent. This is not the profile of a failed state. It is the profile of a society grappling with how to rebuild confidence in institutions that still exist, but whose reach and consistency have been uneven. PART IV INEQUALITY, PRIVATISATION AND THE SHAPE OF SAFETY THE DUALIZATION OF PROTECTION One of the most revealing features of South Africa’s contemporary safety landscape is not found in crime rates alone, but in how protection itself has come to be organised. Over time, a quiet, but profound structural shift has taken place: the rapid expansion of private security alongside stagnation or contraction in public policing capacity, which development has reshaped how safety is experienced, distributed and understood across society. Private security personnel now vastly outnumber sworn public police officers and it is not a marginal trend or a recent anomaly, but a sustained pattern that has unfolded over more than two decades. As public policing capacity struggled to keep pace with the population growth and the rising security complexity, households, businesses and communities have increasingly turned to market-based solutions. In doing so, they did not abandon safety; they privatised it. Note: Dots denote public police personnel (SAPS); squares denote private security personnel. Dotted line segments indicate gaps in available data. Figure 14: Public vs private security personnel (Source: graphics – author; data – CRA, 2025) This figure compares the number of sworn public police officers with registered private security personnel over time. While SAPS personnel numbers have remained broadly flat or declined slightly, private security has expanded rapidly. The result is a dualized system of protection in which safety has increasingly been mediated by ability to pay, which reflects market substitution in response to public capacity constraints, rather than the absence of the state. This dualization of protection has far-reaching consequences, in that those with resources are able to insulate themselves from insecurity through guards, access control, rapid response services and surveillance. Their lived experience of safety may therefore improve even when public crime statistics remain volatile. On the other hand, those without such resources are left to rely almost entirely on an overstretched public system, where they have to experience both higher exposure to risk and slower response times. The result is a society in which safety is no longer primarily a shared public good, but a differentiated commodity, a reality that fuels resentment, deepens inequality and which distorts national narratives. For some (those with means) daily life feels increasingly secure, but for others (those without means) it feels increasingly precarious - both perceptions can coexist without contradiction. MARKET SUBSTITUTION AND MISDIAGNOSIS The growth of private security is often misread as evidence of state collapse, but in fact, it points to something more specific and more remediable: market substitution in response to uneven public provision. Where the state does not expand capacity fast enough, society compensates through private means, a dynamic that is not unique to South Africa, it is observable in health, education and infrastructure as well. Recognising this distinction matters, because it reshapes the policy question. The issue is not whether the state has ceased to function, but whether public capacity has been allowed to erode to the point where inequality becomes the primary mediator of safety. That is a governance failure, not a civilisational one. Moreover, private security’s growth does not render the public police irrelevant. On the contrary, private security relies heavily on public institutions for investigation, prosecution and the rule of law. Guards may deter or respond, but only the state can arrest, charge and convict and it is the persistence of this dependency underscores the continued centrality of public authority. SAFETY, INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL COHESION The privatisation of safety has implications that extend well beyond crime control, because when protection becomes unevenly distributed, trust between citizens erodes, public spaces fragment, social cohesion weakens as communities retreat behind walls, gates and patrols. What happens is that fear becomes spatially and economically coded, in that way reinforcing divisions that crime statistics alone cannot explain. This fragmentation also feeds despairing narratives about national decline, because when those with means withdraw from public systems, their disengagement is often misinterpreted as evidence that the state no longer matters. However, in reality, it reflects a failure to maintain universality in public provision, which is not a loss of statehood itself. Reversing this trend requires more than rhetorical reassurance and instead, it requires deliberate reinvestment in public capacity, targeted reform and a renewed commitment to safety as a collective good. The evidence presented in this report suggests that such a course remains possible: The system is strained, yes, but it has not collapsed beyond repair. PART V MISDIAGNOSIS, MISSTEPS AND THE PATH BACK TO STABILITY The evidence set out in this report points consistently to a country under strain, rather than a country in collapse. Yet, recognising strain without interrogating how it deepened would leave the analysis incomplete. If South Africa’s safety trajectory is not the product of inevitability, then it follows that it is also not beyond correction. Doing justice to that possibility requires a sober assessment of where decisions were misjudged, warning signs overlooked and opportunities missed. One of the most consequential missteps was the failure to sustain policing capacity in line with demographic and social change. The erosion documented in both absolute police numbers and per-capita coverage did not occur overnight, nor was it the result of a single policy choice, instead it emerged gradually, as recruitment slowed, attrition increased and population growth outpaced expansion. The effect was cumulative, rather than dramatic, but its impact on visibility, deterrence and preventative policing was profound and capacity drift, rather than institutional collapse, became the defining feature of the system. A second misjudgement lay in underestimating the long-term implications of uneven provision and so, as public capacity came under strain, private security expanded rapidly, filling gaps in protection for those able to afford it, but this market substitution reduced pressure only in some spaces and at the cost of universality. Safety increasingly became mediated by income and location, rather than citizenship alone. Over time, this dualization of protection weakened shared experience, eroded trust and fed narratives of abandonment, even as public institutions continued to operate. At the same time, the role of accountability and oversight was often mischaracterised in public debate. Oversight mechanisms such as the Independent Police Investigative Directorate were alternately portrayed as evidence of rampant abuse or dismissed as irrelevant. In reality, the existence, visibility and continuity of oversight data point to an institutional order that remains subject to scrutiny and correction. The problem has not been the absence of accountability, but the difficulty of sustaining legitimacy and trust in an environment of high fear and unequal outcomes. Perhaps the most damaging oversight, however, has been conceptual, rather than operational. In public discourse, complexity has too often been flattened into slogans of collapse or failure. Crime trends have been read without historical proportion. Volatility has been mistaken for inevitability. Real suffering has been amplified into fatalism. In some cases, this mischaracterisation has served political or ideological agendas and in others, it has simply reflected exhaustion. In all cases, it has carried a social cost. When exaggeration displaces evidence, social cohesion weakens and when groups retreat into competing narratives of reality, rational discussion is dismissed as denial, and data is treated as propaganda. Fear becomes socially corrosive, not because it is illegitimate, but because it is no longer anchored in proportion or shared facts. In such conditions, despair becomes contagious and despair, in turn, narrows the space for reform. None of this suggests that South Africa’s safety challenges can be resolved through rhetoric alone. Re-establishing stability requires deliberate choices. These include rebuilding public policing capacity, not simply in headline numbers, but in deployment, visibility and preventative reach, narrowing the gap between private and public provision so that safety is again experienced as a collective good and by strengthening institutional leadership and retention so that experience is not continually lost; and protecting the integrity of oversight as a foundation of legitimacy, rather than treating it as an obstacle. Equally important is the restoration of proportion in national self-assessment. Evidence-based realism does not deny pain, nor does it minimise fear. It insists, however, that diagnosis precede prescription and that despair not be mistaken for insight. South Africa’s experience over the past three decades shows that crime outcomes respond to capacity, governance and leadership. Gains have been made before, weakened through neglect, and stabilised again under pressure. That pattern is demanding, but it is not hopeless. This section therefore serves as a hinge between analysis and conclusion. The country’s current position is the result of identifiable choices and constraints, not destiny. The same is true of its future trajectory. Recognising where things went wrong is not an exercise in blame; it is a precondition for correction. And recognising that correction remains possible is the foundation on which any credible sense of hope must rest. PRINCIPLES FOR A PATH BACK TO STABILITY If South Africa’s safety trajectory reflects strain, rather than collapse, then the task ahead is not reconstruction from ruin, but correction under pressure. The evidence presented in this report does not support quick fixes or single-point solutions. It points instead to a set of interlinked principles that, taken together, can begin to stabilise outcomes and restore confidence. First, policing capacity must be rebuilt with discipline and realism, which doesn’t mean simply increasing headline numbers, instead it means ensuring that recruitment, retention and deployment are aligned with population growth, urban density and patterns of harm. Moreover, visible policing, preventative presence and investigative follow-through matter more to everyday safety than episodic crackdowns. Capacity drift was gradual and so rebuilding it will also take time, consistency and political commitment. Second, the widening gap between private and public provision must be narrowed, not by constraining private security, but by strengthening the public baseline on which all safety ultimately depends. A society in which protection is primarily mediated by income will continue to experience fear as unequal and corrosive and so reasserting safety as a collective public good is not only a policing challenge, but a social cohesion imperative as well. Third, legitimacy must be treated as an operational requirement and not a mere moral afterthought. Accountability mechanisms, such as independent oversight, are not obstacles to effective policing, instead they are vital prerequisites for it. Where legitimacy erodes, cooperation declines, intelligence dries up and enforcement becomes reactive. Protecting the integrity, visibility and credibility of oversight strengthens policing, rather than weakens it. Fourth, institutional leadership and experience must be stabilised. The cumulative loss of skills, institutional memory and command continuity has amplified strain across the system. Rebuilding stability requires not only resources, but leadership that is insulated from short-term disruption and allowed to focus on organisational coherence, morale and professional development. Finally, national discourse itself must be re-anchored in proportion and evidence. This is not a secondary concern. Exaggeration, mischaracterisation and agenda-driven narratives do real damage to social cohesion, weakening trust and accelerating withdrawal from public life. Rational, evidence-based discussion is not a luxury reserved for experts, it is a social good that enables societies to correct course without tearing themselves apart. None of these principles offer instant reassurance. They do, however, offer direction. They affirm that South Africa’s safety challenges are shaped by