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ADDENDUMS ADDENDUM 1   Econometric model for government revenue    Long run equation Long run equation: graph of actual and modelled values Cointegration text of long run equation   The hypothesis of the cointegration test is as follows:   H0: No cointegration.   Source:  Own calculations   The results indicate that the variable is statistically significant (at 1% level), which means that we can reject the null hypothesis (of no cointegration). Short run (ECM) equation [1]     Diagnostic and Stability Tests of the ECM       Final (combined) model: actual and modelled values [2] Forecast [3] : Base case Assumptions (2024-2055): CPI and Inflation: increase of 4.5% per year GDP and RYD: Real increase of 2.0% [4] per year RM3: Real increase of 2,1% per year (Average of last 10 years) Prime: Decline from its current value to 9.5% per year over the next four years (until 20207), and then remain fixed at that value (9,5 based on the average of the last 10 years) Forecast: Graph of actual and forecast ADDENDUM 2   S1 and S2 data     ADDENDUM 3   Impact of an increase in the public sector retirement age   To mitigate some of the risks associated with longevity as highlighted in the report, this addendum looks at an additional scenario, namely an increase in the retirement age of public servants.   As far as South African legislation regarding retirement is concerned, the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 [5] provides broad guidelines by stating that:    Subject to the provisions of this section, an officer, other than a member of the services or an educator or a member of the Agency or the Service, shall have the right to retire from the public service, and shall be so retired, on the date when he or she attains the age of 65 years: Provided that a person who is an employee on the day immediately before the commencement of the Public Service Amendment Act, 1996, has the right to retire on reaching the retirement age or prescribed retirement date provided for any other law applicable to him or her on that day.   According to recent news reports the National treasury stated that ‘there is no standard retirement age that is set by government in South Africa,’ and that ‘Employees in formal employment… have a retirement age that is determined by the employer and the relevant retirement fund, which is not prescribed by government.’ In addition, it confirms that ‘there are no planned changes to the old age grant – which remains available from the age of 60 for men and women’ [6] .   However, as far as the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) is concerned, the normal retirement age for GEPF members is sixty (60) years. The fund notes that ‘The GEPF provides for normal and early retirement, as well as retirement for medical (ill health) reasons. Members whose employment have been affected by restructuring or reorganisation are also able to receive retirement benefits’ [7] . Normal retirement rules further specify that ‘benefits paid depend on whether a member has less than 10 years’ pensionable service, or 10 or more years of pensionable service. Members with less than 10 years’ service receive a gratuity – a once-off cash lump sum that is equal to their actuarial interest in the Fund. Members with 10 or more years’ service receive a gratuity and a monthly pension annuity.’   Against this backdrop, this addendum aims to quantify a scenario in which the retirement age for all public sector workers is set at 65 years of age, starting from 2025. This scenario then includes an amendment of the GEPF rules to increase the normal retirement age to sixty-five (65) years of age.   Quantum of costs   As a starting point one needs to get an estimate of the number of government employees currently in the age bracket of 60-65, as well as their earnings.   The 2022 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) provided a detailed breakdown of public compensation data [8] (see Table 1).  This document indicates that in 2022 around 1,308,123  individuals were employed by the public sector. By dividing the expenditure on salaries and wages by the number of employees per sector, in 2022 the average public sector employee earned R457,209 per year.   Table 1: Public-service salaries (R millions) and headcount (number), 2015-2022   Source:  National Treasury, 2022 MTBPS Annexure B   Although a detail breakdown by age is not provided in the MTBPS document, a parliamentary reply by the then Public Service and Administration Minister Dlodlo stated that ‘131 176 public servants will reach the retirement age of 65 in 2025’ [9] .   By dividing this number of individuals, by the total number of public sector employees, gives an estimate of around 10,1% [10] of public sector employees falling within the 60-65 years age bracket [11] .   To get a value for the pensionable portion of these employees, we assume an average contribution rate of 20,5%  - that is 7,5% by the individual self and 13,0% [12] by the employer. By applying this ratio to the average public sector pay, gives an amount of R93 728 per year per employee. By multiplying this amount by the estimated number of individuals in the 60-65 years age bracket equates to just over R12,3 bn per year of (potential) additional retirement savings (‘contributions’) (see Table 2).   Table 2: Public service employees numbers and costs, 2022   Source:  2022 MTBPS, DPSA, compiled by author   However, there is a (significant) caveat to this scenario, that is that if members retire later, the state needs to continue to pay them their salaries up to their retirement date. Using a similar methodology as explained above, the cost to the state to continue paying individuals aged 60 to 65 years would have amounted to around R59,9 bn [13] for 2022.   To project these values over the forecast period, they need to be adjusted for inflation. Actual inflation is used for 2023-2024 after which inflation of 4.5% per year is used (the same as the assumption use throughout the longevity report [14] ). We also have to assume a fixed level of employment over the forecast period.    According to the GEPF 2023/24 annual report, the value of their ‘funds and reserves amounted to R2.34 trillion on 31 March 2024 and accumulated funds and reserves grew at an average rate of 5.53% per year during the 2015 – 2024 period’ [15]   To get an idea of the retirement value of additional years of service, the annual contributions are adjusted for the inflation as well as the average growth rate, reported by the GEPF. To not overcomplicate the analysis, we exclude the impact of withdrawals [16] from the fund here. Figure 1: Additional salary costs (state) and retirement contributions and values (employees/pensioners), 2022-2055   Source : own calculations   Figure 1 indicates that, initially there exists a sizeable gap (around R48 bn) between the cost of additional salary payments of the state and the value of the accumulated retirement savings. This gap further increases to around R67 bn in 2038. However, thereafter, it is narrowed quickly to the point where the accumulated value of savings equals the additional salary expenses towards the end of the forecast period (i.e. 2054).  In reality this is an ‘accounting gap’ in the sense that the state will continue to have to pay the salaries but that the gap can be seen as a proxy for the ‘value to society’ derived from individuals being able to save additionally towards their own retirement.     Impact on the model   To equate the size of the ‘GAP’ to the model applied in the report, the results are compared to the base scenario, discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the report. Given that the 60 to 65 age cohort is in focus here, it makes little sense to also apply the longevity shock, and it is therefore excluded.   The results indicate that the budget deficit is likely to increase by around 0,5 percentage points, compared to the base scenario during the initial forecast years (i.e. around 2025 to 2040). For 2025 this is equal to a deficit of 6,6% of GDP compared to -5,9% for the base scenario. However, the difference between the GAP and base scenario is expected to gradually decline thereafter to the point where the GAP actually indicates a (marginally) smaller deficit during the final year of the forecast period.   Figure 2: Budget Balance as % of GDP (Base and Retirement GAP)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   As can be expected, larger annual deficits will push the debt to GDP ratio up, breaking 90% of GDP by 2037 compared the base scenario which indicates that it should remain below the 90% level. The difference between the two peaks at 5,0 percentage points around mid-2040’s after which it starts to decline to around 3,1% by the end of the forecast period.   Figure 3: Gross Debt to GDP (Base and Retirement GAP)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   Summary   The aim of this section is to quantify the impact of an increase in the retirement age of public servants from 60 to 65 years of age, on the fiscus.   The results indicate that this will have both a social costs (salary payments) as well as social benefit (retirement savings). Initially the costs will outweigh the benefits but over time, and given growth in the investment portfolio, this is estimated to equalise.   The impact on state finances will be a larger budget deficit and debt, especially during the initial years, that should decline over time.   ADDENDUM 4   Impact of an increase in the qualifying age for the Old Age Grant (OAG)   To moderate some of the risks associated with longevity as highlighted in the report, this addendum looks at another additional scenario, namely an increase in the qualifying age of the States Old Age social grant (OAG).   Chapter 4 of the report provided a detailed analysis of the different expenditure items, expected to be most affected by longevity. Specifically, Figure 37 showed the relative contributions of the three items to the total shock, and highlighted the dominant impact of old age grants, followed by the health services expenditure. Old age grant payments represented on average around 60% of the total combined shock to expenditure.   Chapter 3 of the main report already showed that during the 2024/25 fiscal year around 4,1 million individuals received the old age grant, and this is budgeted to rise to just below 4,5 million by 2027/28. This item represents a significant cost to the state and is also the largest (by cost) of the different social grants. The OAG cost the state R106,8 billion currently and is budgeted to increase to R131,0 billion over the next three years (that is an average rise of 7,0% per annum over the medium term).   Recent developments include that the National treasury confirmed that ‘there are no planned changes to the old age grant – which remains available from the age of 60 for men and women’ [17] .   Given the relevance and prominence of this social assistance related expenditure item, this addendum thus aims to quantify a scenario in which the qualifying age for all recipients of the State’s Old age social grant, is increased to 65 years of age, starting from 2026. However, this is done subject to a phased in approach over five years.   Quantum of costs   The main report already provides detailed estimates of the cost to the State of providing the OAG. As far as this addendum is concerned one needs to calculate the possible ‘saving’ if individuals falling between the ages of 60 to 64, are excluded.    According, to StatsSA, in 2024 South Africa had some 24,6 million individuals older than 60 years, while 8,6 million individuals (or roughly 32.6% of the total older than 60 years) fell in the age bracket 60-64 (See Table 1). Table 1: South Africans aged 60 and above, 2024     Male Female Total % of Total 60-64 866481 1134227 2000708 32.6% 65-69 654162 921092 1575254 25.7% 70-74 459581 697690 1157271 18.9% 75-79 273676 471861 745537 12.2% 80+ 212322 441742 654064 10.7% Total 2466222 3666612 6132834 100.0% Source:  StatsSA, Mid-year population estimates, 2024 [18]   Using this as a proxy, we thus assume that around 30% of AOG recipients are likely to fall within the 60-64 age bracket .   As mentioned above this analysis further assumes that the State will follow a phased in approach, that is where the qualifying age for the OAG is increased by one year per annum starting in 2026. This means that for 2026, only individuals 61 years and older will be viable to receive the grant, in 2027 only those 62 years and older, etc., thus reaching the target of 65 years from 2030 onwards.   To not overcomplicate the analysis, we assume that there are an equal number of individuals in the age cohorts 60 to 64. This translates to a linear, cumulative decline (saving) of around 6% [19] per year between 2026 and 2030. All other assumption related to the base and shocked scenarios remain the same as use in Chapter 4 of the main report.   Results   The results indicate a noticeable deviation between the base [20] and adjusted (age to 65 years) scenarios over time. During the first five years (implementation phase) the base scenario continues to rise strongly from around R106.8 bn in 2025 to R154.5 bn in 2030. In contrast to this the adjusted scenario remains largely unchanged from R106.8 bn in 2025 to R108.1 bn in 2030. This is as expected given the continued phasing out of qualifying individuals during the implementation phase.    After 2030 both series starts to rise, but with a significant gap between the series evident throughout the forecast period (see Figure 1). Figure 1: OAG costs of base versus adjusted (age 65) scenarios,  2024 to 2055   Source:  National Treasury (base up to 2028), own calculations   When comparing the results to total government expenditure, we get similar trends but with noticeable lower values for the adjusted (age over 65) scenario. Over the whole period the average for the original (shocked) scenario is around 0.5 percentage point compared to 0.3 percentage points for the adjusted (age over 65)  scenario.   Figure 2: OAG shock to expenditure: impact of original (shocked) versus adjusted (age 65) scenarios,  2024 to 2055   Conclusion   The aim of this addendum is to quantify a scenario in which the qualifying age for all recipients of the State’s Old age social grant, is increased to 65 years of age. This was done by using a phase in approach over 5 years, that is from 2026 to 2030.   The results indicate a significant saving in expenditure, averaging around R25 bn per year between 2026 and 2030. This equates to some R126.1 bn over the whole 5-year period.   When comparing the results as a percentage of total government expenditure, the average value for the original (shocked) scenario is around 0.5 percentage point compared to 0.3 percentage points for the adjusted (age over 65)  scenario. That means an (average) ‘saving’ of around 0.2 percentage point of total government expenditure can be realised per year if the qualifying age of the OAG is adjusted to 65 years of age.   Figure 3:             OAG costs of all original versus adjusted (age 65) scenarios,  2024 to 2055   [1]  All non-stationary variables have been differenced appropriately based on stationarity tests. [2]  Evident from the graph is that, in general, the model provides a good fit and trend of the actual values. Some discrepancies between the actual and modelled values are evident towards the later part (2015+). However, these are to both the upper and lower side, meaning we do not have a specific bias in the model. The large fluctuations during the Covid-19 period (2020-2021) likely further complicates the model’s ability to trace the actual values. [3]  To perform a forecast of the dependent variable (government revenue in this instance), the econometric model requires values for all explanatory variables over the forecasting period. Therefore, the need for the assumptions. [4]  This relates to the upper limit of the SARB’s potential growth rate, as discussed in Chapter 2. [5]   Act 103 of 1994 [6]  Daily Maverick, 27 May 2025, available at: No, there is no change to the retirement age [7]   https://gepf.co.za/retirement-benefits/ [8] 2022 MTBPS Annexure B. Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2022/mtbps.aspx [9]   https://www.dpsa.gov.za/thepublicservant/2022/03/09/govt-remains-largest-employer-in-sa-min-dlodlo/ [10]  This figure is likely understated, however it is difficult to determine the exact number of retirees in each age group per year, given the Minister’s broad statement. [11]  This seems in line with other sources such as StatsSA’s Quarterly Labour Force survey, which indicates that the 55-64 years age bracket represented around 7,8 percent of the total labour force in 2025.  P02111stQuarter2025.pdf . [12]  Note that this is the average rate, and that the DPSA states that the ‘rate is higher for members of the services, i.e. Police, Defence and Correctional Services. The employer contributes 16% of the member’s pensionable salary. Members of Intelligence Services also receive 16% of the member’s pensionable salary.’ https://www.dpsa.gov.za/policy-updates/nlrrm/conditions_of_service/pensions/pensions/ .   [13]  131176 (individuals) x R457 209 (average pay per year) [14]  4,5% per annum is the mid-point of South Africa’s official inflation target. [15]   https://gepf.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/GEPF_Annual-Report-2023_24_FINAL.pdf [16]  The GEPF is a defined contribution pension fund meaning that it does not guarantee a specific retirement benefit. Instead, both the employee and employer contribute a certain amount to an individual account, which is then invested, and the retirement benefit depends on the performance of these investments. ( Why withdrawing your pension from the GEPF could be your worst financial decision - Moneyweb ). [17]  Daily Maverick, 27 May 2025, available at: No, there is no change to the retirement age [18] P03022024.pdf [19]  30% assumption / 5 years = 6% per year [20]  Using the shocked scenario provides very similar trends and will thus not also be discussed here. See Figure 3 at the end of the Addendum for a combined graph of all different options and scenarios.    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY   Longevity’s impact on state finances: empirical evidence    The IMF [1]  notes that the economic and fiscal effects of an aging society have been extensively studied and are generally recognized by policymakers, but the financial consequences associated with the risk that people live longer than expected—longevity risk—has received less attention.  In this sense longevity can be defined as the risk that actual life spans of individuals or of whole populations [2]  will exceed expectations . The IMF notes that unanticipated increases in average life span can results from:   ‘ Misjudging the continuing upward trend in life expectancy, introducing small forecasting errors that compound over time to become potentially significant. There is also risk of a sudden large increase in longevity because of, for example, an unanticipated medical breakthrough. Although longevity advancements increase the productive life span and welfare of millions of individuals, they also represent potential costs when they reach retirement [3] .’   Longevity can broadly impact financial stability via two sources namely fiscal sustainability (e.g. as measured by deteriorating debt-to-GDP ratios) and solvency of private financial and corporate institutions (e.g. increases in their liabilities).    The Asian Development Bank Institute [4]  notes that ‘(the) rapid growth of aging population can pose a serious structural challenge to fiscal sustainability. Two main channels are referred to; (1) shrinking working population who are taxpayers, and (2) increasing government expenditures for age- related programs, particularly healthcare expenditure. In other words, the government’s ability to collect tax revenue decreases due to a smaller base of taxpayers while the government expenditure, particular on healthcare spending, continuously increases ’.   Liu and Zhao (2023) links to the above research by stating that ‘The impact of population aging on finance is primarily manifested in the change in the scale and proportion of government fiscal expenditure and the increase in the level of fiscal burden in old age’. In relation to research on population again they note that there are some variabilities in findings on the impact of population aging on fiscal sustainability due to ‘different research subjects and research methods. However, in general they indicate that the academic literature on the matter shows that ‘mainstream research has concluded that population aging significantly increases the fiscal burden and leads to fiscal unsustainability’. The same authors empirically analysed the impact of population aging in100 Chinese cities between 2010 to 2019 and find that population aging significantly inhibits fiscal sustainability, to the extent that each 1% increase in population aging reduces fiscal sustainability by 0.047%. The aging of the population notably inhibits fiscal sustainability through expenditure on healthcare and fiscal expenditure on social security and employment.   Fiscal sustainability in general remains a serious challenge in the Euro Area (EA) countries, especially after the sharp rise in public debt-to-GDP ratios in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. In a 2020 study, Carmen Ramos-Herrera and Sosvilla-Rivero [5]  analysed  data from 11 EA countries over the period 1980–2019 and finds that a higher old-dependency ratio deteriorates the cyclically adjusted government primary balance of a country, especially for countries with a relatively old population and for more indebted economies. They estimate a rise of one percentage point of the old-dependency ratio can generate a reduction of cyclically adjusted government primary balance of up to 54.5 percentage points in these countries.   Governments in particular bear a significant amount of longevity risk. The IMF identifies three main sources namely: (1) through public pension plans, (2) through social security schemes, and (3) as the “holder of last resort” of longevity risk of individuals and financial institutions. They note that ‘ an unexpected increase in longevity would increase spending in public schemes, which typically provide benefits for life. If individuals run out of resources in retirement, they will need to depend on social security schemes to provide minimum standards of living’ [6] .     Methodology    The study uses two methods, namely time series modelling (or an extrapolation method) as well as testing South Africa’s fiscal stance against the European Commission’s S1 and S2 indicators.     Time series analysis   Anderson (2012:4) states that ‘ the standard approach when assessing fiscal sustainability is an extrapolation method to project future public expenditure and revenues. The main steps are to make a decomposition of expenditures and revenues on demographic characteristics of the population in a given base year and combine this with a population forecast to generate paths for future public sector expenditures and revenues .’ He adds that and advantage of this method is that it is ‘ relatively easy to apply’ . However, he cautions that ‘ a problem could be that it relies on an underlying path for the economic development which may not be feasible, and which disregards important adjustment mechanisms. This may bias the assessment of fiscal sustainability in an unknown direction’ .   In deciding which methodology to use, the researcher is guided primarily by the type of data available. When looking at fiscal sustainability, state revenue becomes the limiting or ‘dependent’ variable against which other expenditure items are measured. We therefore first develop a workable model for state revenue, that can then be used for forecasting.     For this study we are working with time series data, which means that a time series econometric model will be utilised. The econometric modelling applied in this study is based on the Engel-Granger method [7] , in which a long term (cointegrated and a priori economic theoretically correct) and short-term error correcting (“ECM”) components are combined, to provide a final (holistic) model. The error term (“equilibrium error”) from the long run model is used to link the long and short run components.   Annual time series data, from 1990 to 2023 is used for the baseline revenue modelling. This implies using least 33 observations. Once an economic meaningful and statistically significant model has been developed, it can be used for out of sample forecasting.   To determine the impact of longevity on the expenditure side of state finances, this report takes guidance from the European Commission’s (“EC”) ageing [8]  and fiscal sustainability [9]  reports. As far as a methodology for determining total age-related public expenditure items, the EC [10]  identifies four main categories namely: health care, long-term care, education and pensions.  As far as the EC’s entire age-related expenditure projection is concerned it entails four steps namely:   Making population projections; Making exogenous macroeconomic assumptions, covering items such as the labour force (participation, employment and unemployment rates), labour productivity and the real interest rate; Estimating the age-related expenditure items; and Aggregating the above to provide an overall projection of age-related public expenditures.   An overview of how the different steps is combined can be seen in Figure 21.   Below is a brief discussion of the main expenditure items identified. However, it is important to note that the methodologies used by the EC are not all applicable to the South Africa economy and/or fiscal realities. For example, South Africa do not have a social security system (as defined by a mandatory publicly managed system). Also as highlighted in the first section of the report, South Africa’s demographics are (likely) more complex, notably the significant difference observed between population groups. Figure 21: Overview of Age-Related Public Expenditures   Source: European Commission (2021), The Ageing Report, 2     Health care    In its 2021 Ageing Report [11] , the EC notes that population ageing may pose a risk to the sustainability of health care financing in two ways:   Firstly, increased longevity, without an improvement in health status, leads to increased demand for services over a longer period of the lifetime, increasing total lifetime health care expenditure and overall health care spending. It is often argued that new medical technologies have been successful in saving lives from a growing number of fatal diseases but have been less successful in keeping people in good health.   Secondly, public health care is often financed by social security contributions of the working population. Ageing leads to an increase in the old age dependency ratio, meaning fewer contributors to the recipients of services. This can result in fewer people contributing to finance public health care in future, while a growing share of older people may require additional health care goods and services.   The impact of increasing longevity on health care expenditure critically depends on the health status of individuals over the additional lifetime (i.e. whether extra years are spent “in good or bad health”). Here a ‘trade off’ can develop between mortality and morbidity, e.g. in some cases mortality has decreased at the expense of increased morbidity, meaning that more years are spent with chronic illnesses. In contrast, if increasing longevity goes in line with an increasing number of healthy life years, then ageing may not necessarily translate into rising health care costs. Therefore, forecasting the health status of any population is challenging due to the difficulties associated with predicting the changes in morbidity and measuring ill-health.   Health spending is under pressure and the 2025 Budget [12]  notes that ‘ R28.9 billion is added to the health budget, mainly to keep about 9 300 healthcare workers in our hospitals and clinics ’. Figure 22 provides the comparison between the health budget from the 2024 and 2025 budgets, with our own calculations indicating a difference (rise) of closer to R37.1 billion for the years 2025 to 2027. There is also a noticeable pickup in the trend over the Treasury’s medium-term forecast compared to the 2024 budget figures.   Table 11: Health expenditure   Source: National Treasury 2024 Budget Review, 54 https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2024/review/Chapter%205.pdf     Figure 22: Total Consolidated Health Expenditure, 2024 and 2025 Budget Source: National Treasury, 2024 and 2025 Budget Reviews   To assess the impact of longevity this research isolates spending on health services (around 85% of the health budget), as these are the items from Treasury’s health budget, most likely to be affected by longevity risk. Population forecasts (using UN forecast) are used to calculate per capita health services spending.   Next an estimation is made of the proportion of this spending going to individuals older than 65 years.   The study assumes that government’s projections (i.e. this study’s base case forecast values) uses an unchanged stance as far as differences in population age groups and longevity is concerned [13] .   The study uses earlier findings and forecasts to model longevity risk using two separate aging effects:   Structural effect : this relates to the size of the population group older than 65 years old, increasing relative to the overall population (so-called pyramid effect), and Old age effect : this considers people literally getting older than expected.   The second (old age) effect is used to ‘reverse’ the per capita data, back to a nominal time series. The combined effect provides a longevity premium which can then be compared to the original times series.     Long-term care   For long-term care the proposed methodology considers the impact of changes in the age-structure and life expectancy of the population, on long-term care spending. It consisted of applying profiles of average long-term care expenditure per capita by age and gender to population forecasts.   The approach aims to maximise the number of factors affecting future long-term care expenditure. This may include [14] :   the future numbers of elderly people (through changes in the population projections used); the future numbers of dependent elderly people (by making changes to the prevalence rates of dependency); the balance between formal and informal care provision; the balance between home (domiciliary) care and institutional care within the formal care system; the costs of a unit of care.   The World Bank [15]  notes that, Similar to other low- and middle-income countries (“LMICs”), the populations in sub-Saharan African countries view the family unit as the primary provider of LTC services for older family members.   The HIV/AIDS epidemic has also strained the traditional family structure in that older adults may have to care for their adult children, sick family members, or grandchildren who are orphaned or left behind by migrant parents … This presents additional challenges as older adults balance their increasingly complex health needs with caregiving responsibilities for their family members.   Financing LTC appears to be a key issue in preventing the expansion of services across the continent. Financing of programs and facilities comes from a variety of sources, including donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious organizations, and out-of-pocket payments. Even in South Africa where 74 percent of facilities are government subsidized , funds from donations and out-of-pocket payments are needed to cover the costs of care provision   South Africa is one of the few sub-Saharan African countries that has residential facilities for the elderly. Sassa [16]  states that ‘if you are a senior citizen with no relatives available to take care of you in the golden age of 60 plus, there’s no need to worry. You can apply for the SASSA Old Age Grant also known as the old age pension and receive support through an old age home provided by the South African Department of Social Development (DSD ).’   The SASSA website [17]  notes that ‘ old age homes, also called retirement homes or assisted living facilities, are special residences for seniors who require different levels of care and assistance. Depending on the home, services typically include services such as housing and meals, personal care, health monitoring, and transportation’     To qualify for admission to a government-subsidized old age home the individual must:   Be aged  60  or older Be a South African citizen with a valid  ID document Receive the  SASSA Old Age Grant  or other pension fund Need full-time frail care due to health issues  (provide medical report) Have no family or other means to be properly cared for. However, to get aggregated data on public old age homes in South Africa is challenging.  Some information is provided by the Western Cape Government [18]  which notes that ‘ in the Western Cape, there is a total of 300 old age homes of which, 117 are funded by the provincial DSD. For the 2020/21 financial year, R 250 million has been budgeted towards services for older persons .’     Given that the Western Cape accounts for roughly 12% of the total SA population, we can use the R250 million to estimate a total for South Africa of R2,1 billion [19]  in 2020/2021.     Education    The methodology related to education spending considers the expected demographic and labour market developments, notably the  ratio of students to working-age population. The hypothesis is that a reduced ratio of students to working-age population should leads to a reduction in the ratio of total education expenditure to GDP. It does not assume a general rise in the education levels but analyses the effects of expected demographic and labour market developments given the present enrolment and cost situation.   The EC [20]  noted however that ‘ The projections of reduced education expenditure depend on a number of variables. As no underlying trend in enrolment rates is included, wealth effects on the demand side, or investment considerations e.g. related to the Lisbon objectives, could lead to savings being even more limited. The same can happen if expenditure per student should rise relative to GDP per worker, e.g. because of smaller classes or an increase in relative wages . In addition, ‘ enrolment and/or cost levels (could) increase more than what follows from the projections, because of implemented or planned legislation or other policies. This is especially relevant for enrolment in tertiary education. As education is to a large extent an investment in future human capital, many (countries) may also wish to direct any savings arising from demographic developments (rather to) increases in quality or intensity .’   Funding of education (notably tertiary education) in  South Africa remains complex, notably since the ‘FeesMustFall’ campaigns and the announcement by former President Zuma at the beginning of 2018 that ‘ free higher education will be provided to all new first year students from families earning less than R350 000 per year [21] ’ . Since then, changes have been made e.g. to change the support from a bursary scheme to a loan and partial bursary scheme [22] . The main entity offering free higher education is the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) [23]  via fully subsidised government bursaries to qualifying students.   Given the complexities with which to determine the trade-off between demographic changes versus possible changes in legislation or other policies, this item is excluded from the analysis of this report. Pensions (Old age grants)   The EC’s methodology includes social security and other public pensions as well as mandatory private pensions. Social security and other public pensions are broken down into two main categories:   old-age and early retirement pensions (including minimum and earnings-related pensions), with a preference to include also disability and widow’s pensions paid out to persons over the standard retirement age; other pensions (disability, survivors’, partial pensions without any lower age limit, including minimum and earnings-related pensions).   Making this relevant to South Africa, this study will analyse likely change due to longevity in the spending on old age grants.     SASSA notes that ‘ the Old Age Grant, also known as the Old Age Pension, is a South African social welfare program offering financial support to elderly citizens who are 60 years or older and have no income. Administered by SASSA Status check, this grant is available to South African citizens, refugees, and permanent residents. Eligibility is determined through a means test that evaluates the applicant’s income and assets. Once approved, recipients receive monthly payments [24] ’   According to the SASSA website [25] , social assistance (grants) is subject to a means test, which implies that SASSA evaluates the income and assets of the person applying to determine if these are below a stipulated amount. This currently (2024) amounts to an income of not more than R86 280  if you are single or R172 560 if married. The asset threshold is set at not more than 1 227 600 if you are single or R2 455 200 if you are married. The payments to individuals are  R 2 180 per month and R2 200 for individuals older than 75 years [26] . Table 12: Social Protection Expenditure   Source: National Treasury, 2025 Budget Review  https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2025/review/Chapter%205.pdf    During the 2024/25 fiscal year around 4,1 million individuals received the old age grant, and this is budgeted to rise to just below 4,5 million by 2027/28. This item represents a significant cost to the state and is also the largest (by cost [27] ) of the different social grants. Old age grants cost the state R106,8 billion currently and is budgeted to increase to R131,0 billion over the next three years (that is an average rise of 7,0% per annum over the medium term) (see Tabel 12).   Like the methodology for LTC,  the grant data already applies to individuals 60 years and older, and we do not need to apply a structural (‘pyramid’) effect [28] . Therefore, only an old age effect is applied. Other assumptions    As far as this research is concerned, important macroeconomic assumptions include that:   Trends observed during the last ten (10) [29]  years will continue. Inflation is assumed to remain at 4.5% per year, that is the mid-point of the SARB’s  inflation target. GDP growth to average 2.0% per year, linked to the SARB’s potential growth calculations The time horizon for forecasting will be 20 to 30 years. Additional scenarios can include the assumption that a basic income grant is introduced at the food-poverty line.      S1 and S2 indicators   An important starting point for the analysis is to determine a definition for fiscal sustainability. However, this is not as straight forward as it might seem. The European Commission (EC) (2006:3) [30]  notes that ‘ the issue of debt or fiscal sustainability is a multifaceted one and there is no agreed definition on what a sustainable debt position is  . The same commission luckily also provides a detailed definition of debt sustainability, specifically within the context of budgetary challenges posed by ageing populations, namely:   A definition of sustainability is derived from the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. It imposes that current total liabilities of the government, i.e. the current public debt and the discounted value of all future expenditure, should be covered by the discounted value of all future government revenue over an infinite horizon. In other words, the government must run sufficiently large primary surpluses in the future to cover the increasing cost of ageing and to pay off interest on outstanding debt. ( European Commission, 2006:3).   This definition (related to the intertemporal budget constraint) has become known as the so-called S2 indicator. Anderson (2012:2 [31] ) provides an interesting angle to the discussion by noting that intertemporal budget constraint definitions do not take a stand on whether current policies are optimal, or desirable, but rather asks whether they are feasible    In addition, the EC notes that the assessment of long-term sustainability of public finances should go beyond answering the question whether current policies are sustainable or not. ‘ An estimation of the size of the budgetary imbalances is also needed. This is provided by sustainability gap indicators that measure the size of a permanent budgetary adjustment’ . This additional condition is known as the S1 indicator and focusses on a country reaching a pre-determined level of debt to GDP.   Since its inception these indicators have also been revised and a 2023 report [32]  by the EC notes that ‘ (t)he S2 indicator measures the fiscal effort needed to stabilise public debt over the long term. The revised S1 indicator measures the fiscal effort required to bring the government debt-to-GDP ratio to 60% in 2070 [33] , hence capturing vulnerabilities due to high debt levels. The methodological approach differs from the Fiscal Sustainability Report 2021, which determined long-term fiscal risks based on the S2 indicator and the DSA results. The revised S1 indicator provides a better long-term complement to the S2 indicator, as based on a similar time horizon. ’   The EC’s uses the following equation to forecast the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio:   (Equation 1)   Where:   Related to the impact of ageing on the S2 indicator, it is explained that (ceteris paribus)  the higher the projected cost of ageing, the more difficult it is to fulfil the intertemporal budget constraint, as higher revenue – in present terms – is required to cover these costs, in addition to the other non-interest expenditure and debt service (European Commission, 2023:71) [34]   In practice, various types of fiscal balances exist, which according to the IMF [35] , often ‘ relate to special issues or circumstances and are only partial approaches and indicators for assessing complex situations . Some of the diffident types include:   Current fiscal balance:  this represents the difference between current revenue and current expenditure. It provides a measure of the government's contribution to national savings. When positive, it suggests that the government can at least finance consumption from its own revenue. Primary balance:  this balance excludes interest payments from expenditure. It can be said to provide an indicator of current fiscal effort, since interest payments are predetermined by the size of previous deficits. For countries with a large outstanding public debt relative to GDP, achieving a primary surplus is normally viewed as important, being usually necessary (though not sufficient) for a reduction in the debt/GDP ratio. Cyclically adjusted or structural balances [36] :  this item seek to provide a measure of the fiscal position that is net of the impact of macroeconomic developments on the budget. This approach takes account of the fact that, over the course of the business cycle, revenues are likely to be lower (and such expenditure as unemployment insurance benefits higher) at the trough of the cycle. Thus, a higher fiscal deficit cannot always be attributed to a loosening of the fiscal stance but may simply reflect that the economy is moving into a trough.   According to the National Treasury, ‘ the government's fiscal balance before accounting for interest payments on its outstanding debt. It is calculated as the difference between total government revenues and total non-interest expenditures. A positive primary balance indicates that the government’s revenues exceed its non-interest spending, while a negative primary balance suggests a shortfall [37] ’.   As far as its relevance to fiscal studies Bond Economics [38]  notes that ‘ the standard working assumption is that the primary balance is the result of fiscal policymakers, and that they do not wish to depart from this set policy. For example, they do not want to be forced to raise or lower taxes, as that has political consequences. The same holds true for programme spending. The usual interpretation of holding the trajectory of the primary balance fixed is to see whether the current fiscal policy settings are "sustainable" ’ However, the same source also cautions that ‘ the basic problem is that it makes very little sense for fiscal policymakers to care about the primary balance. Taxes are not imposed in the form of absolute levels; they are almost always imposed as percentages of nominal incomes and activity (e.g., income and sales taxes). As such, the tax component of the primary balance will shift based on the economic cycle, even if policy settings are unchanged…The net result is that the primary budget balance moves in a counter-cyclical fashion with the business cycle (deficits rise during recessions) ’.   In applying the EC’s methodology to this research, the development of the primary budget balance will be analysed to determine its relevance to the overall debt trajectory (S2) and to quantify what it should be to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio down to 70% of GDP [39]  by 2055 (S1).  Factors impacting longevity will be included via the adjusted expenditure figures, as discussed in the previous section. CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS    As explained in Chapter 3, the analysis uses two methods, namely time series modelling (or an extrapolation method) as well as testing South Africa’s fiscal stance against the European Commission’s S1 and S2 indicators.     Time Series Analysis  At its core, fiscal analysis boils down to two items namely government revenue and expenditure. When looking at fiscal sustainability, state revenue becomes the limiting or ‘dependent’ variable against which expenditure items are measured. This section therefore first presents a workable model for state revenue, that is used for forecasting.    From here a base scenario  is created in which existing expenditure trends (evident during the past 5 to 10 years), are extrapolated and compared to the estimated development in revenue (as obtained from the econometric model).   The next step it to apply shocks to the base scenario, notably by changing expenditure items that are likely to be impacted most by longevity risks.  Additionally, the implementation of a BIG (Basic Income Grant), is also analysed.     Government revenue model and forecast   Econometric model    A time series can be defined [40] as a set of observations on the values that a variable takes at different times. Such data is usually collected at regular time intervals, such as daily (e.g. stock prices, weather), monthly (e.g. inflation, money supply), quarterly (e.g. GDP), annually (e.g. government budgets) or even at longer time intervals.   Although time series analysis is used heavily in econometric studies, it does present specific problems, notably the assumption that underlying time series are stationary. In short, stationarity can be defined as a time series for which the mean and variance do not vary systematically over time.   However, by using cointegration techniques, as proposed by the econometricians Clive Granger and Robert Engle, or generally referred to as the ‘Engel-Granger’ [41] type analysis, time series that are non-stationary can be shown to share the same common trend so that regression analysis will be meaningful (i.e., not spurious). They are thus said to be cointegrated. Economically speaking, variables will be cointegrated if they have a long-term, or equilibrium, relationship between them. [42] Short run disequilibrium is likely to still exist, but this is corrected by the error correction mechanism (“ECM”), [43]  as also proposed by the Engel-Granger method.   The econometric modelling used for government revenue in this Report is based on the Engel-Granger method, in which a long term (cointegrated and a priori economic theoretically correct) and short-term error correcting (“ECM”) components are combined, to provide a final (holistic) model.  The error term (equilibrium error) from the long run model is used to link the long and short run components. Therefore, this term (i.e. its coefficient and statistical properties) becomes very important in the ECM, as also discussed in more detail below.   Annual time series data, from 1990 to 2023 is used for the baseline revenue modelling. This implies using 33 observations. All data was sourced from the South African Reserve Bank, National Treasury and Statistics South Africa. Because budget data is usually reported in fiscal years, the researcher must take cognisance of other economic variables provided in calendar years, which could impact the comparability of the different datasets. Fortunately, the SARB also provides calendar year values for most of the major state finance line items. The revenue model presented here is therefore run on annual (calendar) year data [44] .   The long run component of the modelling process is done to obtain a cointegrated, long-term trend, or equilibrium relationship between variables. In this sense one wants to rather use fewer variables, that are likely to have theoretically sound economic impacts on the dependent variable. For this purpose, GDP and household disposable income was used and it was confirmed that there does exist a cointegrating relationship between the long run variables (see details in Addendum 1).   The short run component, also known as the error correction mechanism (“ECM”), is defined as the part of the model that corrects for disequilibrium. Variables included in the ECM included household disposable income, the prime interest rate, money supply (“M3”) and inflation. In addition to this the long run component are included (as required) via the residual variable from the long run equation (i.e. ‘Res_Rev’). All variables were differenced appropriately for stationarity and the relevant diagnostic and stability tests confirmed. The detailed specifications and estimated results are provided at the end of this chapter in Addendum 1   In general, the model indicates a good fit as the modelled values closely follows the trend of the actual values (see Figure 23). Some discrepancies are evident towards the later part (around 2020). However, these are to both the upper and lower side, meaning we do not have a specific direction of bias in the model. The large fluctuations in the data itself during the Covid-19 period (2020-2021) likely further complicates the model’s ability to trace the actual values. Figure 23: Revenue Model: Actual and Fitted Values (Real, R millions)   Source:  Own calculation     Revenue forecast   Out of sample forecasting is performed next,  for the period 2024 to 2055 – that is over a period of three decades. The assumptions for the explanatory variables are as follows:   CPI and Inflation: increase of 4.5% per year (as per the mid-point of the SARB’s inflation target) GDP: Real increase of 2.0% [45] per year RYD: Real increase of 1,2% per year (average of last 10 years) RM3: Real increase of 2,1% per year (average of last 10 years) Prime: Decline from its current value to 9.5% per year over the next four years (until 20207), and then remain fixed at that value (9,5 based on the average of the last 10 years)     Base scenario    To make the results from the revenue model comparable to expenditure, the real values are deflated using the CPI. This indicates a continued upwards trend in (nominal) government revenue. Over the short term the modelled annual growth in revenue picks up from 2.3% in 2023 (actual) to 6.9% and 7.7% during 2024 and 2025 respectively. Over the long term (2030 and beyond) the growth rate settles on around 7.1% per year.  This compares very well to the historic average growth of 7.2% per year recorded by this item during the last decade.    As explained in the methodology section, government expenditure is forecasted using an extrapolation (moving  averages) method. To obtain the likely long-term trend in expenditure, it is increased by 6,9% [46] per year – equal to the average rise in this item during the last decade.    Figure 24: Revenue Model: Actual and Forecasted (@1,5% and 2% GDP growth) (Real, R millions)   Source:  Own calculation   Figure 25: Base Scenario: Long term Estimates for Revenue and Expenditure (Nominal, R millions)   Source : SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   Evident from the comparison of the two long term forecasts, is that expenditure continue to outperform revenue over the forecast period. Reasons for this include that, government is currently running a budget deficit, meaning that expenditure starts from a higher value. Also, despite the higher projected growth rate in revenue (7.1% from 2030 onwards) compared to 6.9% average for expenditure, revenue is struggling to make inroads into expenditure, even over the 30-year time horizon.   Another way of looking at this is to calculate the projected budget balance, which indicates a gradual decline from a deficit 6,0% of GDP in 2023 to around -5.8% in 2030 and only dipping below -5.5% of GDP from 2050 onwards (see Figure 26).   This means that under the base scenario the budget deficit is expected to remain negative, albeit declining, over the forecast horizon.   In addition, this means that state debt will continue to climb to fund the annual deficits. Given a rise of 2.0% per year in GDP, debt is expected to continue rising but also to stabilise just below 90% of GDP around the middle of the 2040’s.   However, if the economy only manages to record growth of 1.5%, the debt level is expected to continue accelerating, reaching 90% of GDP in roughly a decade (i.e. around 2034).   Figure 26: Budget Balance as % of GDP (@1,5% and 2% GDP growth) Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   Figure 27: Gross Debt to GDP (@1,5% and 2% GDP growth) Source: SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   Evident from the above is that in order for debt levels to remain below 90% of GDP [47] , the economy will have to grow by a level of at least 2,0% per year [48] . Any value less than this will mean a continued upwards trend, i.e. to clearly unsustainable debt levels. However, the aim of this section is to establish a base scenario on which further analysis can be performed. For this reason, it the (more optimistic) 2,0% per year GDP assumption  will be applied during the remaining of this Section.      Longevity impact scenario    The aim of this section is to quantify and analyse the impact of longevity on a selection of government expenditure items, as identified in the methodology. The items will be quantified individually after which the combined impact will be analysed against the forecast results from the base scenario model.     Health care    The impact on healthcare is calculated by only using health services related spending (around 85% of the total health budget) and using population forecasts to calculate per capita figures. Two separate aging effects are then analysed namely a structural effect (relative size of the population older than 65 to the total population) and an old age effect (people living longer than expected).    Initially health services spending is calculated by using 84.8% of total health expenditure up to 2027 (for which National Treasury data is available), after which it is forecasted by using the 10-year average ratio of this item to total expenditure.     Structural effect   Per capita health services expenditure is calculated , and from there the proportion of this relevant to the elderly (65+) is calculated using a fixed ratio of 6,5% of the population (i.e. the ratio where this age group was at 2024). A second scenario uses an increasing ration (i.e. individuals over 65 years old increasing from 6.5% to 11.2% of the total population).  Figure 4.6 provides the results of the two scenarios. Figure 28: Per Capita Spending by Elderly (65+) on Health Services (Base and Shocked Scenario)   Source:  Own calculations     Old age effect:   In addition, a longevity effect(i.e. the risk that life expectancy is underestimated) need to be added, which is done by applying an aging coefficient (around 0.5 percent per year) to only the population older than 65 years [49] . In brief this increases the size of the 65+ population group in 2055 by around 1.4 million individuals. The ‘new’ total population is then calculated by replacing the old age group with the new numbers. See Figure 29 for the impact of this adjustment. This adjusted population data is used to re-calculate the nominal rand values.   Figure 29: Total Population (Base and Alternative Scenario)   Source : Own calculations Total healthcare effect   The results indicates that the gap (difference) between the base and shocked scenario will continue to increase over the forecast period, reaching and amount of R110,0 billion in 2055.   Figure 30: Health Services (Base and Shocked Scenario)   Source:  Own calculations   Another way to look at this is to compare the gap to total government expenditure, which indicates a shock starting at less than 0.1% of total expenditure around 2030 but rising to around 0.6% of total expenditure in 2055 (see Figure 31).   Figure 31: Health Shock to Expenditure   Source : Own calculations     Long-term care   For long-term care the analysis focus on the impact of changes in life expectancy of the population. Specifically, how these factors are likely to impact the cost of providing public old age homes by the South African Department of Social Development (“DSD”).   As mentioned in the methodology section, it proved difficult to find aggregated data on public old age homes. Some data from the Western Cape Government indicated that in 2020/21 this province spent R250 million on services for older persons.   Using this as a benchmark we estimate a spending for South Africa of around R2,1 [50] billion during the same year.   As base scenario this amount is inflated (using an annual inflation rate of 4.5 % per year). This takes LTC spending from around R2.4 billion in 2024 to R9.4 billion in 2055.   To determine the likely impact of longevity on these figures, a shocked scenario is then developed. As the data already applies to individuals 60 years and older, we do not need to apply a structural (‘pyramid’) effect [51] . Therefore, only an old age effect is applied.   The resultsare presented in Figure 32, which indicates a difference between the base and shocked scenario reaching R500 million in 2040 and further increasing to around R1.5 billion by 2055.   Figure 32: Long term care (“LTC”) Costs (Base and Shocked Scenario)   Source:  Own calculations    Compared to total government expenditure, the LTC shock is fairly small [52] , rising to around only a 10 th  of a percent by 2055.   Figure 33: LTC Shock to Expenditure Source:  Own calculations     Pensions (Old age grants)   The analysis focus on how changes in life expectancy of the population could impact pension payments. Specifically, how this is likely to affect the cost of social assistance payments (so called old age grants).   Like previous sections, a base and shocked scenario is developed. The base scenario uses data from the National Treasury up to 2027/28 after which the item is expected to increase equal to the 10-year average (that is 8.6% per year for old age grants).   The shocked scenario uses this same base data and forecasts but applies an old age coefficient to capture the impact of people in general living longer than expected.   The results are presented in Figure 34 which indicates a difference between the base and shocked scenario reaching R30 billion in 2040 and further increasing to around R195 billion by 2055. Figure 34: Pension Costs (Base and Shocked Scenario)   Source:  Own calculations   The results indicate a relatively large gap averaging 0,5% of total expenditure over the forecast period.  Annual values of more than 1% of total expenditure is reached from 2050 onwards  (see Figure 35).   Figure 35: Pension Shock to Expenditure   Source:  Own calculations     Combined (Health, LTC and pensions)   By adding the three items (Health, LTC and pension), the total impact is derived. In rand value the impact (shock) on total government expenditure is expected to increase over the forecast period, reaching around R40 billion in 2040, and increasing to over R300 billion by 2055.   In percentage terms, this is equal to an average rise of around 0,8% of expenditure over the period, with annual values reaching 1,0% in 2040 and peaking at 1,7% in 2055 (see Figure 36).    Figure 36: Total Shock to Expenditure (R value and %)   Source:  Own calculations   Figures 37 shows the relative contributions of the three items to the total shock, which clearly indicates the dominant impact of old age grants, followed by the health services effect.   Figure 37: Total Shock to Expenditure (Components)   Source:  Own calculations Impact on fiscus   The last part of this section is to consider the impact of the shocked expenditure values on South Africa’s overall fiscal stance. This is done by comparing it to the modelled revenue values and base scenario developed in Section Four. Note that the base scenario using 2% GDP growth [53] is used for comparison.   The base scenario indicated that the budget deficit is expected to peak at 5.8% of GDP around the mid-2030s,after which it will gradually decline to around 5,4% by the end of the forecast period. In contrast to this, the shocked scenario does not see a peak, but instead for the deficit to continue increasing (worsening) over the forecast period, to reach just below 6% of GDP in 2055 (see Figure 38)   Figure 38: Budget Balance as % of GDP (Base and Shock)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   In addition, this means that state debt will continue to climb to fund the annual deficits. In the base scenario debt is expected to stabilise just below 90% of GDP around the middle of the 2040’s. Again, in contrast the shocked scenario does not see a peak, but indicates a continual rise, breaking the 90% level around mid-2040’s and climbing to 93% of GDP by 2055. On average this will mean a higher debt to GDP ratio of around 1.8 percentage points over the forecast period.    Figure 39: Gross Debt to GDP (Base and Shock)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts     Impact of longevity and Basic Income Grant (“BIG”)    As a last part of this section, the aim is to analyse the impact of a possible Basic Income Grant (“BIG”) being implemented. The assumption here is that the existing (temporary) Covid-19 SRD grant be transferred to a basic income grant. The 2025 Budget indicates that around 8,3 million individuals are receiving the SRD at a cost of R35,5 billion to the state.   We assume that the BIG will be implemented at the food poverty line, which is R796 per month (“StatsSA [54] ”). To provide this to 8,3 million individuals will cost the state around R79,3 billion per year. That is roughly double the amount of the SRD.   