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A meeting of the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue organised by the Inclusive Society Institute Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context   MAY 2025   Rapporteur: Daryl Sw anepoel CONTENTS   1 AFRICA THINK-TANK DIALOGUE 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2.1 US - Africa relations from an African perspective 2.2 US–Africa relations from a US perspective 2.3 Convergences and Divergences 2.4 Conclusion 3 OPENING SESSION 3.1 Welcoming remarks Prof Zweli Ndevu, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa) 3.2 Setting the Scene - Navigating Africa’s Future: Multilateral Reform, Global Relations, and Development  Finance Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer, Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa) 3.3 Navigating Geopolitical Currents: South Africa–United States Relations During the 2025 G20 Presidency Dr Philani Mthembu, Executive Director, Institute for Global  Dialogue (South Africa) 3.4 Navigating Global Shifts: South Africa’s Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World Hon. Alvin Botes, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa) 4 SESSION 1: US AFRICA RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AFRICA 4.1 Beyond Rhetoric: Reimagining Africa - U.S. Relations in a Multipolar World Prof. Efem Ubi, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Nigeria) 4.2 United States–Africa Relations — Historical Legacy, Contemporary Challenges, and Future Perspectives Ms Aïcha Karafi, President, Tunisian Association of Local Governance (Tunisia) 4.3 The Importance of African Agency in US–Africa Relations Dr Melha Rout Biel, Executive Director, Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies (South Sudan) 4.4 Evolving US–West Africa Economic Relations - Implications for Côte d’Ivoire Prof Assi Kimou, Deputy Director, CIRES Economic Policy Analysis Unit (Cote d’Ivoire) 4.5 Pan-Africanism, African Diplomacy, and Development - A Critical Analysis Prof. Francis Matambalya, Chief Executive Officer, Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre (Tanzania) 4.6 Africa and the United States - Reimagining a Strategic and Equitable Partnership Amb Omar Mjenga, President and CEO, Centre for International Policy Africa (Tanzania) 4.7 Reimagining US–Africa Relations - Priorities, Challenges, and Strategic Pathways Dr Zine Barka, Independent Public Finance Analyst (Algeria) 4.8 US–South Africa Relations in the Era of Trumpism - A Critical Reflection Dr Sizo Nkala, Senior Researcher, Centre for Africa-China Studies, University of Johannesburg (South Africa) 4.9 US–Africa Relations in the Era of ‘America First’ - A Kenyan Perspective Brigadier (Rtd) Dr Robert Kabage, Executive Director, Mashariki Research and Policy Centre (Kenya) 5 SESSION 2: U.S. – AFRICA RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES 5.1 Understanding African Fragility Through U.S. National Security Perspectives Dr Dylan Craig, Associate Professor, Department of Security Studies, U.S. National War College (United States of America) 5.2 U.S. - Africa Relations in a Time of Geopolitical Transition - Policy, Challenges, and the South African Case Ambassador Michelle Gavin, Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (United States of America) 5.3 The Changing US-Africa Policy Dynamic - Context, Challenges, and Opportunities Dr Anne Griffin, Independent US-Africa policy expert associated with the Centre for American Progress (United States of America) 5.4 Discussion 1 AFRICA THINK-TANK DIALOGUE   The Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD) is an informal collaboration of African think-tanks that have African socio-economic development, governance and a fairer, more inclusive, multilateral order at the heart of their work.   As such, the ATD discusses, amongst others:   Africa’s governance within the framework of the African Union Arica’s relationship with other regional structures such as the European Union, BRICS, the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the G20 Africa’s relationship with world powers such as the United States of America and China Reform of the United Nations and other multilateral organisations in order to reposition Africa's role in the global order How to improve sustainable development in Africa, including required adaptation resulting from Climate Change    Activities   The African Consultative Meeting is held annually in Cape Town, South Africa Participation in the conferences, seminars, workshops and webinars – both ATD organised and those organised by the participating organisations Participation in the programmes of the Global South Perspectives Network Research Advocacy Early warning mechanism on emerging issues for the continent Promote African reform for more inclusive governance and economic development Act as a catalyst for African reformation and unity     2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   The 2025 Africa Consultative Meeting (ACM), held under the auspices of the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD), convened a diverse range of African policy experts, academics, diplomats, and civil society actors to assess the evolving contours of US - Africa relations in a multipolar world.   Against the backdrop of shifting geopolitical alliances, intensifying global competition, and mounting demands for reform in multilateral governance, the meeting sought to interrogate both historical legacies and contemporary dynamics shaping engagement between the United States and African nations.   This report synthesises the insights and debates that emerged over the two-day event, offering a nuanced and multidimensional account of the challenges, opportunities, and strategic imperatives underpinning this complex relationship.   2.1 US - Africa relations from an African perspective   African scholars and policymakers presented a deeply reflective and, at times, critical account of the trajectory of US - Africa relations. A recurrent theme was the persistence of asymmetry in the partnership—where Africa is often treated as a recipient of aid and influence, rather than as a strategic actor with agency and voice. This imbalance, rooted in colonial legacies and exacerbated by Cold War geopolitics, continues to shape both the form and content of American engagement on the continent.   One of the key critiques raised was the framing of engagement through the lens of “relations” rather than “cooperation.” As Prof. Efem Ubi argued, “relations” imply a hierarchical connection with limited mutuality, while “cooperation” denotes equality and shared purpose. African actors expressed dissatisfaction with rhetorical commitments to democracy and development that are not matched by consistent action or genuine partnership.   Security engagement was another focal point of concern. African leaders noted that while US military aid and counterterrorism support may yield short-term stability, they often fail to address root causes such as poverty, youth unemployment, and poor governance. Moreover, US military presence on African soil - especially in the Sahel - led to governance vacuums and unintended civilian harm, raising questions about long-term effectiveness.   Finally, there was a strong emphasis on African agency. As Dr. Melha Rout Biel noted, African nations must set their own priorities, drive their own development strategies, and assert their voices in multilateral forums. Institutional mechanisms such as the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offer blueprints for such autonomy, but realising their potential requires external partners, including the US, to support - not supplant - Africa-led initiatives.    2.2 US–Africa relations from a US perspective   From the American perspective, Africa represents both a challenge and an opportunity. The continent’s demographic dynamism, natural resource wealth, and emerging consumer markets make it an area of strategic interest. However, US policy remains heavily influenced by security imperatives, geopolitical rivalries, and concerns about governance.   Recent years have seen a mix of engagement strategies. Under the Biden administration, there has been a renewed emphasis on multilateralism, democracy promotion, and climate finance. Yet, inconsistencies remain. For example, the absence of key US officials at G20 meetings hosted by South Africa was seen by many Africans as a sign of waning American commitment to multilateral dialogue.   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been a cornerstone of US economic policy toward Africa, offering duty-free access to US markets. Yet its uneven implementation, selective eligibility criteria, and limited support for value-added exports have diminished its impact. Moreover, its potential termination looms as a key concern for countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa.   Investment and trade remain robust in certain sectors. US firms have a significant footprint in mining, manufacturing, and services in South Africa and Nigeria, among others. However, much of this investment is concentrated in resource extraction rather than industrial transformation or skills development. American stakeholders acknowledge that a shift is needed - from short-term interests to long-term partnerships that contribute to Africa’s structural transformation.   Soft power remains a key asset in the US approach. Programmes in education, health, and cultural exchange - along with historic anti-apartheid solidarity and ongoing collaboration among think tanks and civil society - offer a foundation of goodwill. The challenge is to translate these people-to-people ties into a more coherent and strategic policy framework.   2.3  Convergences and Divergences   Despite tensions and asymmetries, there are important areas of convergence between African and American interests. These include:   Climate resilience and just energy transitions : Both sides recognise the need for urgent climate action, and there is agreement on the importance of increased climate finance. African leaders, however, stress that such finance must come in the form of grants, not loans that exacerbate debt burdens. Peace and security:  There is mutual interest in stabilising regions such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. However, there is disagreement over the methods - Africans favour holistic, locally led peacebuilding, while the US often favours militarised responses. Democracy and governance:  Both parties support democratic governance, but African actors are wary of what they perceive as moralistic or inconsistent US advocacy - particularly when American strategic interests override democratic principles. Digital technology and innovation: Africa’s young population and growing tech sector represent opportunities for collaboration. Programmes that support digital infrastructure, STEM education, and startup ecosystems are potential win-win areas for partnership.    Conversely, several divergences persist:   Trade and economic policy:  Africa seeks more inclusive trade frameworks and diversification, whereas US trade policy remains fragmented and protectionist in certain sectors. Moreover, unilateral mechanisms like AGOA do not always align with continental initiatives such as AfCFTA. Multilateralism and global governance reform: African countries are calling for structural changes in the UN Security Council, IMF, and World Bank to better reflect contemporary power dynamics. The US has shown limited support for these reforms, preferring to retain its dominant position. Superpower rivalries:  African states seek to engage with a variety of global actors—China, Russia, India, the EU - based on national interests. US pressure to “choose sides” undermines Africa’s preference for non-alignment and strategic autonomy. Perceptions and narratives:  Misperceptions, media stereotypes, and historical grievances continue to complicate relations. For example, African nations resent being summoned to summits in Washington and treated as passive recipients of aid rather than equal partners.    2.4 Conclusion   The ACM’s discussions reveal that US-  Africa relations are at a pivotal juncture. The relationship is evolving, but still constrained by historical baggage, policy inconsistencies, and structural inequalities. For the partnership to be sustainable and mutually beneficial, several principles must guide future engagement:   Equity and respect:  The US must recognise Africa as a co-equal actor in international affairs. This requires a shift from paternalism to partnership, from aid dependency to co-investment. African agency:  African nations must lead in defining the terms of engagement. US policy must align with continental frameworks such as Agenda 2063 and AfCFTA, not circumvent them. Institutional reform:  The United States should support Africa’s call for reform of global institutions to ensure fair representation and voice. This includes backing permanent African seats on the UN Security Council. People-centred diplomacy:  Engagement must go beyond government-to-government interaction. Civil society, academia, youth, and the diaspora have critical roles to play in deepening ties and countering misinformation. Strategic vision:  Both sides must move beyond transactionalism and embrace a long-term vision grounded in shared prosperity, global justice, and sustainable development.   The ACM reaffirms that Africa’s time is now. With strategic foresight, united leadership, and supportive international partnerships, the continent can rise as a global force. The United States has a vital role to play - but only if it is willing to listen, learn, and evolve alongside a continent that is increasingly shaping its own future. 3 OPENING SESSION   3.1 Welcoming remarks Prof Zweli Ndevu, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa)  The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) was honoured to once again host the Africa Think-tank Dialogue (ATD) in Cape Town. We drew together think-tanks from all corners of Africa to deliberate, strategize and develop policy positions that will promote sustainable development on the continent and a fairer and more just international order that aims to advance greater equitability in development cooperation.   The Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD) is an informal collaboration of African think-tanks that have African socio-economic development, governance and a fairer, more inclusive, multilateral order at the heart of their work.   As such, the ATD discusses, amongst others:   Africa’s governance within the framework of the African Union Arica’s relationship with other regional structures such as the European Union, BRICS, the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the G20 Africa’s relationship with world powers such as the United States of America and China Reform of the United Nations and other multilateral organisations in order to reposition Africa's role in the global order How to improve sustainable development in Africa, including required adaptation resulting from Climate Change   The ATD has in the past discussed weighty issues such a multilateral reform, the superpowers rivalry in relation to influence in Africa. At the last African Consultative Meeting, the ATD deliberated Africa-China relations.   The theme of this year’s Africa Consultative Meeting was US-Africa relations. It came at an opportune time when the US administration is challenging the status quo as it relates to international cooperation and the multilateralism. How Africa responds today will establish the international hierarchy and define the social structure for years to come. It is the responsibility of African think tanks, such as those that were gathered at the African Consultative Meeting, to contemplate a roadmap that will both advance the African cause, whilst retaining good bilateral and multilateral relationships. And then to promote these proposals within their individual spheres of influence.   That said, as Africans we should not fall into the trap of talking to and about ourselves. We also need to understand and talk to our international partners in order to retain and expand mutually beneficial cooperation across the globe. We were therefore blessed to have amongst us influential think-tanks and experts from both the United States and beyond.   We were struck by the frankness of the engagement and the genuine desire from all sides to find a way forward that serves both the American and African people and our shared future. Together we are all stronger, divided we are all weak. 3.2  Setting the Scene - Navigating Africa’s Future: Multilateral Reform, Global Relations, and Development  Finance Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer, Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa) Africa finds itself at a defining historical moment—straddling the challenges of sustainable development, climate resilience, fragile peace, and global inequality. As the world’s youngest continent with vast natural resources and strategic geopolitical importance, Africa must assert itself more forcefully in global decision-making forums. The continent’s leadership, intellectuals, and civil society are increasingly stepping up to make meaningful contributions towards transforming governance systems, both domestically and internationally. In this presentation, Daryl Swanepoel drew from the recent deliberations at the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD) to set the scene for the two-day dialogue, He examined three critical themes: Africa’s relations with global powers, the need for multilateral reform, and the pursuit of climate justice through equitable finance.   3.2.1  Evolving relations with global powers   Africa's relations with major global actors, particularly the United States, form a cornerstone of its broader foreign policy objectives. These relationships have historically been complex and uneven, shaped by a blend of development aid, security partnerships, and economic dependencies. The legacy of colonialism and Cold War-era interventions left behind a framework that often placed Africa in a reactive rather than proactive position.   Today, there is growing consensus that Africa must recalibrate its relations with global powers toward mutual respect and strategic partnership. Under President Joe Biden, the United States has taken steps toward a more constructive and collaborative approach, emphasising trade, investment, and shared growth. However, this trajectory is neither linear nor guaranteed. The prior Trump administration pursued a more transactional model, centred on short-term security interests and reduced foreign aid - policies that raised legitimate concerns about long-term development sustainability.   The return of such an administration, or similar ideological shifts elsewhere, could again marginalise African interests. Particularly worrying are recent changes to U.S. tariff policies that could jeopardise access to trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). As such, Africa must not only engage more proactively but also diversify its partnerships beyond traditional allies. Increasing engagement with emerging powers like China, India, and Brazil provides a broader diplomatic and economic base, but must be balanced carefully to avoid new forms of dependency.   In this regard, Africa’s approach to foreign policy must be guided by clarity of interest, regional cohesion, and strategic assertiveness. While external powers will continue to play an important role, the continent's internal unity and capacity to speak with one voice will determine its leverage in global negotiations.   3.2.2  The demand for multilateral reform   Africa’s exclusion from key decision-making bodies, particularly at the United Nations, has long been a source of frustration and activism. The UN Security Council, arguably the most powerful body in global governance, still reflects the post-World War II power structure. Despite comprising more than 50 countries and 1.4 billion people, Africa has no permanent representation on the Council. This lack of representation undermines Africa’s ability to influence international peace and security policies that directly impact its own stability.   African leaders, through platforms like the African Union (AU), are pushing for structural reforms to address this disparity. The AU’s Common African Position on UN Security Council reform is one such initiative aimed at achieving a fairer distribution of power within the international system. This demand is not merely symbolic; it is about institutional equity and the right to co-determine global norms.   Multilateral reform also extends to economic and financial institutions. Africa remains underrepresented in the decision-making bodies of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). These institutions have significant influence over African economies through loan terms, trade rules, and macroeconomic policy prescriptions. Reforming their governance structures is essential to ensure that African voices shape policies rather than merely respond to them.   Strengthening regional mechanisms is also critical to Africa’s multilateral strategy. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a landmark achievement, aiming to unify African markets, enhance competitiveness, and foster regional value chains. By leveraging such platforms, Africa can present a united front in global trade and investment negotiations, enabling the continent to drive rather than follow international economic trends.   3.2.3  Climate Finance and the Pursuit of Justice   Climate change presents one of the most existential threats to Africa’s future. The continent is experiencing rising temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, droughts, and flooding—disrupting agriculture, livelihoods, and ecosystems. Yet, Africa contributes less than 4% to global greenhouse gas emissions. This stark imbalance has become central to Africa’s advocacy for climate justice. At COP29 and other climate summits, wealthier nations pledged financial support to help developing countries transition to clean energy. While these commitments appear promising, their implementation reveals deeper issues. Much of the financial support is being offered in the form of concessional loans rather than grants. This shifts the financial burden to the very countries least responsible for the climate crisis.   As discussed in the ATD, there are two key concerns with this model. First, concessional loans add to Africa’s debt burden. Many African countries are already struggling to meet existing debt obligations. Asking them to borrow more – under the guise of climate support - essentially forces them to pay for the damage caused by others. This is not only unjust; it is economically unsustainable.   Second, most concessional loans are issued in strong currencies like the U.S. dollar or the euro. Because African countries must repay in these currencies, they face significant currency risk.   A compelling example cited was the effect of a €100 million loan to South Africa’s. Due to exchange rate fluctuations between 2015 and 2024, the total repayment costs increased by nearly 23%, even though the loan carried a low interest rate. These risks often go unacknowledged in global policy circles, yet they have devastating effects on African economies.   To address these challenges, the ATD should propose three policy recommendations:   Shift from loans to grants:  Wealthy nations must offer more grant-based finance to ensure climate transitions do not trap developing countries in unsustainable debt cycles. Currency risk management:  Financial instruments should be structured to allow African countries to borrow and repay in local currencies. Lenders, who are better equipped to manage currency volatility, should absorb this risk as a form of developmental aid. Reform Bretton Woods Institutions:  The IMF and World Bank must adopt more flexible, inclusive, and climate-sensitive lending policies. This includes reducing interest rates, extending grace periods, and factoring in vulnerability to climate risks.   In short, without just climate finance, Africa’s development aspirations will be continually undermined. The world cannot claim to fight climate change while perpetuating financial mechanisms that disadvantage the most vulnerable.   3.2.4  Governance, peace, and security: A continental challenge   Africa’s aspirations for development are also contingent on peace and political stability. While there have been notable improvements in certain regions, persistent conflicts, civil unrest, and extremist violence continue to undermine progress. From terrorist activities in the Sahel and Somalia, to conflicts in Ethiopia’s Tigray region and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), insecurity remains a widespread challenge.   Governance failures, corruption, and weak institutions exacerbate these security threats. Poor governance often erodes public trust, increases inequality, and provides fertile ground for extremist ideologies. At the same time, conflicts consume public resources that could otherwise be used for social services and infrastructure development.   Yet, African nations are increasingly recognising the importance of addressing these root causes. The AU and regional economic communities like ECOWAS are becoming more proactive in conflict mediation and peacekeeping. The AU’s Peace and Security Council has deployed missions to conflict zones and facilitated diplomatic negotiations. ECOWAS has shown leadership in addressing military coups and political crises in West Africa.   One of the more promising developments is the establishment of the African Standby Force, designed to enable rapid and coordinated responses to crises. It reflects a growing commitment to African-led solutions, grounded in the continent’s specific realities. However, implementation remains uneven due to resource and capacity constraints.   Funding remains a significant hurdle. Security operations are expensive, and most African states operate under tight budgets. Competing needs - such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure often take precedence, leaving security underfunded. This shortfall has made African nations reliant on foreign assistance, creating a paradox: the continent needs external support to manage security but also seeks sovereignty and ownership over these very issues.   The influence of external powers, while helpful in the short term, can also realign local priorities in ways that do not serve Africa’s long-term interests. This calls for a delicate balancing act - leveraging global support without surrendering agency.   3.2.5  Toward African agency and strategic sovereignty   The Africa Think-Tank Dialogue and other consultative forums are vital in nurturing a new generation of African thought leaders and policy-makers. These platforms serve as incubators for ideas, strategies, and early warning systems that feed directly into national and regional policy-making. They also create opportunities for cross-border knowledge exchange, allowing for more coherent and context-sensitive strategies.   The goal is to build resilient institutions that can withstand external shocks, adapt to changing global dynamics, and promote African-led solutions. From multilateral diplomacy to climate finance, and from peacekeeping to economic integration, the journey toward self-determination is multifaceted and ongoing.   3.2.6  Conclusion   Africa stands at a crucial juncture in its development trajectory. The choices made today will shape the continent’s ability to address climate change, secure peace, and assert its rightful place in global governance. This report has highlighted the urgent need for more equitable global partnerships, reforms in multilateral institutions, and just climate finance mechanisms.   Africa’s challenges are significant - but so are its opportunities. With bold leadership, strategic unity, and sustained investment in governance and institutions, Africa can redefine its future.   The international community must also ensure that it plays its part by acknowledging the historical responsibilities, honouring financial commitments, and reforming global systems to reflect the realities of the 21st century.   Only through mutual respect, fairness, and solidarity can we build a future that is not only greener and safer but also more just and inclusive for all. 3.3  Navigating Geopolitical Currents: South Africa–United States Relations During the 2025 G20 Presidency Dr Philani Mthembu, Executive Director, Institute for Global  Dialogue (South Africa)  As South Africa assumes the presidency of the G20 in 2025, it does so amid a complex and evolving geopolitical climate. Its leadership is under the global microscope, tasked not only with setting a compelling agenda for inclusive economic growth and sustainability, but also with navigating intricate diplomatic relationships, particularly with the United States. In this presentation Dr Philani Mthembu explored the evolving dynamics between South Africa and the US, focusing on the G20 context, historical diplomatic trends, current tensions, economic interdependence, and the role of non-state actors and misinformation.   3.3.1  South Africa’s G20 presidency and US participation   The year 2025 is a pivotal one for South Africa, as it undertakes the responsibilities of G20 presidency. Under the banner of solidarity, equality, and sustainability, South Africa aims to influence global discourse and policy. The G20 foreign ministers and finance meetings held in Johannesburg earlier this year endorsed these themes, reinforcing South Africa’s capacity to steer international attention.   However, the absence of US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio and US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, from these early high-level G20 meetings signalled ambivalence. While officials from the US were present, the lack of high-level participation raised concerns about the US's commitment to multilateralism, particularly in the wake of a renewed "America First" approach and scepticism toward international commitments. This absence, while not a formal boycott, hinted at the de-prioritisation of the G20 within US foreign policy calculations.   South Africa must therefore calibrate its diplomatic strategies to manage both high-level government relations and second-track diplomacy involving think tanks, civil society, and business. These parallel channels of engagement are not only essential for bridging diplomatic gaps but also for ensuring continuity of cooperation amid shifting political leadership in Washington.   3.3.2  Managing a strategic but tense relationship   Despite the visible friction, South Africa has made strides in engaging key international stakeholders, notably receiving support from the European Union and China. The EU-South Africa Summit demonstrated strong solidarity and resulted in key agreements, further reinforcing South Africa’s leadership role within the Global South and the broader G20 context.   The bilateral relationship between South Africa and the US remains strategic but marked by inherent tensions. Over the past 30 years, despite common values such as democratic governance, their international policy postures have often diverged. South Africa’s reformist stance toward global governance structures contrasts with the US’s defence of the existing international order.   This divergence has historical roots.   In 1990, Nelson Mandela's remarks during a US town hall, in response to criticism of his engagements with leaders such as Fidel Castro and Yasser Arafat, underscored South Africa's independent foreign policy tradition. Mandela reminded audiences that during the apartheid struggle, the US government was largely absent, whereas other nations, now often labelled as adversaries by the US, offered concrete support. This ethos of foreign policy independence continues to shape South Africa's global outlook.   3.3.3  Historical and current points of friction   Past frictions between the US and South Africa have been sharpened during both Trump administrations. During the first Trump presidency, South Africa resisted pressures to align with the US in its geopolitical confrontation with China. This included continued engagement with Chinese firms such as Huawei, despite US objections. South Africa also opposed the US’s pro-Israel policies, including moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem and recognising Israeli settlements in Palestine.   In addition, US recognition of Morocco’s claim over Western Sahara contradicted South Africa’s longstanding support for Sahrawi self-determination. These policy differences were exacerbated by the imposition of tariffs on South African steel and aluminium—measures perceived by some as indirect responses to South Africa’s foreign policy stances.   Significantly, these tensions are not solely tied to one administration. Under President Biden, the US House of Representatives passed the South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act in 2024, which questioned whether South Africa’s foreign policy undermined US interests. This bipartisan scepticism reveals deep-seated differences in global outlook between the two nations.   3.3.4  The economic dimension: Trade and investment   Despite political friction, the economic relationship between South Africa and the US remains robust and mutually beneficial. South Africa is the United States’ largest trading partner in Africa. In 2023, the US exported goods worth $7.1 billion to South Africa, while importing $13.98 billion—primarily composed of critical metals and minerals like platinum, chrome, manganese, and gold. These resources are essential for US national security, particularly in high-tech manufacturing and defence.   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has facilitated duty-free access for specific South African goods into the US market since 2000. AGOA was instrumental in boosting South Africa’s automotive exports from $195 million in 2000 to $1.8 billion in 2013. However, the future of AGOA is uncertain. Discontent among US lawmakers about the agreement’s scope and utility could lead to its reconfiguration or dissolution.   If AGOA is terminated, the economic repercussions for South Africa would be relatively modest but still noteworthy. The Brookings Institution estimates a 2.7% decline in total exports to the US and a 0.06% decrease in GDP. Sectors like automotive manufacturing and food and beverages would be disproportionately affected. However, South Africa’s exports have diversified significantly, especially toward the European Union. By 2022, only 10% of automotive exports went to the US, down from 25% in 2013.   Moreover, many of South Africa’s exports—particularly metals and minerals—do not rely on AGOA preferences, limiting the impact of a potential withdrawal. Most of these goods face tariffs between 3% and 5%, and South African exporters are already accustomed to these non-preferential trading conditions.   3.3.5  Investment and employment interlinkages   Beyond trade, the investment landscape underscores the mutual benefits of the bilateral relationship. Approximately 600 US companies operate in South Africa, employing around 148,000 South Africans. Meanwhile, 22 South African firms have operations in the US, employing about 7,000 American citizens. These cross-border economic linkages create a web of interdependence that makes full-scale disengagement unlikely.   These figures also emphasise that South Africa is not a passive recipient of aid or trade favours. It is an active investor, a producer of globally essential resources, and a regional economic leader. As such, its relations with the US should be understood within a framework of mutual strategic interest rather than aid dependency.   3.3.6  Role of non-state Actors and multi-track diplomacy   A defining feature of US–South Africa relations has been the strength of non-state actor engagement. South African think tanks, civil society groups, and research institutions continue to collaborate with US-based counterparts, especially within the G20’s Think-tank 20 (T20) framework. This networked diplomacy fosters continuity and mitigates the effect of short-term political turbulence.   Indeed, the legacy of anti-apartheid solidarity in the US remains a powerful reservoir of goodwill. South African actors can—and must—engage with diverse US audiences, including those who do not share their worldviews. The country must broaden its reach beyond historical allies, engaging business groups, faith communities, and academic networks that can serve as conduits for diplomatic dialogue.   3.3.7  Countering misinformation and reframing the narrative   Another significant challenge is the proliferation of misinformation. This has manifested in public statements and even executive orders from the US accusing South Africa of human rights violations, land grabs, and anti-minority policies. These claims, largely unfounded, have had real diplomatic consequences, including the expulsion of ambassadors and legislative investigations.   South Africa must adopt a multi-pronged strategy to counteract such narratives. This includes direct engagement with critics, proactive public diplomacy, and mobilising its diaspora and international allies. Domestic outreach is equally important. Speaking with groups like AfriForum, Solidarity, and other Afrikaner organisations—not just to defend policies, but to listen and explain—is crucial for defusing disinformation.   Moreover, South Africa should work with figures who maintain influence in both societies, such as renowned sportspeople, business leaders, and cultural icons. These individuals can serve as informal ambassadors, reshaping perceptions and building trust.   3.3.8  Ambassadorial vacuums and strategic appointments   Currently, neither South Africa nor the US has an ambassador in the other’s capital. While this reflects diplomatic strain, it also presents an opportunity. South Africa must carefully consider the profile of its next ambassador—someone capable of engaging not only with policymakers but also with the business community, media, and civil society.   This is not a moment for panic but for strategic planning. The ambassadorial appointment should reflect South Africa’s long-term vision for the relationship and its evolving role in global affairs.   3.3.9  Conclusion   The relationship between South Africa and the United States is layered and multifaceted, marked by both cooperation and contestation. In 2025, as South Africa holds the G20 presidency, it must manage this relationship with strategic foresight and diplomatic agility. While the US may not prioritise the G20 or multilateralism in the current geopolitical climate, this should not deter South Africa from pursuing its broader goals of reforming global governance and promoting inclusive development.   Despite policy differences, the mutual economic dependency, robust civil society links, and shared democratic values offer a foundation for continued engagement. South Africa must maintain a multi-pronged strategy—combining diplomacy, economic partnerships, and public engagement—to assert its sovereignty, defend its interests, and shape a new geopolitical landscape.   This moment represents not only a challenge but also an opportunity for South Africa to reaffirm its role as a pivotal middle power in a changing world order. Through strategic engagement, pragmatic diplomacy, and diversified alliances, South Africa can turn this complex geopolitical moment into a defining one for its international standing. 3.4  Navigating Global Shifts: South Africa’s Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World Hon. Alvin Botes, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa) South Africa’s foreign policy is currently being tested by a range of internal and external pressures—from domestic socio-economic challenges to major transformations in the global geopolitical order. In his address Deputy Minister Botes laid out the foundations of the country’s evolving foreign policy stance. The speech emphasised themes such as Pan-Africanism, the shift towards a multipolar world, the significance of trade relations, and the critical role of both state and non-state actors in advancing the African developmental agenda.   The speech offered a comprehensive analysis of how South Africa is navigating the increasingly complex global landscape while trying to uphold its developmental objectives and regional commitments.    3.4.1  Pan-Africanism as the ideological anchor   Pan-Africanism remains the ideological foundation of South Africa’s foreign policy, shaping its diplomatic engagements and multilateral alignments.   The speech opened with a tribute to the late Sam Nujoma, founding President of Namibia and a towering figure in Africa’s decolonial struggle. Quoting Nujoma’s call for Africans to support each other and heal the wounds of colonialism themselves, the deputy minister reaffirmed that African unity and agency must underpin any foreign policy discourse.   This ideological commitment manifests through South Africa’s support of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, particularly its emphasis on regional peace, prosperity, and integration. The AU’s “Silencing the Guns” initiative is framed as a vital step toward creating a conducive environment for development. Without security and stability no meaningful progress can be made on economic transformation or social upliftment.   3.4.2  The global order in flux: From Unipolarity to Multipolarity   The deputy minister outlined the erosion of unipolarity and the emergence of a new multipolar world order, in which power is more evenly distributed among various global actors. He traced this development historically, beginning with the Cold War era’s ideological bipolarity—between the capitalist bloc led by the United States and the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union.   Following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the United States emerged as the singular global hegemon. However, as the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted in a referenced quote, this unipolarity was an anomaly—a product of specific historical conditions. The world is now reverting to a more balanced configuration, featuring multiple centres of power including China, Russia, the European Union, and emerging middle powers like India and South Africa.   This shift has deep implications for global governance and multilateralism. While South Africa supports a rules-based international order, the speaker warned of a "spirited pushback" against multilateralism from some quarters, particularly in the West. He highlighted recent U.S. withdrawals from key multilateral organisations and agreements as a cause for concern.   3.4.3  Multilateralism and global governance reform   South Africa envisions itself as a champion of multilateralism. The country’s diplomatic efforts are increasingly focused on reforming global governance institutions to make them more inclusive and representative of the Global South. The UN, World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank continue to reflect outdated power structures, often marginalising African voices.   The upcoming 80th anniversary of the United Nations in 2025 is seen as a critical opportunity to renew global commitments to cooperation and justice. South Africa has been vocal at forums like the Summit of the Future and UN General Assembly (UNGA) in advocating for transformation of these institutions.   What should also be stressed is the need for genuine multilateralism that goes beyond rhetoric. Token representation of African countries without meaningful influence must give way to more equitable participation in global decision-making.    3.4.4  The Strategic imperative of BRICS+   South Africa’s participation in BRICS+ — an expanded configuration that now includes Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran — has elevated its profile but also increased scrutiny. The deputy minister observed that this membership brings both opportunities and challenges. It enhances South Africa’s bargaining power but may also expose it to punitive trade measures from Western powers wary of BRICS' growing influence.   For instance, proposed U.S. tariffs on imports from developing countries—20% for most and up to 60% for China—could indirectly affect BRICS+ partners like South Africa. The country must therefore prepare for a more confrontational global economic environment where alignments carry real economic consequences.    3.4.5  Revisiting AGOA and the AfCFTA Imperative   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a key trade instrument enacted by the U.S., is up for review in September. South Africa has historically benefited from AGOA, but Botes suggested a reassessment will be made of its current structure.   As Africa moves toward greater economic integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), unilateral trade arrangements must align with the continent’s collective interests.   The concern is that AGOA, in its current form, may undermine AfCFTA if it encourages bilateralism over multilateralism. Some African states have already begun negotiating separate trade deals with the U.S., bypassing the AfCFTA framework. Such practices, the speaker warned, threaten to fragment Africa’s economic vision and reduce its collective leverage.    3.4.6  The Sahel and non-state actors in African security   Africa’s security landscape is increasingly influenced by both external powers and non-state actors. Deputy Minister Botes cited examples from the Sahel and Djibouti, regions that host multiple foreign military bases—including from the U.S., China, and France. These deployments, while ostensibly aimed at stabilising conflict zones, also reflect a contest for strategic influence.   Non-state actors are also gaining prominence. However, their role is often ambiguous. While some contribute positively to peacebuilding and development, other - like the former Wagner Group, Blackwater, or domestic entities like AfriForum and Solidarity - are accused of distorting national narratives or promoting destabilising agendas. He emphasised that South Africa must redefine the role of such actors, ensuring they support rather than subvert the country's foreign policy objectives.    3.4.7  Economic diplomacy and industrial development   Economic diplomacy is a cornerstone of South Africa’s international engagement. The country’s largest bilateral trading partner is the People’s Republic of China, with trade commitments totalling over R100 billion in recent years. However, the deputy minister stressed that trade volumes alone are insufficient—what matters is their impact on domestic employment, skills development, and local industrialisation.   South Africa must insist on value addition and beneficiation in its trade deals, especially with strategic partners. For instance, the automotive sector’s growth has historically depended on G7 investment, creating a paradox where former colonial powers now play a vital role in industrialisation. The challenge is to convert this dependency into a mutually beneficial relationship that aligns with national interests.    3.4.8  The dilemma of bilateralism within multilateral aspirations   Botes highlighted a critical tension: while Africa champions collective development through the AfCFTA, many countries continue to pursue bilateral trade deals with external powers. This undermines the spirit of Pan-Africanism and weakens the continent’s bargaining position in global forums.   South Africa finds itself in a difficult position, torn between advancing its national interests and preserving continental unity. He argued that true Pan-Africanism must be reflected not just in rhetoric but in economic strategy. Countries must resist the temptation to pursue short-term gains at the expense of long-term regional solidarity.    3.4.9  Ubuntu diplomacy and core foreign policy principles   Ubuntu - a Southern African philosophy centred on human dignity, mutual respect, and solidarity - serves as the moral compass for South African diplomacy. The deputy minister reiterated that the country’s foreign policy must reflect Ubuntu principles, particularly in its treatment of vulnerable populations and engagement with international crises.   This commitment was evident in South Africa’s submission to the International Court of Justice in 2024 regarding allegations of genocide. He called this act a moral high point, reflecting the country's ethical obligations on the global stage.    3.4.10  Domestic realities and international posturing   Domestic conditions continue to influence foreign policy decisions. Deputy Minister Botes pointed to high unemployment, poverty, and inequality as national grievances that foreign policy must address. He criticised groups that promote false narratives - like the claim of a white genocide in South Africa - as distorting public discourse and diverting attention from real challenges.   Official statistics from Stats SA reveal that 73% of white households fall within the top income quintile, contradicting claims of systemic marginalisation. He called for a clear and honest portrayal of South Africa’s socio-economic realities as a foundation for both domestic cohesion and international credibility.    3.4.11  G20 Presidency and global responsibilities   As South Africa chairs the G20, it faces the responsibility of representing African interests on a global platform. Botes welcomed the U.S.'s willingness to participate in the G20 Troika but emphasised the need for sustained engagement and leadership. He noted that U.S. disengagement from global forums has weakened multilateral cooperation and called for a recommitment to shared global responsibilities.    3.4.12  The SDG crisis and Africa’s developmental lag   Only 17% of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have been met globally, with just five years remaining before the 2030 deadline. Africa’s performance, in particular, is hindered by conflict, weak institutions, and underinvestment. The deputy minister  emphasised the need for intensified efforts from both African states and international partners.   South Africa expects the new African Union Commission leadership to play a transformative role in achieving Agenda 2063 and SDG targets. The AU must act as a unifying force and advocate for Africa’s interests in global governance structures.    3.4.13  Conclusion: A foreign policy of balance and vision   South Africa’s foreign policy is defined by its quest for balance - between competing global powers, between multilateralism and national sovereignty, and between ideological commitments and practical realities. The country seeks to leverage its middle-power status to advocate for a more just, equitable, and multipolar world order.   While significant challenges lie ahead - including trade tensions, regional instability, and domestic socio - Africa remains committed to a foreign policy grounded in Pan-Africanism, Ubuntu diplomacy, and strategic autonomy.   Deputy Minister Botes’ speech offered a roadmap for the future, one in which South Africa asserts itself not as a passive participant, but as a principled actor in global affairs, deeply invested in the fate of Africa and the broader international community.

4 SESSION 1: US AFRICA RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AFRICA   4.1 Beyond Rhetoric: Reimagining Africa - U.S. Relations in a Multipolar World Prof. Efem Ubi, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Nigeria) The dynamic between Africa and the United States has long been characterised by a blend of aspiration and frustration, cooperation and imbalance. Despite decades of engagement, there is a prevailing sense that the relationship lacks depth, equity, and genuine mutual interest. In his presentation Professor provided a comprehensive analysis of Africa - U.S. relations, the persistent challenges, and a proposed path toward a more equitable and cooperative partnership.   4.1.1  Framing the discourse: Africa's position in U.S. calculations   The United States has consistently stated its commitment to Africa - supporting democratic institutions, fostering economic growth, and promoting peace and security. However, in practice, these promises often remain unfulfilled. The paradox between stated U.S. policy and its operational execution, suggests that Africa remains undervalued in the global political and economic hierarchy.   One of the central critiques is the terminology used to frame the relationship: the emphasis on “relations” rather than “cooperation.” Relations imply a loose connection, potentially hierarchical or distant, while cooperation implies equality, shared goals, and collaborative effort. This distinction reflects a deeper issue in how Africa is perceived and treated by global powers, particularly the U.S.   4.1.2  Strategic value and interests: A one-sided equation   There is growing concern that Africa is viewed more as an object of external interest than as an actor with its own agency. This asymmetry is evident in the way African nations are routinely analysed through the lens of U.S. interests—be it strategic military bases, natural resources, or geopolitical leverage—without equal consideration for Africa's developmental goals and aspirations.   Ubi criticised the preoccupation with understanding foreign powers’ interests in Africa - especially China's - at the expense of defining and pursuing Africa’s own interests. The need, then, is to reorient the discourse so that Africa becomes the subject, not the object, of international relations. Africa must assert its priorities in areas such as industrialisation, infrastructure development, and sovereign decision-making.    4.1.3  Unilateralism and superpower rivalries   A recurring theme in the speech was the frustration with the U.S. and other superpowers’ tendency to make unilateral decisions concerning Africa, often without consultation. This dynamic reflects a broader pattern of global governance that excludes African voices, undermines African agency, and perpetuates dependency.   Superpower rivalry - particularly between the U.S. and China - is seen as deeply detrimental to Africa’s development. Rather than fostering cooperation for Africa's advancement, these powers use the continent as a stage for their competition, reminiscent of the colonial-era scramble for Africa. Prof. Ubi recalled the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, where Africa was divided without any African input, and warns that contemporary rivalries risk repeating that historical injustice.    4.1.4  The case for multipolarity and dispersed power   The emergence of a multipolar world presents both a challenge and an opportunity for Africa. Moving away from unipolar or bipolar dominance allows Africa to engage with a variety of partners and pursue more balanced relationships. The concept of "disperse hegemonism" -  where no single power dominates globally - offers a framework for such a future.   South–South cooperation, as seen in groupings like BRICS, provides an alternative model. These coalitions allow developing nations to collaborate based on shared interests rather than subordination. Africa's increasing involvement in such alliances underscores its desire for a more inclusive global order.    4.1.5  Security, instability, and the legacy of inequality   The persistent instability across the African continent, especially in the Sahel region, is linked to both internal governance challenges and the legacy of external interference. The resurgence of military coups in West  Africa - Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and others - is viewed as a reaction to systemic injustice and a failure to address root causes of inequality.   Prof, Ubi stressed that military takeovers will not cease until structural inequalities are resolved. Addressing the root causes - economic marginalisation, lack of industrialisation, and poor infrastructure - is essential. Treating only the symptoms while ignoring the foundational issues will perpetuate the cycle of unrest. 4.1.6  Economic engagement: Aid vs. empowerment   U.S. economic engagement in Africa has often been dominated by humanitarian aid, which, while necessary in crises, does little to build long-term capacity. He called for a shift from aid-centred strategies to empowerment-focused economic policies that prioritise infrastructure, industrialisation, and value-added production.   Despite some positive trends - such as the U.S.–Africa trade increasing to $71 billion - the overall U.S. investment in Africa remains inconsistent and modest compared to emerging powers like China and India. For example, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) skyrocketed from $135 million in 2005 to over $42 billion in recent years, demonstrating a more consistent and aggressive engagement model.   Prof. Ubi emphasised that Africa needs infrastructure, intermodal connectivity, and job-creating industries - not just short-term aid packages. U.S. companies should be encouraged to outsource and offshore operations to Africa, generating employment and technological transfer. Such partnerships would be mutually beneficial and go beyond paternalistic assistance.    4.1.7  Comparative approaches: U.S. vs. China   One of the starkest contrasts in Africa’s international partnerships lies in how China and the U.S. engage the continent. China operates with all 54 African countries, while the U.S. tends to focus only on strategic partners. This selective engagement reflects a hierarchy that marginalises many African nations and undermines continental unity.   Professor Ubi recounted a personal anecdote during Nigeria's struggle against terrorism, where the U.S. refused to supply necessary weapons, while China and Russia stepped in to assist. This example illustrates how strategic calculations - rather than shared humanity or solidarity - often guide U.S. decisions, to the detriment of long-term trust and cooperation. 4.1.8  Constructivism, interdependence, and changing narratives   International relations theories such as constructivism and complex interdependence are cited to underline the importance of perception and mutual interests. He argued that the U.S. must stop acting as a "Big Brother" and instead embrace the notion of interdependence, where both sides contribute and benefit equally.   There is a call for a fundamental change in how Africa is perceived - not as a problem to be solved, but as a partner with immense potential. This requires discarding outdated narratives and embracing a more respectful and balanced approach to international engagement. 4.1.9  The failure of prescriptive development models   The presentation also critiqued development models imposed by external institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s were highlighted as a clear example of failed prescriptions that led to economic stagnation rather than progress. None of the 27 African countries that implemented SAPs emerged stronger, highlighting the need for homegrown development strategies.   Africa must stop outsourcing its development to external actors and instead invest in deliberate, long-term plans rooted in local contexts. Prof Ubi urged African nations to adopt pragmatic five- or ten-year development strategies that are followed consistently and are resilient to external shocks or donor dependency. 4.1.10  Recommendations: Toward a rapprochement   To move beyond rhetoric and toward meaningful rapprochement, several strategic actions were proposed:   Reframe the relationship as cooperation: Shift the narrative from "relations" to "cooperation," emphasising equality, partnership, and shared goals. Promote mutual interests:  African nations must clearly articulate and pursue their own interests in all engagements, rather than being passive recipients of foreign agendas. Support Industrialisation and infrastructure: Replace humanitarian aid models with investments in production, manufacturing, and infrastructure that create lasting value. Encourage inclusive trade:  Expand the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to include support for value-added goods and diversification of exports. Reform global governance:  Advocate for a multipolar world where African voices are heard, and decisions are made collectively, not unilaterally. End superpower rivalries in Africa: Global powers must stop using Africa as a battleground for strategic competition and instead collaborate for the continent’s development. Support sovereignty and agency:  Avoid pressuring African countries into taking sides in global conflicts. Respect their sovereignty and right to independent foreign policy. Invest in African institutions: Encourage investment in local institutions and communities to foster stability, accountability, and long-term development.    4.1.11  Conclusion   Africa-U.S. relations stand at a crossroads. The legacy of unfulfilled promises, imbalanced power dynamics, and neglected agency must give way to a new era of cooperation, mutual respect, and shared prosperity. The United States must reassess its approach, moving from control and conditionality to partnership and empowerment. Likewise, Africa must take the reins of its development, articulate its goals, and seek partnerships that respect its sovereignty and potential.   As Prof. Ubi poignantly noted, development is not an accident - it is deliberate, strategic, and long-term. For Africa to rise, and for U.S.–Africa cooperation to thrive, both sides must act with purpose, humility, and vision.   4.2  United States–Africa Relations — Historical Legacy, Contemporary Challenges, and Future Perspectives Ms Aïcha Karafi, President, Tunisian Association of Local Governance (Tunisia) The relationship between the United States and Africa has evolved over several centuries, shaped by an intricate mix of history, politics, economics, security interests, and human development imperatives. From the dark era of the transatlantic slave trade to the ideological battles of the Cold War and the current dynamics of trade and diplomacy, the US–Africa partnership has been marked by fluctuations and asymmetries. Today, it faces the dual challenge of recalibrating old paradigms while navigating new global realities, such as rising Chinese influence and calls for greater African agency.   The presentation by Ms Aïcha   provided a comprehensive overview of the evolution of US–Africa relations, examining historical legacies, current tensions, and potential future directions for a more balanced and mutually beneficial partnership.   4.2.1  Historical Context   4.2.1.1  The transatlantic slave trade and its legacy   Between the 16th and 19th centuries, the transatlantic slave trade saw the forced deportation of over 12.5 million Africans to the Americas, with roughly 50,000 reaching the territory now known as the United States. This mass human trafficking had devastating demographic and social consequences for Africa. Nearly 2 million Africans died during the Middle Passage—a mortality rate of about 15%. West Africa alone lost up to 20% of its population, severely undermining the region’s economic productivity, social cohesion, and long-term development potential.   For the United States, slavery was foundational to its early economic growth. On the eve of the Civil War, the economic value of enslaved individuals was estimated at $3 billion, a figure that would amount to between $75 and $100 billion today. Cotton, produced predominantly by enslaved labour, accounted for 60% of US exports during the mid-19th century, underpinning the nation's rise as a global economic power.   The legacy of slavery continues to affect perceptions and relations. While the transatlantic slave trade legally ended in the 19th century, its moral and psychological consequences linger in collective memory, shaping African scepticism toward Western powers, including the United States.   4.2.1.2  The Cold War: Strategic interests over development   During the Cold War (1946–1991), the US viewed Africa through the lens of ideological competition with the Soviet Union. Africa became a geopolitical chessboard, with Washington providing over $1.5 billion in military and economic aid to curb Soviet influence.   Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) received over $300 million in American aid from 1965 to 1990. Angola’s civil war exemplifies how superpower rivalry exacerbated internal African conflicts. The war, stoked by both US and Soviet support for rival factions, led to over 500,000 deaths and the displacement of millions. This era entrenched authoritarian regimes supported for strategic purposes, sidelining democratic governance and long-term development.   4.2.2  Post-Cold War shift: Economic engagement and soft power   With the end of the Cold War, the United States gradually shifted its focus from ideological rivalry to economic diplomacy. The enactment of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000 marked a significant development. AGOA allowed eligible African countries to export goods to the US duty-free. While the initiative aimed to boost African exports and encourage market-based economic reforms, its actual impact has been modest.   In 2021, African exports under AGOA reached $7.6 billion, consisting mainly of oil, textiles, and agricultural products. However, this represents only 1–2% of total US trade, pointing to the structural limitations of the programme. Moreover, AGOA remains unidirectional: it primarily benefits countries that meet US-defined eligibility criteria, reinforcing dependency rather than equal partnership.   4.2.3  Humanitarian engagement and health diplomacy   The launch of PEPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) in 2003 demonstrated a significant humanitarian commitment. Over $100 billion has been invested in combating HIV/AIDS, saving an estimated 25 million lives by 2023 and drastically reducing mortality by nearly 50%. More than 18 million individuals across Africa are currently on antiretroviral treatment due to this programme.   In addition, US official development assistance to Africa totalled around $8 billion in 2020, primarily directed toward health, education, and agriculture. However, this aid is often criticised for lacking coordination with local priorities, relying heavily on US-based contractors, and failing to ensure sustainable outcomes.   4.2.4  Contemporary Challenges in US–Africa Relations   4.2.4.1  Trade Imbalances and structural asymmetries   Africa’s total trade with the US in 2022 was $64 billion, of which $26 billion represented African exports. In contrast, the US exported $48 billion to Africa, highlighting a trade imbalance that favours the US. This asymmetry is further underscored by the limited diversification of African exports, which remain concentrated in low-value goods such as raw materials and textiles.   Despite efforts like AGOA, the economic relationship is still predominantly extractive. African countries are calling for more equitable trade arrangements that promote industrialisation and value addition on the continent.    4.2.4.2  The China factor   China’s growing influence has dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape in Africa. With bilateral trade reaching $254 billion in 2021 and investments totalling over $150 billion since 2005, China is now Africa’s largest trading partner. Much of this investment targets infrastructure—roads, ports, railways—and extractive industries.   While critics argue that China engages in "debt diplomacy," many African governments view Chinese aid and investment as faster, less conditional, and more responsive to national development goals than traditional Western assistance. The US, by contrast, is often seen as promoting conditionality, requiring political or economic reforms that are not always locally popular or relevant. 4.2.4.3  Mutual misperceptions and cultural disconnects   Public perceptions reflect underlying tensions. A 2020 Afrobarometer survey indicated that 59% of Africans held a favourable view of the US, compared to 63% for China. On the other side, only 45% of Americans viewed Sub-Saharan Africa positively. These views are shaped by media portrayals, limited cultural exchanges, and historical narratives that perpetuate stereotypes on both sides.   Such misunderstandings undermine mutual trust and complicate diplomatic relations, making it harder to build enduring partnerships grounded in respect and shared values.   4.2.4.4  Governance and corruption as barriers   Corruption remains a major obstacle to US investment. Transparency International reports that most African countries score below the global average of 43/100 in governance indices. The cost of corruption in Africa is estimated at $148 billion annually, deterring American firms that fear reputational damage or legal complications.   While the US has imposed anti-corruption sanctions in several African states, these measures often lack corresponding diplomatic efforts to build transparent institutions. Without coordinated strategies, punitive approaches can further marginalise African states from global economic networks. 4.2.4.5  Security engagement and humanitarian consequences   The US maintains a significant military presence in Africa, focusing on counterterrorism and maritime security. However, military interventions, drone operations, and support for regional militaries have occasionally produced civilian casualties and governance vacuums.   These interventions cost the US roughly $2 billion annually but have mixed results. Some critics argue that excessive militarization undermines democratic institutions and displaces resources from development-focused engagement.   4.2.5 The structural dependence problem   Programmes like AGOA and PEPFAR are largely shaped by American strategic interests. This one-sided design reduces African agency in determining the scope and focus of bilateral cooperation. For example, South Africa—Africa’s most industrialised economy—exports around 10% of its goods to the US. Yet it has limited input into the renewal or reform of AGOA.   The broader aid architecture promotes dependency rather than ownership. To transform this dynamic, African countries must be given space to define the rules of engagement and co-create frameworks that align with their national priorities. 4.2.6  Toward a new strategic partnership   A future-oriented US–Africa relationship must prioritise:   Investment over Aid:  Replace conditional assistance with direct investments in African-led projects, especially in manufacturing, green energy, and digital technology. Support for Continental Initiatives: Align with Africa’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to deepen regional integration. Capacity-Building:  Fund training programmes, research institutions, and vocational education to build a skilled African workforce. Local Ownership:  Shift power toward African governments and civil society actors in the planning and execution of development projects. Balanced Narrative:  Promote educational and cultural exchanges to challenge stereotypes and foster mutual understanding.    4.2.7  Country focus: Tunisia   Tunisia exemplifies both the promise and the challenges of US–Africa engagement. As a small North African market facing political instability, it has remained on the periphery of US foreign policy. Yet Tunisia holds significant potential in education, renewable energy, and tourism. With targeted investment and political support, it could serve as a model for equitable and inclusive development in the region.   4.2.8  Conclusion   US–Africa relations are at a critical juncture. The legacy of the past continues to weigh heavily, but the future remains open to new possibilities. By moving beyond aid dependency and toward a partnership of equals, both sides can benefit. The United States must recognize Africa not just as a recipient of charity or a theatre of competition with China, but as a continent of sovereign states with ambitions, agency, and potential.   A recalibrated relationship rooted in respect, mutual benefit, and shared values can redefine 21st-century diplomacy and development.   4.3  The Importance of African Agency in US–Africa Relations Dr Melha Rout Biel, Executive Director, Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies (South Sudan) In the evolving landscape of international relations, the engagement between the United States and African nations remains a critical axis of global diplomacy. However, for decades, this relationship has been shaped more by external imperatives than by African priorities. As the global order undergoes profound shifts—marked by the rise of multipolarity, renewed geopolitical competition, and increasing calls for equity in international governance—there is a growing recognition that the success of US–Africa relations hinges on a central principle: African agency.   This report delves into the concept of African agency, contextualises its relevance in historical and contemporary US–Africa relations, and outlines the structural changes needed to make this principle a reality. It draws on core ideas presented in the source text to argue for a transformation in how African agency is perceived, respected, and operationalised.   4.3.1  Historical context and structural power asymmetries   Understanding the importance of African agency requires a reckoning with the history of external engagement on the continent. US–Africa relations have traditionally been shaped by asymmetrical power dynamics that emerged from colonial legacies, Cold War geopolitics, and donor-recipient paradigms. Throughout the 20th century, US foreign policy toward Africa was driven largely by strategic interests—such as access to natural resources, countering Soviet influence, and managing migration and security threats—rather than a genuine commitment to Africa’s development or political empowerment.   In practice, this translated into policy prescriptions often rooted in neoliberal economic reforms, military assistance programmes, and externally imposed governance models. African states were treated not as equal partners, but as laboratories for foreign aid experiments or as pawns in broader global rivalries. The resultant aid-dependency and loss of policy sovereignty undermined African self-determination, while limiting the continent’s ability to negotiate on its own terms.   These legacies still cast a long shadow, influencing how African states are perceived and how their voices are integrated (or excluded) in global forums such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. 4.3.2  The rise of multipolarity: A strategic inflection point   The 21st century has witnessed significant changes in the global order, with the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the growing influence of middle powers such as India, Turkey, and Brazil. This shift toward multipolarity has redefined the strategic calculus of many African states, providing them with new diplomatic and economic options.   China’s Belt and Road Initiative, for instance, has poured billions of dollars into African infrastructure, offering an alternative model of engagement that challenges Western dominance. Russia has also deepened ties with several African countries through military cooperation, arms sales, and energy deals. Meanwhile, regional blocs like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) have strengthened the continent’s internal economic integration and negotiating power.   This changing environment presents both opportunities and risks. On one hand, African countries can leverage competition among external actors to maximise benefits and reduce dependency. On the other hand, the return of great power rivalry could lead to new forms of neo-colonialism or strategic manipulation if African agency is not consciously prioritised. 4.3.3  Defining African agency   At its core, African agency refers to the capacity of African actors—states, institutions, civil society, and individuals—to make independent choices, set priorities based on domestic needs, and shape international engagement in ways that advance their interests. It involves more than token participation in global affairs; it demands meaningful leadership, agenda-setting power, and accountability to African citizens rather than to external stakeholders.   Practicing African agency entails:   Policy autonomy:  The ability to design and implement policies free from undue foreign influence. Ownership of development:  Driving national and continental development strategies grounded in local knowledge and contexts. Representation:  Ensuring African voices are adequately and authentically represented in global governance institutions. Norm entrepreneurship:  Contributing to the evolution of international norms on security, democracy, and sustainability from an African perspective.   4.3.4  African institutions as engines of agency   The institutionalisation of African agency is most visible in the role of the African Union (AU), regional economic communities (RECs), and platforms like the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). These bodies have become increasingly assertive in articulating common positions and coordinating responses to continental challenges, such as conflict mediation, public health, and climate change.   The AU’s Agenda 2063 serves as a long-term blueprint for Africa’s development, grounded in principles of inclusivity, sustainability, and sovereignty. It envisions an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens. For US policy to be aligned with African agency, it must engage with these frameworks as foundational—not peripheral—documents.   Furthermore, the AfCFTA marks a significant step in building a continent-wide economic bloc that enhances bargaining power in global trade negotiations. For the US, supporting such African-led initiatives rather than imposing bilateral agreements that fragment the continent is essential for building trust and legitimacy. 4.3.5  Challenges to operationalising African agency   While the normative case for African agency is strong, several structural and political obstacles hinder its full realisation:   Fragmentation and lack of coordination: Despite rhetorical commitments to unity, African states often diverge on key issues due to differing national interests, political regimes, and external allegiances. This weakens collective bargaining efforts. Weak institutional capacity:  Many African institutions, including the AU, struggle with limited funding, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and a lack of enforcement mechanisms. This impairs their ability to implement continental decisions effectively. External conditionalities:  Aid and investment from Western and multilateral donors often come with conditions that limit policy space. Whether it is austerity measures, governance benchmarks, or military cooperation agreements, these conditions can undermine sovereignty. Perceptions and narratives:  African actors continue to face patronising attitudes from Western policymakers and media, which frame the continent as a place of perpetual crisis rather than of agency and innovation. This narrative gap affects how African agency is received abroad.   Addressing these challenges requires action on both sides: African states must invest in political will, institutional development, and intra-continental solidarity, while the US must shift its approach from managing Africa to partnering with Africa. 4.3.6  Toward a new model of US–Africa engagement   If African agency is to be respected and enhanced, the United States must adopt a fundamentally different approach to its engagement with the continent. This includes:   Listening first:  Policy frameworks should be shaped in consultation with African partners, not imposed from Washington. Listening tours, joint working groups, and continuous dialogue with AU bodies can foster mutual understanding. Aligning with African priorities : US aid, trade, and security policies should support existing African strategies such as Agenda 2063 and the AfCFTA. This ensures coherence and prevents duplication or contradiction. Supporting capacity-building:  Rather than just providing technical assistance, the US should help build long-term institutional capacities in governance, public health, education, and infrastructure. Championing reform in global institutions: The US should advocate for fairer representation of Africa in institutions like the UN Security Council and the IMF. This demonstrates a commitment to justice, not just charity. Encouraging mutual accountability: Transparency and accountability should be bilateral. The US should hold itself to the same standards it expects of African partners—on issues like human rights, transparency, and corruption. 4.3.7  Conclusion   As Africa becomes an increasingly central player in global affairs—home to the youngest population, vast natural resources, and rising economic potential—its agency cannot remain an afterthought in international engagement. For US–Africa relations to be meaningful, sustainable, and mutually beneficial, they must be founded on respect for African self-determination.   This is not simply a matter of moral obligation but of strategic foresight. A partnership rooted in African agency will be more resilient, more innovative, and more capable of addressing the complex challenges of the 21st century. In turn, African states must continue to assert their voice, strengthen regional cohesion, and build institutions that reflect the aspirations of their people.   Only then can the narrative of Africa as a subject of foreign influence be transformed into one of Africa as a sovereign actor shaping its own destiny—and contributing to a more balanced, equitable world order.   4.4  Evolving US–West Africa Economic Relations - Implications for Côte d’Ivoire Professor Assi Kimou, Deputy Director, CIRES Economic Policy Analysis Unit (Cote d’Ivoire) The relationship between the United States and Africa, particularly West Africa and Côte d’Ivoire, has been shaped by historical neglect, shifting priorities, and transactional policies under successive US administrations. This contribution by Professor Kimou explores the contemporary dynamics of the US - Africa economic partnership, focusing on trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), development assistance, immigration, and security cooperation. It seeks to understand the evolving role of the US in Côte d’Ivoire’s development trajectory and assess the prospects and risks associated with these shifting dynamics.   4.4.1  Changing trends in US - Africa economic relations   Over the decades, the US - Africa relationship has seen fluctuating levels of engagement. While diplomatic and political ties have persisted, economic relations have often been characterised by marginalisation. African countries, including Côte d’Ivoire, have not always been central to US foreign economic policy. When initiatives have been introduced - such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) - they often focused disproportionately on raw material extraction, particularly oil, with limited strategic investment in structural economic transformation.   The recent US approach, particularly under President Trump’s administration, adopted a more transactional nature, focusing on advancing American interests. This shift marked a departure from multilateral and development-oriented engagement. As a result, Africa’s importance in US foreign policy, though rhetorically acknowledged, often failed to translate into robust economic support or long-term investment strategies.    4.4.2  Trade dynamics and AGOA: A mixed blessing   AGOA, enacted in 2000, was intended to enhance market access to the US for qualifying sub-Saharan African countries. Côte d’Ivoire emerged as one of its beneficiaries, anticipating substantial growth in exports. In 2019, the country’s AGOA-related exports were valued at approximately $1 billion, with projections of increasing to over $3.5 billion by 2025. However, this potential remains precarious. If AGOA were discontinued or significantly reduced, Côte d’Ivoire stands to lose billions in trade revenue, severely impacting its balance of payments and development plans.   AGOA’s benefits, while real, are limited in scope. They focus largely on unprocessed goods, reinforcing Africa's traditional role in the global supply chain as a supplier of raw materials. The absence of policies that support local value addition, technology transfer, or industrial capacity building reduces AGOA’s transformative potential for countries like Côte d’Ivoire.   4.4.3  Foreign direct investment (FDI): Quality over quantity   Another pillar of US economic engagement with Africa is FDI. Although the US maintains a relatively modest FDI footprint on the continent compared to the European Union and China, the nature of these investments is critical. Only around 30% of US FDI targets manufacturing, whereas the EU allocates 40% of its FDI to sectors that support structural transformation, including industrial development and infrastructure.   For Côte d’Ivoire, the implications are clear: a heavier reliance on US FDI risks reinforcing extractive economic models unless there is a pivot toward industrial and human capital development. Declining FDI trends in Côte d’Ivoire and West Africa overall highlight the urgent need for a strategic overhaul, encouraging investment in manufacturing, technology, and services.   4.4.4  Foreign aid and development assistance: A shrinking commitment   USAID has historically been a key development partner for West African countries. However, data indicates that 68 project awards totalling over $360 million are slated for termination in West Africa. These projects span critical sectors such as agriculture, education, health, and governance. Côte d’Ivoire, facing serious security challenges related to violent extremism, has already seen the closure of crucial counterterrorism programmes.   Health is particularly vulnerable. In 2020, USAID and PEPFAR accounted for over 55% of Côte d’Ivoire’s HIV/AIDS funding, while the national government contributed less than 10%. A modelling study conducted to simulate different funding scenarios showed that if the funding gap were not met, up to 76,000 people could die from AIDS-related causes between 2020 and 2025. Even under a “stable” scenario, where the government maintains treatment for those already on antiretroviral therapy, the impact on public health would be profound.   Economically, the cessation of HIV funding would decrease GDP by an estimated 0.35 percentage points by 2025. This demonstrates the tight interlinkages between health aid and macroeconomic stability in developing countries.   4.4.5  Immigration, education, and remittances: An overlooked economic channel   US immigration policy also plays a significant role in shaping Africa’s economic fortunes. The number of West African students in the United States has grown by 66% in recent years, with most enrolled in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields. These students represent an investment in the continent’s future capacity for innovation and economic development.   However, if the US imposes restrictive immigration or visa policies, the educational and economic pipeline may be disrupted. For Côte d’Ivoire, maintaining this educational link is crucial, as it builds a cadre of highly skilled professionals essential for national development.   Remittances are another critical dimension. Between 2014 and 2023, West African countries received between $6–7 billion in remittances from the US. Côte d’Ivoire alone received between $300–400 million annually. This inflow surpasses many forms of foreign aid and is a vital source of household income, investment capital, and economic resilience. Restrictive immigration policies could reduce remittance flows, thereby weakening economic stability in the region.   4.4.6  Strategic imperatives for Côte d’Ivoire   Given these challenges, Côte d’Ivoire must pursue a multi-pronged strategy to safeguard and diversify its development prospects:   Enhance domestic resource mobilisation: The government must reduce its dependency on external funding by improving tax collection, broadening the tax base, and curbing corruption. Efforts should also focus on formalising the informal sector to increase public revenue. Invest in industrialisation and value addition:  Rather than exporting raw cocoa or rubber, Côte d’Ivoire should invest in processing industries. This will create jobs, enhance export value, and reduce vulnerability to global commodity price fluctuations. Leverage the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA):  Regional integration under the AfCFTA offers Côte d’Ivoire access to a broader market. This can serve as a buffer against international policy shifts while promoting intra-African trade and industrial cooperation. Pursue strategic partnerships:  While maintaining ties with the US, Côte d’Ivoire should deepen relations with other global powers such as the EU, China, India, and emerging economies. Diversifying partnerships reduces reliance on any single country and enhances bargaining power. Promote dialogue with the US:  Despite the transactional nature of recent US policies, Côte d’Ivoire should continue engaging in dialogue with American stakeholders. Advocating for sustained AGOA benefits, educational exchange programmes, and security cooperation remains essential.   4.4.7  Conclusion   Côte d’Ivoire stands at a crossroads in its economic relationship with the United States. While historical neglect and recent transactional shifts pose significant challenges, there remain opportunities for recalibrating the relationship. By investing in domestic capacity, fostering regional integration, and pursuing a diversified foreign policy, Côte d’Ivoire can chart a sustainable and sovereign path forward.   At the same time, it is essential for the US to reconsider its strategic posture toward Africa. Long-term engagement, built on mutual benefit and development cooperation, would not only serve African interests but also contribute to global stability and shared prosperity. The future of Côte d’Ivoire and West Africa hinges on responsive policymaking—both domestically and in Washington. 4.5  Pan-Africanism, African Diplomacy, and Development - A Critical Analysis Prof. Francis Matambalya, Chief Executive Officer, Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre (Tanzania) Pan-Africanism is more than an abstract ideological ideal; it is a historically rooted, practical response to centuries of colonisation, slavery, underdevelopment, and cultural erasure. Emerging in the late 19th and early 20th centuries among intellectuals and activists of African descent, the ideology calls for the unity, self-determination, and collective advancement of African peoples on the continent and in the diaspora. Prof. Matambalya, in his presentation, evaluated Pan-Africanism as a framework for contemporary African diplomacy, development, cultural resurgence, and global agency. he emphasised the ideology’s transformative potential, critiques its limitations, and suggests ways forward for African states and societies.    4.5.1  Pan-Africanism as a framework for African unity   Pan-Africanism emerged as a liberation philosophy rooted in the experiences of slavery, colonialism, and racism. Figures such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and Amílcar Cabral envisioned a unified Africa that could assert its sovereignty and build an equitable, dignified future for its peoples.   At its core, Pan-Africanism calls for:   Political unity to resist imperialist domination Economic cooperation to reduce dependence on foreign aid and capital Cultural solidarity that celebrates African heritage Institutional frameworks for collective governance and policy-making   Historical examples such as the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and its successor, the African Union (AU), reflect institutional attempts to realise these goals. However, continental unity remains a work in progress, hampered by political fragmentation, elite nationalism, and weak enforcement of collective decisions.   4.5.2  The role of education in post-colonial reconstruction   Education is central to any meaningful Pan-African project. In many African countries, formal education remains structured around colonial legacies, privileging Western epistemologies, languages, and paradigms. This contributes to a disconnection between knowledge production and the lived realities of African societies.   Decolonising education involves:   Reclaiming indigenous knowledge systems, oral traditions, and spiritual philosophies Promoting African languages as mediums of instruction Training a new generation of critical thinkers, engineers, scientists, and public leaders attuned to the continent's developmental challenges The model proposed by the Dar es Salaam school of thought in the 1960s and 70s—where education was linked directly to development planning, local empowerment, and socialist values—remains relevant today.   Institutions such as the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the African Studies Association are actively engaged in fostering independent research, curriculum reform, and scholarly exchange rooted in African worldviews.   4.5.3  African diplomacy and the global order   Post-independence African diplomacy was initially guided by anti-colonial solidarity and non-alignment during the Cold War. However, the global political economy of the 1980s and 1990s, marked by neoliberal reforms and structural adjustment programmes, diminished Africa’s diplomatic leverage. In the contemporary era, the global order is being reshaped by multipolarity, with emerging powers challenging Western dominance.   A Pan-African approach to diplomacy requires:   Coherent and coordinated foreign policy positions at multilateral forums (UN, WTO, COP summits) The establishment of African-led peacekeeping and conflict resolution mechanisms Enhanced capacity for trade negotiation and dispute arbitration   For instance, the African Union's role in mediating conflicts in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel demonstrates an evolving regional diplomatic capacity. Likewise, Africa’s Common Position on Climate Change, articulated in forums such as COP27, highlights efforts to build consensus on global issues.   