choices, capacities and institutions that can be strengthened, rather than by fate or irreversible decline. The path back to stability is neither simple, nor guaranteed, but it remains open and that fact alone distinguishes a strained society from a failed one. CONCLUSION STRAIN, STABILISATION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF REALISM South Africa’s crime and safety challenges are real, serious and deeply felt. They shape how people live, move and trust. Violence remains unacceptably high. Institutional capacity has been eroded. Inequality continues to determine who feels protected and who does not. Any assessment that denies these realities would be neither credible nor ethical. But realism demands more than acknowledging what is broken. It also requires recognising what the evidence actually shows and what it does not. The data examined in this report does not support the claim that South Africa is in a state of irreversible collapse. Nor does it support the idea that deterioration is inevitable. Across multiple indicators, a more demanding and more instructive picture emerges: a country that inherited extreme levels of violence, achieved significant gains over time, lost some of those gains through capacity drift and governance failures, and has in recent years entered a period of strain marked by volatility and partial stabilisation, rather than uncontrolled decline. This distinction matters. Systems that have collapsed do not stabilise. Institutions that have ceased to function do not produce bounded trends, visible oversight or measurable recovery in confidence. What the evidence reveals instead is a society under pressure, grappling with the consequences of choices made and opportunities missed, but still retaining the institutional foundations required for correction. Recent trends are particularly important in this regard. In several key areas, outcomes have ceased worsening and begun to stabilise. This does not mean the problem has been solved, nor does it justify complacency. It does mean that the trajectory remains open. Capacity, leadership and policy decisions continue to matter. The future is not pre-determined. Equally significant is what happens when evidence is displaced by exaggeration or despair. Mischaracterising strain as collapse may feel emotionally honest in a context of fatigue, but it carries a social cost. It weakens social cohesion, erodes trust between groups, and encourages withdrawal from public life. When fear becomes detached from proportion and despair masquerades as insight, societies lose the shared reality necessary for reform. This report has argued for a different posture: one of disciplined realism. Realism does not minimise fear or suffering. It insists, however, that diagnosis precede judgement and that exhaustion not be mistaken for inevitability. It recognises that South Africa’s challenges are the result of identifiable dynamics, namely capacity drift, inequality of provision, misjudged priorities, and that they can therefore be addressed through deliberate correction, rather than resignation. The path back to stability is neither simple, nor quick. It requires rebuilding public policing capacity, narrowing the gap between private and public protection, strengthening legitimacy through oversight, stabilising institutional leadership and restoring proportion to national discourse. None of these are guaranteed. All of them demand sustained effort. But they are possible and the evidence shows that progress has been achieved before, even under difficult conditions. South Africa is not finished. It is unfinished. That distinction is not a slogan, it is a responsibility. It calls for honesty without despair, confidence without denial and hope grounded in evidence, rather than wishful thinking. Replacing fatalism with realism is not naïve optimism. It is a civic necessity. The purpose of this report and of the True South Africa evidence series more broadly, is not to persuade South Africans that everything is fine. It is to demonstrate that things are not beyond repair, that decline is not destiny and that the space for agency remains open. The country’s future will be shaped not by how loudly collapse is proclaimed, but by whether realism is allowed to guide collective judgement and action. That choice still lies before us. REFERENCES Centre for risk Analysis (CRA). 2025. Socio-Economic Survey of South Africa. Crime and Security 2025.[Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://cra-sa.com/products/socio-economic-survey/2025/files/crime_and_security-march-2025.pdf [accessed: 12 January 2026] Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 1998. The people of South Africa: Population census, 1996. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/PC96/PC96.html (Accessed: 12 January 2026). Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2024. Mid-year population estimates, 2024. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0302/P03022024.pdf (Accessed: 12 January 2026). ANNEXURE A DATA TABLES SUPPORTING THE ANALYSIS This annexure contains the underlying crime, population and policing data series referenced in the report, enabling readers to verify figures, examine year-by-year trends and replicate the analysis. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

EU-Africa Consultative Meeting 2026 Cape Town, South Africa: 27-29 March 2026 Report Disclaimer and Publication Information This report documents the proceedings, discussions, and key insights from the EU–Africa Consultative Meeting 2026, held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 27 to 29 March 2026. The meeting was hosted by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), in partnership with the Africa Think-tank Dialogue, the Foundation Max van der Stoel, the Olof Palme Internationella Centre, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). The views, analyses, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report reflect the contributions of participating individuals and organisations and do not necessarily represent the official positions of the host institutions or partner organisations. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the information contained herein, no responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions, or misinterpretations. This report is intended solely for informational and knowledge-sharing purposes. It does not constitute policy advice, legal opinion, or formal institutional endorsement. Readers are encouraged to consult original sources and to exercise their own judgement when interpreting the material. Copyright © 2026 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the organisers, except for brief quotations used for review, scholarly, or educational purposes, provided that appropriate acknowledgement is given. This report synthesises the content of dialogue transcripts and related inputs under the full intellectual direction and editorial control of the authors. Artificial intelligence tools were utilised in a supportive capacity to assist in the structuring, synthesis, and language refinement of these materials. All substantive analysis, interpretations, and conclusions remain those of the authors, who bear full responsibility for the content. MAY 2026 CONTENTS At a glance Executive Summary Setting the Context, Uwe Optenhögel Reasserting Agency and the Politics of Partnership, Supra Mahumapelo Europe under Scrutiny and the Credibility of Partnership, Udo Bullmann From Partnership to System: Structural Misalignment in a Changing Global Order, Daryl Swanepoel Session 1: Trade, advancing more balanced trade relations, workers’ rights and support for a rules-based order Session 2: Investing in green industrialisation: aligning EU financial and technical instruments, including global gateway, with African priorities Session 3: Migration and human mobility - improving understanding and coordination on migration Session 4: Geopolitical dynamics vs. sovereignty / reforming international financial instruments, the global debt architecture, and tax justice Session 5: Peace and security - shaping a new international security architecture, including UN Security Council reform and a renewed commitment to the UN Charter Cross-cutting discussion and reflections Conclusion and way forward Annexure A: List of participants Cover image: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID:2200922582 1. AT A GLANCE The EU-Africa partnership stands at a moment of recalibration. It remains both necessary and valued, but its credibility is increasingly defined by outcomes rather than intent. Across the consultation, five core insights emerged: The partnership is well-articulated, but unevenly delivered; structural imbalances persist, particularly in trade, finance and value chains; alignment with African priorities remains incomplete, despite expanded engagement; global economic and governance systems constrain development outcomes, beyond the scope of partnership alone; and the future of the partnership will depend on credibility, balance and sustained trust. Taken together, these insights point towards a clear direction of travel: From dialogue to delivery, from participation to transformation; and from operating within the system to shaping it. 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report captures the key insights emerging from the EU-Africa consultation, which brought together policymakers, practitioners and experts to reflect on the evolving nature of the partnership in a rapidly changing global context. Across the discussions, a consistent message emerged: the EU-Africa partnership remains both necessary and valued, but it is entering a phase where its credibility will increasingly be judged by its ability to deliver tangible, balanced and context-responsive outcomes. The consultation was structured around five thematic areas: trade, green industrialisation, migration, global financial architecture and peace and security, each of which highlighted both progress and persistent structural challenges. In the area of trade, participants emphasised that while access has improved, the underlying structure of trade relations remains uneven. The continued concentration of African exports in primary commodities, coupled with limited participation in higher-value segments of global value chains, points to the need for a more deliberate focus on industrialisation and value addition and therefore, a more balanced trade relationship, it was argued, must be measured not only in terms of volume, but in terms of developmental impact. The discussions on green industrialisation reinforced this perspective, with participants agreeing that the global transition to low-carbon economies presents a significant opportunity for Africa, particularly given its resource base, but at the same time there was a realisation that this opportunity depended on aligning the European financial and technical instruments, including the Global Gateway, with Africa’s own priorities. This will require moving beyond project-based engagement towards more integrated strategies that support African infrastructure, industrial capacity and long-term economic transformation. Migration and human mobility were identified as areas where perception and policy are often misaligned and participants stressed the importance of recognising the complexity of migration dynamics, the predominance of intra-African mobility, and the need for more coherent and coordinated approaches. Improving understanding was seen by them as a prerequisite for developing frameworks that are both effective and humane. The discussion on the global financial architecture introduced a more systemic dimension to the dialogue. Constraints on development were linked not only to domestic conditions, but also to the structure of the international financial systems, including those dealing with debt sustainability, access to finance and global tax arrangements. Reform of these systems, are essential for expanding policy space and for enabling long-term development. In the domain of peace and security, participants highlighted growing concerns with regard to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the existing global governance structures, which they said, required the reforming of the United Nations system, including the Security Council. This included a need for a renewed commitment to the principles of the UN Charter, which was identified as being central to maintaining a credible and functional international security architecture. Beyond these thematic areas, a set of cross-cutting insights were identified, the first and central concern was the question of alignment. Across domains, there remains a gap between the design of frameworks and the realities they are intended to address. Bridging this gap requires a more deliberate effort to ensure that instruments, policies and priorities are mutually reinforcing. Second, the distinction between commitment and delivery was repeatedly highlighted. While the partnership is underpinned by a strong architecture of agreements, its effectiveness will increasingly depend on its ability to produce measurable outcomes. Third, the issue of balance, economic, institutional and political, runs through all aspects of the relationship. A partnership that is not experienced as fair risks losing legitimacy over time. Fourth, the importance of agency and coordination within Africa itself was emphasised, with the ability to articulate and pursue coherent priorities being identified as essential to shaping the direction and impact of the continent’s external engagement. Finally, trust was identified as both a condition and an outcome of effective partnership, in that it is built through consistency, transparency and delivery, and it remains essential to sustained cooperation across sensitive policy areas. Taken together, these insights point towards a partnership that must evolve in both form and function, where in the immediate term, it requires the strengthening of alignment, improving coordination and focusing more sharply on implementation. Over the longer term, it calls for engagement with the structural features of the global system that continues to shape development outcomes, including financial and governance architectures. The EU-Africa partnership is thus positioned at a critical juncture. It has the institutional foundation and political relevance to act as a platform for both practical cooperation and systemic engagement. However, its future effectiveness will depend on its ability to adapt to changing realities, to deliver on its commitments, and to reflect a shared understanding of what constitutes a balanced and forward-looking partnership. 