In addition, we assume that part of the individuals receiving the grant could in future also need old age assistance, thus the values are also adjusted for and ageing coefficient. The BIG is assumed to be implemented in 2025.   The results indicate that the budget deficit is likely to increase by around 1 percentage points, compared to the shocked scenario. For 2025 this is equal to a deficit of 7,0% of GDP, which is expected to gradually decline to around 6,6% by the end of the forecast period.    Figure 40: Budget Balance as % of GDP (Base, Shock and BIG)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   As can be expected this will push the debt to GDP ratio up even further, now breaking 90% by 2033 and 100% in 2044. This also adds a significant increase over the shocked scenario, of an average of 8,1 percentage points higher over the forecast period.   Figure 41: Gross Debt to GDP (Base, Shock and BIG)   Source: SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts     S1 and S2 indicators   The S2 indicator measures the fiscal effort needed to stabilise public debt over the long term while the S1 indicator measures the fiscal effort required to bring the government debt-to-GDP ratio to a measurable target at a specific date in future. Both these indicators have a strong focus on the development of the primary budget balance, that is the difference between total revenue and non-interest expenditure, and how this in turn affects the trajectory of government debt levels.    This section first looks at general trends in South Africa’s budget and primary budget balances after which the two indicators are analysed. This builds on the work of Section Four, in as far as the longevity impact on expenditure has already been developed and can thus be further utilised here.     Overview of fiscal balances   An overview of the post-1990 trends in South Africa’s fiscal balances, indicate three distinct periods:   Prior to 1994:  Worsening of fiscal stance as the state ran continued larger deficits, reaching -7.5% of GDP in 1993. 1994 to pre 2008/09 GFC: The improved economic climate re South Africa, after 1994 is evident as the fiscal deficits got smaller, to a point where surpluses were recorded during 2005 and 2006. The primary balance improved significantly and recorded surpluses, averaging around 3% of GDP, during the period 1995 to 2008. Also noticeable during this period is the narrowing in the gap between the fiscal budget and primary balances (In figure 4.19 this is evident from the light blue and orange lines converging during the period). Post 2008/09 GFC: There is a clear switch in sentiments during (and after) the 2008/09 Global Financial Crisis as a large fiscal deficit of -4.7% is recorded in 2009, while the primary deficit records -2.6% of GDP. Both these indicators remain in negative territory (deficits) until 2019, during which a widening (divergence) between the two are again observed (likely as debt starts to increase, driving up debt-service costs). The further severe impact of the Covid-19 crisis is evident in large deficits recorded during 2020-21.   Figure 42: South Africa’s Budget and Primary Balances, 1990 to 2022 Source:  World Bank   Comparing developments in the primary balance to government debt, shows a decline in debt levels between 2000 to 2007 (that is when large primary surpluses were run). 2008 again indicates an inflection point, that is a sharp and sudden reversal in trends as debt starts to climb post the 2008/09 GFC, while the primary balance falls and records deficits for the remainder of the period  (up to 2022) (see Figure 43).      As far as more recent developments the Treasury seems to be committed to focus on establishing and maintaining a primary surplus. The 2025 Budget Review [55] notes that ‘ government projects a main budget primary surplus of 0.5 per cent of GDP, which will increase to 0.9 per cent in 2025/26 ’ and that this ‘will achieve a longstanding ambition to stabilise debt next year through the strengthening primary surplus. The fiscal strategy will continue to manage fiscal risks, support essential services and encourage economic growth .’    Figure 43: Primary Balance and Debt, 2000 to 2022   Source:  World Bank   It is evident that the state is also looking for potential fiscal anchors ‘ to support responsible borrowing and spending. In 2025/26, the debt stabilising main budget primary surplus will serve as the fiscal anchor, with larger primary surpluses planned for the remainder of the decade to reduce debt as a proportion of GDP [56] ’.   However, worrying are statements [57] made after the 2025 budget by the Minister of Finance regarding a change in the budget’s focus from ‘ spending cuts to higher taxes’ , as these could undermine the proposed fiscal anchors as well as outlook of the primary balance. There also remain some uncertainty over some budgeted proposals (notably the implementation of the proposed VAT hike(s)).    Table 13: 2025 Budget: Main Budget Framework   Source:  2025 Budget Review, 31     S2 indicator    The S2 indicator measures the fiscal effort needed to stabilise public debt over the long term. In this case we use equation 1  (see Chapter Three) to estimate the future trend of debt. The starting point is to forecast data for the explanatory variables, after which Dt (the debt-to-GDP ratio) is calculated.   The primary budget balance plays a critical role in these calculations and is obtained as the difference between revenue and non-interest expenditure. To obtain non-interest expenditure, we use the (shocked) expenditure values (obtained earlier in this Chapter [58] ) from which debt service costs are subtracted. This is then expressed as percentage of GDP, using the nominal GDP values. Over the medium term (2026 to 2028) National Treasury’s projections [59] from the 2025 budget is used (see the last row in Table 4.1 above). To forecast the values, the 10-year average (i.e. 2019 – 2028) is used, which equals a value of -0.5% to GDP.    To limit the number of ‘moving parts’ the forecasts for the nominal GDP and nominal interest rates (Repo) are kept pegged at their 2024 values. Figure 44: Primary Balance and Debt Forecast (S2), 2002 to 2055   Source: National Treasury and own calculations   Using the above, the debt trajectory is expected to continue increasing and breach 90% of GDP by 2038 and 100% around mid-2040s.   Further interesting conclusions include that the debt level continues to rise as long as the primacy balance remains negative, albeit by a small margin.      S1 indicator    As explained previously, the S1 indicator will be modified to measures the fiscal effort required to bring South Africa’s government debt-to-GDP ratio to 70% by 2055.   From the S2 scenario we know that any negative value will not be sufficient to stabilise the debt trajectory. Therefore, it is evident that the value for PB needs to be some positive value. By testing different forecast scenario’s, it was determined that a primary surplus of at least 1.15% of GDP needs to be maintained throughout the forecast period to bring the debt level down to 70% of GDP by 2055 .   This compares well to National Treasury’s statement (see Section Four) that the ‘primary surplus will increase to 0.9 per cent in 2025/26’ and that this ‘will achieve a longstanding ambition to stabilise debt’. Albeit that this research indicates that an even higher surplus will be required to actually drive down the debt level. Figure 45: Primary Balance and Debt, S1 Adjusted   Source:  Own calculations     S1 and S2 criteria     The European Commission provides various criteria against which to compare the results. This includes a decision tree (see Figure 46) and threshold levels for the different indicators (see Table 47).   If we start with the S2 indicator as calculated for South Africa, the debt level in 2032 is expected to be 80,4%, placing the country in the medium (‘between 60% and 90% of GDP’) risk category. However as far as the debt trajectory is concerned, it is evident that it should ‘still increase at end of projection’ placing the country in the high category. According to the decision tree (Figure 46), at least one high risk item is sufficient to conclude that South Africa will fall in the high-risk category as far as overall (i.e. S2) debt sustainability is concerned .   Figure 46: Decision Tree for Assessment of Fiscal Sustainability Risks   Source: European Commission [60] , p183   As far as S1 is concerned the criteria state that ‘ the risk classification derived from S1 depends on the amount of fiscal consolidation needed to reduce debt to 60% of GDP over the medium term. When this requires a large effort of more than 2.5% of GDP on top of the baseline assumptions, this identifies a high risk. When no additional effort is needed as debt is already projected to stand below 60% of GDP, corresponding to a negative S1, the risk is low. For intermediate values of S1, the risk is medium [61] ’.   Figure 47:  Debt Sustainability Thresholds   Source: European Commission [62] , p185   Important to note is that, in this research both the forecast horizon (2055 rather than2070) and point target (70% of GDP instead of 60% of GDP) differs from that used by the EC, which complicates then comparison   However, using the required correction value of 1.15% of GDP as calculated above, this will put South Africa in the ‘intermediate’ or ‘medium risk’ category as far as the S1 indicator is concerned. Combining the S2 and S1 indicator puts South Africa in a ‘high/medium’ overall risk category. CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS    The aim of this study is to assess the impact of longevity (i.e. people living longer than expected) on fiscal sustainability in South Africa. These risks were quantified using time series econometrics as well as the European Commission’s S1 and S2 fiscal sustainability indicators.   As far as demographics is concerned the study finds evidence that South Africa’s are indeed ‘living longer’,  as indicated by measures for the median age as well as life expectancy. Looking at recent demographic trends, South Africa’s median age increased from 22 years in 1996 to 28 years by 2022, thus placing the country at the upper end of the ‘intermediate’ age category.  Over the last 22 years, total life expectancy rose by 11.8 years, or roughly 0.54 years per year. By extrapolating from here, life expectancy could rise by between 10.7 years (2045) and 16.1 years (2055) taking life expectancy to respectively 77.2 years (2045) and 82.6 years (2055).   At the same time evidence of ageing is found, notably South Africa’s population aged 65 and higher, increasing from 4,0 percent of the total population in 1994, to 6,5 percent in 2023. The growth rate among elderly (60 years and older) measured 2.84% in 2024 – that is almost 1.5 percentage points higher than that of the overall population. As far as it expected future trend, and depending on different assumptions, the population aged 65 and higher is estimated to increase to between 9,0% and 11,2% of the population in 2055 (in 30 years’ time) - that is almost double the current size.     An overview of the fiscal and economic environment show that South Africa finds itself in a bind as far as its state finances are concerned. South Africa has been accumulating significant amounts of debt during the last decade with gross loan debt rising from 23.6% of GDP in 2009 to 73.8% of GDP in 2024.   A (time series) econometric model is used to model and forecast government revenue, while expenditure is forecasted using recent (five to ten-year average) growth rates. Using these a base scenario is developed against which various shocks can be analysed. The study finds that even under the base scenario, significant fiscal pressure is already evident, including a high probability of continued budget deficits and a concomitant increase in debt levels.   Three age-related public expenditure items (health care, long-term care and old age grant payments) are analysed. The study finds that the combined impact of the three items is equal to an average rise of around 0,8% of total expenditure over the forecast period, with annual values reaching 1,0% in 2040 and peaking at 1,7% in 2055. As far as relative contribution the dominant impact is due to extra expected spending for old age grants, followed by the health services effect.   The combined expenditure shock is tested against the base scenario. The base scenario indicated that the budget deficit is expected to peak at 5.8% of GDP around the mid-2030s, after which it will gradually decline to around 5,4% by the end of the forecast period. In contrast the shocked scenario does not peak but instead predicts a continue increase in the deficit over the forecast period, to reach just below 6% of GDP by 2055. In addition, state debt will continue to climb to fund the annual deficits. The shocked scenario does not see a peak, but indicates a continual rise, breaking the 90% level around mid-2040’s and climbing to 93% of GDP by 2055. On average this will mean a higher debt to GDP ratio of around 1.8 percentage points over the forecast period.    An additional scenario is analysed wherein a Basic Income Grant (“BIG”) implemented at the food poverty line (currently R796 per month), replaces the (temporary) Social Relive of Distress (“SRD”) grant. To provide this to 8,3 million individuals will cost the state around R79,3 billion per year. The results indicate that the budget deficit is likely to increase by around 1 percentage point, compared to the shocked scenario. For 2025 this is equal to a deficit of 7,0% of GDP, which is expected to gradually decline to around 6,6% by the end of the forecast period. This pushes the debt to GDP ratio up further, and indicates that it will break 90% of GDP by 2033 and 100% in 2044.   Related to the European Commission’s S2 indicator, this study finds that the debt trajectory is expected to continue increasing and breach 90% of GDP by 2038 and 100% around mid-2040s. In addition, it becomes evident that the debt level will continue to rise as long as the primacy balance remains negative, albeit by a small margin.   As far as the S1 indicator is concerned, it is determined that a primary surplus of at least 1.15% of GDP needs to be maintained throughout the forecast period, to bring the debt level down to 70% of GDP by 2055.   Comparing the results from the S1 and S2 indicators to the EC’s debt sustainability criteria, puts South Africa at a ‘high/medium’ overall risk category.   The study therefore concludes that longevity poses a significant additional risk to South Africa’s long term fiscal sustainability, given South Africa’s existing fiscal pressures.   In closing, South Africa can find guidance from the IMF regarding proposals on how to mitigate longevity risk to countries in general:   The IMF notes that: a three-pronged approach should be taken to address longevity risk, with measures implemented as soon as feasible to avoid a need for much larger adjustments later. Measures to be taken include: (1) acknowledging government exposure to longevity risk and implementing measures to ensure that it does not threaten medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability; (2) risk sharing between governments, private pension providers, and individuals, partly through increased individual financial buffers for retirement, pension system reform, and sustainable old-age safety nets; and (3) transferring longevity risk in capital markets to those that can better bear it. An important part of reform will be to link retirement ages to advances in longevity. If undertaken now, these mitigation measures can be implemented in a gradual and sustainable way. Delays would increase risks to financial and fiscal stability, potentially requiring much larger and disruptive measures in the future [63] .   CLICK HERE TO CONTINUE TO ADDENDUMS       [1] https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781616352479/ch004.xml   [2]  Important is to differentiate between whole populations or aggregate longevity risk, as opposed to individual (or ‘idiosyncratic’) risk which refers to individuals outliving their financial resources. The focus in this research is on firstly mentioned, i.e. the risk that a population on average live longer than expected.  [3]   Chapter 4: The Financial Impact of Longevity Risk in: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2012 [4]   https://t20japan.org/policy-brief-aging-population-impacts-fiscal-sustainability/   [5]  Fiscal Sustainability in Aging Societies: Evidence from Euro Area Countries ( https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347529813_Fiscal_Sustainability_in_Aging_Societies_Evidence_from_Euro_Area_Countries ) [6]   Chapter 4: The Financial Impact of Longevity Risk in: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2012 [7]  See Enders W. (2004). Applied econometric time series. 2nd edit. Wiley, pp. 1-9; Stock, J.H and Watson M.M (2012) Introduction to econometrics. 3rd edit. Pearson, pp. 691-701  [8]  Two ageing report are available, for 2006 and 2021  https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/economic-and-financial-affairs-publications_en . [9]   https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/economic-and-financial-affairs-publications_en . [10]  The 2006 report also included a category for unemployment benefits, however this was excluded in the 2021 report The impact of ageing on public expenditure - Publications Office of the EU   [11]   The 2021 Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States (2019-2070) - European Commission , 107-109 [12]   https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2025/excelFormat.aspx   [13]  This is a relational expectation as no indications to counter this is evident from the budget documents. Also keep in mind that Treasury’s forecasts usually focus merely on the medium term, i.e. a rolling three years forecast period, during which the impact of longevity risks are of little concern.   [14]  European Commission (2006), The impact of ageing on public expenditure - Publications Office of the EU  p. 139 [15]   World Bank Document [16]   Old Age Homes for SASSA Pensioners - Sassa Check [17]   Old Age Homes for SASSA Pensioners [March 2025] [18]   All Residential facilities for Older Persons must be registered | Western Cape Government [19]  This figure seems in line with findings from other academic research on funding elder care in South Africa, see Funding elder care in South Africa: New report | UCT News [20]  Ibid. 164 [21]   What does free higher education actually mean in South Africa? - Hypertext [22]   Government making strides in fee-free tertiary education drive – The Mail & Guardian [23]   https://www.nsfas.org.za/content/bursary-scheme.html   [24]   SASSA Old Age Grant – How to Apply, Approve Grant? [25]   https://www.sassa.gov.za/Pages/Older-Persons-Grant.aspx   [26]   Old age pension | South African Government [27]  Note that in term of number of recipients the child support grant is biggest, with around 13,2 million recipients in 2024/25 [28]  Technically this report defines the old age grouping as individuals 65 years and older, however for the sake of not overcomplicating the analysis, we use the data as given (thus also including individuals from 60 years old) [29]  A ten-year average is chosen to provide a bit of a longer time period and to diminish some of the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on most variables [30] https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication7903_en.pdf [31]  Anderson, T.M. (2012). Fiscal sustainability and fiscal policy targets. Economics Working Papers, 2012-15 . AARHUIS University. [32] https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/Chapter%20III%20Long-term%20fiscal%20sustainability%20analysis.pdf [33]  This end date (i.e. 2070) was likely selected to link the findings of this report to the 2021 Ageing Report, that was published in May 2021 also by the EC, see The 2021 Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States (2019-2070) - European Commission ( europa.eu )  This study focus mainly on the next 30 years, thus the fiscal target needs to be adjusted (‘loosened’), to e.g. an interim target of 70% of GDP by 2055.  [34] https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/Chapter%20III%20Long-term%20fiscal%20sustainability%20analysis.pdf [35]   IMF Pamphlet Series - No. 49 -Guidelines for Fiscal Adjustment - How Should the Fiscal Stance Be Assessed? [36]  The IMF (ibid.), adds that ‘ The usefulness of these indicators is limited by difficulties in identifying potential and trend output, and, consequently, in distinguishing cyclical and underlying elements of the fiscal deficit ’ [37]  2025 Budget Review [38]   Bond Economics: What Is the Primary Fiscal Balance, And Why Its Use Should Be Avoided [39]  Note the departure from the EC’s objective of a 60% Debt to GDP ratio by 2070, due to the shorter forecast period used in this study.  [40]  Gujarati, D.N, & Porter, D.C. (2009). Basic Econometrics. Fifth edition. McGraw-Hill International Edition. p 22       [41]  See Enders W. (2004). Applied econometric time series. 2 nd  edit. Wiley, pp. 1-9; Stock, J.H and Watson M.M (2012) Introduction to econometrics. 3 rd  edit. Pearson, pp. 691-701 [42]  Gujarati, D.N, & Porter, D.C. (2009). Basic Econometrics. Fifth edition. McGraw-Hill International Edition. p. 762 [43]  Ibid., Pp. 764-765; Stock & Watson (2012) pp. 700-701 [44]  This should also be kept in mind when comparing the values to, e.g. data provided in the various National Treasury Budget documents. However as this study is more interested in the long term trends, the short term discrepancies between the fiscal and calendar year values are of less importance.  [45]  This relates to the upper limit of the SARB’s potential growth rate, as discussed in Chapter 2. To illustrate the impact of different growth scenario’s, the forecast using 1,5% GDP growth is added to this section. The significant impact of this ‘relatively small’ difference in growth performance should be evident over the longer term. Similarly, the assumptions about various of the other explanatory variables, notably the level of inflation can also have significant impacts on the results, especially given the relatively long forecasting time frame.  The aim here is however to establish a base scenario from which further shocks can be analysed and not necessarily on sustainability analysis per se. [46]  The average rise is calculated using the latest fiscal year data. [47]  Broadly in line with the OECD’s guidelines as discussed in Section 2.1. However, even at the current (2024) level of around 75% debt to GDP South Africa is already in trouble as it is at the ‘ability to stabilise the economy’ level. [48]  By default, the other assumptions listed above will also have to materialise  [49]  One can argue that this is still underestimating the impact of longevity as this should actually be applied to the population as a whole. However for the purpose of this study, applying it to only the elderly (65+) population should be sufficient. [50]  Also see Funding elder care in South Africa: New report | UCT News [51]  Technically this report defines the old age grouping as individuals 65 years and older, however for the sake of not overcomplicating the analysis, we use the data as given (thus also including individuals from 60 years old) [52]  Evident however is that the amount included here are for servicing of the facilities while items such as capital outlay, etc. should also be included to provide a fuller indication of costs associated with old age care. But as explained data for this remains scarce.  [53] Likely any of the GDP growth scenarios can be used as ‘base’ as we focus on the changed between the base and shocked versions not necessarily the absolute level. [54]   https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03101/P031012024.pdf   [55]   https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20Budget/2025/review/FullBR.pdf   [56]  Ibid. 25 [57]   ‘Spending cuts were not effective, now we look to higher tax revenue’ – Godongwana - Moneyweb [58]  Note that this item includes the longevity related ‘shocks’ [59]  It should be noted that National Treasury’s projections are rather optimistic, given the longer-term trend in the primary balance. This, by implication also provides a ‘more optimistic’ forecast of debt trajectory. [60]   Fiscal Sustainability Report 2021 (Volume) [61]  Ibid., 181 [62]  Ibid. [63]   Chapter 4: The Financial Impact of Longevity Risk in: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2012   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 10/2025   Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   OCTOBER 2025   Prof Melha Biel (PhD) Principal of Bentiu University of Petroleum & The Executive Director of the Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies Abstract   South Sudan –United States Relations has been a history connected with missionaries and Christianity in the first place. During the 18 th  century, western Christian missionaries came to Africa and the Sudan seeking to convert new believers into the community of believers. Many Sudanese were converted and became Christian. At the same time Christian teaching in form of Bible study was conducted among the believers. This led to translation of the Bible into African languages such as Nuer, Dinka, Bari, to mention a few.   Since the Christianization of South Sudan, the new country is religiously sub-divided into three zones, the northern part of South Sudan which is greater Upper Nile is dominated by Anglican Churches. While greater Bahr Al Ghazal by Catholic Churches and greater Equatoria by both Catholic and Protestants Churches.   Most of leaders of South Sudan were educated at the missionaries’ schools. Some managed to visit Schools in neighboring countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Congo or Zaire.   The development of Missionaries has also influenced the relationship between the South and the North of Sudan and has been one of the factors that led to succession of Southern Sudan in 2011.   According to the Pew –Templeton Global Religious Future Project report on South Sudan(2020), Christian make up of 60.5 % of the population, while African religion/Indigenous  followers come second are said to be 33%, whereas Muslims are 6%. There are other smaller groups that have emerged after the country got independent in 2011 and they are: Baha’I, Buddhism, Hinduism and Judaism.   In another hand, US is aware of the economic potential of South Sudan and was among the first country of the world to start exploration of minerals in the country. This led to the discovery of oil in 1999 in Bentiu, South Sudan. However, this discovery of oil and it subsequently production to Port Sudan led to intensification of Sudan conflict, where villages were forcefully removed from their home in the name of exploring oil(Moro 2019). 1. Introduction and Background   Since independence in 2011, South Sudan has been plagued by political and economic instability characterized by civil war and communal conflict. Post-independence political rivalries led to the outbreak of civil wars in December 2013 and July 2016 which formally ended in September 2018 with IGAD-mediated peace agreement. The 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) created a coalition government, the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), comprising five parties, namely the Incumbent Transitional Government of National Unity (ITGoNU), Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A-OI), South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), Former Detainees and Others Political Parties. The RTGoNU is led by President Salva Kiir Mayardit deputized by First Vice President Riek Machar and Four Vice Presidents. However, some Opposition groups had reservations and declined to sign the R-ARCSS. Some of members of the holdout group are currently negotiating with the RTGoNU under the auspices of the Kenya-led Tumaini Initiative.   The 2018 R-ARCSS stipulated a 44-Month lifespan of implementation that is, 8 months Pre-Transitional Period and 36-month Transitional Period. Key tasks to be implemented include, inter alia, the following: unification of armed forces, including security sector reform/transformation; drafting a new constitution; conducting a population and housing census; socio-economic and governance reforms; transitional justice and national elections. The transition was envisaged to culminate in elections in December 2022 and terminate in February 2023, with an elected government in place. The R-ARCSS implementation has progressed over the years, albeit at a slow pace, uneven and often instrumental, substantially due to several factors, including funding constraints, insufficient trust and political will power.   By mid-2022, it was apparent that the transition would not be completed as envisaged. In August 2022, the R-ARCSS signatories convened a High-Level Committee (HLSC) comprised of senior party members and agreed to extend the transition by two years until February 2025 and adopted a Roadmap for completing outstanding tasks including the conduct of elections by December 2024.   In September 2024, the signatories further extended the transition by another two years until February 2027. According to an assessment by the HLSC, only 10% of the roadmap tasks, had been implemented as of August 2024, thus necessitating a further extension of the Transitional period to allow for the completion of the key elections-related tasks essential for the political transition. A harmonized implementation matrix is currently being developed by the HLSC.   Although progress has been quite slow and limited, it can be noted that in the first extension, the RTGoNU through the NCAC managed to review and enact several elections and security related legislation so as to align them to the R-ARCSS and imbue international best practice; these were the National elections Ac, Political Parties Act, the National Police service Act, Sudan People’s Liberation Army Act, the National Civil Defense Service, etc. RTGoNU has also enacted the constitution Making process Act, the commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing Act and the Compensation and Reparations Authority Act. In this period, it reconstituted election related institution such as the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), the political Parties Council (PPC) and the national Elections Commission (NEC) which are all operational. It has, however, not been able to substantially fund them to enable them effectively to fulfill their mandates. In this period, the RTGoNU unified and graduated 55,000 forces and redeployed 8 brigades (about 6000forcrs) of the army components. It redeployed 3,000 forces of police components. Further through the security sector Strategic Review Board (SDSRD) it reviewed five critical security and defense policy frameworks, including the security Sector Transformation Roadmap. These policy documents await evaluation and adoption by the Executive.   The Republic of South Sudan was part and parcel of the Sudan until it became an independent country in July 2011 after many battles for succession. It has a population of about 12 million people, which made up of 64 ethnic group or tribes, each with unique culture and tradition. Politically, the country has Ten States and Three Administrative Areas. Historically, the country is subdivided into three provinces of Equatoria, Bahr Al- Ghazal and Upper Nile.   In August 1955 South Sudan military officers within the so-called Sudanese army forces rebel against the Government in Khartoum calling for autonomy within the United Sudan. According to them there was marginalization of Southern and religious persecution. This rebellion was brought to an end, when the government of Sudan under president Jaafar Mohamed Al Numerie accepted the calls for an Autonomy region, The Southern region with self-rule was established through what became known as Addis Ababa Agreement signed in March 1972. This follow with the formation of The High Executive Council (HEC) for Southern Sudan with base in Juba. The President of the High Executive Council has its own Ministers and other government Agencies and was in away powerful in term of managing resources within the region. 2. 1972 Peace Accord and the role US in supporting the Anya -Anya Movement   The 1972 Accord between the South and North of Sudan would not been achieved without active involvement of the United States and it alliance. Here the role of Christian missionaries were paramount.   However, in May 1983, the same president Jaafar Mohamed Al Numerie who signed a n agreement for autonomy with the southern leaders decided to abrogate the Autonomy region of South Sudan and sat up a weaker administrative regions which have no  powers in compare to HEC. This decision led to the formation of Anya Anya Two and later to the formation of the SPLM/SPLA led by Col. Dr. John Garang De Mabior. The SPLM/M/SPLA fought the war of liberation from 1983 to 2005 and this war was brought to an end through the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, known as CPA in Nairobi Kenya. This following by a nationwide Referendum on succession of the South Sudan in 2010. The Vote was concluded with 99.8% in favor of separation from Sudan.   On the 9 th  of July 2011 the country was declared independent and Sudan was the first country to recognize the new nation.   3. US-South Sudan Relations before and after succession   The United States with moral support for the marginalized Christians of the Sudan has firmly decided to support Southern Sudanese in their fight for greater role within the Sudanese Muslim and Arabs dominated state. Since the August 1955 mutiny in Torit, South Sudan, various US related Agencies delivered humanitarian and moral support to the Christians in South Sudan(Yoh, 2018). The religion sat up, in the then Southern province has played a vital role in rising funds and guns for the Anya -Anya fighters against Khartoum Governments.   Through, countries which were alliance to the US, such as Israeli, military support came through them to the Anya -Anya rebels. The US support to the liberations fighters in the South slowdown, when SPLM/SPLA was consider communist oriented movement, due to its association with the then Ethopian ruling military government led by Mengistu Haile Mariam from 1969 to 19991. When Mengistu Regime was over through in 1991, the SPLM/SPLA has no option, but to seek realignment with the US and changed it course of policy towards the west rather than the Eastern power. Also the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991open a new opportunity for US to pressure the SPLM/SPLA to change it stands towards the US and it alliance. Step by Step, the US resumed supporting the SPLM/SPLA in the fight for a United Sudan of equal citizenship and religious freedom. The called for “a New Sudan on New bases” was attractive for the western countries and particularly among those who did not support separation between the North and the South. It was equally, appreciated by other marginalizes Sudanese such as the people from Blue Nile, Nuba  Mountains, and Some from Darfur and even from the far North.   Apart from the religion view point, the US has three vital objectives in supporting South Sudan for Statehoods or for a greater role within the New Sudan. Some of these are:   Sudan is a bridge between Africa and Arab World. A strong leadership in South Sudan which is friendly to the United States could assist the US to curbed terrorism and Islamic fundamentalists which were percept using Sudan a center or base for their activities against western interest, particularly, the US as this was the case when an Islamic friendly government was in power in Sudan 1986-1990, many religious fundamentalists find their way to Khartoum. Osama Bin Laden, made Khartoum one of his Headquarters against the western establishment. A Number of embassies were bombed in Khartoum by the terrorist related group. In return, the US bombed Sudan Capital several times, killing a number of terrorists, but also innocent people. Sudan is one of richest country in central Africa. Having a US- friendly government in Khartoum was keys for securing US interest in the country and in Africa.   4. US-South Sudan Diplomatic relations in 2011   After successfully signing of the CPA, the US established a consular in the capital Juba on November 2005. After the independent, the United States administration under President Barack Obama declared the recognition of South Sudan as a Sovereign State. The Consular general established in 2005, was upgraded to an Embassy and the than Consular general Barrie Walkley was appointed to act as Charge’ d’ Affairs pending appointment of a permanent Ambassador. He therefore assumed the role of an Ambassador to South Sudan. This was follow by Susan D. Page who was confirmed as the country ambassador on 18 th  October 2011. 5. Two year later after succession from Sudan and US-South Sudan Diplomatic Relations.   The outbreak of civil war in Sudan and South Sudan 1983 to 2005 and later 2013 and 2016 has undermined the interest of the United States in South Sudan and Sudan. This is because, when the Oil was discovered by Chevron, the American Company in 1999, many civilian in the oil producing States in Southern Sudan were forcefully chase away by the Sudanese Army Forces and militia supporting the government. Many civilian were killed and forced to leave their villages without compensation to date. Public opinion in the US was against the exploration of the oil in the South. Chevron Oil Company was forced to sell their shares to other companies which were more or less not careful about human rights issues in their own countries. This is was one of the issues or setback for US interest in securing her interests in Sudan and South Sudan.   The second setback was the war within South Sudan where thousands of civilian were massacre in cold blood by their own fellow countrymen in name of tribe.   The two civil wars, rolled back South Sudan economically, socially, military and politically. Many countries, particularly from the west sanctioned South Sudan for the crimes committed by some security elements. Those supporting such sanctions including the US and the European Union.   The two civil wars have contributed towards worsen the relationship between the US and South Sudan to date. Currently, the US and it alliance do not support developmental activities in South Sudan, except humanitarian assistance. It is worth noted that the United States is the largest single donor in Sudan and South Sudan since 1983 to date. By 2005, US provided $5 billion in aid to the Sudan and Eastern Chad, majority of these assistances went to Southern Sudan by then.   The US funds over 80% of the World Food Program ‘s Food aid in Sudan/South Sudan and part of Chad. That is 6.5 million people were beneficiary of this assistance.   5.1. According to the Report to Congress on South Sudan Policy   Section 6508(b) of The National Defense Authorization Act, 2023 Report on United States Policy Toward South Sudan a number of actions were taken toward South Sudan Government. Some of which were captured as below:   Consistent with section 6508(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, 2022 (FY 2022 NDAA), the Department of State, in consultation with the United States Agency for International Development and other relevant federal departments and agencies, has submitted  report on United States Policy toward South Sudan.   This reports evaluated the development of South Sudan since independence in 2011.   According to the report, the country is still remains deeply fragile Nation beset by weak governance, Pervasive insecurity, fiscal mismanagement, and widespread corruption. As part of a whole of government approach to South Sudan, the United State is working to mitigate and prevent sub-national violence, protect human rights, better target U.S. assistance to communities in need, protect and defend civic space for civil Society, independent media, and peaceful, political voices, and hold the transitional government accountable to its commitments to manage the country’s natural resources transparently. As stated by the US, the goal of all those measures was and is to support the South Sudanese people’s demands for an inclusive transition and a peaceful, stable future. Some of the actions taken by US and it partners were:   In mid-July, due to the failure of South Sudanese leaders to implement their commitments to bring peace to South Sudan and in close coordination with Congress, the US halted  financial support to the Reconstructed Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) and Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM). In September, joined by the UK, Norwegian, and EU partners, they did not support the two-year extension of the transitional government. At the time of our non-support, we expressed our concern that the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) chose not to take the necessary steps to implement the peace process. We jointly called upon the RTGoNU to immediately demonstrate significant progress towards implementation of the outstanding elements of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and to expand political and civic space to ensure that the voices of the South Sudanese people, including those who hold opposing views, are consistently heard throughout the implementation of the roadmap In November, the US significantly reduced the waivers provided to South Sudan on its TIPTier3 designation and announced our opposition to international financial institution lending to the RTGoNU outside of lending or programs that support basic human needs. In February, working with partners, the US improved oversight mechanisms governing $ 114 million rapid credit facility from the international Monetary Fund, due to shared concerns over failures to abide by public financial management commitments in the R-ARCSS. In December, the US facilitated the travel of South Sudanese civil society activists to Washington for the U.S. -Africa Leaders Summit, where they met with summit participants including Under Secretary for Civilian Security Zeya to demonstrate the importance we place on elevating and engaging with non-governmental South Sudanese leaders. At the same time, the Department of State delivered a clear message to the Foreign Minister, who represented President Salva Kiir, about the need for action to address subnational violence, human rights violations, the lack of justice and accountability, and the lack progress towards bringing the transitional period to a successful conclusion.   Over the course of the past year, the US Embassy in Juba regularly engaged with religious leaders and the South Sudan Council of Churches to encourage a unified message among the various denominations and for the churches to engage communities in an effort to reduce subnational violence and increase civic participation in the political process.   The US Embassy in Juba in coordination with the Troika pressed senior RTGoNU officials to stop exploiting international humanitarian assistance for political gain, to protect humanitarian workers, and for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to communities including those most vulnerable to food insecurity.   In Washington and Juba, the US expanded it outreach and regularly engaged civil society actors and marginalized communities across a range of issues including human rights, subnational violence, and civic space.   These efforts came in the context of another year in South Sudan in which large parts of the population are internally displaced due to sub-national violence and natural disasters, including historic floods and drought. The U.S. commitment to addressing the humanitarian needs of South Sudanese population remained steadfast. In FY 2022, the United States continued to be the leading international donor to South Sudan, providing more than $993 million in humanitarian assistance. In 2022, an estimated 8.9 million South Sudanese (about 70 percent of the country’s population) needed some type of humanitarian assistance, with up to eight million facing crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity, making South Sudan one of the most food-insecure countries in the world. Complicating U.S. efforts, South Sudan continues to be one of the most dangerous places for aid workers. In January and early February 2023, eight humanitarian workers were killed, compared to nine humanitarian workers killed in 2022 and five in 2021. Since the conflict began in 2013, over 150 humanitarians, predominantly South Sudanese, have lost their lives while providing assistance to people.   5.2. Political Factions Stifle Progress and Reform   The RTGoNU continued to fail to implement essential commitments under the R-ARCSS and has repeatedly failed to meet key milestones in a timely manner. The two-year extension of the RTGoNU President Kiir, announced on August 4, 2022, has further undermined confidence that Kiir’s government was committed to reform.   Political elites are deeply vested in maintaining a status quo that allows them to accumulate political power and economic resources at the expense of the people of South Sudan. Further, competition for political power and economic resources manifests in fighting between proxies, with political sub factions manipulating ethnic and communal tensions their advantage, often leading to violence, displacement, and grave human rights abuses. In 2022, violence in Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei States resulted in hundreds of civilians being killed and over 90,000 individuals displaced, homes and livelihoods were burned and destroyed, and horrifying sexual and gender-based violence, including against minors was reported.     5.3. Public Financial Management Reform Challenges   The government has not made significant progress implementing public financial management (PFM) reforms and has not yet met its commitment in the 2018 peace agreement to create a single treasury account to transparently manage its oil revenue. While the Ministry of Finance and Bank of South Sudan have attempted to consolidate government accounts, revenues remain dispersed in multiple locations and commercial accounts. Data on the Ministry of Finance’s website reported $ 1.6 billion in 2021-22 revenue generated by the country’s oil wealth. A lack of transparent accounting for oil revenues and loans collateralized with oil cargo facilitates significant revenue leakage and diversion by corrupt actors, undermining the already negligible financing of basic services for South Sudanese people. Transparency International ranked South Sudan 178 out of 180 countries in its 2022 Corruptions Perceptions Index. 5.4. Security Challenges   The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) documented 503 incidents of violence affecting Civilians between January 1 st   and September 30, 2022, including reported killings, injuries, abduction, and conflict-related Sexual Violence. Those implicated in fueling the conflict include local, state, and federal officials, and armed groups over which they have influence.   The RTGoNU established the necessary Unified Forces (NUF) with the initial graduation of the first batch of more than 20,000 troops from training on August 20, 2022. As of the end of January 2023, the NUF has yet to deploy from their cantonments, lack consistent payment of salaries, are not adequately funded, and the government has not provided information on how the NUF will be utilized to improve security throughout the country.   Escalating harassment, intimidation, and arbitrary arrest by national security and other government officials have had a chilling effect on civic spaces and caused many civil society and media actors to self-censor, resign, withdraw from peace process activities, and/or flee the country. In August 2021, security forces detained former Governor of Northern Bahr El Ghazal State Kuel Aguer Kuel for having signed a letter calling for peaceful protests to President Kiir to leave office. Aguer was held in detention for over a year without charges. On October 7, he was brought to court and charged with eight crimes, including attempt to overthrow a constitutional government by unconstitutional means. The U.S. Government engaged regularly in support of his release. On December 9, a three-judges of appellate court released Aguer from detention after unanimously dropping all eight charges brought against him by state prosecutors and deciding not to send his case to trial.   As recently as January 2023, several employees of government-owned South Sudan Broadcasting Cooperation were detained by members of the National Security Service in connection to a leaked video of President Kiir taken in December 2022. As a result of such instances of shrinking civic and political space, national-level civil society participation in peace agreement implementation has noticeably decreased over the last two years     5.5. Promoting Accountability    On April 3, 2014, the United States established, through executive order (EO) 13664, a South Sudan sanctions program targeting those responsible for, inter alia, threatening the peace and stability undermining democratic processes, or expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan.  Since the issuance of EO 13664, the Department of the Treasury has designated 13 individuals and six entities under that authority primarily for expanding or extending the conflict in South Sudan including by obstructing the reconciliation process or peace talks. The Department of the treasury has also designated six individuals and eight entities in South Sudan pursuant to E.O. 13818- Which implements and builds upon the global Magnitsky Human in Rights Accountability Act of 2017- for their roles in corruption or serious human Rights abuse. The United States will not hesitate to impose costs on those who perpetuate the conflict in South Sudan and will continue to apply pressure on the senior leadership of South Sudan to take concrete measures to bring peace and stability to the country.  State and Treasury officials regularly coordinate on international engagement regarding corruption in South Sudan’s oil sector.     5.6. U.S. Humanitarian and Development Assistance   The vast majority of U.S. assistance for South Sudan addresses humanitarian needs. Over 80 percent of U.S. assistance of South Sudan focuses on delivering humanitarian assistance to alleviate human suffering and prevent wholesale systemic collapse. State Department and USAID-managed bilateral assistance to South Sudan included $ 124 million in FY 2021 for targeted development interventions (including health services, PEPFAR, civil society support/conflict mitigation, education, agriculture, livelihoods, and youth programming) to build resilience against recurring shocks and reduce dependency on emergency assistance. Total USG humanitarian assistance for South Sudan in fiscal year 2022 was more than $993 million, including programming from USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance and the state Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Additional development assistance was provided to the U.S. Institute of peace and Peace and other non-governmental organizations to analyze drivers of conflict and support efforts to meaningfully realize commitments made in R-ARCSS.   Health programs improve health and nutritional outcomes, strengthen state and county-level health service delivery, and enhance access to and sustainable management of water and sanitation systems that are critical to community health, and incorporate protection against gender-based violence and services for victims of sexual violence.   Economic growth programs foster sustainable livelihoods, improve agricultural practices and value chains, and promote sound public financial management. Youth and education programs support improved access to education for girls, marginalized, and hard-to-reach learners across South Sudan, and provide life skills and vocational training for at-risk youth.   USAID’s democracy and governance activities support free and fair media, citizen engagement and oversight of the failures of the peace process by assisting civil society coalitions to promote transparency, conflict management, and advocacy for peace agreement implement. To promote broad citizen oversight of R-ARCSS implementation, USAID provides extensive support for independent media such as radio. USAID continues to finance networks of national and community broadcasters with over three million listeners, as radio remain an essential source of information in a country with high rates of illiteracy and dispersed rural population. USAID remains a staunched supporter of journalists and independent media and has distributed thousands of battery and solar powered radios among beneficiary populations.     5.7. UNMISS Activities   UNMISS-mandated core tasks are protection of civilians, including at the last remaining protection of Civilians camp in Malakal, Upper Nile State; creating conditions conductive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance; supporting the implementation of the R-ARCSS; and monitoring, investing, and reporting on violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights. Politicized subnational fighting continues and is increasingly making the UNMISS mandate both more difficult and critical. According to UN reports, an estimated 9.4 million people will need humanitarian assistance during 2023 and approximately 2.3 million people are internally displaced. Nearly 2.3 million South Sudanese are refugees or are seeking asylum. U.S.  efforts at the United Nations are focused on improving UNMISS’ performance of its protection of civilians’ mandate, and ensuring elections support is targeted to include effective contributions by civil society and non-governmental organizations in the constitutional drafting and elections oversight bodies called for in the 2018 peace agreement.   Despite support from the UN and pressure from the international community, the RTGoNU has made insufficient progress on transitional justice. In January 2021, the Minister of Justice was authorized to begin establishing the three transitional justice mechanisms called for in the R-ARCSS- the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) to be established with the African Union, a Commission on Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), a Compensation and Reparations Authority (CRA). There has been no progress on establishing the HCSS despite commitments by the RTGoNU and the African Union Commission (AUC) to work on the legal framework needed to establish the court. The state Department has repeatedly engaged the AUC on this issue and pressed the RTGoNU and other AU members states, especially members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, to maintain political focus on the commitments in the R-ARCSS support from the UN and the International community has expanded limited access to domestic accountability mechanisms. Launched in December 2022, South Sudan’s Gender Based Violence and Juvenile Court in Juba has been trying some perpetrators of gender-based crimes, including rape, and has successfully concluded multiple convictions.   Since 2017, the South Sudanese judiciary has supported mobile courts with the assistance of UNMISS, the UN Development Program, and other donors. These mobile courts hear criminal and civil cases in where access to justice is otherwise limited. In 2021, despite pandemic challenges, 15 Joint Special Mobile Courts operated throughout the country. The state Department supports long-term accountability efforts in South Sudan through funding human rights documentation designed to support transitional justice processes. The U.S. government consistently advocates for the Human Rights Council’s renewable of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, including its evidence collection mandate, and supports continued human rights reporting by UNMISS and the UN Panel of Experts.     5.8. Barriers to Free and Fair Elections   South Sudan has not established the necessary preconditions for free and fair elections, evidenced by continued delays in establishing the legal frameworks, independent electoral institutions, and civic spaces to enable genuine political competition and democratic elections. This includes failure to date to enact and amend key legislation. Civil society, independent media, and political dissidents continue to face intimidation, harassment, and arrests by security services under the President’s command, which has forced many South Sudanese critical of the transitional government to flee the country. Critical outstanding tasks include, but are not limited to, the full establishment of an impartial and independent National Elections Commission and the drafting of a permanent constitution. RTGoNU officials report that legislation necessary to commence these tasks, including amendments to the Political Parties Act and the National Elections Act of 2012, and passage of the procedural law for drafting a permanent constitution, was approved by the Council of Ministers in 2021, and was only recently submitted to the legislature on February 14(see Report to Congress on South Sudan Policy Section 6508(b) of The National Defense Authorization Act, 2023 Report)     6. The current diplomatics relations between the two countries   Diplomatics relations between US and South Sudan has worsening in the recently years. The US and it alliance are blaming South Sudan leadership for being corrupt, irresponsible towards it citizens and mismanaging of the resources, violations of human rights across the country. There is also issues to do with political will in regards to the implementation of the 2018 peace agreement that bought the civil wars to an end in 2018. While the government accused the US and it alliance of interference in the internal affairs and are lacking the will to support or recognized government efforts in peace building efforts.   Since Obama administration, the relationship between two countries has deteriorated. With Donald Trump taking over the White House in January 2025, it is highly expected that Juba and Washington will not be in a good term with South Sudan and that the situation might grow from bad to worse which we have not seen before.   It is worth noted that South Sudan was a small baby of the US. President Salva of South Sudan visit Washington D.C. in 2005, when he became the First Vice President of Sudan and the President of Southern Sudan where met President G.W. Bush in the White House, he was given an Honor in the form of a BLACK CAP, which he uses up to today.     7. Conclusion and Recommendations   As mentioned above, the relationship between the US and South Sudan has reached a bad stage and is expected to continue in the coming years. The political instability and economic crisis in South Sudan has contributed towards diplomatics row between the two countries. Issues such as human rights violations, corruption accusation against South Sudan have added fuel to the fire. It is not clear how the Trump administration in Washington will behave toward South Sudan leadership. However, it is clear that Africa in general under Donald Trump administrative is not going to be a priority. On another note, the Crisis in Sudan will add more pressure to the political, economic and social situation in South Sudan as the possible for oil shutdown is very high. The recently call in Nairobi, Kenya by opposition parties in Sudan to form a parallel government to that in Port Sudan is another critical development in Sudan crisis. Such development if not handled well by South Sudanese authority could harm the country economically and that a very serious consequences on the future stability in South Sudan.     8. Recommendations   United States-South Sudan relations is in a critical juncture as both countries are making less efforts to normal the situation. There is therefore the need for serious dialogue between the two countries with the purpose to understand each other and come up with the way forward. South Sudan should addressed alleged issues of human rights, corruption, peace implementation etc. For the US, the country should deal with South Sudan with respect. Secondly, the new US administration should take Africa seriously.   References   Athorbei, Deng(2024). Local Government Administration in South Sudan   Breidlid, Anders/Said, Avelino(2010). South Sudan, A Concise History.   Daly, M.W./ Rolandsen, O.(2016). A History of South Sudan, From Slavery to Independence   Yoh, John Gai(2018).The Idea of South Sudan, The History of Political Though   Yates, Doughlas A.(2012). The Scramble for African Oil   Said, A./Breidlid, A.K.(2014). A Concise History of South Sudan   Nhema, Alfred/Zeleza, Paul T.(2008). The Resolution of African Conflicts.   Riak, Jacob D. Chol(2024). The Petroleum Industry of South Sudan.   Korbany, Lawrence(2018). South Sudan, the National Security Interest and Economic Bottlenecks   Riak, Jacob Dut(2024). The Petroleum Industry of South Sudan   El Hassan, Idris Salim(2008). Managing the Process of Conflict Resolution in the Sudan: In Nhema, Alfred at(ed.): The Resolution of African Conflicts   The Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures Project report(2020).   Department of State Country Fact Sheet: South Sudan   Department of State Country Information: South Sudan   Korbandy, Lawrence(2018). South Sudan, the National Security Interest and the Economic Bottlenecks.   South Sudan: An Action(). Major Challenges Facing the South Sudan Economy.   Report to the Congress on South Sudan Policy, Section 6508(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, 2023 Report on United States Policy Toward South Sudan.   Rolandsen, Oystein H./Daly,M.W.(2016). A History of South Sudan, from Slavery to Independence.   Clarkson, Angus(2011). Fools Rush In Where Angels Fear To Tread, Challenges for South Sudan and the International Community.   https://history.state.gov/countries/south-sudan - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 9/2025   Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   SEPTEMBER 2025   Emil Gumede Aviation Analyst based at the University of Sussex, United Kingdom     Abstract   South African Airways’ (SAA) audit results for 2023/24, despite being published 10 months late and uncovering an accounting error that flipped a profit to a loss, reflect encouraging signs of recovery from its previous position under business rescue. The airline is now debt-free and has been gradually expanding its fleet and routes. However, SAA still has many challenges to overcome. At the heart of these is failing governance. State ownership of the airline has been ineffective, as this model has run on political connectedness and government alliances, rather than competence and profitability. There are also global challenges including new aviation regulatory regimes, fluctuating fuel prices, and changing consumer preferences. And, worse, US President Trump’s exorbitant tariffs – which will likely hit Africa the hardest – will leave airlines vulnerable to even minor shifts in operating costs and supply chain disruptions.   