However, progress is hindered by overlapping regional groupings, language and legal system differences, and the uneven capacity of states to implement continental decisions. 4.5.4  Ideological clarity and the challenges of elite capture   A significant limitation of modern Pan-Africanism is its frequent co-optation by ruling elites. Pan-African rhetoric is often used to justify state interests, suppress dissent, or secure legitimacy without advancing tangible liberation outcomes.   Key issues include:   State-centrism: Pan-Africanism is often reduced to elite summits and diplomatic platitudes, with limited popular participation Contradictory alliances: Some states proclaim Pan-African values while partnering with exploitative foreign powers or repressing internal opposition Donor dependency: Many Pan-African initiatives rely on external funding, undermining ideological sovereignty and grassroots ownership   Reinvigorating the movement requires reclaiming Pan-Africanism as a people-driven, revolutionary project grounded in justice, equity, and democratic accountability. Civil society, trade unions, and youth movements play a critical role in this reclamation.   4.5.5  Economic sovereignty and structural transformation   Africa’s integration into the global economy remains extractive and unequal. The continent exports raw materials and imports finished goods, locking many countries into neocolonial economic relationships. True development requires structural transformation of economic systems to achieve self-reliance and inclusive growth.   Key elements include:   Industrialisation: Building manufacturing capacity and promoting agro-industrial value chains Regional integration: Using mechanisms like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to boost intra-African trade and economies of scale Technology and innovation: Investing in research, green energy, and digital economies that leapfrog traditional development models Land and food sovereignty: Reclaiming land for equitable use, supporting smallholder farmers, and protecting seed diversity from corporate capture   Moreover, Africa’s debt burden continues to pose a threat to sovereignty. Structural adjustment and debt repayment have diverted resources away from social services. Debt cancellation and the establishment of continental financial institutions (e.g., an African Monetary Fund) are frequently proposed as remedies. 4.5.6  Geopolitical alignment and strategic autonomy   Africa’s strategic location and natural wealth make it a key player in 21st-century geopolitics. Relationships with the U.S., China, Russia, the EU, India, and Gulf states must be navigated with caution and foresight. A Pan-African approach rejects dependency and asserts the right of African nations to determine their development paths.   China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s engagement in security and energy, and the West’s renewed interest in Africa all present opportunities and risks. African states must ensure that:   Infrastructure and security agreements serve long-term developmental goals Natural resources are leveraged for value-added growth, not raw export Strategic partnerships are diversified to avoid one-sided dependencies   The principle of “African solutions to African problems” remains vital in addressing regional crises and reducing reliance on foreign intervention. 4.5.7  Cultural liberation and identity reconstruction   Cultural decolonisation is central to psychological liberation. Colonialism imposed European norms, languages, and values while denigrating African belief systems and traditions. Reversing this cultural violence involves recovering pride in African identity and cultivating a cultural renaissance.   This includes:   Restitution of stolen cultural artifacts held in Western museums Investment in African film, literature, and visual arts as tools of expression and resistance Support for Pan-African cultural festivals and heritage programmes Reforming educational curricula to reflect African histories and contributions   Youth-led movements in music (Afrobeats, Amapiano), fashion, and literature are already leading this resurgence. Afrocentrism, once dismissed as fringe, has gained global visibility and respect, creating transnational cultural bonds. 4.5.8  Contemporary relevance and youth engagement   Young people under 35 make up over 60% of Africa’s population. Their demographic weight and digital fluency position them at the forefront of contemporary Pan-Africanism. From student movements to climate strikes and entrepreneurial networks, youth are reshaping the narrative of African futures.   Initiatives such as:   The African Youth Charter Regional youth parliaments and leadership programmes Tech hubs and digital advocacy platforms Pan-African podcasting and social media communities   are giving voice to a generation that demands inclusion, justice, and transformation. Issues like climate change, gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and employment are central to this generation’s activism. Their Pan-Africanism is intersectional, global in outlook, and unapologetically assertive. 4.5.9  Institutional frameworks and continental governance   The African Union and regional economic communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, SADC, and EAC provide mechanisms for collective action. However, these institutions face chronic challenges:   Funding deficits Overlapping mandates Political interference from member states Limited enforcement capacity   Agenda 2063—the AU’s development blueprint—articulates a long-term vision of “The Africa We Want,” grounded in integration, peace, and prosperity. While symbolically powerful, the implementation of such frameworks depends on national buy-in, citizen participation, and institutional reform.   Proposals to strengthen AU legitimacy include:   Creating a Pan-African Parliament with legislative powers Streamlining RECs to avoid duplication Increasing contributions from member states to reduce foreign dependency Establishing an independent African Court of Justice 4.5.10  Conclusion   Pan-Africanism remains an indispensable ideology and praxis for addressing Africa’s historical traumas and contemporary aspirations. Its enduring relevance lies in its comprehensive vision—one that combines political unity, economic transformation, cultural affirmation, and global justice.   To fulfil its promise, Pan-Africanism must move beyond rhetoric. It must become a living framework for policymaking, institutional design, and mass mobilisation. This requires the active engagement of African states, grassroots movements, intellectual communities, and diaspora networks.   Africa stands at a crossroads. The choices made today—regarding diplomacy, education, economics, and culture—will shape the continent's place in the 21st century. By embracing a bold, decolonised, and people-centred Pan-Africanism, Africa can chart a path toward liberation, resilience, and unity. 4.6  Africa and the United States - Reimagining a Strategic and Equitable Partnership Ambassador Omar Mjenga, President and CEO, Centre for International Policy Africa (Tanzania) The dynamics of United States–Africa relations have long been shaped by asymmetries in power, historical legacies, and shifting global interests. The reflections presented by Ambassador Omar Mjenga capture key themes that define the current and future trajectories of Africa–US engagement. They explore Africa's evolving geopolitical relevance, structural imbalances in global diplomacy, and the urgent call for Africa to assert itself on the world stage—not merely as a beneficiary of aid but as an active shaper of its destiny. This report synthesises those insights into a structured narrative, assessing the past and present, and offering a vision for a more balanced future.   4.6.1  Africa’s strategic priorities and the vision of unity   Africa’s contemporary policy engagements span six interrelated domains: defence, peace, and security; foreign policy and decision-making; democracy and global governance; gender and women's issues; energy and climate change; and international economic policies. These pillars reflect the continent's broad-based aspirations for transformation and its desire to reposition itself as a global influencer.   Central to this vision is a united Africa. Unity is not merely rhetorical; it implies deeper integration, coherent policies, and consolidated diplomatic leverage. Ambassador Mjenga reflected on the transformative leadership of Kofi Annan, the first African Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the thwarted candidacy of Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, whose pan-Africanist credentials and advocacy for China’s reintegration into the UN likely provoked Western resistance. These anecdotes illustrate the complex interplay between African ambition and global power politics.   4.6.2  Perceptions of Africa and its place in global diplomacy   Perceptions shape policy. Mjenga contrasts how Africa views itself with how it is perceived globally, particularly in the West. While Africa is the fastest-growing region with enormous natural and demographic resources, it remains marginalised in global institutions and narratives. This contradiction is starkly highlighted by a diplomatic exchange involving US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Gabon's President Ali Bongo, in which African efforts to include the continent on the UN Security Council agenda were met with scepticism.   The statement that without Africa, the Security Council would have “no business” underscores the centrality of the continent’s challenges and opportunities to global peace and development. Yet, Africa remains too often the subject of external decisions rather than a participant in shaping outcomes.   4.6.3  The Legacy of the past and the weight of history   No discussion of US-Africa relations is complete without acknowledging the historical roots of the relationship, particularly the transatlantic slave trade. This foundational injustice has framed much of the structural imbalance that still characterises engagement between Africa and Western powers.   Contemporary interactions—whether through trade agreements like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) or aid programmes like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—are seen not as benevolent acts but as partial redress for historical exploitation. Referencing Frantz Fanon, Ambassador Mjenga argues that development in the West is built on African extraction, and Africans should not beg for opportunities like AGOA—they should demand restitution and equity.   4.6.4  A call for dignity in engagement   The ambassador raises a critical question about dignity and respect in diplomatic relations. Why, he asks, are African heads of state always summoned to Washington for the US-Africa Summit? Why are they herded into buses like tourists, when no Western leader would accept such treatment abroad?   This rhetorical critique points to deeper issues of self-respect and sovereignty. Africans, he argues, are sometimes disrespected because they do not demand respect. For Africa to command equal treatment, it must first believe in and assert its own value. This includes behaving geopolitically with the same confidence and assertiveness that countries like Russia and China exhibit toward the US.   4.6.5  The impact of US domestic politics on Africa   US policy towards Africa varies significantly depending on the administration in power. The speaker critiques the administration of former President Donald Trump for erasing Africa from the US foreign policy map. Trump’s first term saw no visits to Africa, diminished foreign aid, and a travel ban that affected several African nations. If a second term is similar, Africa should brace for further marginalisation, with engagement restricted primarily to security and humanitarian issues.   This disengagement creates a geopolitical vacuum that may be filled by emerging powers such as China and Russia. The US’s inconsistent and incoherent approach to Africa weakens its influence and invites others to step in with more sustained and strategic commitments.   4.6.6  Trade and the future of AGOA   Currently, 32 African countries qualify for AGOA, but only a small handful—approximately five nations—account for the vast majority of its benefits. This imbalance demonstrates the limited utility of AGOA as a development tool for the broader continent.   With AGOA set to expire, Mjenga urges African leaders to prepare for its potential non-renewal. Quoting a Swahili proverb, he stresses the importance of readiness and foresight: “Whenever you see your colleague being shaved, prepare your head.” Africa must not wait passively for Washington’s decision; it must strategise for alternatives that enhance self-reliance and regional integration.   4.6.7  Demographics and the African advantage   Africa’s greatest asset may well be its people. With a rapidly growing population and a burgeoning youth demographic, the continent is poised to play a decisive role in the global economy. By 2050, three out of every ten young people in the world will be African.   This demographic dividend could fuel massive economic growth—if properly harnessed. Strategic investment in education, infrastructure, and entrepreneurship will be key. Moreover, Africa must negotiate with global partners from a position of strength, offering not just natural resources but a vibrant labour market and consumer base.   4.6.8  Policy recommendations for a balanced partnership   The report outlines several key recommendations for reshaping US-Africa relations into a more balanced and mutually beneficial partnership:   Leverage Strengths: The US should stop focusing narrowly on countering China and Russia in Africa. Instead, it should capitalise on its comparative advantages—such as democratic institutions, technology, and higher education—to offer value-based partnerships. Develop a Coherent Strategy: Current US policy in Africa is reactive and fragmented. A unified, long-term strategy is essential, one that integrates economic development, security, good governance, and regional cooperation. Foster Local Leadership: Through initiatives like the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), the US should continue to support the emergence of competent, ethical, and innovative African leadership. Empower the Diaspora: African diasporas in the US and beyond can serve as bridges for trade, investment, and cultural exchange. They should be more actively engaged in shaping bilateral relations. Support Institutional Capacity: Instead of imposing external aid structures like USAID, the focus should shift to building strong African institutions that can manage their own development agendas.   4.6.9  Toward self-reliance and continental resilience   The dismantling of USAID, while viewed by some as a blow to Africa, is seen as an opportunity. Drawing from Tanzania’s founding father Julius Nyerere, Ambassador Mjenga reminded the audience of the foundational enemies of African development: poverty, ignorance, and disease. These challenges are best met through domestic resource mobilisation, industrial policy, and regional cooperation—not through dependency on Western aid.   President Uhuru Kenyatta’s response to USAID’s collapse was emblematic of a new wave of thinking: that Africa must now build its own capacity, leverage its own resources, and lead its own development. This pivot toward sovereignty and self-determination could be the foundation for a stronger, more independent Africa.   4.6.10  Conclusion   The speaker closes with an African proverb: “The hand that feeds the other is higher than the one that receives.”  This metaphor captures the asymmetry that continues to define Africa’s engagement with powers like the United States. But the message is clear: it is time for Africa to raise its own hand—to be the one that gives, negotiates, and sets the terms.   The future of US-Africa relations must be built on dignity, mutual respect, and strategic clarity. Africa is not a passive recipient of goodwill. It is a continent rich in potential, steeped in history, and ready to claim its place in the world. For the United States, the opportunity lies not in dominating Africa but in partnering with it—for shared prosperity in an increasingly multipolar world.   4.7  Reimagining US–Africa Relations - Priorities, Challenges, and Strategic Pathways Dr Zine Barka, Independent Public Finance Analyst (Algeria) The evolving dynamics of US–Africa relations continue to shape the trajectory of development, governance, and security across the African continent. The key themes explored by Dr Barka concerned governance priorities, investment, foreign aid, and Africa’s place in the global geopolitical system. It builds upon those reflections to analyse the state of US–Africa relations, review the legacies of recent US presidents in shaping the continent’s prospects, and offer actionable strategies for African states in response to changing global political currents.   4.7.1  Africa’s developmental landscape: A brief overview   Africa faces numerous and interconnected challenges that hinder sustainable development and prosperity. These range from weak trade integration and security vulnerabilities to insufficient investment and a heavy reliance on external aid. The continent’s share of global trade remains strikingly low—between 2 to 3%—a statistic that underscores Africa's marginal position in the global economic order. Notably, African countries trade more extensively with external partners, such as the US and the European Union, than with one another. This fragmented intra-African trade landscape underlines the urgent need for deeper regional integration, a goal championed by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).   Investment is another critical lever for development. While public and private investment are key to growth, many African nations struggle to mobilise domestic resources. Inadequate capital circulation, poorly designed fiscal policies, and weak financial institutions often obstruct efforts to self-finance development. Although aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) serve as alternatives, they come with trade-offs, including policy conditionalities and dependence on external actors. The result is a developmental paradox: while Africa is rich in human and natural resources, it remains poor in terms of infrastructure, industrial output, and technological innovation.   Security and stability are equally pivotal. The Security Threat Index for 2024 highlights the diverse risk profiles across African countries. Mauritius, for example, ranks high in terms of reliability, while Libya remains near the bottom due to persistent conflict. Foreign investors heavily weigh these indicators, and nations perceived as unstable often struggle to attract meaningful investment. A stable political environment, therefore, is not just a domestic priority but a prerequisite for global engagement.   4.7.2  The US and Africa: A presidential legacy perspective   The United States has played a multifaceted role in Africa over the last three decades, with varying degrees of commitment, success, and controversy. The engagement has been shaped by the foreign policies of successive US presidents, each leaving a distinct mark on US–Africa relations.   4.7.2.1  Bill Clinton: Trade Not Aid   President Bill Clinton's administration (1993–2001) was characterised by a strategic shift from aid to trade. The hallmark of his Africa policy was the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), enacted in 2000. AGOA aimed to stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty by allowing nearly 30 African countries to export thousands of goods duty-free to the US market. The agreement reflected Clinton’s belief in free trade as a developmental tool.   Clinton’s commitment extended beyond trade. In response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, he pledged $30 million to the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, underscoring the US role in post-conflict recovery. He also supported health campaigns in Nigeria and skill development in South Africa. In 1994, Clinton announced a $600 million aid package to South Africa, signifying strong diplomatic ties with the post-apartheid government under Nelson Mandela.   4.7.2.2  George W. Bush: Humanitarian Leadership   By a considerable margin, George W. Bush is the most respected US president in Africa, largely due to his administration's monumental health initiatives. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), launched in 2003, stands as one of the largest global health programmes in history. Covering 54 countries, including regions like Western Sahara, PEPFAR has saved an estimated 13 million lives by providing antiretroviral therapy to individuals living with HIV/AIDS.   Bush's approach to Africa was primarily humanitarian, driven by health diplomacy. His administration emphasised disease eradication, health infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance, which earned bipartisan support and widespread acclaim across the continent. However, the longevity and sustainability of such programmes remain under threat due to political shifts in the US. 4.7.2.3  Barack Obama: Symbolism and Youth Empowerment   As the first African-American president, Barack Obama’s election in 2008 sparked tremendous hope across Africa. Many believed that his heritage would translate into transformative policies for the continent. During his two terms (2009–2017), Obama made four visits to Africa, spanning seven countries. These visits reflected a recognition of the continent's growing strategic importance.   Obama’s signature initiatives included the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and the Mandela Washington Fellowship. These programmes focused on empowering youth through leadership training, skills development, and professional networking. Collectively, they aimed to build a new generation of African leaders capable of navigating the complexities of governance and globalisation.   Despite his popularity, some critics argue that Obama’s policies did not dramatically shift the structural foundations of US–Africa relations. His administration's cautious foreign policy and focus on multilateralism sometimes lacked the bold interventions that marked his predecessor’s legacy. 4.7.2.4 Joe Biden: Multilateralism and Global Inclusion   President Joe Biden’s approach to Africa, since assuming office in 2021, has emphasised reintegration into global institutions and renewed multilateralism. One of his early acts was halting the US withdrawal from the World Health Organisation (WHO), reversing a decision made by the Trump administration. Additionally, Biden strongly advocated for the inclusion of the African Union (AU) in the G20—a milestone achieved in 2023.   Biden also supports Africa’s quest for greater representation in global governance. He has called for two permanent African seats on the UN Security Council and endorsed reforms that reflect the continent’s demographic and geopolitical weight. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reinforced this stance by describing Africa as a "major geopolitical force" shaping past, present, and future global dynamics. 4.7.2.5  Donald Trump: Disengagement and Strategic Competition   In stark contrast, President Donald Trump’s tenure (2017–2021) was marked by disengagement and scepticism toward multilateralism. His administration proposed cuts to USAID, a major conduit for development funding to Africa. Furthermore, Trump initiated the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and WHO—decisions that undermined collaborative global health and climate action.   Trump’s Africa policy was largely framed by strategic rivalry with China and Russia. He encouraged African states to align with the US in geopolitical contests rather than advancing a substantive developmental agenda. This transactional approach left many African leaders concerned about the future of US engagement and the erosion of long-standing aid programmes like PEPFAR.   4.7.3  Algeria’s position: Advocating continental representation   As a prominent voice in African diplomacy, Algeria has called for an end to the continent’s marginalisation in global affairs. Aligned with the African Union’s 2009 consensus and the Sirte Declaration, Algeria advocates for fair representation of Africa in the United Nations, especially the Security Council. It seeks a geopolitical realignment that reflects the continent’s growing influence and demographic significance.   Algeria’s position reflects broader African demands for equitable participation in global decision-making processes. As a member of the AU and other regional organisations, Algeria underscores the need for consensus, strategic unity, and institutional reforms.   4.7.4  Strategic imperatives: How Africa should respond   In a world increasingly defined by great power competition, resource scarcity, and geopolitical uncertainty, African countries must adopt a unified and strategic approach to international engagement. The threat of renewed isolationism, particularly under potential Trump 2.0 leadership, demands urgent introspection and policy recalibration.   First, African nations must strengthen regional bodies such as ECOWAS, SADC, and the East African Community (EAC). These organisations are essential for fostering collective security, economic integration, and political coordination. Revisiting their mandates, reforming their structures, and enhancing their capacities are crucial steps toward continental self-reliance.   Second, Africa should safeguard and diversify funding sources for critical sectors like health, education, and infrastructure. With foreign aid under potential threat, domestic resource mobilisation and South-South cooperation must become central pillars of the development strategy.   Third, Africa must assert its sovereignty in global forums. This includes demanding equitable representation in institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and UN Security Council. It also involves forming strategic alliances that serve African interests, rather than merely aligning with external powers for short-term gains.   Finally, African leaders must demonstrate vision, courage, and accountability. The African Union Commission should be led by individuals with a deep commitment to the continent’s future and the capacity to navigate complex global dynamics. Leadership is the keystone upon which Africa’s resilience and progress will depend.   4.7.5  Conclusion   US–Africa relations have evolved over decades, shaped by the personalities and policies of successive American presidents and the shifting aspirations of African nations. While trade, aid, and diplomacy remain foundational, the current geopolitical environment requires Africa to take greater ownership of its destiny. Whether confronting future uncertainties under a disengaged US administration or seizing opportunities in a multipolar world, Africa must act with unity, purpose, and strategic foresight.   The continent’s future lies in its own hands—and with bold leadership, institutional reform, and collective resolve, Africa can shape a new era of global engagement that truly reflects its aspirations, dignity, and potential.   4.8  US–South Africa Relations in the Era of Trumpism - A Critical Reflection Dr Sizo Nkala, Senior Researcher, Centre for Africa-China Studies, University of Johannesburg (South Africa) The dynamics of US–South Africa relations have shifted significantly over the years, moving from a period of high diplomatic engagement and mutual optimism in the post-apartheid era to a phase of strain and uncertainty, particularly during the administration of President Donald J. Trump. In the presentation delivered by Sizo Nkala from the Centre for Africa-China Studies at the University of Johannesburg, a comprehensive and thought-provoking exploration of this evolving bilateral relationship was presented, grounded in the political ideology popularly known as the “Trump Doctrine” or “Trumpism.”   This report synthesises Nkala’s key insights into the nature of the Trump administration’s foreign policy approach and its implications for US–South Africa relations. It contextualises these developments within the broader trajectory of the bilateral relationship, examining how historical goodwill has deteriorated in the face of growing ideological divergence and the aggressive reassertion of American nationalism.   4.8.1  Understanding the Trump doctrine   Central to Nkala’s analysis is the contention that Donald Trump, despite perceptions to the contrary, possesses a coherent—if unpopular—ideological framework guiding his political and diplomatic conduct. Contrary to critics who view Trump’s decisions as erratic or uninformed, Nkala argues that there is method and consistency to Trump’s approach, particularly in terms of foreign policy. Termed the “Trump Doctrine,” this framework is grievance-based and deeply rooted in economic nationalism, populism, and unilateralism.   The Trump Doctrine, according to Nkala, is premised on several interrelated grievances:   Deindustrialisation of the American economy: Trump has long expressed concern over the offshoring of American manufacturing jobs, particularly to countries like China and South Africa. This issue resonates with his core support base—the white, male working-class population—who have been disproportionately affected by industrial decline. Unprofitable international alliances and organisations: Trump has demonstrated a clear aversion to multilateral commitments, criticising the United Nations, NATO, and other institutions as being burdensome to American taxpayers. He believes that the US gains little from these relationships, and he has acted to withdraw from or defund them. Exploitative trade deals: Trump frequently decries trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and NAFTA (now replaced by USMCA) as detrimental to American interests. Although he rarely mentions the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Nkala posits that such arrangements are also viewed unfavourably within Trump’s ideological orbit. Immigration and border security: Another pillar of the Trump Doctrine is the scapegoating of immigrants. Trump has framed immigration as a threat to American security and prosperity, using inflammatory rhetoric and implementing stringent deportation policies. Opposition to military interventions: Trump’s isolationist tendencies are reflected in his disdain for prolonged foreign military entanglements. He has pledged to end “unwinnable wars” and has shown little interest in deploying peacekeepers, particularly in Africa.   These grievances are addressed through a set of “corrective measures,” including the imposition of tariffs, withdrawal from multilateral agreements (such as the Paris Climate Accord, the Iran Nuclear Deal, and UNESCO), and a transactional approach to diplomacy that prioritises American economic and political supremacy. 4.8.2  Personality and policy: The Trump effect   Nkala emphasises the importance of Trump’s personality in shaping US foreign policy. Traits such as narcissism, spitefulness, and confrontational behaviour are not just personal quirks but central to understanding his political methodology. Trump’s tendency to act in a “lose-lose” manner—imposing tariffs that hurt both allies and domestic constituencies, for example—is indicative of his inclination to prioritise political messaging and symbolic victories over practical outcomes.   This personality-driven approach contributes to the volatility of US foreign relations and has had a profound impact on South Africa, where long-standing diplomatic norms have been disrupted. Trump’s confrontational stance often results in symbolic acts of hostility—such as the dismissal of ambassadors or the withdrawal of aid—that signal a broader ideological departure from previous administrations. 4.8.3  From Mandela to mistrust: The evolution of US–South Africa relations   The presentation also offered a valuable historical perspective on US–South Africa relations. In the immediate aftermath of apartheid, South Africa was widely celebrated as a beacon of democracy and reconciliation. Nelson Mandela’s presidency inspired global admiration, and the United States quickly moved to solidify ties with the new democratic government.   In 1994, the Clinton administration extended a $600 million package to support South African development. That same year, the “Investing in People” Conference was held in the US to mobilise American investment in South Africa, and a US–South Africa Business Development Committee was established. A year later, the Binational Commission, co-chaired by then-Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and US Vice President Al Gore, institutionalised high-level diplomatic engagement between the two nations.   This era was characterised by optimism, mutual respect, and frequent communication. South Africa was included in the US Market Initiative in 1995, aimed at promoting it as a key investment destination. These efforts underscored Washington’s view of South Africa as a strategic partner and model of democratic transition in a region often marked by instability. 4.8.4  A rapid decline   Fast forward to the Trump era, and the relationship appears to have deteriorated significantly. According to Nkala, several recent developments illustrate this decline: The abrupt dismissal of the South African ambassador to the US. The permanent suspension of US aid programmes in South Africa as of February 2025. Trump’s inflammatory invitation to members of the Afrikaner community to flee “brutalities” allegedly perpetrated by the South African government. US accusations of human rights violations in South Africa.   These events reflect a breakdown in diplomatic protocol and mutual trust. The absence of ambassadors in both Washington and Pretoria—contrasted with the twice-yearly meetings between high-ranking officials in the 1990s—is emblematic of this shift. The mutual commitment that once defined the relationship has been replaced by suspicion, ideological divergence, and policy disconnect.   Nkala attributes this regression primarily to the Trump Doctrine, which views international engagement through the lens of grievance and zero-sum competition. South Africa, once seen as a promising partner, is now perceived as a drain on American resources and a symbol of the very globalism that Trump seeks to dismantle. 4.8.5  Beyond Trump: A structural shift?   One of the most important arguments presented in the paper is that Trumpism may outlast Donald Trump himself. While Trump is its most visible and vocal proponent, the ideological tenets of Trumpism—economic nationalism, unilateralism, and opposition to liberal internationalism—have gained traction within segments of the American political establishment. As such, the current trajectory of US–South Africa relations may not simply be reversed with a change in leadership.   This insight invites scholars and policymakers in Africa to rethink their engagement strategies with the United States. Rather than assuming that a post-Trump administration will automatically revert to past norms, African governments must prepare for a long-term realignment of American foreign policy interests. This includes recognising the growing domestic pressures within the US that shape its external conduct, from protectionism to isolationism.   4.8.6  Conclusion   The transformation of US–South Africa relations in the age of Trumpism is both stark and instructive. What began as a hopeful partnership anchored in shared democratic values has become a tense and fragile relationship defined by suspicion and policy divergence. Through a detailed exploration of the Trump Doctrine, Sizo Nkala’s presentation shed light on the ideological undercurrents shaping this shift and offers a cautionary perspective on the future of African engagement with the United States.   By understanding Trumpism not as a temporary anomaly but as a potentially enduring political ideology, scholars and policymakers are better positioned to navigate the evolving geopolitical landscape. South Africa, and the African continent more broadly, must engage with the United States with a clear-eyed recognition of the new terms of engagement—terms defined less by shared ideals and more by transactional logic and nationalist sentiment.   In the end, the challenge lies in crafting an African foreign policy that is resilient, strategic, and forward-looking—one that anticipates not just who is in the White House, but what kind of America the world must deal with in the years to come. 4.9  US–Africa Relations in the Era of ‘America First’ - A Kenyan Perspective Brigadier (Rtd) Dr Robert Kabage, Executive Director, Mashariki Research and Policy Centre (Kenya) The dynamics of US–Africa relations have undergone substantial transformation in recent years, particularly under the influence of the "America First" policy doctrine introduced by the Trump administration. This unilateral and nationalist policy framework prioritises US interests above multilateral commitments and global partnerships, thereby presenting both challenges and opportunities for African states. In his presentation,  Brigadier (Retired) Dr. Kabage, CEO of Mashariki Research and Policy Centre, examined the implications of this policy for Africa, with a specific emphasis on Kenya’s strategic responses. 4.9.1  Background and institutional context   The Mashariki Research and Policy Centre, headquartered in Nairobi, is a leading think tank that provides policy-oriented analysis on matters of security, geopolitics, economic growth, and sustainability. Established in February of the previous year, the centre celebrated its first anniversary with the publication of the Mashariki Security Journal . This publication underscores the centre's commitment to fostering a knowledge platform for addressing peace and security challenges across Eastern Africa.   The institution plays a crucial role in offering foresight and research-driven solutions to the region's most pressing issues, from political instability to identity-based conflicts and environmental degradation.   In light of the shifting geopolitical landscape, Dr. Kabage’s presentation addressed the critical policy and governance priorities necessary to reconfigure and strengthen US-Africa relations, grounded in a realist theoretical framework that emphasises national interest and strategic autonomy. 4.9.2  Theoretical framework: Realism in international relations   The analysis rests on the realist theory of international relations, which views states as rational actors driven by the pursuit of power and national interests. From this perspective, the "America First" policy reflects a logical extension of realism, where the US seeks to consolidate its geopolitical advantage through unilateral action and selective alliances. Realism asserts that in an anarchic international system, survival, economic power, and military strength are paramount. This theoretical lens helps contextualise recent shifts in US foreign policy and their ramifications for African states.   4.9.3  Key findings from the study   4.9.3.1  Historical context of US-Africa relations   Historically, US engagement with Africa—from the colonial and slave trade eras to the Cold War and beyond—has been driven by strategic self-interest. The Trump administration's emphasis on "America First" has merely made these interests more explicit, reshaping existing agreements and partnerships. This reality calls for a more honest and pragmatic reassessment of what African states expect and require from international partnerships moving forward.   4.9.3.2  Impact on peace and security cooperation   The traditional US role within NATO and its strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies, such as Kenya, has been affected. Under the current policy, NATO allies are expected to increase their military expenditures and develop independent defence capacities. Kenya, designated a major non-NATO ally, previously benefitted from US defence cooperation, particularly in anti-terrorism operations. However, this relationship is now under strain. The freezing of funding for Kenya’s leadership of a peacekeeping mission in Haiti exemplifies the trend towards decreased US international military engagement. This development underscores the need for Kenya and its regional partners to invest in indigenous peacekeeping mechanisms and self-funded security strategies.   4.9.3.3  Foreign aid and development assistance   A significant consequence of the "America First" doctrine is the withdrawal or reduction of US foreign aid. The freezing of USAID funding has had profound effects in Kenya, especially in the health sector. Programmes addressing HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria face severe highlights the risks of dependence on external donors for essential healthcare services. Such cuts also affect agricultural development, emergency relief, and small enterprise growth, thereby hampering overall national development.   4.9.3.4  Withdrawal from global health institutions   The US withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) signals its intent to disengage from global health governance. This deprives African countries of vital technical support and capacity building. For Kenya, this necessitates urgent reforms in domestic healthcare financing and infrastructure development to maintain progress toward universal health coverage. The public health threat is compounded by emerging global pandemics, which require coordinated international responses - responses now hindered by US disengagement.   4.9.3.5  Climate Action and Environmental Sustainability   The US exit from the Paris Agreement and its reduction of climate funding have negatively affected African nations. Kenya, which derives over 80% of its energy from renewable sources, has been particularly impacted. Climate action is central to Kenya's development strategy, offering benefits such as food security, disaster resilience, and sustainable agriculture. The reduction in US climate finance endangers these gains. Furthermore, the loss of US advocacy on global climate platforms weakens the ability of African nations to push for adaptation financing and technology transfers needed to combat the growing threat of climate change.   4.9.3.6 Gender, diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI)   The current US policy framework marginalises global DEI efforts. Cuts to USAID funding have undermined programmes promoting women’s health, education, and economic empowerment. Kenya, in the context of recent legal advancements for minority rights, faces the challenge of internally sustaining inclusion initiatives without external support. The risk is that marginalised populations, including the LGBTQ+ community, may experience setbacks in legal and social recognition due to the withdrawal of external funding and advocacy that previously supported these rights.   4.9.4  Immigration and labour mobility   US immigration restrictions pose barriers to African professionals and students seeking opportunities in America. With migration avenues tightening, countries like Kenya must reconsider their economic models that rely on labour exports. Emphasis must shift towards domestic job creation, economic diversification, and investment promotion to absorb the national workforce. African governments will need to introduce skills development, technical training, and enterprise financing initiatives to support youth employment and reduce dependency on foreign labour markets.   4.9.5  Strategic recommendations   In response to these policy shifts, Dr  Kabage proposes several strategic recommendations aimed at recalibrating Kenya’s - and by extension Africa’s - foreign and domestic policy posture.   4.9.5.1  Diversify development funding   African nations should reduce overreliance on Western aid by seeking alternative partnerships with emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Strengthening regional institutions like the African Development Bank is also critical for financial self-reliance. These partnerships must be structured around mutual benefit and equitable terms to ensure long-term sustainability. 4.9.5.2  Enhance domestic healthcare financing   To counterbalance foreign aid reductions, governments must increase allocations for health in national budgets. Public-private partnerships should be expanded to boost infrastructure and service delivery, ensuring continuity of critical health services. Local pharmaceutical production and regional procurement frameworks can also enhance medical resilience.   4.9.5.3    Community-driven climate solutions   Kenya and other African states must adopt grassroots approaches to climate adaptation and mitigation. Local investment in renewable energy, water management, and sustainable agriculture will foster environmental resilience and economic independence. Community engagement in climate governance will also improve policy relevance and implementation efficiency.   4.9.5.4  Support local industries and entrepreneurship   Economic sovereignty requires fostering local enterprise. Policymakers should develop frameworks that incentivise small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), encourage innovation, and promote industrialisation to reduce import dependency and create employment. Entrepreneurial hubs, business incubators, and skills training centres should be expanded to catalyse local value chains.   4.9.5.5  Boost intra-African trade and regional integration   The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offers a viable pathway to strengthen intra-African commerce. Harmonising trade policies, eliminating tariffs, and investing in regional infrastructure will enhance economic resilience and reduce external vulnerabilities. Kenya, for example, stands to gain significantly by leveraging AfCFTA to access larger markets, stimulate industrialisation, and foster regional value chains. This integration not only boosts economic diversification but also fosters political unity and continental self-reliance.   4.9.5.6  Expand diplomatic and economic alliances   Beyond traditional partnerships with Western countries, African nations must engage strategically with rising global powers and alternative trading blocs. Dr Kabage pointed to Kenya’s Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union as a viable model amidst uncertainty over the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Furthermore, proactive engagement with BRICS nations could open new avenues for trade, investment, technology transfer, and diplomatic influence. These relationships should be pursued with a clear-eyed assessment of national interests to avoid replicating exploitative dependencies.   4.9.5.7  Improve resource governance   One of the most pressing internal challenges across African states remains poor resource management. According to Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Treasury, simply halving corruption levels could enable the country to service all its public debt obligations. This astonishing insight underscores the critical importance of enforcing transparent procurement systems, strengthening public financial management, and holding officials accountable. Proper resource allocation and reduced wastage would dramatically reduce reliance on foreign aid and debt, enabling countries to fund development goals independently.   4.9.6  Opportunities amidst the challenge   While the "America First" doctrine has introduced considerable strain into US-Africa relations, it also creates opportunities for African countries to reassess and redefine their positions within the global order. Reduced aid and disengagement from multilateralism should not merely be viewed as abandonment, but as a wake-up call for the continent to embrace strategic autonomy.   This shift encourages Africa to take greater ownership of its development agenda. It prompts policymakers to invest in local innovation, adopt resilient health and education systems, modernise agriculture, and harness digital technologies. In the long run, the lessons drawn from navigating external policy shocks can cultivate stronger governance institutions, broaden economic opportunities, and enhance continental unity.   4.9.7  Conclusion   The “America First” policy signals a fundamental recalibration of US foreign engagement that has cascading effects on Africa. While this repositioning presents immediate challenges - such as reduced foreign aid, disrupted security arrangements, and limited migration – it also underscores the necessity for African nations to pursue economic and strategic independence.   Kenya's experience, as articulated by Dr Kabage, provides a valuable lens through which these dynamics can be understood and addressed. Rather than lamenting the loss of traditional aid structures, Kenya and other African countries must pivot toward new partnerships, strengthen intra-African collaboration, and reform internal governance.   By embracing a proactive and pragmatic foreign policy, investing in local capabilities, and promoting inclusive development, Africa can transform external uncertainties into opportunities for self-empowerment. The path forward will require bold leadership, collaborative continental action, and an unwavering commitment to self-determined growth.

5  SESSION 2: U.S. – AFRICA RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES   5.1  Understanding African Fragility Through U.S. National Security Perspectives Dr Dylan Craig, Associate Professor, Department of Security Studies, U.S. National War College (United States of America) This report analyses the evolving conception of African fragility from the vantage point of U.S. national security and foreign policy. Based on the reflective and insider perspective from a Dr Dylan Craig who teaches at the U.S. National War College. It offers rare insight into the priorities, internal dynamics, and persistent tensions within American policy toward Africa.   This report is structured into three main sections. First, it outlines the traditional U.S. conception of African fragility as rooted in geopolitical alignment. Second, it presents a detailed examination of the current administration’s reconfiguration of fragility around geoeconomic priorities. Finally, it discusses the institutional continuity that tempers the impact of these shifts and maintains certain persistent logics in U.S.-Africa relations.    5.1.1  Historical conceptions of African fragility: Geopolitical imperatives   From the early 2000s, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the onset of the global war on terror, the U.S. regarded African fragility largely through a geopolitical lens. Fragile states were not necessarily the poorest, most corrupt, or most violent - but those whose political alignments with the U.S. were in flux or at risk. Stability, from a U.S. perspective, was defined less by the well-being of a population and more by the consistency of a regime’s alignment with American strategic objectives.   During this era, the American objective in Africa was to secure allies in the fight against terrorism and to counter the growing influence of rivals like China and Russia. Thus, support was often extended to governments willing to cooperate on counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, or U.S. military operations - regardless of domestic governance standards. Violent extremist organisations (VEOs) were treated as threats not purely because of their violent methods or ideologies, but because they jeopardised regimes aligned with U.S. interests.   This approach led to a form of instrumentalism in U.S. policy: domestic African issues such as poverty, corruption, and lack of rule of law were addressed not on humanitarian or democratic grounds, but because they undermined the durability of U.S.-friendly regimes. For example, corruption was a concern to the extent that it enabled Chinese-style “debt trap diplomacy,” making U.S. engagement comparatively less competitive.   Initiatives like AGOA were emblematic of this geopolitical logic - providing preferential trade access in exchange for alignment with liberal democratic norms and U.S. interests. Aid, military assistance, and diplomatic attention flowed disproportionately to countries that played by these rules, creating a seller’s market for geopolitical loyalty. Countries like Djibouti, Malawi, and Eswatini leveraged their alignment for significant benefits, showing that even small states could wield disproportionate influence under the geopolitical fragility framework.   5.1.2  The Shift to geoeconomic fragility: A new paradigm   The current U.S. administration marks a clear departure from the above approach. African fragility is no longer chiefly assessed through the lens of political alignment or multilateral diplomacy. Instead, a geoeconomic framing now dominates Washington’s thinking. This paradigm evaluates African states based on their economic utility to global supply chains, their integration with American and allied markets, and their potential to support U.S. economic competitiveness.   Critical minerals, rare earths, energy resources, and logistical positioning are now the primary considerations. Fragility, under this new framework, arises not from ideological deviance or geopolitical wavering, but from being economically irrelevant. States that fail to link meaningfully with global trade and investment flows are increasingly viewed as dispensable.   This transformation significantly affects U.S. engagement. Military aid, diplomatic attention, and development assistance are increasingly reserved for regions with geoeconomic salience. This redefinition of priorities poses new risks for countries that were previously considered important due to strategic alignments, but which now fall outside key economic circuits.   The consequences of this shift are profound. A clear example discussed by Dr Craig is the case of Malawi’s mango exports. Despite the high quality and market potential of Malawian produce, limited reciprocal trade opportunities make sustained engagement unattractive for U.S. private sector actors. Unlike Chinese or Gulf state enterprises - backed by state-led strategic objectives - U.S. businesses demand profitability and reciprocal trade. This illustrates the fundamental structural limitations of U.S. capitalism when confronted with asymmetrical trade relationships, which are common in African economies.   As a result, future engagement may depend not on bilateral U.S.-Africa mechanisms, but on Africa’s capacity to build trade networks with intermediary powers such as Türkiye, Indonesia, and Gulf states. Infrastructure projects - like Turkish-funded port development in The Gambia - are shaping new trade corridors that may eventually link Africa with U.S. markets, indirectly sustaining American commercial interests without direct government intervention. This is a more palatable model to administrations sceptical of foreign aid and direct funding mechanisms.   Nevertheless, some American institutions remain active. The Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Development Finance Corporation continue to operate, often with less scrutiny than USAID, which has suffered significant funding cuts. These institutions are being retooled to support private-sector-led growth in strategic sectors like energy, digital infrastructure, and transportation. The continuation of these programmes signals that the U.S. is not abandoning Africa - it is merely reconfiguring its tools in line with market-driven logic.   5.1.3 Institutional inertia and the role of security bureaucracies   Despite changes in presidential administrations and policy rhetoric, U.S. engagement with Africa remains deeply shaped by long-standing institutional cultures and professional networks. Dr Craig draws attention to the enduring role of national security professionals educated at institutions like the National War College, where future military and civilian leaders are trained together over the course of a year.   These individuals, shaped by their formative years during the global war on terror, still carry with them a mindset attuned to the threats of violent extremism, multilateral engagement, and traditional security partnerships. Even if official policy shifts away from such concerns, the bureaucracy - composed of individuals steeped in earlier doctrines - often continues to act on prior assumptions.   A telling anecdote involves a student and pilot of a V-22 Osprey aircraft, who described his view of Africa in terms of “runways”- that is, regions where he could feasibly operate. This illustrates a physical, operational logic that constrains U.S. engagement. If American military platforms cannot reach a region, or if there is no logistical infrastructure to support activity there, that area effectively disappears from the operational map. Thus, U.S. foreign policy is not only shaped by values and interests but also by pragmatic constraints of access, basing, and overflight.   The role of international fellows—military officers and civil servants from allied nations—at the National War College also reinforces personal diplomacy. Relationships formed during this training often become valuable informal channels through which future collaboration is brokered. This "rolodex diplomacy" ensures that even in the absence of formal treaties or direct engagement, institutional memory and personal trust can facilitate cooperation. Moreover, many of these individuals remain in service for decades, long outlasting any given administration. As such, policy ideas introduced during their formative training may shape practice for years to come, regardless of political turnover in Washington. This underscores the importance of engaging not just with top-level political appointees, but with the enduring strata of career professionals who shape, implement, and sustain U.S. foreign policy.   5.1.4  Conclusion   The U.S. conception of African fragility has evolved from a focus on political alignment and ideological loyalty to a more transactional, market-driven assessment of economic relevance. This geoeconomic turn reflects broader shifts in global power competition, particularly with China, and a domestic political environment in the U.S. that is increasingly sceptical of foreign aid and multilateral commitments.   Yet, this shift is not total. The legacy of past policies, institutional inertia, and the enduring influence of professional security networks continue to shape how the U.S. engages with Africa. While political rhetoric may emphasise economic interests, the individuals implementing policy are often guided by strategic, humanitarian, or relational concerns that were central to previous eras.   For African states, this dual reality presents both opportunities and challenges. Those with geoeconomic relevance - through natural resources, trade corridors, or market size - are well positioned to maintain or expand U.S. engagement. However, countries without such assets may find themselves increasingly marginalised unless they can strategically align with intermediary partners or develop economic niches that appeal to U.S. private sector interests.   Simultaneously, African governments must continue to invest in long-term institutional relationships, ensuring their representatives are embedded in the professional networks that shape U.S. policy. Military-to-military cooperation, educational exchanges, and second-track diplomacy offer durable pathways for influence that transcend political cycles.   In an era where Africa risks being treated merely as a site of extraction or ignored altogether if economically irrelevant, the imperative is clear: African nations must build economic resilience, strengthen strategic partnerships, and engage proactively with both the visible and invisible hands of U.S. foreign policy.   5.2  U.S. - Africa Relations in a Time of Geopolitical Transition - Policy, Challenges, and the South African Case Ambassador Michelle Gavin, Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (United States of America) The United States' relationship with Africa has historically rested on a foundation of bipartisan consensus, pragmatic diplomacy, and mutual interests. However, recent political dynamics, particularly under the Trump administration, have disrupted this continuity, replacing long-held foreign policy traditions with a more transactional and unpredictable approach. Ambassador Gavin explores the evolution of U.S.-Africa policy, the structural challenges in its implementation, and the implications of this shift for the U.S.-South Africa relationship in particular.   5.2.1  A legacy of engagement and its erosion   For decades following the Cold War, U.S.-Africa relations operated within a relatively stable bipartisan framework. The American foreign policy establishment, irrespective of the administration in power, consistently identified its strategic interests in Africa across domains such as peace and security, trade and investment, democracy promotion, and joint efforts to tackle global challenges like climate change and pandemics. Initiatives such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) under President Clinton, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) under President George W. Bush, and Power Africa and Feed the Future under President Obama, exemplified this approach.   Yet, despite their ambition, these programmes yielded mixed results. AGOA, intended to drive trade through duty-free access to U.S. markets, saw limited success in generating meaningful investment or transforming economic landscapes in Africa. Similarly, while PEPFAR achieved monumental success in combating HIV/AIDS and saving millions of lives, it monopolised an overwhelming share of U.S. foreign assistance to Africa - at times consuming up to 80% of funds - thereby limiting flexibility to address other African priorities such as job creation and governance reform.   This expansive and idealistic policy landscape began to fray in recent years. The Trump administration’s foreign policy marked a departure from strategic engagement to one marked by inward-looking nationalism and transactional diplomacy. The collapse of bipartisan consensus, coupled with a broader identity crisis within U.S. political institutions, now casts doubt over the reliability and sustainability of American engagement with Africa.   5.2.2  Structural and bureaucratic constraints   The implementation of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa has always been complicated by structural and institutional limitations. A relatively small and under-resourced Africa policy community in Washington has contributed to widespread knowledge gaps, especially among senior decision-makers tasked with global responsibilities. These gaps manifest in discomfort or reluctance when it comes to serious engagement with African partners.   Moreover, the U.S. legislative system imposes additional constraints. All major foreign assistance initiatives, from PEPFAR to Power Africa, require congressional appropriation and authorisation. Congressional oversight, driven by taxpayer accountability and domestic scrutiny, can frustrate and complicate foreign partnerships. For example, reports of human rights abuses by African governments receiving U.S. aid can prompt congressional backlash and halt programmes, regardless of the broader strategic rationale behind them.   The U.S. private sector, another potential pillar of engagement, remains largely disconnected from government foreign policy. Unlike in China, where the state and private actors often operate in concert, U.S. businesses act independently. Their investment decisions are dictated by profit motives and a rudimentary understanding of Africa’s diverse economic landscapes, often failing to differentiate between vastly different markets such as Ethiopia and Zambia.   Additionally, outdated bureaucratic configurations further impede coherent engagement. The State Department's Africa Bureau excludes North African nations like Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, which fall under the Near Eastern Bureau. This arbitrary division reflects legacy Cold War frameworks rather than present-day geopolitical or cultural realities.   5.2.3  The role of Congress and the decline of oversight   Historically, Congress played a critical role as a counterbalance to the executive branch in foreign policy. A defining example is the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, passed in defiance of President Reagan’s veto, showcasing the power of civil society mobilisation and legislative will. However, this tradition of congressional independence and oversight is diminishing.   The Trump administration has altered this dynamic significantly. Whereas earlier congressional action often reinstated foreign assistance funds cut by the executive, today's Congress is less assertive and increasingly partisan. The erosion of consensus around U.S. national interests and the rise of short-term political thinking threaten the consistency and credibility of American foreign policy. This institutional drift undermines long-term planning and deprives African partners of a reliable interlocutor.   5.2.4  The geopolitical landscape: Multipolarity and perception   As the U.S. retreats from its historical leadership role, the world moves steadily toward multipolarity. The Trump administration’s disdain for multilateralism, combined with global actors such as Russia and China asserting themselves more forcefully, reshapes the rules of engagement. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s infrastructure diplomacy through the Belt and Road Initiative, and Gulf state investments in African states all point to a shifting balance of power.   In this environment, perceptions of the U.S. as a self-interested, unreliable partner deepen. When African states experience delayed debt relief, higher costs for capital, and marginalisation in global crises like COVID-19 or climate change, it reinforces the narrative that global systems are intentionally skewed against them. Even when the U.S. is not the principal actor responsible for these delays, its dominant role in global institutions makes it the face of perceived injustice.   This creates fertile ground for U.S. adversaries to gain traction by exploiting dissatisfaction and amplifying grievances. The structural inequalities in the global system, while genuine, become political tools in the broader contest for influence in Africa.   5.2.5  The collapse of norms and rise of transactionalism   The Trump administration's foreign policy is characterised by a strong aversion to norms, multilateral frameworks, and historical accountability. It eschews long-standing U.S. commitments to democracy, anti-corruption, and institutional reform. Announcements that key enforcement mechanisms like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) will no longer be actively enforced during a review period further underscore this shift.   Simultaneously, prominent unelected figures such as Elon Musk play increasingly visible roles in shaping international relationships, blurring the lines between national and private interests. Deals involving figures like Musk, who is active in both U.S. defence and business interests in Africa, reinforce perceptions of U.S. opportunism rather than principled engagement.   The administration’s resistance to acknowledging historical injustices - evident in its attacks on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives and affirmative action - extends to international affairs. U.S. policy no longer considers past exploitations or legacies of colonialism as relevant to current policy design, even as African partners continue to invoke them in diplomatic dialogues.   5.2.6  South Africa: From kinship to estrangement   The U.S.-South Africa relationship, once considered a cornerstone of post-Cold War cooperation, is emblematic of the broader drift in American foreign policy. Following South Africa’s liberation, the U.S. positioned itself as an enthusiastic supporter of the country’s democratic transition. It was seen as a validation of the American experiment in democracy and multiracial governance. But over time, divergent perspectives and unmet expectations eroded this kinship. From South Africa’s vantage point, the U.S. has often been hypocritical, preaching democracy abroad while ignoring repression among its allies. Meanwhile, Americans increasingly view South Africa’s positions on global issues, such as its non-aligned stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, as evidence of anti-Western alignment.   BRICS - a bloc of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt Iran and the United Arab Emirates - has become a particular point of tension. American scepticism of BRICS stems from its perception as an anti-Western alliance, despite its member states’ diverse ideologies. Growing frustration on both sides has replaced earlier enthusiasm, and recent developments under the Trump administration risk further deterioration.   5.2.7  The danger of demonisation and misinformation   A dangerous aspect of current U.S. discourse is the proliferation of misinformation and the politicisation of media. Allegations of a "genocide" against white farmers in South Africa, though widely debunked by credible sources, continue to circulate in certain corners of the American media landscape. In an era where media consumption is highly siloed and politicised, disinformation can fuel foreign policy decisions divorced from facts.   This poses a direct risk to countries like South Africa. A Trump administration seeking to “make an example” of South Africa for political gains could act based on misinformation, with serious diplomatic consequences. The erosion of trust in facts and institutions within the U.S. further compounds this challenge, leaving African partners uncertain about who or what speaks for America.   5.2.8  Looking ahead: Civil society and the hope for renewal   Despite the bleak outlook under current leadership, civil society remains a resilient force in U.S. foreign engagement. During apartheid, American civil society played a vital role in mobilising support for South African liberation. That potential still exists today, even if it is not being harnessed effectively at present.   The possibility of congressional resurgence or civil society reactivation offers a glimmer of hope. Yet, the path ahead remains uncertain. The United States is undergoing a profound political and institutional crisis. Its democratic institutions, once considered bedrocks of stability, are under strain. The international implications of this crisis are significant, particularly for U.S. partnerships with countries that have historically looked to it as a model or ally.   5.2.9  Conclusion   U.S.-Africa policy is at a crossroads. The long-standing bipartisan consensus has eroded, and structural, institutional, and ideological constraints are reshaping the contours of engagement. In an increasingly multipolar world, African states are recalibrating their partnerships and expectations. South Africa, once a symbol of democratic hope and shared values, now finds itself on tenuous footing with a U.S. administration that views the world through a transactional, nationalist lens.   What lies ahead depends not only on electoral outcomes in the United States but also on how African states assert their agency, diversify their partnerships, and navigate a world where American reliability can no longer be taken for granted. 5.3  The Changing US-Africa Policy Dynamic - Context, Challenges, and Opportunities Dr Anne Griffin, Independent US-Africa policy expert associated with the Centre for American Progress (United States of America) Dr Anne Griffin - an independent U.S. expert affiliated with the Centre for American Progress - offered a deeply reflective and context-rich analysis of the evolving policy dynamics between the United States and Africa. Framed by personal experiences in activism, scholarship, and policy, her presentation unpacked the seismic changes in U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration, dissected the implications for Africa and the diaspora, and emphasised the role of civil society, research, and advocacy in navigating this historic moment.   The report is divided into five core sections: (1) Contextual background and personal journey, (2) Historical and contemporary policy shifts, (3) Characteristics of the new policy paradigm, (4) Challenges to US-Africa relations, and (5) Recommendations and advocacy pathways. The insights offered serve as both critique and call to action, especially for civil society actors, researchers, and diasporic networks engaged in redefining U.S.-Africa relations.   5.3.1  Contextual background and personal journey   Dr Griffin opened her presentation by situating her perspectives within the context of her personal and professional journey. Raised in New Jersey by a mother who was both a professor and activist during the Civil Rights Movement, Griffin was instilled early with a strong sense of advocacy and social justice. Her upbringing involved active participation in protests and community activism from as young as seven years old. This foundation in activism - deeply influenced by cultural nationalism and Pan-Africanist thinking - shaped her lifelong commitment to policy and advocacy.   Her academic trajectory reflects a deep engagement with African affairs: an undergraduate major in Pan-Africanism, a graduate degree comparing the anti-apartheid and Civil Rights Movements, and doctoral research on student transformation post-apartheid. Griffin’s 22-year residence in Africa further solidified her perspective, grounding her scholarship in direct experience with community-led development, capacity building, and leadership training. Her multifaceted career - as a policy analyst on Capitol Hill, a think tank researcher, and a diaspora advocate - underpins the analytical lens she brought to the topic.   This background illustrates how personal history and professional engagement intertwine to produce a nuanced understanding of policy dynamics. It also affirms the importance of lived experience in interpreting geopolitical shifts. Griffin’s story underscores the powerful role of women leaders and activists in shaping both historical and contemporary advocacy for African and diasporic issues.   5.3.2  Historical and contemporary policy shifts   Dr. Griffin's second focus was to interpret the present US-Africa policy dynamic in light of historical trends. Acknowledging previous speakers’ contributions to the historical overview of US-African relations, she instead concentrated on interpreting the policy shifts seen in recent years - especially those under the Trump administration. She characterised the recent changes as “seismic,” describing a political climate of “shock and awe” in which longstanding policies and norms were dismantled swiftly and unilaterally.   Among the key developments she identified were:   Reductions in foreign aid and the sidelining of USAID. The uncertain future of PEPFAR, a hallmark of US-Africa health diplomacy. Escalating deportation plans for undocumented immigrants, which disproportionately affect Africans in the diaspora. A retreat from multilateral climate agreements, which threatens cooperative efforts around the Just Energy Transition.   These shifts, Griffin argued, signify a reorientation of U.S. foreign policy towards a doctrine of “America First,” where domestic security and profitability override principles such as solidarity, equality, and sustainability. The Trump administration’s approach, she explained, marks a fundamental rupture with decades of bipartisan commitment to moral leadership and global cooperation.   Griffin’s reference to back-channel diplomacy, which she practiced while at a progressive think tank in Washington, DC, underscores the complexity of shaping policy outcomes in an era where conventional diplomatic pathways are often bypassed. Furthermore, she urged the audience to view these changes not just as administrative adjustments, but as a profound redefinition of how the U.S. sees its role in the world.   5.3.3  Characteristics of the new policy paradigm   Dr Griffin delved deeply into what she identified as the key features of the new U.S. policy paradigm toward Africa and the broader world. These features illustrate a significant departure from value-based foreign policy to a model defined by transactionalism and raw power.   5.3.3.1  Strategic targeting of USAID   One of the first casualties of the new policy orientation was USAID. Griffin noted that the choice was not accidental; the Trump administration likely targeted foreign aid because of public misconceptions about its size and efficacy. In the popular American imagination, foreign aid is often exaggerated in scope and impact. By cutting USAID, the administration could demonstrate decisive action with minimal political backlash, especially in a context where many Americans feel alienated from the needs of “those over there.”   She highlighted how this misinformed perception reveals a deeper problem: the lack of connection felt by many Americans to global struggles. She positioned the diaspora as a potential corrective to this detachment, capable of injecting urgency and relational understanding into foreign policy debates. Without strong educational efforts and narrative correction, the reduction in foreign aid risks being normalised, thereby undermining decades of development cooperation.   5.3.3.2  America First: Security and profit over principle   Griffin painted the new doctrine as one that unapologetically prioritises American interests, especially security and economic gain. This emphasis marks a shift from policy shaped by ethical commitments—such as democracy promotion or human rights—to one driven by nationalism and isolationism.   The Trump administration, in Griffin’s words, sought to exhibit “power over principle.” She referenced Senator Marco Rubio’s boycott of the G20 summit hosted by an African country on grounds that the event promoted values like solidarity and sustainability - values now at odds with U.S. policy priorities. This rejection of multilateralism and cooperative diplomacy raises critical questions about the role of the United States in shaping a just international order. It also signals to African nations that diplomatic respect and engagement can no longer be assumed, but must be actively negotiated.   5.3.3.3  Disruption of traditional alliances   The new policy approach also involves a retreat from traditional alliances and a willingness to act unilaterally. For decades, both progressives and conservatives in the U.S. have debated the need to reimagine global financial and governance structures. However, Griffin argued that the Trump administration’s disruptive approach destroyed existing structures without offering credible replacements.   Now, with traditional systems dismantled, the central challenge is determining what will replace them. Who will define the new architecture? And on what principles will it be based? She noted the growing vacuum in leadership as an opportunity for African nations and diasporic stakeholders to exert influence and redefine the narrative.   5.3.4  Challenges to US-Africa relations   The presentation identified several challenges that impede a constructive US-Africa relationship in the current context.   5.3.4.1  Erosion of multilateral trust   As the U.S. distances itself from global agreements and institutions, African countries face uncertainty about the reliability of the U.S. as a partner. Abrupt changes—such as PEPFAR’s uncertain status—undermine years of trust-building and programmatic collaboration. A failure to provide consistent support for development and climate resilience weakens long-term planning and reduces the impact of joint initiatives.   5.3.4.2  Weakening of Advocacy Infrastructure   The disbanding of initiatives such as the Presidential Advisory Council on Diaspora Engagement exemplifies a broader trend of dismantling participatory mechanisms. These initiatives previously provided structured avenues for civil society and diaspora communities to contribute to policy debates. Their loss represents not only a symbolic step backward but a practical barrier to inclusion.   5.3.4.3  Underutilised Diaspora Potential   Griffin emphasised the untapped power of the African diaspora in the U.S. While remittances continue to flow to the continent, political and advocacy engagement remains sporadic and insufficiently organised. Mobilising this group is crucial to confronting misinformation and restoring meaningful engagement in U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.   The diaspora holds potential as a strategic bloc that can influence elections, shape discourse, and elevate African interests in Washington. However, this influence can only be realised through coordinated action and institutional support.   5.3.5  Recommendations and advocacy pathways   In concluding her remarks, Dr. Griffin issued a robust call for advocacy, civic engagement, and reimagined partnerships. She outlined several key recommendations for stakeholders seeking to shape the future of US-Africa relations constructively.   5.3.5.1  Centring advocacy in policy change   Dr Griffin believes that advocacy - grounded in rigorous research - is essential to influencing policy. She urged think tanks and civil society organisations to move from research to action. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), for instance, is a promising initiative, but she argued that its success will depend on sustained advocacy and clearly defined timelines. Advocacy must be forward-looking, realistic, and inclusive of the voices most affected by change.   5.3.5.2  Empowering the diaspora   The diaspora must be recognised not only for its economic contributions but also for its potential as a political force. Griffin called for renewed efforts to organise, fund, and empower diaspora organisations to serve as intermediaries between U.S. institutions and African communities. A stronger diaspora voice can drive home the interconnectedness of African and American futures and ensure that policies reflect this dual reality.   5.3.5.3  Rebuilding participatory structures   With official mechanisms like the diaspora council dismantled, alternative platforms must be built. Griffin referenced organisations such as the African Diaspora Network, the African Women’s Leadership Network, and the Advocacy Network for Africa (ADNA) as potential conveners of renewed civic engagement. These groups can help bridge the gap between grassroots movements and high-level decision-makers, fostering an ecosystem of informed activism.   5.3.5.4  Confronting misinformation   Finally, Griffin emphasised the need to develop a stronger counter-narrative to challenge widespread misinformation. Civil society, academics, and journalists must collaborate to disseminate accurate information and foster a deeper understanding of global interdependence. In an age of disinformation, narrative becomes a tool of power, and reclaiming it is essential for policy justice.   5.3.6  Conclusion   Dr. Anne Griffin’s address offered a powerful and timely reflection on the evolving US-Africa policy landscape. Her message was clear: while the challenges are considerable - ranging from declining aid and isolationism to diasporic disengagement - there are also significant opportunities to shape a more just and inclusive future.   Drawing on her experience as an activist, scholar, and policy expert, she called for renewed commitment to advocacy, a revitalised role for the diaspora, and the reconstruction of participatory institutions. She invoked a strong belief in the power of organised communities to push back against political retrenchment and misinformation.   As the global order is redefined, the principles of solidarity, equality, and sustainability - long sidelined - must once again become central to international engagement. The African diaspora, in particular, has a critical role to play, not only in bridging communities but also in amplifying voices of justice and progress.   In the spirit of that young girl in New Jersey raising her fist for justice, this report echoes Griffin’s optimism that through collective purpose, rigorous scholarship, and sustained advocacy, change is not only possible - it is essential.   5.4  Discussion   The discussion that followed the formal presentation was both rich and wide-ranging, touching on a variety of important themes, particularly relating to African development, global politics, the role of the diaspora, and concerns about shifting geopolitical dynamics. Multiple participants provided their perspectives, grounded in both personal experience and broader political analysis.   5.4.1  The Role of the diaspora and returning talent   One of the central themes was the issue of brain drain and the potential of the African diaspora to contribute to development. A delegate recounted the experiences of highly educated Africans in the diaspora who are underutilised, often reduced to menial jobs despite their qualifications. A notable example was given of a former South Sudanese minister who, despite holding a PhD, was unable to secure employment in the UK beyond security work. Upon returning home, he resumed a significant role in governance. This anecdote was used to underline the mismatch between the qualifications of Africans abroad and the opportunities available to them, both overseas and at home.   It was further stressed that returning diaspora members are often met with limited support and a lack of institutional recognition, which discourages repatriation and reintegration. The delegate urged African governments to create favourable conditions for the return of skilled citizens by offering them meaningful opportunities and by valuing their international experience. Ghana was mentioned as an example of a country actively encouraging African-Americans and other members of the diaspora to return and contribute to national development.   5.4.2  Corruption and structural governance failures   The discussion also dealt heavily with the issue of corruption, which was described as a fundamental obstacle to Africa’s progress. Delegates acknowledged that corruption is pervasive and systemic in many African countries, where holding political office is often seen as a route to personal enrichment rather than public service. Comparisons were drawn with countries like China, which maintains a near-zero tolerance for corruption—underscoring how different governance cultures can dramatically affect development trajectories.   One participant lamented the reality in many African states where, once a person becomes a minister or president, public resources are treated as personal property, with little accountability. The delegate emphasised that this mindset erodes institutional trust and undermines development efforts. There was a strong call for reforms that reduce corruption, increase transparency, and ensure that political officeholders are subject to oversight.   5.4.3  Youth empowerment and the role of technology   Another key issue raised was the generational divide in African governance. The delegate highlighted an incident from their time on the South Sudanese Appointments Committee, where older officials rejected younger candidates for senior positions simply based on their age. The argument was made that youthfulness should not be a disqualifier, especially when younger individuals may be more adept with modern technology and better aligned with contemporary governance challenges.   In this context, the importance of embracing technology as a critical developmental tool was stressed. The delegate drew on personal experiences of seeing technological entrepreneurship in countries like China, where individuals conduct business entirely through their mobile phones. A contrast was made with Africa, where even those with computers often lack the training or confidence to use them effectively. He advocated for a cultural and educational shift, starting from kindergarten, to foster technological literacy and innovation in Africa. Mastering technology, it was argued, would allow African nations to add value to their own raw materials and participate more competitively in global markets.   5.4.4  The Importance of research and capacity building   Building state capacity through research and training was another major point of discussion. One participant described earlier efforts in post-war South Sudan, where a wide range of civil servants, including President Salva Kiir, were sent for training in South Africa in collaboration with the University of South Africa (UNISA). Despite these efforts, the implementation of what was learned remained a challenge. Many of those trained were unable to effectively apply their knowledge, particularly in using computers and digital systems, due to entrenched limitations and resistance within the bureaucracy.   There was frustration expressed over how useful research and curriculum development efforts often go unused by government agencies. The delegate warned that failure to institutionalise continuous training and capacity-building hampers the ability of public servants to adapt to rapidly changing policy and technological environments.   5.4.5  Reassessing US foreign policy and international relations   Attention then turned to international politics, particularly US foreign policy under the Trump administration. A question was raised about the perceived inconsistency and volatility in US relationships with allies like Canada and Europe. In response, another delegate interpreted these shifts as part of a broader strategy of economic nationalism and political signalling, aimed more at domestic audiences and economic gains than at actual strategic realignment. For example, the US’s apparent hostility towards NATO was seen not as a desire to dismantle the alliance, but rather as a method to pressure European allies into increasing defence spending—often on American weapon systems.   Greenland and Canada were referenced in the same vein. Rhetoric about ‘conquering’ or acquiring these territories was interpreted as performative, designed to create noise and uncertainty in service of deeper trade negotiations or political branding.   5.4.6  Is the United States drifting toward dictatorship?   Another provocative question concerned whether the United States could be considered to be exhibiting dictatorial tendencies. The delegate expressing this concern noted what they saw as a disregard for law and international norms, raising alarms about potential authoritarian drift. Responding to this, another participant argued that while the Trump administration indeed projects an anti-establishment and authoritarian style, the real test lies in the strength of institutional checks and balances.   The independence of the judiciary, the resilience of the press, and the public’s reaction to government actions were all cited as critical factors. The point was also made that democracy does not automatically guarantee benign international behaviour. Historically, even liberal democracies have inflicted harm on Africa through colonialism and economic exploitation.   5.4.7  US-Africa relations and the Future of AFRICOM   A final question dealt with the future of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), particularly in the context of military bases such as the one in Djibouti. Although this issue was not explored in depth, the question reflects ongoing concern about the militarisation of US-Africa relations and the implications for sovereignty and regional stability.   5.4.8  Reflection on the United Nations and multilateralism   There was a related concern about the United States’ relationship with the United Nations. Participants expressed unease about the potential erosion of multilateralism, especially given previous US withdrawals from agencies like UNESCO and the WHO. One delegate viewed the early nomination of a new US ambassador to the UN as a possibly hopeful sign of continued engagement, though acknowledged that the tone of US policy remains unpredictable and sometimes antagonistic.   5.4.9  Conclusion   The discussion offered a comprehensive exploration of multiple interlinked challenges facing Africa today - ranging from internal governance issues like corruption and youth marginalisation to external factors such as international diplomacy and geopolitical shifts. It revealed a strong desire among participants to confront these issues honestly, and a recognition that Africa must be proactive in shaping its own development trajectory, leveraging the expertise of its diaspora, embracing technological innovation, and asserting itself in the global arena.   The reflections on US foreign policy also revealed a healthy scepticism and critical engagement with the broader international system, particularly its implications for African sovereignty and agency.     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Peacemaking Reflection Group – an association of primarily former senior UN officials – held there annual retreat over the period 7 – 9 May 2025.   The objective was to brainstorm the current state of the world and the place/role of multilateralism, especially the state and role of the United Nations and how the UN could be strengthened to effectively act for the broader good of humanity and the planet. The retreat outcome is expected to culminate in a strategic plan of action for the PRG in support of multilateralism and the UN.   The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel and the Executive Director of the Institute for Global Governance, Dr Philani Mthembu made a joint external intervention on multilateralism and UN reform through the African lens.