3. SETTING THE CONTEXT UWE OPTENHÖGEL VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN PROGRESSIVE STUDIES (FEPS), ON A PARTNERSHIP UNDER PRESSURE In his opening remarks, Uwe Optenhögel situated the consultation to take place over the two days within both its institutional and global context, by drawing attention to the evolving nature of the EU-Africa engagement and the broader environment within which that engagement is now unfolding. He underscored the significance of bringing together two established platforms, the African Think Tank Dialogue, that is being convened by the Inclusive Society Institute, and the FEPS EU-Africa Progressive Network. The consultation forms part of a deliberate effort to deepen structured exchange between the two continents and in this regard, he framed it not as a once-off engagement, but as part of a broader process of sustained dialogue. At the same time, his remarks located the discussion within a shifting global landscape, which points to a world increasingly characterised by insecurity, polarisation and the resurgence of big-power politics, and a corresponding erosion in adherence to the rules-based international order. This context elevates the importance of dialogue between Africa and Europe, not only as partners, but as neighbouring regions having to navigate a shared uncertainty. It was against this backdrop that Optenhögel introduced a central question that would come to shape the deliberations of the consultation: “Is the partnership between Europe and Africa managing to keep pace with the world as it is changing or is it still anchored in previous assumptions that no longer hold?” This framing brought into focus the need to reflect not only on specific policy areas, but on the adequacy of the partnership itself, specifically in relation to trade, industrialisation and migration, which he noted, should not be viewed as isolated themes, but as interconnected dimensions of a broader relationship that must be capable of responding to the evolving global dynamics. He further acknowledged that while the EU-Africa partnership is grounded in shared interests and values, it is equally characterised by areas of divergence and the purpose of the dialogue, in this context, was therefore not aimed at eliminating difference, but to engage it constructively. It is through this process that the partnership can remain relevant and responsive. In this sense, the opening intervention did not seek to prescribe outcomes, but to establish the parameters of the discussion, thereby anchoring it in a changing global reality, and posing the question of whether existing frameworks remain fit for purpose. 4. REASSERTING AGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF PARTNERSHIP SUPRA MAHUMAPELO CHAIRPERSON OF THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION, PARLIAMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA Supra Mahumapelo’s intervention shifted the centre of gravity of the discussion. Where the opening framing had located the EU-Africa partnership within a changing global context, his contribution brought the focus firmly onto Africa itself, its agency, its internal coherence and its expectations of the partnership. At its core, his intervention was not about cooperation in the abstract. It was about control over trajectory. Implicit in his remarks was a recognition that the language of partnership has, over time, often run ahead of its practical expression. Africa has participated in numerous frameworks, strategies and joint declarations with external partners, including the European Union. Yet the question he surfaced, without overstating it, was whether these engagements have sufficiently shifted Africa’s structural position in the global economy, or whether they have, in effect, managed it. This is a subtle, but important distinction. Because if the partnership is to be judged not by its intentions, but by its outcomes, then the metric cannot be the number of initiatives launched or dialogues convened. It must be whether Africa’s position within global value chains, production systems and governance structures is materially changing. It is in this context that Mahumapelo’s emphasis on Agenda 2063 becomes particularly significant. By foregrounding the African Union’s long-term development framework, he effectively re-centred the conversation: the EU-Africa partnership should not define Africa’s trajectory; it should align with one that is already defined. This reframing introduces a quiet, but consequential shift in power dynamics. It suggests that engagement must move from externally shaped cooperation towards internally anchored negotiation. In practical terms, this raises a more demanding standard for partnership, one in which Africa engages not as a collection of needs, but as a bearer of a strategic project. However, his intervention did not locate the challenge solely outside the continent. A second, equally important thread was the question of internal coherence. The effectiveness of any external partnership, he implied, is contingent on Africa’s own ability to coordinate, to articulate common positions, and to act with a degree of strategic unity. Without this, even well-intentioned partnerships risk becoming fragmented, negotiated bilaterally, implemented unevenly, and ultimately shaped more by external leverage than by continental priorities. This introduces a dual responsibility. On the one hand, external partners must be willing to engage Africa on the basis of its stated priorities. On the other, Africa must ensure that those priorities are consistently defined, defended and operationalised across its own institutional architecture. It is within this interplay that the issue of implementation emerges as a central concern. Mahumapelo’s remarks pointed, directly and indirectly, to a persistent gap between commitment and delivery. The EU-Africa partnership is not short of frameworks. It is not short of dialogue. What remains less certain is the extent to which these translate into outcomes that are visible at the level of economies, industries and communities. This gap is not merely administrative. It is political. Because over time, the accumulation of commitments without corresponding delivery begins to erode confidence, not only among policymakers, but among citizens. And once the partnership is no longer experienced as meaningful, its legitimacy becomes increasingly fragile. This connects directly to his emphasis on a people-centred partnership. Here again, the point was not rhetorical. A partnership that does not register in the lived experience of citizens risks becoming an elite construct, sustained in policy forums, but detached from societal realities. The test, therefore, is not whether cooperation is well-designed, but whether it is felt. Economic transformation sits at the heart of this test. Mahumapelo’s focus on industrialisation, job creation and value addition speaks to a long-standing structural challenge: Africa’s continued position at the lower end of global production systems. Partnerships that do not actively support movement up the value chain risk entrenching this position, even as they expand trade and investment flows. This is where the partnership becomes most exposed. Because it is precisely in the domain of economic structure that the difference between cooperation and transformation becomes most visible. And it is here that expectations are highest, and patience increasingly limited. Taken together, his intervention can be read as a call for recalibration, not in rhetoric, but in orientation. A partnership that is: anchored in Africa’s own strategic vision reinforced by internal continental coherence measured by implementation, not declaration and judged by its developmental impact Anything less, the implication is, risks perpetuating a gap between what the partnership claims to be and what it delivers. And in a global environment where alternatives are expanding and alignments are becoming more fluid, that gap may prove increasingly difficult to sustain. 5. EUROPE UNDER SCRUTINY AND THE CREDIBILITY OF PARTNERSHIP UDO BULLMANN MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, S&D GROUP: CHAIR, DELEGATION FOR RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Udo Bullmann’s intervention brought a distinctly European political lens to the discussion, engaging directly with the question that had begun to take shape over the course of the consultation: not only what the EU-Africa partnership aspires to be, but how it is experienced in practice. His remarks reflected an awareness, implicit, but unmistakable, that the credibility of the European Union as a partner cannot be taken for granted. It must be continually reinforced through consistency, delivery and alignment between stated values and actual conduct. At the centre of his intervention was the idea that the EU-Africa relationship must be understood within a broader transformation of the global order. Europe, he suggested, is itself navigating a period of internal and external recalibration, economically, politically and strategically, which has implications not only for how it engages the world, but for how it is perceived by its partners. In this context, the notion of a values-based partnership between the two sides featured prominently. The European Union has long positioned itself as a normative actor, where it has advanced principles such as multilateralism, human rights and rules-based cooperation, but the strength of this positioning does not depend on its articulation, it depends on its application; and the underlying tension is evident. Where principles are applied inconsistently, or appear to yield to geopolitical expediency, the normative foundation of the partnership begins to weaken, and in a global environment already marked by fragmentation and selective adherence to international norms, this inconsistency carries amplified consequences. Bullmann’s intervention, read in this light, pointed towards a central challenge for Europe: how to sustain a values-based approach in a world where power politics is reasserting itself, without allowing those values to become either rhetorical or selectively applied. This challenge is not abstract. It manifests concretely in the domains that define the partnership. In trade, the question arises as to whether regulatory frameworks and market access arrangements genuinely support industrialisation and value addition in Africa, or whether they reproduce existing asymmetries under the guise of openness. In climate policy, the issue is whether commitments to a just transition are matched by financing structures that distribute risk equitably. In global governance, it is whether Europe’s support for reform extends to shifts in representation and voice that reflect contemporary realities. Across these domains, the same underlying test applies: does the partnership operate in a manner