Search

From 27 to 29 March 2026, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), in partnership with the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), and in association with the Africa Think-tank Dialogue, Foundation Max van der Stoel, Olof Palme International Center, Foundation Jean Jaurés and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, co-hosted a high-level EU-Africa Consultative Meeting in Cape Town. Held at the Pullman Hotel, Cape Town, the engagement brought together policymakers, academics, and civil society leaders to reflect on the future trajectory of EU-Africa relations in the context of a rapidly shifting global order.   The meeting opened with a welcome dinner, setting the tone for what would become a candid and forward-looking dialogue. Formal proceedings commenced the following morning with opening remarks from FEPS and ISI leadership, alongside a keynote address by Hon. Supra Mahumapelo, Chairperson of South Africa’s Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation. ISI CEO Daryl Swanepoel moderated the opening exchanges, framing the discussions around the need for a more balanced, equitable and strategic partnership between Europe and Africa.   The first day of discussions focused on economic transformation, sustainability and human mobility. The opening session on trade highlighted the urgency of rebalancing economic relations. Participants emphasised that while trade remains central to both regions, existing frameworks have not sufficiently supported Africa’s industrialisation ambitions. Greater focus is needed on local value chains, fair labour standards, and rebuilding a credible rules-based trading system.   This was followed by a session on green industrialisation, where discussions centred on aligning European investment instruments - particularly the Global Gateway - with African development priorities. Participants stressed that the green transition must move beyond extractive models and instead support sustainable industrial growth, job creation, and long-term capacity building on the continent.   The conversation then turned to migration and human mobility. Here, participants challenged dominant narratives that frame migration primarily as a security concern. Instead, the discussion emphasised migration as a driver of development, noting that most African migration takes place within the continent. A more balanced, rights-based and development-oriented approach to migration governance was widely supported.   The second day shifted focus to global governance, multilateralism and peace and security. Discussions highlighted growing divergences in how Europe and Africa experience the current international order. While the EU has historically benefited from existing multilateral structures, many African countries continue to face structural disadvantages rooted in their limited representation in global institutions.   Participants engaged critically with the need to reform international financial systems, address debt vulnerabilities, and advance tax justice. There was strong consensus that EU-Africa cooperation in multilateral forums will be essential to driving meaningful reform and ensuring a more inclusive global economic architecture.   The final session addressed the crisis in the global peace and security system. With rising conflict levels and increasing strain on the United Nations, participants explored opportunities for joint EU–Africa leadership in advancing UN reform, strengthening conflict prevention, and reinforcing commitments to the UN Charter.   Throughout the engagement, the Inclusive Society Institute played a central convening and intellectual role. ISI not only co-hosted the meeting but also moderated key sessions and contributed to shaping the strategic direction of the discussions. The Institute’s emphasis on inclusive development, balanced partnerships and multilateral reform was a consistent thread across the dialogue.   The meeting reaffirmed that EU-Africa relations remain critically important, but that the partnership must evolve. Moving forward, a shift towards genuine co-development, mutual accountability and shared leadership in global governance will be essential.   For ISI, the engagement forms part of its broader commitment to advancing Africa’s voice in international policy debates and contributing to the development of a more just and inclusive global order.   EU-Africa Consultative Meeting 2026 - Agenda:

Occasional Paper 3/2026 Copyright © 2026   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa                                                                       235-515 NPO                  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   MARCH 2026 by Lars Gumede BCom (Actuarial Science) ABSTRACT   The major powers globally have made cybersecurity a top priority. They see that every aspect of our lives depends on an expanding complex network of cyber systems that are vulnerable to exploitation. That cyberspace is a domain of power and opportunity, but with that comes threat from malicious actors. South Africa is not adequately prepared for this reality. In fact, the country has the third-highest incidence of cyberattacks in the world. Citizens are being scammed, defrauded, robbed and tricked by sophisticated cybercriminal gangs. Businesses are being extorted and held to ransom. The country’s defence organisations and government themselves regularly fall victim to cyberattacks. And the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) is just making it easier for even amateur cyber actors to access dangerous cyber tools.   The crisis of cybersecurity in South Africa requires a national project involving all sectors of society: the government, private sector, civil society and citizens. Following the lead of countries around the world that are winning the cybersecurity war, there are three main priorities. First, is putting in place a dedicated cybersecurity organisation; one that is totally free from political appointments and interference and led by the top cyber experts in the country. The second priority is developing a national cybersecurity awareness campaign to strengthen the weakest link in South Africa’s cyber defence: the human element. And third, a national programme of cultivating the next generation of cyber talent is required. Without proper cybersecurity, no nation can be secure. A single cyberattack could descend the country into total anarchy in less than a week. This thought alone should be driving us to act now, together as a nation. INTRODUCTION   Cybersecurity is the most important aspect of national security in today’s world. Every facet of our lives depends on cyber systems, and these systems are vulnerable to malicious cyber threat actors.   Amateur hackers, cybercriminal gangs and nation-state cyber actors are all engaged in illegal activities targeting South Africa and its people. Malicious software, including spyware, is being deployed against government organisations. Ransomware is being used to extort and hold businesses to ransom. Deepfakes are being deployed against unsuspecting citizens for the purposes of scams, frauds and outright thefts.   Worse, the development of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming this threat landscape into an even bigger one. Due to new AI developments, it has never been easier for cyber actors to get their hands on dangerous cyber tools. This means small-time cyber actors now have access to sophisticated tools once reserved for large organisations and nation-state cyber actors. Furthermore, already sophisticated cyber actors are made even more capable and dangerous.   South Africa is currently the wild west of cyber activity, with among the highest incidences of cyberattacks in the world. Government organisations are routinely infiltrated in cyberspace by hacker groups, nation-state actors and even amateur hackers. Private businesses are consistently victims of ransomware and extortion, being forced to pay large amounts to regain control of their systems. Private citizens are frequent victims of deepfakes and associated cybercrimes intended to rob, scam or extort them.   The fact that the rest of the continent is even more lawless when it comes to cyberspace is a further strategic issue for South Africa, as countries all over the continent house cybercriminal groups actively targeting the country.   As will be seen, there are also plenty of cybersecurity success stories from countries around the world. For the world’s major powers, cyber is a top priority and their primary initiatives are threefold. First, they have dedicated cybersecurity and cyber intelligence organisations that employ their nation’s top cyber experts and coordinate cybersecurity, cyber intelligence, and incident response as well as law enforcement actions with regard to cyber threats and crimes. Second, they have national cybersecurity awareness campaigns, recognising that the weakest link is always the human element. These programmes train citizens in good cyber practises and on how to recognise cyber threats, schemes and scams. Finally, these top nations put great effort into creating and fostering the next generation of cyber talent by giving support to promising young individuals on a large scale.   Cybersecurity is the bedrock of every modern nation; without it no nation can be secure. This is a matter of top priority and requires the urgent attention of the entire country: the government, private sector, civil society and citizenry.   WHAT IS CYBERSECURITY AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?   Cybersecurity is about the protection of data, networks, devices, systems and processes from unauthorised access and interference by known and unknown actors (CISA, 2025). In today’s world, cyber systems are integrated into every facet of our lives, from the devices we carry around like extra limbs, to municipal systems like traffic lights, water infrastructure and electricity grids. These are systems we rely on for the proper functioning of society, and they are all at constant risk of attack, with potentially devastating consequences.   Cyberattacks come in many forms. There is malicious software (Malware), which is software designed to take advantage of a system, and forms a part of most modern cyberattacks. There is social engineering (Phishing), also known as human hacking, which aims to trick an individual into granting the attacker access to a system. Phishing attacks often use seemingly normal emails, text messages, phone calls and other methods to trick an individual into taking actions such as sharing personal information and passwords, downloading malware or sending money. Spoofing is an attacker pretending to be someone you know by replicating their email or phone number. There are Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, which seek to overwhelm and flood a system with large amounts of junk traffic in order to crash the system and render it unusable to the legitimate persons using the system.   Ransomware is utilised to lock legitimate users out of their systems, demanding payment to unlock them. There are also Zero-Day exploits, which are advanced and novel holes attackers find in a system that allows them access — these are very difficult to detect and rely on the fact that no system is perfect. Another type is Password attacks, in which an attacker attempts to guess the victims passwords or login details. These are just some of the types of cyberattacks and risks faced by governments, companies and individuals (IBM, 2025). According to the Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025 report by the World Economic Forum (WEF), these attacks represent the vast majority of cyber threats to governments, businesses and individuals (WEF, 2025).   Figure 1: Most Common Types of Cyberattacks. (Source: Generated by author.)   These cyberattacks can come from various sources. Cybercriminal gangs utilise the above techniques in order to extort and rob ordinary citizens. Hackers, whether amateurs (‘script kiddies’) or persons with expert-level experience and skills, are constantly aiming to exploit common systems like mobile devices, computers, corporate and government systems. There are also nation-state actors, which are groups of hackers with the backing of countries, giving them the resources to pull off sophisticated cyber operations. Often these nation-state actors buy technologies from companies engaged in the development of spyware and other cyber or surveillance technologies (IBM, 2025).   With all our lives and the smooth functioning of society dependant on cyber systems, this is a matter of the utmost importance. At the click of a button an entire country’s electricity grid can be shut off or its water systems interfered with. In 2015, a Russian hacker group known as ‘Sandworm’ remotely shut down the Ukrainian power grid for six hours, leaving 230,000 residents without electricity (CFR, 2015). In 2010, an Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz was disrupted by the Stuxnet virus, a piece of malicious software developed by American and Israeli intelligence (Baezner & Robin, 2017). In 2024, Israel carried out an operation in which the pagers of thousands of Hezbollah operatives were simultaneously and remotely detonated (Trenta, 2024). In 2014, Chinese state-sponsored hackers exfiltrated blueprints of the Lockheed Martin F35 stealth fighter jet, using the information to support their own fighter jet programme (AFOSI, 2020). In 2018, Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was tracked to his brutal murder by Saudi operatives using advanced spyware built by Israeli company, NSO group (The Guardian, 2021). It is clear that there is an ongoing global cyber war of all against all.   The systems we rely on can be infiltrated to such an extent that attackers have more control over our devices than we do — giving them access to everything: our bank details, our personal data and communications, as well as the ability to surveil and sabotage.   Now, despite the fact that these acts are often highly sophisticated, they can be prevented. Most advanced cybersecurity systems are near secure enough for their purposes; the issue is the human aspect. Cybersecurity has a PICNIC problem: Problem In Chair, Not In Computer. Most cyber incidents rely on an unsuspecting individual to click on a link or compromise themselves in some way. Being the weakest link, it is essential to address the human aspect. This involves creating awareness about the realities of cybersecurity and exploitation in order not to gently open the door for the attackers.   This human component is the most important component in cybersecurity as attackers seek to trick legitimate users into giving them access — this makes the attacks even harder to detect and trace. Unfortunately, there is an entirely new aspect to cyber threats in 2025. Cyber actors are now utilising artificial intelligence (AI) to supercharge their attacks. CYBERSECURITY IN THE AGE OF AI. EVEN MORE URGENT   Cybersecurity has been a concern for as long as computers have been around. During World War II, there was a cyber battle between the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany involving building the first advanced computers, building secure encryption to ensure the security of the communications of their respective sides, and attempting to crack the encryption of the other. Breakthroughs by the first cryptographic experts at Bletchley Park in the UK turned the tide of the war and gave birth to the United Kingdom’s cyber intelligence organisation, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). In 2010, the Stuxnet virus, a sophisticated piece of software, caused major disruptions to the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz — the virus was walked through the door on a USB drive by an unsuspecting and naive employee. The top technology companies have been fighting a constant uphill battle with attackers and every few months a new major company is hacked and has data exposed or is held to ransom. It is clear then that the issue of cybersecurity is not new.   Unfortunately, there is a new factor at play today making the issue of cybersecurity even more severe: Artificial Intelligence (AI). Using advanced AI, sophisticated hacking tools are widely available to anyone with sufficient motivation, and already sophisticated actors now have even more sophisticated tools. Actors are now utilising AI and their own creativity to come up with extraordinary cyber schemes. For example, in February 2024, on a regular day in Hong Kong, an employee of Arup, a British multinational company, received instructions on a video conference call with his boss and CFO to transfer $25 million (~R500 million) to an external account. Unfortunately for the company and the employee involved, the entire affair was a complex cyber fraud utilising advanced AI. All the persons on the video call were, in fact, deepfakes. The attackers had used voice-cloning and face-generation tools to imitate the real expressions and speech of the company seniors. The target was left with no doubt of the request’s legitimacy and transferred the money, which was then quickly laundered through accounts and cryptocurrency mixers, and is yet to be recovered. What is most concerning about this incident is that all the tools involved are available essentially for free on the internet for anyone with the bravado and willingness to learn these techniques (Gumede, 2024).   That means these attacks are only going to get more advanced and the attackers, more creative. Platforms such as ElevenLabs can generate a full audio avatar of a person with just a 30-second clip of the person speaking, and WormGPT (the hacking equivalent of ChatGPT) can generate real-seeming personalised emails, texts and scripts for use in such attacks. Recently, a special kind of AI-powered malware was developed (in proof of concept form) by a Canadian cybersecurity research company. This “Polymorphic malware” uses AI to constantly change and hide itself, allowing it to remain undetected by Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools (HYAS, 2024). This means the malware can behave as if it is alive and actively evade detection by the security defences.   The confluence of ordinary cyberattacks and threat actors combined with the developments in AI have brought about a dramatic shift in the cybersecurity landscape. Cybercriminals no longer need specialised skills and abilities in order to carry out these attacks and those who do possess these skills are made even stronger. STATE OF CYBERSECURITY IN SA   South Africa is scarily vulnerable in all aspects of cybersecurity and consistently victim to malicious cyber actors, who essentially have free reign to victimise whomever they please. According to the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC), South Africa ranks as the third-highest country globally in terms of cybercrime victims (SABRIC, 2024). An assessment detailed in Interpol’s African Cyberthreat Assessment Report found that nearly 600 cyberattacks are launched every hour at South African businesses, government and civic organisations (Interpol, 2022). Government, the private sector and the citizenry are all being victimised, with little to no response, as there is no dedicated agency for cybersecurity or cybercrimes like there is in most developed nations.   Each year, the country loses roughly R2.2 billion due to cyberattacks and incidents, according to the Information and Cybersecurity Centre at the CSIR, which does cybersecurity analysis and statistics. The report by the CSIR also states that over half of all South African companies are victims of ransomware each year and that the average cost of a single large data breach is R53.1 million. Moreover, 88% of South African organisations face between one and five cyber incidents each year (CSIR, 2024). This should come as no surprise, as the country lacks a structured counter to this cyber threat.   The National Cyber Policy Framework (NCPF) assigns the Department of Science and Technology (DST) the responsibility of putting in place a national cybersecurity research and development agenda. However, experts such as Prof. Elmarie Biermann and Dr. Noëlle van der Waag-Cowling have assessed a ‘lack of momentum’ in relation to this agenda (Biermann & Cowling, 2018). These critics argue that the legislation introduced in 2018, namely the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, has had no quantifiable effect on the cybersecurity landscape and instead seems to criminalise routine and non-harmful online activities.   The primary laws dealing with cybercriminal activity are the Cyber Crimes Act of 2020 and the Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of 2002. The Cyber Crimes Act criminalises hacking, unlawful interception of data, ransomware and similar activities (Cyber Crimes Act, 2020). The Electronic Communications Act gives legal protections to sensitive electronic activities such as electronic transactions and communications (Electronic Communications Act, 2002). The laws are comprehensive (some say too comprehensive as to inhibit perfectly reasonable activity), but enforcement is virtually nil.   In March 2012, the NCPF mandated the then Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services (now the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies [DCDT]) to create the Cybersecurity Hub. The Cybersecurity Hub serves as the country’s Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) and coordinates cybersecurity responses and information sharing between departments (Cybersecurity Hub, 2025). It also runs an awareness portal (website) with information on cyber awareness but does not run widespread public information campaigns bringing the message to the people. This cyber hub is being overseen by the Cyber Response Committee of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. Since these structures have not substantively reduced the cyber threat (544 police cases in the face of over 100,000 banking-related cyberattacks alone; an 86% increase year-on-year), opposition parties, led by DA Spokesperson for Justice and Constitutional Development Adv. Glynnis Breytenbach MP, have tabled a bill proposing the creation of an Office of the Cyber Commissioner to oversee cyber activities (DA, 2025).   Steps are needed as all sectors of society — public, private, civil and individuals — are under constant cyber victimisation, with little to no consequences from law enforcement. PUBLIC SECTOR   Government departments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are under constant attack from and victimisation by cyber actors.   Eskom, the national power utility, is under constant attack. According to Sithembile Songo, the chief information security officer (CISO) at Eskom, it faces up to one billion attempted cyberattacks per month, with DDoS attacks being most common and ransomware attacks accounting for more than 100,000. In 2022, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was hacked and its systems disrupted. Then Treasury Minister Enoch Godongwana said that neither SARB nor the South African authorities were able to identify the attack; instead, the FBI (from the United States) “took it upon themselves to notify the oblivious authorities” (Maliti, 2022).   In July 2024, Minister of Public Works and Infrastructure Dean Macpherson announced that hackers had stolen R300 million from the department over a period of 10 years of undetected theft (Public Works, 2024). In May 2024, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development was victim to a ransomware attack that compromised over 1,200 sensitive files. In July, National Treasury announced they had found malware on their systems related to an attack on Microsoft Sharepoint and that they were seeking Microsoft’s help in dealing with the issue (BusinessTech, 2025). In Jan 2025, the South African Weather Service suffered a hack that left the systems down and unable to function for two weeks in what it described as a “criminal security breach” (Digital Watch SA, 2025). More recently, in March 2025, Parliament announced the hacking of its social media accounts — an incident which saw attackers using the official social media accounts of the Parliament of South Africa for the purposes of promoting a scam cryptocurrency project.   In 2022, the Department of Defence was hacked by a threat actor by the name of ‘Security Notification Attachment’ a.k.a. Snatch. A spokesperson for the department denied any hack took place, saying they were “categorically unwilling to accept information about penetration into the secure government network” (MyBroadband, 2025a). Despite their bizarre denials, 1.6TB of sensitive data from the Department of Defence was published on the website of the attackers and can still be bought on various dark web data broker websites by anyone with the funds, internet and a computer.   In 2024, Cybersecurity research company Recorded Future reported that the State Security Agency was amongst a handful of government departments around the world that had been breached by the cyber-espionage group RedNovember (MyBroadband, 2025b). The group uses open-source tools to exploit vulnerabilities in devices linked to the internet to target government and private organisations globally (Recorded Future, 2024).   The threat to the country’s security is clear. Hackers can, at will, penetrate all government systems, even sensitive defence systems. Rather than acknowledge this major national security crisis, the Minister of Defence Angie Motshekga told Parliament that “cybersecurity is already inherent in SANDF doctrine” (Teixeira, 2025). In the Department of Defence’s Annual Report for FY2024/25, the DoD notes that it is participating in the discussions to create an Integrated Cybersecurity Centre in the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) cluster. These discussions have been ongoing and there has been no substantive progress yet. In 2018, the DoD stated its aim of creating a cyber capability. However, the head of the SANDF’s cyber command, Brigadier General Mafi Mgobozi, stated before Parliament in 2023 that the new unit was in ‘limbo in relation to finding suitable facilities’ and is currently accommodated in "limited space” at Defence Intelligence headquarters and is, therefore, not able to function optimally (DefenceWeb, 2023). The general has subsequently described the unit as being “partially operational” due to lack of funding (Lesedi, 2023).   Considering the lack of a dedicated, well-funded and capacitated agency to deal with the cyber threat, it is likely this trend will continue and government entities will remain vulnerable. Similar types of attacks against government will only become more prevalent. This is echoed by the State Security Agency’s warning that attacks on critical infrastructure are likely to escalate going forward (DefenceWeb, 2025). PRIVATE SECTOR   It is not just government that is under constant cyberattack; private sector organisations are also being victimised and their victimisation made worse by the lack of government capability in this area.   Cybersecurity researcher Check Point’s Global Threat Intelligence Report, released in July 2025, shows that South African businesses are hit by 2,113 cyberattacks every week (CPR, 2025). Despite this, private sector cybersecurity budgets are low and, more importantly, business awareness of the threats remains low. In a survey mentioned in the report, 80% of IT executives interviewed said they were most confident they could not fall for any kind of phishing attack. However, when tested, 64% of them clicked on a malicious phishing link disguised as a friendly one.   Large companies regularly fall victim to data breach and ransom. In April 2025, Cell C announced it had been hacked by cyberattackers, resulting in customer data being stolen. The company stated it was working with the authorities to deal with the issue and mitigate the impact on customers’ service but that it was unclear just how bad the attack had been. It therefore urged its users to be vigilant and assume the worst. In March 2025, the real estate company Pam Golding suffered a cyberattack. As part of the attack, unidentified cyber assailants remotely accessed the company’s customer relationship management software system. This resulted in the personal data of its customers — like contact details, addresses and ID numbers — being exposed (Decision Inc, 2025).   In April 2025, the telecommunications operator MTN, Africa’s largest mobile operator, underwent a sustained cyberattack. In a company statement, it said the attackers gained unauthorised access to the personal information of customers in various markets across the continent. In March 2025, Astral Foods, which is South Africa’s largest chicken producer, suffered a breach by unknown cyberattackers. The attack disrupted the company’s ability to produce and distribute its chicken, which saw a temporary nationwide chicken shortage (Decision Inc, 2025).   Unfortunately, these threats are not only faced by large businesses, but also by small businesses — often with much worse consequences, as they do not have the capabilities and budgets of large companies. Recent surveys reveal that 47% of South African businesses report experiencing between one and five cybersecurity incidents in the past year (2023), with 88% admitting to at least one security breach (CSIR, 2024).   The consequences of poor cybersecurity readiness are devastating. Imagine a local retail business that processes hundreds of transactions daily. One day, employees are greeted with a ransom note on their screens, demanding R500,000 to unlock their encrypted files. Unable to access customer data, inventory records or payment systems, the business grinds to a halt. After several days of downtime, the company reluctantly pays the ransom, only to discover that the data has been deleted. Legal fees, customer compensation, reputational damage and lack of support from authorities further compound the losses.   Seventy-one percent of cyber leaders believe that small organisations have reached a critical tipping point in being unable to secure themselves against growing cyber threats, according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025 (WEF, 2025). This is because new AI-boosted cyberattacks have reached a pivotal moment in sophistication, requiring more than business owners are able to do to counter them. INDIVIDUALS   Individual citizens are also commonly victim to advanced cyberattacks. Often these attacks are successful due to victims not believing that anybody would go so out of their way to scam them. Yet, there are thousands of ordinary citizens who have been victimised by unscrupulous cybercriminal elements.   One notable advanced tactic is the use of AI-powered scams and frauds. In January 2024, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) issued a public warning after persons were fooled by an investment scam that utilised deepfakes (AI-generated videos) of prominent South African businesspersons such as Patrice Motsepe and Johann Rupert. Recently, former Finance Minister Trevor Manuel warned of a scam on social media platforms that featured a deepfake of him, stating that “there are social media posts using [his] image, and artificial voice and pretending to either give people investment advice or requesting that they invest in products that I advise them to” (Fraser, 2025).   In October 2025, SARB also issued a statement warning of a deepfake investment scam featuring their chief, Governor Lesetja Kganyago. Major bank FNB made similar public statements, warning of a deepfake scam impersonating bank officers and seeking to trick bank customers into giving the attackers access to their systems, saying that “in some cases, the scams can be incredibly sophisticated, leveraging deepfakes, voice synthesis, and automated chatbots to appear more legitimate” (Illridge, 2025) In fact, instances of deepfake scams have risen by 1200% in the past year, according to a report by TransUnion Africa. “We’re a very digitally orientated country, with internet penetration at about 79%, over 50 million users, and 124 million mobile connections. That gives rise to exploitation,” said Amritha Reddy, Senior Director of Fraud Product Management at TransUnion (Nozulela, 2025).   These deepfake scams can also be much more intimate than a social media advertisement using the likeness of a prominent figure. Zoho, a South African cybersecurity company, has warned about much more personal schemes by cybercriminals; impersonating loved ones on WhatsApp. A typical scam such as this works as follows: you get a phone call about something unrelated and over time the attackers develop a large audio file of your voice that can be turned into an audio deepfake. The attackers can then call or send voice notes pretending to be you (Adeyemi, 2025).   This issue has led Deputy Minister of Communications Mondli Gungubele to state that the country needs to prepare to protect consumers against scams and cybercrime related to AI.   Figure 2: Main cyber risks to government, business, society and the citizenry. (Source: Generated by author) AFRICA   Not limited to South Africa, the entire continent is facing a cybersecurity crisis. Cybercrime costs Africa an estimated $3.5 billion (R70 billion) annually, according to a report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and McAfee (Kauder, 2025). According to Interpol, cybercrime accounts for roughly 30% of all reported crimes in both western and eastern Africa.   In July 2024, hackers calling themselves ‘Hunters’ breached Kenya’s Urban Roads Authority, then struck again in December against Telecom Namibia, affecting over 500,000 customers. In April, R100 million was stolen from Nigerian fintech company Flutterwave by daring hackers. According to Interpol, hackers routinely exploit Africa’s poor infrastructure and outdated systems. In fact, cybercriminals operating Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) use African organisations as a testing ground for new malware. After South Africa, the most targeted countries, according to Interpol, are Egypt and Morocco, due to their large economies and internet access (Interpol, 2024).   The primary cybersecurity initiative in Africa is Interpol’s African Joint Operation against Cybercrime (AFJOC), which is engaged in combating cybercrime across the continent. During Operation Serengeti 2.0 (in 2025), a part of AFJOC and involving 18 African nations as well as the UK, over 1,200 arrests were made and close to R2 billion recovered. The operation also dismantled 11,000 ‘malicious infrastructures’ linked to ransomware, business email compromise and large-scale fraud. Under this operation, the authorities in Angola closed 25 illegal cryptocurrency mining sites operated by 60 Chinese nationals and seized close to R800 million in equipment. In Zambia, police dismantled a R6 billion investment fraud scheme that victimised 65,000 people and uncovered a human-trafficking linked scam that utilised 372 forged passports. In Côte d’Ivoire, authorities arrested the leader of a R30 million inheritance scam. Among the countries participating were Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, alongside the UK and other Interpol members (DefenceWeb, 2025).   Due to the rampant cyber lawlessness in the rest of the continent of Africa, South Africa faces an even bigger threat as cybercriminal gangs are targeting South Africa from outside its borders. These challenges make it essential to learn what the most successful cyber countries around the world are doing in order to implement what is proven to work. WHAT TOP COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD ARE DOING   Countries around the world have implemented all sorts of highly successful cyber initiatives, bringing great benefit to their economies, stability, security and more.   In November 2022, after a number of large cyber incidents, such as the breach of Medibank in which the confidential data of millions of Australians was exposed, a new cybercrime task force was set up, known as the ‘Hack the Hackers’ task force. A joint operation by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the country’s cyber intelligence organisation, the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), the task force put together 100 of Australia’s top cyber experts, brought them under one roof and gave them the go-ahead to use offensive cyber tools and tactics similar to those employed by the hackers themselves to hunt down and neutralise cyber threats to Australia (O’Neil, 2023).   The task force has already seen major success, including involvement in Operation Checkmate (2025) taking down the BlackSuit/Royal ransomware group, which has extorted more than R6 billion from victims around the world. In Operation Endgame (2024), the task force took down an international botnet infrastructure using more than 200 servers, made dozens of arrests, and carried out the seizure of millions of euros in cryptocurrency (Breached Company, 2025). This task force is reversing the ordinary dynamic between the authorities and cybercriminals by actively hunting down these threat actors, thus creating real consequences for cyber acts against the state. This is a perfect example of how a country should respond to rising cybercrime and cybersecurity threats.   In July 2021, Singapore’s Cybersecurity Agency (CSA) launched an initiative called ‘Better Cyber Safe Than Sorry’ — a large-scale cybersecurity public awareness campaign. As explored above, the weakest link in any cyber system is the human aspect. By raising awareness in the populous of cybersecurity essentials, one can substantively reduce the costs of cybercrime. The campaign has four key points: Using strong passwords (with multifactor authentication), recognising the signs of phishing and other social engineering schemes, using up-to-date anti-virus software, and always keeping the software on personal devices up to date (CSA, 2025).   The campaign has partnered with major Singaporean e-commerce sites like Shopee, Carousell and hundreds of other stores. It utilises TV ads, bus stop posters and social media to spread the message far and wide. In addition, the CSA runs a ‘Cyber Safe Seniors Programme’ giving multilingual cybersecurity awareness educational content to over 50,000 senior citizens in a bid to prevent those seniors falling victim to cybercrimes and scams. This is a real model for a national cybersecurity awareness campaign (OpenGov Asia, 2021).   The United States has long had several dedicated organisations dealing with cyber. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA), the country’s largest intelligence organisation, which deals with signals and cyber intelligence, including tracking sophisticated cyber actors around the world. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the coordinator for all US cyber and infrastructure security (CISA, 2025). The United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the military organisation, has the goal to “Own the Domain” when it comes to cyberspace. Together these organisations work towards ensuring that whatever happens in cyber space, happens to the advantage of the United States (USCYBERCOM, 2025).   The successes of these organisations are common knowledge, from monitoring and responding to cyber threats to creating the world’s most advanced cyber tools. Recently, in August 2025, the above organisations issued a warning about the Chinese cyber threat actor known as Salt Typhoon — which had targeted telecommunications companies around the world. The NSA even has its own hacking unit, once known as Tailored Access Operations (TAO), directly targeting adversaries and other threats to America. CISA routinely stress tests the systems of large American companies, with the view of protecting them from foreign threat actors. Such dedicated cyber organisations and agencies are essential for the protection of any major country. In 2000, less than 2% of the population of China had access to the internet (World Bank, 2025). Today China is, of course, a global cyber and internet power. In May 1999, after a US missile destroyed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the first known Chinese cyberattack took place. Early Chinese internet users defaced the websites of several American government departments. Those early hackers from the China Eagle Union and the Honka Union of China were the beginning of Chinese hacking power — now known the world over for sophisticated operations that have successfully brought China up to the level of the United States in science and technology (Lafarge, 2022).   Instead of being shunned, these early Chinese hackers were given the support they needed to develop their abilities and given the go-ahead to use their skills for the betterment of the state. As a result, this small group of ‘Honkers’ (derived from the Chinese ‘Hong Ke’) with just 40 hackers, known to western researchers as ‘The Red 40’, which began as a loose network that met in online forums in the 1990s and 2000s, became a global cyber superpower within the short space of a decade or two (Benincasa, 2025).   Today, Israel makes up 0.11% of the world’s population. Despite this, it holds one-third (33%) of the world’s cybersecurity unicorns (billion dollar startups). For comparison, the Cape Town—Stellenbosch corridor (South Africa’s ‘Silicon Valley’) had roughly 450 tech companies in 2022, while Israel had 6,500, one for every 1,400 people. This cyber hub has attracted the majority of the top tech companies in the world to open R&D centres in Israel. This was achieved through programmes such as the Talpiot programme and Unit 8200 (Gumede, 2022). The Talpiot programme is a specialised training programme for the top school and high school students in the country and is designed to get them to the level of a university graduate before they even graduate high school, putting these top students on the path to becoming world-class experts in their fields; everything from cyber, sciences, academia and leadership.   The top cyber trainees go into Unit 8200, Israel’s signals and cyber intelligence organisation, where they are given the go-ahead to create the world’s most advanced cyber systems and tools. Then, after these tools are replaced and become militarily obsolete, they take these tools to the private sector, starting world-class cyber-tech startups. For this reason, Unit 8200 graduates are coveted by tech companies around the world. This unique programme produced Israel’s extraordinary overachievement in cybersecurity and associated technologies (Gumede, 2022).   These examples of the most successful cybersecurity initiatives from around the world each speak to a different essential aspect of this new world: Dedicated cyber organisations, national public awareness campaigns, proactive and offensive operations as well as supporting the next generation of cyber talent, who will create the technologies of the future. WHAT SA SHOULD DO   Given that there are already proven examples of successes from around the world, the country must learn from these. South Africa should seek to emulate all of the initiatives outlined above and below. CREATION OF A NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION   The creation of a dedicated cybersecurity and intelligence organisation that is well capacitated, well-funded and has clear objectives. This organisation should be staffed by the top experts in the field and not encumbered by political appointments and interference. This organisation should oversee all cyber activities, go after cyber threats to the country in order to restore consequences for cybercrimes, and test all public and private systems for their cyber strength.   Such an organisation would oversee the cybersecurity of government departments, infrastructure, corporate systems and products, and the creation of locally made defensive and offensive tools. Most importantly, it should prepare and execute a long-term cyber strategy.     CREATION OF A NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PUBLIC AWARENESS AND EDUCATION CAMPAIGN   The creation of a publicly accessible (zero-rated) platform as well as widespread messaging to bring awareness to the population about proper cybersecurity practices, to address the weak link ‘PICNIC’ problem of cyber defence. This is particularly essential for older citizens or citizens further away from the tech and internet worlds.   Such a campaign would have the effect of raising the cybersecurity awareness of the population, turning all citizens into eyes that can monitor for malicious cyber activities, keeping the citizenry updated on the latest techniques utilised by cybercriminals, and preventing countless persons falling victim to scams, frauds and other criminal activities.     CREATION OF A NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR FOSTERING TOP CYBER TALENT   This could mean giving support to promising school students or giving internships and work opportunities to top talent. It could also mean taking all persons incarcerated for cyber-related crimes and putting their skills to work to the benefit of the state. This strategy is not without precedent globally or in South Africa; as in the case of the Bishops High School student who hacked ABSA in 2003 and was forced to work for three years at the CSIR’s Cybersecurity Research Lab (M&G, 2003).   Such a programme would quickly create a large cohort of cyber experts in all subfields, which will have unquantifiable benefits to the economy, state institutions, employment, and positively affect every other sector of society.   Figure 3: South Africa Cybersecurity Action Triangle. (Source: Generated by author)   By implementing these initiatives, the country will address the current cyber threat crisis (cybersecurity and intelligence organisation), position itself properly for the future (fostering next-generation talent) and turn all South African citizens into cybersecurity-aware frontline defenders (national awareness campaign). These basics are being employed by every major tech-leading country. CONCLUSION   Every facet of our lives depends on cyber systems, and those cyber systems are only becoming more vulnerable to malicious actors . For this reason, the major nations globally have cybersecurity as a top priority.   Cyberspace is a domain of power and South Africa is not adequately prepared. Acts in cyberspace are being committed every day by the powers of the world. From the United States deploying a virus to destroy Iranian nuclear plants, Russia shutting down the Ukrainian power grid, and Israel turning innocent-seeming pagers into explosive devices against Hezbollah, to Chinese hackers exfiltrating defence blueprints from US defence companies — it is clear that the domain of cyberspace is the most important in today’s world. It is a domain in which an invisible global war is being constantly fought.   Not only is South Africa likely the victim of all manner of nation-state cyber operations, but cyber actors of all types are also running free, constantly victimising South African citizens to the point where South Africa has the third-highest incidence of cyberattacks in the world. Ordinary citizens are being scammed, defrauded, robbed and tricked by sophisticated cybercriminal gangs. Businesses, small and large, are being extorted and held to ransom, resulting in billions of rands in losses and unquantifiable damage to the economy. The country’s defence organisations, which are supposed to secure the country from external threats, are themselves consistently penetrated by cyber threat actors. Government is also victim to these cyberattacks, as are private sector organisations and individuals.   The issue of cybersecurity requires a national project involving all sectors of society: the government, private sector, civil society and the population as individuals. This is a defence issue, as the country’s diplomatic communications can be intercepted, the army’s vehicles and planes hacked and disabled, elections influenced, with the only bound being the creativity of the attackers. This is an education and talent issue, as the development of the next generation of cyber experts is needed to create the technologies and strategies of the future. This is also a stability issue, as power grids, water infrastructure, supply chains, food production, can all be hacked and brought to a standstill. Such a thing could descend the country into total anarchy in less than a week.   What needs to be done is clear and does not require the reinvention of the wheel. Following the lead of such countries as Australia, the United States, China and most other developed countries, a dedicated cybersecurity organisation is required. One that is totally free from political appointments and interference and led by the top cyber experts in the country.   Following the lead of countries such as Singapore, a national cybersecurity awareness campaign is needed to work to strengthen the weakest link in South Africa’s cyber defence, which is the human element. If people have a better understanding of the risks and realities of cybersecurity and cybercrime, this will bring massive benefits to the country — including an immediate and substantial decrease in cybercriminality and victimisation.   Following the lead of such countries as Israel, China and the US, a national programme of cultivating the next generation of cyber talent is required. This will create the world-class experts of tomorrow, who will bring knowledge, technologies and security to the country.   Without proper cybersecurity, no nation can be secure. This is a matter of top priority and requires the urgent attention of the entire country: the government, the private sector, civil society and the citizenry. REFERENCES   Adeyemi, S. 2025. Rising security fears in South Africa as scammers weaponise WhatsApp voice notes. [Online] Available at: https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/ rising-security-fears-in-south-africa-as-scammers-weaponise-whatsapp-voice-notes/m50286d [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI). 2020. Cyber espionage for the Chinese government. [Online] Available at: https://www.osi.af.mil/News/ Features/Display/Article/2350807/cyber-espionage-for-the-chinese-government/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Baezner, M. & Robin, P. 2017. CSS Cyber Defense Project: Hotspot Analysis: Stuxnet. Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. [Online] Available at: https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/ gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2017-04.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Benincasa, E. 2025. Before Vegas: The “Red Hackers” Who Shaped China’s Cyber Ecosystem. Zurich: Center for Security Studies. [Online] Available at: https://css.ethz.ch/en/center/CSS-news/ 2025/07/before-vegas-the-red-hackers-who-shaped-chinas-cyber-ecosystem.html [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Biermann, E. & Cowling, N. 2018. Mind the Gap: Addressing South Africa’s cybersecurity skills shortage. [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/ 2018-07-13-mind-the-gap-addressing-south-africas-cybersecurity-skills-shortage/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Breached Company. 2025. Global Cybercrime Crackdown 2025: A Mid-year Assessment of Major Arrests and Takedowns. [Online] Available at: https://breached.company/ global-cybercrime-crackdown-2025-a-mid-year-assessment-of-major-arrests-and-takedowns/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   BusinessTech. 2025. National Treasury exposed to malware in major Microsoft security breach. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/it-services/832796/national-treasuryexposed-to-malware-in-major-microsoft-security-breach/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Check Point Research (CPR). 2025. Threat Intelligence Report — 14 July 2025. [Online] Available at: https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/14th-july-threat-intelligence-report/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 2015. Compromise of a power grid in eastern Ukraine. [Online] Available at: https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/compromise-power-grid-eastern-ukraine [accessed: 4 March 2026].   CSIR Information and Cybersecurity Centre (CSIR). 2024. About the CSIR Information and Cybersecurity Research Centre. [Online] Available at: https://www.csir.co.za/sites/default/files/ Documents/250154_CSIR%20ICSC%20Booklet_Mining.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Cybersecurity Agency (CSA). 2025. Better Cyber Safe Than Sorry. [Online] Available at: https://www.csa.gov.sg/our-programmes/cybersecurity-outreach/cybersecurity-campaigns/ better-cyber-safe-than-sorry-campaign [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). 2025. What is Cybersecurity? [Online] Available at: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/what-cybersecurity? utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Cybersecurity Hub. 2025. Official website of the South African National CSIRT. [Online] Available at: https:// www.cybersecurityhub.gov.za/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Decision Inc. 2025. SA under siege: Why cybersecurity must be a business imperative.  [Online] Available at: https://www.itweb.co.za/article/sa-under-siege-why-cyber-security-must-be-abusiness-imperative/PmxVEMKE6ZpvQY85 [accessed: 4 March 2026].   DefenceWeb. 2023. SANDF Cyber Command operating in “limited space”. [Online] Available at: https://defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-cyber-command-operating-in-limited-space/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   DefenceWeb. 2025. South Africa faces escalating cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure. [Online] Available at: https://defenceweb.co.za/cyber-defence/south-africa-faces-escalatingcybersecurity-threats-to-critical-infrastructure/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Democratic Alliance (DA). 2025. Over 100 000 cyber-attacks while SAPS records just 544 cases – DA pushes for Cyber Commissioner. [Online] Available at: https://www.da.org.za/ 2025/09/over-100-000-cyber-attacks-while-saps-records-just-544-cases-da-pushes-for-cyber-commissioner [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Department of Public Works and Infrastructure, Government of South Africa (Public Works). 2024. Minister Dean Macpherson on R300 million cyber crime theft unearthed at Department Public Works and Infrastructure. [Online] Available at:https:// www.gov.za/news/media-statements/minister-dean-macpherson-r300-million-cyber-crime-theft-uneartheddepartment [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Digital Watch SA. South African weather service hit by cyberattack, affecting critical operations. [Online] Available at: https://dig.watch/updates/south-african-weather-service-hit-by-cyberattack-affecting-critical-operations [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Fraser, L. 2025. Trevor Manuel’s warning for South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/business-opinion/838959/trevor-manuels-warning-for-south-africa/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Gumede, L. 2022. Economic Growth Requires Intelligent Design. [Online] Available at: https://www.sundaytimes.timeslive.co.za/opinion-and-analysis/2022-02-27-economic-growth-requiresan-intelligent-design/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Gumede, L. 2024. AI-powered hackers loom large for SA. [Online] Available at: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2025-04-15-lars-gumede-ai-powered-hackers-loom-largefor-sa/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. HYAS Infosec Inc (HYAS). 2024. BlackMamba: AI-synthesized, polymorphic key logger with on-the-fly program modification. [Online] Available at: https://www.hyas.com/hubfs/ Downloadable%20Content/HYAS-AI-Augmented-Cyber-Attack-WP-1.1.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Illridge, M. 2025. High-tech crime surge in South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/611683-high-tech-crime-surge-in-south-africa.html [accessed: 4 March 2026].   International Business Machines (IBM). 2025. Types of cyberthreats. [Online] Available at: https:// www.ibm.com/think/topics/cyberthreats-types [accessed: 4 March 2026].   International Police Service (Interpol). 2022. Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2022. [Online] Available at: https://www.interpol.int/content/download/19174/file/ 2023_03%20CYBER_African%20Cyberthreat%20Assessment%20Report%202022_EN.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Interpol. 2025. Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2025. International Police Service. [Online] Available at: https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/23094/file/25COM009248%20- %20Cybercrime_Africa%20Cyberthreat%20Assessment%20Report_Design_2025-05%20v11.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Kauder, S. 2025. Why is Africa Losing Billions to Cybercrime? [Online] Available at: https://www.crowe.com/za/insights/af-53-why-is-africa-losing-billions-to-cybercrimeinsight-web-article [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Lafarge, T. 2022. China’s Hacker Army: The World’s Largest Surveillance Network. [Online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNQ8KRfnVYU [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Lesedi, S. 2023. Funding mars SANDF Cyber Command. [Online] Available at: https://www.military.africa/2023/01/funding-mars-sandf-cyber-command/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Mail & Guardian (M&G). 2003. Hacker stole half-a-million rand from Absa clients. [Online] Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2003-07-22-hacker-stole-halfamillion-rand-from-absa-clients/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Maliti, S. 2022. FBI beat security cluster in identifying cyber hack of the SA Reserve Bank, says Godongwana. [Online] Available at: https://iol.co.za/capeargus/news/2022-12-15-fbi-beatsecurity-cluster-in-identifying-cyber-hack-of-the-sa-reserve-bank-says-godongwana/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   MyBroadband. 2025a. Interview with the hackers who broke into South Africa’s Department of Defence. [Online] Available at: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/505982- interview-with-the-hackers-who-broke-into-south-africas-department-of-defence.html [accessed: 4 March 2026].   MyBroadband. 2025b. Chinese hackers may have breached the South African State Security Agency. [Online] Available at: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/612367- chinese-hackers-may-have-breached-the-south-african-state-security-agency.html [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Nozulela, M. 2025. South African Reserve Bank warns public about deepfake investment scam. [Online] Available at: https://iol.co.za/business/2025-09-25-south-african-reserve-bankwarns-public-about-deepfake-investment-scam/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   O’Neil, C. 2023. Press Conference: Cybersecurity Strategy & High Court Decision. Office of Minister for Home Affairs, Government of Australia. [Online] Available at: https:// minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/ClareONeil/Pages/Press-conference-22112023.aspx [accessed: 4 March 2026].   OpenGov Asia. 2021. CSA Launches Campaign to Drive Awareness and Adoption of Cybersecurity Practices. [Online] Available at: https://archive.opengovasia.com/2021/06/28/csa-launchescampaign-to-continue-to-drive-awareness-and-adoption-of-cybersecurity-practices/? c=za [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2002. Electronic Communications Act of 2002. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/ gcis_document/201409/a25-02.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (Parliament). 2020. Cybercrimes Act of 2020. [Online] Available at: https://cybercrimesact.co.za/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Recorded Future. 2024. TAG-100 Uses Open-Source Tools in Suspected Global Espionage Campaign, Compromising Two Asia-Pacific Intergovernmental Bodies. [Online] Available at: https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/tag-100-uses-open-source-tools-in-suspected-global-espionage-campaign [accessed: 4 March 2026].   SABRIC. 2024. Annual Crime Statistics 2024. South African Banking Risk Information Centre. [Online] Available at: https://www.sabric.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/CRIME-STATISTICS-REPORT- 2024.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026].   The Guardian. 2021. Saudis behind NSO spyware attack on Jamal Khashoggi’s family, leak suggests. [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/18/ nso-spyware-used-to-target-family-of-jamal-khashoggi-leaked-data-shows-saudis-pegasus [accessed: 4 March 2026].   Trenta, L. 2024. Nowhere to Hide: Israel’s Pager Attacks on Hezbollah. [Online] Available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/ commentary/nowhere-hide-israels-pager-attacks-hezbollah [accessed: 4 March 2026].   United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). 2025. Mission & Vision of United States Cyber Command. [Online] Available at: https://www.cybercom.mil/About/Mission-and-Vision/ [accessed: 4 March 2026].   World Bank. 2025. Open Data: Individuals using the Internet (% of population) — China.  [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=CN [accessed: 4 March 2026].   World Economic Forum (WEF). 2025. Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025. [Online] Available at: https://reports.weforum.org/docs/ WEF_Global_Cybersecurity_Outlook_2025.pdf#:~:text=Nearly%2047%25%20of%20organization s%20cite%20adversarial%20advances,with%2042%25%20of%20organizations%20reporting%2 0such%20incidents [accessed: 4 March 2026]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 2/2026

Copyright © 2026   prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Global South Perspectives Network   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of The coordinating entities or any of their office bearers   Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 19 January 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   MARCH 2026   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   CONTENTS 1 The middle power concept in a changing international system 2 Geopolitical ruptures and the erosion of global norms 3 Strategic autonomy and the limits of alignment 4 Reaffirming international law and collective norms 5 Domestic politics and the foreign policy of middle powers 6 Perceptions of middle powers in a multipolar world 7 Institutional reform and the limits of structural change 8 The diplomatic role of middle powers 9 Conclusion   Cover photo: Image generated using OpenAI’s DALL·E image generation model (2026). Concept developed for the Inclusive Society Institute / Global South Perspectives Network publication.   1 THE MIDDLE POWER CONCEPT IN A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM   The dialogue began with what might appear to be a simple question: what exactly do we mean when we speak of “middle powers”? It is a term that has circulated in the literature of international relations for decades. Yet the more one reflects on it, the more elusive the definition becomes.   Middle powers clearly do not possess the capacity of great powers to reshape the international system or to impose outcomes unilaterally. At the same time, though, they are far from insignificant actors, in that many possess extensive diplomatic networks, credible economic weight, often also military capabilities, and a meaningful presence within international institutions. And whereas they might not be the architects of the global order, neither are they mere spectators. They occupy an intermediate position somewhere between the dominant global actors and those states whose influence remains largely regional.   What emerged quite quickly during the exchange was just how diverse this category of states really is. Countries commonly described as middle powers differ widely in geography, population size, economic structure and political influence. Some combine large territories and advanced economies with relatively small populations. Others possess vast populations and strong regional influence, but a more limited global reach. What brings together these countries into the “middle power” category, therefore, is not uniform material capability, but a shared capacity to influence international debates/activities through diplomacy, coalition-building and engagement within multilateral frameworks.   Historically, middle powers have often played a quiet but important role in sustaining the multilateral system. At different moments they have acted as intermediaries between larger powers, helping to facilitate compromise and maintain channels of international cooperation. The geopolitical and geo-economic environment in which they now operate, though, appears to be changing, and changing rapidly.   This leads to what might be described as the central challenge for middle powers in our times. They depend on a system of functioning norms for their independence, peace and prosperity. Yet they rarely possess the power to shape or enforce these norms. In a world where major powers appear increasingly willing to operate outside established norms, middle powers find themselves under growing pressure to protect and help adapt the very system on which they depend. 2 GEOPOLITICAL RUPTURES AND THE EROSION OF GLOBAL NORMS   As the conversation unfolded, attention gradually shifted to the broader international environment, in which middle powers now find themselves operating. There was a growing concern that the international system may be entering a period of deeper disruption, perhaps not collapse, but certainly a moment of unsettling, radical change. Recent developments were frequently mentioned in this regard, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the escalation of violence in Gaza following the Hamas attack on Israel, and the latest confrontation involving Iran. Each of these crises has intensified geopolitical tensions, but more importantly, they have also exposed deep disagreements about how international law should be interpreted and applied.   What seemed to trouble many participants was not simply the occurence of large-scale conflict. The international system has always been marked by crises of one kind or another. Rather, it was the growing perception that some powerful states appear increasingly willing to reinterpret, or bypass, international norms when it suits their interests, while the rest of the states and multilateral institutions stand idly by.   Even if that may not hold fully true, or may be temporary, the perception matters. When the rules of the system appear negotiable, confidence in the system itself begins to erode. Several participants suggested that the cumulative effect of these developments may be creating what could be described as a kind of normative vacuum in international politics. In other words, if those actors with the greatest power to uphold international law appear less committed to doing so, the credibility of the international legal order inevitably comes under strain.   In such circumstances, the responsibility for defending the principles of multilateral cooperation may increasingly fall on a wider group of states. Middle powers, in particular, have a direct interest in preserving a stable and predictable international environment as, unlike great powers, they rely heavily on rules and institutions to manage global politics. Can they rise to the occasion and proactively defend the norms- and rules-based system that they depend on, even if that means that they may have to face off the greater powers that are breaking the rules?   This tension lay at the heart of much of the discussion that followed. 3 STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND THE LIMITS OF ALIGNMENT   How do middle powers manage their relationships with larger powers and can they achieve strategic autonomy vis-à-vis those larger powers? Strategic autonomy refers to the ability of a state to pursue its national interests without becoming overly dependent on, or constrained by, more powerful actors. Not a simple thing for sure.   Economic (inter)dependence, security alliances and geographic realities often bind middle powers closely to larger partners, thereby forming relationships that can narrow their room for manoeuvre. They shape trade patterns, security arrangements and, in many cases, the assumptions that quietly guide foreign policy thinking.   One example raised during the exchange illustrated this the above point particularly well. Canada’s economic and security relationship with the United States has historically been exceptionally close. For decades that relationship provided both stability and reassurance. It allowed the country to pursue an active multilateral diplomacy while operating within a relatively predictable strategic environment.   More recently, however, political developments have prompted a reassessment of that environment. Questions have begun to emerge about the reliability of long-standing assumptions. And when such questions arise, governments naturally begin to look for ways to diversify their options. Efforts are therefore underway to broaden economic partnerships and to deepen diplomatic engagement with other regions, including Europe and Asia. The objective is not necessarily to abandon existing relationships, instead it is to reduce dependence on any single partner and create a little more strategic space.   This example fed into a broader reflection about alignment in an increasingly polarised international system. Terms such as non-alignment, selective alignment and active non-alignment surfaced repeatedly during the discussion. The terminology differed, but the underlying instinct was often the same. States need flexibility. They need the freedom to cooperate with different partners on different issues without being drawn too deeply into the rivalries of larger powers. In this sense, the language of non-alignment may simply reflect a pragmatic effort to preserve foreign-policy choice.   Yet the discussion also acknowledged a harder truth. Strategic autonomy cannot simply be declared. It must be built. And many middle powers still find themselves operating within structural constraints that make such autonomy difficult to achieve in practice. 4 REAFFIRMING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLLECTIVE NORMS   At a certain point the discussion returned to a question that sits quietly beneath many debates about international politics: what happens when confidence in the rules of the system begins to erode?   Several participants reflected on the growing perception that respect for international law may be weakening. If the rules governing sovereignty, the use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes are no longer widely observed, the international system begins to look very different. It becomes less predictable. And far more unstable.   Against this backdrop, an interesting idea surfaced during the exchange. Some participants suggested that middle powers might consider taking the initiative in convening a global gathering aimed at reaffirming the foundational principles of the international order.   The historical reference point for such an initiative would be the Bandung Conference of 1955. That meeting brought together newly independent states from Asia and Africa to articulate principles of peaceful coexistence, sovereignty and mutual respect. It later helped shape the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War.   Of course, the circumstances today are very different. The world of the twenty-first century is not the world of decolonisation. Yet the underlying impulse behind Bandung, the collective reaffirmation of international norms, still resonates. A contemporary equivalent would therefore serve a somewhat different purpose. Rather than responding to colonial structures or Cold War divisions, such a gathering could reaffirm the legitimacy of the international legal order at a moment when its authority appears increasingly contested. It could provide an opportunity for states to restate their commitment to the principles embedded in the United Nations Charter and the broader framework of international law. Just as importantly, it could open space for dialogue among countries that still share an interest in preserving a cooperative and rules-based international order. 5 DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF MIDDLE POWERS   At this point the conversation shifted somewhat inward. Up to now much of the discussion had focused on the external environment in which middle powers operate. But foreign policy, as several participants reminded the group, rarely exists in isolation from domestic politics.   In many cases the international behaviour of middle powers is closely shaped by developments at home, where changes in leadership, electoral pressures and shifting political coalitions can all influence how governments position themselves internationally. Thus, foreign policy priorities may change quite quickly when domestic political circumstances change.   Periods of strong engagement with multilateral institutions can therefore be followed by phases in which governments adopt a more cautious or inward-looking posture. This is not unusual; it is, in fact, often part of the natural cycle of democratic politics.   Domestic pressures can also limit the attention governments are able to devote to international initiatives, as electoral cycles, internal controversies and institutional tensions frequently draw political energy inward. When this happens, diplomatic engagement abroad can become more difficult to sustain.   Brazil was mentioned during the dialogue as a useful illustration of this dynamic: The country has long been recognised as an important advocate of multilateral cooperation and South–South partnerships. Its foreign policy trajectory, though, has also reflected changes in domestic political leadership and internal debates.   Recent efforts to reassert Brazil’s global diplomatic profile illustrate how leadership choices can reshape a country’s international engagement. However, ongoing domestic political debates continue to influence both the tone and the direction of Brazil’s foreign policy, leading to major changes depending on whether a Lula or a Bolsonaro is in power 6 PERCEPTIONS OF MIDDLE POWERS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD   At one stage the dialogue turned to a set of findings that provided a useful empirical lens through which to view many of the issues under discussion. Reference was made to the Körber Emerging Middle Powers Initiative, an international research project supported by the Körber Foundation. The project surveys foreign policy experts across several middle powers, in order to understand how policymakers and analysts interpret the changing dynamics of global governance.   The countries included in the survey, among them Brazil, India, South Africa and Germany, represent very different political and geopolitical contexts. Yet taken together, the findings offer an interesting window into how middle powers themselves understand their evolving position within the international system.   One observation in particular stood out: Across several of the surveyed countries there appears to be a clear preference for maintaining strategic autonomy, rather than aligning too closely with any single major power. Put simply, this means that many experts believe that these countries favour the avoidance of rigid geopolitical blocs and instead prefer pursuing partnerships that remain flexible and that can shift depending on the issue at hand. This instinct is perhaps not surprising, given that middle powers often operate in environments where rigid alignments carry real risks. Flexibility allows them to cooperate with different actors while preserving room for manoeuvre.   At the same time, the survey revealed some interesting differences in perception between parts of the Global North and the Global South. Respondents in Northern countries tended to view the global role of the United States more positively. In parts of the Global South, however, attitudes were noticeably more sceptical. The reverse was true regarding China’s role in international affairs.   These differences are important in that they remind us that the category of “middle powers” does not describe a unified geopolitical bloc. Rather, it encompasses a diverse group of states shaped by very different historical experiences, strategic environments and foreign policy priorities.   The survey also revealed a noticeable degree of pessimism regarding the prospects for global institutional reform. Support for multilateralism remains widespread among experts in the surveyed countries. Confidence that major institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, will undergo meaningful reform in the near future, however, appears to be far more limited.   Taken together, these findings point to both the possibilities and the constraints facing middle powers in an increasingly complex, unpredictable and evolving international order. 7 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE LIMITS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE   The conversation then turned more directly to the question of institutional reform and in particular, participants reflected on the possibility of convening a review conference under Article 109 of the United Nations Charter.   ARTICLE 109 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE REVIEW CONFERENCE MECHANISM   Article 109 of the United Nations Charter provides for the convening of a General Conference of UN Member States for the purpose of reviewing the Charter.   The provisions of article 109 outline three key elements:   1 Convening of a Review Conference   A Charter Review Conference may be convened if it is approved by a two-thirds majority in the United Nations General Assembly, and supported by at least nine members of the United Nations Security Council.   At the conference itself, each UN member state participates on an equal basis, with one vote per state.   2 Adoption of proposed Charter changes   If the conference recommends alterations to the Charter, these must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of UN member states.   3 Ratification of outcomes   Any recommended Charter changes only enter into force once they are ratified according to the constitutional procedures of two-thirds of UN member states, including all five permanent members of the Security Council (each of the P5 thus has a veto in the ratification process).   In practice, this means that although a UN Charter Review Conference could be convened without the consent of the five permanent members of the Security Council, any amendments to the Charter would ultimately require the ratification by all five to come into force.    In theory, such a conference could examine the functioning of the UN and propose amendments to the Charter. In practice, however, any amendments would ultimately require ratification by the permanent members of the Security Council, thus giving those states critical influence – in effect a veto - over the outcome of the process.   This reality raises difficult questions about the practicality of pursuing major structural reforms through existing institutional mechanisms of the United Nations. Several participants in fact noted that opening the Charter to revision could even weaken certain protections, if the process were to be dominated by the interests of powerful states. For that reason, the discussion returned repeatedly to the need for caution when considering initiatives aimed at institutional redesign. 8 THE DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS   As the conversation moved toward its concluding stages, attention returned to a practical question: how exactly might middle powers exercise influence in an international system that is becoming increasingly fragmented?   There was broad agreement amongst the participants that middle powers still possess the ability to shape international debates, and that the challenge lies less in the existence of that potential and more in how it is exercised.   One idea that surfaced during the discussion was the possibility of closer coordination among middle powers, but this suggestion quickly prompted an important caution, when several participants warned against the temptation to organise middle powers into a formal bloc or alliance structure.   At first glance, such an arrangement might appear attractive. By acting collectively, middle powers could achieve greater leverage in international negotiations. The risk, though, is that a new grouping of middle powers might simply reproduce the same bloc politics that already complicate cooperation within the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. Put plainly, the formation of a middle-powers bloc could deepen the fragmentation it seeks to overcome and so instead, a more subtle approach to diplomacy was needed. Middle powers may need to rely less on formal alliances and more on flexible and pragmatic forms of cooperation.   Issue-based coalitions are one example of pragmatic middle power cooperation, and could help advance issues like climate action or pandemic response. Coordinated diplomatic initiatives within existing multilateral institutions are another example. In some cases, the most important role may simply be convening dialogue among states whose geopolitical positions differ. Historically, middle powers have often played precisely this kind of intermediary role, because whilst they are not themselves dominant powers, they are frequently able to maintain relationships with multiple actors at the same time. They can thus act as bridge-builders between competing geopolitical camps and facilitate conversations that might otherwise prove difficult. This form of influence is not always visible. It does not resemble traditional power politics, but it can be surprisingly important.   Middle powers may prove most effective not when they attempt to compete directly with great powers, but when they help sustain dialogue, reaffirm shared norms and build consensus around practical responses to global challenges; because their influence often operates quietly and sometimes almost invisibly. Seen from this perspective, the strength of middle powers lies less in formal institutional authority and more in what might be described as diplomatic entrepreneurship. Acting as conveners, mediators and agenda-setters, they can help set the tone and direction of international debates, even in periods of heightened geopolitical rivalry. 9 CONCLUSION   What the dialogue ultimately revealed was a picture of middle powers navigating a world that is becoming increasingly uncertain and an international system that is clearly undergoing a period of transformation. Geopolitical rivalry is intensifying, confidence in established institutions is weakening, and rules that once appeared relatively settled are now being questioned more openly.   Middle powers do not stand outside these developments, instead they are deeply affected by them. Domestic political pressures, economic dependencies and differing regional priorities all shape the extent to which these states are able to act collectively on the global stage. In practice, their room for manoeuvre is often narrower than the rhetoric of diplomacy might suggest.   But the discussion also produced a quieter, but important observation, namely that  middle powers should not be underestimated. Their influence rarely lies in the ability to impose outcomes or reshape the balance of power. Rather, it often lies in something less dramatic, but no less valuable: sustaining dialogue, reaffirming international norms and keeping open the channels of cooperation that allow the international system to function.   In this sense, the role of middle powers may be less about power in the traditional sense and more about the stewardship of the UN’s values and the rules-based order. They might not be able to determine the future of the global order on their own, but they can certainly help preserve the principles and institutions that make international cooperation possible.   In a period of geopolitical turbulence, that may prove to be a contribution of considerable significance.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.   GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.   Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.   GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) participated prominently in the National Planning Commission’s Social Cohesion Roundtable, held in Pretoria on 3-4 March 2026, where the Institute presented the 2025 update of the South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI). Acknowledgement is given to Telkom, who has been supporting the SASCI project from its inception. Telkom was represented by its Group CFO, Nonkululeko Dlamini, who also delivered a speech during the session.   The roundtable brought together policymakers, academics, civil society leaders and public institutions to reflect on the state of social cohesion in South Africa and to explore strategies for strengthening national unity in the context of persistent inequality, historical legacies and contemporary political challenges.   The event formed part of the National Planning Commission’s broader work on social cohesion and nation-building and was convened under the theme “Social Cohesion: Going Back to the Fundamentals.”   A national dialogue on the foundations of cohesion   The roundtable programme reflected a deliberate effort to engage deeply with the structural drivers of cohesion in South Africa. Discussions addressed themes such as the legacies of apartheid, land and economic inequality, the role of traditional leadership, migration and citizenship debates, language and identity, and strategies to address unemployment and poverty.   Participants included a wide range of scholars, policy experts and public figures who contributed to group discussions and panel sessions examining both the historical roots and contemporary manifestations of social division in South Africa.   The discussions were structured around the idea that social cohesion cannot be reduced to notions of harmony alone, but must grapple with deeper questions of justice, redress and shared nationhood.   Presentation of the South African Social Cohesion Index   On the second day of the roundtable, the Inclusive Society Institute presented the 2025 update of the South African Social Cohesion Index, with ISI Chief Executive Officer Daryl Swanepoel delivering the keynote speech introducing the findings of the report. A detailed presentation was then made my Mari Harris, the Institute’s Polling and Data Science consultant.   The South African Social Cohesion Index is a scientifically grounded instrument developed by the Inclusive Society Institute in partnership with Constructor University in Bremen, Germany, and represents one of the most comprehensive attempts to measure social cohesion in an African context.   The Index measures cohesion across multiple dimensions including: trust between citizens, trust in institutions, perceptions of fairness, acceptance of diversity, solidarity and civic participation, respect for social rules and national identification.   Rather than relying on anecdotal perceptions about the state of the nation’s social fabric, the Index provides an empirical and longitudinal measurement tool that allows policymakers and researchers to track trends in social cohesion over time. Key findings: A fragile, but improving social fabric   The 2025 update of the Index provides a nuanced picture of the state of South Africa’s social cohesion. The overall national score now stands at 56 out of 100, placing South Africa within the moderate cohesion category. While this suggests that the country’s social fabric remains intact, it also highlights the continuing vulnerability of several underlying dimensions of cohesion.   Encouragingly, the data shows that social cohesion has improved for the second consecutive year, suggesting that the country may have reached the bottom of a difficult cycle and begun a gradual recovery.   At the same time, several dimensions remain fragile, particularly perceptions of fairness, acceptance of diversity and respect for social rules. These areas represent structural pressure points that require sustained policy attention.   Social cohesion as national infrastructure   In his address at the roundtable, Swanepoel emphasised that social cohesion should not be treated as a “soft” policy topic, but rather as a critical component of national stability and economic development.   Drawing on international research, he highlighted the strong relationship between cohesion and economic performance, arguing that societies characterised by trust, fairness and shared identity are better positioned to attract investment, sustain reform and manage diversity.   He noted that: “Social cohesion is the invisible infrastructure of a nation. If we strengthen it deliberately, it becomes the foundation of long-term stability and growth. If we neglect it, the costs will not remain abstract, they will be economic, institutional and social.”   Informing the National Dialogue process   The roundtable discussions and the presentation of the Social Cohesion Index form part of the National Planning Commission’s broader efforts to inform the National Dialogue process currently being prepared in South Africa.   Participants emphasised that strengthening cohesion will require coordinated action across government, business, civil society, faith communities and the media, as well as sustained efforts to address structural inequality and expand economic opportunity.   The Inclusive Society Institute remains committed to continuing its work on measuring and analysing social cohesion in South Africa and will continue to provide the South African Social Cohesion Index as an annual evidence-based tool to support public policy and national dialogue on the future of the country.