Occasional Paper 5/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. M A Y 2 0 2 5     Prof William Gumede Former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; former Senior Associate Member and Oppenheimer Fellow,   St Antony’s College, Oxford University; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg).   Abstract   The danger of a global economic downturn because of the wide-ranging tariffs introduced by the US, the 30% tariffs specifically on South African exports, the cutting of development aid the prospect of the country being cut from African Growth and Opportunity Act market access, means that the country is looking at a potential massive economic meltdown. A break-up of the current Government of National Unity will unleash further political and economic turmoil.   The National Treasury’s GDP growth forecast of 1.9% in 2025 is based on optimistic assumptions and fails to reflect the country’s ongoing structural obstacles to growth, including its public service, governance, policy and debt woes. The solution will not be found in doggedly following the same strategy of consumer and welfare-led growth, which puts pressure on public finances, and stagnates economic growth and job creation. It will also not be found in the pockets of already struggling citizens or the 12% who pay tax – increasing VAT and tax will simply dampen consumer confidence. No-one should be expected to pay more for broken systems that only continue to deteriorate. Rather, the answer lies in the governing ANC genuinely tackling corruption, advocating for merit-based competence, strengthening the rule of law, protecting property rights, and letting go of populist and ideological anti-growth, anti-business and anti-job-creation policies. A new growth path must be based on boosting infrastructure, manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and renewable energy. And it must be collaboratively led by a partnership between the government, private sector, civil society and professionals. The solution is not new, but it is becoming ever more urgent to action.      Introduction   If South Africa (SA) stays on its current economic policy path, or becomes more economically populist, and if it is unable to strike a compromise deal with the United States (US), it is unlikely to get even the 1.9% GDP economic growth predicted by the National Treasury in the 2024/2025 Budget.   The Treasury’s economic strategy to lift economic growth focuses on maintaining macroeconomic stability, implementing structural reforms, building state capability, and supporting growth-enhancing public infrastructure investment (Godongwana, 2025).   The National Treasury predicts real GDP growth of 1.9% in 2025, an upward revision from the 1.7% projected in the 2024 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS). Over the medium term, economic growth is projected to average 1.8%. The past decade has seen the economy grow only 0.8% per year (Neethling, 2025). Whereas, the country’s population has been growing at 1.5% per year.   The Treasury growth forecasts assume higher investment, recovery in household consumption, declining inflation, moderately rising employment, improving household balance sheets, and easing structural constraints on growth. However, the Treasury growth forecast appears to be overly optimistic (Bloomberg, 2025a).   The finance, trade, and agriculture sectors have in recent times contributed positively to GDP growth (Gumbi, 2025). However, contractions in manufacturing, energy, transport, and government services have undermined growth.   The Treasury does not appear to consider the continued structural obstacles to growth, such as the continued lack of state capacity because of public service, state-owned entity (SOE), infrastructure and municipal failures, caused by corruption, incompetence, and the many anti-growth policies (Jooste, Liu & Naraidoo, 2013). High levels of business regulation also undermine growth.   Moreover, global uncertainties threaten economic growth. US President Donald Trump has unleashed widespread global tariffs, including 30% against South Africa, and has cut development funding to the country. The US’ withdrawal of development aid – significant amounts of which were going to state, public, and civil society institutions – has left a big hole in South Africa’s public finances.   On 4 April 2025, US Congressman Ronny Jackson also introduced the US-South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025, which calls for a full review of the bilateral relationship between the US and South Africa. It insists on sanctioning senior South African government and ANC officials who support US “adversaries”.   The Budget estimates a revenue shortfall of R16.7 billion in the 2025/2026 year. The Treasury revenue estimates are based on expected infrastructure investment, while there is very little meaningful new infrastructure built that would justify such an optimistic infrastructure-led revenue. Furthermore, the structural hurdles undermining infrastructure development include corruption, ineffective SOEs and development finance institutions (DFIs), ideological opposition by many ANC groups to involving the private sector in service delivery, the Expropriation Law (which undermines property rights), many anti-business laws, and potential domestic and global economic turmoil unleashed by the US President Donald Trump’s wide-ranging global tariffs against allies and adversaries alike ( Shalal , 2025).   The Treasury revenue estimates are also overly optimistic – built on misplaced growth forecasts (Neethling, 2025). US tariffs will push up inflation and interest rates in emerging markets, including South Africa, and worse, will lead to a global economic downturn. Low global growth means lower demand for South  Africa ’s minerals and products. The unprecedented overhaul of global trade caused by the Trump administration will negatively impact on business and consumer sentiment, spending and investment, dragging down global GDP growth. There is also a real possibility that the US may unleash sanctions against South Africa, and individual ANC leaders, for long-standing anti-Americanism.   The ANC’s insistence on governing as if it is the sole majority-party, rather than it being part of a multiparty Government of National Unity (GNU) – which entails involving partners in decision-making, appointments, and policymaking – is threatening to break up the current GNU, with the real danger that the Democratic Alliance will exit. This will plunge South Africa into political turmoil. Add to this the US administration’s 30% tariffs against South African exports and its cutting of development aid to the country, and South Africa will be thrusted into a massive economic crisis.   The National Treasury’s forecasts are also based on unrealistically favourable macroeconomic outlooks, misplaced assumptions that there will be improved investor confidence, a stable supply of electricity, continued interest rate drops, and that South Africa will become a declining risk premium.   The reality is that South Africa’s business environment remains uncertain. A positive business outlook is one of the reasons for the Treasury and others’ positive economic forecasts, based on the assumption that the Government of National Unity following the May 2024 general elections would bring political stability, which would be the impetus for economic reform and, in turn, boost private investment and GDP growth (Bishop, 2025). However, as will be discussed later in this paper, the ANC, governing as if it is still the majority government, and not a multiparty GNU government, adopting ANC party policies without consulting partners, is putting the GNU at risk, undermining political stability. SA’s fallout with US President Donald Trump’s administration will also negatively impact on the economy, and on the country’s political stability.    Policy instability, infrastructure bottlenecks, and public service and SOE failures have undermined business confidence, investment flows, and lowering of the country’s risk profile (Jacobs, 2025a). State infrastructure SOEs, in power, logistics and transport – key to the economy – have undermined the economy’s expansion. They have undermined trade exports. The severe loadshedding has been reduced, however, parts of the economy had already collapsed, with business closures, which means that the return of power has not boosted economic activity. The country has seen declining real per-capita income, persistent unemployment, pervasive poverty, and one of the highest inequality rates in the world. Productivity has also declined.   The Treasury’s national expenditure estimates are also understated. Given the lack of political will to tackle the structural impediments to growth, such as poor governance, lack of professionalisation in the public service, and corruption, it is very likely that new bailouts for SOEs and DFIs will be required. New laws, policies and regulations that are motivated more by ideology, populism, and wishful thinking, rather than pragmatism and cost-benefit analyses, and that will be opposed in courts, will further increase expenditure.   South Africa is facing the real possibility of a debt crisis. Government’s gross debt is now projected to stabilise at 76.2% of GDP in 2025/26. However, government does not include SOE debt in its debt projections, even though that debt is likely to increase, given the lack of political will to tackle the causes of SOE and government failure: political cadre appointments, captured preferential black economic empowerment procurement, and government reluctance to hold failing SOEs – which are managed by political cadre appointees – accountable, for fear of alienating ANC party factions.   South Africa needs to build and fund a R390 billion expansion of the national grid so it can connect more power plants. South Africa’s electricity transmission network is owned by Eskom. Eskom provides more than 80% of South Africa’s electricity. It has neglected the maintenance of plants, and has not build enough new ones, and the two built, Medupi and Kusile, announced in 2007, ran eight years late and beyond budget. It was planned to cost R163 billion, but the likely final price is now more than R460 billion. Both Medupi and Kusile are still not functioning at full capacity.   Eskom plans to build 14,218 kilometres of power lines over the 10 years. This is three times the capacity it has built over the past decade. Eskom also have to increase its transformer capacity six-fold. Given the fact that Eskom struggled to built Medupi and Kusile, its capacity to build new infrastructure is in question. Eskom plans to source from the capital markets after the 2026 financial year to finance new transmission infrastructure. It plans to a mix of equity and debt. ANC leaders have insisted that the state lead these infrastructure projects, rather than the private sector (Bloomberg 2024).   The Treasury revised down the contingency reserve, which is currently sitting at R21.6 billion over the medium term, a wholly inadequate sum to mitigate the risks of unforeseen crises – now a real possibility for South Africa, given the factors raised above.   Consumer and welfare-led growth   Much of the economic growth over the past decade came from consumer spending (Hausmann et al, 2022). Unless other areas of the economy lift, household consumption is expected to drive economic growth in the immediate future. In fact, consumer spending likely prevented South Africa from sinking into a recession last year (Thukwana, 2025). It makes up around 60% of local GDP, and so, raising value-added tax (VAT) could dampen consumer confidence – and drag down economic growth (Jacobs, 2025b; Qwelani, 2025).   STANLIB economist Kevin Lings calculated that 138% of South Africa’s economic growth over the last 10 years has come from retail spending, with a significant proportion of that going to imported items (Lings, 2025). Mining and manufacturing have declined, and as a result, so to have their employment statistics and foreign exchange earnings.   A sizeable proportion of consumer spending is through state welfare grants – South Africa has a whopping 28.7 million people on welfare grants, and only 7.4 million personal income taxpayers. This means that 44% of the country’s population is on social grants, and it depends on 12% taxpayers (SASSA, 2025). This undermines the country’s fiscal sustainability. It means that increases in social development come without increases in tax revenue. Even worse, it comes with increases in the state’s wasteful expenditure, revenue leakages, misallocated state capital, and capital flight – due to the combination of corruption, state and SOE incompetence by political cadre-appointees, and anti-growth policies.    Welfare-led growth is unsustainable, as it puts pressure on public finances, and stagnates economic growth and job creation. Public debt continues to rise, with debt servicing now the largest expenditure in the Budget. State capacity and infrastructure delivery are not improving, because of the same issues of corruption and incompetence by political cadre-appointees. South Africa’s tax base is concentrated in a narrow band of high-income earners, who are highly globally mobile. Domestic anti-growth policies, continued state failure, corruption, and incompetence will force them to leave to other domiciles. Furthermore, global economic downturns – as a result of the worldwide impact of the US government’s global tariffs – will negatively impact on the incomes of high-net individuals (Goldman Sachs, 2025).   In the last quarter of 2024, manufacturing shrank 0.6%, mining dropped 0.2%, and construction fell 0.4%. Trade grew 1.4% and finance 1.1%, according to Statistics South Africa (Stats SA, 2023). For 2024, as a whole, growth rose 0.6%. Withdrawals under last year's “two-pot” pension reform had increased household spending towards the end of the year. Sixty-one percent (61%) of consolidated non-interest spending over the medium term is allocated to the social wage. This is not sustainable in the long-term.   South Africa's economy saw modest growth in the fourth quarter of last year, helped by a recovery in agricultural output. Agriculture expanded 17.2% in the fourth quarter of 2024 on the back of increased activity in field crops and animal products (Thukwana, 2025). However, agriculture is heavily influenced by climate change, extreme weather events, and anti-growth policies. The Expropriation Act, which allows for expropriation of property without compensation, will undermine agriculture investment certainty.   South Africa’s manufacturing industry continued to decline (Pule, 2023), dropping as a percentage of GDP from 21% in 1994 to 12% in 2021, meaning the country is deindustrialising. Manufacturing employment at the end of 2022 declined by 12%, compared to 2009. Between 2005 and 2021 the manufacturing industry lost 309 000 jobs, according to Stats SA. High levels of crime, power outages, infrastructure decline, no sustainable industrial policies, but rather, restrictive regulations, state failures, and a poor economic environment caused mainly by government, has led to this sector’s decline.   Although mining has carried the South African economy during difficult times, it has also consistently declined since 1994 (Chamber of Mines, 2015). The downward trend has been masked by commodity booms. Since 1994, South Africa’s mining output has broadly decreased by 0.4% annually, with gold decreasing by 85% during that period. The decline is not as a result of market conditions, but rather, it is due to power collapse, regulatory failures, corruption, capture of empowerment programmes and policies, and administrative incompetence in the departments overseeing mining (Parker, 2025). Incompetence, corruption, and lack of transparency has led to a massive backlog of exploration and mining permits – resulting in loss of investment (Jacobs, 2024).    More recently, local ‘development’ mafias and “zama zamas” have captured mining operations, leading to the informalisation of the mining sector. Typically, like in all other sectors, year after year, government have promised beneficiation, processing, and value-add product development – which has come to nothing. In 2014, South Africa had 35% of Africa’s exploration budget; now it has only 7%, meaning the future development of the country’s mining is imperilled (Miller, 2025). Mining companies have been deterred from investing in greenfield projects, focusing on maintaining current operations.   The gold industry, the bedrock of South Africa’s modern development, is the most symbolic example of the decline. Until 2006, the country was the world’s largest gold producer. South Africa has now dropped to eighth, with production down 80% over the past 35 years. China is now the largest producer. The gold workforce used to be over 500 000-strong. It now has under 94 000 employees. Switzerland is currently the world’s gold trading centre, with the largest refineries, which naturally should have been South Africa. The Bank of England stores many countries’ physical gold reserves, which bring these countries investment, employment, and revenues. South Africa’s decline into corruption, incompetence, and poor planning means that it is not seen as a holder of other countries’ gold. Paul Miller (2025) writes that South Africa “has lost two decades of new geological knowledge that could have been used to attract investment, support new discoveries, and develop the industry”.    In the 1990s, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) had around 850 listed companies. This has dropped to under 300, including some companies that have dual listings (Van Cuyck & Ahmed, 2024). The last few years have seen fewer large iconic companies emerging. And some of South Africa’s historic companies have been taken over by foreign companies or are the subject of takeovers. The de-listings are partially the result of the cost of regulation, compliance, and reporting, but also because of a difficult economic environment (Pask, 2024).   Based on data reported by the exchange operator, the JSE, 2023 was the eighth year in a row that foreign investors dumped South African equities, taking the total since 2016 to $53 billion. Foreign investors have been cautious of South Africa’s high corruption, high crime, anti-business policies, infrastructure collapses, and power outages (Bloomberg, 2025b). The Expropriation Act, the introduction of the National Health Insurance (NHI), and the fallout with the US – unless rectified with more pragmatic policies – are likely to slow down growth in 2025. Before the Expropriation Act and fallout with the US, the economy was predicted to modestly accelerate in 2025, as a result of an envisaged recovery in real household incomes caused by low inflation and falling interest rates boosting consumer confidence. However, this sentiment has been turned on its head. A continued fall-out between South Africa and the US will likely increase inflation – and the Reserve Bank is likely to maintain interest rates, rather than reduce them, which will undermine consumer confidence (Steenkamp, 2019).   Graph 1: National Treasury’s estimates of individuals and taxable income for the 2024/25 financial year.   Constraints on growth   South Africa’s democratic, political, economic, and rules-maintaining institutions have deteriorated – which has contributed to the country’s economic decline. Property rights are vulnerable. Rule of law in many parts has collapsed, the lower courts are inefficient and policing ineffective. Corruption is systemic. State capacity in many parts of the public services, among state-owned entities, and local government has been eroded. Crime is out of control. The state cannot efficiently enforce laws, rules, or policies. Infrastructure has collapsed in many areas. Many sectors of the economy, such as public transport, mining, and construction, have become informalised. The country has been deindustrialising.   Given this grim picture, an external economic shock, such as a prolonged fallout with the US Donald Trump administration, will have a disproportionately debilitating impact on the South African economy. The obstacles to most of these are political, social, and patronage-based, rather than technical, which is harder to reform. The political culture of the country has made corruption, incompetence, and misbehaviour acceptable – if it is done by those who share a similar colour, party, and ideology. Standard Bank Chief Economist Goolam Ballim rightly argued recently that while many of the constraints to growth “are largely technical, crime and corruption involve significant social elements which cannot be engineered or mechanically altered”, but needs political will from ruling elites (Jacobs, 2025a).   The International Monetary Fund (IMF) ranks South Africa as the most difficult place to do business globally among 49 countries in the IMF’s ease of doing business index (IMF, 2025; Jacobs, 2025b). The IMF highlights excessive regulation and government inefficiencies that hinder economic growth. It argues that halving SA’s restrictive business regulations relative to its emerging market peers could increase medium-run output by 9% and boost employment (IMF, 2025).   Gross fixed capital formation, which is an important factor of investment in capital assets, has regularly fallen (Sachs, 2021). The weakness in capital investment points to ongoing uncertainties in the business environment, as investors remain wary of policy instability, infrastructure bottlenecks, and economic volatility. Policymakers underestimate the impact of state failure, corruption, incompetence, and anti-growth policies on the economy, reducing revenue and undermining business confidence.   Lack of inclusive compromises on key policies, the NHI, the Expropriation Law, apparent refusal to renegotiate aspects of the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA) Bill to make it more inclusive, and perceived anti-American foreign policies have caused investment, capital, and skills flight.   In a VAT-increase scenario, businesses are likely to pass on the costs to consumers, which will, in turn, drive up inflation. This means that any rise in VAT is unlikely to bring in revenue as envisaged by the Treasury, as it would depress other parts of the economy (Gumede, 2014, 2025). In a study unrelated to SA’s VAT debate, the World Bank reported that over-reliance by emerging markets on VAT to generate revenue slows GDP growth, as it reduces household consumption – the effects are even worse in countries with high inequality levels (Tanzi & Zee, 2001).   South Africa saw high interest rate hikes during the period leading up to and including 2022 and 2023. Recent repo rate reductions, including the latest lowering of the repo rate by 25 basis points, have been marginal, at best. South Africa’s household debt is high, with the debt-to-disposable income ratio at a high 61.6% in the fourth quarter of 2023. Fuel prices have risen 12% year-on-year . If the government insists on also increasing value-added tax, it will undermine the purchasing power of consumers, spiking any economic recovery (National Assembly, 2025).    The Reserve Bank will have to review the policy of inflation targeting. State and state infrastructure failure is a significant contributor to inflation, as citizens have to use private companies to deliver ‘public’ services because the state has failed to deliver effective policing, education, energy, and health. This means that South Africans pay double: taxes for the state and state infrastructure services that are not being delivered, and taxes for private public services. Businesses then increase prices for products and services to factor in state failure.   But runaway administrative prices – which is the prices of products, services, and utility rates set by state-owned entities, government utilities, and municipalities – also contribute significantly to inflation (Gumede, 2022). Administrative prices are either set directly by state entities, or are strongly influenced by them, rather than by market forces. In normal private markets, where there are competitors to provide products and services, the price and quantity of these are set by the mechanisms of demand and supply. Prices for products and services in such open markets are usually forged depending on the demand for them, the availability of supply, and the multiplicity of providers from which to choose. However, goods and services provided by government entities are often supplied through monopolies with no competition, and customers have no other alternative than to get cheaper or better-quality products elsewhere. The government entities can then set prices at arbitrary levels, even if the quality of these products and services is poor.   The business model of most government agencies is based on increasing prices to make up for increased costs and revenue losses, rather than using market-related pricing – as is the case with Eskom, where prices are increased even if demand declines, and the quality of supply drops (Gumede, 2022). Crucial infrastructure SOEs, such as Transnet, which are monopolies, also often set prices that are disconnected from the quality, cost, and market absorption rate of services they provide.   The quality of government entities’ services, products, and aftercare services often does not reflect the prices they charge. Municipalities often set rate, water, and refuse prices at levels unrelated to those that equivalent private sector establishments would charge, but without any concomitant standards in service delivery. For example, the Transnet National Ports Authority issued a tariff increase of 19.74% for the 2021/22 financial year. In 2003, the South African Reserve Bank warned that administered prices, specifically by SOEs such as Eskom, Transnet, and Telkom, were fuelling runaway inflation.   Furthermore, the regulatory processes involved in setting prices for government services and products are woefully ineffective. Regulation is meant to correct government market failures, as in the case of ineffective price setting by state entities, which have no competition, by ensuring that they set prices more realistically (Gumede, 2022).     South African Reserve Bank Governor Lesetja Kganyago recently said the country’s 25-year-old inflation targeting regime is out of date and might be inhibiting faster growth and making the economy less competitive (Mutizwa, 2025). The inflation targeting framework helped lower interest rates from above 20% in 2000 to 7.5% now, and helped reduce macroeconomic volatility. The government adopted the inflation targeting regime in 2000, when it was set at between 3-6%. “The South African target is now rather dated, reducing our competitiveness and opportunity to generate faster and more sustainable growth,” Kganyago said. There will have to be a review on what is an optimal inflation targeting perimeter given South Africa’s structural rigidities, state failure, and the rapidly changing global macroeconomic policy trajectory.   Graph 2: Foreigners have sold South African stocks (JSE, Bloomberg).       Infrastructure neglect   Deteriorating infrastructure has undermined new investment, industrialisation, and growth. Infrastructure has declined because of corruption, mismanagement, maintenance neglect, underinvestment, and lack of long-term planning (Jacobs, 2025c). In fact, most of the infrastructure SOEs, such as Transnet, Eskom, and the waterboards, are in disarray. And many municipalities, the key infrastructure developers, are marred with corruption, incompetence, and poor planning.   The same can be said for the myriad of state infrastructure development plans and forums, including the Reconstruction and Recovery Plan and initiatives such as Operation Vulindlela, which have become virtual talkshops. Structures – such as the National Logistics Crisis Committee and Investment and Infrastructure Office – set up to play an oversight and coordination role, and provide governance over infrastructure, have not been able to provide the coordination, direction, or accountability promised (Lightfoot, 2023).   The breakdown of infrastructure drives up inflation, just as state, SOE, and policy failures do, as it drives up prices, the cost of living, cost of business, and erodes savings and deters future investment. The Reserve Bank has warned that the breakdown in infrastructure threatens the stability of the financial system.   Loadshedding, for example, has caused not only the loss of lives, but of businesses, capital, skills, employment, and investment. It has contributed to South Africa’s low-growth path, possibly taking away up to 3% of possible growth. South Africa needs around R150 billion per year just to replace the destroyed infrastructure, let alone build new infrastructure.   “The sustained deterioration in critical infrastructure poses direct operational risks that could disrupt the functioning of the financial system,” said the Reserve Bank in its latest Financial Stability Review. “While electricity availability appears to be gradually returning to historical trends, other critical infrastructure such as the supply and quality of water and transport infrastructure – especially rail, port and road networks – continues to degrade.”   Nedbank’s Chief Economist Nicky Weimar rightly said that after decades-long lack of investment in developing and maintaining infrastructure, the country’s economic infrastructure has imploded (Jacobs, 2025c). This means “our general supply curve is at a very low level. Even if demand accelerates, the moment it starts to strain supply, prices go up, interest rates go up, demand slows again.” Sadly, as Wiemar stated, if South Africa lifts growth to 3%, the power outages will return as there is not enough energy capacity to sustain the growth.   Restoring energy is a critical structural reform that is urgently needed. Unfortunately, reforms have been opposed by powerful interest groups who are benefiting from the energy crisis. As part of the structural reforms, the private sector has to partner – again, there is strong ideological opposition by some groups in the ANC and opposition party spinoffs from the ANC to private partnership in delivery. The energy reforms will have to focus on bringing on board renewable energy, cleaning coal in the way the Japanese are doing, bringing on board biofuels as Brazil has done, investing in gas development – whether in SA or in neighbouring countries – boosting energy grid infrastructure, and cleaning up Eskom, the state energy utility.   Current power infrastructure does not support higher growth   South Africa’s power grid built during the apartheid-era is centred around coal-power stations and the north of the country, which delivers power to the country’s main economic heartland in what is now Gauteng. Renewable energy currently comes mostly from the Cape areas – the Northern, Western, and Eastern Cape. Integrating the coal and renewable energy grid points, as well as potentially new energy sources such as biofuels and gas, is crucial to sustainably solving SA’s power problems.   The grid infrastructure of the country at the moment is not enough to handle rising energy production. The government announced a grid infrastructure expansion that would include over 14 000km of transmission lines and new substations. The problem is that many promises of infrastructure have been made in the past – with little delivery, due to a lack of state capacity, the manipulation of empowerment policies, and preferential procurement to give contracts to politically connected businesses who do not have the capacity.   The construction of new lines and substations is proceeding at a snail’s pace. The lack of transmission infrastructure is undermining attempts to bring new electricity on board. An example that after calling for bids that would double wind-power purchases from private contractors, the government did not award any of the contracts because it was not possible to connect the projects to any transmission infrastructure. Raine Adams, an analyst at fund manager Allan Gray, wrote in a note (2024) to clients that grid shortages pose a risk to the estimated 66 gigawatts of wind and solar plants that are already at various stages of development. As a structural reform, key strategic projects must be excluded from empowerment, preferential procurement conditions, and given on capacity merit.   Water provision has also plunged. Many of the water infrastructure SOEs, municipal entities, and boards have fallen into disarray. The provision of water in many of South Africa’s cities and towns has deteriorated to such an extent that many citizens are without water for long periods during water outages. South Africa’s freshwater sources are under threat of wastewater contamination. Many state waste water treatment works (WWTWs) are collapsing across the country, threatening ecological disaster in surrounding areas (Thorne, 2025a).   Water expert and environmental advisor Anthony Turton told BusinessTech: “The simple truth is that WWTWs are slowly rendering the country’s drinking water unusable. Without sounding dramatic, South Africa is slowly committing ecocide – national suicide by poisoning its own drinking and crop production water” (Thorne, 2025b).   The lack of reliable water has also caused the flight of businesses, investment, and skills and increased inflation, unemployment, and has undermined growth. “Load shedding has been supplanted by the water security crisis, which poses a similar if not greater threat to the quality of life and economic prospects of all South Africans,” said President Cyril Ramaphosa in his 2025 January 8th statement.   Transnet, the state-owned logistics giant responsible for South Africa’s ports, rail, and pipelines is, like Eskom, a major contributor to the country’s low-growth path. Transnet has a R136 billion debt burden. Its inefficiencies are causing bottlenecks at ports and limiting rail freight, undermining trade. It costs the economy over R1 billion per day. S&P has placed Transnet on credit watch, cautioning that the SOE’s cash flow is not likely to improve fast enough to stabilise its debt levels. Transnet has been burdened with governance issues, political appointees, corruption in procurement and ideological policies from government. It undermines South Africa’s competitiveness; increases prices, inflation, business collapse, and unemployment; and has undermined growth.   Investec Chief Economist Annabel Bishop calculated that Transnet’s lack of capacity to meet demand has reduced GDP growth by around 3% per annum. “This is likely to remain the major limitation on GDP growth this year for South Africa, with modest inroads made on capacitating Transnet only expected to add a per cent to growth, as South Africa’s GDP lifts by 1.8% y/y in 2025,” according to Bishop. Because of the decline of the railways, due to lack of maintenance, corruption, and mismanagement, Transnet estimates it needs to invest R200 billion to restore the railways back to capacity.   It will be a waste of money to invest in Transnet without bringing in merit-based management, cleaning up procurement by exempting the organisation from preferential procurement rules, and discarding ideological objections to having the organisation fully partnering with the private sector in delivering infrastructure services. Transnet needs a social pact between itself, the private sector, civil society, and professional organisations to co-deliver services and clean up the organisation. It is estimated that Transnet’s poor performance cost the economy R353 billion in 2023.     South Africa’s failing infrastructure SOEs and Development Finance Institutions are constraints on growth   The Government’s Reconstruction and Recovery Plan identified infrastructure development as a key vehicle for poverty alleviation, job creation, and economic growth. However, currently South Africa’s SOEs, particularly the infrastructure ones, are a major structural constraint on growth. The country’s state DFIs are similarly in crisis and lack the capacity and funding to significantly accelerate infrastructure development funding.     Thanks to corruption, incompetence, lack of capacity, and high debt levels, they are not able to manage any significant infrastructure build. They have been unprofitable, with large debts, and are in financial distress, having to regularly receive bailouts. According to the Department of Public Enterprises, between 2012 and 2023 the debt levels of the largest 10 SOEs rose by R313.6 billion. Government had to bail out these SOEs with R318.1 billion during that period.   The Treasury projected contingent liabilities at R1.17 trillion in 2025/26, mainly due to SOEs. Unless there is serious action taken to tackle the political interests behind the governance failure, corruption, and inefficiencies of SOEs, the debt-to-GDP trajectory could worsen.   Fixed investment by infrastructure SOEs fell 50% between 2013 and 2023 – where they invested 3.5% of GDP in 2013, this dropped to 1.6% of GDP in 2023. Just to get back to the 2013 SOE fixed investment levels, SOEs must invest around R134 billion. Investec has calculated that not only must SOEs bring their fixed investment levels to the 2013 levels of R134 billion; they need to invest an additional R240 billion to get to a 5% of GDP target.   Furthermore, in total, SOEs need to spend R1.75 trillion over five years to overcome the infrastructure neglect and simultaneously bring on board new critical infrastructure. Rationally, SOEs do not have the competence, the balance sheets, and the capacity – given their high debt levels, and many have their procurement captured by interest groups. The private sector will have to be brought on board on a large scale to deliver infrastructure.   The infrastructure SOEs and municipal entities will have to be prioritised for reform. The structural reforms to turnaround infrastructure SOEs must include merit-based appointments – with no preferential procurement – performance contracts with employees, and linking salary increases and benefits with performance. Where infrastructure SOEs obviously do not have the capacity, they must partner with the private sector to co-deliver services or fully outsource to the private sector to deliver (Ter-Minassian, 2017).    Graph 3: State infrastructure performance (Nedbank, Eskom, Stats SA & SARB, 2025).     The 2024/25 Budget   On 12 March 2025, the Minister of Finance, Enoch Godongwana, delivered the National Budget Speech, following a postponement on 19 February 2025. Controversy has centred around the proposed fiscal measure to increase the value-added tax (VAT) rate by 0.5 percentage points in 2025/26, followed by another 0.5 percentage points in 2026/27, which will result in a 16% VAT rate by 2026/27. The 2025 Fiscal Framework and Revenue Proposal with the 0.5% VAT increase was voted in on 2 April 2025. The Democratic Alliance (DA) is taking it to court.   The DA, many ANC members, and civil society organisations are opposed to this, saying it will negatively impact poor households – and that ways can be found to generate revenue elsewhere, such as cutting public sector waste, mismanagement, and corruption. Pushing for taxes to overcome revenue shortages is the wrong strategy. SA has reached the ceiling of raising taxes (Gumede, 2014, 2025). The state – owing to corruption; incompetence; state failure; growth-reduction populist policies such as the NHI, Expropriation Bill, and anti-American foreign policies; marginalisation of minorities and large parts of SA’s diverse society, political views and ideas – has lost the credibility to get SA’s relatively smaller taxpaying citizens and corporates to pay more taxes, as taxpayers cannot see value for money when it comes to the taxes they are already paying.    Within the ANC there have been two views on taxes over the past decades: popular among the masses, the first is to raise taxes for the ‘rich’. This view argues that the country’s well-off are under-taxed and that taxing the ‘rich’ is a lesser form of wealth tax, and importantly, taxing the rich will mean less electoral erosion for the ANC. The second view is the VAT option, because that is seen as spreading the tax over larger constituencies and is not ‘direct’. However, this tax is seen as more electorally damaging as it disproportionally impacts the working and lower middle-classes.    The ANC development model has been to increase taxes to recover losses caused by state inefficiencies, mismanagement, corruption, and ideological and populist policies; at the same time the government has cut capital spending, and entrepreneurial, technology, research and innovation budgets, while increasing social development budgets (Gumede, 2025). This is the wrong approach to fill revenue gaps. The savings should rather be made by decreasing state inefficiencies, mismanagement, corruption, and ideological and populist policies. However, the reality is that tackling these issues is politically difficult, as it would mean taking on powerful interest groups within the ANC and government – which could cause disruptions in the party. According to the Laffer Curve, there is a tipping point where increasing taxes will be so onerous that revenue will decline as people try not to pay taxes (Trabandt & Uhlig, 2011; Wanniski, 1978). Obviously, a high tax-to-GDP ratio can be argued for if there is a quality return for the taxes – better public services, reduced incompetence, and more accountability.   South African Revenue Service Commissioner Edward Kieswetter (2025) rightly argues that higher tax rates do not automatically result in increased tax revenues. Kieswetter says taxes must be seen by the public as being “equitable”. If not, it undermines trust and inadvertently hampers compliance and revenue collection (Kieswetter, 2025).   The focus overwhelmingly should be on keeping taxes as they currently are or reducing them, while aggressively increasing state efficiency, cutting corruption, boosting competency – which is at the heart of performance – and stopping wastages that occur on account of captured empowerment programmes, captured procurement, and the deployment of politically connected but incompetent public sector and SOE officials. There has to be better capital allocation by the state to prioritise growth sectors. State capital allocated as part of fiscal responses to boost economic sectors often does not reach its intended targets, diverted to patronage, captured empowered programmes, or simply not given to those who can make a critical difference. A case in point of the latter was the government’s Covid-19 loan guarantee scheme to rescue struggling businesses, which saw less than 10% implementation by June 2021 (Hausmann et al, 2022).    Despite a new three-year wage agreement to reduce budget uncertainty, managing the public sector wage bill remains challenging. A sustainable approach to remuneration and productivity is needed to align with long-term fiscal plans and ensure effective service delivery. However, public service trade unions are important ANC constituencies – and the party has been very unwilling to take them on by reducing the public sector wage bill.   Similarly, given the failure of the state, the private sector, civil society, and professionals must be brought in to help the state co-deliver public services and infrastructure. However, there is an ideological objection by some ANC groups to involving the private sector, civil society, and non-ANC professionals in delivering public services or infrastructure. This is a structural impediment which slows down the adoption of policies that would enhance public-private partnerships.   The simplification of public-private partnership regulations is good news, as attracting private collaboration will be essential to solving some of the country’s largest challenges, such as water, rail, and electricity.   The Budget reported that South Africa’s 2024/25 budget deficit was R31.8 billion higher than projected in the 2024 Budget Review , as revenue collection fell below expectations. The government’s gross debt stock is expected to increase from R5.69 trillion in 2024/25 to R6.81 trillion in 2027/28. South Africa’s net loan debt – gross loan debt less cash balances – will increase from R5.47 trillion to R6.70 trillion over the same period. The Budget predicts SA’s gross loan debt to stabilise at 76.2% of GDP in 2025/26.   In the 2025/26 fiscal year, the government will pay a total of R424.9 billion to service debt, which translates into R1.1 billion per day to service its debt.  Servicing debt is now larger than social welfare. Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana said debt redemptions were R73.8 billion lower than estimated a year ago because the government’s bond-switch programme continued to exchange shorter-dated for longer-dated bonds. This meant, according to Godongwana, SA’s gross borrowing requirement, consisting of the budget deficit, maturing debt, and Eskom’s debt-relief deal, dropped from a projected R457.7 billion to R415.7 billion for 2024/25 – 6.1% to 5.6% of GDP.   The Budget says that debt will gradually decrease – and debt services will decrease after this fiscal year. This is very optimistic. Debt is unlikely to stabilise while the underlying factors that contribute to debt remain. Furthermore, as Efficient Group Chief Economist Dawie Roodt has pointed out, South Africa’s debt burden is larger than the official debt numbers presented in the 2025 Budget. He said this is because the National Treasury did not account for the government’s obligations and liabilities, including the approved guarantees for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or the risks posed by municipalities’ debt to Eskom. Roodt has strongly argued for the Treasury to include both explicit and implicit debts in its outstanding debt estimates – which is currently not the case. Explicit debt is officially recognised in government accounts and includes government borrowings and guaranteed loans. Implicit debt is not recorded as debt in financial documents but represents expected future financial obligations – guarantees for SOEs, such as Eskom and Transnet, and municipal debts are part of these.   The fact that South Africa’s debt portfolio is weighted to domestic lenders, appears to have lulled many into complacency. If the business environment continues to decline, investors could sell and move their capital to foreign assets, which will make SA’s fiscal position worse. In the past few years there has been a rise in borrowing from the international development finance, which has increased since 2020.    The problem is, opposition to the structural reforms needed to reduce debt levels, the deficit, and increase revenue is mostly political, ideological, interest-based, and from corrupt groups – with strong powers to resist reforms. Many of the structural reforms being implemented so far have focused on technical aspects, capacity-building, and increasing or reducing budget allocations. Many of the non-technical, but rather political, ideological, interest-based, and corruption factors that drive the level of the budget deficit, the performance of the public service, and SOE and municipal liabilities, are not easy to tackle.   Many parts of the public service, SOEs, municipalities, and management of state infrastructure are beset with governance challenges, largely because of politically appointed, but incompetent leaders, widespread corruption, the capture of procurement policies, mismanagement, and ideologically-based regulations, policies and priorities – the solutions to these are mostly political. And up until now, there has been very little apparent political will to tackle these sources of governance challenges. Political appointees to the public service, SOE and state infrastructure management, vested political interest, ideological and corrupted policies have led to state failure, have undermined growth and the flourishing of private companies, the formation of new business, and the attracting of investments – undermining revenue generation.   Graph 4: Gross tax revenue as a proportion of GDP (National Treasury & SARS).       Assumptions underlying the Budget   The challenge is how to bring sustainability to South Africa’s public finances. Key to doing so is to reduce debt, increase revenues, improve the efficiency of the public service and SOEs, increase productivity, and lift economic growth.   To start, there has to be a political acceptance that growth is top priority. Many ANC politicians do not genuinely think growth should be at the centre of economic policy, arguing wrongly that to do so will be promoting ‘neo-liberalism’. Policies that undermine growth will have to be jettisoned. This means the NHI Bill must be reined in, and a middle-way must be cobbled together that introduces a dual public-private health system, not a fully nationalised state health system. The NHI Bill as it currently stands is threatening the sustainability of public finances, destroying value, will cause capital and skills flight, all of which will undermine growth. The Expropriation Law is also a concern as, firstly, it goes against the Constitution, which allows for expropriation of property for public interest purposes, but with compensation. And secondly, as it is, the Law undermines property rights.   State sectors that are catalytic to growth will have to be prioritised (Schröder & Storm, 2020). State failure is a big reason for low growth. In the short-to-medium term, state departments and SOEs that are fundamental to growth should be prioritised for professionalisation, corruption should be slashed, and competence increased, to increase productivity and lift performance. At least senior leadership of these organisations must be merit-based. Consequence management must be enforced. And preferential procurement requirements in growth-prioritised state sectors must be lifted.   Critical infrastructure SOEs and DFIs should be prioritised for reforms – and for public-private partnerships to co-deliver services; or where state institutions are so hollowed out, to hand over delivery to the private sector. Laws, regulations, and rules that obstruct public-private partnerships should be jettisoned.   Key growth catalysing municipalities and metros should also be identified and prioritised for professionalisation, corruption curbing, merit-based administrative appointments and procurement. In areas of deep failure in critical state departments and SOEs that have no prospect of immediately being turned around because of vested political, ideological, and trade union interests, the private sector must be brought in to deliver. Essentially, this will mean putting SA on a two-track structural economic reform programme: prioritising the key state growth sectors for reform, while outliers will come along.   There will have to be a review of South Africa’s inflation targeting monetary policy framework, given the continued structural rigidities, state failures, and the changing global economy – as it is, after 25 years, under new political and economic conditions – corruption, state failure and low-growth, potentially undermining economic growth.   Key catalytic growth sectors will have to be prioritised. Manufacturing remains important – its declining trend needs to be reversed. Agriculture is critical. It is important that land reform is not populist, emotional, ideological and revenge-driven, but rather, that it focuses on securing food; fostering an agricultural, manufacturing, processing, and technology industrial hub; and fostering related artisan, technical, and research skills. This would mean partnering with the private sector to bring back artisan programmes, agricultural technical institutions – especially in the rural areas – and fostering agriculture technology.    Lack of rule of law is also a constraint on economic growth. There has to be rule of law. Crime has to be tackled seriously. And the police, prosecuting and justice system have to be reformed to bring merit-based competency, fight corruption, and partner with business, civil society, communities and professionals. Insecure property rights is another binding constraint on growth. Incidents where property, development projects, businesses and houses, mines, and transport assets are hijacked by mafias, whether “zama zamas”, taxi organisations or political groups, will have to be brought to heel visibly. Sadly, property rights, rule of law, and rules-based social behaviours – without which economic growth cannot take place – are not taken seriously by many of South Africa’s political formations, trade union groups, and other formations.   Despite the usually superficial statements that mining is critical, very little has been done to encourage its expansion. South Africa has not taken any serious actions to beneficiate, process, or refine minerals. Mining laws, policies, and rights allocations are in many cases captured by politically connected figures, mafias, such as the “zama zamas”, and trade union interests – which is yet another obstacle to growth.   Graph 5: Total SA Mining Output (Minerals Council South Africa & Stats SA).   Impact of leaving AGOA, possible sanctions   The US introduced a 30% tariff increase on all South African imports into the US, announced by US President Donald Trump on 2 April 2025. The US accounts for 9% of South African exports, and over 600 US companies have investments in South Africa. South Africa exports 21.3% of its goods to the European Union (EU).    Losing preferential access to the US market through the African Growth and Opportunity Act or increased tariffs for South Africa’s products, will make these less competitive in the US market (Baskaran, 2024). Even the alternative of negotiating a bilateral trade deal with the US could take a long time to unfold.    Mining exports have protected South Africa during difficult economic periods. For now, some South African minerals – platinum group metals (PGMs),  coal ,  gold , manganese, and chrome – are excluded from the US tariffs. However, diamonds, steel, iron-ores and concentrates, metal jewellery, granulated slag from the  manufacturing  of iron or  steel , will be subject to the tariffs (Arnoldi, 2025). South Africa’s exports of mineral  products  and precious metals to the US came to R65.3 billion in 2024, with PGMs accounting for 76.3% of the total.   However, all this can change, depending on whether South Africa continues with its current old-style, counter-productive engagement with the Trump administration – not accepting accountability for long-standing anti-Americanism, for threatening South African and US property, land, and business interests through the Expropriation Act, for persistently marginalising minorities in state governance, and for blame-shifting the SA-US fallout on right-wing Afrikaner groups (Botes, 2023).   A 30% tariff on SA products will make exporting to the US unviable. It will have heavy negative direct and indirect economic consequences. Products immediately impacted include fresh produce, wine, and motor vehicles. The 30% will reduce SA exports, employment, household incomes, and government revenues. Upwards to 200 000 jobs may be threatened, and a reduction of up to 2% of GDP is likely.   If SA can retain the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) preferences, while non-AGOA SA products are under the increased tariffs, it may be less devastating. Nevertheless, whether the 30% tariff includes or excludes AGOA products, it will impact on the mining, manufacturing, and agriculture sectors. The mining and agriculture sectors have in recent times been the economic saving sectors for SA. And both these sectors have multiplier impacts on other industries, which means if these sectors are negatively impacted, it will also have negative spillover effects on downstream sectors.   Political actors and groups who reckon South Africa can quickly pivot from the US market to alternatives, such as BRICS, have a case of wishful thinking, as a loss of the US market cannot be immediately replaced. Of course, BRICS and non-BRICS countries in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, the European Union, and Canada, offer alternative trade options and could help mitigate US losses. However, for example, Russia’s trade with South Africa represents only 1.7% of the country’s total trade, exports and imports with the BRICS economies in 2022. Globally, Russia was the destination for only 0.2% of South Africa’s exports during the same time (Siegle, 2023). Russia contributes less than 1% of the foreign direct investment  in Africa (Siegle, 2023). A transition to new markets cannot be achieved overnight. Worse, SA’s state trade negotiation capacity is currently possibly at its weakest – most over-ideological, least agile and opportunity-minded – since the end of apartheid. State capacity has been eroded in state trade structures, as in other parts of the state, through cadre deployment, exclusion of minorities, and informalisation.   China may be South Africa’s largest trading partner by volume, but it mostly takes South Africa’s raw material, not manufactured products – it has trade barriers, but sends manufactured products to South Africa, which displaces local jobs. US companies manufacture in South Africa, meaning they have larger multiplier impacts. The Chinese government often demands exemptions from local labour, empowerment, and affirmative laws. US companies generally actively institute diversity, local supplier development, and affirmative action and social responsibility programmes – meaning they stimulate the economy in many other ways too, than only direct trade.   The US also provides development aid, not only through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through other state departments, through sub-programmes from US organisations receiving development aid from US non-governmental organisations and philanthropic foundations – directly funding South African state agencies, NGOs, and the private sector. China does not offer developmental aid – state, private, and philanthropic – on such a scale.   Neither will the African Free Trade Area be an immediate alternative. Thirty-four out of 54 African countries are in some or other conflict, and systemically unstable, which has made African free trade virtually impossible to implement on scale. African economies do not have the diverse, sophisticated consumer wealth that the US offers.   Graph 6: Debt Service Costs, Source Budget Review     US Trump administration tariffs heralding structural changes in the global economy   The wide-ranging tariffs introduced by US President Donald Trump will push structural changes in the global economy. In recent times, the world has seen mainly cyclical changes. US President Trump, on 2 April 2025, announced reciprocal tariffs that include all nations, not just a smaller group of 10 to 15 countries with the biggest trade imbalances. This new tariff plan has been dubbed "Liberation Day". US tariffs will push up inflation and interest rates in emerging markets, including South Africa, and lead to a global economic downturn.   South Africa may be part of the global formations such as BRICS and the G20, however, its economy has become marginal. South Africa’s economy is a small one, the size of which has declined dramatically since the end of apartheid – from being in the top 20, to the late 30s, it is now, sadly, in the same league as African economies such as Nigeria, while South Africa’s emerging peers Poland, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea have all risen to become $1 trillion GDP economies. There is a real danger that South Africa may lose out to most in the structural changes the global economy is undergoing, because many of its political leaders still operate ideologically in the Cold War era, are anti-business, continue to insist on anti-growth economic policies, and lack the resolve to tackle systemic state failure – which is an impediment to growth.   A fallout with the US will increase South Africa’s risk premium as an investment, capital, and development destination. It will result in global companies being reluctant to commit capital in South Africa. Many US companies and institutional investors may pull the plug. Companies will also be reluctant to pledge long-term capital because of the uncertainty. It will raise the cost of South Africa’s debt. It will also put pressure on the rand currency in relation to the US dollar.   On 4 April 2025, US Congressman Ronny Jackson introduced the US-South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025, which calls for a full review of the bilateral relationship between the US and South Africa. It calls for sanctioning senior South African government and ANC officials who support US “adversaries” (Fraser, 2025), which include China, Russia, and Iran. “South Africa has brazenly abandoned its relationship with the United States to align with China, Russia, Iran, and terrorist organizations, a betrayal that demands serious consequences,” said Jackson. “This legislation ensures we conduct a comprehensive review of this supposed ‘ally’ while also holding accountable any corrupt officials.”   The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) released its Financial Stability Review (FSR) in 2023, highlighting the likely impact of secondary sanctions on the financial stability of South Africa. The rand would be under pressure – and would be fragile and volatile (Soobyah & Steenkamp, 2019). The country’s risk premium would increase. There would likely be large selloffs of local bonds. During the 2023 fallout between South Africa and the US over evidence from the US that a Russian ship was on-loading weapons, local companies suffered heightened scrutiny by offshore banks when they made payments to foreign suppliers in the recent weeks, undermining their ability to do business.   If there are sanctions against South Africa, US dollar payments via the international payment system, SWIFT, could be sanctioned, as is the case with Russia. According to the Reserve Bank, secondary sanctions would mean a tightening or termination of correspondent banking relationships and increasing costs of cross-border payments. This would also directly impact countries in the South African Development Community (SADC) region using South African banks for cross-border transactions. The rand is part of the 18 currencies that participate in the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) system – regulated and supervised by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The SARB says that should secondary sanctions be imposed on South Africa, the CLS may remove the rand from the system, which would then expose South African banks to principal risks when settling foreign exchange transactions in CLS currencies, increasing settlement risk for South African banks.   It will also make it difficult for SA banks to make or receive any payments from correspondent banks in US dollars. The US may expand sanctions to include payments in euros or pounds. All of this will make it onerous to finance any trade or investment flows. The Reserve Bank says sanctions “will be catastrophic for the South African economy and has the undeniable potential to trigger a financial crisis”. It says the South African financial system will not be able to function if it is not able to make international payments in US dollars – which will impact on the economy and financial markets. Over 90% of South Africa’s international payments, of all currencies, are done through the SWIFT international payment system. South Africa is heavily dependent on foreign savings, capital, and investments (Loewald, Faulkner & Makrelov, 2019). The country’s current account deficit is widening. In the past few years, South Africa has experienced massive foreign investment outflows. Grey listing of the country because of high levels of corruption, illegal financial flows, and ineffective state policing; anti-business and anti-growth policies and laws; state failure; and infrastructure collapse have increased these outflows. Sanctions against South Africa will only heavily inhibit further foreign investment flows.   Graph 7: SA Mining, Manufacturing and Retail Activity (Stats SA & Stanlib).     Interventions needed to lift GDP growth   South Africa needs to and can grow itself out of its economic struggles. Economic growth is critical for reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio (Dybczak & Velculescu, 2025). Fiscal consolidation needs economic growth (Maupa, Makwiramiti, Padayachee, Nemataheni & Paine, 2019). It needs political will. It needs competent public institutions to oversee the reform programme. It needs a clear, coordinated, pragmatic plan. If state performance is not improved, corruption not cut significantly, wastages through captured empowerment programmes not eliminated, and anti-growth policies not stopped, SA will have no choice but to drastically cut expenditure.   As mentioned, the ANC development model has been to increase taxes to recover losses caused by state inefficiencies, mismanagement, corruption, and poor policies. Related to that, the government has cut capital spending, entrepreneurial, technology, research and innovation, while increasing social development budgets. Although raising taxes for the ‘rich’ is popular among the masses – and will lead to less electoral erosion for the ANC – it should not be an option. In a similar vein, raising VAT would disproportionally impact the working and lower-middle classes. Clearly, increases in taxes cannot be justified when public service delivery declines, and incompetence, corruption, and lack of accountability continues to rise (Gumede, 2014, 2025).   It is very likely that the high taxes – combined with poor public services, high corruption, and incompetence – are now damaging to the economy (Gumede, 2014, 2025). The Katz Commission (1996) in its third report   recommended the Treasury set a ceiling of 25% as the maximum tax-to-GDP ratio. The purpose of a tax ceiling would be to mitigate a negative outcome – if taxes are too high, they become damaging to the economy, as argued in the Laffer Curve proposition (Trabandt & Uhlig, 2011; Wanniski, 1978). National Treasury has rejected this ceiling proposal.   The warrants repeating: The focus overwhelmingly should be on keeping taxes as they currently are or reducing them, while aggressively increasing state efficiency, cutting corruption, boosting competency – which is at the heart of performance – and stopping wastages that occur on account of captured empowerment programmes, captured procurement, and the deployment of politically connected but incompetent public sector and SOE officials. There has to be better capital allocation by the state to prioritise growth sectors. State capital allocated as part of fiscal responses to boost economic sectors often does not reach its intended targets, diverted to patronage, captured empowered programmes, or simply not given to those who can make a critical difference. A case in point of the latter was the government’s Covid-19 loan guarantee scheme to rescue struggling businesses, which saw less than 10% implementation by June 2021 (Hausmann et al, 2022).    The ongoing SOE and DFI crises remain threats to national fiscal sustainability, public service delivery, and growth (Williams, 2022). The public sector, SOEs, and DFIs will have to be genuinely professionalised. This means that merit in appointments and procurement must be introduced – at least at the SOEs and DFIs critical to growth. There has to be greater accountability and oversight over spending. There has to be an increased efficiency in government spending, eliminating wasteful expenditure and mismanagement. But there also has to be more efficient allocation of state human capital to priority growth sectors. Deployment, affirmative action without adequate skills, and trade union protection of poorly performing state employees makes efficient allocation of state human capital to oversee implementation of projects almost impossible. The state will have to prioritise investments in infrastructure to support long-term economic growth (Lawrence, Eichenbaum & Rebelo, 2010). However, such initiatives must be in partnership with the private sector. There are many other viable non-tax revenue alternatives, including cutting corruption, inefficiencies, and waste – at least in the ministries and departments, SOEs, and DFIs critical for growth. Cancelling cadre deployment, preferential procurement at the ministries and departments, SOEs and DFIs is critical for growth.   Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) should be the pillar of South Africa’s growth efforts. SMEs are estimated to provide close to 90% of all employment globally. For the past 30 years, South Africa's growth strategy wrongly prioritised essentially ‘big’ state-led growth, meaning getting the ‘big’ state to create jobs. Clearly, this was a flawed growth strategy. Because ‘big’ state became captured, appointments and procurements have often been made based on political affiliation or patronage, and it adopted ideological, populist, and anti-growth policies, causing the strategy to fail at delivering growth.   The interventions needed to lift GDP growth are largely political, social, and vested interest, rather than technical. Fiscal consolidation cannot happen without tackling these. If South Africa does not take a more reconciliatory stance towards the Trump administration, retaliation from them will undermine growth. The South African engagement with the Trump administration must be on the basis that the fallout with the US, unless resolved, may tank South Africa’s economy, at the worst possible moment, massively increasing deindustrialisation, dis-investment and de-skilling, which will deepen poverty, unemployment, and business closures.   A key structural reform needed is to bring in the private sector, civil society, and professional associations to help with public service delivery and tackle development, state, institutional, infrastructure, and policy failure.   The best way forward would be to negotiate a compromise through an SA Incorporated approach, which would involve not only the ANC, but also the Government of National Unity partners, organised business, civil society, non-ANC experts, and South Africans based in the US who are in Trump's inner circle. Critically, it is going to be important that the new SA ambassador to the US not be someone associated with the ANC, but could be drawn from the non-ANC GNU partners, a business leader actively doing successful business in the US, or a South African civil society figure, not associated with the ANC, but respected in the US, or a South African within the Trump circle based in the US.   It is crucial for the turnaround of the economy that the GNU partners with business, civil society, and professionals to form a kind of GNU+, to help provide new ideas, capacity, and energy to turn around the country’s broken state, broken economy, and broken society. Importantly, this partnership should be based on co-delivery, co-implementation, and co-ideas generation. It has to be real co-creation partnership, not government only seeking the help of business, civil society, and professionals in instances of full state collapse. Nevertheless, partnership is particularly important in mission-critical state, policy, and resource failures.     Conclusion   The Treasury’s economic strategy the past decade has been focused on maintaining macroeconomic stability, implementing structural reforms, building state capability, and supporting growth-enhancing public infrastructure investment. The Treasury’s 12-year fiscal consolidation strategy has failed to reduce debt-to-GDP and deficit ratios or the structural challenges, because these problems have their origins in politics, which is beyond the Treasury remit. In fact, the Treasury has found it hard to pursue fiscal consolidation, avoiding more debt, and cutting expenditure to keep public finances together.   However, the Treasury’s efforts have been undermined by the lack of political will in the governing ANC to genuinely tackle corruption, bring merit-based competence, strengthen the rule of law, protect property rights, and let go of populist and ideological anti-growth, anti-business and anti-job-creation policies. Furthermore, the Treasury is constrained by the lack of a conducive environment for job creation and investment. This is not the Treasury’s fault, as the national government is responsible for this. The national government has consistently fostered a hostile environment for business, investment, and job creation by not tackling the rule of law, corruption and incompetence, by adopting anti-business and anti-growth laws, policies and public stances.   Instead of infrastructure-led growth, South Africa got consumer and welfare-led growth, which is not sustainable. It is not possible to change the country’s growth path without tackling the structural inhibitors such as corruption, incompetence, state, SOE, DFI, and municipal failure, and anti-growth, anti-business policies. A new growth path must be based on boosting infrastructure, creating a manufacturing mining processing complex, especially around critical minerals, an agriculture industrial complex, expanding renewable energy, establishing a biofuels industry, expanding SMEs, and fostering new industries that South Africa lacks, but which the world needs. 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South Africa’s Fiscal Consolidation: A Historical and International Context , Unpublished.   Mikhaylov, S. 2018 . The Development of South African Policy Planning: A Qualitative Text Analysis. Background Note . Washington, DC: World Bank.   Miller, P. 2025. SA has this one, final chance to win back mining investors, Miningmx . [Online] Available at: https://www.miningmx.com/opinion/59758-this-is-sas-last-chance-to-win-back-mining-investors/  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Mutizwa, G. 2025. South Africa central bank says inflation targeting framework may be stifling growth.  [Online] Available at: https://www.cnbcafrica.com/2025/south-africa-central-bank-says-inflation-targeting-framework-may-be-stifling-growth/  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   National Assembly. 2025. Report of the Standing Committee on Finance on the 2025 Fiscal Framework and Revenue Proposals . [Online] Available at: https://pmg.org.za/tabled-committee-report/6101/ [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Neethling, B. 2025. South Africa’s financial situation is worse than it looks .   [Online] Available at: https://dailyinvestor.com/finance/81669/south-africas-financial-situation-is-worse-than-it-looks/  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Parker, D. 2025. Swanepoel rubbishes claims that South Africa's mining industry is on the decline . [Online] Available at: https://www.miningweekly.com/article/swanepoel-rubbishes-claims-that-south-africas-mining-industry-is-on-the-decline-2025-03-28  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Pask, A. 2024. Can the JSE stem the tide of delistings – and what this means for SA investors?  [Online] Available at: https://www.fanews.co.za/article/views-letters-interviews-comments/18/all/1102/can-the-jse-stem-the-tide-of-delistings-and-what-this-means-for-sa-investors/39612  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Peyper, L. 2025. Sars boss speaks out against tax hikes – again . 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Trump says reciprocal tariffs will target all countries . [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/trump-says-reciprocal-tariffs-will-target-all-countries-2025-03-31/  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Siegle, J. 2023. Decoding Russia’s Economic Engagements in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/decoding-russia-economic-engagements-africa/  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Soobyah, L. & Steenkamp, D. 2019. The Role of the Rand as a Shock Absorber, ERSA Working Paper 790 . Cape Town: Economic Research Southern Africa.   South African Reserve Bank. 2023. Financial Stability Review , May, Pretoria.   South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). 2025. 12th Statistical Report: Social Assistance , Department of Social Development, March.   Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2023. Three facts about the manufacturing industry . [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=16493  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Steenkamp, D. 2019. The Relationship between Growth and Inflation in South Africa, SARB Economic Note 19/03 . Pretoria: South African Reserve Bank.   Tanzi, V. & Zee, H. 2001. Tax Policy for Developing Countries .   [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues27/  [accessed: 24 April 2025]. Ter-Minassian, T. 2017. Identifying and Mitigating Fiscal Risks from State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), IDB Discussion Paper 546 . Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.   Thorne, S. 2025a. Water supply collapsing across South African towns . [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/809453/water-supply-collapsing-across-south-african-towns/  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Thorne, S. 2025b. Warning about water in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/809604/warning-about-water-in-south-africa/  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Thukwana, N. 2025. Consumer boost likely saved South African economy from recession . [Online] Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-04/consumer-boost-likely-saved-south-african-economy-from-recession?embedded-checkout=true  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Trabandt, M. & Uhlig, H. 2011. The Laffer Curve Revisited,  Journal of Monetary Economics , 58(4): 305–327.   Van Cuyck, C. & Ahmed, M. 2024. Delistings and the changing landscape of the JSE . [Online] Available at: https://www.denkercapital.com/delistings-and-the-changing-landscape-of-the-jse/  [accessed: 24 April 2025].   Wanniski, J. 1978. Taxes, Revenues, and the 'Laffer Curve',  The Public Interest , Number 50, Winter.   Williams, C. 2022. Funding South Africa’s infrastructure spending gap: Why it is crucial to crowd in the private sector . [Online] Available at: https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/funding-south-africas-infrastructure-spending-gap-why-it-is-crucial-to-crowd-in-the-private-sector-2022-01-18  [accessed: 24 April 2025]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to advance its efforts in promoting constitutional literacy and democratic values within secondary schools across Gauteng Province. On Tuesday, 22 April 2025, a total of 76 learners from Northwood Secondary School, located in Central Pretoria, participated in the Institute’s “Taking the Constitution to the People” workshop. The session was facilitated by Mr Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s Gauteng Schools Coordinator. The primary objective of the workshop was to deepen learners’ understanding and appreciation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa—its historical evolution, structural framework, and the fundamental rights and responsibilities articulated in Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights. Delivered through an interactive and pedagogically sound approach, the session provided learners with a comprehensive overview of the constitutional drafting process, the guiding values underpinning its development, and its ongoing significance in shaping democratic governance and societal cohesion. A particular emphasis was placed on the Founding Provisions of the Constitution, which articulate the foundational values of human dignity, equality, and freedom. Furthermore, the workshop underscored the importance of responsible citizenship, equipping participants with the knowledge and motivation to actively contribute to the consolidation of a just, inclusive, and democratic society. The Inclusive Society Institute remains steadfast in its commitment to this initiative. In collaboration with various Districts within Gauteng Province, the Institute will continue to implement similar workshops in secondary schools throughout the region. Through this sustained engagement, the Institute seeks to cultivate a generation of informed, civically engaged, and socially responsible citizens who are equipped to uphold and advance the democratic principles upon which the Republic of South Africa is founded.

#PublicDebtisPublic is new public platform on sovereign borrowing terms and conditions. The platform draws on available data rather than trying to get reporting directly from countries or private creditors.   It is an initiative of the Sovereign Debt Forum and Massive Data Institute (MDI) at Georgetown’s Mc Court School of Public Policy.   The #PublicDebtIsPublic is an initiative of the Sovereign Debt Forum and Massive Data Institute (MDI) at Georgetown’s McCourt School of Public Policy. The Gates Foundation will also share an update on its debt portfolio and why it decided to support this initiative.   A Webinar was organised by the TRUST ACCOUNTABILITY &  INCLUSION COLLABORATION   on 5 May 2025 to introduce the platform to public policy practitioners. The Inclusive Society Institute’s Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, attended.   The ISI is currently preparing for the UN Finance For Development Summit scheduled for the end of June 2025, where it will be arguing for fairer and more just Climate Financing for developing nations. It is concerned with current models that may well be over-indebting nations.

The Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, represented the Inclusive Society Institute at the T20 High-Level Policy Dialogue  that was held at the CSIR International Convention Centre over the period 29 – 30 April 2025.   This high-level event will brought together leading African think tanks, academics, policymakers, and international experts to discuss and develop Africa-centric policy recommendations.    Key topics include: Multilateralism, International Trade, and Investment Democracy, Governance, and Economic Development Social Cohesion, Inclusive Development, and Employment Climate Change Responses and Sustainability Digital Transformation Debt and External Development Finance Peace and Security To read the concept note, please click below:

3.4.10   Italy's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.10.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Italy, freedom of assembly and association is constitutionally protected under Article 17 and Article 18 of the Italian Constitution. These rights allow citizens to gather peacefully and form associations without government interference, as long as the activities do not violate public safety or morals. Italy is also bound by the European Convention on Human Rights, which further guarantees these freedoms.   In practice, freedom of assembly is generally respected in Italy, and public demonstrations are a common way for citizens to express dissent or demand political and social change. However, protests are occasionally met with restrictions or intervention by law enforcement, especially in cases where demonstrations are seen as a threat to public order. The use of excessive force by police during protests has been reported, particularly during protests against economic austerity, labour rights, and environmental issues.   Freedom of association is also respected in Italy, with a vibrant civil society made up of political parties, trade unions, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, organisations working on sensitive issues, such as immigration and anti-corruption, sometimes face pressure from political groups or state authorities.   In summary, while Italy upholds strong legal protections for freedom of assembly and association, there are occasional challenges in the practical application of these rights, particularly around law enforcement responses to public demonstrations.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Italy, the right to a fair trial and due process is guaranteed by the Constitution and reinforced by the country's membership in international human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Italy’s judicial system operates under principles of impartiality, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a defence, as outlined in Article 111 of the Constitution.   While these rights are protected in law, the Italian justice system faces significant challenges in practice. One of the main concerns is the length of judicial proceedings, which are often subject to delays. Italy has repeatedly been criticised by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for its prolonged pretrial detention periods and the excessive duration of both civil and criminal cases, which undermine the principle of a timely trial.   Corruption and political influence in certain high-profile cases also raise concerns about the full impartiality of the judiciary. Despite these issues, Italy has made efforts to reform its judicial system, particularly through measures aimed at reducing case backlogs and improving the efficiency of court proceedings.   In conclusion, while Italy upholds the right to a fair trial and due process, the country's legal system continues to face structural challenges that affect its ability to provide timely justice for all citizens.   Score: 3/5  – “Judicial independence is inconsistent. Some cases, especially political ones, may experience government interference. Arbitrary detention or extended pretrial detention is reported, but not widespread.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. •                Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Njus.it . 2023. Italy convicted for a violation of the right to a fair trial for having enacted a law that conditioned the outcome of the proceedings in which a public entity was a party . [Online] Available at: https://www.njus.it/news/1046/italy-convicted-for-a-violation-of-the-right-to-a-fair-trial-for-having-enacted-a-law-that-conditioned-the-outcome-of-the-proceedings-in-which-a-public-entity-was-a-party/ [Accessed: 18 September 2024]. SR Defenders. 2024. Italy: Alleged due process violations and other worrying developments related to the trial of HRDs in Trapani and the regulation of civilian search and rescue – joint communication . [Online] Available at: https://srdefenders.org/italy-alleged-due-process-violations-and-other-worrying-developments-related-to-the-trial-of-hrds-in-trapani-and-the-regulation-of-civilian-search-and-rescue-joint-communication/ [Accessed: 18 September 2024].    3.4.10.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Italy is a well-established democracy, with political participation and democratic governance guaranteed under the Constitution. The country operates a parliamentary system, with free and fair elections held regularly for both the national Parliament and local governments. The President of the Republic serves as the head of state, while the Prime Minister leads the government. Elections are generally considered to be transparent, and the political system allows for broad participation by various political parties.   Italy has a vibrant civil society and political landscape, featuring a wide range of political parties, from centre-left to right-wing populist groups. In recent years, populist parties such as the Five Star Movement and the League have gained prominence, reflecting broader European trends. While Italy's political system is open, challenges include political fragmentation, which often leads to unstable coalitions and frequent changes in government.   Corruption remains a concern in Italian politics, with several high-profile cases involving politicians and public officials. Transparency International has highlighted the need for reforms to combat corruption and improve the accountability of elected officials. Nonetheless, Italy has strong institutions in place, including an independent judiciary and a free press, both of which play a critical role in maintaining democratic governance and holding political leaders accountable. The International IDEA notes Italy's strong commitment to democratic governance.   In conclusion, Italy’s democratic system allows for widespread political participation, but challenges related to corruption and political instability continue to impact the effectiveness of governance.   Score: 5/5  – “The country guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in government. Political opposition is allowed and respected, and there is a transparent process for democratic governance.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). 2023. Italy Democracy Tracker . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/italy   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Transparency International. 2023. Corruption Perceptions Index 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.4   Freedom from Discrimination   In Italy, freedom from discrimination is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, which states that all citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, regardless of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, or personal and social conditions. Additionally, Italy has enacted a variety of anti-discrimination laws, such as the Law on Racial Discrimination (1993) and the Equal Opportunities Code (2006), which further strengthen protections against discrimination.   Despite these legal frameworks, issues of discrimination persist, particularly against minority groups such as immigrants, Roma, and LGBTQ+ individuals. Reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch highlight continued racial and ethnic discrimination, especially against migrants and refugees, who often face challenges in accessing housing, employment, and social services. The Roma community, in particular, remains marginalised, frequently living in segregated camps with limited access to basic services.   Gender discrimination is another ongoing issue in Italy. While significant progress has been made in advancing women’s rights, including increased female representation in politics, the gender wage gap and underrepresentation of women in senior leadership positions remain problematic. Gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide, is a significant concern, despite legal protections like the Code on Violence Against Women (2013).   Discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals, although illegal, persists, with cases of social exclusion and violence being reported. Italy has made some strides, such as recognising same-sex civil unions in 2016, but full legal equality, particularly in areas like marriage and adoption, has not yet been achieved.   In summary, while Italy has strong legal protections against discrimination, challenges remain in fully realising equality for all citizens, particularly for minority and marginalised groups.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In Italy, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is protected by the Constitution and reinforced by Italy’s ratification of international treaties, such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Torture was formally criminalised in Italy with the passage of a specific law in 2017, following years of pressure from human rights organisations. Prior to this, Italy faced criticism for not having a specific criminal provision against torture, despite its international commitments.   Despite these legal protections, concerns about the treatment of detainees, especially in police custody, remain. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented cases of excessive use of force by law enforcement during arrests and detentions. Italy has also faced scrutiny over the treatment of migrants and refugees in detention centres, where overcrowding and poor living conditions have been reported.   Italy's handling of protests has also been a focal point for human rights concerns. Instances of police brutality during protests, such as the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa, remain infamous for the excessive use of force by law enforcement. Although Italy has made strides in addressing these issues through legal reforms, the enforcement of these laws and accountability for violations continue to be areas of concern.   In conclusion, while Italy has made significant progress in addressing torture and inhuman treatment through legislation, challenges in the consistent enforcement of these protections remain, particularly concerning the treatment of detainees and migrants.   Score: 3/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Council of Europe. 2022. European Committee for the Prevention of Torture: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Italy, human rights defenders operate within a generally safe legal framework that guarantees freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. However, those working on sensitive issues, such as migrants’ rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption efforts, face various challenges. While the Italian Constitution and international commitments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, protect the activities of human rights defenders, concerns remain about state responses to activism, especially when protests or campaigns challenge state policies or corporate interests.   Italy has mechanisms in place to protect human rights defenders, but the enforcement of these protections can be inconsistent, particularly when defenders challenge powerful political or economic interests. Advocacy groups continue to call for stronger legal safeguards and better enforcement to ensure that defenders can carry out their work without fear of retaliation.   Score: 4/5  – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2024. Italy: Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy.  [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.7   Freedom of Expression   In Italy, Freedom of Expression is guaranteed under Article 21 of the Italian Constitution, which protects the right to freely express opinions through speech, writing, and other forms of communication. Italy is also bound by international human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, that uphold this fundamental freedom. The country has a vibrant media landscape, with a wide range of political and social commentary available in newspapers, television, and online platforms.   However, concerns persist regarding media ownership and political influence. Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders have pointed out that media pluralism in Italy is often undermined by the concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few powerful families and political interests. Former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's control over much of the media through his family’s ownership of the Mediaset group has been cited as a long-standing issue. This has led to concerns about the independence of media outlets and the potential for censorship or self-censorship.   Additionally, defamation laws in Italy have been used to target journalists and critics. Criminal defamation charges can result in prison sentences, and although reforms have been discussed, the laws continue to pose a threat to Freedom of Expression. Journalists, particularly those investigating organised crime, corruption, or political misconduct, have faced harassment, legal challenges, and, in some cases, physical threats.   Italy’s blasphemy laws, though rarely enforced, also remain a concern for Freedom of Expression. These laws have been criticised by international human rights organisations for limiting speech related to religious criticism.   In conclusion, while Italy provides strong constitutional protections for Freedom of Expression, challenges such as media concentration, defamation laws, and political influence continue to affect the full realisation of this right.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in Italy . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   In Italy, freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally protected under Article 19 of the Italian Constitution, which guarantees the right of individuals to freely practice their religion or belief. The state upholds a secular approach, allowing citizens to practice any religion or none at all. Italy is also a signatory to international human rights agreements such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which further supports religious freedom.   The majority of Italians identify as Roman Catholic, and the Catholic Church historically has had a significant influence on Italian society and politics. However, the state is officially secular, and there is no official religion. Italy recognises other religions through agreements known as intese, which provide certain legal rights and privileges to recognised religious groups. These include Protestant, Jewish, Islamic, and other religious communities.   Despite these legal protections, challenges remain, particularly for minority religious groups. Islam is the second-largest religion in Italy, but Muslim communities have faced difficulties in gaining formal recognition and securing permits to build mosques. There have been incidents of Islamophobia, and some political figures have called for stricter controls on Islamic practices. Additionally, there have been cases of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim incidents, reflecting broader societal prejudices.   Religious discrimination in the workplace and public sphere continues to be a concern for some minority faith communities. However, Italy's legal framework provides avenues for addressing such discrimination, with protections against religious intolerance.   In summary, while freedom of religion or belief is largely respected in Italy, challenges remain, particularly for minority religions, in securing equal treatment and combating societal prejudices.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. Globally, Government Restrictions on Religion Reached Peak Levels in 2021, While Social Hostilities Went Down . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2024/03/PR_2024.3.5_religious-restrictions_REPORT.pdf [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. International Religious Freedom Report: Italy.  [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.9   Right to Privacy   Italy has strong privacy protections under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), as part of its commitment to European Union standards. However, concerns persist regarding government surveillance, particularly in the context of anti-terrorism measures. Italy has enacted laws, such as the 2015 Anti-Terrorism Decree, which allow for extended data retention and the blocking of websites suspected of terrorism-related activities. These measures, while aimed at combating terrorism, have sparked criticism due to the potential for overreach and insufficient judicial oversight.   Civil liberties groups and the Italian Data Protection Authority have raised alarms about provisions that allow law enforcement to remotely access private communications and metadata without adequate checks and balances. For example, data retention periods for internet traffic metadata have been extended to 24 months, raising concerns about compliance with European Court of Justice rulings that limit such practices.   In addition, Italy's involvement in intelligence sharing, both within the EU and with other nations, has raised privacy concerns. The use of intrusive surveillance tools, such as remote hacking software (Trojans), further complicates the balance between security and privacy, with critics arguing that such tools threaten fundamental rights under both Italian law and international human rights frameworks.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   European Digital Rights (EDRi). 2015. Italy: Anti-terrorism decree to strengthen government surveillance . [Online] Available at: https://edri.org/our-work/italy-anti-terrorism-decree-strengthen-government-surveillance/ [Accessed: 17 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Privacy International. 2017. The Right to Privacy in Italy: Privacy International Submission to Human Rights Committee . [Online] Available at: https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/HRC_italy119_0.pdf  [Accessed: 17 October 2024].     3.4.10.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   Italy has comprehensive legal protections in place for the right to life and security. However, there are persistent concerns about police violence, particularly toward migrants and minority groups. Amnesty International has reported cases of excessive force by law enforcement, particularly in migrant detention centres and during public protests. These instances include the use of electric shocks, beatings, and other forms of physical abuse during the fingerprinting of migrants.   Further, the conditions in detention centres have been criticised as punitive and falling below international standards, with detainees often experiencing worse conditions than in prisons. These facilities are highly restrictive, lack adequate health and safety provisions, and severely limit the autonomy of detainees.   The lack of accountability remains a significant issue, with very few officers facing disciplinary action for their actions, which raises concerns about the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms to address police violence.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or political views). Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2016. Hotspot Italy: How EU’s flagship approach leads to violations of refugee and migrant rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/hotspot-italy-how-eus-flagship-approach-leads-to-violations-of-refugee-and-migrant-rights/ [Accessed: 17 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2019. Italy: Refugees and migrants’ rights under attack: Amnesty International submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review, 34th Session of the UPR Working Group, November 2019 . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur30/0237/2019/en/ [Accessed: 17 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2024. Italy: Abuse of migration-related detention in punitive conditions deprives people of liberty and dignity . [Online] Available at: https://www.tolerance.ca/ArticleExt.aspx?ID=559316&L=en [Accessed: 17 October 2024].    3.4.10.11   Overall Score for Italy – 3.7/5   While Italy has a robust legal framework for protecting human rights, there are notable areas of concern, particularly in terms of law enforcement accountability, discrimination, and access to justice. The country shows commitment to human rights protection but faces challenges in fully enforcing its legal frameworks, particularly for marginalised groups.     3.4.11   Japan's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.11.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Japan guarantees freedom of assembly and association under its Constitution, and in practice, peaceful protests are generally allowed. Civil society organisations can operate with minimal interference.   However, certain demonstrations, particularly those concerning politically sensitive issues, such as the US military bases in Okinawa, have faced significant restrictions and heavy policing. These measures, though relatively rare in Japan, underscore the challenges faced by civil society groups when addressing politically contentious topics.   Furthermore, the construction of a new US military base in Henoko has been met with widespread protest, with the Japanese and US governments largely disregarding the opposition expressed by Okinawans. This heavy presence of military facilities and the ensuing protests have raised ongoing concerns about the freedom of peaceful assembly in Okinawa.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections are inconsistent or weak. Protests are often subject to heavy policing or restrictions. Civil society groups face bureaucratic hurdles or occasional harassment.”   References:   IMADR. 2015. Human Rights Violations in Okinawa, Japan . [Online] Available at: https://imadr.org/humanrights-violations-okinawa-japan-hrc30-2015-joint-ws/ [Accessed: 17 October 2024]. IMADR. 2016. Freedom of peaceful assembly in Okinawa, Japan . [Online] Available at: https://imadr.org/freedomofpeacefulassembly-okinawa-japan-hrc32-2016-os/ [Accessed: 17 October 2024].    3.4.11.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   Japan’s legal system guarantees a fair trial and due process under the Constitution, but there are significant concerns regarding the treatment of detainees, particularly in pretrial detention, and the use of confessions obtained under duress.   The practice of "hostage justice" in Japan involves detaining suspects for extended periods under the daiyo kangoku or substitute prison system, during which detainees have very limited access to legal representation. Amnesty International has highlighted the harsh conditions faced by detainees, including beatings, sleep deprivation, and the prohibition of lawyers during interrogations. These methods are often used to extract confessions, which are then heavily relied upon in criminal proceedings.   Human Rights Watch has also reported that the Japanese criminal justice system frequently relies on prolonged pretrial detention and coercive interrogation practices to extract confessions. In many cases, suspects are rearrested multiple times on different charges related to the same incident to circumvent the legal 23-day detention limit, pressuring them to confess.   Both organisations have called for significant reforms to bring Japan's criminal justice system in line with international standards, including the right to legal representation during interrogations and an end to coercive methods of obtaining confessions.   Score: 2/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair. Legal representation may be limited for many individuals.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2012. Japan: End abusive detention system after murder conviction quashed . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/pre015452012en.pdf [Accessed: 17 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. Japan: ‘Hostage Justice’ System Violates Rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/japan [Accessed: 17 October 2024].    3.4.11.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Japan holds free and fair elections with generally high voter turnout, and political opposition is permitted.   The Global State of Democracy Report from International IDEA highlights that Japan scores in the mid-range for political participation compared to other countries, with issues such as gender equality and inclusive suffrage still lagging behind other top-performing nations. The report also notes that although Japan performs well in general democratic metrics like representation, rights, and rule of law, its youth engagement remains limited, partly due to political disillusionment and the dominance of established parties like the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed but faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   International IDEA. 2024. The Global State of Democracy Report: Japan . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/japan [Accessed: 17 October 2024].    3.4.11.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Japan does not have comprehensive legal protections against discrimination. Minority groups, including ethnic Koreans, the Ainu indigenous people, and LGBTQ+ individuals, continue to face discrimination.   Amnesty International highlights that societal discrimination remains a significant barrier to achieving equality. For example, despite the passage of laws meant to protect LGBTQ+ rights, such as legislation passed in 2023 to create a “plan” to safeguard against unjust discrimination, these measures often lack clear definitions or enforcement mechanisms, leaving vulnerable communities without sufficient legal recourse.   Human Rights Watch reports that Japan does not have laws prohibiting racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination, or discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Human Rights Watch also notes that Japan’s 2023 law on sexual orientation and gender identity, aiming to "promote understanding" and prevent "unfair discrimination", falls short of comprehensive non-discrimination legislation.   Score: 2/5  – “Discrimination is prevalent, and legal protections are either weak or non-existent. Marginalised groups face systemic inequality, and the state does little to address these disparities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Japan: Human Rights in 2023 Overview . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/japan/report-japan/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Japan.  [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/japan [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.11.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Japan is a signatory to the Convention against Torture (CAT), and while legal measures are in place to prevent torture, serious concerns persist about the treatment of detainees, particularly death row inmates. Both Amnesty International and the United Nations Committee Against Torture have raised issues with Japan's practice of prolonged solitary confinement, which is considered a form of cruel and inhumane treatment. Death row prisoners are frequently kept in strict isolation for years, with limited access to medical care, which has been linked to the deterioration of their mental health.   Reports highlight that prisoners are only notified of their execution mere hours beforehand, further exacerbating psychological stress. Amnesty International has criticised Japan for failing to provide necessary mental health care to those with psychological disorders on death row, arguing that the conditions in these facilities violate Japan's obligations under international law.   The United Nations Committee Against Torture has similarly noted Japan’s failure to adequately address these issues, particularly regarding the harsh conditions faced by death row inmates. The Committee has urged Japan to reform its detention practices to meet international standards, emphasising the need for better medical care and the abolition of prolonged solitary confinement.   These concerns suggest that while Japan has taken steps to align with the CAT, more comprehensive reforms are required to ensure humane treatment of detainees.   Score: 3/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2009. Hanging by a Thread: Mental Health and the Death Penalty in Japan.  [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa22/005/2009/en/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. United Nations Committee Against Torture. 2013. Committee Against Torture Examines Report of Japan . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2013/05/committee-against-torture-examines-report-japan [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.11.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Human rights defenders in Japan generally operate in a free environment, but there are notable concerns regarding how activists involved in politically sensitive issues are treated. For instance, activists protesting against US military bases in Okinawa, such as Hiroji Yamashiro, have faced arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention. Yamashiro, who led peaceful protests, was detained for five months and was reportedly pressured to confess, highlighting issues of arbitrary detention and suppression of peaceful activism in Japan.   Additionally, the UN Human Rights Committee has raised concerns about restrictive laws in Japan that limit press freedom and the right to protest. The Committee specifically noted the excessive use of force during protests and surveillance of demonstrators, especially during protests in Okinawa. This indicates that, while Japan offers constitutional protections for Freedom of Expression and assembly, these rights are sometimes undermined, particularly in cases involving protests against state policies.   Score: 4/5  – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Civicus Monitor. 2023. UN body raises concerns about laws restricting press freedom and stifling protests while foreign journalists in Japan face threats . [Online] Available at: https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/un-body-raises-concerns-about-laws-restricting-press-freedom-and-stifling-protests-while-foreign-journalists-japan-face-threats/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. IMADR. 2017. Japan’s arbitrary arrests and detention of Okinawan human rights defender . [Online] Available at: https://imadr.org/japan-arbitrary-arrests-detention-okinawan-humanrights-defender-hrc35-2017-joint-os/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.11.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression is guaranteed by Japan’s Constitution, but concerns exist over media independence and government influence. Reporters Without Borders has documented cases of self-censorship among journalists, particularly in relation to criticism of the government or coverage of sensitive issues like the Fukushima disaster. There are also concerns about the use of defamation laws to limit criticism of public officials.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections exist but are weak. Some journalists and activists face censorship or legal repercussions for their work. Independent media faces bureaucratic or financial challenges.”   References:   Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Japan: RSF.  [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/japan [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.11.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Japan guarantees freedom of religion, and individuals are generally free to practice their faith without interference. However, certain minority religious groups face social stigma. The Pew Research Center notes that Japan has low restrictions on religious practices.   Additionally, Jehovah’s Witnesses have experienced challenges, including a rise in hate crimes and societal discrimination. This has included incidents of physical attacks, harassment, and damage to property, highlighting the ongoing social stigma against the group.   Score: 4/5   – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Bitter Winter. 2023. Hate Crimes Epidemic Against the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Japan: Who Is Responsible?  [Online] Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/hate-crimes-epidemic-against-the-jehovahs-witnesses-in-japan-who-is-responsible/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. Restrictions on Religious Freedom Around the World . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2024/03/PR_2024.3.5_religious-restrictions_REPORT.pdf  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.11.9   Right to Privacy   Japan has legal protections for privacy under the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI), which regulates the handling of personal data. However, concerns have been raised about government surveillance, especially in the context of national security. Recent developments, such as amendments allowing for broader surveillance powers, have sparked debate about the balance between privacy and security. Civil liberties organisations have criticised the government's increasing ability to monitor online communications without sufficient oversight, raising fears of potential abuse under anti-terrorism laws.   The 2013 State Secrecy Law further allows the government to classify information as secret, limiting transparency around its surveillance practices. While Japan does not have the same level of surveillance as some other nations, the growing use of surveillance technologies and the absence of robust oversight mechanisms are significant concerns.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom on the Net 2023: Japan . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/japan/freedom-net/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.11.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   Japan’s legal system provides protections for the right to life, but there are significant concerns about police brutality and the treatment of detainees, especially those on death row. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented instances of excessive force used by law enforcement during detentions, as well as the harsh conditions faced by death row inmates. In particular, detainees on death row are often held in prolonged solitary confinement, with little to no advance notice of their execution date, leaving them in constant fear of execution.   Amnesty International has highlighted cases where prisoners live under severe psychological distress, as they are informed of their execution only hours before it takes place. In some cases, prisoners may not be notified at all, exacerbating concerns about the treatment of these individuals. Additionally, reports indicate that some detainees experience ill-treatment, including the use of force during interrogations, which in some cases leads to coerced confessions.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or political views). Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Hanging by a thread: Mental health and the death penalty in Japan. [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA22/005/2009/en/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Japan. [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/japan  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.11.11   Overall Score for Japan – 3.1/5   Japan has a robust legal framework for human rights protection but faces challenges in fully enforcing these protections, particularly regarding privacy, discrimination, and access to justice. The country continues to face scrutiny over its treatment of marginalised communities and detainees, its use of the death penalty and lack of clear anti-discrimination laws.   3.4.12   Mexico's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.12.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Mexico provides constitutional protections for the rights to peaceful assembly and association. However, these rights are often inconsistently enforced, particularly in situations involving protests related to government corruption, organised crime, or human rights abuses. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented numerous cases where security forces used excessive force against protesters, including instances of arbitrary arrests and violence. These abuses are most common during demonstrations that challenge state or federal authorities.   Activists and journalists in Mexico face significant risks, often encountering harassment and violence, especially when reporting on or protesting issues related to human rights violations or organised crime. Mexico remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for human rights defenders and journalists, with very little accountability for perpetrators. Investigations into attacks are often insufficient, and the justice system has failed to adequately protect those targeted.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of assembly and association are restricted. Protests and demonstrations are often banned or dispersed violently. Civil society organisations are heavily regulated, and activists face repression.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/report-mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Mexico, the right to a fair trial and due process is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 14 and Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution, which protect individuals from arbitrary detention and ensure legal rights during criminal proceedings. Mexico is also a party to several international human rights treaties, including the American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both of which reinforce these guarantees.   Despite these legal protections, Mexico faces significant challenges in upholding the right to a fair trial. One of the major concerns is the widespread issue of pretrial detention, or "prisión preventiva", which often sees individuals held for extended periods before their cases go to trial. Many detainees are held without formal charges, and some are denied prompt access to legal representation, violating due process rights. The pretrial detention system disproportionately affects marginalised and low-income individuals, exacerbating inequalities in the criminal justice system.   Corruption within the judiciary and law enforcement also undermines the right to a fair trial. Reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International highlight that police often rely on coerced confessions obtained through torture, which are later used in court. This practice violates the fundamental principles of due process and undermines the integrity of the legal system.   Furthermore, the National Code of Criminal Procedures (CNPP), which was introduced to reform Mexico’s justice system and transition from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial one, has had mixed success. While it has led to some improvements, such as greater transparency in legal proceedings, the system continues to face challenges in ensuring timely trials, addressing judicial inefficiency, and curbing impunity.   In summary, although Mexico has a legal framework that guarantees the right to a fair trial and due process, systemic issues such as prolonged pretrial detention, coerced confessions, and judicial inefficiency continue to undermine these rights.   Score: 2/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair. Legal representation may be limited for many individuals.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Mexico holds regular elections and allows for political opposition, with electoral processes generally being respected. However, significant concerns exist regarding corruption, vote-buying, and political violence, especially at the local level. Transparency International highlights that corruption remains pervasive, undermining public trust in elections and democratic institutions. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Mexico low in terms of public sector transparency, particularly in handling political processes and governance.   Violence targeting political candidates and activists is a grave issue. In the 2024 election cycle alone, Mexico witnessed the highest number of political assassinations in its modern history, with 63 political figures killed between June 2023 and June 2024.   This violence, often linked to organised crime, poses a serious threat to electoral integrity, particularly in regions controlled by criminal groups. The risks extend beyond candidates, as journalists and human rights defenders also face frequent threats and violence.   Score: 3/5  – “Elections occur, but there are significant constraints, such as voter suppression, lack of transparency, or barriers to political opposition.”   References:     Stratfor. 2024. Mexico: 2024 Election Brought the Most Political Killings in Mexico's Modern History . [Online] Available at: https://library.stratfor.com/situation-report/mexico-2024-election-brought-most-political-killings-mexicos-modern-history [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Transparency International. 2023. Corruption Perceptions Index 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/mex [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Wilson Center. 2024. Political Violence in Mexico’s 2024 Elections . [Online] Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/political-violence-mexicos-2024-elections-organized-crime-involvement  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.4   Freedom from Discrimination   In Mexico, freedom from discrimination is legally protected under Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution, which prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, gender, age, disabilities, social conditions, health conditions, religion, opinions, sexual preferences, marital status, or any other characteristic that violates human dignity. Mexico is also a party to several international treaties aimed at eliminating discrimination, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).   Despite these legal protections, discrimination remains a significant issue in Mexico. Indigenous communities, women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and Afro-Mexicans continue to face systemic and institutional discrimination in various sectors, including employment, education, and healthcare. Indigenous peoples, in particular, experience higher rates of poverty, lower access to healthcare, and limited political representation. While the Mexican government has made efforts to promote Indigenous rights, many communities remain marginalised.   Gender discrimination is another pressing issue. Although Mexico has laws in place to promote gender equality, such as the General Law on Women's Access to a Life Free of Violence and the Federal Labour Law, gender-based violence remains pervasive. Femicide and violence against women are particularly high, with limited enforcement of legal protections. Women also face discrimination in the workplace, where the gender pay gap and limited career advancement opportunities are widespread.   Discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community is also prevalent, despite legal progress in recognising same-sex marriages in some states and providing gender identity protections. LGBTQ+ individuals frequently face violence, harassment, and exclusion, particularly in rural areas where conservative social attitudes remain strong.   In summary, while Mexico has a robust legal framework to protect against discrimination, significant challenges remain in fully realising equality for Indigenous peoples, women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and other marginalised groups.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In Mexico, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is protected under Article 22 of the Mexican Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Mexico is also a signatory to international treaties such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), which further commits the country to prevent, investigate, and punish acts of torture.   Despite these legal protections, torture and ill-treatment, particularly by law enforcement and military personnel, remain widespread issues. Reports from organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch highlight systemic problems within Mexico's justice and law enforcement systems, where torture is often used to extract confessions. This is particularly prevalent in cases involving organised crime and drug trafficking, where coerced confessions are frequently used in prosecutions, leading to serious concerns about the integrity of the legal system.   Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) has also documented numerous cases of torture, particularly in police custody. Methods of torture reported include beatings, electric shocks, and asphyxiation. Victims are often held incommunicado, without access to legal representation, exacerbating their vulnerability to abuse.   Efforts to combat torture have been made, including the passage of the General Law on Torture in 2017, which aimed to address impunity and improve investigations into torture allegations. However, implementation of this law has been slow, and accountability for those who commit acts of torture remains limited. Human rights organisations continue to call for stronger enforcement mechanisms and greater protection for victims.   In summary, while Mexico has legal frameworks in place to protect individuals from torture and inhuman treatment, these practices remain a significant problem, particularly in the context of law enforcement and organised crime investigations.   Score: 2/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are reported frequently, and legal protections are weak or rarely enforced. Law enforcement and security forces often act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Mexico, human rights defenders face significant challenges, despite legal protections. Human rights defenders (HRDs) work to promote and protect the rights of marginalised communities, including Indigenous peoples, environmental activists, journalists, and those advocating for women’s rights. However, they frequently encounter threats, harassment, and violence, particularly in regions affected by organised crime and corruption.   According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, HRDs in Mexico are often subject to intimidation, surveillance, and physical attacks, with many cases going unpunished. Journalists and activists who expose corruption or challenge powerful economic and political interests are especially vulnerable. Mexico remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists, with many killed or disappearing while investigating organised crime, government corruption, or human rights abuses.   Environmental and land rights defenders also face substantial risks. Activists working to protect Indigenous territories from large-scale infrastructure or mining projects are frequently targeted. Global Witness has documented numerous cases where environmental defenders have been threatened, attacked, or killed for opposing projects that threaten their communities and land.   Despite the Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists, which was established in 2012 to provide protection for those at risk, its effectiveness has been questioned due to inadequate funding, poor implementation, and the ongoing impunity for perpetrators of violence against HRDs. Human rights organisations continue to call for more robust protections and greater accountability for those who threaten or harm human rights defenders in Mexico.   Score: 2/5  – “Human rights defenders are frequently persecuted, harassed, or jailed for their work. Legal protections are minimal, and the state often seeks to suppress their activities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2023. Mex ico: Land, Territory, and Environmental Defenders Criminalized for Exercising Their Right to Protest . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/mexico-land-defenders-criminalized-right-to-protest/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Global Witness. 2022. Annual Report on Land and Environmental Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.globalwitness.org [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.7   Freedom of Expression   In Mexico, Freedom of Expression is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 6 and Article 7 of the Mexican Constitution, which protect the right to free speech and freedom of the press. Mexico is also bound by international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, that reinforce these protections.   Despite these legal safeguards, Mexico remains one of the most dangerous countries for journalists and those exercising their right to free expression, particularly when reporting on sensitive topics like corruption, drug trafficking, and organised crime. Human rights organisations such as Reporters Without Borders and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly raised concerns about the high levels of violence and impunity faced by journalists. Many journalists are subject to threats, harassment, and, in the worst cases, assassination, with little accountability for those responsible. Mexico has consistently ranked among the most dangerous countries for journalists due to these risks.   The Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists was established in 2012 to offer protective measures for those at risk. However, its implementation has been inconsistent, and many defenders and journalists continue to face violence. In some cases, state and local officials are implicated in attacks against journalists, further complicating efforts to safeguard Freedom of Expression.   In addition to physical violence, legal harassment is also used to silence critics. Defamation lawsuits and legal threats are often employed by powerful actors to intimidate journalists and human rights defenders. While defamation was decriminalised at the federal level in 2007, it remains a criminal offence in several Mexican states, continuing to pose a threat to free expression.   In summary, while Mexico has a legal framework that protects Freedom of Expression, the environment for journalists and activists remains hostile due to violence, impunity, and legal intimidation.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of Expression is heavily restricted. The press and media are frequently censored, and individuals face legal consequences or violence for expressing dissent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Mexico: Press Freedom Report . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   In Mexico, freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally protected under Article 24 of the Mexican Constitution, which ensures that all individuals are free to practice the religion of their choice or none at all. The state is secular, as established by the Constitution and reinforced by the Law on Religious Associations and Public Worship of 1992. This law guarantees the separation of church and state and prohibits religious discrimination.   Mexico is a religiously diverse country, with the majority of the population identifying as Roman Catholic, though other faiths such as Protestantism, Evangelical Christianity, and Islamism are also present. Despite legal protections, minority religious groups sometimes face social discrimination and challenges in securing equal treatment in public services, education, and political representation.   While freedom of religion is generally respected, reports from organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have highlighted occasional tensions, particularly in Indigenous communities. In some Indigenous regions, local customs and practices can clash with religious freedoms, leading to tensions between converts to non-traditional religions and the broader community. This has led to cases where individuals are pressured or even expelled from their communities for practicing a different faith.   Discrimination based on religious beliefs also persists in some rural areas, especially among Indigenous communities where religious minorities may face social exclusion. Evangelicals and other non-Catholic groups have reported forced displacement in areas where Catholicism dominates the local culture. In one case, evangelical families in Chiapas were forced to leave their homes for not participating in local religious festivals. In summary, Mexico provides robust legal protections for religious freedom, but societal challenges, particularly in rural areas and Indigenous communities, still pose barriers to the full realisation of this right.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections exist but are inconsistently enforced. Religious minorities may face discrimination, and the state may impose limitations on religious practices.” References:   ACN International. 2023. Mexico Report 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://acninternational.org/religiousfreedomreport/reports/country/2023/mexico   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. International Religious Freedom Report: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.9   Right to Privacy   In Mexico, the right to privacy is constitutionally protected under Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution, which guarantees the inviolability of private communications and the protection of personal data. Mexico is also subject to the Federal Law on the Protection of Personal Data Held by Private Parties (LFPDPPP), which provides comprehensive regulations on how personal data should be collected, processed, and stored by private entities. The law establishes the rights of individuals to access, rectify, cancel, and oppose the processing of their personal data (known as ARCO rights).   Additionally, the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information, and Personal Data Protection (INAI) is responsible for overseeing the protection of personal data and ensuring compliance with data privacy laws. The INAI plays a crucial role in enforcing regulations and responding to complaints related to data breaches or unlawful data processing.   However, concerns about privacy rights have arisen due to the government's use of surveillance technology, particularly in the context of national security. Reports by Amnesty International and Citizen Lab have revealed that the Mexican government has used spyware, such as the controversial Pegasus software, to monitor journalists, human rights defenders, and political opponents. These revelations have raised significant concerns about state overreach and the potential abuse of surveillance powers.   In summary, while Mexico has a strong legal framework for protecting privacy, issues related to government surveillance and data protection remain areas of concern, especially regarding the use of invasive technologies against activists and journalists.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.12.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   Mexico’s right to life and security of person is enshrined in its legal framework, but ongoing violence and systemic issues remain significant concerns. Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented high rates of violence and impunity in Mexico, especially related to organised crime and abuses by security forces. Military and police forces have been involved in numerous incidents of extrajudicial executions, and excessive use of force is a recurring issue, particularly during public security operations.   One of the most alarming aspects is the persistent use of excessive force by military personnel and the National Guard, with cases of unlawful killings and impunity for these actions. For example, in 2023, five young men were allegedly killed by soldiers in Nuevo Laredo, an incident that sparked widespread criticism and led to an investigation by the National Human Rights Commission.   Enforced disappearances are another grave issue. Thousands of people go missing each year, often involving collusion between criminal organisations and state actors. Families searching for disappeared loved ones face extreme risks, including threats, violence, and even murder. The Mexican government's responses have been criticised as inadequate, with only minimal progress in solving these cases.   Score: 2/5  – “The right to life is not consistently protected. Arbitrary killings, state violence, or widespread abuses by security forces are common, and accountability mechanisms are weak.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/mexico/report-mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.11   Overall Score for Mexico – 2.4/5   Mexico has a solid legal framework for protecting human rights, but systemic issues like impunity, violence, and corruption hinder the effective enforcement of these rights. Marginalised communities, including women and Indigenous peoples, are disproportionately affected by these challenges.     3.4.13   Russia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.13.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Russia, the right to freedom of assembly and association is heavily restricted despite constitutional protections. Over the past decade, authorities have passed repressive legislation that severely limits public demonstrations, particularly those critical of the government. Under current laws, spontaneous protests are prohibited, and any public assembly requires prior authorisation from the state. The police regularly use excessive force to disperse unauthorised protests, and demonstrators, particularly those opposing government policies, often face arrest and prosecution.   During 2023, anti-war protests related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine saw mass detentions, with over 15,000 individuals arrested in the first month alone. Protesters in ethnic minority regions, like Dagestan, were particularly affected, facing harsh crackdowns and criminal charges. Laws criminalising repeated participation in unauthorised protests further curtail freedom of assembly, with penalties that can include several years in prison.   Freedom of association is also under threat, with civil society organisations, particularly human rights groups, being targeted under "foreign agent" and "undesirable organisation" laws. These laws allow authorities to shut down organisations critical of the government, restrict their activities, and prosecute individuals affiliated with them. In 2023, several prominent human rights organisations were dissolved, including the Moscow Helsinki Group and Memorial, under these repressive measures.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of assembly and association are restricted. Protests and demonstrations are often banned or dispersed violently. Civil society organisations are heavily regulated, and activists face repression.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Russia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/eastern-europe-and-central-asia/russia/report-russia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Russia, the right to a fair trial and due process, while formally enshrined in the Constitution, is routinely compromised. Amnesty International has reported systemic bias within the judiciary, particularly in cases involving political dissidents and human rights defenders. These cases often see a lack of impartiality, with courts favouring the prosecution, and confessions obtained under torture or ill-treatment being admitted as evidence. This undermines both the fairness of the trials and the integrity of the judicial process.   Additionally, Human Rights Watch has highlighted the frequent use of politically motivated charges to silence opposition figures and activists. For example, trials are often closed to the public, and defence lawyers representing opposition figures face intimidation, harassment, and in some cases, arrest. The case of Alexei Navalny and his legal team, many of whom were detained on charges related to extremism, exemplifies this trend.   The situation worsened after Russia’s 2022 withdrawal from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which effectively closed a critical avenue for Russian citizens seeking redress for human rights violations. This move further diminished access to fair trials and due process, leaving citizens without recourse to independent international justice mechanisms.   Score: 2/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair. Legal representation may be limited for many individuals.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/eastern-europe-and-central-asia/russia/report-russia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Political participation and democratic governance in Russia are severely restricted despite constitutional guarantees. Over the years, the government has enacted laws and policies that undermine genuine political competition, hinder the formation of opposition movements, and limit the public’s ability to participate freely in the political process. Key opposition figures, such as Alexei Navalny, have been repeatedly targeted with politically motivated charges, arrests, and restrictions that prevent them from running for office or engaging in public life.   Elections in Russia are widely criticised for not meeting international standards of fairness and transparency. Independent political parties face significant obstacles, with authorities often rejecting their registration or preventing them from fielding candidates. Electoral fraud, including ballot-stuffing and manipulation of results, has been reported in various elections, contributing to an environment where political power remains concentrated in the hands of President Vladimir Putin and his United Russia party.   Furthermore, the media landscape in Russia is largely controlled by the state or pro-government actors, severely limiting the diversity of political opinions. This lack of media freedom compounds the difficulties for opposition groups and civil society organisations to reach the public and effectively participate in the democratic process. International observers and civil rights groups have expressed concern about the lack of democratic governance in Russia, citing the government’s efforts to suppress dissent and control political discourse.   Amendments to the Constitution in 2020, which allow President Putin to potentially remain in power until 2036, have further entrenched authoritarian governance. These changes were passed through a referendum marred by irregularities, including pressure on voters and a lack of independent oversight, undermining the legitimacy of the political system.   Score: 2/5  – “Elections are either heavily manipulated or restricted to one-party rule. Political opposition is limited or banned, and democratic processes are consistently undermined by the state.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/russian-federation/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.4   Freedom from Discrimination   In Russia, freedom from discrimination remains a significant challenge, with various groups, including ethnic minorities, LGBTQ+ individuals, and migrants, facing systemic inequalities. The government has been criticised for promoting xenophobia, especially in relation to migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Police regularly subject these groups to racial profiling, arbitrary detentions, and ill-treatment. Reports from Human Rights Watch highlight how police conduct ID checks and raids in areas where non-Slavic individuals are concentrated, often resulting in prolonged detentions under inhumane conditions.   LGBTQ+ individuals face severe discrimination as well. In 2023, the Russian government intensified its crackdown on LGBTQ+ rights, banning any public expression or promotion of LGBTQ+ identities, labelling the LGBTQ+ movement as extremist, and implementing laws that prohibit gender-affirming surgeries and the recognition of gender identity in legal documents. These legal developments have led to increased social stigma and violence against LGBTQ+ people, and the state’s stance has been condemned by numerous human rights organisations.   Ethnic minorities and Indigenous populations in Russia also experience discrimination, particularly in regions with significant non-Russian ethnic groups, such as the North Caucasus. These communities often lack access to social services and face restrictions on their cultural and political rights, exacerbating their marginalisation.   Score: 2/5  – “Discrimination is prevalent, and legal protections are either weak or non-existent. Marginalised groups face systemic inequality, and the state does little to address these disparities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2024. The State of the World's Human Rights: April 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/7200/2024/en/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In Russia, the right to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is constitutionally guaranteed, but the practice remains widespread and largely unpunished. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented systemic abuses, particularly in detention centres and prisons. These include beatings, electric shocks, and waterboarding, with many victims reporting degrading and inhuman treatment during their detainment. Detainees, especially those involved in political protests or opposition movements, are particularly vulnerable to such treatment, with law enforcement officers often using excessive force to extract confessions or intimidate critics of the government.   Torture is also prevalent in cases involving individuals accused of extremism or terrorism, where police frequently use severe methods of interrogation. Although Russia has ratified international agreements against torture, such as the UN Convention Against Torture, the lack of accountability for state actors means that perpetrators are rarely prosecuted, contributing to a culture of impunity. The government’s increasing repression of civil society, particularly in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, has only exacerbated the risks of torture and ill-treatment, as demonstrated by numerous reports of abuse targeting anti-war protesters.   Score: 2/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are reported frequently, and legal protections are weak or rarely enforced. Law enforcement and security forces often act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Russia. [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/eastern-europe-and-central-asia/russia/report-russia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2022. Russia: Brutal Arrests and Torture, Ill-Treatment of Anti-War Protesters. [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/09/russia-brutal-arrests-and-torture-ill-treatment-anti-war-protesters  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Russia, human rights defenders face increasing levels of harassment, intimidation, and legal persecution. Despite their crucial role in advocating for fundamental rights, the state has systematically targeted these individuals under repressive laws. The “foreign agents” and “undesirable organisations” laws, first enacted in 2012 and later expanded, allow authorities to label NGOs and individuals critical of the government as foreign agents, exposing them to criminal charges, administrative fines, and public stigmatisation.   Human rights defenders, such as those working on anti-corruption initiatives or defending environmental and Indigenous rights, have faced numerous attacks and legal harassment. For example, Ilya Shumanov, a prominent human rights defender, has been criminally charged under the “foreign agents” law for failing to label his work on social media accordingly, leading to administrative penalties and possible imprisonment. Such cases demonstrate how these laws are used to silence critical voices and restrict civic space in Russia.   The situation has deteriorated significantly since 2022, with the government further expanding its crackdown on civil society amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. Human rights defenders working on politically sensitive issues, including opposition to the war, are particularly vulnerable, facing criminal charges, threats, and physical violence with impunity.   Score: 2/5  – “Human rights defenders are frequently persecuted, harassed, or jailed for their work. Legal protections are minimal, and the state often seeks to suppress their activities.”   References:   Amnesty International. Russia: Unfair Game: Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Russia Intensifies. [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur46/0950/2019/en/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. OMCT. 2024. Opening of Criminal Proceedings Against Human Rights Defender Ilya Shumanov.  [Online] Available at: https://www.omct.org/en/resources/urgent-interventions/russia-opening-of-criminal-proceedings-against-human-rights-defender-ilya-shumanov [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.7   Freedom of Expression   In Russia, Freedom of Expression is constitutionally protected, but these protections have been significantly eroded in practice, especially under President Vladimir Putin’s regime. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented a marked increase in restrictions on freedom of speech, particularly concerning dissent against the government and criticism of Russia’s military actions. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, authorities introduced even more repressive laws, criminalising the dissemination of "false information" about the Russian military. These laws have been used to target critics of the government, with many opposition figures and activists facing harsh prison sentences.   The Russian government also employs extensive media censorship, effectively silencing independent journalism. Many media outlets that were critical of the government have been forced to shut down, and those still operating face constant pressure and threats. Journalists who attempt to report on politically sensitive topics, such as corruption or human rights abuses, are subject to harassment, legal charges, or even physical violence. The government’s control over major news outlets further limits the scope of public discourse, fostering an environment where self-censorship is prevalent among journalists.   Additionally, the Russian government has employed digital censorship and surveillance, blocking numerous websites and social media platforms that host critical content. The authorities also use advanced surveillance technologies to monitor online communications, particularly among activists and dissidents, contributing to an atmosphere of fear and repression for those who dare to speak out.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of Expression is heavily restricted. The press and media are frequently censored, and individuals face legal consequences or violence for expressing dissent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Russia: Dark Times for Human Rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur46/6651/2023/en/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief in Russia is constitutionally guaranteed; however, in practice, the government has increasingly imposed restrictions, particularly on religious minorities. The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations remains a primary instrument through which the state controls religious activities, often discriminating against groups that are not part of the Russian Orthodox Church, which enjoys privileged status. Various religious groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, have been targeted for alleged “extremism”, despite their peaceful beliefs. The Russian government banned Jehovah's Witnesses in 2017, designating them as an extremist organisation, a decision that has been widely condemned by international human rights bodies.   Authorities have increased their use of anti-extremism laws to limit religious freedom, often applying these laws to criminalise religious practices and beliefs. Muslims, particularly those adhering to non-state-sanctioned interpretations of Islam, have also faced heightened scrutiny, arrests, and criminal charges. Followers of certain Islamic sects, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, are often prosecuted under terrorism laws, even when there is no evidence of violent intent or actions. This has led to a climate of fear among religious minorities, who face continuous harassment and surveillance by law enforcement agencies.   In addition to legal harassment, state actions include the monitoring and raiding of religious institutions. Religious literature deemed to be "extremist" is frequently banned, and individuals found in possession of such materials can face serious penalties. The government’s alignment with the Russian Orthodox Church extends beyond favouritism, creating an environment where any perceived deviation from the state-approved religious narrative is met with severe repression. This undermines the fundamental principles of religious freedom, contributing to an atmosphere of intolerance and discrimination.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of religion is restricted, with certain religious groups facing persecution or being banned. State religion or dominant faith is heavily privileged.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Early release for Jehovah's Witness reverted . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/urgent-actions/early-release-jehovahs-witness-reverted [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.9   Right to Privacy   In Russia, the right to privacy is constitutionally protected, but the government has increasingly violated this right through widespread surveillance and data collection practices. Several laws have been enacted to enable mass surveillance, particularly targeting political activists, opposition figures, and journalists. The System for Operative Search Measures (SORM) allows security agencies to intercept telephone and internet communications without adequate judicial oversight. This system has significantly increased the government’s ability to collect data on individuals, thereby infringing on the right to privacy.   The Yarovaya Law, passed in 2016, further undermines privacy protections by obligating telecommunications providers to store users' data for up to six months and granting authorities access to that data without requiring strong legal justification. This law, along with others, has facilitated mass data collection and heightened concerns about online privacy for Russian citizens (BBC News, 2019). These surveillance measures are often used to monitor and intimidate those critical of the government, including journalists and human rights defenders, further eroding personal privacy.   The Russian government also employs censorship and surveillance techniques to control the digital sphere. The Sovereign Internet Law, passed in 2019, grants authorities the power to isolate Russia from the global internet and block access to information deemed inappropriate or harmful by the state. This law significantly impacts both online privacy and Freedom of Expression, as users' activities on the internet are subject to increased state scrutiny.   Score: 2/5  – “Privacy rights are weak or frequently violated. Government surveillance and intrusion into personal data are widespread, and there is little accountability for breaches.” References:   BBC News. 2019. Russia internet: Law introducing new controls comes into force . [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50259597 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Russia: Freedom on the Net 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/freedom-net/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   In Russia, the right to life and security of person is enshrined in the Constitution, but in practice, this right is frequently undermined, particularly for political opponents, activists, and vulnerable groups. Extrajudicial killings, torture, and the use of excessive force by law enforcement and security agencies have been documented, raising serious concerns about the state's commitment to upholding this right.   Political dissidents, journalists, and human rights defenders have frequently been targeted with violence, with some cases resulting in murder. The killing of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in 2015 is one of the most notable examples of the dangers faced by those who criticise the government. Investigations into such murders are often opaque, with allegations of state involvement or, at the very least, state complicity failing to adequately prosecute the perpetrators.   Torture and ill-treatment in detention centres remain widespread, especially in cases involving individuals accused of political crimes or extremism. Human rights groups have reported numerous instances of detainees being subjected to physical abuse, including beatings and electric shocks, to extract confessions. These abuses often occur with impunity, as the judicial system rarely holds law enforcement officials accountable for their actions.   In addition to these concerns, the Russian government’s military actions, both domestically in the North Caucasus and abroad, particularly in Ukraine, have resulted in large-scale violations of the right to life. Civilians have been killed or injured in military operations, with reports of indiscriminate attacks and the use of prohibited weapons. The invasion of Ukraine in 2022, for example, has led to widespread civilian casualties, with human rights organisations documenting targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure in violation of international humanitarian law.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no effective protection for the right to life. State violence, extrajudicial killings, or systematic abuses are rampant, and there is no accountability for perpetrators.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2024. Ukraine/Russia: Justice for Ukraine means accountability for all crimes committed by Russia since 2014 . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/02/with-russias-full-scale-invasion-two-years-ago-an-act-of-aggression-that-is-a-crime-under-international-law-the-tragically-familiar-human-rights-catastrophe-extended-acros/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. BBC News. 2019. Boris Nemtsov murder: Five Chechens jailed for 2015 killing . [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40592248 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/russian-federation [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.11   Overall Score for Russia – 1.9/5   While Russia has a legal framework for human rights, systemic violations, political repression, and widespread government abuses hinder the effective protection and enforcement of these rights. 3.4.14   Saudi Arabia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.14.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Saudi Arabia, the right to freedom of assembly and association is severely restricted. The government does not permit public protests, and those participating in unauthorised gatherings risk arrest, imprisonment, or harsher penalties under the country’s broad anti-terrorism laws. Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are required to obtain a government licence to operate, and the authorities closely monitor and regulate their activities. Independent unions and civil society organisations that advocate for human rights or political reform face heavy restrictions, often leading to harassment, shutdowns, and the arrest of activists.   Additionally, the government exerts tight control over political associations, prohibiting the formation of political parties. Any form of public dissent is quickly suppressed, and those advocating for reforms or greater freedoms face serious reprisals. International human rights organisations have repeatedly criticised Saudi Arabia for its failure to respect basic rights related to assembly and association, which stifles civil society and political participation. Score: 1/5  – “There are no meaningful legal protections for freedom of assembly and association. Protests are banned, civil society organisations are disbanded or state-controlled, and activists are routinely imprisoned or persecuted.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Saudi Arabia, the right to a fair trial and due process is frequently compromised. The judiciary operates under the control of the king and is deeply influenced by Islamic law (Sharia), which leaves little room for the protection of rights typically associated with a fair trial in international human rights standards. Defendants, particularly in political and security-related cases, often face prolonged pretrial detention, lack access to legal representation, and are subjected to trials that do not meet basic procedural safeguards.   The criminal justice system frequently uses confessions as the primary form of evidence, often extracted under duress or torture. Trials are held in secrecy, especially those involving political dissidents or activists, and defendants are denied access to proper defence. Furthermore, the Public Prosecution, directly under the Ministry of Interior, exerts significant control over legal proceedings, limiting judicial independence.   Appeals and reviews of sentences are rare, and the death penalty is regularly applied in cases where fair trial standards are not met. This situation disproportionately affects foreign workers and individuals from marginalised communities, who often lack adequate legal resources and protection.   Score: 1/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair. Legal representation may be limited for many individuals.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, and political participation is extremely limited. The king holds ultimate authority, controlling both executive and legislative functions, with no national elections for key political positions. The Consultative (Shura) Council is appointed by the king and serves only an advisory role, lacking any legislative power. While municipal elections occur, they have minimal impact as elected officials hold limited authority, and the majority of council members are appointed.   Political parties are banned, and the formation of any political organisations is prohibited. Civil society participation in governance is tightly restricted, with the government exercising strict oversight over nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). NGOs face significant hurdles, including the need for government licensing and constant scrutiny, making it difficult for independent voices to influence policy or governance.   Public criticism of the ruling family, government policies, or the monarchy is met with severe reprisals, including imprisonment and intimidation. There is little tolerance for dissent, and activists and critics face significant restrictions, including travel bans and detention without trial. Furthermore, the political system lacks transparency, with no avenues for ordinary citizens to participate meaningfully in governance (Amnesty International, 2022).   Women’s participation in politics remains minimal, despite reforms allowing them to vote and run for office in limited municipal elections. Although women were allowed to participate in the 2015 municipal elections for the first time, their political influence remains marginal due to the overall restrictions on governance and political activity (Global Gender Gap Report, 2023).   Score: 1/5  – “There are no free or fair elections. The state is ruled by an authoritarian regime, and any political opposition is systematically crushed. Democratic governance is non-existent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Global Gender Gap Report. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Women’s Political Participation . [Online] Available at: https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia.  [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.4   Freedom from Discrimination   In Saudi Arabia, discrimination remains deeply entrenched in law and practice, particularly against women, religious minorities, and migrant workers. The legal system is heavily influenced by conservative interpretations of Islamic law (Sharia), which formalises gender-based discrimination. Women face significant legal restrictions, including the male guardianship system, which requires women to obtain permission from male relatives to marry, travel, or access certain government services. Despite recent reforms allowing women to drive and travel without male permission, these changes are limited, and women’s rights continue to be curtailed in many aspects of life.   Religious discrimination is also prevalent, particularly against the Shia Muslim minority, who face systemic marginalisation in employment, education, and religious practice. Shia Muslims are often excluded from senior positions in government and the military, and their religious practices are frequently restricted or monitored by the state. Non-Muslims are prohibited from openly practising their religion, and public displays of non-Islamic religious symbols or ceremonies are strictly forbidden.   Migrant workers, who make up a significant portion of the workforce, are also subject to widespread discrimination under the kafala (sponsorship) system. This system ties a migrant worker’s legal status to their employer, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, and forced labour. Despite efforts to reform the kafala system, migrant workers continue to face harsh working conditions, lack of legal protection, and barriers to accessing justice.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no legal protections against discrimination, and the state actively promotes or tolerates discriminatory practices. Marginalised groups are heavily oppressed and face severe inequality.”    References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In Saudi Arabia, the right to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is routinely violated, particularly in cases involving political dissidents, human rights activists, and individuals accused of terrorism-related offences. Detainees are frequently subjected to physical abuse, including beatings, electric shocks, and prolonged solitary confinement. Confessions extracted under torture are regularly used as primary evidence in trials, undermining the integrity of the judicial process.   The lack of independent oversight of detention facilities and limited access to legal representation for detainees exacerbate the problem. Political prisoners and those accused of state security crimes are particularly vulnerable to abuse. In many instances, detainees are held incommunicado for extended periods, during which they are denied medical care and legal counsel, increasing their susceptibility to torture and other forms of inhuman treatment.   International bodies, such as the United Nations Committee Against Torture, have raised concerns about Saudi Arabia’s continued failure to comply with international human rights standards, including those under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Despite these international obligations, Saudi Arabia has taken limited steps to address the widespread use of torture within its security apparatus. Moreover, human rights organisations have repeatedly called on Saudi Arabia to enact reforms that would ensure detainees' rights are protected and that allegations of torture are thoroughly investigated (MENA Rights Group, 2023; UN Committee Against Torture, 2021).   Score: 1/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are widespread and systematically used by the state. There are no legal protections, and security forces routinely act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent.  [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2016. UN Committee Against Torture to Review Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/26/un-committee-against-torture-review-saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. MENA Rights Group. 2023. The Saudi Human Rights Commission: A Whitewashing Tool of the Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://menarights.org/en/documents/saudi-human-rights-commission-whitewashing-tool-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Human rights defenders in Saudi Arabia face severe repression, harassment, and imprisonment for their activities. The government imposes strict laws that criminalise peaceful activism, particularly in areas related to political reform, women’s rights, and free speech. Many prominent human rights defenders have been arrested under broad anti-terrorism and cybercrime laws, which the authorities use to target those who criticise the government or call for reforms.   The Law on Combating Terrorism Crimes and its Financing has been frequently used to suppress human rights defenders, with vague definitions of terrorism enabling the authorities to detain activists on charges that are often politically motivated. Many are subjected to unfair trials, prolonged detention without trial, and, in some cases, torture or ill-treatment while in custody. The Saudi government has also been criticised for using travel bans, asset freezes, and threats against family members to silence human rights defenders, both domestically and internationally.   International human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have repeatedly condemned Saudi Arabia’s treatment of human rights defenders. Despite some reforms in recent years, the kingdom continues to operate with little tolerance for dissent, and the risks for those advocating for human rights remain extremely high. Calls from the international community for Saudi Arabia to respect its obligations under international human rights law have largely gone unheeded, and the environment for human rights defenders remains perilous.   Score: 1/5  – “Human rights defenders are systematically targeted by the state. They face imprisonment, torture, or worse, and there are no legal protections for their work.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. MENA Rights Group. 2020. Saudi Human Rights Commission: A Whitewashing Tool for the Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://menarights.org/en/documents/saudi-human-rights-commission-whitewashing-tool-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in Saudi Arabia is severely restricted. The government exercises tight control over the media and the internet, and public criticism of the government, royal family, or religion is heavily censored. The country’s laws, including the Anti-Cyber Crime Law and Counter-Terrorism Law, are frequently used to prosecute individuals for peaceful expression, particularly those who criticise the authorities, advocate for reform, or express dissenting views online. Journalists, bloggers, and activists are regularly targeted for their work, with many facing imprisonment, fines, or travel bans.   Social media platforms are closely monitored by authorities, and users who post content deemed politically sensitive or critical of the government face prosecution. The case of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was murdered in 2018 after criticising the Saudi government, highlighted the risks faced by those who challenge the state’s narrative. Freedom of the press is virtually non-existent, with media outlets heavily censored and subject to government control.   Although some reforms have been introduced in recent years, such as loosening restrictions on women’s participation in public life, the broader landscape of free expression remains tightly controlled. International organisations continue to call on Saudi Arabia to respect Freedom of Expression and cease the repression of those exercising their right to speak out.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no meaningful protections for Freedom of Expression. The state controls the media, and dissenting voices are silenced through imprisonment or violence.”   References:   Amnesty International, 2023. Human Rights in Saudi Arabia .  [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/saudi-arabia/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Freedom of the Press Index . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Saudi Arabia imposes strict limitations on freedom of religion or belief, with the government enforcing a rigid interpretation of Sunni Islam. Public practice of any religion other than Islam is prohibited, and non-Muslim religious activities are restricted to private spaces. The government does not recognise the right to change one’s religion or belief, and apostasy is punishable by death under Islamic law (Sharia). Religious minorities, particularly Shia Muslims, face systematic discrimination, including restrictions on their religious practices and exclusion from senior government positions.   Religious police, known as the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), continue to monitor and enforce strict religious observance, despite reforms in recent years that have reduced their power. Shia Muslims in particular face restrictions on building mosques and holding public religious ceremonies, while non-Muslims are forbidden from displaying religious symbols or openly practising their faith.   International human rights organisations have repeatedly criticised Saudi Arabia for its severe restrictions on religious freedom, calling on the government to allow greater tolerance of religious diversity. Despite these calls, Saudi Arabia continues to maintain strict controls over religious expression and limits the freedoms of religious minorities and non-Muslims.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no freedom of religion or belief. The state enforces a particular belief system, and those who dissent face imprisonment, violence, or severe discrimination.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2023. 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/saudi-arabia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.9   Right to Privacy   The right to privacy is significantly curtailed in Saudi Arabia, where the government engages in widespread surveillance of its citizens and residents. The authorities routinely monitor internet activities, social media platforms, and private communications. Under the Anti-Cyber Crime Law, individuals can be prosecuted for content shared in private communications if it is deemed critical of the government, religious authorities, or public morality. The government has implemented advanced surveillance technologies to monitor and track individuals’ online activities, contributing to a climate of self-censorship.   Saudi Arabia’s Counter-Terrorism Law is also used to justify invasive surveillance practices. This law enables authorities to intercept communications and search individuals' homes without court orders in cases related to national security. Furthermore, women's privacy is particularly restricted under the guardianship system, which grants male relatives control over certain aspects of women’s lives, such as travel and access to personal documents, limiting their autonomy and privacy.   The government’s use of spyware to track dissidents has been widely reported, with allegations that the Saudi authorities have used tools like the Pegasus software to monitor and target activists and critics of the regime both inside and outside the country. This widespread breach of privacy extends beyond national borders, raising significant concerns about the Saudi government's reach in surveilling its citizens and critics globally.   Score: 2/5  – “Privacy rights are weak or frequently violated. Government surveillance and intrusion into personal data are widespread, and there is little accountability for breaches.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. BBC News. 2021. NSO spyware used to target activists, says report.  [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-57891506 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.14.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   In Saudi Arabia, the right to life and security of person is frequently undermined by state practices, particularly in relation to the use of the death penalty, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killings. The country maintains one of the highest execution rates in the world, with the death penalty applied for a wide range of offences, including drug-related crimes and acts considered to be against the state, such as political dissent or terrorism. Trials leading to capital punishment are often criticised for not meeting international standards of fairness, with confessions sometimes extracted under torture.   Arbitrary detention is another concern, particularly for political activists, human rights defenders, and those accused of terrorism. Individuals are often held without charge for extended periods, denied access to legal representation, and subjected to ill-treatment while in custody. Many detainees report being tortured or otherwise mistreated, and in some cases, these abuses have resulted in death.   Security forces in Saudi Arabia, including the Ministry of Interior, have been implicated in numerous cases of abuse, particularly in suppressing political dissent or protests. International human rights organisations have raised concerns about the lack of accountability for these abuses, with security personnel rarely facing prosecution for violations of human rights.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no effective protection for the right to life. State violence, extrajudicial killings, or systematic abuses are rampant, and there is no accountability for perpetrators.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reprieve. 2022. Saudi Arabia and the death penalty: Everything you need to know about the rise in executions under Mohammed bin Salman . [Online] Available at: https://reprieve.org/us/2023/01/31/saudi-arabia-and-the-death-penalty-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-rise-in-executions-under-mohammed-bin-salman/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.11   Overall Score for Saudi Arabia – 1.1/5   Saudi Arabia's overall score reflects its significant shortcomings in upholding fundamental human rights. Despite some recent reforms, the country continues to impose severe restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, while maintaining a justice system that lacks transparency and fairness. Systemic discrimination, the use of torture, and the persecution of human rights defenders remain pervasive. The low score highlights the ongoing repression and absence of meaningful legal protections for individuals, particularly in areas concerning civil and political rights. Substantial reforms are necessary to address these critical human rights issues.