that is experienced as fair? Bullmann’s remarks also engaged, directly and indirectly, with the importance of multilateralism. In a context where global institutions are under strain, the EU continues to position itself as a defender of cooperative, rules-based frameworks, but the effectiveness of this position depends on whether those frameworks are perceived as inclusive and responsive, particularly by actors in the Global South. This introduces a further layer of complexity, because defending multilateralism is not only about preserving existing institutions; it is about ensuring that those institutions evolve in ways that sustain their legitimacy. Without such evolution, defence risks becoming preservation of form, rather than function. At a more practical level, his intervention pointed to the need for delivery and implementation. The EU-Africa partnership is underpinned by a dense architecture of strategies, financing instruments and political commitments, and therefore, the challenge lies not in the absence of frameworks, but in ensuring that these frameworks translate into outcomes that are visible, measurable, and sustained. Here again, credibility is at stake. Because in the absence of delivery, even well-articulated partnerships begin to lose traction. Expectations, once raised, can become sources of frustration if not met. And in a global environment where alternative partnerships and alignments are increasingly available, the cost of unmet expectations rises. Taken together, Bullmann’s intervention can be read as an engagement with the credibility question from a European vantage point. It suggests that the future of the EU-Africa partnership will depend not only on the willingness to engage, but on the capacity to align: values with practice commitments with delivery and principles with consistency This is a demanding standard. But it is also, increasingly, a necessary one. Because in a partnership shaped by history, tested by present realities, and situated within a rapidly changing global order, credibility is not a given. It is constructed, continuously, and often under scrutiny. It is within this tension between principle and practice that the discussion began to move beyond the partnership itself, and towards the structure of the global system within which it operates. 6. FROM PARTNERSHIP TO SYSTEM: STRUCTURAL MISALIGNMENT IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER DARYL SWANEPOEL CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE INCLUSIVE SOCIETY INSTITUTE The discussion shifted from the functioning of the EU-Africa partnership to the structure of the global system within which that partnership operates. At its core was a simple, but far-reaching proposition: the challenges confronting the EU-Africa relationship are not primarily the result of weak cooperation, but of structural misalignment between global rules and contemporary realities. This distinction is important. Because if the problem is understood as one of partnership design, the response will be to refine frameworks, strengthen dialogue, and improve coordination. But if the problem lies in the architecture of the system itself, then incremental adjustments will be insufficient. What is required is a more fundamental reconsideration of how value, risk, and voice are distributed in the global order. This misalignment manifests across multiple domains, but it follows a consistent pattern, in that rules that were designed under one set of historical conditions are being applied in a world that has moved beyond them. Nowhere is this more evident than in the global economic system, where for decades, developing economies, particularly those in Africa, have been integrated into global markets to serve primarily as suppliers of raw materials. While this model has enabled participation, it has not facilitated transformation. Consequently, the movement up the value chain has remained constrained, not only due to domestic limitations, but also as a result of the global trade structure and production systems themselves. The implication is that participation does not automatically translate into development. Moreover, it is being exacerbated by the architecture of international taxation, where current frameworks have led to a significant extraction of value from developing economies through profit shifting, regulatory arbitrage and jurisdictional competition. In such a system, economic activity may occur in one jurisdiction, while taxable profits are recorded in another. The result is a systematic erosion of fiscal capacity in countries that are least able to absorb it. This is not a marginal inefficiency. It is a structural constraint. Because without adequate domestic resource mobilisation, development becomes dependent on external financing, financing that is itself shaped by conditions that introduce further vulnerability. This dynamic becomes particularly pronounced in the context of climate finance. Africa contributes a negligible share of global emissions, yet the continent faces a disproportionate exposure to climate risk. At the same time, it holds many of the critical resources required for the global energy transition, but the prevailing model of climate finance remains heavily reliant on debt-based instruments, often denominated in foreign currency, which creates a compounding effect. Exchange-rate volatility, driven by global financial conditions, rather than domestic policy choices, increases the real cost of repayment over time and so what may begin as concessional financing can, over the lifecycle of a project, due to factors such as currency volatility, become a significant fiscal burden. In effect, countries are required to assume long-term financial risk in order to participate in a transition for which they bear limited historical responsibility. This raises a fundamental question: whose transition is being financed, and on whose terms? The pattern extends beyond economic structures into the realm of global governance. It was acknowledged and argued that institutions such as the United Nations Security Council continue to play a central role in maintaining international peace and security, but there are serious concerns about its composition which continues to reflect a distribution of power of bygone years that are misaligned with the current geopolitical realities. This creates what may be described as a legitimacy gap, being a growing distance between the authority these institutions claim and the representativeness that they embody. Efforts at reform remain, for the most part, constrained by political realities. In the case of the veto, for example, abolition remains unlikely. The more plausible pathway lies in regulation as to how the veto is to be exercised, introducing mechanisms that enhance transparency, constrain use in cases of mass atrocity, for example, and subject decisions to broader scrutiny. Whilst this does not resolve the imbalance entirely, it is a pragmatic recognition of the notion that if power cannot be removed, it must be disciplined. Underlying these institutional dynamics is a broader concern regarding the state of international law and the effectiveness of which depends not only on its formal existence, but also on its consistent application. Increasingly, however, there is a perception, particularly within parts of the Global South, that adherence to legal norms is selective and contingent on power and interest, rather than on principle. Whether universally accepted or not, this perception has real consequences. Because once rules are seen to apply unevenly, they begin to lose their binding character. They become, instead, instruments of convenience. And at that point, the system does not collapse suddenly, it fragments. Compliance becomes conditional. Cooperation becomes transactional. And the space for shared norms begins to narrow. Taken together, these dynamics point to a broader conclusion. The challenge is not the absence of rules, nor the absence of partnership. It is the misalignment between rules, power, and lived reality. And it is within this misalignment that the EU-Africa partnership must now operate. This has direct implications for how partnership itself is understood. If the underlying system continues to distribute value, risk and voice unevenly, then even well-intentioned partnerships will struggle to produce equitable outcomes. The issue, therefore, is not simply how Europe and Africa engage one another, but how they position themselves within, and potentially reshape, the system that frames that engagement. This introduces a more demanding conception of partnership. One that moves from engagement within the system, to engagement about the system . Because ultimately, the sustainability of the EU-Africa partnership will depend not only on its internal coherence, but on its ability to respond to, and where necessary challenge, the structural conditions that shape it. In this sense, the question is no longer whether the partnership is functioning. It is whether it is fit for purpose in a world where the system itself is in transition. 7. SESSION 1: TRADE, ADVANCING MORE BALANCED TRADE RELATIONS, WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND SUPPORT FOR A RULES-BASED ORDER The first thematic session engaged directly with one of the most enduring and sensitive dimensions of the EU-Africa relationship: the structure of trade and the extent to which it reflects, or falls short of, the notion of partnership. At its core, the discussion was not about trade in aggregate terms. It was about balance. Because while trade volumes between Africa and Europe have grown over time, the question raised repeatedly was whether the composition and conditions of that trade are evolving in a manner that supports mutual benefit or whether they continue to reflect underlying asymmetries. This distinction framed much of the exchange. Africa’s participation in global trade remains, in large measure, concentrated in the export of primary commodities, while higher-value manufactured goods continue to flow in the opposite direction. This pattern is not new, but its persistence raises a more fundamental question: can a trade relationship be considered balanced if its structural characteristics remain largely unchanged? The issue, therefore, is not access alone. Market access, in formal terms, has improved over time, and the EU–Africa partnership has created multiple frameworks through which trade can expand. But as several contributions underscored, access does not automatically translate into equitable outcomes. A system can be open, and yet produce results that are uneven in their developmental impact. It is in this context that the notion of advancing more balanced trade relations takes on practical meaning. Balance, as it emerged in the discussion, is not about symmetry in volume. It is about fairness in opportunity, and the ability of both sides to derive sustainable developmental benefit from the relationship. For Africa, this implies the capacity to move beyond raw material exports and participate more meaningfully in value-added production; and for Europe, it raises the question of how its trade frameworks and regulatory regimes enable, or constrain, that shift. A recurring theme in this regard was the role of standards and compliance requirements, where on the one hand, such standards are integral to modern trade, in that they ensure quality, safety and environmental integrity. On the other, they can function as barriers where the capacity to meet them is uneven. For economies in the process of industrialisation, increasingly complex regulatory requirements may limit entry into higher-value segments of the market, even where formal access exists. This creates a structural tension. A trade regime that promotes openness, but imposes conditions that are difficult to meet, risks reinforcing existing patterns, rather than transforming them. The result is not exclusion in principle, but constraint in practice. Closely linked to this was the question of value addition. Participants emphasised that more balanced trade relations cannot be achieved without a shift in the structure of production. The beneficiation of resources, local processing, and the development of manufacturing capacity are not peripheral concerns; they are central to rebalancing the relationship. Without this shift, trade risks remaining extractive in character, even where it is framed as cooperative, but at the same time it was recognised that the responsibility for achieving this balance does not lie on one side alone. While external frameworks matter, internal capacity, coordination and policy coherence within African economies are equally critical, where, for example, the ability to articulate common positions, leverage continental initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area and building regional value chains, all form part of this equation. Balance, therefore, is co-produced. It emerges from the interaction between external opportunity and internal capability. A second, and equally important, dimension of the session centred on workers’ rights. Here, the discussion moved beyond macroeconomic structures to the conditions under which trade is experienced at the level of labour. The question was not only how trade is structured, but how its benefits and costs are distributed within societies. For Europe, labour standards form a core component of its trade identity, reflecting a long-standing commitment to social protection and decent work. For Africa, the issue is more complex. While the protection of workers’ rights is widely recognised as essential, there is also an acute awareness of the need to generate employment at scale, often under conditions of structural constraint. This introduces a delicate balance. The promotion of labour standards must not become a mechanism that inadvertently restricts participation in trade. At the same time, the absence of such standards risks entrenching forms of work that are insecure, informal or exploitative. The discussion did not present these as mutually exclusive objectives, instead it was portrayed as being interconnected ones. A more balanced trade relationship, it was suggested, must also be a more socially grounded one, in which economic exchange is aligned with the principles of decent work, fair wages and human dignity; and as such, the challenge lies in ensuring that these principles are applied in a manner that is both credible and context-sensitive. This brings into focus the third element of the session: support for a rules-based order. In a global environment increasingly characterised by fragmentation and selective adherence to international norms, the reaffirmation of a rules-based trading system remains a shared point of reference between Africa and Europe. However, as the discussion made clear, the legitimacy of that system depends not only on its existence, but on how it is experienced. Rules, in themselves, are not neutral, in that they reflect historical processes, institutional power and negotiated outcomes that may not always align with contemporary realities and where rules are perceived to operate unevenly, or to favour some actors over others, their legitimacy begins to erode. This concern was evident in the way participants engaged with the global trading system more broadly, because whilst support for multilateralism remains strong, it is accompanied by a growing expectation that the system must evolve. It was argued that a rules-based order that does not adapt, will risk becoming detached from the realities it seeks to govern. In the context of EU-Africa trade, this translates into a need for consistency and fairness, that is consistency, in the application of rules and standards, and fairness, in the outcomes those rules produce. Without these, support for the system becomes increasingly difficult to sustain, particularly among actors who experience its constraints more acutely than its benefits. Taken together, the session revealed a convergence around a central proposition: that trade, if it is to underpin a credible partnership, must be both economically and socially balanced, and embedded within a rules-based system that is experienced as legitimate. This is a demanding standard. It requires that trade frameworks do more than facilitate exchange, they must, in fact, enable development. They must protect dignity. And they must operate within a system of rules that commands confidence across different contexts and levels of development. The discussion did not suggest that this standard has been fully achieved, But it did make clear that it is increasingly the benchmark against which the EU-Africa trade relationship will be judged. 8. SESSION 2: INVESTING IN GREEN INDUSTRIALISATION: ALIGNING EU FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL INSTRUMENTS, INCLUDING GLOBAL GATEWAY, WITH AFRICAN PRIORITIES The second thematic session shifted the discussion from the structure of trade to the question of investment, and more specifically, to the role of finance and technical cooperation in enabling a green industrial transition in Africa. At its core, the session engaged with a dual imperative. On the one hand, the global transition towards low-carbon economies is accelerating, reshaping production systems, energy models and investment flows. On the other, African economies remain engaged in a broader process of industrialisation, one that is not yet complete, and which must now unfold under the additional constraint of climate transition. The intersection of these two dynamics defines the challenge. Green industrialisation, as it emerged in the discussion, is not simply about decarbonisation. It is about ensuring that the transition to a low-carbon economy does not bypass Africa’s developmental needs, but rather becomes a vehicle through which those needs are advanced. This introduces a fundamental question: can the global energy transition be aligned with Africa’s industrialisation trajectory or does it risk imposing a new set of constraints on it? The session did not treat this as a theoretical concern. It engaged it through the lens of investment. The European Union, through a range of financial and technical instruments, including the Global Gateway initiative, has positioned itself as a key partner in supporting infrastructure development, energy transition and connectivity across Africa. These instruments carry significant potential. They offer access to capital, technology and expertise at a scale that is difficult to mobilise domestically. But the discussion made clear that the effectiveness of these instruments depends not only on their scale, but on their alignment. Alignment, in this context, emerged as the central organising concept of the session. Alignment between European priorities and African strategies. Alignment between climate objectives and development needs. And alignment between the design of financial instruments and the realities of implementation on the ground. Without such alignment, even well-resourced initiatives risk underperformance. A recurring theme in this regard was the relationship between green transition and industrialisation. Africa holds a significant share of the world’s critical minerals, resources that are essential for renewable energy technologies, battery storage and broader decarbonisation processes; and this therefore positions the continent as a key actor in the global energy transition. However, as participants noted, there is a risk that Africa’s role remains confined to that of a supplier of raw materials, replicating patterns already evident in traditional trade. The alternative, and the objective articulated in the session, is to embed these resources within domestic and regional value chains. Green industrialisation, in this sense, is not only about producing clean energy. It is about building industries around that energy, processing resources locally and capturing greater value within African economies. This is where investment becomes decisive. Because moving from extraction to value addition requires not only policy intent, but infrastructure, technology and capital. It requires energy systems that are reliable and affordable, transport networks that support production and industrial ecosystems that can absorb and scale new activities. The European Union’s Global Gateway Initiative was discussed within this broader framework. The initiative’s ambition to mobilise substantial investment in sustainable infrastructure was recognised as a significant opportunity, but, at the same time, the importance of guarding against such investments not only being directed towards large-scale projects was critical. They ought also to be integrated into a coherent developmental strategy. This raises practical considerations, such as how projects are selected, whose priorities shape investment decisions, and how are local stakeholders, including governments, industries and communities and involved in the design and implementation of these initiatives. These questions point to a broader issue: the distinction between investment in Africa and investment with Africa. The former can proceed at scale, but may risk misalignment. The latter requires deeper engagement, but is more likely to produce outcomes that are sustainable and locally embedded. A further dimension of the discussion centred on the structure of finance itself. While significant funding is being mobilised for climate-related investments, much of this finance remains debt-based. For economies already facing fiscal constraints, this raises concerns about sustainability, the cost of borrowing, currency volatility and repayment risks that all shape the feasibility of such long-term investment. This introduces a tension within the green transition, in that countries are expected to undertake long-term structural changes, often involving high upfront costs, while relying on financial instruments that may not be aligned with these time horizons. Where financing conditions are short-term or risk-sensitive, they may undermine the very investments they seek to support. Participants therefore pointed to the need for a more diversified financing approach, that should include the greater use of concessional finance, grant-based support for adaptation and mechanisms that share risk more equitably between partners. Moreover, it should also include consideration of granting finance in local currency, because this can mitigate exposure to external shocks. These are not technical adjustments alone. They speak to the broader question of how the transition is structured, and who bears its costs. Closely linked to this was the role of technical cooperation and capacity building. Finance, while essential, is not sufficient on its own, since the ability to design, implement and maintain complex infrastructure and industrial systems, depend on skills, institutional capacity and knowledge transfer. The session emphasised that technical instruments must therefore be aligned not only with projects, but with long-term capacity development, because without this, investments risk remaining externally driven, with limited domestic spillover. The issue of coordination also emerged as a critical factor, because Africa is not a single market in practice, even as it moves towards greater integration through initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area. Therefore, the alignment of external investment with continental and regional priorities requires a degree of coordination that extends across national and institutional boundaries. For the European Union, this implies engaging not only at the bilateral level, but also with continental frameworks and institutions, and for African partners, it requires articulating priorities with sufficient clarity and coherence to guide external engagement. Alignment, once again, is co-produced. It depends on both the willingness of external partners to adapt, and the capacity of African actors to define and coordinate their developmental trajectory. Taken together, the session underscored that green industrialisation represents both an opportunity and a risk. An opportunity to reposition African economies within a rapidly changing global system, to build new industries, and to capture value within emerging sectors. A risk that, without careful alignment, finds the transition reproducing existing patterns, with Africa supplying inputs into global value chains without fully participating in their higher-value segments. The role of the EU-Africa partnership, in this context, is therefore pivotal. Its financial and technical instruments have the potential to shape the trajectory of this transition. But that potential will be realised only if those instruments are aligned with African priorities that are structured in a manner that supports long-term development, and implemented in partnership, rather than in parallel. The discussion did not suggest that this alignment is absent. But it did make clear that it cannot be assumed. It must be actively constructed, continuously assessed, and, where necessary, recalibrated. Because in the context of green industrialisation, the question is not only whether investment flows. It is whether those flows translate into transformation. 