This paper argues that SAA can not only be saved from potential disaster, but it can also be turned into a major contributor to South Africa’s GDP and employment sector. To do so, SAA must be depoliticised, ensure impeccable governance and service differentiation, target high-income routes and smart strategic partnerships, and pivot South Africa as a key international connecting hub. Many airlines have had success through partnerships, which can help leverage economies of scale by bulk buying aircraft and fuel together, sharing routes and services. SAA needs a new, more diverse share ownership model, which excludes the state from being the major owner, although still giving the state a part-ownership role. Cathay Pacific’s diverse mixed private-public-state shareholder ownership model, which drove its successful turnaround, could be a model for SAA. Introduction   To ensure long-term success, South African Airways (SAA), in its rebuilding, needs to consider targeting new high-income routes currently under-serviced, securing strategic partnerships with other airlines, and pivoting South Africa as a key international connecting hub between continents.   Airlines that have successfully overcome the aviation COVID-19 pandemic-induced plunge in passenger traffic, revenue losses and closures, have done so in part by striking clever strategic partnerships, tie-ups, and mergers. South African Airways, and many domestic and African airlines, have struggled to overcome the COVID-19-induced challenges, while having to deal with an array of new ones, such as new aviation regulatory regimes, fluctuating fuel prices — worsened by the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Middle East conflict — and changing consumer preferences. Strategic partnerships emerge as pivotal mechanisms to bolster sustainability (de Vos, 2025). While many airlines have never recovered from COVID-19, others that struck partnerships to share capacity, costs, and risks, have often not only achieved full financial recovery but have also surpassed their pre-pandemic performance.   However, the sweeping tariffs introduced by US President Donald Trump will knock the global aviation industry, which was just recovering from the devastation of the global lockdowns because of COVID-19, with Africa likely to suffer the most. The sweeping US tariffs will significantly disrupt global trade, industry sectors — including aviation — and domestic economies, with major consequences everywhere. Africa is likely to be the region hardest hit. Some of Africa’s airlines may collapse.   From increased aircraft purchase and maintenance prices, as well as higher ticket prices, the effects of the tariffs will be felt across the global aviation industry. Airlines that are already operating on very thin margins will be forced to pass costs onto customers, ultimately making air travel less accessible (Chen, 2025). SAA has experienced a moderate yet steady recovery since resuming operations after the COVID-19 pandemic, slowly acquiring additional aircraft and reintroducing destinations it once served, but now faces the negative impact of the punishing tariffs introduced by the Trump administration.   A major COVID-19-related challenge for airlines has been a dearth of aircraft availability due to supply chain disruptions, which have undermined the sustainability of many airlines. For instance, the Lufthansa Group in 2023 reported a half-year loss of 427 million Euros, which the company largely attributed to aircraft delivery delays (IATA, 2025).   SAA has experienced a moderate yet steady recovery since resuming operations after the COVID-19 pandemic, slowly acquiring additional aircraft and reintroducing destinations it once served. Despite facing a few obstacles, such as the privatisation deal with Takatso Consortium disappointingly falling apart and the recent pilot strike causing significant delays and cancellations, which have since been resolved, SAA appears, in general, to be on the up. However, in July 2025, SAA published its audited financial results for the 2023/24 financial year 10 months late and revealed a loss of R354 million for the year. The 2023/24 financial year reflected the second full year of operations since the group got out of business rescue in April 2021 (Fraser, 2025).   Nevertheless, while SAA’s improvements are encouraging, further progress will require strategic planning, entrepreneurial foresight, and global partnerships and better governance. US Tariffs will undermine global aviation   The sweeping US tariffs will significantly disrupt global trade, industry sectors — including aviation — and domestic economies, with major consequences everywhere. Africa is likely to be the region hardest hit. Some of Africa’s airlines may collapse (de Vos, 2025).   From increased aircraft purchase and maintenance prices, as well as higher ticket prices, the effects of the tariffs will be felt across the global aviation industry. Airlines already operating on very thin margins will be forced to pass costs onto customers, making air travel less accessible (Chen, 2025).   The International Air Transport Association (IATA) financial forecasts for the year 2025 — before the Trump tariffs — show the global net profit for the industry being $36.6 billion. Of that total, Africa is set to contribute a mere $0.2 billion. Airlines operate on extremely thin profit margins, just 3.6% globally, according to IATA (IATA, 2025). Worse, the African aviation industry profit margin forecast for 2025 was just 0.9% compared to the global 3.6% (IATA, 2025). This means airlines have little ability to absorb the additional costs that Trump’s global tariffs will bring. Airlines are likely to pass them on to passengers through higher ticket prices, added fees, or reduced services.   The overall impact on travellers could manifest in several ways. Domestic flights, particularly in the US, may see noticeable price increases, while international travel could become more expensive as well. Budget airlines, which rely heavily on cost efficiency, may be forced to raise baggage fees or introduce new surcharges to offset rising expenses. With profit margins already razor-thin, even small cost increases could significantly reshape airfare pricing, making travel less affordable for many passengers (IATA, 2025). The effects of the tariffs on different regions are likely to vary, with some regions being hit harder than others.   This narrow margin leaves African airlines highly vulnerable to even minor fluctuations in operating costs, which can prove disastrous for many of the continent’s carriers. Rising aircraft purchase prices, increasing maintenance fees, and fluctuating fuel costs will further strain the already fragile financial standing of African airlines. Trump’s tariffs against many African countries and the withdrawal of US development aid to African countries have already made many African economies even more fragile.   The aviation industry is built on a complex tapestry of globally interconnected nodes. Aircraft manufacturers and maintenance service providers rely on sourcing parts and materials from all around the world. Because of the global supply chain of the aviation industry, it is very susceptible to global economic disruptions, whether economic downturns, global economic crises, or pandemics such as COVID-19 (IATA, 2025).   This fine balance has and will continue to be affected by Donald Trump’s radical trade policies, which will have a heavy impact on many different segments of the industry, disrupt supply chains, increase the costs of supplies, and restrict global travel. From increased manufacturing costs for Boeing to potential price hikes on airline tickets, these tariffs have reshaped the economics of air travel (Chen, 2025). Ironically, the impact of Trump tariffs will also negatively impact the US domestic market (de Vos, 2025).   Production costs are increasing for both Boeing and Airbus, which together hold a 100% market share duopoly on widebody aircraft. Airlines will inevitably feel the impact. Another indirect effect is the potential delay in fleet modernisation. If airlines postpone purchasing newer, fuel-efficient planes due to higher costs, they may continue operating older aircraft that consume more fuel (Chen, 2025).   Trump’s tariff war has had significant consequences for Boeing and will continue to do so, as the 25% tariffs on all steel and aluminum imports will substantially increase production costs (Chen, 2025). Boeing depends heavily on a finely balanced global supply chain, with a vast range of international vendors and manufacturers. In total, more than 20 countries contribute to the production of the Boeing 737. Boeing’s CEO Kelly Ortberg shared his concerns in an address to company employees, saying it will be challenging to keep prices competitive due to inevitable supply chain disruptions (Hepher, 2025). Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury has also expressed concerns about what the tariffs could mean not just for Airbus but for the industry as a whole (Hepher, 2025).   Ireland’s AerCap, the world’s largest aviation leasing company — which boasts a portfolio of over 2,000 aircraft and helicopters with orders for nearly 400 additional aircraft (as of 14 March 2025) — has also expressed concerns about the effects of the tariffs. AerCap CEO Aengus Kelly stated that if the EU retaliates with tariffs of their own, Boeing products such as the hugely popular 787 Dreamliner could cost upwards of $40 million more (Chen, 2025).   Many African airlines, including SAA, lease their planes, which could now be more expensive to lease (Chen, 2025). As of June 2025, SAA has 18 aircraft, of which 16 are leased and two are owned. These aircraft are sourced from a range of companies; five have been leased from Ireland’s AerCap, two from Air Lease Corporation (USA), three from China Aircraft Leasing Company (CALC), four from SMBC Aviation Capital (Japan), two from CMB Financial Leasing (China), one from Airborne Capital (Ireland) and one from Aergo Capital (Ireland) (Planespotters.net, 2025). All the companies that SAA have sourced their aircraft from will inevitably face the challenges of increased aircraft acquisition and maintenance fees, which will ultimately be passed on to clients such as SAA. Even though SAA operates a fleet of aircraft exclusively made by Airbus, who are entirely European owned, key components that are built in the USA will drive up prices. Strategic partnerships – global aviation learnings   North American, Latin American, European, Middle Eastern, and Asian airlines have increasingly formed strategic partnerships to enhance connectivity, optimise operations, and expand market presence. In the Middle East, Qatar Airways has implemented the partnership model with significant success. The benefits of these partnerships are most evident in economies of scale; for example, airlines can negotiate more favourable pricing when making bulk purchases for aircraft, fuel, maintenance, and other supplies. The US aviation market, the largest globally, has witnessed numerous mergers throughout its history — often driven by necessity or competition. Recently, Alaska Airlines decided to merge with Hawaiian Airlines to strengthen its position in aviation markets between Hawaii, the mainland US, and the Asia-Pacific region (US Department of Transportation, 2025). By combining resources, the two carriers aim to expand their networks and consumer offerings while competing with the American "big three": American Airlines, Delta, and United. This merger reflects the increasing reliance on partnerships to navigate a volatile industry.   In Europe’s highly competitive aviation landscape, strategic partnerships have also proven essential. The International Airlines Group (IAG), formed by the British-Spanish merger between British Airways and Iberia, now includes LEVEL, a low-cost airline brand, and the IAG rewards programme. In 2013, IAG made headlines with one of the largest orders for Airbus A320neo aircraft, buying 220 units. With a list price of approximately $110 million per aircraft, IAG’s large-scale order enabled it to secure an estimated 15% discount, reducing the cost per aircraft to around $93.5 million and saving the group approximately $3.6 billion (BBC News, 2013). These aircraft were then strategically allocated across IAG’s member airlines.   The Middle East has become pivotal to global aviation due to its strategic geographic location, fostering the rise of global carriers such as Qatar Airways. Despite facing challenges similar to those of other carriers — such as fluctuating fuel prices and financial constraints — Qatar Airways has effectively leveraged strategic partnerships to remain resilient. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated aircraft supply shortages due to supply chain disruptions, threatening the sustainability of many carriers. For instance, the Lufthansa Group reported a half-year loss of €427 million in 2023, attributing much of this to aircraft delivery delays (Lufthansa Group, 2024).   As a member of the Oneworld Alliance, which includes Finnair, Royal Air Maroc, and Qantas, Qatar Airways has used these alliances to mitigate such disruptions by sharing routes and costs. A notable example includes Finnair's shift in strategy due to the closure of Russian airspace. As a result, it partnered with Qatar Airways to operate direct flights from Scandinavian capitals to Doha. This collaboration was critical, given Finland’s proximity to Russia, which is engaged in a conflict with Ukraine. Similarly, Qatar Airways partnered with British Airways to operate flights between London Heathrow/Gatwick and Doha. American Airlines also partnered with Qatar Airways for its new service between New York JFK and Doha. In these alliances, partner airlines use their own aircraft while maintaining cooperative route operations with Qatar Airways. African airlines have struggled to build strategic alliances    Difficult domestic and global economic environments pose significant hurdles for African airlines and SAA. Fluctuating currencies, limited access to financing, and high operating costs have cast a long shadow over the financial viability of many African airlines. Partnerships can range from joint ventures, mergers, and route sharing.   African partnerships could also improve service offerings, improve quality, streamline flight schedules, and foster economic growth within the region. Together, successful African aviation collaborations could modernise Africa’s aviation industry, reduce costs, expand the aviation sector considerably, and can help African airlines compete more effectively in the global market. Partnerships can help African airlines leverage economies of scale by bulk buying aircraft together, sharing routes and services. Forming strategic alliances can enhance market reach, boost operational efficiency, share costs, and improve services.   However, many African attempts to build partnerships have, sadly, failed. Ethiopian Airlines stands out as the most successful airline on the African continent. Ethiopian Airlines has also formed strategic partnerships and alliances, expanding its reach and enhancing its competitiveness. The airline has consistently had professional management, regularly benchmarked its performance against global competitors, and has prioritised profitability. Ethiopian Airlines rightly proposed a joint venture with the Nigerian government to operate a new proposed Nigerian airline, in which Ethiopian Airlines would own 49%. Although Ethiopian Airlines sank considerable investment in the proposed joint venture, it fell apart, because of local Nigerian opposition to foreign ownership.   The Nigerian government-Ethiopian Airlines collaboration could have modernised Nigeria's aged aviation sector by integrating it into Ethiopian Airlines' global network and operational expertise. This would have improved connectivity, service quality, and operational efficiency, potentially reducing costs and enhancing competitiveness for Nigerian airlines.   Kenya Airways proposed, in 2021, a Pan African strategic partnership with South African Airways. However, it never gained traction, mainly because of SAA’s governance, operational, and direction struggles. Similarly, the South African Airways-Kenya Airways partnership, if pulled off, could expand route networks and enhance connectivity across Africa and internationally for both airlines (Pande, 2022).   In 2024, two major West African airlines sealed a strategic alliance. Air Sénégal and Air Côte d’Ivoire struck a strategic commercial and operational partnership with the intention of “pooling their networks, offering passengers enhanced connections while optimising both airlines’ operating costs” (Deenapanray, 2024). Through the partnership, both sets of customers will get access to more destinations, more connections, and more frequent flights, domestically, regionally, and internationally. The partnership linked the airlines’ loyalty programmes. As part of the agreement, the airlines pool their technical teams, human resources personnel, and logistics. The airlines would buy fuel jointly. The airlines would also share maintenance, repair, and overhaul capacity (Deenapanray, 2024). Figure 1:  African Airline Failures - Reasons   African airlines have battled with governance   Many of Africa’s failing airlines are state-owned — appointments and contracts are made by governing parties and leaders, based on connectedness not on competence and ability, which means their management is often poor. Governments that own African airlines often do not insist that they make profits or are managed efficiently. Airlines are often viewed solely as state utilities that can provide jobs, contracts for members of the governing elite, and prestige for African governing parties. Airlines are often run on unprofitable routes, but which satisfy political alliances and considerations their governments have with other countries.   Failing state airlines are often fiercely protected — for prestige and patronage reasons, even if they are inefficient, run corruptly, and are wasteful. Many state airlines are regularly bailed out by governments, without the requirement that they in turn be managed by competent managers, they increase performance and cut waste. For instance, Kenya Airways recently received a R5.85 billion ($300 million) state bailout, which, according to Business Insider Africa, takes the airline's total liabilities to R16.5 billion ($845.5 million) (Benson, 2022).   In 2023, Air Mauritius CEO Krešimir Kučko and CFO Jean Laval Ah Chip were forced to temporarily stand by the airline’s board after it was alleged that the duo accepted a stay in a hotel in France, covered by one of Air Mauritius’ suppliers (Airspace Africa, 2023). Air Mauritius is one of the better-run African airlines.   Nigeria’s Senate Committee on Aviation, in 2023, slammed the launch of Nigeria’s then new carrier Nigeria Air as a ‘fraud’ during an investigative hearing with Airline Operators of Nigeria (AON) and representatives of the ministry of aviation (Kedem, 2023). During the hearing, former Minister of Aviation Hadi Sirika claimed that Nigeria Air was only unveiled and not launched during a fanfare on 26 May 2023. At the unveiling of the aircraft, Sirika said the airline was expected to commence operations in a month’s time. The aircraft used for the unveiling was discovered to be a chartered flight (Kedem, 2023).   While numerous airlines have faced challenges, and even failures, across Africa, there are shining examples of success that demonstrate the potential for growth and profitability when African airlines improved their governance. Ethiopian Airlines stands out as the most successful airline on the African continent. Ethiopian Airlines has consistently had professional management, regularly benchmarked its performance against global competitors, and has prioritised profitability. The Ethiopian government has stayed clear of meddling in its operations.   TAAG Angola Airlines, the national carrier of Angola, has proven to be another African success story; the airline has witnessed an impressive recovery in the post-pandemic era. In fiscal year 2022, the airline achieved significant financial success, with a remarkable 30% increase in net profit, totaling R15.4 million ($800 000). Operating revenue also doubled compared to the previous year, reaching R7.5 billion ($390 million). Notably, TAAG's cargo operations experienced strong growth, contributing R1.2 billion ($67 million) in operating revenue (Casinader, 2023)   The Angolan government appointed Eduardo Fairen Soria, an experienced manager, engineer and pilot, and former CEO of VIVA Air Peru, as the CEO of TAAG. Soria has prioritised professionalising the operations of TAAG Air, benchmarking its operations against those of successful international peers, and focusing on making the airline profitable. He has focused on niche markets. The Angolan government plans to privatise the airline. SAA has shown steady improvement since its return following business rescue   SAA’s proposed privatisation equity deal with the Takatso Consortium, which would have seen a 51% stake taken over by private investors, collapsed in March 2024. SAA has been beset by mismanagement, corruption allegations, and loss-making (Auditor-General, 2024; BusinessTech, 2025; Creecy, 2025). Between 2007 and 2022, it received bailouts of over R50 billion from government. The company has battled with managing its finances since 2018, with its 2019-2022 financial audits only recently being completed.   In July 2025, SAA published its financial results 10 months late. It reported that a R431 million accounting error has wiped out its previously published profit for the 2023/24 financial year. The accounting error caused a loss of R354 million, a reversal of the previously reported profit of R60 million ( SAA,   2025) . Transport Minister Barbara Creecy (Airspace Africa, 2025) said: “The error is regrettable, but it does not negate the operational efficiencies achieved.”   On the upside, SAA generated revenue of R7 billion, which showed a 23% year-on-year increase for the company. It said currency fluctuations and ‘external’ factors impacted its operations. SAA reported a R415 million foreign-currency translation loss because of the rand’s volatility.   A negative trading environment undermined the company. Higher fuel prices also impacted on the company’s profit margins. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine pushed SAA’s jet fuel costs from R1.3 billion to R1.9 billion during the period. SAA’s finances were also undermined by the global shortage of aircraft, which caused a delay in SAA receiving ordered aircraft. But it also hiked SAA’s aircraft leasing costs by more than 30%. All of which reduced the company’s revenue.   On a positive note, SAA reported healthy cash and cash equivalents of R1.4 billion, and R6.4 billion in equity. SAA’s revenue rose 183% to R5.7 billion in 2022/23. And has no borrowings, as it has now eliminated its past obligations. However, without an equity partner, SAA is systemically vulnerable to any financial volatility.   SAA’s number of flights increased by 42%. Since September 2021, since it restarted its operations following business rescue, SAA has increased its networks to 16 routes and doubled its aircraft fleet to 18. It also plans to increase its fleet by 30% and double its route network within 18 months. Mango Airlines, the wholly owned subsidiary of SAA, is undergoing business rescue. Mango was placed in voluntary business rescue on 28 July 2021. It has struggled to secure an investor (BusinessTech, 2025). Furthermore, the business rescue has received a blow after one of its creditors got a court ruling declaring the business rescue invalid.   Transport Minister Barbara Creecy (2025) in her Budget Vote Speech said: “Now operating independently and no longer reliant on government guarantees, SAA is self-funding its operations and fleet growth, while remaining open to a strategic equity partner as part of its long-term restructuring.”   SAA’s Chief Executive John Lamola said: “… we have entered a period of structured and strategic reconstruction of the business, focusing on institutionalising robust governance and management systems, whilst implementing plans on aircraft fleet and route network expansion and elevation of customer experience.” Lamola added: “The FY2023/24 results reflect significant progress in SAA’s financial health. We have strengthened the channels of our revenue streams and cost containment measures. We have a debt-free, asset-rich balance sheet that is supporting the steady growth of the airline and the recovery of SAA as a global aviation brand.”   According to a 2024 report by Oxford Economics, commissioned by SAA, the airline contributed R9.1 billion to South Africa’s GDP in 2023/24. SAA’s contribution is projected to more than triple to R32.6 billion by 2029/30. Over the same period, the airline's operations are expected to support 86,700 jobs, an increase from the current 25,000 (Oxford Economics, 2024).   Figure 2:  Proposed SAA Turnaround Strategy Pillars How SAA can strike strategic partnerships   To ensure long-term success, South African Airways need to consider targeting potential new high-income routes currently under-serviced, strategic partnerships with other airlines, and pivoting South Africa as a key international connecting hub between continents.   Pursuing a connecting hub strategy will make it easier for SAA to attract strategic partners who could co-share service offerings and products, leveraging economies of scale by bulk buying aircraft or fuel, which would reduce costs. It will also improve services, enhance market share, and boost operational efficiencies. Such a strategy would increase flight footprints. Increasing flights will mean cheaper airfares. Overall, a connecting hub strategy would increase the competitiveness of not only SAA, but South Africa, as it would bring more people, business, and capital to the country.    Restarting a direct flight between Johannesburg and Mumbai seems like an obvious strategic move. In 2019, over 3,000 passengers travelled between the two cities each month in both directions, totaling over 100,000 in the year. Due to SAA’s endemic past struggles, nearly 50% fly the India-South African route via Addis Ababa with Ethiopian Airlines — Johannesburg to Mumbai via Addis Ababa has become Ethiopian Airlines’ biggest airport pairing (Pearson, 2024).   This highlights a clear demand for a nonstop connection. A recent study by Airbus suggests that a direct flight between Johannesburg and Mumbai would significantly increase passenger numbers between Johannesburg and Mumbai. The convenience of nonstop travel would not only benefit business travellers and tourists but also South Africa's significant Indian diaspora. Furthermore, direct flights to Mumbai could open smoother connections to other major Indian cities such as Delhi and Bengaluru. This would offer SAA a valuable opportunity to tap into an underserved market. This enhanced connectivity would strengthen both economic, business, and cultural ties between the two regions.   South Africa is geographically situated between both Asia and Latin America. This offers an opportunity for SAA — to serve as a bridge, offering efficient transit options for passengers traveling to and between these two regions. SAA is particularly well-placed to be a link between Brazil and China via South Africa. As two prominent members of the BRICS trade alliance, China and Brazil are actively taking steps to boost economic collaboration.   Many global airlines leverage their geographic advantages to facilitate travel between Asia and the Americas. Leading carriers such as Qatar Airways, Ethiopian Airlines, Turkish Airlines, and Emirates have positioned themselves as key transit hubs connecting these regions. However, there is a surprising lack of direct air connectivity between China and Latin/South America, with only one direct route currently linking China to Mexico City.   China and Brazil have strengthened their bilateral ties, including signing a mutual visa agreement. This agreement allows ordinary passport holders from both nations to obtain visas valid for up to 10 years for purposes such as tourism, business, and family visits. Visa holders can stay for up to 90 days per visit, with the option to extend their stay to 180 days if necessary.   There is great potential for SAA to expand its connecting role by linking Latin America, Asia, and Australia, through a South African transport hub. These routes are strategically important for the airline as they benefit from strong point-to-point demand, ensuring consistent passenger traffic. Furthermore, these routes position SAA to serve as a key connector for passengers traveling between Latin America, Australia, and other destinations via its Johannesburg hub. Over and above business and tourism travel, with over 200,000 Latin American-born people living in Australia and a growing number of Australians with ethnic or cultural ties to Latin America, there is an increasing demand for connectivity between these regions. SAA, as of writing, operates direct flights to both São Paulo, Brazil, and Perth, Australia.   LATAM Airlines, the largest airline holding company in South Africa, after LAN Airlines of Chile took over TAM Linhas Aéreas of Brazil in 2012. LATAM Airlines expects to transport over 200,000 passengers annually on routes connecting Australia and Latin America (Aviaconline, 2025). This is also a potential opportunity for SAA to explore partnership with LATAM Airlines, now the largest airline company in Latin America.   SAA is desperate for a capital injection. SAA has for example been outspoken about its struggles to acquire additional aircraft since its return to the skies — because of lack of capital.   A strategic partnership with a capital-rich airline group is one option to secure new capital. In Africa, a strategic partnership between SAA and Ethiopian Airlines, modeled after Qatar Airways’ arrangement with IAG (International Airlines Group), could offer significant financial, operational, and strategic benefits. An SAA-Ethiopian Airlines partnership has been talked about for many years now, but has never been realised. The Qatar Airways-International Airlines Group partnership offers an example of what an SAA-Ethiopian Airlines or an SAA strategic partnership with a Latin American, Asian, Middle Eastern, or European airline group could look like.   Qatar Airways first acquired a 9.99% stake in IAG in 2015, gradually increasing it to 25.1% by 2020 with a $600 million investment. In 2024, IAG announced a €350 million share buyback, and Qatar participated by selling €88 million-worth of shares (Curren, 2024). Despite this sale, Qatar maintained its 25% stake due to the reduced number of shares in circulation after the buyback. Through this move, Qatar Airways can maintain its influence within IAG, while at the same time providing liquidity to IAG.   Ethiopian Airlines could for example provide SAA with a much-needed capital injection, either through acquiring an equity stake or participating in a share buyback programme if one were initiated. This would immediately strengthen SAA's financial position.   SAA needs to fix its governance   Failing governance has been at the heart of many of SAA’s problems. In March 2025, the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) announced it had formally added SAA to a list of state institutions to be investigated on allegations of "serious maladministration, corruption, and unlawful conduct".   In 2021, the SIU also probed 84 SAA contracts and 44 of its aircraft leases, following allegations of contractual irregularities such as inflated pricing, fronting, conflicts of interest on the part of SAA staff, ghost vendors, work orders, and bank accounts and over-payments. It also probed non-delivery of services and products (SCOPA, 2021). In 2015, the late SAA Chairwoman Dudu Myeni was alleged to have tried to recruit a third-party leasing company in the SAA’s 2015 contract with Airbus (Finance Standing Committee, 2016). The arrangement was stopped by then Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene. The allegations were examined by the Zondo Commission on State Capture (Corruption Watch, 2022).   In March 2024, Parliament’s Public Enterprises Portfolio Committee had asked the SIU to investigate the now aborted sale of 51% of SAA to the Takatso Consortium. Former Public Enterprises Department Director-General Kgathatso Tlhakudi’s alleged misconduct in the Takatso deal suggested that SAA’s valuation for the transaction was inaccurate and that the Takatso Consortium was favoured (Thorne, 2024). The allegations of wrongdoing had been rejected by the late then Public Enterprises Minister Pravin Gordhan.   In September 2024, the Auditor-General told SAA to work on its governance structures to stabilise operations. Briefing the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) in Parliament in September 2024 about SAA’s audit outcomes for the 2018/19, 2019/20, 2020/21, and 2021/22 financial years, a team from the Auditor-General’s office recommended that executive leadership positions be filled with skilled and experienced personnel (Auditor-General, 2024). It said internal governance issues should be improved. It recommended that the key policies, procedures, and processes that underpin financial and record-keeping functions must be updated, implemented, and established where they did not exist. “The board and management must ensure that strict consequence management practices are ingrained in the culture of SAA. Officials who transgress or permit non-compliance must be held accountable for their actions.”   Poor governance led to SAA being placed under business rescue on 5 December 2019. Poor governance was at the heart of the operational deficiencies, a financial crisis, and the withdrawal of services by critical service providers. Irregular expenditure between 2018 and 2022 was R44.5 billion. Fruitless and wasteful expenditure increased over the same four periods and was R207.3 million. SAA received audit disclaimers from the Auditor-General from 2018/19 to 2021/22 and received R48.3 billion in government bailouts between the 2017/18 to 2022/23 financial years.   Lack of competent management, political interference in operations, appointments and contracts, and procurement corruption have been among the reasons the organisation has struggled. It appears that poor governance remains an issue at SAA.   In February 2025, the South African Cabinet approved the appointment of John Lamola’s permanent group chief executive officer for a two-year term. However, the decision has sparked controversy, with the Democratic Alliance (DA) filing a complaint with the Public Protector against Deputy President Paul Mashatile and Transport Minister Barbara Creecy for alleged undue political interference in the selection process (Sibiya & Cowan, 2025).   The SAA board initially recommended Allan Kilavuka, the current CEO of Kenya Airways, as the preferred candidate. Philip Saunders was also recommended as an option by the SAA board, who ranked Saunders higher than Lamola. Saunders was appointed SAA’s chief commercial officer in 2019 and briefly became the airline’s interim CEO in 2020. SAA will have to be run, not like a failing state-owned entity, with political management and board appointees, and needing state bailouts year after year, but as a profitable commercial company, run by experienced, merit-based management and board.    It is critical that SAA fixes its failing governance.       Figure 3:  Cathay Pacific Turnaround Model    Cathay Pacific as a model for a revitalised SAA   The successful turnaround of Cathay Pacific, the flag carrier of Hong Kong, after the airline plunged into crisis because of COVID-19 lockdowns, through smart strategic partnerships, a new aviation industry-experienced management and board, impeccable governance, improved efficiency, and customer-friendly service, offers a turnaround path for South African Airways.   As SAA struggles with finding an equity partner and state ownership of the airline having been ineffective, the airline needs a new, more diverse share ownership model, which excludes the state from being the major owner, although still giving the state a part-ownership role.   Cathay Pacific’s diverse mixed private-public-state shareholder ownership model, which drove its successful turnaround, could be a model for SAA.   As of March 2024, Cathay Pacific operates as a publicly listed company, with Swire Pacific, a private company, being the largest shareholder. Air China owns the second-largest shareholding, and Qatar Airways the third-largest stake. The majority of Air China is owned by the state-owned China National Aviation Holding. This diverse shareholding structure of private, public and state-owned enterprise ownership should be looked at as an option for SAA.   Cathay Pacific was plunged into a devastating crisis following the COVID-19 lockdowns. The Hong Kong government, in 2020, then agreed to lead a $5 billion bailout of Cathay Pacific, taking a minority stake in the carrier. Cathay and parent company Swire Pacific had sought to raise $5 billion in new capital to help the airline survive the COVID-19 crisis. The Hong Kong government provided the bulk of the new funds by giving a $3.5 billion bailout package, consisting of loans and preferred share purchases. The remaining capital came from issuing new stock. Under the bailout deal, Aviation 2020, a limited company owned by Hong Kong’s government, took a 6% share in Cathay. The government would appoint two observers to Cathay’s board. By July 2024, Cathay had bought back the remaining half of the preference shares issued to the government as part of the COVID-19 bailout package during its airline’s recapitalisation in 2020.   SAA could do well by securing a cash-rich international airline partner, like a Qatar Airways, combined with a domestic private sector partner, and the remainder of the shareholding could remain with the state, preferably owned or managed by a specialist state entity like, for example, the Public Investment Company, rather than a government department as is currently the case.   Cathay Pacific’s post-pandemic turnaround strategy is also instructive to SAA. Cathay Pacific brutally cut areas of the company that were non-essential. The airline closed down Cathay Dragon, the regional arm of the airline (equivalent to state-owned SA Express) in order to streamline their operations. The 35-year-old Cathay Dragon had tanked during the COVID-19 lockdown crisis. To bring down costs and increase efficiency, the airline used the pandemic to get rid of all their older aircraft such as the expensive-to-operate Airbus a340, which SAA continues to use. Furthermore, as part of its post-COVID-19 turnaround strategy, the organisation right-sized its staff numbers, and reduced the pay of remaining staff.    Cathay Pacific has tightened up its governance. Appointments and contracts are made based largely on merit. The company has focused on making decisions, whether about routes or vendors, based on maximising its commercial profitability, rather than on political considerations.   The airline has a management team of incredibly talented, industry-proven, and widely respected individuals in the global aviation industry. Again, SAA could take a leaf out of Cathay’s book.   In late 2022, Cathay Pacific appointed an experienced top management and board to steer the turnaround. Ronald Lam, Cathay Pacific’s CEO since 2023, has been with the airline since 1996. He has extensive experience in commercial, cargo, and customer operations, having also run the low-cost carrier HK Express. Patrick Healy, Executive Chairman since 2019, has over 30 years’ experience with Swire Group. He held leadership roles across aviation and consumer businesses, including CEO of HAECO Xiamen and Managing Director at Swire Coca-Cola HK (Cathay Pacific, 2019).   Cathay Pacific pivoted its strategy on operating as an international aviation connecting hub. It has capitalised on Hong Kong’s position by building a strong network across Asia, connecting key regional markets to global destinations. Its central location enables efficient east-west and north-south connectivity, essential for both business and leisure travel. SAA has huge potential to operate in a similar way connecting East to West. There is a huge market to connect Asia and South America, Africa and Australia/Asia as well as Europe and Australia.   In a highly competitive aviation market, Cathay Pacific has focused on delivering world-class, superior, efficient, clean, and friendly services as a differentiator. In 2024, it was named in the Skytrax World Airline Awards, the fifth World’s Best Airline, the World’s Best Economy Class airline, and the World’s Cleanest airline. A revitalised SAA can also, like Cathay Pacific, prioritise delivery efficiency, and superior, clean, customer-friendly services. To do so, it must be depoliticised, appoint management and boards based on merit, ensure impeccable governance, and make smart strategic partnerships.   Conclusion   Clearly, SAA stands at a critical juncture, with encouraging signs of recovery marked by improved finances and the gradual expansion of its fleet and routes. However, sustaining this momentum requires strategic foresight, new capital and partnerships.   Many airlines, including African ones, such as Ethiopian Airlines, have achieved remarkable success through effective management, service differentiation, strategic alliances, government easing onerous administrative burdens, and through accountable governance. By strengthening its governance, ensuring competent management and board, and competent procurement, SAA can turn around. Political interference in operations, appointments, and contracts, and procurement corruption must be eliminated.   Through effective management, service differentiation, and strategic alliances, SAA can chart a path to prosperity. Reintroducing key routes, such as the Johannesburg-Mumbai connection, leveraging Johannesburg as a strategic transit hub between Latin America, Asia, and Australia, and exploring financial partnerships with established carriers are essential steps. 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Hong Kong’s Cathay Pacific should improve service, tap belt and road potential: Paul Chan . [Online] Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3269485/finance-chief-urges-cathay-pacific-airways-raise-service-quality-boost-hong-kongs-aviation-hub [accessed: 27 August 2025]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   October 2025   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   CONTENTS   1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 The enduring centrality of the Security Council 1.2 The deadlock of reform 1.3 Beyond state-centric reform 1.4 Theoretical significance 1.5 Research questions and contribution 1.6 Structure of the paper 2 THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 2.1 Origins: San Francisco and the Great Power Compromise 2.2 Early functioning and criticism 2.3 The 1965 enlargement 2.4 Cold War stagnation 2.5 Post-Cold War resurgence of reform 2.6 Kofi Annan and the High-Level Panel 2.7 Lessons from history 3 CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS AND THE PERSISTENT DEADLOCK 3.1 The G-4 proposal: Expanding permanent membership 3.2 The African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus 3.3 The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) Group 3.4 Other proposals and coalitions 3.5 The Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) 3.6 Structural sources of deadlock 3.7 Implications for alternative models 4 REGIONAL UNION REPRESENTATION: CONCEPT, THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS, COMPARATIVE PRECEDENTS AND DESIGN OPTIONS 4.1 Conceptual foundations 4.2 Normative rationale 4.3 Theoretical foundations 4.4 Comparative precedents 4.5 Design options 4.6 Advantages of regional representation 4.7 Challenges and criticisms 4.8 Why this proposal matters 5 LEGAL ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL UNION REPRESENTATION 5.1 The Charter as a living constitution 5.2 Membership and representation 5.3 Precedents of representation beyond states 5.4 Voting and the Veto 5.5 Regional arrangements under Chapter VIII 5.6 Amendment procedure 5.7 Possible amendment text 5.8 Legal objections and responses 5.9 Precedents of Charter amendment 5.10 Conclusion of legal analysis 6 CASE STUDIES OF REGIONAL ROLES IN SECURITY GOVERNANCE 6.1 The African Union in Somalia: AMISOM and beyond 6.2 The European Union in the Balkans: Crisis management and integration 6.3 NATO and the Libyan intervention: Resolution 1973 6.4 ASEAN and Myanmar: Regional diplomacy under strain 6.5 ECOWAS and West African interventions 6.6 Synthesis of case studies 6.7 Critiques of regional involvement 6.8 Implications for Security Council reform 7 POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF REGIONAL UNION REPRESENTATION 7.1 The P5: Guardians of privilege 7.2 Africa: Between Ezulwini and pragmatism 7.3 Asia-Pacific: Diversity and division 7.4 Latin America and the Caribbean 7.5 The Arab World and Middle East 7.6 Europe: Between status quo and EU ambitions 7.7 Middle Powers and UFC States 7.8 Civil society and academic voices 7.9 Negotiation strategies 7.10 Comparative feasibility 7.11 Conclusion on feasibility 8 IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP AND RISKS 8.1 Phased implementation 8.2 Diplomatic strategy 8.3 Risks and mitigation 8.4 Long-Term implications REFERENCES ANNEXURE A: DRAFT AMENDMENT TEXT ANNEXURE B: DRAFT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1 INTRODUCTION   1.1 The enduring centrality of the Security Council   The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has since its inception occupied a unique, central and enduring place in the global order. Having been conceived in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, it was designed as the organ of “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (UN, 1945). More than any other body of the United Nations, the Security Council represents the attempt to translate power politics into institutionalised governance. Unlike the General Assembly (GA), where each state has one vote, the Council privileges a handful of powers through permanent membership and the veto. In doing so, it reflects not only a legal order, but also a political reality, namely that global security cannot be maintained without the consent and participation of the strongest states.   Yet, nearly eight decades after its creation, the Council is increasingly criticised as anachronistic. Its composition reflects the geopolitical balance of 1945, not that of the twenty-first century. Africa, despite comprising more than a quarter of UN membership, lacks permanent representation. Asia, home to more than half the world’s population and several rising powers, has only one permanent seat, that is China. Latin America and the Caribbean are excluded from permanent membership altogether. Europe, by contrast, retains two permanent seats alongside representation among the elected members.   The legitimacy crisis is not merely symbolic. The Security Council derives its authority not only from the Charter, but also from perceptions of fairness and representation. If large parts of the membership feel excluded, compliance with Council decisions may erode and the institution risks irrelevance. “No action can be coherently described as legitimate if it is not socially recognised as rightful” (Morris & Wheeler,2007). 1.2 The deadlock of reform   Reform of the Security Council has been on the UN agenda for decades. The last and only structural enlargement was in 1965, when membership was expanded from 11 to 15 (UN, 1963). Since then, the United Nations itself has more than tripled in size, but the Council remains frozen.   Successive reform initiatives have stalled. The G-4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) have pressed for permanent seats, while the African Union has demanded two permanent African seats through the Ezulwini Consensus (AU, 2005). Opposing them, the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group, led by Italy and Pakistan, has argued against permanent expansion, proposing instead additional elected seats. The Arab Group, the L.69 coalition and others have advanced variations.   The Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) established in 2008 were meant to forge compromise. Yet, they have produced little more than restatements of entrenched positions (UNGA. 2009). The structural reason for this deadlock lies in Article 108 of the Charter, which states that any amendment requires a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the Member States, including all five permanent members. Because the P5 have little incentive to dilute their privileges, and because rivalries among aspirant states prevent consensus, reform has become a Sisyphean task.   1.3 Beyond state-centric reform   Most reform debates are framed in state-centric terms, which suggests individual states “deserve” permanent membership? Should new great powers such as India or Brazil be added? Should Africa’s largest states, Nigeria, South Africa or Egypt, be elevated? These questions are divisive. They pit neighbours against each other, inflame regional rivalries and make consensus impossible.   This paper proposes an alternative model, namely that instead of granting permanent seats to individual states, the Council should allocate five new seats to regional unions. Likely candidates include:   The African Union (AU), The European Union (EU), An organisation representing the Americas (OAS or CELAC), An Asia-Pacific grouping centred on ASEAN or a broader consortium, The League of Arab States or another body for West Asia.   These seats would be held by the regional organisation itself, with internal procedures determining which member state would serve as representative at any given time. Such an approach builds upon the logic of Chapter VIII of the Charter, which already recognises the role of regional arrangements in peace and security and aligns institutional design with the reality that regional organisations are indispensable to contemporary conflict management. 1.4 Theoretical significance   The proposal contributes to debates on legitimacy and institutional design in international organisations. As Jan Aart Scholte (2011) has argued, legitimacy has both input dimensions - who is represented, who participates - and output dimensions - effectiveness of problem-solving. Current reform proposals tend to emphasise input legitimacy by expanding permanent seats. Yet, output legitimacy, that is how well the Council can respond to crises, depends heavily on regional actors, who provide troops, funding and political cover.   From the perspective of institutional design theory, the proposal reflects what Robert Keohane and David Victor (2011) call “regime complexes”, being overlapping global and regional arrangements. The UNSC has always functioned in such a regime complex, relying on NATO, the AU, the EU, ASEAN and others. Giving these organisations formal seats would institutionalise what is already de facto practice. 1.5 Research questions and contribution   This article asks three core questions:   What is the historical trajectory of Security Council reform and why has it stalled? How could regional union representation address the Council’s legitimacy and effectiveness deficits? What legal and political changes would be required in order to implement such a reform under the UN Charter? In answering these questions, the paper contributes both to policy debates and to academic scholarship on institutional legitimacy, global governance and regionalism. 1.6 Structure of the paper   The article proceeds in eight parts. Section 2 traces the historical trajectory of Security Council reform, from San Francisco in 1945 to the enlargement of 1965 and the post-Cold War debates. Section 3 surveys the current proposals and explains the deadlock. Section 4 then introduces the regional union proposal, situating it in comparative practice and theoretical frameworks whereas Section 5 provides a detailed legal analysis of the Charter. Section 6 presents case studies of regional organisations in security governance and Section 7 examines political feasibility. Finally, Section 8 outlines an implementation roadmap. Annexes provide draft Charter amendments and a model General Assembly resolution. 2 THE HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM   2.1 Origins: San Francisco and the Great Power Compromise   The Security Council was born in 1945 as part of the larger architecture of the United Nations, having formed part of the design at the San Francisco Conference; and its creation reflected the lessons of the League of Nations, whose inability to enforce peace stemmed in part from the absence of the United States and the reluctance of great powers to submit to collective authority. The architects of the UN were determined not to repeat these mistakes.   From the outset, it was accepted that the new organisation could only succeed if the world’s most powerful states, the victors of the Second World War, were fully invested in its operation. The P5 powers made it clear that their participation was conditional on special privileges, with prominent “internationalist” power brokers such as Senator Arthur Vandenberg, for example making it clear: support for US membership in a postwar organisation was contingent on a veto (Throntveit, 2017). The US Secretary of State Edward Stettinius told smaller states in San Francisco that the veto was “the price of great power participation.” Similarly, Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko warned that without unanimity among the major powers, “there would be no organisation (Office of the Historian, N.d.).”   The compromise enshrined in the Charter created a dual structure of membership: five permanent members (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States), each with veto power, and six non-permanent members elected for two-year terms. The veto was codified in Article 27(3), which required “the concurring votes of the permanent members” for substantive decisions. This arrangement institutionalised what was called the “Yalta formula,” reflecting the power realities of the time.   Smaller states protested, but their resistance was overruled, since the deal was justified according to the great states and necessary for effectiveness: no enforcement action would succeed if opposed by a great power. Yet, it was also criticised as an undemocratic concession. The seeds of the Council’s legitimacy problem were planted at its birth. 2.2 Early functioning and criticism   During its early decades, the Security Council functioned as an arena for Cold War rivalry. The Soviet Union used the veto 106 times between 1946 and 1965, blocking Western initiatives (Scharf, 2023). The Council was often paralysed and legitimacy was less a matter of representativeness than of functionality.   Nevertheless, representation soon emerged as an issue. Newly independent states from Asia and Africa, admitted to the UN in the 1950s and 1960s, noticed their absence from the Council. With only six elected seats, representation was heavily skewed toward Europe and the Americas. The imbalance became untenable as the General Assembly swelled in membership. 2.3 The 1965 enlargement   By the early 1960s, the UN membership had grown to over 110 states, with many of them being from Africa. Pressure mounted for enlargement of the Council and in 1991 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1991 (UN, 1963), which proposed amending the Charter so as to increase the Council membership from 11 to 15 members, thereby expanding non-permanent seats from six to ten. The amendment entered into force in 1965 after ratification by all permanent members (UN, N.d.).   The enlargement was framed as a response to decolonisation. African and Asian states gained more frequent opportunities to sit on the Council, while the Latin American and Western European groups preserved their shares. Yet, the reform was modest and it left untouched the permanent membership and the veto, thus reinforcing the hierarchical structure of 1945.   This experience demonstrates two enduring lessons. The first being that Charter amendments are possible when there is overwhelming political consensus and the second being that reforms are likely to be incremental and aimed at addressing representational imbalances without altering the fundamental privileges of the P5. 2.4 Cold War stagnation   Between 1965 and 1990, reform debates largely receded and the Council was often paralysed by superpower rivalry. The United States and the Soviet Union wielded their vetoes to block each other’s initiatives and most peacekeeping operations were improvised under Chapter VI of the Charter, which urges the pacific settlement of disputes, rather than being enforced actions under Chapter VII, which deals with actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. In this context, questions of legitimacy and representation were overshadowed by concerns about functionality.   Nevertheless, occasional calls for reform emerged, particularly from developing states. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) frequently criticised the dominance of the P5. Yet, without momentum in the General Assembly and with the Cold War stalemate paralysing the Council, serious reform efforts were postponed. 2.5 Post-Cold War resurgence of reform   The end of the Cold War transformed the Security Council. Suddenly freed from superpower deadlock, the Council authorised an unprecedented wave of peacekeeping operations and enforcement actions. New operations resumed in 1988, when the USSR dramatically altered its foreign policy position toward the world body. Since the thawing of the Cold War, the UN has undertaken fifty- eight peacekeeping operations. The Council became the most active it had ever been (Weiss & Daws, 2018).   Yet, this activism exposed legitimacy deficits. The Council authorised intervention in the Gulf War via Resolution 678, 1990 (UN, 1990), imposed sweeping sanctions on Iraq, and launched humanitarian operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Critics charged that the Council was unrepresentative: permanent members made decisions affecting the developing world without their participation. The Rwandan genocide in 1994, in particular, demonstrated both the Council’s centrality and its failure.   In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace  highlighted the growing role of regional organisations in conflict management (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). This marked the beginning of a normative shift, namely that legitimacy required not only broader state representation, but also institutional cooperation with regional actors. 2.6 Kofi Annan and the High-Level Panel   By the early 2000s, reform was back on the agenda. Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which in 2004 issued its landmark report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility  (Annan 2004). The panel proposed two models:   Model A: six new permanent seats (without veto) and three new elected seats. Model B: eight new renewable four-year seats and one new two-year seat.   Both models aimed to increase representation without altering the P5 veto. Annan endorsed the need for enlargement, stating that the Council “must be broadly representative of the realities of power in today’s world.”   Yet, the proposals failed. The G-4 campaigned vigorously for Model A, while the African Union advanced the Ezulwini Consensus, demanding two permanent seats with veto. The Uniting for Consensus group opposed permanents altogether. But the P5 remained ambivalent, unwilling to risk their privileges and by 2005, the reform momentum collapsed. 2.7 Lessons from history   This history yields several lessons. Firstly, reforms are politically possible only when they avoid threatening P5 prerogatives and secondly, expansions framed in state-centric terms invariably inflame regional rivalries, which prevents consensus. Thirdly, legitimacy deficits persist despite reform inertia, which is leading to the Council’s authority being undermined.   It is within this context of repeated failure that alternative models is gaining traction and so, by shifting the focus from individual states to collective regional organisations, reform could sidestep the rivalries that have doomed past initiatives. 3 CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS AND THE PERSISTENT DEADLOCK   The issue of Security Council reform has occupied the agenda of the United Nations for decades, but while broad consensus exists that the Council must become more representative, accountable and legitimate, how  to achieve the reform has proven elusive. The debates have coalesced around several competing proposals, the most prominent ones being those that are advanced by the G-4, the African Union and the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group, but there are also additional coalitions, such as the L.69 group and the Arab Group, which have added further complexity. Together, these positions illustrate both the depth of demand for reform and the reasons for its intractability. 3.1 The G-4 proposal: Expanding permanent membership   3.1.1 Origins and rationale   The so-called G-4, being Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, have long aspired to permanent seats. Their proposal emerged prominently in the 1990s and early 2000s, gaining momentum alongside the High-Level Panel report in 2004. The G-4 argue that their economic weight, population size, regional leadership and contributions to UN peacekeeping and financing entitle them to permanent representation (Von Freiesleben, 2015).   Germany and Japan, as the world’s third- and fourth-largest economies, are among the largest contributors to the UN budget and international peace operations. India is the world’s most populous democracy and a major troop contributor to UN peacekeeping. Brazil presents itself as the leading power in Latin America. Collectively, the G-4 claim that without their inclusion, the Council lacks legitimacy. 3.1.2 The proposal   The G-4 propose expanding the Council to 25 members, which they propose doing through the addition of six new permanent seats and four non-permanent seats. Two permanent seats would go to Africa and the G-4 states themselves would occupy the others. The new permanent members would not initially have veto rights, though they support extending veto rights after a review period (McDonald & Stewart, 2010).   3.1.3 Support and opposition   The G-4 have attracted substantial support, including from the United Kingdom and France, who have publicly endorsed their candidacies. The L.69 group of developing countries also tends to back expansion that includes them. However, strong opposition has prevented progress (Von Freiesleben, 2015)..   