3.4.6  France's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.6.1  Freedom of Assembly and Association   In France, freedom of assembly and association are protected under both domestic law and international agreements.   While freedom of assembly is generally respected, there have been notable instances where state responses to protests have raised concerns. France has a long tradition of public demonstrations, often on issues related to labour rights, social justice, and political reform. However, in recent years, large-scale protests, such as the Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) movement, have seen heavy-handed responses from law enforcement. Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have criticised the use of excessive force, such as tear gas and rubber bullets, by French police during protests.   Additionally, France’s legal framework allows the government to impose certain restrictions on assemblies in the interest of public safety or national security. For example, during periods of heightened security threats, such as after the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the French government invoked a state of emergency that restricted certain civil liberties, including the right to assemble.   Freedom of association is also guaranteed in France, allowing citizens to form unions, political parties, and civil society organisations freely. However, in recent years, some civil society organisations, particularly those working on issues related to immigration and human rights, have reported increased scrutiny and pressure from the government.   In summary, while France provides strong legal protections for freedom of assembly and association, recent protests and government responses have highlighted tensions between maintaining public order and fully respecting these rights.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: France . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.2  Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In France, the right to a fair trial and due process is protected, but the judicial system faces challenges that affect the timely and equal administration of justice. While legal frameworks ensure the presumption of innocence, access to a defence, and impartial courts, delays in legal proceedings and pretrial detention are ongoing concerns.   Particularly for marginalised communities, access to justice can be hindered by long judicial processes and the uneven availability of legal assistance. France's high-profile counterterrorism laws have also raised concerns about the potential erosion of due process, with critics pointing to cases of prolonged detentions without formal charges under emergency laws.   Despite these challenges, France's judiciary is largely independent and functions well in most cases, but reforms have been called for to improve efficiency and better safeguard procedural rights.   Score: 4/5  – “Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.3  Political Participation and Democratic Governance   France is a well-established democracy with a political system based on the Fifth Republic, which features a strong executive and regular, free elections at local, regional, and national levels. Citizens participate actively in politics through voting, and elections are generally regarded as free and fair, overseen by independent electoral authorities.   Political participation in France is robust, with multiple political parties representing a wide range of ideologies. However, recent years have seen increasing voter apathy, particularly among younger citizens, and growing disenchantment with traditional political parties. This has contributed to the rise of populist movements, including the far-right National Rally (formerly Front National) and the emergence of outsider political figures like President Emmanuel Macron.   While the democratic system functions effectively, concerns remain about political polarisation, the underrepresentation of marginalised groups, and the impact of economic inequality on political engagement. Civil society organisations continue to play an active role in shaping public discourse and holding the government accountable.   Score: 5/5  – “The country guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in government. Political opposition is allowed and respected, and there is a transparent process for democratic governance.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: France . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.4  Freedom from Discrimination   In France, freedom from discrimination is protected by both constitutional provisions and specific anti-discrimination laws, including the Loi sur la discrimination (Law on Discrimination). These laws prohibit discrimination based on race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and other characteristics. France is also a signatory to various international human rights treaties that reinforce these protections.   Despite these legal frameworks, discrimination remains a concern, particularly against minority groups such as immigrants, Muslims, Roma communities, and people of African descent. There have been documented cases of racial profiling by law enforcement, which disproportionately affects young men from these communities. Additionally, Islamophobia has been a growing issue, with the controversial bans on religious symbols, such as headscarves in public schools, drawing criticism from human rights groups for disproportionately targeting Muslim women.   Gender inequality is another persistent issue in France, despite progress in women’s rights. The gender wage gap, underrepresentation of women in leadership positions, and ongoing concerns about gender-based violence continue to be areas where further action is needed.   In summary, while France has comprehensive anti-discrimination laws, societal challenges remain, particularly in addressing racial and religious discrimination, as well as gender inequality.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: France . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.5  Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In France, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is protected under domestic law and international commitments. The Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights prohibit torture and degrading treatment, and France is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT). Despite these legal protections, concerns remain about the treatment of detainees, particularly in police custody and prisons.   Reports from human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have highlighted cases of police brutality, particularly during protests and in low-income neighbourhoods. Instances of excessive force used by law enforcement, including the mistreatment of protestors and the use of dangerous crowd control tactics, have been documented. These incidents have raised concerns about the state's commitment to upholding the prohibition of inhuman treatment. In the prison system, overcrowding and poor conditions are longstanding issues, contributing to concerns about the humane treatment of inmates. Human rights groups have criticised the government for inadequate living conditions, lack of access to healthcare, and occasional instances of violence within prisons.   The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) highlighted overcrowded prisons and a lack of psychiatric beds, which exacerbate the situation. Additionally, the UN Torture Rapporteur requested that France address its obligations, particularly around security operations.   While France has a strong legal framework against torture, challenges in enforcement, particularly within law enforcement and the prison system, persist and have drawn international criticism.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist and are generally enforced, though there may be occasional reports of abuse by law enforcement. Violators are usually held accountable.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Council of Europe. 2023. Anti-Torture Committee Criticizes France for Prison Overcrowding and Poor Conditions . [Online] Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/france-anti-torture-committee-deplores-conditions-of-detention-prison-overcrowding-and-lack-of-psychiatric-beds [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2024. UN Torture Rapporteur Requests France’s Action on Security Operations . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/06/ahead-major-security-trade-fair-paris-un-torture-rapporteur-requests-france  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.6.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In France, human rights defenders are generally able to operate within a robust legal framework that protects freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. However, human rights defenders, particularly those advocating for minority rights, migrants, and environmental protection, face growing challenges. Human rights organisations such as Front Line Defenders and Amnesty International have raised concerns about the harassment and intimidation of activists, especially those involved in protests against state policies and corporate activities.   Environmental activists, for instance, have been increasingly targeted during protests against infrastructure projects, where reports of excessive police force and legal harassment have been noted. Similarly, human rights defenders advocating for migrants’ rights have faced difficulties, including legal threats and police monitoring, particularly when assisting undocumented migrants.   France has a National Human Rights Commission and legal mechanisms designed to support the protection of human rights defenders. However, gaps in implementation remain, especially in cases where the defenders’ activities conflict with state interests, such as protests or migrant advocacy.   Despite these challenges, civil society in France remains active, and human rights defenders continue to play a crucial role in advocating for social justice, environmental protection, and the rights of marginalised groups.   Score: 4/5  – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2024. France: Protection of Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in France is protected under Article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) and is reinforced by the French Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. These legal frameworks guarantee the right to freely express opinions, ideas, and information. France is also home to a vibrant media landscape and active civil society, contributing to robust freedom of speech protections.   However, there have been increasing concerns about restrictions on this freedom, particularly in the context of national security, terrorism, and hate speech laws. In recent years, laws aimed at countering terrorism and hate speech have led to heightened surveillance and the potential restriction of free expression. The Global Security Law, passed in 2021, sparked significant controversy, as it was seen as limiting the ability of journalists and citizens to document police activities, leading to protests and criticism from both national and international human rights groups.   Additionally, while France has strong hate speech laws, there is a delicate balance between combating discrimination and protecting free speech. Laws criminalising hate speech, Holocaust denial, and incitement to violence are in place, but critics argue that these laws can sometimes be used to suppress legitimate expressions of dissent, particularly on sensitive issues like religion or national identity.   The country also faces challenges concerning online censorship and misinformation, as social media platforms are increasingly being held accountable for content shared on their platforms under European and domestic laws. This has raised debates about the balance between maintaining free expression and controlling harmful or false information.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in France . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief in France is protected under the French Constitution and is further reinforced by international agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 1 of the Constitution guarantees the principle of laïcité (secularism), which ensures the separation of religion and state, and protects the freedom of individuals to practice their religion or not.   While the state maintains neutrality in religious matters, France has faced challenges in balancing secularism with religious expression, particularly in relation to Islamic practices. Laws such as the 2004 ban on wearing religious symbols, including the Islamic headscarf, in public schools and the 2010 ban on face coverings in public spaces have drawn criticism from human rights organisations. Critics argue that these laws disproportionately affect Muslim women and infringe on their right to religious freedom.   Religious minorities, including Muslims, Jews, and Christians, generally practice their faith freely in France, though incidents of discrimination and hate crimes based on religion persist. Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attacks, in particular, have been noted by groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, despite efforts by the government to combat hate crimes.   In summary, while France's legal framework strongly protects freedom of religion or belief, tensions around the application of secularism and the treatment of religious minorities continue to raise concerns.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections exist but are inconsistently enforced. Religious minorities may face discrimination, and the state may impose limitations on religious practices.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2024. France: Hijab Bans Ahead of Olympic and Paralympic Games Spark Concerns . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/france-hijab-bans-olympic-and-paralympic/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: France.  [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. Restrictions on Religious Freedom Around the World . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2024/03/PR_2024.3.5_religious-restrictions_REPORT.pdf  [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. 3.4.6.9   Right to Privacy   France has robust privacy laws, particularly through the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). However, concerns remain about state surveillance.   In France, the right to privacy is protected under domestic law and international agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life. Domestically, the Data Protection Act (1978) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which applies across the European Union, provide robust protections for personal data, ensuring that individuals have control over how their data is collected, used, and stored.   Despite these strong legal frameworks, concerns about state surveillance and the collection of personal data have grown in recent years. The passage of anti-terrorism laws following the 2015 Paris attacks expanded the government’s surveillance powers, allowing law enforcement to monitor communications, search homes without a warrant, and impose house arrests without judicial oversight. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have raised concerns about these measures, arguing that they infringe on the right to privacy and could be abused to suppress dissent.   The National Commission on Informatics and Liberty (CNIL), France's data protection authority, plays an important role in ensuring compliance with privacy laws, particularly regarding the handling of personal data by companies and public authorities. In recent years, CNIL has imposed significant fines on major tech companies for violations of data protection laws.   In summary, while France has comprehensive legal protections for privacy, concerns remain regarding the balance between national security measures and individual privacy rights, particularly in the context of increased state surveillance.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. European Data Protection Board (EDPB). 2023. Annual Report 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2024-04/edpb_annual_report_2023_en.pdf [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. La Quadrature du Net. 2024. Eprivacy . [Online] Available at: https://eprivacy.laquadrature.net/en/ [Accessed: 15 September 2024].    3.4.6.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   In France, the right to life and security of person is constitutionally protected, and the country is a signatory to various international human rights treaties, including the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These frameworks safeguard the right to life, security, and the protection of individuals from arbitrary violence or harm.   Despite these legal protections, France faces significant challenges, particularly related to policing and security. Instances of police violence, especially during protests and in low-income neighbourhoods, have raised concerns. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented cases where the use of force by law enforcement has led to deaths or serious injuries. The 2016 protests against labour reforms and the more recent Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) movement saw widespread allegations of police brutality, prompting calls for greater accountability and reform in policing practices.   In addition to law enforcement concerns, the French government has implemented strict anti-terrorism measures in recent years, which, while aimed at protecting public safety, have raised human rights concerns. The state of emergency declared after the 2015 Paris attacks allowed authorities to impose measures that critics argue infringed on civil liberties, including increased surveillance and restrictions on movement.   Gender-based violence also remains a serious issue in France. The country has made efforts to combat violence against women, but high rates of domestic violence, including femicide, have led to ongoing debates about the effectiveness of these measures.   In summary, while France’s legal framework strongly supports the right to life and personal security, concerns about police violence, state surveillance, and gender-based violence highlight the need for continued reforms and stronger protections for vulnerable populations.   Score: 3/5  – "The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or sexual orientation). Law enforcement often operates with impunity."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.11   Overall score for France – 3.8/5   France's overall score reflects a country with strong legal protections for human rights, particularly in areas such as political participation, fair trials, and Freedom of Expression. However, issues such as police violence during protests, racial discrimination, and limitations on religious freedom highlight challenges in enforcement, particularly for marginalised groups like Muslims and migrants. While France upholds a robust legal framework for civil liberties, gaps remain in ensuring equal treatment and protection for all citizens, especially in relation to law enforcement accountability and anti-discrimination efforts.   3.4.7   Germany's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.7.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Citizens have the right to organise and participate in demonstrations and protests without prior notification, though this right can be subject to restrictions in cases where public safety or order is at risk. Assemblies under the open sky may be subject to conditions or bans, especially if they pose a threat to public security.   Germany is known for its robust protections for peaceful assembly, and protests are a common form of political and social expression. However, there are limits to these freedoms, particularly when it comes to extremist groups. For instance, associations that seek to undermine democratic principles, such as those with neo-Nazi or other extremist ideologies, can be banned under Article 9 of the Grundgesetz. The government has taken steps to restrict the activities of groups it deems a threat to public safety, such as those promoting hate speech or violence.   In practice, most public demonstrations in Germany occur peacefully, though there have been occasional clashes with law enforcement, particularly during protests related to far-right or far-left movements. The Federal Constitutional Court ensures that restrictions on assembly and association adhere to the principle of proportionality, balancing individual freedoms with the need for public security.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   German courts operate with a high degree of independence, free from government or political interference. Judges are appointed based on merit and are subject to strict legal guidelines, ensuring their impartiality. The Federal Constitutional Court serves as a guardian of the constitution, upholding the rule of law and ensuring that fair trial principles are adhered to in all cases.   The German legal system guarantees several key elements of due process, including the presumption of innocence, the right to legal representation, and the right to appeal decisions. The Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozessordnung) outlines the rights of defendants, including the right to be informed of charges, to present evidence, and to confront witnesses.   Germany provides legal aid to individuals who cannot afford legal representation, ensuring that financial limitations do not hinder access to justice. This is particularly important in maintaining the fairness of the judicial process for economically disadvantaged groups.   While Germany generally adheres to high standards of fairness in legal proceedings, there have been occasional criticisms, particularly regarding the length of time it can take to resolve cases. Overcrowded courts and a backlog of cases sometimes result in delays, which can prolong pretrial detention in certain circumstances. Nonetheless, the right to a prompt and fair trial remains a cornerstone of the German justice system, with courts working to mitigate these challenges.   Score: 4/5 –  “Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles.”   References:   Council of Europe. 2021. Reforms to address unreasonable legal delays . [Online] Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/impact-convention-human-rights/-/reforms-to-address-unreasonable-legal-delays [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Germany holds regular, free, and fair elections at both federal and state levels. The Bundestag, the federal parliament, is elected every four years through a mixed-member proportional representation system. Citizens over the age of 18 have the right to vote, and voter turnout is typically high, reflecting strong political engagement. The political landscape is dominated by several major parties, including the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and Alliance 90/The Greens, ensuring a competitive and pluralistic political environment.   Civil society in Germany is strong, with a vibrant network of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), advocacy groups, and trade unions actively participating in political discourse. Citizens can engage in political life through protests, petitions, and referenda at the state level, providing multiple avenues for influencing government decisions.   Although Germany has a robust democratic framework, some challenges remain. Political participation by certain minority groups, such as immigrants and people with lower socio-economic status, is often lower than the national average. There are also growing concerns about the rise of far-right political movements, which have gained representation in local and national parliaments, challenging the country's democratic values.   Score: 5/5  – “The country guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in government. Political opposition is allowed and respected, and there is a transparent process for democratic governance.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination is a core principle protected under Article 3 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination on grounds such as race, gender, disability, religion, or political opinion. Germany has also implemented several legal frameworks, including the General Equal Treatment Act (AGG), to combat discrimination and ensure equal treatment in areas like employment, education, and access to services.   The AGG, passed in 2006, is a key piece of anti-discrimination legislation in Germany. It prohibits discrimination in various fields, including employment, housing, and access to goods and services, on the basis of race, ethnic origin, gender, religion, disability, age, or sexual orientation. The AGG provides individuals with legal recourse if they experience discrimination, including the right to file complaints or seek compensation.   Despite strong legal protections, certain minority groups in Germany still face discrimination. Immigrants, particularly those of Turkish or Arab descent, as well as asylum seekers and refugees, are often subject to xenophobia and unequal treatment in employment and housing.   Germany has also faced criticism for its treatment of the Roma and Sinti communities, who continue to face significant barriers to accessing housing, employment, and education. Although the government has taken steps to address these issues, including public awareness campaigns and social integration programmes, discrimination against these groups remains a challenge.   While Germany has made significant progress in gender equality, including closing the gender pay gap and promoting women in leadership positions, challenges remain. Women, particularly those from immigrant backgrounds, continue to face unequal treatment in the workplace. Furthermore, while Germany legalised same-sex marriage in 2017, LGBTQ+ individuals still report discrimination in both public and private life. Hate crimes targeting LGBTQ+ people have also been on the rise, highlighting the ongoing challenges in ensuring full equality.   Overall, while Germany has a strong legal framework to combat discrimination, the practical application of these protections continues to face obstacles, particularly for minority and vulnerable groups.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections against discrimination exist but may be inconsistently enforced. Discrimination is not widespread, though certain marginalised groups may face barriers.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Germany: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/germany/report-germany/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Germany is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) and its domestic legal framework, particularly the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. Article 1 of the Basic Law emphasises the inviolability of human dignity, providing a strong constitutional foundation against torture and mistreatment. Furthermore, Article 104 prohibits any physical or mental mistreatment of persons in detention.   The Criminal Code stipulates penalties for public officials who commit acts of torture or inhuman treatment, and German courts have taken action to prosecute such offences. Law enforcement agencies are generally held accountable, with oversight mechanisms such as the Federal Agency for the Prevention of Torture monitoring detention facilities and prisons to ensure compliance with anti-torture regulations.   Although Germany has comprehensive legal protections, there have been concerns regarding the treatment of asylum seekers and migrants, particularly in detention centres. Human rights organisations have reported occasional instances of excessive use of force by law enforcement, though these are generally investigated, and responsible individuals are held to account. Germany’s efforts to accommodate large numbers of refugees since 2015 have tested the system, leading to scrutiny of conditions in some reception centres, but no widespread patterns of abuse have been documented.   While cases of police brutality are rare, some instances of excessive force, particularly during protests, have raised concerns. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have highlighted isolated incidents where police officers used disproportionate force, though such cases are usually followed by investigations. Germany's judicial system provides a framework for holding law enforcement accountable when abuses occur.   In summary, while Germany has strong legal frameworks to prevent torture and inhuman treatment, continued vigilance and monitoring are necessary, particularly concerning vulnerable groups like asylum seekers and detainees. The country generally upholds its commitment to international human rights standards, with effective oversight mechanisms in place.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist and are generally enforced, though there may be occasional reports of abuse by law enforcement. Violators are usually held accountable.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Germany: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/germany/report-germany/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2022. Germany: 2022 National Preventive Mechanism Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/spt-opcat/npm/German-2022.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Human rights defenders in Germany operate in a largely free and open environment, with the ability to advocate for human rights issues, including those related to migrants, LGBTQ+ rights, and environmental activism. They have access to legal recourse when their rights are violated, and civil society organisations play an active role in ensuring that human rights defenders are able to conduct their work without fear of reprisal, although threats and attacks are not unheard of. Law enforcement agencies are generally responsive in investigating and prosecuting those who threaten or attack human rights defenders. Civil society organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, operate freely in the country, providing support to human rights defenders through advocacy, legal assistance, and public awareness campaigns. These organisations also play a critical role in holding the government accountable when failures occur in protecting human rights defenders.   Some environmental human rights defenders have reported increased intimidation tactics by law enforcement, such as use of force during protests, prosecution and exorbitant fines, preventative detention, and even raids on their homes. Such measures have raised concerns about the erosion of civil liberties and the chilling effect on public protest, especially regarding climate change activism, which is seen as challenging the state’s economic policies related to coal mining and other industries.   In summary, while Germany offers a supportive environment for human rights defenders, challenges persist, particularly from far-right groups. Continued vigilance is needed to ensure that human rights defenders can carry out their important work without facing threats or intimidation.   Score: 4/5  – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. DW. 2023. Germany: Viral video prompts debate on police brutality . [Online] Available at: https://p.dw.com/p/4Qa2F [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. Germany Prosecutes Environmental Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/28/germany-prosecutes-environmental-defenders [Accessed: 19 October 2024].     3.4.7.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression is a fundamental right in Germany, enshrined in Article 5 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). This article guarantees every individual the right to freely express and disseminate their opinions in speech, writing, and images, as well as the right to receive information. However, this right is not absolute, and certain limitations are placed on speech that incites hatred, denies the Holocaust, or glorifies Nazism.   Germany has a robust and free press, with journalists generally able to operate without government interference. The country ranks high on global press freedom indices, and its legal framework protects media organisations from undue restrictions. Public and private media co-exist, and the Federal Constitutional Court has played a crucial role in safeguarding the media’s role as a watchdog over the government.   Despite the strong protections, there are legal restrictions on certain types of expression. Germany has strict laws against hate speech, Holocaust denial, and the use of Nazi symbols. The Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) criminalises incitement to hatred, which can result in significant penalties. Additionally, Section 130 of the code specifically prohibits speech that incites violence or hatred against minorities. These restrictions are rooted in Germany’s post-World War II commitment to preventing the spread of fascist ideologies and protecting public order.   In recent years, Germany has implemented stricter laws governing online content. The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), passed in 2017, requires social media companies to remove illegal content, including hate speech and defamation, within 24 hours or face substantial fines. While aimed at curbing online abuse, the law has raised concerns among free speech advocates about over-censorship and its impact on legitimate speech.   In conclusion, while Germany offers a strong legal framework for Freedom of Expression, the state maintains certain restrictions to prevent hate speech and protect public order, reflecting its unique historical context.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., hate speech or national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in Germany . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/germany [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.7.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Article 4 of the Basic Law ensures that everyone has the right to freely practice their religion, and religious communities have the right to self-governance. Germany recognises several religious communities, including Christianity (Catholic and Protestant churches), Judaism, Islamism, Buddhism, and other faiths. These communities are allowed to operate schools, run charities, and engage in various social activities under their religious identities.   Germany maintains a formal separation between church and state. However, certain religious groups, such as the Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church, enjoy a special status and are allowed to collect a "church tax" from their members through the state’s tax system. Religious instruction is also available in public schools, although it is optional, and students may choose to take ethics classes instead.   While religious freedom is broadly respected, certain minority groups, especially Muslims, face social discrimination and challenges in fully exercising their religious rights. For instance, the construction of mosques and the wearing of religious symbols, such as the hijab, have sparked public debates. There have been instances where local governments placed restrictions on mosque construction or public displays of religious dress, raising concerns about Islamophobia and the treatment of Muslim communities.   The German government has taken steps to address religious discrimination and support religious communities. Laws are in place to prosecute hate crimes based on religion, and efforts to promote interfaith dialogue are ongoing. However, some religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Jews, report that more needs to be done to ensure they are treated equally in public life.   Score: 4/ 5 – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. International Religious Freedom Report: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/germany/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.9   Right to Privacy   The right to privacy in Germany is strongly protected under Article 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which guarantees personal rights, including the protection of personal data. In addition to the constitution, Germany is also subject to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which sets out stringent standards for the processing of personal data across the European Union.   While Germany generally upholds strong privacy protections, concerns have been raised about state surveillance, particularly under the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), which has been accused of overreach in its monitoring activities. In 2020, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court ruled that parts of the BND law were unconstitutional, stating that surveillance of foreign nationals outside Germany violated fundamental privacy rights. This ruling has since prompted reforms to limit the scope of surveillance by state authorities.   Despite strong protections, Germany faces challenges in balancing security concerns with privacy rights. Anti-terrorism measures, such as the retention of telecommunications data under the Data Retention Act, have sparked debates about whether such measures violate individual privacy rights. The act has been the subject of legal challenges, with critics arguing that it infringes on citizens' rights to privacy.   In conclusion, Germany has established a solid legal framework to protect privacy, but concerns about state surveillance and the balance between privacy and security continue to be debated.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/germany/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   In Germany, the right to life and security of person is enshrined in Article 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which guarantees the right to life and physical integrity. The state is obligated to protect these rights through its legal system and public security measures. Germany adheres to strict human rights protections, and its legal framework aligns with international human rights treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights.   While the German police are generally effective and held to high professional standards, there have been occasional concerns about police conduct, particularly regarding excessive use of force. This has been highlighted in recent debates about police tactics during protests and public demonstrations. Nonetheless, Germany has strong mechanisms for holding law enforcement accountable, with independent oversight bodies that investigate allegations of misconduct.   In recent years, Germany has faced security challenges related to international terrorism and domestic extremism. The government has introduced a range of counterterrorism measures to protect public safety, including increased surveillance, tighter border controls, and expanded law enforcement capabilities. However, these measures have sparked debates about the balance between security and individual rights. Germany remains committed to upholding human rights even as it addresses security concerns.   Germany continues to face challenges in addressing gender-based violence and domestic abuse. Although legal protections are in place, including laws against domestic violence and support services for victims, gender-based violence remains a serious issue. Reports of domestic violence surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, prompting the government to implement additional support measures for victims.   Despite these challenges, Germany maintains a strong commitment to protecting life and personal security, with a legal framework that aligns with its obligations under both domestic law and international human rights standards.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, and violence is generally low, though certain groups (e.g., minorities or marginalised communities) may face occasional threats. Law enforcement generally follows legal protocols but may overstep in some cases.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Germany: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/germany/report-germany/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.11   Overall Score for Germany: 4.1/5   Germany shows a strong commitment to human rights, with robust legal frameworks that protect freedoms such as expression, assembly, and privacy. While the country generally upholds these rights, challenges remain, particularly in addressing rising far-right extremism, incidents of police overreach during protests, and ongoing issues related to gender-based violence. Despite these concerns, Germany's well-functioning judiciary, accountable law enforcement, and active civil society contribute to its high human rights standards.    3.4.8   India's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.8.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Citizens have the right to gather and protest peacefully, but this is often subject to prior permission from authorities, particularly in urban areas. The requirement to obtain permission, often in the form of a permit, has sometimes been criticised for leading to the suppression of protests, particularly those that challenge the government. Over the years, there have been notable instances where peaceful assemblies have been met with police force, particularly during politically sensitive events, such as protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the farmers' protests of 2020–2021.   India’s constitution also guarantees the right to form associations and unions, with trade unions being a particularly prominent example. However, restrictions can be imposed on groups considered a threat to public order or national security.   In practice, both freedoms have faced challenges. Protests are sometimes met with excessive police force or detentions, and there are concerns about laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) being used to suppress dissent and limit freedom of association, particularly for groups advocating for minority or marginalised communities. While freedom of assembly is generally respected, large-scale protests, particularly those critical of government policies, often face significant resistance from state authorities.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections are inconsistent or weak. Protests are often subject to heavy policing or restrictions. Civil society groups face bureaucratic hurdles or occasional harassment.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. India: Freedom of Assembly Under Threat . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: India . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024].     3.4.8.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process in India is constitutionally protected in India, to ensure equality before the law, protection from arbitrary arrest, the right to legal representation, and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. India’s legal framework aims to uphold judicial independence and safeguard the rights of accused individuals.   However, despite these constitutional protections, the Indian legal system faces significant challenges. Delays in judicial proceedings and overcrowded courts result in prolonged pretrial detentions, with many individuals waiting years for their cases to be heard. The application of laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and sedition laws has raised concerns about the suppression of dissent and the extended detention of political activists without trial, undermining the principles of a speedy and fair trial. While legal aid is available through government programmes, many economically disadvantaged and marginalised individuals face barriers in accessing competent legal representation. In practice, India struggles to fully realise the right to a fair trial due to these systemic issues, despite the presence of strong legal safeguards in the constitution and judicial system.   Score: 3/5  – “Judicial independence is inconsistent. Some cases, especially political ones, may experience government interference. Arbitrary detention or extended pretrial detention is reported but not widespread.”   References:   Constitution of India. Articles 14, 19, 20, 21, and 22 . [Online] Available at: https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: India . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Political participation and democratic governance in India are robust, with the country being the largest democracy in the world. The Constitution of India ensures that citizens have the right to vote in regular, free, and fair elections, with the Election Commission of India overseeing the process. India holds national, state, and local elections that allow for broad public participation.   Political power is distributed across multiple levels of government, and political parties, including both national and regional entities, play a vital role in shaping India's diverse political landscape. Major political parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Indian National Congress (INC) dominate national politics, while various regional parties hold significant influence at the state level.   Challenges to democratic governance include rising concerns about electoral integrity, political corruption, and the increasing influence of money and media on elections. Additionally, the curbing of dissent and the use of laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) to suppress political opposition have raised concerns about the erosion of democratic norms. Despite these issues, India remains a functioning democracy with active political participation and a well-established electoral process.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed but faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: India . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International IDEA. 2023. India . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-overview?country=103 [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.8.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination in India is guaranteed under Article 15 of the Constitution of India, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Article 17 further abolishes untouchability, which historically affected lower-caste communities, particularly Dalits. Despite these legal protections, discrimination based on caste, religion, gender, and ethnicity remains prevalent in many parts of society.   While outlawed, caste-based discrimination continues to affect social and economic opportunities, particularly for Dalits and other historically marginalised groups. Despite affirmative action policies, such as reservations in education and government jobs, caste violence and social exclusion are still reported, especially in rural areas.   India's diverse religious landscape includes Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, and others. Tensions between religious communities occasionally result in violence, with Muslims and Christians sometimes facing discrimination and hate crimes.   Despite legal frameworks promoting gender equality, women in India face significant challenges, including gender-based violence, wage gaps, and underrepresentation in political and economic spheres. Gender-based violence, including domestic violence and sexual assault, remains pervasive, although laws such as the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act and Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act offer some protection.   While India decriminalised homosexuality in 2018, LGBTQ+ individuals still face significant social stigma and discrimination. Legal recognition of same-sex relationships and rights to marriage, adoption, and inheritance remain areas of ongoing advocacy.   In conclusion, while India’s legal framework prohibits discrimination, deep-rooted societal prejudices and systemic inequalities continue to challenge the full realisation of freedom from discrimination.   Score: 2/5  – “Discrimination is prevalent, and legal protections are either weak or non-existent. Marginalised groups face systemic inequality, and the state does little to address these disparities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in India . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india/report-india/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Freedom from torture and inhuman treatment in India is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. India is also a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), though it has yet to ratify the convention, raising concerns about the adequacy of legal protections against torture. Domestic laws, such as the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, prohibit physical harm and custodial violence. However, incidents of torture and ill-treatment, particularly in police custody, continue to be reported.   Reports of custodial deaths, police brutality, and inhuman treatment by law enforcement agencies are ongoing issues in India. Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented numerous cases where individuals in police custody have been subjected to physical abuse, often to extract confessions or as a means of punishment. Despite laws in place, accountability for such abuses remains weak, and convictions of police officers involved in custodial violence are rare.   The Indian judiciary has played an important role in addressing custodial torture. The Supreme Court of India has passed several judgements reinforcing the rights of detainees, including the need for medical examinations and legal representation for those in custody. Despite these efforts, implementation at the ground level remains inconsistent.   While India’s constitution and judiciary provide safeguards against torture, the prevalence of custodial violence and the lack of a robust legal framework continue to undermine these protections.   Score: 2/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are reported frequently, and legal protections are weak or rarely enforced. Law enforcement and security forces often act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in India . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india/report-india/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Protection of human rights defenders in India remains a significant concern, despite constitutional guarantees of Freedom of Expression and association. Human rights defenders in the country often face intimidation, harassment, legal challenges, and even physical violence, particularly when advocating for the rights of marginalised communities, such as Dalits, indigenous peoples, and religious minorities. The situation is especially dire for those raising issues related to environmental rights, land disputes, or criticising government policies.   Human rights defenders, particularly those working on environmental and land rights issues, face significant risks. The assassination of activists like Gauri Lankesh and attacks on those opposing large infrastructure projects or mining activities highlight the dangers faced by those challenging powerful interests. In many cases, perpetrators of violence against human rights defenders enjoy impunity, as investigations are slow and prosecutions rare.   India has also seen an increasing crackdown on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) critical of the government. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) has been used to restrict the funding of NGOs, particularly those advocating for human rights. Amnesty International, for example, was forced to halt operations in India in 2020 after its bank accounts were frozen, allegedly due to FCRA violations.   Despite these challenges, India has an active civil society, with numerous organisations continuing to fight for the protection of human rights defenders. However, ongoing state repression, misuse of legal frameworks, and lack of accountability for violence against activists remain serious obstacles.   Score: 2/5  – “Human rights defenders are frequently persecuted, harassed, or jailed for their work. Legal protections are minimal, and the state often seeks to suppress their activities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2020. Protect Our Human Rights Work in India . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/petition/protect-our-human-rights-work-in-india/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2023. India: Human Rights Defenders Under Threat . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in India is protected by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, allowing citizens to freely express opinions. However, Article 19(2) permits restrictions based on national security, public order, and other factors. In practice, laws such as Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (sedition law) and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) have been used to target dissenters, journalists, and activists, limiting their ability to criticise the government.   Media freedom in India is under pressure, with frequent reports of harassment and intimidation of journalists, and the country ranked poorly in the 2023 World Press Freedom Index. Furthermore, the Information Technology Rules, 2021 regulate online content and have raised concerns about censorship, especially on social media platforms.   Despite legal protections, these restrictions have created a challenging environment for free speech in India.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of Expression is heavily restricted. The press and media are frequently censored, and individuals face legal consequences or violence for expressing dissent.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: India . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. World Press Freedom Index 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief in India is constitutionally protected under Article 25 of the Constitution of India, which grants all citizens the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate their religion. India is home to a diverse range of religious groups, including Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, and others, with the state maintaining a secular stance. However, this freedom is subject to reasonable restrictions on the grounds of public order, morality, and health.   In practice, there have been concerns about rising religious intolerance and violence, particularly against religious minorities. In recent years, incidents of communal violence, mob lynchings, and hate crimes against Muslims, Christians, and Dalits have raised serious concerns about the protection of religious freedoms. Additionally, the rise of Hindu nationalist sentiment has led to increased pressure on minority religious communities, with laws such as anti-conversion laws being enacted in several states. These laws, aimed at preventing forced religious conversions, have often been criticised for targeting Christian and Muslim communities.   The government's handling of religious issues has also come under scrutiny, with critics alleging that it has not done enough to curb religious violence or protect vulnerable groups. International human rights organisations have raised concerns about growing restrictions on religious freedoms, calling for stronger measures to protect the rights of all religious communities in India.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of religion is restricted, with certain religious groups facing persecution or being banned. The state either privileges a dominant religion or, in secular states, imposes restrictions on all religious practices.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in India . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india/report-india/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2021. Religion in India: Tolerance and Segregation . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/06/29/religion-in-india-tolerance-and-segregation/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.9   Right to Privacy   The right to privacy in India was explicitly recognised as a fundamental right by the Supreme Court in its landmark Puttaswamy v. Union of India ruling in 2017. This right is derived from Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The judgement strengthened protections for individual privacy, particularly in the context of data protection, surveillance, and bodily autonomy.   India does not yet have comprehensive legislation specifically governing privacy, though the Information Technology Act of 2000 and associated rules offer some protections concerning digital privacy and cybersecurity. These provisions mandate companies to safeguard user data, especially sensitive personal information. However, concerns remain regarding the adequacy of these protections in the face of increasing government surveillance and data collection.   The government's use of surveillance technology, such as the Aadhaar biometric identification system, has sparked debates about privacy infringements. Critics argue that without strong legal safeguards, there is potential for misuse, as Aadhaar links personal data to a centralised database. Moreover, the lack of a robust data protection law raises concerns about data breaches and the unauthorised use of personal information.   In conclusion, while the recognition of the right to privacy marks a positive step forward, challenges remain in terms of practical implementation and the protection of individual privacy in the digital age.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations.”     References:   Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Supreme Court of India. 2017. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs Union of India . [Online] Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/127517806/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person in India is constitutionally protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. However, in practice, challenges remain in ensuring these protections for all citizens.   India faces high levels of violence, including crimes such as murder, sexual assault, and gender-based violence. One of the most pressing concerns is the issue of gender-based violence, particularly violence against women.   Additionally, communal violence and mob lynchings, often targeting religious minorities, have raised serious concerns about the state’s ability to protect its citizens. Security forces, including the police, have also been implicated in extrajudicial killings, particularly in conflict regions like Jammu and Kashmir, where state security measures have been accused of overreach.   In terms of state action, law enforcement agencies have been criticised for their use of excessive force during protests and detentions. Allegations of police brutality, custodial deaths, and the use of unlawful force highlight gaps in ensuring the right to life and security of person for detainees and protesters.   In summary, while legal protections for the right to life exist, India continues to face significant challenges in addressing violence, ensuring law enforcement accountability, and protecting vulnerable populations.   Score: 2/5  – “The right to life is not consistently protected. Arbitrary killings, state violence, or widespread abuses by security forces are common, and accountability mechanisms are weak.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. India: Violence and Security . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.11   Overall Score for India: 2.5/5   While India democratic governance and political participation, significant challenges persist in areas such as freedom from discrimination, torture, and protection of human rights defenders. Legal safeguards exist but are often inconsistently enforced, leading to systemic inequalities and state overreach in several sectors. 3.4.9   Indonesia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.9.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Indonesia, freedom of assembly and association is guaranteed under the Constitution and various international human rights treaties to which Indonesia is a party, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These legal frameworks ensure citizens' rights to peacefully assemble and form associations, including trade unions, political parties, and civil society organisations.   Despite these protections, the reality of exercising these rights is often challenging. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have reported frequent government restrictions on assemblies, particularly those that are critical of the government or related to sensitive political issues. Protests are often met with heavy-handed responses by the police, who have been criticised for using excessive force to disperse crowds, detaining protestors, and imposing arbitrary restrictions on gatherings. Protests related to labour rights, Indigenous land rights, and political dissent are particularly vulnerable to repression.   In addition to assembly rights, the right to form associations is also restricted in certain areas. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that advocate for human rights or environmental protections frequently face scrutiny, and in some cases, their activities are hindered by bureaucratic red tape or allegations of subversive activities. Labour unions, while legally permitted, have also encountered barriers, including intimidation and harassment of union leaders.   While Indonesia has strong legal provisions for these freedoms, in practice, the state's control over political expression and assembly remains a concern, particularly when it comes to activism critical of government policies.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections are inconsistent or weak. Protests are often subject to heavy policing or restrictions. Civil society groups face bureaucratic hurdles or occasional harassment.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report.  [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Indonesia, the right to a fair trial and due process is enshrined in the Constitution and protected under national law. Indonesia is also a party to international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees these rights. However, there are significant gaps in how these rights are implemented in practice.   Indonesia’s judicial system is often criticised for being inefficient and subject to corruption. Defendants from marginalised communities, particularly those from low-income or rural areas, often face difficulties in accessing legal representation. The country's public defender system is under-resourced, and legal aid is limited, which undermines the ability of defendants to receive a fair trial.   Additionally, concerns have been raised about pretrial detention, with individuals often held for long periods without formal charges. Reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented cases where detainees have been denied access to legal counsel or faced coercion, including forced confessions during interrogations. Furthermore, the   Human Rights Monitor   highlights how trials are frequently undermined by the influence of powerful political and military actors, exacerbating systemic weaknesses.   The independence of the judiciary is another issue, as political pressure and corruption can influence court decisions. High-profile cases, particularly those involving political dissent, terrorism, or blasphemy, have raised questions about judicial impartiality.   In summary, while Indonesia has a legal framework that guarantees the right to a fair trial and due process, in practice, these rights are often compromised due to systemic inefficiencies, corruption, and uneven access to justice.   Score: 3/5  – “Judicial independence is inconsistent. Some cases, especially political ones, experience government interference. Arbitrary detention or extended pretrial detention is reported but not widespread.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Monitor. 2023. US Govt Releases New Report on Human Rights Situation in Indonesia in 2022 . [Online] Available at: https://humanrightsmonitor.org/news/us-govt-releases-new-report-on-human-rights-situation-in-indonesia-in-2022/ [Accessed: 15 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   In Indonesia, political participation and democratic governance are characterised by both progress and challenges. Since the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has transitioned into a democratic system, holding regular multiparty elections. These elections, generally considered free and fair, are key to the country’s political participation. The Constitution guarantees the right to vote, and political parties are active at both the local and national levels, with the People’s Consultative Assembly and the House of Representatives playing central roles in governance.   However, political participation is often constrained by systemic corruption and political patronage. Transparency International and Freedom House have raised concerns about the influence of money in politics, where candidates and parties with financial backing often have disproportionate sway. Additionally, while democratic mechanisms are in place, political freedoms have been restricted in certain contexts, particularly when dissent challenges the ruling government or security interests. Indonesia has a vibrant civil society, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an essential role in advocating for democratic reforms. However, there have been instances where activists and political opposition figures have faced harassment, intimidation, and legal action, particularly in regions such as West Papua, where separatist movements and protests have been met with state crackdowns.   Despite being one of the most populous democracies in the world, Indonesia's political landscape remains fraught with challenges, including voter disenfranchisement in remote areas and underrepresentation of women and marginalised groups in politics. Political participation in Indonesia is evolving, but concerns about corruption, authoritarian tendencies, and the protection of political freedoms remain.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2024  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Transparency International. 2023. Corruption Perceptions Index 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/ind  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.4   Freedom from Discrimination   In Indonesia, freedom from discrimination is legally guaranteed under the Constitution and further reinforced by laws such as the Human Rights Law (1999) and the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination Law (2008).   Despite these legal frameworks, discrimination remains a significant issue in practice. Religious minorities, such as Christians, Ahmadiyya Muslims, and Shia Muslims, often face social and legal discrimination. Reports of violence against religious minorities, including the destruction of places of worship and harassment, are not uncommon, and local governments have been criticised for failing to protect these groups. Blasphemy laws, which have been used to target individuals for perceived insults to Islam, are another source of concern, leading to the persecution of minority groups and activists.   Gender discrimination is also prevalent, despite the legal protections in place. Women face challenges in accessing equal employment opportunities, and there are high rates of gender-based violence. Indonesia has made progress in addressing some of these issues, but enforcement of anti-discrimination laws remains inconsistent.   Indigenous peoples and members of the LGBTQ+ community also face marginalisation. Indigenous communities often struggle to defend their land rights against large-scale developments, while the LGBTQ+ population encounters societal stigma and legal barriers, with no specific legal protections in place for sexual orientation or gender identity.   While Indonesia’s legal framework provides some protections against discrimination, significant gaps remain in enforcement, and marginalised groups continue to face systemic challenges.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In Indonesia, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is legally protected under the Constitution and international conventions, such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), to which Indonesia is a party. Despite these formal commitments, reports of torture and ill-treatment, particularly by law enforcement and security forces, remain a significant concern.   Human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have documented numerous cases of police and military personnel using excessive force, particularly during interrogations and in detention centres. Torture is frequently reported in efforts to extract confessions from suspects, especially in cases involving political dissent or terrorism. Additionally, the conditions in many Indonesian prisons and detention facilities are described as inhumane, with overcrowding, poor sanitation, and inadequate access to healthcare being common issues.   Indonesia’s security forces, particularly in regions like West Papua, have been repeatedly accused of using torture and inhuman treatment against Indigenous populations and political activists. While the government has established some mechanisms, such as the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), to address these issues, accountability remains weak, and perpetrators are rarely brought to justice.   Efforts to reform the police and military have been ongoing, but the lack of effective oversight and accountability continues to undermine the country’s progress in eradicating torture and ill-treatment.   Score: 3/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Komnas HAM. 2022. Annual Report on Human Rights in Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.komnasham.go.id/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.9.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Indonesia, human rights defenders face considerable challenges, despite the country’s constitutional protections for Freedom of Expression and association. Those who advocate for the rights of marginalised communities, Indigenous people, environmental protection, or political dissent are particularly vulnerable to intimidation, harassment, and violence. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have raised concerns about the increasing risks faced by defenders, particularly those operating in sensitive areas like West Papua or those challenging government policies or corporate interests.   Environmental activists and land rights defenders are frequently targeted, especially those opposing large-scale infrastructure projects, logging, or mining activities. Many of these defenders face threats from private actors, including corporations, as well as state-backed security forces. In regions like West Papua, defenders advocating for political self-determination or the rights of Indigenous groups are at heightened risk of arbitrary detention, violence, and even extrajudicial killings.   Human rights defenders working on LGBTQ+ issues, women's rights, and migrant rights also report facing significant threats, including legal harassment, social stigma, and physical violence. Despite the existence of mechanisms such as the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), defenders often lack adequate protection, and perpetrators of violence against them are rarely held accountable.   In summary, while Indonesia has made strides in promoting human rights, the protection of human rights defenders remains a serious concern, with widespread impunity for violations and ongoing risks for those challenging powerful state and corporate interests.   Score: 3/5  – “Human rights defenders face some harassment or legal challenges, particularly when criticising the government. Protections are weak or inconsistently applied.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2024. Indonesia: Human Rights Defenders at Risk . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.7   Freedom of Expression   In Indonesia, Freedom of Expression is constitutionally guaranteed, but in practice, it is subject to significant limitations. Article 28 of the Constitution grants citizens the right to express their opinions, but various laws, including the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law, have been used to criminalise speech, especially online. Human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have raised concerns about the misuse of these laws to suppress criticism of the government, political figures, and state policies.   The ITE Law has been widely criticised for its vague definitions of defamation, which have led to prosecutions of journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens for their posts on social media. The law has been used to silence dissent, particularly in cases involving political corruption, environmental issues, or criticisms of powerful figures.   Journalists in Indonesia operate in a difficult environment, with reports of intimidation, harassment, and violence, particularly when covering sensitive issues such as human rights abuses in West Papua. In addition, media outlets that report on politically sensitive topics may face pressure from both the government and corporate interests, leading to self-censorship.   Freedom of Expression is further restricted through blasphemy laws, which are frequently used to target individuals accused of offending religious sensitivities. These laws have led to convictions and jail sentences for those deemed to have insulted religion, disproportionately affecting religious minorities and activists advocating for secularism.   In summary, while Freedom of Expression is legally protected in Indonesia, the government continues to use broad laws to restrict this right, targeting activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens, particularly in politically sensitive or religious contexts.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections exist but are weak. Some journalists and activists face censorship or legal repercussions for their work. Independent media faces bureaucratic or financial challenges.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in Indonesia 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/indonesia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.9.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   In Indonesia, freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally protected under Article 29 of the Constitution, which guarantees that all citizens are free to worship according to their own religion or belief. However, the practical application of this right is limited by both societal norms and government regulations, especially for religious minorities. The government officially recognises only six religions—Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism—creating a restrictive environment for those practicing other beliefs or non-religious groups.   Indonesia’s Blasphemy Law has been a significant tool for curbing religious freedom, often used to prosecute individuals for expressing beliefs that are seen as deviating from mainstream interpretations. The most high-profile case in recent years involved the former governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who was convicted of blasphemy in 2017 for comments perceived to insult Islam. Human rights groups, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have criticised the blasphemy law for fostering intolerance and disproportionately affecting religious minorities, such as Christians, Ahmadis, and Shia Muslims.   Religious intolerance in Indonesia is exacerbated by both social and institutional pressures. In some regions, religious minorities face restrictions on building places of worship, and there have been reports of violence and intimidation against those attempting to practice their faith. For instance, Ahmadiyya and Shia communities have faced harassment, and local governments in certain areas have issued regulations that restrict their religious activities.   In summary, while Indonesia's constitution guarantees freedom of religion, the reality for many religious minorities is fraught with legal and societal challenges. The blasphemy law and other restrictive measures continue to limit religious freedom, especially for non-mainstream faiths and belief systems.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections exist but are inconsistently enforced. Religious minorities may face discrimination, and the state may impose limitations on religious practices.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. 5 facts about Muslims and Christians in Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/03/28/5-facts-about-muslims-and-christians-in-indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 September 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. International Religious Freedom Report: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.9   Right to Privacy   In Indonesia, the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but aspects of it are protected under other laws and regulations. The Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law and the Law on State Intelligence provide some legal framework around the use of personal data and surveillance, though these laws have raised concerns among human rights groups about state overreach.   The ITE Law, while initially designed to regulate online information and protect individuals from defamation and cybercrimes, has often been criticised for being vague, especially regarding privacy protections. The law has been used to criminalise online expression, and it permits broad surveillance of online activities, raising concerns about privacy violations.   Additionally, the Personal Data Protection Bill, which was passed in 2022, represents an important step toward formalising privacy protections, setting out rules for the collection, processing, and storage of personal data. This law aims to strengthen data protection, aligning with international standards, but its implementation remains uncertain, and enforcement mechanisms have yet to be fully developed.   Despite these legal frameworks, there are ongoing concerns about government surveillance and data collection practices. Reports of state monitoring of communications, particularly in politically sensitive regions such as West Papua, have raised concerns about the state's commitment to upholding privacy rights. Activists and human rights defenders have been particularly vulnerable to these surveillance practices.   In summary, while Indonesia has made progress in legislating privacy protections, particularly with the new data protection law, concerns remain about the state’s ability to balance security measures with respect for individual privacy rights.   Score: 2/5  – “Privacy rights are weak or frequently violated. Government surveillance and intrusion into personal data are widespread, and there is little accountability for breaches.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2024. A web of surveillance . [Online] Available at: https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2024/05/a-web-of-surveillance/ [Accessed: 19 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   In Indonesia, the right to life and security of person is protected under the Constitution and various international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Indonesia is a party. Despite these legal frameworks, the country faces ongoing challenges in fully protecting these rights, particularly in the areas of police violence, extrajudicial killings, and human rights abuses in conflict regions like West Papua.   Reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented numerous cases of police brutality and excessive use of force, particularly during protests, in detention centres, and in the context of anti-drug operations. Extrajudicial killings have been reported, especially in conflict-prone areas like West Papua, where the military and police are accused of committing human rights violations against Indigenous populations and political activists. These incidents raise serious concerns about the state's capacity to protect the right to life.   Another major issue is the death penalty, which remains in force in Indonesia, primarily for drug-related offenses. The use of the death penalty has drawn international criticism, particularly because of concerns about fair trial standards and reports of torture used to extract confessions from suspects. The Indonesian government has maintained its stance on capital punishment despite growing calls for its abolition or at least a moratorium.   Gender-based violence is another critical area affecting the right to life and security of person in Indonesia. Rates of domestic violence and femicide are high, with many victims facing barriers to accessing justice. Laws aimed at protecting women and children from violence are often inadequately enforced, leaving vulnerable groups at risk.   In summary, while Indonesia has legal protections for the right to life and security of person, significant challenges remain, particularly in relation to police violence, the use of the death penalty, and gender-based violence.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or political views). Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.11   Overall score for Indonesia: 3/5   Indonesia demonstrates a mixed record in its protection and enforcement of civil and political rights. The country has signed numerous international treaties and upholds a constitutional framework to protect these rights, but significant gaps remain in enforcement. While there are legal protections for rights such as Freedom of Expression and assembly, these are often undermined by restrictions, heavy policing, and inconsistent application, especially for minority groups. There are also concerns regarding the judiciary's independence and issues surrounding access to justice.   In areas such as freedom from discrimination and the protection of human rights defenders, Indonesia continues to face challenges, with harassment and limited legal recourse reported for marginalised communities and activists. Despite these shortcomings, efforts are being made to address human rights violations, though progress remains slow.

3.4.2 Australia’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.2.1 Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Australia, freedom of assembly and association are fundamental rights protected by both the Constitution and various laws. While Australia does not have a formal bill of rights, these freedoms are recognised under common law and protected through legislation at both federal and state levels. For instance, the Fair Work Act 2009 protects the right to freedom of association in the context of union membership and collective bargaining.   Australians generally enjoy the right to peaceful assembly, including the right to protest. Laws across states and territories regulate the conditions for public assemblies, often requiring permits for large gatherings. However, certain limitations exist, particularly concerning public safety, national security, and public order. In some instances, law enforcement's response to protests has raised concerns, especially in cases involving indigenous land rights, environmental activism, and refugee advocacy.   There have also been debates about laws like the Anti-Discrimination Act in Queensland and other states, which criminalise incitement to discrimination and racial hatred but can potentially limit certain forms of protest and speech. Additionally, anti-terrorism laws have led to heightened scrutiny of some groups, raising concerns about freedom of association in particular circumstances.   Despite these limitations, Australia’s legal system broadly supports freedom of assembly and association, allowing civil society, trade unions, and other groups to operate freely.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.2.2 Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Australia, the right to a fair trial and due process is protected by both domestic laws and international commitments. While Australia does not have a constitutional bill of rights, principles of due process are embedded in the legal system through common law, statutes, and international agreements, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Australia is a signatory. These principles ensure that individuals are entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court, the presumption of innocence, and access to legal representation.   While the legal system generally upholds due process, certain areas raise concerns. Australia’s use of mandatory detention for asylum seekers has been widely criticised by human rights organisations for violating due process rights, as detainees often face long periods of detention without judicial review. Additionally, anti-terrorism laws allow for the detention of individuals without charge for extended periods, raising concerns about the potential erosion of fair trial protections.   In conclusion, while Australia has a strong legal framework supporting the right to a fair trial and due process, issues such as access to legal representation and the treatment of asylum seekers and terrorism suspects remain contentious.   Score: 4/5  – "Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.3 Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Political participation and democratic governance in Australia are supported by a robust system based on constitutional principles and democratic institutions. Australia operates as a federal parliamentary democracy, with a constitutional monarchy. The political system is grounded in regular, free, and fair elections, with mandatory voting ensuring high voter turnout. Citizens are encouraged to engage in the political process, and elections are held at federal, state, and local levels.   Australia's preferential voting system ensures that elected representatives reflect a broader spectrum of the electorate. Political parties, including the dominant Liberal and Labor parties, as well as smaller parties like the Greens and independents, participate actively in the political process. The independent Australian Electoral Commission oversees elections to ensure transparency and fairness.   Despite strong democratic institutions, challenges remain, particularly regarding the influence of money in politics and the representation of minority and Indigenous communities. The role of political donations and the influence of corporate interests on policymaking have been subjects of public concern. Additionally, while Indigenous Australians have the right to vote, they remain underrepresented in political institutions, and ongoing debates about constitutional recognition and treaty-making reflect broader issues of governance and inclusion.   In conclusion, while Australia’s democratic governance is well-established and generally strong, ongoing debates about political representation, the role of money in politics, and the participation of minority groups continue to shape the country’s political landscape.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.2.4 Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination in Australia is protected by a strong legal framework that includes both constitutional provisions and comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation.   Australia has made significant progress in addressing racial discrimination, but challenges persist, particularly for Indigenous Australians and migrant communities. Indigenous Australians face systemic disadvantages in areas like health, education, and employment, and they are disproportionately affected by the criminal justice system. The Uluru Statement from the Heart and ongoing debates about Indigenous constitutional recognition highlight the need for deeper structural reforms.   Australia has been at the forefront of promoting gender equality, with strong protections under the Sex Discrimination Act. However, gender-based violence, wage inequality, and underrepresentation in leadership positions remain significant issues. Movements like #MeToo and ongoing campaigns for gender equality in the workplace have brought attention to the need for further reforms.   LGBTQ+ rights have advanced significantly in recent years, with the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2017 marking a significant milestone. Despite these gains, LGBTQ+ individuals continue to experience discrimination in certain areas, particularly in healthcare and employment, and there are ongoing debates around religious exemptions that allow discrimination against LGBTQ+ people in some settings.   In summary, while Australia has comprehensive anti-discrimination laws in place, enforcement remains uneven, and certain communities continue to face systemic discrimination, particularly Indigenous Australians and marginalised groups.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.5 Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Freedom from torture and inhuman treatment in Australia is protected under both domestic and international law. The Criminal Code Act 1995 criminalises acts of torture, and Australia is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), which prohibits torture in all circumstances. Additionally, the Australian Human Rights Commission plays a role in overseeing and investigating complaints of mistreatment and upholding these protections.   Despite these strong legal frameworks, concerns remain regarding the treatment of certain populations, particularly asylum seekers and Indigenous Australians. Australia’s offshore detention of asylum seekers on islands like Nauru and Manus Island has been heavily criticised by human rights organisations for involving inhuman and degrading treatment. Reports of poor living conditions, inadequate medical care, and prolonged detention without clear legal resolution have raised serious concerns about the country’s compliance with international human rights obligations.   Indigenous Australians have also reported instances of excessive force and mistreatment, particularly in the criminal justice system. The high rates of incarceration of Indigenous people, alongside documented instances of abuse and mistreatment in custody, underscore the ongoing challenges in ensuring freedom from torture and inhuman treatment for all individuals in Australia.   .While Australia has a solid legal framework, issues related to the treatment of asylum seekers and Indigenous Australians highlight the need for ongoing vigilance and reform.   Score: 3/5  – "Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Australia, human rights defenders are generally able to operate in a supportive legal environment, with constitutional protections for free speech, assembly, and association. However, they sometimes face challenges, particularly when addressing issues related to Indigenous rights, environmental protection, and refugee advocacy. Defenders working on Indigenous issues often encounter resistance, including harassment or legal challenges, when advocating for land rights or addressing the treatment of Indigenous communities in the criminal justice system.   Environmental activists have faced increasing scrutiny, particularly those protesting against large-scale infrastructure or mining projects. In some instances, environmental defenders have been subjected to legal action or intimidation by corporations and government authorities, particularly under laws designed to limit civil disobedience.   Human rights defenders advocating for refugees, especially those working to highlight the conditions in offshore detention centres, also face challenges. There have been reports of intimidation and restrictions on access to these facilities, limiting the ability of defenders to expose human rights abuses.   Despite these challenges, Australia’s legal system provides avenues for defenders to seek protection and address violations, and civil society remains strong. However, defenders in certain sectors continue to face obstacles, especially when advocating against powerful interests or government policies.   Score: 3/5  – "Human rights defenders face some harassment or legal challenges, particularly when criticising the government. Protections are weak or inconsistently applied."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.2.7       Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in Australia is largely protected by the Constitution, common law, and various federal and state laws. While the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee free speech, the High Court of Australia has interpreted an implied right to political communication, ensuring the protection of speech related to political and public matters. Additionally, Australia is a signatory to international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which safeguards Freedom of Expression.   Despite these protections, there are limitations on free expression, particularly in areas concerning hate speech, defamation, and national security. Australia's defamation laws are among the strictest in the world, with media organisations frequently facing lawsuits for publishing critical or investigative pieces. Although recent reforms have aimed to balance freedom of the press and the protection of individual reputations, concerns remain about the impact of defamation laws on free speech.   Laws against hate speech, such as the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, prohibit speech that incites racial hatred or vilifies groups based on race, ethnicity, or religion. While these laws aim to protect vulnerable groups from harm, they have raised debates about the balance between preventing hate speech and safeguarding free expression.   In the context of national security, legislation such as the Espionage and Foreign Interference Act has broadened the scope of government control over information, raising concerns about the potential suppression of investigative journalism and whistleblowing on sensitive political matters. Journalists and human rights groups have expressed concerns that these laws could be used to limit press freedom and restrict access to information in the public interest.   Score: 4/5  – "Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics. The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.2.8 Freedom of Religion or Belief   Australia guarantees freedom of religion, with minimal restrictions on religious practice. Religious communities, including minority groups, generally operate freely, and there are few cases of government interference. Pew Research Center (2024) has classified Australia as having low government restrictions on religious practices.   Freedom of religion or belief in Australia is protected by both domestic law and international treaties. While the Australian Constitution does not explicitly guarantee religious freedom, Section 116 prevents the government from making laws that establish any religion, impose religious observance, or prohibit the free exercise of religion. Australia is also a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which reinforces protections for freedom of religion or belief.   Australia is home to a diverse range of religious communities, including Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Judaism, as well as a significant portion of the population identifying as non-religious. Religious groups generally operate freely without government interference, and religious tolerance is a key feature of the country’s social fabric.   However, some challenges remain. Religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Jews, have reported incidents of discrimination, hate speech, and occasional hate crimes. These incidents are often isolated, but they raise concerns about religious intolerance. In response, the government has taken steps to strengthen laws against hate crimes and religious discrimination, particularly through anti-discrimination legislation at the federal and state levels.   In summary, while Australia provides strong protections for freedom of religion or belief, ongoing challenges related to discrimination and balancing religious rights with other human rights continue to be discussed.   Score: 5/5  – "The country guarantees complete freedom of religion or belief, allowing all individuals to practice their faith or choose no faith without fear of persecution. Religious communities operate freely and equally."   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. Globally, Government Restrictions on Religion Reached Peak Levels in 2021, While Social Hostilities Went Down . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2024/03/PR_2024.3.5_religious-restrictions_REPORT.pdf [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/australia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.9 Right to Privacy   The right to privacy in Australia is protected under various laws, although the Constitution does not explicitly mention privacy rights. Australia has developed a robust framework for privacy protection, primarily through the Privacy Act 1988, which governs how personal information is collected, used, and disclosed by both government and private entities. This law is administered by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), which ensures compliance with the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs).   The Privacy Act includes provisions to protect individuals’ data, such as the right to access and correct personal information held by organisations and the right to be informed about how personal data is used. It also covers protections for sensitive information, such as health data and financial records. However, Australia’s privacy protections are not as comprehensive as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), leading to debates about the need for stronger laws, particularly in the digital age.   Concerns have been raised about government surveillance, particularly with laws like the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, which allows law enforcement agencies to access communications data under certain circumstances. Australia’s metadata retention laws have also faced criticism for enabling the government to collect and store vast amounts of telecommunications data without adequate oversight, raising fears about privacy violations.   In summary, while Australia has solid privacy protections through legislation like the Privacy Act, concerns persist regarding government surveillance and the adequacy of privacy safeguards in the digital era.   Score: 3/5  – "Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations."   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.10 Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person in Australia is protected by various legal frameworks and institutions. While the Australian Constitution does not explicitly guarantee the right to life, Australia’s commitment to this right is grounded in common law principles and international human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Australia is a party.   Australia generally enjoys high levels of personal security, but challenges exist, particularly in relation to certain groups. Indigenous Australians face disproportionately high rates of violence, including higher levels of death in custody, and the issue of police accountability remains an area of concern. Despite legal protections, reports of excessive use of force by police, particularly during interactions with Indigenous people and those with mental health issues, have raised concerns about the adequacy of safeguards for the right to security.   Australia also faces challenges related to gender-based violence. The country has high rates of domestic violence, with women and children being particularly vulnerable. Efforts have been made to address this through national initiatives, such as the National Plan to Reduce Violence against Women and their Children. However, violence against women, including intimate partner violence, remains a significant issue affecting the right to life and personal security for many Australians.   While Australia provides strong legal protections against threats to life and security, issues like police violence, Indigenous rights, and gender-based violence require ongoing attention to ensure that these rights are fully realised for all citizens.   Score: 3/5  – "The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse. Law enforcement often operates with impunity."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/australia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.11 Overall Score for Australia: 3.6/5   Australia’s overall score reflects a country with strong legal frameworks in place for protecting civil and political rights but with noticeable gaps in enforcement for marginalised groups, particularly Indigenous Australians. While the country upholds free elections, freedom of assembly, expression, and religion, issues such as police brutality, discrimination, and limitations on privacy rights remain concerning. Australia's robust judicial system is offset by challenges in accessibility, especially for vulnerable populations. These combined factors demonstrate that while Australia performs well in several areas, significant improvements are still needed in enforcement and equality across different sectors of society.   3.4.3 Brazil’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.3.1 Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Brazil, freedom of assembly and association is enshrined in the Constitution of 1988, which guarantees citizens the right to assemble peacefully and form associations without interference. Article 5 of the Constitution explicitly protects these rights, ensuring that individuals and groups can gather and organise for political, social, or labour purposes without prior authorisation, provided the assembly is peaceful and does not conflict with other constitutional principles.   However, in practice, these rights are sometimes restricted. Law enforcement agencies have been criticised for using excessive force during protests, particularly in large cities. Human rights organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented cases of police violence against protesters, especially during demonstrations related to issues such as political corruption, social inequality, and environmental concerns. There have also been reports of arbitrary arrests and intimidation of protestors.   Additionally, while trade unions and other associations are legally recognised, Brazil has seen efforts to restrict the activities of labour unions, especially under recent administrations. Strikes and protests organised by trade unions and other civil society groups often face governmental resistance, including legal challenges that limit their effectiveness.   Despite these challenges, civil society in Brazil remains vibrant, with numerous social movements advocating for the rights of marginalised groups, environmental protection, and political reforms. Nevertheless, ongoing concerns about police violence and legal restrictions on protests underscore the tension between constitutional guarantees and the reality on the ground.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections are inconsistent or weak. Protests are often subject to heavy policing or restrictions. Civil society groups face bureaucratic hurdles or occasional harassment.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/brazil/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.3.2 Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process in Brazil is protected under the Constitution of 1988, particularly in Article 5, which guarantees equality before the law, the right to legal defence, and the presumption of innocence. These principles are reinforced by Brazil's ratification of international human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.   However, the Brazilian judicial system faces significant challenges that undermine these rights. One of the key issues is the lengthy delays in the judicial process. Brazil’s court system is often overwhelmed, leading to extensive case backlogs and prolonged pretrial detention. Many individuals, particularly those from marginalised communities, spend long periods in detention awaiting trial, which has raised concerns about violations of the right to a timely and fair trial.   Moreover, access to quality legal representation is unequal, with wealthier defendants having better legal resources while low-income individuals often rely on an underfunded and overburdened public defender system. Human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have highlighted cases of abuse in the judicial process, such as arbitrary arrests, coerced confessions, and instances of torture, particularly within the prison system.   Efforts at reform have been slow, but there have been initiatives aimed at improving the efficiency of the courts and ensuring better legal protections for defendants. Despite these reforms, the judicial system's inefficiencies, coupled with social and economic inequality, continue to pose significant barriers to fully realising the right to a fair trial and due process in Brazil.   Score: 2/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/brazil/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.3.3 Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Brazil is a federal republic with a democratic system of governance, and political participation is constitutionally guaranteed under the Constitution of 1988. Citizens have the right to vote, and voting is compulsory for those aged 18 to 70. Elections at the federal, state, and municipal levels are held regularly, and Brazil has a history of peaceful transfers of power through free and fair elections, overseen by the Superior Electoral Court.   The political landscape in Brazil is diverse, with multiple political parties, though it is often dominated by two major blocs: the Workers' Party (PT) and more conservative parties like the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and Liberal Party (PL). While elections are generally seen as free and fair, the political environment has been marked by high levels of polarisation, especially during recent elections.   Corruption remains a significant issue, affecting public trust in political institutions. High-profile corruption scandals, such as the Operation Car Wash investigation, exposed widespread graft involving top politicians and business leaders, which led to several prosecutions but also deepened political divisions. Efforts to address corruption through reforms have been slow, although anti-corruption measures are in place and regularly updated.   Social inequality also plays a role in limiting political participation. While formal rights to vote and run for office are guaranteed, the influence of wealth on political campaigns and the underrepresentation of marginalised groups, such as Indigenous communities, women, and Afro-Brazilians, in decision-making positions remains a challenge.   Despite these issues, Brazil maintains a strong tradition of civil society engagement, with NGOs, social movements, and advocacy groups actively participating in the political process, particularly around issues like environmental protection, Indigenous rights, and social justice.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Transparency International. 2023. Corruption Perceptions Index: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/bra [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.3.4 Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination is guaranteed in Brazil under Article 5 of the Constitution of 1988, which prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, age, religion, and other personal characteristics. Brazil is also a party to various international human rights treaties, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).   Despite these legal protections, discrimination remains a significant issue in Brazil. Racial discrimination is deeply entrenched, particularly against Afro-Brazilians and Indigenous populations, who face social and economic disparities, including limited access to quality education, healthcare, and employment opportunities. Afro-Brazilians are also disproportionately affected by police violence and face higher rates of incarceration.   Gender-based discrimination is another major concern. While Brazil has made progress in promoting gender equality, women continue to experience wage gaps, underrepresentation in leadership positions, and high rates of violence. The country has some of the highest rates of femicide in the world, despite the introduction of laws like the Maria da Penha Law aimed at combating domestic violence.   LGBTQ+ individuals also face discrimination and violence, despite recent advances in legal protections, such as the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2013. Transgender individuals, in particular, are frequently targets of violence, and Brazil has one of the highest rates of violence against the LGBTQ+ community globally.   Indigenous populations are similarly marginalised, facing discrimination, land rights violations, and inadequate protection from government policies that often favour large agribusinesses and infrastructure projects. Indigenous communities have been vocal in their resistance to encroachments on their lands, but they face significant threats, including violence and political exclusion.   Efforts to address these issues are ongoing, with advocacy from civil society groups and international pressure, but systemic discrimination persists across various sectors of society. Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/brazil/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.3.5 Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is guaranteed under Brazil’s Constitution of 1988, and the country is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT). Despite these legal safeguards, there are significant concerns about the use of torture, particularly by law enforcement and within the prison system.   Police brutality and the use of excessive force are widespread in Brazil, particularly in low-income, predominantly Afro-Brazilian communities. Human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented numerous cases of torture and ill-treatment, often during arrests or interrogations. Torture is frequently used to extract confessions or to intimidate and punish detainees. The victims are often individuals from vulnerable or marginalised communities, including prisoners and young men from poor urban areas.   Brazil’s prison system is notorious for its overcrowding, violence, and lack of adequate medical care, which exacerbates the risk of inhuman treatment. Many prisons are severely overcrowded, with detainees living in unsanitary conditions, and instances of violence between inmates are common. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and local organisations have repeatedly raised concerns about the conditions in these facilities, which have been described as amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment.   Despite legal frameworks aimed at preventing torture, accountability remains inconsistent. Law enforcement officials accused of torture or excessive force are rarely prosecuted, and impunity for such acts is a significant issue. Although some reforms have been introduced, including the establishment of torture prevention mechanisms, these measures are often under-resourced and ineffective in practice.   In conclusion, while Brazil has strong legal protections against torture, systemic issues such as police violence, impunity, and inhumane conditions in prisons continue to undermine the country’s ability to fully realise freedom from torture and inhuman treatment.   Score: 2/5   – "Torture and inhuman treatment are reported frequently, and legal protections are weak or rarely enforced. Law enforcement and security forces often act with impunity."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/brazil/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 2022. Situation of Human Rights in Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Brazil2021-en.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Organization of American States (OAS). 2022. Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2022: Chapter V – Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2022/Chapters/11-IA2022_Cap_5_BR_EN.pdf [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. United Nations Committee Against Torture. 2023. UN Committee Against Torture publishes findings on Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, and Slovakia . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/05/un-committee-against-torture-publishes-findings-brazil-colombia-ethiopia   [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.3.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Human rights defenders in Brazil, particularly those working on environmental and indigenous rights, face significant threats. Amnesty International has documented ongoing violence against activists, especially those opposing illegal deforestation and land seizures in the Amazon. These defenders often receive death threats, and there have been numerous cases of assassination, with little accountability from the state.   Furthermore, Human Rights Watch reports that environmental defenders and indigenous leaders continue to be threatened and killed at alarming rates, particularly in rural areas where illegal logging and land seizures are rampant. The Brazilian government's failure to adequately protect these defenders exacerbates the issue, with perpetrators often escaping justice due to weak law enforcement.   Further corroborating these claims, Global Witness identified Brazil as one of the most dangerous countries for environmental defenders, particularly those standing up against deforestation in the Amazon. The organisation reported several high-profile cases of violence against indigenous activists and environmental defenders, with many victims receiving little protection from the state [1] .   Score: 2/5  – “Human rights defenders are frequently persecuted, harassed, or jailed for their work. Legal protections are minimal, and the state often seeks to suppress their activities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Indigenous peoples’ rights still remain at risk . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr19/7258/2023/en/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Global Witness. 2023. Defending Tomorrow: The climate crisis and threats against land and environmental defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/defending-tomorrow/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.3.7 Freedom of Expression   While Brazil guarantees Freedom of Expression by law, journalists often face harassment, violence, and legal challenges. In the 2024 RSF Press Freedom Index, Brazil’s score slightly improved from 58.67 to 58.59, yet its global ranking fell from 82nd to 92nd due to ongoing threats to journalists, particularly those covering corruption, organised crime, and deforestation.   Under President Lula’s government, relations with the media have improved, but structural issues like concentrated media ownership and violence against journalists persist. Reporters working in rural areas are especially vulnerable to physical attacks and threats.   Additionally, Human Rights Watch reports increasing threats and violence against journalists investigating sensitive political issues, with frequent cases of online harassment and attacks on social media platforms.   Score: 2/5  – "Freedom of Expression is heavily restricted. The press and media are frequently censored, and individuals face legal consequences or violence for expressing dissent."   References:   Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2024. Press Freedom Index . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/brazil [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.3.8 Freedom of Religion or Belief   Brazil guarantees freedom of religion, and religious communities generally operate freely. However, Afro-Brazilian religions such as Candomblé and Umbanda continue to face violence and discrimination, particularly from evangelical groups.   While government restrictions on religion are low, according to Pew Research Center (2024), social hostilities based on religion remain a significant issue for minority religious communities.   Score: 3/5  – "Legal protections exist but are inconsistently enforced. Religious minorities may face discrimination, and the state may impose limitations on religious practices." References:   Pew Research Center. 2024. Religious Restrictions Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2024/03/05/religious-restrictions/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.3.9 Right to Privacy   Brazil’s General Data Protection Law (LGPD) establishes a legal framework for personal privacy and data security. While the LGPD has been praised for providing solid protections, significant concerns persist regarding government surveillance, particularly in the context of organised crime and anti-corruption investigations. Human Rights Watch (2022) has documented instances where Brazilian authorities employed invasive surveillance techniques, often without adequate judicial oversight, leading to violations of citizens' privacy rights.   Further concerns arise from the expansion of surveillance technologies. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) reported that Brazil's government has continued to expand its surveillance infrastructure, often without appropriate legal oversight. This includes monitoring individuals’ online activities, which raises concerns about the state infringing on civil liberties and personal privacy.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent.”   References:   Electronic Frontier Foundation. 2021. Brazil’s Fake News Bill: Perils and Flaws of Expanding Existent Data Retention Obligations . [Online] Available at: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/11/brazils-fake-news-bill-perils-and-flaws-expanding-existent-data-retention [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2022. Children’s Rights Violations in Brazil: Governments’ Surveillance . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/05/25/how-dare-they-peep-my-private-life/childrens-rights-violations-governments  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.3.10 Right to Life and Security of Person   Brazil continues to face alarmingly high levels of violent crime and police brutality, particularly affecting marginalised communities. Human Rights Watch (2023) reported over 6,145 police killings in 2021, with most victims being Afro-Brazilians from low-income areas.   The disproportionate use of lethal force by police, especially in favelas, continues to raise significant human rights concerns. Amnesty International has also highlighted the lack of accountability for such killings, with law enforcement often acting with impunity, making it one of the most pressing human rights issues in Brazil.   Score: 2/5  – “The right to life is not consistently protected. Arbitrary killings, state violence, or widespread abuses by security forces are common, and accountability mechanisms are weak.”   References: Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Still Remain at Risk . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr19/7258/2023/en/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.3.11 Overall score for Brazil: 2.6/5   Brazil’s overall score reflects a nation with a strong legal framework for the protection of civil and political rights but significant challenges in enforcing these protections. Systemic issues, such as police violence, discrimination against marginalised groups, and threats to Freedom of Expression, indicate a gap between legal commitments and actual practice. While Brazil upholds international and regional human rights standards, further efforts are needed to address these ongoing enforcement challenges across the country.   3.4.4 Canada’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.4.1 Freedom of Assembly and Association   Canada’s Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects freedom of assembly and association. Peaceful protests and demonstrations are generally allowed, and civil society organisations operate freely without fear of retribution. However, there are some restrictions, particularly concerning Indigenous land disputes and environmental protests, where police intervention has been heavy at times.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny."   References:   Amnesty International. 2022. Ca nada: Pipeline construction on Indigenous territory endangers land defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/10/canada-pipeline-indigenous-territory-endangers-land-defenders/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.2 Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   Canada's justice system, while independent and generally accessible, still faces challenges, especially for Indigenous and low-income individuals. Human Rights Watch reports that systemic discrimination and delays in court processes create barriers for these groups.   Additionally, the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice highlights that many Canadians cannot afford legal representation, which results in a growing number of self-represented litigants. This lack of representation affects the overall effectiveness of the justice system, leading to unresolved disputes with significant social and economic costs.   Score: 4/5  – "Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles." References:   Canadian Forum on Civil Justice. 2012-2018. The Cost of Justice: Weighing the Costs of Fair & Effective Resolution to Legal Problems . [Online] Available at: https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/2012CanLIIDocs233#!fragment/zoupio-_Toc2Page1-Page10/BQCwhgziBcwMYgK4DsDWszIQewE4BUBTADwBdoAvbRABwEtsBaAfX2zgCYAFMAc0ICMjHvwEAGAJQAaZNlKEIARUSFcAT2gByTVIiEwuBMtUbtu-YZABlPKQBCGgEoBRADLOAagEEAcgGFnKVIwACNoUnYJCSA [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/canada  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.3 Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Canada guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in the democratic process. Political opposition operates without interference, and the electoral system is transparent and well-managed. However, challenges persist concerning political representation for Indigenous and marginalised communities, despite strong overall voter participation and engagement. According to International IDEA’s Democracy Tracker, Canada continues to maintain a high standard of democratic governance, though some inequalities remain in political representation.   