9. SESSION 3: MIGRATION AND HUMAN MOBILITY - IMPROVING UNDERSTANDING AND COORDINATION ON MIGRATION The third thematic session turned to one of the most politically sensitive and often contested dimensions of the EU-Africa relationship: migration and human mobility. From the outset, the discussion signalled a need to move beyond entrenched narratives. Migration, as participants observed, is frequently framed through the lens of crisis, particularly within European political discourse, but, in empirical terms, mobility between Africa and Europe is only one component of a much broader and more complex set of migration dynamics, the majority of which occur within the African continent itself. This gap between perception and reality emerged as a central concern. Because where migration is primarily understood as a problem to be contained, rather than a phenomenon to be managed, policy responses tend to become reactive, fragmented and often misaligned with underlying drivers. Improving understanding, therefore, was not treated as an abstract objective. It was seen as a precondition for effective coordination. Participants emphasised that migration is not a singular process, but a spectrum of movements, encompassing labour mobility, education, displacement, family reunification and informal cross-border flows. Each of these carries different motivations, time horizons and policy implications. A failure to distinguish between them risks producing responses that are overly generalised and insufficiently targeted. This complexity is further compounded by the asymmetry in how migration is experienced across regions. For many African countries, migration is as much an internal and regional phenomenon as it is an international one, because it is also linked to urbanisation, economic opportunity, environmental pressures and demographic change; for Europe, migration is often framed in terms of external arrivals, border management and domestic political pressures. These differing vantage points shape priorities. And where priorities diverge, coordination becomes more difficult. The session therefore placed considerable emphasis on the need for a more shared understanding of migration as a structural and long-term feature of global and regional systems, rather than a temporary disruption. This shift in perspective has practical implications. It suggests that policy responses should move from short-term containment towards longer-term management, grounded in cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination, which then also implies a need to recognise the positive dimensions of mobility, including its contribution to economic activity, skills development and social exchange. Migration, in this sense, is not only a challenge. It is also a resource. However, the ability to harness this potential depends on the existence of frameworks that are coherent, predictable and mutually understood. It is here that the issue of coordination becomes central. The EU-Africa relationship is underpinned by a range of migration-related dialogues, agreements and initiatives, but these frameworks often operate in parallel to each other, rather than in concert, which can lead to overlaps, gaps and inconsistencies in the implementation of the agreed objectives. Coordination, therefore, is not simply about increasing engagement, instead it is about aligning existing mechanisms in a way that enhances coherence. This includes coordination across institutions, between different levels of governance, and across policy domains, because migration does not operate in isolation. It intersects with labour markets, education systems, development strategies and, increasingly, climate dynamics and therefore effective coordination requires that these linkages are recognised and integrated into policy design. A further dimension of the discussion concerned trust. Migration governance is highly sensitive to perceptions of fairness and reciprocity, for if one side perceives that its concerns are not adequately reflected or that commitments are unevenly implemented, trust can erode. This has direct implications for cooperation, because migration management depends, to a significant extent, on sustained engagement between partners and without a baseline of trust, even well-designed frameworks can struggle to gain traction. Participants therefore highlighted the importance of dialogue that is not only continuous, but candid; and it should therefore be a space in which differences can be articulated without undermining the broader partnership. In this regard, the session echoed a broader theme present throughout the consultation: that partnership does not require uniformity of position, but it does require a willingness to engage difference constructively. The human dimension of migration also featured prominently. Beyond policy frameworks and institutional coordination, migration is experienced at the level of individuals and communities, since it involves decisions taken under conditions of uncertainty, shaped by aspirations, constraints, and, in some cases, necessity. These dimensions risk getting overlooked when approaching migration through a purely technocratic lens. There is a need for policies that are attentive to human realities, including the protection of rights, the reduction of vulnerability and the creation of pathways that are safe and regulated, amongst others. This becomes particularly relevant in the context of irregular migration, where the absence of legal pathways can drive individuals towards more precarious routes, with significant human and social costs. As such, improving coordination, in this context, also means improving pathways for regular migration. Ensuring that mobility can occur within frameworks that are predictable, transparent and humane. At the same time, the session recognised the constraints under which migration policy is developed. Domestic political considerations, public sentiment and institutional capacities all shape what is feasible, which adds a layer of complexity to EU-Africa coordination, as policies must be navigated within different political and societal contexts. This does not negate the need for cooperation, but it does underscore the importance of realism in how coordination is pursued. Taken together, the session advanced a more nuanced understanding of migration within the EU-Africa partnership, since it suggested that improving coordination is not primarily a technical exercise, but a relational one and it depends on a shared understanding of migration as a structural phenomenon; alignment between policy frameworks and lived realities; coherence across institutions and policy domains; and a foundation of trust that allows for sustained engagement The discussion did not seek to resolve all tensions inherent in migration governance, but it did move the conversation away from simplified narratives, and towards a more grounded appreciation of complexity. In doing so, it reinforced a central insight: that migration, if approached through understanding and coordination, rather than fragmentation and reaction, can be managed in a way that supports both stability and opportunity within the EU-Africa relationship. 10. SESSION 4 GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS VS. SOVEREIGNTY / REFORMING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, THE GLOBAL DEBT ARCHITECTURE, AND TAX JUSTICE The fourth substantive session shifted the focus of the consultation from sectoral cooperation to the structure of the global system within which that cooperation takes place. At its core, the discussion engaged with a more fundamental proposition, being that many of the challenges confronting the EU-Africa partnership are not solely the result of gaps in policy or implementation, but because they are rooted in deeper structural dynamics within the global political and economic order. This reframing is significant, because it suggests that even well-designed partnerships may struggle to deliver transformative outcomes if they operate within systems that are themselves misaligned with contemporary realities - this is particularly true as it relates to the realities of developing economies. The point of departure was the relationship between geopolitical dynamics and sovereignty, where participants reflected on a global environment that is increasingly being characterised by contestation, shifting alignments and the reassertion of power politics. The space for smaller and/or less economically dominant actors to exercise meaningful sovereignty in such a context, becomes more constrained, not necessarily through formal mechanisms, but through structural pressures. These pressures manifest most clearly in the economic domain, where sovereignty, in formal terms, remains intact, but in practical terms, the policy space is often shaped by external conditions, including access to finance, exposure to global markets, and dependence and reliance on international institutions. This introduces a distinction between formal sovereignty and operational sovereignty. The former is recognised in principle. The latter is experienced in practice. It is within this gap that much of the session’s discussion was situated. A central area of focus was the architecture of international finance. Participants pointed to the way in which existing financial systems, including the role of international financial institutions and global capital markets, shape the options available to developing economies. Access to financing, the terms on which it is provided, and the conditions attached to it, all influence domestic policy choices. The issue is not simply availability, but structure, where financing is predominantly debt-based, and where borrowing costs are influenced by factors beyond domestic control, such as global interest rates, risk perceptions and currency volatility, the ability of countries to pursue long-term development strategies becomes constrained. This is particularly evident in the context of sovereign debt, where the growing burden of debt across many African economies, and the challenges associated with restructuring and relief was highlighted. It was argued that the existing mechanisms for debt resolution is fragmented, slow, and often insufficiently responsive to the scale and urgency of the problem. This creates a situation in which countries may find themselves caught between competing imperatives, which on the one hand is the need to service debt and maintain macroeconomic stability, and on the other, the need to invest in development, infrastructure and social services. Where these imperatives are not aligned, policy space narrows. This brings into focus the question of reform. Participants did not suggest that the current system is without merit, but there was a clear sense that it is no longer fully fit for purpose in a changing global economy. It was said that the distribution of voice, the responsiveness of institutions and the design of financial instruments were all areas that required reconsideration. This extends beyond debt to the broader functioning and governance of the international financial institutions. The governance structures of these institutions, often reflecting historical configurations of power, were seen as increasingly misaligned with contemporary economic realities; and whilst reforms have been initiated in some areas, the pace and depth of change were viewed as limited relative to the scale of the challenges faced. This raises a question as to how legitimate these governance structures are, given that institutions derive their authority not only from their formal mandates, but also from the extent to which they are perceived as being representative, responsive and fair. Where this perception weakens, so too does their ability to function effectively. Closely linked to the issue of debt was the question of the global tax architecture. Here, the discussion turned to the ways in which value is created and captured within the global economy, with current tax frameworks, that were shaped by principles developed in an earlier era of economic organisation, now being seen as increasingly ill-suited to a world characterised by digitalisation, financialization and complex multinational structures. Participants highlighted the extent to which profit shifting, regulatory arbitrage and jurisdictional competition enable the relocation of taxable income away from the jurisdictions in which economic activity occurs, which for developing economies, represents not merely a technical inefficiency, but indeed, a significant loss of fiscal capacity, due to revenue that could be used to fund development being missed out on, because it is being captured elsewhere. This has direct implications for sovereignty, given that the cornerstone of state functionality is fiscal capacity, and without it, the ability to design and implement policy, invest in public goods and respond to societal needs becomes constrained. The call for tax justice, therefore, was not framed in abstract moral terms, but instead it was grounded in the practical realities of development and economics. The alignment of taxation collection more closely with real economic activity, the enhancement of transparency and the need to ensure more inclusive participation in the governance of tax systems, were all identified as necessary steps towards a more equitable framework. A further dimension of the discussion concerned the interplay between external reform and internal agency, because whilst much of the focus was on global systems, there was also a recognition that African countries and institutions have a role to play in shaping outcomes, which includes the strengthening of coordination, articulating common positions and engaging more strategically in global negotiations. Sovereignty, in this sense, is not only constrained externally. It is also exercised internally. The effectiveness of that exercise depends on the degree of coherence and alignment within the continent itself. Taken together, the session advanced a more systemic understanding of the challenges facing the EU-Africa partnership. It suggested that progress in areas such as trade, investment and development cannot be fully realised without addressing the broader structures within which these operate. This does not imply that partnership is irrelevant. On the contrary, it underscores its importance. Because partnerships such as that between the EU and Africa provide a platform through which these structural issues can be engaged, negotiated, and, where possible, reformed. But it also introduces a more demanding expectation. That the partnership must not only function within the existing system, but contribute to its evolution. The discussion did not present a single pathway for achieving this, but it did clarify the direction of travel: Towards a global economic and financial architecture that is more responsive to contemporary realities, more inclusive in its governance, and more aligned with the developmental needs of those it seeks to serve. 