The fiercest resistance comes from regional rivals. Pakistan opposes India, arguing that Indian permanent membership would destabilise South Asia; Italy opposes Germany, fearing loss of influence within Europe; Argentina and Mexico oppose Brazil’s claim to represent Latin America; and China opposes Japan’s candidacy, citing historical grievances. The United States has been cautious, supporting Japan, but equivocal on the others (von Freiesleben, 2015).. 3.1.4 Assessment   The G-4 proposal has the advantage of aligning with the principle of “responsibility and capability,” rewarding those who contribute most. Yet, it fails the political test of consensus, because by elevating specific states, it inflames rivalries and deepens divisions and even if adopted in the GA, it would likely fail at the ratification stage, as P5 and regional rivals could withhold approval. 3.2 The African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus 3.2.1 Origins   The Ezulwini Consensus, which was adopted in 2005 in Swaziland (now Eswatini), articulates Africa’s common position. It reflects decades of frustration at Africa’s exclusion from permanent membership, despite being the continent most often on the Council’s agenda. As the AU has emphasised, “Africa constitutes more than one quarter of UN membership, but has no permanent seat on the Security Council” (African Union 2005). 3.2.2 Content of the proposal   The Ezulwini Consensus demands:   Two permanent seats for Africa, with all privileges of current permanents, including veto power. Two additional non-permanent seats for Africa. If veto power is not abolished, Africa insists it must be extended to new permanents to avoid creating second-class members. 3.2.3 Support and internal tensions   The AU’s position is formally united and endorsed by all African states. The Common African Position has been reaffirmed repeatedly at AU Summits, however, unity masks deep internal divisions. For example, which states would occupy the permanent seats, remains contested. Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt are the strongest contenders, but rivalries prevent consensus and smaller states worry that empowering the big three would marginalise them.   Outside Africa, Ezulwini is supported in principle by many developing countries, but the insistence on veto extension has alienated others. The UFC group, in particular, rejects any expansion of veto power. The P5, too, have no appetite for more veto-wielding states. 3.2.4 Assessment   Ezulwini highlights the principle of equitable geographic representation and rectifying historical injustice, however, its maximalist demands, permanent seats with  veto, render it politically unviable. Moreover, it is unlikely the P5 would agree to extend the veto power and many Member States oppose creating new veto holders. Yet, Ezulwini remains diplomatically powerful, as no African state will publicly deviate from it, ensuring Africa speaks with one voice even as internal consensus on candidates is absent. 3.3 The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) Group   3.3.1 Origins and membership   The Uniting for Consensus group, also known as the “Coffee Club,” emerged in the 1990s to counter the G-4 push. Its founding members included Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, South Korea and Argentina. Today, it includes a range of other countries as well, mostly middle powers and regional rivals of the G-4 aspirants. 3.3.2 Proposal   The UFC rejects the idea of new permanent members and instead, it advocates expanding the number of non-permanent seats, including the creation of longer-term seats with the possibility of immediate re-election as this would allow major states to serve more frequently, without granting them permanent privileges (Von Freiesleben, 2015). 3.3.3 Rationale   The UFC argues that permanent membership contradicts democratic principles, because by locking in privilege indefinitely, it entrenches inequality. They argue that expansion should instead be more flexible, allowing rotation and accountability and they also argue that new permanent members would exacerbate rivalries, particularly in volatile regions. 3.3.4 Assessment   The UFC position has considerable support, particularly from states wary of empowering regional rivals, who argue that it is consistent with the democratic critique of permanent membership. However, it offers little to those pushing for greater recognition of rising powers or Africa’s historical grievances. It also does not address the question of legitimacy as effectively as enlargement of permanents 3.4 Other proposals and coalitions   3.4.1 The L.69 Group   The L.69 is a coalition of developing countries from Africa, Latin America, Asia and   the Pacific advocating for expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats. They tend to align with the G-4, but emphasise the need for equitable representation of the Global South (ISI, 2020). 3.4.2 The Arab Group   The Arab Group insists on permanent representation for Arab states, citing their collective population, regional significance and frequent presence on the Council’s agenda and their position intersects with Africa’s demands, since many Arab states are also African Union members (BNA, 2018). 3.4.3 The Small Island Developing States (SIDS)   SIDS emphasise the need for more equitable rotation of elected seats, ensuring that small states can access the Council and while they lack the numbers to drive reform, their moral argument for inclusivity has resonance (ROJ, 2022). 3.5 The Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN)   In 2008, the General Assembly established the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) as a formal process to consolidate reform discussions (UNGA, 2008). The IGN is structured around five “key issues”:   Categories of membership, The question of the veto, Regional representation, The size and working methods of the Council, The Council’s relationship with the General Assembly. (UN, N.d.)   Despite more than a decade of meetings, the IGN has failed to produce a consolidated negotiating text. Instead, sessions have been characterised by repetition of entrenched positions and no written draft has ever emerged, which reflects the inability to bridge divides. 3.6 Structural sources of deadlock   Several structural factors explain the persistent stalemate:   Any Charter amendment, for example, requires ratification by all five permanent members and the P5 have little incentive to dilute their privileges and are content with the status quo. The candidacy of specific states triggers opposition from neighbours, as has been seen with India and Pakistan, Brazil and Argentina/Mexico, Germany and Italy, and Japan  and China. In turn, while the Ezulwini Consensus on the face presents a united front, internal African rivalries prevent agreement on candidates, thereby undermining and weakening the bloc’s leverage. Normative arguments for equity also clash with pragmatic political realities, such as, for example, the demands for the extension of the veto, which create unbridgeable divides.   As Vargas Toro (2008) observes, every reform proposal to date has been “nice in principle, but, in practice it does not work.” The IGN has become a ritualistic process, keeping the issue alive, but perpetually unresolved. 3.7 Implications for alternative models   The failure of state-centric proposals highlights the potential of alternative models. If debates about which state  deserves a permanent seat are structurally irresolvable, shifting the focus to regional organisations  could break the logjam. By representing entire regions, rather than individual states, the reform would reduce rivalries and broaden legitimacy.   In this light, the proposal for regional union representation does not merely offer another option, indeed it responds directly to the structural causes of deadlock identified above. 4 REGIONAL UNION REPRESENTATION: CONCEPT, THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS, COMPARATIVE PRECEDENTS AND DESIGN OPTIONS   4.1 Conceptual foundations   The proposal to introduce regional union representation in the Security Council marks a conceptual departure from the state-centric model of international governance, because since the founding of the UN in 1945, membership and representation in its organs have been strictly limited to sovereign states. And even though being a supranational organisation with extensive competences, the European Union only has  observer status in the UN General Assembly (Verbeek, 2022). The Security Council, in particular, has been jealously guarded as the preserve of states.   The idea advanced here is that the Council’s representational deficit cannot be solved by simply adding more states. Doing so inflames rivalries, creates hierarchies among states and risks ossifying inequalities. Instead, representation should be extended to regional organisations, which are increasingly the central actors in peace and security governance.   Under this model, the five permanent members (P5) would remain. The ten elected non-permanent members would also remain. But five additional seats would be created, each allocated to a regional union designated by the General Assembly. Likely candidates include:   The African Union (AU), representing Africa. The European Union (EU), representing Europe. An organisation representing the Americas, such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). An Asia-Pacific grouping, possibly ASEAN, SAARC or a composite arrangement. The League of Arab States, representing West Asia and North Africa.   Each regional union would decide internally which member state would physically occupy the seat at a given time. This could be rotational, elective or delegated to the regional secretariat. Crucially, the seat would belong to the organisation , not the individual state. 4.2 Normative rationale   The normative case for regional representation rests on three pillars, namely, legitimacy, effectiveness and fairness. 4.2.1 Legitimacy   The Council’s legitimacy depends on both input and output dimensions (Scholte 2011). Input legitimacy concerns who participates in decision-making. Currently, the Council underrepresents vast constituencies: Africa, Latin America, the Arab world, South Asia. Regional seats would ensure that these constituencies have a permanent voice.   Output legitimacy concerns the effectiveness of outcomes. Decisions are more likely to be respected and implemented when they are perceived as legitimate. By incorporating regional perspectives, the Council would craft more balanced and widely accepted resolutions.   4.2.2 Effectiveness Regional organisations are indispensable to contemporary peace operations. The AU has deployed tens of thousands of troops in Somalia, the EU has led missions in the Balkans and Africa, ASEAN has mediated in Myanmar and NATO has implemented enforcement operations under UNSC mandates. Yet, these actors lack formal seats at the Council and therefore, by institutionalising their voices, coordination would be improved, duplication reduced and enforcement strengthened.   4.2.3 Fairness Permanent seats for individual states inevitably raise questions of fairness, because why India and not Pakistan, why Brazil and not Argentina, and why Germany and not Italy? Regional representation circumvents these rivalries, because it elevates the collective, rather than individual  actors. This promotes fairness and avoids zero-sum contests. 4.3 Theoretical foundations 4.3.1 Institutional legitimacy theory   According to international relations scholars, institutions derive legitimacy from participation and accountability (Hurd 1999). The UNSC suffers from a legitimacy gap because its composition is frozen in time. Regional representation broadens participation and embeds accountability within regional constituencies.   4.3.2 Nested governance and regime complexes   Keohane and Victor (2011) describe international institutions as “regime complexes”: overlapping, loosely coupled arrangements rather than neat hierarchies. The UNSC already operates within such a regime complex, relying on NATO, the AU, EU and others. Giving regional organisations formal seats institutionalises this nested governance, aligning form with function. 4.3.3 Constructivist perspectives   Constructivist theories emphasise the social legitimacy of institutions (Finnemore and Barnett, 2004). Regional representation affirms the identity and agency of regions, recognising them as collective actors. It reflects the diffusion of authority in a multipolar world where regions are central nodes of governance. 4.4 Comparative precedents 4.4.1 The European Union in international organisations   The EU provides the strongest precedent. It has exclusive competence in trade policy, and the European Commission negotiates on behalf of its members in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The EU also speaks as a bloc in climate negotiations and within the UN, Resolution 65/276 (UN, 2011) granted the EU enhanced observer rights, which includes their ability to speak, submit proposals and reply, though not vote.   This demonstrates that non-state entities can be accommodated procedurally in UN organs, though full voting membership has not yet been granted. 4.4.2 The African Union and regional peacekeeping   The AU has repeatedly deployed troops with UNSC authorisation, notably in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia. In 2008, the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) became the largest peacekeeping mission in the world. The AU’s Peace and Security Council has become a vital regional counterpart. Yet, Africa has no permanent voice in the UNSC (Security Council Report, 2011). 4.4.3 The Arab League and regional diplomacy   The League of Arab States has mediated conflicts in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. In 2011, its call for action in Libya was pivotal in persuading the UNSC to adopt Resolution 1973 (UN, 2011), authorising “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. Without Arab League endorsement, Western states would have faced accusations of neo-imperialism. 4.4.4 ASEAN and regional legitimacy   ASEAN has limited enforcement capacity, but considerable regional legitimacy. It played a central role in the Cambodian peace process in the 1980s-90s and has been engaged in Myanmar’s crises and while it has been criticized for consensus-based diplomacy, ASEAN exemplifies how regional actors can confer legitimacy on interventions. 4.5 Design options   4.5.1 Selection of representatives   Regional unions would determine their representatives internally. Options include:   Rotation, where member states will rotate every one or two years. Election, where the regional union elects a state to serve. Delegation, where the union’s secretariat appoints a representative. The GA could also set minimum standards for transparency and inclusiveness in these processes. 4.5.2 Voting rights   Regional representatives would have the same voting rights as elected members, but no veto, which preserves the P5 prerogatives while expanding voice.   An alternative innovation could be a collective veto, where regional representatives could only exercise a blocking vote if the entire union agreed, but whilst this would enhance legitimacy, it is politically complex. 4.5.3 Accountability mechanisms   Regional representatives could be required to submit annual reports to the General Assembly in which they have to explain their voting records and decision-making processes, which too would strengthen accountability and transparency. 4.5.4 Conflict of interest rules   To address potential conflicts, regional representatives should abstain when the dispute directly involves the regional organisation or one of its member states, which principle already exists in Article 27(3) of the Charter in that it requires parties to a dispute to abstain. 4.6 Advantages of regional representation   Broader legitimacy is promoted in that each seat represents dozens of states, thereby expanding inclusivity. Conflict is better managed in that it will avoid zero-sum rivalries among aspirant states. Operational effectiveness will be improved in that coordination with regional peacekeeping will be strengthened. Greater flexibility will be promoted in that regional unions can adapt representation to evolving dynamics. Preservation The P5 Veto is preserved in that it does not challenge the core prerogatives of the great powers and therefore making it more politically feasible. 4.7 Challenges and criticisms   Ambiguity of Representation: Which organizations qualify as “regional unions”? Should they be universal (like the AU) or selective (like ASEAN)?   There are internal rivalries that need to be considered. For example, some regions have multiple competing organisations (OAS vs. CELAC; ASEAN vs. SAARC). And the GA would therefore need to adjudicate recognition. There are capacity gaps, with some unions having limited institutional capacity (e.g., Arab League, SAARC). This raises doubts about effectiveness. Then there’s African Concerns, where, for example, the Ezulwini Consensus demands state-based  permanents and therefore the AU as a seat might be perceived as diluting that claim. Legal innovation will be required, because the granting of voting rights to non-state actors will require a Charter amendment and may provoke resistance from sovereigntist states. 4.8 Why this proposal matters   Despite challenges, regional representation may be the only realistic way forward, because it preserves the veto, avoids rivalries, aligns with Charter provisions on regional organisations and enhances legitimacy. As Edward Luck (2006) observes, reform must be politically viable, not merely normatively desirable. By shifting the debate from states  to regions , this proposal offers a pragmatic escape from decades of deadlock. 5 LEGAL ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL UNION REPRESENTATION 5.1 The Charter as a living constitution   The Charter of the United Nations is often described as the “constitution of the international community” (Simma et al. 2012), because like national constitutions, it establishes institutional structures, allocates powers and enshrines basic principles. But, unlike domestic constitutions, the UN Charter is notoriously rigid and it has been amended only a handful of times since 1945, and its provisions on the Security Council are especially entrenched, reflecting the great powers’ determination to safeguard their privileges. Any reform proposal must therefore confront the Charter head-on. The key provisions relevant to Security Council composition and functioning include:   Article 4 restricts membership of the UN only to states. Article 23(1) limits the Security Council to fifteen Members of the United Nations. Article 27(3) which provides for decisions on substantive matters to require the concurring votes of the permanent members. Articles 52-54 provides for regional arrangements to be used for peace and security, but under UNSC authority. Article 108 states that Charter amendments must require a two-thirds GA approval and that it be ratified by two-thirds of Member States, including all P5. Article 109 provides for a Charter Review Conference, but it should be noted that this provision has been rarely invoked.   Of course, each of these provisions has implications for the feasibility of the regional representation proposal, but they are not insurmountable. 5.2 Membership and representation   The most fundamental barrier lies in Article 23(1), which states:   “The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations.” The Charter clearly envisions Council members as states . Even the 1965 enlargement, which increased elected seats from six to ten, did not alter this principle. Regional organisations are not “Members of the United Nations” within the meaning of Article 4.   The General Assembly has extended procedural rights to organisations such as the European Union (Resolution 65/276, 2011), but these remain observer privileges. Voting rights in the Security Council are reserved exclusively for states.   To accommodate regional union representation, Article 23 must be amended explicitly to add “regional union members” alongside state members and therefore a new Article 23 bis would need to define what constitutes a “regional union” and how such entities are designated. 5.3 Precedents of representation beyond states   Although the Charter currently restricts Council membership to states, international practice has shown some flexibility in representation.   The European Union in the General Assembly.  Resolution 65/276 (UN, 2011) granted the EU enhanced rights, which included their ability to speak, to propose amendments and to reply, which demonstrates that the GA can innovate procedurally, though it did stop short of granting the EU a vote. Taiwan/China Precedent . GA Resolution 2758 (UN, 1971) recognised the People’s Republic of China as “the only lawful representative of China to the United Nations,” displacing Taiwan. This shows that representation can be politically determined by the GA without Charter amendment, though this was a matter of state identity, not organisational membership. 1965 Enlargement . Whilst the only precedent for formal Charter amendment relating to the Council, it demonstrates the feasibility, but also the difficulty of building consensus and securing ratification. These precedents suggest that while procedural flexibility exists, the granting of full voting membership  to non-state entities will unequivocally require a Charter amendment. 5.4 Voting and the Veto   Article 27 codifies the veto:   “Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.”   After the 1965 enlargement, the threshold was raised from seven to nine, preserving the P5 veto. If regional union seats are added, the threshold must again be adjusted (e.g., from 9 to 12 if the Council expands to 20 members).   The proposal here preserves the P5 veto, but denies it to regional seats. This is both legally straightforward and politically necessary, because the P5 are highly unlikely to consent to additional veto holders.   A potential innovation is to allow regional unions a “collective veto”, that is a right to block Council action only if all members of the union agree. However, this would complicate decision-making and may weaken efficiency.   Ultimately rules should be developed to regulate the exercising of the Veto, but that will form part of a separate proposal. 5.5 Regional arrangements under Chapter VIII   The Charter already acknowledges the role of regional organisations in peace and security. Articles 52–54 provide:   Article 52: Members are encouraged to use regional arrangements for pacific settlement of disputes. Article 53: Enforcement action by regional organisations requires UNSC authorisation. Article 54: The Council must be kept fully informed of activities under regional arrangements.   These provisions reflect the drafters’ expectation that regions would play a role in maintaining peace. In practice, the Council has repeatedly authorised operations led by NATO, the AU, ECOWAS and others.   The proposed reform builds directly on this logic. By granting regional unions formal seats, the Council would institutionalise the Chapter VIII framework, elevating regional voices from consultative to participatory. 5.6 Amendment procedure   Article 108 sets the rules for amendment:   “Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.”   This means three hurdles:   Two-thirds approval in the GA (currently 129 of 193 states). Ratification by two-thirds of Member States (128 of 193). Ratification by all five permanent members.   This last requirement is the most formidable. Any one P5 can block reform by withholding ratification.   Article 109 provides for a Charter Review Conference, but this too requires GA approval and P5 concurrence. A Review Conference has never been held since 1945. 5.7 Possible amendment text   To implement regional representation, the following amendments would be required to the Charter: Article 23(1):   “The Security Council shall consist of five permanent members, a further ten elected members of the United Nations and five regional union members designated in accordance with Article 23 bis.” New Article 23 bis:   “The General Assembly shall, by resolution adopted by a two-thirds majority, designate regional unions that will be entitled to hold seats on the Security Council. Each designated union shall establish procedures for selecting its representative. Regional union members shall enjoy the same rights and obligations as other non-permanent members, except that they shall not exercise the veto under Article 27.”   Article 27(2) (amended threshold):   “Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of twelve members.”   Article 27(3) (substantive matters):   “Decisions on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of twelve members including the concurring votes of the permanent members, subject to Article 23 bis.” 5.8 Legal objections and responses   5.8.1 Non-State membership   Critics will argue that allowing non-states to sit on the Council contradicts Article 4’s definition of UN membership. The response is that Charter amendment is precisely the mechanism to expand membership categories. Just as the 1965 amendment expanded elected seats, so too could a new amendment create “regional members.” 5.8.2 Sovereignty concerns   Some states may resist ceding representation to a regional union, fearing loss of sovereignty and therefore the amendment must clarify that representation is delegated voluntarily by member states, consistent with practices in the EU and AU. States would retain sovereignty while mandating their union to represent them collectively. 5.8.3 Veto equality   The AU insists that if veto exists, it must be extended to all new permanents (Ezulwini Consensus). However, this reform proposes no veto  for regional seats. This is legally simpler and politically essential to gain P5 support. To reconcile with Ezulwini, the AU seat could be framed as complementary to Africa’s demand for state-based permanents. 5.8.4 Precedent for other organisations   Some fear that granting seats to regional unions would encourage other organisations (e.g., NATO, OECD, BRICS) to demand the same. To address this, the amendment must limit eligibility to regional organisations composed of states within a defined geographical area, recognised by the General Assembly as representative. 5.9 Precedents of Charter amendment   The history of Charter amendment demonstrates both the feasibility and difficulty thereof: The 1965 enlargement increased the SC membership from 11 to 15 and ECOSOC from 18 to 27 through GA Resolution 1991 and ratification by the P5. This shows that amendment is possible with broad consensus. The 1971 PRC recognition, though not an amendment, recognised the PRC through GA Resolution 2758 as the only lawful representative of China, which resolution displaced Taiwan from the UN. This demonstrates the GA’s power to determine representation questions. Then here were other amendments too. A 1971 amendment increased ECOSOC membership to 54 and amendments in the 1990s adjusted the size of the International Court of Justice. These show incremental changes are possible, but fundamental reforms (like the veto) remain untouched. 5.10 Conclusion of legal analysis   From a legal perspective, regional union representation is feasible, but requires amendment of Articles 23 and 27, with a new Article 23 bis. The hurdles are formidable, especially P5 ratification. Yet, compared to proposals for new state-based permanent members with vetoes, this model may be more palatable to the P5, since it expands representation without threatening their core privileges.   The Charter’s rigidity has been a source of paralysis in reform debates, but it is not immovable. Just as the 1965 enlargement reflected the reality of decolonisation, a 21st-century amendment could reflect the rise of regionalism as a central pillar of international governance. 6 CASE STUDIES OF REGIONAL ROLES IN SECURITY GOVERNANCE   The argument for regional union representation in the Security Council is not merely theoretical. In practice, regional organisations have long been indispensable to conflict management, peacekeeping and crisis diplomacy. Under Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Council is empowered to cooperate with such bodies, but their role has often gone beyond consultation. In many instances, they have borne the brunt of peace operations or conferred legitimacy on interventions and so by examining specific cases, the centrality of regional actors to contemporary peace and security can be highlighted. 6.1 The African Union in Somalia: AMISOM and beyond   6.1.1 Background   Somalia has been without a functioning central government since 1991. After the failure of UN peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s (UNOSOM I and II: consecutive United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in Somalia, established to address the Somali Civil War and subsequent famine) (UN Peacekeeping, N.d.), the Security Council was reluctant to commit large-scale forces and so in 2007, faced with the growing threat of al-Shabaab terrorism, the African Union established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).   6.1.2 AU-UN partnership   AMISOM was authorised by AU decision, but endorsed and supported by the Security Council through Resolution 1744 (UN, 2007). The UN provided logistical support via the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and at its height, AMISOM had deployed over 22,000 troops to Somalia (Anyadike, 2024).   This was one of the largest and most robust peace enforcement operations in the world and demonstrated Africa’s willingness to take ownership of regional security, but also its dependence on UN backing for funding and legitimacy.   6.1.3 Lessons   AMISOM underscores the paradox of Africa’s role in global security. The continent provides the largest number of troops to UN operations and deploys its own missions, yet lacks permanent representation in the Council. A permanent AU seat would institutionalise Africa’s voice, which will ensure that it is not merely a contractor, but also a co-decisionmaker. 6.2 The European Union in the Balkans: Crisis management and integration   6.2.1 Post–Cold War context   The violent dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s tested the international community’s ability to respond effectively and whereas the EU (then the European Community) initially attempted to mediate, divisions among member states weakened its credibility. The Council eventually authorised NATO-led operations, including the use of force in Bosnia (UN, 1993) and Kosovo (UN, 1999). 6.2.2 EU operations   From the early 2000s, the EU developed its own security role under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2003, the EU launched Operation Concordia in North Macedonia, its first-ever military mission and later, mandated by Resolution 1575 (UN, 2004), it took over peacekeeping in Bosnia from NATO through EUFOR Althea.   The EU also deployed police missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and its integration conditionality further anchored stability in the Balkans, which provision of security, eventually led to EU membership. 6.2.3 Lessons   The EU has emerged as a security actor of first resort in its neighbourhood. Its combination of military, police and economic instruments illustrates the multidimensional role regional organisations can play. A permanent EU seat on the Council would recognise this role formally, reducing duplication and ensuring alignment between Council mandates and EU implementation. 6.3 NATO and the Libyan intervention: Resolution 1973   6.3.1 Background   The 2011 Libyan uprising posed a critical test for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, but it passed muster, because as Gaddafi’s forces advanced on Benghazi, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 (UN, 2011}, authorising “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. 6.3.2 Role of the Arab League   Crucially, the resolution was preceded by a call from the League of Arab States for international action. Without this endorsement, Western intervention would have been politically untenable and therefore the Arab League’s support provided regional legitimacy, which helped persuade China and Russia to abstain, rather than veto. 6.3.3 NATO implementation   NATO assumed command of the intervention and authorised the use of force to protect civilians in Libya. This was the first time that the Council has ever authorised the invasion of a functioning state, but while the operation achieved its immediate objective, it later became controversial for contributing to state collapse in Libya. 6.3.4 Lessons   The case illustrates two points. Firstly, regional organisations like the Arab League are pivotal in conferring legitimacy to UNSC action. Secondly, NATO’s operational capacity made implementation possible. Yet, neither body had a permanent seat at the Council table and so many argue that their formal representation could have improved deliberation and accountability. 6.4 ASEAN and Myanmar: Regional diplomacy under strain   6.4.1 Background   Myanmar’s crises, from the 1988 crackdown to the Rohingya exodus and the 2021 military coup, have repeatedly tested the Council’s resolve, where vetoes by China and Russia have blocked robust UNSC action, which frustrated Western states and human rights advocates.   6.4.2 ASEAN’s role   ASEAN, despite its principle of non-interference, has, however, played a modest role in mediation. In 2021, it adopted a “Five-Point Consensus” (5PC) on Myanmar, calling for dialogue, cessation of violence and humanitarian aid. The gist of the 5PC consisted of (i) an immediate cessation of violence, (ii) constructive dialogue to seek a peaceful solution, (iii) a Special Envoy of ASEAN to facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, (iv) ASEAN would provide humanitarian assistance and (v) a Special Envoy to visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned (Tene, 2024) While implementation has been weak, ASEAN’s involvement highlights its status as the only body with regional legitimacy. 6.4.3 Lessons   A permanent ASEAN or Asia-Pacific seat would ensure that regional perspectives are institutionalised in Council deliberations. While ASEAN’s capacity is limited, its legitimacy as a convener is significant and thus formal representation would also force ASEAN to assume greater responsibility, which could potentially strengthening its role. 6.5 ECOWAS and West African interventions   6.5.1 Liberia and Sierra Leone   In the 1990s, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed forces (ECOMOG) to intervene in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This was of course long before the UN acted decisively, but the UNSC did eventually endorsed these missions, which therefore retrospectively recognised ECOWAS as a key regional security provider (Shiro, 2024). 6.5.2 Recent coups   More recently, ECOWAS has been central in responding to military coups in Mali, Guinea and Niger. While criticised for inconsistencies, it remains the most active regional organisation in Africa in enforcing democratic norms. 6.5.3 Lessons   ECOWAS demonstrates the potential for sub-regional organisations to act as first responders, with the UNSC providing legal cover. A permanent AU seat could channel and coordinate such efforts at the global level. 6.6 Synthesis of case studies   These cases reveal common patterns:   Regional organisations provide operational capacity (AU in Somalia, NATO in Libya). Their participation confers political legitimacy (Arab League in Libya, ASEAN in Myanmar). They often act as the first responders (ECOWAS in Liberia, AU in Burundi). The UNSC relies on them and yet, it does not formally include them.   This asymmetry, that is reliance without representation, undermines legitimacy. By institutionalising regional seats, the Council would acknowledge the reality that peace and security are today co-produced by global and regional institutions. 6.7 Critiques of regional involvement   It is important to acknowledge criticisms. Regional organisations are not always impartial. The AU has been accused of shielding sitting governments from criticism, for example Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir. ASEAN has been criticised for inaction on Myanmar and NATO’s Libya operation was accused of overreach in that it moved from civilian protection to regime change.   These flaws underscore the need for accountability mechanisms. Regional seats must not become platforms for regional hegemonies, they should instead, operate under clear rules of impartiality, transparency and reporting to the GA. 6.8 Implications for Security Council reform   The case studies demonstrate both the indispensability and the imperfection of regional organisations. They already act as partners, implementers and legitimisers of Council mandates and so giving them formal seats would:   Align form with function, because it codifies existing practice. Enhance legitimacy, in that it broadens participation in decisions that directly affect the particular regions. Improve coordination, in that it links Council mandates to regional enforcement capacities. It incentivise responsibility by pushing regional organisations to invest more in peace and security. The risks of partiality and inefficiency can be managed through legal safeguards and GA oversight and thus, on balance, the benefits outweigh the drawbacks, which makes regional representation a compelling pathway for reform. 7 POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF REGIONAL UNION REPRESENTATION   7.1 The P5: Guardians of privilege   The five permanent members (P5), being China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are the ultimate gatekeepers of Security Council reform and under Article 108 of the Charter, no amendment can enter into force without their ratification. Their interests are not identical, but they share a common reluctance to dilute their privileged status. 7.1.1 United States   The US has historically been ambivalent about Council reform. Washington has expressed rhetorical support for “modest expansion,” including Japan and India as potential permanents, but has consistently avoided firm commitments (Weiss and Daws 2018, 237), but the US would likely view regional representation with cautious pragmatism. Because on one hand, it would preserve US veto power and avoid empowering rivals like Brazil or Germany and on the other hand, it could introduce new actors, such as the AU or Arab League, that might be more critical of US foreign policy positions, particularly on Israel-Palestine or Middle East interventions. Overall, however, Washington might tolerate regional seats, so long as they lack veto power. 7.1.2 United Kingdom and France   The UK and France, as European powers, face unique legitimacy challenges. Their permanent seats are increasingly questioned, because many question why two medium-sized European states should retain veto power, while Africa and Latin America have none? Both have endorsed G-4 expansion as a way to bolster legitimacy without surrendering their own seats.   For them, an EU seat would be politically complex. While France has often championed EU external action, it would resist any arrangement that replaced its own permanent seat. The UK, particularly post-Brexit, would resist EU institutional privilege and yet, both might support regional representation in principle if it did not displace their seats. And they would likely view AU and Arab League seats positively, as these could broaden legitimacy, without threatening European prerogatives. 7.1.3 Russia   Russia has consistently opposed most reform proposals. Its primary concern is preserving veto power and preventing dilution of its influence. Moscow has been sceptical of G-4 expansion, particularly Japan and Germany, and lukewarm on African permanents. Russia may prefer regional seats, because they avoid empowering specific rivals and could dilute Western influence. However, Moscow would scrutinize the AU or EU seats for signs of Western dominance.   7.1.4 China   China is perhaps the most interesting case. Beijing strongly opposes Japan’s candidacy for a permanent seat and is wary of India’s rise. It has therefore  consistently blocked G-4 expansion. Regional union representation might appeal to China as a way to avoid state-based rivals. Beijing has cultivated strong ties with the AU and ASEAN, both of which it could influence, however, China would resist any EU seat that amplified Western voices. It might support AU and ASEAN seats and remain ambivalent on others. 7.1.5 Overall P5 outlook   In sum, the P5 would likely resist any reform that expands veto power, but they may view regional seats as a lesser evil compared to state-based permanents and since the proposal preserves their own privileges, it has a better chance of overcoming P5 resistance than the G-4 or Ezulwini demands. 7.2 Africa: Between Ezulwini and pragmatism   Africa is the most underrepresented continent on the Council. The Ezulwini Consensus (2005) demands two permanent seats with veto and two non-permanent seats. This maximalist stance reflects Africa’s exclusion since 1945, however, internal rivalries among Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt prevent agreement on which states should occupy permanent seats.   An AU seat could be framed as complementary, not substitutive, to Ezulwini. It would give Africa a permanent institutional voice without forcing states to compete. Smaller African states might prefer AU representation, fearing domination by Nigeria or South Africa. The challenge will be to persuade the AU to view this as a step forward, rather than a dilution of Ezulwini. Framing matters and therefore it should be presented as a pragmatic phase one reform, with state-based permanents to be revisited later. 7.3 Asia-Pacific: Diversity and division   Asia-Pacific is the most divided region. Aspirant powers include India, Japan, Indonesia and Australia. Rivalries, India and Pakistan, Japan and China, India and China, have paralysed consensus. ASEAN has tried to articulate a collective voice, but its consensus model has limited effectiveness.   A regional Asia-Pacific seat would sidestep these rivalries. However, the question of which body  represents the region is contentious: ASEAN? SAARC? A newly created Asia-Pacific Union? Without clarity, implementation would be difficult. Still, some states may prefer a rotating regional seat to seeing rivals elevated. China, as noted, would be comfortable with an ASEAN-focused seat it can influence. India and Japan may resist, fearing it blocks their aspirations for state-based permanents. 7.4 Latin America and the Caribbean   Latin America has long advocated for greater representation, but has been divided between Brazil’s G-4 ambitions and the opposition of Mexico and Argentina. Regional institutions are fragmented; the OAS includes the US and Canada, while CELAC excludes them.   A Latin American and Caribbean seat could be filled by CELAC, which claims to represent the region’s identity. This would allow inclusion without privileging Brazil or Mexico, however, the US would likely resist CELAC representation, preferring OAS. And so to reconcile these institutional rivalries will be essential. 7.5 The Arab World and Middle East   The Arab League has proven pivotal in shaping UNSC action, particularly in Libya (2011). Arab states argue they are disproportionately affected by UNSC decisions, yet  they lack permanent representation and so an Arab League seat would institutionalise their voice. However, divisions among Arab states, for example, Gulf vs. Levant vs. North Africa, could weaken effectiveness, as does the overlapping of some with AU membership, because of the questions of double representation that may be raised. Still, Arab states would likely support such a seat as recognition of their collective role. 7.6 Europe: Between status quo and EU ambitions   Europe already enjoys disproportionate representation with two P5 seats, namely the UK and France, and the frequent rotation of Germany, Italy and others. An EU seat could rationalise this, but only if it supplements, rather than replaces national seats. France might frame it as an addition, but the UK would resist. Germany would support an EU seat, but only if paired with its own permanent role.   Overall, Europe is unlikely to prioritise regional representation, because it already enjoys privileged access, but that said, an EU seat might be tolerable if it does not displace existing members. 7.7 Middle Powers and UFC States   The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group opposes new permanents and advocates longer-term elected seats. Regional representation could be a compromise, since it avoids creating new permanents, while strengthening regional voice. Italy, Pakistan, Mexico and others may cautiously support it as preferable to G-4 expansion. However, they may worry it entrenches certain organisations, for example the AU or EU, at their expense. 7.8 Civil society and academic voices   Civil society organisations have long criticised the Security Council as elitist and unrepresentative and many NGOs call for abolition or restriction of the veto, greater transparency and regional equity. And while it is true that regional representation does not address all their concerns, it would conceivably be welcomed as a step toward inclusivity. Scholars of global governance, for example Keohane, Hurd and Scholte, have increasingly emphasised the importance of regionalism. Academic opinion would likely support experimentation with regional seats as an innovative compromise.   7.9 Negotiation strategies   For the proposal to succeed, careful diplomacy will be required:   The proposal will have to be framed as complementary and not substitutive.  Regional seats may have to be presented as an interim step that does not foreclose eventual state-based permanents. It will have to appeal to P5 interests, stressing that the veto is untouched and that regional seats will not challenge their prerogatives. Engage the AU to present the proposal as consistent with Ezulwini’s spirit of redressing underrepresentation. Asia-Pacific divisions need to be bridged by, for example, exploring ASEAN-led representation as a pragmatic compromise. Latin America will have to be managed by seeking CELAC endorsement, while engaging OAS members in order to avoid US resistance. Create legal clarity by drafting precise amendment text so as to pre-empt sovereignty concerns. Follow an incremental approach by beginning with enhanced consultative roles under the current Chapter VIII, before pursuing full amendment. 7.10 Comparative feasibility   Compared to state-based permanent expansion, regional representation has notable advantages, in that:   It is a lower threat to the P5, since the Veto is preserved and no rival permanents are created. Regional rivalries are reduced in that it avoids zero-sum contests among aspirant states. It ensures broader inclusivity in that entire regions are represented, rather than selected states.   Challenges remain, particularly African insistence on state-based permanents and institutional fragmentation in Asia-Pacific and Latin America, but on balance, the proposal has greater political viability than G-4 or Ezulwini demands, which are effectively blocked. 7.11 Conclusion on feasibility   The political landscape for Security Council reform is notoriously hostile. Yet, if reform is to occur, it must be acceptable to the P5 and broadly tolerable to the wider membership. Regional union representation, while not universally popular, offers a pragmatic compromise, in that it broadens legitimacy without undermining P5 privileges, sidesteps regional rivalries and reflects the growing role of regional organisations in global governance.   The path will undoubtedly be arduous and it will require careful framing, phased implementation and legal innovation, but compared to the deadlocked alternatives, it stands as one of the few viable reform options.   8 IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP AND RISKS   The adoption of regional union representation in the Security Council requires more than abstract agreement. It demands a carefully sequenced political and legal strategy. Reform of the nature envisaged in this paper, will have to navigate the treacherous terrain of UN diplomacy, satisfy legal constraints under the Charter and mitigate risks of unintended consequences.   8.1 Phased implementation   8.1.1 Phase one: Procedural enhancement without Charter amendment   The first phase would rely on procedural innovation within existing Charter provisions. Under Articles 31 and 32, the Security Council may invite non-members, including organisations, to participate in discussions without a vote. This mechanism could be expanded to grant regional organisations permanent observer status at the Council.   For example:   The AU could be invited to all discussions on African matters. The EU could attend debates on European or global crises where it plays a role. ASEAN and the Arab League could be institutionalised as “standing invitees.”   This would not alter the Charter, but would normalise regional participation, building legitimacy and familiarity. 8.1.2 Phase two: General Assembly recognition of regional seats   The General Assembly could pass a resolution recognising five regional unions as designated consultative representatives to the Council. This would stop short of granting votes, but would formalise the role of regional organisations in Council deliberations, for which GA Resolution 65/276 (UN, 2011), which gave the EU enhanced rights, provides precedent. 8.1.3 Phase three: Charter amendment for full membership   Once procedural practices are established, a formal amendment under Article 108 could be pursued, which would:   Expand Council membership to 20. Create five “regional seats” allocated to designated unions. Define their voting rights (no veto, equal to elected members). Establish conflict-of-interest abstention rules.   Gradualism increases political feasibility, since it builds habits of cooperation, before demanding legal change.   8.2 Diplomatic strategy   8.2.1 Coalition building   A successful reform campaign would require a coalition capable of cutting across traditional divides:   African states will have to be persuaded that AU representation complements Ezulwini. UFC states will have to be reassured that regional seats will avoid new permanents. Small states need to be convinced that regional voices enhances inclusivity. And the P5 need to be reassured that the veto power remains untouched. In order to break the current stalemate, the coalition should be framed as a “third way” between the G-4 and Ezulwini maximalism. 8.2.2 Sequencing negotiations   In order to ensure transparency and buy-in, negotiations should begin in the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) framework, and once consensus emerges, a draft resolution can be tabled in the General Assembly, to be followed by a Charter amendment process. 8.2.3 Engaging civil society   Civil society advocacy networks, for example, the Campaign to Stop Veto Abuse and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, could be mobilised to frame reform as a matter of legitimacy and human rights, because public pressure can help overcome diplomatic inertia. 8.3 Risks and mitigation   8.3.1 Risk of paralysis   Expanding the Council to 20 may risk slower decision-making and so to mitigate this, working methods must be streamlined through:   Expanding the use of informal consultations. Clearer agenda-setting powers for the presidency. Digital voting mechanisms to expedite procedures. 8.3.2 Risk of regional fragmentation   Some regions have multiple organisations, for example OAS vs. CELAC. Disputes over which body qualifies could paralyse reform. The GA should establish criteria, such as universality, institutional capacity and representativeness. 8.3.3 Risk of regional hegemony   Powerful states within regions, for example, Nigeria, Brazil and India, may dominate their union’s seat and therefore safeguards, such as rotational representation and GA oversight of procedures, need to be considered. 8.3.4 Risk of P5 rejection   The greatest risk remains P5 refusal to ratify and so to mitigate then risk, reform must be framed as preserving their prerogatives, while enhancing legitimacy. And thus, emphasising that veto power remains untouched, is critical. 8.4 Long-Term implications   If the proposal were to succeed, regional representation would:   Institutionalise nested governance and therefore make UNSC decisions more legitimate. Encourage regional responsibility and compelling unions to invest in security. Create a dynamic precedent for adapting the UN to evolving global realities. Far from being radical, the reform would fulfil the spirit of Chapter VIII, bringing the UN closer to its founding vision of cooperative security.   REFERENCES   African Union (AU). 2005. Ezulwini Consensus: The Common African Position on UN Reform: “The Ezulweni Consensus”.  Adopted in Swaziland. [Online] Available at: http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Calendar_of_%20Events/7th%20extra%20ordinary%20session%20ECL/Ext%20EXCL2%20VII%20Report.pdf [accessed: 15 September 2025]   Annan, K. 2004. 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The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations  (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press     ANNEXURE A   DRAFT AMENDMENT TEXT   Article 23 (Revised)   The Security Council shall consist of five permanent members, ten elected members of the United Nations, and five regional union members designated in accordance with Article 23 bis.   The General Assembly shall elect the ten non-permanent members of the United Nations for a term of two years, in accordance with equitable geographical distribution. Regional union members shall be designated by their respective unions in accordance with Article 23 bis.   Article 23 bis (New)   The General Assembly shall, by resolution adopted by a two-thirds majority, designate regional unions entitled to hold seats on the Security Council.   A regional union shall be an intergovernmental organisation composed of sovereign states within a defined geographical region, recognised as representative by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly.   Each regional union shall establish internal procedures for selecting its representative. Regional union members shall have the same rights and obligations as elected members, except that they shall not exercise the veto under Article 27.   Where a dispute directly involves a regional union or one of its member states, the representative shall abstain from voting in accordance with Article 27(3).     Article 27 (Revised Excerpts)   Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of twelve members   Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of twelve members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members.     ANNEXURE B    DRAFT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION   United Nations A/RES/XX/XXX General Assembly Reform of the Security Council: Regional Union Representation   The General Assembly,   Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,   Reaffirming the central role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security,   Recognising the essential contributions of regional organisations in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction,   Acknowledging the long-standing demand for equitable representation of all regions in the Security Council,   Mindful that reform requires broad political consensus and the ratification of amendments under Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter,   Decides in principle that the Security Council shall be expanded to include, in addition to its five permanent members and ten elected members, five regional union members designated under Article 23 bis;   Requests the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council reform to incorporate this proposal into its framework;   Adopts the amendments to Articles 23 and 27 of the Charter, as set out in Annex I, subject to ratification by Member States in accordance with Article 108;   Invites regional organisations to begin consultations on procedures for representation;   Requests the Secretary-General to provide legal and technical support to Member States;   Decides to remain seized of the matter.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Journal for Inclusive Public Policy  (JIPP), an official publication of the Inclusive Society Institute, is pleased to invite submissions for Volume 6, Issue 1 , themed:   G20 and the Global South   Submission Deadline:  31 October 2025 The G20 brings together the world’s largest economies (19 countries plus the European Union and the African Union), representing 85% of global GDP, more than 75% of international trade, and two-thirds of the world’s population. While these nations wield immense influence over the global economic order, profound inequalities persist.   The Global South continues to grapple with structural backlogs in infrastructure, poverty reduction, unemployment, sustainable growth, and environmental resilience.   From 1 December 2024 to November 2025, South Africa holds the G20 Presidency, under the theme: Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability .   This issue of JIPP invites submissions that critically engage with the role of the G20 in reshaping international governance to create a more just and equitable world. Contributions should consider how global economic and political structures might be reimagined to empower developing countries to meet their development and sustainability goals.   Suggested Areas of Focus   Authors may align their article with the following Task Force Sub-themes:   Trade & Investment ·         Reforming the multilateral trading system ·         Inclusive investment for sustainable industrialization ·         Value and supply chains for sustainable, inclusive growth   Digital Transformation ·         Connectivity ·         E-government and Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) ·         Regulation of emerging technologies   Financing for Sustainable Development ·         Reforming the IMF and Multilateral Development Banks ·         Debt and development ·         International taxation cooperation Solidarity for Achieving the SDGs ·         Accelerating SDG enablers, reducing negative spillovers ·         Reducing inequalities ·         Food security through sustainable food systems   Climate Action and the Just Energy Transition ·         Equitable mineral value chains ·         Scaling adaptation finance ·         Supporting inclusive Just Energy Transitions ·         Biodiversity–Climate–Environment nexus   Submission Guidelines ·         Language:  English ·         Length:  5,000 – 8,000 words (excluding references and abstract) ·         Abstract:  Up to 250 words ·         Formatting:  Arial, 12pt, 1.5 spacing, justified ·         Referencing:  Harvard style (in-text and reference list) ·         Peer review:  Articles will undergo review by two moderators. ·         Remuneration:  The journal does not provide payment. Contributions are altruistic, with the aim of influencing public policy discourse. ·         Publication:  Electronic   Important Dates ·         Submission deadline:  31 October 2025 ·         Author notification:  11 November 2025 ·         Revised papers due:  09 December 2025   About the Journal for Inclusive Public Policy (JIPP) The Journal for Inclusive Public Policy  is an official publication of the Inclusive Society Institute, committed to advancing a non-racial, non-sexist, socially just, and cohesive society grounded in democratic values.   JIPP publishes peer-reviewed theoretical, empirical, and analytical articles in the fields of Public Policy, Administration, Development, Governance, Political Science, Ethics, and related interdisciplinary areas. While the journal’s focus is South Africa and Africa, it welcomes international contributions with direct relevance to issues facing the continent.   ·         Frequency:  Twice per year   Submission & Queries Please submit manuscripts and direct queries to: jipp@inclusivesociety.org.za   Contribute to shaping the global policy discourse. Submit your article and help reimagine the role of the G20 in building a fairer, more inclusive world.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 31 July 2025 which have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   October 2025   Rapporteur: Odile Bulten Editor: Daryl Swanepoel CONTENTS   1 SETTING THE SCENE 2 RETHINKING AND REFRAMING AFRICA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES - PRESENTED BY DR EDDY MANDIKWAZA 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Conceptualising security in Africa 2.2.1 The securitisation paradigm 2.2.2 Violent extremism and the expansion of terrorism 2.2.3 Shifting global security partnerships 2.2.4 Governance and political instability 2.2.5 Humanitarian consequences of conflict 2.2.6 Maritime insecurity and illicit trade 2.2.7 Environmental degradation and climate change 2.2.8 Demographic pressures and the youth bulge 2.2.9 Geopolitical exploitation and sovereignty 2.3 Strategic recommendations 2.4 Conclusion 3 DELIBERATIONS ON AFRICA’S SECURITY, MILITARY, AND PEACEKEEPING 3.1 Weakening of continental security and peace mechanisms 3.2 Militarisation and the retreat of multilateral peacekeeping 3.3 Civil-military dysfunction and securitisation of dissent 3.4 Foreign military influence and the commodification of security 3.5 Maritime insecurity and transnational threats 3.6 Military underdevelopment and technological disparities 3.7 Proposals for reform and strategic autonomy 3.8 Conclusion: From fragility to transformation 4 INSIGHTS FROM THE DISCUSSION 4.1 Key conclusions 4.1.1 Escalating security threats 4.1.2 Weak peacekeeping frameworks 4.1.3 External Dependence 4.1.4 Governance and political instability 4.1.5 Humanitarian crises 5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND ROADMAP 1 SETTING THE SCENE   The July 2025 session of the Africa Think-tank Dialogue (ATD) Webinar Series was convened in response to a profound shift in the global security architecture and the increasingly precarious peace and stability landscape across the African continent. While the theme of the webinar encompassed broader development challenges, this report focuses exclusively on the military, security and peacekeeping dimensions that shaped the intellectual and policy imperatives behind the dialogue.   The urgency of the session was underscored by the growing proliferation of armed conflicts across Africa, the resurgence of military coups and the complex interplay of regional instability, violent extremism and weakened peacekeeping frameworks.   