Score: 5/5  – "The country guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in government. Political opposition is allowed and respected, and there is a transparent process for democratic governance."   References:   International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). 2023. Canada Democracy Tracker . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.4.4 Freedom from Discrimination   Canada has strong anti-discrimination laws in place, with the Canadian Human Rights Act and provincial legislation offering protections against discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, and other characteristics.   However, according to Human Rights Watch   and Amnesty International, Indigenous communities, Black Canadians, and LGBTQIA+ individuals still face systemic discrimination, particularly in areas like employment, housing, and interactions with law enforcement.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections against discrimination exist but may be inconsistently enforced. Discrimination is not widespread, though certain marginalised groups may face barriers."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Canada: Addressing Systemic Discrimination . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/canada/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. Discrimination in Canada: Ongoing Challenges . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.5 Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Canada has robust legal protections against torture, in line with the Convention against Torture (CAT), to which it is a signatory. However, issues related to police use of excessive force, particularly towards racial minorities and Indigenous peoples, have been highlighted in recent years. Amnesty International reports incidents of excessive force during arrests and protests, often with limited accountability for police officers involved in such abuses. Amnesty International  and Human Rights Watch highlight these issues, particularly during arrests and protests, where accountability for law enforcement misconduct remains inconsistent. The lack of comprehensive accountability measures for officers involved in these incidents, combined with reports of disproportionate policing in marginalised communities, points to ongoing challenges in fully enforcing these protections.   The United Nations Committee Against Torture's 2018 Concluding Observations on Canada raised concerns about the disproportionate use of force by law enforcement, especially toward racial minorities and Indigenous populations. The report emphasised the need for Canada to enhance accountability mechanisms for police misconduct. The Committee also acknowledged Canada's positive steps in establishing independent investigative bodies, like the Independent Investigations Office and Bureau des Enquêtes Indépendantes, but it encouraged further measures to address systemic issues.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections exist and are generally enforced, though there may be occasional reports of abuse by law enforcement. Violators are usually held accountable."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Canada: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/canada/report-canada/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. United Nations Committee Against Torture. 2018. Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Canada . [Online] Available at: https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsglSZMQd1BoEakgym8DLljp%2FtVZwAcP32UhceoEv6s9EFDnHa%2FfIXxFR9KNVY4qkr3X7%2FaP5eVqCmw6nDLJyD3dA5iGzIWJ0XfsLEbi0yIvz   [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Canada generally protects human rights defenders, allowing them to operate freely and without fear of persecution. However, Amnesty International   reports occasional harassment and pressure, particularly for Indigenous and environmental activists who challenge major development projects, such as pipelines. While the legal framework supports human rights defenders, the enforcement of protections can be inconsistent, especially in rural areas.   Human Rights Watch highlights that these activists, especially those opposing natural resource projects, often face harassment, legal actions, and disproportionate use of force by law enforcement. The Canadian government has made efforts to protect rights defenders, but ongoing concerns about police actions during protests and the targeting of activists remain.   Score: 4/5  – "Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Canada: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/canada/report-canada/   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.7 Freedom of Expression   Canada has comprehensive legal protections for Freedom of Expression under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The press operates freely, and dissenting views are tolerated. However, there have been occasional concerns raised about government surveillance and hate speech legislation that could limit free expression in some contexts.   Reporters Without Borders (2024) ranks Canada highly on its Press Freedom Index, though Indigenous and community media sometimes face financial and bureaucratic challenges.   Score: 4/5  – "Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure."   References:   Reporters Without Borders. 2024. Canada: Press Freedom Index . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.8 Freedom of Religion or Belief   Canada guarantees freedom of religion under its Charter of Rights and Freedoms, allowing individuals to practice their faith freely. While there are no significant legal restrictions, social discrimination against minority religious groups, such as Muslims and Sikhs, persists.   The Pew Research Center (2024) notes that while government restrictions are minimal, there have been instances of social hostility towards certain religious minorities, particularly in the wake of terrorist attacks abroad.   Score: 4/5  – "Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Canada: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/canada/report-canada/   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. Religious Restrictions Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2024/03/05/religious-restrictions/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.9 Right to Privacy   Canada has a solid legal framework to protect privacy rights, particularly under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). However, there are concerns about potential overreach in government surveillance, particularly in relation to national security measures. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (2023) has raised issues around public perception regarding the balance between privacy and security. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) has raised concerns regarding federal political parties' handling of personal data, arguing that privacy laws should apply to them.   The CCLA and other organisations are urging political parties to commit to transparency and accountability in their data collection and usage, which currently operates in a legal grey area. This issue highlights gaps in privacy protections in Canada, particularly in the context of political processes.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective."   References:   Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA). 2023. CCLA Joins Other Organizations to Urge Federal Political Parties to Accept that Privacy Laws Apply to Them . [Online] Available at: https://ccla.org/privacy/ccla-joins-other-organizations-to-urge-federal-political-parties-to-accept-that-privacy-laws-apply-to-them/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). 2024. Security, Surveillance, and Government Overreach: United States Set the Path for Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/security-surveillance-and-government-overreach-united-states-set-path-canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. 2023. Canadians’ Views on Privacy . [Online] Available at: https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/research/explore-privacy-research/2023/por_ca_2022-23/  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.4.10 Right to Life and Security of Person   Canada generally ensures the right to life and personal security, with relatively low levels of violence compared to other countries.   However, Human Rights Watch   highlighted concerns regarding the use of force by police, particularly in interactions with Indigenous and racial minority communities.   Amnesty International has raised concerns about the violation of the right to life and security of Indigenous people in Canada during police raids on protest encampments in Alberta. The use of force and the lack of accountability for police actions have endangered the safety of protesters, particularly those advocating for land and environmental rights.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections exist, and violence is generally low, though certain groups (e.g., minorities or marginalised communities) may face occasional threats. Law enforcement generally follows legal protocols but may overstep in some cases."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Police Raids on Protest Encampments in Alberta . [Online] Available at: https://amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/police-raids-protest-encampments-alberta/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Amnesty International. 2023. Canada: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/canada/report-canada/   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/canada  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.11 Canada’s overall score: 4.1/5   Canada’s strong legal framework for human rights is reflected in its overall score. The country maintains robust protections for civil liberties, including Freedom of Expression, freedom of religion, and democratic governance. However, ongoing issues with systemic discrimination, particularly for Indigenous and racial minority communities, highlight areas where improvement is needed.  Canada also faces challenges in addressing police violence and excessive force, especially in interactions with vulnerable populations. Nonetheless, the country remains a global leader in human rights protection with room for continued progress. 3.4.5 China's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.5.1 Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association are severely restricted in China, where the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controls political and social activities. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China guarantees these rights in theory, but in practice, they are heavily curtailed by strict regulations, surveillance, and crackdowns on dissent.   Peaceful assembly, including protests and demonstrations, is rarely tolerated, particularly if it is critical of the government or touches on sensitive topics like human rights, ethnic autonomy, or corruption. Large-scale protests, such as those in Hong Kong in 2019, were met with a forceful government response, including mass arrests, police brutality, and new laws like the National Security Law that further restrict freedoms. On the mainland, protests are often dispersed quickly, and organisers are subject to imprisonment under vague charges such as "subverting state power" or "inciting separatism."   Freedom of association is equally restricted. Independent trade unions, political parties, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are not allowed to operate freely. All social organisations must be registered with the government, and unregistered groups are considered illegal. The Overseas NGO Law (2017) has further limited the operations of international organisations by requiring them to be registered and supervised by state authorities, effectively reducing their ability to engage in advocacy or human rights work.   China's repression of assembly and association is supported by mass surveillance and digital censorship, with authorities closely monitoring online discussions and swiftly shutting down any attempts to organise protests or critical social movements. This pervasive system of control significantly undermines civil society and individual rights in the country.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no meaningful legal protections for freedom of assembly and association. Protests are banned, civil society organisations are disbanded or state-controlled, and activists are routinely imprisoned or persecuted.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.2 Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process in China faces significant challenges despite legal provisions that theoretically guarantee these rights. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China and the Criminal Procedure Law outline the right to legal representation, public trials, and the presumption of innocence. However, in practice, these guarantees are frequently undermined by the judiciary’s lack of independence, as it operates under the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).   Judicial decisions, particularly in cases involving political dissidents, human rights activists, or those charged under state security laws, are often seen as predetermined. Defendants accused of crimes such as "subversion of state power" are frequently denied adequate legal representation, and trials are often closed to the public. For example, many high-profile political cases are marked by secretive proceedings, with lawyers barred from accessing their clients or presenting a proper defence.   Pretrial detention is another area of concern, with detainees often held for long periods without trial. Reports of forced confessions obtained through torture, despite being prohibited under Chinese law, are common. Political prisoners and those detained under anti-terrorism or national security charges frequently face arbitrary detention, and their rights are often violated in the process.   China's broad security laws, including the National Security Law and Counterterrorism Law, grant sweeping powers to authorities, allowing for the detention and prosecution of individuals without adherence to standard legal procedures. The lack of judicial oversight, combined with the opaque nature of many trials, particularly those involving sensitive political matters, undermines the right to a fair trial and due process in the country.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no meaningful judicial independence. Courts are tools of the state, used to silence opposition. Arbitrary detention is routine, and fair trials are virtually non-existent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report. [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China. [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China. [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.5.3 Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Political participation and democratic governance in China are tightly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which maintains a monopoly on political power. While China is nominally a "people's republic", it does not have a system of open, multiparty elections as seen in democratic countries. The CCP controls all levels of government, from local administrations to national leadership, with no legal avenue for other political parties to challenge its rule.   Elections do take place in China, but they are tightly managed by the state. For example, elections for local People’s Congresses occur, but candidates must either be CCP-approved or independent candidates vetted through a restrictive system. These elections offer little genuine political choice, and the higher echelons of government, including the National People’s Congress, are composed overwhelmingly of CCP members. This legislative body functions largely as a rubber-stamp parliament, with limited real influence over state policies.   Political dissent is not tolerated, and efforts to promote democratic reforms or challenge the CCP’s authority are met with swift suppression. Activists and advocates for greater political openness are frequently arrested or silenced. High-profile pro-democracy movements, such as those seen in Hong Kong, have faced crackdowns, with leaders imprisoned or forced into exile. The implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong in 2020 further eroded the region’s limited autonomy and political freedoms.   Additionally, China's system lacks transparency, with decision-making concentrated within the CCP’s elite circles. Public participation in governance is minimal, and there are no independent media or civil society organisations that can freely challenge government decisions or hold officials accountable.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no free or fair elections. The state is ruled by an authoritarian regime, and any political opposition is systematically crushed. Democratic governance is non-existent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.4 Freedom from Discrimination   China's legal framework theoretically guarantees freedom from discrimination, with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China affirming equality for all citizens regardless of ethnicity, gender, or religion. Additionally, the Labour Law and other legislation prohibit discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, or gender in employment and public life. However, in practice, significant challenges remain in ensuring freedom from discrimination, especially for ethnic minorities, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals.   Ethnic minorities, particularly Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other non-Han Chinese groups, face systemic discrimination and repression. The Chinese government has been widely criticised for its policies toward Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, where reports from human rights organisations have documented mass detentions, forced labour, and re-education camps. The Chinese state tightly controls religious practices and cultural expression among minority groups, often framing these restrictions as measures to prevent extremism or maintain national unity.   Although China has laws against gender discrimination in employment, women continue to face barriers in the workplace, including unequal pay and discriminatory hiring practices. Many women report being asked about their marital status or plans for children during job interviews. Furthermore, despite laws promoting gender equality, cases of workplace sexual harassment and gender-based violence are underreported, and enforcement of protections is weak.   While homosexuality is not illegal in China, there are no comprehensive legal protections for LGBTQ+ individuals. LGBTQ+ advocacy is heavily restricted, and public discourse on LGBTQ+ issues is often censored. Same-sex marriage remains illegal, and social discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals is widespread, with many facing stigma, family pressure, and workplace discrimination.   Although China has made some legislative efforts to combat discrimination, the gap between law and practice remains significant, especially for marginalised groups. Ongoing surveillance, censorship, and suppression of advocacy efforts make it difficult for civil society organisations to address these issues effectively. Score: 1/5  – “There are no legal protections against discrimination, and the state actively promotes or tolerates discriminatory practices. Marginalised groups are heavily oppressed and face severe inequality.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China. [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.5 Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), and the country's Constitution and Criminal Procedure Law officially prohibit the use of torture. However, in practice, the use of torture and inhuman treatment remains a serious issue, especially in the context of political repression and law enforcement.   Reports from human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International frequently document the use of torture in Chinese detention facilities, particularly against political dissidents, human rights activists, and ethnic minorities. Common methods of torture include beatings, sleep deprivation, and the denial of medical treatment. These practices are often used to extract forced confessions, which are then presented in court as evidence despite China’s official legal prohibitions on such evidence.   The situation in Xinjiang, where Uyghur Muslims and other Turkic minorities have been detained in "re-education" camps, has drawn international condemnation. Numerous reports have surfaced of detainees being subjected to physical abuse, forced sterilisation, and psychological torture. The Chinese government refers to these camps as vocational training centres aimed at combating extremism, but mounting evidence points to widespread human rights abuses, including torture and inhuman treatment.   Human rights defenders, lawyers, and activists detained under national security laws are particularly vulnerable to torture. Notable cases include those of human rights lawyers detained during the 2015 "709 crackdown", many of whom reported severe physical and mental abuse while in custody. Activists who criticise the government or advocate for greater political freedoms are often targeted and subjected to inhumane treatment during long pretrial detentions.   Despite legal frameworks prohibiting torture, there is little accountability for perpetrators. Judicial oversight is weak, and state authorities rarely investigate allegations of torture. Those who report such abuses often face retaliation, making it difficult to hold officials accountable for their actions.   Score: 1/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are widespread and systematically used by the state. There are no legal protections, and security forces routinely act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. United Nations. 2022. Chin a responsible for ‘serious human rights violations’ in Xinjiang province: UN human rights report . [Online] Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1125932 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.5.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In China, human rights defenders operate in a highly repressive environment where their activities are severely restricted, and they often face persecution. While international human rights norms call for the protection of human rights defenders, in China, the government views activism, particularly on sensitive issues like democracy, Freedom of Expression, and ethnic minority rights, as a threat to state stability. This leads to frequent crackdowns on individuals and groups advocating for human rights.   Human rights defenders, including lawyers, journalists, and activists, are regularly subjected to harassment, surveillance, and arbitrary detention. The 709 crackdown in 2015 is a notable example, during which hundreds of human rights lawyers and activists were detained or arrested. Many were tortured, held incommunicado, or subjected to forced disappearances. Those involved in defending political prisoners or advocating for Freedom of Expression face continuous state repression.   China’s laws, particularly the National Security Law and Criminal Law, are frequently used to charge human rights defenders with crimes such as "subverting state power" or "picking quarrels and provoking trouble". These vaguely defined crimes allow authorities to target anyone engaged in activism or critical speech, making it extremely difficult for human rights defenders to carry out their work without fear of arrest.   Chinese authorities employ extensive surveillance measures to monitor the activities of human rights defenders. Activists and their families are often placed under house arrest, and their communications are heavily monitored. International human rights organisations have condemned the Chinese government for using these surveillance tactics to intimidate defenders and prevent them from engaging with global human rights networks.   In some cases, the Chinese government exerts pressure on human rights defenders by targeting their families. Family members of detained activists often face harassment, social isolation, and restrictions on movement, creating further difficulties for human rights defenders to continue their advocacy.   Despite international condemnation, the Chinese government has shown little willingness to protect human rights defenders or reform laws that allow their persecution. Many defenders remain imprisoned or under constant threat of arrest, limiting the capacity for civil society to flourish in China.   Score: 1/5  – “Human rights defenders are systematically targeted by the state. They face imprisonment, torture, or worse, and there are no legal protections for their work.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Defenders Under Threat . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2022. China: Situation of Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.7 Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in China is heavily restricted, with the Chinese government exerting tight control over media, the internet, and public discourse. Although the Constitution of the People's Republic of China guarantees freedom of speech, in practice, these rights are severely limited by laws that criminalise dissent, criticism of the government, and the sharing of politically sensitive information.   China’s state-run media landscape is tightly controlled by the government, with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ensuring that all media aligns with its policies and narratives. Independent journalism is virtually non-existent, and media outlets are frequently censored or shut down if they publish content critical of the state. International media are also subject to restrictions, with foreign journalists facing intimidation, surveillance, and expulsions.   The Chinese government maintains one of the most comprehensive internet censorship systems in the world, often referred to as the "Great Firewall". Websites, social media platforms, and search engines that allow the free flow of information—such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter—are blocked in China. Domestic platforms like WeChat and Weibo are heavily monitored, with content relating to sensitive topics such as human rights, democracy, or criticism of the CCP swiftly removed. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) plays a central role in regulating online content and censoring any material deemed harmful to state interests.   In addition to censorship, China employs widespread digital surveillance to monitor its citizens' online activities. Individuals who express dissenting views or share politically sensitive content face severe consequences, including arrest, imprisonment, and even forced disappearances. Human rights defenders, journalists, and activists are particularly vulnerable, with many being detained for “subverting state power” or “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”.   Laws such as the National Security Law and Cybersecurity Law give the state broad powers to suppress Freedom of Expression in the name of national security. These laws are frequently used to justify the detention of individuals who criticise the government or advocate for reforms.   China’s repression of Freedom of Expression extends beyond its borders, with increasing efforts to control the narratives around its policies, such as in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan, by pressuring international media and corporations to comply with its censorship standards.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no meaningful protections for Freedom of Expression. The state controls the media, and dissenting voices are silenced through imprisonment or violence.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Freedom of Expression Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. China: Media Freedom and Censorship . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.8 Freedom of Religion or Belief   In China, freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 36 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which states that citizens "enjoy freedom of religious belief". However, in practice, the Chinese government tightly controls religious practices, and religious freedoms are severely restricted, particularly for groups that are not sanctioned by the state.   State Control of Religion: The Chinese government officially recognises five religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islamism, Catholicism, and Protestantism. All religious groups must register with the state and operate under government-supervised bodies, such as the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association and the Three-Self Patriotic Movement for Protestant churches. Religious groups that operate outside state-sanctioned structures are considered illegal and are often subject to persecution. The government's Regulations on Religious Affairs, revised in 2018, further restrict religious activities, particularly those deemed to be foreign influences or linked to separatist movements.   Persecution of Religious Minorities: Religious minorities, particularly Uyghur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, and underground Christian churches, face severe repression. In Xinjiang, over a million Uyghur Muslims have reportedly been detained in so-called "re-education" camps, where they are subjected to forced indoctrination, restrictions on religious practices, and in some cases, physical abuse. Tibetan Buddhists face restrictions on their religious activities, including the veneration of the Dalai Lama, which is banned by the government. Unregistered or "house" churches, both Catholic and Protestant, are frequently raided by authorities, with congregants facing harassment, detention, and forced closures.   Crackdown on Falun Gong: Falun Gong, a spiritual movement combining meditation and qigong, has been the target of a brutal crackdown since 1999, when the government banned the practice. Falun Gong practitioners have been arrested, imprisoned, and reportedly subjected to forced labour and torture. There have also been allegations of organ harvesting from imprisoned Falun Gong practitioners, which has been condemned by international human rights organisations.   Increased Restrictions: In recent years, the Chinese government has tightened its control over religious practices, increasing surveillance and repression under the guise of maintaining social stability. The state has promoted “Sinicisation” of religion, which seeks to align religious practices with Chinese socialist values and reduce the influence of foreign religious doctrines. This has led to the removal of religious symbols, such as crosses from churches, and the imposition of state-approved religious doctrine.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no freedom of religion or belief. The state enforces a particular belief system, whether religious or secular, and those who practice or promote any dissenting views face imprisonment, violence, or severe discrimination.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in China . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.9 Right to Privacy   The right to privacy in China is highly restricted, with the state maintaining extensive control over personal data, communications, and digital activities. While Article 40 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China guarantees the privacy of correspondence, this protection is limited in practice, particularly in the digital realm. The Chinese government’s extensive surveillance infrastructure and legal frameworks allow for broad monitoring and control over citizens’ private information.   China operates one of the most sophisticated and widespread surveillance systems in the world. The state monitors communications through technologies such as facial recognition, AI-based surveillance, and social credit systems, which collect vast amounts of personal data. The Cybersecurity Law of 2017 and the Personal Information Protection Law of 2021 provide legal backing for the collection of personal data under the guise of protecting national security and public safety. However, these laws are also used to justify state overreach into the private lives of citizens. Major tech companies are required to cooperate with the government, sharing data upon request and ensuring that platforms align with government censorship and surveillance policies.   The Chinese government exercises significant control over the internet, and the Great Firewall blocks access to many international websites, such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter. Domestic platforms like WeChat and Weibo are tightly monitored, with any content deemed politically sensitive swiftly removed. User data on these platforms is regularly accessed by the state, and online activity is closely tracked, limiting online privacy and free expression.   Specific groups, including human rights defenders, ethnic minorities, and political dissidents, are subjected to heightened levels of surveillance. The situation in Xinjiang, where Uyghur Muslims are under constant surveillance, is a notable example. Uyghurs are monitored through high-tech systems that track their movements, communications, and religious practices. Reports indicate that the Chinese government uses facial recognition technology and biometric data to enforce this surveillance regime, raising grave concerns about privacy violations.   China's legal and technological framework for monitoring personal privacy has drawn criticism from international human rights organisations, which argue that these practices undermine fundamental privacy rights and grant the state unparalleled control over its citizens.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no meaningful privacy protections. The government monitors individuals heavily, and there is no legal recourse for violations of privacy.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in China . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Skadden. 2021. China’s New Data Security and Personal Information Protection Laws: A Compliance Perspective . [Online] Available at: https://www.skadden.com/Insights/Publications/2021/11/Chinas-New-Data-Security-and-Personal-Information-Protection-Laws [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.10 Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person is theoretically protected under Article 37 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, which prohibits unlawful deprivation of life and personal liberty. However, in practice, significant concerns arise due to state actions, particularly in the areas of extrajudicial detentions, forced disappearances, and the treatment of ethnic minorities.   China's extensive use of arbitrary detention, particularly through the Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location (RSDL) system, allows the government to hold individuals for extended periods without formal charges. Political dissidents, human rights defenders, and ethnic minorities are often detained under this system, which has been associated with reports of torture and abuse. There are also concerns about the lack of transparency in police actions, with some individuals disappearing for long periods before any legal proceedings occur.   The situation in Xinjiang has been particularly alarming, with reports from international organisations detailing mass detentions, forced sterilisation, and abuses against the Uyghur Muslim population. Human rights groups have described the conditions in the region as amounting to crimes against humanity, with the Chinese government tightly controlling life and personal security in Xinjiang under the guise of countering extremism. Reports of forced labour and severe restrictions on religious and cultural practices further highlight the precarious state of personal security for Uyghur and other ethnic minorities.   China remains the world’s leading executioner, although precise numbers are difficult to verify due to state secrecy surrounding death penalty cases. The death penalty is often imposed for a wide range of offences, including non-violent crimes such as drug trafficking, raising concerns about the proportionality of the punishment. International human rights organisations have called for greater transparency in China's use of capital punishment and urged the government to reform its judicial practices.   Despite legislative progress, including the Anti-Domestic Violence Law of 2016, gender-based violence remains a significant issue in China. Many victims of domestic violence face barriers in accessing justice, and there is limited state protection or enforcement against such abuses. Cultural stigma, weak enforcement of the law, and inadequate support services further exacerbate the issue, leaving many women vulnerable to continued violence.   While China's legal framework includes provisions for the protection of life and security, in practice, the state’s extensive control mechanisms and weak accountability systems create a climate where personal security is frequently undermined.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no effective protection for the right to life. State violence, extrajudicial killings, or systematic abuses are rampant, and there is no accountability for perpetrators.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. United Nations. 2022. China responsible for ‘serious human rights violations’ in Xinjiang province: UN human rights report . [Online] Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1125932 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.11 Overall Score for China: 1/5   China's legal framework provides nominal protections for civil and political rights, but in practice, these rights are routinely violated. State surveillance, political repression, and systemic abuses, particularly against ethnic minorities like the Uyghurs, severely undermine human rights in the country.      - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [1]   Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=85 [Accessed: 3 July 2024].

3.4.15   South Africa's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.15.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   In South Africa, freedom of assembly and association is constitutionally protected, and the country has a vibrant history of public protest and civil society activism. The Constitution of South Africa (1996) guarantees the right to peacefully assemble, demonstrate, picket, and petition. These rights are generally respected, and protests are a common form of expression for addressing grievances related to social justice, economic inequality, and political matters.   However, there are occasional challenges in the practical application of these rights. The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 governs public protests, requiring organisers to notify authorities in advance, which sometimes leads to restrictions or bureaucratic hurdles. In certain cases, law enforcement authorities have been criticised for using excessive force to disperse protests, particularly in marginalised communities. The Marikana Massacre in 2012, where 34 miners were killed by police during a strike, remains a stark example of the tensions between the right to protest and state responses.   The African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF) has called for reforms in crowd management, advocating for better training of Public Order Police (POP) units to ensure protests are handled in line with international human rights standards. APCOF's submission on national policing standards highlights the need for proportionality and the protection of protesters' rights to peaceful assembly.   Freedom of association is also constitutionally protected, and South Africa has a strong civil society sector. Trade unions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and political parties operate freely and play significant roles in shaping the country’s political and social landscape. However, there have been reports of intimidation and violence against activists, particularly those involved in environmental, land rights, and anti-corruption movements, highlighting ongoing challenges in ensuring full protection for these freedoms.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF). 2024. Submission on the proposed revised national policing standards for Municipal Police Services on Crowd Management During Gatherings and Demonstrations . [Online] Available at: https://apcof.org/wp-content/uploads/apcof-submission-on-national-policing-standards-for-mps-on-crowd-management-.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2022. South Africa: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/southern-africa/south-africa/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-africa [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   South Africa's judiciary is independent and generally upholds the right to a fair trial, but the judicial system faces serious delays and backlogs. Access to legal representation is constitutionally guaranteed, but in practice, legal aid is underfunded, affecting low-income and rural citizens. Human Rights Watch has raised concerns about pretrial detention, particularly in cases involving political activists or marginalised communities.   One significant issue is the prolonged pretrial detention caused by delays in the judicial system, largely attributed to case backlogs and understaffing. This is particularly problematic for individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds, who often rely on an overburdened legal aid system. Additionally, overcrowding in detention facilities exacerbates these challenges, with many accused individuals held for extended periods before their cases are heard.   Score: 4/5  – “Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Motloung, M.P. 2015. The Impact of Delayed Trials on the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://uir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/19103 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   South Africa is a constitutional democracy with strong formal protections for political participation and democratic governance, rooted in its post-apartheid Constitution of 1996. The country holds regular, multiparty elections at national, provincial, and local levels, which are overseen by the independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC). These elections are generally regarded as free and fair, although concerns about voter apathy and declining turnout, particularly among younger citizens, have been raised in recent years.   The political system in South Africa is characterised by a vibrant civil society, which plays a crucial role in shaping policy and holding the government accountable. However, challenges such as political corruption, poor service delivery, and internal divisions within the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), have eroded public trust in democratic institutions. The Zondo Commission into state capture has shed light on systemic corruption, which has undermined good governance and exacerbated public frustration with political leadership.   Despite these challenges, the South African political landscape remains diverse. Opposition parties, such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), actively participate in the political process, although the ANC retains dominance at both the national and provincial levels. Grassroots activism and protests also play a significant role in political participation, with citizens frequently using protests as a means to express dissatisfaction with governance, particularly around issues like unemployment, inequality, and corruption.   Efforts to strengthen democratic governance in South Africa include calls for electoral reform to make the system more inclusive and responsive. The judiciary continues to serve as a crucial check on executive power, with rulings that reinforce constitutional norms and uphold democratic principles. However, continued vigilance is needed to address ongoing issues of corruption, inequality, and political disengagement to ensure the long-term stability and inclusivity of South Africa's democracy. Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International IDEA. 2023. South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-overview?country=207   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Zondo Commission. 2022. State Capture Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.statecaputurereport.org.za [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination is a foundational principle enshrined in South Africa’s Constitution of 1996, particularly under Section 9, known as the Equality Clause, which explicitly prohibits discrimination on various grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth. The government has introduced a range of legislative measures, such as the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA), to enforce this constitutional right and promote equality.   However, despite these legal protections, South Africa continues to struggle with deep-seated inequality and discrimination. The legacy of apartheid’s racial segregation policies still manifests in socio-economic disparities, particularly affecting black South Africans, who remain disproportionately affected by poverty, unemployment, and limited access to quality education and healthcare. Gender-based violence is another pervasive issue, with South Africa having some of the highest rates of violence against women in the world, despite significant legal protections for women’s rights.   Discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community, though formally illegal, remains an issue in practice, with reports of violence and hate crimes against LGBTQ+ individuals, particularly in rural areas. Efforts to improve LGBTQ+ rights, such as the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2006, are landmark achievements, but societal attitudes remain a barrier to full equality.   The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) plays a key role in addressing discrimination complaints, and civil society organisations continue to advocate for greater enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. Despite these efforts, the intersection of race, gender, and socio-economic status means that many South Africans, particularly those in vulnerable communities, still face significant discrimination in their daily lives.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/southern-africa/south-africa/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2024: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-africa [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.15.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   South Africa is a signatory to international treaties such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), and the right to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is enshrined in Section 12 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996). Despite this legal framework, reports of police brutality, abuse in detention, and ill-treatment of detainees remain significant concerns.   Law enforcement and correctional officers have been implicated in cases of excessive force and torture, particularly during interrogations and protests. Although the Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act (2013) criminalises torture, accountability remains inconsistent, with few officers prosecuted for human rights violations. Incidents of inhuman treatment have been documented in South Africa’s overcrowded prisons, where detainees often face substandard living conditions, exacerbating concerns about their treatment.   Score: 3/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/southern-africa/south-africa/report-south-africa/   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Prison Insider. 2023. South Africa: Prisons in 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.prison-insider.com/en/articles/south-africa-prisons-in-2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In South Africa, human rights defenders (HRDs) operate in a challenging environment, where, despite constitutional protections, they face intimidation, harassment, and violence. The Constitution of South Africa enshrines the right to Freedom of Expression, assembly, and association, but HRDs, particularly those advocating for land rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption measures, frequently encounter threats from both state and non-state actors.   HRDs advocating against corruption and government misconduct, especially at the municipal level, often face intimidation and, in extreme cases, assassination attempts. Community leaders and environmental activists, particularly those challenging large corporate interests or engaging in protests around land rights, have been targeted. The murder of environmental activist Fikile Ntshangase in 2020, who was opposing mining activities, highlights the risks faced by HRDs in South Africa.   Score: 3/5  – “Human rights defenders face some harassment or legal challenges, particularly when criticising the government. Protections are weak or inconsistently applied.” References:   Centre for Environmental Rights (CER). 2020. The Killing of Somkhele Environmental Activist Fikile Ntshangase: A Joint Statement . [Online] Available at: https://cer.org.za/news/the-killing-of-somkhele-environmental-activist-fikile-ntshangase-a-joint-statement [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2024. South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/south-africa [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.15.7   Freedom of Expression   South Africa’s Constitution guarantees Freedom of Expression, and the country has a vibrant media landscape. However, there have been instances of government attempts to stifle criticism, particularly involving whistleblowers and investigative journalists.   One of the key concerns is the Protection of State Information Bill (often referred to as the Secrecy Bill), which has been criticised for potentially limiting investigative journalism by making it easier for the government to classify information as state secrets. Although the Bill has not been fully enacted, it has raised concerns about the potential impact on the media’s ability to report on corruption and governance issues.   Journalists and human rights defenders sometimes face threats, harassment, and even violence, particularly when covering sensitive topics like corruption, land reform, or government mismanagement. While South Africa has not seen widespread media repression, cases of intimidation against investigative journalists, especially those probing corruption, have been reported.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., political corruption). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International Federation of Journalists (IFJ). 2010. South Africa’s Secrecy Bill is a “threat” to Free Expression, says FAJ . [Online] Available at: https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/africa/article/south-africas-secrecy-bill-is-a-threat-to-free-expression-says-faj.html [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/south-africa [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.15.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally guaranteed in South Africa under Section 15 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996), which ensures that everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, and opinion. South Africa is a religiously diverse country, with Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, and traditional African religions all practiced openly, alongside atheism and other non-religious beliefs. The country’s legal framework promotes religious tolerance and prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. Despite the strong legal protections, challenges persist, particularly in relation to religious minorities. Incidents of religious intolerance, though relatively rare, have been reported. For example, members of the Hindu and Muslim communities have occasionally faced social discrimination and localised conflicts over religious practices. Additionally, while public schools are required to accommodate religious diversity, there have been cases where students from minority religions have faced difficulties in observing religious practices, such as wearing religious attire.   South Africa’s broad legal protections ensure a relatively high level of religious freedom compared to many other countries in the region. However, ongoing efforts are needed to maintain religious harmony and ensure that religious minorities are fully protected against any form of discrimination or prejudice.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/south-africa/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.9   Right to Privacy   South Africa has strong legal protections for privacy, particularly through the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA). However, despite these legal protections, privacy concerns have been raised in relation to the government's surveillance capabilities. The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act (RICA) enables state agencies to intercept communications under certain conditions, raising concerns about potential overreach and lack of judicial oversight.   While South Africa’s legal framework provides robust protections for privacy, ongoing efforts are needed to strengthen oversight mechanisms, particularly concerning state surveillance and data privacy breaches in both the public and private sectors.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-africa/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life is constitutionally protected in South Africa under Section 11 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996). The state is obligated to ensure the protection of this right through effective policing, justice systems, and protection measures. Despite this legal protection, South Africa faces significant challenges related to high levels of violent crime, police brutality, and threats to personal security.   South Africa has one of the highest rates of violent crime in the world, including murder, assault, and gender-based violence. The government has implemented various strategies to address these issues, including the National Development Plan (NDP) and the establishment of specialised police units such as the Family Violence, Child Protection, and Sexual Offences (FCS) units. However, violent crime, particularly in low-income communities, remains a pressing issue that disproportionately affects vulnerable groups.   Gender-based violence (GBV) is particularly pervasive, with the country often referred to as having an epidemic of violence against women. Despite legislative frameworks like the Domestic Violence Act and the Sexual Offences Act, enforcement remains inconsistent, and many victims face barriers to accessing justice. Civil society organisations, including Amnesty International and Sonke Gender Justice, have consistently called for more effective implementation of these laws and greater accountability for perpetrators of GBV.   In addition to violent crime, police brutality and extrajudicial killings also undermine the right to life and security of person. Reports of excessive use of force by law enforcement officers, especially during protests or in police custody, have raised serious concerns.   The state’s ability to protect the right to life is further hampered by resource constraints within the police and justice systems, along with widespread corruption. Despite legal and institutional frameworks to protect life and security, practical challenges continue to undermine the full realisation of these rights in South Africa.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or socioeconomic status). Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2022. South Africa: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/southern-africa/south-africa/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-africa [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Sonke Gender Justice. 2023. Sonke Gender Justice and the Bushbuckridge Civil Society Forum Calls on Religious Leaders to Partake in Combating Gender-Based Violence and Femicide in Communities . [Online] Available at: https://genderjustice.org.za/news-item/sonke-gender-justice-and-the-bushbuckridge-civil-society-forum-calls-on-religious-leaders-to-partake-in-combating-gender-based-violence-and-femicide-in-communities/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-africa/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.11   Overall Score for South Africa – 3.6/5   South Africa has a robust legal framework for human rights protection but faces challenges in enforcement, particularly in areas such as police misconduct and social inequality. The country’s constitution provides strong legal protections, but more work is needed to ensure these rights are consistently upheld for all citizens.     3.4.16   South Korea's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.16.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association are protected under South Korea’s Constitution of 1987, which guarantees citizens the right to peaceful assembly and the formation of associations. In practice, these rights are generally upheld, with a vibrant civil society and regular public demonstrations on various political, social, and economic issues. Protests are common in South Korea, and the government usually respects the right to assemble, though there are some restrictions.   South Korean law requires organisers to notify authorities in advance of any public assembly. While this notification system is not overly burdensome, the police sometimes impose restrictions on protests based on concerns for public order or national security.   Freedom of association is generally respected, and civil society organisations, trade unions, and political groups operate without significant interference. South Korea’s National Security Act also imposes limitations on freedom of association by restricting the activities of groups perceived to support North Korea, leading to criticism from human rights organisations for potentially curbing legitimate political dissent.   Despite these challenges, South Korea has made significant progress in advancing the protection of these rights since the country’s transition to democracy in the late 1980s. Ongoing advocacy by civil society groups has contributed to a more open environment for political expression and activism, though concerns remain about the treatment of labour unions and political protesters.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process is protected under South Korea’s Constitution of 1987, which ensures the independence of the judiciary and the right of individuals to be treated equally before the law. The Criminal Procedure Act and Civil Procedure Act provide the framework for legal processes, guaranteeing rights such as the presumption of innocence, the right to legal representation, and the right to a public trial.   South Korea’s judicial system is generally seen as impartial and independent, with a well-established legal framework that upholds due process rights. However, concerns have been raised about the judicial system’s susceptibility to political pressure in high-profile cases, particularly those involving powerful business conglomerates (chaebols) or government officials. While high-ranking individuals have been prosecuted for corruption, such as former presidents and chaebol leaders, there have been instances where the judicial system has been perceived as lenient towards these figures.   Pretrial detention practices have also attracted criticism. Although legal safeguards exist, there have been reports of lengthy pretrial detentions and insufficient access to legal counsel in some cases. Additionally, the practice of solitary confinement for detainees under investigation has been highlighted as a concern by human rights organisations, with some suggesting that this treatment may amount to inhumane treatment in certain circumstances.   Despite these challenges, South Korea’s judiciary remains generally respected for its independence and ability to provide fair trials, particularly in civil and criminal cases not involving sensitive political or national security issues. Continued judicial reforms and oversight are essential to ensuring that these rights are consistently upheld.   Score: 4/5  – "Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   South Korea is a vibrant constitutional democracy, with strong legal protections for political participation and democratic governance enshrined in its Constitution of 1987. The country holds regular, free, and fair elections at the national, regional, and local levels, overseen by the National Election Commission. Citizens are generally able to engage in the political process without significant restrictions, and voter turnout tends to be high in both presidential and legislative elections, reflecting a strong civic engagement.   The political landscape in South Korea is characterised by active political parties, civil society organisations, and a free press that plays a key role in shaping public discourse. The major political parties, such as the conservative People Power Party (PPP) and the progressive Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), dominate national politics. Political competition is generally robust, although political polarisation has become more pronounced in recent years.   Corruption and undue influence by powerful business conglomerates, known as chaebols, remain ongoing concerns for South Korea’s democratic governance. Scandals involving high-level officials, including former presidents, have led to public disillusionment with political elites. The Candlelight Protests of 2016-2017, which resulted in the impeachment and removal of President Park Geun-hye, highlighted the strength of South Korea’s civil society and its capacity to hold the government accountable through peaceful means.   Despite the overall strength of its democracy, South Korea faces certain limitations regarding political participation, particularly for marginalised groups such as migrants, North Korean defectors, and women. Women remain underrepresented in politics, although recent efforts have been made to address gender disparities in political representation. Additionally, the National Security Act, a Cold War-era law, continues to place restrictions on political expression and association, particularly in cases related to North Korea, which has drawn criticism from human rights groups for its potential to curb political dissent.   Overall, South Korea’s political system is stable and inclusive, with a high level of public trust in democratic institutions. However, ongoing efforts are needed to address corruption, political polarisation, and the inclusion of underrepresented groups in the political process to ensure the continued strength of South Korea’s democratic governance.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International IDEA. 2023. South Korea: Country Overview . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/republic-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.4   Freedom from Discrimination   South Korea’s Constitution of 1987 guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination on various grounds, including gender, religion, social status, and political opinion. However, the country lacks comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that would explicitly protect individuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or other marginalised statuses. Despite legal protections in place, various forms of discrimination persist in society, particularly concerning gender, LGBTQ+ rights, and migrants.   Gender inequality remains a significant issue in South Korea. Although legal protections for women exist, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, gender-based discrimination in the workplace, politics, and other public spheres is still prevalent. South Korea ranks low among OECD countries in terms of gender equality, with a substantial gender pay gap and underrepresentation of women in leadership positions. Women also face societal pressures related to traditional gender roles, which often result in unequal treatment in professional and private spheres.   The rights of the LGBTQ+ community in South Korea are limited, as same-sex marriage is not legally recognised, and anti-discrimination protections based on sexual orientation or gender identity remain absent. The military, under the Military Criminal Act, still criminalises consensual same-sex activity between soldiers, further contributing to societal stigma. Despite this, the LGBTQ+ community has grown more visible in recent years, with the Seoul Queer Culture Festival becoming a notable event, though it often faces pushback from conservative groups.   Migrant workers and North Korean defectors are other groups that experience systemic discrimination. Migrant workers, particularly those from Southeast Asia, often face exploitation, poor working conditions, and limited legal protections. While there have been improvements in the legal framework protecting foreign workers, enforcement remains inconsistent. North Korean defectors, though offered resettlement assistance, often struggle with societal discrimination, isolation, and economic marginalisation.   Efforts to pass a comprehensive anti-discrimination law have been stalled in the National Assembly due to political resistance, particularly from conservative lawmakers and religious groups. Human rights organisations, both domestic and international, have consistently called for stronger legal protections against discrimination in South Korea, but progress remains slow.   Score: 3/5   – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. OECD. 2024. OECD Employment Outlook 2024 - Country Notes: Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-employment-outlook-2024-country-notes_d6c84475-en/korea_636e4c7a-en.html [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   South Korea is a signatory to key international human rights treaties, such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), and its Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman treatment. Domestic laws, including the Criminal Procedure Act, also provide legal protections against torture and outline the rights of individuals in detention. Despite these protections, concerns remain about the treatment of detainees, particularly during police interrogations and in the country’s correctional facilities.   In South Korea’s prisons and detention centres, overcrowding and substandard conditions have been raised as concerns. Human rights groups have reported on poor living conditions, inadequate healthcare, and a lack of mental health support for inmates. While torture is not widespread, there have been isolated incidents of physical and psychological abuse in detention centres, particularly against vulnerable groups such as foreign detainees and LGBTQ+ individuals.   South Korea’s government has taken steps to address these issues, including reforms aimed at improving the transparency of police practices and establishing independent oversight mechanisms. The National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) plays a crucial role in monitoring human rights abuses and advocating for better treatment of detainees, but it has called on government to address inhumane conditions in prisons. Further efforts are needed to ensure full compliance with international standards and to address the lingering issues of mistreatment in detention settings.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist and are generally enforced, though there may be occasional reports of abuse by law enforcement. Violators are usually held accountable.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. South Korea: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK). 2023. The National Human Rights Commission of Korea Calls for Action on Inhumane Prison Overcrowding . [Online] Available at: https://www.humanrights.go.kr/eng/board/read?boardManagementNo=7003&boardNo=7610127&menuLevel=2&menuNo=114 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   South Korea is a democracy that offers legal protections for civil liberties, including the rights of human rights defenders (HRDs). The Constitution of South Korea guarantees freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, allowing HRDs to operate openly in most cases. However, human rights defenders—particularly those advocating on sensitive issues such as labour rights, LGBTQ+ rights, and North Korea-related activism—face challenges ranging from legal constraints to harassment.   One of the primary concerns regarding HRDs in South Korea relates to the enforcement of the National Security Act (NSA), which has been criticised for restricting Freedom of Expression and association, particularly when it comes to political dissent involving North Korea. Activists who are perceived as sympathising with or defending North Korean interests may face charges under this law, even when their work is focused on peacebuilding or human rights advocacy. This has led to self-censorship among some HRDs working on issues related to inter-Korean relations.   Despite these challenges, South Korea’s legal framework offers some protections for HRDs, and civil society remains vibrant and active. However, ongoing efforts are needed to address the legal and social barriers that limit the ability of HRDs to carry out their work freely and safely.   Score: 4/5   – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. South Korea: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2023. South Korea: HRD Situation Overview . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression is constitutionally guaranteed in South Korea under Article 21 of the Constitution of 1987. The country generally enjoys a vibrant media landscape, with diverse opinions represented in print, broadcast, and online media. South Korea’s press is regarded as relatively free compared to other countries in the region, but there are still notable challenges to full Freedom of Expression, particularly in relation to political and security issues.   One significant restriction on Freedom of Expression comes from the National Security Act (NSA). Enacted during the Cold War, the NSA criminalises expressions deemed to sympathise with or promote North Korea. Human rights organisations have criticised this law for being overly broad and suppressing legitimate political speech, as well as stifling academic debate and activism related to inter-Korean relations. Activists and scholars have faced prosecution under the NSA for comments or publications perceived to be supportive of North Korea, which has contributed to self-censorship on sensitive political matters.   South Korea also faces challenges related to online Freedom of Expression. The government regulates online content through the Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC), which monitors and censors online speech deemed harmful or inappropriate. While these regulations are intended to protect against cyberbullying, defamation, and the spread of false information, critics argue that they can be used to silence dissenting voices or restrict critical political commentary.   Journalists in South Korea have generally been able to operate without fear of reprisal, although there have been reports of government pressure on media outlets. Investigative journalists covering issues such as political corruption, corporate misconduct, or sensitive national security matters have occasionally faced intimidation, lawsuits, or denial of access to information. Although the media is diverse and private ownership allows for a variety of viewpoints, media outlets with critical views of the government sometimes report subtle forms of pressure or interference.   Public protests and demonstrations also play a significant role in South Korea's expressive culture, with the right to assemble constitutionally protected. However, there have been instances where police used excessive force to disperse protests or limit participation in politically sensitive gatherings.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom Index: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally guaranteed in South Korea under Article 20 of the Constitution of 1987, which protects individuals' rights to religious freedom and prohibits any discrimination based on religion. South Korea is religiously diverse, with Christianity (both Protestantism and Catholicism), Buddhism, and other traditional religions being widely practiced, alongside a growing population of people who identify as non-religious.   In practice, South Korea generally respects the right to religious freedom, and people are free to practice or not practice a religion of their choice without interference from the state. The government does not officially endorse any religion, and there are no significant legal restrictions on religious practice or worship. Religious organisations, including churches, temples, and mosques, operate freely, and religious leaders often play a prominent role in social and political life.   Despite these constitutional protections, some challenges remain, particularly regarding religious minorities. The Muslim population, though small, has reported occasional social discrimination and difficulties in obtaining permission to build mosques. Tensions between religious and non-religious groups, as well as between different religious communities, sometimes flare up, especially in the context of public debates on moral or social issues such as LGBTQ+ rights or secularism in public schools.   Another significant issue is conscientious objection to mandatory military service. South Korea has a strict policy of compulsory military service for men, and until recently, there was no provision for conscientious objectors, many of whom are Jehovah’s Witnesses. These individuals faced imprisonment for refusing to serve on religious grounds. However, a landmark ruling by the Constitutional Court in 2018 recognised the right to conscientious objection and required the government to provide alternative service for those who refuse military service on religious or moral grounds. Despite this progress, the alternative service system has faced criticism for being punitive and excessively long.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2022. South Korea: Drop charges against first conscientious objector to refuse alternative service . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/08/south-korea-conscientious-objector-military-service-hye-min-kim/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.9   Right to Privacy   The right to privacy is protected under South Korea’s Constitution and further reinforced by several laws, including the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) of 2011, which is one of the most comprehensive data privacy laws in the world. The law regulates the collection, storage, and use of personal data by both public and private entities, requiring consent for the use of such data and setting penalties for violations.   Despite these legal safeguards, concerns about government surveillance and data privacy breaches have persisted in South Korea. The National Security Act allows for significant state surveillance, particularly in cases related to national security and issues concerning North Korea. Critics argue that this has led to the overreach of surveillance measures and a potential infringement on the privacy rights of individuals, especially those involved in political activism or sensitive discussions regarding North Korea.   South Korea’s government also monitors internet activity extensively. The Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC) is responsible for regulating online content, including monitoring and censoring content that is deemed to be harmful or illegal. This has raised concerns among civil liberties groups about the balance between national security and personal privacy.   In recent years, the misuse of personal information in the private sector has also gained attention. High-profile data breaches involving companies like Naver and Kakao have underscored the need for stricter enforcement of data protection laws. The South Korean government has responded by enhancing regulations on cybersecurity and increasing penalties for data breaches, but challenges remain as companies and public institutions face growing cyber threats.   South Korea has made efforts to bolster data privacy rights, particularly with the establishment of the Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC), an independent agency tasked with enforcing PIPA and protecting personal data. Despite these advancements, ongoing concerns about government surveillance and the misuse of personal information highlight the need for continued vigilance in balancing security and privacy rights.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-korea/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person is protected under South Korea’s Constitution and further reinforced by legal measures aimed at protecting individuals from violence and ensuring public safety. South Korea generally enjoys a low crime rate, and the government has robust law enforcement and public safety mechanisms in place. However, specific challenges remain in areas such as domestic violence, gender-based violence, and concerns related to the use of force by law enforcement.   One of the most pressing issues related to the right to life in South Korea is the prevalence of gender-based violence. Despite legal protections such as the Act on the Prevention of Domestic Violence and the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Crimes of Domestic Violence, reports of domestic abuse and violence against women remain significant. Civil society organisations, including women’s rights groups, have called for more effective enforcement of these laws and better support systems for victims. Additionally, South Korea's #MeToo movement has highlighted systemic issues related to sexual harassment and violence, particularly in the workplace and public institutions.   Police use of force is generally well-regulated, but there have been concerns about excessive use of force during protests and in handling public demonstrations. While such incidents are rare, human rights groups have reported cases where law enforcement officers used unnecessary or excessive force, raising concerns about accountability. The government has made efforts to address these concerns through police reforms and better training on the use of non-violent tactics.   Suicide remains another major public health issue, with South Korea having one of the highest suicide rates among OECD countries. Mental health services and suicide prevention measures have been expanded in recent years, but societal stigma surrounding mental health persists, making it difficult for individuals to seek help. The government has implemented national suicide prevention plans aimed at addressing the root causes of suicide, including poverty, mental illness, and social isolation.   Capital punishment remains a sensitive topic in South Korea. Although the country has not carried out any executions since 1997, it retains the death penalty, and there are still individuals on death row. The debate around abolishing the death penalty continues, with human rights organisations advocating for its full abolition in line with global human rights standards.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, and violence is generally low, though certain groups (e.g., activists or protestors) may face occasional threats. Law enforcement generally follows legal protocols but may overstep in some cases.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. South Korea: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Korea JoongAng Daily. 2023. Suicide among young Koreans is systemic problem, experts say . [Online] Available at: https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/13/national/kcampus/korea-suicide-moonbin/20230713174115739.html [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-korea/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.11   Overall Score for South Korea: 3.9/5   In conclusion, South Korea upholds a strong legal framework for human rights, but challenges remain. Restrictions on political dissent under the National Security Act, limitations on Freedom of Expression, and discrimination against women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and migrant workers persist. Despite reforms in areas like military service and privacy, concerns about police conduct and protection of vulnerable groups continue. Further reforms are needed to strengthen human rights protections.   3.4.17   Turkey's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.17.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association are constitutionally protected in Turkey, but in practice, these rights face significant restrictions, especially under President Erdoğan. The government frequently limits protests, restricts civil society organisations, and stifles dissent through legal and administrative measures.   Large protests, such as Gezi Park (2013) and university protests (2021), were met with excessive police force, mass arrests, and vague charges like "terrorism". The situation worsened after the 2016 coup attempt, with a two-year state of emergency leading to further curtailment of these rights, and many restrictions remain in place.   Civil society organisations, particularly those working on human rights, women’s rights, LGBTQ+ issues, and press freedom, face legal obstacles, harassment, and government control. Despite these challenges, grassroots movements continue to push for reforms, though the climate for assembly and association remains highly restricted.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of assembly and association are restricted. Protests and demonstrations are often banned or dispersed violently. Civil society organisations are heavily regulated, and activists face repression.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Turkey: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process is enshrined in Turkey’s Constitution and guaranteed under both domestic laws and international human rights treaties to which Turkey is a party, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. However, in practice, these rights have been significantly undermined, particularly in the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup attempt, which led to widespread purges and crackdowns on dissent.   Turkey’s judiciary has faced increasing politicisation in recent years, raising concerns about its independence. The dismissal of thousands of judges and prosecutors following the 2016 coup attempt, and the appointment of government-aligned officials, have contributed to a judiciary that is often seen as biased, particularly in politically sensitive cases. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has raised concerns about the lack of judicial independence in Turkey and the erosion of fair trial rights, especially for political opponents, journalists, and human rights defenders.   Prolonged pretrial detention is another issue undermining due process in Turkey. Individuals accused of terrorism, often under vague or broad charges, can be held for extended periods before trial. This practice disproportionately affects political activists, journalists, and civil society members. Many of these cases are brought under the country’s expansive anti-terrorism laws, which have been criticised for being used to stifle dissent rather than address legitimate security concerns.   The use of emergency decrees during the post-coup state of emergency (2016–2018) further weakened fair trial standards, allowing the government to bypass normal legal procedures. Although the state of emergency has officially ended, many of the restrictive measures introduced during this period remain in place, continuing to impact the justice system.   While Turkey does provide access to legal representation, lawyers defending individuals in politically charged cases often face harassment, intimidation, and legal action themselves. This creates a climate of fear among legal professionals, further undermining the right to a fair defence.   Score: 2/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair. Legal representation may be limited for many individuals.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. MEDEL. 2023. Statement of the Platform for an Independent Judiciary in Turkey on the Erosion of Rule of Law in Türkiye . [Online] Available at: https://medelnet.eu/statement-of-the-platform-for-an-independent-judiciary-in-turkey-on-the-erosion-of-rule-of-law-in-turkiye/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. The Law Society. 2023. Widespread Mistreatment of Lawyers in Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/contact-or-visit-us/press-office/press-releases/widespread-mistreatment-of-lawyers-in-turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Turkey is a republic with a multiparty political system, but political participation and democratic governance have been increasingly restricted under the administration of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While elections are held regularly, concerns about the fairness and integrity of the electoral process have grown in recent years. Turkey’s political environment is marked by the dominance of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and allegations of government interference in the judiciary, media, and opposition parties.   Turkey’s Electoral Law guarantees citizens the right to vote and participate in elections, and voter turnout is generally high. However, opposition parties and independent observers have raised concerns about electoral fairness. The 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections, for example, were criticised for media bias in favour of the ruling party, unequal access to campaign resources, and reports of voter intimidation, particularly in Kurdish regions.   Freedom of political expression is significantly curtailed, with opposition parties, activists, and media outlets frequently targeted under Turkey’s broad anti-terrorism laws. Members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) have been especially affected, with many party leaders and parliamentarians arrested or removed from office on charges of terrorism. This has severely limited political representation for the Kurdish minority and other opposition groups.   Civil society and grassroots political participation are also heavily restricted. Following the 2016 coup attempt, the Turkish government imposed a state of emergency that lasted two years, during which time many civil society organisations were shut down, and political dissent was suppressed. Although the state of emergency has officially ended, many restrictive measures remain in place, limiting the ability of civil society to engage in political activism.   The role of the judiciary in democratic governance has also come under question, with widespread reports of political influence over judicial appointments and rulings. This has weakened the system of checks and balances and raised concerns about the erosion of democratic governance in Turkey.   While Turkey remains a functioning democracy in terms of holding elections, the political space for meaningful opposition and participation has significantly narrowed, raising concerns about the country’s democratic backsliding.   Score: 3/5  – “Elections occur, but there are significant constraints, such as voter suppression, lack of transparency, or barriers to political opposition. Democratic processes are undermined by the ruling party.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Turkey’s Constitution guarantees equality before the law regardless of language, race, gender, political opinion, or religion, but discrimination remains widespread, particularly against women, minorities, LGBTQ+ individuals, and refugees.   Women face systemic discrimination, especially in the workforce, with a persistent pay gap and underrepresentation in leadership. Gender-based violence is a serious issue, and the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention has weakened protections for women.   The Kurdish minority faces repression, particularly regarding cultural rights, and other religious minorities also encounter societal discrimination and limited access to services. LGBTQ+ individuals lack legal protection, and same-sex relationships are not recognised. Activists and events face increasing government crackdowns, leaving LGBTQ+ individuals vulnerable to harassment and violence.   Refugees, especially Syrians, face discrimination, with limited access to employment, healthcare, and education, exacerbated by rising social tensions and political scapegoating.   Score: 2/5  – “Discrimination is prevalent, and legal protections are either weak or non-existent. Marginalised groups face systemic inequality, and the state does little to address these disparities.”    References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/turkiye/report-turkiye/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Turkey, a signatory to international treaties like the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), prohibits torture under its Constitution. However, reports of torture and ill-treatment, especially in detention and police custody, remain a major concern. Human rights organisations have raised alarms over widespread abuses following the 2016 coup attempt, when emergency powers led to mass arrests and detainees faced beatings, threats, and solitary confinement, often without access to legal representation or medical care.   Overcrowded prisons and poor conditions further exacerbate these issues, particularly for political prisoners and dissidents. Police brutality during protests, especially against pro-democracy, Kurdish, and LGBTQ+ activists, is also a serious issue. Despite torture being illegal, accountability for perpetrators remains rare, and victims face barriers to justice.   While the government has introduced reforms to improve detention conditions and train law enforcement, these efforts have been insufficient, and abuses persist, undermining Turkey’s commitment to eradicating torture.   Score: 2/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are reported frequently, and legal protections are weak or rarely enforced. Law enforcement and security forces often act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Turkey: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). 2022. The CPT and Türkiye . [Online] Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Human rights defenders in Turkey face significant risks despite constitutional protections for Freedom of Expression, assembly, and association. Over the past decade, especially after the 2016 coup attempt, the government has intensified its crackdown on civil society, using anti-terrorism laws and vague charges to silence defenders, journalists, and activists critical of state policies.   These laws have been used to accuse defenders of links to terrorism, particularly those advocating for Kurds, women, and LGBTQ+ rights. High-profile cases include the persecution of the Ankara Bar Association and the imprisonment of Osman Kavala. Human rights defenders face legal obstacles, arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention, and unfair trials. The Law on Associations has further restricted civil society, allowing the dissolution of NGOs on security grounds. Lawyers representing defenders also face harassment.   Women’s rights and LGBTQ+ activists have seen growing repression, especially after Turkey's withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. LGBTQ+ events have been banned, and activists face threats, smear campaigns, and criminal charges. Defenders are also subject to state surveillance, travel bans, and intimidation, forcing many to flee or work in secrecy.   Reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International highlight the misuse of anti-terrorism laws to suppress defenders, yet the government has shown little willingness to address these abuses, continuing to target human rights advocates.   Score: 2/5  – “Human rights defenders are frequently persecuted, harassed, or jailed for their work. Legal protections are minimal, and the state often seeks to suppress their activities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2023. Turkey: Overview of the Situation for Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2020. Turkey: Criminal Case for Opposing Homophobic Speech . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/01/turkey-criminal-case-opposing-homophobic-speech [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT). 2023. Turkey: The Instrumentalization of the Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Its Impact on Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.omct.org/en/resources/reports/turkey-the-instrumentalization-of-the-counter-terrorism-legislation-and-policies-and-their-impact-on-hrds [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.17.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in Turkey is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution of Turkey, which ensures individuals the right to express and disseminate their thoughts and opinions. However, in practice, this right has been severely curtailed, especially in recent years. Under the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, there has been an intensified crackdown on dissenting voices, including journalists, academics, opposition politicians, and activists, with Freedom of Expression increasingly undermined by legal and extralegal measures.   Turkey has one of the most restrictive environments for media freedom in the world. Numerous media outlets critical of the government have been shut down, particularly following the 2016 coup attempt, and many journalists have been imprisoned under charges of terrorism or insulting the president. According to Reporters Without Borders, Turkey remains one of the top jailers of journalists globally. Media outlets that remain in operation face heavy government pressure, including threats of fines, license revocations, and other sanctions. Many prominent media organisations are now controlled by pro-government business interests, limiting the diversity of views in mainstream news.   Turkey’s broad anti-terrorism laws have been widely used to suppress Freedom of Expression. Critics of the government, including journalists and social media users, are frequently charged with supporting terrorism or inciting violence, even for peaceful criticism of state policies. Individuals who speak out on sensitive issues such as the Kurdish question, the Armenian genocide, or military operations in Syria often face criminal prosecution. This has created a chilling effect, where many journalists and activists resort to self-censorship to avoid legal repercussions.   Social media platforms have become a critical space for dissent in Turkey, given the restrictions on traditional media. However, the government has taken steps to curtail online expression as well. In 2020, Turkey passed a new social media law requiring platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to appoint local representatives and store user data within Turkey. The law gives authorities greater control over content removal and user information, raising concerns about privacy and state surveillance. Numerous social media users have been arrested or prosecuted for their posts, particularly those critical of government policies.   Academic freedom has also been under attack in Turkey, particularly for those critical of the government or military actions. After the 2016 coup attempt, thousands of academics were dismissed from their positions, with many also facing criminal charges. Universities have been pressured to align with government policies, and student activists are frequently targeted during protests. Similarly, artists, filmmakers, and writers who produce work critical of the government often face censorship, fines, or even imprisonment.   International human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have consistently condemned Turkey’s assault on Freedom of Expression. Although the Turkish government occasionally signals reforms, substantial changes to restore Freedom of Expression remain elusive.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of Expression is heavily restricted. The press and media are frequently censored, and individuals face legal consequences or violence for expressing dissent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2022. Türkiye’s “disinformation law” tightens government control and curtails Freedom of Expression . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/EUR4461432022ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Turkey: Press Freedom Index . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally guaranteed in Turkey, but in practice, significant restrictions affect religious minorities. While Sunni Islam is the dominant religion, minority groups such as Christians, Jews, Alevis, and non-Sunni Muslims face various challenges. Alevis, for example, are denied official recognition of their places of worship, resulting in disparities in funding and state support. Similarly, Christian denominations often struggle with legal and bureaucratic hurdles, particularly when reclaiming property or maintaining religious institutions.   The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which regulates Sunni religious institutions, does not support other religious groups, reinforcing the marginalisation of these communities. The state also exercises significant control over religious education and institutions, often citing secularism as a basis for its involvement. However, under President Erdoğan, there has been a shift toward greater government influence over religious affairs, leading to concerns about the erosion of secularism and the increased promotion of Sunni Islam.   Despite constitutional protections, the unequal treatment of religious minorities continues to undermine Turkey’s commitment to religious freedom.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of religion is restricted, with certain religious groups facing persecution or being banned. State religion or dominant faith is heavily privileged.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report 2022 . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.9   Right to Privacy   The right to privacy is constitutionally protected in Turkey, but government surveillance and data monitoring practices raise significant concerns. Under the Law on the State Intelligence Services and other security-related laws, the government has broad powers to intercept communications, monitor online activity, and gather personal data, often with minimal judicial oversight. The expansion of digital surveillance, particularly following the 2016 coup attempt, has heightened concerns over the government's ability to infringe on personal privacy under the guise of national security.   Social media platforms are also subject to strict regulations. A 2020 law mandates that major platforms store user data in Turkey and comply with government requests for content removal and data access, raising fears about the erosion of online privacy. Human rights organisations have criticised these measures for facilitating state overreach and weakening protections for free expression.   While legal frameworks exist for protecting personal data, including the Law on the Protection of Personal Data (2016), enforcement remains weak, and state surveillance practices continue to undermine privacy rights.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognized, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations.”    References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. DW. 2020. Turkey: New law tightens hold on social media . [Online] Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-tightens-control-on-social-media-with-new-law/a-54360493 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. JURIST. 2020. Analysing the Effects of Turkey’s Social Media Regulation Bill . [Online] Available at: https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/09/akshita-tiwary-turkey-social-media-bill/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person is protected under Turkey’s Constitution and international human rights agreements to which the country is a party. However, Turkey faces persistent challenges in ensuring these rights, particularly due to high levels of violence, state security operations, and police brutality.   Turkey has been criticised for excessive use of force by law enforcement, especially during protests and in Kurdish regions. Security forces have been implicated in extrajudicial killings and torture, particularly in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt and during counter-terrorism operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Reports from human rights groups document instances where detainees and protestors were subjected to harsh treatment, with little accountability for perpetrators.   Gender-based violence is another major issue in Turkey, with high rates of femicide and domestic abuse. Despite legal protections like the Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence Against Women, enforcement remains inconsistent. The government’s 2021 withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, an international treaty aimed at preventing violence against women, further exacerbated concerns about the state’s commitment to addressing this issue.   Additionally, Turkey's handling of refugees and migrants, especially in border regions, has raised human rights concerns. There are reports of ill-treatment and, in some cases, unlawful returns of refugees to conflict zones, violating international law.   Score: 2/5  – “The right to life is not consistently protected. Arbitrary killings, state violence, or widespread abuses by security forces are common, and accountability mechanisms are weak.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Turkey: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Turkey: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2022 . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.11   Overall Score for Turkey – 2.2/5   Turkey faces significant challenges in protecting civil and political rights, particularly in areas like judicial independence, freedom of assembly, and the treatment of political dissidents and minorities. While there are legal protections in place, their inconsistent enforcement and frequent violations raise serious concerns. 3.4.18   United Kingdom's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.18.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association are protected in the United Kingdom (UK) under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, integrated through the Human Rights act 1998. Citizens generally have the right to protest, join trade unions, and form associations. However, these rights are not absolute and may be restricted to maintain public order, national security, or prevent disorder.   Recent legislation, such as the Police, Crime, Sentencing, and Courts Act 2022, grants the police more power to limit protests based on factors like noise or disruption. This has raised concerns among human rights organisations about curbing the right to peaceful protest. Freedom of association, particularly for trade unions, is well established but faces restrictions, especially around strike action, as highlighted in the Trade Union Act 2016.   Criticism has mounted due to the heavy policing of movements like Black Lives Matter and Extinction Rebellion, with claims that government measures could restrict civil liberties.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. United Kingdom: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. The Independent. 2021. Extinction Rebellion and BLM protests: Robert Buckland defends new police powers . [Online] Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/extinction-rebellion-blm-robert-buckland-police-b1814392.html [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process is a fundamental principle of the UK’s legal system, protected under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which is incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998. The UK legal framework ensures individuals are entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal. The principle of due process is upheld through the right to legal representation, the presumption of innocence, and the right to appeal.   Despite the strong legal protections, certain areas remain concerning. The UK's legal aid system, which is critical for ensuring access to justice for those who cannot afford representation, has faced significant cuts in recent years. This has limited access to adequate legal support, particularly for low-income individuals, raising concerns about inequality in legal representation.   In addition, there are concerns regarding the use of terrorism laws and extended pretrial detention periods for individuals suspected of terrorism-related offences. Critics argue that these measures can undermine fair trial standards, particularly regarding the right to a prompt and public hearing.   The judicial system in the UK remains highly regarded for its independence and fairness. However, issues such as delays in court proceedings and limited access to legal representation continue to pose challenges for ensuring full compliance with the right to a fair trial and due process.   Score: 4/5  – “Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Legal Aid Agency. 2022. Legal Aid Report 2022 . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/legal-aid-agency-annual-report-and-accounts-2021-to-2022 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].     3.4.18.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   The UK is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy, where citizens enjoy the right to participate in free and fair elections. The political system is underpinned by democratic institutions, with the Parliament comprising the House of Commons and the House of Lords. General elections are held at least every five years, and voter turnout is generally high, reflecting robust citizen engagement in the political process.   Political participation is open to all citizens, and the UK maintains a multiparty system, with the Conservative Party and the Labour Party being the dominant political forces. Smaller parties, such as the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party (SNP), also play significant roles, particularly in devolved regions such as Scotland and Wales, which have their own parliaments or assemblies.   Challenges to democratic governance have emerged, including concerns over voter disenfranchisement and new regulations like voter ID requirements, which critics argue could marginalise vulnerable groups. There are also ongoing debates about the representation of minority groups in Parliament and the wider political landscape.   The UK's devolution system, which grants legislative power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, ensures that regional governments can govern according to the specific needs of their populations. However, tensions around devolved powers, particularly regarding Scotland's independence movement, remain an important issue in British politics.   Score: 5/5  – “The country guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in government. Political opposition is allowed and respected, and there is a transparent process for democratic governance.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International IDEA. 2023. United Kingdom Democracy Tracker . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination is protected under several laws in the UK, most notably the Equality Act 2010, which consolidates previous anti-discrimination laws and ensures protection based on characteristics such as race, gender, age, disability, religion, and sexual orientation. The UK’s legal framework is among the most comprehensive in the world, with specific provisions to prevent discrimination in employment, education, housing, and public services.   However, despite these legal protections, discrimination remains a persistent issue in practice. Racial and ethnic discrimination continues to affect minority communities, particularly Black, Asian, and other minority ethnic groups. Studies show disparities in employment opportunities, educational outcomes, and interactions with the criminal justice system. The Windrush scandal further highlighted systemic racism within immigration enforcement, where British citizens of Caribbean descent were wrongly detained or deported.   Gender-based discrimination is also prevalent, with women facing challenges in pay equity, representation in leadership roles, and ongoing issues with gender-based violence. While laws like the Equal Pay Act aim to address gender inequality, progress has been slow, particularly in sectors like finance and technology. The gender pay gap remains a significant issue, despite legal requirements for companies to publish pay gap data.   Discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals has improved significantly following the legalisation of same-sex marriage and the implementation of anti-discrimination protections. However, hate crimes targeting LGBTQ+ people, particularly transgender individuals, remain a concern, with many reporting harassment and violence.   Disability discrimination continues to pose challenges, particularly in terms of accessibility to services and employment opportunities. While the Equality Act 2010 mandates reasonable adjustments for disabled individuals, implementation remains inconsistent, and many disabled people face barriers to full participation in society.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections against discrimination exist but may be inconsistently enforced. Discrimination is not widespread, though certain marginalized groups may face barriers.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United Kingdom.  [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is protected under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), incorporated into UK law through the Human Rights Act 1998. The UK is also a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), which reinforces the absolute prohibition of torture in all circumstances.   In practice, the UK generally upholds these protections. However, concerns have been raised in relation to the treatment of individuals in immigration detention centres, prisons, and during counter-terrorism operations. Human rights organisations have criticised conditions in detention centres, particularly for asylum seekers and immigrants, where reports of inhumane treatment, poor living conditions, and inadequate healthcare have emerged.   In the context of policing, the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) has been involved in reviewing cases of excessive force or misconduct by officers, although such cases are relatively rare. Still, issues of police violence during protests, including the use of force against protestors, have occasionally been raised by civil rights groups.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist and are generally enforced, though there may be occasional reports of abuse by law enforcement. Violators are usually held accountable.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. United Kingdom: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   The UK provides a generally safe environment for human rights defenders compared to many other countries, with strong legal protections in place. Human rights defenders, including activists, journalists, and civil society organisations, are free to operate and advocate for various causes, benefiting from the country's respect for Freedom of Expression and association. Laws such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010 provide a legal framework that supports the work of human rights defenders.   However, there are growing concerns about certain trends that may negatively impact the work of human rights defenders. Recent legislation, such as the Police, Crime, Sentencing, and Courts Act 2022, has raised concerns among activists and civil society groups about potential limitations on the right to protest, which could restrict the activities of human rights defenders advocating for social justice, environmental issues, and other causes. Critics argue that the increased police powers to limit protests could create a chilling effect on peaceful demonstrations, which are a key tool for human rights defenders to raise awareness and push for reforms. In addition, organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have expressed concerns over the UK government's increasing scrutiny of non-governmental organisations, particularly those addressing issues like migration and the treatment of asylum seekers. There have been reports of NGOs and human rights defenders facing legal and bureaucratic obstacles in carrying out their work, especially when challenging government policies.   Despite these challenges, the UK remains a largely supportive environment for human rights defenders, with a robust civil society and numerous avenues for legal recourse in cases of harassment or threats. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) also plays a key role in safeguarding the rights of activists and organisations.   Score: 4/5  – Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in the United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.7   Freedom of Expression   The UK generally upholds this right, allowing for a free press and open public discourse. However, there are concerns regarding certain legal and political developments that may limit free expression. For example, the Public Order Act 1986 contains provisions that criminalise speech that incites hatred on grounds of race, religion, or sexual orientation, which some critics argue can lead to the over-policing of speech. Additionally, the Defamation Act 2013 was introduced to balance protection of reputation with free speech, reducing the ability to bring frivolous defamation claims.   Social media has also become a focal point for debates about free speech, with the rise of online harassment and hate speech leading to calls for tighter regulation. The UK’s Online Safety Bill, which seeks to impose new regulations on online platforms to prevent harmful content, has been controversial. Critics argue that while it aims to curb harmful online content, it could also stifle legitimate free expression, particularly in cases where definitions of harm are vague.   There are also concerns over restrictions on protests and demonstrations. The Police, Crime, Sentencing, and Courts Act 2022 has been criticised for expanding police powers to limit protests based on noise or disruption, which human rights organisations argue could suppress peaceful assembly and freedom of speech.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in the United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/united-kingdom/report-united-kingdom/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   The UK provides robust legal protections for individuals to practice their religion or belief freely, or to choose not to practice any religion at all. This right includes the freedom to manifest beliefs in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. The Equality Act 2010 further protects individuals from discrimination based on religion or belief in areas such as employment, education, and public services.   The UK is a religiously diverse country, with Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Judaism, and other religions practiced openly. While the Church of England is the state religion, the UK maintains a largely secular public space. Religious freedom is broadly respected, and individuals are allowed to express their beliefs freely, provided they do not infringe on the rights of others or public order.   Despite these protections, some challenges remain. Religious minorities, such as Muslims and Jews, face ongoing issues of discrimination and hate crimes. Islamophobia and antisemitism have been persistent problems, with reports of harassment, vandalism, and violence against places of worship (particularly after October 7th, 2023). The UK government has introduced policies and strategies to combat hate crimes, such as the Hate Crime Action Plan, which seeks to provide stronger legal recourse and protections for religious communities.   The intersection of religious freedom and other rights has occasionally been contentious. For example, debates over religious attire in schools or workplaces, such as the wearing of hijabs or Sikh turbans, have highlighted tensions between individual rights and institutional policies. However, UK law generally favours accommodating religious practices unless there are strong reasons not to, such as health and safety concerns.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in the United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/united-kingdom/report-united-kingdom/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. UK Government. 2019. Hate Crime Action Plan . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hate-crime-action-plan-2016 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.18.9   Right to Privacy   The UK has robust data protection laws, particularly through the Data Protection Act 2018, which implements the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This framework ensures that individuals have control over their personal data and imposes strict obligations on organisations to handle personal information responsibly. Individuals also have the right to access their data, correct inaccuracies, and request its deletion.   Despite these protections, concerns have arisen about the government’s use of surveillance powers, particularly under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (often referred to as the "Snooper's Charter"). This law grants wide-ranging powers to security and intelligence agencies to intercept communications and collect bulk data. While the government argues these measures are necessary for national security, critics and human rights groups argue that they infringe upon privacy rights and lack sufficient oversight.   Furthermore, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) allows authorities to carry out surveillance and access personal communications in certain circumstances. These laws have sparked debate about the balance between security and privacy, with human rights organisations like Privacy International raising concerns over state overreach.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Liberty. 2023. Legal challenge to the Investigatory Powers Act . [Online] Available at: https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/legal-challenge-investigatory-powers-act/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Privacy International. 2023. Key highlights of our results 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/5294/key-highlights-our-results-2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person is a fundamental right protected in the UK under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), incorporated into domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998. This right imposes both negative and positive obligations on the state. The state must refrain from taking life, except in strictly necessary circumstances like self-defence, and must also take proactive measures to protect individuals' lives, particularly those who are vulnerable.   While the UK generally upholds this right, there are areas of concern, particularly regarding police use of force, custodial deaths, and the protection of vulnerable individuals, such as victims of domestic violence and refugees.   Custodial   deaths also raise significant concerns, particularly the conditions in prisons and immigration detention centres. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Freedom House, have highlighted issues of overcrowding, poor mental health care, and violence within the UK’s prison system. Vulnerable detainees, including those with mental health conditions, often face inadequate protection, leading to tragic outcomes.   Domestic violence remains a major challenge to the right to life and security of person. Despite the legal framework, including the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, domestic abuse victims often face barriers to protection, and the number of domestic homicides remains high. Organisations like Refuge and Women's Aid continue to advocate for stronger enforcement of existing laws and better support for victims.   There are also concerns regarding the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, particularly those held in immigration detention. Reports from groups such as Human Rights Watch have raised alarm about conditions in detention centres and the government's duty to protect the right to life of these individuals.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, and violence is generally low, though certain groups (e.g., minorities or marginalised communities) may face occasional threats. Law enforcement generally follows legal protocols but may overstep in some cases.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. United Kingdom: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.11   Overall Score for the UK: 4.1/5   The UK has a robust legal framework for human rights protection but faces challenges in enforcement and compliance, particularly in areas such as Freedom of Expression and police accountability.