This report has been enabled through the generous support of Telkom Copyright © 2026   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   March 2026   Author: Mari Harris (Ipsos South Africa) Statisticians: Corné Bodenstein (Ipsos South Africa), Lungelo Mkhize (Ipsos South Africa) Editor: Daryl Swanepoel (Inclusive Society Institute)  TABLE OF CONTENTS   Executive Summary 1. Introduction 2. Measuring social cohesion 2.1. Data 2.2. Analytical approach 3. Current level and trend of social cohesion 3.1. Social cohesion in South Africa 3.2. Social cohesion in the nine provinces 4. Structural influences on social cohesion 4.1. Data and methodology 4.2. Results 5. Individual experiences of social cohesion 5.1. Data and methodology 5.2. Identifying four classes of experience of social cohesion 5.3. Socio-demographics of the four classes 6. Social cohesion and subjective well-being 6.1. Provinces – data and methodology 6.2. Individuals 7. Conclusion and the way forward References Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:1440750455 LIST OF TABLES    Table 2.1: Sample sizes of Khayabus Table 2.2: Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 1 Table 2.3: Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 2 Table 2.4: Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 3 Table 3.1: Overall index and dimensions Table 3.2: Overall index in the provinces Table 3.3: Dimension 1.1 – Social networks in the provinces Table 3.4: Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people in the provinces Table 3.5: Dimension 1.3 – "Acceptance of diversity" Table 3.6: Dimension 2.1 – Identification in the provinces Table 3.7: Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions in the provinces Table 3.8: Dimension 2.3 – "Perception of fairness" Table 3.9: Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness in the provinces Table 3.10: Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules Table 3.11: Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation in the provinces Table 4.1: Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table 5.1: 2025 Results: Social Cohesion Dimensions and LCA Table 5.2: Socio-demographic and -economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents Table 6.1: Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Table 6.2: Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents     LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Constitutive elements of social cohesion Figure 1.2: Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix A: Indicators of cohesion across time Table A.1: Dimension 1.1 – Social networks results over time Table A.2: Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people results over time Table A.3: Dimension 1.3 – Acceptance of diversity results over time Table A.4: Dimension 2.1 – Identification results over time Table A.5: Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions results over time Table A.6: Dimension 2.3 – Perception of fairness results over time Table A.7: Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness results over time Table A.8: Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules results over time Table A.9: Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation results over time Appendix B: Correlations of social cohesion on the province level Table B.1: Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table B.2: Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Appendix C: Latent class analyses Table C.1: Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Table C.2: Relative class sizes for LCA solutions EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   This report represents the fifth complete application of the South Africa Social Cohesion Index (SASCI). It updates the study published in February 2025 and focuses on the development and trends of social cohesion from 2021 to 2025. To recap, the study follows the measurement concept of the Social Cohesion Radar (SCR), developed by the Bertelsmann Stiftung. As illustrated in a graph in the report, the study assessed social cohesion in three domains:   Social Relations, including the intactness of social networks, general trust in people and acceptance of diversity Connectedness, including identification with one’s place of residence, trust in institutions and perceptions of fairness Focus on the Common Good, including solidarity and helpfulness, respect for social rules and civic participation.   The study uses data collected in the first wave of the Ipsos Khayabus study every year (two or three waves are conducted annually). This is a large-scale representative study of South African adults, conducted face-to-face in the homes and home languages of a randomly selected sample, covering all nine provinces and different types of settlements all over South Africa.   The Bertelsmann concept of defining a country’s level of social cohesion allows scores between 0 (no cohesion) and 100 (maximum cohesion). The decision of which score to regard as sufficiently high is both a normative and a political one.   Currently (2025), the overall level of social cohesion in South Africa as a whole is “moderate” at 56 points. Looking at its development since 2021, the country has achieved a slight increase of 2.5 points.   Since the commencement of the study, the dimension of identification (in the domain of Connectedness) has proved to be the strongest in South Africa, and it is still the case. The score for identification, currently at 76.7, has grown by 3.5 points since 2021. However, the biggest increases over this period were achieved by the measurement of civic participation, which grew 6.2 points since 2021, to now stand at 60.6, and solidarity and helpfulness, which grew 4.1 points, to now stand at 63.1 points.   At the other end of the scale, the lowest scores are still registered for respect for social rules (in the domain of Focus on the Common Good). This score currently measures 42, but it also grew by 1.7 points since 2021 and is now regarded as moderate and no longer low.   Still looking at the overall picture, eight of the nine dimensions registered growth from  2021 to 2025.   All nine provinces also registered moderate scores, clustering in a relatively narrow band, ranging from the Northern Cape at the bottom of the list with 51.7 and the Eastern Cape at the top of the list with 58.9.   This report also presents results from Latent Class Analysis (LCA), a procedure identifying distinct groups in society. Four groups were identified that experience different strengths and deficits in social cohesion in their immediate life contexts.   In the end, the report examines the relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being. The evidence suggests that the quality of society (social cohesion) translates directly into citizens’ quality of life (subjective well-being).   It is exactly the strong positive relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being that underscores the necessity of political action, planning and cooperation between government, business and civil society to improve South Africa’s level of social cohesion. Social cohesion translates the social and economic structures (like performance and output of the economy and living conditions) into the quality of life (issues like happiness, life satisfaction, etc.) directly experienced by individual members of society. In the case that cohesion is neglected, one can expect societal polarisation and instability.   1. INTRODUCTION   Civis Romanus sum [1]   In the latter centuries of the Republic, as Rome grew into a great power, gladiatorial combat became a means of maintaining social cohesion.   To watch the gladiators fight was a key perk of citizenship, a common experience fostering a shared sense of civic Roman identity. [2]   Since the earliest times leaders – religious, military and political – tried to keep their followers, soldiers or citizens/populations together, by inspiring behaviour and attitudes that foster unity of minds and actions. This spirit of social cohesion is thus not at all a new concept. There has recently been more interest in the subject, as proved by various studies and reports – see specifically the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) report titled, “Social Cohesion: Concept and Measurement”, published in 2023. This report states that a plurality of definitions and applications of the concept of social cohesion have been advanced by international governments and academic researchers – and they published a selection of definitions as put together by Statistics Canada in Tabular format (UNECE, 2023:4), which is copied here:   As in previous studies, the research commissioned by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) built on work by Langer et al. (2017) and Leininger et al. (2021). The Langer study used Afrobaromer data from nineteen countries and defined social cohesion in an African context as the interplay of three salient aspects: perceived inequalities, trust (interpersonal and institutional) and identity (national vs ethnic).  The Leininger study also compared African counties. According to its authors, “cohesion is characterised by a set of attitudes and behavioural manifestations that includes trust, an inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good” (Leininger et al., 2021:3). These three attributes unfold into two elements, encompassing horizontal or vertical relations among citizens and the state (see Figure 1.1): social trust and institutional trust, group identity and national identity, intergroup cooperation, and state-society cooperation. (More information about these two studies is published in the 2024 update of this report.)   Figure 1.1:  Constitutive elements of social cohesion (Source: Leininger et al., 2021) This 2025 report uses new data, collected during the first quarter of 2025, but it still aims to provide a theoretically-based and methodologically-sound empirical assessment of social cohesion in the South African society, with the view to deliver credibly on five goals:   To measure the current degree of social cohesion in South Africa as a whole and in each of the nine provinces separately. To track how social cohesion has progressed (or not) from 2021 to 2025. To identify structural characteristics from the thematic fields of the economic situation in the country, inequality and poverty, demographic developments, diversity and modernisation that can promote or hinder social cohesion. To explore which social groups demonstrate high or low levels of social cohesion. To investigate how social cohesion – very broadly seen as the quality of society – relates to citizens’ overall well-being, defined as their quality of life.    As in previous reports, we aimed to achieve these goals with the application and use of the measurement concept as defined by the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar (SCR). This was informed by an initial comprehensive literature review (Schiefer & van der Noll, 2017) and the input of various experts on the topic. It defines social cohesion as the “quality of social cooperation and togetherness of a collective, defined in geopolitical terms, that is expressed in the attitudes and behaviours of its members. A cohesive society is characterised by resilient social relations, a positive emotional connectedness between its members and the community, and a pronounced focus on the common good” (Dragolov et al., 2016:6). These three domains unfold into three dimensions, as illustrated overleaf in Figure 1.2.   Each one of the dimensions comprises three measurements:   The “social networks” domain includes the measurements of social networks, trust in people, and acceptance of diversity. The “connectedness” domain includes the measurements of identification, trust in institutions, and perception of fairness. The “focus on the common good” domain includes the measurements of solidarity and helpfulness, respect for social rules, and civic participation.   Figure 1.2:  Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar (Source : Dragolov et al. (2016))   As in previous reports, this report uses the comprehensive approach of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar in our analysis as the output is logical and insightful.   2. MEASURING SOCIAL COHESION   This section details the data and methodological approaches employed for measuring social cohesion in South Africa. 2.1. DATA   The data collected in this report have been put together over a period of six years (2020 to 2025) using the Ipsos Khayabus study as a vehicle. The Khayabus is an Omnibus study, conducted twice a year via face-to-face interviews in the homes and home languages of a representative sample of South Africans, 15 years and older. As not all the questions are asked to 15-17-year-olds, data have been filtered on the results for those 18 years old and older. In an Omnibus-type study, different clients take the opportunity to include questions on the master questionnaire. In this way the Inclusive Society Institute added questions to the first wave of the study in the form of a section called Gov-Dem-Poll. Data from the 2020 study have been used for preliminary testing, and deep analysis and modelling followed from 2021 onwards.   Data are collected in all nine provinces of South Africa, but sample sizes per province differ – depending on the overall population size in each province in comparison to the South African population. We do make use of some disproportionate sampling in the case of provinces with very low population figures, like the mainly arid and rural Northern Cape. In the end the data are weighted by different demographic criteria to reflect the true population spread in the country, according to published sex, age and working status proportions in each province. Data are also projected to overall adult population figures and are as such representative of the South African population, within a margin of error (depending on sample size, response rate and sampling methodology used).   This procedure is followed to provide a mirror image of the views of the overall adult South African population. Thus, the smaller sample size used in some provinces (especially those with smaller populations than Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal) do invoke a larger standard sample error for sample statistics. This means in practical terms that the precision of the measurements for Gauteng is about four times higher than that for the Northen Cape at the same variability in the data. Therefore, we advise caution when interpreting data for provinces in isolation.   The table overleaf provides the achieved sample sizes (N) and population-weighted relative frequencies (%) of respondents over time (from 2020 to 2025) for South Africa as a whole and the nine provinces.   Table 2.1:  Sample sizes of Khayabus Note:  The table shows the absolute count (N) and population-weighted relative frequencies (%) of respondents from South Africa and its nine provinces in Wave 1 of the Khayabus surveys from 2020 to 2025.     2.2. ANALYTICAL APPROACH   A phased methodological approach was employed to select the appropriate survey questions (items/indicators) to measure the nine dimensions of social cohesion in line with the Bertelsmann concept. We then computed scores for each of the nine dimensions and the overall social cohesion index based on the scores.   Item selection was performed by using a multi-step procedure:   Each member of the research team independently identified potential items for measuring the nine social cohesion dimensions. Members of the research team then jointly prepared a pool of items according to face validity.  Items from the pool were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis for each dimension. [3] Finally, we assessed the internal consistency of the scales formed by the selected items to measure pertinent dimensions: Cronbach’s α coefficients should reach .90 for an excellent scale, .80 for a very good scale, .70 for a satisfactory scale, and minimally .30, or, in case of short scales, at least .10 times the number of items in the scale.    Several data preparation steps had to be taken before performing the factor analysis:   Where needed, the response options of the items were reverse coded so that a higher numerical value stands for a more vital expression of the pertinent aspect of cohesion.  The response option of all items was rescaled to range from 0 (weakest expression of cohesion) to 100 (strongest expression of cohesion). If present, missing values on an item were substituted with the sample mean – fortunately the rate of missing values was very low. Below and on the next two pages, Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 document the selected items’ factor loadings and the internal consistencies of the scale these items form for measuring the nine dimensions of social cohesion.   Table 2.2:  Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 1 Note:  The table shows the factor loadings of the items from factor analysis for the pertinent dimensions. Values in parentheses refer to Cronbach's α coefficient of internal consistency of the scale, formed by the items selected to measure the pertinent dimension .   Table 2.3:  Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 2 Note:  The table shows the factor loadings of the items from factor analysis for the pertinent dimension. Values in parentheses refer to Cronbach's α coefficient of internal consistency of the scale, formed by the items selected to measure the pertinent dimension.   a  Loadings and Cronbach's α cannot be computed; substituted with mean from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1   Table 2.4:  Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 3 Note:  The table shows the factor loadings of the items from factor analysis for the pertinent dimension. Values in parentheses refer to Cronbach's α coefficient of internal consistency of the scale, formed by the items selected to measure the pertinent dimension.   a  Loadings and Cronbach's α cannot be computed; substituted with mean from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1     It is obvious from these three tables that not all dimensions of social cohesion were measured equally well over the five-year period of the study. There were several reasons for this:   The questionnaire offered a limited choice of indicators for some dimensions. This is why not all dimensions could be measured with at least three items. This is relevant to Dimension 2.1 (Identification) and Dimension 3.1 (Solidarity and Helpfulness). Furthermore, for Dimension 2.1 (Identification) an item from the 2020 Khayabus had to be included, to assess citizens’ identification with South Africa in 2021. Not all scales exhibit a high degree of homogeneity (the level of intercorrelation) of the included items. This is particularly true for Dimension 2.1 (Identification) and Dimension 3.3 (Civic Participation). After sorting items via factor analysis, the nine-dimension scores were computed by calculating the arithmetic mean of the items determined to belong to a given factor. The overall cohesion index was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the nine-dimension score. Dimension and index scores for the provinces and the country as a whole were calculated by aggregating the individual-level data to the respective level via the population-weighted arithmetic mean. Scores for the dimensions and the overall index range from 0 (very low cohesion) to 100 (very high cohesion), where:   Scores from 0 to 19.99 can be interpreted as pointing to a very low level of cohesion, Scores from 20 to 39.99 as pointing to a low level of cohesion, Scores from 40 to 59.99 as pointing to a medium level of cohesion, Scores from 60 to 79.99 as pointing to a high level of cohesion, and Scores from 80 to 100 as pointing to a very high level of cohesion.     3. CURRENT LEVEL AND TREND OF SOCIAL COHESION 3.1. SOCIAL COHESION IN SOUTH AFRICA   Table 3.1 below illustrates the annual level and trend (development) of social cohesion in South Africa since 2021. Using the 2021 data as a base, it also shows the year-on-year development of dimensions of cohesion since 2021.   Table 3.1:  Overall index and dimensions Note:  The table shows the scores of South Africa as a whole on the overall index of social cohesion and its dimensions in 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025.   For this table and further tables, scores up to 19.99 (very low cohesion) are shaded in red, scores between 20 and 39.99 (low) are shaded in orange, scores between 40 and 59.99 are shaded in yellow, and scores above 60 (high cohesion) are shaded in green. The table also shows changes over time. Positive changes are given in green, and negative changes are indicated in red. Looking specifically at the findings for 2025, the fact of four green scores is noticed immediately. In the past five years the dimension of “Identification” has consistently delivered green scores, but it was unfortunately the only one. The dimension of “Social Networks” started off well in 2021, but could only manage another green score in 2025, while the dimension of “Solidarity and Helpfulness” achieved green scores for the last two years. In 2025, “Civic Participation” also achieved a green score. It is clear that social cohesion is on a stronger footing than before, with the overall country index improving 2.5 points since 2021 to reflect an overall index of 56 for the year 2025.  Currently, South Africa exhibits four green scores and five yellow scores. It is also an important finding that eight of the nine scores improved when comparing them to the situation in 2021. This is indeed a very positive result.   Another important finding is that the dimension of “Respect for Social Rules” showed an upward movement over the last year (from 2024 to 2025), with the score moving from orange to yellow.   The results show a nuanced profile of social cohesion in South Africa, covering quite a spectrum, from 42 to 76.7. It is notable that each one of the three domains includes at least one green score. When programmes are designed to promote social cohesion in the country, it would be advisable to use the essence of the green scores as main “selling points” to try to achieve movement on the other scores as well. As before, it is clear that the “glue” that holds the country together is still strongly reflected in citizens’ strong identification and affiliation with the country, at a score of 76.7 (3.5 points higher than in 2021).   On the other hand, three issues have the inherent potential to destabilise the South African society, namely:   Acceptance of Diversity (currently at 47.7 points), Perception of Fairness (currently at 47.1 points), and Respect for Social Rules (currently at 42 points). 3.2. SOCIAL COHESION IN THE NINE PROVINCES   The table overleaf shows the social cohesion scores for the nine South African provinces – all scores are in yellow, indicating medium-level index scores for the whole country.    In four provinces (the Eastern Cape, North West, Western Cape and Gauteng) the overall social cohesion score is higher than in the country as a whole. Especially the Eastern Cape and North West showed good progress over the last five years: the score in the Eastern Cape is 7 points higher than in 2021, while the score in North West is 7.6 points higher than in 2021.   The Northern Cape shows the highest points loss (7.5 points), from the 59.2 points measured in 2021 to the 51.7 measured in 2025.  However, it has been mentioned before that findings in the Northern Cape will probably show greater variability and inconsistency than in other provinces, as the sample size is really low. (This vast province houses only 2% of the country’s population.)   Two other provinces also recorded a decline in Social Cohesion when the 2025 findings are compared to those from 2021, although these losses are much smaller than that in the Northern Cape: Limpopo lost 1.2 index points, and the Free State lost 0.9 index points. All other provinces are doing better regarding overall Social Cohesion index points than in 2021.   Table 3.2:  Overall index in the provinces Note:  The table shows the scores of the nine South African provinces on the overall social cohesion index from 2021 to 2025. The table also shows changes over time. Positive changes are highlighted in green, and negative changes are highlighted in red.   The next nine tables will show the nine provinces’ performance on the three domains and nine dimensions of Social Cohesion over the five reporting periods/years. It will become clear that none of the provinces exhibit a consistent profile – in other words, each province has its strong and weak points when it comes to Social Cohesion.   The only exception is the strength of the dimension of identification with the country, which is high across all provinces. THE “SOCIAL RELATIONS” DOMAIN   Table 3.3:  Dimension 1.1 – Social networks in the provinces     Regarding social networks in the provinces, there are two clear groups in the country currently: the green group (good scores) and the yellow group (moderate scores). Social networks work well in the Western Cape, North West, Gauteng and Northern Cape. The other five provinces fare less well on this dimension and four out of the five have lost ground since 2021.     Table 3.4:  Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people in the provinces     Eight out of the nine provinces perform moderately on this dimension. The exception is the Eastern Cape – not only is this province the best overall performer this year, but it succeeded in steadily improving on the Trust in People dimension every year for the last five years and ended on an index score 16.4 points higher than where it started in 2021. Table 3.5:  Dimension 1.3 – "Acceptance of diversity"     All nine provinces registered moderate scores on this dimension. In a country with so many different population groups, a high Gini-coefficient, very different levels of development and educational qualifications, and diversity in terms of home languages and religions, it is perhaps not surprising. However, the process of nation-building should definitely get more attention nationally. The other aspect complicating the sentiment about acceptance of diversity is the issue of immigrants. More about this later. THE “CONNECTEDNESS” DOMAIN   Table 3.6:  Dimension 2.1 – Identification in the provinces     It is clear that Identification is by far the strongest dimension of Social Cohesion in the country, as has been mentioned previously. Seven provinces consistently registered “good” results on this dimension, and in 2025 two provinces, the Eastern and Western Cape, have registered “excellent” results. This is a very strong element of Social Cohesion in South Africa’s favour and can possibly be employed in a clever campaign to help promote some of the other desired opinions and dimensions of Social Cohesion.     Table 3.7:  Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions in the provinces   Another all yellow – i.e. moderate – performance. A campaign addressing Trust  in general, and both the dimensions of trust in other people and trust in institutions, making use of good stories or talking about good experiences might work in the long run. Table 3.8:  Dimension 2.3 – "Perception of fairness"   The scores for the Perception of Fairness are all moderate as well, but on the lower half of the moderate category. South Africans do have an issue with this on many different levels – just think about how many times there are news articles about unfairness, unfair treatment, discrimination and related issues. One positive observation, though, is that all the scores in the provinces (bar one) have increased since 2021. THE “FOCUS ON THE COMMON GOOD” DOMAIN   Table 3.9:  Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness in the provinces     This dimension of Solidarity and Helpfulness is another strong performance area for South Africa and all nine provinces. Eight of the nine provinces are in the “good”/green category and only one in the moderate category in terms of the indices. To be helpful, caring and friendly is a way of life for many in the country.   Table 3.10:  Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules     The dimension of Respect for Social Rules is by far the worst performer in terms of the Social Cohesion indices in South Africa – although many of the scores in the past five years have been much worse than those achieved in 2025. The related aspects of lawlessness, the attitude that “everything goes”, and even the reckless driving behaviour of some motorists count as everyday proof that South Africans have a low regard for rules, regulations and laws. This should not be allowed to continue.   Table 3.11:  Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation in the provinces     With this last dimension of Civic Participation, the pattern looks very similar to the very first dimension of Social Networks – four provinces recording “good”/green scores and five recording yellow/”moderate” scores. This time the Eastern Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo are the best performers, perhaps showing the strong sense of community in the three more rural provinces and even in the mainly metropolitan Gauteng province, where shared issues of service delivery have engendered a stronger sense of community and participation in local issues over the last year or so. It is also interesting that the scores for this dimension have all increased since 2021, with the Northern Cape again being the odd one out.    Although there is certainly still a lot of work to be done in the country concerning support and promotion of Social Cohesion, the index figures in general show a much more positive picture than five years ago, when we were still in the last phase of the Covid-19 pandemic and health, political and economic uncertainties were rife. Although the current situation in the country is not plain sailing, there is more participation and dialogue and the economy is slowly showing some tender green shoots, although growth is still severely inhibited. 4. STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON SOCIAL COHESION   This section focuses on the structural characteristics of the provinces that may have an influence on the promotion or hinderance of social cohesion within the provinces, with the aim of finding evidence on structural determinants of social cohesion. To bring this about, we explore the relationship between the overall level of social cohesion in the nine provinces and selected characteristics of the provinces from different themes, namely, the economic situation, inequality and poverty, demography, diversity and modernisation. The focus on these aspects is not arbitrary, as studies of different societies and the circumstances within them have illustrated empirically that aspects from these themes act as determinants rather than outcomes  of social cohesion (Dragolov et al., 2016; Arant et al., 2017; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Boehnke et al., 2024).     4.1 DATA AND METHODOLOGY   To touch on the economic situation in the provinces, we followed the same procedures as in previous studies and used data on the gross domestic product per capita [4] in South African Rand (ZAR) (Stats SA, 2025), Human Development Index (Global Data Lab, 2024), and unemployment rates – using both the official and expanded definitions of unemployment.   We measured poverty using one subjective indicator – the share of households in a province who perceive themselves as poor (Stats SA, 2024c), and objective indicators concerning three definitions of the poverty line [5] . We employed the Gini index of income inequality and the P90/P10 ratio (own calculations based on CRA, 2023) to measure inequality [6] .   We drew on data from the official Census 2022 in South Africa (Stats SA, 2023a) for the remaining thematic fields. In particular, regarding demographics, we considered population density, the share of urban and rural populations, the share of single and married citizens, and the population’s median age. To tap into diversity, we used the share of blacks, whites, coloureds and Indians/Asians, and other races, the share of immigrants, as well as ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalisation [7] (own calculations based on Stats SA, 2023a).   To measure modernisation, we used the share of citizens with completed primary, secondary and tertiary education, the share of citizens owning a computer and a mobile phone, and the share of the population without access to the internet (annual Khayabus results).   For reasons of data availability, all structural indicators, except GDP per capita, where the 2025 figure is used, refer to the years 2021, 2022 and 2023 (the latest Census was undertaken in 2022). The Khayabus data are from the year when fieldwork was undertaken.  Thereby, some figures precede the most recent measurement of social cohesion. Although the intentional time lag – earlier measurement of the provinces’ structural characteristics and later measurement of social cohesion – introduces a certain degree of temporal order in the analyses, it cannot prove the existence of a causal relationship, but it can increase the plausibility of attributing causality.    Each of the above-listed structural characteristics of the provinces was subjected to a correlation test with the level of social cohesion. Two variables are correlated when changes in one are closely followed by changes in the other. A correlation can be positive (the more variable A, the more variable B) or negative (the more variable A, the less variable B). The strength of the association is reflected in the coefficient correlation, which can range from 0 (no correlation) to ±1 (perfect correlation). Typically, a correlation below .10 is very weak, between .10 and .30 is weak, between .30 and .50 is moderate, and above .50 is strong.   As before, we experimented with both Pearson and Spearman correlations. However, using Pearson correlations the low number of provinces (only nine) means that only extremely high correlations can reach statistical significance. As a parametric test, the Pearson correlations involve assumptions that cannot be fulfilled with the data on the level of provinces. Therefore, we again used Spearman correlations as a non-parametric, assumption-free alternative. A Spearman correlation is, in essence, a Pearson correlation performed on ranked data. The distinction between the two approaches is that a Pearson correlation considers the exact distances between the observations on each variable, whereas a Spearman correlation considers only whether there are differences, regardless of their size.   Both bivariate correlations and correlations partial to GDP were measured, because previous studies in other countries showed that GDP was highly positively related to social cohesion (Dragolov et al, 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). Generally, the more prosperous a society is, the more cohesive it is. Partialling GDP out of a relationship removes the “halo effect” – the influence of GDP on both variables involved. This makes it possible to speak of associations between a given structural characteristic of the provinces and social cohesion, independent of their economic prosperity. 4.2 RESULTS   Table 4.1 (overleaf) documents the relationships between the structural characteristics of the nine provinces and social cohesion per thematic field.   Table 4.1:  Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Note :  The table shows Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and structural characteristics of the provinces, performed on the level of the provinces ( N  = 9). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p  ≤ .05, *** p  ≤ .01. 5. INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCES OF SOCIAL COHESION   This section looks at the data at the level of individual respondents to explore which population or societal groups are at risk of experiencing low cohesion in South Africa. This exercise involved the identification of distinct groups – or classes – of respondents, based on their scores on the nine dimensions of social cohesion.     5.1. DATA AND METHODOLOGY   To classify respondents into groups with distinct experiences of cohesion, we used Latent Class Analysis. “Latent Class Analysis (LCA) is a statistical procedure used to identify qualitatively different subgroups within membership who often share certain outward characteristics. The assumption underlying LCA is that membership in unobserved groups (or classes) can be explained by patterns of scores across survey questions, assessment indicators, or scales” (Weller et al., 2020). The classes of respondents resulting from the analysis are characterised by similarities within the class and dissimilarities across the classes concerning the experience of the nine aspects of cohesion by the respondents who belong to each class. It is also possible to relate class membership to socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics and investigate how the experience of social cohesion is related to individual characteristics.   The Latent Class Analysis produced a best fit for four classes of South Africans [8] :   Critics, 15.5% of the adult population, Integrated Sceptics, 22.5% of the adult population, Middle South Africa, 48.2% of the adult population, and Cohesive Communities, 13.8% of the adult population.     5.2. IDENTIFYING FOUR CLASSES OF EXPERIENCE OF SOCIAL COHESION    Critics (Class 1) are characterised by high identification (like all groups) but critically low acceptance of diversity. They also have low trust in people and in institutions and their perception of fairness and respect for social rules lag behind. This group has the lowest overall social cohesion index score at 40.6.   Integrated Sceptics (Class 2) show well-knit social networks, they have high trust in people and accept diversity, experience solidarity and helpfulness and participate in civic life. Like all South Africans, they agree strongly with the country. However, they fall short on trust in institutions (they are “sceptics”, after all) and exhibit very low levels of respect for social rules and perceptions of fairness. This group has the second-highest overall cohesion index score at 56.5.   Middle South Africa (Class 3) is the biggest group and also the most like the “average South African”, if something like that existed.  They identify strongly with the country and have high solidarity and helpfulness when it comes to society. But, for all the other dimensions, their views are somewhere in the middle. This group has the second-lowest overall social cohesion index score at 55.7.   Cohesive Communities (Class 4) characterise the ideal-typical model of strong cohesion in South Africa, manifesting itself in exceptionally high identification and high scores on all the other dimensions. This group has the highest overall social cohesion index score at 73.4.   A series of chi-square tests of independence suggest that these four classes differ along core socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics.   Table 5.1:  2025 Results: Social Cohesion Dimensions and LCA Note:  The table shows the average score (M) and the standard deviation (SD) of the overall index of social cohesion and its nine dimensions in the four classes of respondents. Scores below 20 are highlighted in red, scores between 20 and 39.99 are highlighted in orange, scores between 40 and 59.99 are highlighted in yellow, scores between 60 and 79.99 are highlighted in green, and scores above 80 are highlighted in blue.     A closer look at the average scores of the four classes on the nine dimensions reveals the aspects of cohesion along which the classes differ from each other (see Table 5.1 above). It is clear that all four classes exhibit a high to very high level of identification.  There is also more convergence than in previous studies on the dimension of solidarity and helpfulness, with three of the four classes now exhibiting good scores. (This dimension stayed at about the same level for Critics in 2025 as in 2024.)   5.3. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE FOUR CLASSES    In this section, the typical individual characteristics for the four classes are explored. As illustrated in Table 5.2 overleaf, socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics are used. The four classes are characterised in the framework of separate chi-square tests of independence between respondents’ class membership and the respective individual characteristics of interest. Table 5.2 documents the population weighted relative frequencies (%) of the socio-demographic and socio-economic categories in the total sample and in each of the four classes as well as the respective results from the chi-square tests of independence and Cramer’s V  coefficient of effect size. Due to the large sample sizes in three of the classes, all nine tests emerged as statistically significant, although some effect sizes are small.   Critics include an overproportion of single young females, with four out of five from the black population group – with home languages corresponding to this finding. They mainly live outside of metropolitan areas, and their education reflects a similar pattern to that of the country, with a slight overproportion of individuals with a lower education. Just over four in ten Critics are unemployed, leading to an effect on personal income. As we have seen in the previous section, the Critics group are not experiencing low levels of social cohesion in the country and their communities.   We have seen that Integrated Sceptics experienced a much higher level of social cohesion. This group tend to be slightly older than the first and display a slight overrepresentation of whites and coloureds than the general South African population. They also come more from married relationships and include an overrepresentation of Afrikaans-speakers, and proportionally more of them live in rural areas. The spread of Integrated Sceptics over the categories of education, working status and income is broadly similar to the general South African patterns.   Middle South Africa – exactly as the name says, this group mainly follows a distribution in different socio-demographic and socio-economic groups similar to the general South African population. If anything, this group is slightly overrepresented in the black population and live more in metropolitan areas than the general population.   Cohesive communities are more male than female and have stronger representation in the 25-to-64 age group than the general population. They show a good spread of home language and population groups but are overrepresented in the Indian/Asian group and almost half live in rural areas or villages. They are overrepresented in the group with secondary education, and are mostly employed, with corresponding higher than average incomes. They experience the highest level of social cohesion of all four groups. Table 5.2:  Socio-demographic and -economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents Note:  The table shows the population-weighed relative frequencies (%) of the categories of the pertinent socio-economic and demographic characteristics in the total sample (N = 3456) and in each of the four classes of respondents (n1 = 532, n2 = 808, n3 = 1637, n4 = 479), the respective result from a chi-square test of independence between the characteristic and class belonging, and Cramer’s V coefficient of effect size. Significance of the estimates in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     6. SOCIAL COHESION AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING   In this section, we check whether the data support the consistent findings from previous studies that high levels of social cohesion are related to greater (subjective) well-being.   Five items from the Khayabus study are used as proxies of well-being, namely:   Think of the way your family lives, would you say that your family is … better off than a year ago / about the same / worse off than a year ago? And how do you think your family’s lives will be in a year’s time? Do you think your family will be … better off than today / about the same / worse off than today? Please think about your children or the children of family or friends. What do you think the future holds for these children? Do you think that … they have a bright future ahead of them / they have a bleak future ahead of them? And your satisfaction with life? Has it … improved / stayed the same / worsened compared to a few months ago? On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate whether you (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) agree, or (5) strongly agree with the following statement: I am seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so.   Analyses on both the level of provinces and of individuals were conducted.     6.1. PROVINCES – DATA AND METHODOLOGY   We aggregated individual responses to the five items to measure well-being on the level of provinces. For each province, we took the respective share of the positive response option for each of the four items with categorically scaled answers (better off, bright future, improved). We applied the same methodological approach as in Section 4, which explored associations between several structured characteristics of the provinces and the index of social cohesion. Appendix B documents the biserial bivariate correlations on the individual level and the bivariate and partial Pearson correlations on the level of provinces. As in Section 4, we report and interpret the results from the Spearman correlations partial for GDP. Table 6.1:  Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Note:  The table shows Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and aspects of subjective well-being on the level of the nine provinces (N = 9). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     These correlations are less strong than those measured in previous studies.     6.2. INDIVIDUALS   To investigate the association between social cohesion and subjective well-being on the individual level, we relate the individual responses to the well-being items to respondents’ membership in the four distinct classes of experiencing social cohesion. As most of the items on well-being are of categorical measurement quality, we apply the approach from Section 5 to describe the four classes based on respondents’ socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The individual experience of social cohesion exhibits strong associations with all four of the indicators of subjective well-being. Table 6.2: Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents Note:  The table shows the population-weighed relative frequencies (%) of the responses to the pertinent aspect of subjective well-being in the total sample (N = 3456) and in each of the four classes of respondents (n1 = 532, n2 = 808, n3 = 1637, n4 = 479), the respective result from a chi-square test of independence between the aspect of well-being and class belonging, and Cramer’s V coefficient of effect size. Significance of the estimates in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     The evidence presented a clear picture. The greatest share of respondents who evaluated their family’s life as better off than a year ago was found in Class 4 (Cohesive Communities). Looking at the two measures of optimism, we found similar evidence. The largest share of respondents believing that their family’s lives would be better off in a year’s time than at the time of the fieldwork, was again found in the Cohesive Communities. Likewise, optimism related to the future of children was also found to be highest in Class 4, and the pattern holds for satisfaction with life, with almost half of Group 4 claiming that their life satisfaction had improved.   In each case the optimism and hope of Cohesive Communities was shared by smaller proportions of Group 3 (Middle South Africa) and by even smaller proportions of Group 2 (Integrated Sceptics).   Group 1 (Critics) in many cases did not strongly express themselves – either positively or negatively – but largely chose the middle options of “stayed the same” when this was offered. In the case of the future of children, where no middle option was offered, more than half of Critics chose the option that children would have a “bleak future”.     7. CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD   The concept and reality of Social Cohesion should form part of the central discussion in a diverse developing country like South Africa.  Thus, this project, which has developed over five years of intense studies and modelling, can contribute constructively to the intensifying and necessary discourse. Looking at the project over the five years, it is possible to see the progress made so far, but also to see what still needs to be done. For instance, the “Critics” group are seriously lagging in positive opinions about themselves and the future of the country. Special attention should be paid to developing a programme to help them see the way out of the dire situations they find themselves in. This group is mainly made up of young women, and it should be possible to mobilise NGOs and the Department in the President’s office that pays special attention to women to concentrate on this group – in a way that can be informed by the findings of this project and measured in future.   However, it would be wrong not to pay any attention to the other three groups: “Integrated Sceptics”, “Middle South Africa” and “Cohesive Communities”. These groups can perhaps be more easily addressed and involved in Social Cohesion programmes, however, it should be noted that the messages designed for each of these groups must be different. They still exhibit very different “group personalities”, have different interests, and support or are concerned about different issues. In this case, some further study and careful planning will be appropriate.   As mentioned at various instances in this report, the glue that holds the South African society together consists to a significant extent of the high level of identification with the country, as illustrated by all four groups/classes of South Africans. This national pride cannot be taken for granted. Today, it rests to a large degree on the shared connection to the country, its history and its people and the sense of belonging we share, and it also finds expression in the shared joy experienced at the success of our sports teams. But this cannot be all; other elements of “nation-building” also need to be identified, built on and shared. Looking at other areas we can develop, South Africans largely share a strong feeling of solidarity and helpfulness when it comes to fellow citizens, and relatively well-functioning social networks.    These aspects can aid in the nation-building project.   On the other hand, serious political and planning attention must also be paid to the widely perceived lack of respect for social rules, as this can easily spark turmoil and unrest. Policymakers might also consider overcoming the perceived lack of fairness of various elements of the political system, likewise, strengthening of the acceptance of diversity is also needed, and trust in institutions needs urgent attention – especially with a view to the coming local government elections.   It also has to be mentioned that overall Social Cohesion in the country has increased over the last two measurement periods and that it is at an overall higher level than 2021 – thus, slow progress has been made. But it is still on a rather moderate level of 56, and is still falling far short of the hope, attitude of reconciliation and common vision of the “Rainbow Nation” of 1994. A lot of work still needs to be done.   To increase the use of this report and aid planning for Social Cohesion development, the report contains a lot of information specifically aimed at each of the provinces. On the one hand it is important to promote social cohesion on a national level, but on the other, each province also displays its own idiosyncrasies and legitimate findings and issues. The overall direction of the Social Cohesion plan should therefore include a separate special focus on each province. It would also be possible to link and disaggregate the analysis of the four groups of South Africans to each province, in order to facilitate the employment of the same building blocks in provinces as on the national scale. The fifth study in this series really proves the stability and usefulness of the study overall and corroborates the fact that the quality of a society (its social cohesion) translates directly into citizens’ quality of life (measured by subjective well-being) – and their optimism for the future. In turn, this can improve political participation, a sense of belonging, participation in the economy, the health of communities, and even the paying of taxes!   APPENDICES   APPENDIX A: INDICATORS OF COHESION ACROSS TIME    This Appendix documents the population-weighted relative frequencies of the response categories of the indicators used to calculate the social cohesion scores in this report. The reported values pertain to the respective percentage distributions in the total sample for each year of data collection.   Table A.1:  Dimension 1.1 – Social networks results over time     Table A.2:  Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people results over time       Table A.3:  Dimension 1.3 – Acceptance of diversity results over time     Table A.4:  Dimension 2.1 – Identification results over time   *values stem from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1 ( N  = 3758) .  Table A.5:  Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions results over time *values stem from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1 (N = 3758).   Table A.6:  Dimension 2.3 – Perception of fairness results over time   Table A.7:  Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness results over time Table A.8:  Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules results over time     Table A.9:  Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation results over time   * values stem from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1 ( N  = 3758).     APPENDIX B: CORRELATIONS OF SOCIAL COHESION ON THE PROVINCE LEVEL   Table B.1:  Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Note:  The table shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and structural characteristics of the provinces, performed on the level of the provinces (N = 9). For comparison, the table further shows the biserial correlations on the level of individuals (N = 3172). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     Table B.2:  Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Note:  The table shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and aspects of subjective well-being on the level of the nine provinces (N = 9). For comparison, the table further shows the biserial correlations on the level of individuals (N = 3172). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01. APPENDIX C: LATENT CLASS ANALYSES   This Appendix documents goodness-of-fit indices for the various LCA models specified.   Table C.1:  Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Note:  The table documents goodness-of-fit indices of the different solutions from latent class analysis. AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. saBIC: sample-size-adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion. APCM: Average Probability of Class Membership.     Table C.2: Relative class sizes for LCA solutions Note:  The table shows the population-weighed relative sizes of the classes (% of total sample) for different solutions from Latent Class Analysis. Percentages may not sum row-wise up to 100 due to rounding errors. N = 3172.     REFERENCES   Abrahams, C. 2016. Twenty years of social cohesion and nation-building in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 42(1), 95–107. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43900558   Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. & Wacziarg, R. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth , 8, 155–194. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024471506938   Apraku, A., Moyo, P. & Akpan, W. 2018. Coping with climate change in Africa: an analysis of local interpretations in Eastern Cape, SA. Development Southern Africa , 36(3), 295–308. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2018.1482199   Arant, R., Dragolov, G. & Boehnke, K. 2017. Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2017 . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Arant, R., Larsen, M. & Boehnke, K. 2016. Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Bremen . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Ballantine, C., Chapman, M., Erwin, K. & Maré, G. (Eds.). 2017. Living together, living apart? Social cohesion in a future South Africa . South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=496   Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.). 2018. What holds Asian societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Boehnke, K., Berrueto, A., Dragolov, G. & Ocampo Villegas, P. 2019. Are value preferences and social cohesion interconnected? The case of Mexico. Acta de Investigación, 9(2). http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fpsi.20074719e.2019.2.262   Boehnke, K., Dragolov, G., Arant, R. & Unzicker, K. 2024. Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2023 . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Burns, J., Hull, G., Lefko-Everett K. & Njozela, L. 2018. Defining social cohesion  (SALDRU Working Paper 216). Cape Town: SALDRU, UCT.   Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA). 2023. Assets and Incomes . Johannesburg: Centre for Risk Analysis.   Delhey, J. & Boehnke, K. 2018. Conceptualizing social cohesion in Asia, In Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.), What holds Asian societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar  (pp. 29-48). Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Delhey, J., Dragolov, G. & Boehnke, K. 2023. Social Cohesion in International Comparison: A Review of Key Measures and Findings. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 75, 95-120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-023-00891-6   Dragolov, G., Ignácz, Z. S., Lorenz, J., Delhey, J., Boehnke, K. & Unzicker, K. 2016. Social cohesion in the Western world. What holds societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar . Switzerland: Springer International. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32464-7   Global Data Lab. 2024. Subnational HDI (v8.0) . [Online] Available at: https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/table/shdi/ZAF/ [accessed: 24 September 2024].   Langer, A., Stewart, F., Smedts, K. & Demarest, L. 2017. Conceptualising and measuring social cohesion in Africa: Towards a perceptions-based index. Social Indicators Research, 131, 321-343. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1250-4   Larsen, M. M. & Boehnke, K. 2016. Measuring Social Cohesion in the Kyrgyz Republic. Social Cohesion Index . University of Central Asia's Institute of Public Policy and Administration Working Paper No. 36, Bishkek.   Leininger, J., Burchi, F., Fiedler, C., Mross, K., Nowack, D., von Schiller, A., Sommer, C., Strupat, C. & Ziaja, S. 2021. Social cohesion: A new definition and a proposal for its measurement in Africa  (Discussion Paper 31/2021). Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). https://doi.org/10.23661/dp31.2021.v1.1   OECD. 2021. Old-age income inequality. In Pensions at a Glance 2021: OECD and G20 Indicators . Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/d1a5a309-en   Schiefer, D. & van der Noll, J. 2017. The essentials of social cohesion: A literature review. Social Indicators Research, 132(2), 579-603. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1314-5   Statistics South Africa. 2023a. Census 2022 . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa. 2023b. Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Quarter 4: 2022 . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa. 2024a. Estimation of regional gross domestic product for South Africa: Experimental estimates . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa. 2024b. Population Estimates . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa.2024c. Subjective poverty in South Africa. Findings from the General Household Surveys 2019 and 2022 . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa. 2025. Estimation of regional gross domestic product for South Africa: Experimental estimates . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Wasserstein, R. L., Schirm, A. L. & Lazar, N. A. 2019. Moving to a World Beyond “ p  < 0.05”. The American Statistician, 73(sup1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2019.1583913   Weller, B. E., Bowen, N. K. & Faubert, S. J. 2020. Latent Class Analysis: A guide to best practice. Journal of Black Psychology, 46(4), 287–311. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095798420930932 [1]  “I am a Roman citizen.” [2]  Holland, T. & Sandbrook, D. 2024. The rest is History Returns . London: Bloomsbury. p71. [3]  Factor analysis is a statistical sorting procedure that analyses the matrix of item intercorrelations to identify items with a highly similar subgroup. The various subgroups of items (called factors) allow us to assess whether or not the items were selected appropriately according to their face validity as per the different dimensions of social cohesion. An important selection criterion is the item’s factor loading, which reflects how strongly an item is correlated with the other items sorted into the given factor. Item loadings should typically exceed .40 to be seen as sufficiently high. Items exhibiting sufficiently high factor loadings were retained. [4]  In line with the customary practice in economic research and previous SASCI studies, we transform the raw values by taking their natural logarithm ( ln ). [5]  Individuals below the food poverty line cannot afford enough food to obtain the minimum daily energy requirement for adequate health. Individuals below the lower-bound poverty line are unable to afford both adequate food and non-food items and have to sacrifice food for essential non-food items. Individuals below the upper-bound poverty line can afford adequate food and essential non-food items. In 2022, the food poverty line was at R663, the lower-bound poverty line at R945, and the upper-bound poverty line at R1,417, according to the Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA, 2023). [6]  The Gini coefficient measures income inequality in the population as a whole: It ranges from 0 (perfect equality among all individuals) to 1 (perfect inequality, where one individual has all income). The P90/P10 ratio contrasts the income at the 90 th  percentile of the income distribution to the income at its 10 th percentile (OECD, 2021). [7]  Fractionalisation is the probability that two randomly selected individuals are not from the same group (ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.) (Alesina et al, 2023). The corresponding indices for ethnic/linguistic/religious fractionalisation range from 0 (all individuals are from the same ethnic, linguistic, religious group) to 1 (each individual belongs to a separate ethnic, linguistic, religious group). [8]  The names chosen for each class refers to the opinions and characteristics defining the class.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026   This paper is published jointly by the  Inclusive Society Institute and School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University   PO Box 610 Bellville, 7550 South Africa  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report was prepared with the assistance of AI technology, including ChatGPT.   Certain images may have been generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature.   FEBRUARY 2026   Author: Prof Tania Ajam & Daryl Swanepoel   A SUMMARY OF THE DELIBERATIONS AT THE 2025 STELLENBOSCH SCHOOL OF PUBLIC LEADERSHIP’S WINELANDS CONFERENCE ON THE IMPACT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AI ON PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURES   The future impact of AI on the country’s democracy will depend on the governance choices that its public policymakers make today. If they design systems that focus on the needs and rights of the citizens, that ensure strong human oversight, use AI to strengthen fairness and administrative justice, and if they deploy it in ways that support reflective reasoning, rather than replace it, then the technology can deepen inclusion and enhance democratic participation. However, without such safeguards, AI could weaken institutions, erode cognitive autonomy and concentrate power in technological systems that are not publicly accountable, and which can reshape democratic life in ways democratic societies never intended.   Artificial Intelligence has evolved into one of the defining forces in contemporary governance and yet its character and consequences remain profoundly contested. The presentations delivered at the 2025 Winelands Conference at the Asara Wine Estate in Stellenbosch on 22-24 October 2025 demonstrate that AI’s impact on democratic life cannot be understood in narrow technical terms. Instead, AI must be interpreted as a political, institutional, social, cognitive and normative phenomenon. Its application reshapes how authority is exercised, how public services are organised, how citizens engage the state, how collective decisions are made and even how people think.   In this sense, AI does not merely introduce new tools; it inaugurates a new terrain of governance in which the boundaries between human and machine, and between carbon and silicon, become increasingly blurred. The question of whether AI serves as a gateway to inclusion or a risk to democracy, therefore depends not on technology alone, but also on how societies structure its use, how its institutions regulate and govern it and how citizens relate to it.   Prof Ayad Al-Ani’s presentation offers a compelling starting point for this expanded inquiry. He situates AI within a long historical arc in which technological shifts have decentralised capabilities that were once exclusive to elites. While universal basic income remains a distant objective, AI may, in the meantime, serve as a form of “universal technological provision”, granting individuals access to advanced intelligence through personal devices. In what Al-Ani characterises as the era of “abundant intelligence”, AI potentially democratises cognitive capacity itself with political implications: In a situation characterized by economization and digitization of all spheres of life, an “intimate relationship between human and machine may be the only utopia that is left”.   This shift may mark a deeper transformation in the distribution of power. Intelligence, which was once dependent on formal education, professional training or institutional access, has now become a more widely accessible resource that is being delivered through personalised AI systems that individuals can deploy as their cognitive “partners”.   Al-Ani illustrates that this transformation has immediate implications for citizenship and public administration. He envisions a dual AI architecture consisting of a citizen proxy/avatar and a digital intelligent public agent (see infographic 1). The citizen proxy is conceived as an AI assistant that not only identifies options, and completes and authenticates tasks, but interprets rights, translates bureaucratic requirements into everyday language and acts on behalf of the citizen in navigating state systems. This proxy can communicate across relevant languages and can adjust to social contexts, such as speaking to elders with respect and to youth with an informal and accessible tone. And it can operate through widely used platforms, such as WhatsApp or USSD, which is making it viable for individuals who have limited data access or digital literacy. By preparing complex applications, checking eligibility, assembling and storing documents, guiding users step-by-step and even escalating unresolved issues to human authorities, the proxy reduces the layers of administrative friction that have historically excluded the poor, the rural, the disabled and the digitally marginalised.   The public agent, in turn, functions as the government-facing component that verifies identity, processes applications, validates consent, executes transactions and ensures data minimisation. Together, the citizen and public AI agent, communicating and interacting directly through secure communication protocols, constitute a socio-technical system that potentially enables citizens to exercise their rights more effectively, facilitates more efficient delivery of public services, and significantly reduces bureaucratic barriers. In the longer term, it can be assumed, public agents will evolve into “digital public employees”—AI systems endowed with autonomy to manage more complex service processes, coordinate with humans, and make certain operational decisions independently. This presents an "event horizon" scenario where effective supervision of technology remains uncertain.   Infographic 1:  AI-Mediated Public Service Architecture (Source: Author, 2025)   Al-Ani’s examples illustrate the practical democratizing potential of this architecture. In this future scenario, a citizen in Limpopo could apply for a social grant using voice prompts in Sepedi, an informal trader could log a power outage and track the municipality’s response, a student applying for educational funding could rely on the proxy to gather the necessary documentation and monitor progress. These examples demonstrate how AI can address gaps in service delivery and administrative justice, particularly for communities that have traditionally faced barriers to accessing public institutions. However, it is foreseeable that advancements in digital interactions among AI agents will extend beyond the scope of public services. It is equally likely that these new forms of interaction will shape citizens’ participation in political processes: individuals may utilize agents to engage in such processes, and the resulting data will offer policymakers a more empirical basis for informed decision-making. Yet, Al-Ani’s analysis is not limited to empowerment, in that he also warns of an emerging risk he terms PSYOP capitalism, which is illustrated vividly in the emotionally resonant AI avatars displayed in his presentation. He noted that these systems, which are owned by technology companies and thus merely give the impression of being “our partners”, are engineered to simulate empathy, companionship and emotional presence. By forming bonds with users,   AI creates possibilities for subtle behavioural influence, with the line between assistance and persuasion becoming increasingly difficult to detect, because, when systems understand users’ preferences, vulnerabilities and emotional states, they gain the ability to shape behaviour in ways that may not be consciously perceived by the users.   This raises profound democratic concerns, in that unacknowledged influence undermines the autonomy necessary for civic judgement, whereas democracy depends on transparent persuasion and free choice. AI systems capable of shaping behaviour through psychological immersion therefore challenge these constitutional assumptions.   The normative and institutional implications of these developments are articulated with precision by Prof Martijn van der Steen, when he argues that AI introduces fundamental questions that are both political and normative. It raises the political issue of who decides, because AI systems are increasingly making decisions that were once reserved for humans. That, in turn, raises the issue of who protects, because institutions must determine how to safeguard citizens from algorithmic error, bias, hallucinations or harm. And it raises the issue of who dominates, because AI systems often depend on technological infrastructure controlled by private actors whose interests do not always align with public values. Van der Steen argues that these questions cannot be approached with naïveté. He contends that democratic societies must avoid both naïve optimism and apocalyptic pessimism about AI, and  instead ground their understanding of AI in its observable consequences.   Van der Steen’s concept of siliconization illustrates the gravity of these shifts. When algorithms, data systems and sensors become deeply – and often inconspicuously - embedded in public governance, silicon-based systems then begin to shape administrative logics that were once exclusively human. Traditional bureaucracies - that is carbon-based systems  reliant on human judgement - may find themselves weakened if they cannot adapt to algorithmic demands. The institutional future, according to van der Steen, is not predetermined.   His three scenarios illustrate possible trajectories. His X-Curve scenario presents a world where algorithmic authority accelerates while human institutions decline. This is the scenario that poses the greatest democratic risk, as democratic oversight mechanisms fail to keep pace with technological change. The Double-S scenario, in turn, imagines a more balanced ecosystem in which human and machine capabilities reinforce each other, a scenario which aligns far more closely with a vision of AI serving democratic aims. The Watchful Waiting scenario, on the other hand, reflects a more cautious evolution to the introduction of AI, where gradual adaptation occurs without dramatic disruption. These three scenarios underscore that the democratic impact of AI will depend on the choices that the democratic institutions make.   Infographic 2:  AI and Institutional Capacity: Three Possible Trajectories (Source: Author, 2025)   Dr Gray Manicom’s analysis grounds these theoretical insights in practice by examining how AI is already embedded in South African governance and the examples he raised illustrate that AI is not a distant prospect. AI is, for example, already shaping visa adjudication, tax assistance, information retrieval and climate forecasting today. The Lwazi AI assistant at SARS enhances taxpayer support, the AI-enabled visa adjudication system at Home Affairs speeds decision-making, the GovSearch tool provides quick access to government documentation and the Itiki drought prediction system, which integrates indigenous knowledge with machine learning, supports farmers and communities facing climate-related risk. These are practical examples that show that AI can improve efficiency and expand service delivery, but they also, at the same time, demonstrate how deeply AI is becoming integrated into administrative processes, which is raising questions about fairness, transparency, procedural justice and human oversight. To illustrate this, one can cite the example of a visa application denied by AI, which may bring about efficiency gains, but it remains a decision with life-altering consequences. It must therefore be open to human review and explanation. The cognitive dimension of AI’s influence is articulated powerfully in the work of Linda Snippe, whose research does not only examine the institutional or political impacts of AI, but more so its effects on human decision-making. She compares unaided decision-making with decision-making supported by delegative AI and decision-making supported by conversational AI and her findings reveal that conversational AI produces the highest perceived decision quality across multiple datasets, particularly in early and middle phases of decision-making where critical thinking, creativity and problem framing are most essential. Snippe’s interpretation draws upon Cognitive Fit Theory and Dual-Process Theory, which theories, she argues, propose that delegative AI encourages fast, intuitive thinking by providing immediate answers with limited engagement. Conversational AI, on the other, she submits, encourages slow, reflective thinking by prompting users to articulate, question and refine their own ideas, which iterative dialogue with themselves, engages the cognitive processes associated with analytical reasoning. Snippe’s findings illustrate that AI is not merely a source of information, because it can also shape the cognitive pathways through which decisions emerge, an insight that has profound implications for democracy. Because the health of democratic institutions depends on the capacity of citizens to evaluate information, reason through complexity and participate in public deliberation and therefore, if conversational AI strengthens these capacities by scaffolding reflective reasoning, it may enhance democratic participation, but if delegative AI becomes dominant, citizens may increasingly outsource judgement to machines, which will weaken the cognitive autonomy of citizens. Furthermore, the integration of emotionally persuasive AI systems, as highlighted by Al-Ani, will intensify this risk, because should these systems guide decisions through psychological influence, the democratic choice that individuals make, may become vulnerable to manipulation.   Taken together, the Winelands presentations reveal that AI is simultaneously an opportunity and a threat. An opportunity in that it expands inclusion by reducing administrative barriers, supporting multilingual access and empowering citizens with personalised tools, and it offers efficiency gains and improved service delivery. It can also strengthen deliberative reasoning through conversational engagement. But equally so, one should recognise the potential threat to democratic norms when authority is shifted toward opaque algorithmic systems, in that it  may challenge institutional oversight and enable subtle but pervasive forms of influence that could erode cognitive independence and democratic institutions. The future of AI hinges on the choices that public policymakers make now. If governments design citizen-centred systems like Al-Ani’s proxy and agent model, retain strong human oversight as van der Steen argues, use AI to strengthen administrative justice as shown in cases which Manicom highlights, and support reflective reasoning, rather than cognitive outsourcing as Snippe’s research advises, then AI can deepen democratic inclusion. However, without such safeguards, AI risks accelerating institutional erosion, diminishing cognitive autonomy and can lead to the concentration of power in unaccountable technological and commercial systems.   In this analysis, one conclusion emerges clearly: AI’s democratic consequences are not a product of fate, but of governance. Societies that design AI with intentionality, transparency and an unwavering commitment to public value may gain a more inclusive and effective democratic order. Those that fail to do so may find that the most powerful technology of the century has quietly reshaped their institutions, their politics, and their citizens’ minds.   Infographic 3:  AI’s Democratic Impact: A Matter of Choice (Source: Author, 2025)     This policy brief draws on the presentations made by the undermentioned academics at the Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership’s Winelands Conference that was held from 22 – 24 October 2025.   Al-Ani, Ayad. Einstein Center Digital Future, Berlin Manicom, Gray. Policy Innovation Lab, Stellenbosch University Snippe, Linda. Inholland University of Applied Sciences Van der Steen, Martijn. Erasmus University, Rotterdam   The synthesisation of this policy brief has been aided through the use of AI, which has drawn solely from the presentations made by the aforementioned academics. The brief has subsequently been amended, verified and edited by the author.       