In recent years, Africa has witnessed the alarming spread of violent extremist networks beyond traditional hotspots, such as the Sahel, into coastal West Africa and parts of Southern and Central Africa. Simultaneously, several peace agreements, whether brokered through multilateral platforms or bilateral deals, have either collapsed or stalled, leaving populations vulnerable to renewed violence and displacement.   Compounding these threats is a broader geopolitical recalibration in which traditional international security actors have drawn down or redirected their engagement on the continent. The retreat of such actors has exposed long-standing fragilities within African peace and security institutions, highlighting the urgency of developing sustainable, indigenous frameworks for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and military readiness. From the Democratic Republic of Congo to the Horn of Africa, there is a growing recognition that reliance on external actors is not a viable long-term strategy.   The ATD webinar provided a timely opportunity for African think-tanks to interrogate the current state of peacekeeping, security operations and strategic responses across different regional theatres. The session aimed to contribute to the development of practical, African-led solutions that move beyond reactive crisis management and toward proactive peace and security frameworks.   The dialogue also served to reframe the discourse from externally imposed security paradigms to one rooted in African political realities, institutional constraints and the aspirations of its people.   By drawing on recent case studies, including fragile peace processes in the Great Lakes region, regional instability in the Sahel and cross-border security spillovers in the Horn, the session sought to chart a more coherent path forward.   Participants were called upon to examine both the operational and normative challenges of peacebuilding, ranging from the coordination gaps among regional bodies to the strategic incoherence of security interventions on the ground.   The webinar’s objective was not merely to describe Africa’s deteriorating security environment, but to provoke critical thinking and institutional introspection about how to reverse current trajectories. In doing so, it aimed to lay the groundwork for more resilient, contextually grounded approaches to continental peace and security, approaches that prioritise local agency, regional coordination and sustainable stability.   2 RETHINKING AND REFRAMING AFRICA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES - PRESENTED BY DR EDDY MANDIKWAZA   2.1 Introduction   Dr Eddy Mandikwaza delivered a compelling and in-depth presentation focused on rethinking and reframing Africa’s security challenges. His address was structured to provide a rigorous interrogation of how security is conceptualised and operationalised across the African continent.   Dr Mandikwaza emphasised that African states continue to grapple with deeply entrenched and emerging threats within a context of geopolitical shifts, institutional weaknesses and socio-economic vulnerabilities. His central thesis revolved around the dual nature of the security crisis in Africa: the persistence of existential threats such as violent extremism and political instability and the securitisation of socio-economic issues like poverty, inequality and governance grievances.   This report presents a comprehensive synthesis of Dr Mandikwaza’s insights and aims to elaborate on the underlying factors, manifestations and strategic imperatives of Africa’s contemporary security landscape. 2.2 Conceptualising security in Africa   The presentation commenced with a fundamental query: How should Africa define its security challenges? Dr Mandikwaza questioned the assumptions often taken for granted in academic and policy discourse, noting that "security" in Africa cannot be confined to conventional interpretations such as military strength or territorial sovereignty. Instead, he advocated for a multidimensional understanding of security that encompasses national, human, regional and informal dimensions.   National security involves the protection of the state against external and internal threats, while human security focuses on the well-being of individuals, ensuring access to healthcare, education, food security and personal freedoms. Regional and continental security reflect the interdependence of African states, particularly in the context of transnational threats like terrorism, piracy and illicit trade. Informal security structures, often developed in response to state failure, include community-led mechanisms to ensure local protection and conflict resolution. 2.2.1 The securitisation paradigm   Dr Mandikwaza highlighted the increasing relevance of the securitisation framework in analysing African security politics. Securitisation refers to the framing of certain issues as existential threats that require extraordinary measures, often involving military force. He emphasised that securitisation is frequently used by governments not to protect citizens, but to justify repressive actions against political opposition, civil society and marginalised communities. For instance, when citizens demand service delivery, transparency or economic justice, their concerns are often labelled as security threats.   This approach not only suppresses legitimate democratic engagement but also fuels resentment and radicalisation. In this regard, Dr Mandikwaza argued that many African states have inverted the logic of security by criminalising poverty and dissent while neglecting the systemic reforms needed to address the root causes of instability. 2.2.2 Violent extremism and the expansion of terrorism   A major concern raised in the presentation was the growing threat posed by violent extremism and terrorism. According to Dr Mandikwaza, Africa recorded the highest number of fatalities and attacks from terrorism in 2024, with the Sahel region bearing the brunt of the violence. However, the threat is no longer confined to traditionally volatile areas; it is expanding into regions like Southern Africa, which were previously considered stable.   He referenced developments in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo as indicative of this geographic spread. These extremist groups have become more sophisticated, employing technologies such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and drones, tools that many African militaries are ill-equipped to counter. This technological asymmetry places additional strain on already under-resourced national defence systems. 2.2.3 Shifting global security partnerships   Compounding the threat of extremism is the strategic withdrawal of foreign security actors, most notably the United States, which has begun to shift its Africa policy away from direct intervention. Dr Mandikwaza emphasised that this withdrawal exposes the continent’s lack of self-sufficiency in defence capabilities. Without robust military industries or strategic funding, many African countries are ill-prepared to confront the evolving security landscape.   He called attention to the chronic underfunding of critical sectors, noting that while African governments face myriad security challenges, there is insufficient investment in the institutions and infrastructure necessary to respond effectively. 2.2.4 Governance and political instability   Political instability and governance deficits were identified as equally pressing issues. Between 2019 and 2023, the continent witnessed 22 coups, 18 of which were successful. This trend marks a disturbing regression from democratic governance, reinforcing authoritarian practices and undermining electoral legitimacy. Dr Mandikwaza observed that this wave of coups is often met with public support, including from civil society organisations, reflecting a broader disillusionment with democratic processes that fail to deliver substantive change.   He argued that this phenomenon demands a re-evaluation of the role of civil society in promoting accountable governance, particularly when such institutions appear to legitimise military takeovers. 2.2.5 Humanitarian consequences of conflict   The consequences of these conflicts have been profound. Dr Mandikwaza cited data indicating that over 45 million people have been forcibly displaced across 15 African countries due to armed conflict. This represents a 14% increase in displacement between 2023 and 2024 alone. Most of the displaced populations are concentrated in East, Central and West Africa, as well as parts of the Sahel.   These humanitarian crises are unfolding at a time when global aid is in decline, further compounding the vulnerability of affected populations. Basic needs such as food, shelter, education and healthcare are frequently unmet, leaving millions in precarious conditions. The lack of international support also underscores the fragility of Africa’s humanitarian infrastructure and the urgent need for self-reliant mechanisms to address internal displacement. 2.2.6 Maritime insecurity and illicit trade   Maritime security was another domain of concern raised by Dr Mandikwaza. He explained that Africa’s maritime governance remains weak and underdeveloped, relying heavily on Western powers for policing and surveillance. The absence of robust maritime institutions has allowed for a proliferation of illegal fishing, piracy and smuggling. Dr Mandikwaza estimated that Africa loses approximately one billion USD annually to illegal and unregulated fishing, much of it perpetrated by European commercial fleets.   In addition to the economic toll, maritime insecurity facilitates the trafficking of arms, drugs and counterfeit goods, undermining both national security and public health. 2.2.7 Environmental degradation and climate change   Environmental crimes and climate-related risks were also discussed in detail. Illegal logging, unregulated mining and toxic waste dumping continue to deplete Africa’s natural resources and exacerbate ecological degradation. At the same time, climate change is rendering land less arable and contributing to resource-based conflicts.   In the Sahel, for example, rising temperatures and desertification are prompting mass migration, creating further pressure on already strained state resources. The consequences of climate change are not limited to agriculture but extend to humanitarian emergencies, including floods, droughts and the spread of disease.   Dr Mandikwaza warned that Africa’s failure to prepare for these eventualities would only deepen the continent’s security and development crises. 2.2.8 Demographic pressures and the youth bulge   He also discussed the demographic transformation underway in Africa. By 2050, one in every four people on the planet will be African, a sharp increase from one in eleven in the 1960s. This youth bulge presents both an opportunity and a challenge.   On one hand, a large working-age population could drive economic growth; on the other, high unemployment and inadequate education systems could fuel discontent and radicalisation. The continent’s inability to harness its demographic dividend threatens to destabilise fragile states and increase the appeal of extremist ideologies among disillusioned youth. 2.2.9 Geopolitical exploitation and sovereignty   Dr Mandikwaza was critical of the prevailing geopolitical dynamics that frame Africa’s engagement with the global community. He noted that security partnerships are increasingly transactional and extractive. Superpowers are providing military assistance not in the spirit of mutual development, but as leverage for access to strategic minerals and natural resources.   He pointed to the Democratic Republic of Congo as a case where peace agreements were negotiated on the basis of resource exchange rather than genuine conflict resolution.   Similarly, China’s growing presence on the continent was critiqued for emphasising regime protection over democratic accountability. These dynamics, he argued, reinforce neocolonial patterns and undermine African sovereignty. 2.3 Strategic recommendations   In the final section of his presentation, Dr Mandikwaza offered several recommendations.   First, African leaders must confront the reality of their governance failures. Acknowledging the internal causes of insecurity is a prerequisite for meaningful reform. He called for institutional reform aimed at democratic consolidation, transparency and the rule of law. Enhancing citizen participation and rebuilding trust between states and societies were identified as essential components of long-term stability. Dr Mandikwaza stressed the importance of technological investment to improve service delivery and governance efficiency. He also advocated for enhanced domestic resource mobilisation to reduce reliance on foreign aid. Anti-corruption mechanisms should be strengthened at both national and regional levels to close the accountability gap. He underscored the need to revamp the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to ensure better coordination among the African Union, regional economic communities and mediation platforms.   Drawing on the example of the DRC-Rwanda conflict, he noted that external actors, such as Qatar and the United States have been more effective at brokering peace than African institutions, a situation he described as unacceptable.   2.4 Conclusion   In conclusion, Dr Mandikwaza emphasised the dual nature of Africa’s security dilemma: the presence of immediate threats such as violent extremism, and the longer-term implications of misgovernance, inequality and environmental degradation.   He warned against the overreliance on militarised responses and urged a shift toward holistic strategies that integrate governance, development and human security. The future of African peace and stability, he argued, depends not on external actors, but on the continent’s ability to reform from within, harness its resources and respond to the needs and aspirations of its people. 3 DELIBERATIONS ON AFRICA’S SECURITY, MILITARY, AND PEACEKEEPING    During the deliberation phase of the seminar, the discussion pivoted from formal presentations to a more dynamic and multi-perspective interrogation of Africa’s contemporary security dilemmas. Moving beyond theoretical frameworks, participants shared deeply contextual insights and grounded assessments of the realities on the continent, with a strong emphasis on the military fragility of African states, the declining effectiveness of peacekeeping structures and the troubling implications of shifting global security paradigms.   This chapter synthesises those deliberations with particular attention to the thematic threads of institutional weakness, geopolitical manipulation, civil-military relations and proposals for reform.   The dialogue revealed a shared understanding that Africa stands at a precarious crossroads: while it is endowed with immense resources, a youthful population and transformative potential, it is equally beset by compounding crises. These include escalating violent extremism, recurrent civil conflict, state fragility, illicit foreign interventions and a troubling erosion of both democratic norms and public trust. The security situation is no longer isolated to conflict zones but permeates broader systems of governance and state legitimacy, implicating both internal and external actors.   3.1 Weakening of continental security and peace mechanisms   A recurring concern was the gradual degradation of Africa’s multilateral security mechanisms, notably the African Union’s Peace and Security Council and its associated peacekeeping capabilities. Several participants argued that the AU, once envisioned as a pillar for pan-African solidarity and continental peace enforcement, has struggled to effectively mediate or de-escalate contemporary conflicts. The issue is not merely one of ambition, but of capacity, coherence, and political will.   On participant offered a pointed critique of the AU’s diminishing ability to act decisively, especially in crises such as South Sudan, Sudan and the DRC. He expressed frustration that mediation in these conflicts has increasingly been outsourced to external actors like Qatar and the United States, even in cases where African regional bodies were already present and ostensibly active. The failure of mechanisms such as the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes to harmonise efforts, particularly in the DRC-Rwanda conflict, illustrated a fragmentation in Africa’s approach to conflict resolution.   This reflects not only structural weaknesses in AU architecture, but also a lack of internal unity among member states, who often pursue their own geopolitical or economic interests at the expense of coordinated continental strategies. As one participant put it: the assertion that Africa must learn to “confront the giants” together, not individually, underscored a call for unity as a foundation for more effective peacebuilding.   3.2 Militarisation and the retreat of multilateral peacekeeping   Beyond the institutional challenges, participants expressed deep concern over the increasing reliance on military force, often externally supplied or inspired, to address fundamentally political and social problems. Dr Eddy Mandikwaza detailed how the UN Security Council, historically central to peacekeeping operations in Africa, has become increasingly dysfunctional, with missions being scaled back or terminated even as conflicts intensify. This has left a vacuum, one now being filled by bilateral security arrangements, private military contractors and transactional geopolitical deals.   He explained that many external security partnerships are now shaped not by humanitarian or peacebuilding imperatives, but by access to strategic resources, regime protection and geopolitical influence. For instance, in countries like the Central African Republic or parts of the Sahel, private military companies have become prominent actors, sometimes operating independently of or even contrary to the interests of the national population. Their presence has further complicated the landscape, reducing transparency, undermining sovereignty and creating new dependency traps.   Several speakers highlighted the importance of the Kigali Financing Decision, adopted in 2016, which aimed to increase African self-reliance in funding AU peace operations. While visionary, the implementation has been weak, hindered by both external resistance (especially from Western trading partners who oppose the associated import levies) and internal political resistance from AU member states reluctant to cede fiscal autonomy or prioritise AU dues. 3.3 Civil-military dysfunction and securitisation of dissent   The seminar also delved deeply into the disturbing pattern of African governments responding to social and economic grievances with securitised repression, rather than dialogue or reform. Regimes, when faced with demands for transparency, accountability or economic justice, frame these calls as national security threats. This leads to violent suppression of protests, censorship of civil society and the criminalisation of dissenting political voices.   Participants raised the alarm over the narrowing civic space across much of the continent. The weakening of civil society’s ability to operate freely, often through new legislation or surveillance, was interpreted as a symptom of broader democratic regression. Future studies, it was suggested, should investigate just how constrained civil society has become and how these constraints correlate with security and conflict outcomes.   The implication of this dynamic is stark: as avenues for peaceful expression and engagement are closed off, aggrieved populations increasingly turn to violence, radicalism or migration. In this context, violent extremism is not merely a product of ideology, but a consequence of unaddressed injustice, systemic exclusion and the absence of legitimate political recourse. 3.4 Foreign military influence and the commodification of security   An extensive portion of the discussion was dedicated to exploring the growing influence of external military powers in Africa and the commodification of security partnerships. Both Western and Eastern powers were implicated, albeit in different ways. Western countries were critiqued for their inconsistent engagement, offering aid or arms only when politically expedient and for abandoning multilateralism in favour of transactional bilateralism.   An example from Nigeria was provided, where during the early 2010s the US refused to sell military equipment for counterterrorism, citing human rights concerns. Yet later, with a change in administration, the same countries provided military aid, highlighting how strategic interests often override principled policy. In response, Nigeria and others turned to Russia and China, illustrating how Africa is increasingly navigating a geopolitical marketplace for security, one that reinforces dependency without building sustainable defence capacity.   This phenomenon was labelled as "security in exchange for resources", noting with concern how African governments are now signing security pacts that allow foreign actors access to minerals, ports and infrastructure in return for protection, whether from rebels, rival factions or even their own citizens.   3.5 Maritime insecurity and transnational threats   Maritime insecurity, often overlooked in land-centric security discussions, was also a major topic of deliberation. The continent’s vast and largely unprotected coastlines are vulnerable to illegal fishing, piracy, human trafficking, arms smuggling and environmental crimes. It was pointed out that there was a $1 billion annual loss due to illegal fishing alone, much of it perpetrated by European and Asian fleets operating with impunity in African waters.   Participants stressed that the absence of coherent maritime enforcement structures, either at national or regional levels, has allowed criminal networks and foreign exploiters to thrive. The African Union’s maritime security framework remains poorly operationalised and coordination among coastal states is weak. This undermines not only economic development, but also internal stability, as maritime insecurity contributes to food shortages, coastal poverty and increased migration. 3.6 Military underdevelopment and technological disparities   The seminar also explored the technological and logistical inferiority of African military institutions in confronting 21st-century threats. It was emphasised that militant groups have become increasingly sophisticated, using drones, encrypted communications and advanced improvised explosive devices (IEDs), while many African militaries still lack basic surveillance or mobility equipment.   This disparity has emboldened armed non-state actors and undermined state authority in several conflict zones. Coupled with underfunding, political interference in military affairs and poor civil-military relations, this creates an environment in which state armed forces are seen not as protectors of the public, but as enforcers of regime survival. 3.7 Proposals for reform and strategic autonomy   Several concrete proposals emerged from the discussion, focusing on long-term reform and the establishment of strategic autonomy for African states in the realm of peace and security. Among the most significant proposals were:   Full implementation of the AU Peace Fund, including dedicated resources for early warning systems, mediation and rapid deployment forces; Investment in indigenous defence industries to reduce dependency on foreign arms suppliers; Electoral reform and term limits to prevent coups and political violence driven by unconstitutional power grabs; Strengthening of civil society and civic freedoms to allow for peaceful redress of grievances; Improved coordination among RECs and the AU to streamline conflict resolution mechanisms and avoid redundancy; and Harnessing Africa’s natural resources not through extraction-for-security arrangements, but through value-added trade that funds public goods and security reform.   The importance of redefining security through a human-centred lens, where the goal is not merely to control populations, but to empower and protect them, was emphasised. He called for A new African security doctrine that prioritises inclusion, justice, dignity and development alongside territorial integrity was called for. 3.8 Conclusion: From fragility to transformation   The deliberations underscored a critical juncture in Africa’s history. The continent faces a matrix of interlinked threats, ranging from violent extremism and coups to maritime crime and climate-induced migration, within a global system that is increasingly inward-looking and transactional. Yet within this crisis lies an opportunity: to rethink and rebuild African security from the ground up, grounded in sovereignty, solidarity and strategic foresight.   The discussions did not downplay the severity of the challenges, but neither did they succumb to fatalism. Instead, there was a resounding call for African ownership, of its peace, its prosperity and its narrative. Only through unity, reform and a break from dependency can Africa chart a sustainable course toward durable peace and collective security. 4 INSIGHTS FROM THE DISCUSSION   Africa’s Agenda 2063 is clear in its aspiration to have durable peace, inclusive development, security and stability, but the dominant narrative around African security often centres on terrorism, armed conflict and transnational organised crimes. Furthermore, securitisation redirects development aid to military budgets, sidelines governance reforms, curtails civil liberties, tolerates corruption, criminalises dissent and obscures developmental failures, undermining long-term peace-building and democratic institutions.   Drawing from an in-depth discussion and security data analysis, this report presents a comprehensive overview of the complexities and drivers of Africa’s security dilemmas, such as s hifting geopolitics with rising Eastern influence and declining Western roles that create transactional security dynamics, weaken the rule of law and democratic consolidation.  The dialogue aimed to propose a way forward and institutional responses to develop practical and African-led solutions that move beyond reactive crisis management and towards proactive peace and security frameworks.   4.1 Key conclusions   4.1.1 Escalating security threats    Africa faces a dual security crisis with persistent threats, such as violent extremism and political instability, and the securitisation of socio-economic issues, such as poverty and inequality. There are also maritime security issues, including illegal fishing and drug trafficking, which threatens food security and African economies.   4.1.2 Weak peacekeeping frameworks   It is important to note that the African Union's Peace and Security Council and its associated peacekeeping capabilities are struggling to effectively mediate or de-escalate contemporary conflicts.   4.1.3 External Dependence   The strategic withdrawal of foreign security actors, such as the US has exposed the continent’s lack of self-sufficiency in defence capabilities.   4.1.4 Governance and political instability   The continent has witnessed a disturbing regression from democratic governance, with numerous coups undermining electoral legitimacy and exacerbating insecurity. 4.1.5 Humanitarian crises   Conflicts have led to significant displacement and humanitarian crises, exacerbated by declining global aid and the impact of climate change on security is also undeniable, all of which underscores the need for Africa to strengthen its own security mechanisms.   5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND ROADMAP Africa faces both real security threats and a securitisation dilemma, where military and suppressive responses neglect root causes, such as poverty and exclusion. Moreover, heavy-handed tactics erode democracy and civic freedoms, which necessitates holistic, people-centred strategies to address the internal and external drivers for sustainable peace. The actionable recommendations contained herein offer pragmatic steps to overcome the continent’s structural factors that is shaping its security challenges. The proposed Roadmap  calls for an integrated approach to security that aims to build a sustainable and resilient peace and security framework for Africa that is grounded in local agency, regional coordination, long-term peace-building and sustainable stability.   Institutional reform and anti-corruption mechanisms require African leaders to confront governance failures and implement institutional reforms that are aimed at democratic consolidation, transparency and the rule of law. Moreover, addressing competency and governance challenges requires acknowledging realities, ending colonial stereotypes, tackling economic failures and strengthening mechanisms at national and regional levels to counter corruption, state capture and electoral disputes. Investment in technology is paramount as Africa faces high fatalities from terrorism, especially in the Sahel, with expanding militant groups using advanced technology, and thus the harnessing of technology leverage will foster improved service delivery and governance efficiency in confronting it. Revamp the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to ensure better coordination among the African Union, Regional Economic Communities, the UN Security Council for peace support operations and mediation platforms, because the strengthening of strategic partnerships with geopolitical powers will ensure Africa’s ownership over its own its security mechanisms. A human-centred security lens must be applied to redefine security, by prioritising inclusion, justice, dignity and development. Civil society engagement is crucial to safeguard its space and freedom to foster better state-society relationships and for them to contribute to development and security governance. ROADMAP   1. Short-term (1-2 years):   Implement immediate institutional reforms to enhance transparency and the rule of law. Strengthen anti-corruption mechanisms and ensure accountability at all levels. Invest in technology to improve governance efficiency and service delivery.   2. Medium-term (3-5 years):   Revamp the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to ensure better coordination among the African Union, Regional Economic Communities, the UN Security Council and other mediation platforms. Develop indigenous defence industries to reduce dependency on foreign arms suppliers. Enhance domestic resource mobilisation to reduce reliance on foreign aid. 3. Longer-term (5+ years):   Foster a new African security doctrine that prioritises inclusion, justice, dignity and development alongside territorial integrity. Strengthen civil society and civic freedoms to allow for peaceful redress of grievances. Harness Africa’s natural resources through value-added trade that funds public goods and security reform.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   August 2025   Rapporteur: Daryl Swanepoel    CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 REFORM UN80: EFFICIENCY MEASURES OR POLITICAL RENEWAL? 1.1 The limits of technocratic reform 1.2 Fidelity to the Charter narrative 1.3 Leadership and the Global South 2 BUDGETARY CHALLENGES: BETWEEN SURVIVAL AND STRATEGIC FOCUS 2.1 The political nature of the budget crisis 2.2 The mandate trap and budget strain 2.3 Doing less, better 2.4 Reform proposals: Accountability and sustainability 2.5 The risk of collapse 2.6 Conclusion 3 UNILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND THE RISE OF REGIONALISM 3.1 The appeal and the limits of transactional unilateralism 3.2 Multilateralism under pressure 3.3 Regionalism: Substitute or complement? 3.4 The leadership vacuum 3.5 Reclaiming multilateralism 3.6 Conclusion 4 US - CHINA RIVALRY, SECURITY COUNCIL PARALYSIS AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 4.1 The dysfunction of the Security Council 4.2 Competing models of reform 4.3 Shifting influence of the United States and China 4.4 Implications for the Global South 4.5 Africa’s strategic role 4.6 Multipolarity and the Charter narrative 4.7 Conclusion 5 LEADERSHIP, ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE AND THE HUMAN FACTOR IN UN REFORM 5.1 Politicisation of senior appointments 5.2 A culture of risk aversion 5.3 Engineers, not only diplomats 5.4 Recruitment, talent and morale 5.5 Accountability and trust 5.6 Conclusion 6 IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA 6.1 Africa as the testing ground for UN relevance 6.2 Security Council reform and Africa’s stake 6.3 Complementarity with the African Union 6.4 Financing reform and Africa’s leverage 6.5 South Africa’s role 6.6 Risks of passivity 6.7 Conclusion 7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7.1 Recommendations 7.2 Final reflection ANNEXURE 1 ANNEXURE 2 ANNEXURE 3 ANNEXURE 4 Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:2153311089 INTRODUCTION In 2025, the United Nations (UN) marks its 80th year of existence and while for it has remained the central institution for fostering international peace, development and cooperation, now, as the global order undergoes profound shifts, the challenges confronting the UN system have grown more complex and urgent. Recognising the need for renewal, the UN Secretary-General launched the UN80 reform initiative, which is aimed at bringing about necessary reform to transition the organisation into one that is fit for purpose in the decades ahead.   As part of these deliberations, the Inclusive Society Institute has sought to deepen its understanding and develop its position on what comprehensive reform of the UN system should entail. To this end, the Institute convened a consultative webinar with a distinguished panel of experts, drawn primarily from former senior UN officials.   The discussion was guided by four questions. First, as the UN reaches its 80th anniversary and embarks on the UN80 reform agenda, what is the true aim of this initiative? Second, given the organisation’s persistent financial difficulties, which is being exacerbated by the withholding of funds by some member states, particularly the United States, alongside increasing demands for peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions, how can the UN realistically resolve its budget crisis? Third, how does the Secretary-General view the rising trend of unilateralism, which is in sharp contrast to the UN’s foundational and Charter commitment to multilateralism? And finally, in the context of the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China, who are both committed to expanding their global influence, what implications do their shifting roles, and sway, within the UN have for the broader institution and particularly for the Global South? 1 REFORM UN80: EFFICIENCY MEASURES OR POLITICAL RENEWAL?   The Secretary-General’s Reform UN80 initiative is framed as a necessary rationalisation exercise. It promises to streamline structures, consolidate offices and address the vast proliferation of mandates that have accumulated since 1945. According to internal estimates, the UN currently operates under more than 40,000 standing mandates, many of which are duplicative or obsolete. This “mandate trap” has become a drain on resources, since it obliges the Secretariat to produce thousands of reports annually with little political impact.   At a purely administrative level, Reform UN80 seeks to:   Cut across-the-board budgets by 20 percent. Relocate certain functions from high-cost centres such as New York and Geneva to lower-cost duty stations. Reduce the enormous reporting burden, freeing up staff for substantive work. Introduce a Mandate Implementation Review (MIR), which, if carried through, could retire obsolete resolutions and allow the UN to focus on current priorities.   These steps are not insignificant. They represent one of three main “tracks” of the reform, namely, efficiency measures, mandate review and structural changes. Together, these could address some of the organisation’s chronic inefficiencies. 1.1 The limits of technocratic reform   Yet, the consultation revealed broad scepticism about whether such measures alone can save the UN from decline. The critique aligns closely with other warnings that reform debates risk “putting the cart before the horse”. Administrative efficiencies, however desirable, cannot substitute for political renewal. Without addressing the UN’s legitimacy crisis, which is rooted in Security Council paralysis, politicised leadership and erosion of trust, technical reforms risk becoming little more than “housekeeping.”   This tension was summed up in the consultation as the difference between tidying the house and rebuilding its foundations. Reform UN80, if pursued only as a managerial exercise, risks repeating the pattern of previous reform cycles, which introduced efficiencies, but left underlying political dysfunction untouched. 1.2 Fidelity to the Charter narrative   What is missing, participants argued, is a compelling political narrative to accompany the reform. The reflection on the UN Charter emphasised that the institution’s legitimacy derives not from bureaucratic tidiness, but from fidelity to its founding ideals of peace, justice and collective security. Reform UN80 will be judged not by the number of reports eliminated or offices merged, but by whether it strengthens the UN’s ability to fulfil its Charter mandate in a 21st-century context. This requires more than efficiency. It requires political vision, linking reform to the UN’s core purpose of “freeing humanity from the scourge of war.” Without such a vision, the reform risks deepening cynicism within both member states and the Secretariat’s own staff.   1.3 Leadership and the Global South   Another concern is leadership. As pointed out, efficiency drives instil fear among staff when they are presented as across-the-board cuts rather than strategic choices. True reform requires leaders who can articulate priorities, protect the institution’s core functions and build confidence among member states. In this regard the Global South is presented with a unique opportunity. Instead of them being passive recipients of reform that is designed to appease Washington and/or Beijing, these Southern states can seize UN80 as a platform to demand inclusivity, equity and a stronger focus on peacebuilding. Moreover, by asserting their priorities in the reform agenda, they can help ensure that efficiency measures do not eclipse political renewal.   António Guterres Secretary-General of the Unted Nations [1]   2 BUDGETARY CHALLENGES: BETWEEN SURVIVAL AND STRATEGIC FOCUS   The financial crisis of the United Nations is not new, but the scale and persistence of the current crisis place the organisation in uncharted territory. The UN today faces chronic arrears, deliberate late payments and mounting demands from peace operations, humanitarian emergencies and global crises.   The Inclusive Society Institute consultation described the financial situation as “existential.” A briefing note underscored the gravity: as of 2024, the UN faced $2.4 billion in unpaid contributions to the regular budget and $2.7 billion in unpaid peacekeeping contributions. Of this, $1.5 billion was owed by the United States alone. With nearly half the UN’s budget tied to two major powers, the US and China, both of whom are increasingly unreliable payers, the risk of systemic collapse is real. 2.1 The political nature of the budget crisis   The consultation made clear that the UN’s financial problems are not simply technical, they are deeply political. It was argued that “the budget is not the problem, politics is the problem”. Arrears reflect member states’ political ambivalence toward the UN, particularly when they disagree with its actions or priorities. For example:   The US Congress has long used budget withholding as a tool to influence UN policies on Israel/Palestine, peacekeeping or human rights. China, while paying its dues in full, increasingly delays contributions until late in the financial year. Because of budget rules, these late payments cannot be programmed in time, creating artificial liquidity crises and often resulting in refunds.   This undermines not only cash flow, but also confidence in collective responsibility. Smaller states may ask why should they pay on time when the largest powers manipulate the system? 2.2 The mandate trap and budget strain   A critical link between finances and mandates was emphasised. The UN has accumulated over 40,000 standing mandates since 1946. Few have ever been retired, even when they are obsolete. The Secretariat remains obliged to produce reports, run offices and maintain activities that no longer reflect current priorities. This “mandate trap” stretches already limited resources across too many fronts, diluting impact and increasing perceptions of waste.   Reform UN80’s Mandate Implementation Review (MIR) could help rationalise this overload by pruning outdated mandates, but as participants cautioned, unless politically supported, such reviews risk stalling. Member states may resist letting go of mandates they perceive as symbolic victories, even if obsolete, because without discipline at the political level, the budgetary strain will persist.   2.3 Doing less, better   The consultation was unequivocal, saying that the UN cannot continue trying to “do more with less.” Instead, it must do less, but better. This requires a sharper focus on the organisation’s comparative advantages:   Norm-setting and compliance by maintaining and monitoring universal rules on human rights, development, climate and disarmament. Convening and coordination by bringing states and stakeholders together to generate collective responses. Political mediation and peacebuilding by serving as an impartial mediator in crises and by supporting post-conflict transitions.   Conversely, the UN should reduce and/or exit roles where others are better placed, such as, for example, large-scale operational development delivery that could be led by governments, NGOs or regional bodies, which reorientation would not be about downsizing for its own sake, but about applying strategic focus. 2.4 Reform proposals: Accountability and sustainability   The consultation and external commentaries converged on several possible reforms to enhance financial sustainability, which includes:   Linking payments and voting rights : Enforce Article 19 of the Charter, which suspends voting rights for members in arrears, more strictly and extend this principle to Security Council veto rights, where chronic non-payers would lose their ability to block Council action. Revising refund rules : End the practice of refunding late contributions that cannot be spent and instead, retain these funds for future programming. Stabilising peacekeeping finance : Consider assessed contributions to be channelled through regional organisations, such as the African Union, backed by predictable UN funding streams. Political narrative : Above all, strengthen the case for why the UN deserves funding and understanding that no amount of technical efficiency will secure resources without trust in the UN’s political legitimacy.   2.5 The risk of collapse   The consultation drew parallels to the collapse of the League of Nations, which faltered both financially and politically when its largest members refused to sustain it. The UN today faces similar risks. If arrears persist and mandates remain unreformed, the organisation could become hollowed out, be technically alive, but politically impotent.   Yet the UN also retains unique strengths. No other body has its universal membership, legitimacy in norm-setting or convening power. The challenge is to safeguard these by focusing resources strategically and by ensuring financial commitments are honoured. 2.6 Conclusion   The budgetary crisis is the canary in the coal mine for the UN’s future. It reveals the erosion of trust, the paralysis of collective responsibility and the unwillingness of powerful states to sustain the system they helped create. Reform UN80’s administrative measures are necessary, but insufficient. What is required is a political compact on finances, whereby member states must recommit to timely payment, mandate discipline and strategic prioritisation.   If the budget crisis is treated merely as an accounting problem, the UN will continue to limp from one liquidity crunch to the next. If it is treated as a political problem, requiring rules, enforcement and leadership, the organisation can regain stability. In short, fixing the UN’s budget is less about spreadsheets and more about political will. United Nations budget: Who has paid their dues? [2] 3 UNILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND THE RISE OF REGIONALISM   The United Nations was founded on the conviction that peace and security can only be sustained through collective action. The Charter narrative, as the consultation reminded us, was one of binding the use of force to universal rules, taming unilateral power through law and yet, at its 80th anniversary, the UN faces an erosion of this multilateral ethos. This is because states increasingly pursue unilateral and/or transactional arrangements, often sidelining the UN’s mechanisms.   The consultation convened by the Inclusive Society Institute warned that unilateralism, while it may deliver short-term bargains, undermines the foundations of sustainable peace. 3.1 The appeal and the limits of transactional unilateralism   Conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and Asia increasingly feature unilateral or mini-lateral deals, brokered by powerful states or regional actors that prioritise immediate stability or access to resources. These arrangements are pragmatic, but often fragile, because they avoid tackling root causes such as governance failures, inequality or exclusion.   The warning about “putting the cart before the horse” applies here. When quick deals are prioritised over long-term legitimacy, short-term stability may be achieved, but the cycle of conflict is likely to continue. The UN’s comparative advantage, namely sustained mediation and inclusive political frameworks, risks being eroded. 3.2 Multilateralism under pressure   The consultation stressed that the UN itself has contributed to the decline of multilateralism by under-investing in its peace and security role. As conflicts doubled over the past two decades, the organisation cut back on peacekeeping and underfunded political missions. The obsession with efficiency and cost-saving, driven by member state pressure, has left the UN less politically engaged at precisely the moment when engagement is most needed.   It was argued that the key challenge is to “operationalise multilateralism”, to make cooperation more than rhetoric, which meant investing in the tools of prevention, mediation and peacebuilding and not just in administrative reshuffles. Multilateralism must be tangible in outcomes, not only aspirational in speeches. 3.3 Regionalism: Substitute or complement?   As the UN’s authority weakens, regional organisations have stepped into the vacuum. The African Union (AU) has deployed peace operations in Somalia, the Sahel and elsewhere; ASEAN has mediated disputes in Southeast Asia; BRICS has positioned itself as a forum for alternative global governance. The consultation viewed this trend with nuance. On one hand, regionalism can act as a substitute when the UN fails to act. But on the other hand, it can serve as a complement to a UN that provides universal legitimacy and normative grounding.   The challenge is institutional design. Currently, UN - regional partnerships are ad hoc, improvised in crises. The mandate trap compounds this problem and the Secretariat is burdened with outdated obligations, leaving little bandwidth to invest in structured regional cooperation. To bring relief and create space for itself Reform UN80 could use the Mandate Implementation Review to prune obsolete obligations, freeing resources to deepen UN - AU frameworks. 3.4 The leadership vacuum   Underlying the drift towards unilateralism and the reliance on regionalism is a leadership vacuum. The UN Secretariat has become risk-averse, more focused on process than on problem-solving. Member states, especially great powers, prioritise national interests over collective responsibility. The result is that multilateralism is often invoked rhetorically, but rarely organised in practice.   Here too, external commentary reinforces the consultation. It was argued that trust and legitimacy must precede structural reform. Without leadership that inspires trust, no amount of efficiency will restore multilateralism and so the UN must demonstrate through practice, through operationalised missions and results that is, that multilateralism delivers. 3.5 Reclaiming multilateralism   The way forward a requires deliberate reinvestment in the UN’s political role, which should include, amongst others:   Strengthening preventive diplomacy by ensuring that political missions are given adequate funding and authority to act early in crises. Institutionalising UN - regional partnerships by creating standing arrangements with the AU, ASEAN and others for financing, planning and joint operations. Cultivating leadership for outcomes by appointing leaders that are willing to take risks, prioritise results over process and articulate a vision for collective action. Mandate discipline, which should include the retiring of obsolete mandates so the UN can focus on present conflicts and avoid spreading itself too thin. 3.6 Conclusion Unilateralism reflects not only the ambitions of powerful states, but also the weaknesses of multilateral institutions. If the UN is to reclaim its Charter promise, it must organise multilateralism, not merely proclaim it. This means freeing itself from outdated mandates, reinvesting in peace and security and institutionalising complementarity with regional organisations.   The consultation and external commentaries converge on the same lesson, namely that without leadership, legitimacy and political will, multilateralism risks becoming a hollow slogan. With them, however, the UN can still embody what one paricipant described as the Charter’s enduring narrative, namely that law, not unilateral power, should govern international relations.   United Nations Peacekeeping [3] 4 US - CHINA RIVALRY, SECURITY COUNCIL PARALYSIS AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH   Among the most destabilising forces in the current international system is the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, because for the United Nations, this rivalry is not an external factor, but a structural crisis, playing out directly within its institutions and paralysing its ability to fulfil its Charter mandate.   Participants attending the Inclusive Society Institute consultation emphasised that the effects of this rivalry are felt most acutely in the Security Council, but it also permeate the wider UN system. This assessment is reinforced by external analysis introduced into the discussion, which analysis highlights how geopolitical competition has transformed the UN into an arena of contestation, rather than a platform for consensus. 4.1 The dysfunction of the Security Council   The Security Council, which is intended to be the engine of collective security, has instead become the primary site of paralysis. US and Chinese positions, often compounded by Russian obstruction, have, for example, blocked decisive responses to conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, Gaza and beyond.   There is persistent gridlock in that resolutions are vetoed or watered down to meaninglessness and even humanitarian carve-outs, once considered non-controversial, are now hostage to great-power bargaining. There has been a decline of peacekeeping due to traditional UN peacekeeping authorisations that have all but ceased and instead, mandates are fragmented or outsourced to regional actors, often with weaker legitimacy and fewer resources. Legitimacy has been lost due to the Council’s inability to act on issues of mass violence, which has eroded confidence among member states and publics alike. This amounts to a betrayal of the Charter’s narrative, which promises that power would be restrained by law.   The consultation argued that without Council reform, no administrative or financial reforms will save the UN from irrelevance. 4.2 Competing models of reform   Several proposals for reforming the Security Council were raised:   Instead of endlessly debating which states deserve new permanent seats, allocate representation by region, where Africa, Asia, Latin America and other regions could hold rotating seats, ensuring inclusivity, while avoiding entrenched hierarchies. Introduce a qualified veto by restricting veto use to cases where proposed resolutions demonstrably contravene the Charter and in so doing, independent legal review, through the UN Office of Legal Affairs or advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, could introduce accountability. Or there could be hybrid approaches thereof, for example, expanded elected membership combined with regional representation and legal limits on the veto, could collectively enhance legitimacy and functionality.   These ideas echoed those in the briefing notes that were introduced into the consultations, which also argued that only bold innovation and not incremental tinkering, will allow the UN to adapt to multipolar realities. 4.3 Shifting influence of the United States and China   Beyond the Council, US and Chinese rivalry manifests across the UN system:   The United States  remains the single largest financial contributor, but increasingly uses budget leverage to constrain the organisation. Arrears and withholding are tools of political influence as much as fiscal policy. China  has expanded its influence and has become the second-largest contributor, has asserted leadership roles in specialised agencies and has positioned itself as a champion of South - South cooperation. But these advancements are also accompanied by concern that Beijing is seeking to align the UN norms with its own governance model.   This dynamic has transformed the UN into a battleground of narratives, with Washington framing itself as a defender of rules-based order and Beijing as a leader of equitable development; and for smaller states, the challenge has become how to navigate these competing visions without being marginalised.   4.4 Implications for the Global South   The consultation emphasised that US - China rivalry is both a risk and an opportunity for the Global South, because:   The South risks becoming an arena of competition, its conflicts instrumentalised by external powers and its priorities sidelined in the process. Rivalry creates strategic space in that just as some states leveraged the Cold War competition to secure aid and concessions, today’s Global South can use competition to advance its own priorities.   Three strategies were emphasised:   First, coalition-building by articulating collective positions through platforms such as the African Union, G77 or BRICS, Southern states can negotiate from strength rather than as isolated actors. Second, agenda-setting. The South must seize initiative by proposing its own frameworks for Security Council reform, financing rules and sustainable development. Waiting passively leaves space for great powers to impose their agendas. And third, leveraging multipolarity. In a world where no single hegemon dominates, the South has more room to assert its agency if it acts collectively. 4.5 Africa’s strategic role   Africa, in particular, emerged in the consultation as central to the future of UN reform. It accounts for the majority of active conflicts addressed by the UN, it contributes the largest number of uniformed peacekeepers, it is home to 54 member states, over a quarter of UN membership and yet it has no permanent seat on the Council.   This imbalance cannot be sustained. Reform UN80 provides an opportunity for Africa to demand regional representation in the Council, structured complementarity between the UN and the African Union and more equitable financial governance.   South Africa was singled out as especially well placed to lead. Its history of negotiated transition gives it symbolic authority, while its role in BRICS and the AU provides practical platforms for influence. As one participant put it, the Global South must not only seek inclusion, but lead in shaping reform. 4.6 Multipolarity and the Charter narrative   One of the analyses of the Charter narrative is instructive here. The Charter was meant to constrain great powers under law, ensuring that smaller states would not be permanently subordinated. The current paralysis of the Security Council is therefore not merely dysfunctional, it is a profound breach of the Charter’s spirit.   The Global South’s demand for reform is, at its core, a demand for fidelity to the Charter itself. The caution is again relevant in that structural reforms without political will mean little. Reform will only matter if it restores trust in the UN as an impartial forum of collective security. 4.7 Conclusion   The US - China rivalry is both the UN’s greatest challenge and, paradoxically, its greatest opportunity. It paralyses the Security Council, distorts agency agendas and corrodes trust in multilateralism. Yet, it also creates the conditions for the Global South, especially Africa, to assert a stronger role.   The consultation, reinforced by external analyses, points to a clear path, namely that bold innovation in Security Council reform, coalition-building by the South and leadership that reclaims the Charter’s promise that law, not power, governs the international system.   At 80, the jury is still out as to whether the UN will decide to remain a stage for great-power competition or whether it will evolve into a genuinely multipolar platform for collective security. 5 LEADERSHIP, ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE AND THE HUMAN FACTOR IN UN REFORM   Beyond mandates, budgets and geopolitics, the fate of UN reform ultimately rests on people. Those who lead the organisation, those who staff it and the cultures they inhabit. The Inclusive Society Institute consultation stressed that without a fundamental renewal of leadership and organisational ethos, even the most elegant reform packages will falter. External commentary echoes this. It cautions that reforms that focus on bureaucratic rearrangements without tackling political trust and leadership are “putting the cart before the horse”. 5.1 Politicisation of senior appointments   The UN’s leadership deficit is rooted in the politicisation of appointments, where senior positions are often awarded through bargaining among powerful states, rather than through meritocratic and transparent selection. This produces:   Variable quality when competence and vision is subordinated to nationality. When leaders feel beholden to their patron states, rather than the UN’s mandate, accountability may be compromised. A patronage culture is instilled when appointees replicate political logics in their own hiring, which perpetuates a cycle of politicisation.   One of the participants highlighted this directly when he cautioned that structural reforms cannot succeed without leadership accountability and warning that without changing how leaders are chosen and held to account, Reform UN80 will repeat past cycles of limited results. 5.2 A culture of risk aversion   The consultation with the UN experts identified a pervasive risk-averse culture that spread across the Secretariat, where leaders and staff are often more concerned with avoiding mistakes than they are with solving problems and this has manifested in:   Process obsession which has resulted in decision-making being slowed down by endless consultations and burdensome procedures. Political cautiousness, resulting in reluctance to act decisively for fear of antagonising powerful states. Conformity being rewarded with career advancement being linked to compliance, not innovation.   The “mandate trap” analysis mentioned earlier in the report reinforces this diagnosis and charges that the accumulation of thousands of outdated mandates has created a bureaucratic environment where staff are trapped in servicing obsolete processes, which leaves little space for creative problem-solving. The risk aversion is not just cultural, it is institutionalised through workload and reporting requirements. 5.3 Engineers, not only diplomats   The consultation proposed a cultural shift, namely that the UN must cultivate leaders who are not only diplomats, but also engineers of solutions, which would mean valuing leaders who:   Are prepared to take calculated risks in pursuit of results. Focus on innovation rather than to merely manage. Will hold themselves accountable to outcomes and not just procedural compliance. Ground their decisions in field realities and not just headquarter dictated  processes.   The Charter was not designed to create a self-perpetuating bureaucracy, but, rather, a living institution of political problem-solving and therefore leaders who embody this spirit are essential, if the UN is to remain true to its founding ideals. 5.4 Recruitment, talent and morale   A related concern is recruitment and staff morale. The UN was envisioned as a forum for the “best and brightest” from across the globe, however, today, politicisation, quota pressures and bureaucratic stagnation seem to limit diversity and innovation.   Reform proposals from the consultation and external analyses converged on the need for the UN to:   Broaden its recruitment pipelines beyond entrenched networks so as to ensure diversity of geography and expertise. Strengthen meritocracy by establishing independent search committees with public shortlists and performance-based contracts for senior officials. Encourage mobility be requiring senior staff to gain field experience, thereby ensuring a leadership hat is grounded in realities. Reward innovation by recognising risk-taking and creativity and not only compliance with procedure.   It was noted that leadership renewal cannot be separated from accountability and therefore, senior officials must be tied to measurable outcomes. Without such mechanisms, staff morale will continue to decline under cycles of reform fatigue and uncertainty. 5.5 Accountability and trust   Both the consultation and external sources converge on a central insight, namely that trust is the true currency of reform. It stresses that without political trust, structural or bureaucratic reform is meaningless and it therefore needs accountability mechanisms that restore confidence in leadership.   Recommendations include:   Binding performance contracts for senior officials. Independent oversight of leadership performance, with consequences for failure. Transparency in appointments to restore trust in impartiality.   Only by linking leadership to accountability can the UN cultivate the credibility necessary for member states to sustain it financially and politically. 