3.4.19   United States' Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.19.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association in the United States (US) is protected by the First Amendment, which guarantees the right to peaceful assembly and the formation of groups, including unions and political organisations. These rights are fundamental to democratic participation, allowing citizens to protest, advocate for causes, and organise collectively. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) further protects the right to form unions and engage in collective bargaining.   While these rights are strongly upheld, there are limitations. Governments may impose time, place, and manner restrictions to maintain public order, but these must not target the content of the assembly. Recent protests, such as the Black Lives Matter demonstrations, have exposed concerns about police handling of peaceful assemblies, with law enforcement criticised for excessive force. Similarly, challenges to unionisation, particularly in states with "right-to-work" laws, highlight ongoing obstacles to fully exercising freedom of association.   According to Freedom House, the US maintains a high degree of freedom for assembly and association, but the increasing use of aggressive tactics by police at protests and restrictions on union activities present notable challenges to fully exercising these rights.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 2023. Freedom of Assembly and Protest Rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process in the United States is protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution, which guarantee that no individual shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law". The Sixth Amendment further guarantees specific trial rights, including the right to a speedy and public trial, the right to legal representation, and the right to confront witnesses.   The US judicial system is built on principles of fairness and impartiality, and trials are overseen by independent courts. However, concerns exist around racial and economic disparities within the system. Marginalised groups, including Black and Latino individuals, are more likely to face harsher sentencing and experience systemic bias throughout the trial process. The high cost of legal representation also means that low-income individuals often rely on public defenders, who may be overworked and underfunded, raising concerns about the quality of defence in some cases.   Although the right to a fair trial is firmly established, issues such as prolonged pretrial detention, unequal access to legal resources, and racial disparities continue to affect the justice system. Additionally, concerns about due process have arisen in cases related to national security, where the rights of detainees at facilities like Guantanamo Bay have been questioned.   In summary, while the US legal system provides significant protections for fair trials and due process, ongoing challenges remain related to racial inequality and legal representation.   Score: 4/5  – “Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   The US holds regular, free, and fair elections, with a robust system that allows political opposition.   Citizens have the right to vote, form political parties, and run for office, with elections overseen by independent electoral bodies. Political participation is further strengthened by robust civil society and advocacy groups that influence public policy and hold government accountable.   However, voter suppression, gerrymandering, and barriers to political participation for certain groups, including racial minorities and low-income individuals, persist. Human Rights Watch has raised concerns about these issues, particularly during the 2020 elections.   While the US prides itself on its democratic values, there are challenges related to voter access and participation. Laws like the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were designed to eliminate racial discrimination in voting, but recent restrictions on voting, including stringent voter ID laws and reductions in early voting periods, have raised concerns about disenfranchisement. These measures have disproportionately affected minority groups, leading to debates over voter suppression. Additionally, low voter turnout in certain elections, particularly midterms and local elections, has been a recurring concern.   In summary, while the US maintains a strong democratic framework with widespread political participation, challenges related to voter access, political polarisation, and the influence of money in politics continue to affect its democratic processes.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.” References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination in the United States is protected by a combination of constitutional amendments, civil rights legislation, and court rulings.   Despite these legal protections, discrimination persists in various forms. Racial discrimination remains a significant issue, especially for Black and Latino communities. Disparities in policing, sentencing, and access to education and healthcare are well-documented.   Gender-based discrimination is another key challenge. While progress has been made through laws like the Equal Pay Act, women—particularly women of colour—continue to face wage gaps, workplace discrimination, and barriers to reproductive rights.   LGBTQ+ individuals have also seen legal victories, such as the 2015 Supreme Court ruling legalising same-sex marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges), but they still face discrimination in areas like employment, healthcare, and housing. Protections vary widely by state, with some states offering more comprehensive safeguards than others.   In conclusion, while the US has strong anti-discrimination laws in place, enforcement and equality of outcomes remain inconsistent, particularly for racial minorities, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 2023. Laws Enforced by EEOC . [Online] Available at: https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/laws-enforced-eeoc [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Freedom from torture and inhuman treatment in the United States is protected under both domestic law and international treaties to which the US is a party. The Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment", and this forms the basis for protection against torture in the criminal justice system. Additionally, the US is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT).   Despite these legal protections, the US has faced criticism for violations, particularly in the context of law enforcement, prison conditions, and national security. The use of torture in counterterrorism operations after 9/11, including practices such as waterboarding, has drawn international condemnation. The release of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on CIA torture practices further revealed the extent of inhuman treatment used during interrogations. Although the US government has since banned such practices, concerns about accountability for these actions persist.   In the domestic context, reports of inhuman treatment within the US prison system are common. Overcrowded facilities, solitary confinement, and abusive conditions have been criticised by human rights organisations. The use of excessive force by law enforcement, particularly against racial minorities, has also been highlighted as a serious issue, with incidents of police brutality raising concerns about state-sanctioned violence.   In summary, while US law prohibits torture and inhuman treatment, significant concerns remain, particularly in relation to past actions in the context of counterterrorism, as well as ongoing issues in the criminal justice system.   Score: 3/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. United States: Human Rights Issues . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In the United States, human rights defenders operate within a legal framework that supports robust civic participation, protected by the First Amendment, which guarantees freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. These protections enable human rights defenders to advocate for social justice, challenge government policies, and hold corporations accountable. Civil society organisations, advocacy groups, and journalists play key roles in these efforts.   However, human rights defenders, particularly those working on issues like racial justice, police accountability, and environmental protection, face significant challenges. Harassment, surveillance, and arrests, especially during movements like Black Lives Matter, have raised concerns about law enforcement's treatment of activists. Environmental and Indigenous rights defenders opposing infrastructure projects also face legal threats and violent opposition, often from corporate interests, with tactics like Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) used to silence them.   While the US legal system and civil society offer recourse for these defenders, ongoing issues such as police violence, state surveillance, and corporate influence continue to pose risks.   Score: 4/5  – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in the United States is strongly protected under the First Amendment of the US Constitution, which guarantees individuals the right to free speech, including the freedom to express opinions, protest, and engage in political discourse.   However, certain limitations to free expression exist, including restrictions on speech that incites violence, threats, and defamation. Laws related to hate speech, while controversial, also come into play, though the US has historically upheld a broad interpretation of what constitutes protected speech, often allowing even highly offensive speech under the banner of free expression.   Recent challenges to Freedom of Expression include concerns about the role of social media platforms, where the debate around misinformation, disinformation, and content moderation has intensified. The private ownership of these platforms means that they have significant control over what content is allowed, leading to debates over whether restrictions on social media violate free speech principles.   Overall, while the US continues to offer some of the strongest protections for free expression in the world, the rise of digital platforms, political polarisation, and the spread of hate speech and misinformation present ongoing challenges.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in the United States . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/united-states   [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief in the United States is strongly protected under the First Amendment of the US Constitution, which guarantees the right to freely practice any religion or no religion at all.   In practice, the US has a diverse religious landscape, with protections extending to people of all faiths, including Christianity, Islamism, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and other religions, as well as atheists. Religious freedom cases often arise in contexts such as education, healthcare, and employment.   Recent concerns about religious freedom have emerged, particularly surrounding issues like the travel ban targeting Muslim-majority countries and debates over religious exemptions in laws related to healthcare and civil rights protections. Religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Sikhs, have reported instances of discrimination and hate crimes, raising concerns about the protection of their rights in practice.   In summary, while the US provides robust legal protections for freedom of religion or belief, challenges remain, particularly for religious minorities facing discrimination or exclusion.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.19.9   Right to Privacy   The US has privacy protections in place, particularly with regard to personal data and digital privacy. However, concerns remain about state surveillance, especially following the revelations from Edward Snowden on the National Security Agency’s mass surveillance programmes. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Human Rights Watch have raised issues about the extent of data collection and government surveillance without adequate oversight.   In recent years, concerns about digital privacy have grown. Laws such as the Patriot Act have expanded government surveillance capabilities, allowing the collection of personal data in the name of national security. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the widespread use of technologies like facial recognition and data mining have raised concerns about government overreach and the erosion of individual privacy. The Edward Snowden revelations in 2013 brought attention to the scale of government surveillance, sparking debates on privacy versus security.   In summary, privacy in the US is protected through various legal mechanisms, though the rapid evolution of technology and surveillance capabilities presents ongoing challenges to fully safeguarding this right.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person in the United States is protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution, which guarantee that no one shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law".   However, significant challenges remain in fully realising these protections, particularly with respect to police violence, gun violence, and systemic inequality. Police brutality, especially against Black and Latino individuals, has been a longstanding issue, leading to nationwide protests, particularly after high-profile cases such as the killing of George Floyd in 2020. Excessive use of force by law enforcement has raised questions about state accountability and the need for reform in policing practices.   Gun violence is another major concern. The US has one of the highest rates of gun-related deaths among developed countries, including both homicides and suicides.   In terms of state protection of individuals, disparities in access to healthcare and safety services contribute to unequal protection of the right to life, with marginalised communities often being disproportionately affected by violence and neglect.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or political views). Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. United States of America: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/united-states-of-america/report-united-states-of-america/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.11   Overall Score: 3.6/5   While the US has strong legal protections for fundamental rights such as Freedom of Expression, political participation, and fair trials, persistent issues remain. These include racial and economic disparities, police violence, and concerns about privacy and government surveillance. The US continues to face challenges in ensuring equal protection under the law for all citizens, particularly for marginalised communities.                           4 TABULATED SCORES Table 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association by Country    Table 12: Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   Table 13: Political Participation and Democratic Governance  Table 14: Freedom from Discrimination   Table 15: Freedom from Torture and Inhumane Treatment   Table 16: Protection of Human Rights Defenders Table 17: Freedom of Expression   Table 18: Freedom of Religion or Belief   Table 19: Right to Privacy   Table 20: Right to Life and Security of Person   Table 21: Overall Score   5 CONCLUSION   The Human Rights Barometer for G20 nations reveals a complex landscape of progress and challenges in the protection of fundamental human rights across the world’s major economies. While many G20 nations have enshrined legal frameworks that protect rights such as Freedom of Expression, assembly, and the right to a fair trial, significant gaps remain in the enforcement and realisation of these rights. Key issues include widespread gender-based violence, police brutality, corruption, and restrictions on civil liberties. Vulnerable groups, including migrants, minorities, and human rights defenders, are often disproportionately affected by these challenges.   Many countries in the G20 continue to grapple with systemic discrimination, inequalities in access to justice, and impunity for state actors. The ongoing prevalence of torture, arbitrary detention, and surveillance without adequate oversight raises concerns about the erosion of personal freedoms. In countries with authoritarian tendencies or populist leadership, political participation and freedom of the press face additional threats, with journalists, activists, and opposition figures frequently targeted.   However, the Barometer also highlights positive trends. Countries with strong civil societies and independent judiciaries tend to demonstrate better human rights outcomes, providing examples of how robust democratic institutions and respect for rule of law can support human dignity. Many G20 nations have also adopted progressive policies on LGBTQ+ rights, gender equality, and religious freedoms, reflecting a growing global commitment to inclusivity and tolerance.   The Barometer highlights the importance of continued vigilance, reform, and international cooperation in addressing human rights violations within the G20. It is clear that while progress has been made, sustained efforts are required to ensure that human rights are fully protected and realised for all.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), represented by its Chief Executive, Daryl Swanepoel and the Center for China & Globalization (CCG), represented by their Director for External Relations, John Zhao and Senior Fellow, Philip Xie, met at the CCG’s Head Office in Beijing, China, on Tuesday, 8 April 2025 to explore potential area for cooperation.   Both the CCG and ISI are seized with dialogue and research aimed at bringing about a fairer and more lust multilateral order. And both organisations are studying BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative. Similarly both organisations focus on Global South development in the fields of the economy, research and innovation and human development (including skills and talent development).   The two sides agreed that the overlap in work, conflation of areas of interest and influence within their various spheres warranted closer cooperation. It was decided to further explore how their relationship and cooperation could be deepened and actioned.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   April 2025   Author: Inclusive Society Institute Research Unit CONTENTS   1. SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Defining the Scope 1.3 Academic Sources and Legal Frameworks 1.4 Justification for the Scope 1.5 Human Rights Barometer for G20 Members: Selecting Key Indicators 1.5.1 Selection Criteria 1.5.2 Key Indicators  1.5.3 G20 Members  2       CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS AMONG G20 MEMBERS   2.1    Introduction        2.2    Common Protections Among G20 Members    2.3    G20 Members’ Laws and Policies   2.3.1  Argentina   2.3.2  Australia    2.3.3  Brazil  2.3.4  Canada      2.3.5  China         2.3.6  European Union  2.3.7  France       2.3.8  Germany    2.3.9  India  2.3.10 Indonesia   2.3.11     Italy   2.3.12 Japan         2.3.13  Mexico       2.3.14 Russia        2.3.15 Saudi Arabia       2.3.16 South Africa        2.3.17 South Korea        2.3.18 Turkey (Türkiye)  2.3.19 United Kingdom  2.3.20 United States      3 THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS BAROMETER   3.1 Overview of the Human Rights Barometer        3.2 Methodology for Measuring Compliance 3.3 Rights Matrices   3.4    Enforcement of Civil and Political Rights Protections: Applying the Barometer 3.4.1  Argentina's Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.2  Australia’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.3  Brazil’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis       3.4.4  Canada’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis    3.4.5  China's Human Rights Barometer Analysis       3.4.6  France's Human Rights Barometer Analysis     3.4.7  Germany's Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.8  India's Human Rights Barometer Analysis         3.4.9  Indonesia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.10  Italy's Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.11     Japan's Human Rights Barometer Analysis       3.4.12   Mexico's Human Rights Barometer Analysis     3.4.13 Russia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis      3.4.14    Saudi Arabia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis     3.4.15  South Africa's Human Rights Barometer Analysis      3.4.16   South Korea's Human Rights Barometer Analysis      3.4.17   Turkey's Human Rights Barometer Analysis     3.4.18   United Kingdom's Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.19   United States' Human Rights Barometer Analysis      4       TABULATED SCORES  5       CONCLUSION    TABLES   Table 1: Freedom of Assembly and Association Matrix       Table 2: Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Matrix  Table 3: Political Participation and Democratic Governance Matrix       Table 4: Freedom from Discrimination Matrix   Table 5: Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Matrix  Table 6: Protection of Human Rights Defenders Matrix       Table 7: Freedom of Expression Matrix   Table 8: Freedom of Religion or Belief Matrix   Table 9: Right to Privacy Matrix      Table 10: Right to Life and Security of Person Matrix  Table 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association by Country      Table 12: Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process  Table 13: Political Participation and Democratic Governance      Table 14: Freedom from Discrimination  Table 15: Freedom from Torture and Inhumane Treatment  Table 16: Protection of Human Rights Defenders       Table 17: Freedom of Expression   Table 18: Freedom of Religion or Belief   Table 19: Right to Privacy      Table 20: Right to Life and Security of Person  Table 21: Overall Score           Cover phote: istock.com - Stock photo ID:1795102165 1. SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY   1.1 Introduction   This research brief explores the development of a human rights barometer to assess and compare the civil and political rights compliance of G20 members. Drawing from international law and academic sources, the barometer will establish a baseline for evaluating these members' commitment to fundamental human rights principles. This research brief will outline the civil and political rights laws and policies of each G20 member in order to create a legal and policy baseline, from which the human rights barometer will be drawn. Thereafter, the brief will consider the latest available data outlining levels of respect for civil and political rights by G20 members and measure this data against the barometer.   1.2 Defining the Scope   Civil and political rights are foundational to democratic societies and are protected under international law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as well as numerous domestic human rights laws. These rights ensure individuals' freedom to participate in public life, express opinions, and receive fair treatment by the state. For this brief, the following civil and political rights are within the scope:   Freedom of Expression Recognised in Article 19 of the UDHR and ICCPR, this right includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media, ensuring individuals can communicate without censorship or fear of retaliation. Freedom of Assembly and Association Defined in Articles 20 and 21 of the UDHR and ICCPR, this encompasses the right to peaceful assembly and to form associations or join groups, allowing people to organise for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Under Articles 10 and 11 of the UDHR and Articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR, this right involves the protection against arbitrary detention and the guarantee of a fair and public trial by an independent judiciary, ensuring justice and legal representation. Political Participation and Democratic Governance Recognised in Article 21 of the UDHR and ICCPR, this includes the right to take part in the government, vote in free and fair elections, and access political representation, underpinning democratic governance. Freedom from Discrimination Defined in Article 2 of the UDHR and Article 26 of the ICCPR, this encompasses equal protection under the law without discrimination based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other characteristics. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Recognised in Article 5 of the UDHR and Article 7 of the ICCPR, this right prohibits torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, ensuring the dignity of individuals is respected. Protection of Human Rights Defenders Although not explicitly defined in a single article of the UDHR or ICCPR, this right is supported by various international norms, including the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. It ensures individuals and groups can advocate for human rights without fear of persecution or retaliation. Freedom of Religion or Belief Protected under Article 18 of the UDHR and ICCPR, this right ensures individuals have the freedom to adopt, change, or practice a religion or belief of their choice, free from coercion or discrimination. Right to Privacy Recognised in Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR, this right protects individuals from arbitrary interference with their privacy, family, home, or correspondence and guarantees the right to be free from unwarranted surveillance. Right to Life and Security of Person Defined in Article 3 of the UDHR and Article 6 of the ICCPR, this right includes protection against arbitrary deprivation of life and ensures the security and protection of individuals from violence, abuse, and harm.   1.3 Academic Sources and Legal Frameworks   The rights outlined above are derived from established international legal frameworks and academic research on human rights. Notable sources include:   United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC): Publishes reports on the status of civil and political rights globally. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch: Non-governmental organisations that document violations and promote human rights advocacy. Academic Journals: Articles from journals like the Human Rights Law Review and International Journal of Constitutional Law explore the application and interpretation of these rights in various contexts.    1.4 Justification for the Scope   Civil and political rights form the bedrock of personal freedoms and democratic governance. They are enshrined in international law and widely recognised by G20 members. By focusing on these rights, the barometer aims to evaluate the extent to which these members uphold their international obligations and create a meaningful baseline for assessing human rights compliance.   1.5 Human Rights Barometer for G20 Members: Selecting Key Indicators   To create a human rights barometer that effectively measures civil and political rights compliance in G20 members, selecting key indicators is crucial.   1.5.1 Selection Criteria   To ensure the indicators are useful and reliable, they should meet these criteria:   Relevance: Indicators should reflect significant aspects of civil and political rights. Measurable: They must be quantifiable or assessable through data. Reliable: Sources must be reputable to ensure accuracy and consistency.   1.5.2 Key Indicators   The following indicators are used in this brief for evaluating civil and political rights in G20 members:   Freedom of Expression   Indicator: Press freedom index, censorship laws, and incidents of journalists being harassed, detained, or killed.   Sources:  Reports from organisations like Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House, as well as government records on media-related prosecutions.   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Indicator:  Laws regulating public gatherings, requirements for permits for peaceful protests, and cases of police violence during demonstrations.   Sources:  Legal databases, government records on protest-related arrests, and reports from NGOs monitoring public assembly.    Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   Indicator:  Judicial independence index, time to trial, and reports on arbitrary detention or political imprisonment.   Sources:  Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports, as well as government statistics on judicial proceedings.   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Indicator:  Election transparency, voter turnout, and representation of women and minorities in political offices.   Sources:  Election observation reports from organisations like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), along with government statistics on electoral processes and representation. Freedom from Discrimination Indicator:  Anti-discrimination laws, reported incidents of hate crimes, and data on social inequalities.   Sources:  Reports from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), national anti-discrimination bodies, and NGOs monitoring social discrimination.   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Indicator:  Legal prohibitions against torture, documented incidents of abuse, and mechanisms for holding violators accountable.   Sources:  Reports from organisations like Amnesty International and the UN Committee Against Torture, as well as official records from national human rights bodies.   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Indicator:  Legal protections for human rights defenders, instances of harassment or persecution, and the existence of laws that safeguard activists.   Sources:  Reports from Front Line Defenders, Human Rights Watch, and government data on the treatment of civil society actors.   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Indicator:  Legal protections for religious freedom, incidents of religious persecution or discrimination, and the state’s treatment of religious minorities.   Sources:  Reports from NGOs like Open Doors and the Pew Research Center, as well as government records on religious freedom violations.    Right to Privacy Indicator:  Laws regulating government surveillance, data protection laws, and incidents of privacy violations by state actors.   Sources:  Reports from international privacy organisations, UN privacy experts, and national data protection bodies.   Right to Life and Security of Person   Indicator:  Legal protections against violence, state-sanctioned killings, and reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces.   Sources:  Reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and government data on incidents of violence or arbitrary killings.    1.5.3 G20 Members   The following is a list of G20 members and a short description of their legal systems:   Argentina : A federal republic with a bicameral legislature consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Executive power is vested in the President. Australia : A federal representative democracy and a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral Parliament consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Brazil : A Federative Republic with a bicameral Parliament consisting of a Chamber of Deputies and a Federal Senate. Canada : A federation with a bicameral Parliament, consisting of the House of Commons and the Senate, and a constitutional monarchy. China : The world's largest legislative body with a unicameral National People's Congress. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds significant power. European Union : The European Parliament is the lawmaking body of the European Union, with 705 Members elected by direct universal suffrage. France : A bicameral Parliament consisting of the Senate and the National Assembly. The Senate has 348 members, and the National Assembly has 577 members. Germany : A bicameral parliamentary system with the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The Bundestag is the main legislative body. India : A parliamentary system with a bicameral Parliament consisting of the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) and the Lok Sabha (House of the People). Indonesia : A bicameral Parliament with the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) comprising the House of Representatives and the Council of Representatives of the Regions. Italy : A bicameral Parliament with the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic. Both houses are elected every five years. Japan : A constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. The National Diet consists of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. Mexico : A federal republic with a bicameral Congress of the Union consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Russia : A bicameral Federal Assembly consisting of the State Duma and the Federation Council. Saudi Arabia : A monarchy with a Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura) that advises the King. The council has 150 members appointed by the King. South Africa : A bicameral Parliament consisting of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. South Korea : A single-chamber National Assembly responsible for reflecting the views of the Korean people, pursuing their interests, and scrutinising government actions. Türkiye : A constitutional republic with a Presidential system. The Grand National Assembly has 600 seats. United Kingdom : A constitutional monarchy with a bicameral Parliament comprising the House of Lords and the House of Commons. United States : A federal republic with a bicameral Congress consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate.   2. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS AMONG G20 MEMBERS   2.1 Introduction   This section of the brief introduces the common civil and political rights protections that exist among G20 members and outlines how these protections vary between members. To evaluate each member's commitment to human rights, the barometer examines legal frameworks and policies governing these rights. This introduction provides an overview of the most common civil and political rights protections, offering a foundation for subsequent analysis of individual G20 members' laws and policies.     2.2 Common Protections Among G20 Members   Among the G20 members, certain protections for civil and political rights are widely recognised, typically based on international agreements like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Common protections include:   Freedom of Expression: The right to express opinions and share information without fear of censorship or retaliation. Freedom of Assembly and Association: The right to peacefully assemble and form groups for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Protections ensuring judicial independence and fair legal processes. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: The right to participate in political processes and hold public office. Freedom from Discrimination: Legal frameworks preventing discrimination based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other characteristics. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Laws prohibiting torture and inhuman treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Protections for human rights activists, journalists, and civil society advocates.   2.3 G20 Members’ Laws and Policies     In this section, the brief will delve into each G20 member's laws and policies individually to explore their compliance with these common protections. The analysis will cover domestic legislation, international agreements, and other regulatory frameworks that influence civil and political rights. 2.3.1 Argentina   Argentina is a signatory to various international and regional human rights instruments that protect civil and political rights. The following list includes the international and regional agreements to which Argentina subscribes:   International Instruments   Argentina has ratified core international human rights treaties [1] , including:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Additionally, Argentina has ratified various optional protocols, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT, indicating its commitment to human rights monitoring and protection.   Regional Instruments   Argentina is a member of the Inter-American System of Human Rights, overseen by the Organization of American States (OAS). As part of this system, Argentina subscribes to the American Convention on Human Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are key mechanisms for monitoring and promoting human rights in the Americas.   Domestic Protections in Argentina   Argentina's domestic laws offer protections for civil and political rights. The Argentine Constitution contains provisions that align with international human rights standards, including:   Freedom of Expression: Protected under constitutional law, allowing for the free exchange of ideas and opinions. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Guaranteed by the constitution, permitting citizens to assemble peacefully and form associations for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Enshrined in the constitution, ensuring judicial independence and protection from arbitrary detention. Freedom from Discrimination: Constitutional provisions prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other characteristics, ensuring equal protection under the law. Argentina also has additional domestic laws that reinforce these constitutional protections. For instance, the Anti-Discrimination Law prohibits discrimination based on various grounds, and the Right to Information Law promotes transparency and freedom of information. These domestic protections, along with Argentina's international commitments, reflect the country's efforts to uphold civil and political rights. Civil and Political Rights Protections in Argentina   Argentina offers the following protections for civil and political rights, derived from its constitution, domestic laws, and international commitments:   Freedom of Expression: Individuals can freely express their opinions and share information without fear of censorship or retaliation. Freedom of Assembly and Association: People are allowed to assemble peacefully and form associations for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Ensures judicial independence, fair trials, and protection against arbitrary detention. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: Guarantees the right to vote, participate in elections, and hold public office. Freedom from Discrimination: Protection against discrimination based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other characteristics, ensuring equal treatment. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Prohibits torture, cruel, or degrading treatment, ensuring humane treatment of individuals. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Ensures the safety and freedom of activists, journalists, and civil society advocates. Access to Information: Promotes transparency and allows individuals to access public information.   2.3.2 Australia   Australia subscribes to a range of international and regional instruments that protect civil and political rights, along with domestic protections outlined in its constitution and other laws.   International Instruments   Australia has ratified many core international human rights treaties [2] , demonstrating a commitment to international standards. These include:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Reduction of Statelessness.   Optional protocols are also ratified, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT.   Regional Instruments Australia is part of the Asia-Pacific region and does not have a regional human rights convention like other continents. However, it actively participates in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and supports the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).   Domestic Protections   Australia's constitution does not explicitly list all civil and political rights but contains some key protections, including:   Freedom of Political Communication: Implied in the constitution. Anti-Discrimination Laws: Addressed through various acts, including the Racial Discrimination Act, the Sex Discrimination Act, and the Disability Discrimination Act. Judicial Independence: Ensured through the separation of powers in the constitution.   Additional protections in Australia include:   Freedom of Expression: While not directly stated in the constitution, it is protected through legal frameworks and court rulings. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Laws permit peaceful assembly and the formation of associations. Right to a Fair Trial: Protections against arbitrary detention and for judicial independence. Freedom from Discrimination: Laws that prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other grounds. Civil and Political Rights Protections in Australia   Freedom of Expression: Australians can express opinions and share information without fear of censorship or retaliation. This freedom is generally implied within the legal framework and court rulings. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Australians have the right to assemble peacefully and form associations for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Legal frameworks ensure judicial independence, protect against arbitrary detention, and guarantee fair legal processes. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: Australians have the right to vote, participate in elections, and hold public office. Freedom from Discrimination: Legal provisions ensure equal protection under the law and prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Australian laws prohibit torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Legal frameworks provide safety and freedom for activists and journalists. Access to Information: Australians have the right to access public information, promoting transparency. These protections are derived from a combination of domestic laws and international commitments.  2.3.3 Brazil   Brazil is a signatory to various international and regional human rights instruments that protect civil and political rights. It also has domestic protections in its constitution and other laws.   International Instruments Brazil has ratified key international human rights treaties [3] , demonstrating a commitment to international standards. These include:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)   Brazil has also ratified optional protocols, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT, indicating a commitment to monitoring human rights and ensuring compliance.   Regional Instruments   Brazil is part of the Inter-American System for Human Rights, subscribing to the American Convention on Human Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.   Domestic Protections in Brazil   Brazil's constitution, adopted in 1988, is known for its comprehensive human rights provisions. It enshrines key protections for civil and political rights, including:   Freedom of Expression: Individuals have the right to express opinions without fear of censorship. Freedom of Assembly and Association: The right to assemble peacefully and form associations for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Judicial independence and protection against arbitrary detention. Freedom from Discrimination: Laws prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other characteristics. Brazil's domestic laws reinforce these constitutional protections. For example, the Anti-Discrimination Law and other legislation focus on anti-racism and gender equality. Brazil's legal system also supports freedom of information and other civil liberties. Civil and Political Rights Protections in Brazil   The following is a list of civil and political rights protections in Brazil, derived from its constitution and international commitments:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Political Participation and Democratic Governance Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information These protections provide a basis for evaluating Brazil's compliance with civil and political rights. 2.3.4 Canada   Canada is a G20 member that upholds various civil and political rights through a combination of international and regional commitments and domestic legislation.   International Instruments   Canada has ratified key international human rights treaties [4] , including:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Canada has also ratified several optional protocols, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT.   Regional Instruments Canada is part of the Inter-American System for Human Rights under the Organization of American States (OAS), subscribing to the American Convention on Human Rights and other instruments. Domestic Protections in Canada Canada's domestic protections for civil and political rights are derived from its constitution and other laws. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a part of the Canadian Constitution, guarantees fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to a fair trial. Additionally, Canada has anti-discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other characteristics. Canada's legal system also supports human rights through judicial independence, promoting transparency, and protecting human rights defenders. Other laws, like the Anti-Discrimination Act and the Right to Information Law, reinforce these constitutional protections. Civil and Political Rights Protections in Canada The following is a list of the common protections for civil and political rights in Canada, derived from its constitution, domestic laws, and international commitments: Freedom of Expression: Canadians have the right to express opinions and share information without fear of censorship. Freedom of Assembly and Association: The right to assemble and form associations for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Ensures judicial independence and protection from arbitrary detention. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: The right to vote, participate in elections, and hold public office. Freedom from Discrimination: Prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other characteristics. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Canadian laws prohibit torture and degrading treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Ensures the safety and freedom of activists, journalists, and civil society advocates. Access to Information: The right to access public information, promoting transparency.    2.3.5 China   China has ratified or joined numerous international human rights instruments, including six core UN conventions. Among these instruments are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). China has also participated in the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council and served as a member of the council several times.   On the regional level, China does not belong to a specific regional human rights system. However, it actively engages in global human rights governance, participates in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and has a consistent record of ratifying international human rights instruments.   China's domestic laws and policies are designed to comply with these international human rights instruments, ensuring that legislation and policies are consistent with these conventions. The white paper on the practice of the Communist Party of China regarding human rights outlines China's approach to respecting, protecting, and promoting human rights.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in China   Below is a list of the civil and political rights protections in China, derived from its international commitments and domestic laws:   Freedom of Expression: Individuals can express their opinions, although within certain constraints. Freedom of Assembly and Association: While this right is protected in China’s constitution, China has specific regulations that control public gatherings and associations. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Legal frameworks support judicial independence and protect against arbitrary detention. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: Political processes are regulated, with limited multiparty participation. Freedom from Discrimination: Laws prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other characteristics. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Laws prohibit torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Human rights defenders are subject to specific regulations and oversight. 2.3.6 European Union   International Instruments   The European Union (EU) is unique in its comprehensive incorporation of international human rights standards into its legislative framework. It adheres to a wide range of international treaties and has its mechanisms to ensure compliance:   European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Regional Instruments   The EU's framework is robust, with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) playing critical roles in overseeing and enforcing human rights standards across member states.   Domestic Protections   The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees numerous civil and political rights across its member states, including dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights, and justice. The EU actively promotes these rights both within its borders and in its external relations.   Civil and Political Rights in the European Union   Freedom of Expression and Assembly: Broadly protected across member states, though variations exist in the application depending on national laws. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Strongly enforced, with mechanisms in place to ensure fair trials and legal accountability. Freedom from Discrimination: The EU has stringent anti-discrimination laws covering race, gender, religion, disability, and more. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: The EU is known for its strong stance on protecting human rights advocates both within and outside its borders.    2.3.7 France   France has committed to protecting civil and political rights through international human rights instruments, domestic legislation, and regional mechanisms.   International Instruments   France has ratified several key international human rights treaties [5] , demonstrating its commitment to global human rights standards. These include:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) France has also ratified various optional protocols, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT.   Regional Instruments   France is part of the European human rights system, subscribing to regional agreements like the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and supporting bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights. These regional mechanisms offer additional protection for human rights in Europe.   Domestic Protections in France   France's domestic legislation includes various protections for civil and political rights. The French Constitution ensures fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Additional domestic laws focus on anti-discrimination, protection against torture, and support for refugees and migrants.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in France   The following protections for civil and political rights are found in France:   Freedom of Expression: Protected under French law, with certain restrictions regarding incitement to violence or hate speech. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Legal frameworks regulate public gatherings and associations, with some restrictions for security reasons. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Judicial independence and protections against arbitrary detention. Freedom from Discrimination: Laws that prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other characteristics. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Legal provisions against torture and cruel or degrading treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Legal mechanisms exist to support activists and journalists, though there are instances of police brutality during protests. Access to Information: Right to access public information, promoting transparency.    2.3.8 Germany   Germany has ratified various international human rights treaties and has a comprehensive domestic legal framework protecting civil and political rights.   International Instruments   Germany has ratified many key international human rights treaties [6] , demonstrating its commitment to global human rights standards. These include:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Germany has also ratified various optional protocols, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT.   Regional Instruments   Germany is part of the European human rights system and subscribes to regional agreements like the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is a key regional body overseeing compliance with these instruments.   Domestic Protections in Germany   Germany's constitution, the Basic Law, guarantees various civil and political rights, such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Additional domestic laws address anti-discrimination, judicial independence, and other human rights protections.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in Germany   The following protections for civil and political rights are found in Germany:   Freedom of Expression: Protected under German law, with some limitations regarding incitement to violence or hate speech. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Legal frameworks support public gatherings and forming associations. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Judicial independence and protection from arbitrary detention. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: The right to vote, participate in elections, and hold public office. Freedom from Discrimination: Laws that prohibit discrimination based on various grounds. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Protections against torture and cruel or degrading treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Legal frameworks support the work of activists and journalists. Access to Information: The right to access public information, promoting transparency. 2.3.9 India   India has signed several international and regional instruments that protect civil and political rights. Here is an overview of these instruments and domestic protections in India.   International Instruments India has ratified a number of key international human rights treaties [7] , including:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). However, India has not ratified all optional protocols, including the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (CAT).   Regional Instruments   India does not belong to a specific regional human rights system, but it participates in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).   Domestic Protections in India   India's constitution provides fundamental rights and protections for civil and political rights, such as freedom of expression, assembly, association, and the right to a fair trial and due process. Additional domestic laws focus on anti-discrimination, judicial independence, and protection against torture.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in India   India provides various civil and political rights protections, derived from international treaties and domestic legislation, including: Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information   2.3.10 Indonesia   International Instruments   Indonesia has committed to several key international human rights instruments [8] , which reflect its engagement with global human rights standards:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Regional Instruments   As part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia is a signatory to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, which aims to enhance regional cooperation on human rights issues.   Domestic Protections   Indonesia’s Constitution guarantees numerous civil and political rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to a fair trial. Additionally, Indonesia has national laws that support these constitutional protections:   Human Rights Law: Enshrines broad protections for civil and political rights. Anti-Discrimination Law: Addresses various forms of discrimination and promotes equality. Information and Electronic Transactions Law: Regulates digital communication, aiming to balance freedom of expression with protections against online harm. Civil and Political Rights in Indonesia   The protections for civil and political rights in Indonesia include:   Freedom of Expression: Legally protected, though subject to limitations concerning public order and morality. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Guaranteed but requires government notification and can be subject to restrictions based on security and public order. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Ensured through the judiciary, though challenges in consistency and enforcement remain. Freedom from Discrimination: Supported by legislation, although implementation varies across regions. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Prohibited under law, with ongoing efforts to strengthen enforcement mechanisms. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Increasingly recognised, though activists often face challenges. Access to Information: Supported by laws that promote transparency and public participation in governance. 2.3.11 Italy   International Instruments   Italy is party to several international treaties [9] that uphold civil and political rights, such as:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Optional Protocol to CEDAW Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Optional Protocol to CRPD Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) Italy has also accepted the individual complaints procedures of the ICCPR, CAT, CEDAW, CRPD, CRC, CERD, and CPED, allowing individuals to submit complaints about human rights violations.   Regional Instruments   Italy is part of the European human rights system, subscribing to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Social Charter. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) oversees these conventions' implementation.   Domestic Protections   The Italian Constitution provides for various civil and political rights, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Italy's domestic laws reinforce these protections, covering areas like anti-discrimination, judicial independence, and transparency.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in Italy   Italy's protections for civil and political rights include:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information 2.3.12 Japan   International Instruments   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Optional Protocol to the ICCPR Optional Protocol to the CEDAW Optional Protocol to the CRC Optional Protocol to the CRPD Regional Instruments   Japan does not belong to a specific regional human rights system but actively participates in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and supports the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).   Domestic Protections   Japan's constitution guarantees civil and political rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Domestic laws further reinforce protections against discrimination and torture.   Civil and Political Rights Protections Japan's protections for civil and political rights include:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information 2.3.13 Mexico   International Instruments   Mexico has ratified international treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention against Torture (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).   Regional Instruments   Mexico is part of the Inter-American System for Human Rights, subscribing to the American Convention on Human Rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights monitor and enforce these regional conventions.   Domestic Protections   Mexico's constitution includes guarantees for civil and political rights like freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Additional domestic laws provide protections against discrimination, torture, and arbitrary detention.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in Mexico   Mexico's protections for civil and political rights include:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information   2.3.14 Russia   International Instruments   Russia is a signatory to several international human rights instruments, including:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention against Torture (CAT) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Regional Instruments   Russia is part of the European human rights system and has signed the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Social Charter.   Civil and Political Rights in Russia   Protections for civil and political rights in Russia are covered through a combination of international and regional instruments and domestic legislation:   Freedom of Expression: Russian citizens have the right to freely express their opinions, although this is subject to certain limitations. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Regulations allow for peaceful assembly and association, with certain restrictions. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Judicial independence and protection against arbitrary detention, though often criticised for political bias. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: The right to vote, participate in elections, and hold public office, although restrictions exist. Freedom from Discrimination: Anti-discrimination laws exist but with varying effectiveness in enforcement. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Legal protections against torture and degrading treatment, although concerns remain. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Activists and journalists face increasing restrictions and scrutiny. Access to Information: Access to information is constrained by governmental control over media. 2.3.15 Saudi Arabia   International Instruments   Saudi Arabia has committed to various international human rights frameworks, though its adherence and the breadth of its commitments have been subjects of significant international scrutiny: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Regional Instruments   As a member of the Arab League, Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which was ratified in 2008. This Charter reaffirms the principles contained in universally recognised human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights, but has been criticised for not fully meeting international norms, particularly regarding women's rights and the rights of children.   Domestic Protections   Saudi Arabia's legal framework includes provisions that theoretically protect various civil and political rights. However, the application and enforcement of these provisions often fall short of international standards. Key issues include restrictions on freedom of expression, association, assembly, particularly for activists and human rights defenders and consistent use of the death penalty. Recent years have seen some reforms, such as improvements in women's rights, notably the right to drive and a reduction in the male guardianship system, although these changes have not fully dismantled systemic gender discrimination. Civil and Political Rights in Saudi Arabia   Freedom of Expression and Assembly: Severely restricted, with the government frequently targeting activists and critics under the guise of security and cybercrime laws. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Often compromised by the use of special courts and anti-terrorism laws that lack transparency and procedural fairness. Freedom from Discrimination: Despite some progress, significant challenges persist, especially concerning gender equality and the rights of foreign workers. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Human rights defenders face arrest, detention, and harassment, often without due process. 2.3.16 South Africa   International Instruments   South Africa is committed to international human rights standards, demonstrated by its ratification of several key treaties:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Convention against Torture (CAT) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Regional Instruments   As a participant in the African human rights framework, South Africa subscribes to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol).   Domestic Protections   The South African Constitution is celebrated for its broad protections of human rights, including:   Bill of Rights: Enshrines freedoms such as expression, assembly, association, and the right to a fair trial. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act: Tackles discrimination and promotes equality. Protection of Personal Information Act: Safeguards personal information and enhances the right to privacy. Civil and Political Rights in South Africa   Key protections include:   Freedom of Expression: Strongly protected under the Constitution. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Guaranteed and actively upheld. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Central to the judicial system, with independent courts. Freedom from Discrimination: Extensive laws to prevent discrimination on any grounds. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Explicitly prohibited and enforced by law. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Generally supported, though challenges exist in practice. Access to Information: Robust legislation facilitating transparency and accountability. 2.3.17 South Korea   International Instruments   South Korea has ratified international treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention against Torture (CAT), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).   Regional Instruments   South Korea does not belong to a specific regional human rights system but participates in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).   Domestic Protections   South Korea's constitution guarantees various civil and political rights, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Its domestic laws reinforce protections against discrimination, torture, and arbitrary detention.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in South Korea   South Korea's protections for civil and political rights include:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information    2.3.18 Turkey (Türkiye)   International Instruments   Turkey has ratified key international conventions, reflecting its commitment to uphold human rights:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Convention against Torture (CAT) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Regional Instruments   As part of the European human rights regime, Turkey subscribes to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Social Charter.   Domestic Protections   Turkey’s constitutional and legal framework provides for civil and political rights:   Constitution of Turkey: Incorporates fundamental rights and freedoms, including detailed articles on freedom of expression and the press. Law on Meetings and Demonstrations: Governs public gatherings, aiming to balance security and freedom of assembly. Anti-Discrimination and Equality Board: Established to enforce laws against discrimination. Civil and Political Rights in Turkey   Prominent protections include:   Freedom of Expression: Constitutionally protected, though subject to significant legal restrictions. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Allowed with regulatory requirements. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Affirmed in the legal system, with ongoing concerns about judicial independence. Freedom from Discrimination: Legislation in place, with varying effectiveness in enforcement. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Prohibited by law, with ongoing international scrutiny. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Legally recognised yet facing operational challenges. Access to Information: Legal provisions exist, promoting government transparency to an extent. 2.3.19 United Kingdom   International Instruments   The United Kingdom (UK) has ratified several key international human rights instruments, highlighting its commitment to upholding global human rights standards. These treaties include:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention Against Torture (CAT) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Regional Instruments   As a member of the Council of Europe, the UK is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Domestic Protections   The UK integrates international commitments into its domestic legal framework, primarily through the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the ECHR. Additionally, various statutes and common law provide protections against discrimination, ensure due process, and uphold other fundamental rights.   Civil and Political Rights in the United Kingdom   The protections for civil and political rights in the UK include:   Freedom of Expression: Robustly protected, subject to certain legal restrictions regarding hate speech and national security. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Well-established rights, with police needing to be notified of public assemblies. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Fundamental rights under the UK legal system, emphasising fair legal procedures and access to justice. Freedom from Discrimination: Comprehensive laws that cover various grounds including race, gender, and disability. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Strongly prohibited under both domestic law and international obligations. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Generally upheld, with legal protections in place to support their activities. Access to Information: Enshrined in the Freedom of Information Act, providing public access to data held by public authorities. 2.3.20 United States   International Instruments   The United States (US) has ratified key international human rights treaties, reflecting its commitment to uphold these standards, including:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Compared to other nations, however, the US has ratified relatively few treaties related to civil and political rights. The US has notably not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Furthermore, although less relevant to this barometer, which focuses on civil and political rights, the US has not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).   Regional Instruments   The United States participates in the Inter-American System for Human Rights but has not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, which limits its commitments under this regional framework.   Domestic Protections   The US Constitution provides robust protections for civil and political rights, with the First Amendment guaranteeing freedom of speech and assembly, among other rights. The Fourteenth Amendment ensures due process and equal protection under the law. Federal statutes like various iterations of the Civil Rights Act protect against discrimination on several bases including race, colour, religion, sex, or national origin.   Civil and Political Rights in the United States   Key protections include:   Freedom of Expression and Speech: Broadly protected under the First Amendment, with no specific laws criminalising hate speech, recognising a high threshold for limiting speech to cases of imminent lawless action. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Strongly protected, allowing individuals to gather and organise freely. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: A cornerstone of the American legal system, ensuring fairness and legal equity. Freedom from Discrimination: Supported by extensive legislation that prohibits discrimination across various contexts. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Outright prohibited under US law and international treaties the US has ratified. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: While generally supported, human rights defenders in the US can face challenges such as surveillance, legal actions intended to curb activism, and in some cases, harassment or violence, which may hinder their ability to operate freely. Access to Information: Facilitated by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which promotes transparency and accountability in government. These protections, while extensive, are subject to ongoing legal and social challenges that test the boundaries and effectiveness of civil and political rights in the US. 3 THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS BAROMETER   3.1 Overview of the Human Rights Barometer   The Human Rights Barometer is a tool designed to evaluate the compliance of G20 members with civil and political rights standards, focusing on both legal frameworks and the realities of enforcement. This document introduces and applies the Barometer using a set of rights matrices, each tailored to specific human rights categories. These matrices reflect both the legal protections in place for each right and the actual enforcement and lived experiences of individuals within these states.   The Barometer covers a broad spectrum of rights that are foundational to the protection of civil and political freedoms, including:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Political Participation and Democratic Governance Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Freedom of Religion or Belief Right to Privacy Right to Life and Security of Person   While this document introduces the Barometer and demonstrates its use, it does not provide a comprehensive study of all G20 members. Instead, it provides an illustrative application, using external reports and available data to offer an overview of each country’s compliance with key human rights. For a complete and fully accurate application of the Barometer, each G20 member would require a dedicated, in-depth study focusing on the specific rights evaluated by the tool.   3.2 Methodology for Measuring Compliance   The Barometer evaluates each country’s performance in respect of the selected human rights categories through matrices that combine legal standards (de jure protections) with actual enforcement and compliance (de facto realities). The matrices provide a five-point scale for each category, reflecting both the presence of legal protections and the extent to which these protections are enforced in practice. This approach ensures a nuanced understanding of each country’s human rights landscape, considering not just what is written into law but how effectively those laws are applied and respected.     3.3 Rights Matrices   Each rights category is assessed using a matrix that outlines clear criteria for scoring. Below are the matrices used to determine a member’s protection of civil and political rights according to the barometer.   Table 1: Freedom of Assembly and Association Matrix Table 2: Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Matrix Table 3: Political Participation and Democratic Governance Matrix Table 4: Freedom from Discrimination Matrix Table 5: Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Matrix Table 6: Protection of Human Rights Defenders Matrix Table 7: Freedom of Expression Matrix Table 8: Freedom of Religion or Belief Matrix Table 9: Right to Privacy Matrix Table 10: Right to Life and Security of Person Mat rix 3.4 Enforcement of Civil and Political Rights Protections: Applying the Barometer   Having explored the domestic, regional, and international legal frameworks that underpin civil and political rights in each G20 country, the next step in the Barometer’s application is to assess the enforcement of these protections. This section will provide an overview of how each country implements and upholds these rights in practice, using the 10 matrices developed earlier. These matrices cover a broad range of rights, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association, the right to a fair trial, protection from discrimination, and more.   In assessing the enforcement of these rights, the analysis will draw on reports from credible sources such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, UN bodies, and other authoritative organisations. While this overview is not an exhaustive analysis of each country’s human rights performance, it provides a snapshot of how well legal protections translate into real-world outcomes. The Barometer, as applied here, serves as a framework for understanding compliance with civil and political rights and highlights areas where countries perform well, as well as those where significant challenges remain.   3.4.1 Argentina's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.1.1 Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association are constitutionally guaranteed in Argentina under Article 14 of the Constitution, which protects the right to meet peacefully and to form associations for lawful purposes. These rights are fundamental to Argentina's democratic system and have been central to its civil society, particularly in the aftermath of the country’s military dictatorship.   Despite these protections, there are concerns regarding the state’s handling of protests, particularly in cases involving police violence against demonstrators. Law enforcement responses to social protests, often related to economic conditions or human rights issues, have sometimes involved the use of excessive force, raising concerns about violations of the right to peaceful assembly. Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented instances of police brutality in controlling protests, particularly in lower-income areas.   Trade unions and political parties operate freely, with strong legal protections for labour organisations. However, union leaders and activists have occasionally faced threats and violence, particularly when advocating for workers’ rights in conflict with business interests. These incidents highlight ongoing challenges in fully protecting the right to association in practice.   Score: 3/5  – "Legal protections are inconsistent or weak. Protests are often subject to heavy policing or restrictions. Civil society groups face bureaucratic hurdles or occasional harassment."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024 : Argentina. [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023 : Argentina. [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.1.2 Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Argentina, the right to a fair trial and due process is protected under both national and international legal frameworks. The Constitution of Argentina guarantees due process rights in Articles 18 and 75, which include the presumption of innocence, the right to a defence, and the prohibition of arbitrary detention. Argentina is also a signatory to the American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which further affirm these protections.   Despite these legal safeguards, there are persistent concerns about the effectiveness of Argentina’s judicial system. Issues such as long delays in court proceedings, pretrial detention without timely access to justice, and corruption within the judiciary remain significant problems. Many detainees, particularly those from marginalised communities, face extended periods in pretrial detention due to case backlogs and an underfunded judicial system.   Although judicial reforms have been introduced to address these issues, challenges remain in ensuring timely access to fair trials, especially for those who cannot afford private legal representation. Corruption, political influence, and inefficiencies in the system continue to undermine the right to due process for many individuals.   Score: 2/5  – "The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Annual Report 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. United Nations Human Rights Committee. 2016. Concluding Observations on Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FARG%2FCO%2F5&Lang=en  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.1.3 Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Argentina is a federal, representative democracy with regular, multiparty elections at all levels. Elections are generally free and fair, with high voter turnout due to mandatory voting laws. The political landscape has traditionally been dominated by the Justicialist Party (Peronists) and the Radical Civic Union, though polarisation has increased in recent years, particularly over economic and corruption issues.   Corruption is a significant problem, undermining public trust in government institutions. High-profile corruption cases and political influence over the judiciary have slowed reforms, and political clientelism, especially in poorer areas, affects the fairness of elections. Despite these challenges, Argentina has a strong civil society and an independent media that play crucial roles in democratic accountability, although journalists covering sensitive issues occasionally face harassment.   Score: 4/5  – "Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations."   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2024  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 2022. Electoral Integrity in Argentina. [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/country?country=11&database_theme=293   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Transparency International. 2023. Argentina Corruption Perceptions Index . [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.4 Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination in Argentina is protected under the Constitution of Argentina and reinforced by various national laws and international treaties.   Argentina is a global leader in gender and LGBTQ+ rights. It was the first country in Latin America to legalise same-sex marriage in 2010 and is known for its progressive Gender Identity Law (2012), which allows individuals to change their gender on legal documents without needing medical procedures. Despite these legal advances, women and LGBTQ+ individuals continue to face discrimination in practice, particularly in employment and healthcare, including access to abortion. Gender-based violence remains a critical issue, with high rates of femicide.   Indigenous groups, particularly in rural areas, often face economic and social exclusion. Discrimination against Afro-Argentine and immigrant communities, especially migrants from neighbouring countries, is also reported, manifesting in limited access to public services and employment opportunities. The state has introduced laws to address these issues, but enforcement remains inconsistent, and these communities continue to face marginalisation.   Argentina has strong legal protections for people with disabilities, including the Comprehensive Protection Law for people with disabilities. However, in practice, people with disabilities often encounter barriers in accessing education, employment, and healthcare, and there are frequent reports of inadequate infrastructure and services.   In summary, while Argentina has made significant strides in establishing legal protections against discrimination, challenges persist, particularly for women, LGBTQ+ individuals, indigenous groups, and people with disabilities.   Score: 3/5  – "Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. BBC. 2023. Abortion may be legal in Argentina but women still face major obstacles . [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-64784660  [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.5 Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   While torture is prohibited by law in Argentina, reports of police brutality and inhuman treatment persist.   There have been ongoing concerns about police violence and mistreatment of detainees, particularly in prisons and detention centres. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented cases of excessive use of force, torture, and ill-treatment by law enforcement officials, particularly against vulnerable populations, including migrants and those in poorer communities. These reports often highlight instances of torture used to extract confessions or punish individuals during detention.   In the aftermath of Argentina’s military dictatorship, the country has worked to address past human rights abuses, including widespread torture. Argentina has held numerous trials for individuals involved in state-sponsored torture during the dictatorship, reflecting its commitment to holding perpetrators accountable. However, current-day allegations of police brutality and ill-treatment continue to be areas of concern.   While Argentina has made significant strides in addressing historical torture and strengthening legal protections, the ongoing use of excessive force by law enforcement highlights the need for continued oversight and reforms to ensure full protection against torture and inhuman treatment.   Score: 3/5  – "Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. United Nations. 2022. Convention Against Torture: Argentina's Review . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/cat  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Argentina, human rights defenders play a critical role in advocating for social justice, democracy, and accountability, often in the face of significant risks. While Argentina's Constitution and international human rights treaties guarantee protections for human rights defenders, in practice, defenders frequently face threats, harassment, and even violence, particularly when addressing sensitive issues like corruption, indigenous rights, and environmental protection.   Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented cases where human rights defenders, particularly those from indigenous and rural communities, have been targeted by both state and non-state actors. Environmental defenders opposing large-scale projects like mining and deforestation are especially vulnerable, facing intimidation and legal challenges from powerful corporate interests.   Despite these threats, Argentina’s civil society remains strong, with human rights defenders continuing to advocate for marginalised communities and hold the government accountable for human rights violations. However, ongoing challenges in ensuring the safety of defenders, particularly in remote areas, highlight the need for stronger legal and institutional mechanisms to protect them.   Score: 3/5  – "Human rights defenders face some harassment or legal challenges, particularly when criticising the government. Protections are weak or inconsistently applied." References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2023. Argentina: Protection of Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.7 Freedom of Expression   Freedom of expression in Argentina is protected by Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees individuals the right to express their ideas and opinions freely.   Despite these legal protections, challenges persist in practice. Media outlets and journalists face pressures when reporting on sensitive topics such as corruption, government mismanagement, and human rights violations. Journalists, particularly those working in investigative journalism, have reported harassment and threats when covering politically sensitive stories.   In conclusion, while Argentina has strong legal frameworks protecting freedom of expression, the reality for journalists and civil society actors sometimes involves navigating threats, government pressure, and legal challenges.   Score: 4/5  – "Freedom of expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics. The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2024  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.8 Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief in Argentina is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution, which ensures the right to freely practice any religion. Argentina has a rich religious diversity, with Roman Catholicism historically being the dominant religion, though the state formally separated from the Catholic Church in 1994. The Constitution also prohibits any form of religious discrimination, and Argentina is a signatory to international treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), further solidifying protections for religious freedom.   Argentina has made significant strides in promoting religious tolerance. Various religious communities, including Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, and indigenous spiritual practices, coexist in relative harmony. The country also has one of the largest Jewish communities in Latin America.   However, despite these protections, religious minorities occasionally face social discrimination. There have been reports of antisemitism and instances of intolerance toward other religious groups, such as evangelical Christians and Muslims, though these incidents are relatively rare. The government generally promotes religious pluralism and engages in dialogue with various faith communities to address these issues.   Overall, Argentina’s legal framework strongly supports freedom of religion or belief, although vigilance is needed to address occasional incidents of discrimination and ensure the continued protection of all religious communities. Score: 5/5  – "The country guarantees complete freedom of religion or belief, allowing all individuals to practice their faith or choose no faith without fear of persecution. Religious communities operate freely and equally."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2024  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. International Religious Freedom Report: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.9 Right to Privacy   The right to privacy in Argentina is protected under Article 19 of the Constitution, which guarantees personal autonomy and the protection of private life. This article establishes that private actions that do not harm others are outside the scope of public authority, forming the basis for privacy protections in the country. Argentina has also implemented the Personal Data Protection Law (Law 25.326), which regulates the collection, storage, and use of personal data, drawing inspiration from international data protection frameworks like the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).   The National Directorate for the Protection of Personal Data is responsible for overseeing the enforcement of this law, ensuring that individuals' data is handled responsibly, and protecting their right to privacy. This law includes provisions for the protection of sensitive data, the right to access and rectify personal information, and the requirement for informed consent before personal data is collected.   However, concerns remain about government surveillance, particularly regarding law enforcement’s access to personal data in the name of national security. There are also criticisms of the effectiveness of the country's data protection system, with reports of weak enforcement and delays in updating regulations to address new technological challenges.   Score: 3/5  – "Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent." References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2024  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.10 Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person is guaranteed in Argentina under Article 18 of the Constitution, which prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life and ensures protection from violence and harm. Argentina is also a signatory to international human rights agreements, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, both of which enshrine the right to life and personal security.   Despite strong legal protections, Argentina faces significant challenges in ensuring the right to life and security of its citizens, particularly due to high levels of violent crime, police brutality, and gender-based violence. Crime rates, especially in urban areas, remain a concern, with high incidences of homicides and violent assaults. Organised crime and drug-related violence have also increased, particularly in cities like Rosario, further undermining security.   Gender-based violence, particularly femicide, remains a critical issue in Argentina. Despite the introduction of laws like the Comprehensive Law on Violence Against Women, enforcement is inconsistent, and many women continue to face violence and abuse. Argentina has one of the highest femicide rates in Latin America, sparking widespread protests and campaigns like "Ni Una Menos" to demand better protections and justice for victims.   Police violence and excessive use of force, particularly during protests or in marginalised communities, have been reported by human rights organisations. There are concerns about impunity for police officers involved in unlawful killings, as well as inadequate accountability mechanisms to address such violations.   In conclusion, while Argentina has robust legal frameworks for the protection of life and security, persistent issues with crime, gender-based violence, and police brutality undermine the full realisation of these rights for many individuals.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse. Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.11 Argentina’s overall score – 3.3/5   Argentina demonstrates a mixed performance in terms of civil and political rights protections. The country has made significant strides in areas such as political participation and democratic governance, as well as freedom of religion, with strong legal frameworks in place. However, there are still notable challenges in enforcing these rights, particularly concerning issues of police brutality, and freedom from torture. While there are comprehensive anti-discrimination laws, enforcement remains uneven, particularly in rural areas and among vulnerable groups. Additionally, despite the legalisation of abortion, barriers persist in accessing these rights for many women.      - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [1]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=7&Lang=EN  [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [2]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=9  [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [3]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=24   [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [4]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=31  [Accessed: 3 July 2024].   [5]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=62 [Accessed: 3 July 2024].   [6]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=66  [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [7]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=79 [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [8]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=80 [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [9]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=85 [Accessed: 3 July 2024].