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026   prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Global South Perspectives Network   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of The coordinating entities or any of their office bearers   Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 19 January 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   FEBRUARY 2026   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 2 THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT: SYMBOLIC ADVANCE AND POLITICAL CONTRACTION 3 MULTILATERALISM UNDER PRESSURE: WHEN RULES DEPEND ON RESTRAINT 4 REINTERPRETING THE AFRICAN G20: AGENDA-SETTING AS INFLUENCE 5 CONTESTATION AND LANGUAGE: NORMS UNDER EXPLICIT CHALLENGE 6 EXCLUSION AND PRECEDENT: PROCEDURAL NORMS AT RISK 7 ARTICLE 109 AND THE LIMITS OF FORMAL RENEWAL 8 FROM UNIPOLARITY TO MULTIPOLARITY: FRAGMENTATION AS STRUCTURAL TRANSITION 9 COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: PRAGMATIC COOPERATION IN A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM 10 AGENDA NARROWING: COHERENCE OR RETRENCHMENT? 11 PRESIDENCY CYCLES, CONTINUITY AND THE RISK OF HIATUS 12 FRAGMENTATION AND THE ILLUSION OF EXIT 13 BUREAUCRATISATION AND THE LOSS OF INFORMALITY 14 CONCLUSION: THE G20 BETWEEN STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINT AND ADAPTIVE AGENCY   Cover photo: Image generated using OpenAI’s DALL·E image generation model (2026). Concept developed for the Inclusive Society Institute / Global South Perspectives Network publication. 1 INTRODUCTION   The Open Consultation Mondays webinar on “What is the future of the G20?” took place at a moment when the international system appears to be quietly, but unmistakably, recalibrating itself. This is not a period marked by dramatic institutional collapse, nor by the sudden abandonment of multilateral frameworks. Rather, it is characterised by something more subtle and more unsettling: the gradual loosening of the political consensus that once gave those frameworks coherence and direction.   Multilateralism continues to exist in form, yet increasingly struggles to operate in substance, since rules remain written, but compliance has become selective. Forums still convene, but authority is uneven, contested and often fragile.   Within this unsettled terrain, the G20 occupies a distinctive and revealing position, because unlike treaty-based institutions, it is neither anchored in international law, nor supported by enforcement mechanisms. Its legitimacy rests almost entirely on political consent, procedural convention and the shared understanding that systemically important economies carry a collective responsibility for managing global risk. Where that understanding weakens, the G20 does not simply underperform. It becomes a site where deeper tensions in global governance are exposed.   For this reason, the consultation approached the G20 not as a discrete institution facing episodic difficulty, but as an indicator of broader transformations in how multilateral cooperation is practiced. The central concern was not whether the G20 has delivered particular outcomes, but whether the conditions that once made it a credible and effective forum still hold. 2 THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT: SYMBOLIC ADVANCE AND POLITICAL CONTRACTION   The discussion was framed by the conclusion of the first G20 Summit hosted on the African continent. This G20 in Johannesburg marked an important symbolic expansion of global economic governance, that reflected both the shifting geography of systemic importance and the growing assertiveness of the developing and middle-income economies. Hosting the G20 on African soil carried an implicit challenge to inherited hierarchies within the international system, in that it reinforced the long-standing arguments that global governance must adapt to the contemporary economic realities, rather than remaining tethered to historical precedent.   But the consultation deliberately resisted a purely symbolic reading of the Summit and instead, it situated the African presidency within a longer trajectory in which developing countries have sought to reshape both the content and the normative orientation of global economic governance. The agenda advanced during the presidency foregrounded structural constraints, rather than cyclical fluctuations, directing attention to issues that speak directly to long-term development and systemic vulnerability.   At the same time, the consultation acknowledged that this agenda unfolded within a narrowing political space. Participation by some major economies, most notably the United States, was limited. Contestation over language intensified. And soon after the Summit, developments surrounding the forthcoming presidency introduced new uncertainty regarding the procedural norms of the forum itself. This juxtaposition, between agenda expansion on the one hand and political contraction on the other, framed much of the discussion that followed. 3 MULTILATERALISM UNDER PRESSURE: WHEN RULES DEPEND ON RESTRAINT   A foundational analytical premise of the consultation was that multilateral institutions derive their effectiveness not from formal rules alone, but from the willingness of participants to accept constraint. Rules do not enforce themselves. They function because actors believe that restraint serves their long-term interests better than unilateral action.   When this belief erodes, institutions rarely collapse outright. More often, they hollow out. Procedures continue, but their binding force weakens. Participation becomes conditional, selective or instrumental. The consultation argued that this pattern is increasingly visible across the multilateral system as a whole.   The G20 is particularly exposed to this dynamic. Its informality was originally its greatest strength, allowing rapid coordination in moments of crisis and enabling dialogue among actors with divergent political and economic systems, but informality also carries vulnerability and so when commitment to consensus fades, flexibility can be repurposed to justify exclusion, agenda narrowing or procedural manipulation.   Current tensions within the G20 were therefore framed not as isolated dysfunctions, but as manifestations of a broader shift in global governance, namely a shifting away from rule-bounded cooperation and toward power-mediated engagement. This shift does not eliminate multilateralism, but it fundamentally alters its character, which renders cooperation more contingent and less predictable. 4 REINTERPRETING THE AFRICAN G20: AGENDA-SETTING AS INFLUENCE   A substantial portion of the discussion was devoted to reassessing what constitutes “impact” in contemporary global governance. The consultation challenged evaluation frameworks that privilege attendance by heads of state, the specificity of communiqués or the immediacy of deliverables.   Instead, emphasis was placed on agenda-setting as a form of influence, given that the shaping of the terms of debate can, in a fragmented system, be more consequential than securing immediate commitments. The African presidency was therefore understood as exercising policy and norm entrepreneurship, filling discursive space at a moment when the global narrative is unsettled.   Debt sustainability was foregrounded as a structural issue embedded in the architecture of global finance, rather than as a failure of fiscal discipline and the cost of capital was elevated as a central constraint on development. Climate finance was reframed around access, quality and adaptation, rather than aggregate pledges alone, and critical minerals were positioned within a development and beneficiation discourse that challenges extractive models which externalise value.   The consultation noted that many of these issues transcend the G20 itself. Their significance lies in their capacity to migrate across forums, reinforcing debates in development finance, climate negotiations and regional processes and so, in this sense, influence operates cumulatively, through repetition and coalition-building rather than through singular decisions.   5 CONTESTATION AND LANGUAGE: NORMS UNDER EXPLICIT CHALLENGE   The consultation examined the intensification of contestation within the G20, particularly around language previously regarded as settled, where issues such as climate action, gender, sustainable development and solidarity again became sites of explicit disagreement.   What distinguished this phase of contestation was not its breadth, but its nature; where the use of previously agreed language as a basis for compromise was resisted by some member states and where normative frameworks that had accumulated over time were no longer uniformly treated as common reference points. The discussion underscored that in consensus-based forums such as the G20, even limited resistance can exert disproportionate influence on the outcomes, because in such fora, even  a small number of dissenting actors can significantly narrow them and recalibrate what is considered to be politically possible. The result is that over time this dynamic reshapes expectations, which weakens the stabilising function of precedent.   This development was interpreted as reflecting a broader environment in which norms themselves are increasingly contested, because as power politics reassert themselves, commitments to shared values become conditional, subject to reinterpretation or outright rejection. 6 EXCLUSION AND PRECEDENT: PROCEDURAL NORMS AT RISK   A critical analytical focus of the consultation concerned the unilateral exclusion of a founding G20 member, South Africa, under the forthcoming presidency, which, while formally framed as temporary, could set a troubling precedent.   The G20’s legitimacy rests on inclusion and shared participation among its members and therefore selective exclusion, even without formal expulsion, undermines this premise. More consequential, however, was the absence of collective resistance from the other members of the G20.   The consultation interpreted this silence of the other members as indicative of the current fragmented political environment in which institutional principles seem to increasingly yield to bilateral calculation. States may object privately, but publicly, they are reluctant to incur political cost by defending procedural norms. This pattern was identified as a key mechanism through which consensus-based systems erode. It does not occur through overt rejection, but through submission; and then over time, the exceptions become normalised, thereby altering expectations and embedding procedural uncertainty within the institution itself. 7 ARTICLE 109 AND THE LIMITS OF FORMAL RENEWAL   Flowing directly from the discussion on exclusion and procedural precedent, the consultation broadened its analytical lens to consider deeper structural constraints affecting institutional reform within the multilateral system. Particular reference was made to the United Nations Charter’s built-in reform mechanisms, notably Article 109, and to the persistent failure to activate them in any meaningful way.   Article 109 was treated as emblematic, rather than exceptional. Its existence demonstrates that the multilateral system is not legally frozen, pathways for comprehensive reform are formally available. Yet its non-use highlights a more fundamental reality: reform is not blocked by legal impossibility, but by political equilibrium. Those actors most empowered to activate reform are frequently those with the least incentive to alter existing arrangements.   This observation underscored a broader point. Institutional stagnation should not be misread as technical failure; instead, it reflects a balance of power in which entrenched advantage is preserved through inaction, where reform becomes conceivable only when shifts in power alter incentive structures and not merely when legal mechanisms exist. The consultation also cautioned against the activating Article 109, due to the profound political risk thereof. In a deeply fragmented and power-contested international system, the opening of the Charter to wholesale revision may yield an order markedly worse than the one it seeks to reform. 8 FROM UNIPOLARITY TO MULTIPOLARITY: FRAGMENTATION AS STRUCTURAL TRANSITION   Building on the discussion of institutional stasis, the consultation situated the current G20 dynamics within the wider historical transition that is underway; a transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order.   The post-Cold War unipolar moment created an enabling environment for consensus-based multilateralism. In such an environment the concentration of power reduced coordination costs, which allowed dominant actors to underwrite the institutions even when the outcomes were imperfect or unevenly distributed. As power diffuses, however, the logic of cooperation changes fundamentally. Consensus becomes harder to sustain, veto power more widely distributed and normative coherence more fragile.   Fragmentation, in this reading, is not synonymous with chaos. It is a structural consequence of multipolarity. The challenge facing institutions such as the G20 is not whether fragmentation exists, but whether it can be governed. Consequently, thinner outcomes, slower consensus and heightened contestation may in fact reflect an adaptation of the system, rather than its failure. 9 COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: PRAGMATIC COOPERATION IN A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM   Against this backdrop, the consultation explored the growing role of coalitions of the willing as pragmatic instruments of cooperation, not as substitutes for multilateralism, but as adaptive responses to institutional gridlock. Coalitions of the willing allow cooperation to proceed where unanimity proves unattainable, and so by enabling a critical mass of states to align around shared objectives, progress can be made without waiting for universal agreement. Their legitimacy of such cooperation will be derived from the coalition’s effectiveness, openness and the capacity to expand. The discussion acknowledged the potential risks associated with such coalition formation, where poorly designed coalitions can entrench fragmentation or reinforce power asymmetries. Yet in the current environment, paralysis was seen as a greater danger than pluralism and therefore carefully structured coalitions may help sustain cooperation, while preserving institutional continuity.   Within this logic, the G20 itself can be understood as an early coalition of the willing, given that it was created as to address systemic risks informally, when the existing institutions multilateral processes proved insufficient.   10 AGENDA NARROWING: COHERENCE OR RETRENCHMENT?   The proposal to narrow the G20 agenda to its original macroeconomic and financial focus was examined in detail. While agenda expansion has strained coherence, the consultation rejected a simplistic return to “back-to-basics”.   The global economy today is structurally different from that of earlier periods. Finance, development, inequality and climate risk are deeply intertwined. Treating development as external to economic governance misreads contemporary risk, in that a finance-only G20 risks managing symptoms, while ignoring the underlying causes.   The distinction advanced was therefore between rationalisation and regression. Streamlining may be necessary, retreat is not.   11 PRESIDENCY CYCLES, CONTINUITY AND THE RISK OF HIATUS   The discussion also noted that the immediate transition following South Africa’s presidency includes a de facto hiatus under the current United States presidency, during which the G20 process is expected to operate with reduced momentum and limited agenda expansion. This interlude was not framed as withdrawal from the forum, but as a period of lowered political investment, with implications for continuity and follow-through on issues elevated during the African presidency. Against this backdrop, cautious hope was expressed by a number of participants in the consultation that the United Kingdom presidency may serve as a point of reactivation, where deferred threads could be picked up and where the G20’s work programme can be re-anchored, even if under a different framing and set of priorities.   The consultation also reflected on the implications of the G20 presidency cycle, particularly the transition from South Africa to the United Kingdom, and thereafter to South Korea. The concern expressed was not one of intent or legitimacy, but of continuity. Presidencies matter because they shape agenda priority and framing, and the risk identified was that issues foregrounded under South Africa’s leadership, notably development constraints, inequality, debt dynamics and the cost of capital, may struggle to retain salience as the forum shifts toward political economies with different strategic reference points. The UK was implicitly associated with a more traditional G7-style orientation, while South Korea was seen as occupying a more ambiguous middle position. The underlying question was whether the momentum created by the African presidency would be carried forward or quietly diluted. Or will it be re-anchored around narrower macroeconomic concerns.   12 FRAGMENTATION AND THE ILLUSION OF EXIT   The discussion also addressed the proliferation of alternative groupings and parallel institutions, which should not be viewed  as straightforward substitutes for established forums. Fragmentation may very well create tactical openings, but it could also magnify power asymmetries. Negotiations in such fragmented environments could lead to smaller and middle-income states losing their collective leverage. 13 BUREAUCRATISATION AND THE LOSS OF INFORMALITY   A reflective strand of the consultation focused on the increasing bureaucratisation of the G20, where procedural density has expanded considerably, coupled with extensive negotiation over text that crowds out essential less formal political dialogue.   The G20 was originally conceived as an informal space for candid engagement and in the current environment that is marked by mistrust and fragmentation, such relational spaces may be increasingly important. Dialogue, the consultation argued, is not ornamental. It is infrastructural. 14 CONCLUSION: THE G20 BETWEEN STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINT AND ADAPTIVE AGENCY   The consultation underscored that the G20 should no longer be assessed against expectations formed in a different structural era. Its present tensions reflect deeper constraints embedded in the contemporary international order.   Formal reform pathways exist, but remain politically blocked and fragmentation is structural, rather than episodic and therefore, consensus, where it emerges, will be partial and issue-specific.   Within this environment, the G20 remains ambiguous, but consequential. It cannot restore a lost consensus, nor can it substitute for comprehensive institutional reform. Its value lies in functioning as a flexible platform for coordination, agenda-setting and selective alignment.   The future of the G20, like that of multilateralism itself, will be shaped by political choice, by whether states remain willing to accept constraint in pursuit of cooperation that is imperfect, but still necessary.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.   GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.   Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.   GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   October 2025   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   Contents   1 INTRODUCTION: Contextualising the conversation 2 THE CONSULTATION: Framing the questions in an era of systemic drift 3 ANALYTICAL EXPANSION OF THE FOUR CORE QUESTIONS 3.1 China’s dual impulse: Corrective and strategic at once 3.2 Great-Power reactions: Anxiety, ambivalence and the defence of hierarchy 3.3 Global South perspectives: Resonance without alignment 3.4 Implications for the future of multilateralism: Between adaptation and fragmentation 4 DEEPENING THE DISCUSSION: PERSPECTIVES AND COUNTER PERSPECTIVES 5 BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR A GLOBAL SOUTH STRATEGY 6 LOOKING AHEAD: THEMES FOR FUTURE CONSULTATION 7 CONCLUSION: CHOOSING BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND FRAGMENTATION Cover photo: AI generated 1 INTRODUCTION Contextualising the conversation   The Global South Perspectives Network enters this new phase of publishing its Monday Consultations at a moment when the international system appears suspended between epochs. One can sense a world taking stock of itself, as if pausing briefly before deciding what kind of order it wishes to inhabit next. The structures inherited from 1945 still stand, at least in name and legal form, yet their gravitational pull has weakened. Power has become more diffuse, expectations more plural and the consensus that once underpinned multilateralism has thinned with time.   It is within this atmosphere of transition that China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI) has emerged. It is an initiative that has not only intensified existing debates about global power but has also illuminated the deeper uncertainties defining this historical moment. Some interpret the GGI as a strategic challenge to a familiar order, whilst others see it as a direct response to the reform inertia that has plagued multilateral institutions for decades. Many in the Global South recognise in it an echo of long-articulated frustrations, a sense, so to say, that the current system speaks the language of universality, yet often operates through hierarchies that privilege the few over the many.   This consultation, one of many held under the Monday Consultations banner, brought together analysts, practitioners and observers from across the global community, each contributing to a shared inquiry into what the GGI represents and what its emergence might mean for the future of global governance.   This analytical brief offers an expanded account of that conversation. It does not merely document the dialogue, it attempts to interpret it, so as to situate the remarks, questions and insights within the broader currents shaping the transition from an older order to whatever may come next. In doing so, it aims to provide a reflective and grounded contribution to the growing discourse on how the Global South might navigate a system that is neither stable, nor yet fully transformed.     2 THE CONSULTATION Framing the questions in an era of systemic drift   The consultation began by acknowledging a simple, but often overlooked truth, that global governance is no longer anchored to the geopolitical realities that produced it. The architecture designed in 1945, so elegant in conception, so ambitious in spirit, now struggles under the weight of contemporary demands. Its foundational assumptions have eroded, yet its institutional form has remained largely intact.   The United Nations Security Council still mirrors the balance of power at the end of the Second World War. The Bretton Woods institutions continue to reflect an economic geography that no longer exists. And even when the international system has pledged reform, as it did in the 2005 World Summit, implementation has consistently failed to materialise.   In this context, the emergence of the GGI appears less surprising and more inevitable. The world has been signalling its desire for reform for decades, but reform has proven elusive. Where institutions fail to adapt, the system creates the very spaces into which new actors step. China’s initiative thus becomes not merely a Chinese story, but a symptom of a deeper systemic malaise.   The consultation therefore sought to explore four interlocking questions: whether China is filling a vacuum or rewriting rules; how other great powers are responding; how the Global South interprets the initiative; and what this means for the future of multilateralism. These questions framed the discussion, but did not confine it and instead, they opened a broader reflection on the contingencies of this moment in world affairs.     3 ANALYTICAL EXPANSION OF THE FOUR CORE QUESTIONS   3.1 China’s dual impulse: Corrective and strategic at once   A central theme emerging from the discussion was the recognition that the GGI cannot be reduced to a single motive in that it reflects both a critique and an ambition, both a response to structural inequities and a desire to shape the evolving order. This duality is not a contradiction. It is a characteristic of rising powers throughout history.   China’s argument begins with the claim that the multilateral system suffers from a legitimacy deficit, frozen, as it were, in the institutional imagination of 1945. The Initiative positions itself as a corrective to this democratic stagnation. Yet the GGI also grows out of a decade-long pattern of parallel institution-building: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank of BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative, and now the GGI’s associated platforms. In combining critique with construction, China demonstrates both frustration with the existing order and confidence in its capacity to propose alternatives.   This dual impulse, being simultaneously reformist and strategic, was widely noted in the consultation. It reflects a broader truth, that no major power seeks to reform the world in ways that negate its own interests. The more revealing question is not China’s ambition, but the conditions that have rendered that ambition consequential. If the existing institutions had evolved with greater agility, the space within which the GGI now operates might have been narrower. As it stands, the system itself has created the void that the GGI seeks to fill.     3.2 Great-Power reactions: Anxiety, ambivalence and the defence of hierarchy   The consultation examined how other major powers interpret the GGI and what these reactions reveal about their own strategic anxieties.   The United States has framed the initiative as destabilising, even revisionist. Yet this rhetorical posture contrasts sharply with its longstanding resistance to institutional reforms it professes to support. Whether in IMF quota adjustments or Security Council redesign, Washington’s defence of the “rules-based order” often coincides with a defence of inherited privileges.   Europe’s position differs in tone, but not always in substance, because while sharing Western concerns about China’s intentions, European actors remain deeply protective of institutional arrangements that grant disproportionate influence to a continent whose demographic and economic weight has steadily declined. The two permanent Security Council seats held by France and the United Kingdom, for example, exemplify this disjuncture between contemporary realities and institutional persistence. India, Japan and other Asian powers were described as occupying a space of strategic ambivalence. They are frustrated by the inertia of the system, but wary of a Sinocentric alternative, and they are conscious of their own role as regional poles within an increasingly plural global landscape.   What emerges from these reactions is not a coherent response to China, but a diverse set of anxieties about losing position within the existing hierarchy. Debates about global governance reform, in this sense, are inseparable from debates about power. The GGI becomes a prism through which the deeper insecurities of established and emerging powers are refracted.     3.3 Global South perspectives: Resonance without alignment   One of the consultation’s clearest insights was the divergence between Western and Global South interpretations of the GGI. Across Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, China’s critique of the global system finds significant resonance. Many states recognise their own frustrations in China’s diagnosis: an unrepresentative system, inconsistent application of norms and a persistent sense of marginalisation within the institutions of global governance.   But resonance does not imply alignment. The Global South’s response is more subtle and more pragmatic. It reflects a recognition that the GGI, whatever its motivations, acknowledges grievances that the established custodians of the system have long neglected. For middle powers such as South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia and Türkiye, the GGI represents neither a new orthodoxy, nor a threat to be resisted, but an additional space in which agency may be exercised.   This pragmatic reading acknowledges both opportunity and risk, where the opportunity lies in leveraging competing centres of global influence to expand the negotiating space for developing countries; and where risk arises if parallel systems evolve into competing regimes that will deepen fragmentation and erode the universality that multilateralism aspires to maintain.   The consultation also highlighted the concerns of civil society, whose voices is said to adde further nuance to the discourse. Their concerns about transparency, governance standards and human rights are not solely directed at China, but also at the West, whose selective approach to human rights diplomacy, they argue, has undermined the West’s own credibility. These tensions reflect the broader philosophical question that asks who has the authority to define legitimacy, and to whom is that authority accountable?   3.4 Implications for the future of multilateralism: Between adaptation and fragmentation   Perhaps the most reflective portion of the consultation centred on what the GGI and the reactions it provokes tell us about the trajectory of multilateralism itself.   Multilateralism, it was suggested, stands at a crossroads. Not because China challenges it, but because those entrusted with its stewardship have allowed it to stagnate. The institutions that once embodied the hope of a cooperative world have become, in some respects, the custodians of their own paralysis. Three observations shaped the discussion. The first is that alternatives arise when institutions fail to adapt. The GGI’s emergence is therefore as much a reflection of institutional stasis as of Chinese ambition.   The second is that multipolarity is now an unavoidable reality, because whether acknowledged or resisted, it is shaping the contours of global politics. No single actor can unilaterally impose its vision of the world and any future order will, therefore, be layered, plural and hybrid. The third observation is that containment strategies are unlikely to succeed. The GGI resonates not because it is Chinese, but because it speaks to structural inequities that many states experience directly. The more the initiative is dismissed rather than engaged, the more its appeal may grow.   The consultation thus returned repeatedly to a reflective tension: the world must navigate between the dangers of fragmentation and the necessity of adaptation. The GGI may well be the first major test of whether the existing system can accommodate new voices and new institutional forms without fracturing.     4 DEEPENING THE DISCUSSION: PERSPECTIVES AND COUNTER PERSPECTIVES   The conversation unfolded with a richness that exceeded the scope of the initial questions, drawing the participants into deeper reflections on the philosophical foundations of global governance.   One participant argued that legitimacy, far from being an ambiguous construct, requires universal standards, because without legitimacy grounded in representation and participation, multilateralism risks becoming a façade for power politics. Another countered that universalism itself is often claimed by those who historically benefited from defining it and so the question then becomes: who determines what counts as legitimate? The Charter may offer the anchor, but interpretation remains contested.   Others reflected on the tension between international law and the so-called “rules-based international order.” For many states, the latter is seen not as a neutral framework, but as a flexible vocabulary used to justify inconsistent action. The consultation suggested that a re-centring of the Charter, rather than a reliance on ad hoc interpretations, might offer firmer ground for a renewed multilateralism.   Concerns about multipolarity also surfaced, with one participant suggesting that multipolarity offers the promise of inclusivity, but also the risk of disorder, because he proffered, without strong institutions capable of coordinating the interests of multiple poles, the world may slide toward spheres of influence reminiscent of earlier eras. Yet the consultation resisted fatalism, by suggesting that multipolarity need not replicate the past, as it can be shaped into something more collaborative, provided the institutional imagination is revived. Another theme that surfaced was the paralysis surrounding Security Council reform. While Africa’s demand for two permanent seats remains consistent, the question of which  states should hold them continues to divide the continent, which is an internal divergence that mirrors similar divides across the Global South. These divergences, therefore, suggests that reform requires not only a redrawing of institutional lines, but indeed also a re-articulation of the principles upon which representation should rest.     5 BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR A GLOBAL SOUTH STRATEGY   The discussion illuminated several implications for the Global South’s approach to global governance., one being that there is growing recognition that the Global South is no longer a passive recipient of global norms, but an active co-author of emerging institutional debates. The GGI, regardless of its origin, provides a platform through which long-standing concerns about equity and representation can be expressed more forcefully.   A second implication is the need for greater coherence within the Global South itself, because internal divergences weaken negotiating power and slow reform. Yet the consultation suggested that these divergences, if openly acknowledged, rather than suppressed, can become sources of creative institutional design, such as the proposal that regional representation should be explored, rather than expanding the Security Council along national lines.   A third implication is the need to balance opportunity and caution. China’s initiative should be neither romanticised, nor rejected in that its possibilities lie in the space between endorsement and opposition.  It could evolve into a strategic engagement that recognises its potential to reshape global governance without surrendering the normative aspirations that the Global South holds for a fair and inclusive system.   6 LOOKING AHEAD: THEMES FOR FUTURE CONSULTATION   The discussion pointed toward several directions for future exploration, including, amongst others, the evolving relationship between international law and competing rule-making systems, the institutional implications of multipolarity, the governance of digital, financial and technological domains and the future of development finance in a world no longer dominated by the Bretton Woods institutions. All emerged as themes that merit deeper reflection.   The GGI will not be the last initiative to challenge the global governance status quo. But by beginning here, the Monday Consultation Series establishes a foundation for understanding how global governance might evolve if the voices of the Global South are treated not as peripheral commentary, but as central contributions.   7 CONCLUSION: CHOOSING BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND FRAGMENTATION   The consultation closed with an observation that captures the philosophical spirit of the discussion, namely that the world is not choosing between a Western order and a Chinese order. It is choosing between an order capable of evolving and an order condemned to fragment.   China’s GGI is a reminder that global governance can stagnate only for so long before alternatives arise. Whether those alternatives deepen fragmentation or contribute to renewal depends on the willingness of established institutions to open themselves to reform and on the ability of emerging actors to articulate their visions with clarity and coherence.   In this sense, the GGI is not simply a Chinese proposal. It is a mirror held up to the international community, reflecting both the failures of the present and the possibilities of a different future.   The Global South Perspectives Network offers this analytical brief as the first step in an ongoing dialogue. Much remains to be explored, questioned and re-imagined. But this consultation has made one truth clear: global governance is at its most vibrant when the conversation is shared.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.   GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.   Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.   GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026   prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Global South Perspectives Network   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of The coordinating entities or any of their office bearers   Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 19 January 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   FEBRUARY 2026   Author: Dr Klaus Kotzé   CONTENTS   1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 THE ATTACK ON VENEZUELA: A NEW PRECEDENT IN THE USE OF AMERICAN FORCE 3 VIOLENCE AS A SYSTEMIC PHENOMENON, NOT AN ANOMALY 4 EROSION OF EMPATHY AND THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 5 GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVES: CONSTRAINTS AND STRATEGIC AGENCY 5.1 COLLECTIVE DE-RISKING AND STRATEGIC DECOUPLING 5.2 INSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL AND NORM REINFORCEMENT 5.3 SHARED NARRATIVE AND MORAL RECLAMATION 6 REGIONAL AND GLOBAL RIPPLE EFFECTS 7 CONCLUSION - A CALL FOR DELIBERATE INTERRUPTION Cover photo: Microsoft Copilot 2026, AI generated illustration depicting U.S.–Venezuela geopolitical tensions, M365 Copilot image generation tool. 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   On 3 January, the United States launched a major military operation against Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. This event marked the most direct U.S. military intervention in Latin America in decades and represents a fundamental rupture in the norms governing state sovereignty and the use of force. Experts convened by the Global South Perspectives Network assessed this event not as an isolated crisis but as a critical inflection point in global order, one with ramifications far beyond Venezuela. Their discussion made three core claims:   The attack signals a deep break-down of international norms, where force can be deployed unilaterally under broad pretences. It accelerates a global shift toward systemic violence, undermining institutions designed to contain conflict and protect sovereign equality. For the Global South, traditional responses based on deference or hedging are no longer sufficient; instead, collective strategies of agency, resilience and institutional renewal must be pursued.   This brief synthesises this expert conversation and explores the Venezuela operation’s effects on the international system’s current crisis, the pathways for Global South responses, and the broader consequences for the future of multilateralism and global governance.     2 THE ATTACK ON VENEZUELA: A NEW PRECEDENT IN THE USE OF AMERICAN FORCE   The U.S.’ operation in Venezuela, widely documented as involving air strikes on strategic installations in and around Caracas and the exfiltration of President Maduro, represents an unprecedented direct assault on another sovereign state’s leadership by U.S. forces in recent history.   What distinguishes this from previous military interventions is not just its scale but its apparent disregard for multilateral legal constraints. According to expert commentary, the operation violates core principles of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.   Consultation participants underscored that this attack, framed by U.S. authorities as a counter-narco-terrorism and stabilisation operation, is emblematic of a broader pattern in which coercion is normalised, and legal norms are treated as optional rather than foundational.   3 VIOLENCE AS A SYSTEMIC PHENOMENON, NOT AN ANOMALY   A central theme of the expert discussion was that contemporary global violence is no longer episodic, confined to specific wars or crises. Instead, it has become systemic, embedded in institutional behaviours, strategic logics, and narratives that reward escalation. Speakers drew historical parallels to early twentieth-century upheavals, when incremental violations of norms eventually culminated in widespread conflict. They argued that the Venezuela attack, like past military precedents, risks opening new floodgates rather than resolving discrete problems.   This systemic view of violence was reinforced by a public health analogy: unchecked violence spreads much like an epidemic through exposure, imitation and reinforcement. Without continuous mechanisms of interruption, the patterns of force used in one context are readily replicated elsewhere. In this framing, the international system lacks effective institutional capacity to contain contagion once precedent for the use of force is established.     4 EROSION OF EMPATHY AND THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS   Consultation participants highlighted that the attack on Venezuela exposes a profound empathy deficit in global political discourse. Suffering, displacement and disruption caused by military action are now so frequently broadcast that they risk becoming background noise, tolerated consequences rather than urgent moral challenges. Institutions designed to mediate interstate conflict, above all the United Nations, were described as increasingly unable to enforce their own norms or to offer meaningful political mediation. This is not merely institutional failure; it is a crisis of legitimacy. When the greatest military powers disregard the system they helped to build, the normative foundation of multilateralism is hollowed out.   This erosion was illustrated starkly by the swift reactions of world leaders and civil society: some came out to condemn the U.S. action as a violation of international law and a threat to sovereignty, while others celebrated it as bold leadership. This polarisation further undermines the possibility of unified, normative responses that reinforce peaceful conflict resolution. It challenges the very edifice of global order.     5 GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVES: CONSTRAINTS AND STRATEGIC AGENCY   For states in the Global South, the Venezuela crisis presented several pressing questions about agency, sovereignty and strategic alignment. Historically, many of these states have balanced relations with major powers to secure trade, investment and development partnerships. The Venezuela episode suggests that reliance on normative deference, or on the continuation of established diplomatic frameworks, may no longer be sufficient. Various speakers emphasised that while formal sovereignty remains a principle of international relations, practical sovereignty is increasingly compromised by the unilateral actions of powerful states. In effect, the traditional security guarantees and legal frameworks that once offered a measure of insulation against external intervention are no longer reliable.   This reality prompts a reassessment of strategic options. The experts identified three broad response pathways for the Global South:     5.1 COLLECTIVE DE-RISKING AND STRATEGIC DECOUPLING   Rather than isolated hedging or alignment with existing power blocs, Global South countries could explore collective strategies of de-risking. This would reduce dependence on external patronage that can be leveraged coercively. This could involve expanding trade among each other in the Global South, diversifying diplomatic partnerships, and strengthening regional security architectures. Collective de-risking would not be isolationist, but rather a coordinated effort to build resilience that reduces vulnerability to unilateral coercion.     5.2 INSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL AND NORM REINFORCEMENT   Various speakers stressed the need for reinvigorating multilateral institutions with broader legitimacy and balanced authority. This includes reforming U.N. mechanisms to ensure that no single power can override established norms with impunity. Reformed and new platforms where Global South voices are not marginalised are now more needed than ever.   Institutional renewal also means developing mechanisms capable of sustained engagement, rather than episodic crisis management, to interrupt cycles of violence effectively.     5.3 SHARED NARRATIVE AND MORAL RECLAMATION   The attack on Venezuela and the inaction from the global community crystallises a broader cultural crisis: a weakening of collective commitment to humanitarian norms and shared global responsibility. Global South actors can play a leading role in articulating and popularising alternative narratives that resist the normalisation of coercive violence and emphasise cooperation over dominance.     6 REGIONAL AND GLOBAL RIPPLE EFFECTS   Various participants suggested that the Venezuela episode will have far-reaching effects on regional stability and global geopolitics. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the fear of contagion, whether political, economic, or military, has already driven shifts in diplomacy, migration pressures and security postures. The crisis has the potential to deepen emigration flows, strain host-state resources and heighten regional militarisation.   Beyond the Western Hemisphere, the attack reinforces concerns about great powers using force various spurious pretexts, including counterterrorism or transnational crime. If unchallenged, the precedent set in Venezuela will likely lower thresholds for intervention elsewhere, eroding the protective value of sovereignty as a principle.     7 CONCLUSION - A CALL FOR DELIBERATE INTERRUPTION   The experts in the Global South Perspectives Network concluded that the attack on Venezuela is more than a geopolitical flashpoint; it is a wake-up call. The international order is currently oscillating between inertia and escalation, and the path it follows will depend on whether political actors choose to invest in deliberate mechanisms of interruption and renewal or allow systemic violence to self-perpetuate.   The Global South finds itself at a crossroads: continue to navigate within the existing architecture, or contribute to shaping a more resilient, equitable and normatively grounded framework for global governance.         - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.   GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.   Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.   GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2026   by Yuxin Tang   Abstract   On December 1, 2024, South Africa became the first African country to assume the G20 presidency, establishing the theme of "Unity, Equality, and Sustainability". As the continent with the largest concentration of developing countries and the largest developing country, China and Africa share similar historical experiences, face common economic development tasks, and have extensive common economic interests in international affairs. In recent years, agriculture and food security have become one of the global focuses. Under the G20 framework, China-Africa agricultural cooperation is closely related to global issues, and the coordinated development of bilateral agricultural trade is of far-reaching significance for promoting cross-regional agricultural cooperation.   Keywords: Green channel for agricultural products, China-Africa trade, Agricultural cooperation, Food security 1. Introduction   Since Africa's decolonisation, China has carried out extensive agricultural investment to alleviate Africa's food security issues. Starting from the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China-Africa agriculture has been firmly committed to improving agricultural productivity. However, although agriculture is the pillar industry of Africa, it is mainly self-sufficient for personal consumption. Therefore, agricultural production mainly depends on natural resources, while biodiversity and the length of the growing season are affected by the quantity of cultivated land and water resources. Despite ongoing domestic and international debates on the efficiency of China's agricultural support to Africa, the model of China-Africa agricultural cooperation has demonstrated remarkable success.   From the establishment of FOCAC (2000s) to 2020, China has hosted various China-Africa summits to demonstrate its commitment to helping Africa address food security issues. The agricultural sector has proposed multiple strategies, including establishing agricultural demonstration centres aimed at enhancing agricultural productivity across the African continent. Official development assistance provided by the Chinese government to African countries has increased significantly (Siméon, Li & Sangmeng, 2022). China's advantages in agricultural experience have helped African countries improve agricultural productivity and meet their practical needs. Since 2001, the Chinese government has dispatched agricultural technical experts to more than 20 African regions, training agricultural farms to independently carry out agricultural development projects, which has been achieved through the establishment of Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres (ATDCs) in Africa (Ya & Pei, 2022).   Although China has remained Africa's largest trading partner for 16 consecutive years, issues such as unbalanced trade structure and large deficits in African countries remain prominent. Despite Africa's abundant and high-quality agricultural products—such as cocoa (world's No. 1 production), Nigerian peanuts (world's No. 2 production)(Ya & Pei, 2022), Côte d'Ivoire cashews (accounting for 20% of global output), and Ethiopia as the birthplace of coffee—most African agricultural products primarily flow to European and American markets. China's import volume is only $4.256 billion, long remaining in a "depressed" state with huge trade potential yet to be unleashed.   The Report on China-Africa Economic and Trade Relations 2023 released during the 2023 expo shows that in recent years, Africa's agricultural exports to China have grown at an average annual rate of 11.4%, making China the second-largest destination for African agricultural exports. With the deepening of cooperation, China continues to expand the "green channel" for African agricultural products to China, accelerating the quarantine and access procedures.   Establishing a "green channel" for African agricultural products under the new development pattern of "dual circulation" not only meets China's needs for consumption upgrading and enriches import sources but also optimises the import structure from Africa, increasing foreign exchange income and local employment in African countries. However, compared with Europe and the United States, China's imports of African agricultural products have long been in a "depressed" state, and the huge trade potential remains untapped. In the future, China and Africa should closely follow the artery of "dual circulation", tap the potential of "China-Africa economic and trade cooperation", and continue to expand imports of African agricultural products (Tang, 2022). 2. Literature Review   2.1 Current Situation: Coexistence of Policy-driven and Practical Achievements   2.1.1 Sustained Growth in Trade Scale, with China Becoming an Important Agricultural Market for Africa   China-Africa agricultural trade has shown a significant growth trend since the 21st century. Data analysis (Yang, 2019) found that from 2001 to 2017, China's agricultural imports from Africa grew at an average annual rate of 14.96%, reaching $2.01 billion in 2017, making Africa an important source of China's agricultural imports.   Notably, under the "green channel" policy, the export growth of African characteristic agricultural products to China has accelerated. For example, Kenyan fresh avocados achieved export to China within half a year after obtaining quarantine access in 2022, reflecting the efficiency of policy implementation. Tang (2022) mentioned that China's agricultural imports from Africa reached $4.256 billion in 2020, making it the second-largest export destination for African agricultural products, with sesame, cocoa and other products accounting for more than 40% of China's import market.   2.2 Gradual Improvement of Policy System: Tariff Reduction, Quarantine Facilitation and Platform Construction   China has implemented zero-tariff policies for agricultural products from the least developed countries in Africa since 2005. As of 2021, 98% of tariff items from 33 African countries have been granted zero-tariff treatment, significantly reducing the export costs of African agricultural products. Under the framework of FOCAC, China has clarified the expansion of imports of non-resource products, such as cotton and sugar, from Africa through the China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035.   The General Administration of Customs prioritises the quarantine and access procedures for African agricultural products through the "green channel", combining risk assessment processes to shorten the access cycle. For example, Tanzanian sesame and Ethiopian coffee achieved export to China through rapid assessment. Xie (2024) mentioned that China has built 24 agricultural technology demonstration centres in Africa, which indirectly promote the efficiency of quarantine access by improving local agricultural product quality through technology transfer. 2.3 Prospect: Potential Release and Path Optimisation   2.3.1 Growth Space Driven by Market Demand   Against the backdrop of China's consumption upgrading, the demand for African characteristic agricultural products (cocoa, coffee, and nuts) continues to rise. It is predicted that under the "dual circulation" pattern, China's imports of African agricultural products are expected to exceed $20 billion by 2030, especially the proportion of high-value-added processed products will increase. Chinese consumers have a growing preference for organic and original ecological agricultural products, leaving market gaps for African green tea, honey, and other products.   2.3.2 Technological Cooperation and Capacity Enhancement: From "Blood Transfusion" to "Haematopoiesis"   Agricultural Technology Transfer and Demonstration: China has promoted technologies such as hybrid rice and water-saving irrigation in Africa. For example, the hybrid rice cultivated by Yuan Longping's team in Madagascar has a yield 2-3 times that of local varieties, enhancing food supply capacity. Feng (2025) reported that China has built agricultural industrial parks in Africa, introducing agricultural machinery and processing technologies to promote the transformation of agricultural products from raw material export to deep processing.   Policy Coordination and Digital Empowerment: Utilise blockchain technology to achieve agricultural product traceability, simplify quarantine procedures; expand "single window" docking to realise real-time sharing of trade data (Yuan, 2022). Proposed learning from the experience of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to sign rapid customs clearance agreements for agricultural products with Africa, reducing institutional costs.   3. Analysis of the Current Situation and Characteristics of African Agricultural Products Exporting to China   In recent years, with the deepening of China-Africa cooperation, the export of African agricultural products to China has shown a unique development trend, demonstrating distinct characteristics in terms of trade scale, product structure, and trade channels.   3.1 Sustained Growth in Trade Scale and Huge Potential   China has maintained its position as Africa's largest trading partner for many consecutive years and is also the second-largest export destination for African agricultural products. Since the 2024 FOCAC Beijing Summit, the General Administration of Customs has actively promoted the expansion of quarantine access for African agricultural and food products. Thirty-one types of agricultural and food products from 19 African countries, including Tanzanian chili peppers and Zambian macadamia nuts, have obtained access to the Chinese market. According to customs statistics, the amount of agricultural and food products imported from Africa has achieved eight consecutive years of positive growth. In the first five months of 2025 alone, China's imports of agricultural and food products from Africa reached 15.83 billion yuan, among which imports of coffee, cocoa beans, and frozen strawberries increased by 145.7%, 88.6%, and 82% respectively. At the 2024 FOCAC Beijing Summit, China decided to grant zero-tariff treatment to 100% of tariff items for all least developed countries that have established diplomatic relations with China, including 33 African countries. This measure is expected to further unleash the potential of African agricultural products exporting to China and promote the continuous expansion of trade scale. After obtaining access to the Chinese market, Malagasy mutton entered the Chinese market for the first time this year, with a good market response and a growing import volume, which fully demonstrates the broad prospects of African agricultural products in the Chinese market.   3.2 Relatively Concentrated Product Structure but Gradually Enriched Categories   For a long time, the categories of agricultural products imported by China from Africa have been relatively concentrated. Taking oilseeds and fruits (HS12) as an example, sesame, as the largest agricultural product imported by China from Africa, occupies an important position. About 60% of the sesame consumed by Chinese consumers comes from Africa. Products of tobacco and tobacco substitutes (HS24), coffee, tea, mate and flavouring spices (HS08), etc., are also major import categories. However, in recent years, the categories of African agricultural products exported to China have been gradually enriched. A variety of characteristic agricultural products such as Malagasy mutton, Zimbabwean fresh avocados, Zambian soybeans, Mozambican pigeon peas and macadamia nuts have successively obtained access to the Chinese market. In 2025, during the 4th China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo, the General Administration of Customs signed five protocols on the access of agricultural and food products to China with the counterpart departments of four countries, including Ethiopia, Congo, Gambia and Malawi, opening the door for more African characteristic agricultural products to enter China. This not only enriches the choices of Chinese consumers but also broadens the export scope of African agricultural products.   3.3 Increasingly Diverse Trade Channels   In terms of traditional trade channels, large-scale exhibitions such as the China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo and the China International Import Expo provide important display platforms for African agricultural products. At the 3rd China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo, the on-site sales of permanent pavilions exceeded 2 million yuan, and 37 order projects such as purple tea, seafood, and mutton were signed, with an intended cooperation amount of 43.9 billion yuan. Emerging channels such as cross-border e-commerce are also booming, providing a new path for African agricultural products to enter the Chinese market. In May 2020, the Rwandan Ambassador to China endorsed his hometown specialties through live broadcasting, and 3,000 bags of Rwandan coffee were sold out in an instant. Nowadays, a large number of high-quality African characteristic agricultural products enter thousands of Chinese households through cross-border e-commerce platforms. Activities such as the African Goodies Online Shopping Festival further promote the sales of African agricultural products through e-commerce channels, expanding the sales scope and improving the sales efficiency.   4. Analysis of Barriers to African Agricultural Products Exporting to China   4.1 Supply Side: Weak Agricultural Production and Processing Capabilities, and Unstable Supply   4.1.1 Backward Agricultural Production Technology and Low Land Utilisation Rate   African agricultural production has long relied on traditional models, with seriously insufficient technological input. Zhang (2013) pointed out that Africa has 717 million hectares of arable land, but the actual cultivated area only accounts for 29.55%, and the utilisation rate of arable land in countries such as Zambia is less than 14%, with prominent land idleness. Through data analysis, Yang et al. (2019) found that the unit yield of grains in Africa is only 300-500 kg/ha, less than one fifth of that in the United States, and the low agricultural production efficiency leads to limited supply capacity of bulk agricultural products. Xie (2024) mentioned that there are only 8,476 agricultural science and technology practitioners in Africa, with less than 400 scientific research institutions, and 40% of the institutions have fewer than five researchers, so the weak scientific and technological innovation capability restricts the improvement of output.   4.1.2 Low Processing Conversion Rate of Agricultural Products, Mainly Exporting Primary Raw Materials   African agricultural product processing capabilities are weak, and most countries still export low-value-added raw materials. As the largest cashew producer in Africa, Côte d'Ivoire has a domestic processing conversion rate of less than 10%, mainly exporting unpeeled cashews; in the export structure of African agricultural products, primary products such as textile raw materials (such as cotton) and oilseeds (such as sesame) account for more than 60%, lacking deep processing and value-added links, which makes it difficult to meet the demand for processed products in the Chinese market.   4.2 Circulation Side: High Trade Barriers and Logistics Costs Hinder Market Access   4.2.1 Tariff and Non-tariff Barriers Restrict Import Scale   China's tariff policy on African agricultural products still has barriers. Although China has implemented zero tariffs on 98% of tariff items for 33 least-developed African countries, it still implements the most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff rate for the rest of African countries. For example, the MFN tariff rate for fresh or dried shelled cashews is 10%, and that for unshelled cashews reaches 20%, which is higher than that of ASEAN countries (0%). African agricultural products need to go through strict quarantine access procedures to enter China. For example, risk analysis is required for the first import of plant-derived foods, involving 425 products, and only 39 products from more than 30 African countries have obtained access, with a long access cycle and complex procedures.   4.2.2 Poor Logistics Channels and High Transportation Costs   The logistics infrastructure between China and Africa is weak, and the transportation cost is significantly higher than that of other regions. It is estimated that the transportation cost of African agricultural products accounts for 11.5% of the total import volume, while that of Asia and North America is 7.2% and 6.7% respectively, and the transportation cost of landlocked countries such as Malawi is even as high as 55%. There are few and low-frequency shipping routes between China and Africa, and the cold chain preservation facilities are insufficient, resulting in a loss rate of fresh agricultural products exceeding 30%. For example, Kenyan flowers are transported to China by air, and the logistics cost accounts for more than 40% of the selling price, which weakens the price competitiveness.   4.3 Demand Side: Insufficient Market Cognition and Brand Building, Limited Consumer Acceptance   4.3.1 Low Awareness of African Agricultural Products among Chinese Consumers   African agricultural products have weak brand influence and low consumer awareness in the Chinese market. The marketing of African agricultural products in China is mainly dominated by government-led exhibitions (the China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo), but lacks brand promotion for ordinary consumers, resulting in low penetration of high-quality products such as Kenyan coffee and Ethiopian flowers in the retail market. Although the order of African products reached 43.9 billion yuan at the 3rd China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo, most consumers still perceive African agricultural products as "primary raw materials" and have insufficient awareness of deep-processed products.   4.3.2 Single Branding and Marketing Channels   African agricultural products lack systematic brand building and rely on traditional trade channels. African countries have not yet formed geographical indication brands similar to "Colombian coffee" and "Thai jasmine rice", and their products have weak premium capabilities. The export of African agricultural products to China still mainly relies on bulk trade, and the proportion of emerging channels such as cross-border e-commerce is less than 10%, while the penetration rate of ASEAN agricultural products through e-commerce platforms has reached 30%. In contrast, the ability of African products to reach the retail end is obviously insufficient.   5. Prospect of African Agricultural Products Exporting to China: Policy Empowerment and Technological Collaboration Drive Trade Upgrading     5.1 Deepening of Policy Mechanisms and Expansion of Trade Facilitation, Releasing Institutional Dividends   Policy coordination under the FOCAC framework will become the core driving force for trade growth. Yuan (2022) pointed out in “Review and Outlook on China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation under the Framework of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum” that China has clarified the expansion of imports of non-resource products from Africa through the China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035, and will further implement the "green channel" policy in the future to accelerate quarantine access procedures. For example, in the "Agricultural Development and Livelihood Improvement Partnership Action" proposed at the 2024 FOCAC Beijing Summit, China promised to build 100,000 mu of agricultural standardisation demonstration zones and dispatch 500 agricultural experts. Such measures will directly improve the quality standards of African agricultural products and shorten the access cycle. Tang & Xiao (2022), in “The current situation and prospects of African agricultural products exported to China under the new development pattern of ‘dual circulation’”, suggest that China can sign free trade agreements on agricultural products with key African countries by referring to the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area model, expand the zero-tariff items from 98% to all agricultural products, and it is expected that Africa's agricultural exports to China will exceed $20 billion by 2030.   Sun et al. (2007) mentioned in “Structure and characteristics of China-Africa agricultural trade” that China-Africa agricultural trade has significant complementarity. Africa's tropical cash crops (like cocoa and coffee) form a trade complementarity with China's horticultural products, and policy dividends will further strengthen this trend. For example, China's zero-tariff policy for the least-developed countries in Africa has covered 4,762 commodities. In the future, if the scope of tariff items is further expanded, it will promote the annual growth of exports of advantageous agricultural products such as Benin cotton and Ethiopian sesame to China by more than 15%.   5.2 Technological Cooperation and Whole Industrial Chain Upgrading, Breaking through Supply-side and Circulation-side Bottlenecks   In-depth technological cooperation and integration of the whole industrial chain will become the key path to break through trade barriers. The technologies such as hybrid rice and high-efficiency peanut cultivation promoted by China in Africa have doubled local yields. For example, the yield of hybrid rice in Madagascar is 2-3 times that of local varieties, and such technologies can be extended to economic crops such as sesame and cotton. China has built 24 agricultural technology demonstration centres in Africa. In the future, relying on the "China-Africa Agricultural Science and Technology Innovation Alliance", technologies such as rice close planting and integrated pest management can be combined with local resources in Africa, and at the same time, the construction of agricultural product processing parks can be promoted, increasing the deep processing ratio of African cashews, cocoa, and other products from less than 10% to more than 30%.   Through the bibliometric analysis in Research Status and Trends of China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Based on CiteSpace, it is found that capacity building and industrial chain collaboration are the hotspots of future research. It is expected that China will train 5,000 technical personnel for Africa every year through the "Agricultural Vocational Education and Training Project" to fundamentally improve agricultural production efficiency. The "order agriculture" model promoted by Chinese enterprises in Africa (the cassava planting project in Uganda) has achieved a 40% increase in farmers' income. In the future, it can be further combined with cross-border e-commerce channels (the African Goodies Online Shopping Festival) to create a full chain of "planting-processing-selling".   6. Conclusion   Under the G20 framework, China-Africa agricultural product trade cooperation ushers in important development opportunities. As the first African country to hold the G20 presidency, South Africa provides a new opportunity for China-Africa agricultural cooperation. By implementing zero-tariff policies and accelerating quarantine access procedures, China continues to expand imports of African agricultural products and promotes the continuous growth of trade scale. At the same time, China-Africa agricultural technical cooperation has been continuously deepened. China has promoted advanced technologies such as hybrid rice and water-saving irrigation in Africa, helping Africa improve agricultural productivity and product quality and optimise the structure of agricultural products.   However, the export of African agricultural products to China still faces many challenges, such as weak agricultural production and processing capabilities, high trade barriers and logistics costs, and insufficient market awareness and brand building. In the future, China and Africa should continue to strengthen policy coordination and mechanism innovation, further improve the "green channel" policy, and promote trade facilitation. At the same time, taking technological cooperation as the core, it is necessary to promote the upgrading of the whole industrial chain and enhance the added value and market competitiveness of African agricultural products. Driven by the dual wheels of policy empowerment and technological collaboration, China-Africa agricultural product trade is expected to achieve a transformation from "scale expansion" to "quality upgrading", injecting new impetus into the deepening of the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between China and Africa, and providing useful reference for global agricultural cooperation and food security. References   Bai, S.J. 2023. China-Africa agricultural cooperation strikes a "concerto". International Business Daily .   Chen, X., Liu, B., Tawiah, V. & Zakari, A. 2024. Greening African economy: The role of Chinese investment and trade.  Sustainable Development , 32(1), 1001–1012.  https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.2713 .   Cui, C.X., Li, J.M. & Meng, X. 2013. Complementarity and influencing factors of China-Africa agricultural trade. Guangdong Agricultural Sciences , Volume 40, 232-236. https://doi.org/10.16768/j.issn.1004-874x.2013.24.056 .   Ding, L.L. 2024. Great potential for future China-Africa agricultural cooperation. Farmer's Daily.   Feng, Y.C. 2025. New momentum injected into China-Africa agricultural cooperation. Hunan Daily .   Liu, Y.M. 2024. Strengthening cleaning and disinfection, optimising detection requirements, and ensuring ASF control in slaughtering links. China Animal Health .   Qiao, M. 2024. Development status and effectiveness of China's aided agricultural technology demonstration centres in Africa. World Agriculture .   Shen, L. 2025. Classification and comparative study on scientific and technological innovation levels of G20 countries based on extended DEA.   Siméon, N., Li, X. & Sangmeng, X. 2022. China's agricultural assistance efficiency to Africa: Two decades of Forum for China-Africa Cooperation creation. Journal of Agriculture and Food Research , 9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jafr.2022.100329 .   Sun, D.S. et al. 2007. Structure and characteristics of China-Africa agricultural trade. Chinese Rural Economy .   Tang, B. & Xiao, H. 2022. The current situation and prospects of African agricultural products exported to China under the new development pattern of ‘dual circulation’. China Investment , 98-99.   Wang, R.X. & Li, Y. 2025. Research status and trends of China-Africa agricultural cooperation based on CiteSpace analysis. Foreign Trade , 01, 12-15.   Wei, W. 2024. China-Africa relations enter a new stage, agricultural cooperation strides forward. China Youth Daily .   Xi, J., Su, P.Y., Liu, Y.F. et al. 2023. Mutual complementarity of arable land use in the Sino-Africa trade: Evidence from the global supply chain. Land Use Policy , 128, 106588. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2023.106588.   Xie, D.S. 2024. Status and development suggestions of China-Africa agricultural cooperation. World Agriculture   Ya, Z. & Pei, K. 2022. Factors Influencing Agricultural Products Trade between China and Africa. Sustainability ,14(9), 5589, https://doi.org/10.3390/su14095589 .   Yang, J., Dong, W.L. & Cui, Q. 2019. Characteristics of changes in Sino-Africa agricultural trade and policy implication. Journal of Agro-Forestry Economics and Management , 18(3), 395-406. https://doi.org/10.16195/j.cnki.cn36-1328/f.2019.03.43 .   Yuan, X. 2022. Review and Outlook on China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation under the Framework of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum. International Economic Cooperation , 6, 43-51 & 87-88.   Zhang, X.Y., & Fan, L.B., 2013. Problems and strategic choices in developing China-Africa agricultural product trade. International Business Forum.   Zhong, C.Y. & Huang, J.Y. 2025. Global health issues of G20 and for China. Medicine and Society , 38(1), 1-7. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2026   by Xingcan Zhou   Abstract   Blue finance represents a cutting-edge financial paradigm proposed by the United Nations for marine resource development and the realisation of Sustainable Development Goals. Within the framework of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the UN and its relevant agencies have initially established a planning framework for blue finance to effectively promote the sustainable development and utilisation of marine resources. As a continent with a 26,000-kilometre coastline, Africa actively aligns itself with the UN’s SDGs, proactively seeks international cooperation, and innovatively employs blue financial instruments, constituting an important global attempt to explore broader pathways for food security and pursue marine ecological conservation. However, the institutional shortcomings of existing international financial cooperation mechanisms struggle to meet Africa’s blue finance development needs. From the perspective of sustainable development demands in the Global South countries, blue finance is intricately linked to the transformation of traditional finance, encompassing issues such as social financing in marine development investments, the investment structures of sovereign states, sovereign ownership of coastal states in global governance, and the distribution of marine rights and interests revenues. Thus, exploring new definitions and collaborative models for blue finance from the perspective of financial cooperation in the Global South constitutes a significant theoretical endeavour for global governance reform and the achievement of sustainable development goals.   Keywords:  Blue Finance, Africa, Sustainable Development, Marine Resources, Global Governance 1. Introduction   Blue finance is a cutting-edge financial paradigm proposed by the United Nations (the UN) for marine resource development and the realisation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The UN  2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (hereinafter referred to as the Agenda ) lists “protecting and sustainably using the oceans and marine resources for sustainable development” as one of its 14 goals, creating a favourable international policy environment for the rise and development of blue finance.   The UN and its relevant agencies have also issued a series of documents to initially establish a planning system for blue finance. However, the existing international financial system embodies a distinct post-WWII “core-periphery” power structure in international governance, with current blue finance standards predominantly formulated by developed countries—prioritising environmental-economic balance while ignoring core demands of the Global South countries, such as definitions of blue finance, attribution of marine sovereignty, and fair distribution of benefits. The Global South countries also lack effective voice in key issues like capital investment models and definition of sovereign rights and interests.   As a Global South representative with a 26,000-kilometre coastline, Africa’s blue finance practices represent not only a regional development issue but also a critical arena for testing the Agenda ’s inclusivity and observing contradictions in international rulemaking. Therefore, exploring new definitions of blue finance and collaborative research under the Agenda framework from the perspective of the Global South cooperation constitutes an important theoretical exploration for global governance reform and the achievement of sustainable development goals.   2. Planning Mechanisms of Blue Finance under the Agenda   Blue finance serves as an essential financial instrument for the development of the blue economy. Currently, the international community has yet to establish a unified definition of blue finance, and existing frameworks largely remain confined to traditional finance. The United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) defines “financing for the sustainable blue economy” as “financial activities (including investments, insurance, banking, and supporting intermediary activities) that participate in or support the development of a sustainable blue economy, particularly through the application of the Principles for Sustainable Blue Economy Finance  in financial decision-making and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) frameworks” (UNEP FI, 2021). Since the World Bank established the Blue Ribbon Panel in 2013, the UN and relevant agencies have successively issued policy initiatives and investment guidelines, initially constructing a planning system for blue finance. However, this system still reveals defects in top-down rule provision.   