11. SESSION 5 PEACE AND SECURITY - SHAPING A NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, INCLUDING UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO THE UN CHARTER The fifth thematic session extended the discussion into the domain of peace, security and global governance, when it engaged directly with the institutions and principles that underpin the international security order. At its core, the session was anchored in a growing recognition that the existing architecture of global security is under increasing strain, which strain is not only operational, but also structural. Operationally, it is reflected in the difficulty of responding effectively to contemporary conflicts, and structural it raises questions about the continued alignment between institutional design and present-day geopolitical realities. The United Nations system, and the Security Council in particular, featured prominently in this discussion. For decades, the Security Council has occupied a central position in the maintenance of international peace and security. But its composition and functioning remain rooted in a historical moment that no longer reflects the distribution of power, nor the diversity of actors, in today’s global system. This creates what participants implicitly and explicitly identified as a legitimacy gap. On the one hand, the Council retains formal authority, but on the other, its representativeness, responsiveness and perceived fairness are increasingly contested, which creates a gap that has practical consequences. Where legitimacy is questioned, the capacity of institutions to act decisively and to command broad-based support is diminished, which becomes particularly evident in situations where divisions among major powers limit the ability of the Council to respond to crises in a timely and coherent manner. The issue of reform, therefore, is not an abstract or aspirational objective, instead it is a necessary condition for maintaining the relevance and effectiveness of the international security system. Participants engaged with a range of reform considerations, which included, amongst others, the question of representation, particularly the underrepresentation of Africa within the Security Council, as well as broader concerns regarding the inclusivity of decision-making processes. The argument advanced was not only that representation should be more equitable, but that it should also reflect the realities of the current global dynamics. Closely linked to this was the issue of the veto held by the permanent members of the Security Council, recognised as both a foundational feature of the current system and a significant constraint on its functioning. While its complete removal was politically unlikely, there was a need for greater restraint, transparency and accountability in its use, and particularly in situations involving large-scale humanitarian crises. This reflects a broader tension within the system, that is the tension between the need to accommodate major powers, and the need to ensure that collective action is not indefinitely blocked in the face of urgent challenges. Beyond institutional reform, a strong emphasis was placed on the normative foundations of the international order, specifically the United Nations Charter, which remains the central reference point for principles such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-use of force and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Nonetheless, the strength of these principles depends not only on their formal status, but also on their consistent application. In a global environment where adherence to international norms is increasingly selective, the credibility of the rules-based order becomes more fragile, and therefore, the need for a renewed commitment to the UN Charter was framed as not being a symbolic gesture, but, indeed, a practical necessity. Moreover, it requires that states, regardless of power, operate within the bounds of agreed principles, and that deviations from these principles are not normalised or justified through expediency. This commitment, it was argued, was is particularly important within a context where the line between stability and fragmentation is becoming less clear. The session also engaged with the evolving nature of conflict and security, where contemporary security challenges are becoming increasingly complex - they often span national borders and involve a combination of state and non-state actors. Accordingly, issues such as regional instability, transnational threats and the intersection between security and development require responses that are both coordinated and context-sensitive, and this has implications for how the security architecture is to be conceived. A system that is overly centralised and/or rigid, may struggle to respond effectively to diverse and rapidly changing conditions, and this has led to a growing recognition of the need for regional organisations to play a role in peace and security. In the African context, institutions such as the African Union and the continent’s sub-regional bodies, have developed capacities in areas such as mediation, peacekeeping and conflict prevention. Moreover, these organisations bring both contextual knowledge and proximity that can enhance the effectiveness of interventions aimed at stabilising conflict. Participants therefore reflected on the need to better integrate regional and global mechanisms, not to replace the United Nations system, but to complement it. In so doing, different levels of governance can operate in a more coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner. This pointed towards a more layered understanding of security architecture as being one that recognises that legitimacy and effectiveness are strengthened when institutions reflect both global authority and regional relevance. Taken together, the session underscored that the future of international peace and security will depend on the ability to adapt existing frameworks to contemporary realities, which will involve enhancing representation and inclusivity, addressing constraints within decision-making mechanisms, reaffirming commitment to foundational principles and strengthening coordination between global and regional actors. These are not incremental adjustments, they speak to the need for a recalibration of the system itself. At the same time, the discussion remained grounded in pragmatism, in that it recognised that the reform of international institutions, particularly those embedded in the post-war settlement, is inherently complex and politically sensitive. This meant that progress is likely to be gradual, and shaped by negotiation and compromise, but, as the session made clear, even if protracted, the cost of inaction may be greater. A system that does not evolve risks becoming increasingly disconnected from the realities it seeks to govern, and in the domain of peace and security, such a disconnect carries profound consequences. The EU-Africa partnership, within this context, was implicitly positioned as a platform through which these issues can be engaged. Not only in terms of cooperation on specific security challenges, but as a space for advancing dialogue on the future of the international system itself. 12. CROSS-CUTTING DISCUSSION AND REFLECTIONS The discussion session that followed the thematic inputs introduced a different dynamic into the consultation. Where the earlier sessions had set out structured perspectives across distinct domains, the discussions brought these strands into interaction. In doing so, they did not simply reinforce the themes already identified. Rather, they exposed points of convergence, areas of tension, and, perhaps most importantly, the underlying questions that cut across the EU-Africa partnership as a whole. A first and recurring thread was the question of alignment. Across trade, green industrialisation, migration, financial architecture, and security, participants returned, in different ways, to a common concern: that the frameworks through which the partnership operates do not always align fully with the realities they are intended to address. In the economic domain, this misalignment is visible in the persistence of structural trade patterns and the constraints on industrial upgrading. In the context of green transition, it emerges in the gap between climate ambitions and the financing structures available to support them; in migration, it is reflected in the divergence between perception and lived reality; and in global governance, it appears in the disconnect between institutional design and contemporary distributions of power and vulnerability. These are not isolated issues. They point to a broader pattern in which systems, frameworks, and instruments, many of them developed under different historical conditions, are being applied in a context that has materially changed. The implication, as reflected in the discussion, is that incremental adjustment may no longer be sufficient. A second cross-cutting theme was the distinction between formal commitment and practical outcome. The EU-Africa partnership is underpinned by an extensive architecture of agreements, strategies and joint declarations. It can therefore not be said that there is a shortage of frameworks, nor stated intent, but, as several participants observed, the translation of these commitments into tangible outcomes remains uneven. This gap between commitment and delivery was not attributed to a single cause, instead, it was understood to be as the result of multiple interacting factors, such as institutional complexity, coordination challenges, capacity constraints, and, at times, differing priorities between partners. What emerged, however, was a shared recognition that the credibility of the partnership increasingly depends on its ability to demonstrate impact at the level of economies, societies and communities. Without this, the risk is not only inefficiency, but erosion of confidence. A third theme concerned the question of balance. This was most explicit in the discussion on trade, but it extended into other domains. Balance, as it emerged in the discussions, is not about parity in a narrow sense. It is about the extent to which the partnership produces outcomes that are experienced as fair, and that support the developmental trajectories of both sides. In economic terms, this relates to value addition, industrialisation and the distribution of benefits across value chains, which in the context of finance, speaks to the allocation of risk and the sustainability of debt; in migration, it touches on reciprocity and the management of mobility in ways that are humane and predictable; and in global governance, it is reflected in representation, voice, and the equitable application of rules. Across these domains, the same underlying question recurs: does the partnership operate in a manner that is experienced