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, visited the Institute for African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, from 9 – 10 April 2025. He was accompanied by Ms Jenny Wu, a member of the Institute’s Advisory Council. The IAS was represented by their Deputy Director, Prof Xu Wei, Prof Yang Kai, Deputy Director International, and Prof Zhang Qiaowen, Academic Deputy Director.   During the visit the two sides met to discuss and deepen cooperation between the two Institute’s. Among others, they agreed to joint projects related to the programme of the Think-tank 20, which is being hosted in South Africa during 2025. Among the projects agreed was a G20 policy brief development process and the hosting of a T20 Academic Seminar in Cape Town during the second half of 2025.   CEO Daryl Swanepoel, also delivered a guest lecture in his capacity as Distinguished Visiting Professor on Thursday, 10 April 2025. The lecture was titled “ The G20: A Comprehensive Overview & Expectations of South Africa’s Presidency 2025 ” .   Follow the link below to access the guest lecture presentation:

Occasional Paper 4/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. A P R I L 2 0 2 5   Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPAHons, ND: Co. Admin Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University      Abstract   This Economic Brief analyses the country's precarious economic situation, that is characterised by significant domestic challenges and global trade disruptions. Business confidence has been negatively impacted by the historic withdrawal of the National Budget due to the controversy over the Value-Added Tax increases which, although now agreed, has triggered government instability and legal disputes. Deteriorating relations with the United States threatens South African exports and have raised uncertainties regarding South Africa's ongoing participation in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which will seriously impact particularly the automotive and agricultural sectors. Amidst declining business and consumer confidence, economic growth remains stubbornly low. Persistent levels of high unemployment, particular among the youth, inequality and poverty, exacerbate the crisis, and risks social stability. While inflation is projected to moderate, the deep-seated structural weaknesses hinder recovery efforts. The brief emphasises the urgent need for comprehensive reforms to restore confidence, enhance competitiveness, and address systemic issues vital for sustainable growth.   1. Introduction   For the first time in the history of South Africa the National Budget as presented to Parliament by the Minister of Finance had to be withdrawn due to the controversy over a proposed Value-Added-Tax increase. Whilst the budget was subsequently re-introduced and approved, members within the National Executive voted against the budget proposals. Moreover, the budget is being procedurally challenged in the courts.   The aforementioned dynamics does not bode well for business and consumer confidence.   The budget has also been presented against the backdrop of geo-political turmoil. The United States administration initiated global trade war has put the global economy into turmoil. South Africa has not escaped the impact thereof. In fact, the country’s relationship with the United States has been deteriorating at a rapid pace, which has resulted in billions of dollars of aid being withdrawn.   Moreover, South Africa’s continued inclusion in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), an agreement that provides eligible sub-Saharan African countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for over 1,800 products, in addition to the thousands more than 5,000 products eligible for duty-free access under the Generalized System of Preferences programme (Office of the US Trade Representative, N.d.) is uncertain. The author, with the benefit of having had extensive discussions with senior public policymakers within the US, is of the view that unless the relationship between the two countries are rapidly restored, South Africa’s graduation out of AGOA is almost certain. South Africa’s automotive and agricultural sectors will, under such circumstances, be particularly hard hit.   These dramatic turn of events happen within a slow-growth economic environment, with low business and consumer confidence and economic infrastructure backlogs that are inhibiting the further expansion of the economy. Without expanding the economy the high employment rate cannot be addressed. The social stability of the nation is at risk.   This paper assesses the current state of the South African economy, and the prospects for its recovery and growth. It further considers the implications of the 2025 national budget and the emerging ‘global trade wars’ thereon.   This paper is the result of the combined insights of a number of reputable economists and financial analysts that participated in a webinar workshop and additional interviews in the first part of April 2025. The insights have been synergised by the author. The views expressed during the webinar and interviews have informed the content of the paper, but cannot be ascribed to any one of them. The interpretation of the content is that of the author.   The experts consulted include:   Dr Adel Bosch, Senior Economist, Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) Dr Miriam Altman, Strategist, Economist and Social Activist, Altman Advisory Prof William Gumede, Associate Professor, School of Governance, Witwatersrand University Mr Theo Vorster, CEO and Co-founder, Galileo Capital Mr Isaac Matshego, Senior Economist, Nedbank Dr Roelof Botha, Economic Advisor to the Optimum Investment Group Ms Lara Hodes, Economist, Investec   The webinar workshop and interviews were structured in such a way as to address the following five issues:   A prognosis of the current state of the economy The impact of the 2025/2026 national budget proposals thereon The likelihood of meeting the 1,9% GDP growth target Further interventions needed to spur meaningful GDP growth Should US impose tariffs on and graduate South Africa out of AGOA, how serious will the impact be on the South African economy?   In addition to the content generated through the workshop and interviews, some desktop research was done where further expansion, clarity or verification was needed. The main points of the paper is summed up in the text-box below:     The South African National Budget was withdrawn for the first time due to controversy over a proposed Value-Added-Tax increase, highlighting governance issues. After its re-introduction, the budget faced opposition from some within the National Executive, leading to further procedural challenges in court. This has highlighted fractures within the ruling coalition which has further negatively impacted  business confidence. Business and consumer confidence are under duress, which is detrimental to economic growth and recovery. The global trade war initiated by the U.S. has created a tumultuous international economic environment that negatively impacts South Africa. South Africa’s relationship with the U.S. is rapidly deteriorating, resulting in the withdrawal of billions of dollars in aid and support. There is uncertainty regarding South Africa's continued inclusion in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), critical for duty-free access to the U.S. market. Loss of AGOA status could severely impact South Africa’s key sectors, particularly automotive and agriculture. The economy recorded a meagre GDP growth rate of 0.6% in 2024, falling significantly short of the necessary levels for job creation and poverty reduction. Whilst the budget has assumed a 1.9% GDP growth, it is unlikely to be achieved given the structural impediments and global trade turmoil. It is likely to be in the 1% to 1.5% range, making unlikely that the budgeted revenue projections will be achieved. Key indicators highlight low business confidence, with indices hovering around 45 points, indicating a lack of optimism among investors. Consumer confidence continues to decline, reflecting growing scepticism about the economy's recovery and health. The high level of unemployment, currently 33.2%, poses substantial risks to economic stability, especially with youth unemployment at 45.5%. The integration of large segments of the population into the workforce is critical to boosting household consumption and ensuring social stability. South Africa faces chronic poverty and inequality, with some of the highest disparities globally, exacerbating social tensions. Inflation is projected to be around 4.5% in 2025, suggesting moderating prices, though challenges to purchasing power remain. The global “tariff war” could result in upward pressure beyond the 4.5% mark. Overall, the South African economy's fragile recovery is threatened by deep-rooted structural weaknesses, necessitating urgent policy reforms to enhance competitiveness and reduce red tape.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author    2. Macroeconomic overview   The South African economy’s recovery is fragile. It remains clouded as growth remains subdued and continues to stagnate. The economy recorded a meagre 0.6% GDP growth rate in 2024. This is way below the threshold necessary to generate significant job creation and to reduce poverty. The growth continues to be slow in spite of the relatively favourable global economic environment during the past years, which would suggests deep-rooted structural weaknesses within the domestic economy.   Key indicators further highlight the severity of the economic malaise:   Business confidence continue to be low. Indices hover around a worrying 45 index points.  (the neutral threshold is 50 points). This is especially troubling given that the low confidence has been sustained below the 50 point mark for at least five years (Trading Economics, N.d.(1)). The below 50 points threshold figure reflects the widespread pessimism and a lack of forward-looking investment sentiment among businesses. For outsiders to invest in the country, the economy will need to be more competitive, for which the ease of doing business will have to be addressed. To this end the levels of red tape will need to be reduced considerably.     Consumer confidence has similarly declined, further illustrating the erosion of public faith in the ability of the economy to mend. Consumer confidence in South Africa decreased to -20 points in the first quarter of 2025 from -6 points in the fourth quarter of 2024 (Trading Economics, N.d.(2)).   This erosion of confidence perpetuates economic underperformance, since businesses delay investment and expansion, while households reduce discretionary spending.   The stubbornly high unemployment rate (32.1%) as at the end of the third quarter of 2024, and especially that of the youth (45.5%) (Stats SA, 2025), undermines South Africa's long-term growth prospects. The failure to integrate large segments of the population into productive employment limits household consumption and contributes to social instability.   Compounding these issues are chronic poverty and high levels of inequality, which are among the highest globally.   Inflation, is expected to be in the region of 4.5% in 2025 (SARB, 2025 (1)), thus showing signs of moderation, but challenges remain. A stable inflation environment is critical for consumer purchasing power. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has limited room to further cut interest rates given the inflationary pressures and the need to maintain financial market stability. Thus, the current monetary policy landscape offers little space for expansionary measures to stimulate demand. Alternative view on the cutting of interest rates   The current real lending rate in South Africa is 7.8%, whilst some argue that it should not be above 5%. The lowering of interest rates are important given that the average real prime rate in our major trading partners is a third of what it is in South Africa. The cost of capital in this country, it is argued, is too high.   It is said that the household debt costs as percentage of household disposable income at the beginning of 2022 was 6.7%, compared with the current 9.1%. If it had stayed at 6.7 the interest rates would not have increased by much, but then consumers would have over the three-year period been able to spend R200 billion more in the economy. This would have provided R50 billion more to play with in the budget and the VAT rate increase would not have been on the table. It is argued that the Reserve Bank is overly concerned with inflation, which approach provides an obstacle to growth in this economy, which is impacting the country’s fiscal stability.   High interest rates do not only refer to the supply side, but also the demand side, which is closely related to the type of investment we seek as a country. Investments in bonds, shares and deposits provide relatively high rates of return. Investors find it more attractive to invest in these instruments that a relatively risk-free, as opposed to investment into plant and machinery which carries much higher risk.   The down side of this is that South Africa seeks investment into real production, since this can boost both exports and jobs.   Also to be considered is the inflationary impact of the punitive US tariff regime on global inflation and the real possibility of a US and global recession, which JP Morgan suggest is a 60% probability (Siddarth, 2025).   The above inflation salary increase for the public service (that is 5.5% against the 4,5% anticipated inflation) (Moloi, 2025) will place further upward pressure on inflation and reduce the revenue available for public services and infrastructure.   The electricity supply, whilst relatively stable over the last few months, continues to plague the economy. The threat of loadshedding remains, and is putting the brake on expansion in manufacturing and other high-energy use sectors. The disruption in the supply of electricity negatively impacts productivity and dampens investor sentiment.  The unpredictable nature of the electricity supply has also led to many companies having to incur additional costs by investing in alternative energy solutions, which reduces the overall competitiveness of the South African business environment and discourages both domestic and foreign investment.   The energy crisis is contributing to a broad sense of societal discontentment in the economy's ability to deliver. The power outages hinder educational institutions, medical facilities and small businesses. It is disrupting their daily operations and is exacerbating inequality between communities that have varying access to alternative energy solutions.   The growing disparities need to be addressed urgently. Government can do so through the introduction of targeted interventions, which could include, for example, subsidies for off-grid solutions and the prioritisation of energy reforms.   The national budget presumes a 1.9% GDP growth for the fiscal year (Treasury, 2025). Given the external shocks triggered by the US tariff war, the impact thereof on global inflation and the upward pressure on local inflation resulting from the VAT increase, together with the underperformance of actual 2024 GDP growth against projected GDP growth (as can be seen from the graph below), and a reduction in consumer spending, it is highly unlikely that the 1.9% target will be realised. It would mean a trebling of GDP growth from 2024 levels, and there is little evidence to suggest that the economic structural deficiencies will be dramatically corrected in the short term. A target of around 1.5% is more realistic, and may even be optimistic.   On the back of expected higher inflation and lower than budgeted GDP growth, it is likely that the revenue targets set in the budget will not be achieved.   In terms of gross fixed capital formation, the National Development Plan envisages increasing it from 17 percent to 30 percent by 2030 (Parliament, 2025). However, when one considers current investor confidence and that the average in emerging markets is around 25%, it seems a little over optimistic.   Fragile Economic Recovery:  South Africa's economy is struggling, with only a 0.6% GDP growth rate in 2024, insufficient for significant job creation and poverty reduction, indicating deep-rooted structural weaknesses. Low Business and Consumer Confidence:  Business confidence remains low at around 45 index points, causing delayed investments and expansions, while consumer confidence is also declining, further reducing discretionary spending. High Unemployment and Inequality:  The unemployment rate stands at 33.2%, with youth unemployment at 45.5%, contributing to social instability and limiting household consumption amidst chronic poverty and inequality. Inflation and Monetary Policy Constraints:  Inflation is expected to moderate at about 4.5% in 2025, but the South African Reserve Bank has limited capacity to cut interest rates, complicating efforts to stimulate demand in a challenging economic environment. Energy Crisis Impact : Persistent electricity supply issues, including the threat of loadshedding, are stifling economic expansion and contributing to societal discontent, necessitating urgent government interventions for targeted energy reforms and support for off-grid solutions.   Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author   3. Fiscal framework and revenue composition   Government revenue is far too heavily dependent on a narrowing and shrinking tax base, which places the South Africa's fiscal framework under considerable strain.   Individual income taxes is the largest contributor to government income. It is followed by value-added tax (VAT), corporate taxes, fuel levies and customs duties. This structure exposes government to significant risks during periods of economic downturn, more so when unemployment rises and real incomes decline.   Since South Africa's tax base is so small, the over-reliance on individual taxpayers is particularly problematic. With only around 7.9 million taxpayers out of a population of over 60 million, of which 1 million pay 60% of all income tax, and 28 million welfare recipients, there is a serious risk to fiscal sustainability (Business Tech, 2025 (1)).   The regressive nature of VAT further exacerbates the already high levels of inequality, since it disproportionately affects low-income households who spend most of their income on consumption.   The decision to increase VAT by 0.5% - that is from 15% to 15.5% - will undoubtedly have an impact on consumer spending, as well as on inflation. Economists predict the increase could depress GDP growth by up to 0.1% annually and raise inflation by 0.25%. Given the fragile state of consumer confidence, any tax increase could further erode household disposable income and reduce overall demand.     Case study: Potential to reach the budgeted tax target   One of the economists consulted referred to research that he had previously undertaken.   In 2018, VAT was increased from 14% to 15%.  The total VAT that was projected by National Treasury at that time was R348.1 billion. The proposal itself was expected to raise an additional R22.9 billion. But the actual collection, that is the number released by National Treasury about two years later after the first revisions, was R324.8 billion, R23.3 billion below what National Treasury had forecasted.   But that does not tell the full story, because when one examines the breakdown, refunds were estimated at just under R200 billion, but it came in at R229, that is R29 billion more than expected.   This was due to the impact of State Capture. Under the previous Commissioner, the South African Revenue Services (SARS) was weak, there was corruption within the SARS system, and because of the widescale corruption, there was no public buy-in. People were disillusioned, so found ways to cheat the system.   Now that corrective action has been taken at SARS, which Commissioner Edward Kieswetter has to a large extent transformed back into its former efficient state, it is believed that the VAT revenue shouldn’t be far off of the VAT projected should the GDP growth be achieved.   That said, as discussed previously, the likelihood of a GDP growth being achieved is questionable.   Because what also needs to be noted is that most of South Africa’s economic growth over the last decade has been from consumer spending. Unless other areas of the economy and other sectors of the economy can stimulated, household consumption is expected to drive economic growth in the immediate period. It is important to note that consumer spending last year most probably prevented South Africa from going into recession. And the two-pot pension reform, increased household spending towards the end of the year, which further helped.   In the context of consumer driven growth, to raise value added tax, even if  only by 0.5%, will dampen consumer confidence and undermine the consumer spending growth. It is likely to drag down economic growth. In a VAT increase scenario, businesses are likely to pass on the cost to consumers. That, in turn, will drive up inflation. This means that any rise in VAT, even if it's only 0.5%, is unlikely to bring the revenue as envisaged by the Treasury, as it would depress other parts of the economy.   Customs duties, while a smaller component of total revenue, play a significant role in regional economic relations. South Africa collected approximately R160 billion in 2023/4 in customs duties of which it retained only around R80 billion (approximately 50%). The balance was distributed to neighbouring countries through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (SARS, 2024).   Even though only 10% of imports incur duties, these revenues form a crucial fiscal pillar for SACU member countries such as Lesotho, Eswatini, Namibia, and Botswana. Transfers to these countries of around 50%, a figure that vastly surpasses their proportional share of the duty-bearing imports. South Africa 97.4% to the pool (SARS, 2024).This raises questions with regard to the equity and sustainability of the current revenue-sharing arrangements.   The current structure of SACU revenue distribution not only strains South Africa's budget but also creates a dependency syndrome among member countries, where in some cases, these transfers often make up more than 50% of their revenue. It also serves as a disincentive for the diversification of their economies.   Consideration should be given to the re-evaluation of the SACU formula. The new arrangements should balance actual trade values and development needs in order to foster a more equitable regional partnership.     Over-reliance on a Narrow Tax Base : South Africa's government revenue is heavily dependent on individual income taxes from a small taxpayer base, which poses risks to fiscal sustainability and equity. Impact of VAT Increase:  A proposed 0.5% increase in value-added tax (VAT) may negatively affect consumer spending and inflation, potentially dampening economic growth and undermining consumer confidence. Role of Consumer Spending:  Consumer spending has been the main driver of South Africa's economic growth over the past decade, and any tax hikes could reduce household disposable income and overall demand. Customs Duties and SACU Dynamics:  Customs duties contribute significantly to South Africa's revenue but much of this is redistributed to neighbouring countries through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), raising questions about equity and sustainability. Need for SACU Reform:  The revenue-sharing arrangements under SACU strain South Africa's budget and create dependency among member countries, highlighting the need for a re-evaluation of the distribution formula to foster regional equity and diversification.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author    4. Public expenditure and debt dynamics   South Africa's commitment to social support - which includes welfare grants, health and education - is reflected in its public spending. This commitment, however, brings pressure to bear on the national budget. Education receives over R500 billion annually, aimed at improving school infrastructure, teacher remuneration and the provision of other educational resources. But, despite the significant investment, the outcomes remain uneven. The high levels of disparity between urban and rural schools persist.   Social services, such as grants for the elderly, children, and disabled, receives R431 billion annually. These programmes are essential in mitigating poverty and inequality, but cognisance needs also to be taken of its growing share of the budget. As such, they limit fiscal space for other essential functions like infrastructure investment and innovation.   Perhaps most worrying is the rising cost of debt servicing.   As debt-to-GDP levels increase, more of the budget is being absorbed by interest payments that reduce the funds available for development. The fiscal crowding out is becoming a pressing issue, because it is constraining the government's ability to adequately invest in long-term growth drivers, such as economic infrastructure.   The South African government's gross loan debt is projected to reach nearly 75% of GDP in the coming fiscal years (Trading Economics, N.d.(3)), which some consider high. The reality is that South Africa does not has a super-high debt-to-GDP ratio, it just does not have the growth trajectory to support the payments, which is the problem.     Debt per se is not problematic, it what the debt is used for that matters. Investment into economic infrastructure will serve as a stimulus to generate growth and future revenue to service the debt. Unfortunately, the performance in public infrastructure spending is poor. Creating opportunity through the reform of Public Private Partnership (PPP) regulations – which government has started doing - can serve to overcome poor spending performance. An approach similar to the lifting of the embedded electricity generation restrictions enabling the private sector to invest, is another example.   But as confidence in the country's fiscal sustainability declines, borrowing costs may very well increase, further worsening the ability to service the debt burden. This dynamic creates a vicious cycle that can only be broken by sustained fiscal consolidation and/or economic growth.   To mitigate long-term risks, South Africa's approach to public spending needs to be more strategic. Treasury will need to conduct comprehensive spending reviews in order to evaluate efficiency, to eliminate duplication and to improve the outcomes of its spending.   Investments in digital governance and fiscal transparency could enhance accountability and improve budget implementation. So too, a switch to performance-based contracts and incentives to attract the private sector into managing some public services will introduce efficiencies with concomitant savings.   Currently Treasury is making cuts to education and health personnel, which is not sensible for long-range growth and capacity, since this will negatively impact the skills and capacity needed ten years down the line.   Public Spending and Budget Pressure : South Africa allocates significant funds to social support, including education and welfare grants, but this creates pressure on the national budget and limits fiscal capacity for other essential functions. Education Investment vs. Outcomes:  Although over R500 billion is spent annually on education to enhance infrastructure and resources, disparities between urban and rural schools persist, indicating uneven outcomes. Growing Debt Servicing Costs:  Rising debt-to-GDP levels, projected to approach 75%, result in a larger portion of the budget being consumed by interest payments, which hinders investment in growth-oriented infrastructure. Need for Strategic Spending:  South Africa must adopt a more strategic approach to public spending, including spending reviews to improve efficiency, eliminate duplication, and enhance outcomes, while investing in digital governance and fiscal transparency. Impact of Budget Cuts:  Current cuts to education and health personnel by Treasury may adversely affect long-term growth prospects and the development of essential skills and capacity needed for future economic stability.   Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author 5. Infrastructure investment and economic revitalisation   Infrastructure investment serves as a major catalyst for economic recovery. It is therefore assuring that the 2025–2026 budget has allocated more than R1 trillion for the development and revitalisation of the country's energy and transport infrastructure (Magubane, 2025), since these investments will address key supply-side constraints, facilitate trade, and attract foreign direct investment (FDI).   However, for this to materialise, the existing implementation gap will have to be addressed, since projects are often held up in the planning stage as a result of bureaucratic inefficiency, the lack of project preparation, and insufficient feasibility assessments. Realising the benefits of infrastructure spending will require urgent improvements in project management capacity, procurement efficiency, and intergovernmental coordination.   Structural reforms have begun to create space for greater private sector participation, particularly through public-private partnerships (PPPs). These frameworks aim to de-risk infrastructure projects and leverage private capital in order to supplement public investment. Successful examples in the energy sector serve as a model that can be replicated and expanded to other sectors such as transportation, logistics, and housing.   Government should be the flywheel that crowds in capital. It should accept that it hasn’t got all the capital and it can’t do everything, but it can be the flywheel. It can allow infrastructure projects or supply chains or the regulatory environment to act as the stimulant to expand capital investment beyond its own sources.   The infrastructure backlogs in municipalities also needs to be urgently addressed. Inadequate water, sanitation and road infrastructure, serves as a barrier to development and hinders productivity and the communities' quality of life. Municipalities often lack technical expertise and financial management capacity, leading to underspending and inefficient use of grants. National government must play a proactive role in capacity-building and oversight.   In addition to conventional infrastructure, digital infrastructure is emerging as a key enabler of economic growth and development. Through the expansion of broadband access, particularly in underserved rural areas, new opportunities in education, healthcare and e-commerce can be unlocked. Government should, therefore, prioritise digital inclusion as a strategic component of its long-term infrastructure planning.   Special attention will also have to be given to reviving the manufacturing sector, which has all but collapsed. In the late 1980’s manufacturing contributed 25% to South Africa’s GDP. It now stands at around 9%. Contraposed to this, Malaysia also stood at 25% in the late 1980’s, but manufacturing now contributes around 30% to their GDP.   In this regard, more attention needs to be given to the beneficiation of minerals and other raw materials.   Infrastructure Investment Significance:  The 2025–2026 budget allocates over R1 trillion for energy and transport infrastructure, which is crucial for economic recovery, addressing supply-side constraints, facilitating trade, and attracting foreign direct investment. Implementation Challenges:  To realise the benefits of infrastructure spending, the existing implementation gap must be closed, requiring improvements in project management, procurement efficiency, and intergovernmental coordination. Private Sector Participation:  Structural reforms are fostering greater private sector involvement through public-private partnerships (PPPs), which can de-risk projects and enhance public investment in various sectors. Municipal Infrastructure Backlogs : Urgent action is needed to address inadequate municipal infrastructure, such as water and sanitation, which hampers development and quality of life. The national government should assist municipalities with capacity-building and oversight. Digital Infrastructure Expansion:  Prioritising digital infrastructure, especially broadband access in rural areas, is essential for economic growth and can unlock new opportunities in education and healthcare. Digital inclusion should be a key focus in long-term infrastructure planning.   Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author     6. The investment climate and private sector dynamics   Due to policy uncertainty, infrastructure constraints, and the private sectors limited confidence in the government's ability to deliver the required reforms that will enable economic growth, current investment levels remain weak.   Investors are hesitant to commit capital when returns on safer instruments, such as government bonds, offer risk-free and guaranteed yields of 6% or more. This crowding out effect is particularly significant for sectors like manufacturing and agriculture, where risk-adjusted returns are less certain.   For the private sector to flourish, it requires less red tape, and a clearer and more supportive regulatory environment. Delays in licensing, opaque decision-making processes and shifting policy signals deter investment. To address these challenges a streamlined regulatory regime, improved transparency, and a commitment to policy continuity is needed.   There are also concerns about South Africa's potential growth rate. A decade ago, potential growth was estimated at around 3.5%, but this figure has likely declined due to institutional decay and lost capacity. Rebuilding institutional effectiveness—particularly at the municipal and provincial levels—is essential for restoring investor confidence.   Foreign direct investment has also been impacted by perceptions of corruption, weak enforcement of contracts, and limited investor protections. South Africa must strengthen the rule of law, improve dispute resolution mechanisms, and instil confidence amongst investors so that they believe that they will have recourse to fair treatment.   To reinvigorate local investment, the government should support small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs), which are critical to job creation. It should take steps to improve access to finance, to simplifying tax compliance, and to tailor support programmes that will empower entrepreneurs and stimulate grassroots economic activity.   Impacting each of these interventions are the real and perceived anti-growth policies. The recently promulgated Expropriation Act being one example, where the ambiguity as to what constitutes ‘’property” and under what circumstance expropriation without compensation may occur lead antagonists to suggest that property rights are under threat. What is needed as a minimum is clearer definition; which definition should be defined collaboratively between the state, the private sector, civil society, and professionals in order to ensure that all sectors of the economy are in sync and sing from the same hymn sheet.   Such clarity will also reduce the potential for misunderstanding such as that of the current US administration who have embarked on punitive measures against South Africa based on what some infer to be a false narrative (Mbembe & Gilmore, 2025). The reality is, however, that differences in interpretation do exist.   Investment Hesitation:  Current investment levels in South Africa are weak due to policy uncertainty, infrastructure issues, and low confidence in the government's reform capabilities, leading investors to favour safer, guaranteed returns like those from government bonds. Regulatory Challenges : A clearer, more supportive regulatory environment is necessary for the private sector to thrive, as delays, opaque decision-making, and shifting policies deter investment. Streamlining regulations and improving transparency are critical steps. Concerns About Growth:  South Africa's potential growth rate has declined from an estimated 3.5% due to institutional decay. Rebuilding effective institutions, especially at municipal and provincial levels, is essential for restoring investor confidence. Foreign Investment Issues:  Perceptions of corruption, weak contract enforcement, and limited investor protections are hindering foreign direct investment. Strengthening the rule of law and improving dispute resolution mechanisms are needed to rebuild investor trust. Support for SMEs and Clarity on Expropriation:  Government support for small and medium enterprises (SMMEs) is vital for job creation. Additionally, clearer definitions around property rights and expropriation are necessary to prevent misunderstandings that may lead to international tensions and miscommunications.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author     7. Trade and international relations   South Africa's external trade environment is under pressure due to the emergence of global protectionist tendencies and shifting international trade alliances. The unilaterally imposed punitive tariffs of the United States call into question the feasibility of continuing exports to them at current levels, which can have a significant impact on the economy, given that the US accounts for 8% of South African exports (Mohamed & Moloi, 2025). Source: Stanlib in Daily Investor (15 April 2025)   Exporters will have to find new markets for their products as South African products and produce in the US will become expensive and uncompetitive. This is however not a short term solution as one market cannot be shut down today, and a new market opened tomorrow. It will take time to develop. In the interim manufacturers need to survive in the short term; the possibility of some not, is real.   Automotive exports could be particularly hard hit, posing a direct threat to this vital manufacturing sector. The auto industry supports thousands of jobs and is a major contributor to export earnings. The 25% tariff that has been imposed could be devastating for local producers, especially for small and medium enterprises that lack the capital to absorb such shocks.   Negotiations with key trade partners like the United States must be prioritised to preserve favourable terms under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).  Potentially, up to 200,000 jobs (125,000 in automotive industry alone) (Libera, 2025) may be threatened. AGOA in 2024 accounted for about 46% of total exports to the US (Business Tech, 2025 (2)), and somewhere between 3% - 4% of total exports. Although this may appear to be a small exposure, it does have an impact downstream, because a lot of the exposure is concentrated in certain sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing – particularly motor vehicles and component parts.   One economist pointed out that many manufacturers of component parts are not large enterprises and thus do not have the balance sheet to support shocks of this magnitude. Some concessions need to be considered.   At the same time, diversification of trade partners—especially within Africa and Asia—can reduce dependence on any single market. The strategic planning in this regard should assume South Africa’s graduation out of AGOA, especially given the fractious  relationship between US and South Africa.   Regional trade also needs reform. SACU revenue sharing, as noted, is skewed and lacks transparency. South Africa effectively subsidises the budgets of its neighbours, with little reciprocal benefit. These arrangements must be re-evaluated to ensure long-term fiscal fairness and regional economic stability.   The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) presents a unique opportunity to expand intra-African trade. However, success will depend on harmonising standards, improving logistics and investing in cross-border systems and infrastructure. In order for South Africa to position itself as a regional trade hub, it should play a leadership role in operationalising AfCFTA.   Global Trade Pressures:  South Africa's trade is facing challenges due to rising global protectionism, particularly with the imposition of US tariffs, which threaten the viability of exports to the US, accounting for 8% of South African exports. Need for Market Diversification:  Exporters must find new markets as US tariffs make South African products less competitive; however, this is a long-term process and short-term survival for manufacturers is critical. Impact on Automotive Industry:  The automotive sector, a significant contributor to jobs and export earnings, is especially vulnerable to the 25% tariff imposed by the US, which could adversely affect small and medium enterprises. Importance of Trade Negotiations:  Prioritising negotiations with key partners like the US is crucial to maintaining favorable trade terms under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and preventing potential job losses of up to 200,000. Regional Trade Reform and AfCFTA:  South Africa needs to reform regional trade arrangements for fairness and stability while seizing the opportunity presented by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to enhance intra-African trade through improved logistics and standards.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author     8. Social Considerations: Welfare, consumption and human capital   Social grants support millions of South Africans and serve as an important consumption driver. However, this model is not sustainable in the long term. With only a small proportion of the population paying income tax, the balance between support and dependency must be carefully managed.   Consumer spending has historically driven economic growth, but this trend is weakening due to wages that have been stagnating and persisting inflationary pressures. The recent introduction of the two-pot pension system, which allows partial early withdrawals, offers short-term liquidity but may undermine long-term savings.   Investing in human capital is paramount. The educational outcomes we now have in the public schooling system are quite unsatisfactory. According to one of the world’s leading development economists and specialist on education reform, Professor Lant Pritchett, South Africa is the single biggest learning underperformer relative to GDP per capita among low and middle income countries. In short, we get extremely poor education outcomes despite our high levels of public expenditure (Schirmer, 2023).     Education must be re-imagined and vocational training must be aligned with market needs. Programmes that promote entrepreneurship, digital literacy, and technical skills that can empower citizens to contribute productively to the economy, must be rolled-out.   Healthcare is another key pillar of human development. The proposed National Health Insurance (NHI) aims to provide universal access but faces funding, infrastructure, and administrative hurdles. A phased, consultative approach is necessary to ensure that healthcare reforms are inclusive and fiscally sustainable.   9. Institutional capacity, integrity and governance   Poor governance and corruption have been a recurring themes in South Africa's economic stagnation. State capture has significantly eroded institutional integrity, and has affected everything from procurement processes to service delivery. Rebuilding trust requires transparent governance, accountability, and a capable public sector.   That is, however, only part of the story. The reality is that we have been in as low growth economy for decades – we have an institutional problem, and constraints.   The first part of the constraint has the infrastructure SOEs, Transnet, Eskom, the water boards, etcetera, which are in disarray. Their roles in lifting growth by investing and driving infrastructure are not that strong anymore. And the breakdown of infrastructure has also driven up inflation, prices, the cost of living and the cost of doing business; and it has eroded savings. It has a deterring effect, or at least threatens to deter future investment. The Reserve Bank, for example, has warned that a breakdown in infrastructure is threatening the stability of South Africa's financial system also (SARB, 2024 (2)).   Municipal governments, which are key to local economic development, suffer from under-capacity and corruption. Reforms in municipal finance, procurement and service delivery will be crucial to achieving inclusive growth.   Improving the ease of doing business must remain a top priority. Urgent attention needs to be given to measures such as digitising licensing processes, reducing red tape, and clarifying land rights, all of which can unlock significant investment.   Civil society and the media are important watchdogs that enhance and ensure accountability. These institutions must be strengthened so as to ensure the protection of the freedom of expression and similarly, civic engagement must be encouraged, as both are vital components of a resilient democracy and economy.     10. Strategic recommendations and conclusion   South Africa's economic revival requires a multifaceted approach:   Accelerate infrastructure implementation: Shovel-ready projects need to be expedited and public project management capacity must be improved. Reform revenue sharing: Revise SACU arrangements for equitable fiscal contributions and reduced dependency. Promote private investment: Lower barriers to entry, improve investor protection, streamline regulatory approvals and reduce the levels of red tape. Target key sectors: Provide targeted incentives to revive agriculture, manufacturing, energy, and construction. Rebuild institutions: Focus on governance, transparency, and public sector training at all levels of government. Diversify trade and exports: Strengthen regional and Asian trade ties to reduce vulnerability to Western protectionism. Support SMEs: Simplify tax compliance and provide financial support to small businesses and start-ups. Foster innovation and skills: Increase investment in R&D, higher education and vocational training. Strengthen civic institutions: Empower watchdog organisations and ensure freedom of the press and civil participation.     Conclusion   South Africa stands at a crossroads. The choices made in the next few years will determine whether the country continues on a path of stagnation or begins a journey toward inclusive and sustainable growth.   The building blocks exist: a diversified economy, a young population, and robust institutions that, though weakened, can be rebuilt and restored.   But for it to be achieved, action must be decisive and coordinated. By implementing bold reforms, investing in infrastructure and human capital, and by fostering a culture of accountability, South Africa can reclaim its position as a dynamic emerging market and a leader on the African continent.     References   Business Tech. 2025 (1). South Africa has 7.9 million taxpayers funding 28 million grant recipients. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/budget-speech/816563/south-africa-has-7-9-million-taxpayers-funding-28-million-grant-recipients/ [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Business Tech. 2025 (2). R70 billion disaster for South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/821032/r70-billion-disaster-for-south-africa/  [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Libera, M. 2025. South African province in crisis, and 125,000 jobs at risk. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/5-things/820748/south-african-province-in-crisis-and-125000-jobs-at-risk/ [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Magubane, K. 2025. BUDGET 2025 | R1-trillion infrastructure drive 'will jolt economy to higher level'. [Online] Available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times-daily/business/2025-03-12-budget-2025-r1-trillion-infrastructure-drive-will-jolt-economy-to-higher-level/  [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Mbembe, A. & Gilmore, R.W. Trump’s attacks on South Africa are a punishment for independence. [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/mar/07/trumps-attacks-on-south-africa-are-a-punishment-for-independence  [accessed: 14 April 2025]   Mohamed, S. & Moloi, T. 2025. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/PBO/Budget_Analysis/2025/17-02-2025/PBO_Pre-budget_brief_South_Africas_trade_relations_with_the_USA.pdf [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Moloi, D. 2025. DPSA Issues Circular Announcing Public Service Cost of Living Adjustments 2025/26.  [Online] Available at: https://www.dpsa.gov.za/thepublicservant/2025/04/03/dpsa-issues-circular-announcing-public-service-cost-of-living-adjustments-2025-26/#:~:text=In%20light%20of%20this%20resolution,with%20effect%20from1%20April%202025. [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Office of the US Trade Representative. N.d. Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) [Online] Available at: https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa [accessed: 14 April 2025]   Parliament. 2025. 2025 Budget Analysis. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/PBO/Budget_Analysis/2025/3-march/18-03-2025/PBO_2025_Budget_analysis_18_March_2025.pdf [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Schirmer, S. 2023. South Africa’s failing education system. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.cde.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/The-Silent-Crisis-South-Africas-failing-education-system.pdf  [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Siddarth, S. 2025. Global brokerages raise recession odds; J.P. Morgan sees 60% chance [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/jpmorgan-lifts-global-recession-odds-60-us-tariffs-stoke-fears-2025-04-04/ [accessed: 14 April 2025]   South African Reserve Bank (SARB). 2025 (1). Statement of the MPC March 2025. [Online] Available at: https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/statements/monetary-policy-statements/2025/march#:~:text=The%20overall%20result%20of%20these,the%20better%20fuel%2Dprice%20projections. [accessed: 15 April 2025]   South African Reserve Bank (SARB). 2025 (2). Reserve Bank warns poor infrastructure is a major threat to SA's financial system.  [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/reserve-bank-warns-that-poor-infrastructure-is-a-major-threat-to-sas-financial-system-20241129  [accessed: 15 April 2025]   South African Revenue Services (SARS). 2024. Media release: Joint media statement National Treasury and South African Revenue Service on the release of the 17th annual edition of Tax Statistics. [Online} Available at: https://www.sars.gov.za/latest-news/media-release-joint-media-statement-national-treasury-and-south-african-revenue-service-on-the-release-of-the-17th-annual-edition-of-tax-statistics/#:~:text=In%20the%202023/24%20fiscal,9%20billion%20(R32. [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025. Statistics South Africa on official unemployment rate in third quarter of 2024. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/statistics-south-africa-official-unemployment-rate-third-quarter-2024-12-nov#:~:text=The%20official%20unemployment%20rate%20was,persons%20to%208%2C0%20million [accessed 15 April 2025]   Trading Economics. N.d.(1) South Africa Business Confidence. [Online] Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/business-confidence [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Trading Economics. N.d.(2). South Africa Consumer Confidence. [Online] Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/consumer-confidence [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Trading Economics. N.d.(3). South Africa Government Debt-to-GDP. [Online] Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/government-debt-to-gdp#:~:text=In%20the%20long%2Dterm%2C%20the,according%20to%20our%20econometric%20models. [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Treasury.2025. 2025 Budget. Budget Review. [Online] Available: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20Budget/2025/review/FullBR.pdf [accessed: 15 April 20125] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The inclusive Society Institute, represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, attended the Civil Society Policy Forum 2025 on Wednesday, 23 April 2025. The meeting was held at the Headquarters of the International Monetary Fund in Washington and Online. The focus of the meeting was on hidden debt and how to tackle grand corruption in debt management in order to safeguard financing for development.   Debt is essential for the economy. But what happens when it is captured, mismanaged, acquired improperly, or hidden? Amid increasing democratic backlash, greater transparency and accountability in debt are urgently needed. The session also explored lessons from Mozambique to shape FfD4 discussions on preventing debt capture and safeguarding economic sustainability and future generations’ welfare. Speakers included:  Daniela Patino Pineros, Lead Public Resources, Transparency International (moderator) Aslak Jangård Orre, Senior Researcher Chr. Michelsen Institute Kjetil Abildsnes, Senior Policy Officer - Debt Justice, Eurodad Sally Torbert, Policy Manager, International Budget Partnership Alessandro Gullo, Assistant General Counsel, IMF

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is fulfilling its commitment to bringing the Constitution closer to the people by conducting impactful workshops at secondary schools across Gauteng Province. These sessions are led by ISI’s Schools Coordinator, Mr. Patrick Motsepe, who is working diligently to advance one of the Institute’s core mandates. On Wednesday, 23 April 2025, Grade 11 learners at Acudeo College in Kirkney had the opportunity to participate in one such transformative workshop. The session offered learners a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of South Africa’s constitutional framework, a cornerstone of the country’s democratic order. The workshop content is thoughtfully aligned with the Life Orientation and History curricula, addressing essential themes such as values in education and social cohesion. By engaging with these critical topics, the workshops aim to instill a lasting appreciation for the Constitution—an enduring symbol of the nation’s democratic principles and collective identity. In addition to constitutional education, the sessions also explore South Africa’s national symbols, including the flag and the national anthem, thereby fostering a stronger sense of pride and connection to the country's heritage. The timing of this particular workshop was especially meaningful, as it coincided with the commemoration of 31 years of South African democracy. Held during Freedom Month, with Freedom Day on 27 April marking the anniversary of the country’s first democratic elections in 1994, this year’s theme— “United in Resilience for the Defence of our Freedom and Democracy” —resonated strongly with the purpose of the initiative. ISI remains committed to educating young South Africans about these foundational elements of the nation's history and civic life, with additional workshops scheduled for roll-out across numerous high schools in Gauteng in the months ahead. Mr. Rampete, Head of the Life Orientation Department at Acudeo College, expressed his appreciation for the initiative, stating: “These workshops should also be extended to NGOs, CBOs, NPOs, faith-based organisations, and other civic entities. I would like to invite Mr. Motsepe to return and present the workshop to our Grade 12 learners as well.” The Inclusive Society Institute welcomed this feedback and is currently considering the request.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   April 2025   Author: Prof Jan van Heerden Editor: Daryl Sw anepoel   Table of Contents             Introduction      Models used      The core principles of the CGE models used in the simulations           The baseline forecast           The policy forecasts Macro-economic interventions      1. Alternative debt-reduction roadmap      2. Youth solidarity tax      3. Limited public salary bill increases Conclusion Bibliography             List of Figures             Figure 1 The baseline and policy forecasts Figure 2 Debt to GDP ratio (policy simulation) Figure 3 Increase in public sector debt above the baseline Figure 4 Government Deficits (policy simulation) Figure 5 Investment Expenditure and Imports (deviations from the baseline) Figure 6 GDP and its components (cont.) (deviations from the baseline) Figure 7 Industry survivors (relative to the baseline) Figure 8 Short run industry losers Figure 9 Real GDP % deviation from the baseline Figure 10 Change in the income tax rate on rich households Figure 11 Annual deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components (% change) Figure 12 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in main GDP expenditure components Figure 13 Cumulative % change from the baseline in Industry output Figure 14 Deviation from the baseline in household consumption by income group Figure 15 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components levels (revenue not recycled) Figure 16 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components (revenue recycled) Figure 17 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the Supply Side components of GDP, as well as real wages and the CPI. Introduction   The report below is a summary of a more technical modelling report of three macroeconomic simulations done for the Inclusive Society Institute in 2024. The three macroeconomic interventions are listed in the textbox at below.    Macro-economic interventions   Alternative debt-reduction roadmap – increase debt to GDP to 100 percent over the next five years followed by a systematic reduction. Proviso: increased debt ringfenced purely for economic infrastructure development, NO consumption spending.   Youth solidarity tax: Increase personal tax by one percent for all taxpayers earning R600,001+ per annum. In the form of a transitional tax for five years only. Ringfenced for youth enterprise development to be administered by the Solidarity Fund. See if this can be funded by delaying inflationary bracket adjustments over the next two or three years.   Limit the public salary bill increases to inflation   Models used   The study was done using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. The Department of Economics at the University of Pretoria has various CGE models, with the same core set of equations, but with different extensions, depending on the tasks at hand. We have used three different models for the simulations: (i) The national model was used for the first macroeconomic intervention where the debt-to-GDP ratio was increased temporarily; (ii) An older version of the provincial TERM model was used for the remaining two macroeconomic interventions, since the national model does not have income taxes (personal or corporate) integrated into the model, and (iii) the latest version of our provincial TERM model was used for some sectoral interventions, included in the technical report, but not reported on here.     The core principles of the CGE models used in the simulations   A CGE model is basically a system of thousands of equations describing the relationships that exist in the economy. It uses data from Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), namely the Supply and Use tables, which resembles a snapshot of the economy at a specific point in time. The Supply and Use tables show that the economy is in equilibrium, or balanced, in the sense that the supply and demand for every commodity or factor of production is equal at that point in time. So, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) starts with a general equilibrium of all goods, services and factors of production in the economy, and then uses a computer to solve a very large system of equations that describes all the relationships between role players in the economy. We start with equilibrium and then change one or two things in the model, such as a tax rate or spending by the government, or investment by the private sector, and then let the computer calculate the values that will hold in a new equilibrium. A CGE model could be a national model that studies the economy of the country at large, or a multi-regional CGE model which treats each province of South Africa as a separate economy. The regional model not only studies the equilibria of each province, but could also calculate the effects that actions of one province would have on the national economy as well as on all other province.   The equations of the CGE model describe the relationships between all the role-players in the economy, namely the Industries, Households, Investors, Governments and Foreigner buyers, who could be foreign industries, households, investors, or governments, or merely buyers from other provinces in the case of the regional models.   Unlike the Australian CGE model, we have multiple households in our South African models, namely twelve groups distinguished by income: we have the poorest decile split into two ventiles; then the eight next deciles by income, and finally the richest decile also split into two ventiles. The model is therefore very well suited to measure changes in the income distribution or poverty levels. In the older models we had 48 household groups, by income as well as race group.   The basic production function for all industry production is the so-called Leontief function, which means that inputs into the production process are used in fixed proportions: if an industry wants to double output, it has to double all inputs, irrespective of input prices. The Leontief production function is generally accepted by economists world-wide: for example, to produce one car, the factory needs four wheels, one engine, one steering wheel, etc., and to produce ten of those cars, it will need ten times as many wheels, engines, steering wheels, and so forth. Even though we assume that the basic production function has this simple form, industries can choose where  to buy their intermediate inputs from, according to CES [1] demand functions: depending on relative prices and the substitutability of the goods from different sources, industries may decide to source their inputs from the local market, or from abroad, depending on price.   Transportation cost in the model plays a very important role, and is included in the purchaser’s price of a commodity. A buyer would therefore rather source from a nearby industry than from one far away. Distances between the capitals of the nine provinces as well as to the different ports of import and export are used to build a gravity  mechanism, determining where industries would source their inputs from, or which ports of import and export they will use.   The demand for factors of production also follows the CES functional form: an average level of factors grows proportionally with output, according to the Leontief  function, but an industry could substitute labour for capital or vice versa. Labour demand is also modelled using the CES demand functional form: once the industry has decided about the capital-labour ratio it prefers, different occupational groups – we have 11 in the model – are chosen: different wage levels play a strong role, as well as the substitutability of one occupation for another.    Export demand is a very simple function of domestic versus foreign prices of commodities: if South Africa’s price levels increase relative to world prices, which are exogenous in our model, then the demand for South African commodities decrease. Since South Africa is a small open economy, exports play a very significant role in the model.   Household demand follows the LES (Linear Expenditure System) format: households have a subsistence demand for all commodities, which they will buy first, without looking at the price of the goods. Then they will use the money left over in their budgets to buy “luxury” components of the same goods. For example, we have a subsistence demand for petrol to drive to work every day, but when we go on holiday, the demand for petrol becomes a luxury demand. Subsistence demand is not a function of the price of a good – it is a must have - but luxury demand is a function of the disposable incomes of households.   Unlike households, who maximise utility, given their budget constraints, and industries, who minimize costs or maximise profits, given certain quantities to be produced, we do not have a theory of government in the model. We model the government in two possible ways: (i) exogenously, with its behaviour determined by the modeler (from information published by the government itself, such as in the regular medium-term budget information sessions), or (ii) endogenously, and specifically tied to household behaviour. Governments receive direct and indirect tax income, as well as transfers from all the role players in the economy. The indirect taxes could be modelled as GST’s or a VAT system, and we use the latter. Individual households as well as companies pay direct income taxes as well, while we also have production taxes and subsidies in the model. The government could borrow and build up debt over time, which needs to be serviced on an annual basis. In our simulation we keep the annual government budgets balanced: they give grants to all households, but need to raise either indirect or direct taxes to finance the grants, or a combination of the two types of taxes.   The general method of performing dynamic simulations with a CGE model is to start with a baseline forecast of the macroeconomy, without the economic interventions that we try to implement. A second forecast – the policy simulation – is then performed and compared to the baseline. We generally only report the deviations from the baseline that happen as a result of the policy simulations. So, to some extent we always perform two forecasts: one with the current state of affairs, and a second with some external intervention into the economy. We are then interested in the difference between the two forecasts.    The baseline forecast   The task at hand is to compare the results of three simulations, suggested by the Inclusive Society Institute, to a “baseline” forecast. Any economic forecast is difficult, so we try to keep the baseline forecast as simple as possible. We would typically incorporate macroeconomic forecast data from the National Treasury of South Africa and the International Monetary Fund, amongst others. Specifically, we adopt forecasts for the GDP expenditure components, employment and population growth. We do a “vanilla” forecast, which means that we assume the economy would run on a smooth and moderate path, rather than jumping up and down in a zig-zag fashion. For this study we adopted the strategy of gradually bringing the economy to GDP real growth of around 2% in 2026, and keep it at that level throughout the forecast period.   The policy forecasts   The baseline graphs of all the variables are usually quite smooth, especially of the future forecast values of the variables. We then apply “shocks” to the model – suggested by the Inclusive Society Institute -  by changing one or more of the exogenous variables in the model, which will then alter the smooth path of all the model variables to higher or lower levels than in the baseline. In Figure 1 below the blue line depicts the baseline path of some variable from 2023 to 2039. In 2026 some policy measure is implemented which alters the path of the variable to the orange line. We are typically interested in the size of the deviation from the baseline , and not necessarily the absolute values of the baseline and policy variable values.   Figure 1 The baseline and policy forecasts   Macro-economic interventions   1. Alternative debt-reduction roadmap   The first macroeconomic intervention to be modelled was to “increase debt-to-GDP to 100 percent over the next five years followed by a systematic reduction”, with the proviso that “increased debt (would be) ringfenced purely for economic infrastructure development (and) NO consumption spending”.   It might sound like simple tasks to “increase debt-to-GDP ratio” and “build economic infrastructure” but unfortunately neither task is straight forward.   Debt is built up over time when government expenditure exceeds government income from year to year, so, to increase the debt-to-GDP ratio, the government needs to spend more , or receive less  income , given the size of the GDP. To build infrastructure (and not spend on consumption goods) is tricky in our models. The model database has as its core the National Supply and Use Tables, published occasionally [2] by Statistics South Africa. UN-DESA (2018) describes the Supply and Use Tables (SUTs) as follows:   The SUTs describe the whole economy by industry (for example, the motor vehicle industry) and by product (for example, sports goods). The tables show links between components of GVA, industry inputs and outputs, and product supply and use. The SUTs link different institutional sectors of the economy (for example, non-financial corporations) together with details of imports and exports of goods and services, final consumption expenditure of government, household and non-profit institutions serving households (referred to as NPISHs), and capital formation.   The Supply and Use Tables form part of the system of National Accounts, measuring all aspects of the GDP of a country. However, infrastructure   per se  is not part of the measurement of GDP! We therefore cannot simply increase government expenditure on “infrastructure” to increase the government deficit in a particular year, and hence the debt over time. The industries building the infrastructure do  have their activities recorded in the SUTs, such as all the commodities that they buy or sell, and the values thereof, but the value of old or new infrastructure does not form part of GDP. So, how do we respond to the goal of simulating the government increasing their debt and building infrastructure? (And answer questions such as” how much growth will this bring?” and “how many jobs would be created?”).   Simulation Design   The industry most closely linked to the building of infrastructure is the Construction Industry, so one might let the government buy more Construction Goods and Services, increasing the deficit in that way. However, even if the government would buy all the available Construction Goods and Services, it would not increase the deficit enough to reach the 100% goal of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, the government does not actually buy any Construction Goods and Services in the model: of their total expenditure, less than 1% goes to Construction Goods and Services. So, even if they would start buying all available Construction Goods and Services, it would not lead to more or better infrastructure, since they are not directly involved in infrastructure development. Private firms  are hired to build infrastructure, and they do buy significant amounts of Construction Goods and Services, when they increase their investment spending. Even though the government does not buy much Construction Goods or Services, or spend much directly on infrastructure, we could let them subsidize everyone else who does! So, in our simulation we let the government borrow funds (increase their debt) and use the funds to subsidize all investment expenditure. All Investment expenditure in the model takes place according to a fixed recipe: one unit of investment has specific inputs into its production process, and Construction Goods and Services form 64,9% of all domestic inputs into the production of Investment Goods. This means that any R100 spent on Investment in the model would automatically buy R64,90 worth of Construction Goods or Services, and the rest on other inputs such as transport equipment, real estate, business services, etc., which are converted into what we know as infrastructure.   In our view all capital goods in the economy, whether privately or publicly owned, form part of the total economic infrastructure. Capital goods are produced through investment activities and Construction Goods and services form more than half of all investment. So, a subsidy on investment would be the best avenue in our model to improve the general infrastructure in the model.   Simulation Results   Figure 2 shows the results for the debt-to-GDP ratio in our simulation. We could not reach a higher level than 84% of GDP without crashing the model, using a subsidy on all investment activities. CGE models are designed for small shocks to their variables: we typically start with the economy in equilibrium and then apply small changes to one or more variables, and let the computer find a new equilibrium accordingly. We then compare the two equilibria and make conclusions about the differences.  Trying to achieve a debt-to-GDP ratio of 100% is an abnormal type of simulation to try with any CGE model.   Figure 2 Debt to GDP ratio (policy simulation)   To achieve the debt-to-GDP ratios in Figure 2, we needed to apply a subsidy on all investment done by all industries in the model of 30% in 2024, an additional 20% in 2025 and an additional 10% in 2026. To get the debt-to-GDP ratio back to its starting value, we then had to remove the subsidies again from 2027 to 2030. Figure 3 shows the level of extra debt to be generated above the baseline to achieve the said goals, peaking at R639bn in 2027. Figure 3 Increase in public sector debt above the baseline     The government’s debt increases from one year to the next if they spend more than their income, that is, when they incur a budget deficit in a specific year. If they continuously incur deficits, the debt will grow larger and larger.   Figure 4 shows how the government deficit has to increase significantly at the start of the simulation, to achieve the debt-to-GDP ratios in Figure 2, and subsequently decrease again to get back to the baseline levels of debt-to-GDP.   Figure 4 Government Deficits (policy simulation)     The GDP components   The blue line in Figure 5 shows the deviation from the baseline in total Investment expenditure, which is the sum of all investment expenditure by all industries. In the beginning of the graph investment expenditure shoots up to 20% above the baseline, because all investment expenditure is subsidized by the government. It becomes profitable to invest and all role-players therefore respond to the government’s subsidy, and buy investment goods. The graph looks much like the one in Figure 4, because the deficit there was exactly caused by the introduction of a subsidy on investment expenditure in the first place, and then the reverse policy later on. The orange line in Figure 5 shows the deviation in Import expenditures from the baseline. Buying investment goods typically entails a high proportion of Imports (24% of all new investment expenditure is on imports), so we expect that the Imports graph should look similar to the Investment graph.   Figure 5 Investment Expenditure and Imports (deviations from the baseline)   Figure 6 shows the trends in GDP itself, as well as the remaining GDP components, Household Consumption, Government Expenditure and Exports. All the graphs show the deviation from the baseline, in percentage points. For example, the blue line shows that real GDP moves above the baseline and increases to 2,2 percentage points above the baseline in 2027. This is a wonderful result! The government borrows money and subsidize investment expenditure, and then the economy grows 2,2 percent higher than without the government’s intervention. It then decreases and lies below the baseline from 2029 onwards. The baseline portrays what would have happened without the policy intervention. So, the policy intervention of increasing government debt in the short run, is good for real GDP in the short run. However, when we apply the contractionary counter policy in the latter part of the simulation, real GDP would be worse than what it would have been for the last decade of the simulation.   Figure 6 GDP and its components (cont.) (deviations from the baseline)     The orange line shows that Household Consumption starts off very poorly as a result of the policy simulation, and then grows significantly above the baseline for five years, before following real GDP into the negative zone. The first two periods are very significant and poses a dilemma for the policy makers. However, GDP is reacting well to the policy intervention in the short run: it is the massive investment increases that cause the positive results in GDP, while households fare not good at all. The increased demand for investment goods as a result of the subsidy, pushes up the demand for construction goods, which forms half of all the components of investment. Construction goods also forms significant parts of many goods that households buy, such as real estate, transport equipment, all transport services, business and other services. The said goods’ prices increase relative to other goods, with the result that the basket of goods that the typical household buys, becomes more expensive than without the policy intervention. Households move above the baseline when we start to reverse the investment subsidy policy intervention in 2026. However, in the long run household consumption follows the rest of the economy into the red zone.   Exports perform better than in the baseline until 2030, and then also falls below it. The export equation in the model is very simple: export demand increases if South African prices increase at a slower rate than foreign prices (or decrease faster). With investment subsidies all industries benefit, and except for the prices of construction goods and a few other ingredients of a unit of investment, most prices fall, relative to the baseline. South African industries thus become more competitive in the world and therefore export more.    Industry winners and losers   Of the 56 industries in our National Model, only 6 end up above the baseline at the end of the simulation period, as shown in Figure 7. It is clear that the forms of their graphs over time are very similar to the graph of total investment in Figure 5 above, since all of them are closely related to the production of investment goods, or the construction industry itself.   Figure 7 Industry survivors (relative to the baseline) A second series of industry graphs simulates that of Household Consumption in Figure 6, and reading through the industry names reminds one of the goods that we as households buy on a regular basis: Bakery, Dairy and Grain products, Education and Health services and Water.   Figure 8 Short run industry losers     Discussion   Increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio temporarily to allow for infrastructure development shows positive results for all industries directly related to the production of investment goods, such as the Construction industry and other hard-core Manufacturing industries. Exports also perform well in the short to medium term because the industry subsidies make South African firms more competitive than before due to lower costs of production. Unfortunately, Households are paying the price for this policy intervention in the short run because many of the goods in their shopping baskets have become relatively more expensive. In the long run all the GDP components fall below the baseline, while only a handful of the 56 industries produce more per annum than what they would have produced in the baseline.   Productivity improvement   Fortunately, the story does not end here. Investment expenditure forms part of GDP, alongside household expenditure, government expenditure, exports and imports. It is a straight forward result that a subsidy on investment expenditure would lead to increased investment and increased GDP, if the decrease in household consumption does not outweigh the increases in investment.   However, why does GDP dip below the baseline towards the end of the simulation period and not benefit from the better infrastructure? Because we have not simulated the effects of better infrastructure yet! Until now we have only subsidized investment expenditure for three years, and then reversed the subsidy subsequently.   Let’s assume that the new infrastructure would improve total factor productivity in all industries, from 2027 onwards, when the subsidy on investment is completed. Figure 9 shows the percentage deviation from the baseline in real GDP as a result of the initial (three year) subsidy on investment and the subsequent removal of the subsidy. There are two graphs, namely, the original graph of GDP from Figure 6 above, and the resulting GDP (orange line) when we let total factor productivity in all industries improve by a mere 0,3% per annum.   The conclusion could be made that it could be a good policy measure to borrow funds for infrastructure development, because (i) in the short to medium term the investment itself would lead to significant growth in GDP, and (ii) in the longer run the productivity in the economy would improve enough to secure a permanently higher level of growth over time.   Figure 9 Real GDP % deviation from the baseline 2. Youth solidarity tax   The task at hand in this Section was defined as “Youth solidarity tax: Increase personal income tax by one percent for all taxpayers earning R600,001+ per annum. In the form of a transitional tax for five years only. Ringfenced for youth enterprise development to be administered by the Solidarity Fund. See if this can be funded by delaying inflationary bracket adjustments over the next two or three years.”   Simulation Design   “Youth enterprise development” is quite difficult to define in terms of our CGE model. The labour force in the model does not have an age dimension, and we are convinced that the youth is working in all of the industries in the model. What the model does have, is a labour force divided into ten different occupational groups. So, in this simulation we are modelling a one per cent increase in the income tax rate on all “rich” households, and recycling the tax revenue in the form of wage subsidies to three of the ten occupational groups. The three chosen groups are elementary workers , operators  and skilled agricultural workers . In reality, wage subsidies are paid to industries for extra  workers hired, but in the model, they are paid to all the workers in the three said occupational groups. Since the cost of labour comes down, industries would certainly hire more labour in each of the three categories, including new young workers.   Figure 10 Change in the income tax rate on rich households   In this simulation we define “rich” households as everybody in the three top deciles according to labour income received [3] .  Figure 10 shows the change in the income tax rate for the top three deciles of households, above the baseline.   Simulation Results   The simulation results look very good, and could serve as part of a policy recommendation to the government. The GDP Components   All the GDP components benefit from this policy intervention. Government consumption (yellow line) is not allowed to deviate from the baseline because all the new income tax revenue is recycled into wage subsidies, while all other government expenditures remain the same. The graph of Real GDP is hidden behind the Household consumption graph. Exports is the biggest winner, and it stems from the decreased labour cost to firms as result of the wage subsidies to some occupational groups. The CGE model is a neo-classical model, which means that all the savings on labour are given through to the consumers of the goods produced. South African firms become more competitive in the world because they are able to charge lower prices for their goods as a result of the wage subsidies. Lower labour cost implies that more labour will be hired, which increases the purchasing power of households, leading to increased household consumption. Lower cost of production also leads to increased investment, since investment goods are produced using capital and (cheaper) labour, just like all other goods.   Figure 11 Annual deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components (% change)   Figure 11 shows the annual differences between the policy simulation results and the baseline during the five years of higher direct taxes, recycled as wage subsidies. After five years all the GDP expenditure items move back to the baseline. That means that cumulatively over time the five years would result in permanent increases in all the variables above the baseline. This is shown in Figure 12: the expenditure components increase to levels above the baseline during the five years of the policy intervention, and then remain there. Take investment as an example: in Figure 11 we see that investment grows 0,1% faster than in the baseline, for five years. Then it grows at baseline levels again. Five periods of 0,1% growth each adds up to about 0,5% cumulative growth, which is the level portrayed in Figure 12. Figure 12 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in main GDP expenditure components   Industry Winners and Losers   Industries are very dependent on the GDP expenditure components that they are connected with. For example, the Food industry is strongly related to Household expenditure, while the Mining industries are related to Export demand. If all the GDP expenditure components have positive trends as in Figure 12, we could expect all industries to also have similar positive outcomes. This is indeed confirmed by all 30 industry graphs in Figure 13. It is clear that some industries gain much more than others, but in general, this policy intervention does not show any real losers.   Figure 13 Cumulative % change from the baseline in Industry output.     Discussion   This policy intervention looks very promising, with mostly positive results on the macroeconomic as well as industry levels. The increased income taxes would certainly harm some industries that supply consumer goods to the rich group of households who pay extra taxes in the simulation, but their harm should be compared to the benefits of other groups, to determine whether the policy should be implemented or not.   Are these results too good to be true? What is the catch here? If this is such a good policy measure, why does the government not just implement it permanently? Wouldn’t there be a significant cost to the economy if the rich has to pay more income tax?   Figure 14 shows the changes in household consumption for the twelve income groups in the model. The richest 3 deciles (four groups) who pay higher percentages of income tax are depicted by the bottom four lines in the graph. One of the groups (D8) increase their consumption, while V19 stays more or less on the baseline, with D9 and V20 dropping below the baseline in the simulation. The moral of the story is that higher income tax rates do not necessarily mean that household consumption of the taxpayers would decrease. It could, but it does not always happen. In the simulation the wage subsidy causes the cost of production and price levels to decrease, which could lead to an increase in consumption. The poorer groups – V1 to D7 – do not pay more tax, and all consume more as a result of (i) lower price levels of consumption goods and services, and (ii) higher total wage income for three of the occupational groups, due to wage subsidies.   Figure 14 Deviation from the baseline in household consumption by income group     3. Limited public salary bill increases   The requested policy intervention was to “limit the public salary bill increases to inflation”. We briefly report the results here, because most of the explanations of what would happen has been done in Section 3 above. Limiting the public salary bill is contractionary government policy, if they do not spend the savings on other priorities. We could expect similar results to those reported above.   Simulation Design   In the model we have three government “industries”, namely General government, Education and Health and Social Services. It is necessary to think about the government like that because they are employers of factors of production, such as labour and capital, and they produce something, namely “Government Services”. So, in the policy simulation we fix all real wages of the three government industries for seven years, starting in 2024, which means that nominal wage increases are limited to the rate of inflation. Since other industries are not limited in the same fashion, government wages seem to be lower than other wages and the model would let the government employ more labour. We therefore also need to fix the number of workers in government to avoid anomalous results.   Simulation Results   Case 1: Government revenue not recycled   All the macroeconomic results shown in Figure 15  could have been anticipated from what we learned in Section 3 above. Contractionary government policies lead to decreased total demand in the economy, resulting in decreasing price indices. South African goods seem to be cheaper than those of the rest of the world, so that exports increase. Household consumption would be less than in the baseline, because all the workers in the public sector receive lower wages than in the baseline, and therefore have less buying power. In Figure 15 below only exports lie above the baseline, while the other GDP expenditure components look very similar to those in Figure 17 above where the corporate tax rates were increased without recycling the revenue.    Figure 15 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components levels (revenue not recycled)   Industry Winners and Losers   The three government industries would perform better than any other industry, because their labour cost is relatively lower, by design. A handful other industries who are very reliant on exports also perform better than in the baseline, but the majority of all industries lose with the contractionary government policy.   Discussion   Enough was said above about contractionary government policies, so we would rather do something with the savings that the government build up through paying lower nominal wages than in the baseline.   Case 2: Government revenue is recycled   We ran a second simulation where we used all the savings from the government wage bill to subsidize the sale of Construction Services, to all users thereof. This should have similar results to our subsidy on all investment done in Section 1 above, because Construction Services forms about half of all investment goods, and  Figure 16 shows that this is exactly the case. The big winner is Investment that grows to 5% above the baseline towards the end of the simulation period. This is to be expected because all Construction Services are subsidized, so Investors’ cost of production is decreased. Real GDP benefits from the higher levels of Investment also. However, Households are again the worst off. Many people work for the government and they are being paid less than in the baseline, so their purchasing power is decreased. They cause a decrease in total demand for many goods in the economy, which leads to decreasing real wages and price levels, which benefits Exports.   Figure 16 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components (revenue recycled) Figure 17 shows how a subsidy on Construction Services, funded by lower government wages, would distort the supply side of the economy. Investment is growing fast, which leads to the economy becoming capital intensive: the capital stock is growing while employment is decreasing. Even though GDP is higher than the baseline, Households suffer because employment is decreasing, and the employed work force have to face lower real wages.   Figure 17 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the Supply Side components of GDP, as well as real wages and the CPI.    Discussion   This forth macroeconomic policy intervention should stress two important points from above: (i) decreasing government expenditure through lower real wages would lead to a contraction of the economy with mostly negative results on both the macro- and industry levels, and (ii) the choice of recycling mechanism is a matter of paramount importance.   Conclusion   The three macroeconomic interventions modelled above used three different methods of increasing the government’s spending power, namely (i) increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio (borrowing money), (ii) increasing the personal income tax rates on the rich, (iii) keeping government wages constant in real terms, rather than giving annual increases.   One fact that should be clear after reading the three sets of simulation results, is that increased savings by the government is generally bad for the economy if the government does not spend the savings properly. Keeping the increased revenue in or under the sofa is contractionary economic policy which decreases total economic activity; it is deflationary and mostly inefficient.   One of the three macroeconomic interventions showed very positive results, namely, a wage subsidy on youth labourers. The subsidies on investment and construction services also have positive GDP results, but these two recycling schemes would only benefit households in the longer run, and would therefore be unpopular for the government to implement in the short run, but which will yield positive economic infrastructure development to enable future production expansion and GDP growth.   This report should not be interpreted, read or understood as a fixed set of recommendations, but rather as a catalyst for dialogue on proposed interventions.    Bibliography   UN -DESA. (2018). Handbook on Supply and Use Tables and Input Output-Tables with Extensions and Applications. Available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/SUT_IOT_HB_Final_Cover.pdf   [1]  Constant elasticity of substitution [2]  They are not published on an annual basis, but rather every five or ten years, or so. [3]  One percentage point is very small and if only those above R600 000 were chosen the additional revenue would not get very far in terms of wage subsidies.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. 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