2.1 Clear Practice Principles and Broad Influence of Initiatives   The Principles for Sustainable Blue Economy Finance (hereinafter referred to as the Principles ) serve as the practical guidelines for blue finance and a critical basis for regulating the blue finance market. Jointly launched in 2018 by the European Commission, World Wide Fund for Nature, World Resources Institute, and European Investment Bank, the Principles are managed by the UNEP FI. As the world’s first principle framework guiding financial institutions to promote marine sustainable development, the Principles  provide comprehensive and systematic guidance for financial institutions’ investment, financing, and risk management activities in the blue economy, filling a gap in the development of blue finance and leading financial institutions to align their operations with marine sustainable development goals (Guo & Bi, 2022).   Currently, over 80 institutions worldwide have become signatories or members of the Principles (UNEP FI, 2023). To operationalise the Principles  and urge more countries and financial institutions to engage with blue finance, UNEP FI officially launched the Sustainable Blue Economy Finance Initiative (hereinafter referred to as the Initiative ) in 2019 based on the Principles. The Initiative brings together multi-stakeholder participants including financial institutions, scientists, enterprises, and civil society organisations, enhancing the financial sector’s and broader society’s attention to blue finance and driving innovation in blue finance-related standards, products, and services.   2.2 Clear Guidelines and Diverse Development Pathways   The guiding principles of blue finance build on those of green finance, clarifying and operationalising relevant standards through a series of guidelines. In 2022, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) issued the Blue Finance Guidelines , establishing the first global blue asset classification standards and a blue activity inventory. These translate general blue economy financing principles into specific reference criteria for blue bond issuance and blue loan disbursement, providing a foundation for global blue finance implementation.   In 2023, the IFC and multiple international organisations jointly developed the New Guidance on Blue Bonds to Help Unlock Finance for A Sustainable Ocean Economy , offering market participants clear standards, practices, and case examples for blue bond financing and issuance (UNEP FI, 2023). Blue finance development pathways advocated by the UN are closely anchored in relevant principle frameworks, balancing specificity and comprehensiveness. Reports such as Turning the Tide: How to Finance a Sustainable Ocean Recovery  and Diving Deep：Finance，Ocean Pollution and Coastal Resilience  propose sustainable pathways for key marine industries, focusing on sector-specific characteristics to enhance operational relevance.   2.3 Unequal Power Dynamics in Rulemaking   The UN does not treat the marine sovereignty of the Global South countries as a core governance issue but rather views their marine spaces solely as resource carriers and tools for achieving Agenda goals. This stems from at least three institutional contradictions. First, the UN’s current system perpetuates a power-dominated post-war order, leading to highly centralised blue finance rulemaking authority in international financial institutions led by developed countries. The Global South countries have long remained in a position of passive acceptance in key areas such as standard-setting and fund allocation. Second, there is an institutional imbalance in sovereignty and benefit distribution: the marine sovereignty of coastal states is often diluted within the framework of “global public goods”, while international financial governance rules fail to establish fair benefit-sharing mechanisms. The flow of proceeds from marine resource development is severely disconnected from resource-owning countries’ development needs, causing erosion of resource sovereignty and financial sovereignty.   Finally, governance mechanisms underrepresent the Global South voices: “top-down” rulemaking systematically sidelines their participation in governance and rights definition. These inclusivity gaps in the UN framework risk hindering sustainable development goals.   3. Status Quo and Traits of Africa’s Blue Finance under the Agenda   The Western-dominated blue finance financing mechanism essentially perpetuates a governance model where “the Global South countries implement, while developed nations control rules”. Although most projects rely on Western funding, African countries inject local priorities into project designs to seek institutional breakthroughs within the framework.   3.1 Policy Alignment with Agenda Goals   In recent years, Africa has promoted blue economy development through systematic policy frameworks, aligning its Agenda 2063 with the UN Agenda, with blue finance serving as a key financing tool. In 2014, the African Union (AU) launched the African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS 2050), emphasising joint development of marine resources, infrastructure, and ecological protection through financing. In 2015, the Agenda 2063  listed “developing a blue economy for sustainable growth” as a priority and positioned it as a frontier for African renewal. In 2016, the African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development  (Lomé Charter) formally integrated sustainable blue economy development into AU member states’ commitments, marking a major leap in regional cooperation (Zhang, 2021). In 2018, the AU established the Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment to coordinate strategy formulation.   The 2020 African Blue Economy Strategy—a cornerstone document—stressed innovative financing mechanisms for marine resource development, renewable energy, and conservation (African Union, 2016). Special initiatives like the 2021 Great Blue Wall  have advanced African-led climate action and marine protection (IUCN, N.d.). While lacking a standalone blue finance plan, Africa drives blue finance through long-term, coordinated blue economy policies. 3.2 International Cooperation for Agenda Implementation   Africa’s blue finance primarily relies on collaboration with international organisations, financial institutions, and other nations to advance Agenda implementation, with a consistent focus on sustainable development. The World Bank collaborates with members of the West Africa Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission, Indian Ocean Commission, as well as African Small Island Developing States and the Indian Ocean Rim Association, committing to increasing investments in sustainable fisheries and healthy oceans (World Bank, N.d.). In 2022, the World Bank launched the Blue Economy for Resilient Africa Program  ( BE4RAP ) to support Africa’s coastal regions in addressing development challenges through financing (World Bank Group, 2022). Leveraging resources like the multi-donor trust fund PROBLUE, the Bank provides financial support for African blue economy projects.   In July 2024, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the African Union Commission (AUC) established a joint initiative—the Blue Economy Reference Group (BERG)—to serve as a platform for planning, implementing, and monitoring blue economy development (UNDP, 2024). African countries have also actively participated in mangrove blue carbon pilot projects, which exemplify blue finance applications in climate governance and global governance. These projects demonstrate Africa’s capacity to engage in global governance through blue finance, serving as successful models for sustainable marine resource management.   3.3 Innovative Tools for Agenda  Objectives   Africa employs a series of innovative blue financial instruments aligned with the Agenda’s sustainable development goals. However, due to heavy reliance on funding from developed countries and international financial institutions, its innovations remain constrained. In other words, Africa must implicitly promote the localisation of governance rules through strategies such as goal substitution and tool adaptation within the Western-dominated institutional framework.   Among the three main financial instruments, blue bonds are the most representative. In 2018, Seychelles issued the world’s first blue bond, with transaction costs fully sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation (Qiu & Zhou, 2024). In January 2023, Cabo Verde launched its first blue bond on the Blu-X sustainable finance platform, achieving the first privately issued bond without public guarantee, fully supported by market demand (Christopher, 2023).   The second instrument, “debt-for-nature”, involves partial debt relief for creditor countries in exchange for ecological protection commitments, a common debt relief model in developing countries typically guaranteed by multilateral development banks (iWeekly, 2023). Several African countries, including Seychelles, Madagascar, Gabon, and Mozambique, have begun practicing or exploring this mechanism. In 2015, The Nature Conservancy facilitated a groundbreaking debt swap agreement between Seychelles and the Paris Club, integrating marine protection into debt restructuring frameworks (Wang & Wang, 2020). In August 2023, Gabon completed a $500 million debt-for-nature transaction, earmarking $163 million for marine conservation—the largest debt restructuring deal signed by an African country (Global Finance Magazine, 2023).   The third instrument, blue funds, are specialised funds investing in marine conservation and sustainable use projects. On March 9, 2017, ten African countries signed a memorandum of understanding to establish the "Blue Fund", now with 17 member states, aiming to promote green and blue economic development among participants (Fonds Bleu pour le Bassin du Congo, N.d.). Africa’s innovative practices with blue financial instruments provide valuable experiences for global blue finance development.   4. Potential and Challenges of Africa’s Blue Finance under the Agenda   Against the backdrop of lagging inland infrastructure, blue finance has the potential to enhance the competitiveness of related industries and accelerate Africa's industrialisation process. However, Western countries influence project designs through rule-setting, mandating that funds be allocated to ecological conservation rather than industrial upgrading. This has trapped Africa in a cycle of low-value-added industrial lock-in, making it difficult to break through into higher-value sectors.   4.1 Potential for Africa’s Blue Finance from Industrial Upgrading   Africa, as one of the regions with the greatest blue economic potential globally, sees its blue finance development opportunities closely tied to resource endowments, international cooperation, and sustainable development goals. Blue finance serves as a key driver for Africa’s economic growth, ecological conservation, and global value chain integration by supporting marine resource development, infrastructure optimisation, and international cooperation mechanism innovation.   First, Core Industries’ High Financing Demand. Africa’s blue economy core industries—including fisheries, port logistics, marine energy, and coastal tourism—have significant financing needs. Africa holds 20% of global fishery resources, and World Bank projections indicate that scaled aquaculture could solve food security for 200 million people and boost export earnings by 2030 (Yang, 2024). In marine energy and mineral development, coastal countries like those in the Gulf of Guinea and South Africa have vast offshore wind and oil/gas potential. Projects such as the Morocco-UK Power Project, Egypt’s Suez Wind Farm, and Gotion High-Tech’s first phase in Morocco demonstrate diverse institutional funding for offshore renewables, reducing fossil fuel dependence and contributing to climate action. Current financing needs for African offshore renewables focus on exploration technology, clean energy equipment, and ecological compensation mechanisms. Technological progress, policy support, and growing demand are expected to unlock further financing potential for Africa’s energy transition and economic growth.   Second, Strong Momentum for Infrastructure Optimisation. Africa’s blue finance development heavily relies on modern infrastructure, where gaps present both challenges and opportunities. A PricewaterhouseCoopers report estimates that a 25% improvement in port performance could raise GDP by 2% (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2018).   With most African countries dependent on raw material exports and imports of food, manufactures, and fuel, ports are critical to trade. Continental port throughput is projected to grow from 265 million tons in 2009 to over 2 billion tons by 2040 (NEPAD, 2012), driving upgrades for existing ports and new projects like Lamu Port and Badagry Port. Improved port efficiency will increase cargo volumes, toll revenues, and related services, generating returns for financial investments. Current infrastructure financing needs to focus on deep-sea port construction, smart logistics systems, and regional connectivity projects. Developing multimodal transport—integrating inland waterways, roads, and railways—will enhance inland connectivity, with blue finance investments set to appreciate as trade scales and transport/warehousing demands grow.   Third, Substantial Potential in International Cooperation Mechanisms. International financing and cooperation mechanisms serve as catalysts for Africa’s blue finance development, unlocking potential through multilateral platforms, financial instrument innovation, and policy coordination. International financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and African Development Bank have provided substantial funding and technical support for Africa’s blue economy projects, creating expanded opportunities for blue finance. For instance, the World Bank supports African countries in sustainable fisheries, marine conservation, and port development through loans, grants, and technical assistance. A series of international maritime conventions and initiatives also provide guidance and norms for Africa’s blue finance development. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) clarifies states’ rights and obligations in marine resource development, utilisation, and protection, offering legal foundations and safeguards for African nations to exploit marine resources. Under its framework, African countries can more explicitly plan blue economy development and attract international funding for projects compliant with legal norms.   4.2 Challenges to Africa’s Blue Finance from International Financial Rules   Africa’s blue finance market remains underdeveloped, facing a massive funding gap. On the surface, this stems from issues such as lack of macro guidance, investment risks from maritime disputes, and prominent structural contradictions in blue industries. At a deeper level, it originates from Africa’s marginalisation in international financial rulemaking, imbalanced power distribution in global ocean governance, and the absence of institutional guidance for industrial chain upgrading under the UN framework—multiple factors that collectively hinder blue finance from fully realising its potential.   First, the fragmentation of Africa’s blue finance strategies is essentially a result of the lack of voice for the Global South countries in international financial rulemaking. Current blue finance standards are predominantly shaped by Western institutions, whose environment-first regulatory orientation conflicts with African countries’ dual needs for “resource sovereignty and development”. This mismatch results in a lack of macro-coordination, planning, and robust governance frameworks for Africa’s blue finance development. While the AU and countries like Mauritius and Seychelles have introduced blue economy policy frameworks, specific blue finance strategies remain absent, leading to vague priorities and disjointed financial support measures. Additionally, policy implementation gaps in some African nations weaken the coherence and effectiveness of macroeconomic policies, impacting the pace and direction of financial sector development.   Second, the exacerbation of investment risks due to maritime disputes in Africa essentially reflects an imbalance in the allocation of ocean governance power. Disputes over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and marine mineral resource boundaries—though seemingly about territorial claims—reflect deeper inequities in global ocean governance. Despite UNCLOS provisions on maritime boundaries, conflicts persist over resource extraction, undermining African states’ maritime governance capacities and deterring blue finance investments due to heightened risks. Piracy and armed robbery further exacerbate vulnerabilities, highlighting how Western-dominated rules fail to safeguard the Global South countries’ maritime sovereignty and resource rights, making Africa a focal point for generational governance conflicts.   Third, while Western financing alleviates funding shortages, blue finance projects disproportionately focus on ecological conservation, neglecting Africa’s urgent need for industrial chain upgrading. Traditional marine industries remain in an extensive development phase, plagued by low technological capacity and underdeveloped emerging sectors. Incomplete industrial chains—lacking synergies between traditional and new industries—hinder competitiveness and limit the ecological and economic impact of blue finance projects. This highlights a critical gap: the UN framework’s lack of institutional guidance for systematic industrial upgrading.   5. Reflections and Insights on Africa’s Blue Finance under the Agenda   Africa‘s blue finance practices within the Agenda framework highlight the institutional contradictions and innovative possibilities in global ocean governance. As a key to addressing the imbalance between rights and responsibilities in traditional governance systems, blue finance urgently requires redefinition around equitable governance rules. The Global South cooperation, by integrating the diverse demands of countries in the Global South, not only provides a pathway for unlocking the effectiveness of blue finance but also serves as a pivotal lever for reforming the global ocean governance system toward inclusivity and sustainability.   5.1 Blue Finance Requires Redefinition Around Governance Rules   The Agenda provides a macro-guidance framework for global sustainable development, yet existing institutional arrangements have not fundamentally resolved the deep-seated dilemmas in the field of blue finance. Against this backdrop, this paper aligns with the UN’s blue finance objectives, arguing that the core challenge lies in constructing effective implementation pathways, which necessitate the guiding role of new financial rules.   Blue finance can be defined as a strategic financial model that prioritises addressing basic livelihood issues through targeted capital investment, drives the development of the full marine industrial chain, and focuses on the real economy. Its implementation pathways include optimising real capital allocation, promoting marine industrial upgrading, and restructuring global governance systems. In other words, it involves constructing a development framework of “protein supply structuring—marine resource capitalisation—governance system equalisation”, forming a blue economic value chain through deep integration of capital and the real economy to achieve systematic breakthroughs from basic livelihood security to full industrial chain upgrading. This innovative model not only helps overcome the externality constraints of traditional marine development but also, by restructuring marine governance, establishes a new balance mechanism between sovereign states’ interests and global public welfare, driving a fundamental shift in the international community’s understanding of the strategic value of marine space. While blue finance under the UN framework emphasises balancing environmental and economic objectives, it overlooks the contradictions between institutions and rights in marine development. This paper advocates that blue finance should prioritise both livelihood issues and strategic industries, paralleling real economy construction with global governance innovation. Specifically:   (1) Problem Targeting: In response to the rigid growth in protein demand driven by global population growth and dietary upgrades, blue finance focuses on marine biological resource development to stimulate supporting industrial demand through enhanced protein supply capacity.   (2) Industrial Gradience: Blue finance advances marine real economy layout in phases, starting with biological resource development and gradually expanding to equipment manufacturing and high-end industries, comprehensively driving the development of the blue economy’s full industrial chain.   (3) Sustainability: By channeling funds toward ocean-friendly projects, blue finance protects biodiversity and enhances carbon sink capacity while investing in emerging industries to strengthen economic resilience and attract private capital. It also improves coastal livelihoods, creates jobs, and establishes fair marine resource revenue distribution mechanisms.   (4) Unique Risks: Blue finance must address natural risks like sea-level rise, ocean acidification, and extreme weather that damage marine infrastructure. Additionally, the lack of sufficient sovereign actors in blue economy development introduces investment uncertainties from high costs and long return cycles.   Thus, this paper identifies global ocean governance reform as a core dimension, emphasising the need to break through entrenched international power structures via financial tool innovation and reconstruct the Global South countries’ subject status in marine governance.   5.2 Blue Finance as a Catalyst for Global Ocean Governance Reform   The development of Africa’s blue finance, in essence, represents an institutional exploration by the Global South countries to reconstruct existing marine development rules within the Agenda  framework. This exploration is not merely about Africa’s sustainable development but is also a crucial practice for the Global South countries to secure a voice in international governance.   The particularity of marine resource development, characterised by massive capital and specialised technology needs, is not the primary barrier. From an international political science perspective, the misalignment between the long-standing, Western-dominated international relations and limited global governance systems, which still govern international cooperation, and marine development goals poses a significant challenge for many African countries. In other words, the core contradiction in marine resource development is institutional rather than factor based. Current international power distribution and rule design fail to fully address developing countries’ demands for maritime sovereignty integrity and fair marine resource revenue distribution.   From a globalisation standpoint, marine resource development has transcended the capacity of individual sovereign states, evolving into a systemic project that requires cross-regional flows of capital, technology, and institutions. As globalisation advances from commodity trade to deeper factor allocation and institutional rulemaking, blue finance’s strategic value goes beyond traditional industrial financing. It acts as an institutional bridge linking the physical needs of marine development with global capital allocation and a key hub for restructuring the global ocean governance system and order. Its core function is to drive governance rule changes through financial tool innovation, including establishing ecosystem-based development standards, improving market-based benefit distribution mechanisms, and constructing international cooperation frameworks for risk sharing.   Thus, only by strengthening ocean governance—especially in countries with incomplete decolonisation—and creating an open, cooperative, and win-win investment environment for marine development can more national, social, and industrial capital be drawn into the blue economy. This implies that the scale, progress, and scope of blue finance will hinge on global ocean governance reform under the UN framework. Only by breaking the historically entrenched power structures at the governance system level can the development potential of the blue economy be truly unleashed. This will enable sustainable marine resource development and sharing, promote higher-level global ocean governance, enhance human well-being, and foster a maritime community of shared future.   5.3 Blue Finance Breakthroughs Through Global South Cooperation   The development of Africa’s blue finance highlights that the successful implementation of the UN Agenda depends on the institutional involvement of the Global South countries, and their rule systems should be jointly formulated by these nations. In fact, collaborative cooperation among the Global South countries is crucial to releasing the potential of blue finance. The Global South cooperation has a systemic breakthrough value in realising the effectiveness of blue finance, and its core roles are as follows:   First, it is the core path to break the institutional bottlenecks in blue finance development. In the traditional North-South cooperation framework, the rule-providing model has long been dominated by developed countries. Even in the South-South cooperation mechanism, the Global South countries are often only regarded as “implementers of the Agenda ” rather than equal participants in rulemaking. This has made blue finance in regions like Africa turn into a tool for solely bearing environmental responsibilities, and it has always been unable to touch the core of governance. However, the Global South cooperation, by systematically integrating the diverse demands of various countries, forms a force that challenges the existing “centre-periphery” power structure. This “bottom-up” collaborative model is expected to fundamentally change the power pattern of rulemaking.   Second, it is an ideological innovation to reshape the value dimension of blue finance. Although the current blue finance framework of the UN takes the balance between the environment and the economy as its core, practice shows that the institutional design without equal governance rights will inevitably lead to the Global South countries being forced to transfer their rights and interests in practice. The Global South cooperation needs to promote blue finance to transform towards “inclusive governance” and “equal governance”, and incorporate the coastal sovereignty and marine resource sovereignty of the Global South countries such as African countries, along with global ecological goals, into the institutional design. This innovation is not a partial repair of the existing system, but a fundamental reconstruction of the evaluation framework of blue finance from the bottom of values. It promotes blue finance to fundamentally change from “an ecological tool of developed countries” to “a development carrier of the Global South”. This process is to break through the traditional global governance model on the basis of adjusting rules and build a new financial governance paradigm that takes into account both ecological sustainability and development fairness.   Third, it is a practical path to build a multi-stakeholder governance system for blue finance. The globalisation of production and distribution, the accelerated circulation of resources and information, and the new technological revolution are profoundly changing the global development pattern and reshaping international relations. These changes bring opportunities as well as a series of new global challenges, which urgently need more inclusive governance solutions. In this context, around new problems, strengthening South-South cooperation and shaping new North-South relations still require more institutional designs and brand-new ideological changes (Yang, 2023). Modern history shows that no single country has the ability and willingness to solve global problems independently. This means that all global problems faced by humanity must be addressed through global actions, responses, and cooperation, which should become a consensus of the international community (Yang, 2023).   6. Conclusion   The practice of Africa’s blue finance within the Agenda framework reveals deep-seated contradictions in power distribution and responsibility-sharing within the global ocean governance system, while also demonstrating the potential for the Global South countries to break through institutional constraints via financial tool innovation. This study argues that unlocking the effectiveness of blue finance relies not only on cross-regional flows of capital and technology but also on reconstructing global governance rules centred on equity. This represents both a key to resolving Africa’s marine resource development dilemmas and a critical pathway for advancing the Global South participation in international rulemaking.   From a practical perspective, Africa has preliminarily established a blue finance development model aligned with the Agenda  through three pathways: international cooperation, tool innovation, and industrial upgrading. Financial support from international financial institutions like the World Bank, innovative instruments such as Seychelles’ blue bonds, and the advancement of port infrastructure and renewable energy projects all validate the synergistic potential between financial tools and sustainable development goals. However, the Western-dominated rule system has trapped Africa’s blue finance in a dilemma of “ecological conservation prioritising over industrial upgrading”, exposing the structural neglect of developing countries’ needs in global governance mechanisms.   Theoretically, this study transcends the traditional blue finance framework focused on environmental-economic balance, proposing a trinity analytical paradigm integrating “livelihood security—industrial upgrading—governance equality”. It finds that the Global South cooperation is the core pathway to overcoming institutional bottlenecks: forming a “bottom-up” rule-change dynamic by integrating diverse demands can not only transform blue finance from a “developed-world ecological tool” to a “Global South development carrier” but also reconstruct a new balance mechanism between sovereign rights and global public good provision in ocean governance.   Currently, Africa’s blue finance exhibits development trends such as climate finance integration, expanded fintech applications, and private investment attraction, profoundly reflecting its strategic adaptation and innovative exploration in regional and global sustainable development. Therefore, redefining blue finance through an African lens not only accelerates Africa’s modernisation but also injects momentum into building a maritime community of shared future. Going forward, the Global South is poised to use blue finance as a breakthrough to advance global governance reform and collectively construct a human community with a shared future. References   African Union. 2016. African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter).  [Online] Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37286-treaty-african_charter_on_maritime_security.pdf [accessed: 20 April 2025].   Christopher, M. L. 2023. Cabo Verde Hoists the Blue Flag . [Online] Available at: https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/news-centre/news/2023/01/cabo-verde-hoists-the-blue-flag.html [accessed: 20 April 2025].   Fonds Bleu pour le Bassin du Congo. N.d. Accueil - Fonds Bleu pour le Bassin du Congo. [Online] Available at: https://www.lefondsbleu.africa/fr/ [accessed: 20 April 2025].   Global Finance Magazine. 2023. First ‘Debt-For-Nature’ Swap Complete In Gabon . [Online] Available at: https://gfmag.com/sustainable-finance/first-debt-for-nature-swap-complete-in-gabon/ [accessed: 20 April 2025].   Guo, P. Y. & Bi, L. S. 2022. Review of the Sustainable Blue Economy Finance Principles. China Finance , 23, 51–52.   IUCN. N.d. The Great Blue Wall Initiative . [Online] Available at: https://iucn.org/resources/brochure/great-blue-wall-initiative [accessed: 20 April 2025].   iWeekly. 2023. Gabon Issues Blue Bond, Triggering a Wave of Debt-for-Nature in Developing Countries . [Online] Available at: https://www.163.com/dy/article/ICEEU91U0512830U.html [accessed: 20 April 2025].   NEPAD. 2012. Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/PIDA/PIDA%20Executive%20Summary%20-%20English_re.pdf [accessed: 20 April 2025].   PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2018. Strengthening Africa’s Gateway to Trade . [Online] Available at: https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/PwC-Strenthening-Africas-gateways-to-trade-2018_04.pdf [accessed: 20 April 2025].   Qiu, C. G. & Zhou, Y. 2024. Catalysis and Mainstreaming of Blue Bonds: Analysis of Capital Forms and Financial Players. Sustainable Development Economics Guide , 4, 26–31.   UNDP. 2024. Blue Futures: Integrating Blue Economy Trade into Development for African SIDS and Coastal Nations . [Online] Available at: https://www.undp.org/geneva/events/blue-futures-integrating-blue-economy-trade-development-african-sids-and-coastal-nations [accessed: 20 April 2025].   UNEP FI. 2021. Turning the Tide: How to Finance a Sustainable Ocean Recovery . [Online] Available at: https://www.unepfi.org/publications/turning-the-tide/ [accessed: 20 April 2025].   UNEP FI. 2023. Sustainable Blue Economy Finance Initiative Members . [Online] Available at: https://www.unepfi.org/blue-finance/our-members/ [accessed: 20 April 2025].   UNEP FI. 2023. New guidance on blue bonds to help unlock finance for a sustainable ocean economy . [Online] Available at: https://www.unepfi.org/themes/ecosystems/new-guidance-on-blue-bonds-to-help-unlock-finance-for-a-sustainable-ocean-economy/ [accessed: 20 April 2025].   Wang, Y. L. & Wang, Z. Y. 2020. Case Study on Blue Finance: The Republic of Seychelles’ Innovative Use of Debt-for-Nature Swap to Advance Marine Protection . Central University of Finance and Economics Green Finance International Research Institute. [Online] Available at: https://iigf.cufe.edu.cn/info/1012/1460.htm [accessed: 20 April 2025].   World Bank. N.d. Fostering Climate-Smart Ocean Economies in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/969901469570263481-0010022016/original/Chapter06Africaclimatebusinessplan.pdf [accessed: 20 April 2025].     World Bank Group. 2022. Blue Economy for Resilient Africa Program (BE4RAP). [Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/environment/brief/blue-economy-for-resilient-africa-program#1 [accessed: 20 April 2025].   Yang, B. R. 2023. New Features Emerged in International Relations From the “Global South”. Frontiers , 23, 60–69.   Yang, H. Q. 2024. Blue Economy Becomes a New Bright Spot in China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation. Economic Daily , 4.   Zhang, C. Y. 2021. Blue Economy Empowers the High-Quality Development of China-Africa “The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”: Internal Mechanism and Practical Path. West Asia and Africa , 1, 37–69. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2026 Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026.   by Tebogo Keitheile   Abstract   This article seeks to explore data privacy and data protection rights and obligations through the lens of social contracts, human rights and ethics, whether through commercial endeavours or public service provision. While not a new human asset, digital data is at the centre of sustainable development as it allows accurate statistical oversight when setting developmental goals, monitoring progress or assessing their impact after the fact; accordingly, data availability is an important joint goal that benefits humans, corporations and governments alike. Through viewing data protection through the lens of Ubuntu, and similar social contract lenses, in light of the slow pace of regulation across jurisdictions, data protection can be given a human-centric approach, notwithstanding the word of the law, thus mitigating inefficiencies and limiting risks to data subjects, controllers and the broader data ecosystem as a whole.   Keywords:  Data privacy, Data protection, Social contract, Human rights, Ubuntu ethics, Digital governance, Big Data, Consent and choice, Artificial intelligence, Fiduciary duty Introduction   “The social contract emerges from the interaction between a) expectations that a given society has of a given state; b) state capacity to provide services, including security, and to secure revenue from its population and territory to provide these services (in part a function of economic resources); and c) élite will to direct state resources and capacity to fulfil social expectations. It is crucially mediated by d) the existence of political processes through which the bargain between state and society is struck, reinforced and institutionalised. Finally, e) legitimacy plays a complex additional role in shaping expectations and facilitating political processes. Legitimacy is also produced and replenished, or, conversely, eroded by the interaction among the other four factors ... Taken together, the interaction among these factors forms a dynamic agreement between state and society on their mutual roles and responsibilities – a social contract” (OECD, 2008). When the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulations (General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679) (GDPR) came into effect in 2018, African regional bodies had already recognised the growing imperative to enact standards in their member countries, protecting personal data, due to the growing reliance on the computer and the internet. These were demonstrated by the 2010 ECOWAS Act (Supplementary Act A/SA. 1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection) governing the west African region, SADC’s 2013 Modern Law on Data Protection governing sub-Saharan countries, and the African Union’s 2014 Convention on Cyber Security. In terms of benchmarking, however, the EU instrument served as a reference point allowing implementation of complimentary standards to the many considered the gold standard in data protection laws. Spurred in part by the extraterritoriality of claims under GDPR, the sizeable penalties and the limitations it put on data transfers to less compliant jurisdictions, recent years have seen the regulatory instrument inspire similar data protection progress across the continents, with countries seeking to ensure continuity of data transfers, and resultantly, ensure secure commercial, governmental, personal, and other internet access to markets that would otherwise potentially be increasingly restricted by regulatory disparities.   The COVID pandemic is often identified as an unofficial marker (particularly in less developed economies) for when digital data truly moved from being a mere fact of life, to a true societal, economic commodity, due in large part to the increase in internet reliance during the global shutdown, thus motivating a greater reliance on internet-driven services out of necessity. Through pushing communications and media to largely internet-based spaces (web-based meetings, greater reliance on social media, the explosion of the online marketplace, reliance on health tracking data for pandemic response, etc.), the global shutdown catapulted reliance on internet interactions and with that, the use of personal data by corporations and governments alike for their various objectives. As a result, between 2019 and 2021, internet use in Africa increased by 23% whereas in the Asia-Pacific region it increased by 24%, increasing by 20% in the least developed countries. Globally the figure rose from 54% internet connectivity to 63% of the world’s population having access to the internet, this left 2.9 billion people who remained unconnected to the internet as at 2021, of which 96% live in developing countries (ITU, 2021). By 2024, 68%, or 5.5 billion, of the global population was online, with the correlation between internet access and economic development still stark, 93% of high-income nations were online, compared to just 27% internet penetration in the low-income nations, again concentrated in Africa and Asia (with Africa having the lowest internet access rate at 27%) (ITU, 2021).   Figure 1:  Percentage of individuals using the Internet by region, 2019 and 2024 (ITU, 2021)   As increased internet access becomes the norm, it is also  increasingly a corporate and national policy objective as well as a distinct objective set by regional intergovernmental organisations such as the AU, UN and their sub-regional organisations, as well as regional regulators, for various reasons. Due, however, to the many risks posed by increased digital presences, and the limited binding regulations implemented to date, particularly in Africa, exploring the social contract underpinning the relationship between data subjects and the various entities to which they share their data, including the means and reasons they do so, is more and more urgent in order to determine the appropriate ways in which data privacy and protection approaches and governance models can be viewed in order to ensure greater protection of personal data rights. It is through this assessment that questions such as to whom the data created through human interaction with the internet ultimately belongs, the parameters of its continued use, extrapolation, referencing whether in serving the data subject or in pursuit of the broader national interests or economic objective, and where it all ends, become increasingly critical.   As human beings increasingly interact with one another, their governments, corporations and other entities through digital means, we create greater and more complex digital identities, directly. To these direct digital disclosures and connections are added the data shared indirectly through the increasingly ever constant data collection spurred by the Internet of Things (IoT) and pervasive presence of internet digital reliance, such as information about our preferences, habits, and other purely digital iterations of our beings such as data from our cell phones, cars, TVs, health watches, to CCTV (including Safe City initiatives) and unauthorised recordings from other internet users through social media videos, to data leaks and breaches,  and more and more commonly, data from previously non-digital ordinary household appliances such as fridges, toasters, washing machines as well as personal data shared between data collecting organisations.   In this data-driven bartering system where data subjects trade their data in exchange for access to digital solutions, is the mutual understanding that data controllers will not only at minimum handle the data with the requisite care but will further guard it from unauthorised access by ensuring appropriate security measures are in place. It is from this broad mutual understanding between data subjects and the entities that collect and derive value from their personal data that the data privacy principles will be upheld – that data collected will be limited to what is collected lawfully, fairly or consensually, data quality will be relevant to the collection objective and accurate as much as possible, both parties are clear on why the data collection is being collected, continued confidentiality or limited use of the data unless required by law or a greater good, prevention of unauthorised access through appropriate security safeguards, openness and transparency between the parties, individual participation allowing the data subject to continue to have some control over their personal data, and that both parties remain accountable for their obligations to one another regarding the personal data (OECD, 2002).   The value of data to corporations and governments alike has increased exponentially in the last two decades, transforming data collection from direct means to ever expanding sharing means, such as data brokerage and the creation of data sharing ecosystems. Per McKinsey & Company, data creates tangible, real-world commercial value for organisations, with 40% more revenue generated from personalised services and over $1 trillion in additional value in top quartile performance (McKinsey, 2021). From a public authority perspective, personal data functions in supporting governments in delivering its agreed policies and services to its citizens, as well as helping them attain data-driven goals such as e-governments and smart cities (Löfgren & Webster, 2020). From a civil society perspective, access to data supports transparency, allowing oversight over national statistics, allowing independent means to measure real-world issues affecting the citizenry such as government policy implementation, whether on service delivery or other human rights obligations (World Bank, 2021).   Data Privacy as a Human Right   While like other mammals, humans are a social species, we still need privacy. Alan Westin points out that in our daily endeavours, we seek out both privacy and community, seeking out company from others while at times setting limitations on proximity through boundaries, creating family, friendship, or other community sub-units that exclude other community members in some respect self-identifying with these various groups, while at the same time distinguishing oneself and others from them in some way (Westin, 1967), highlighting that from the time of primitive societies, communing with the spirits or gods, required one to be alone from [perception by] fellow humans. Westin further highlights the human need, in more modern democratic societies, for privacy as groups away from governmental perception, allowing not only open and unhindered exchange of ideas and association, including on topics that deviate from dominant opinion, demonstrated through privacy of voting, protection from unlawful intrusions on one’s privacy even by state organs such as the police.   The overall right to privacy gained one of its earlier forms of legal recognition through Article 12 of the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948) before, owing to the need to speak to the growing digitisation of human lives and experiences, and with them their data, coupled with the increasing reliance on computing and the risk that interruptions in these data flows had on the global economy in light of the then disparity of the legislation on the topic globally, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1980 devised its Recommendation on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, which was further updated in 2013 (OECD, 1980; 2013). The organisation noted the futility of regulating data privacy at a purely national level given the rate at which data was transferred between nations as a function of the increased interconnectedness brought by the internet.   From an African perspective, while some scholars have argued that the concept of “Ubuntu” (or “Botho” in Setswana) excludes a personal right to privacy, the argument falters when one considers that Ubuntu as a function of mutual respect and empathy cannot reject duty of confidence that one owes to ones chosen sub-community groups, much in the same way as highlighted above by Westin, as a material feature. Accordingly, Ubuntu, including within more formal settings, is itself a social contract creating a variety of obligations amongst the members of the community, directly between the human individuals on either end and thus appropriately underpinning such wider subjects as business ethics and human rights (whether as a function of trust or mutual obligation) in communities for whom it is central. It is thus unfortunate that the 1981 African Charter on Human Rights did not specifically mention privacy as a distinct right in its final draft, leaving some debate rife on the subject. Notwithstanding this, even prior to the advent of modern data privacy laws, at least 25 African countries [1]  contained the right to privacy within their constitutions, limited, when so done, primarily for national security reasons and always under the standard of reasonableness and proportionality (Mavedzenge, 2020 ).   Since these foundational moments in the  international legal recognition of personal data privacy, more variables continue to add complexity through advancements in algorithms, machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT) and social network systems (Sutherland, 2021) as more and more of our lives continue to require the internet (ITU, 2021), and correspondingly, more and more of our personal data enters and becomes essential to the functioning of the broader digital ecosystem. In its 2015 general assembly sitting, the United Nations noted the need for data in gauging implementation success and ultimately evaluating real-life outcomes of the goals set through the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) stating:   “Quality, accessible, timely and reliable disaggregates data will be needed to help with the measurement of progress (SGDs) and to ensure that no one is left behind. Such data is key to decision-making. UN member states committed to, amongst others ...”   Big Data, which has many definitions, can be characterised as everything from “call logs, mobile-banking transactions, online user-generated content such as blog posts and Tweets, online searches, satellite images, etc.” to GPS locations, social media post interactions, purchase history and many other forms of information about ourselves that we share consciously and unconsciously and leave a trail of while engaging (directly or indirectly) with a device or service that requires the internet (UN Global Pulse, 2012). Considering the age of the internet, number of users, type and amount of data collected, etc., at any given moment, Big Data is resultantly so large, variable and performing (evolving) with such speed that it cannot be processed by ordinary data processing tools, hence BIG  data. Commercially, Big Data is credited with helping corporations with more accurate and precise decision-making, providing better and more detailed insights about internet users, providing more and more acutely personalised customer experiences, whereas from a public service provision perspective, Big Data can support policymaking, developmental target creation and monitoring, accurate statistical collection and interpretation (UNDP, 2017). From a development perspective, the UN states that Big Data can support nations to achieve their development goals in a myriad of ways, including efficient traffic control using GPS data, spending data used to determine poverty levels and habits, tracking deforestation by combining satellite imagery and crown sourced data, disaster management through social media monitoring (UN Global Pulse, 2012).   In addition to the role it plays in attaining sustainable developmental goals, internet access as a whole has a direct impact on economic growth in developing and least-developed countries due to increased access not only to information (locally and internationally) but also to potential export markets and innovative technologies. Advancements in internet access thus benefits citizens through improved financial inclusion (greater access to alternative financial systems such as mobile money or internet-enabled financial solutions); improved social services through functional, efficient and reliable e-government solutions and digitised civil society access; improved healthcare administration (whether public or private providers) through data availability for early warnings, education, e-health solutions and in education through distance and online education availability; access to scholarships; general access to information by the broader population; in agriculture, internet connectivity supports critical processes such as supply chain management, price transparency and climate data (Guerriero, 2015).   Various studies conducted in Sub-Saharan African countries have demonstrated a positive correlation between basic internet connectivity and a reduction in poverty, and ultimately, an improvement in economic grown as a result of growth in improved market access, including e-commerce (Jonas Hjort, 2025). The World Bank highlighted that while data (particularly Big Data) is an essential enabler for not only achieving the UN’s SDGs but for economic growth as a whole, developing countries continued to be plagued by delays in general access to the internet and limited opportunities to not only submit their data but to benefit from their data, due to obstacles such as limited infrastructure (World Bank, 2021).   To bridge this infrastructure deficit, the African Union (AU) and African Development Bank (AfDB) highlight digital transformation of the continent as a major priority underpinning the objective of propelling African industrialisation (AU, 2020), devising a continent-wide Digital Transformation Strategy for 2020 to 2030 (AU-DTS) and Digital Transformation Action Plan for 2024 to 2028 (AfDB-DTAP), respectively. The AfDB-DTAP aims to contribute to the international digital economy and thus support the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), premised on the overall pillars of improved digital infrastructure to bridge the digital gap, by investing in digital entrepreneurs and innovation (creating end-to-end tech ecosystems in African countries), integration of digital and other emerging technologies into various sectors including government, agriculture, education, commerce and sustainable energy, (AfDB, 2024) as well as creating an enabling environment for policy and regulatory advancements in line with the ultimate objectives (AU, 2020).   Over and above its pivotal role in economic development, commerce and communication, access to the internet plays an increasingly essential role in maintaining democratic institutions, by virtue of its function as one of the increasingly central means for citizens to exercise their right to freedom of expression. As an extension, however, of the ultimate objective of a more data-driven future in which universal access to the internet is achieved, the transition from in-person, pen and paper, analogue economies and personal lives, lived primarily outside the digital universe, to the modern age of digital ubiquity and IoT permanence, data subjects who wish to maintain relatively whole and efficient lives outside the digital universe find themselves with fewer and fewer alternatives, as analogue and manual service provision is continually neglected and phased out by corporations and governments alike. Through an extension of the right to opt out or be forgotten, corporations and governments alike have an obligation to allow alternative service provision outside of digital and internet connected means, allowing space for a right to use (or limit one’s presence on) the internet. By having a right to be forgotten, data subjects likewise have a right to not be known digitally at all, where possible, and to whatever extent is reasonable, opt out of a digital presence without compromising their overall quality of life (Terzis, 2025); this right can only be exercised where access (to the economy, to other communication, to essential services or to the world as a whole) is not contingent on waiving other rights.   Currently, with the limitation of physical processes and of non-digital solutions, anyone choosing to live outside the digital realm, for whatever reason they choose, finds themselves likewise forgoing a degree of access (Kloza, 2021). Accordingly, it can be reasonably argued that by limiting life outside of digital solutions, the right to be forgotten or opt out is compromised; as a result, the right not to analogue alternatives, is not only functionally necessary to data privacy, but is further critical in guarding against digital discrimination, where opting out means losing out. The result of this need, as well as the growing risk that the unavailability of alternative non-digital spaces consolidates all the functions that are carried through the internet to one potential failure point, is that it creates an obligation by governments to ensure that basic services remain accessible outside of internet-reliant means.   Data in Commerce   The internet began its transformation into the more commercial variant as we now know it between the late-80s and mid-90s, shifting its primary function from an instrument of communication by creating wholly novel markets to which it could bring value. This historic invention was achieved through innovation such as the  introduction of HTTPS and HTML as well as the opening up of web access by the decommissioning of the US National Science Foundation’s (NSF) NSFNET through the National Information Infrastructure Act of 1993, introducing privately-owned internet infrastructure and funding the first freely available web browser – Mosaic (NSF, N.d.). The arrival of internet service providers (ISPs) widened its reach to private citizens, transforming the almost exclusively academic and military internet monopoly that existed prior to that point, allowing businesses as well as their customers to interact in a novel way outside of physical and printed marketing and transactions as well as creating new digital spaces for individual users to interact socially. In the period since, its value to users as a tool of international, real-time communication has been surpassed only by its value to commerce (McKinsey, 2021).   The modern world has turned everyday experiences and appliances/devices into data collection opportunities for a countless number of increasingly innumerable and faceless, at times interconnected corporate entities. From Siri and Alexa, to smart TVs, fridges and printers perpetually connected to Wi-Fi and capable of voice commands, to health monitoring wearable tech and location sharing, the digital age is making it increasingly impossible to live outside the ever-expanding Internet of Things, all the while underpinned by assurances from data controllers that our most sensitive personal data is safe in their hands (Balkin, 2020). These comparatively better resourced (compared to the average human internet user) corporations often rely on user consent in their data collection exercises, backed by at times difficult-to-read policies that the average user is required to agree to in order to benefit from the services. As a result, the average internet user is required to have read, understood, and agreed to be bound by a data privacy policy for each stand-alone service that requires their personal data before they derive reciprocal value from this service. This requirement is irrespective of the user’s background, level of education, or disparity of internet services (and thus policies to review and consent to) (Ibdah, 2021).   In Botswana, as a regional example, prior to the Data Protection Act of 2025, data protection rights were espoused primarily, particularly in a commercial setting, in legislation such as the Constitution of the Republic of Botswana [Cap 00:00], Financial Intelligence Act, 2019, Banking Act [Cap 46:04] and common law (Bookbinder Law, 2021). These laws primarily, at least on the face thereof, sought to regulate privacy through reference to the inherent fiduciary duty of client confidentiality, particularly in financial and business affairs. Notwithstanding the Data Protection Act subsequently coming into effect, these legal instruments and the obligations they introduced still stand, resulting in parallel (complimentary) legal obligations. Similarly, across similar judications, through instruments relating to elements such as cyber security, medical confidentiality, and commercial confidentiality, privacy between corporations and their customers (or patients) precedes data protection legislation.   By retaining the view of data privacy and data protection as fiduciary duty (at least where personal data is utilised in commercial endeavours), and thus ethical obligation to the data subject, it places greater obligation not only on the corporate controller entity but also directly on management and ultimately the board, to ensure the data subjects’ rights are considered and given priority outside of as a matter purely of regulatory compliance, thus aligning it to cybersecurity and other digital fiduciary obligations. This further ensures alignment with King IV and ultimately King V (as well as the Pula Code [BAOA, 2020]) by addressing required oversight over Technology and Information governance and the obligation upon the governing body to ensure ethical use of information, deletion of obsolete information, management of third-party and service provider risks relating to information, integration of information risk in the organisation’s overall risk management processes, and policy creation (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2016).   By defining data protection as a fiduciary duty, the pervasive on data subject consent over other lawful reasons for processing personal data, is mitigated, and reasonably so, as being the weaker party, with no realistic access to verify the controller’s claims, and being the party whose consent was given on the back of policies they at times do not fully grasp (Ibdah, 2021), at times without legal advice, and under the threat of losing access to any service in which they do not give this consent (thus making the consent not truly, wholly freely given), data subjects should at minimum be able to rely on the controller’s “duties of care, confidentiality and loyalty” as emanating from the business relationship, position of trust of the controller to the user, and the data subject’s inherently vulnerable position (Balkin, 2020).   From a governance perspective, between the size of potential fines often carried by data protection laws (particularly those modelled after GDPR), to the extraterritoriality of privacy claims, to the cascading risks brought by transfers to corporations with poorer compliance records and jurisdictions with weaker laws or regulators and even to the trust and goodwill that underpins data protection undertakings and the giving of consent, it is increasingly upon the board to fully encompass their obligations as data privacy fiduciaries, which exist outside of strictly legal compliance obligations, particularly due to the operational and reputational risks espoused by data breach risks (McKee, 2024). It is not hard to determine that this umbrella of concerns motivated the increased emphasis on data governance in King V, its recently released executive summary emphasising more distinctly than previous versions, the critical nature of information governance, and protection of stakeholder interests (of which the data subject is now a prominent feature due to the increasingly material need for good information governance and in the spirit of Ubuntu) as a function of Ubuntu and overall responsible governance practices over and above pure shareholder concerns (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2025).   The overreliance on consent as a basis for processing personal data, and shifting of onus to the uninformed and ill-resourced individual data subject and away from well-resourced corporate entities, is further exacerbated by the widespread use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) not only in standard operating software, but also in carrying out tasks relating to personal data across industries inclusive of healthcare, marketing to insurance amongst many other industries. AI systems not only collect and process big data at a scale previously not possible, but through internet scraping, cross referencing, extrapolating and perpetual processing, thus foundational data privacy principles such as purpose limitation, data minimisation, transparency, accuracy and even the ability for data subjects to receive comprehensive reports of data held by controllers or wholly withdraw consent (and require that all their personal data be deleted), remain uncertain (Trott, 2024). In addition to AI’s incredible capacity to process large amounts of personal data, AI as a technology remains largely hard-to-understand technology for the average citizen. Accordingly, how it does what it does (including how it further processes the data they have given to make inferences about the data subject, particularly when customising user habits and preferences for marketing purposes), the bounds of its abilities, and where it sources the information it uses to perform its functions, is largely not fully grasped by average data subjects even when consenting to incorporation of AI technologies when processing their personal data (Trott, 2024).   Due to increased general reliance on AI, as evidenced by its introduction into numerous websites such as Google, and integration as a standard feature in software by corporations such as Microsoft, the speed with which it continues to advance, its potential to support economic growth, increased innovation, employment creation, and generally keeping African countries somewhat on par with the rest of the world, the AU Executive Council endorsed a Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy in July 2024 (the “AU AI Strategy”) (AU, 2024).   As of December 2024 however, no African country had introduced a binding instrument relating to AI, whether facing developers in country, or roll out of the technology within its borders, to its citizens. As at the end of 2024, only Algeria, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal had implemented a national strategy or policy, with others such as Botswana, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda having initiated stakeholder consultations and/or published a draft document (Alayande, 2025), which number still represents less than half of the 54 countries on the continent. Comparatively, 36 African countries have currently implemented Data Protection laws (of which 25 have Data Protection laws that speak in some regard to AI), with Ethiopia, Namibia and Malawi’s laws still yet at draft stage (ALT Advisory, 2024). Due to the slow pace at which AI and other regulations are being rolled out not only in Africa but also internationally, it then places the impetus on corporations involved to ensure their own values and cultures determine the approach they will take regarding new technologies and the use of personal data, as a function of their business and professional ethics, as well as a function of corporate governance including under the subject of Environmental Social and Governance (ESG). In its 2025 report, the OECD commented on this, lamenting:   “Given the pace of change, governments and regulators themselves are continually trailing technological and scientific progress and urgently need to strengthen their capacities for horizon scanning and regulatory foresight. This will build knowledge to better anticipate emerging and future challenges and avoid harms playing out due to regulatory vacuums or institutional inertia, or having burdensome legacy regulations. In addition to increasing institutional foresight capacity, regulators on the frontline will need equipping with sufficient powers and resources to act on their insights. At times when the last resort of sanctions is reached, these may pale in comparison to the size and cross-border nature of regulated entities, calling into question the very efficacy of enforcement regimes” (OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025, 2025). It is of further concern that in a majority of instances governments collect data through private corporate data collectors. A growing percentage of the data that is useful to a government, whether from a policy perspective (accurate information, statistics, and other data that forms Big Data used for decision-making) or national security purposes (political opinions, movement, etc.), is directly sourced by the government itself. Private entities such as META, TikTok, Google (including location tracking, voice command, online behaviour monitoring, and other similar applications by such organisations) hold a majority of the information that would prove useful to governments in its policymaking or surveillance efforts. However, while we may know (at least on paper) how these private entities intend to store and use our data, “national security risk” and “public safety” remain blanket exceptions that can be easily manipulated and adapted to meet whatever current regime’s objectives are (officially and otherwise). Accordingly, the digital nature of current data collection, storage and use means, along with the current critical nature of personal data in society, pose particular challenges (Darwin & Wa Nkongolo, 2023). As a result, there is a need for governments, in their regulatory efforts, to ensure that rights processed in reality are as much as possible reflected in online environments, particularly as online environments have increasingly significant real-world effects notwithstanding.   In addition to these challenges, the right to legal identity, which was included in the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, underpins the right to access basic services. Being able to produce a legal identity document is, for example, a key requirement for participating in the formal commercial economy in many jurisdictions as a function of anti-money laundering legislation, premised largely on the need to formally identify counterparties for Know Your Counterparty. Due to the digitisation of commerce and a large section of human interaction, a digital version of legal identity has been determined to be more and more urgent. Justifications for this growing need include limiting false identities online, ensuring regulatory compliance, limiting bottlenecks in service provisions through a reliable means of identity, allowing a uniform approach to identity submission and verification online (World Economic Forum, 2016). Challengers to the roll out of digital identities, however, point to the privacy risks posed, particularly in terms of the reliance on biometrics for its functionality and, most concerningly, of the ability for abuse, through limitation of access to basic services, in certain scenarios, or to outright weaponisation and surveillance potential.   Conclusion   “Everything is solidly anchored within a pedagogic space. A painting ‘shows’ a drawing that ‘shows’ the form of a pipe; a text written by a zealous instructor ‘shows’ that a pipe is really what is meant. We do not see the teacher's pointer, but it rules 30 This Is Not a Pipe throughout-precisely like his voice, in the act of articulating very clearly, ‘This is a pipe’. From painting to image, from image to text, from text to voice, a sort of imaginary pointer indicates, shows, fixes, locates, imposes a system of references, tries to stabilize a unique space. But why have we introduced the teacher's voice? Because scarcely has he stated, ‘This is a pipe’, before he must correct himself and stutter, ‘This is not a pipe, but a drawing of a pipe’, ‘This is not a pipe but a sentence saying that this is not a pipe’, ‘The sentence “this is not a pipe” is not a pipe’, ‘In the sentence “this is not a pipe”, this is not a pipe: the painting, written sentence, drawing of a pipe – all this is not a pipe” (Foucault, 1983).   While regulators and legislators (through access) ostensibly to wish to create a more open and safe internet, without a human-centric, Ubuntu / good governance or other social ethic contract premise underpinning its foundations, whether from a governmental or from a commercial perspective, it is imperative that the solution be at all times human centric and centred in protecting critical social contracts such as Ubuntu and duty of care for one another as members of the broader human community. Corporations, governments and citizens alike ultimately stand to benefit greatly through the use of data to propel humanity forward, whether through closing gaps in development and ending inequalities currently exacerbated by lack of access, or through innovation and commercial success. For this reason, for this to be achieved mutual trust in the collection, use and sharing of data must be built and protected.   More and more literature points to the need for self-regulation by corporations and governments alike. Corporations must determine their position vis-à-vis their clients, employees, corporate counterparts and other stakeholders, devising rules of conduct for themselves premised on good governance, and seek to implement policies based on more than what is legal, but also on what their duty of care requires of them. Likewise, governments – as the counterparty to the primary social contract between humans – whose role is to regulate human relations and protect the greater community from abuse whether externally or internally through inequality and discrimination, have an obligation to protect this relationship with their citizens by playing an active part in ensuring regulations are appropriate, responsive and enforceable, with the greater additional objective of ensuring that future iterations of itself, inherit checks and balances, seek to ultimately achieve the objective of ensuring the success of its citizenry.   References   AfDB. 2024. African Development Bank Group Digital Transformation Action Plan 2024 - 2028.  [Online] Available at: https://vcda.afdb.org/en/system/files/report/DTAP_Detailed%20Version.pdf [accessed 16 October 2025].   African Union (AU). 2020. The Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030).  [Online] Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38507-doc-dts-english.pdf [accessed 16 October 2025].    African Union (AU). 2024. Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy.  [Online] Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/44004-doc-EN-_Continental_AI_Strategy_July_2024.pdf [accessed 16 October 2025].   Alafaa, P. 2022. Data Privacy and Data Protection: The Right of User’s and the Responsibility of Companies in the Digital World . [Online] Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4005750 [accessed 16 October 2025].   Alayande, S. E. 2025. African Countries Are Racing to Create AI Strategies - But Are They Putting the Cart Before the Horse?  [Online] Available at: https://www.globalcentre.ai/research/african-countries-are-racing-to-create-ai-strategies-but-are-they-putting-the-cart-before-the-horse [accessed 16 October 2025].    ALT Advisory. 2024. Which African data protection laws regulate AI?  [Online] Available at: https://dataprotection.africa/ai-and-data-protection-regulation/ [accessed 16 October 2025].   Balkin, J. M. 2020. The Fiduciary Model of Privacy. Harvard Law Review Forum, 134(1), Yale Law & Economics Research Paper Forthcoming. [Online] Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3700087 [accessed 16 October 2025].   BAOA. 2020. [Online] Available at: https://www.baoa.org.bw/standards-setting-adopted-standards/ [accessed 16 October 2025].    Bookbinder Law. 2021. Data Protection in Botswana . [Online] Available at: https://bookbinderlaw.co.bw/data-protection-in-botswana/ [accessed 14 October 2025].   Darwin, V. & Wa Nkongolo, M. 2023. Data Protection for Data Privacy-A South African Problem? https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2306.09934.   Davis, T. & Trott, W. 2024. The regulation of artificial intelligence through data protection laws: Insights from South Africa. African Journal on Privacy & Data Protection , 207-219.   EU. 2016. General Data Protection Regulations - Lawful Processing.  [Online] Available at: https://gdpr-info.eu/art-6-gdpr/ [accessed 16 October 2025]. Foucault, M. 1983. This is Not a Pipe.  University of California Press. [Online] Available at: https://monoskop.org/images/9/99/Foucault_Michel_This_Is_Not_a_Pipe.pdf [accessed 16 October 2025].    Galal, S. 2024. Internet usage in Africa - statistics & facts . [Online] Available at: https://www.statista.com/topics/9813/internet-usage-in-africa/ [accessed 16 October 2025].   Guerriero, M. 2015. The impact of Internet connectivity on economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa (p19-27). [Online] Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a0899b40f0b652dd0002f4/The-impact-of-internet-connectivity-on-economic-development-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa.pdf [accessed 16 October 2025].    Ibdah, D., Lachtar, N., Raparthi, S.M. & Bacha, A. 2021. “Why Should I Read the Privacy Policy, I Just Need the Service”: A Study on Attitudes and Perceptions Toward Privacy Policies. IEEE Access , 9, 166465-166487. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3130086.   Institute of Directors in Southern Africa. 2016. King IV.  [Online] Available at: https://www.iodsa.co.za/page/king-iv [accessed 16 October 2025].    Institute of Directors in Southern Africa. 2025. King V Code on Corporate Governance for South Africa Executive Summary of Fundamental Concepts. [Online] Available at: https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/collection/7DAE15BF-07FA-4922-879E-6788368F5DB4/KingV_code.pdf [accessed 14 October 2025].   International Telecommunication Union (ITU). 2021. Facts and Figures 2021 Internet uptake has accelerated during the pandemic . [Online] Available at: https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/2021/11/15/internet-use/ [accessed 16 October 2025].   International Telecommunication Union (ITU). 2024. Measuring digital development Facts and Figures 2024. [Online] Available at: https://www.itu.int/hub/publication/d-ind-ict_mdd-2024-4/ [accessed 16 October 2025].   Jonas Hjort, L. T. 2025. The Economic Impact of Internet Connectivity in Developing Countries.  [Online] Available at: https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/129143/1/annurev-economics-081224-102352.pdf [accessed 16 October 2025].   Kloza, D. 2021. It’s All About Choice: The Right Not to Use the Internet.  [Online] Available at: https://cris.vub.be/ws/portalfiles/portal/77048349/dk2021_Its_All_About_Choice.pdf [accessed 30 September 2025].    Kovalenko, Y. 2022. The Right to Privacy and Protection of Personal Data: Emerging Trends and Implications for Development in Jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights. Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, 16(1), 37–58.   Löfgren, K. & Webster, C. W. R. 2020. The value of Big Data in government: The case of ‘smart cities’.  Big Data & Society ,  7 (1). https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951720912775.   Mavedzenge, J. A. 2020. The Right to Privacy v National Security in Africa: Towards a Legislative Framework Which Guarantees Proportionality in Communications Surveillance. African Journal of Legal Studies , 12(3-4), 360-390. https://doi.org/10.1163/17087384-12340056.   McKinsey. 2021. The value of getting personalization right—or wrong—is multiplying . [Online] Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/growth-marketing-and-sales/our-insights/the-value-of-getting-personalization-right-or-wrong-is-multiplying [accessed 16 October 2025].   NSF. N.d. Birth of the Commercial Internet . [Online] Available at: https://www.nsf.gov/impacts/internet [accessed 16 October 2025].    OECD. 1980; 2013. OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal Data . [Online] Available at: https://www.refworld.org/policy/legalguidance/oecd/1980/en/14534 [accessed 13 October 2025].   OECD. 2002. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.  [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264196391-en [accessed 16 October 2025].   OECD. 2008. Governance and Peace for Development.  [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/governance-and-peace-for-development.html [accessed 16 October 2025].   OECD. 2023. Explanatory memoranda of the OECD Privacy Guidelines,  OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 360. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/ea4e9759-en.   OECD. 2025. OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025 . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/04/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2025_a754bf4c/full-report/regulating-for-the-future_e948d334.html [accessed 16 October 2025].   