as balanced? Closely linked to this was the issue of agency. Participants consistently emphasised that the effectiveness of the partnership is contingent not only on the actions of external actors, but on the capacity of African institutions and states to articulate, coordinate and pursue their own priorities. This includes aligning external engagement with continental frameworks such as Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area, as well as strengthening internal coherence across policy domains and levels of governance. Agency, in this sense, is both a precondition and an outcome. It shapes how the partnership is engaged, which is, in turn, is shaped by the structures within which that engagement takes place. The discussions also brought into sharper focus the role of trust, which operates across multiple levels, such as between institutions, between states and between policymakers and the constituencies they represent. It is built through consistency, transparency and delivery, and it is eroded where commitments are not met, where rules are applied unevenly, or where outcomes are perceived as misaligned with stated objectives. In a partnership as historically layered and politically complex as that between the EU and Africa, trust cannot be assumed, instead, it must be continually reinforced; and this is particularly important in areas such as migration and finance, where policy decisions have direct and often immediate implications for individuals and communities. A further insight that emerged from the discussions was the interconnectedness of the thematic areas, in that trade, investment, migration, finance and security are often treated as distinct policy domains. But, in practice, they are deeply interlinked. Constraints in one area can have cascading effects in others. To illustrate one can cite limited industrial capacity that affects trade outcomes, and which in turn shapes employment and migration dynamics; financial constraints that influence the ability to invest in green transition, which has implications for both economic development; and social stability, and weaknesses in global governance structures, that affect the management of both economic and security challenges. This interconnectedness suggests that isolated interventions are unlikely to be sufficient and what is required therefore, is a more integrated approach, one that recognises the systemic nature of the challenges being addressed. Taken together, the discussions point towards a recalibration of how the EU-Africa partnership is understood, that is to say, not as a collection of sectoral engagements, but as a relationship situated within a broader and evolving global system. Within this system, the partnership is both shaped by, and has the potential to shape, the rules, norms and structures that govern interaction. This introduces a more demanding expectation. That the partnership must operate on two levels simultaneously: at the level of practical cooperation, delivering outcomes across specific domains and at the level of systemic engagement, contributing to the evolution of the global order The discussions did not resolve the tensions inherent in this dual role. But they did clarify them and in doing so, they established a more rigorous lens through which the partnership can be assessed. A partnership that is: aligned with contemporary realities capable of translating commitment into outcome balanced in its effects grounded in mutual agency reinforced by trust and responsive to the interconnected nature of global challenges Anything less, the implication is, risks widening the gap between what the partnership aspires to be and what it delivers. And in a global environment marked by increasing fluidity and alternative alignments, that gap may prove increasingly difficult to sustain. 13. CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD The consultation underscored both the depth of engagement within the EU-Africa partnership and the increasing complexity of the environment in which it operates. Across the thematic sessions and subsequent discussions, a consistent picture emerged: one of a partnership that is well-articulated at the level of intent, but uneven in its translation into outcomes; one that is supported by a dense architecture of frameworks and instruments, but still grappling with questions of alignment, balance and delivery; and one that is situated within a global system that is itself undergoing significant change. Taken together, these dynamics point not to a failure of partnership, but to a moment of recalibration. A first and immediate priority is to strengthen alignment between ambition and implementation. This requires a more deliberate effort to ensure that financial, technical and regulatory instruments are consistently anchored in African priorities and development trajectories - initiatives such as the Global Gateway therefore carry significant potential, but their impact will depend on the extent to which they are integrated into coherent, locally grounded strategies, rather than operating as parallel or externally driven interventions. Alignment, in this sense, must move from principle to practice. Closely linked to this is the need to narrow the gap between commitment and delivery. The credibility of the partnership will increasingly be judged not by the breadth of its declarations, but by its ability to generate tangible outcomes, which calls for greater coordination across institutions, clearer prioritisation of interventions and more consistent follow-through in implementation. It also suggests the importance of monitoring not only inputs and outputs, but outcomes and impact. A second priority lies in advancing a more balanced economic relationship. This includes supporting the structural transformation of African economies through value addition, industrialisation and the development of regional value chains. Trade and investment frameworks must be assessed not only in terms of access, but in terms of the distribution of benefits they generate. In parallel, the financing of development and transition requires renewed attention. Reform of international financial instruments, the global debt architecture and tax frameworks, is not peripheral to the partnership; it is central to its long-term sustainability. Without adequate fiscal space and access to appropriately structured finance, the ability of countries to pursue development strategies, including green industrialisation, will remain constrained. In this regard, the partnership provides an important platform for engagement on systemic reform. A third area of focus concerns the management of mobility. Improving understanding and coordination on migration requires a shift away from reactive and fragmented approaches towards more coherent, long-term frameworks. This includes recognising the diversity of migration dynamics, strengthening dialogue between partners, and supporting pathways that are safe, regulated and responsive to both developmental and societal considerations. Here, as in other areas, the quality of coordination will be as important as the substance of policy. A fourth priority relates to the broader architecture of global governance, particularly in the domain of peace and security. The continued relevance of the international system depends on its ability to adapt to contemporary realities, which means that the reform of the United Nations system, including the Security Council, requires a renewed commitment to the principles of the UN Charter. These are essential components of this process. The EU-Africa partnership, given its scale and political weight, is well positioned to contribute constructively to these discussions. It can do so through both the adoption of joint positions and through sustained engagement in the various multilateral fora. Across all these areas, two cross-cutting considerations stand out. The first is the centrality of agency, and accordingly, for the partnership to be effective, African actors must not only participate, they must actively shape its direction. This will require internal coordination, clarity of priorities and the ability to engage strategically across different levels of governance. The second is the importance of trust, and to build that trust, consistency, transparency and delivery is essential, in that it is reinforced when commitments are met and when outcomes align with expectations. Conversely, it is eroded when there is a persistent gap between intent and experience. Strengthening trust, therefore, is not a separate objective. It is an outcome of how the partnership functions across all domains. Looking ahead, the EU-Africa partnership faces a dual challenge: It must deliver more effectively within the existing frameworks, whilst also contributing to the evolution of the broader systems within which it operates, which requires both pragmatism and ambition. Pragmatism in improving coordination and implementation; and ambition in engaging with the structural reforms necessary to ensure long-term relevance and fairness. The consultation did not seek to resolve all the complexities inherent in this task. But it did provide a clearer articulation of the direction in which the partnership must move. Towards a relationship that is more aligned with contemporary realities, more balanced in its outcomes, more effective in its delivery, and more responsive to the interconnected challenges of a changing global order. Figure 1: Towards a Renewed EU–Africa Partnership In this, the partnership is not only an instrument of cooperation. It is, increasingly, a test of whether cooperation itself can be reimagined, and made to work, in a world that is no longer what it once was. 14. ANNEXURE A: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS NAME SURNAME COMPANY Rachel Dubale Africa-Europe Foundation Febe Potgieter-Gqubule African National Congress Wesley Seale African National Congress Zine Barka Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization Eddy Mandikwaza Centre for Mediation in Africa Assi Kimou Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences Masindo Maswanyane Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa Anna Knoll European Centre for Development Policy Management Asad Beg European External Action Service Udo Bullman European Parliament Damaris Uzoma European Parliament Beatriz Abellán Foundation for European Progressive Studies Thainá Leite Foundation for European Progressive Studies Uwe Optenhögel Foundation for European Progressive Studies Kathrin Meissner Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung South Africa Office Ibrahim Rage (Mukhtar) Heritage Institute for Policy Studies Odile Bulten Inclusive Society Institute Zweli Ndevu Inclusive Society Institute Buyelwa Sonjica Inclusive Society Institute Daryl Swanepoel Inclusive Society Institute Ben Katoka Institut du Développement Durable et des Relations Internationales Mikatekiso Kubayi Institute for Global Dialogue Sanusha Naidu Institute for Global Dialogue Aimée-Noël Mbiyozo Institute for Security Studies Melha Biel Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies Francis Matambalya Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre Trenton Elsley Labour Research Service Robert Kabage Mashariki Research and Policy Centre Tula Dlamini Nedbank Beauty Ogbologu Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Efem Ubi Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Nkanyiso Maqeda Olof Palme International Centre Supra Mahumapelo Parliament of South Africa Alex Benkenstein South African Institute for International Affairs Hermine Sam The German Marshall Fund of the United States Sameh Abidi Tunisian Association of Local Governance Sizo Nkala University of Johannesburg Christopher Ogunmodede World Politics Review Annefloor Robijn This report has been published by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies and the Inclusive Society Institute The Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) is the European progressive political foundation and think tank of the progressive political family at the EU level. Our mission is to develop innovative research, policy advice, training and debates to inspire and inform progressive politics and policies across Europe www.feps-europe.eu The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an independent organisation dedicated to strengthening multi-party democracy, social justice, cohesion, equality, and development in South Africa and globally. Through pragmatic research and collaboration, it supports capable democratic institutions and promotes social and national democratic values. www.inclusivesociety.org.za This event is organized with the financial support of the European Parliament. It does not represent the views of the European Parliament.