5.6 Conclusion   Leadership and culture are the linchpins of UN reform. Politicised appointments, risk-averse culture and weak accountability have created an organisation that manages process, but struggles to deliver results. Reform UN80 will succeed only if it goes beyond administrative streamlining to address the human factor and moreover, who leads, how they are chosen, what culture they embody and how they are held accountable.   The ISI was reminded that the UN was designed as a political project of collective will, not as a technocratic machine, and that should warn us that efficiency without trust is hollow. Outdated mandates embed inefficiency and inertia and leadership accountability must be central.   Together, these insights affirm the consultation’s conclusion that without cultural renewal, even the most carefully designed reforms will falter. 6 IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA   The 80th anniversary of the United Nations is not only a global milestone, but a decisive moment for Africa. The continent is both a primary stakeholder in the UN and one of its most underrepresented voices. Africa hosts the majority of active conflicts on the UN agenda, provides the largest share of peacekeepers and absorbs a disproportionate share of humanitarian assistance. Yet, Africa has no permanent seat on the Security Council, limited influence in budgetary decisions and often finds its priorities overshadowed by great-power rivalries.   The Inclusive Society Institute consultation, reinforced by recent analyses, underscored that the success or failure of Reform UN80 will be judged most visibly on the continent. 6.1 Africa as the testing ground for UN relevance   The UN’s credibility is often tested in Africa. From the peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to humanitarian operations in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, Africa has been the proving ground for the UN’s capacity to deliver. Yet, repeated shortcomings, underfunded mandates, ambiguous missions and abrupt withdrawals, have left deep frustrations.   As was emphasised, this is not only a resource problem, but a political problem. Missions falter because they are shaped more by the interests of external powers than by the needs of African populations. For the UN to remain relevant, reform must prioritise political renewal in Africa, not just administrative reshuffles. 6.2 Security Council reform and Africa’s stake   Africa’s exclusion from permanent Security Council membership is the most glaring example of systemic inequity, because in spite of accounting for over a quarter of UN membership and the majority of peacekeeping mandates, Africa remains a bystander in the Council’s permanent decision-making.   Participants supported innovative proposals that could break the deadlock:   Regional representation , with the allocation Council seats to regions and allowing Africa to hold a permanent voice through rotational arrangements. Qualified veto restrictions , which will prevent the abuse of the veto by subjecting it to legal review under the Charter and hereby ensuring that Africa’s concerns are not perpetually blocked by great-power rivalries.   This aligns with the insights that affirm that the Charter was designed to prevent domination by the strongest and to guarantee universality of voice. Africa’s demand for Council reform is thus not only about representation, but also about fidelity to the Charter’s spirit of equality. 6.3 Complementarity with the African Union   The African Union (AU) has increasingly taken on peace and security roles where the UN has been absent or gridlocked, with examples that include AMISOM in Somalia and regional interventions in Mali, but AU missions often face crippling funding shortages.   The UN experts consulted stressed the need for structured complementarity between the UN and AU, which would require predictable financing arrangements, joint planning mechanisms and burden-sharing that respects both global legitimacy and regional ownership.   Here, the “mandate trap” analysis is relevant, because freeing the UN from outdated mandates could allow resources to be redirected into deeper partnerships with the AU, ensuring missions are fit for purpose and sustainable. 6.4 Financing reform and Africa’s leverage   The UN’s budget crisis affects Africa disproportionately, since many of its largest missions are based on the continent. When the US withholds funds or China delays payments, African operations are the first to suffer. $2.4 billion in arrears to the regular budget and $2.7 billion to peacekeeping, translates directly into resource gaps in African missions.   The consultation therefore suggested that Africa has a vested interest in budgetary reform. Proposals such as suspending veto rights for chronic non-payers or revising refund rules for late contributions are not abstract governance issues but immediate survival strategies for African operations. 6.5 South Africa’s role   South Africa, as one of Africa’s most prominent states, has both an opportunity and a responsibility to shape Reform UN80. Several avenues were highlighted:   South Africa can use its credibility as a mediator to convene African and Global South voices around a unified reform agenda. As a member of BRICS, South Africa can channel Southern perspectives into global reform debates, thereby ensuring that multipolarity does not marginalise Africa, but serves rather to empower it. By generating proposals on Security Council reform, financial accountability and UN - AU complementarity, South Africa’s role can move beyond advocacy to actual agenda-setting. South Africa’s negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy offers it symbolic weight when advocating for inclusive and negotiated solutions in the UN.   Unless Africa more broadly, and South Africa in particular, starts to insist on trust and political will before structure, the continent risks being sidelined by technocratic reforms that do not address its core concerns. 6.6 Risks of passivity   The greatest risk for Africa is passivity, because by doing nothing, the US - China rivalry could easily reduce the continent to an arena of competition, where its conflicts are instrumentalised and its priorities sidelined. That said, however, it should also be noted that the rivalry also creates strategic space in that by building coalitions through the AU, BRICS and other platforms, Africa can advance its own agenda and prevent being marginalised.   The Global South must not merely seek inclusion, but lead reform debates. For Africa, this means moving from the margins to the centre of UN reform, not as petitioners, but as co-authors of the future multilateral order. 6.7 Conclusion   Africa stands at the heart of the UN’s 80th anniversary reform debates given the continent’s disproportionate exposure to conflict and humanitarian crises, which is coupled with its systemic underrepresentation, thereby making it both the UN’s greatest stakeholder and its greatest test.   Reform UN80 will be judged in Africa. If reform strengthens Security Council representation, institutionalises UN - AU complementarity and stabilises financing, Africa stands to gain. If reform remains narrowly technocratic, the continent risks deeper neglect.   For South Africa, the opportunity is to act as a bridge and thought leader, turning rhetorical commitments into concrete proposals. By doing so, it can help ensure that Reform UN80 is not another cycle of administrative tinkering, but a genuine renewal of the Charter’s promise, namely that all voices, especially those of the Global South, matter in shaping international peace and security. President Cyril Ramaphose at the United Nations [4] 7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS   The UN at its 80th anniversary stands at a crossroads. It was founded on the bold promise of the Charter, to free humanity from the scourge of war, to affirm faith in rights and equality, and to ensure that power was restrained by law. As the meeting observed, the Charter is more than a legal instrument, it is a narrative of global hope and collective restraint, but that narrative is under unprecedented strain.   The Inclusive Society Institute consultation’s assessment is stark:   Reform UN80 is necessary, but insufficient, because whilst the streamlining of structures, the consolidation of offices and the cutting reports may improve efficiency, without political renewal these measures risk becoming a hollow exercise. Participants warned that focusing on bureaucracy without addressing legitimacy is “putting the cart before the horse”. The budget crisis is political, not technical. It was pointed out that arrears now exceed $5 billion, with the US responsible for $1.5 billion. This suggests that the matter is not merely about liquidity, but about political ambivalence as powerful states use finances as leverage. Unilateralism and mandate overload is eroding multilateralism, with 40,000 mandates weighing down the UN and this, combined with the rise of transactional unilateral deals, risks the UN being sidelined unless it operationalises multilateralism with real outcomes. Great-power rivalry paralyses the Security Council, but empowers the Global South, because whilst the US - China contest threatens to hollow out the UN, it also creates strategic space for Africa, BRICS and other Southern actors to assert leadership. The reforms will require a decisive leadership and culture. Moreover, politicised appointments, the risk-averse culture and the weak accountability within the UN system need to changes, because the current ways are undermining the UN’s ability to adapt. Without a shift to accountable and outcome-driven leadership, reforms will stall.   The choice is therefore stark: renewal or decline. Renewal requires courage, vision and fidelity to the Charter’s spirit. Decline will follow if reform remains technocratic and timid. 7.1 Recommendations   Based on the consultation and reinforced by external analysis, the following recommendations are advanced:   A. Re-anchor reform UN80 in the Charter’s promise Prioritise peace and security . Place political engagement, conflict prevention and mediation at the heart of Reform UN80, not just managerial restructuring. Connect reform to the Charter narrative . Efficiency should be framed not as an end in itself, but as a way to deliver on the Charter’s vision of peace, rights and justice.   B. Address the political nature of finances Arrears need to be linked to accountability . Enforce Article 19 suspensions more consistently and explore extending this principle to veto rights for chronic non-payers. End perverse refund rules . Retain late contributions for future programming instead of reimbursing them. Focus the budget on comparative advantage . Do less, better, concentrate resources on norm-setting, convening and mediation while scaling back duplicative delivery roles. C. Escape the mandate trap Mandate Implementation Review (MIR).  Use Reform UN80 to prune obsolete mandates. Without political discipline from member states, efficiency reforms will collapse under the weight of outdated obligations.   D. Rebuild multilateralism Operationalise multilateralism . Demonstrate its value through preventive diplomacy, political missions and field outcomes, not rhetoric. Institutionalise regional complementarity . Predictable financing and planning frameworks need o be established with the AU, ASEAN and others. E. Security Council reform Pursue regional representation . Break the deadlock on Council reform by allocating seats by region rather than states, with provisions for internal rotation so as to ensure inclusivity. Introduce a qualified veto , which restricts the use of the veto to cases which demonstrably contravene the Charter and such a veto should be subject to legal review. F. Leadership and organisational culture Depoliticise appointments . Create independent recruitment committees, introduce public shortlists and introduce performance contracts for senior leaders. Shift culture from process to outcomes . Promote leaders who innovate, take risks and deliver, and address the structural roots of risk-aversion by reducing reporting burdens and mandate overload.   G. Empower the Global South Move from inclusion to leadership . The South must not only demand seats at the table, but it should propose its own frameworks for reform. Leverage multipolar platforms .  Use the AU, G77 and BRICS to articulate collective positions and resist fragmentation by avoiding to be sucked in by the great-power rivalry.   H. Africa and South Africa Seize Africa’s central role .  Press for Council representation, predictable UN - AU financing and budget accountability. South Africa as thought leader .  Use its diplomatic credibility and platforms to bridge divides, articulate Southern perspectives and ensure Africa is not marginalised. 7.2 Final reflection   The UN at 80 faces a decisive choice. The organisation can continue to be hollowed out by arrears, unilateral deals and geopolitical rivalry, sliding toward the irrelevance that doomed the League of Nations or it can reclaim its Charter promise by focusing on peace and security, disciplining mandates, reforming finances, renewing leadership and amplifying the voices of the Global South.   The consultation and external analyses converge on one clear lesson, namely that technical reforms alone will not save the UN. What is required is political imagination, trust and courage. Reform UN80 will only succeed if it goes beyond efficiency to fidelity, that is fidelity to the Charter’s spirit of collective security, equality and justice.   If this challenge is met, the UN’s 80th anniversary will be remembered not as the beginning of decline, but as the rebirth of multilateralism for a multipolar century.   ANNEXURE 1   What is the aim of reform UN80?   Reform UN80 is framed by the Secretary-General as a comprehensive effort to modernise and streamline the United Nations system on the occasion of its 80th anniversary. At its core, the reform seeks to:   Enhance efficiency by reducing duplication across the Secretariat, consolidating structures and relocating some functions to lower-cost duty stations. Reduce administrative burden by cutting the excessive number of mandated reports required by the General Assembly and Security Council, many of which add little political value. Rationalise mandates through the proposed Mandate Implementation Review (MIR), which aims to prune thousands of outdated or duplicative mandates that date back decades.   However, the consultation and supporting analyses stress that the true aim of reform must go beyond managerial efficiency. Without political renewal, Reform UN80 risks being another cycle of bureaucratic housekeeping. The UN was created to prevent war and foster peace, unless reform strengthens its ability to mediate conflicts, engage in preventive diplomacy and uphold the Charter’s principles, it will not restore legitimacy.   Thus, the aim of Reform UN80 should not be narrowly understood as cost-saving or restructuring. Its deeper purpose must be to re-anchor the UN in its founding mission, ensuring that efficiency gains are harnessed to deliver political results, strengthen multilateralism and meet the expectations of member states and peoples in a multipolar world.   ANNEXURE 2   How does the UN solve its budget problem, given the withholding of funds by some (the USA in particular), coupled with increased peace missions and humanitarian crises?   The UN’s budget crisis is one of its most pressing existential challenges. The organisation currently faces billions of dollars in unpaid contributions, as of 2024, $2.4 billion in regular budget arrears and $2.7 billion in peacekeeping arrears, with the United States alone responsible for $1.5 billion. At the same time, demands on the UN are expanding, with a rising number of conflicts, complex humanitarian emergencies and peace operations.   The consultation concluded that this is not simply a financial problem, but a political one, since arrears and delayed payments are being deployed as deliberate tools of influence This is especially true for powerful states who create artificial liquidity crises, which then undermine trust and destabilise missions, particularly in Africa.   The UN can address this only through bold reforms by:   Ensuring   accountability for arrears by strictly enforcing Article 19 of the Charter, which provides for the suspension of voting rights for chronic non-payers, and consider linking veto powers in the Security Council to financial compliance. Revising financial rules to end the practice of refunding unspent late contributions and instead the funds should be retained for future programming in order to stabilise budgets. Introducing strategic prioritisation which adopts a “do less, better” approach, thereby focusing resources on areas of unique comparative advantage (norm-setting, convening and mediation), while reducing overstretched delivery roles. Changing the political narrative with the aim of rebuilding trust and legitimacy by connecting financial reforms to outcomes and showing member states that resources will translate into results.  In short, solving the budget problem requires political will, accountability mechanisms and strategic discipline, without which the UN risks following the League of Nations into irrelevance. ANNEXURE 3   What is the Secretary-General’s view concerning the growing trend towards unilateralism compared with the UN’s notion of multilateralism?   The Secretary-General’s consistent position is that unilateralism cannot substitute for multilateralism. And yet, transactional deals are often brokered by powerful states or coalitions. But while they may provide short-term stability, they fail to resolve the structural causes of conflict. Moreover, in developing the deals, key stakeholders are frequently excluded, which deals  then lack legitimacy and collapse once immediate incentives shift.   In contrast to the transactional deals, the UN’s commitment to multilateralism is grounded in its Charter and in the principle that collective action is the only sustainable basis for peace and security. The UN provides legitimacy, inclusivity and the capacity to mediate disputes impartially, attributes that unilateral or mini-lateral arrangements cannot replicate.   The consultation noted, however, that the UN has not lived up to this role. Years of underinvestment in peace and security, combined with the “mandate trap” of servicing outdated obligations, have left the organisation less engaged just as unilateralism has gained ground. The Secretary-General therefore urges member states to support reforms that operationalise multilateralism, not just invoke it rhetorically. This means:   Reinvesting in preventive diplomacy and political missions. Institutionalising partnerships with regional organisations, for example, the AU and ASEAN) to act as first responders within a global framework. Cultivating leadership that delivers outcomes, not just process.  The Secretary-General’s view is clear: multilateralism must be made tangible through results. Without this, the world will slide further toward fragmented unilateralism, undermining the very foundations of the UN system. ANNEXURE 4   Given the stand-off between the USA and China, how does the UN consider their changing influences and roles within the UN system? And what does this mean for the Global South?   The rivalry between the United States and China is reshaping the UN from within.   On the one hand, the United States , the UN’s the largest contributor, is using its arrears and late payments to exert influence and to weaken the UN’s financial stability in order to coerce support for its foreign policy interests. On the other hand, China, now the second-largest contributor, is expanding its leadership in UN agencies and presenting itself as a champion of South - South cooperation, while also promoting its own governance models.   This rivalry has paralysed the Security Council and is turning it into an arena of obstruction, where vetoes block action on crises from Syria to Ukraine and beyond. Furthermore, it also polarises the broader UN debates, as each side seeks to advance their own competing visions of world order.   For the Global South, this rivalry presents both risks and opportunities, in that the South could either be reduced to a passive arena for great-power competition, with its conflicts instrumentalised and its priorities sidelined or it could tactically use the multipolarity to creates space for its own agency. By building coalitions through the African Union, BRICS, G77 and other platforms, the South can articulate and advance its own reform agenda and it can leverage rivalry to extract commitments and ensure its voices are central.   Africa stands at the centre of this dynamic. It is the testing ground for the UN’s legitimacy, the largest contributor of peacekeepers and yet systemically underrepresented in decision-making. Reform UN80 provides an opportunity to press for regional representation on the Council, predictable UN - AU financing and a stronger African voice in governance.   For South Africa in particular, this moment is pivotal. As a bridge between Africa, the Global South, and emerging powers, it has both moral authority and strategic positioning to shape the reform agenda. The implication is clear: if Africa and the South act collectively and proactively, they can turn great-power rivalry from a risk into a historic opportunity for influence. Top of Form   [1]  United Nations (n.d.) Secretary-General speaking at a media briefing  [Photograph]. UN Cyprus Talks. Available at: https://uncyprustalks.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_width_image/public/field/image/sg3.jpg (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under fair dealing in South Africa. No permission obtained. [2]  Statista via Newsweek (n.d.) United Nations member contributions to UN budget  [Infographic]. Available at: https://d.newsweek.com/en/full/1534981/unites-nations-member-contributions-statista.jpg?w=1200&f=d66b63c5cbd3385e0117d0e131988928 (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under fair dealing (review/reporting purposes) in accordance with South African law; permission not secured. [3]  United Nations (n.d.) UN peacekeepers at the 2023 Ghana Ministerial  [Photograph]. United Nations Peacekeeping. Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/styles/1200x500/public/field/image/ghana_ministerial.jpeg?itok=MLjHVz3B (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under South African fair dealing (reporting/commentary). No permission obtained. [4]  United Nations (2023) Speaker at the UN General Assembly, 2023 UN General Debate  [Photograph]. United Nations General Assembly. Available at: https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/styles/max_1300x1300/public/2023-09/un71000505.jpg?itok=dzDGdPF_ (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under South African fair dealing for reporting/commentary on current events. No permission obtained.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On 17 September 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute, in partnership with Daily Maverick, hosted the third instalment of its Constitutional Insights by Albie Sachs  webinar series. Building on a four-part podcast with former Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs, the series explores the Constitution, social justice, and the promise of transformation in South Africa, while highlighting the ongoing challenges of building an inclusive and equitable democracy. The third conversation focused on The Power of Mother Tongue Education  — a foundational issue for both educational equity and social inclusion. Leading the discussion was Prof. Mbulungeni Madiba , Dean of the Faculty of Education at Stellenbosch University, whose scholarship and advocacy have been pivotal in advancing multilingualism and linguistic justice in South Africa’s education system. He was joined by public intellectual Prof. William Gumede  and diversity and multilingualism researcher Dr. Robyn Tyler , bringing together expertise from education, research, and public policy. The discussion examined how language policies intersect with identity, equity, and access . Prof. Madiba emphasised that mother tongue education is more than a pedagogical strategy — it is a constitutional imperative that empowers learners, strengthens communities, and affirms cultural and linguistic diversity. Gumede and Dr. Tyler explored the broader societal impact, highlighting how equitable access to mother tongue education can address historical inequalities, enhance learning outcomes, and reinforce the Constitution’s commitment to dignity and equality. The speakers underscored that centring mother tongue education fosters a more inclusive and just society, reflecting the Constitution’s core values in both practice and principle. The conversation also reinforced the idea that multilingual education is a key tool for social cohesion, democratic participation, and community empowerment. This third episode continues the series’ exploration of South Africa’s constitutional landscape, following earlier conversations on citizenship and belonging  and the role of state institutions in upholding democracy . The final episode will focus on creating an inclusive electoral system , completing the series’ examination of critical democratic and constitutional issues.

On 15 September 2025, the Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society, Daryl Swanepoel, participated in the FOGGS Open Consultation on “Shaping Global Governance Through Middle Power Capabilities.” This virtual consultation formed part of the FOGGS Open Consultation Mondays series, a platform designed to explore critical issues in global governance and the evolving role of middle powers.   Background and purpose of the event   As geopolitical rivalries intensify and competition among major powers grows, existing governance structures have revealed their limitations. In this shifting landscape, middle powers have emerged as crucial actors, recognised for their diplomatic skill, commitment to multilateralism, and capacity to build consensus. These states are uniquely positioned to act as bridges within a fractured global system, advancing peace, sustainability and fair economic practices. The session’s objectives were to:   Identify areas of influence where middle powers can make a difference, including peacebuilding, climate action and sustainability. Map out institutional pathways within the UN, regional organizations and bilateral relations that enable middle powers to exert influence. Define their unique capabilities, from leadership approaches and economic positions to legacies of global engagement. Empower middle power policymakers to take initiative and foster change on the global stage.   CEO’s intervention   In his contribution to the discussion, Mr Swanepoel addressed a central challenge confronting middle powers: how to navigate potential sanctions or punitive measures from superpowers that seek to constrain their autonomy. He underscored that when middle powers attempt to advance alternative pathways of governance or justice that do not align with the interests of dominant states, they often face retaliation.   As an example, he referred to the US push-back against South Africa’s action at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning Israel, framing it as a case where a middle power’s principled stance in defence of international law attracted resistance from the global superpower.   Significance of the discussion   Mr. Swanepoel emphasised that such dynamics highlight the importance of collective resilience among middle powers, the diversification of partnerships and instruments to withstand coercive measures and the advancement of inclusive multilateralism where all states, not only the most powerful,  have a voice in shaping global rules.   By raising this issue, he contributed to a broader debate on how middle powers can move from being vulnerable actors caught in superpower competition to becoming proactive shapers of fair and sustainable global governance.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 31 July 2025 which have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   August 2025   Rapporteur: Odile Bulten Editor: Daryl Swanepoel CONTENTS 1 SETTING THE SCENE: Rethinking development financing in Africa’s age of uncertainty 2 FINANCING AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT IN A COMPLEX GLOBAL ORDER: Insights from Amb Fébé Potgieter-Gqubule 2.1 Global dynamics and emerging complexities 2.2 Historical legacy and the African development agenda 2.3 The political economy of bilateral aid and its limitations 2.4 The African Union’s strategic financial reforms 2.5 Sector-specific challenges and the imperative for differentiated financing approaches 2.6 Conclusions and strategic recommendations 3 DELEGATE PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT FINANCING: Ground-level realities and strategic reflections 3.1 Enduring Aid Dependency and Its Institutional Impacts 3.2 The gap between fiscal discourse and budgetary commitment 3.3 Domestic resource mobilisation: An ambition yet to be realised 3.4 Mindset shift: Beyond material constraints 3.5 National case studies: Illustrations from the ground 3.6 Conclusion: Redefining responsibility in African development finance 4 INSIGHTS FROM THE DISCUSSION 5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND ROADMAP ROADMAP Cover photo (Africa): istock.com - Stock illustration ID:2090866893 Cover photo (Money): istock.com - Stock photo ID:484780166 1 SETTING THE SCENE Rethinking development financing in Africa’s age of uncertainty   Africa’s development trajectory remains intricately tied to how the continent mobilises, manages and governs its financial resources. Despite decades of reformist declarations and regional development strategies, much of Africa’s growth potential continues to be constrained by structural dependencies on external funding, narrow domestic revenue bases and fragmented financial governance. The imperative to reimagine how Africa finances its development is no longer a matter of long-term planning, it is a strategic necessity in the face of global shifts and declining aid flows.   Recent reductions in Official Development Assistance (ODA), most notably from the United States, have exposed the vulnerabilities of a model built on external goodwill and short-term commitments. Many African states remain heavily reliant on aid to fund critical sectors such as health, education and infrastructure. With donor priorities shifting inward and multilateral budgets tightening, the continent faces a growing risk of underinvestment in public services, institutional capacity and long-term development goals.   Private capital, heralded as the next frontier of development finance, has not delivered on its promise. Mechanisms such as blended finance and impact investing, though widely promoted in global frameworks like the Compromiso de Sevilla, have yet to gain meaningful traction in Africa. In practice, these models often prioritise risk minimisation for investors over developmental outcomes. Moreover, the absence of enforceable accountability structures, time-bound targets and alignment with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) priorities renders such instruments inadequate substitutes for traditional financing, especially in countries with weak credit ratings or limited financial markets.   This financial fragility is compounded by enduring issues such as capital flight, illicit financial flows, inefficient tax systems and limited institutional capacity to collect and manage public revenue. The consequences are far-reaching: reduced fiscal space for social spending, stagnating infrastructure development and constrained investments in education, innovation and job creation. These factors collectively undermine the continent’s ability to chart an independent and sustainable development path.   Amid these pressures, the conversation is shifting. There is growing consensus that Africa must adopt a more self-reliant, diversified and resilient financing strategy. Central to this is the need to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, from expanding tax bases to improving public financial management. Equally important is the pursuit of regional mechanisms for pooled financing, as seen in efforts by the African Union to operationalise frameworks like the Kigali Financing Decision. Such initiatives aim to fund continental priorities through internally generated revenues, signalling a shift away from donor dependency toward institutional sovereignty.   Furthermore, Africa’s position in global financial governance needs to be recalibrated. The continent’s ability to influence international norms on debt, aid and investment remains limited, even as these decisions have disproportionate effects on African economies. Coordinated negotiation strategies, stronger regional blocs and greater use of collective voice within institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO are critical steps toward reshaping the rules that govern financial flows into and out of the continent.   It is against this backdrop that the Africa Think Tank Dialogue (ATD) convened the July 2025 session on "Funding for Development." The aim was to interrogate the assumptions underpinning Africa’s current financing landscape, assess the viability of emerging models and explore actionable strategies for building a more autonomous and development-aligned financial ecosystem. The conversation recognises that Africa’s development challenge is not solely about mobilising more funds, but about gaining greater control over the sources, conditions, and uses of those funds.   The following section offers an in-depth reflection on these issues through a comprehensive analysis of Africa’s development financing architecture. Drawing from institutional history, policy evolution and emerging continental frameworks, the discussion explores how Africa can transition from reactive dependency to proactive financial sovereignty.   2 FINANCING AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT IN A COMPLEX GLOBAL ORDER Insights from Amb Fébé Potgieter-Gqubule Head of Policy at the African National Congress and former South African diplomat and senior African Union official   Ambassador Fébé Potgieter’s contribution to the African Think Tank Dialogue (ATD) offers a rare and incisive panorama of Africa’s evolving financial landscape. Drawing from extensive diplomatic engagement, institutional analysis and policy reform within the African Union (AU), Potgieter contextualises Africa’s development challenges within a shifting global geopolitical framework. Her intervention not only traces the historical and structural challenges associated with development financing, but also calls for a revitalised commitment to internal continental reforms and differentiated strategies that reflect the nuanced demands of peace, infrastructure, climate and human development.   In this report, her address is analysed in depth across six thematic axes: the shifting global context; the historical evolution of the African development financing agenda; the political economy of bilateral aid and its limitations; AU institutional reforms; differentiated sectoral financing approaches; and the critical policy lessons that must guide Africa’s path forward. 2.1 Global dynamics and emerging complexities   Ambassador Potgieter opened her remarks by situating Africa’s development predicament within a broader landscape marked by diminishing international support and increasing complexity in geopolitical relations. She underscored that Africa finds itself navigating a global environment where traditional donor support, particularly from the United States, has significantly waned. This reduction is not isolated to bilateral arrangements, but extends to support for multilateral institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and other developmental arms of the international system.   This retrenchment of multilateral financing directly undermines the capacity of African states to respond to pressing health, climate and economic challenges. The inability to rely on predictable, rules-based multilateral support has led to a funding vacuum that compromises the effectiveness of research, health systems and long-term developmental programming. It also restricts the continent’s agency in shaping global norms around health security, climate adaptation and post-conflict recovery.   Potgieter further noted a worrying trend in bilateral trade relations, where aid and trade are increasingly conflated under coercive conditionalities. Rather than advancing mutually beneficial trade, some powerful nations have imposed unilateral tariffs, as high as 30% to 50%, under the guise of market negotiations. These tariffs, presented as non-negotiable, are often tied to political concessions or commercial advantages for the donor country’s corporations, significantly undermining the negotiating power and economic sovereignty of African states.   In the domain of peace and security, Potgieter identified a paralysis within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), particularly in terms of supporting peacekeeping operations in Africa. While historically the UNSC has authorised missions across the continent, the current dysfunction, marked by geopolitical deadlock and resource withdrawal, has left many African conflicts underfunded and unresolved. This is particularly problematic given that most UN peacekeeping missions in recent decades have taken place in Africa.   Adding to this challenging context is the issue of climate finance. Potgieter emphasised the compounded impact of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the broader failure of developed nations to honour climate finance commitments. This not only leaves African countries vulnerable to natural disasters and environmental degradation, but also deprives them of the funding necessary for climate adaptation, resilience building and post-disaster recovery.   Taken together, these trends present a highly constrained global environment, where the traditional instruments of development cooperation are no longer reliable and where African agency is increasingly restricted by external priorities and internal fragility. 2.2 Historical legacy and the African development agenda   To better understand contemporary dynamics, Potgieter encouraged a retrospective examination of the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period she characterised as critical in shaping the trajectory of Africa’s development financing discourse. During this era, African leaders, responding to decades of underdevelopment and marginalisation, began articulating a more assertive continental agenda centred on debt forgiveness, institutional reform and integration into global governance structures.   One of the central debates of the time was the growing recognition that African countries were servicing debt at unsustainable levels. The cost of interest payments on sovereign debt often exceeded the total volume of development assistance received. This financial paradox became the rallying point for global debt cancellation campaigns, most notably the Jubilee 2000 movement, which was spearheaded by civil society actors, faith-based organisations and progressive political leaders. Potgieter recalled how this advocacy led to meaningful, if partial, debt relief initiatives and drew global attention to the structural imbalances embedded in the international financial system.   Concurrently, African countries were crafting the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which sought to reframe the continent’s development narrative from one of dependency to one of strategic partnership and homegrown solutions. The NEPAD agenda emphasised regional integration, institutional reform and engagement with global forums such as the G8, G20 and the World Trade Organization. This period marked Africa’s concerted effort to avoid marginalisation amid the rapid globalisation of trade and capital, particularly following what Potgieter termed the “dead development decades” of the 1970s and 1980s.   African countries also began engaging in bilateral partnerships designed to enhance trade and development cooperation. Initiatives such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), as well as similar engagements with the UK and EU, promised to channel resources into infrastructure and social development. While these engagements were symbolically significant, Potgieter hinted that they were often asymmetrical in nature, reflecting deeper power imbalances. 2.3 The political economy of bilateral aid and its limitations   Potgieter’s critique of bilateral aid was particularly compelling. She dismantled the illusion of donor altruism, arguing that most aid packages were embedded in a transactional logic designed to advance the strategic and commercial interests of donor countries. Aid was seldom unconditional. It came with clauses favouring donor-country companies in project implementation, a phenomenon she illustrated using the example of energy infrastructure development in the Democratic Republic of Congo.   This arrangement often meant that aid funds were effectively recycled back to donor economies via contracts awarded to firms headquartered in the Global North. In consequence, African economies saw limited gains in terms of local capacity building, employment or technology transfer. Industrial development stagnated and inter-African trade remained negligible despite decades of donor interventions.   She cited Nobel Peace Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who in characteristically blunt terms criticised African leaders for “dancing for donors” while ignoring the fiscal contributions of their own citizens. This metaphor underscored a broader epistemic dependency, where external validation was sought at the expense of internal confidence and ownership.   While acknowledging that some least-developed countries remain structurally dependent on aid, especially for health and education, Potgieter urged a paradigm shift toward recognising and scaling up domestic resource mobilisation, reinforcing the principle that development must be funded and driven by Africans themselves. 2.4 The African Union’s strategic financial reforms   One of the most substantive elements of Potgieter’s address was her detailed account of the African Union’s institutional response to financial dependency. She identified two landmark initiatives: The first was led by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. This initiative assessed Africa’s external and internal financing patterns, providing a holistic overview of aid flows, loan repayments, foreign direct investment and infrastructural needs. Its key recommendation was that the African Union should significantly reduce its reliance on external funding. This led to the historic Kigali Financing Decision in 2016, which proposed that the AU finance at least 75% of its operational and programmatic budget internally, alongside 25% to 30% of its peace support operations.   To operationalise this vision, the AU introduced a 0.2% import levy, modelled after ECOWAS’s financing mechanism, to generate predictable and sustainable revenue. While conceptually sound, implementation has been uneven due to resistance from both external partners and AU member states, particularly in the SADC region.   The second initiative was spearheaded by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, who chaired the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs). This panel revealed that Africa loses billions annually due to capital flight, through tax avoidance, under-declaration of mineral exports and illegal financial transactions. The volume of IFFs far outstrips official development assistance, making it a central priority for reform. Importantly, the panel broadened the definition of IFFs to include legal but unethical corporate practices, thus spotlighting systemic enablers of underdevelopment both within and outside Africa.   Both initiatives advanced the principle of developmental sovereignty, arguing that the continent’s future cannot be outsourced to donor agendas, but must be rooted in sound domestic institutions, transparent governance and strategic resource retention. 2.5 Sector-specific challenges and the imperative for differentiated financing approaches   Potgieter was unequivocal in her assertion that financing African development cannot be approached monolithically. She advocated for a differentiated approach tailored to the unique needs and financing structures of various sectors.   In the realm of peace and security, for instance, she noted that African-led peace enforcement operations are frequently underfunded and strategically marginalised due to the UN’s preference for “peacekeeping” rather than “peace enforcement.” This hesitancy creates a gap that African institutions must fill independently. The Kigali Decision envisioned a more autonomous AU, capable of rapid deployment and intervention in fragile contexts, even when the UN fails to act.   Climate finance represents another sector where global commitments have fallen short. While Africa bears the brunt of climate change, it receives only a fraction of the promised adaptation funds. Financing here must be concessional, long-term and equity-based, with a focus on resilience, loss and damage and disaster preparedness.   In the health and education sectors, Potgieter acknowledged that aid remains vital for many LDCs. However, she emphasised the importance of enhancing domestic fiscal capacity and service delivery mechanisms to ensure long-term sustainability. These sectors also require predictable, recurrent funding, which external partners are often reluctant to guarantee.   On infrastructure, she noted a positive trend. Citing an AU-NEPAD review of the PIDA (Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa), Potgieter highlighted that Africa had exceeded some of its targets in attracting external financing for infrastructure projects. While the quality and strategic relevance of these projects vary, this progress signals that infrastructure may be an area of relative strength that can be scaled up. 2.6 Conclusions and strategic recommendations   Ambassador Potgieter concluded with a stark, but hopeful message: while Africa has made commendable progress in articulating its development priorities and designing institutional mechanisms, the challenge remains one of implementation and political will. The continent’s financing future hinges not only on external conditions, but on internal choices, alignments and reforms.   She called for a revival of the Kigali Decision, strengthened enforcement of AU member obligations and a renewed campaign to operationalise the recommendations of both the Obasanjo and Mbeki panels. Equally important is a shift in narrative, from one of dependence to one of agency. African leaders must centre their citizens’ contributions, challenge exploitative trade dynamics and reclaim the continent’s role as a proactive agent in global development.   Above all, Potgieter urged African institutions to adopt strategically disaggregated financing strategies. Peacekeeping, climate resilience, infrastructure, education and health all demand distinct financing models, tailored governance arrangements and sector-specific partnerships.   Her address stands as a compelling call to action, insisting that Africa's development trajectory is not merely shaped by global forces, but by the courage and coordination of its own institutions.   3 DELEGATE PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT FINACING Ground-level realities and strategic reflections   As the keynote concluded, the dialogue opened to participants from across the continent, think tank representatives, who brought national and regional perspectives into sharper focus. Their contributions revealed a shared concern about Africa’s entrenched reliance on external financing, as well as a collective desire to see greater fiscal ownership, institutional discipline and mindset transformation in how the continent finances its development priorities.   The contributions, grounded in lived national realities, provided compelling illustrations of how financing challenges play out at policy and operational levels. Despite differences in country contexts, a number of strong thematic threads emerged: an enduring dependence on external funding; limited progress in mobilising domestic resources; institutional misalignment between fiscal policy and development ambitions; and the urgent need for African governments to demonstrate greater political and budgetary ownership over national development agendas. 3.1 Enduring Aid Dependency and Its Institutional Impacts   Across multiple interventions, the extent to which African states remain dependent on donor financing was laid bare. A participant from Nigeria spoke candidly about the situation in their country, particularly within the health sector, where international donors continue to play an outsized role in sustaining essential services. “Most of our countries are largely dependent on external funding,” the participant said, adding that in many cases, donors provide 80 to 90 percent of the financial resources required to run health programmes. Governments may contribute the remaining 10 or 20 percent, but this often functions more as a symbolic gesture than a foundation for sovereignty.   This reality, the speaker emphasised, is not limited to Nigeria. It is reflective of a broader pattern across the continent, where reliance on bilateral and multilateral development assistance, particularly for social sectors, remains deeply entrenched. While such aid has filled vital gaps, its continued dominance raises questions about ownership, sustainability and accountability.   Another delegate echoed this concern, noting that donor-dependency distorts national priorities. With programmes and timelines often shaped to fit donor cycles, governments may find themselves aligning with external benchmarks rather than homegrown development plans. This, in turn, weakens the autonomy of national institutions and limits their capacity to build long-term financing frameworks tailored to local needs.   3.2 The gap between fiscal discourse and budgetary commitment   Several participants drew attention to the disjuncture between public policy discourse and actual fiscal behaviour. While national leaders routinely emphasise the importance of African self-reliance and ownership over development financing, national budgets frequently fail to reflect these priorities in meaningful terms.   For example, one participant pointed out that although domestic funding for health or education is often formally included in national plans, the actual disbursement of such funds is frequently delayed, incomplete or deprioritised. External donors are then called upon to fill the void. This reinforces the dependency cycle and signals to development partners that national leadership may not fully prioritise these sectors.   Delegates noted that this credibility gap has long-term consequences. Donors may become reluctant to transition financial and programmatic control to national governments if those governments appear unwilling or unable to take full fiscal responsibility. Thus, the absence of consistent and timely domestic funding undermines both national autonomy and international trust. 3.3 Domestic resource mobilisation: An ambition yet to be realised   The imperative to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) emerged as a core theme. One delegate observed that African countries often speak passionately about the need to take charge of their development, but continue to rely overwhelmingly on foreign funding when it comes to actual implementation. “We must take ownership,” a participant urged, emphasising that the continent already possesses the material and human capital necessary to drive its development, what is lacking is the coordination and resolve to marshal those resources effectively.   However, delegates were not naïve about the obstacles. A narrow tax base, large informal economies and limited administrative capacity to collect and manage revenue were all cited as structural constraints to effective DRM. Moreover, the legitimacy of taxation itself is often undermined by poor service delivery and weak public trust, which make citizens less willing to comply with tax obligations. One speaker summarised this cycle succinctly: “If people don’t see the benefits of paying taxes, they will continue to evade them.”   Nonetheless, there was strong support for DRM as the only viable path to sustainable development finance. Delegates called for reforms in tax administration, more equitable revenue policies and more transparent use of public funds. Several noted that when citizens believe their contributions are being used responsibly, they are more likely to accept taxation as part of a legitimate social contract. 3.4 Mindset shift: Beyond material constraints   Beyond technical and institutional constraints, some participants emphasised the importance of changing the way African states and societies conceptualise their own capabilities. “We must stop thinking we are poor,” one speaker urged, calling for a revaluation of Africa’s internal strengths, its people, its culture, its natural resources and its economic potential. This mindset, they argued, is not only necessary for building public confidence, but also for shifting how African countries position themselves globally, not as aid recipients, but as equal partners and contributors to global development.   This was not merely a rhetorical point. Several participants connected this mindset to concrete governance behaviour: When leaders believe they must rely on donors, they structure their budgets, policies and political strategies accordingly. But when they commit to mobilising internal resources, even modestly, they begin to invest in the systems and institutions that enable long-term transformation. 3.5 National case studies: Illustrations from the ground   Delegates offered insights from specific country contexts to ground these broader themes. A representative spoke of Côte d’Ivoire, saying that while strategic frameworks for national development are in place, the actual financial resources required to implement them often fall short. The speaker highlighted the tensions between national ambition and fiscal reality, a gap that too often results in underperformance or missed targets.   Another participant shared the Ugandan perspective, that while efforts are underway to increase domestic contributions to national priorities, challenges persist. The tax base remains narrow, enforcement mechanisms are weak and institutional coordination is inconsistent. Despite these hurdles, there was cautious optimism that gradual reforms and increased fiscal discipline could pave the way for more predictable and autonomous financing in the years ahead.   Other speakers echoed these sentiments, reinforcing the view that while no country is immune to constraints, each must find its own pathway to incrementally reduce its reliance on external financing and strengthen domestic systems of financial governance. 3.6 Conclusion: Redefining responsibility in African development finance   The delegate inputs underscored a crucial insight: that the question of financing development in Africa is not simply a matter of technical solutions or financial inflows. It is fundamentally a question of political will, institutional integrity and shared responsibility, between governments and citizens and among countries within the continent.   While donors will likely remain part of the financing mix in the near term, the overwhelming message was clear: Africa must take decisive steps to own its development trajectory, not only in policy, but in budgeting, implementation and accountability. This includes setting clear national priorities, committing adequate domestic resources, building trust with citizens through responsible governance and resisting the temptation to default to donor dependency.   In short, the dialogue confirmed that development financing is inseparable from development ownership. And until African governments prioritise the internal financing of their national ambitions, external actors will continue to shape the pace, scope and direction of Africa’s future. 4 INSIGHTS FROM THE DISCUSSION   This report presents an extensive overview of Africa's development financing landscape, integrating an in-depth discussion and insights from African perspectives, to outline pivotal conclusions, recommendations and a strategic roadmap.   Furthermore, it emphasises the need for integrated policy proposals that address funding, security and economic growth comprehensively. The success of these goals hinges on the pivotal role of governance and leadership in empowering African institutions to take ownership of their development and security challenges.   Key conclusions   Dependency on external funding   Africa's development has predominantly relied on external funding, like Official Development Assistance (ODA) and private capital. However, diminishing ODA and the limited efficacy of private capital mechanisms have exposed the vulnerabilities of this model.   Financial fragility   Factors such as capital flight, illicit financial flows, inefficient tax systems and constrained institutional capacity have exacerbated Africa's financial fragility, limiting fiscal space for essential social and infrastructure investments.   Shift Towards Self-Reliance   There is a growing consensus that Africa must adopt a more self-reliant, diversified and resilient financing strategy, focusing on strengthening domestic resource mobilisation and pursuing regional pooled financing mechanisms.   Global financial governance   Africa's influence in shaping global financial norms on debt, aid and investments remains limited, necessitating strategic recalibration.   Sector-specific financing challenges   Sectors like peace, security, climate finance, health and education require tailored financial strategies.   Inclusive economic growth   Emphasis was placed on fostering growth that benefits all citizens, addressing debt relief, equitable trade agreements and robust infrastructure development. Civil Society Engagement   Civil society’s role is critical in addressing security challenges, promoting good governance, accountability and ensuring efficient resource utilisation.   Leadership and institutional capacity   Strong leadership and robust institutions are vital for effective resources management, corruption mitigation and policy implementation.   Interconnected pillars   Security, funding, economic growth and governance are intrinsically linked. Inclusive sustainable development hinges on addressing these elements collectively when designing policies.    5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND ROADMAP   To achieve financial sovereignty, Africa must transition from external dependency to proactive internal strategies and reforms. This includes seizing potential opportunities for growth and investing in innovative technologies. These actionable recommendations offer an opportunity to shape the continent’s development future.   The proposed Roadmap  serves as a call to action for Africa to take decisive steps in shaping its development trajectory. This involves setting clear national priorities, committing sufficient domestic resources, fostering trust with citizens, including the Youth, through responsible governance, and resisting the allure of donor dependency.   Revive the Kigali Decision , which aims to reduce Africa's reliance on external funding by financing at least 75% of the African Union's operational and programmatic budget internally, alongside 25% to 30% of its peace support operations. Pursuing regional pooled mechanisms to fund continental priorities through internally generated revenues is crucial.   Enforce the AU member commitments in order to ensure compliance with agreed-upon financial obligations.   Implement the recommendations of the Obasanjo and Mbeki Reports, which recommendations focus on reducing external financial dependency and curbing illicit financial flows.   Adopt differentiated financing strategies, whereby African institutions are urged to tailor sector-specific approaches, such as concessional loans for infrastructure, long-term financing for climate resilience and predictable funding for peacekeeping, education and health.   Promote a narrative of agency in which African leaders are encouraged to highlight citizens' contributions, challenge inequitable trade dynamics and assert Africa’s proactive role in global development.   Strengthen domestic resource mobilisation by expanding tax bases, enhancing public fiscal management and boosting institutional efficiency to collect and manage public revenue.   Recalibrate Africa's position in global financial governance by coordinating negotiation strategies, strengthening regional blocs and amplifying Africa’s collective voice in global forums and institutions. Enhance political will and institutional integrity so as to align national priorities with budgeting, implementation and accountability.   ROADMAP   1. Short-Term (1-2 years) :   Reform tax and fiscal management systems to improve domestic resource mobilisation. Activate regional financing frameworks like the Kigali Financing Decision . Develop and implement sector-specific financial strategies.   2. Medium-Term (3-5 years) :   Strengthen regional blocs for global influence. Scale up and sustain successful domestic resource mobilisation initiatives. Align sector-specific financing models with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).   3. Long-Term (5+ years) :   Drastically reduce reliance on external funding. Position Africa as a key global development actor. Ensure resilient, sustainable financing aligned with long-term development objectives.     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The recent Daily Maverick: The Gathering  marked its 15 th  iteration of the flagship annual event. Held on 28 August, it brought together some of South Africa’s leading thinkers and doers. Including journalists, business leaders, activists and public officials, the event offered an interactive space for public discussion. Represented by Dr Klaus Kotzé, the Inclusive Society Institute actively participated in the day’s proceedings. More than just a conference, the Gathering serves as a dynamic platform for impact-driven reflection. Guided by the Daily Maverick’s Rebecca Davis, some of the stand-out panels included a session on fixing government. Here Home Affairs Minister Leon Schreiber, SARS Commissioner Edward Kieswetter, and Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions Ouma Rabaji-Rasethaba acutely shone light on the institutional challenges and avenues for restoring public trust. Perhaps the most insightful session featured BOSA leader Musi Maimane, ActionSA president Herman Mashaba and Songezo Zibi of Rise Mzansi. The speakers spoke to the fresh visions and bold politics needed to revitalise South African politics. The Institute notes with keen interest the commitment not only of these speakers, but of the event at large, for increased active participation of citizens in the political process. It is encouraging that the initiative sought to move the discussion towards the inclusive, political centre.