Riduan, S., Leonard, S. & Muhammad, I.H. 2023. Human Rights in The Digital Era: Online Privacy, Freedom of Speech, and Personal Data Protection. Journal of Digital Learning and Distance Education , 2(4), 513-523. https://doi.org/10.56778/jdlde.v2i4.149.   Robles-Carrillo, M. 2024. Digital identity: an approach to its nature, concept, and functionalities, an approach to its nature. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 32(1). https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eaae019.   Sutherland, E. 2021. The Governance of Data Protection in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3922218 [accessed 16 October 2025].   Terzis, G. 2025. Ethical meditations for a human right to an analogue life. In Dariusz et al. (Eds), The Right Not To Use The Internet - Concept, Context, Consequences.  UK: Routledge.   UN. 1948. UN General Assembly, Resolution 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A/RES/217(III). [Online] Available at: https://​www​.un​.org​/en​/about-us​/universal-declaration-of-human-rights [accessed 16 October 2025].   UN Global Pulse. 2012. Big Data for Development: Challenges & Opportunities.  [Online] Available at: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/events/2014/beijing/documents/globalpulse/Big%20Data%20for%20Development%20-%20UN%20Global%20Pulse%20-%20June2012.pdf [accessed 15 October 2025].   UNDP. 2017. Data Privacy, Ethics and Protection Guidance Note on Big Data for Achievement of the 2030 Agenda. [Online] Available at: https://unsdg.un.org/resources/data-privacy-ethics-and-protection-guidance-note-big-data-achievement-2030-agenda [accessed 10 October 2025].    UNHRC. 2021. A/HRC/47/L.22. [Online] Available at: https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/ltd/g21/173/56/pdf/g2117356.pdf [accessed 16 October 2025].   Warner, D. & McKee, L. 2024. Board of Directors Role in Data Privacy Governance: Making the Transition from Compliance Driven to Good Business Stewardship. Journal of Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice ,   2024(1), Article 14.   Westin, A. 1967. Privacy and Freedom.  [Online] Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol25/iss1/20 [accessed 16 October 2025].   World Bank. 2021. World Development Report 2021: Data for Better Lives.  [Online] Available at: https://wdr2021.worldbank.org/the-report/ [accessed 16 October 2025].    World Economic Forum. 2016. A Blueprint for Digital Identity: The Role of Financial Institutions in Building Digital Identity.  [Online] Available at: https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Blueprint_for_Digital_Identity.pdf [accessed 16 October 2025]. [1]  Including: Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, Nigeria, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Guinea, Gambia, Senegal, Togo, Niger, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Lesotho, and Burundi. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2026 Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026.   by Daryl Swanepoel   Abstract   South Africa’s economy is trapped in a cycle of low growth, high unemployment and fiscal fragility. Competing frameworks, being the African National Congress’s National General Council Base Document (2025) and the Inclusive Society Institute’s National Dialogue Concept Note (2025), propose contrasting paths to renewal. The ANC document advances a redistributive, state-led developmentalism, whereas the ISI offers a growth-first, capability-centred model grounded in fiscal realism and social partnership. This article compares the two, evaluates their coherence against social-democratic criteria, and assesses which approach can realistically deliver a sustainable welfare state. Drawing on comparative evidence from development economics and welfare-state theory, it argues that the ISI framework aligns more closely with both empirical growth dynamics and the philosophical core of modern social democracy. Economic inclusion, it concludes, is not the consequence of redistribution, but its precondition.   Keywords: Inclusive growth, Social democracy, Fiscal realism, Developmental state, Redistribution, State capability, Institutional integrity, Social partnership, Economic sequencing, Sustainable welfare state Preface   South Africa faces an interlocking crisis of production, distribution and legitimacy. The ANC’s National General Council Base Document  reflects the governing party’s attempt to reclaim the developmental momentum through renewed state activism, expanded redistribution and ideological reaffirmation. The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) approaches the same crisis through a national rather than partisan lens, proposing a disciplined sequence of growth, employment and capability-building as the foundation of inclusive prosperity.   The comparative analysis that follows finds important areas of overlap, such as ethical governance, skills and partnership, but identifies decisive differences in sequencing and execution. The ANC framework prioritises redistribution before production, equating state scale with effectiveness, whereas the ISI model prioritises growth before redistribution, equating credibility with capacity. When assessed through the fiscal, institutional and philosophical standards of social-democratic economics, the ISI’s framework emerges as the only credible pathway to a sustainable welfare state. It offers a Southern adaptation of the Nordic model, namely a phased egalitarianism grounded in productivity, partnership and performance.   1. Introduction   1.1 South Africa’s economic and policy context   Three decades after democracy, South Africa remains caught between moral aspiration and economic constraint. Growth seldom exceeds population increase, the expanded unemployment rate hovers around fourty percent, inequality remains among the highest in the world, and the state’s debt service absorbs more than one-sixth of expenditure. Against this backdrop, both the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) have articulated frameworks for national renewal.   The ANC’s National General Council (NGC) Base Document (2025)  seeks to reinvigorate a developmental state by re-centring the state as the driver of production and redistribution. The ISI’s National Dialogue Concept Note (2025) , conversely, defines a capable state as the enabler rather than the monopolist of development. It argues that inclusive growth, not redistribution alone, is the engine of social justice and cohesion.   1.2 Overview of source frameworks   The ANC’s National General Council (NGC) Base Document (2025) is both a political and economic reaffirmation of the party’s developmental-state philosophy. It calls for an expanded state role in production, redistribution and ownership through re-industrialisation, localisation and strategic control of key sectors such as energy, minerals and finance. It emphasises wealth taxes, land reform, public employment and welfare expansion as the primary means to advance equality, and positions the state as the central agent of transformation. The framework therefore marries social justice aims with a renewed faith in state activism, arguing that redistribution and state intervention will unlock growth by stimulating domestic demand and correcting historical distortions.   The Inclusive Society Institute’s (ISI) National Dialogue Concept Note (2025), in contrast, offers a pragmatic, non-partisan roadmap for national renewal centred on a capable, partnership-based state. It defines inclusive growth, rather than redistribution alone, as the precondition for social justice. The ISI framework proposes a phased approach by first restoring fiscal and institutional credibility, then accelerating employment through investment and reform of network industries and finally expanding social protection in step with affordability. It emphasises ethics, competence, evidence-based policy and social dialogue as the instruments of transformation.   Together these documents capture South Africa’s policy crossroads with one vision that seeks equality through expanded redistribution, and the other that seeks it through productive inclusion and capability. The analysis that follows evaluates their respective strengths, weaknesses and implications for a sustainable welfare state.   1.3 Purpose and method of comparison   This paper compares the two frameworks not as rival manifestos, but as competing theories of change for a struggling middle-income democracy. It identifies areas of alignment, exposes growth-inhibiting contradictions in the NGC framework, and considers how the ANC’s moral and historical mission could be reconciled with the ISI’s empirical realism. The analysis proceeds through ten sections, which are conceptual divergence, areas of alignment, structural contradictions, pathways for synthesis, implications for governance, the social-democratic character of the ISI model, fiscal realism as a pathway to social democracy, and, finally, a comparative evaluation of which model can deliver a sustainable welfare state.   1.4 Theoretical context   The comparative analysis contained herein contributes to a broader conversation about how developing democracies ought to reconcile equity with capability. Emerging literature on developmental and post-redistributive states argue that durable welfare outcomes depend less on ideology than on institutional performance and productive capacity; and if such holds true, then the ISI’s growth-first model aligns with this insight, because it proposes that fiscal realism and competence are not technocratic substitutes for justice, but its enablers. In this sense, the paper advances a Southern interpretation of social democracy, being one that balances moral purpose with empirical realism and adapts the developmental-state tradition to South Africa’s constitutional framework.   Analytical note: A shared destination, divergent pathways   Both the ANC’s National General Council (NGC) Base Document (2025)  and the Inclusive Society Institute’s National Dialogue Concept Note (2025)  pursue the same normative destination, being a social-democratic and national-democratic dispensation grounded in equality, inclusion and participatory governance. Empirically, this is evident in their shared objectives, namely the eradication of poverty, the reduction of inequality, the pursuit of full employment and the construction of a capable, ethical and developmental state. Each envisions a society in which political freedom is matched by socioeconomic justice, the moral core of South Africa’s democratic project.   Their divergence lies not in ends, but in means, because where the ANC positions redistribution and state direction as the catalysts  of growth and legitimacy, believing that justice must precede efficiency, the ISI reverses this sequence, holding that growth and institutional capability are the preconditions  for justice, implying that efficiency must finance equity. In effect, both frameworks interpret the same social-democratic creed through different causal logics in that where the ANC seeks equality to generate prosperity, the ISI seeks prosperity to sustain equality.   From a typological perspective, both belong within the broad     family of social democracy, but occupy distinct variants. The ANC represents a form of social-democratic populism , which is moral-activist, redistributive and state-driven in nature, drawing its legitimacy from liberation ideals and the politics of moral urgency. This variant of left-populist social democracy, as described by Ward and Guglielmo (2024) and March (2007), combines egalitarian aspiration with political mobilisation of the historically excluded. The ISI, by contrast, embodies social-democratic developmentalism , which is pragmatic, capability-centred and partnership-based in nature, aligning with the model of the social-democratic developmental state advanced by Van Eck (2010) and Kieh Jr (2015). It derives legitimacy from institutional performance, fiscal realism and fiscal discipline, rather than emotive mobilisation.   The contrast is therefore not ideological opposition, but a difference in temperament and sequencing, where the one asserts justice through redistribution, the other achieves it through competence and fiscal discipline.   The comparison that follows evaluates which pathway better reconciles moral aspiration with economic realism.   While the distinction between redistribution-first and growth-first paradigms is economic in form, it is ultimately philosophical in substance. Both the ANC and the ISI are heirs to South Africa’s constitutional promise of a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights . Section 195 of the Constitution commits public administration to efficiency, accountability and developmental purpose, which affirms that competence itself is a moral duty. The ISI’s framework, therefore, can be read not only as an economic strategy, but as a constitutional interpretation of social justice and one that gives operational meaning to the moral obligations of the state.   This reframing transforms efficiency from a technocratic pursuit into an ethical principle and the means through which dignity is made affordable. In this sense, fiscal discipline and institutional integrity are not opposites of compassion, but its instruments. The capable and partnership-based state as is envisioned by the ISI is thus an expression of constitutional morality in which good governance becomes the daily practice of justice.     Figure 1:  Two pathways to a just economy (Source: Author, 2025) 2. Conceptual divergence: State as driver versus state as enabler   The NGC document articulates a post-neoliberal vision in which the state reclaims directive authority over the economy. It envisages a revitalised public sector expanding ownership, managing strategic industries and distributing resources to achieve equity. Economic justice is conceived primarily as a function of redistribution.   The ISI, by contrast, defines development as a partnership between state, market and society. The capable state, in this conception, is not measured by size, but by focus, and its legitimacy arises from competence, predictability and moral authority. Growth is the means through which social justice becomes sustainable, and redistribution is the result, not the driver.   The philosophical divergence can be summarised as one of causality. The ANC’s paradigm holds that equity will produce growth by stimulating domestic demand and correcting historical distortions. The ISI maintains that growth will produce equity by broadening the tax base, creating employment and enabling progressive redistribution. Both seek legitimacy through justice, but they differ on how justice is financed.   3. Areas of alignment   Despite ideological contrasts, there are striking overlaps once the party-political lens is removed. Both frameworks acknowledge that the crisis of governance has become the crisis of development. The professionalisation of the public service, merit-based appointments and ethical leadership are common pillars. Each calls for a skills revolution  in areas such as curricula reform, vocational training and digital literacy to prepare citizens for a transformed labour market.   Equally, both recognise that social partnership is indispensable. The NGC’s appeal for renewed compacts between business, labour and government echoes the ISI’s structured National Dialogue  process. Both perceive cohesion not merely as cultural harmony, but as an economic asset that reduces transaction costs and underwrites trust.   Furthermore, both diagnose the persistence of a dual economy, that is, an advanced corporate sector coexisting with a marginalised informal economy. Structural transformation, be it in spatial, racial or sectoral terms, is viewed as necessary to complete the democratic project. The difference lies in tone and mechanism. The ANC frames transformation as an ideological imperative requiring distributive assertion, whereas the ISI frames it as an economic necessity requiring productivity and competitiveness.   4. Where the ANC NGC framework undermines growth   The NGC’s aspiration to justice is unambiguous, yet its economic mechanics undermine the very growth that would make that justice achievable.   Redistribution before production. The document proposes wealth taxes, expanded grants, accelerated land redistribution and direct job creation through the state. These measures are morally compelling, but fiscally premature. In an economy where growth barely exceeds one percent, redistribution without new production risks eroding the tax base and precipitating debt distress.   State expansion without rationalisation. The call for insourcing and expanded state-owned enterprises assumes capacity that manifestly does not exist. When efficiency is low, increasing scope multiplies dysfunction. The capable state is built through focus, not sprawl.   Ambivalence toward markets. Repeated denunciations of “monopoly capital” coexist uneasily with appeals for investment. This dualism signals policy risk to both domestic and foreign investors, deterring the long-term capital formation that employment requires.   Macro ambiguity. The NGC’s resistance to fiscal consolidation as “austerity” and its hints at more directive monetary policy erode confidence in macroeconomic stewardship. Credibility once lost raises risk premia, crowds out productive spending, and ultimately reduces the very social expenditure the policy seeks to protect.   Regulatory overload and competitiveness gaps. Multiple, overlapping empowerment codes, licensing bottlenecks and localisation mandates that ignore cost competitiveness drive up transaction costs. The failure to stabilise logistics, energy and local government finances further constrains production.   Labour-market rigidity. Well-intentioned, but inflexible wage and hiring rules, unaccompanied by productivity incentives or youth-entry schemes, discourage job creation in the very sectors capable of absorbing low- and semi-skilled workers.   Foreign-policy ambiguity. The NGC’s anti-imperialist rhetoric risks alienating key trading partners and investors, substituting solidarity for strategy. A credible non-aligned diplomacy that prizes access to technology and markets would better serve inclusive growth.   These contradictions do not invalidate the NGC’s moral intent; they demonstrate that intent without sequencing undermines feasibility. Equity requires production and production requires confidence.   4.1 Empirical snapshot: Fiscal and structural constraints   The theoretical divergence between redistribution-first and growth-first sequencing becomes clearer when tested against South Africa’s macroeconomic data. Over the past decade, output growth has remained chronically below both potential and population growth, while unemployment and debt have accelerated. Table 1 summarises key fiscal and structural indicators that reveal the constraints within which any developmental strategy must operate. Table 1:  South Africa’s structural economic indicators (2015–2024)   Indicator 2015 2019 2024 Trend Real GDP growth (%) 1.3 0.8 1.2 Persistently below population growth (≈ 1.5 %) Unemployment (narrow definition, %) 25.4 29.1 32.1 Rising Unemployment (expanded definition, %) 35.6 38.5 41.2 Rising Gini coefficient 0.63 0.63 0.64 Static at extreme levels Public debt-to-GDP ratio (%) 50.7 63.5 74.0 Rising sharply Debt-service costs (% of budget expenditure) 11.2 13.6 16.8 Crowding out social investment Public sector wage bill (% of total expenditure) 34.5 36.0 36.8 Upward rigidity Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 20.5 18.2 15.3 Declining Private investment confidence (index, 2015 = 100) 100 92 84 Eroded by uncertainty (Sources: Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin; National Treasury Budget Review, 2024; Stats SA, 2024)   The data reveal a pattern of fiscal compression and investment stagnation that constrains redistributive elasticity. With debt service now absorbing nearly one-sixth of expenditure and private investment at its lowest share of GDP in two decades, the state’s fiscal multiplier has weakened considerably. Under such conditions, front-loaded redistribution is not possible, because it cannot generate sustainable welfare gains, since it lacks a productive base to support it.   The empirical evidence therefore validates the sequencing logic being advanced by the ISI, namely that macroeconomic credibility must precede expansive redistribution. Growth elasticity of revenue has averaged only 0.8 since 2015, meaning that each percentage point of GDP growth yields less than a proportional increase in tax receipts (National Treasury, 2024). This underscores that fiscal consolidation is far from being “austerity”; instead, it is the prerequisite for reinvestment in education, infrastructure and human capability. As Figure 2 later illustrates, credibility → investment → jobs → revenue → redistribution remains not an ideological preference, but an empirical necessity.   5. A reconciliation path: Toward a developmental partnership state   The gap between the ANC’s redistributive ambition and the ISI’s growth pragmatism can be bridged through disciplined sequencing, rather than ideological retreat. A developmental partnership state  would lead by credibility, not command, and it would transform the energy of moral aspiration into the discipline of economic realism.   Such a state would first restore macroeconomic credibility. Fiscal consolidation must be redefined not as austerity, but as social investment, where every rand saved in interest payments is a rand released for infrastructure and education. The independence of the South African Reserve Bank anchors expectations and lowers borrowing costs, and fiscal anchors enforce honesty about trade-offs.   Second, the state’s institutional architecture must be rationalised around capability, not capacity. Functions should be prioritised around the retention and professionalisation of core sovereign duties, such as justice, policing, revenue and regulation. Non-core delivery, such as housing construction, logistics, digital infrastructure, should be contracted competitively under transparent, performance-based frameworks. It should be a question of competence, and not ideology, that decides who does the work.   Third, the growth compact must be formalised, where government guarantees policy stability and reforms network industries, where business commits to domestic investment targets and job creation, and where labour moderates wage demands in exchange for training, equity participation and social protection. Tripartite compacts must be contractual, time-bound and published to restore accountability.   Fourth, industrial policy must shift from aspiration to execution. In renewable energy, agro-processing, automotive components and the digital economy, government should publish bankable sector deals  with clear incentive matrices, regulatory timelines and exit conditions.   Fifth, network-industry reform, for example in energy and logistics, is the fastest route to productivity gains. Unbundle electricity transmission into an independent operator, open rail and ports to concessioning and enforce transparent tariff regulation. These are not neoliberal acts; they are acts of governance.   Sixth, labour-market reform must reconcile dignity with dynamism. Introduce youth-entry contracts with portable benefits, training vouchers and productivity-linked wage progression. Equity demands inclusion, not rigidity.   Seventh, local-government renewal is indispensable. Fiscal ring-fencing of service revenues, transparent dashboards and merit-protected technical appointments can restore delivery. Municipal collapse is a hidden tax on growth.   Finally, anti-corruption must be systematised, through for example, full e-procurement, beneficial-ownership disclosure and automated anomaly detection in public accounts. Integrity must become an operating system, not a slogan.   Through these measures, South Africa can build the virtuous sequence the ISI describes: credibility → investment → jobs → revenue → redistribution. Moral aspiration remains the same, the order of operations changes.  Figure 2:  The virtuous sequence (Source: Author, 2025) 6. Governance and evaluative implications   When the preceding synthesis is tested against the efficiency-equity logic of mainstream economics, it passes both tests. A credible fiscal anchor reduces sovereign-risk premiums and lowers the cost of capital. Reformed network industries, such as energy, transport and logistics, compress economy-wide input costs, raising competitiveness. Predictable regulation and streamlined permitting improve investor confidence, while a meritocratic civil service raises the return on public spending . Redistribution then scales with real resources rather than with debt.   This sequencing also restores political legitimacy. In a context where liberation memory no longer guarantees obedience, legitimacy must derive from performance . Citizens tolerate constraint when they perceive that institutions deliver. A capable state that does fewer things well, generates a moral dividend, which is trust. In the ISI model, governance credibility becomes an economic variable, reinforcing growth through confidence.   Conversely, when the state over-promises and under-delivers, citizens retreat into self-help, elites seek rents and capital flees. The result is a vicious circle, where weak growth erodes revenue, fiscal pressure drives populism and populism erodes growth. Breaking this cycle requires a state that earns consent through competence, which is precisely the ideal that the ISI’s framework operationalises. 7. The social-democratic character of the ISI pathway   The ISI framework is recognisably social-democratic in spirit and structure. It insists on democratic pluralism, civic participation and a mixed economy regulated for fairness. It values markets as instruments, not ends, and views taxation as the ethical mechanism through which prosperity funds solidarity.   Yet it departs from European orthodoxy in one crucial respect: sequence . The Nordic and Continental welfare states emerged only after decades of industrial expansion and institutional consolidation. Productivity growth financed redistribution, and  universalism followed capability. South Africa, by contrast, inherited expectations of Scandinavian equity with the fiscal base of a developing country. Attempting to copy the European model wholesale would be fiscally catastrophic.   The ISI’s approach therefore represents phased egalitarianism, being a pragmatic adaptation of social democracy to developmental realities. It proposes to rebuild state capability, stimulate inclusive growth, and then expand the welfare net in step with affordability. This is not ideological compromise, but historical fidelity and it mirrors the trajectory through which Europe itself achieved social democracy. Justice achieved through competence is more durable than justice asserted through decree. Box 1:  Comparative Pathways – Lessons from Finland and Mauritius   Finland: Capability before welfare   Finland’s transition from a peripheral agrarian society to a high-trust welfare democracy illustrates that social democracy was built after  productivity and state capability were established. Between 1950 and 1970, the Finnish state invested heavily in universal education, meritocratic administration and export competitiveness before expanding its welfare commitments. According to Kosonen (2014), “the Nordic welfare state grew out of an efficiency consensus, where distribution followed production”. Productivity-led equality thus financed welfare universalism, aligning with the ISI’s sequence of credibility → growth → redistribution.     Mauritius: Inclusion through competitiveness   Mauritius presents an African variant of the same logic. Following independence, the state focused on export diversification, education and macroeconomic stability before introducing broad social programmes. Subramanian and Roy (2003) found that its inclusive institutions, transparent fiscal management and export-orientated strategy generated fiscal space for redistributive policies without destabilising growth. Mauritius therefore demonstrates that developmental sequencing, that is, building growth capacity first, can deliver both cohesion and equity within an African context.   Synthesis   Both cases affirm that welfare sustainability depends on capability and growth preceding redistribution. They illustrate that sequenced egalitarianism , which is the ISI’s central proposition, is not a theoretical construct, but a historical constant across successful developmental democracies.   8. Fiscal realism and the South African pathway to social democracy   South Africa’s structural conditions of low employment absorption, a narrow tax base, and elevated debt, render an immediate European-style welfare state unaffordable. Implementing one prematurely would precipitate macroeconomic instability that would ultimately destroy social spending. The ISI recognises this constraint and sequences reform accordingly.   Phase One emphasises stabilisation and capability restoration, where fiscal discipline and efficient administration rebuild credibility, infrastructure reform lowers costs, education and health investment restore human capital. Phase Two focuses on inclusive growth, by crowding-in private investment, expanding exports and accelerating employment. Phase Three then scales redistribution as the economy’s resource envelope widens.   This progression is consistent with comparative evidence. Azulai et al. (2014) demonstrate that effective states precede sustainable welfare and here “state capability is the missing link between policy intent and developmental outcomes”. Andrews et al. (2017) similarly argue that governments must “build capability before expanding ambition”. Hirvilammi (2020) finds that welfare systems divorced from productivity soon face fiscal and political exhaustion. The ISI’s model thus embodies the lesson that growth and governance are the preconditions of generosity .   The ANC’s NGC framework, by contrast, inverts this logic. Its redistributive front-loading presupposes a fiscal elasticity that South Africa no longer possesses. Expanding transfers without first raising productivity widens debt, discourages investment and ultimately undermines the very redistribution it seeks to achieve. As Zeidy (N.d.) notes, “fiscal sustainability is a prerequisite for inclusive growth; without stability, equity cannot endure”.   Fiscal realism is not the enemy of social justice, but its guarantor. The ISI’s pathway offers a developmental road to social democracy that acknowledges constraint, yet preserves aspiration, in other words, a welfare state built on growth, not instead of  it.   Figure 3:  Phased Egalitarianism – The South African Road to Social Democracy (Source: Author, 2025) 9. Comparative evaluation: Which model can deliver a sustainable welfare state?   Applying the five criteria of social-democratic economics, which are fiscal sustainability, productive capacity, institutional capability, equity and legitimacy, reveals a decisive pattern.   Fiscal sustainability. The ANC’s redistributive acceleration burdens an already fragile fiscus, by expanding entitlements without enlarging the revenue base, which is a risk to debt stability. In turn, the ISI’s growth-first sequencing widens revenue before obligation, which aligns with international evidence that suggests that stable fiscal frameworks serve to underpin social spending (Zeidy, N.d.).   Productive capacity. The ANC’s state-controlled tendencies deter investment by heightening uncertainty and politicising enterprise. The ISI’s partnership model fosters capital formation, technology diffusion and employment, which are all preconditions for a self-financing welfare state.   Institutional capability. The ANC recognises ethical decay, but leaves cadre deployment largely intact, perpetuating politicised administration. The ISI’s emphasis on merit, accountability and transparency directly targets the bureaucratic weaknesses that comparative research identifies as binding constraints on growth (Azulai et al., 2014; Andrews et al., 2017).   Equity and inclusion. Both seek equity, but through different instruments. Where the ANC offers redistribution through transfer, the ISI offers it through participation, and where the former alleviates poverty, the latter eradicates its causes.   Legitimacy. The ANC’s political legitimacy is historical and emotive, whereas the ISI’s would be performance-based and deliberative. Sustained legitimacy in mature democracies derives from delivery, not identity.   In sum, while the ANC’s model delivers moral urgency, it risks economic fragility. The ISI’s framework couples compassion with capability, sequencing equity after growth. Empirical evidence suggests that only this order of operations can yield a welfare system that survives political cycles. Growth-funded redistribution endures, whereas debt-funded redistribution decays.   10. Conclusion   Both frameworks share a moral horizon of a just, inclusive and cohesive South Africa. Yet their routes diverge sharply. The ANC’s NGC document treats redistribution as the engine of justice, whereas the ISI treats it as the dividend of justice achieved through growth. The former relies on political mobilisation, and the latter on institutional credibility.   The comparative evidence and economic reasoning converge on one conclusion. In an economy as constrained as South Africa’s, social justice cannot precede productivity. Growth is not a technocratic obsession; it is the means by which dignity becomes affordable. The ISI’s approach therefore represents not a rejection of the welfare ideal, but its only viable foundation.   Measured against the standards of modern social democracy, being fiscal realism, institutional integrity and productive inclusion (ISI, N.d.; 2020; 2024), the ISI’s framework stands out as the credible pathway to a sustainable welfare state. It transforms compassion into capacity and rhetoric into results. The ANC’s redistributive vision may inspire, but the ISI’s sequenced realism can deliver.   Ultimately, the task before South Africa is not to choose between justice and growth, but to recognise that justice requires growth. The capable, partnership-based state envisaged by the ISI embodies that recognition. It offers a model of social democracy suited to the nation’s realities. It is a disciplined, inclusive and sustainable route to deliver a republic where prosperity funds fairness and competence restores hope.   10.1 Policy implications for the medium term   The comparative analysis offers not only theoretical insight, but actionable direction for South Africa’s economic governance. The core lesson contained herein is that fiscal realism, institutional integrity and social partnership are not ideological concessions, instead they are prerequisites for an equitable society. Translating the ISI’s framework into policy practice will require deliberate sequencing and political will to sustain reform beyond electoral cycles, which, admittedly, is difficult, but still, necessary. First, macroeconomic credibility must be reclaimed as a social investment, where fiscal consolidation is reframed as the moral discipline through which the state protects its developmental mandate. The reduction of debt-service costs will, for example, release resources for infrastructure, education and innovation, while a predictable fiscal anchor will rebuild trust with investors and citizens alike. The test of a progressive fiscal policy is not its expansiveness, but its sustainability.   Second, industrial and network-industry reform must shift from declaratory ambition to execution. Policy stability in energy, transport and digital infrastructure is the fastest route to restoring competitiveness and employment. The state should publish time-bound sector deals with clear metrics and transparent performance reviews. This would demonstrate that South Africa can plan, implement and deliver, thereby transforming credibility into confidence.   Third, social partnership must be institutionalised rather than episodic. A renewed compact between government, business and labour should be contractual, transparent and measurable, linking wage moderation and investment commitments to shared developmental outcomes. Dialogue must evolve from consultation to co-responsibility.   Fourth, capability restoration within the state must become a national project. Public administration reform, merit-based recruitment and performance-linked accountability are not bureaucratic details but moral imperatives of social justice. A capable state is the social policy.   Finally, political leadership must communicate a new developmental narrative, and one that reconciles growth with justice, and anchors hope in performance. South Africa’s democratic legitimacy now depends less on historical memory than on delivery. The capable, partnership-based state proposed by the ISI thus offers a reform pathway that is both ethically grounded and economically credible. It is a model of social democracy in which prosperity funds fairness and competence restores trust.   Epilogue   The choice before South Africa is not between growth and justice, but between illusion and endurance. Prosperity without fairness corrupts, fairness without productivity collapses. The task of our time is to make them one by building a state that delivers justice through capability and a nation where compassion is measured in competence. References   African National Congress (ANC). 2025. National General Council Base Document . Johannesburg: African National Congress.   Andrews, M., Pritchett, L. & Woolcock, M. 2017. Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action.  [Online] Available at: https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/bb540dab-9bbb-45ea-8ef1-4843b24dd432/624551.pdf? [accessed: 5 November 2025].   Azulai, M. et.al. 2014. State Effectiveness, Growth, and Development.  London: International Growth Centre (IGC) Evidence Paper. [Online] Available at: https://www.theigc.org/sites/default/files/2014/09/IGCEvidencePaperState.pdf [accessed: 4 November].   Hirvilammi, T. & Koch, M. 2020. Sustainable Welfare beyond Growth.  Sustainability , 12(5), 1824. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12051824.   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). N.d. Our Value System.  [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/isi-our-value-system [accessed: 6 November 2025].   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2020. Developing a New Economic Blueprint for South Africa – Lessons from Germany: Building Social Cohesion . Cape Town: Inclusive Society Institute. [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/developing-a-new-economic-blueprint-for-sa-lessons-from-germany-building-social-cohesion [accessed: 6 November 2025].   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2024. The South Africa Social Cohesion Index: Measuring the well-being of a society (2024 Update) . Cape Town: Inclusive Society Institute. [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/the-south-africa-social-cohesion-index-measuring-the-well-being-of-a-society-2024-update [accessed: 6 November 2025].   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2025. National Dialogue Concept Note.  Cape Town: Inclusive Society Institute.   Kieh, G.K. 2015. Constructing the social democratic developmental state in Africa: lessons from the “Global South”.  Bandung J of Global South,  2(1), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40728-014-0004-4   Kosonen, P. 2014. The Nordic Welfare State Model: From Expansion to Austerity.  FIIA Working Paper No. 80. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. [Online] Available at: https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/the-nordic-welfare-state-model-from-expansion-to-austerity [accessed: 6 November 2025].   March, L. 2007. From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox Populi : Left-populism as a “Shadow” of Contemporary Socialism. The SAIS Review of International Affairs , 27(1), 63–77. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26999345.   National Treasury. 2024 .   Budget Review 2024.  Pretoria: National Treasury, Republic of South Africa. [Online] Available at: www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2024/review/FullBR.pdf [accessed: 5 November 2025].   South African Reserve Bank (SARB).   2024. Quarterly Bulletin (No. 312, September 2024).  Pretoria: SARB. [Online] Available at: https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/quarterly-bulletins/quarterly-bulletin-publications/2024/september/Quarterly%20Bulletin%20September%202024.pdf [accessed: 5 November 2025].   Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025. Gross domestic product, Fourth quarter 2024 (Statistical release P0441).  Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/P04414thQuarter2024.pdf [accessed: 6 November 2025].   Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025. Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Fourth Quarter 2024 (Statistical release P0211).  Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02114thQuarter2024.pdf [accessed: 6 November 2025].   Subramanian, A. & Roy, D. 2001. Who Can Explain the Mauritian Miracle: Meade, Romer, Sachs or Rodrik?  IMF Working Paper No. 01/116. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=15215 [accessed: 6 November 2025].   Van Eck, L. 2010. Social Democracy and the “Developmental State” as Development Alternatives for South Africa, Honours Students' Projects , Paper No. 107457, Rhodes University, Department of Economics and Economic History. https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.107457.   Ward, B. & Guglielmo, M. 2024. People, class, democracy: re-mapping left populism from populist social democracy to popular socialism.  Journal of Political Ideologies , 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2024.2371506.   Zeidy, I. N.d. Fiscal Policy for Inclusive Growth.  Lusaka: COMESA Secretariat.[Online] Available at: https://www.comesa.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/220909_FISCAL-POLICY-AND-INCLUSIVE-GROWTH-Final.pdf [accessed: 6 November 2025]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2026 Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026.   by Prof William Gumede   Abstract   US President Donald Trump’s global tariffs, slashing development aid and funding to global multilateral organisations, combined with major global disrupting forces, such as climate change and artificial intelligence (AI), are ushering in a new global era of uncertainty, triggering a likely global economic downturn and possibly causing economic ruin for many countries.   It is causing a Great Disruption. South Africa’s Government of National Unity (GNU) offers an inclusive governance model to navigate the Great Disruption. The GNU brings together the diversity of SA’s political parties, colours and resources. However, for the GNU to be effective, it must be truly inclusive, including non-ANC partners in decision-making, policymaking and ideas-generation. A government of national unity (GNU) model, which tries to bring together a diversity of parties – therefore different ideologies, ideas and minority groups – is a more inclusive governance approach in societies under crisis, but also societies that face external threats.   GNUs are established when societies face deeply-rooted crises, and one single-party or group alone cannot solve these, or do not have the electoral mandate to do so on their own. Effective coalitions need formal coalition agreements, beyond a handshake between party leaders. Formal coalition agreements also set out how the partners engage with each other, the rules of engagement and the protocols. The success of South Africa's new GNU will heavily depend on whether ANC and participating opposition party leaders can muster the maturity to adhere to consensus decision-making, rather than majority decision-making or brinkmanship.   Although South Africa's African National Congress is in a multiparty Government of National Unity, it makes decisions, policies and behaves as if it is the majority government, solely in power, without any partners, and because of this, perpetually undermines the stability, longevity and cohesion of the country's first post-1994 national coalition government. For the GNU to be successful, there has to be a governance culture change, from majoritarianism to multiparty consensus.   But South Africa’s domestic and international challenges cannot be navigated by politicians or government officials alone. A Government of National Unity Plus governance model, whereby the GNU partners with business, civil society and professionals, will improve South Africa’s capacity to navigate the frightening domestic and global challenges and seize the opportunities.   It is critical that the GNU transforms into a GNU Plus, which would include business, civil society and professionals to co-govern South Africa during the Great Disruption South Africa and the world now face. A key structural reform needed is to bring in the private sector, civil society and professional associations to help with public service delivery and tackle development, state, institutional, infrastructure, and policy failure.   Keywords:  Government of National Unity (GNU), GNU Plus, Inclusive governance, Coalition government, Consensus decision‑making, SA Inc approach, Pragmatism in policymaking, State capacity, Public service delivery, Structural reforms   Introduction   US President Donald Trump’s sweeping tariffs, slashing development aid and funding to global multilateral organisations, combined with major global disrupting forces, such as climate change and artificial intelligence (AI), are ushering in a new global era of uncertainty, triggering a likely global economic downturn and possibly causing economic ruin for many countries.   Global trade, economic and political governance rules, institutions, multilateralism have been upended. It is causing internal turmoil in countries outside the US, disrupting economies, companies and potentially causing instability in societies, as their economies are experiencing, or will experience, downturns (Morgan, 2025; Shang-Jin, 2025; Staiger, 2025). It is causing a Great Disruption.   There is the real danger for South Africa and many countries to experience Covid-19-like disruptions of economies, businesses and societies. Many developing country economies will crash, especially those that are poorly governed.   Countries, firms and communities that practice good governance are more likely to thrive in global disruption (Byrne, 2025; Gumede, 2025). Good governance is a buffer to uncertainty. Good country governance is an inoculation against geopolitical, economic, technological and environmental unpredictability. Good governance helps strengthen country, society and company resilience in uncertainty.   Countries that have inclusive models of government will weather global storms better. Countries, companies with poor governance will be left behind.   South Africa’s Government of National Unity (GNU) offers an inclusive governance model to navigate the global disruption (Gumede, 2025). The GNU brings together the diversity of South Africa’s political parties, colours and resources. However, for the GNU to be effective, it must be truly inclusive, including non-ANC partners in decision-making, policymaking and ideas-generation. Diversity offers a buffer to uncertainty (Duchek et al., 2019; Levin, 2020; Ma et al., 2024). South Africa’s growth, poverty reduction and employment creation can only come through its diversity (Gumede, 2025). So, diversity-led growth, poverty reduction and employment creation.    A Government of National Unity (GNU) model, which tries to bring together a diversity of parties – therefore different ideologies, ideas and minority groups – is a more inclusive governance approach in societies under crisis, but also societies that face external threats.   GNUs are established when societies face deeply-rooted crises, and one single-party or group alone cannot solve these, or do not have the electoral mandate to do so on their own (Kadima, 2006; Gumede, 2024). South Africa is facing multiple domestic crises – ranging from a battling economy, high unemployment, mass homelessness, lawlessness, and rising tribalism (Gumede, 2025). Furthermore, the impact of Trump’s sweeping tariffs have brought an external challenge to the country (Gumede, 2025).   Coalition governance even more appropriate in diverse societies, to recover from economic emergencies and from conflict   Coalition governments can either be established when no party secures a majority, or it can be formed when one party gains a majority but includes the losing parties in a form of Government of National Unity (GNU). Coalitions can also be formed pre-election – before the parties have taken part in an election – or post-election, based on the results of the election (Golder, 2006; Conti, 2014; Gumede, 2024).   Coalition governance allows for the greater participation of minorities in governance, helps cater for the interests of all groups in a country and for the adoption of policies that cater for marginalised constituencies, as dominant governing parties often only deliver to their own constituencies and exclude the interests of non-supporters (Kadima, 2006; Figueiredo, 2007; Evans, 2019; Gumede, 2024). Furthermore, because coalition governance forces participants to regularly engage with each other, get to know the other side, and build relationships, if done effectively, it is a good institution to build trust across political, racial and class divides.   Effective coalition governance demands compromises for the greater good of public service delivery, participation of all partners and parties governing in the interests of all the constituencies of the partnership ( Thies, 2001; Müller & Strøm, 2008; Evans, 2019; Gumede, 2024 ). Successful coalition governance cultures also transplant to the rest of societies – making diverse societies more open to compromise, to look after the interests of all communities and stakeholders and encourage a culture of conflict resolution (Gumede, 2024). This means that coalition governance is likely to lead to more peaceful societies (Evans, 2019; Gumede, 2024). Since the Second World War, coalition governments have produced among the greatest country economic miracles, from Germany and Switzerland to Brazil.   Most African countries are exceptionally diverse – ethnically, religiously and linguistically – because of the way former colonial powers arbitrary created these countries (Mamdani, 2012; Gumede, 2017). However, since the end of the independence from colonialism, white-minority regimes and apartheid, most African countries have been run by dominant liberation and independence movements, military and personal regimes which often had their power bases in one ethnic, religious, language or regional group (Kadima, 2006; Mamdani, 2012; Gumede, 2017).   African governments invariably have governed only for their ‘own’ group, rather than in the widest interests of all communities in their countries (Mamdani, 2012; Gumede, 2017). Furthermore, when most African countries launched multiparty regimes, they adopted ‘winner-takes-all’ electoral systems in which the party or leader that wins governs only for their ‘constituencies’ and excludes everyone else from state, private sector and societal positions (Gumede, 2017). This has been among the main reasons for development, state and democratic economic failures in post-independence Africa. Coalition governments would have been a much more inclusive form of governance for countries in Africa.   Coalitions have been particularly critical in countries rebuilding after war, ethnic conflict and civil war. Following defeat in the Second World War, Germany had long periods of coalition governments, as parties spanning various ideologies and religions worked together to rebuild the country, fostering national unity and boosting industrial recovery (Evans, 2019). In fact, in the post-Second World War, Germany was only governed for one term by a single party ( Riker, 1962; Martin, 2017). The great German post-Second World War growth miracle happened under coalition governments.   Following the civil war in 1918, between socialists and those who oppose socialism, Finland had continuous coalitions governments, often between parties with opposite ideological outlooks ( Tornudd, 1969) . The civil war was conducted between the  Finnish Socialist Workers’ Republic (Red Finland) and the non-socialists (White Finland), during the country’s transition from being part of the Russian Empire, to an independent state. The coalition governments helped the country bind together again after the violent divisions of civil war.   In Brazil, it took coalitions of parties to band together to push out military rulers and restore constitutional rule (Mainwaring et al., 2000). Following a long period of military rule, a coalition government took power following the 1945 elections, with the Social Democratic Party ( Partido Social Democrático), founded by Getúlio Vargas  in alliance with the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) forming the PSD-PTB alliance, which governed Brazil between 1946 and 1964, before the military staged another coup in 1964. The PSD-PTB governing alliance prioritised restoring constitutional order following the military rule.  After another period of military rule in Brazil, a coalition between the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the Liberal Front Party (PFL)   took power, under José Sarney, between 1985 and 1990, following the collapse of military rule, and formed the first civilian government since 1965. The PMDB-PFL governing coalition restored democracy again.   Post-Second World War Japan had different mechanisms of coalitions (Evans, 1995; Gumede, 2018). From the late 1950s onwards, Japan’s dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), although even if not in coalition, offered policy concessions in Parliament to the opposition parties, pursuing consensus-style politics, involving opposition parties in policymaking, in return for support for its export-led growth strategy. Unlike, in Africa, where dominant governing parties often steamrolled the opposition parties, the LDP co-opted opposition, and almost co-governed and co-legislated around a core set of national priorities (Gumede, 2017). Japan’s LDP introduced the idea of a social pact, involving organised business and trade unions as part of country policymaking.   Governments of National Unity in Africa   Ordinary governing coalitions are put together when no single party wins an outright majority – mostly in normal times. However, GNUs usually involve including additional parties, not necessarily required to form a governing majority. The focus of a GNU is to try to get the widest representation of political parties into a government, which would serve South Africa well in facing its multiple crises – economic, lawlessness and tribalism (Gumede, 2023).   Former South African President Nelson Mandela presided over a Government of National Unity, a form of coalition government, to promote reconciliation, inclusiveness and participation, when he included all the other major opposition parties into government, including the National Party, the former governing party, despite the fact that the ANC won the 1994 elections (Gumede, 2005).   Zimbabwe had a GNU at independence in 1980. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe at the time offered portfolios to the rival liberation movement, the Patriotic Front, and positions to former members of Ian Smith’s white-minority government. Mugabe’s then Zimbabwe African National Union won 57 out 100 parliamentary seats in the 1980 election but signed a coalition agreement with the opposition Patriotic Front of Joshua Nkomo and with the Rhodesian Front, formerly white governing party led by Ian Smith ( Ross, 1980) . In February 2009, Mugabe’s Zanu-PF formed a GNU with Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change and Arthur Mutambara’s faction of the MDC (Matyszak, 2010) .     After Kenya’s disputed 2007 presidential elections, the country plunged into conflict between supporters of incumbent president Mwai Kibaki, leading the Party of National Unity, and opposition leader Raila Odinga, leading the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).   Kibaki had announced he had retained the presidency, which was disputed by Odinga. Both candidates used ethnicity and the fear of ethnic dominance to mobilise support. More than 1,200 people died, and 350,000 people were displaced in the violence. Kibaki formed the party just before the election.    To bring an end to the violence, the political opponents Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga formed a GNU, which lasted from 2008 to 2013 (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010; Mapuva, 2010). The Kenyan GNU coalition formulated a new Constitution for the country (Mapuva, 2010). The agreement called for a President and a Prime Minister, the writing of a new Constitution, and referendum to approve it. Each party would have equal ministerial positions (Kagwanja, 2024). Ministers of one party were teamed up with deputies of another country. A mechanism was agreed to adopt policies. Kenya also introduced an “interagency committee system” to get different government departments to collaborate around specific crises, policies and implementation. Performance agreements for ministers were introduced. Ongoing country conflicts would be mediated by external mediators. It was agreed that violence would be monitored by independent monitors. The Kenyan GNU agreement proposed an ethnicity conference to tackle inter-ethnic conflicts.   In 2024, following renewed protests over the Kenyan government’s failures, Kenyan President William Ruto formed a GNU, by including four prominent opposition leaders in his Cabinet, to sooth public unhappiness and to establish a more inclusive national government structure ( Wasike, 2024) . The weeks-long 2024 violent public protests caused over 50 deaths, destruction of public property and widespread political polarisation. The protests began on June 18 as peaceful rallies against tax hikes but morphed into a wider anti-government campaign calling for President Ruto to resign.   Ruto said in his address following the appointment of his GNU: “The crisis has presented us with a great opportunity as a nation to craft a broad-based and inclusive citizen coalition for national transformation and progress made up of Kenyans from all walks of life. Consequently, I have started the process of forming a new broad-based cabinet to assist in driving the urgently needed and irreversible transformation of our country” (Al Jazeera, 2024). Some opposition groups slammed the GNU as “cosmetic”, arguing it “only maintains a tradition in Kenyan politics of leaders co-opting the opposition with jobs and perks while the population sees no benefits” (Al Jazeera, 2024).   GNU need formal agreements and structures   The key to the success of the GNU is how it will be structured. The size, meaning the number of parties in a GNU, is critical to its effective functioning. While every attempt must be made to be inclusive, too many parties may hinder governing effectiveness (Gumede, 2023). It will be better to include a smaller number of parties in the core GNU and involve other parties in case-by-case co-governing arrangements, whether heading legislative committees or chairing official inquiries. There are 11 parties in the current GNU. The ANC has pushed the idea to include more smaller parties – doing so would make the GNU operation more cumbersome than is currently the case.   National Executive Committee member Mzwandile Masina said the ANC was moving ahead with plans to include more political parties in the GNU, and discussions are ongoing with political parties, including with former ANC and South African President Jacob Zuma’s uMkontho weSizwe (MK) party (Maromo, 2025).   “This GNU is led by ourselves. The DA [Democratic Alliance] will have to accept that we are resetting the button. We are bringing others who will be prepared to subscribe,” said Masina recently (Maromo, 2025).    Many national coalitions in other African countries fail because partners do not sign formal agreements which set the terms of the coalitions, establishing coalition governance structures, and agreeing on key policies that will underpin the coalitions (Gumede, 2024). Many of South Africa’s municipal coalitions have failed because coalition partners do not come up with formal agreements, set up coalition governance structures and agree on the core policies for the coalition.   Kenya’s 2008 and 2013 GNU had no formal agreement, beyond handshakes (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010; Mapuva, 2010). Effective coalitions need formal coalition agreements, beyond a handshake between party leaders. Often coalition agreements are only based on how appointments will be distributed among parties. Formal coalition agreements also set out how the partners engage with each other, the rules of engagement and the protocols.   Such formal agreements hold parties accountable to themselves, to their partners and to the voters. Such agreements must ideally be made public, so that voters understand these agreements. Making agreements publicly is important to hold parties accountable, as voters can measure parties’ coalition engagements in relation to these agreements. It also helps hold parties accountable, as parties cannot willy-nilly leave coalitions for superficial reasons.   Most of South African municipal coalitions do not sign partnership agreements (Gumede, 2024). Parties often leave coalitions for no substantial reason, unleashing governing instability. Because there are no formal coalition agreements, party supporters and voters cannot assess whether their leaving is credible. The GNU will also have to put together a code of conduct to ensure acceptable behaviour, common decency and rules of engagement for leaders. Such a code of conduct must be equitably policed.   Parties in a coalition also need to come up with a joint coalition policy programme. Coalitions are multiparty governments – and therefore have to come up with policies that reflect the priorities of the members of the coalition, not that of the party with the most votes. Many coalitions at a municipal level in South Africa have failed because the party with the most votes, often wrongly, insists their policies become the government policies (Gumede, 2024). The ANC, South Africa’s former majority governing party, has struggled to change its culture from having the ANC’s party policies becoming the government’s policies, to having multiparty policies, in which the GNU members jointly agree on policies.   The GNU must create a political structure or structures where senior party leaders can meet regularly to discuss issues related to governance, to pre-empt minor differences between members ballooning into big fallouts. Coalitions must be seen as a ‘super-party’. This means GNU or parties in any coalition, must have a parallel political structure where all key party leaders – not the national leaders of the party – for example, their general secretaries, can regularly meet, whether two-weekly or so, to pro-actively look at issues that could potentially be conflictual. Such a mechanism was in agreement between the Multiparty Charter of 15 parties that agreed ahead of South Africa’s May 2025 elections to participate in a national government if they would be able to secure a majority. But the presidents of the participating GNU parties must also meet at appropriate intervals outside the Cabinet and government structures.   Coalitions, and the GNU, need a conflict resolution mechanism. A key factor in the success of many Western European national coalitions is the creation of formal conflict management structures for coalitions ( Riker, 1962; Müller & Strøm, 2008; Conti, 2014; Schermann & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014 ).   Many coalitions at South Africa’s municipal level failed because of an absence of conflict resolution mechanisms or an abuse of such mechanisms by dominant parties. The Statement of Intent that provides for the GNU provides for a dispute deadlock breaking mechanism (ANC, 2024). It is called a clearing-house mechanism. It is an issue-specific negotiating committee, chaired by Deputy President Paul Mashatile, to iron out disputes.   During all the policy disputes between the ANC and non-ANC GNU partners, the clearing house had its last meeting in December 2024, where the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA) Act, a South African law passed in December 2024 that amends the South African Schools Act and the Employment of Educators Act, was the centre of the deliberations. But the clearing-house subcommittee was ultimately not able to resolve the dispute (O’Regan, 2024). In a letter to Ramaphosa on 24 January 2025, in which John Steenhuisen, the leader of the DA, objected to the Expropriation Act, he claimed the clearing-house “mechanism was abused during the dispute over Bela” (DA, 2025).    The GNU’s conflict resolution mechanisms must be reformed (Gumede, 2025). The clearing house has yet to adopt terms of reference and is not an ideal conflict resolution mechanism (O’Regan, 2024). For it to be effective, impartial and fair, it cannot be chaired by a leader from the dominant party. It obviously cannot be chaired by the country president. It has to be chaired by one of the smallest parties or by an independent outsider – an Ombudsman – which has buy-in from all GNU partners. South Africa is a constitutional democracy. This means that every policy dispute, including one in the GNU, when agreed conflict resolutions mechanisms are unable to resolve disputes, can be taken to the courts to arbitrate.   Consensus decision-making   Consensus, rather than majority-rule decisions, has been at the heart of countries that have established inclusive democracies, sustainable development and peaceful societies. Many of the great economic miracles in the post-Second World War period, whether in Japan, Germany or in Scandinavian countries, such as Sweden, have been based on consensus decision-making in politics, economics and wider society (Robin, 1982; Lijphart, 1984; Linder, 1994; Evans, 1995; Hofstede & Soeters, 2000).    The June 2024 agreement that established the GNU provided for consensus decision-making as the basis to arrive at decisions (GNU, 2025). The principle is outlined in clause 19 of the GNU’s Statement of Intent, the charter by which parties to the GNU operate. Broadly, if there is deadlock the principle of ‘sufficient consensus’ will be the basis of decision-making. Parties representing 60% of the seats in the National Assembly must agree.  This means that the non-GNU partners will have to mobilise all the non-GNU members and the pro-Constitutional parties outside the GNU, such as ActionSA and Build One SA.   The Statement of Intent also provides that “in instances where sufficient consensus is not reached”, parties should raise disputes within the deadlock-breaking mechanisms created for this purpose. The deadlock mechanism currently is what is called the clearing-house mechanism, an issue-specific negotiating committee, chaired by Deputy President Paul Mashatile, to iron out disputes. However, the clearing house has yet to adopt terms of reference and is not an ideal conflict resolution mechanism. The clearing house had its last meeting in December 2024, where the Bela Act was the centre of the deliberations. But the clearing-house subcommittee was ultimately not able to resolve the dispute.   Up to now, the ANC, which has governed South Africa for the past 30 years, based its decisions on majority rule, which is democracy in its most limited form. In many cases the majority rule decisions of the ANC often favoured the party's, its leadership, or ideological and populist interests, rather than the best interests of South Africa (Gumede, 2005, 2012). The ANC has struggled to transition from its long-standing culture of unilateral majority-based decision-making to inclusive consensus decision-making as outlined in the GNU agreement (Gumede, 2024, 2025).   Consensus decisions – if genuinely taken in the widest public interest – produce better quality policies, wider societal embrace of decisions and policies, and therefore, more successful implementation of them (Robin, 1982; Hofstede & Soeters, 2000). But consensus-seeking is more likely to produce outcomes that are in the widest interests of all of society, rather than dominant groups ( Lijphart, 1984; Lewin, 1998). In consensus decision-making, not everyone gets all that they want, but common basic agreements are reached, which does not harm any of the participants interests (Robin, 1982; Lijphart, 1984; Lewin, 1998; Hofstede & Soeters, 2000). In a GNU model, broad consensus is reached which is in the best interests of all of society, not one political party, colour or ethnic group.   The success of South Africa's new GNU will heavily depend on whether ANC and participating opposition party leaders can muster the maturity to adhere to consensus decision-making, rather than majority decision-making or brinkmanship.   Need governance culture change: from majoritarianism to multipartyism   Although South Africa's African National Congress is in a multiparty Government of National Unity, it makes decisions, policies and behaves as if it is the majority government, solely in power, without any partners, and because of this perpetually undermines the stability, longevity and cohesion of the country's first post-1994 national coalition government.   South Africa's post-2024 GNU government is a new multiparty government, not the continuation of the ANC majority government. Yet many ANC leaders, members and supporters misguidedly insist that it is an ANC government, with the GNU partners as add-ons. The ANC, having governed for 30 years as a majority party, has struggled to change from majority party-based decision-making to collaborative decision-making – at the heart of any successful coalition government (Lijphart, 1984).   In this wrong view, ANC policies of the past, for example, foreign policy or the National Budget, automatically become GNU policies. Yet, the GNU is an entirely new government, a new multiparty government, that needs new policies at all levels. Given that it is a new multiparty government, and not an ANC majority government, it must come up with new GNU policies, not continue with the policies and budget the ANC adopted and implemented when it was the majority government. For the GNU to be successful, there has to be a governance culture change, from majoritarianism to multiparty consensus.   South Africa's National Budget presentation was initially cancelled hours before its delivery after the Democratic Alliance, one of the parties in the GNU, refused to support it because the ANC did not consult its GNU partners. Since coming into power in 1994, the ANC has put together Budgets without consulting opposition parties, business or civil society. The ANC put together this year’s national Budget, by itself, solely based on the ANC’s party policies, as if it was the majority government, without consulting, or including, the policies and views of the GNU partners.   Most of South Africa’s coalitions at municipal level have collapsed in the past because parties with the most votes behave like majority parties, forcing through their own party-specific policies, decisions and appointments, rather than governing in partnership, and coming up with consensus policies.   GNU Plus – partnering with business, civil society, professionals   South Africa’s domestic and international challenges cannot be navigated by politicians or government officials alone. A Government of National Unity Plus governance model, whereby the GNU partners with business, civil society and professionals, will improve South Africa’s capacity to navigate the frightening domestic and global challenges and seize the opportunities.   It is critical that the GNU transforms into a GNU Plus, which would include business, civil society and professionals to co-govern South Africa during the Great Disruption South Africa and the world now face. Economic disaster can be averted and new opportunities grasped if South Africa takes a South Africa Inc (SA Inc) approach involving non-ANC GNU members, business, civil society and professionals coming up with new policies, new strategies and improving government execution.    A key structural reform needed is to bring in the private sector, civil society and professional associations to help with public service delivery and tackle development, state, institutional, infrastructure and policy failure. Key elements of the ANC ideologically oppose working with business, civil society and professionals – unless they are ANC political capitalists, ANC-associated ‘civil society’ or forums; or unless the ANC can ‘discipline’ business and civil society or the partnership is temporary to fix dire state failure.   It is crucial for the turnaround of the economy that the GNU partners with business, civil society and professionals to form a kind of GNU+, to help provide new ideas, capacity and energy to turn around the country’s broken state, broken economy and broken society. Importantly, this partnership should be based on co-delivery, co-implementation and co-ideas generation. It has to be real co-creation partnership, not government only seeking the help of business, civil society and professionals in instances of full state collapse. Nevertheless, partnership is particularly important in mission-critical state, policy and resource failures.   For example, South Africa must establish a GNU Plus task team bringing together the GNU partners, critical government departments and business, civil society and professionals to negotiate South Africa’s impasse with the US and to seek new markets for the country’s products. Business Leadership South Africa, for example, has urged the government to establish a 'Trade Crisis Committee', bringing together key government departments, business, civil society and professionals to drive coordinated action to secure new markets, to tackle US tariffs' damaging impact.   In its critical negotiations over tariffs with the US, South Africa must assemble a special team of negotiators led by the business sectors currently actively exporting to US markets, and heavyweight South Africans in US President Donald Trump’s inner circle. The negotiations are of such critical nature that traditional diplomacy is not to carry muster. South Africa has an advantage in that there are many South Africans within the Trump inner circle that can leverage in these high-stakes negotiations. It is critical that ideological, colour or party affiliations are not criteria for negotiators.   SA Inc approach   The GNU Plus governance model has to be based on an SA Inc approach, whereby South Africa’s policies, challenges and public service failures will have to be solved through involving not only the ANC, the government, but also the ideas, capacity and energy of non-ANC GNU partners, business, civil society and professionals.   An SA Inc approach looks at solutions based on whether it is in the widest interest of South Africa, not whether it is in the interest of one political party, ideology or colour. Pragmatism is critical in such an approach.   The South Africa Inc approach that President Ramaphosa used, involving the non-ANC Government of National Unity partners, business and civil society organisation, and keeping ANC ministers in the background, helped to ensure that the Trump-Ramaphosa meeting did not plunge into a Zelenskyy-like shouting match. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, using an SA Inc approach, taking along non-African National Congress Government of National Unity members, business and trade union leaders, in his tense meeting in the White House with US President Donald Trump, considerably helped to soften Trump, who could have responded with even more outrage than was the case in the meeting.   It is critical that President Ramaphosa govern from now on based on an SA Inc model involving non-ANC GNU partners, organised business, civil society and professionals – in co-governance, rather than as add-ons to be involved only the moment the state has failed in the delivery of a public service, which is in public focus, and where there is clearly no state capacity to deliver it, only for partners to be dispatched immediately once the public service has been delivered.   This will mean an ideological change is needed from many ANC leaders and members, who are often ideologically opposed to business, civil society and professional organisations, because of the mistaken belief that the ANC party is the sole decision-making power, and that only the state can deliver development and public services.   In an SA Inc approach, for example, in South Africa’s negotiations with the US, it will mean the country appointing an SA Inc negotiating team that excludes senior ANC figures but involves South African business figures that are doing business in the US, civil society figures with networks in the US Republican Party, non-ANC GNU members, and South Africans in Trump's inner circle. A new South Africa ambassador to the US, if an SA Inc approach is adopted, would come either from the non-ANC GNU partners, a South African business leader successful in the US, or a credible South African civil society figure, not associated with the ANC, or a South African within the Trump circle.   Pragmatism should be basis of policymaking   It is critical that pragmatism is at the heart of policymaking, decision-making and public appointments. Pragmatism is basing decisions on being practical, in the present, in the current context, rather than based on ideology, or the past or on “Great Truth” ideologies, whether Marxism or ‘Black or White’ thinking.  The US was always perceived to be the country that has industrialised based on pragmatism, using policies based on whether they work, rather than based on ideology (Thayer, 1970; West, 1989; Morrisey, 1994). US thinkers such as John Dewey emphasised pragmatism as an ideology to guide country decision-making ( Westbrook, 1993; Talisse, 2007).     The East Asian economic miracles after the end of the Second World War was largely because of pragmatic policies, approaches and stances, rather than based on “Great Truth” ideologies (Schmiegelow, 1991; Evans, 1995; Austin, 2001). These countries have adopted orthodox or unorthodox policies not based on dogma or ideology but on practicality (Evans, 1995; Tsai & Liu, 2013) . Thus, these countries could combine state-guided policies with market-driven policies, pragmatically based on the context. For example, Japan partnered with the US, who defeated Japan in the Second World War; Vietnam partnered with the US even after the Vietnam war; communist China copied Japanese-style policies. The Israeli’s worked with the Germans after the Second World War. In contrast, failing African countries followed Marxist, African socialism or struggle allegiance policies.   China’s own post-60s economic miracle has been based on pragmatism, choosing policies that have worked across the world, taken from Japan or the US, rather than pursuing dogmatic communist policies ( Tsai & Liu, 2013).   ANC leaders and members have often pursued populist, ideologically rigid and past-based policies, rather than adopting pragmatic policies. Populist and left breakaway parties from the ANC also in most cases adopted populist, ideologically outdated and past-based policies. For example, many of the ANC’s foreign policies have prioritised past liberation-era allegiances of the ANC, rather than being based on the present conditions. Such policies have often been against the national interests of South Africa, stunting economic growth, undermining development and industrialisation.   East Asian miracle economy governments pragmatically changed policies, as the domestic and the global environment changed – and because of this, were able to grasp new opportunities (Evans, 1995; Rüland, 2007) . Because of the lack of pragmatism, ANC governments have dug in deeper when their policies failed, or when domestic or global conditions or markets changed, compounding failure, rather than pragmatically changing course as conditions change. In South Africa, ANC leaders and members and populist offshoots from the ANC have, for example, refused to work with white business groups, saying they are “white monopoly capital”; or are reluctant to work with white civil society organisations, saying these are “right wing”. Pragmatism means that parties and leaders must partner across ideology, colour and communities.   ANC leaders and members and ANC populist offshoots, for example, support autocratic Russian ideologically as if it is still the Soviet Union, or support autocratic other African liberation movements ideologically based on the past struggle associations, even if it undermines South Africa’s economic interests. Autocratic African liberation movements unleash violence, unemployment and poverty on their citizens, who flee to South Africa, stretching South Africa’s resources. Similarly, ANC leaders and members and ANC populist offshoots support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, even if it raises the ire of the US and Western allies – and so, undermine South Africa’s economic interests.   A GNU that prioritises pragmatism may foster a society-wide movement towards pragmatic approaches to economic development, political partnerships and community collaborations – necessary for higher levels of economic growth.   Opposition and the GNU   Effective coalition governments boost oversight of the management of government, as individual coalition partners hold each other accountable for public service delivery. The coalition GNU may therefore be a governance oversight structure over the management of government affairs under the coalition ( Thies, 2001) . GNU partners may be keener to be responsive to the criticisms of poor delivery, corruption, and dishonesty by their partners.   Opposition parties that joined the GNU are under pressure to show the voters that they can deliver in their portfolios. Non-ANC GNU partners have a greater urgency to show that they can deliver and outperform ANC ministers, many of whom have been in government for decades with very little to show in terms of delivery. This means they must be able to independently show their voters and the public that they are performing better than the ANC ministers.   This competition between the ANC and non-ANC GNU partners to show they can deliver, increases overall public service delivery. To do so, non-ANC partners will have to regularly publicly showcase their delivery. In the past, when the ANC was the majority party, it had very little incentives to perform, as voters continued to vote for them, even if they did not deliver effective public services. The good thing is, Members of Parliament of non-ANC GNU partners have also exercised their oversight role of the GNU executive, particularly of ANC Cabinet Ministers, state-owned agencies and democratic institutions, as if they are the opposition. This has been good for democratic oversight.   However, the challenge is that competition between non-ANC and ANC ministers over who best deliver can also risk that ANC and non-ANC ministers could operate in silos, could undermine integrated delivery of public services and could create tension between the ANC and non-ANC ministers. Nevertheless, the quality of the oversight of the opposition outside the GNU is also going to be critical to hold the GNU accountable for its performance. How the opposition outside the GNU will oppose the government, will be critical in determining the quality of delivery of the GNU. Key opposition parties formed the Progressive Caucus to oppose the GNU – although the parties involved are mostly populists, tribalists and anti-Constitutionalists, and can by no definition be taken as progressive. They include the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the United Africans Transformation (UAT), the African Transformation Movement (ATM) and the MK party.   The tone of opposition has changed. When the DA was the opposition, the party pursued a “lawfare” approach, taking unconstitutional, irrational and ideological policies of then majority ANC to court. Of course, South Africa is a constitutional democracy, and the courts are an essential avenue to challenge policies. However, the “lawfare”, although successful, undermined black grassroots’ embrace of the party. The ANC could portray the DA as a “white” party and “using” the courts to oppose “transformation”. The EFF again, when it opposed the majority ANC, used street protest-style opposition in Parliament, rather than scrutinising the details of policies, giving the impression they were a protest movement, rather than a political party in Parliament.   The MK party, with its many MPs who were state entity CEOs and former Cabinet ministers – who understand how the state and its entities work – have brought more scrutiny of the GNU executive, state entities and the public service. The MK’s opposition approach to scrutinise the details of executive and state entity reports, appears to have also pushed the EFF into focusing more on scrutiny policies and decisions, rather than on protesting. Furthermore, it is difficult for the ANC to dismiss the MK, as the new official opposition, as a “white” party, and it is forced to substantially respond to the MK. The ANC is divided between two factions: one faction opposed to the ANC’s GNU partnership with former MPC members such as the DA and the FF Plus, and the other wanting the ANC to partner with the EFF and MK.   President Cyril Ramaphosa appears to see the challenge for the ANC from both anti-MPC groups within the ANC and the populist ANC breakaways, the EFF and MK. This means President Ramaphosa and the ANC leadership appear to take MK and EFF opposition more seriously as an electoral threat, especially the possibility that the EFF and MK could combine with the ANC populist faction opposed to the ANC’s GNU partnership with MPC members, the DA, FF Plus and the IFP.    Conclusion   Good country governance is an inoculation against global political and economic environments that are increasingly unpredictable. US President Donald Trump's sweeping global trade tariffs, combined with the forces of climate change and artificial intelligence, are causing a great disruption of trade, business and politics. Many developing country economies will crash, especially those that are poorly governed.   South Africa's Government of National Unity (GNU) offers an inclusive governance model, which brings together a wide number of political parties, ideas, energy and resources. However, for the GNU to be effective, it must be truly inclusive. The ANC will have to change from behaving as if it is still the majority party and not part of a multiparty government. Non-ANC GNU partners must be included in decision-making, policymaking and ideas-generation. Consensus-based decision-making must be the basis of GNU decision-making, policies and actions.   In using consensus-style decision-making, South Africa must adopt an SA Inc approach in governing, putting the widest interest of the country ahead of political party, ideological or colour interests when making decisions, policies and actions. The GNU conflict resolution mechanisms must be reformed to make it more functional, more credible and less open to abuse by the ANC.   Furthermore, the GNU must marshal the capacity of business, civil society and professionals in a GNU Plus model, whether to make policies, implement public services where the state fails or negotiating new global trade deals. GNU Plus policymaking must be based on pragmatism, rather than on fundamentalist ideologies, populism and emotions.    References   African National Congress (ANC). 2024. Statement of intent of the 2024 Government of National Unity . [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/statement-of-intent-of-the-2024-government-of-national-unity-2/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Al Jazeera. 2024. Kenya’s Ruto announces partial cabinet amid mass protests . [Online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/19/kenyas-ruto-announces-partial-cabinet-amid-mass-protests [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Austin, I.P. 2001.  Pragmatism and public policy in East Asia: origins, adaptation and development.  PhD Thesis, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland. Bosman, I., Rubidge, L. & Gruzd, S. 2024. Coalitions and the GNU in South Africa: Proposals to Embrace, Pitfalls to Avoid . [Online] Available at: https://saiia.org.za/research/coalitions-and-the-gnu-in-south-africa-proposals-to-embrace-pitfalls-to-avoid/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Byrne, D. 2025. How to cope with tariffs: the corporate governance perspective . [Online] Available at: https://www.thecorporategovernanceinstitute.com/insights/news-analysis/how-to-cope-with-tariffs/?srsltid=AfmBOoqGks1EXNsElMozd4XgatsFHx1rf6SiRL81SQ8oQRCvJLg5710d [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Cheeseman, N. & Tendi, B-M. 2010. Power‐sharing in Comparative Perspective: The Dynamics of ‘Unity Government’ in Kenya and Zimbabwe.  Journal of Modern African Studies , 48(2).   Conti, N. (Ed.). 2014.  The Challenge of Coalition Government: The Italian Case.  UK: Routledge.   Dewey, J. 1927. The Public and its Problems . New York: Henry Holt & Company.   Duchek, S., Raetze, S. & Scheuch, I. 2019. The role of diversity in organizational resilience: a theoretical framework.  Business Research,  13, 387–423. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40685-019-0084-8   Ennser-Jedenastik, L. & Schermann, K. 2013.  The Dynamics of Policy Implementation in Coalition Governments . Paper presented at the 7th ECPR General Conference. Bordeaux, 4–7 September.   Eugster, B. & Strijbis, O. 2011. The Swiss: A Political Nation? Swiss Political Science Review , 17(4), 394–416.   Evans, M. 2019. Coalition Government as a Reflection of a Nation’s Politics and Society.  UK: Routledge.   Evans, P. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation.  US: Princeton University Press.   Falcó-Gimeno, A. 2014. The Use of Control Mechanisms in Coalition Governments: The Role of Preference Tangentiality and Repeated Interactions. Party Politics,  20(3).   Figueiredo, A.C. 2007. Government Coalitions in Brazilian Democracy. Political Science Review , 1(2), 182-216.   Golder, S.N. 2006. Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.  British Journal of Political Science,  36(2), 193–212.   Government of National Unity (GNU). 2025. Statement of Intent . Republic of South Africa, July 2025.   Gumede, W. 2005. Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC . US: Penguin Random House.   Gumede, W. 2012. Restless Nation: Making Sense of Troubled Times . South Africa: Tafelberg.   Gumede, W. 2017. The Democracy Deficit of Africa’s Liberation Movements Turned Governments. Politikon,  44(1), 27-48.   Gumede, W. 2021. Building a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa . [Online] Available at: www.dbsa.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/2021-02/Policy%20Brief%20No.%201%20Delivering%20a%20democratic%20developmental%20state%20in%20South%20Africa_0.pdf [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Gumede, W. 2023. Improving Coalition Governance . [Online] Available at: https://www.democracyworks.org.za/policy-brief-improving-coalition-governance/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Gumede, W. 2024. Cast the GNU net wide beyond politicians . [Online] Available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/opinion/2024-06-09-cast-the-gnu-net-wide-beyond-politicians/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Gumede, W. 2025a. ‘GNU Plus’ offers a pragmatic, inclusive approach that could redefine governance in SA . [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2025-08-25-gnu-plus-offers-a-pragmatic-inclusive-approach-that-could-redefine-governance-in-sa/ [accessed: 2 February 2026]. Gumede, W. 2025b. Going for growth: Structural reforms needed for South Africa's economic recovery . [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/going-for-growth-structural-reforms-needed-for-south-africa-s-economic-recovery [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Gumede, W. 2025c. With the GNU comes hope, a sense of fresh energy and new talent . [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2025-01-30-with-the-gnu-comes-hope-a-sense-of-fresh-energy-and-new-talent/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Hartwell, L. 2013. Reflecting on Positive Zimbabwe GNU Moments.  The Zimbabwe Independent , 11 July.   Hofstede, G. & Soeters, J. 2000. Consensus Societies with Their Own Character: National Cultures in Japan and the Netherlands, In: J. Benders, N. Noorderhaven, A. Keizer, H. Kumon & J. Stam (Eds.), Mirroring Consensus: Decision-Making in Japanese-Dutch Business , Lemma Publishers, 1-17.   Kadima, D. (Ed.). 2006. The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa . Johannesburg: EISA/KAS.   Kagwanja, P. 2024. Interview: “What Can South Africa Learn from Kenya’s Government of GNU?” Newzroom Afrika , June 8.   Laver, M. & Schofield, N. 1990. Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe . UK: Oxford University Press.   Levin, M. 2020. How to translate diversity strategies into resilient organizations . [Online] Available at: https://www.weforum.org/stories/2020/03/diversity-strategies-resilient-organizations-leadership/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Lewin, L. 1998. Majoritarian and Consensus Democracy: The Swedish Experience. Scandinavian Political Studies , Bind 21, 3. https://tidsskrift.dk/scandinavian_political_studies/article/view/32929/31307   Lijphart, A. 1984. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries . US: Yale University Press.   Linder, W. 1994. Swiss Democracy. Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies . New York: St Martin's Press.   Ma, A., Paek, J.J.W., Liu, F. & Kim, J.Y. 2024. Research: Why Forming Diverse Teams Is Harder in Uncertain Times . [Online] Available at: https://hbr.org/2024/12/research-why-forming-diverse-teams-is-harder-in-uncertain-times [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Mainwaring, S. & Scully, T. (Eds). 1995.  Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America.  US: Stanford University Press.   Mainwaring, S., Meneguello, R. & Power, T.J. 2000. Conservative Parties, Democracy and Economic Reform in Brazil, In: Kevin Middlebrook (Ed),  Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America . US: Johns Hopkins University Press.   Mamdani, M. 2012. Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity.  US: Harvard University Press.   Mapuva, J. 2010. Government of National Unity (GNU) as a Conflict Prevention Strategy: Case of Zimbabwe and Kenya. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa , 12(6), 247–263.   Maromo, J. 2025. ‘Don’t give us ridiculous conditions’: EFF and MK party invited to join GNU . [Online] Available at: https://thestar.co.za/news/politics/2025-08-08-dont-give-us-ridiculous-conditions-eff-and-mk-party-invited-to-join-government-of-national-unity/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Martin, L.W. & Vanberg, G. 2011.  Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance . Oxford: Oxford University Press.     Matyszak, D. 2010. Law, Politics and Zimbabwe’s Unity Government.  The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.   Morgan, J.P. 2025. US tariffs: What’s the impact on global trade and the economy? [Online] Available at: https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/current-events/us-tariffs [accessed: 2 February 2026]. Morrisey, D.J. 1994. Pragmatism and the Politics of Meaning. Drake Law Review , 43(3), 1993-1994. https://drakelawreview.org/volume-43-no-3-1993-1994/.   Müller, W. & Strøm, K. 2008 . Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe . Oxford: Oxford University Press.    O’Regan, V. 2024. Bela Act report is with Ramaphosa, says Mashatile, as consultation deadline arrives . [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2024-12-13-bela-act-clearing-house-process-has-concluded-says-mashatile/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Riker, W.H. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.   Robin, R.J. 1982. Consensus, the Japanese way — collective energy at work. European Management Journal , 1(2), 10-26.   Rüland, J. 2007. Editorial: The Politics of Pragmatism: Southeast Asia’s New Free Trade Bilateralism. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs , 26(1), 7-13.   Schermann, K. & Ennser-Jedenastik, L. 2014. Coalition Policy Making Under Constraints: Examining the Role of Preferences and Institutions.  West European Politics,  37(3), 564–583.   Schmiegelow, M. 1991. The Asian Newly Industrialized Economies: A Universal Model of Action. Civilizations , 40-1, 133-171.   Schwartz, D. 2010. Coalition government: Precedents from around the world.  [Online] Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/coalition-government-precedents-from-around-the-world-1.876563 [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Sleeper, R.W. 2001. The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy . US: University of Illinois Press. South African Government. 2023. Concept discussion document on the Development of a Framework for Coalition Governments . Presidency, Pretoria, August.   Staiger, R. 2025. How Trump threatens the world trading system . [Online] Available at: https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/01/08/how-trump-threatens-the-world-trading-system/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Steenhuisen, J. 2025. DA declares formal GNU dispute over Expropriation Bill and NHI . [Online] Available at: https://www.da.org.za/2025/01/da-declares-formal-gnu-dispute-over-expropriation-bill-and-nhi [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Talisse, R.B. 2007. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy . UK: Routledge.   Thayer, H.S. 1970. Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism . US: Hackett Publishing.   Thies, M.F. 2001. Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments.  American Journal of Political Science , 45(3), 580–598.   Tornudd, K. 1969. Composition of Cabinets in Finland 1917-1968. Scandinavian Political Studies , Bind 4. https://tidsskrift.dk/scandinavian_political_studies/article/download/32048/29545?inline=1   Tsai, T-C. & Liu, T.T-C. 2013. Whither East Asian Regionalism? China's Pragmatism and Community Building Rhetoric.   Japanese Journal of Political Science , 14(4) , 543–566.   Wang, J. 2007. John Dewey in China: To Teach and to Learn . New York: State University of New York Press.   Wasike, A. 2024. Embattled William Ruto seeks stability with government of national unity . [Online] Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/kenyan-president-expands-cabinet-with-figures-from-opposition/3284268 [accessed: 2 February 2026].   Wei, S-J. 2025. How to Counter Trump’s Tariffs Productively . [Online] Available at: https://business.columbia.edu/insights/columbia-business/productive-strategies-to-counter-trump-tariffs [accessed: 2 February 2026].   West, C. 1989. The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism . US: University of Wisconsin Press.   Westbrook, R.B. 1993. John Dewey and American Democracy.  US: Cornell University Press.   Zubek, R. & Klüver, H. 2015. Legislative Pledges and Coalition Government.  Party Politics , 21(4), 603–614. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2026   by WenTao Lin   Abstract   The ascent of the Global South and Africa's drive for sustainable modernisation are pivotal in reshaping contemporary global governance. The G20, significantly enhanced by the African Union's permanent membership, is increasingly central to supporting Africa's developmental aspirations. This essay explores how China-Africa cooperation, operating synergistically within the G20 framework, can effectively empower Africa's sustainable modernisation agenda. It first analyses the evolution and "upgrade" of the G20's Africa focus from the Hangzhou Summit (2016) to the Johannesburg Summit (2025). Building on this, the paper proposes concrete pathways and mechanisms—spanning institutional synergies, multi-actor engagement, and enhanced cooperation in both traditional and emerging sectors—for aligning China-Africa initiatives with G20 platforms. Such concerted efforts can unlock significant potential, accelerating Africa's journey towards sustainable modernisation and contributing to a more equitable and collaborative global future.   Keywords: G20, Africa's Sustainable Modernisation, China-Africa Cooperation 1 Introduction   Against the backdrop of profound shifts in the global power landscape and the collective ascent of Global South nations, the African continent is embarking on a new journey towards autonomous and sustainable modernisation, a process that profoundly influences the international order and global governance systems. In this context, the Group of Twenty (G20), as the premier forum for global economic governance, is undergoing a significant transformation in its focus on and engagement with African development issues. The formal accession of the African Union (AU) as a permanent member has historically elevated Africa's representation and voice, opening new vistas for G20 support to African modernisation. Africa's modernisation is not merely crucial for its own destiny and the realisation of development blueprints like Agenda 2063; it also holds profound implications for global sustainable development and prosperity. The evolution of the G20's Africa agenda, from initial advocacy at the Hangzhou Summit to the "leapfrogging upgrade" at the Johannesburg Summit, reflects an acknowledgement of Africa's rising status in the global politico-economic landscape and poses new challenges for the international community on how to more effectively support Africa's modernisation.   Against this backdrop, China-Africa cooperation’s—as a paradigm of South-South cooperation and a key force driving the solidarity and self-reliance of the Global South—distinctive role and pathways for supporting Africa's sustainable modernisation within the G20 framework assume significant theoretical and practical importance. China's successful modernisation experience, its long-standing foundation of friendly cooperation with Africa, and the high degree of alignment in development philosophies between both sides provide a robust underpinning for jointly empowering Africa's modernisation. This paper aims to explore the trajectory of Africa's modernisation agenda within the G20 from Hangzhou to Johannesburg amidst the G20's institutional transformation. Building on this, it focuses on investigating how China-Africa cooperation, through innovative pathway designs and pragmatic mechanism construction within the G20 framework, can more effectively support African nations in pursuing sustainable modernisation paths tailored to their national conditions, thereby jointly charting the blueprint for "Empowering Modernisation, Building a Shared Future".   To systematically address this core issue, this paper will first review and analyse the transformative characteristics of the G20's African modernisation agenda, from its foundational impetus at the Hangzhou Summit to the "leapfrogging upgrade" at the Johannesburg Summit. Subsequently, the paper will, with a primary focus on the G20 framework, delve into the specific pathways and mechanisms for China-Africa cooperation to support Africa's sustainable modernisation across multiple dimensions: institutional construction synergy, multi-actor empowerment, upgrading cooperation in traditional fields, and frontier leadership in emerging sectors. A conclusion and outlook will conclude the paper. 2 G20 Transformation – Upgrading Africa's Modernisation Agenda from Hangzhou to Johannesburg   2.1 The Foundational Role and Impetus of the Hangzhou G20 Summit for Africa's Modernisation Agenda   In 2016, the G20 Hangzhou Summit, themed "Towards an Innovative, Invigorated, Interconnected and Inclusive World Economy" (Group of Twenty, 2016), emphasised the importance of practicing the concept of "inclusive growth" against the backdrop of globalisation. This meant ensuring that economic growth benefits all countries and peoples, especially developing countries and low-income groups, thereby paying close attention to their development aspirations. The Summit particularly advocated building closer "Global South partnerships", committed to creating more development opportunities for developing countries in key areas such as "interconnectivity", "trade and investment facilitation", "the digital economy", "poverty reduction and inclusive growth", and "sustainable development".   Notably, the communiqué of the Hangzhou Summit significantly elevated Africa's priority in the G20 development agenda, calling on G20 members to strengthen support for African countries in multiple dimensions, including infrastructure development, universal education, public health improvement, industrialisation processes, and renewable energy development.   Specifically, the Hangzhou G20 Summit launched the landmark "G20 Initiative on Supporting Industrialisation in Africa and LDCs” (WangYi, 2025). The initiative clearly proposed "supporting industrialisation in developing countries, especially in Africa and LDCs", marking the first time African industrialisation was discussed in-depth as a specific core issue at the G20 leaders' level, with a dedicated action plan adopted. The initiative encouraged all parties to strengthen inclusive growth models tailored to local conditions through voluntary policy options, thereby effectively enhancing the African continent's endogenous development potential.   Guided by the spirit of this initiative and propelled by a favourable policy atmosphere, Chinese enterprises actively responded to and participated in Africa's wave of industrialisation. For example, in Gqeberha (previously Port Elizabeth), a port city in South Africa, Chinese automotive manufacturers invested in setting up assembly plants, promoting local employment and skills enhancement by hiring local staff for vehicle assembly. In Morocco, North Africa, Chinese enterprises also invested in factories producing hybrid vehicles. Furthermore, Chinese investments in the manufacturing sector in countries like Cameroon and Ethiopia have also injected vitality into local economic development.   Several African media outlets positively appraised the outcomes of the Hangzhou Summit. For instance, Ana Rita Cardoso, a journalist from Mozambique's Notícias, commented: "This allows the voices of African countries to be better heard by the international community, providing a valuable opportunity for African nations to articulate their own needs and attract investment from G20 members, which is expected to bring fruitful results to the African continent” (Largest African media delegation in G20 history warmly reviews the Hangzhou Summit, 2016). This viewpoint, to a certain extent, reflects African society's expectations and recognition of the summit's role in promoting its development.   2.2 Deepening and Institutionalisation of the G20 Africa Agenda   Following the G20 Hangzhou Summit's heightened focus on African development in 2016, the G20's engagement with Africa's modernisation agenda entered a key phase of deepening and institutionalisation between 2017 and 2024. This stage was primarily marked by the "Compact with Africa" (CwA), initiated at the German Summit in 2017, and the African Union (AU) becoming a permanent member of the G20 at the Indian Summit in 2023. These two major developments significantly enhanced Africa's collective voice and agenda-setting influence in global economic governance, providing robust institutional support for advancing Africa's modernisation agenda within the G20 framework.   Firstly, the "Compact with Africa" (CwA) focused on empowering African modernisation. This initiative, co-championed by Germany and South Africa, aimed to attract private sector investment into key areas of modernisation in Africa, such as infrastructure, by improving the business environment and macroeconomic resilience. Since its inclusion in the G20 Development Working Group (DWG) agenda in 2017, with support from the World Bank and IMF, the CwA has provided signatory countries with policy advice, investment matchmaking, and capacity building. Currently, 12 African countries have participated in this initiative and received loans, forming an institutionalised cooperation model of "one country, one policy" that effectively aligns African national modernisation strategies with G20 resources (Clynch, 2023).   Secondly, the African Union becoming a permanent G20 member in 2023 represents a historic breakthrough in enhancing Africa's representation in global economic governance (African Union, 2024). Its main significance lies in: First, the AU's formal inclusion means Africa's collective interests are systematically integrated into the G20's highest decision-making level. With a permanent seat, the AU can directly participate in agenda-setting and policy coordination on core issues crucial to African modernisation, such as the digital economy, sustainable development, food security, climate change, and debt governance, thereby significantly strengthening its collective bargaining power. Second, the G20 is required to consult the AU when formulating policies involving Africa, ensuring their strategic synergy with Africa's own development blueprints like the African Continental Free Trade Area and Agenda 2063. Third, this move also provides G20 members with a direct and efficient platform for dialogue with Africa's major Regional Economic Communities, enhancing the inclusiveness of global governance and its responsiveness to Africa's modernisation needs.   In summary, between 2017 and 2024, the G20's Africa modernisation agenda made substantial progress in terms of institutionalisation, and Africa's overall representation and policy influence were significantly enhanced. These institutional achievements and cooperation experiences laid a solid foundation and provided operational prerequisites for deepening China-Africa cooperation and supporting Africa's sustainable modernisation at the Johannesburg G20 Summit.   2.3 Johannesburg G20 Summit: A Leapfrogging Upgrade of Africa's Modernisation Agenda   The 2025 Johannesburg G20 Summit, as the first G20 summit ever held on the African continent, carried milestone significance not only due to its geographical breakthrough but also because it marked a leapfrogging upgrade of the G20's African modernisation agenda and a profound transformation of the G20 mechanism itself. South Africa, in its capacity as the G20 President, placed African priorities and sustainable modernisation needs at the core of the global governance agenda. This, complemented by the full participation of the African Union as a permanent G20 member, jointly shaped a new phase for the agenda that better reflects African agency and promotes inclusive and sustainable development.   This Summit, themed "Fostering Unity, Equity, and Sustainability", profoundly resonated with the two major contemporary aspirations: "the Rise of the Global South" and "African Modernisation” (Group of Twenty, 2025). This theme itself represents an ideological upgrade from previous development paradigms: it not only continues the focus on economic growth but also prioritises collaborative global partnerships, equitable development opportunities, and the holistic sustainability of an integrated economy-society-environment system. This reflects both South Africa's deep contemplation of its own development path and the African continent's collective aspiration for a fairer and more sustainable mode of participation in the new global landscape, heralding a transformation in the G20's development philosophy towards a more comprehensive and human-centred direction.   Specifically concerning Africa's modernisation agenda, the Johannesburg Summit, building on previous G20 efforts, achieved a significant deepening and expansion of agenda items:   First, an "upgrade" from debt relief to constructing long-term debt sustainability mechanisms. While the Hangzhou Summit had begun to address the financing needs of developing countries, the Johannesburg Summit directly confronted the systemic debt challenges faced by many developing economies, including numerous African nations. South Africa pushed the G20 not only to focus on short-term liquidity support and debt relief but also to commit to exploring the construction of effective long-term debt sustainability solutions. This includes addressing structural deficits, reforming sovereign credit rating systems to ensure fairness and transparency, and tackling the issue of unreasonably high-risk premiums faced by developing economies, thereby unlocking long-term fiscal space for African countries to invest in critical modernisation areas such as infrastructure, healthcare, and education. This marks a profound transformation in G20 support for African development, from responsive aid to systemic empowerment.   Second, an "upgrade" from general energy cooperation to a focus on "Just Energy Transition" and its financing guarantees. Whereas previous G20 discussions might have broadly touched upon energy accessibility, the Johannesburg Summit upgraded the agenda to tailor "Just Energy Transition" pathways for Africa and concentrate on resolving its financing bottlenecks. South Africa advocated for G20 members to reach stronger commitments on enhancing the scale, quality, and accessibility of climate finance for developing countries. It also promoted the strengthening of support from Multilateral Development Banks for country platforms like the "Just Energy Transition Partnerships", and innovation of mechanisms to more effectively leverage and channel private capital to serve Africa's green and low-carbon development. This reflects a significantly enhanced G20 consideration for the sustainability and inclusivity of Africa's modernisation path within the global climate governance framework.   Overall, the Johannesburg G20 Summit was a key platform for consolidating consensus, mobilising resources, and elevating G20-Africa cooperation to new heights, thereby injecting strong momentum into the African continent's path towards autonomous, inclusive, and sustainable modernisation.   3 Pathways and Mechanisms for China-Africa Cooperation to Support Africa's Sustainable Modernisation within the G20 Framework   As Africa's modernisation agenda within the G20 framework progresses from its foundation and deepens due to the leapfrogging upgrade at the Johannesburg Summit, the significant involvement of the African Union as a permanent member has further invigorated the G20 mechanism's inclusive transformation. At this crucial juncture, China and African nations, as core forces and natural partners in the sustainable development of the Global South, should actively explore how to effectively integrate their profound bilateral cooperation base with the functional advantages of the G20 as a premier platform for global economic governance. To achieve this, China and Africa need to jointly design and implement a series of concrete measures, constructing a synergistic operational model of "China-Africa Cooperation + G20 Platform". This will amplify the effectiveness of their cooperation and provide more robust and powerful global support for the African continent's journey towards autonomous, inclusive, and sustainable modernisation.   3.1 G20 Synergy in Institutional Construction: Enhancing Global Credibility and Governance Effectiveness of Cooperation   To enhance the global effectiveness of China-Africa development strategy alignment and the dissemination of consensus, both parties should commit to leveraging the G20 platform to systematically share successful experiences, innovative models, and pragmatic outcomes of aligning China's "Global Development Initiative" (GDI) with African national and AU's Agenda 2063, as well as the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Specific measures include China and Africa, particularly the AU, utilising their G20 membership, jointly encouraging G20 member states to deepen their understanding of Africa's development priorities and advocating for the optimisation of global development resources towards Africa. This will thereby consolidate broader cooperation consensus at the multilateral level and create a favourable international environment for supporting the African continent's integration process and the enhancement of its autonomous development capabilities.   In optimising project execution and evaluation mechanisms, China and Africa should jointly commit to enhancing the transparency and international credibility of their cooperation projects. Key measures involve promoting the establishment of an open and shared China-Africa cooperation project database platform and actively collaborating with international institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the African Union Commission (AUC) to build scientific and independent evaluation and supervision frameworks. More importantly, the construction and operation of these mechanisms should proactively benchmark against and fully adopt G20 principles and best practices concerning quality infrastructure investment, debt sustainability, development effectiveness, and Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) criteria. The results and experiences can be regularly reported, exchanged, and promoted through the G20 Development Working Group (DWG) and related subsidiary bodies, effectively addressing international concerns and providing valuable practical examples for the governance of various development cooperation projects within the G20 framework.   To shape a more favourable international environment for institutional opening-up conducive to African modernisation and China-Africa cooperation, both sides need to act proactively within the G20 framework. When China advances high-level Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with African countries, deepens customs cooperation facilitation reforms such as the "single window" system, and promotes local currency settlement and currency swaps, it should rely on key G20 mechanisms like the Trade and Investment Ministerial Meetings and Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meetings. In these forums, China, together with African countries (especially through the collective voice of the AU), should jointly advocate for maintaining an open, inclusive, and non-discriminatory multilateral trade and investment system, resolutely opposing all forms of protectionism. Simultaneously, they should push for the G20 to encourage its member states (especially developed economies) to provide more preferential and convenient market access conditions for products and services originating from Africa, promoting the evolution of international economic and trade rules in a direction that is more just, balanced, and conducive to the sustainable modernisation of developing countries.   3.2 G20 Empowerment for Converging Efforts of Multiple Actors: Building Extensive Modernisation Partnership Networks   To effectively converge the immense strengths of multiple actors—including governments, enterprises, think tanks, and educational institutions—to empower African modernisation, China and Africa urgently need to utilise the G20 platform to foster broader and more diverse international modernisation partnership networks. At the intergovernmental cooperation level, successful practices and cooperation outcomes between China and Africa, particularly those involving Chinese local governments and African countries in sharing development planning experience and exchanging local governance best practices (such as the "one country, one policy, paired assistance" cooperative governance models between Chinese provinces/cities and African countries), should be actively showcased and promoted to other G20 member states and the international community through institutionalised channels within the G20 framework, such as the Urban 20 (U20) Summit, local government development forums, and G20 development experience sharing seminars. This will not only enhance the international visibility and referential value of China-Africa local cooperation models (like Zhejiang's "Ten Counties/Districts Connecting with Fifty-Four African Countries" initiative) but also attract and encourage more international partners to participate in targeted and results-orientated cooperation projects with Africa, thereby forming a broader global development synergy.   In the field of industry-academia-research collaboration and human capital development, China and Africa should commit to proactively aligning their cooperative initiatives—such as joint enterprise-school cultivation of locally suitable talent (e.g., "Luban Workshops", "Banmo Colleges" for vocational skills training), co-establishment of joint laboratories and R&D centres, and strengthening of industry-education integration and science-education integration—with the G20's core agendas and priorities concerning educational innovation and reform, future workforce skills development, universal digital literacy enhancement, and human capital investment returns. Specific measures could include striving to incorporate successfully validated China-Africa cooperation projects into the priority support scope of G20 human resource development cooperation plans, or leveraging the G20 platform and the quality educational and technological resources of its member states to attract top-tier educational institutions, research institutes, and high-tech enterprises from other member countries to jointly participate, thereby building trilateral or multilateral international talent cultivation and technological innovation alliances, with the goal of efficiently transforming Africa's vast demographic potential into valuable human capital, driving its sustainable modernisation.   At the level of think tank exchanges and youth and people-to-people interactions, China and Africa should jointly promote the G20 platform expansion for knowledge production and cultural exchange. The research outcomes of China-Africa think tank collaborations, the construction of data-sharing platforms, and the establishment of governance experience exchange systems—yielding high-quality policy reports and profound insights—should be actively disseminated and effectively translated into policy through official G20-affiliated academic and intellectual platforms via annual summits, policy briefs, and closed-door seminars, thus providing robust intellectual support for the formulation of more targeted and forward-looking G20 agendas concerning Africa.   Concurrently, youth and people-to-people exchange programmes like the "China-Africa Universities 100 Cooperation Plan" and the "Silk Road Heart-to-Heart China-Africa People-to-People Friendship Partnership Plan (2024-2026)" should be actively promoted for effective linkage and deep integration with important G20-affiliated dialogue mechanisms such as the Youth 20 (Y20), Women 20 (W20), and Civil 20 (C20). This can be achieved by organising young leaders, women representatives, and civil society organisation leaders from China and Africa to jointly participate in the discussion, advocacy, and action on key global issues, thereby enhancing mutual understanding and broadly consolidating cooperation consensus at the global level, laying a more solid social and public opinion foundation for the continuous deepening of the China-Africa strategic partnership and the stable, long-term development of G20 cooperation.   3.3 G20 Synergistic Upgrading of Cooperation in Traditional Fields: Consolidating the Solid Foundation for Africa's Modernisation   China-Africa pragmatic cooperation in traditional fields such as infrastructure connectivity, agricultural development security, and industrial capacity upgrading has always been a vital external support for African countries in achieving industrialisation, agricultural modernisation, and improving livelihoods. Through the strategic synergy and multilateral empowerment of the G20 platform, cooperation in these key traditional areas can achieve qualitative improvements and model innovations, thereby serving the long-term strategic goals of the African continent's sustainable modernisation more precisely and effectively.   To deepen economic and trade cooperation and efficiently support the construction of the African Continental Free Trade Area, China should, at the G20 Trade and Investment Working Group and relevant ministerial meetings, unite with the AU and other G20 members supportive of African development to jointly advocate for and promote the G20 to formulate a collective action roadmap and specific support plans for the high-quality implementation of the AfCFTA. These measures may include providing technical assistance and capacity building in trade facilitation, promoting regional standards harmonisation and mutual recognition of conformity assessments, and encouraging investment and financing support for cross-border infrastructure in Africa, aiming to accelerate the process of African regional economic integration and value chain construction.   Meanwhile, successful practices from China-Africa co-construction of pioneering zones for in-depth economic and trade cooperation, can also be shared and promoted as typical cases within the G20 framework. This can provide African experience and Chinese wisdom for G20 discussions on how to promote the deep integration of developing countries into global value chains and build more resilient and inclusive regional supply chain networks.   Regarding the African continent's rich mineral resources, China and Africa, while jointly promoting the integrated "exploration, extraction, processing, and trade" whole-chain cooperative development for minerals, should commit to actively advocating, leading by example, and jointly promoting the improvement of global principles for responsible mineral resource development and supply chain management within the G20 framework. This includes enhancing industry transparency standards and comprehensively adopting Environmental, Social, and Governance best practices. A specific measure is for China, together with African countries, to jointly push for the establishment of a fairer, more equitable, and inclusive global governance system, pricing mechanisms, and benefit-sharing frameworks for critical minerals on the G20 platform. They should firmly support and assist African countries in enhancing their domestic processing capabilities and value creation from their mineral resources, ensuring that African nations can fairly and sustainably derive greater development dividends from their valuable natural endowments, truly transforming potential resource advantages into powerful endogenous drivers for their sustainable industrialisation process and economic structural diversification.   In the domain of agricultural modernisation and food security, China-Africa cooperation should be more closely integrated with the G20's core agendas and priority actions concerning global food security challenges, development of climate-smart agriculture, promotion of sustainable land management practices, and advocacy for responsible agricultural investment. Key implementable measures include China and Africa, at G20 Agricultural Ministers' Meetings and relevant technical working groups, jointly calling on G20 developed members to earnestly fulfill their Official Development Assistance commitments to agricultural development in developing countries (especially Africa), based on Africa's actual agricultural development needs and the agricultural transformation goals of Agenda 2063. They should also promote enhanced R&D cooperation and transfer of agricultural technologies within the G20. Furthermore, joint efforts should be made to push the G20 to focus on and support African countries in improving food storage and logistics systems, reducing post-harvest losses, and developing agro-processing industries to extend value chains, thereby systematically building more resilient, inclusive, and sustainable regional and global food supply systems.   3.4 G20 Frontier Leadership in Laying Out Emerging Fields: Jointly Shaping New Momentum for Africa's Modernisation   By accurately grasping and proactively adapting to the wave of the new scientific and technological revolution and global industrial transformation, China and Africa's forward-looking cooperation in strategic emerging fields such as green energy, sustainable blue economy, and artificial intelligence is not only an intrinsic requirement for achieving their own leapfrog development but can also contribute unique Eastern wisdom and African solutions to G20's leadership in the healthy and inclusive development of global emerging industries. This will jointly shape and powerfully drive new growth engines for Africa's modernisation process.   To deepen China-Africa green partnerships, their cooperative practices and successful experiences in areas such as joint development of clean energy, co-construction of green and low-carbon demonstration zones, support for the green upgrading and transformation of traditional industries, and exploration of the potential for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, should be systematically showcased and promoted using G20 platforms. Specific measures include China and Africa jointly advocating for G20 member states, especially developed countries, to increase efforts in green technology R&D and transfer to Africa, and promoting the establishment of more diversified, accessible, and preferential financing mechanisms and risk mitigation tools for green development in Africa. The innovative operational model and early achievements of initiatives like the "China-Africa Green Industry Chain Special Fund" can also provide valuable practical reference and policy insights for G20 discussions on how to effectively leverage and guide public and private capital to jointly support developing countries in achieving a just and orderly green and low-carbon transition.   In the realm of sustainable blue economy cooperation, as China and Africa continuously expand and deepen their collaboration from traditional areas like marine fisheries, shipping, and port construction to marine future industries such as deep-sea operations, marine technology equipment manufacturing, and R&D, both sides should commit to actively promoting, at the G20 level, the integration of building sustainable and resilient blue economy ecosystems into the core agenda of global economic growth and international cooperation.   Actionable measures include China and Africa jointly advocating, within the G20 framework, for strengthened coordinated actions and policy dialogues on global marine ecosystem protection and climate change risk response; promoting the establishment of international cooperation funds aimed at supporting developing countries, especially African coastal and island states, in enhancing marine governance capabilities and developing sustainable blue industries; building open and shared global marine science and technology innovation networks and data platforms; and actively participating in promoting the formulation of fair, equitable international rules and codes of conduct for deep-sea resource exploration, development, and equitable benefit-sharing that can effectively balance economic development with ecological protection needs, by improving bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for China-Africa blue economy cooperation and striving to sign bilateral blue economy cooperation agreements with more African countries.   Addressing the rapid development of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) industry and its profound impact on global governance, China, while actively implementing the "Global AI Governance Initiative" and jointly exploring AI cooperation frameworks with African countries, should commit to proactively participating in and constructively influencing the G20-level process of formulating global rules and standards concerning AI ethics, data security and cross-border flows, intellectual property protection, security risk assessment, and capacity building.   The core measures for China and Africa should be to jointly ensure that these emerging global governance rules fully embody development-orientated and inclusive principles, effectively balance technological innovation incentives with potential socio-ethical risks, and pay special attention to the unique national conditions, practical needs, and capacity gaps of developing countries in AI R&D, application, and governance. Both sides should jointly promote, within the G20 framework, the bridging of the "AI divide" that may arise from technological disparities, by encouraging Chinese enterprises to invest in AI infrastructure in Africa, fostering joint China-Africa research and the establishment of AI technology cooperation centres in Africa, and supporting African countries in establishing AI industrial parks and expanding AI applications in agriculture, manufacturing, trade, finance, and social governance, thereby creating new growth points for China-Africa cooperation and contributing to the leapfrog and sustainable modernisation process of the Global South as a whole.   4 Conclusion   By organically combining the profound practices of China-Africa cooperation with the global platform advantages of the G20, and by implementing comprehensive, multi-level synergistic and innovative measures across institutional construction, multi-actor engagement, traditional fields, and emerging sectors, a broader prospect will undoubtedly be opened up for the African continent to achieve its "upgraded" sustainable modernisation agenda. This not only enriches and deepens the connotation of the China-Africa community with a shared future but also powerfully enhances the inclusiveness and effectiveness of the G20 as the core platform for global economic governance, jointly composing a new chapter for the Global South's solidarity, cooperation, and shared development in the new era.   References   African Union. 2024. African Union’s Landmark G20 Engagement: Shaping Global Energy Transition and Driving Sustainability . [Online] Available at: https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20241005/african-unions-landmark-g20-engagement-shaping-global-energy-transition-and [accessed: 3 June 2025].   Clynch, H. 2023. Germany invests €4bn in African green projects at Compact with Africa Conference. [Online] Available at: https://african.business/2023/11/trade-investment/germany-invests-e4bn-in-african-green-projects-at-compact-with-africa-conference [accessed: 3 June 2025].   G20 South Africa. 2025. G20 Presidency . [Online] Available at: https://g20.org/g20-presidency/?utm [accessed: 3 June 2025].   G20. 2016. The G20 Hangzhou Summit Communiqué . [Online] Available at: http://www.g20chn.org/hywj/dncgwj/201609/t20160906_3392.html [accessed: 3 June 2025].   Guo, J. 2015. China-Africa Forum: A Long-term Mechanism for Pragmatic Cooperation. China Social Sciences Today, 10 December, 3.   2016. Largest African media delegation in G20 history warmly reviews the Hangzhou Summit. China Economic Weekly , 36, 125.   Wang, Y. 2025. Becoming a Driving Force for Historical Progress. Speech at the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting on "G20 Cooperation Goals for 2025", Johannesburg, South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ziliao_674904/zyjh_674906/202502/t20250221_11560207.shtml [accessed: 3 June 2025]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2026   by Jiajun Fan   Abstract   This study investigates the evolution and driving mechanisms of the food trade network among G20 countries. Based on trade data from the UN Comtrade database (2013-2023), directed weighted and unweighted networks involving 19 G20 members were constructed. Using complex network analysis (CNA), the research analyses evolutionary patterns from three dimensions: macro-level network density, meso-level community structure, and micro-level node centrality. Key findings include: The network density decreased by 7.4% over a decade but maintained structural resilience amid crises, with a rebound in 2023 (density=0.7611, clustering coefficient=0.807) driven by the Bali Declaration on Food Security. The core-periphery structure underwent periodic reconstruction: dominated by the U.S., Canada, and Germany in 2014, China and Russia joined the core through regional policies in 2019, while Brazil and South Africa rose to core status via the African Free Trade Area in 2023, and Russia fell to the periphery due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. China has evolved from a semi-peripheral to a sub-core node, though its betweenness centrality declined from 0.795 to 0.347, indicating a shift toward direct trade. Vulnerabilities stem from path dependence on key nodes (e.g., Russia-Ukraine accounting for 25% of food exports) and regional disparities (Asia-Pacific accounts for 58% of trade flows, while Africa and Latin America remain marginalised). Recommendations include strengthening G20 emergency reserve sharing mechanisms, empowering marginalised countries through technology transfer and regional integration, and diversifying China’s food import channels to enhance its competitiveness in global food value chains. This study systematically unveils the complex dynamics of food trade networks within the G20 framework, offering an interdisciplinary paradigm for global food security governance.   Keywords: G20, Global grain trade, Trade network 1 Introduction   1.1 Research Background   Food security in G20 countries faces multiple challenges, including climate change, geopolitical conflicts, and public health crises, which directly impact food production, supply chain stability, and national food accessibility (Guo et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2024). The vulnerability of food systems in G20 countries has intensified in recent years, particularly under the impacts of major events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict (Guo et al., 2021; Xu et al., 2024).   As a critical component of G20 countries' food systems, the Food Trade Network (FTN) plays a core role in balancing food supply and demand, enhancing food accessibility, and diversifying food sources among G20 nations (Guo et al., 2021; Wang & Dai, 2021; Wang et al., 2023). Food exports from agriculturally developed countries have compensated for food shortages in most G20 countries, with the influence of G20 food trade on food security increasing annually (Guo et al., 2021; Wang & Dai, 2021). However, the complexity and high concentration of the trade network also introduce systemic risks: some countries’ high dependence on imports makes them vulnerable to external shocks (Guo et al., 2021; Wang & Dai, 2021; Wang et al., 2023). G20 countries themselves hold a central position in the global food trade network, dominating the production, export, and trade flows of major food crops (Ercsey-Ravasz et al., 2012; Murphy, 2013; Wang & Dai, 2021; Wang et al., 2023). These nations not only influence the stability of global food markets but also possess unique leverage in addressing food security crises and promoting policy coordination and market reforms (Murphy, 2013; Wang et al., 2023). Measures such as advancing food policy reforms, enhancing the transparency of food reserves, and regulating export restrictions through the G20 framework have helped strengthen the stability and resilience of global food markets (Murphy, 2013).   1.2 Research on the G20   As the core platform for global economic governance, the G20’s institutional design focuses on the dual mandates of policy coordination and crisis response. In the field of food security, the G20 promotes dialogue among member states through initiatives such as the Global Framework for Food Security and Nutrition, but in practice, it faces structural limitations—short-term policy interventions (e.g., price regulation) outweigh long-term institutional construction (e.g., futures market regulatory systems), and the decision-making process insufficiently incorporates the voices of developing countries (Murphy, 2013). In the dimension of environmental governance, G20 countries attempt to balance economic growth and ecological protection through mechanisms such as consultations on the implementation rules of the Paris Agreement and guidance on renewable energy investment. For example, the pilot application of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) aims to incorporate environmental costs into the trade system (Qiao et al., 2019; Rizwanullah et al., 2024). Such practices not only demonstrate the G20’s policy leverage but also expose deep-seated divisions between North and South countries in responsibility-sharing.   Trade openness and technological innovation have become twin engines of economic growth for G20 countries, but their effects exhibit significant heterogeneity: developed countries achieve an annual average total factor productivity (TFP) growth of 1.2%–1.5% through agricultural export expansion and R&D investment, while developing countries, constrained by technical barriers, achieve only 60%–70% of that growth rate (Xu et al., 2023). The transnational transmission effects of trade policies are particularly prominent: the U.S. agricultural subsidy policy expands the price volatility of Brazilian soybeans by 20%–25% through the global trade network, highlighting the "spillover-feedback" mechanism of core economies’ policies (Salvatore & Campano, 2019).   G20 countries form the "core network" of global food trade, whose operational logic embodies the tension between efficiency and equity: on one hand, export powerhouses such as the United States and Brazil occupy more than 70% of global soybean and corn trade volumes through economies of scale and technological advantages, with export trade contributing 45% to agricultural TFP (Xu et al., 2023); on the other hand, import-dependent countries such as Japan and Saudi Arabia outsource 30%–40% of agricultural production links to developing countries through an "environmental cost transfer" model, causing the latter to face issues such as overexploitation of water resources and biodiversity loss (Cabernard et al., 2022). This "core-periphery" structure has intensified the vulnerability of the global food system: the 2022 wheat trade disruption caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict led to food price fluctuations in import-dependent G20 member states 2.3 times higher than in non-member states (Murphy, 2013).   1.3 Research on Trade Networks   Trade network research covers diverse industries such as manufacturing, services, technology trade, and food trade, presenting a landscape of interwoven traditional and emerging fields. Manufacturing, electrical and mechanical industries have long dominated international trade, accounting for over 35% of global merchandise trade, with specialised division networks centred on Germany and Japan as technological hubs and China as a manufacturing centre (Maluck & Donner, 2015; Shiyong et al., 2021). The services sector exhibits a "domestically dominated, cross-border lag" characteristic: financial and business services account for over 50% of domestic trade networks, but cross-border services are restricted by institutional barriers, with only digital services (e.g., cross-border e-commerce) achieving rapid annual growth of 12%–15% (Shiyong et al., 2021; Liu & Tsai, 2022). Technology trade has become a new growth pole, with patent licensing networks in knowledge-intensive industries such as artificial intelligence and biomedicine expanding rapidly, where the U.S., Europe, and China occupy 90% of global core nodes (Liu & Tsai, 2022). Food trade networks are unique due to their strategic attributes: the food trade of 196 countries worldwide exhibits a "resource endowment-driven" structure, with export powerhouses like the U.S. and Brazil dominating soybean and corn networks, import-dependent countries like Japan and Saudi Arabia forming vulnerable peripheral nodes, and G20 countries accounting for over 70% of core trade flows in such networks (Duan et al., 2021).   Research objects in trade networks exhibit a three-dimensional "macro-meso-micro" characteristic. At the macro level, studies focus on national and regional networks, such as connectivity analyses of service trade networks along the Belt and Road Initiative and dependency assessments of G20 food trade networks, revealing that Southeast Asian countries’ dependence on Chinese intermediate goods imports reaches 45%, and food trade volumes among G20 members account for 65% of the global total (Duan et al., 2021; Liu & Tsai, 2022). At the meso level, industry and product networks have become focal points—for example, the regional concentration of global lithium mining supply chains (Chile and Australia control 80% of exports) and the vulnerability of chip trade networks (the top five exporting countries dominate 85% of trade volumes), such studies revealing strategic risks in specific industries (Bernard & Moxnes, 2018). At the micro level, multi-party transaction networks between firms have received extensive attention: Apple’s supplier network covers 43 countries, and transnational grain enterprises like ADM control key nodes in global food supply chains through a "hub-and-spoke" model. Studies show that only 10% of high-productivity firms contribute 70% of export volumes (Rauch, 2001; Bernard & Moxnes, 2018).   The structure and evolution of trade networks are synergistically driven by multiple factors: geography, economy, policy, technology, and crises. Geographically, spatial proximity increases trade volumes between adjacent countries by 40%–60%, trade density among G20 members is 2.1 times that of non-members, and port hub countries (e.g., Singapore) long occupy intermediary centrality in networks due to their locational advantages (Maluck & Donner, 2015; Duan et al., 2021). Economic and resource factors shape network hierarchies: developed economies dominate high-value-added trade (e.g., medical devices), while developing countries rely on resource exports (e.g., Brazilian soybeans), with economic disparities leading to "core-periphery" network structures (Duan et al., 2021; Guo et al., 2023). At the policy and institutional level, regional trade agreements (e.g., USMCA) reduce trade costs among member states by 15%–20%, while trade protection measures (e.g., the 2018 China-U.S. friction) reduce network density in related industries by 8% (Liu & Tsai, 2022; Kosztyán et al., 2024). Technological innovation drives network transformation: digital platforms reduce the participation threshold for small and medium enterprises by 60%, and 3D printing technology reshapes manufacturing supply chains, reducing the proportion of parts and components trade from 70% to 55% (Shiyong et al., 2021; Guo et al., 2023). Crisis events trigger structural restructuring: the 2008 financial crisis reduced global trade network degree centrality by 12%, the 2020 pandemic shifted medical supplies networks from "single-centre" to "multi-regional hubs", and climate crises have intensified the volatility of food trade networks (Maluck & Donner, 2015; Duan et al., 2021; Kosztyán et al., 2024).   2 Evolution Analysis of Food Trade Network among G20 Countries   2.1 Construction of Food Trade Network among G20 Countries   This study downloaded the import and export data of food trade from 2013 to 2024 for 19 countries in the G20 (the European Union is not included as a regional economic organisation) from UN Comtrade, and screened HS codes 1001-1008 according to the 2022 Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, totalling 10,460 records.   The specific food products studied in this paper are shown in Table 1 according to their HS codes:   Table 1:  HS code and name of grain  HS code Name HS code Name 1001 Wheat and spelt 1005 Corn 1002 Rye 1006 Rice 1003 Barley 1007 Sorghum 1004 Oats 1008 Buckwheat   2.2 Evolution of Food Trade Network among G20 Countries   2.2.1 Overall Pattern   Based on the complete data analysis of network density and clustering coefficient of the G20 food trade network from 2013 to 2023, the evolution of this network exhibits clear stage characteristics, while demonstrating structural resilience under multiple crisis impacts. In the initial stage of 2013, both network density (0.8216) and clustering coefficient (0.835) were at high levels, reflecting the close food trade connections among member states and the stability of the network structure. However, in 2014, the indicators plummeted to a trough (density 0.7544, clustering coefficient 0.789), which may be related to the emerging market currency crisis—for example, the trade contraction caused by Argentina's debt default led to a significant short-term shock on the global food circulation network. In the following three years (2015-2017), a continuous recovery trend was observed, and by 2017, the indicators returned to near-initial levels (density 0.8070, clustering coefficient 0.835), indicating that the market self-regulation mechanism and policy coordination jointly promoted network recovery.   Since 2018, the network has entered a five-year recession cycle. Density and clustering coefficient declined simultaneously, reaching a ten-year low in 2022 (density 0.7456, clustering coefficient 0.785), with cumulative declines of 7.6% and 6.0% respectively. This prolonged recession was driven by multiple overlapping crises: a brief rebound in 2020 due to panic grain hoarding at the initial stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (density rebounded to 0.7953), but the long-term effect of supply chain disruptions caused a decline again in 2021; the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 became a turning point, as the interruption of the Black Sea grain corridor directly impacted the core hub accounting for 25% of global grain exports, forcing member states to switch to high-cost alternative trade routes, resulting in the simultaneous deterioration of network tightness and structural stability. It is worth noting that despite the significant recession, the two indicators have consistently maintained above key thresholds (density > 0.75, clustering coefficient > 0.78) over the decade, proving that the basic trade network did not experience a systemic collapse.   The resilient rebound in 2023 is of great significance. Density increased by 2.1% to 0.7611, and the clustering coefficient rose by 2.8% to 0.807, marking the first recovery after five consecutive years of recession. This shift is closely related to the G20 coordination mechanism—the emergency reserve sharing mechanism promoted by the 2022 Bali Declaration on Food Security, and the food circulation within the Asia-Pacific region driven by the G20 (accounting for 58% of G20 traffic), jointly constituted structural support.   However, long-term vulnerabilities cannot be ignored. The deep-seated contradictions behind the overall 7.4% decline in density over a decade urgently need to be resolved: the node dependency risk exposed by the Russia-Ukraine conflict (the two countries account for over 25% of food exports), and the escalating regional differentiation (the 2023 clustering coefficient rebound mainly relies on the Asia-Pacific region, while the participation of Africa and Latin America continues to shrink). Overall, the global governance mechanism of the G20 has a relatively strong ability to resist crises, providing a key stable platform for global food governance. Figure 1:  2013-2023 Density evolution of G20 countries grain network (Source: Data from UN Comtrade) 2.2.2 Community Structure   This study selects 2014, 2019, and 2023 as nodal years to analyse the core-periphery structure of the G20 food trade network based on coreness (Corene), with classification thresholds set as: core (Corene ≥ 0.26), semi-core (0.2 ≤ Corene < 0.26), and periphery (Corene ≤ 0.2). Its evolution exhibits three distinct stages:   First Stage (2014): Initial Differentiation Driven by Resources   Countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Germany formed the core layer (Corene ≥ 0.286) by leveraging resource advantages (e.g., food exports from the U.S. and Brazil) and demand markets (e.g., consumption in India and France), creating "Europe-North America-South America-South Asia" trade clusters. Semi-core countries like China and Italy (Corene 0.215–0.259) relied on resource imports from core regions (e.g., China’s food imports). Peripheral countries such as Saudi Arabia (Corene 0.015) and Australia (Corene ≤ 0.167) were marginalised due to resource disadvantages (e.g., Saudi Arabia’s desert climate) and trade isolation (core-periphery connection density ≤ 0.2).   Second Stage (2019): Hierarchical Adjustment via Policy Empowerment and Regional Integration   China (Corene 0.26) and Russia (Corene 0.26) entered the core layer through Sino-Russian food trade growth (e.g., Russia’s wheat exports to China), reflecting Asia’s rising trade status. Semi-core countries like Brazil and South Africa (Corene 0.257–0.258) became bridges between core and periphery by enhancing trade linkages across South America and Africa. Saudi Arabia (0.076) and Mexico (0.031) remained peripheral due to constraints like insufficient arable land and technological backwardness in modern agriculture, highlighting dual resource-technology bottlenecks.   Third Stage (2023): Structural Reshaping by Geopolitical Shocks and Policy Games   Brazil and South Africa rose from semi-core to core (Corene 0.275) via the African Free Trade Area, which increased intra-core trade density (0.90), demonstrating regional integration’s role in peripheral breakthroughs. Russia’s Corene collapsed to 0 and fell to the periphery due to disrupted trade with Europe from the Russia-Ukraine conflict (core-periphery connection density 0), a typical case of geopolitical shocks subverting hierarchies. Semi-core countries like Canada and Italy (Corene 0.233–0.257) maintained medium connectivity through trade networks in China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN (e.g., China-Vietnam grain trade), serving as transitional hubs between core and periphery. Table 2: Core-periphery countries Years Core Countries Semi-core countries Periphery 2014 CAN DEU USA IND ARG FRA CHN ITA RUS BRA JPN ZAF TUR GBR KOR AUS IDN MEX SAU 2019 CAN USA IND FRA CHN RUS ZAF BRA ITA DEU JPN KOR ARG TUR GBR AUS IDN SAU MEX 2023 BRA ZAF USA FRA IND GBR CAN ITA TUR CHN DEU ARG AUS KOR JPN IDN SAU MEX RUS (Data resource：UN Comtrade)   Figure 2: 2014 Cluster diagramme of G20 countries’ grain network   Figure 3:  2019 Cluster diagramme of G20 countries grain network   Figure 4:  2023 Cluster diagramme of G20 countries grain network This study selects 2014, 2019, and 2023 as nodal years to conduct non-overlapping community analysis on the food trade network among G20 countries. Using the CONCOR algorithm in Ucinet6.0 software, with a maximum partition depth of 2 and a convergence criterion of 0.2, 15 countries were partitioned into multiple blocks. After multiple iterations, a dendrogram expressing the degree of structural equivalence of each trade node was obtained. The block partition results are as follows.   2.2.3 Individual Status   2014: The United States, Italy, India, etc., had degree centrality values reaching 100 (after standardisation), conducting direct trade with most of the 19 G20 countries (e.g., U.S. food exports covered major global markets); peripheral countries such as Mexico (61.111) and Indonesia (66.667) had few trade partners and weak local participation. Core countries (U.S., Italy, India, etc.) had closeness centrality values mostly at 100, achieving high trade efficiency; peripheral countries such as Saudi Arabia (90) and India (75) had long paths and low information dissemination efficiency. Canada (0.812), the United States (0.812), etc., had high betweenness centrality and were regarded as transit hubs controlling (a large number of) trade paths; Mexico (0), India (0.041), etc., had almost no intermediary role and no control over trade flows.   2019: Brazil (100) joined the core ranks, with trade partners increasing from 14 countries (94.444 in 2014) to 18 countries. Germany (94.444) slightly contracted, but the U.S., Italy, and India still maintained 100. Among peripheral countries, India (72.222) and Mexico (55.556) saw increased degree values and enhanced local connections. The closeness centrality of core countries remained stable, and Indonesia (78.261) saw improved closeness; Saudi Arabia (90) still relied on single transit and showed no significant improvement in closeness. The intermediary role of Canada (0.929) and Brazil (0.929) was strengthened, and China (0.795) saw the rise of intermediary capabilities ("Belt and Road" promoted China-EU food trade via China's transit). Peripheral countries (Indonesia, 0.134; Mexico, 0.087) still had weak intermediary roles.   2023: The U.S., Italy, India, Brazil, France, etc., maintained node centrality values of 100; Mexico (72.222) and Indonesia (83.333) further increased their degree values, with peripheral countries' integration approaching the sub-core level. Indonesia (85.714) saw a significant improvement in closeness; Saudi Arabia (85.714) reduced its dependence on single transit countries by deepening trade with GCC countries (Gulf Cooperation Council), with closeness decreasing from 90 to 85.714. The U.S., Brazil, France, Italy, Indonesia, etc., formed balanced transit control; Canada (0.288) saw a weakened intermediary role (increased direct trade in emerging markets reduced the need for North American transit), and China (0.347) saw a decline in betweenness due to optimised trade structures (predominantly direct trade, reduced transit demand). The G20 food trade network achieved closer connections, maximised efficiency, and balanced control, reflecting the optimisation and upgrading of global food supply chains under multilateral cooperation. Table 3:  2014, 2019,  2023 Centrality of G20 countries grain network   2014     2019     2023   Countries Deg Col Bet Deg Col Bet Deg Col Bet BRA 94.444 94.737 0.706 100 100 0.929 100 100 0.729 CAN 100 100 0.812 100 100 0.929 94.444 94.737 0.288 DEU 100 100 0.812 94.444 94.737 0.383 88.889 90 0.347 ZAF 94.444 94.737 0.453 88.889 90 0.285 100 100 0.729 USA 100 100 0.812 100 100 0.929 100 100 0.729 CHN 94.444 94.737 0.362 94.444 94.737 0.795 88.889 90 0.347 SAU 88.889 90 0.084 88.889 90 0.177 83.333 85.714 0.044 FRA 94.444 94.737 0.453 94.444 94.737 0.642 100 100 0.729 AUS 88.889 90 0.321 88.889 90 0.249 94.444 94.737 0.288 IDN 66.667 75 0.041 72.222 78.261 0.134 83.333 85.714 0.044 ITA 100 100 0.812 100 100 0.929 100 100 0.729 JPN 88.889 90 0.259 94.444 94.737 0.383 100 100 0.729 MEX 61.111 72 0 55.556 69.231 0.087 72.222 78.261 0 RUS 100 100 0.812 94.444 94.737 0.795 61.111 72 0 IND 100 100 0.812 100 100 0.929 100 100 0.729 (Data resource：UN Comtrade ) 3 Conclusion 3.1 Conclusions   From 2013 to 2023, the G20 food trade network density decreased by 7.4% overall but remained above 0.75 with clustering coefficients stabilising at 0.78–0.835, demonstrating structural resilience to shocks despite short-term declines from crises like the 2014 emerging market crisis and post-2018 pandemic/Russia-Ukraine conflict impacts, with a 2023 rebound (density=0.7611, clustering=0.807) driven by G20 coordination. The core-periphery structure evolved dynamically: the U.S., Canada, and Germany formed the core in 2014; China and Russia joined via regional policies by 2019; Brazil and South Africa rose to core status through the African Free Trade Area in 2023 while Russia fell to the periphery due to conflict, and China maintained semi-peripheral hub roles with stabilised core degree but reduced betweenness centrality (0.795→0.347), reflecting a shift to direct imports. Key vulnerabilities include path dependence on Russia-Ukraine (25% of exports), triggering 2.3× higher price volatility in import-dependent G20 states in 2022, and regional disparities with the Asia-Pacific accounting for 58% of trade flows versus marginalised Africa/Latin America, compounded by arable land/technology constraints in peripheral countries.   3.2 Recommendations   Strengthen G20 coordination mechanisms by modelling the 2022 Bali Declaration on Food Security to establish regional food reserve pools among core countries (U.S., China, Brazil) and hubs (EU, India) with emergency allocation rules to reduce single-node dependence (e.g., Black Sea Corridor), while standardising export restriction transparency and creating a "policy spillover" early-warning model via G20 Agricultural Ministers’ Meetings. Boost capacity building in African / Southeast Asian peripherals (e.g., South Africa, Indonesia) through G20-backed digital agriculture technology transfer and irrigation investments to enhance TFP, and support AFCFTA/RCEP food trade facilitation to increase regional connection density. Optimise China’s strategy by diversifying imports from Brazil/Argentina and Central Asia/Eastern Europe via the Belt and Road Initiative and leveraging G20 platforms for joint R&D in digital agriculture / gene breeding to enhance global food trade rule-making participation and supply chain security.   References   Bernard, A. & Moxnes, A. 2018. Networks and Trade. S&P Global Market Intelligence Research Paper Series. https://doi.org/10.1146/ANNUREV-ECONOMICS-080217-053506.   Bringmann, B., Berlingerio, M., Bonchi, F. & Gionis, A. 2010. Learning and Predicting the Evolution of Social Networks. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 25, 26-35. https://doi.org/10.1109/MIS.2010.91.   Cabernard, L., Pfister, S. & Hellweg, S. 2022. Improved sustainability assessment of the G20’s supply chains of materials, fuels, and food. Environmental Research Letters, 17. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ac52c7.   Doreian, P. & Stokman, F. 1997. Evolution of Social Networks (1st ed.), 233-250. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203059500   Duan, J., Nie, C., Wang, Y., Yan, D. & Xiong, W. 2021. Research on Global Grain Trade Network Pattern and Its Driving Factors. Sustainability. https://doi.org/10.3390/su14010245.   Ercsey-Ravasz, M., Toroczkai, Z., Lakner, Z. & Baranyi, J. 2012. Complexity of the International Agro-Food Trade Network and Its Impact on Food Safety. PLoS ONE, 7. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0037810 .   Guo, J., Mao, K., Yuan, Z., Qin, Z., Xu, T., Bateni, S., Zhao, Y. & Ye, C. 2021. Global Food Security Assessment during 1961–2019. Sustainability, 13(24), 14005. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132414005 .   Guo, R., Wang, T., Xu, C. & Zhou, Y. 2023. Research on the Relationship Between International Trade and Network. Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences, 56. https://doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/56/20231051.   Guo, T. 2009. Contemporary International Trade Theory Development and Evolution. Journal of Guangxi University of Finance and Economics.   Hellmann, T. & Staudigl, M. 2012. Evolution of Social Networks. Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Paper No. 470 . https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2321900.   Herman, P. 2021. Modeling complex network patterns in international trade. Review of World Economics, 158, 127-179. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-021-00429-y.   Hui-Gang, H. 2006. The Evolution of International Trade Theories and its Enlightenments. Journal of Hubei University of Economics.   Jackson, M. & Watts, A. 2002. The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks. J. Econ. Theory, 106, 265-295. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2903 .   Jeyarajah, S. 2021. A Survey of the Evolution of International Trade Theories, 10, 66-70.   Kossinets, G. & Watts, D. 2006. Empirical Analysis of an Evolving Social Network. Science, 311, 88-90. https://doi.org/10.1126/SCIENCE.1116869.   Kosztyán, Z., Kiss, D. & Fehérvölgyi, B. 2024. Trade network dynamics in a globalized environment and on the edge of crises. Journal of Cleaner Production, 465. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.142699.   Kozyrev, A. 2024. The evolution of international trade theories in the 20th–21st centuries. Economics of Contemporary Russia, 4. https://doi.org/10.33293/1609-1442-2024-4107-128-140 .   Lee, J. 2020. A Study on the Research Trends in International Trade using Social Network Analysis. The Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society, 21, 465-476. https://doi.org/10.5762/KAIS.2020.21.11.465.   Li, Y., Luo, P. & Pin, P. 2020. Utility-Based Model for Characterizing the Evolution of Social Networks. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems, 50, 1083-1094. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSMC.2017.2690827 .   Liu, W., Sidhu, A., Beacom, A. & Valente, T. 2017. Social Network Theory. In The International Encyclopedia of Media Effects (eds Rössler, P., Hoffner, C.A. & Zoonen, L.). 1-12. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118783764.WBIEME0092 .   Liu, X. 2022. New Development of International Trade Theory and Differentiation of International Trade Pattern. International Journal of Scientific Research, 11(7). https://doi.org/10.36106/ijsr/8623221.   Liu, Y. & Tsai, S. 2022. Dynamic Evolution of Service Trade Network Structure and Influence Mechanism in Countries along the “Belt and Road” with Big Data Analysis. Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 8378137. https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/8378137 .   Maluck, J. & Donner, R. 2015. A Network of Networks Perspective on Global Trade. PLoS ONE, 10. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0133310.   Murphy, S. 2013. The G-20 and Food Security: What is the Right Agenda? International Organisations Research Journal, 8, 73-91.   Qiao, H., Zheng, F., Jiang, H. & Dong, K. 2019. The greenhouse effect of the agriculture-economic growth-renewable energy nexus: Evidence from G20 countries. The Science of the Total Environment, 671, 722-731. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.03.336.   Rauch, J. 2001. Business and Social Networks in International Trade. Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 1177-1203. https://doi.org/10.1257/JEL.39.4.1177.   Rizwanullah, M., Shi, J., Nasrullah, M., Zhou, X. 2024. The influence of environmental diplomacy, economic determinants and renewable energy consumption on environmental degradation: Empirical evidence of G20 countries. PLOS ONE, 19(3): e0300921.  https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0300921 .   Salvatore, D. & Campano, F. 2019. Global Implications of U.S. Trade Policies for Reducing Structural Trade Imbalances. Journal of Policy Modeling. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97692-1_1.   Scott, J. 1988. Social Network Analysis. Sociology, 22, 109-127. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038588022001007.   Shiyong, Z., Bing, C. & Biqing, L. 2021. Analysis on the evolution of Global trade space based on SNA. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Intelligent Information Processing (ICIIP '21). Association for Computing Machinery, New York. 72–85. https://doi.org/10.1145/3480571.3480583 .   Ubaldi, E., Burioni, R., Loreto, V. & Tria, F. 2021. Emergence and evolution of social networks through exploration of the Adjacent Possible space. Communications Physics, 4. https://doi.org/10.1038/s42005-021-00527-1.   Venherska, N. & Lubenets, I. 2021. Retrospective of International Trade Theories. Economic Space, 175, 19-22. https://doi.org/10.32782/2224-6282/175-3.   Wang, D. 2006. The Evolution of International Trade Theory and Agricultural Development. Commercial Research.   Wang, J. & Dai, C. 2021. Evolution of Global Food Trade Patterns and Its Implications for Food Security Based on Complex Network Analysis. Foods, 10. https://doi.org/10.3390/foods10112657 .   Wang, X., Ma, L., Yan, S., Chen, X. & Growe, A. 2023. Trade for Food Security: The Stability of Global Agricultural Trade Networks. Foods, 12. https://doi.org/10.3390/foods12020271 .   Xu, H., Niu, N., Li, D. & Wang, C. 2024. A Dynamic Evolutionary Analysis of the Vulnerability of Global Food Trade Networks. Sustainability, 16(10), 3998. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16103998 .   Xu, J., Wang, Y., Zhao, X., Etuah, S., Liu, Z. & Zhu, H. 2023. Can agricultural trade improve total factor productivity? Empirical evidence from G20 countries. Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2023.1100038.   Xu, P. 2019. The Development of International Trade Theory. [Online] Available at: https://webofproceedings.org/proceedings_series/ESSP/ICISS%202019/ICISS19055.pdf  [accessed: 30 January 2026].   Zhong, Y. 2024. Research of Theories on International Trade from the Perspective of Globalization: 1945-2023. Academic Journal of Business & Management, 6(2), 152-159. https://doi.org/10.25236/ajbm.2024.060222. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Articles Click on the article title below to read: Towards a GNU Plus model: Inclusive public policy responses to South Africa’s governance and development crisis Prof William Gumede Comparative policy analysis: The ANC’s NGC Economic Framework and the Inclusive Society Institute’s Growth Vision Daryl Swanepoel  Whose data is it anyway? Tebogo Keitheile G20 Essays Africa's Blue Finance Development under the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Xingcan Zhou Current Situation and Prospect of Green Channel for African Agricultural Products Exporting to China Yuxin Tang Evolution and mechanism of grain trade network in G20 countries Jiajun Fan Empowering modernisation, Building the future: Exploring China-Africa Cooperation’s support for Africa’s sustainable modernisation within the G20 framework WenTao Lin