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   September 2025   Author: Daryl Swanepoel    CONTENTS   ABSTRACT 1 THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 2 THE INCLUSIVE SOCIETY INSTITUTE’S CONCERN 3 ABOUT THE GOVDEM  SURVEY 4 SURVEY RESULTS 4.1 Overall trust in immigrants from Africa 4.2 Age, employment and gender differences 4.3 Trends over time 5 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 6 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1 Distinguish clearly between legal and illegal immigration 6.2 Curb unlawful vigilantism and uphold the rule of law 6.3 Anchor policymaking in empirical evidence 6.4 Enforce labour and immigration laws effectively 6.5 Strengthen integration programmes to promote social cohesion 6.6 Reaffirm constitutional and human rights commitments 7 CONCLUSION REFERENCES Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:2212407849 ABSTRACT   This paper presents the findings of the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Poll, undertaken with IPSOS as part of its Khayabus survey, on South Africans’ attitudes towards immigrants from elsewhere in Africa. Based on over 3,000 face-to-face interviews in respondents’ homes and home languages and weighted in line with national demographics, the survey provides a robust measure of public sentiment with a margin of error of three to five percent.   The 2025 results show high and rising distrust. 73.1 percent of respondents reported that they do not trust immigrants from Africa “at all” or “not very much. Longitudinal data confirms a worsening trend during the last five years, with distrust in immigrants from Africa rising from 62.6 percent in 2021 to a staggering 73.1 percent in 2025.   This paper includes further analyses by age, race, gender and employment status, it offers recommendations to guide evidence-based governance and concludes that South Africa must replace fear with facts and unlawful action with lawful governance, if we are to build an inclusive society.   1 THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA   South Africa has historically always been a destination for migrants from across the African continent. They have and continue to be drawn to the country due to its comparatively stronger economy, its advanced infrastructure and the opportunities for education and work (Okunade, 2024). However, at the same time, the country is grappling with deep rooted challenges, such as poverty, unemployment and inequality. It is these challenges which serve to heighten social tensions between the immigrants and the local communities (Faluyi & Olutola, 2024). It is in this context that immigration has become a sensitive and polarising issue.   The public discourse is frequently marked by debates over the perceived economic and social impact of immigrants. On the one hand, whilst migrants contribute meaningfully to local economies, by filling labour gaps, starting businesses and enriching South Africa’s cultural fabric (OECD/ILO, 2018), there are, on the other hand widespread perceptions, particularly amongst the vulnerable communities that are struggling with unemployment, that immigrants are competing for scarce jobs, housing and public services, such as healthcare and education. These pressures have, at times, spilled over into xenophobic violence and hostility and it is the migrants from elsewhere in Africa that have borne the brunt thereof (Yingi, Ncube & Benyera. 2023).   In recent years tensions between immigrants from Africa and local communities  have grown and immigrants have been provoked by locals in a more organised and confrontational manner. Movements, such as Operation Dudula, have been mobilising local communities to act against foreign nationals, which they often do so through intimidation and harassment.  Tactics also include demands for the removal of immigrants from state facilities, such as hospitals and schools and vigilantes also try to force immigrants out of their jobs, out of their businesses and out of the local neighbourhoods (HRW, 2024). These extra-judicial actions not only undermine the rule of law, they also deepen mistrust and resentment and moreover, it is ventured, immigrants often end up serving as an excuse for public service non-performance and as convenient scapegoats for the broader structural challenges facing the nation, such as crime, structural unemployment and poor service delivery. All of this reflects a societal environment that risks fuelling (some, including the author, may even argue already has) social division due to the fear-mongering and misinformation.   2 THE INCLUSIVE SOCIETY INSTITUTE’S CONCERN   The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), which works to strengthen democracy and to foster social cohesion in South Africa, has consistently warned against the dangers of inflated rhetoric and unlawful vigilantism. It has stressed that inflated figures about the scale of illegal immigration distort the debate, fuels resentment and helps creates conditions ripe for hostility between the immigrant and local communities.   Senior political leaders, such as Action SA’s leader, Herman Mashaba and the then Home Affairs Minister Aaron Motsoaledi,  have respectively bandied around figures as high as 15 million (Hoffman, 2025) and 13 million (ISI, 2022). Key findings from opinion surveys conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) suggest that many South Africans believe the number of illegal immigrants in the country to be as high as 17- 40 million (ISI, 2022).   Empirical data, however, such as that of Stats SA, suggest a far smaller illegal migrant population than often claimed. According to a Stats SA statement in August 2021 there were around 3,95 million foreign born persons (legal and illegal immigrants) in South Africa (Stats SA, 2021). Whilst data on the exact number of illegal immigrants is lacking, through deduction it is plausible to assume that around half of the foreign born persons are in the country illegal (Gordon in ISI, 2022). Home Affairs could, for example, only account for around 2 million foreign born persons (Iturralde in ISI, 2022). The Inclusive Society Institute has consistently argued that there is a profound difference between dealing with a challenge of 2 million versus figures that are higher than 13-15  million, which are frequently cited in public discourse without evidence.   For the Inclusive Society Institute, ensuring rational, evidence-based debate is not only a matter of good governance, it is necessary to safeguard South Africa’s fragile social fabric, because social cohesion is weakened when fear and populism drive public opinion, and strengthened when facts, fairness and inclusivity underpin policymaking. The Institute has therefore stressed the need for sober, evidence-based policy decisions and stronger institutional capacity, as opposed to populist interventions or unlawful acts by civic groups 3 ABOUT THE GOVDEM  SURVEY   The Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey  (ISI, 2025) is conducted in partnership with IPSOS as part of its long-standing syndicated Khayabus Survey (IPSOS, 2025), one of the largest and most reliable public opinion surveys undertaken in South Africa. It comprises around 3,600 respondents from across the nation. To ensure the accuracy of the responses and inclusivity, the respondents are interviewed face-to-face their own homes and in their home language and therefore eliminates many of the barriers that telephone or online surveys often present. This approach also helps to ensure that participants are comfortable, understood and able to express their views freely and authentically. The survey sample is carefully weighted in line with South Africa’s demographics, which means it reflects the diversity of the country in terms of age, gender, race, geography and socio-economic status and on this basis, the findings can be regarded as a fair representation of South Africans’ prevailing sentiment at the time of that the survey was conducted. In this case between May and July of 2025 (Harris, 2025).   As with all surveys of this scale and magnitude, a margin of error is to be expected. In this survey the margin of error is around 2 percent. This margin does not detract from the robustness of the insights, which policymakers, civil society and the public can comfortably consider as reliable evidence of the prevailing attitudes in the country at the time that the survey was conducted (Harris, 2025).   4 SURVEY RESULTS 4.1 Overall trust in immigrants from Africa   Having set out the broader context and outlined the GovDem Survey’s  methodology, we now turn to the results of the survey. The findings reveal a striking level of distrust among South Africans towards immigrants from elsewhere on the continent. When asked whether they trusted people from these groups and measured against the responses “I don’t trust them at all” or “I do not trust them very much,” 73.1 percent of respondents indicated such negative sentiment.   Notably, this distrust is not confined to one segment of society, but is broadly shared across South Africa’s racial groups. Among white respondents, 72.48 percent expressed distrust, among black respondents, it was 73.17 percent, among Indian respondents, 75.22 percent and among coloured respondents it was 72.61 percent. The sentiment therefore cuts across the racial divide, reflecting a widespread national attitude rather than an isolated viewpoint within a particular community.   4.2 Age, employment and gender differences   When analysing the survey results by age, it also emerges that all age groups reflect similarly high levels of distrust towards immigrants from elsewhere in Africa. Among the youngest group, 18–24 year olds, 74.12 percent indicated that they did not trust immigrants. For 25–34 year olds, the figure was 71.22 percent, for those aged 35–49, 71.74 percent and among respondents over 50 years old, 76.16 percent. These results show that the sentiment is broadly uniform across generations, with only marginal differences.   Where a more marked differentiation emerges is between those respondents who are employed and those who are not. Among respondents who reported being in employment, 70.06 percent indicated distrust of immigrants. By contrast, among those who reported being unemployed, the figure rises to 77.31 percent. This could suggest that joblessness intensifies the negative perceptions that local communities have of African immigrants, which is most probably due to the belief that they, the immigrants that is, are competing in the labour market to the detriment of the local job seekers.   Finally, when comparing survey results by gender, a slight divergence is evident, with men expressing distrust in immigrants from Africa at a rate of 71.39 percent, while women reflect a slightly higher distrust at 74.33 percent. Women are thus marginally more concerned about the presence of African immigrants in the country than their male compatriots, but, as already said, the gap is relatively small. Graphic 1: % of respondents distrusting of immigrants from African countries (various demographics)   (Source: Author, 2025) 4.3 Trends over time   The GovDem Survey  also provides disturbing insight into how attitudes towards immigrants from Africa have hardened over the past five years. In 2021, 62.63 percent of respondents indicated that they did not trust immigrants “at all” or “not very much”  and in 2022, the figure was almost identical at 62.72 percent. But by 2023, however, the percentage had risen to 67.74 percent and in 2024 it continued to remain elevated (66.98 percent). The most recent survey, that was conducted in mid-2025, shows that distrust has again risen sharply to an alarming 73.1 percent.   The results of the survey indicate that while anti-immigrant sentiment has consistently been high, hovering in the low sixty percent range, it has been steadily worsening over time and it has now (between 2024 and 2025) registered a particularly notable increase. This sharp rise may plausibly be argued to be linked to the heightened attention illegal immigration has received in public discourse, as well as the protest actions and vigilante campaigns, such as those driven by movements like Operation Dudula, which have amplified the issue in the national consciousness of late. Graphic 2: Distrust of immigrants from Africa – a five-year (2021 – 2025) trend   (Source: Author, 2025)   5 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION   The findings of the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey  underscores the persistence and intensification of the anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa and what is striking about it, is not only the consistently high levels of distrust, but so too the fact that these attitudes cut across race, age and gender. This would suggest that the distrust of immigrants hailing from elsewhere in Africa has emerged as a shared national concern, which can no longer be ascribed to any particular community and/or demographic cohort. The broad-based nature of the sentiment arguably reflects just how deeply woven into the nation’s shared socio-economic anxieties the immigration concerns have become. The sharp divergence between the employed and the unemployed respondents is particularly telling and it suggests that unemployment exacerbates the fears that the immigrants are competitors for scarce jobs and resources. This perception, whether or not borne out by evidence, points to a deeper structural problem, namely that the widespread economic insecurity is fuelling resentment. Moreover, immigrants are becoming the scapegoat for frustrations that are, at its source, about inequality and exclusion. The trend-data reinforces this interpretation, because while distrust has long hovered in the low to mid-sixties range, it has suddenly, between 2024 and 2025, risen sharply, which period also aligns with that of intensified political and media focus on immigration and increased protest and vigilante activity. Arguably, this would suggest that public sentiment is not static and that it can be inflamed by populist rhetoric, misinformation and highly visible acts of anti-immigrant mobilisation.   Read together, the results of the GovDem Survey  present a warning signal that South Africa faces a growing risk of the anti-immigrant sentiment eroding social cohesion and deepening societal divisions (if left unaddressed). Moreover, it will undermine the inclusive values enshrined in the Constitution. And so for the Inclusive Society Institute, the imperative is clear: Fear needs to be countered with facts and bridges of solidarity need to be built. Moreover, it is to ensure that immigration policy is guided by evidence and the principles of democracy, rather than by populism or unlawful vigilantism.   6 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS   The results of the GovDem Survey , when coupled and considered within the broader social context, point to the urgent need for a more coherent and balanced approach to immigration policy, from which the following recommendations emerge:   6.1 Distinguish clearly between legal and illegal immigration   Government must urgently draw a line of clarity between those immigrants who are in the country legally and those who are not. At present, the conflation of the two feeds public anxiety and undermines long-term social cohesion. A distinction is also critical to ensuring South Africa retains much-needed skills brought by legal immigrants, which contribute to building the economy, because whilst it is so that some immigrants may compete for jobs, many others fill gaps in scarce professions and therefore the presence of suitably qualified legal immigrants should be recognised as an asset, not a liability. 6.2 Curb unlawful vigilantism and uphold the rule of law   As the Inclusive Society Institute has emphasised, inflated rhetoric and unlawful actions by civic groups or individuals set a dangerous precedent and they, no matter their concerns, have no business in enforcing the laws of the country, that remains the role of the state. Allowing vigilante actions against immigrants undermines state authority, disrupts vital public services and risks legitimising illegality. The authorities must send a clear signal that unlawful enforcement will not be tolerated.   6.3 Anchor policymaking in empirical evidence   The Inclusive Society Institute has already cautioned against inflated figures, which fuel hostility and panic, and accordingly, accurate, evidence-based data on migration must inform public policy. This includes refining population counts, understanding the real scale of irregular migration and communicating these facts to the public in an accessible manner, because without this, populist claims will continue to dominate the discourse and in so doing, worsen mistrust.   6.4 Enforce labour and immigration laws effectively   Given South Africa’s strained economic position and persistently high unemployment, it is unrealistic to assume that growth alone will resolve competition over jobs and therefore a more immediate and practical step is to ensure the effective enforcement of labour and immigration laws.   Employers must be required to hire only South Africans and legal immigrants, with strong penalties for those found employing undocumented workers. To effectively police this, regular workplace inspections and transparent enforcement mechanisms should be instituted to protect vulnerable local job seekers. It appears current efforts are ineffective and lacking. Critically, government must demonstrate greater resolve in curbing the inflow of illegal immigrants into the country, because it is clear that the issue is progressively growing larger, which reflects gaps in enforcement and implementation. If the flow is properly managed, the conditions that fuel social unrest and vigilante actions would be diminished, making such unlawful responses unnecessary in the first place. 6.5 Strengthen integration programmes to promote social cohesion Distrust of immigrants is pervasive across race, age and gender groups, which points to the need for deliberate, state- and community-led initiatives to foster integration, such as public education campaigns, community dialogues and support for immigrant-owned businesses. So too, building broader public awareness of the positive contributions migrants make to society, can help counterbalance the narrative of fear and suspicion.   6.6 Reaffirm constitutional and human rights commitments South Africa’s Constitution and international obligations guarantee access to essential services and protects against discrimination and therefore the country’s immigration policy must remain aligned with these principles in spite of the growing populist onslaught against them. While the enforcement of laws need to be strengthened, dignity and human rights need to be ensured and safeguarded. 7 CONCLUSION   The findings of the GovDem Survey are clear, and that is that distrust toward immigrants from Africa is high, widespread and rising and the distrust cuts across race, gender and age groups, reflecting a national concern that can no longer be ignored. The sharp increase in negative sentiment over the past year suggests that public debate, populist rhetoric and unlawful campaigns, such as vigilante actions, have contributed to the inflaming of public attitudes. For the Inclusive Society Institute, whose mission is to strengthen democracy and foster social cohesion, the message is equally clear: South Africa cannot afford for the immigration debate to be driven by fear, inflated figures and unlawful action.   Policymaking must be anchored in empirical evidence and a clear distinction must urgently be drawn between legal and illegal immigrants. At the same time, government must do its job better, by enforcing immigration and labour laws effectively and by curbing the inflow of undocumented immigrants. Only then can the conditions that give rise to social unrest and vigilante action be eliminated.   The challenge now is to strengthen social cohesion, by countering mistrust and hostility with fact-based debate and to ensure that legal immigrants, many of whom bring scarce and much-needed skills, are seen as contributors to building a stronger economy. It is only through a balanced, lawful and dignified approach that South Africa can ensure that immigration does not weaken its democracy, but instead advances the constitutional ideal of an inclusive society.   South Africa must replace fear with facts and unlawful action with lawful governance, if we are to build an inclusive society.   REFERENCES   Faluyi, O.T. & Olutola, A.A. 2024.  Poverty in South Africa: Drivers of Perpetuation.  African Journal of Inter/Multidisciplinary Studies 2024,   6(1): 1-13   Harris, M. 2025. Zoom meeting between the author and Mari Harris, Director of IPSOS (South Africa) on 25 August 2025.   Hoffman, P. 2025. The rights of undocumented immigrants in SA . [Online] Available at: https://accountabilitynow.org.za/the-rights-of-undocumented-immigrants-in-sa/#:~:text=Previous%20claims%20by%20the%20party%20that%20there,when%20the%20most%20recent%20census%20was%20held. [accessed: 23 August 2025]   Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2024. World Report 2025: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/south-africa#:~:text=Violence%20against%20women%20and%20girls%20is%20widespread%2C%20endemic%2C%20and%20an,the%20highest%20femicide%20rates%20worldwide  [accessed: 22 August 2024]   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2022. Developing an effective response to addressing xenophobia in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jAuVT3ePb-2Q0cjrihPxp6ua795UaV-i/view [accessed: 23 August 2025]   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2025. GovDem Survey . Cape Town: ISI   Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation/Internal Labour Organisation (OECD/ILO). 2018. How Immigrants Contribute to South Africa’s Economy . Paris:  OECD Publishing.   Okunade, S. K. 2024. Addressing irregular migration into South Africa: Paradiplomatic efforts of subnational governments in the Limpopo Province.  South African Journal of International Affairs ,  31 (4), 475–495.   Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2021.   Erroneous reporting of undocumented migrants in SA.  [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14569 [accessed: 23 August 2025]   Yingi, E., Ncube, T. & Benyera, E. 2023. Situating Dashed Prospects of Independence into the Xenophobic Narrative in South Africa.  Journal of Black Studies ,  55 (1), 68-89.      - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute’s Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, participated in the 1st National Convention of the National Dialogue, held from 15–16 August 2025 at the University of South Africa’s Muckleneuk Campus, Pretoria.   This historic convention, initiated following the President of the Republic’s call for all South Africans to engage in shaping the nation’s future, marked the formal kick-off of the National Dialogue, a 12-month, citizen-led process aimed at developing a shared 30-year vision for South Africa.   Purpose of the Convention   The convention served as an agenda-setting platform for the National Dialogue. It brought together representatives from 30 sectors of society, including civil society, labour, business, government and political parties, ensuring broad inclusivity.   Key objectives included:   Launching the National Dialogue process and setting its guiding spirit. Introducing the citizen-led dialogue framework. Showcasing community-based and citizen-initiated model dialogues. Agreeing on organising principles and processes for ward-based and sectoral dialogues. Presenting the Eminent Persons Group and Steering Committee who will oversee the process.   Looking ahead   The National Dialogue Convention laid the groundwork for an extensive year-long process of public and sectoral dialogues across the country. Through these, South Africans from all walks of life will have the opportunity to reflect on the nation’s journey, confront difficult conversations and collaboratively imagine the path forward.   The Inclusive Society Institute remains deeply engaged in this process and will continue contributing to efforts aimed at strengthening democracy, inclusivity, and long-term nation-building.

On Monday, 25 August 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) hosted a high-level webinar entitled “Reform UN80: Renewal or Decline? The Future of Multilateralism at the United Nations’ 80th Anniversary.”  The event formed part of ISI’s ongoing consultations to shape its position on global governance reform.   The webinar brought together a distinguished panel of former senior United Nations officials and experts, who reflected on the UN Secretary-General’s Reform UN80 initiative, launched to ensure the organisation remains fit for purpose in a rapidly changing global order.   Key themes   Discussions were structured around four pressing questions:   The true aim of Reform UN80 and whether it represents genuine political renewal or merely administrative streamlining. The UN’s deepening budget crisis, including the political nature of arrears and the impact on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The rise of unilateralism and its implications for multilateral cooperation. The consequences of US-China rivalry for the UN system and the opportunities and risks this creates for the Global South, particularly Africa.   Speakers emphasised that while efficiency measures, such as mandate reviews and budget rationalisation are important, they cannot substitute for political renewal and trust in the UN’s Charter principles. They argued that Africa, and South Africa in particular, have a pivotal role to play in shaping reform outcomes and ensuring that the voices of the Global South are heard.   Conclusion   The consultation concluded that the UN stands at a crossroads: it can either enter a cycle of decline marked by financial fragility and great-power rivalry, or seize this reform moment to rebuild legitimacy, strengthen multilateralism and amplify the Global South’s agency.

The Inclusive Society Institute, represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, attended the Social Services Cluster Media and Stakeholder Briefing held on Thursday, 21 August 2025.   The theme of the briefing was “Ensuring open access and provision of quality social services to the people.” During the briefing, the work undertaken by each of the Committees was discussed as follows:   The Portfolio Committee on Health, Dr Sibongiseni Dhlomo,   will talk about: Tobacco Products and Electronic Delivery Systems Control Bill Operation Dudula at healthcare centres   The Portfolio Committee on Basic Education, Ms Joy Maimela, will talk about: Bela Act Regulations Safety in schools   The Select Committee on Education, Sciences and Creative Industries, Mr Makhi Feni will talk about: Threat of disruptions of schools when they open for 2026 on account of foreign nationals Exploring better ways of working with all civil society organisations on foreigners Legislative interventions, including Labour Migration Policy and Border Management Authority   The briefing provided an important platform for stakeholders to engage on key social development initiatives, highlight progress, and address pressing societal challenges. The Inclusive Society Institute remains committed to contributing towards building an inclusive and equitable society, and its participation in the session reaffirmed this dedication.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   August 2025   Rapporteur: Daryl Swanepoel CONTENTS   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CONTEXT AND RATIONALE KEY THEMES AND FINDINGS POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 1 INTRODUCTION 2 BACKGROUND 3 EVOLVING GEOPOLITICS AND AFRICA’S STRATEGIC NAVIGATION: INSIGHTS FROM THE US-AFRICA-CHINA NEXUS 3.1 SHIFTS IN US FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 3.2 STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA AND AFRICA’S ROLE 3.3 THE US POLICY SHIFT AWAY FROM DEMOCRATIC NORMS 3.4 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC RESPONSE AND AGENCY 3.5 DE-DOLLARISATION AND ECONOMIC AUTONOMY 3.6 INTERNAL CHALLENGES AND FOREIGN POLICY COHERENCE 3.7 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD 3.7.1 ADOPT A POLICY OF STRATEGIC NON-ALIGNMENT 3.7.2 LEVERAGE NATURAL RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT, NOT EXTRACTION 3.7.3 BUILD INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FOR COHERENT FOREIGN POLICY 3.7.4 STRENGTHEN REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 3.7.5 REFRAME AFRICA’S NARRATIVE ON THE GLOBAL STAGE 3.7.6 PURSUE FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY 3.7.7 ANCHOR FOREIGN POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC AND DEVELOPMENTAL VALUES 3.7.8 CONCLUSION 4 NAVIGATING THE AFRICA - CHINA - US NEXUS: STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES IN A LANDSCAPE OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSION: THE TRIANGULAR DIPLOMATIC DYNAMICS 4.1 CHINA’S ROLE IN AFRICA: MORE THAN INFRASTRUCTURE 4.2 THE US DIVERSION STRATEGY: COUNTERING CHINA THROUGH AFRICA 4.3 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC POSITIONING: DUAL ENGAGEMENT WITH A FOCUS ON AUTONOMY 4.4 HOW CHINA SHOULD RESPOND: BUILDING RESILIENCE IN AFRICAN PARTNERSHIPS 4.5 CONCLUSION: TOWARD A TRIANGULAR BALANCE 5 TRIANGULAR TRADE DYNAMICS: US, CHINA AND AFRICA IN ECONOMIC TENSION AND OPPORTUNITY 5.1 CHINA - AFRICA TRADE: SCALE, SPEED AND STRUCTURAL DOMINANCE 5.2 US - AFRICA TRADE: DECLINE, REDEFINITION AND OPPORTUNITY GAPS 5.3 TRADE AS GEOPOLITICAL LEVERAGE: THE RISK OF WEAPONISATION 5.4 AFRICA’S TRADE STRATEGY: TOWARD A BALANCED AND BENEFICIAL REGIME 5.5 CONCLUSION: TRADE AS A STRATEGIC LEVER, NOT A PASSIVE FLOW 6 CONTOURS OF CONTAINMENT: US – AFRICA - CHINA MILITARY AND SECURITY DYNAMICS 6.1 US SECURITY ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA: CONTAINMENT THROUGH COUNTERTERRORISM 6.2 CHINA’S EVOLVING SECURITY ROLE: FROM NON-INTERVENTION TO STRATEGIC POSITIONING 6.3 PEACE AND SECURITY AS A SITE OF COMPETITION, NOT COOPERATION 6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN AUTONOMOUS AFRICAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 6.5 CONCLUSION: FROM THEATRE OF RIVALRY TO ARENA OF SOVEREIGNTY 7 REFLECTIONS ON THE TRIANGULAR HORIZON: RETHINKING POWER, PARTNERSHIP AND PURPOSE 7.1 AFRICA AT THE CENTRE, NOT THE MARGIN 7.2 THE US AND CHINA: FROM COMPETITION TO CONSTRUCTIVE COEXISTENCE? 7.3 A CALL TO REIMAGINE PARTNERSHIP 7.4 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE IS NEGOTIATED, NOT INHERITED 8 FINAL WORD: AFRICA AS THE AUTHOR OF ITS OWN FUTURE IMAGE REFERENCES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   This report sets out to explore the evolving triangular relationship between the United States, China and Africa, which is an increasingly significant nexus that is shaping global power dynamics, trade, security and development. In drawing upon insights from a high-level webinar conducted under Chatham House Rules and guided by supporting reflections and research by the Inclusive Society Institute, the report examines the underlying forces, challenges and strategic options that are available to African policymakers in navigating this complex geopolitical terrain. CONTEXT AND RATIONALE   The return of President Donald Trump to the White House, combined with a resurgent China that has growing global ambitions and the sharpening rivalry between these two global powers, place Africa at a critical juncture. Both Washington and Beijing seek to advance their strategic interests on the continent, economically, diplomatically and militarily and yet their engagement styles, priorities and philosophies differ markedly. And as for Africa, the challenge and the opportunity now lies in it resisting binary choices and instead it should focus on charting a course that is rooted in agency, coherence and long-term development. KEY THEMES AND FINDINGS   Africa must claim its strategic agency  by repositioning itself, not as a passive recipient of global influence, but as a deliberate and autonomous actor. This involves rejecting Cold War-style alignment, defining clear development goals and leveraging global competition so as to secure better terms for trade, investment and technology.   China has established itself as Africa’s largest trading partner and focuses on infrastructure, extractives and bundled finance, whilst  US - Africa trade has declined and remains narrowly focused, but both powers use trade as a geopolitical instrument, often prioritising influence over development outcomes. Africa must therefore factor in the geopolitical and trade dynamics  by pushing for value addition, local manufacturing and regional integration, through initiatives such as the Africa Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Economic autonomy and de-dollarisation   and other emerging trends, including BRICS-led financial alternatives and local currency trade,  now offer new pathways for economic independence, which can help mitigate Africa’s over-reliance on the US dollar, which exposes it to external shocks and limits monetary sovereignty, but it requires strong institutions, regional coordination and political will. Peace and security tensions  are primarily the responsibility of Africans themselves. Currently, the US’s security engagement with Africa is increasingly shaped by counterterrorism and anti-China containment, while China has chosen to move cautiously into peacekeeping and to position itself in strategic geographical locations, but both approaches, nevertheless, risk militarising diplomacy and sidelining African peace frameworks.  Africa must therefore reaffirm ownership of its security agenda and demand transparency, accountability and multilateral cooperation. Africa must control the narrative and norm contestation  by taking control of its own story, one that highlights innovation, leadership and dignity, rather than dependency or vulnerability. Shaping the global narrative is not cosmetic, it is strategic and essential to redefining Africa’s place in world affairs. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS   Pursue a policy of principled non-alignment  in which Africa must maximise its  leverage by avoiding binary choices and engaging with both the US and China, based on clearly defined interests.   Build institutional and negotiation capacity  by strengthening technical expertise across foreign ministries, trade departments and regional bodies so as to ensure effective, sovereign engagement.   Promote Continental coherence  ought to be promoted by using platforms like the African Union and AfCFTA in order to avoid fragmented bargaining and in so doing set minimum standards for trade, debt and digital governance.   Financial and digital sovereignty  ought to be asserted through the continued development of its regional payment systems and data governance frameworks, so that it reflects African priorities, not those imposed externally.   Recalibrate security engagements  by ensuring that external military partnerships align with African peacebuilding goals and support the continent’s own security institutions.   Foster strategic communication and trust-building  by creating platforms for trilateral dialogue, not as adversarial blocs, but as co-stakeholders in global peace, prosperity and reform.   CONCLUSION   Africa sits at the centre of a shifting global order, an order defined not only by who holds power, but also by how that power is exercised. The triangular relationship between the US, China and Africa is not static, it is being actively negotiated. This negotiation must be led by African voices, guided by African values and directed toward African visions of justice, development and dignity.   Therefore, in a world which is fast moving toward multipolarity, Africa must insist on not just being a partner, but so too, a peer. 1 INTRODU CTION   The global geopolitical landscape is undergoing a period of profound transformation, which is marked by the resurgence of the great power syndrome and with shifting global alliances and nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, whose strategic importance is continuing to grow in the eyes of global powers.   The return of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States in 2025 has reignited debates over the nature and trajectory of US foreign policy and in this report the focus is on the US’s engagement with Africa and its increasingly adversarial stance toward China.   In response to these evolving dynamics and to better understand them, the Inclusive Society Institute convened a high-level webinar titled “Building US-Africa relations under the Trump administration and its nexus with China” , which webinar was hosted on 22 July 2025. This platform brought together distinguished thought leaders, policy and military/intelligence analysts from both the United States and South Africa to assess the implications of renewed US leadership on Africa’s development, diplomacy and global positioning.   The core premise of the webinar rested on the assumption that the Trump administration is likely to pursue a more transactional and assertive approach to international relations. This will undoubtedly also apply to Africa. Moreover, its competitive posture against China, will simultaneously be amplified, particularly in areas such as trade, investment, military presence and human rights. The complexity that this evolving relationship between the US and China presents, demands urgent attention and nuanced understanding and for the purposes of this report, also its ripple effects across African nations, lest policymakers are to be caught ill-prepared.   China has an entrenched economic footprint across Africa that spans infrastructure construction and financing, trade partnerships and development aid, and it has over the last few decades presented both opportunities and challenges for African governments. The US, meanwhile, remains a key diplomatic, security and development actor on the continent, whose policies continue to significantly influence both regional stability and governance trends on the continent. It is the intersection of these two global players' interests in Africa, and the risks and openings that it presents, especially for African countries who seek to balance external relations in order to protect domestic priorities, that is the interest of this report.   The webinar therefore sought to interrogate four pivotal questions, namely:   Firstly, what are the expectations of US policy toward Africa under the new Trump administration? Secondly, how might the hardening of US-China relations impact Africa? Thirdly, what stance is the US likely to adopt with regard to its military presence in Africa under the new administration and how will it view the presence of other global powers, such as China, who have operations on the continent? And finally, how should African nations position themselves to engage both the US and China diplomatically, economically and strategically?   This report sets out to present a comprehensive overview and critical analysis of the discussions held during the webinar. Its aim is to distil the key insights offered by panellists, in order to provide contextual understanding of current US-Africa-China dynamics and to offer strategic guidance to African policymakers and stakeholders on how best to navigate this complex trilateral relationship in the years ahead. 2 BACKGROUND   The geopolitical landscape in which Africa operates has shifted dramatically in recent years and it has been propelled by intensifying competition between global powers and a growing awareness within the continent of its own strategic value. Whilst traditionally, the continent has been viewed as the object of foreign influence, and often courted or neglected in cycles, Africa today stands at the intersection of powerful global currents emanating from both East and West and at the heart of this evolving terrain lies the complex trilateral relationship between Africa, the United States and China, a nexus that is increasingly shaping Africa’s policy decisions and long-term developmental path.   With the return of President Donald Trump to the White House, the United States has adopted a more forthright and transactional foreign policy posture and the rhetoric from Washington has grown sharper, signalling a shift not only in tone, but also in strategic orientation. The Trump administration’s scepticism toward multilateralism and traditional alliances, along with its firm stance on countering Chinese global influence, has profound implications for Africa, because now it has to distinguish between rhetorical novelty and genuine policy shifts and it has to respond, not as passive recipients of foreign policy, but as active agents capable of setting the terms of engagement.   Simultaneously, China’s role in Africa has expanded dramatically and has been marked by deepening trade relationships, infrastructure investments and diplomatic outreach. This presence, while often framed in strategic or even ideological terms by external observers, has increasingly become a routine part of Africa’s economic ecosystem, yet, growing global scrutiny of China’s influence, particularly from the US, has added pressure on African states to clarify their positions. The Trump administration’s likely intensification of this contest with China raises questions about how far it may go in discouraging African engagement with Beijing and whether this will manifest through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure or altered aid and investment patterns.   Beyond geopolitics, emerging global economic trends are also challenging Africa to rethink its place in the world economic order and so enters the de-dollarisation debate.   The rising interest in de-dollarisation and the development of alternative financial infrastructure, such as non-SWIFT payment systems and cross-currency trade settlements among BRICS countries, represent a broader push toward economic sovereignty and for many African policymakers, these innovations are more than technical adjustments, they are statements of autonomy and a reassertion of agency in a world where currency and finance remain tools of global influence.   Importantly, this moment presents not only risks, but also opportunities, given that Africa’s leverage is also increasing: its collective voice at the United Nations, its resource base, youthful population and rapidly expanding markets make it an indispensable player in any vision of global progress. Such leverage must, however,  be used wisely, since African countries face a fundamental choice, whether to align passively with the interests of foreign powers or to define their own path, one that is rooted in diversified partnerships, mutual benefit and long-term strategic thinking.   In this shifting environment, the notion that Africa has to “choose” between the East and West is becoming increasingly obsolete and instead, the continent must focus on achieving balance, asserting its priorities, cultivating agency and refusing to be cast merely as the arena in which others compete. As highlighted in the Inclusive Society Institute’s framing of this dialogue, the questions at hand are not just about policy, they are about sovereignty, vision and the role Africa wishes to play in shaping the 21st-century global order.   3 EVOLVING GEOPOLITICS AND AFRICA’S STRATEGIC NAVIGATION: INSIGHTS FROM THE US-AFRICA-CHINA NEXUS    3.1 SHIFTS IN US FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION   Since the return of President Donald Trump to the Oval Office in January, the US’s foreign policy has undergone a pronounced shift, both in terms of its tone and in its structure. Moreover, this transformation is grounded in a deeply nationalistic ethos that prizes unilateral decision-making and which is guided by transactional diplomacy and a reassertion of American primacy in global affairs. Africa, within this framework, is viewed by the administration less as a developmental or strategic partner in a collaborative sense, and more as a transactional space in which it the continent is valued by the Trump-administration primarily for its resources and its geopolitical position vis-à-vis rivals, such as China.   The “America First” paradigm being espoused by the Trump administration favours direct bilateral engagements over multilateral cooperation, resulting in the sidelining of traditional institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation and other multilateral frameworks that have historically been involved in structuring Africa’s global interactions. This approach not only alters diplomatic norms, but also undermines the collective decision-making processes, which leaves smaller nations more exposed to power asymmetries in bilateral negotiations.   Several participants at the webinar highlighted that this policy trajectory is not entirely new, but that it represents an unvarnished continuation of long-standing American ambivalence toward Africa. Past administrations have frequently engaged Africa in fits and starts, they have often reacted to crises or strategic necessities, rather than adopting a consistent and forward-looking longer-term strategy. However, what distinguishes the current administration is the degree of candour and rigidity in its objectives of securing economic benefit, geopolitical leverage and reduced US liabilities in foreign engagements.   Furthermore, the restructuring within the US State Department and the scaling down of USAID’s developmental footprint, signifies a retreat from values-based diplomacy, since the reductions in staffing, particularly in departments focused on democracy, human rights and labour, suggest that soft power tools are being deprioritised in favour of more commercially-driven and profit-centric engagements. In this emerging configuration, African countries are expected to present themselves, not as political partners, but primarily in terms of what economic opportunities they bring to the table, primarily measured by their contributions to US commercial and security interests.   This reorientation challenges African policymakers to critically assess their diplomatic toolkits, because the absence of traditional diplomatic courtesies and institutional platforms, once taken for granted, now necessitates a recalibration of how African states need to frame their bilateral relations with the United States. Instead of navigating established aid and development channels, African states are now having to increasingly deal directly with power centres, be they special envoys, corporate entities or more narrowly focused agencies that operate outside of the traditional diplomatic norms.   3.2 STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA AND AFRICA’S ROLE   One of the most critical geopolitical backdrops to US - Africa relations under the Trump administration is the intensifying competition between the United States and China, and Africa sits squarely within the crosshairs of this rivalry, not as a passive terrain, but as a strategic and economic theatre where influence and access and alliances are continuously contested. The Trump administration’s Africa policy cannot be fully understood without a deep examination of this nexus.   China is deeply entrenched and engaged on the African continent, with a plethora of investments that span infrastructure development, digital ecosystems, critical minerals and diplomatic influence. Moreover,  through mechanisms such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its expansive financing of roads, ports and energy projects, China has positioned itself as a key economic partner for many African nations, with a long-term investment strategy, which is often welcomed by African states, who desperately seek capital and rapid development, even when such investment raises concerns about debt sustainability or political leverage.   The United States, in contrast, has approached this competition with a clear intent to limit China’s influence and as several webinar contributors observed, the Trump administration sees China not only as a rival, but as a threat to American geopolitical primacy. This zero-sum framing has, of course, far-reaching implications for how the US will engage African countries, particularly those with existing or growing ties to Beijing.   Rather than presenting a compelling alternative development agenda, the US has responded with targeted commercial diplomacy, which emphasises trade, security cooperation and critical minerals. A prominent example is the convening of a “mini-summit” with five African leaders from Mauritania, Senegal, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, who were selected less for regional representativeness and more for their access to strategic natural resources. The focus of these engagements, panellists suggested, was not on governance, development or mutual goals, but rather on how the US could benefit from the relationships, especially through control of supply chains that counterbalance China’s hold on the global minerals market.   The selective nature of these partnerships reflects a divide-and-rule tactic that bypasses regional organisations and multilateral consensus, since instead of engaging the African Union or regional blocs, the Trump administration has preferred bilateral deals with countries deemed compliant or strategically expedient. This serves to undermine efforts at African unity and policy coherence and may erode hard-earned continental consensus on issues such as natural resource governance, environmental standards and regional infrastructure integration.   Several analysts expressed concern that African nations are being asked to choose sides in this geopolitical rivalry, but in doing, it would be strategically shortsighted, because African countries would then risk becoming pawns in a larger contest that prioritises external interests over domestic development. Furthermore, the transactional logic of the Trump administration lacks the long-term developmental framing that African nations require, such as commitments to, among others, value addition, industrialisation or human capital investment.   Critically, panellists emphasised that Africa’s best interest lies not in alignment, but in balance and thus by cultivating diversified relationships that extract maximum benefit from both Beijing and Washington, African states can mitigate dependency on either power and enhance their global agency. To do this effectively, however, requires sophisticated diplomacy and intra-African coordination with considerably more investment in policy design and institutional capacity.   The strategic competition between the US and China is likely to continue reshaping the global landscape for years to come, and for Africa, this contest presents both challenges and opportunities and so it will be essential for African leaders to avoid making binary choices. And they should resist short-term temptations, but instead focus on sustainable, inclusive partnerships that serve long-term development goals.   3.3 THE US POLICY SHIFT AWAY FROM DEMOCRATIC NORMS   One of the more consequential shifts under the Trump administration’s foreign policy has been the departure from long-standing US commitments to promoting democratic values abroad, particularly in Africa, where historically the US’s engagement with the continent has included significant investment in democratic institution building, human rights, civil society development and electoral transparency. While these efforts have, at times, been inconsistent or selectively applied, they broadly represented an important normative framework that set their expectations and which gave leverage to reformers across the African states.   Under the current administration, that framework has weakened considerably and as several participants in the webinar highlighted, the Trump administration has significantly de-emphasised both democracy promotion in its rhetoric and in its resourcing. Key offices within the US State Department, including the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, have all seen reductions in staffing and political support and USAID’s traditional development agenda, which often supported governance reform, civil society training and election integrity, is being reframed, marginalised and now cancelled under a more commercial and transactional mandate.   This shift has not gone unnoticed by African governments, with some leaders, particularly those with authoritarian tendencies or fragile democratic institutions, welcoming this change, which for them is interpreted as a reprieve from what they previously viewed as intrusive conditionalities. For them, the reduction in democratic scrutiny from Washington has created more political space for illiberal practices, weakened checks and balances and stalled, or even, reversed progress on constitutional governance and human rights protections in those countries. Several webinar participants noted the enthusiastic responses from authoritarian regimes, some of which have publicly praised the Trump victory as a signal that American pressure on governance issues would abate.   The implications of this retrenchment are far-reaching, because in the absence of strong democratic signals from Washington, autocratic actors are emboldened, while democratic actors, civil society organisations, independent media and reformist politicians, find themselves with fewer external allies and diminished moral and material support. This contributes to a chilling effect across the continent, where some leaders may no longer feel compelled to maintain even the facade of democratic performance, which could conceivably result in the possibility of a democratic and human rights backslide in those societies. Perhaps more troubling, however, is the accompanying shift in priorities within the US - Africa relationship, since where democracy and governance once featured prominently in their bilateral engagements, they have now been displaced by commercial focussed diplomacy and security cooperation. Trade, access to critical minerals and transactional peace agreements are prioritised by the US administration, often with little reference to political or human rights contexts and as one panellist put it, “what matters now is what you have, not how you govern”.   The move away from democracy promotion also serves to undermine long-standing US soft power. For decades, despite its contradictions, America’s reputation as a proponent of democracy lent it moral authority in Africa, particularly among youth populations and civil society, but the retreat from these principles has not only eroded US credibility, it has also opened space for other actors, such as China and Russia, to fill the normative vacuum with alternative governance models that emphasise state prominence in governance, socio-economic development and stability over pluralism and rights.   Webinar participants expressed their concerns that this recalibration of values could have a generational impact. Where democracy was once supported through tangible programmes and high-level diplomatic backing, they may be increasingly viewed by African leaders as optional or expendable. And in this context, it is imperative for African civil society and regional institutions to fill the void and to with renewed energy reaffirm democratic norms and the building indigenous capacity to resist ant possible authoritarian drift.   While there may be strategic logic in pursuing a more interest-driven foreign policy, the long-term costs of abandoning democratic norms - both for African societies and for global democratic order - are substantial, because if democracy is no longer a priority for global powers, the risks of political instability, social unrest and international disengagement with the continent, may very well increase.   In summary then: The US’s policy shift away from democratic norms represents a significant inflection point in Africa’s political trajectory and it now places the onus on African actors themselves to defend democratic gains and to build alliances within and outside the continent - alliances that prioritise accountable governance and the rights of citizens. For many, this may be the ultimate test of African agency and resolve in a rapidly changing world.   3.4 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC RESPONSE AND AGENCY   As global power dynamics evolve and as the great powers reposition themselves, African states find themselves at a pivotal crossroads and having to decide as how to respond to the changing dynamics. The challenge they face is not merely to respond to the external pressures from the United States and China, but, more importantly it is argued, how to reframe Africa’s role in global affairs from that of a reactive subject to a proactive and strategic actor. The continent’s ability to assert its agency in this fluid period of geopolitical transition will not only determine the outcomes of individual diplomatic engagements, but so too the future trajectory of Africa’s development, its autonomy and its global influence.   One of the central themes that was emphasised during the webinar was the need for Africa to reject the outdated binary argument of having to “choose sides” between the West and the East, with several contributors arguing forcefully that such a dichotomy is reductive and detrimental to Africa’s interests and therefore Africa must rather pursue a policy of principled non-alignment, not in the ideological sense of the Cold War era, but as a pragmatic strategy that maximises leverage, that preserves independence and that extracts the best possible terms from all partners.   This approach calls for a renewed focus on sovereign interest articulation, in other words, a clear definition of what each African country wants from its engagements with global powers. These interests must be rooted in long-term development goals, such as industrialisation, education, health, climate resilience, digital transformation and infrastructure and crucially, they must go beyond the allure of short-term financial inflows or extractive deals. Instead they should emphasise partnerships that transfer knowledge, build capacity and promote value addition on the continent.   Participants in the webinar stressed that Africa must professionalise and strengthen its negotiating institutions, which includes enhancing the technical capacity  its diplomatic corps, trade ministries and regional economic communities to effectively bargain with better-resourced counterparts from Washington or Beijing, with a recurring concern being raised about African states entering negotiations without coherent strategies or sufficient data on the true value of their resources and markets, which then puts them on the back footing, limits their bargaining power and reinforces dependency.   One practical example raised during the dialogue was the growing importance of critical minerals, such as lithium and rare earths, which are vital to the green transition and the digital economy, where it was argued by the panellist that instead of simply exporting these raw materials, African countries must negotiate deals during their bilateral trade consultations, that include local processing, employment guarantees, infrastructure investment and environmental protections. It was noted that current US efforts to secure access to these minerals often target smaller, less prepared states with weak regulatory frameworks, in that way exposing the risk of “divide and conquer” strategies.   To counteract this, the importance of regional coordination and integration was repeatedly underscored by the participants, with continental frameworks, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and regional blocs, such as ECOWAS and SADC, identified as key tools for creating bargaining coherence and avoiding competitive underbidding among African states. A united African voice, particularly in areas such as, among others, digital governance, tax harmonisation and resource sharing, can shift the continent from the periphery to the centre of global decision-making.   Another dimension of Africa’s agency lies in narrative control, because too often, Africa is spoken about, rather than spoken with. The stories told about Africa in Washington, Brussels and Beijing frequently focus on conflict, poverty or foreign rivalry, rather than innovation, leadership and potential. Several webinar participants called for a concerted effort by African scholars, journalists and leaders to tell Africa’s story on its own terms by highlighting success stories in mobile finance, renewable energy, democratic reform and entrepreneurial growth.   There is also an urgent need for intra-African solidarity, because as countries negotiate with global powers, they must avoid undercutting each other for short-term gain. A race to the bottom in regulatory standards or concessionary tax regimes only benefits external actors at the expense of long-term continental development, so instead, states should adopt common principles for engagement, whether in environmental policy, labour rights or fiscal governance in order to ensure that Africa negotiates from a position of strength.   Of course, asserting agency does not mean ignoring geopolitical realities, since power asymmetries remain significant and the influence of global capital, technology and military infrastructure cannot be wished away. However, as multiple participants noted, Africa does have leverage, such as its growing markets, its young and dynamic population, its natural resources are vast and its strategic geography makes it indispensable to global trade, energy security and climate goals.   The question is whether African governments will seize this moment. Will they invest in long-term strategic thinking? Will they build institutions that outlast administrations? Will they collaborate rather than compete? And will they define and defend a vision of African development that transcends foreign agendas?   The opportunity exists, the stakes are high and/but the responsibility lies with Africa itself. 