Copyright © 2026   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report was prepared with the assistance of AI technology, including ChatGPT.   Certain images were generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature.   JANUARY 2026   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   CONTENTS   Executive Summary Section 1: Introduction and purpose of the study visit Section 2: Finland’s education system - core principles and institutional culture Section 3: Mother-tongue education: Pedagogy, identity and cognitive development Section 4: Multilingualism without polarisation Section 5: The ‘one facility, two or more schools’ model: Pragmatic expansion without displacement Section 6: Implications for South Africa: from policy paralysis to pragmatic adaptation Section 7: Education, social cohesion and the long view of nation-building Section 8: Conclusion – From study visit to policy action Section 9: Methodological note and source boundaries Section 10: Acknowledgements and closing note Annexure a: The ministry of justice and the governance of linguistic rights in Finland Annexure b: Mother-tongue education, multilingual pedagogy and the Finnish educational approach Annexure c: Cognitive development, language and the pedagogical logic of co-located schooling – insights from the university of Helsinki Annexure d: Minority-language community perspectives on schooling, identity and institutional survival – Reflections from Folktinget Annexure e: Policy options and implementation pathways Sources consulted A. Interviews and study visit engagements (primary sources) B. Selected supplementary sources (contextual)   Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:1401612772 | Credit: evgenyatamanenko EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report arises from a study visit undertaken to examine international approaches to mother-tongue education, multilingualism and institutional design, with a particular focus on the Finnish experience. The visit was motivated by ongoing debates in South Africa regarding language in education, educational equity, social cohesion and the long-term sustainability of multilingualism in a highly unequal society. Rather than seeking models for direct transplantation, the purpose of the visit was to identify principles, tensions and institutional logics that may inform context-appropriate policy choices in South Africa.   A central finding of the study visit is that debates about mother-tongue education are frequently framed in overly binary terms. In many international discussions, particularly those reflected in United Nations-associated literature, mother-tongue instruction is presented as a foundational cognitive intervention, especially in contexts of inequality where learners are required to acquire knowledge through languages they do not yet command. By contrast, several Finnish academics and practitioners expressed caution about treating mother-tongue instruction as a singular or decisive driver of cognitive performance. This divergence, however, does not represent a contradiction in principle, but a difference of context.   Finland constitutes a distinctive educational environment characterised by strong early childhood education, high baseline language comprehension, consistently high teaching quality, low levels of socio-economic inequality and robust institutional capacity for early learner support. In such conditions, language of instruction is less likely to function as a binding cognitive constraint, and pedagogical quality can mitigate learning barriers that would be structurally decisive in weaker systems. The Finnish position should therefore be understood as context-specific, rather than universally generalisable. The report argues that Finland is an outlier in the cognitive debate precisely because it is not operating under the conditions that give language its strongest cognitive salience elsewhere.   The study visit also revealed an important nuance in Finnish academic and policy thinking. While Finnish scholars caution against treating mother-tongue education as a rigid or universally determinative policy instrument, this caution does not reflect a dismissal of its cognitive value. Rather, it distinguishes between recognising the importance of strong first-language grounding for comprehension, reflective thinking and cognitive confidence, and resisting its translation into inflexible or ideologically framed policy prescriptions. This distinction is particularly significant for multilingual societies marked by inequality, where weak first-language grounding functions not as a marginal pedagogical issue, but as a structural cognitive constraint.   At the same time, there was broad and consistent agreement across Finnish interlocutors, including educators, academics and minority-language representatives, that mother-tongue education plays a vital role in affirming learner identity, dignity and belonging. This point was not framed sentimentally, but institutionally. Language was repeatedly described as central to recognition, legitimacy and participation within the education system and society more broadly and even where cognitive claims were treated with caution, the social and ethical case for sustaining linguistic diversity was unequivocally affirmed.   The report also identifies a structural risk that is highly relevant to the South African context: the risk of default anglicisation. In the absence of deliberate institutional design, parental aspiration, labour-market incentives and historical resource patterns tend to push education systems towards English as the dominant medium of instruction, which drift occurs not through explicit policy decisions, but through incremental choices that privilege convenience over constitutional intent. One of its most damaging consequences is the confinement of high-quality indigenous-language schooling to rural and township contexts, while suburban and well-resourced areas remain linguistically homogeneous. Against this background, the report advances the “one facility, two or more schools” model as a practical and expansionary institutional pathway. Rather than framing language policy as a zero-sum redistribution of existing schools, this approach treats school infrastructure as a public asset capable of supporting multiple language-specific schools under clearly defined governance arrangements, which crucially, distinguishes between shared facilities and shared institutional identity. The model allows for the establishment of, for example, fully fledged isiZulu-, isiXhosa- or other indigenous-language schools within suburban settings, while preserving autonomy, leadership and linguistic integrity and in doing so, it decouples language from geography and socio-economic status, expanding access without displacement. The Finnish experience reinforces the importance of institutional discipline in safeguarding and sustaining multilingualism. Language erosion rarely occurs through formal policy reversal, it occurs when institutional environments normalise convenience over rights, leading speakers of less dominant languages to relinquish their claims in everyday practice. Finland addresses this risk not through heavy enforcement, but through clearly located responsibility, routine monitoring and strong institutional signals that linguistic rights are ordinary matters of administrative compliance, rather than episodic sources of dispute. The report argues that South Africa does not necessarily require new institutions in this regard, but does require clearer ownership, coordination and proactive oversight within its existing governance landscape.   Importantly, the report does not present Finland as a model to be replicated. Instead, it treats the Finnish experience as a set of disciplined responses to enduring tensions between language, identity, cognition and institutional capacity. The annexures to the report document these perspectives from four distinct vantage points: state governance, educational practice, academic analysis and minority-language community experience. They are intended to provide depth and triangulation, not to extend or alter the report’s core arguments.   The report concludes that South Africa does not face a choice between mother-tongue education and social cohesion, nor between multilingualism and global participation. The real challenge lies in institutional design and implementation discipline. Mother-tongue education should neither be treated as a panacea, nor dismissed as impractical, because if properly designed, it can reduce avoidable learning barriers, affirm dignity and belonging and it can contribute to a more cohesive and inclusive education system. Achieving this will require structured experimentation, careful piloting, professional trust and a willingness to move beyond fear-driven binaries, and towards pragmatic and context-sensitive solutions. SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY VISIT   Source: This composite image strips was generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature. This report arises from a study visit to Finland, undertaken at a moment when debates about education in South Africa have become increasingly polarised, emotive, and, at times, detached from practical solutions. The visit was not conceived as an exercise in idealisation or replication. Finland’s social history, institutional maturity and demographic profile differ fundamentally from those of South Africa. Rather, the purpose of the study visit was to examine how a high-performing education system approaches questions of language, equity, identity and learning outcomes,  and to reflect critically on what lessons, if any, may be adapted within South Africa’s constitutional, social and fiscal realities.   The decision to focus on Finland was deliberate. For more than two decades, Finland has been recognised internationally not only for strong learning outcomes, but for the consistency and coherence of its education system. Crucially, its success has not been driven by relentless reform cycles, competitive ranking pressures or technocratic over-engineering. Instead, it rests on a relatively simple, but demanding set of principles: trust in teachers, equity as a design feature, rather than a remedial afterthought and a deep respect for the role of language in cognitive development and personal dignity.   For South Africa, being a country in which educational inequality remains one of the most enduring legacies of apartheid, these themes resonate sharply, in that despite substantial post-1994 investment in access, infrastructure and curriculum reform, outcomes remain profoundly uneven and language policy sits at the centre of this challenge. Moreover, whilst the Constitution affirms multilingualism and the right to receive education in the language of one’s choice where reasonably practicable, the implementation thereof has been hesitant, inconsistent and often politically charged. Mother-tongue education is frequently discussed either as an idealistic aspiration or as a threat to social cohesion, rather than as a pragmatic developmental strategy grounded in evidence.   The study visit therefore set out to interrogate three interrelated questions. Firstly, how does Finland conceptualise and operationalise mother-tongue education within a multilingual society, without turning language into a zero-sum political battleground? Secondly, what institutional arrangements, particularly those with regard to teacher education, school governance and curriculum autonomy, make this approach viable in practice, rather than merely being a defensible in theory? And thirdly, what insights can be translated into the South African context through careful adaptation? Importantly, this report does not treat education policy in isolation, since throughout the study visit, it became clear that Finland’s approach to schooling is inseparable from broader questions of social trust, cohesion and long-term nation-building. Language is not approached as a marker of hierarchy or exclusion, but as a foundation for learning, participation and shared citizenship, which perspective offers a valuable counterpoint to South Africa’s often reactive debates, where language is too easily framed as either an obstacle to transformation or a proxy for historical grievance.   The purpose of this report, then, is threefold. It seeks first to document key observations from the Finnish education system, with particular attention to mother-tongue instruction and multilingual practice. Second, it aims to analyse why these approaches work within their institutional and cultural setting. Third, and most importantly, it proposes a set of reflections for South Africa that move beyond abstract principle, towards practical pathways, including the exploration of models that expand access to mother-tongue education without displacement, exclusion or institutional rupture.   What follows is not a blueprint, nor a prescriptive policy manual. It is an attempt to bring seriousness, evidence and pragmatism back into a conversation too often dominated by ideology or fear. In doing so, the report positions education, and language policy in particular, not merely as a sectoral concern, but as a central pillar of South Africa’s long-term project of building an inclusive, cohesive and capable society. SECTION 2: FINLAND’S EDUCATION SYSTEM - CORE PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE   Source: This composite image strips was generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature. The study visit engagements made clear that the performance of the Finnish education system cannot be understood through discrete interventions or isolated policy instruments. What distinguishes the system is not a single reform, but a coherent institutional culture in which values, governance arrangements and professional practice are closely aligned. Education in Finland functions as a public trust, rather than a contested policy battleground, and this orientation shapes decisions at every level of the system.   A defining feature repeatedly emphasised during the visit was the centrality of trust. Finnish education governance is built on a presumption of professional competence, rather than on suspicion and compliance. Teachers are not treated as implementers of centrally prescribed scripts, but as skilled professionals capable of exercising judgement in the classroom, trust which is neither naïve nor unconditional, in that it is earned through rigorous initial teacher education and sustained through a culture of accountability that is internalised, rather than externally imposed. The absence of high-stakes inspection regimes and constant standardised testing is not a sign of laxity, but of confidence in the system’s human capital.   Closely linked to this is the status and preparation of teachers. Throughout the study visit, teacher education emerged as a cornerstone of system quality. Entry into the profession is selective, training is research-informed and pedagogical formation is treated as intellectually demanding work. This investment has long-term consequences. Teachers are equipped not merely to deliver content, but to also adapt instruction to the needs of the learners, their linguistic backgrounds and their developmental stages. In such a context, debates about language of instruction are not reduced to administrative compliance, but are approached as pedagogical questions requiring professional discernment.   Another recurring theme was the system’s commitment to equity as a design principle, rather than a compensatory measure. Finnish education policy does not rely on elite pathways, selective schools or differentiated curricula to produce excellence, but instead, it seeks to raise the floor for all learners by ensuring that schools are adequately resourced, supported and trusted to meet diverse needs. During site visits and discussions, officials consistently framed educational success not in terms of producing a narrow cohort of top performers, but in minimising failure and exclusion. This orientation is especially relevant to language policy, where early disadvantage can quickly compound into long-term educational marginalisation.   Institutionally, this equity focus is reinforced by a high degree of coherence between national frameworks and local implementation, but while there is a national curriculum, it functions as a guiding framework, rather than a rigid prescription. Municipalities and schools retain significant autonomy to adapt curricula to local circumstances, including linguistic composition and community context. This balance between national consistency and local flexibility enables responsiveness without fragmentation and it also reduces the likelihood that language policy becomes a proxy for political contestation, in that decisions are embedded within professional and institutional processes, rather than in public confrontation.   The study visit also highlighted the importance of stability. Finland has resisted the temptation of constant structural reform, because it recognises that educational change is cumulative and generational. Policies are allowed time to mature, practices to settle and institutions to learn, a long-term perspective that fosters predictability for educators and learners alike and which reduces the fatigue and cynicism that often accompany perpetual reform agendas. It is in such an environment that debates about pedagogy and language can be approached deliberatively, rather than defensively. Taken together, these elements point to a system where outcomes flow less from technical sophistication than from institutional alignment, and where trust, professionalism, equity and stability reinforce one another, thereby creating conditions in which complex issues such as multilingual education can be handled pragmatically and without undue politicisation. The lesson for South Africa is not that these features can be transplanted wholesale, but that sustainable improvement depends on cultivating an enabling institutional culture, which goes beyond merely adjusting policy levers.   This institutional context is essential for understanding Finland’s approach to mother-tongue education and multilingualism. Language practices observed during the study visit are not stand-alone innovations, they are embedded within a broader system that values learner comprehension, professional judgement and social cohesion and it is to this substantive engagement with language, cognition and identity that the report now turns. SECTION 3: MOTHER-TONGUE EDUCATION: PEDAGOGY, IDENTITY AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT   Source: This composite image strips was generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature. In Finland , the use of a learner’s first language in the early years of schooling is not treated as a cultural concession or a symbolic affirmation of identity. Rather, it is understood as a pedagogical foundation upon which comprehension, reasoning and confidence are built.   A note of tension: Finnish academic caution and the mainstream international view One of the more illuminating aspects of the Finland engagements was that not all Finnish academic interlocutors framed mother-tongue education as the decisive or “critical” explanatory factor behind system performance. This differs from the dominant international framing, including those United Nations-associated norms and reports that were referenced in preparation for the visit, which tend to treat mother-tongue-based education, particularly in the early years, as a foundational enabler of comprehension, equity and sustained learning [1] . The value of this tension is precisely that it forces conceptual discipline. The Finnish caution does not necessarily refute the cognitive logic of learning in a familiar language. Rather, it suggests that in a high-capacity system with strong teacher preparation, stable governance and high social trust, language policy may operate as one component within a wider institutional ecology and not as a single “silver bullet”. The mainstream international view, by contrast, is often articulated with particular urgency in contexts of inequality, where the cognitive load of learning through an unfamiliar language compounds disadvantage and accelerates dropout, underperformance and disengagement.   While Finnish education policy and academic discourse are often presented internationally as unequivocally supportive of mother-tongue instruction, which it is, closer engagement actually reveals a more nuanced and internally contested position. Finnish academics and practitioners consistently caution against treating mother-tongue education as a rigid or universally determinative policy instrument, particularly in multilingual or socially complex settings. This caution should not be read as a dismissal of the value of mother-tongue education’s role in aiding cognitive development and reflective thinking. Rather, it reflects concern about over-essentialising language as identity, the risks associated with weak or uneven implementation and the assumption that cognitive gains will follow automatically in the absence of strong pedagogical design.   At the same time, empirical research from Finland demonstrates a clear and measurable relationship between first-language grammatical and metalinguistic mastery and the development of higher-order cognitive capacities, including syntactic control, metacognition and the ability to consciously shape and revise meaning. Taken together, these perspectives suggest that Finnish scholarship carefully distinguishes between recognising the cognitive value of strong first-language grounding and resisting its translation into inflexible or ideologically framed policy prescriptions [2] .   It is important to state explicitly that Finland is something of an outlier in this debate, not because the cognitive logic of learning in a familiar language is wrong, but because Finland’s institutional conditions soften the extent to which language functions as a binding cognitive constraint. The Finnish system is characterised by unusually high levels of institutional alignment, teacher professionalism, stability and social trust, which create an enabling environment in which learning barriers can be identified early and addressed through pedagogical practice, rather than being left to compound.   In many of the contexts that shape mainstream international and UN-associated arguments, the institutional environment is far weaker and inequality far sharper and in such settings, requiring learners to acquire foundational literacy and numeracy through an unfamiliar language materially increases cognitive load and accelerates disengagement [3] .   For South Africa, this divergence is not a reason to abandon mother-tongue approaches, nor to treat them as a panacea. It is a reason to be more precise about what claim is being made. The argument is not that mother-tongue education automatically produces high performance, but that it can reduce avoidable cognitive barriers and widen meaningful participation, provided that the institutional conditions for quality teaching, materials and progression are deliberately built around it.   The Finnish nuance is important precisely because it is often lost when mother-tongue education is debated in Global South contexts. In relatively linguistically secure systems such as Finland’s, where the vast majority of learners encounter their mother tongue consistently across home, school and public life, the cognitive foundations provided by first-language mastery are largely taken for granted. This allows Finnish scholars to focus their critique on questions of pedagogy, flexibility and policy design, rather than on linguistic access itself. In contrast, in multilingual societies, such as South Africa, where large numbers of learners experience early schooling in a language they do not fully command, weak first-language grounding becomes a structural cognitive constraint, rather than a marginal pedagogical concern.   In such contexts, the Finnish evidence suggests that the absence of strong mother-tongue grammatical and metalinguistic mastery is likely to impede the development of reflective thinking, conceptual clarity, and executive control over learning itself. The Finnish debate therefore does not undermine the case for mother-tongue education in the Global South, rather, it underscores the need to distinguish carefully between cognitive foundations and policy form, recognising that what can be treated flexibly in Finland may represent a binding developmental constraint elsewhere.   Notwithstanding these differences of emphasis, there was broad agreement across Finnish educators and academics, as well as in the international frameworks referenced during the study visit, on one foundational point: that education in a learner’s mother tongue plays a significant role not only in supporting comprehension and cognitive confidence, but also in affirming self-worth, identity and a sense of belonging. This was not presented as a sentimental or symbolic consideration, but as a lived pedagogical reality. Learners who encounter schooling through a language that reflects who they are and how they experience the world are more likely to feel recognised, respected and secure within the learning environment.   That sense of recognition, in turn, underpins engagement, participation and trust in the institution of the school itself and so even where mother-tongue education was not framed as the decisive driver of cognitive performance, it was consistently acknowledged as an important contributor to learner dignity and social inclusion, particularly in linguistically diverse societies. In this respect, the value of mother-tongue instruction lies not only in how learners think, but in how they come to see themselves as legitimate participants in the educational and social order.   Across engagements with educators, school leaders and education officials, a consistent logic emerged: learning is most effective when conceptual understanding precedes linguistic transition. In practice, this means that early literacy, numeracy and problem-solving are anchored in the language most familiar to the learner. The objective is not linguistic isolation, nor the permanent insulation of learners from additional languages, but the establishment of cognitive depth before the gradual expansion into second and third languages. Language, in this approach, functions as a cognitive bridge, rather than a barrier.   The study visit also highlighted the close relationship between language and learner confidence. Finnish educators repeatedly emphasised that early schooling should cultivate curiosity, participation and a willingness to engage with complex ideas. Where learners are required to grapple simultaneously with unfamiliar concepts and an unfamiliar language, the risk is not merely slower progress, but disengagement and self-doubt, but by contrast, instruction in the mother tongue allows learners to demonstrate understanding, ask questions freely and develop a secure sense of competence. This confidence then carries over as additional languages are introduced.   Importantly, mother-tongue education in Finland is not divorced from questions of identity and dignity. While pedagogical considerations dominate, educators acknowledged that language affirms belonging and recognition when learners experience the school environment as one in which who they are and how they speak are valued, rather than corrected or marginalised. This does not translate into linguistic relativism or lowered expectations, instead, it reinforces high standards by ensuring that learners are cognitively equipped to meet them. During the visit, an alternative view was explicitly acknowledged and discussed, being that early immersion in a dominant or global language, most often English, may offer cognitive or developmental advantages by accelerating access to wider bodies of knowledge and global opportunity. Proponents of this view argue that the delaying of  immersion risks entrenching disadvantage in a world that is unequal and where language proficiency is closely linked to economic mobility.   Finnish educators did not dismiss this argument out of hand and instead, they responded by drawing a clear distinction between exposure and understanding. Early exposure to an additional language was not rejected, however, what was questioned was the assumption that exposure alone produces meaningful cognition. From the Finnish perspective, immersion without comprehension may on the surface yield familiarity, but it weakens conceptual mastery and thus the concern is that learners may appear linguistically competent, while in reality lacking the deeper reasoning skills that are necessary for sustained academic progression.   This response was grounded not in abstract theory, but in observed outcomes and long-standing practice. Finnish schooling prioritises depth over speed, favouring a developmental sequence in which strong foundations support later acceleration and thus the aim is not to shield learners from global languages, but to ensure that when such languages become the medium of instruction, learners will possess the cognitive tools to succeed within them.   The study visit further revealed that this approach is facilitated by the broader institutional context as was discussed in Section 2 of this report, which requires high levels of teacher professionalism to allow for differentiated instruction, careful pacing and curriculum flexibility that enables schools to introduce additional languages without undermining comprehension in core subjects. Trust-based governance reduces the pressure to produce immediate, standardised results at the expense of long-term learning.   For South Africa , the relevance of these observations lies less in replication than it does in reframing the debate. Language of instruction is often treated as a proxy for political alignment or economic aspiration, rather than as a pedagogical choice with cognitive consequences. The Finnish experience, on the other hand, suggests that the question is not whether learners should acquire proficiency in global languages, but when and on what cognitive foundation this transition should occur.   This section does not claim universal validity for a single model. It recognises that historical, social and institutional conditions differ markedly. What it does offer is a grounded illustration of how mother-tongue education, when embedded within a coherent system and supported by professional capacity, can serve both cognitive development and social cohesion. The implications of this insight, particularly for multilingual societies grappling with inequality, form the basis for the discussion that follows on multilingualism without polarisation and the institutional arrangements required to sustain it. SECTION 4: MULTILINGUALISM WITHOUT POLARISATION   Source: This composite image strips was generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature. One of the most striking observations made during the study visit was the absence of overt conflict around language in the everyday functioning of the Finnish education system, probably because multilingualism in Finland  is not framed as a zero-sum contest between linguistic communities, nor as a threat to national cohesion. It is, instead, treated as a normal condition of a modern society, which is managed through institutional design, rather than political confrontation.   This depoliticised approach does not imply the absence of linguistic diversity or historical sensitivity. Finland’s own linguistic landscape, shaped by the coexistence of Finnish, Swedish and a range of minority and migrant languages, has required careful accommodation over time. What distinguishes the Finnish approach, as encountered during the study visit, is the way in which language policy is embedded within professional and administrative processes, rather than allowing for it to be elevated into a recurring public controversy. Decisions about language of instruction, support for minority languages and transitions between languages are handled within schools and municipalities within guidelines provided by national frameworks, but which is often adapted to local realities.   A key factor in avoiding polarisation is the system’s emphasis on functionality, where language is approached primarily as a means of enabling learning, participation and progression, rather than as a marker of hierarchy or entitlement, which functional orientation reduces the incentive to instrumentalise language for broader political purposes. Because when language is understood as serving the learner, rather than the ideology of a group, the stakes of debate are lowered and space is created for pragmatic compromise.   Multilingualism is normalised through sequencing, rather than simultaneity, meaning that learners are not expected to master multiple languages at once and/or in ways that overwhelm their cognitive capacity. Instead, languages are introduced in a deliberate and staged manner, that is aligned with scholar developmental readiness and instructional purpose, which is a sequence that reinforces the insight that was discussed in Section 3 of the report. The notion is that cognitive depth in one language can support, rather than inhibit, the acquisition of additional languages. Multilingualism thus emerges as an outcome of careful design, rather than as an unstructured accumulation of demands. Another important observation was the role of institutional trust in sustaining multilingual practices, and because educators are trusted to exercise professional judgement, language-related decisions do not require constant external validation or political arbitration. Teachers are able to adjust instruction, provide targeted support and communicate with parents without fear that flexibility will be interpreted as non-compliance or favouritism, which professional space is critical in multilingual settings, in that rigid rules are rarely adequate to manage the diversity of learner needs.   The Finnish approach also benefits from a broader societal consensus on the purpose of education, in which schooling is widely understood as a public good that is aimed at fostering capable, confident and socially integrated citizens and so, within this consensus, linguistic diversity is accommodated as part of the collective project, rather than as a centrifugal force that pulls communities apart. It is a shared understanding that reduces the temptation to frame language as a battleground for unresolved historical or political grievances. For South Africa , these observations are particularly salient, in that language debates in the education system are often proxies for deeper anxieties about identity, power and belonging and in such an environment, policy choices can easily harden into symbols, which makes compromise difficult and implementation fraught. The Finnish experience does not offer a simple solution to these challenges, but what it does, however, is to demonstrate that multilingualism need not be inherently polarising if it is approached through institutional practice, rather than political theatre.   The implication is not that South Africa can or should depoliticise language through decree. Rather, it suggests that careful institutional design, including clear frameworks, professional autonomy and local flexibility, can gradually reduce the salience of language as a source of conflict and by embedding multilingualism in the routine workings of schools and educational governance, rather than in episodic public battles, it becomes possible to shift the conversation from identity defence to learner development.   This understanding provides a critical bridge to the next section. It will explore how institutional arrangements and infrastructure can be leveraged to expand access to mother-tongue education without displacement or exclusion. The question is no longer whether multilingualism is desirable, but instead, how it can be operationalised in ways that can strengthen both learning outcomes and social cohesion. SECTION 5: THE ‘ONE FACILITY, TWO OR MORE SCHOOLS’ MODEL: PRAGMATIC EXPANSION WITHOUT DISPLACEMENT   Source: This composite image strips was generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature.   One of the most generative reflections to emerge from the study visit was not a single policy instrument observed in Finland , but an institutional logic that has direct relevance for South Africa’s most intractable education debates. Throughout engagements with Finnish educators and administrators, it became clear that the expansion of linguistic accommodation has been approached as a matter of capacity-building, rather than redistribution. This insight provides the conceptual foundation for what this report describes as the “one facility, two or more schools” model.   In Finland, the use of shared educational facilities to accommodate different linguistic or curricular streams is neither exceptional nor controversial, in that school buildings are understood as public assets serving a defined community, not as exclusive territories tied to a single linguistic identity. Within this framework it becomes possible for different language streams to coexist in separate schools located within the same physical infrastructure. Their independence is secured in that they are governed by clearly separated administrative arrangements and supported by professional collaboration. Importantly, this coexistence does not require the dilution of educational standards or the erosion of institutional culture, on the contrary, it is enabled by clarity of purpose and mutual recognition of legitimacy.   Transposed conceptually to South Africa , this approach offers a way out of the false binary that has long dominated debates about language and schooling. Too often, the expansion of mother-tongue education in African languages is perceived as necessitating the displacement or downgrading of existing Afrikaans-medium schools, particularly those with strong infrastructure and institutional capacity, which framing has fuelled resistance, litigation and political mobilisation, while doing little to expand overall access or improve outcomes.   The “one facility, two or more schools” model rejects this zero-sum logic. It starts from the premise that South Africa’s educational challenge is not the redistribution of scarcity, but the expansion of effective provision. Many Afrikaans-medium schools possess physical infrastructure, governance experience and pedagogical expertise that could support additional language streams without undermining their existing educational offering. By treating facilities as platforms for expansion, rather than prizes to be reallocated, it becomes possible to grow access to mother-tongue education in African languages while preserving institutional stability.   Crucially, this model does not imply forced integration or administrative homogenisation. Distinct schools or language streams would retain their identity, governance structures and pedagogical focus, even while sharing physical space and certain services, with the emphasis is on functional co-location, rather than symbolic merger. This distinction matters, since it reduces the perceived threat to existing communities whilst at the same time opening space for practical cooperation, which the Finnish experience suggests can work where roles are clear, expectations are aligned and professional trust is present.   The study visit also underscored that shared-facility models require careful institutional design, where timetabling, staffing, leadership responsibilities and accountability mechanisms must be clearly delineated, because without such clarity the co-location of different schools could risk becoming a source of friction, rather than synergy. However, when properly structured, shared facilities can foster informal professional exchange, resource efficiency and it can promote a broader sense of common purpose across the linguistic lines.   From a social cohesion perspective, the significance of this model lies in its ability to decouple language from conflict, in that it doesn’t frame language policy as a struggle over ownership and loss, but rather as a collective effort to expand opportunity. The physical proximity of different language communities that are enabled to operate side by side within a shared public institution, can normalise diversity without forcing premature integration. In this sense, cohesion is built through coexistence and mutual recognition and not through enforced uniformity.   This section does not propose an immediate blueprint for implementation, nor does it underestimate the legal, administrative and political complexities involved, instead, it advances a conceptual pathway grounded in the logic observed during the study visit: that inclusive systems grow by adding capacity, not by redistributing insecurity. The task for South Africa is to explore how this logic might be operationalised within its constitutional framework and by/through the provincial education systems.   The implications of this model extend beyond infrastructure. They point towards a broader reorientation of policy thinking, away from defensive debates about loss and entitlement, and towards constructive questions about how public assets can be mobilised to serve a multilingual society. It is these systemic implications, and their relationship to education as a driver of social cohesion and nation-building, that the report addresses in the next section. SECTION 6: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA: FROM POLICY PARALYSIS TO PRAGMATIC ADAPTATION Source: This composite image strips was generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature. The preceding sections have deliberately avoided treating the Finnish experience as a template to be copied. The study visit consistently reinforced the point that education systems are products of history, institutional maturity and social consensus. What Finland offers South Africa  is therefore not a model to replicate, but a set of orienting insights that help reframe entrenched policy debates and open space for practical adaptation.   A first implication concerns the way language policy is positioned within the South African education discourse. Language of instruction has become a highly charged proxy for broader struggles over identity, power and historical redress. As a result, policy discussions often oscillate between abstract constitutional principle and confrontational politics, with limited attention to classroom-level pedagogy. The Finnish experience, as encountered during the study visit, suggests that progress depends on shifting the centre of gravity back to learning itself: how children best acquire understanding, confidence and cognitive depth over time.   This reframing has consequences for implementation. In South Africa, mother-tongue education in African languages is widely endorsed in principle, but weakly supported in practice and what is more is that the gap is not merely one of political will, but of institutional capability. Teacher preparation, curriculum materials, assessment practices and school-level governance have not been aligned in a coherent way to support sustained mother-tongue instruction beyond the early grades. The study visit underscores that language policy cannot succeed as a stand-alone intervention, in that it must be embedded within a professional ecosystem that equips teachers in a way that they are empowered to exercise judgement and to adapt instruction to learner needs.   A second implication relates to governance and trust. Finland’s trust-based system cannot simply be imported into a context marked by uneven capacity and historical mistrust. However, the lesson is not that trust must wait until perfection is achieved. Rather, selective and graduated trust, linked to professional development, mentoring and clear accountability, can begin to replace overly centralised compliance regimes that often stifle innovation. Without some restoration of professional agency, language policy in South Africa is likely to remain performative, rather than transformative.   The “one facility, two or more schools” concept discussed in Section 5 illustrates how this logic might be operationalised pragmatically. Accordingly, instead of framing policy choices as redistributive battles over existing institutions, South Africa could pilot expansionary arrangements that add capacity whilst protecting stability through such pilots that would allow provincial education departments to learn incrementally, to refine governance arrangements and to steadily build confidence among communities. Importantly, this approach aligns with the constitutional principle of reasonable practicability, thus avoiding absolutist positions that invite legal contestation, but deliver little educational progress.   A further implication concerns matters sequencing and patience. The study visit highlighted Finland’s willingness to think in generational, rather than electoral timeframes. South Africa’s education system has been subject to frequent policy shifts, often driven by political urgency, rather than pedagogical evidence. The Finnish experience suggests that sustained improvement requires stability, consistency and the courage to allow reforms time to mature, which in the context of language policy means accepting that cognitive and social returns may only become visible over time and by resisting the temptation to declare success or failure of the policy prematurely.   Finally, the Finnish case underscores the inseparability of education policy and social cohesion, whereas in South Africa, language debates are often treated as threats to unity that have to either be managed or suppressed. The study visit offers a different perspective: that carefully designed educational arrangements can, over time, reduce the salience of language as a site of conflict. And so, by embedding multilingualism within routine institutional practice, rather than staging it as a recurring political showdown, it becomes possible to normalise diversity and to build a shared sense of investment in the public education system.   Taken together, these implications point towards a shift from policy paralysis to pragmatic adaptation, meaning that the question is no longer whether South Africa should embrace multilingualism and mother-tongue education (since that principle is already constitutionally settled) and that the real challenge now lies in designing institutional pathways that make these commitments workable, credible and socially sustainable. It is this longer-term relationship between education, language and nation-building that the report turns to in the final analytical section.   SECTION 7: EDUCATION, SOCIAL COHESION AND THE LONG VIEW OF NATION-BUILDING   Source: This composite image strips was generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature.   Throughout the study visit, one theme surfaced repeatedly, often implicitly, rather than by design: the extent to which education systems either stabilise or strain the social fabric of a society. In Finland , schooling is not burdened with the task of resolving every social tension, yet it is clearly understood as a foundational institution through which cohesion is cultivated over time. This perspective offers a useful lens through which to reflect on South Africa’s own struggles to reconcile diversity, inequality and shared belonging.   In the South African context, education has long been expected to perform contradictory roles. It is tasked simultaneously with redress, social mobility, nation-building and economic competitiveness. Language policy, in particular, has become a fault line where these expectations collide, because when poorly designed or inconsistently implemented, language arrangements in schools can entrench exclusion, foster resentment and reinforce perceptions of injustice, but conversely, when approached with care and institutional coherence, the policies can create conditions that promote mutual recognition and a shared investment in the future.   The Finnish experience, as observed during the study visit, suggests that social cohesion is not produced through symbolic gestures or forced uniformity, but rather, it emerges incrementally and through institutions that function predictably, that treat all scholars fairly and that execute its duties and functions competently. Learners who experience schooling as a place where they are understood, supported and challenged are more likely to develop trust in public institutions and confidence in their own agency and as such, language plays a central role in this process, not as an identity badge, but as the medium through which understanding and participation are made possible.   This insight has particular relevance for multilingual societies marked by historical inequality, because in such contexts, premature demands for linguistic neutrality or assimilation risk reproducing disadvantage under the guise of unity. The study visit reinforced the idea that social cohesion is not threatened by difference per se, but rather when unfair treatment amongst the various communities is perceived and when that the difference is considered unmanaged, ignored and/or instrumentalised. Education systems that acknowledge linguistic diversity and design for it proactively are better positioned to prevent language from becoming a site of grievance.   At the same time, the Finnish case cautions against romanticising cohesion as a short-term policy outcome. Trust, legitimacy and shared purpose are accumulated slowly through repeated institutional encounters. Schools contribute to this nation-building process not by preaching cohesion, but by embodying it in their everyday practice through, for example, ensuring fair access to the available resources, respectful engagement with difference and ensuring consistent expectations for all learners. Over time, these experiences help shape how individuals relate to, and amongst, one another, and to the state.   For South Africa , taking such a this long view is particularly important within the context of the apartheid education legacies, which continue to cast a long shadow. The impatience for rapid transformation, is both understandable and politically potent, but what the study visit underscores is the risks of conflating speed with progress, because durable cohesion is unlikely to emerge from abrupt policy shifts that outpace institutional capacity or community buy-in. It requires steady expansion of opportunity, clarity of purpose and the avoidance of zero-sum framing.   The “one facility, two or more schools” model that was discussed earlier in this report can be understood in this light. By enabling coexistence without displacement, it offers a practical mechanism through which diversity can be normalised, rather than dramatized. Such arrangements do not erase difference, but situate it within a shared public institution oriented toward collective benefit and in doing so, they create everyday opportunities for contact, recognition and mutual respect, without forcing premature integration or uniformity.   Ultimately, the contribution of education to the nation-building project will lie less in its capacity to resolve social tensions directly, and more so in its ability to create a credible platform for fostering a shared future. When learners across linguistic and cultural lines experience schooling as fair, enabling and dignified, the foundations for cohesion are laid quietly, but persistently, which the Finnish experience, as encountered during the study visit, illustrates. It shows how this can be achieved through institutional coherence and pedagogical seriousness, rather than rhetorical flourish.   This brings the report to its concluding reflections: how the insights drawn from the Finland study visit can inform a realistic, principled and forward-looking approach to education reform in South Africa, one that recognises language as a resource, not a threat, and schooling as a long-term investment in a cohesive society.     SECTION 8: CONCLUSION – FROM STUDY VISIT TO POLICY ACTION   Source: This composite image strips was generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature. This report has deliberately resisted the temptation to turn the Finland study visit into a search for ready-made solutions. Finland’s education system is the product of a distinct social history, deep institutional maturity and high levels of professional trust that cannot simply be transplanted into the South African context. Yet, to stop at reflection alone would be to underuse the value of the study visit. The purpose of learning from another system is not imitation, but disciplined adaptation. This conclusion therefore moves beyond synthesis and sets out clear, actionable pathways through which the insights gained can be tested, refined and operationalised in South Africa   The central lesson emerging from the study visit is that debates about language in education become unproductive when they are framed as ideological contests or zero-sum struggles over loss and entitlement. In Finland, language policy succeeds not because one position “wins”, but because language is treated as a pedagogical and institutional question, embedded within a wider system that prioritises learner comprehension, professional judgement and long-term stability. Where South Africa has often approached language as a political proxy, Finland approaches it as a practical design challenge.   Crucially, the study visit surfaced a nuanced tension that is frequently absent from South African debates. Finnish academics did not uniformly present mother-tongue education as the decisive explanatory factor behind system performance. At the same time, there was broad agreement among Finnish educators and within the international frameworks referenced during the visit, that education in a learner’s first language contributes meaningfully to learner dignity, identity, confidence and belonging. The implication for South Africa is not to elevate mother-tongue education into a panacea, nor to downgrade it as incidental, but to locate it properly: as a mechanism that can reduce avoidable cognitive and social barriers when supported by appropriate institutional capacity.   From this perspective, the most pressing challenge facing South Africa is not constitutional principle or policy intent, both of which are already settled, but institutional execution. Mother-tongue education has remained weakly implemented, because it has been treated as a stand-alone policy aspiration, rather than as part of an integrated system involving teacher preparation, curriculum design, governance arrangements and phased progression into additional languages. The Finnish experience reinforces the point that language policy cannot succeed in isolation. It must be carried by professional capability, clarity of roles and a stable institutional environment.   A recurring weakness in South Africa’s approach to language policy has been the gap between constitutional commitment and institutional follow-through. While the legal and policy framework for multilingualism is well established, responsibility for implementation is often diffuse, unevenly exercised and largely reactive. Language rights tend to surface institutionally only when disputes arise, rather than being embedded into routine administrative practice, which pattern has contributed to gradual erosion through neglect, rather than overt policy reversal; reinforcing the tendency towards default solutions that privilege convenience over constitutional intent. Addressing this gap requires not new principles, but stronger mechanisms of coordination, visibility and accountability within the existing system.   A further and critical consideration, repeatedly underscored during the study visit discussions, is the risk of default anglicisation within the South African education system. In the absence of intentional institutional design, parental aspiration, labour-market signals and historical patterns of resource allocation will continue to drive schooling towards English as the dominant medium of instruction. This trajectory is already evident and has the cumulative effect of confining high-quality indigenous-language schooling largely to rural and township contexts, while suburban and well-resourced areas remain linguistically homogeneous. Such an outcome undermines both educational equity and the constitutional commitment to multilingualism, not by overt exclusion, but by quiet structural drift.   As the Finnish experience makes clear, linguistic erosion rarely occurs through formal policy reversal, it occurs when institutional environments quietly normalise convenience over rights, leading speakers of less dominant languages to relinquish their linguistic claims long before those claims are ever legally contested.   The “one facility, two or more schools” model offers a concrete mechanism to interrupt this dynamic. By enabling the establishment of fully fledged isiZulu-, isiXhosa- or other indigenous-language schools within suburban settings, using existing infrastructure and clear governance separation, it becomes possible to decouple language from geography and socio-economic status. In doing so, mother-tongue education in African languages is repositioned not as a remedial option for marginalised communities, but as a credible, high-quality choice within the full spectrum of South African society. This shift is essential if multilingualism is to be sustained in practice, rather than eroded by default.   The report therefore argues for a decisive shift in approach: from redistributive confrontation to expansionary design. Nowhere is this more evident than in the proposed “one facility, two or more schools” model that, rather than framing the expansion of African-language mother-tongue education as requiring the displacement or erosion of existing Afrikaans-medium institutions, the model treats school infrastructure as a public asset capable of supporting multiple language streams under clearly defined and autonomous governance arrangements. This approach rejects the logic of loss and instead focuses on the expansion of effective provision that services catering for a multilingual community.   The recommendation flowing from this insight is not immediate system-wide implementation, but structured piloting, where provincial education departments, in partnership with willing school governing bodies and communities, could identify a small number of sites where shared-facility, multi-school arrangements can be tested under controlled conditions. These pilots should be deliberately modest in scale, rigorously governed and carefully evaluated over time. Their purpose would be to build institutional learning, rather than to score symbolic victories.   Alongside this, the study visit points to the necessity of sequencing and patience, for if  Finland’s education success, that rests in part on its resistance to perpetual reform, is anything to go by. South Africa’s education system, by contrast, has often been characterised by frequent policy shifts that outpace institutional capacity and exhaust professional goodwill. Language policy, in particular, demands a long view. Cognitive, social and cohesion-related outcomes accumulate gradually, and premature declarations of success or failure are more likely to undermine credibility than accelerate progress.   The study visit also highlights the importance of clearly located institutional responsibility for monitoring and normalising linguistic rights. In Finland, this function is exercised through a small specialist unit within the Ministry of Justice, supported by the supervisory role of the Parliamentary Ombudsman. The significance of this arrangement lies not in its institutional scale or coercive power, but in its effect: linguistic rights are treated as an ordinary and ongoing matter of administrative compliance, rather than as an episodic source of dispute or litigation. For South Africa, the implication is not necessarily the creation of new institutions, but the need to clarify ownership, coordination and proactive oversight within the existing governance landscape, so that language rights are sustained through everyday institutional practice, rather than reactive intervention.   A further actionable implication concerns professional agency. The Finnish system’s ability to manage linguistic diversity without polarisation is inseparable from the trust placed in educators as professionals. While South Africa cannot assume equivalent levels of capacity across the system, it can move incrementally towards graduated trust, linked to professional development, mentoring and accountability. Without restoring some measure of professional discretion at school and classroom level, language policy risks remaining performative, rather than transformative.   Finally, the study visit reinforces an often overlooked point, being that education policy is inseparable from the broader project of social cohesion and nation-building. Language becomes a source of conflict, not because diversity exists, but because institutional arrangements fail to manage it fairly and predictably. When learners experience schooling as enabling, dignified and credible, regardless of language, trust in public institutions grows, and thus, over time, this quiet institutional legitimacy does more to foster cohesion than any symbolic gesture or rhetorical appeal.   In moving from study visit to policy pathway, the task ahead is therefore clear. South Africa does not need another round of abstract debate about language in education. It needs disciplined experimentation, expansionary institutional design and the courage to move beyond fear-driven binaries. The Finland study visit does not tell South Africa what to become. It shows what becomes possible when language is treated seriously, institutions are designed coherently, and reform is pursued with patience rather than panic.   The Finnish experience demonstrates that caution in policy design should not be confused with scepticism about cognitive foundations. While Finnish scholars rightly resist treating mother-tongue education as a rigid or deterministic policy instrument, the evidence and practice observed during the study visit reinforce the importance of strong first-language grounding in supporting cognitive control, reflective thinking and meaningful participation in learning, particularly in contexts marked by inequality and linguistic exclusion. If this report succeeds, it will not be because it resolves long-standing disagreements. It will be because it helps shift the debate from ideology to implementation, from confrontation to construction, and from paralysis to pragmatic action.     SECTION 9: METHODOLOGICAL NOTE AND SOURCE BOUNDARIES   Source: This composite image strips was generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature.   This report is intentionally bounded in scope. Its analysis and conclusions are derived exclusively from the Finland study visit and the documentary material associated with it. This includes the presentations, briefing notes, background papers and discussion records contained in the six core documents provided prior to drafting. No additional site visits or interviews were undertaken for purposes of this report, and no post-visit research was conducted beyond limited contextual consultation explicitly identified as such.   Where reference is made to international norms or frameworks, including those associated with the United Nations system, such references serve two limited purposes. First, they reflect the conceptual environment within which Finnish educators and officials framed their own practice during the study visit. Second, in a small number of instances, they reflect post-visit contextual consultation undertaken to situate Finnish perspectives in relation to mainstream international thinking. Such references are used for orientation and contrast, not as primary evidence or external validation.   The report does not seek to adjudicate global academic debates on education, language or cognitive development. Alternative perspectives are acknowledged where they arose during the study visit, and they are addressed through the logic, reasoning and practical experience articulated by Finnish interlocutors. No independent literature review was conducted, and no claims are made that would require empirical substantiation beyond the study visit record. Analytically, the report adopts a policy-reflective, rather than policy-prescriptive approach. Its purpose is to distil insights, identify institutional logics and explore plausible pathways for adaptation within the South African context. Proposals such as the “one facility, two or more schools” model are presented as conceptual constructs informed by observed practices, not as ready-made implementation plans.   This methodological discipline serves two purposes. Firstly, it preserves the integrity of the study visit as a learning exercise, rather than a pretext for advocacy, and secondly, it ensures transparency about the limits of inference and transferability. Readers are invited to assess the arguments advanced here on the basis of their coherence, plausibility and contextual sensitivity, rather than on claims of universal applicability.   In this sense, the report should be read as a contribution to an ongoing policy conversation that is grounded in observation, attentive to context and open to refinement, rather than as a definitive statement on education reform.   The report is supported by a series of annexures that document selected engagements undertaken during the study visit, as well as a concluding annexure that outlines policy options flowing from the analysis. These annexures are not intended as extensions of the main analysis, nor as exhaustive records of discussion, but as contextual lenses that illuminate specific dimensions of the enquiry. Each annexure reflects a distinct institutional or community perspective, including governance, educational practice, academic analysis and minority-language experience and should be read as complementary, rather than cumulative. The core arguments and recommendations of the report are developed in the main text, with the annexures providing depth, triangulation and transparency without altering the analytical conclusions.   Where reference is made to mainstream international thinking on the cognitive dimensions of mother-tongue education, this reflects limited post-visit contextual engagement with established UNESCO frameworks, rather than a comprehensive literature review.     SECTION 10: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND CLOSING NOTE   Source: This composite image strips was generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature.   The Inclusive Society Institute wishes to express its appreciation to the Embassy of Finland in Pretoria for its assistance in facilitating the study visit. The Embassy played an important enabling role in supporting engagement with Finnish institutions and interlocutors, and its cooperation contributed meaningfully to the depth and coherence of the programme.   This report was made possible by the Finland study visit and the generosity of the educators, administrators and officials who engaged openly with the delegation. Their willingness to explain not only what works within the Finnish education system, but why it works, and under what conditions, provided the intellectual substance upon which this analysis rests. The value of the visit lay less in exposure to exemplary institutions than in the quality of dialogue about pedagogy, governance and long-term educational purpose.   The six core documents provided to the delegation formed the documentary backbone of this report. They ensured a shared evidentiary base across participants and enabled reflection to continue beyond the site visits themselves. The discipline of working strictly within these materials has been intentional, preserving the integrity of the study visit as a bounded learning exercise, rather than an open-ended research project.   The report also benefited from the opportunity to reflect on Finland’s experience through a South African lens that is attentive to constitutional commitments, institutional constraints and social realities. This comparative posture has been critical in avoiding both idealisation and dismissal. The aim has not been to borrow solutions, but to recover a sense of pragmatic imagination about what is possible when policy, institutions and professional practice are aligned.   As a closing note, it should be emphasised that the value of this report will ultimately not be measured by agreement with its conclusions, but by its capacity to shift the quality of debate. If it helps move discussions about language, education and social cohesion away from fear-driven binaries and towards practical, expansionary thinking, it will have served its purpose.   The Finland study visit is now complete. The work of reflection, adaptation and cautious experimentation lies ahead.     