3.5 DE-DOLLARISATION AND ECONOMIC AUTONOMY   One of the most significant and far-reaching, but under-discussed themes that seems to be emerging in the current geopolitical reordering, is the gradual, but determined shift toward de-dollarisation, which can be vital for Africa’s economic sovereignty and its position in global finance. While this trend is certainly still in its early stages and although the stage of its development varies widely across countries and sectors, it nevertheless represents a subtle, yet powerful assertion of economic autonomy in a world that has traditionally been dominated by US monetary hegemony, but which now seeks de-linking. The process of de-dollarisation of course refers to the broader efforts by countries to reduce their reliance on the US dollar in international trade, financial settlements and foreign reserves and it is not just about adopting new currencies, such as the BRICS currency, for example. For Africa, this shift is partly driven by pragmatism, because dollar-based transactions often entail high costs due to multiple currency conversions, a reliance on correspondent banks and exposure to US monetary policy fluctuations over which they have no control. However, it is also increasingly being driven by political and strategic motivations, particularly in response to the US sanctions regimes and their financial surveillance systems like SWIFT, which give Washington considerable leverage over global capital flows and which African counties believe impacts their own sovereignty. During the webinar, participants highlighted several developments that reflected this shift, notably, the growing momentum behind bilateral trade settlements in local currencies, such as, for example, direct transactions from the South African rand to the Chinese renminbi, which is both economically sound and a symbolically potent step toward financial self-determination. These initiatives have the effect of reducing transaction costs, insulating trade from dollar volatility, as well as diminishing vulnerability to external shocks beyond domestic control. Moreover, the broader BRICS grouping, of which South Africa is a member, has also been actively exploring alternative financial architectures, including cross-border payment systems that bypass the SWIFT network and proposals for a digital or common reserve currency. And while panellists acknowledged that the realisation of a unified BRICS currency remains distant and politically complex, they emphasised that these conversations alone signify a major shift in how emerging economies are starting to think about their own financial sovereignty. For the Trump administration, however, the idea of de-dollarisation is perceived as a direct challenge to US global power, where historically, the dominance of their dollar afforded them unique privileges, not least the ability to finance their own deficits cheaply and to impose extraterritorially sanctions. So from their perspective, any attempt by a country, or a group of aligned countries, to reduce their dollar dependency, especially through coordinated efforts by the US’s geopolitical rivals, such as China and Russia, is met with US suspicion and, in some cases, retaliatory policy. The possibility that the US may respond with secondary sanctions, punitive tariffs and/or diplomatic pressure against countries that actively pursue de-dollarised arrangements was also discussed. These instruments, it was said, could be wielded, not only against the BRICS coordination thereof, but also against other bilateral efforts that are seen as undermining US’s strategic interests. And so, for African countries that are  already contending with economic fragility, high debt burdens and limited access to global capital, such penalties could be highly disruptive and even crippling.   Despite these risks, African governments finds the idea of de-dollarisation an option worth exploring, due to their nations being heavily dependent on the dollar and the tendency for local  currencies to be undervalued, inflation-prone and vulnerable to speculative attacks. And so, by moving away from the dollar and where feasible, it can enable countries to assert greater control over their own domestic monetary policy, thereby encouraging regional trade in local currencies and it can assist in developing homegrown financial instruments that reflect domestic priorities. However, the path to meaningful de-dollarisation it must be said, is not without significant hurdles, since many African central banks remain conservative in their policy orientation and are wary of challenging the existing dominant financial norms. There are also infrastructure challenges, such as underdeveloped financial markets, low digital penetration and regulatory fragmentation, that severely complicates the implementation of cross-border currency systems.   Moreover, intra-African coordination is critical, because without harmonised frameworks, countries may find themselves experimenting in isolation, with limited scalability and/or political support. Institutions such as the African Union, the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) have key roles to play in facilitating such regional financial integration and in standardising trade finance protocols.   Ultimately, de-dollarisation is not a panacea for all of Africa’s financial woes and it will not automatically insulate African economies from external shocks, nor will it eliminate structural weaknesses in governance, productivity or revenue collection. Nevertheless, it is an important step toward diversifying economic risk, asserting agency and reducing over-dependence on any single actor or system.   As the global financial order becomes more multipolar and contested, Africa must ensure that it does not merely adjust to the global new rules, it also has to help shape them. This requires not just technical reforms, but political vision and a recognition that economic autonomy is central to real sovereignty and that in an increasingly transactional world, self-reliance may be the most valuable currency of all.   3.6 INTERNAL CHALLENGES AND FOREIGN POLICY COHERENCE   While external geopolitical shifts command much of the attention in Africa’s engagement with the United States and China, as important are the internal dynamics that are shaping how African countries formulate, coordinate and project foreign policy. And so too, the continent’s ability to respond strategically to the US - China rivalry and to leverage global opportunities in its favour, depends heavily on its internal coherence, institutional maturity and its leadership unity.   A recurring theme discussed in the webinar was the fragmented nature of Africa’s foreign policy landscape, where, although the African Union (AU) and several regional bodies have made strides toward continental coordination, the individual countries’ national interests still dominate and it is often at the expense of the region’s collective strength. In a global system that is  increasingly defined by strategic competition, this fragmentation is counter-productive, because it weakens Africa’s bargaining power and opens the door to divide-and-rule tactics by more powerful states.   It was noted that many African countries lack long-term foreign policy strategies, resulting in diplomatic engagements often being reactive, rather than proactive, and this is due to them being shaped by short-term needs or the preferences of ruling parties, rather than through clear national or regional priorities. This makes it difficult for diplomats to articulate consistent positions and for countries to build reliable partnerships or to push back effectively when they are faced with exploitative or coercive behaviour by external actors. The lack of capacity and resources within many of the African foreign ministries, which is often combined with frequent leadership changes and where there is usually limited cross-party consensus on external affairs, serves to further exacerbate this challenge. Moreover, foreign policy decisions are concentrated in the hands of a few elite individuals and there is  minimal parliamentary oversight or public debate, which not only means diminished transparency, but it also undermines the legitimacy and durability of international countries’ international agreements.   South Africa was cited during the webinar as a case study in complexity. As a member of both BRICS and a partner of the West, it occupies a unique, yet difficult diplomatic space. Its constitutional commitment to values such as democracy, social justice and international solidarity is being tested in that it often clashes with the ideological posture of the Trump administration, which prioritises economic nationalism and which is suspicious of multilateralism. The balancing act that South Africa’s has to play by engaging both Beijing and Washington, while adhering to its constitutional and regional responsibilities, illustrates the nuanced diplomacy required in today’s global context.   But even in South Africa inconsistencies persist, because while rhetorically committed to multilateralism and African solidarity, its actual engagements often in practice reflect its own national self-interest or ambiguous priorities, particularly in contentious global debates such as UN Security Council reform, vaccine diplomacy or the war in Ukraine. These contradictions, participants argued, must also be acknowledged, and resolved, if African leadership is to be credible and effective on the world stage.   Beyond state actors there are frequently bureaucratic and institutional misalignments that hinder strategic coherence, where, for example, Ministries of finance, trade, defence and foreign affairs often operate in silos, with limited coordination or shared analysis. And as a result, their international negotiations on trade, investment or security often proceed without unified positions, which then leads to suboptimal outcomes or even internal contradictions. For instance, trade concessions made by one department may inadvertently undermine environmental protections that are overseen by another, or in another instance, security cooperation agreements may be in conflict with the country’s human rights obligations.   Intra-African dynamics too complicate the continent’s foreign policy picture, where rivalries between regional powers, competition for donor funding and divergent ideological alignments contribute to message fragmentation. While the African Union has sought to build a “One Africa” approach in diplomacy, the reality on the ground often reflects a patchwork of unaligned and sometimes contradictory national agendas which weakens the continent’s collective negotiating position and allows external powers to selectively engage with preferred partners, thereby exacerbating divisions.   To overcome these internal challenges a number of reforms are needed:   Institutional investment in foreign policy capacity, including dedicated think tanks, professional diplomatic training academies and inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms is urgently needed. Long-term strategic planning, anchored in developmental blueprints like Agenda 2063, but operationalised through detailed country-level foreign policy roadmaps that align with national interests and regional objectives have to be undertaken. Increased transparency and public engagement in foreign policy formulation, including the involvement of civil society, academia and parliamentarians in shaping international positions is required. Regional and continental diplomacy frameworks, including common guidelines for resource negotiations, cybersecurity, digital trade and external military cooperation, to reduce fragmentation and to promote African consensus, have to be developed.   The path to foreign policy coherence is not easy, but it is indispensable, because without it, Africa will struggle to navigate an increasingly complex international environment. With it, the continent can move from being a sphere of competition to a sphere of influence and a place where African priorities shape, rather than react to global power dynamics 3.7 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD The discussions culminated in a series of forward-looking insights and strategic imperatives for African nations to ponder. As they navigate a shifting global order that is characterised by intensifying US-China competition, deglobalisation trends and the erosion of traditional multilateral norms, they need to consolidate their efforts. Amid these uncertainties, one message was clear, namely that Africa’s future will be determined not by external decisions alone, but by the continent’s ability to act with clarity, coordination and conviction. Drawing from the insights of the panel, the following policy recommendations are made in order to provide a structured path for African policymakers, institutions and regional bodies that seek to engage global powers, particularly the United States and China, on equitable and sovereign terms.   3.7.1 Adopt a policy of strategic non-alignment   African states should avoid framing their foreign policy within the binary of East versus West and instead of “choosing sides,” the continent must adopt a position of principled non-alignment rooted in self-interest. This does not imply neutrality or disengagement, but rather a sophisticated diplomacy that maximises Africa’s leverage by engaging all actors based on merit, reciprocity and long-term development objectives, because by refusing to be drawn into ideological or strategic rivalries, African countries can create space for creative partnerships, negotiate better terms and avoid becoming proxy arenas for geopolitical competition.     3.7.2 Leverage natural resources for development, not extraction   Africa’s vast deposits of critical minerals and natural resources, such as cobalt, lithium and rare earth elements, should be seen as strategic assets to be carefully stewarded and systematically leveraged, and accordingly the current global demand for these materials, especially in the context of the energy transition and digital infrastructure, gives Africa unprecedented negotiating power.   However, the webinar participants also warned against repeating the same mistakes of the past, which saw raw materials being exported wholesale, with little benefit to local populations and so instead, African states must condition resource access on commitments to local value addition, technology transfer, infrastructure development and environmental sustainability. This will require enhanced geological data, coordinated policy frameworks and transparency mechanisms to prevent corruption and illicit capital flight. 3.7.3 Build institutional capacity for coherent foreign policy   Effective diplomacy begins with strong institutions and so African countries must invest in the professionalisation of their foreign ministries, build cross-sectoral coordination among trade, defence and development agencies and they ought to institutionalise long-term strategic planning.   Foreign policy should not be left to elite circles only or be influenced solely by short-term political calculations. It must be embedded within national development plans, be subjected to parliamentary oversight and it has to be responsive to citizen input. Moreover, governments should cultivate specialised cadres of technocrats who can lead negotiations in areas like digital policy, climate diplomacy and multilateral reform.   3.7.4 Strengthen regional integration and collective bargaining   No single African country, regardless of size or economic standing, can compete with global powers alone, which implies the need for regional and continental integration in order to amplify Africa’s voice and bargaining power. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) must be empowered and resourced to coordinate foreign policy positions, to manage trade disputes and to advance shared priorities.   This includes negotiating as blocs when engaging with external actors on issues such as digital taxation, climate finance or health diplomacy and so too, greater regional alignment can also help deter predatory tactics by external powers that exploit national divisions for strategic gain. 3.7.5 Reframe Africa’s narrative on the global stage   Africa must take charge of its image and the narrative that defines what the continent is about, because for too long, Africa has been portrayed primarily through the lenses of poverty, instability and external dependency, which framing undermines Africa’s agency and obscures the real innovation, leadership and transformation that is taking place across the continent.   Governments, the media and civil society must therefore actively promote a more accurate and empowering narrative, being one that emphasises Africa’s entrepreneurial ecosystems, technological ingenuity, youth-led movements and cultural influence. This is not just about soft power, it’s about setting the terms of engagement and it is needed to shape how the world sees and deals with Africa. 3.7.6 Pursue financial and digital sovereignty   Africa must continue exploring alternatives to traditional financial and digital infrastructures that entrench dependency, which includes, among others, developing regional payment systems, exploring local currency trade agreements and participating in emerging BRICS or South-South financial mechanisms.   Digital sovereignty is equally important, since African countries must assert control over their digital infrastructure, data governance and cybersecurity strategies, whether in negotiations over 5G infrastructure, AI development or digital tax policy. African states must ensure that their digital futures are shaped by their local needs and they should guard against it being dictated by external actors.   3.7.7 Anchor foreign policy in democratic and developmental values   Finally, while external partners may deprioritise democracy, African countries should not, as democratic governance, inclusive growth and social accountability remain the most sustainable foundations for peace and prosperity. Foreign engagement must be guided by these values, and it should not be subordinated to short-term economic or geopolitical expediency.   This means holding firm on human rights, resisting external pressures that undermine domestic institutions and ensuring that foreign partnerships align with the continent’s constitutional and developmental aspirations. 3.7.8 Conclusion   The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency, the strategic assertiveness of China and the broader reordering of the global system all present a moment of challenge and opportunity for Africa, but the choices made by African leaders, institutions and societies in this moment will shape outcomes more than the preferences of external powers.   Africa has leverage, it has agency and it has a voice. The task now is to use them, to negotiate from a place of strength, to pursue partnerships rooted in mutual benefit and to define its own role in a changing world.   As the webinar made abundantly clear: this is not the time to wait for direction. It is the time to act with purpose, unity and vision.   4 NAVIGATING THE AFRICA - CHINA - US NEXUS: STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES IN A LANDSCAPE OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSION: THE TRIANGULAR DIPLOMATIC DYNAMICS   Image: African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia   The triangular relationship between Africa, China and the United States represents one of the most consequential arenas of 21st-century geopolitics and as competition between Washington and Beijing intensifies, Africa’s strategic relevance grows, not only as a source of critical resources and expanding markets, but as a political and ideological battleground where both powers seek to define the norms and direction of global engagement. Under the Trump administration, the US has adopted an increasingly adversarial posture toward China’s role in Africa, which has manifested in direct rhetoric denouncing China’s infrastructure investments as “debt traps,” its technological offerings as security risks and its governance model as incompatible with democratic values. But behind this rhetoric lies a deliberate strategy and that is to counter Chinese influence by framing US engagement in Africa as the more transparent, values-driven alternative. But, this narrative often doesn’t match the financial scale, speed and political consistency that China has brought to the continent over the last two decades.   For Africa, the challenge is to navigate this tension without becoming collateral in a rivalry that is not of its own making. The continent must avoid being reduced to a passive prize in a East – West geopolitical contest and instead, it should adopt a multi-dimensional strategy that embraces the benefits of both relationships while insulating itself from coercion, dependency or forced alignment. 4.1 CHINA’S ROLE IN AFRICA: MORE THAN INFRASTRUCTURE China’s influence in Africa is vast and spans traditional infrastructure financing, such as ports and railways; digital development, for example, telecom networks and smart cities; resource extraction; medical diplomacy; and higher education. Over 50 African countries have signed onto the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Chinese firms are embedded across nearly every sector, from construction and energy to fintech and agriculture.   Importantly, China’s approach has resonated with many African leaders, because it emphasises speed of execution, non-interference in domestic politics and pragmatic engagement. Chinese loans, while often opaque, are usually tied to tangible infrastructure projects, which do not carry the governance conditionalities typical of Western donors and therefore, for states grappling with immediate development needs, this model has proven appealing.   However, this success has not been without consequences, to the contrary, it has been accompanied by rising debt burdens, concerns over labour practices and limited local content in Chinese contracts that have sparked public backlash in some African countries. And as the geopolitical rivalry with the US intensifies, these issues are likely to be amplified, either organically or as part of a deliberate American strategy to discredit China’s presence.   4.2 THE US DIVERSION STRATEGY: COUNTERING CHINA THROUGH AFRICA   The Trump administration’s Africa strategy, while thin on developmental substance, is heavily influenced by its overarching objective to contain China. This is evident in targeted engagements with mineral-rich African states, intensified anti-China rhetoric during bilateral talks and emerging policy tools such as trade incentives, digital infrastructure offerings, e.g. Open RAN, and diplomatic pressure brought to bear in order to have BRI contracts cancelled or revised.   This strategy of diversion and disruption seeks not necessarily to displace China from Africa outright, but to raise the cost of Chinese engagement and sow doubt about its intentions and ultimately aims to push African states toward re-alignment with US-backed alternatives. It is a geopolitical game of optics, influence and ideological framing, one that attempts to undermine trust in China’s partnerships, while at the same time offering selective inducements from Washington. 4.3 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC POSITIONING: DUAL ENGAGEMENT WITH A FOCUS ON AUTONOMY   To safeguard its interests, Africa must resist being pulled into a binary trap and therefore the continent’s strategic posture should rest on three pillars:   Diversified partnerships  in which Africa must maintain strong relationships with both China and the US, using competition between the two to drive better terms, technology transfer and concessional finance. Diplomatic hedging, not allegiance, is the path to sovereignty. Conditional engagement  through which African governments must condition economic access to strategic sectors, particularly digital infrastructure, critical minerals and energy, on clear and enforceable developmental outcomes, whether engaging with China or the US and deals must include provisions for skills development, local sourcing, environmental safeguards and long-term value addition to mineral extraction. Continental coherence  where the African Union and regional economic communities establish continental norms for foreign engagement, outlining standards on debt transparency, environmental sustainability, labour rights and technology governance, which will help curb external actors’ ability to exploit state-by-state fragmentation.   4.4 HOW CHINA SHOULD RESPOND: BUILDING RESILIENCE IN AFRICAN PARTNERSHIPS   China, for its part, must recognise that US strategy in Africa is increasingly designed not to merely offer an alternative development model, but also, for its own domestic foreign policy purposes, to erode trust in China’s intentions, so in response, China is advised to move from a purely transactional approach to one that strengthens political trust, operational transparency and mutual accountability.   Key steps China can take include:   It should increase contract transparency  by proactively publishing the terms of infrastructure and debt agreements which can pre-empt Western accusations of predatory lending and reinforce legitimacy. Deepen local integration  with more Chinese-funded projects incorporating local labour, firms and oversight mechanisms. This is in any event good business practice, since localisation builds goodwill and mitigates claims of neocolonialism. Support African agency  by instead of framing China as Africa’s “alternative” to the West, Beijing should rather openly support Africa’s push for non-alignment and greater international voice, whether at the WTO, IMF or UN Security Council. Invest in soft power  through cultural exchange, academic collaboration and media partnerships, which can prove critical in countering Western narratives and in embedding China’s presence in Africa as multifaceted, and not just infrastructural. Build multilateral development frameworks wherein China should be open to co-financing projects with African and even Western institutions, thereby showcasing a willingness to act collaboratively rather than competitively.     4.5 CONCLUSION: TOWARD A TRIANGULAR BALANCE   The Africa - China - US nexus will continue to define the strategic contours of the continent’s future, but Africa must neither be a buffer zone nor a battleground. It must be an assertive broker of its own destiny.   As the US and China recalibrate their Africa strategies, the one through rivalry, the other through long-term presence, the continent must rise above reactive diplomacy and it must demand fairness, transparency and partnership from both sides. Africa’s message should be clear: “We are open for business, but not for capture. Compete here, yes, but on our terms”. 5 TRIANGULAR TRADE DYNAMICS: US, CHINA AND AFRICA IN ECONOMIC TENSION AND OPPORTUNITY   Image: Coal Mining Operation, South Africa   Trade relationships between Africa, the United States and China form the backbone of the trilateral interactions between the three and it serves as both a point of contention and a platform for potential collaboration. Moreover, as global supply chains reconfigure and the more geopolitical competition has intensified, the more complex,  asymmetrical and strategically charged the trade dynamics among these three players have grown.   Each actor brings distinct motivations, instruments and vulnerabilities to the trading table and therefore an understanding of these dynamics is essential for African policymakers who seek to optimise their position, guard against economic coercion and chart a path toward structural transformation. 5.1 CHINA - AFRICA TRADE: SCALE, SPEED AND STRUCTURAL DOMINANCE   China’s trade relationship with Africa has expanded dramatically over the last two decades, making it the continent’s largest bilateral trading partner, registering trade volumes that have reached over $250 billion in recent years. China imports vast quantities of raw materials, such as oil, copper, cobalt and lithium from Africa, whilst it  exports manufactured goods, machinery, electronics and consumer products to Africa.   Chinese trade with Africa is often embedded in broader financing packages that include concessional loans, infrastructure development and tied procurement contracts, which bundling of trade and finance has allowed China to consolidate its presence in key sectors, particularly in extractives, construction, telecommunications and logistics. However, this relationship is structurally imbalanced, because Africa overwhelmingly exports primary commodities to China, whilst mainly importing finished goods from them. This reinforces a pattern of dependency. Local value addition is limited, despite periodic efforts to encourage Chinese companies to manufacture locally by relocating the manufacturing to  Africa, yet it has occurred only sporadically and at small scale.   Participants in the webinar emphasised that while China’s trade presence has brought short-term growth and infrastructure, it has also entrenched Africa’s position in the global economy as a supplier of raw inputs and if not recalibrated, this model could constrain Africa’s long-term industrial development and competitiveness. 5.2 US - AFRICA TRADE: DECLINE, REDEFINITION AND OPPORTUNITY GAPS In contrast, US - Africa trade has declined in relative terms. Where once a leading trading partner, US trade with Africa now lags behind China, the EU and even intra-African exchanges in some regions and while programmes like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) have offered preferential access to US markets, uptake has been limited to a handful of countries and sectors, primarily textiles, apparel and some agricultural goods.   AGOA, though symbolically important, is seen by many as outdated, unpredictable and skewed toward US commercial interests, moreover, the Trump administration has not prioritised trade with Africa in strategic terms, focusing instead on bilateral deals that align with domestic political imperatives or counter-China objectives.   Webinar participants noted that the US commercial footprint in Africa is thin and largely dominated by extractives, finance and defence-linked services and performing way below its potential, even though the private sector in the US is wa ell-capitalised and technologically advanced. This is because it often views Africa as high-risk and low-margin region, which has led to underinvestment and disengagement. Nonetheless, the US still offers comparative advantages that Africa can leverage, such as access to high-value markets, expertise in services and digital industries, and it has potential for technology partnerships that differ materially from China’s state-led model, however, to unlock these opportunities, Africa must demand more coherence and greater responsiveness from Washington, and particularly as it relates to simplifying market access. 5.3 TRADE AS GEOPOLITICAL LEVERAGE: THE RISK OF WEAPONISATION   Trade is no longer merely economic, in that it has now also become a geopolitical tool, with both China and the United States increasingly using it as a tool to reward allies, punish rivals and project influence, and for Africa, this weaponisation of trade poses serious risks.   The Trump administration’s trade strategy toward Africa is heavily influenced by its desire to counter China, for instance, countries deepening economic ties with China could face informal diplomatic pressure or even be excluded from US trade preference schemes. This coercive approach undermines Africa’s trade sovereignty and it exposes countries to strategic whiplash, depending on global alignments. Meanwhile, China’s own trade practices are becoming more selective and strategic. As Beijing responds to global backlash and domestic economic pressures, it may reduce exposure to high-risk African markets or tighten trade conditions and accordingly, African states that fail to meet debt repayment schedules or fail to align with Chinese diplomatic preferences could see disruptions in trade flows, financing or procurement.   This creates an urgent need for Africa to de-risk its trade policy, by building regional value chains, diversifying partners and localising production where possible, because relying on a single dominant partner, be it China or the US, is simply not wise. It makes African economies vulnerable to external shocks, policy shifts and political manoeuvring. 5.4 AFRICA’S TRADE STRATEGY: TOWARD A BALANCED AND BENEFICIAL REGIME   To thrive within this triangular dynamic, African countries will have to take a more deliberate and strategic approach to trade policy, which policy should be grounded in the following principles:   Africa must move beyond commodity exports and will accordingly have to integrate into regional and global value chains, with investment in agro-processing, green minerals refining, pharmaceuticals and digital goods being essential. Full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) must be prioritised, because it can reduce reliance on volatile external markets and moreover, intra-African trade is less exposed to geopolitical manipulation and more conducive to SME growth. African states should negotiate trade agreements collectively, whether with China, the US or the EU, regional blocs and the African Union taking the lead in setting minimum standards and trade objectives. African trade diplomacy must be agile, informed by data and grounded in national development strategies and technical expertise in trade law, digital regulation and investment arbitration will be increasingly critical. Trade agreements must be publicly debated, scrutinised and evaluated against national priorities, because citizens and civil society have a right to know how trade affects jobs, prices and public goods. 5.5 CONCLUSION: TRADE AS A STRATEGIC LEVER, NOT A PASSIVE FLOW The triangular trade relationship among Africa, China and the United States is not static and it is being reshaped by geopolitics, digitalisation and demographic change. While competition between Beijing and Washington presents risks, it also presents opportunities for Africa to demand better terms, deepen industrial capacity and to shift from the periphery to the centre of global commerce.   But, to  seize this moment it will require unity, clarity and resolve. Africa must no longer accept being a market for finished goods and a mine for raw materials, but instead, it must transform itself into a manufacturing hub, a trade rule-maker and a strategic broker that defines its own trade future, on its own terms. 6 CONTOURS OF CONTAINMENT: US – AFRICA - CHINA MILITARY AND SECURITY DYNAMICS   Image: Military Operation, Mozambique   The military and peace and security dimensions of US – Africa - China relations represent one of the most delicate and consequential aspects of the triangular engagement. While trade and development cooperation often garner public attention, it is in the realm of defence, counterterrorism, peacekeeping and strategic access where the geopolitical stakes are highest and where Africa’s sovereignty is most directly challenged.   The webinar discussions revealed a sobering truth, that is that Africa’s security landscape is increasingly entangled in a global competition, but not of its own making. Both the United States and China have intensified their military posturing on the continent, not primarily in response to African security needs, but as part of a broader global rivalry and so for African states, this creates a dual challenge, namely to manage internal and regional security concerns while also navigating external militarisation that may undermine long-term peacebuilding and regional autonomy. 6.1 US SECURITY ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA: CONTAINMENT THROUGH COUNTERTERRORISM   The United States has maintained a long-standing military footprint in Africa, primarily under the banner of counterterrorism, security sector reform and peacekeeping support and through initiatives such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and AFRICOM (US Africa Command), the US has built an extensive web of bases, partnerships and operations across the continent.   However, as participants in the webinar noted, the nature and tone of US military engagement worldwide have shifted significantly under the Trump administration, because now rather than being embedded within a broader developmental or governance framework, security cooperation has become increasingly transactional, bilateral and strategically competitive. This applies particularly in regions where China is expanding its influence and so one can expect a shift in US approach on the African continent as well. This is most evident in East Africa, where the US military presence near Djibouti is now operating alongside China’s first overseas military base in the very same vicinity. What was once framed as counterterrorism assistance is now also about containing the Chinese military ambitions, along with securing sea lanes and monitoring infrastructure corridors funded by Beijing. Critically, African security concerns, such as community-level conflict, state fragility and disarmament, are often subordinated to global counterterrorism priorities, which mismatch has contributed to the militarisation of diplomacy, where security actors become the primary US interlocutors. Governance, peacebuilding and reconciliation are marginalised through such an approach.   Participants expressed concern that such narrow security engagements do little to address the root causes of violence, inequality, youth unemployment and weak institutions and may even serve to exacerbate tensions by reinforcing coercive state behaviour. Moreover, selective partnerships with “strategically useful” regimes, regardless of their democratic credentials, undermines Africa’s long-term stability as envisaged, by for example, the African Union. 6.2 CHINA’S EVOLVING SECURITY ROLE: FROM NON-INTERVENTION TO STRATEGIC POSITIONING   China has traditionally adhered to a foreign policy of non-interference, focusing its Africa strategy on infrastructure, trade and diplomacy, however, over the past decade and particularly in response to US militarisation, China has begun to recalibrate its security posture on the continent.   This evolution is, as already mentioned, most visibly embodied in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base in Djibouti, a strategic site that supports Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean, anti-piracy patrols and logistical supply chains for Belt and Road projects. China has also increased its participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and has become one of the largest contributors of personnel and funding, particularly in South Sudan and Mali. Participants in the webinar interpreted these moves not as a wholesale shift toward US-style military projection, but as a strategic insurance policy and a means for Beijing to protect its citizens, investments and trade corridors in what has become a volatile global environment. However, they also warned that China’s increasing security footprint, if unchecked, could replicate the very patterns of dependency and instrumentalization that China itself once criticised in Western foreign policy.   Unlike the US, China’s security engagements are typically less visible, less conditioned and more state-centric, often focused on regime protection rather than human security. This has implications for how African civil society, opposition parties and fragile communities experience Chinese presence: as both stabilising and exclusionary. 6.3 PEACE AND SECURITY AS A SITE OF COMPETITION, NOT COOPERATION   What emerged clearly from the discussion is that Africa’s security arena is no longer governed by multilateralism, but by rivalry. Rather than cooperating on peacekeeping, conflict prevention or disarmament, the US and China are using Africa as a theatre to test power projection, technological capabilities and alliance-building.   This competition distorts peace and security norms. It diverts attention from African-led conflict resolution mechanisms, such as those under the African Union and ECOWAS, and prioritises short-term containment over long-term conflict transformation.   There is also a growing risk that African military forces may be drawn into proxy arrangements, trained, equipped and financed by competing powers with divergent doctrines and endgames which could fragment regional defence integration, militarise domestic politics and undermine the neutrality of African security institutions.   Moreover, the proliferation of dual-use technologies that is in the main supplied by external players, such as surveillance systems, cyber operations and AI-enabled border control, raises new ethical and governance challenges. African states must take heed of the potential threats and ensure that these tools are not used to entrench authoritarianism or suppress their own civic spaces, particularly when provided without transparency or safeguards.   6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN AUTONOMOUS AFRICAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE   To reclaim their agency in this domain, African nations must reassert ownership over their peace and security agenda, which his involves several strategic imperatives:   They must strengthen the operational and financial independence of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the African Standby Force and early warning systems. Any external military engagement, whether with the US or Chinese, must be assessed against local security needs, conflict dynamics and constitutional mandates, in other words, conditionality should flow both ways. Security cooperation agreements should be transparent and they should therefore be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and to public debate, especially when they involve basic rights, technology transfer and/or counterterrorism laws. Africans must take the lead by creating forums where China, the US and African states can engage on shared security concerns, such as those presented by piracy, arms trafficking and peacekeeping. Moreover, the engagement must not be framed as a zero-sum contest. The root causes of insecurity, poverty, exclusion and environmental degradation, needs to be prioritised over militarised containment. Security must be people-centred, not power-centred.   6.5 CONCLUSION: FROM THEATRE OF RIVALRY TO ARENA OF SOVEREIGNTY   Africa must not be a chessboard for competing empires. Its security landscape is complex, nuanced and deeply rooted in local history and conditions, so while it is to be expected that external actors will inevitably seek strategic footholds, it is incumbent upon African leaders and institutions to themselves define the terms of engagement.   US - China competition on African soil must not be allowed to crowd out African agency, displace peacebuilding norms or militarise the continent’s diplomacy. Instead, Africa must articulate a clear, coherent and sovereign security strategy, one that is principled, pragmatic and centred on the well-being of its people.   7 REFLECTIONS ON THE TRIANGULAR HORIZON: RETHINKING POWER, PARTNERSHIP AND PURPOSE   As the world experiences a period of geopolitical turbulence and political  reconfiguration that has been introduced with the advent of the new Trump administration, so too the triangular relationship between Africa, the United States and China has emerged as a strategic contest. But it is more than that, it is also as a test of the principles of global engagement, sovereignty and solidarity, which are being redefined on the move.   The conversations captured in the webinar underscore a sobering reality, namely that Africa is no longer simply a stage on which others perform, but a site where power is contested, norms are negotiated and futures are forged. But in spite of this centrality, the risk remains that Africa is spoken for, acted upon and pulled in directions that may not serve its long-term aspirations, and so in this moment, a philosophical and strategic recalibration is necessary, not just for Africa, but for all three actors. 7.1 AFRICA AT THE CENTRE, NOT THE MARGIN   It is time for Africa to claim its place as an architect and not a mere accessory of the global order, considering that the continent is home to the world’s youngest population, some of its fastest-growing economies and a trove of critical resources essential for the planet’s energy transition and technological evolution. But beyond statistics lies a deeper truth, one that advocates Africa as a moral and political actor with its own vision, its own history of solidarity and its own stake in shaping what global justice should look like.   To fulfil this role, African states must transcend the temptation of short-term gains, whether mineral royalties or military aid and embrace the harder, longer path of institution building, regional integration and strategic independence. This is not about rejecting partnerships, to the contrary, it about entering into them with clarity, unity and a demand for reciprocity.   The era of passive engagement is over; the future requires Africa to be a broker, a convener and a challenger, capable of working with both East and West while refusing to be defined by either.   7.2 THE US AND CHINA: FROM COMPETITION TO CONSTRUCTIVE COEXISTENCE?   Both Washington and Beijing must re-evaluate their approaches to Africa, not only as a matter of, but as a test of the kind of global actors they wish to be.   For the United States, Africa cannot remain a secondary theatre in its broader competition with China. A truly meaningful US - Africa relationship must go beyond militarised counterterrorism and transactional diplomacy. It must reinvest in the very values that once made America compelling: democratic solidarity, inclusive development, human rights and multilateral cooperation. Africa should not be engaged out of fear of China’s rise, but out of respect for Africa’s rise.   For China, continued influence will depend on whether it can evolve from infrastructure financier to genuine development partner, transparent, responsive and grounded in mutual respect. If China wishes to avoid the pitfalls of the very powers it once criticised, it must support not only roads and rails, but also African governance, agency and accountability.   Both countries must recognise that the African continent is not a void to be filled or a risk to be managed, but a partner to be listened to. Triangular relations must mature from transactionalism to cooperative pluralism, where diverse approaches coexist and local ownership is non-negotiable. 7.3 A CALL TO REIMAGINE PARTNERSHIP   What is ultimately at stake here, is not only influence, but the very philosophy of global engagement raising the question as to whether international relations is doomed to be a zero-sum pursuit of power or whether it can evolve into the mutual recognition of interdependence, dignity and shared purpose.   The path forward will require all three actors to:   Move from suspicion to strategic trust, thereby recognising that cooperation is not capitulation. Institutionalise dialogue, not just bilaterally, but trilaterally as well, with Africa not considered as the object, but as the convenor. Embed development in diplomacy so as to ensure that security, trade and technology serve people before geopolitics. Invest in multilateral reform, through which Africa can be given a real voice in shaping global rules, from the WTO and IMF to the UN Security Council.   The triangular future to be sought for Africa is one that must not be about who dominates who, but it should rather be about design and the co-creation of a global system that is equitable, sustainable and anchored in the dignity of all. 7.4 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE IS NEGOTIATED, NOT INHERITED   The triangular relationship between the US, China and Africa is at a crossroads. It can deepen into a vortex of rivalry, extraction and mistrust or it can be reshaped into a new grammar of cooperation: one that reflects a multipolar, multi-perspective and multi-stakeholder world.   Policymakers on all sides have a choice. They can double down on old logics of power, or they can imagine and enact a new logic, one rooted in fairness, foresight and mutual gain.   Africa will be central to this reimagining, but so too must be the willingness of the US and China to step beyond competition and towards co-existence.   The outcome is not inevitable, it must be negotiated and the time to begin is now.   8 FINAL WORD: AFRICA AS THE AUTHOR OF ITS OWN FUTURE   The triangular relationship between the United States, China and Africa is no longer defined by dominance and deference, it is now shaped by contestation, recalibration and unprecedented possibility for Africa, once written into the margins of global strategy, to now hold the pen.   The choices African leaders, institutions and citizens make in this decisive decade will reverberate far beyond the continent’s borders. They will reshape how power is distributed, how prosperity is pursued and how global partnerships are formed, not through coercion, but through vision.   To China and the United States, the message is clear: Africa will no longer be a passive recipient of foreign strategy. It demands respect, reciprocity and relevance. To Africa’s policymakers, the imperative is urgent: resist the false binaries, assert agency and forge a path that is neither dictated nor dependent, but distinctly African.   The continent is no longer navigating between giants. It is rising among them and those who understand this will not just win Africa’s markets, they will win its trust. IMAGE REFERENCES   Cover page:   African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Source: iStock. African Union Headquarters . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/african-union-headquarters-gm180957062-26498948  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Military, Mozambique, Source: iStock. Armed Forces Marching Holding Bayonets . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/armed-forces-marching-holding-bayonets-gm2174863525-594507140  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Mining, South Africa, Source: iStock. Piece of Large Machinery Used for Coal Mining in an Open Pit in South Africa . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/piece-of-large-machinery-used-for-coal-mining-in-an-open-pit-in-south-africa-gm1440533764-480488486  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Flag of the United States of America, Source: Wikipedia. Flag of the United States (Web Colors) . Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_the_United_States#/media/File:Flag_of_the_United_States_(Web_Colors).svg  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Flag of the African Union, Source: Wikipedia. Flag of the African Union . Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_the_African_Union#/media/File:Flag_of_the_African_Union.svg  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Flag of the People’s Republic of China, Source: Wikipedia. Flag of the People's Republic of China . Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_China#/media/File:Flag_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China.svg  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Page 16:   African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Source: iStock. African Union Headquarters . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/african-union-headquarters-gm180957062-26498948  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Page 20:   Mining, South Africa, Source: iStock. Piece of Large Machinery Used for Coal Mining in an Open Pit in South Africa . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/piece-of-large-machinery-used-for-coal-mining-in-an-open-pit-in-south-africa-gm1440533764-480488486  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Page 24:   Military, Mozambique, Source: iStock. Armed Forces Marching Holding Bayonets . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/armed-forces-marching-holding-bayonets-gm2174863525-594507140  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On 20 August 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute, in partnership with Daily Maverick, hosted the second episode of its Constitutional Insights by Albie Sachs  webinar series. This series builds on a four-part podcast with former Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs, offering South Africans a deeper understanding of the Constitution’s founding values and exploring the challenges of building a more inclusive and accountable democracy. Following the inaugural conversation on “What does it mean to be South African?” , this episode brought together political analyst William Gumede  and constitutional law scholar Prof. Pierre de Vos  to discuss how state institutions can support and uphold South Africa’s constitutional democracy . The dialogue examined the critical role of institutions such as the judiciary, Parliament, Chapter Nine bodies, and the public service in protecting rights, ensuring accountability, and maintaining democratic stability. Both speakers emphasised that the Constitution provides a strong framework for institutional independence, but the effectiveness of these institutions depends on their practical functioning — resisting political interference, maintaining integrity, and remaining responsive to the public. Gumede highlighted the risks posed by corruption and institutional capture, noting that such threats erode public trust and weaken democracy. De Vos stressed the need for institutions to actively uphold constitutional values, enforce the law impartially, and hold those in positions of power accountable. The discussion underscored that South Africa’s democratic resilience relies as much on strong institutions as on an engaged and informed citizenry. The conversation also reflected on lessons from recent political and judicial challenges, demonstrating both vulnerabilities and the remarkable capacity of institutions to safeguard democracy when supported by law and public oversight. The speakers called for continued efforts to strengthen public trust, professionalise the state, and ensure that institutions serve all citizens equally. The remaining episodes in the series will continue to explore pressing constitutional themes, including: The power of mother tongue education What it will take to create an inclusive electoral system Through these conversations, the Constitutional Insights  series aims to foster public reflection, debate, and engagement with the Constitution as a living framework for an inclusive and just South Africa.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is extending its constitutional literacy programme to schools in both Gauteng and the North West Province. These workshops, targeted at Grade 11 and 12 learners, aim to deepen young people’s understanding of the South African Constitution, with a particular focus on its imperatives and foundational principles. On Monday, 28 July 2025, the Institute held one such workshop at Soshanguve South Secondary School. The session was facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, ISI’s Schools Project Coordinator for both provinces. His engaging and interactive approach ensured that learners were not merely passive recipients of information but were actively involved throughout the workshop. The workshop content covered essential aspects of the Constitution, including: The Preamble, which encapsulates the vision and values underpinning South Africa’s democracy. The Founding Provisions, setting out the core principles on which the Republic is built. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of all South Africans. Chapter 9 Institutions, established to safeguard democracy and ensure accountability. Learners displayed a high level of interest and enthusiasm, asking a wide range of thoughtful and challenging questions. Their inquiries touched on topics such as the meaning of democracy in practice, the role and responsibilities of political parties in the governance of the country, and the duty of government to uphold constitutional values. Many learners also drew connections between the Constitution and their everyday lives, highlighting the relevance of such educational interventions. Feedback from both learners and educators at Soshanguve South Secondary School was overwhelmingly positive. Teachers expressed appreciation for the Institute’s efforts, noting that the workshop not only enriched classroom learning but also encouraged learners to think critically about their role as future leaders and active citizens. For many of the participants, this was their first detailed engagement with the Constitution beyond their textbooks, and it left a lasting impression. The Inclusive Society Institute views this initiative as part of its broader commitment to strengthening democracy through civic education. By equipping young people with knowledge about their constitutional rights and responsibilities, the Institute is helping to cultivate a new generation of South Africans who are empowered to participate meaningfully in the democratic process. Looking ahead, ISI intends to continue expanding the reach of these workshops beyond Gauteng and the North West Province. Plans are already underway to roll out the programme to schools in other provinces, ensuring that more learners across the country benefit from this vital educational opportunity. The Institute firmly believes that by investing in the constitutional literacy of today’s youth, it is investing in the democratic resilience of South Africa’s future.

The Vital Role of Participatory Democracy in Building a Just and Inclusive Society By the Inclusive Society Institute in collaboration with the Daily Maverick Participatory democracy acts as a fundamental pillar in our pursuit of a just and inclusive society. As responsible citizens and leaders, it is incumbent upon us to deeply comprehend and uphold the principles that underpin this vision. Justice Albie Sachs, a distinguished former Constitutional Court Judge, offers valuable reflections on a case that exemplifies the importance of Participatory Democracy, the Doctors for Life case. In 2005, Parliament passed four pieces of legislation relating to reproductive healthcare matters. Doctors for Life, a conservative organisation, objected to the passing of this legislation, alleging that the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) had not sufficiently involved the public in the process, in violation of sections 72 and 118 of the Constitution. Section 72 of the Constitution requires the NCOP to facilitate public involvement in legislative processes, while section 118 imposes the same obligation on provincial legislatures. Doctors for Life International, which had conservative views on the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, challenged the proposed law on the grounds that it had not been subject to sufficient public participation in a novel case that pitted representative democracy against participatory democracy. In this particular case's verdict, the Constitutional Court determined that the NCOP had not fulfilled its constitutional duty to encourage public participation in the process of creating laws. The Court established that the NCOP had neglected to request written input from the public regarding the Bills, had not conducted public hearings on the Bills, and had disregarded public opinions when making decisions about the Bills. The word "participatory" does not appear in the Constitution, but section 1(d) refers to a "multi-party system of democratic government." The meaning of this phrase was central to the judgment, which ultimately found that the NCOP had not met its constitutional obligations to facilitate public participation in the legislative process. The Doctors for Life case was a landmark decision that affirmed the importance of public participation in the law-making process. It also highlighted the tension between representative democracy, in which the people elect representatives to make decisions on their behalf, and participatory democracy, in which the people themselves have a more direct role in decision-making. The Doctors for Life matter served as a poignant reminder of the paramount importance of engaging the public in legislative processes. This landmark decision not only reaffirmed the need for participatory justice in South Africa but also continues to provide valuable insights for our democratic institutions. The case is a reminder that participatory democracy is not just an abstract ideal but a fundamental right enshrined in the South African Constitution. It is a right that must be upheld to build a truly democratic society. Our Constitution, as the foundational document of our democracy, envisions a system that goes beyond periodic elections. It calls for a dynamic democracy that actively engages citizens in decision-making. As Justice Sachs eloquently states, the vision is not akin to "sleeping beauty," where democracy is awakened solely during elections. Instead, it demands ongoing public engagement and the recognition of the diverse voices within our society. Participatory democracy yields several benefits for both governance and society. When people are knowledgeable about the law and have been involved in its formulation, they feel a sense of ownership and belonging. This fosters unity amidst diversity, ensuring that all sections of society have an opportunity to contribute meaningfully. Better outcomes are achieved when legislation reflects the realities and aspirations of those most affected by it. Participatory democracy is also particularly vital for groups traditionally marginalised or underrepresented in formal power structures. The Doctors for Life case highlighted the importance of engaging local healers and recognising their expertise. By involving such outlying groups, we strengthen our democracy by embracing the wisdom and experiences of all citizens. The recognition and inclusion of diverse perspectives lead to fairer outcomes and a stronger sense of social cohesion. The Constitutional Court's decision to strike down the law in question demonstrated the court's commitment to upholding participatory justice. It was not an encroachment on Parliament's authority but a necessary consequence of Parliament's failure to fulfil its promise of public engagement. This judgment affirms that reasonable measures must be taken to ensure genuine public involvement, thus emphasising the Court's role as the guardian of constitutional principles. South Africa stands out as a beacon of participatory democracy, with few precedents worldwide of legislation being struck down due to failures in public engagement. We must recognise this unique position and continue to lead by example. The global trend toward disillusionment with traditional political processes calls for revitalising participatory democracy. Rather than sporadic consultations, continuous public engagement is key to rebuilding trust and empowerment. In conclusion, The Doctors for Life case offers us valuable insights into the true essence of participatory democracy. As a living document, our Constitution demands more than just representative democracy; it envisions an active, engaged citizenry. We must embrace the principles of inclusivity, accountability, and openness. By taking reasonable steps to involve the public, we strengthen our democracy and ensure a fair and just society. Let us seize this.