ANNEXURE A: THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND THE GOVERNANCE OF LINGUISTIC RIGHTS IN FINLAND   The engagement with Finland’s Ministry of Justice provided a critical institutional lens through which to understand how linguistic rights are conceptualised, governed and sustained over time. Unlike education-focused discussions that centre on pedagogy and classroom practice, the Ministry’s contribution situated language firmly within the architecture of constitutional obligation, public administration and long-term state responsibility. The presentation and interview stressed that Finland’s multilingual settlement is not sustained by sentiment or symbolism, but through a deliberately constructed legal and governance framework, that is continuously monitored and incrementally adjusted as societal conditions change. At the core of this framework lies Section 17 of the Finnish Constitution, which establishes Finnish and Swedish as equal national languages and which obliges public authorities to meet the cultural and societal needs of both language communities on an even basis. The Constitution also recognises Sámi, Romani and sign languages and affirms the right of all language groups to use and develop their own language and culture. Importantly, Finland does not formally designate “official minority languages”. Instead, it differentiates between national languages, which enjoy strong and enforceable rights in dealings with public authorities, and other languages, whose protection is shaped by a combination of sector-specific legislation and practical measures aimed at ensuring comprehension and access. This constitutional logic already signals a key feature of the Finnish approach: linguistic equality is pursued through structured differentiation, rather than through uniform treatment.   The Ministry of Justice carries overall responsibility for promoting and monitoring linguistic rights across the Finnish state. Its role is not operational, but coordinative and supervisory. The Ministry drafts language-related legislation, advises other ministries on the linguistic implications of proposed laws, prepares the Government Report on the Application of Language Legislation every four years, and coordinates a network of language experts across the public service. Remarkably, this extensive mandate is discharged by a very small specialist unit, with only three officials directly responsible for linguistic rights. This institutional design reflects a broader Finnish assumption: that linguistic rights are realised not through enforcement-heavy bureaucracies, but through clear legal frameworks, shared norms, and continuous inter-institutional coordination.   Demographically, Finland remains a predominantly Finnish-speaking country, with Finnish speakers constituting just over eighty-four per cent of the population and Swedish speakers slightly above five per cent. Sámi speakers account for a very small proportion of the population, while speakers of other languages have increased notably in recent years, largely as a result of immigration. Linguistic rights are partly territorially organised through the designation of municipalities as unilingual or bilingual, which determines the obligations placed on local authorities, but central government bodies are however always bilingual, regardless of their physical location. This system reflects a balance between geographic concentration and individual mobility, because it acknowledges that language communities are not confined to fixed spaces, even where their historical presence is regionally rooted.   A central feature of the Finnish model is its reliance on long-term strategy, rather than ad hoc intervention as is illustrated by the National Languages Strategy, first adopted in 2012 and revised in 2021, which provides an overarching framework for the protection and development of Finnish and Swedish. Its preparation process was deliberately extensive, involving stakeholder hearings, expert interviews, participatory consultations and political steering at the highest level. The Strategy is built around three guiding objectives, being the right to services in one’s own language, safeguarding the status of the national languages and the promotion of what is described as “living bilingualism”. These objectives are translated into sixty-two concrete measures, each assigned to specific ministries, ensuring that responsibility for implementation is dispersed, rather than centralised.   One of the most instructive aspects of the Ministry’s presentation was its frank acknowledgement of English as a growing structural pressure within Finnish society. English is not framed as an existential threat to Finnish, but its expanding use, particularly in universities, research and specialised professional domains, is recognised as a potential source of long-term domain loss. Notably, research commissioned by the government indicates that English has exerted greater pressure on Swedish than on Finnish, with many public officials reporting stronger proficiency in English than in Swedish. The policy response to this trend is not prohibitive, but instead, it focuses on strengthening national-language capacity by ensuring that graduates can function professionally in Finnish, by developing terminology in national languages and by promoting multilingual practices, rather than defaulting to English as a convenient substitute.   The interview further highlighted a recurring structural vulnerability in multilingual systems, which is the tendency for minority-language speakers to relinquish their linguistic rights in mixed language environments. In bilingual workplaces and public settings, Swedish speakers often switch to Finnish, because it is more widely understood, more institutionally dominant or simply more convenient, but in doing so this pattern, over time, risks hollowing out formal rights through everyday practice. The Ministry recognises this as a systemic problem, rather than an individual failure. Its response emphasises the need for authorities to signal, through visible practices and service design, that the use of one’s own language is both legitimate and welcomed. In this respect, linguistic rights are sustained as much by institutional cues and planning, as by formal legal entitlements.   Enforcement within the Finnish system relies far less on sanctions than on legitimacy and oversight, which is illustrated by there being no direct penalties for authorities that fail to meet their linguistic obligations and instead, compliance is encouraged through monitoring, guidance and reputational accountability. The Parliamentary Ombudsman plays a key supervisory role, and language-related discrimination may also fall within the remit of the Non-Discrimination Ombudsman. The Ministry’s view is that sustained compliance flows from a deeply embedded administrative culture that takes legality seriously, rather than from punitive mechanisms. Whether this approach would function equally well in other contexts is acknowledged as an open question.   From a South African perspective, the Ministry of Justice engagement offers several cautionary and constructive insights. It demonstrates that linguistic drift towards a dominant language, whether Finnish in relation to Swedish, or English in relation to both, occurs by default unless actively countered through institutional design and it  also illustrates that minority-language protection depends less on rhetorical commitment than on careful planning, visible service environments and ongoing monitoring. Perhaps most importantly, it reinforces the idea that multilingualism is not self-sustaining and that it must be continually reproduced through political will, legal clarity and administrative practice.   This annexure therefore anchors the study visit’s broader conclusions in a governance reality: that language policy is not merely an educational concern, but a constitutional and institutional project that unfolds over generations. In that sense, Finland’s experience speaks directly to South Africa’s own challenge, not of declaring multilingualism, but of designing institutions capable of making it endure.   ANNEXURE B: MOTHER-TONGUE EDUCATION, MULTILINGUAL PEDAGOGY AND THE FINNISH EDUCATIONAL APPROACH   The engagements with the Finnish National Agency for Education, the Ministry of Education and Culture and education practitioners provided a detailed and at times counter-intuitive perspective on mother-tongue education and multilingualism within the Finnish education system. While Finland is internationally recognised for its strong commitment to linguistic rights and cultural diversity, the study visit revealed a more nuanced position than is often assumed in global debates on mother-tongue instruction.   A defining feature of the Finnish approach is that multilingualism is not treated as an exception or remedial category, but as a normal and universal condition of schooling. Finnish education policy proceeds from the premise that every learner is, in practice, multilingual, whether through national languages, foreign languages, dialects or emerging hybrid language practices. This assumption is embedded in the National Core Curriculum for Basic Education and underpins the concept of the “language-aware school,” in which every teacher is regarded as a language teacher and every subject is understood to carry its own linguistic demands. Language is therefore primarily approached as a medium of learning and identity formation, and is applied to promote social interaction, rather than as a discrete or isolated subject area.   Within this framework, mother-tongue education is not positioned as an absolute or exclusive driver of cognitive development, instead the Finnish interlocutors expressed caution at treating mother-tongue instruction as a singular or deterministic explanatory variable. They seem to be somewhat dismissive of its role in supporting comprehension, metalinguistic awareness and the development of reflective cognitive control. In this sense, Finnish practice distinguishes between recognising the cognitive value of strong first-language grounding and resisting its elevation into a stand-alone policy solution detached from pedagogy, teacher capacity and institutional context.   This position does not reflect indifference to mother-tongue instruction. On the contrary, the Finnish Constitution explicitly guarantees the right of every person to maintain and develop their own language and culture. In practice, municipalities may offer mother-tongue instruction for learners whose home language is not Finnish, Swedish or Sámi, supported by targeted state funding. Participation in such programmes has expanded steadily, with instruction currently provided in dozens of languages. However, Finnish policymakers openly acknowledge that these programmes reach only a portion of eligible learners and are constrained by practical considerations such as staffing, scale and sustainability.   Crucially, mother-tongue instruction in Finland is understood primarily as a mechanism for supporting identity, self-confidence and belonging, rather than as a substitute for acquiring proficiency in the language of schooling. Finnish educators consistently stressed that strong competence in the societal language is indispensable for educational progression, labour market participation and social integration and for this reason, mother-tongue education is deliberately structured to complement, rather than compete with, instruction in Finnish or Swedish. This logic is reinforced through pedagogical practices such as translanguaging, in which learners are encouraged to draw on all their linguistic resources to support understanding across subjects, whilst they progressively master the academic language that is required for formal learning.   The Finnish experience also highlights the importance of institutional design that is aimed at protecting linguistic diversity without entrenching segregation based on language. The parallel Finnish- and Swedish-language school systems illustrate how language rights can be institutionalised through separate, but equal educational pathways, which is often shared within facilities. At the same time, Finnish officials cautioned that even well-protected minority languages remain vulnerable to gradual erosion if institutional boundaries and responsibilities are not clearly defined and/or if collaborative arrangements proceed without deliberate linguistic safeguards. This concern was particularly evident in discussions around Swedish-language education, where it was pointed out that the maintenance of a distinct linguistic space within a school is regarded as essential to preventing assimilation of Swedish into the dominant Finnish language environment. For learners with migrant backgrounds, Finland adopts a strong inclusive approach, where migrant learners attend mainstream schools according to their age and where they are supported by preparatory education, second-language instruction and subject-specific language support where it is so required. Mother-tongue instruction is offered as an additional layer, not as an alternative pathway, with the underlying policy objective being clear, namely the integration into a shared education system, coupled with recognition of linguistic identity, rather than parallel systems that risk marginalisation or long-term disadvantage.   Throughout the discussions, Finnish practitioners returned repeatedly to the theme of balance. Excessive emphasis on language rights without adequate attention to pedagogical coherence was seen as counter-productive, just as neglect of linguistic identity was recognised as socially corrosive. The Finnish model therefore seeks to hold these tensions in productive equilibrium, by affirming linguistic diversity, investing in language awareness across the curriculum and by ensuring that all learners acquire strong competence in the languages that structure public life.   For South Africa, the relevance of this experience does not lie in the direct replication of the Finnish model, but rather through in the strategic insights that the model offers. The Finnish case demonstrates that mother-tongue education need not be framed as an all-or-nothing proposition, but instead it can and should be embedded within a broader multilingual pedagogy that supports identity and belonging while maintaining clear pathways for individual scholars into the language or languages of wider social community. The Finnish model also underscores the important and necessary role that institutional clarity, professional autonomy and long-term policy consistency plays in preventing linguistic rights from becoming mere symbolic commitments which end up eroding those rights through neglect.     ANNEXURE C: COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT, LANGUAGE AND THE PEDAGOGICAL LOGIC OF CO-LOCATED SCHOOLING – INSIGHTS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   Academics attached to the University of Helsinki’s Faculty of Education, introduced an important layer of analytical nuance, particularly in relation to the cognitive development of children, multilingual learning and the institutional logic that underpins the Finnish co-located schooling model. Rather than reaffirming conventional assumptions about mother-tongue instruction as an unqualified cognitive advantage, the Helsinki engagements foregrounded a more complex and empirically cautious understanding of how language, cognition, identity and pedagogy interact over time. These perspectives should be read as emerging from a high-capacity educational system and should not be assumed to invalidate mainstream international findings, which are largely derived from low-capacity and unequal schooling contexts where language functions as a far more binding cognitive constraint.   Finnish scholars were explicit in cautioning against reductive interpretations of the relationship between language of instruction and cognitive performance and whilst there is broad agreement that early learning in a familiar language can support comprehension and initial engagement, these particular academics were of the view that the evidence does not support strong claims that mother-tongue instruction, in isolation, produces superior long-term cognitive outcomes across subjects. Empirical research in Finland suggests that the initial performative differences observed among learners educated in a second language tended to diminish over time, provided of course that the teaching quality is strong and that learners acquire sufficient proficiency in the language of instruction. Cognitive development, according to this view, is less a function of linguistic purity than it is of pedagogical coherence and sustained instructional quality.   This position challenges dominant international narratives that present mother-tongue education primarily as a cognitive intervention. Helsinki academics were clear that such arguments are difficult to sustain empirically, not least because children’s linguistic environments are inherently complex and fluid. Learners move continuously between languages across home, school, peer interaction, media and digital spaces, making it methodologically difficult to isolate language of instruction as a single causal variable. The Finnish research perspective therefore resists instrumentalising language purely as a cognitive tool, instead situating cognition within broader social, cultural and pedagogical ecosystems.   At the same time, the Helsinki discussions emphatically reaffirmed the importance of language for identity, dignity and belonging and so while the cognitive case for mother-tongue instruction may be context-dependent and empirically nuanced, the identity-forming role of language was considered foundational. Scholars emphasised that language carries emotional memory, intergenerational continuity and cultural meaning that cannot be substituted by functional proficiency in a dominant or global language.   Nursery rhymes, stories, idiomatic expressions and everyday linguistic practices were repeatedly cited as key mechanisms through which children develop a sense of self and continuity with their community and so from this perspective, the justification for maintaining mother-tongue education rests less on cognitive optimisation and more on the ethical and social imperatives of recognition, respect and belonging.   The Helsinki engagements also offered critical insight into the concept of multilingual cognitive development, since rather than viewing multilingualism as a deficit or a transitional burden, Finnish scholars highlighted a growing body of evidence that children possess a greater capacity for managing multiple linguistic systems than is often assumed. Practices such as translanguaging, code-switching and flexible language use were described not as confusion, but as adaptive cognitive strategies that can strengthen executive function, problem-solving and metalinguistic awareness of the scholars. Importantly, this does not negate the need for strong proficiency in the language of instruction, which remains crucial, but it also underscores the parallel   value of pedagogical approaches that consciously acknowledge and work with the learners’ full linguistic repertoires.   These insights were closely linked to the Finnish experience of co-located schools. Drawing on long-term ethnographic research, Helsinki academics explained that co-location, in itself, does not automatically produce bilingualism or social integration. In many Finnish co-located schools, pupils remain socially and linguistically separated despite certain facilities, such as dining halls and playgrounds, being shared, which reflects deeply embedded institutional cultures of parallel monolingualism. The persistence of such separation is not accidental, but the result of deliberate policy choices aimed at preserving minority-language spaces as lived majorities within the school environment. Moreover from a Finnish perspective, a degree of institutional separation has historically always been viewed as a necessary imperative to prevent language dilution and assimilation. However, the Helsinki discussions also revealed growing ambivalence about the long-term consequences of this model, because while separation may protect minority languages within schools, it can inadvertently limit learners’ confidence and competence in the majority language, with unintended implications for higher education, employment and social mobility. The scholars noted emerging concerns among the Swedish-speaking youth in Finland with regard to their proficiency in Finnish, which suggests that rigid separation may produce unintended trade-offs, which has of late prompted increasing interest in more deliberately designed forms of interaction within co-located schools, including, for example, shared activities, bilingual projects and carefully structured spaces for collaboration that do not undermine institutional autonomy.   Crucially, the Helsinki perspective reframed co-located schools as contested pedagogical spaces that are shaped by what scholars term “spatial ideologies”, being a deeply held belief that language, space and identity should be organised between  educational institutions that are located in the same facility. Research comparing Finland and South Tyrol demonstrates that co-located schools simultaneously reproduce language separation and create opportunities for its renegotiation. Architecture, scheduling, administrative boundaries and everyday practices within the school all function as instruments of language policy, by either reinforcing parallel monolingualism or by enabling controlled forms of multilingual interaction.   For South Africa, the relevance of these insights lies in the cautioning against simplistic solutions, because neither full integration, nor strict separation, guarantees positive cognitive or social outcomes, instead, matters is the intentional design of institutional arrangements, pedagogical practices and language policies that are aligned with clearly articulated objectives. This means that co-located schooling can either entrench linguistic dominance or expand linguistic justice, depending on how they structure their space, authority and interaction.   Taken together, the University of Helsinki engagements reinforce a central conclusion of this report: debates about mother-tongue education should not be reduced to cognitive claims alone. While cognition certainly matters, the deeper and more enduring case for linguistic diversity in education rests on the role it plays in promoting the sense of identity, dignity, social cohesion and democratic inclusion. At the same time, protecting linguistic rights requires institutional sophistication, pedagogical professionalism and an honest recognition of trade-offs, and as such the Finnish experience illustrates both the strengths and the limitations of parallel language systems. It offers South Africa a set of cautionary insights, rather than a prescriptive model.     ANNEXURE D: MINORITY-LANGUAGE COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOLING, IDENTITY AND INSTITUTIONAL SURVIVAL – REFLECTIONS FROM FOLKTINGET   The engagement with representatives of Folktinget, the statutory body tasked with safeguarding the Swedish language in Finland, provided an important community-level perspective that complements the institutional, pedagogical and academic analyses contained elsewhere in this report. Unlike state authorities or academic interlocutors, Folktinget speaks from the standpoint of the Swedish linguistic minority that is constitutionally protected, socially embedded and yet having to be continuously alert to the conditions required for its long-term survival. This perspective is particularly relevant for societies that seek to sustain multilingualism in practice, rather than in principle alone.   What was also highlighted by the Folktinget representatives, was the existential role that schools play in maintaining Swedish linguistic continuity. The schools are not merely sites of learning, but importantly, also the primary institutional mechanism through which the Swedish language, culture and identity are reproduced from one generations to the next. Folktinget representatives were unequivocal in stating that without Swedish-medium schools, Finland’s bilingual character would not be sustainable in its current form. This was not framed as a cultural preference, but as a structural reality, because language communities, they say, only endure where they possess institutions that are capable of sustaining the language’s everyday use, its intergenerational transmission and its social legitimacy.   The discussion also underscored the continued value attached to Swedish-medium schooling, even in a modern, highly globalised society. Swedish-speaking families overwhelmingly choose Swedish schools for their children, and notably, many bilingual families do the same. This preference of the Swedish and bilingual families Folktinget  presented as evidence that minority-language schooling is not experienced by the community as a constraint or disadvantage, but indeed it is accepted as a valued educational and cultural pathway into Finnish society. At the same time, Folktinget representatives expressed concern about demographic and social shifts, particularly with regard to the under-representation in Swedish-medium schools of learners with migrant backgrounds. While immigration has significantly reshaped Finland’s population, this diversity has not been reflected proportionally within Swedish schools, which is raising questions about inclusion, integration pathways and the future composition of the minority community.   In addressing the Finnish education’s institutional design, the Folktinget representatives provided a nuanced insight into the practice of co-located schools, that is where separate Finnish and Swedish schools are located in one facility. While the organisation’s principled preference remains for separate school buildings where feasible, it acknowledged that economic pressures and declining pupil numbers are increasingly necessitating shared facilities in the form of such co-located schools. Importantly, this acceptance is conditional. Folktinget emphasised that co-location can only function without linguistic erosion, where separate administrations, leadership structures and school identities are maintained. The distinction between “one building with two schools” and “one school with two languages” was repeatedly stressed as decisive. From the community’s perspective, dilution occurs not through shared infrastructure per se, but through the erosion of institutional boundaries that sustain minority-language environments.   At the same time, the discussion resisted an absolutist interpretation of separation. Folktinget representatives recognised the value of structured interaction between language groups, particularly in shared social spaces, such as during breaks, meals and joint activities. In that such interaction was viewed as beneficial for social cohesion and for fostering mutual understanding. This is quite acceptable, even desirable, provided it does not undermine the integrity of the language-specific educational pathways. This balance between the institutional separation of the schools and the social interaction between their scholars, reflects a pragmatic approach that is aimed at sustaining Swedish linguistic identity while avoiding social isolation.   A further dimension of the discussion concerned symbolism and legitimacy in which Folktinget placed considerable emphasis on the importance of visible linguistic recognition by public figures and institutions. The use of both national languages by senior political leaders, the celebration of Swedish cultural events and the presence of Swedish in the public life of Finland were all cited as powerful signals that reinforce the legitimacy of minority languages. Such symbolism should not treated or considered as superficial, but rather, as a necessary complement to legal protection, as it shapes societal attitudes and everyday language choices over time. The value of the Folktinget contribution lies not in pedagogy, but in articulating the lived realities, priorities and concerns of a minority community navigating demographic change, institutional pressure, and the long-term challenge of language maintenance. . For South Africa, the relevance of this perspective lies in its emphasis on institutional survival, rather than symbolic recognition, in that Folktinget demonstrated  illustrates that minority languages persist, not because they are constitutionally acknowledged, but because they are embedded within institutions that command confidence, legitimacy and daily use. It also reinforces a central insight of this report: that shared infrastructure need not imply shared identity, and that carefully designed co-located schooling arrangements can expand access while preserving linguistic integrity. In this sense, the Finnish experience does not offer a template, but a cautionary affirmation that multilingualism, once institutionalised, must be actively maintained or it will erode through neglect rather than confrontation.     ANNEXURE E: POLICY OPTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION PATHWAYS   This annexure sets out a limited number of policy options that flow from the analysis contained in the main report. It does not propose a single preferred model, nor does it attempt to translate the report’s findings into an implementation blueprint. Rather, it identifies feasible pathways through which South Africa could begin to test, refine and institutionalise mother-tongue and multilingual education approaches in a manner that is constitutionally aligned, fiscally realistic and sensitive to institutional capacity constraints.   The purpose of this annexure is therefore to support informed decision-making, rather than to prescribe outcomes. Each option reflects a different balance between ambition, risk and institutional demand, and each could be pursued independently or sequentially.   The first option is a pilot-based expansion of mother-tongue schooling through co-located institutions . This approach would involve the identification of a small number of existing public school facilities, particularly in suburban or peri-urban areas with stable enrolment and adequate infrastructure, that could host an additional language-specific school alongside an existing institution, with the defining feature being institutional separation, rather than spatial separation. Each school would retain its own governance, leadership, staff establishment and linguistic identity, while sharing physical infrastructure. The value lies its ability to expand access to indigenous-language schooling without displacing existing school communities or requiring large-scale capital investment through the pilot programme it will allow the state to test institutional design questions, such as leadership autonomy, timetable coordination and language boundary maintenance, under controlled conditions.   A second option could focus on language diversification within the existing public school estate , particularly in relation to feeder-zone dynamics, because rather than establishing entirely new schools, this pathway would encourage provinces to designate selected under-utilised schools as bi-lingual schools with dual management. The institutions supported by deliberate enrolment planning and targeted resource allocation. Over time, this could create genuine language choice within a geographic area, reducing the de facto association between language, race and socio-economic status. This option is less visible than co-located expansion, but potentially more systemically transformative if sustained over the long term.   A third option centres on strengthening institutional responsibility and oversight for language rights within the education system . The report’s engagement with Finnish institutions highlights that multilingualism is not primarily sustained through litigation or episodic conflict, but rather through routine administrative accountability. In the South African context, this could involve clearer designation of responsibility within existing education governance structures for monitoring language policy compliance, advising schools and mediating disputes before they escalate, with the intent not being to create new bureaucratic layers, but to normalise language considerations as part of everyday institutional practice, as opposed to unwelcome intervention.   A fourth option emphasises professional and pedagogical support as an enabling condition for language policy . One of the consistent insights from the Finnish experience is that language policy cannot succeed in isolation from teaching quality. Any move towards expanded mother-tongue or multilingual provision would therefore need to be accompanied by targeted investment in teacher development, curriculum support and learning materials. This option recognises that the credibility of language reform depends on the educational experience it delivers, poorly supported language initiatives risk reinforcing scepticism rather than building confidence.   A fifth and complementary option involves structured experimentation and learning through evidence-informed pilots , where rather than seeking immediate national coherence, it accepts variation and learning as necessary components of reform. Pilot projects could be designed with explicit learning objectives, clear evaluation criteria and built-in mechanisms for adjustment, that over time would allow policymakers to distinguish between what is context-dependent and what is systemically replicable, thereby reducing the risk of over-generalisation or premature scaling.   Across all options, a common thread is the need for clarity about what language policy is intended to achieve, which this report cautions against framing mother-tongue education as either a panacea for educational underperformance and/or an ideological project that is disconnected from practical constraints. Instead, language should be understood as one component of a broader effort to reduce avoidable learning barriers, affirm dignity and belonging and expand meaningful participation in education. The appropriate policy response is therefore not a single reform, but a sequence of disciplined, context-sensitive interventions aligned with institutional capacity.   This annexure should be read as an invitation to further deliberation, rather than as a conclusion. The options outlined here are deliberately framed to allow for political choice, administrative judgement and adaptive learning. In that sense, they are consistent with the report’s overall argument: that progress on language and education will come not from importing models or asserting principles, but from patient institutional design informed by evidence, experience and sustained engagement.     SOURCES CONSULTED   A. Interviews and study visit engagements (Primary sources)   Finnish National Agency for Education (EDUFI). Briefings and presentations on bilingualism, multilingual education policy, mother-tongue instruction, and the concept of the language-aware school. Helsinki, December 2025.   Folktinget (The Swedish Assembly of Finland). Engagement on minority-language community perspectives, Swedish-medium schooling, institutional survival, identity, and co-located school arrangements. Helsinki, December 2025.   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2025. Transcripts, presentations and briefing materials from engagements during the study visit to Finland, which was undertaken over the period 1 - 5 December 2025.   Ministry of Education and Culture, Finland Ministry of Justice, Finland University of Helsinki, Faculty of Education     B. Selected supplementary sources (Contextual)   These sources were consulted post-visit  to contextualise mainstream international thinking on the cognitive dimensions of mother-tongue education. They are referenced for interpretive background only and do not constitute the primary evidentiary base of the report.   Marjokorpi, J. 2023. The relationship between grammatical understanding and writing skills in Finnish secondary L1 education. [Online] Available at: The relationship between grammatical understanding and writing skills in Finnish secondary L1 education [accessed: 8 January 2026]   United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 2010.   Enhancing learning of children from diverse language backgrounds: Mother tongue-based bilingual or multilingual education in the early years. [Online] Available at:  https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000212270/PDF/212270eng.pdf.multi [accessed: 7 January 2026]   United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 2022. Why mother language-based education is essential. [Online] Available at: https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/why-mother-language-based-education-essential [accessed: 7 January 2026] [1]  This reference reflects mainstream international policy framing associated with UNESCO and related United Nations agencies, which emphasise mother-tongue-based instruction in the early years as a means of improving comprehension, equity and learning outcomes in unequal education systems. These frameworks are referenced here to capture the conceptual environment within which Finnish interlocutors positioned their own views during the study visit, rather than as primary evidence or as part of a comprehensive literature review. [2]  This observation draws on post-visit contextual consultation with Finnish academic research examining the relationship between first-language grammatical and metalinguistic mastery and writing-related cognitive control in Finnish learners. See, for example, Marjokorpi, J. 2023. “The relationship between grammatical understanding and writing skills in Finnish secondary L1 education”. [3]  This reference reflects mainstream international policy framing associated with UNESCO and related United Nations agencies, which emphasise mother-tongue-based instruction in the early years as a means of improving comprehension, equity and learning outcomes in unequal education systems. These frameworks are referenced here to capture the conceptual environment within which Finnish interlocutors positioned their own views during the study visit, rather than as primary evidence or as part of a comprehensive literature review.     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   October 2025   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   Contents   Abstract Introduction: A partnership pauses to reflect FOCAC’s institutional journey Cultural and intellectual resonances Governance, multipolarity and the Global South Expanding fields of cooperation Knowledge institutions as architects of the future Youth and intergenerational imagination Looking forward: Toward a shared horizon Conclusion References Abstract   This report reflects on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) through the insights from a joint symposium convened by the Inclusive Society Institute and the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University. It argues that FOCAC has evolved from a primarily developmental platform into a mature, multidimensional partnership that has been shaped by shared intellectual, cultural and governance concerns. The discussions situate China-Africa cooperation within a shifting global order that is marked by multipolarity and a rising Global South agency, emphasising the growing role of knowledge institutions, cultural resonance and youth engagement. The paper reaches the conclusion that FOCAC, at twenty-five, represents a philosophical inflection point, which signals a move away from transactional cooperation and towards deeper intellectual and civilisational co-creation.     1. Introduction: A partnership pauses to reflect   There are moments in the life of international partnerships when the ordinary tempo of cooperation slows, and a deeper rhythm emerges, the rhythm of reflection. The symposium jointly convened by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) and the Institute of African Studies (IAS) at Zhejiang Normal University marked such a moment. Although formally situated within the celebrations of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the gathering quickly moved beyond ceremonial acknowledgement.   What unfolded was a reflective and at times almost contemplative conversation about the meaning of the relationship between China and Africa, the memory that anchors it and the imagination required to carry it forward. Academic exchanges are often framed as technical discussions around data, research and policy and yet in Cape Town, something more elemental surfaced, an awareness that partnerships, much like individuals, reach a point when they must pause, take stock of themselves and rediscover the deeper reasons they exist. Prof. Liu Shu (2025), in opening the symposium, captured this sensibility when he framed the gathering as a response to President Xi Jinping’s message in a letter to African scholars, which he said was not to be treated as a mere diplomatic gesture, but as an invitation to deepen the civilisational and scholarly conscience of the relationship. His remarks reminded participants that research is not a passive adjunct to diplomacy, it is an active instrument through which partnerships think about themselves. Liu’s framing created an atmosphere of attentiveness, the sense that everyone in the room was being asked to listen more carefully than usual, to speak with intention, and to resist the temptation of treating the anniversary as a checklist of achievements. From the outset, the symposium leaned toward introspection, thereby signalling that this anniversary would be measured not only in outcomes, but in how understanding is improved. The keynote reflection by Daryl Swanepoel (2025) reinforced the tone by offering an expansive reading of FOCAC’s institutional development over the past twenty-five years. His account of the Forum’s maturation over a quarter-century emphasised that institutional longevity arises from real alignment, not rhetorical alignment, not ideological alignment, but developmental alignment. He traced how FOCAC began in 2000 as a diplomatic platform designed to stabilise and formalise cooperation, yet gradually grew into a multidimensional developmental machinery encompassing infrastructure, human capital formation, public health, green energy, digital finance and governance reform. The way he narrated FOCAC’s evolution carried a philosophical undercurrent, that institutions, like people, discover themselves over time and they evolve in response to necessity, experience and the subtle accretion of trust. In his telling, FOCAC was not designed fully formed, it became itself through interaction, experimentation and iterative cooperation.   This observation set the stage for the symposium’s broader inquiry, namely that if the first twenty-five years of FOCAC were about discovering institutional purpose, then the next twenty-five must be about deepening institutional meaning. And to understand this meaning requires more than economic metrics, it requires attention to culture, history, intellectual frameworks, identity, symbolism and memory, the human elements that shape how cooperation is understood and lived.   It was precisely this terrain that the symposium sought to explore. 2. FOCAC’s institutional journey   The institutional story of FOCAC is well known in broad outline, yet the symposium revealed a more layered understanding of its development. Swanepoel (2025) described the Forum as being a living architecture that is not a static bureaucratic agreement, but rather, it has developed into a dynamic structure that adapts as Africa’s needs and China’s capabilities evolve. In its earliest years, FOCAC’s focus on infrastructure reflected Africa’s developmental urgency of the time, such as the need for economic infrastructure like roads, power stations, ports, railways and telecommunications that could unlock economic potential and China’s experience with large-scale infrastructure and its capacity to mobilise finance at scale aligned naturally with these priorities.   But as multiple participants noted, the institutional journey did not stop at infrastructure. It broadened into a sophisticated framework for cooperation across diverse fields. What differentiates FOCAC from many other development partnerships, Wang Xiao (2025) observed, is its responsiveness, the capacity to evolve in tandem with Africa’s changing strategic aspirations, for example, when Africa began prioritising industrialisation, FOCAC expanded vocational training, manufacturing cooperation and industrial parks. When digital transformation emerged as a critical frontier, the partnership introduced cross-border e-commerce training, digital customs innovations and partnerships with Chinese technology ecosystems. When Africa’s public health vulnerabilities were exposed during the Ebola crisis and later during COVID-19, new forms of health cooperation emerged, such as the Africa CDC, medical training schemes, hospital twinning arrangements and emergency health infrastructure.   This was echoed by Prof. Liu Hongwu (2025), who described China’s developmental trajectory as having evolved from an agrarian society into a manufacturing powerhouse, which then further evolved into a technological innovator, thereby equipping China with a unique set of experiences from which Africa can selectively draw, but importantly, Africa must guard against simple imitation, because development models must be adapted to local circumstances and not only copied. He then went on to emphasise that China’s experience holds value precisely because it demonstrates that development is possible outside Western frameworks, and under conditions that resonate with African contexts.   Ambassador Gert Grobler (2025) offered a complementary diplomatic perspective, arguing that FOCAC’s durability is a product of consistent engagement, for example, China has shown up, in ministerial meetings, in summit dialogues, in crisis response, in long-term capacity initiatives. International partnerships often falter because intentions fade or political cycles intervene. FOCAC has endured because it has been continuously cultivated and this has created diplomatic reliability and the space for deeper forms of cooperation, which is enabling Africa and China to walk together through shifting global circumstances.   The institutional journey of FOCAC has also has a psychological dimension, which was illuminated by the intervention of Buyelwa Sonjica (2025), who argued that Africa’s engagement with China has helped to disrupt the legacy of dependency that was created by Africa’s colonial and post-colonial relationships with the West. For her, the institutional framework offers not merely aid or investment, but affirmation and a recognition of Africa as a capable, sovereign actor in its own development, a psychological dimension which is not peripheral, in that it shapes how Africans perceive themselves within global systems.   Taken together, the institutional journey of FOCAC emerges not as a linear progression, but as a deepening spiral, where in each cycle the cooperation has broadened the relationship’s scope, expanded its intellectual foundations and refined its ethical commitments.     3. Cultural and intellectual resonances   If the institutional story establishes how Africa and China work together, the cultural story explains why cooperation resonates and it was here that the symposium revealed its most distinctive intellectual contributions.   Stephen Langtry (2025) made a particularly evocative intervention when he dug deeper into the historical presence of the Chinese people in South Africa. Records traced their presence in South Africa from as far back as the 1660s. His storytelling disrupted the common assumption and widely held view that China-Africa relations is a recent development and/or that it has been externally imposed. Instead, it was as he described, a slow, quiet entanglement of lives across centuries, woven through migration, cultural adaptation and shared vulnerability. This historical recovery served an important conceptual purpose, in that  it reframed the partnership between the two sides not as an encounter between strangers, but rather as a renewal of an old relationship, albeit that it’s under-remembered in current times.   Langtry then offered a philosophical meditation on ubuntu and Confucian harmony, identifying an ethical consonance between African and Chinese thought: Ubuntu, with its insistence that “a person becomes a person through other people,” and Confucian harmony, with its emphasis on relational balance and moral self-cultivation, both call for forms of coexistence grounded in reciprocity. For Langtry, these traditions illuminate why China-Africa cooperation has a cultural ease absent in many other external partnerships. They resonate at the level of worldview and they reflect similar intuitions about community, humanity and the moral obligations of leadership. This exploration of cultural resonance found parallel expression in the reflections of Liu Hongwu (2025) when he emphasised that African traditions of pluralism and Chinese traditions of inclusiveness produce a natural affinity. He described how African societies, despite their deep internal diversity, nurture forms of belonging that accommodate difference, which is mirrored in Chinese philosophical traditions that value the similar qualities of harmony without homogeneity. These shared dispositions, Hongwu suggested, helps to explain why the partnership between China and Africa has endured despite the longstanding and often divisive geopolitical turbulence. Sonjica (2025) took the cultural conversation further by introducing the concept of “intangible deliverables,” which she did by describing how encounters with Chinese society has challenged African perceptions, which have been largely shaped by colonial narratives that positioned the West as the primary reference point for modernity. Seeing a non-Western society achieve extraordinary developmental transformation restores African psychological confidence and it enlarges the imagination of what is possible. In her view, these shifts in mental horizons are as important as material infrastructure. Identity, she argued, is a development outcome.   In a different tone, Dr Yu Guizheng (2025) emphasised the intellectual responsibility of scholars in shaping cross-cultural understanding. He argued that scholarship cultivates interpretive generosity, which allows societies to see beyond stereotypes and misunderstandings, and in his observation, academic exchange nurture “the capacity to learn from difference. ” This struck at the heart of the symposium’s philosophical endeavour. Meanwhile, the contribution of Berenice Marks (2025), through her recognition of young South African scholars in the G20 essay competition that was co-organised by the ISI and IAS, added a generational layer to cultural resonance. The students’ research, which spanned topics from green development to blue finance and agricultural modernisation, amongst others, showed how young Africans are already engaging China intellectually, and vice versa, shaping their own narratives and resisting reductive framings of the relationship. Their enthusiasm underscored that cultural resonance between the two people’s is not static, to the contrary it is constantly renewed through intergenerational learning.   Together, these contributions, it was argued, transformed culture from a soft addition to cooperation into an analytical cornerstone. The symposium revealed that China-Africa relations resonate because they touch something deep, a shared philosophical orientation toward community, a historical memory of connection, an ethical commitment to relationality and a generational desire for futures not circumscribed by Western paradigms.   4. Governance, multipolarity and the Global South   As the symposium moved from cultural resonance to the broader questions of global governance, the tone shifted in that it now carried the weight of geopolitical complexity. The participants recognised that the twenty-fifth anniversary of FOCAC coincided with a historical inflection point, namely the weakening of unipolar structures, the fragmentation of global consensus and the emergence of new normative frameworks driven by the Global South. In this context, China-Africa cooperation is no longer merely bilateral or developmental in that it has become an intellectual and political site through which the broader debates about the emerging global order is being contested and reimagined.   Prof. Liu Hongwu (2025) argued that a new era of global governance is emerging, which will be an era in which Western institutions no longer monopolise the authority to define global norms. He also suggested that the fragmentation of the West’s dominance is not the result of external challenges alone, but also because of internal contradictions within their own system, which fractures have arisen due to unsustainable societal issues, such as unequal development, the inconsistent application of norms, and the failure to recognise the cultural and political plurality of the contemporary world. It is in this vacuum that Africa and China, who have each in their own way, found themselves increasingly drawn to articulate alternative principles that are grounded in idea of inclusion, sovereignty, developmental fairness and cultural respect.   Hongwu’s perspective resonated with Daryl Swanepoel (2025), who noted that Africa’s agency in global governance has expanded significantly in recent years, which expansion is evidenced by its role in BRICS, its interventions in climate negotiations and in its invitation to join the G20 as a permanent member. He traced how FOCAC has gradually become a platform through which African states coordinate not only development priorities, but also global governance positions. For Swanepoel, this shift is not incidental; it is the product of accumulated trust, institutional maturity and the recognition on both sides that global governance must reflect the lived realities of the majority of the world’s population.   This political dimension of the partnership between China and Africa was echoed in the diplomatic reflections of Ambassador Gert Grobler (2025), who,   his intervention, emphasised the continuity and reliability of China’s support for Africa’s fair and just multilateral participation. Grobler contextualised this support within the broader diplomatic history, by noting that China has consistently advanced African priorities at the United Nations and in other global forums, which he suggested underscored China’s political solidarity not a rhetorical, but as a structural feature of the relationship. Where Hongwu, Swanepoel and Grobler approached global governance through political analysis, Zhan Mengshu (2025) introduced a different, but complementary dimension, being the role that research collaboration plays in shaping governance outcomes. Zhan argued that governance cooperation cannot rest solely on political commitments, in it must be grounded in shared intellectual frameworks, and so she proposed strengthened research networks, joint policy analysis and deeper engagement between think tanks as essential elements of future governance architecture. Her contribution added an epistemological layer to the discourse in that it emphasised that ideas and evidence shape governance outcomes as much as political will. Meanwhile, Wang Xiao (2025) provided a diplomatic anchor for these discussions by reaffirming China’s principled stance on sovereignty, non-interference and mutual respect, where in her remarks she highlighted that China views global governance reform not through ideological confrontation, but through the pursuit of balance, representation and developmental justice. This lens, she argued, is one of the reasons that African states have found China to be a reliable partner in navigating global political complexity.   The symposium’s exploration of global governance was not limited to structural analysis, in that it also engaged with the philosophical undercurrents existing within the international community. Langtry (2025), though primarily concerned with cultural identity, observed that the global governance debates often overlook the role of collective moral imagination, because traditions such as ubuntu and Confucianism offer alternative ethical vocabularies for thinking about international cooperation, both of which vocabularies are grounded in relationality, responsibility and balance. The subtle, yet important dimension to the governance discussion that he was making was that political systems do not operate in moral vacuums, they tend to also reflect underlying conceptions of what it means to be human, and what obligations societies believe they owe one another. This philosophical nuance presented by Langtry complemented Sonjica’s (2025) insistence that governance reform must not only be attentive to institutional efficiency, but that it also has to be conscious to other factors, such as identity, dignity and psychological liberation. In her view, global governance systems that were shaped under colonial or imperial logics, cannot simply be tinkered with, in that they require a far more reaching and complete re-articulation that has to be grounded in the lived experience of those societies that were historically excluded from decision-making due to the imposed logics. For Africa, she argued, global governance cannot merely be considered as a technical question of representation: it must reclaim its authority to shape global norms. Together, these insights painted a picture of China-Africa cooperation as a microcosm of a broader shift in international relations, which shift requires a partnership that should be increasingly aware of its potential, and its responsibility, to contribute to a more inclusive global order. For Africa it is no longer simply about roads and railways, it is now also about the philosophical, political and epistemic frameworks through which the next century of global governance will be written.     5. Expanding fields of cooperation   While governance considerations set the philosophical horizon, the symposium also examined the concrete forms of cooperation that have emerged under FOCAC and yet, even here, the tone remained reflective rather than technocratic. Participants did not simply list projects, they also explored how these initiatives can reconfigure African developmental possibility. Swanepoel (2025) revisited the centrality of infrastructure, noting that although the term has become commonplace, its meaning is often reduced to engineering. Infrastructure, which he argued, is fundamentally about possibility, such as the possibility of travel, trade, education healthcare access and economic participation and it is a precondition for dignity. He described how Chinese-built railways, bridges and power grids have transformed not only the economic landscapes in Africa, but so too the imaginative landscape of what development can look like. This contextual understanding was echoed by Liu Yuankang (2025), whose reflections on digital transformation added a futuristic dimension when he expalined how digital customs systems, smart ports, e-government platforms and educational technologies are becoming new fields of China-Africa collaboration. For him, digital cooperation marks a shift from industrial modernisation to informational modernisation. It creates opportunities for Africa to leapfrog traditional constraints and build governance systems suited to its youthful population. In Liu’s vision, the digital future is not purely technological it is also social, cultural and political.   Public health cooperation also figured prominently in the symposium. Several participants recalled China’s role during the Ebola crisis and later during the COVID-19 pandemic, citing the establishment and strengthening of the Africa CDC, medical training programmes, vaccine cooperation and emergency health infrastructure. These interventions were described by Swanepoel (2025) not as episodic acts of aid, but as manifestations of long-term solidarity which is rooted in shared vulnerability. He pointed to cooperation in the field of health, which he said revealed the underlying principle that lies at the heart of the relationship: that development is inseparable from human security. Agricultural collaboration also emerged as a vital and expanding area of engagement between the two sides. Liu Hongwu (2025) emphasised that China’s experience in agricultural modernisation, that evolved from a smallholder driven agricultural economy to rural industrialisation, holds valuable lessons for Africa’s own food security and rural development. Agricultural technology demonstration centres, hybrid seed cooperation, irrigation projects and training programmes have created practical channels through which Chinese agricultural innovations can be shared and adapted to African contexts. Participants were of the view that agricultural cooperation, while often overshadowed by infrastructure in the public discourse, may ultimately have more transformative long-term effects for the Africa, because it directly impacts the lives of millions of Africans directly. Odile Bulten (2025), approaching cooperation through the lens of governance, underscored the importance of transparency, when, she argued, cooperation grows more complex, for example when it spans digital finance, water management, green energy and urban development: accountability and ethical oversight must grow with it. Because for her, the sophistication of cooperation must be equally matched by the sophistication of governance.   Security cooperation also entered the discussion, though in subtler tones, in that while the symposium did not frame security cooperation in militarised terms, it acknowledged the interconnectedness of development and peace. Whether through maritime security, anti-piracy initiatives, peacekeeping collaborations or counter-terrorism support, China and Africa have begun exploring ways to stabilise the environments necessary for development to flourish. These engagements were framed as being pragmatic responses to shared vulnerabilities, as opposed to being instruments of geopolitical influence. Against the background of Africa facing disproportionate climate risks despite contributing minimally to global emission, climate and environmental cooperation emerged as one of the most future-oriented fields of engagement. Swanepoel (2025) and several Chinese scholars highlighted China’s global leadership in renewable energy technologies, such as solar, wind, hydroelectric and electric vehicles, and its potential role in supporting Africa’s green transition, though for example green industrialisation, climate adaptation, sustainable urban development and ecological protection; which were all identified as areas where cooperation could profoundly influence Africa’s development trajectory.   Taken together, these expanding fields of cooperation between China and Africa illustrated how FOCAC has evolved into a multidimensional ecosystem. It is not a single initiative, but a constellation of interlinked programmes that touch almost every aspect of African life, including economic, social, political, cultural, environmental and technological, amongst others. The symposium therefore articulated a vision of cooperation that is not only expansive, but integrative and a system that seeks to address development holistically, rather than piecemeal.     6. Knowledge institutions as architects of the future   If cooperation is to be integrative, then knowledge institutions must be central. This was perhaps the most consistent and unifying theme of the symposium. There was a shared realisation among participants that the future of the China-Africa relationship will be shaped not only by government decisions, but by the intellectual infrastructure that thinkers, scholars, universities and research institutes create.   Prof. Liu Shu (2025) framed the entire symposium as an academic response to President Xi’s call for deeper scholarly engagement, advancing the idea that intellectual labour is foundational, not decorative. And scholars, he argued, do not merely observe the cooperation between the two sides, they conceptualise it, critique it and they provide the interpretive frameworks that shape the policy decisions that impact it.   Dr Yu Guizheng (2025) added depth to this idea by describing academic communities as custodians of interpretive generosity, in that they are institutions that model how to read another culture without distortion, how to absorb complexity without flattening it and how to allow oneself to be transformed by intellectual encounter: a perspective that suggests that scholarship is not only analytical, but also relational, and it builds trust by reducing cultural distance between people’s.   Meanwhile, Zhan Mengshu (2025) provided a practical blueprint for strengthening academic cooperation, which plan proposes research mobility programmes, co-authored publications, joint conferences, interdisciplinary initiatives and policy-oriented research platforms. For Zhan, think tanks and universities are not ancillary to development, they are laboratories of governance innovation.   Odile Bulten (2025) emphasised that the intellectual ecosystem also carries responsibilities. Scholars must hold both African and Chinese institutions accountable and they must ensure that cooperation is transparent, ethical and socially responsive. Her intervention served to remind participants that knowledge institutions are not neutral spaces, but moral actors in their own right. This emphasis on knowledge resonated strongly with Daryl Swanepoel’s (2025) reflection that Africa’s engagement with China must increasingly be guided by Africa’s own intellectual resources, because, he argued, African think tanks must develop the conceptual tools to interpret China from African vantage points. And it must be interpreted not through Western paradigms and not through overly romanticised lenses, but through grounded, rigorous and contextually sensitive analysis.   It was fitting that Berenice Marks (2025), representing youth scholarship, demonstrated that this intellectual future is already emerging. The students honoured at the symposium, for their essays on green development, blue finance, agricultural resilience and sustainable trade, exemplified the next generation of Africa-China scholars. Their work signalled that knowledge cooperation is not a future aspiration, but a living practice already shaping new imaginaries of development.   In this sense, the symposium revealed that think tanks and universities are not simply observers of China-Africa cooperation. They are its architects. They produce the ethical, conceptual and analytical foundations on which future cooperation will rest.     7. Youth and intergenerational imagination   Amid the intellectual, political and cultural depth of the symposium, the voices of young scholars stood out not as an addendum, but as a revelation, because their essays, curated by Berenice Marks (2025) through the G20 essay awards, brought into focus the generational horizon against which China-Africa cooperation must now define itself. If the first twenty-five years of FOCAC established the structural and diplomatic scaffolding of the relationship, the next twenty-five will be shaped by the imaginations and capacities of those who were not yet born when FOCAC began. This intergenerational shift constituted one of the symposium’s most quietly profound moments.   The winning students’ research offered a window into the intellectual consciousness of Africa’s emerging thinkers. Their essays, exploring blue finance ecosystems, opportunities in the grain trade corridors, green development strategy and sustainable agricultural futures, were technically sophisticated, but more importantly, they were conceptually open. They approached their research not through inherited anxieties or romanticised projections, but with a grounded curiosity that has been shaped by their lived realities as young Chinese and Africans that are learning to navigate a multipolar world.   What struck many of the participants was how naturally the youth seemed to integrate China and Africa into their cognitive maps of global development, because unlike earlier generations who grew up in a world structured by Western hegemony and Cold War binaries, contemporary students see the world as a multiplicity of actors, ideas and systems. The African youth, for example, do not perceive China as an external force, but as a normal, inevitable part of the global landscape and one with which engagement is not only possible, but necessary. This generational shift carries enormous implications for the future of China-Africa relations and it means that cooperation will increasingly be shaped not by the logic of geopolitical alignment, but by the logic of shared problem-solving.   For Buyelwa Sonjica (2025), this generational emergence represents one of the most important “intangible deliverables” of the relationship between the two sides. Youth engagement nurtures psychological liberation by expanding the horizons of what Africa believes itself capable of achieving and therefore, when young Africans encounter Chinese innovation, modernisation and cultural self-confidence, they internalise a different story about global possibilities, which is one not limited by the historical narratives of colonial dependency. This shift in self-understanding, she argued, is foundational to development.   From a philosophical standpoint, the symposium’s younger participants offered something even more valuable, they brought into the conversation a sense of temporal humility. They reminded everyone that the institutions, narratives and assumptions shaping China-Africa relations today will be judged, inhabited and revised by people whose relationships to history, culture and identity differ fundamentally from those who currently steer policy. Their imaginations will define the next arc of cooperation more profoundly than any summit declaration.   Youth, then, are not merely participants in the China-Africa relationship, they are its future custodians. Their capacity to think beyond inherited narratives, to engage China and Africa analytically, rather than ideologically, and to situate Africa’s developmental trajectory within a broader global ecosystem gives hope that the next quarter-century of FOCAC, will be more intellectually sophisticated, more culturally grounded and more globally attuned than the last.     8. Looking forward: Toward a shared horizon   As the symposium moved toward its final reflections, it became clear that the participants were not only attempting to assess the past twenty-five years of FOCAC, but also to intuit the shape of its future. And so each voice contributed a different facet of the emerging horizon, which together formed a compelling vision of what China-Africa cooperation could become in the next historical cycle.   For Swanepoel (2025), the future lay in aligning FOCAC with China’s four global initiatives of development, security, civilisation and governance. He argued that these frameworks were not abstract policy instruments, in that they represent a coherent worldview that is rooted in global interdependence. In his reading, the Global Development Initiative (GDI) encourages pragmatic cooperation, the Global Security Initiative (GSI) emphasises stability without coercion, the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI) affirms cultural plurality, and the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) invites adaptation, rather than imposition, which together offer a philosophical architecture that resonates deeply with Africa’s own aspirations for dignity, agency and self-determined development.   Wang Xiao (2025) offered a further complementary perspective that is rooted in diplomatic experience, by emphasising that China’s path of modernisation, which is marked by poverty reduction, technological advancement and cultural preservation, provides an alternative reference point for African societies seeking to chart their own developmental futures. Importantly, she underscored that China does not present its experience as a model to be copied, but as a set of lessons to be adapted, which  humility, she argued, is essential for sustaining trust in the relationship.   Liu Hongwu (2025), by drawing on his long engagement with African philosophy and political systems, suggested that the next phase of cooperation must embrace an ethic of “civilisational humility,” because, he argued, true partnership requires acknowledging that no single society holds a monopoly on wisdom. China must remain open to learning from Africa’s models of pluralism, social resilience and communal identity and Africa, in turn, must draw from China’s developmental pragmatism and institutional experimentation without subordinating its cultural identity. Hongwu’s reflection restored a moral dimension to the future of FOCAC, which is to be one grounded in mutual learning, rather than competitive assertion.   Zhan Mengshu (2025) projected the conversation into the realm of intellectual architecture and for her, the future of China-Africa cooperation hinges on long-term research collaboration. Joint studies on climate adaptation, digital governance, rural development, peacebuilding, sustainable industry and public administration will produce the intellectual capital that informs policy. Zhan argued that strengthening academic mobility, co-authorship and institutional partnerships will help ensure that cooperation remains analytically grounded and responsive to new challenges.   Meanwhile, Liu Yuankang (2025) envisioned a digitally integrated future in which Africa’s technological ecosystems, fintech, e-government, smart infrastructure and digital trade, become central pillars of cooperation, which digital transformation, he predicted, would reshape not only Africa’s economic life, but also its political institutions, social networks and cultural expressions. Digitalisation, in his telling, is not merely a tool but a new developmental ontology.   Odile Bulten (2025) extended this forward-looking vision by emphasising governance integrity as the backbone of future cooperation, which will become even rmore important as cooperation widens into more complex domains, such as renewable energy, water security, artificial intelligence and environmental protection, transparency and public participation must remain central, because, in her words “without ethical governance, cooperation risks losing legitimacy”. For Ambassador Grobler (2025), the future will require steady diplomatic stewardship, because, as he reminded participants, partnerships only endure when they are cultivated consistently, especially during periods of global instability; and that requires diplomacy, trust-building and institutional continuity as essential anchors.   Finally, the reflections inspired by youth contributions offered the most hopeful dimension of all, being the recognition that futures are not shaped by documents or communiqués, but instead, by imagination. Young scholars demonstrated that Africa approaches China not with deference or suspicion but with clarity, curiosity and critical engagement. The partnership is no longer defined only by senior policymakers, it is alive in the minds of those who will inherit the global order being constructed today.   Taken together, these perspectives pointed toward a shared horizon defined by intellectual depth, moral imagination, cultural respect, ecological responsibility, technological adaptability and political courage.   The symposium agreed that the next twenty-five years of FOCAC will require not only new policies, but so too new philosophical commitments that need to be grounded in empathy, curiosity and a willingness to reimagine global relations from the vantage point of the Global South.     9. Conclusion   By the time the symposium drew to a close, what lingered, was not the particularities of each intervention, but the subtle harmony of the whole, because it became clear that the partnership between Africa and China has moved far beyond the transactional logic that often characterises South-South cooperation. It has become a space where memory, identity, knowledge and aspiration converge. A space where infrastructure is inseparable from meaning, where governance is inseparable from dignity, where culture is inseparable from development, and where imagination is inseparable from policy.   FOCAC at twenty-five is not simply an institutional milestone, it is a philosophical moment. It signals that Africa and China are ready to engage one another at the depth where civilisations speak, not only through trade and investment, but through worldviews, ethical commitments and shared futures. The symposium made visible the full spectrum of voices required to sustain such a partnership: Liu Shu grounding the dialogue intellectually, Swanepoel mapping its structural architecture, Wang Xiao affirming its diplomatic integrity, Liu Hongwu offering its philosophical foundation, Langtry illuminating its cultural memory, Sonjica revealing its moral and psychological dimensions, Yu Guizheng articulating its epistemic humility, Zhan Mengshu expanding its scholarly horizons, Odile Bulten grounding it in governance integrity, Liu Yuankang charting its technological pathways, Ambassador Grobler anchoring it in diplomatic continuity and Berenice Marks showing that the dreams and inquiries of the young will carry the partnership into the next quarter-century.   In this way, the symposium revealed that FOCAC is not merely an agreement between governments, but a site of intellectual and moral co-creation. It is a place where Africa and China learn to think together, to dream together and to confront the deep challenges of the twenty-first century together. And if there is a single insight to carry forward, it is this: partnerships endure when they allow themselves to grow, to deepen, to question, to imagine and, above all, to become more fully human.     10. References   Bulten, O. 2025. Symposium Notes on Governance, Transparency and Civil Society Participation.  Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Grobler, G. 2025. Video Address to the ISI-IAS Symposium.  Delivered at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Hongwu, L. 2025. Reflections on Global Governance, Civilisational Inclusion and Africa–China Cooperation. Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Langtry, S. 2025. Cultural, Historical and Philosophical Reflections on China-Africa Relations.  Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Marks, B. 2025. Presentation of G20 Youth Essay Awards and Reflections on Youth Participation in Africa-China Cooperation. Delivered at the ISI-IAS Symposium, Cape Town.   Mengshu, Z. 2025. Research Collaboration and Knowledge Partnership Proposals for Strengthening FOCAC Mechanisms. Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Shu, L. 2025. Opening Reflections on the Intellectual Responsibilities of Africa-China Scholarship.  Delivered at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Sonjica, B. 2025. Reflections on Identity, Intangible Deliverables and the Moral Foundations of Cooperation.  Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium, Cape Town.   Swanepoel, D. 2025. FOCAC at Twenty-Five: Institutional Reflections and Future Pathways.  Keynote Address delivered at the ISI–IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Wang, X. 2025. Diplomatic Reflections on Mutual Respect and Shared Futures in China-Africa Cooperation.  Delivered at the ISI-IAS Symposium, Cape Town.   Yu, G. 2025. Remarks on Academic Communities as Custodians of Interpretive Understanding.  Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Yuankang, L. 2025. Digital Transformation and Africa’s Technological Future: Opportunities for China-Africa Cooperation. Delivered at the ISI–IAS Symposium, Cape Town.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za