Search

The Unfinished Republic and South Africa’s Journey to an Inclusive State is a timely and compelling exploration of one of South Africa’s most urgent questions: Why does a constitutionally strong democracy continue to struggle with governance, trust and inclusion? Authored by Daryl Swanepoel and drawing on years of research by the Inclusive Society Institute, this book argues that South Africa’s challenge is not the absence of sound laws or institutions, but a crisis of ethics, leadership and civic engagement. The Republic, the book contends, remains unfinished not because the constitutional vision has failed, but because its moral foundations have been neglected. Spanning constitutionalism, ethical leadership, public participation, social cohesion, state capability and global governance, the book offers both diagnosis and direction. It shows how corruption, institutional fatigue and declining public trust have weakened the social contract, while also demonstrating that renewal is possible through professionalisation of the public service, meaningful citizen participation and a recommitment to constitutional values. Accessible yet rigorous, The Unfinished Republic and South Africa’s Journey to an Inclusive State bridges theory and practice. It translates complex governance debates into practical insights for policymakers, public servants, academics, civil society leaders and engaged citizens. Central to the book is the Inclusive Society Institute’s Governance Model, which sets out a clear framework for building a capable, ethical and inclusive state grounded in accountability, participation and social cohesion. More than an academic work, this book is a call to conscience. It reminds us that democracy is not self-sustaining and that the future of South Africa’s constitutional project depends on moral leadership and active citizenship. The Republic remains unfinished — but not irredeemable. ✅ Price: R200 + delivery 📖 Read it. Reflect on it. Act on it. 👉 To order your copy, contact us at info@inclusivesociety.org.za.

Mrs Berenice Marks of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) attended the urgent virtual Imbizo convened by the South African Human Rights Commission on Monday, 25 May 2026, from 11:30 to 15:30 via MS Teams, together with approximately 480 other participants. The meeting brought together a broad range of stakeholders, including members of the public, civil society organisations, community leaders, humanitarian groups, and other affected parties to engage on the recent marches alleged to be against undocumented migrants in South Africa. The discussion reflected the gravity and volatility of the issues under consideration. At various points, the mood of the meeting was tense and exchanges became angry as participants expressed strongly held views. Despite these moments, the Imbizo served as an important platform for engagement, allowing participants to share concerns, lived experiences and perspectives on the humanitarian and human rights implications of the crisis. The ISI is of the view that government ought to deal with the illegal immigrant issue with more vigour and urgency lest social cohesion starts unravelling.

Southern Africa Centre for Mediation and Extremism Prevention (SACMEP) is a regional transdisciplinary research and knowledge hub focused on mediation and preventing violent extremism across the SADC region. SACMEP is registered in South Africa as a non-profit company (Incorporation No. 2026/106841/08). SACMEP envisions a peaceful, secure, and resilient Southern Africa where violent extremism is proactively prevented and mediation efforts are effective, inclusive, and data driven. Our mission is to generate empirical research and provide technical support to strengthen regional and national capacities on violent extremism prevention and mediation, fostering multi-stakeholder partnerships and community-driven solutions. SACMEP is built on an existing, pan-SADC network of leading academics and practitioners, with institutional homes at various SADC-based institutions. Our overall goal is to generate empirical evidence, inform policy and practice, build regional capacity, and foster multi-stakeholder dialogue to promote conflict mediation practices and prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism in the SADC region. SACMEP is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasizes the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalised communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

Copyright © 2026 prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Global South Perspectives Network DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of The coordinating entities or any of their office bearers Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 11 May 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context. MAY 2026 Rapporteur: Daryl Swanepoel CONTENTS Executive Summary Introduction: Why the debate over Global Governance matters now The Global Governance Initiative in context: China’s broader architecture of Global Initiatives What problem is the Global Governance Initiative trying to solve? The core principles of the Global Governance Initiative How new is the GGI really? Continuities with historical Global South thinking Reform or Strategic Influence? The difficult question of intentions From principles to Practice: The implementation challenge Implications for the United Nations and the Future of Multilateralism What does this mean for Africa and the Global South? The bigger question: Is a Non-hegemonic Multipolar Order possible? Cover photo: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID:2220958157 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The current international order is increasingly characterised by geopolitical fragmentation, competing governance models, growing dissatisfaction with existing institutions and renewed contestation over who gets to shape global rules and priorities. Against this backdrop, China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI), launched in late 2025, presents itself as an attempt to rethink aspects of global governance through greater emphasis on multilateralism, sovereign equality, inclusive development and enhanced representation for developing countries. This discussion, convened as part of the Global South Perspectives Network’s Open Consultation Mondays, explored both the substance of the GGI and the broader questions it raises regarding the future of multilateralism, institutional reform and the evolving balance of influence within the international system. A central theme emerging throughout the discussion was that the Global Governance Initiative should not, at least in its stated form, be understood as an attempt to replace the current international order or displace existing institutions such as the United Nations and instead, as speakers repeatedly argued, the initiative presents itself as a reform-oriented framework intended to address perceived deficiencies in the existing system, particularly with regard to representation, legitimacy, effectiveness and responsiveness to contemporary global challenges. Several structural trends were identified as underpinning the emergence of the initiative. These include the growing economic and political weight of countries in the Global South; dissatisfaction with governance arrangements largely designed in the aftermath of the Second World War; increasing perceptions of inconsistency in the application of international law and norms; and governance gaps relating to emerging issues such as artificial intelligence, digital technologies, climate change and global inequality. The discussion further situated the Global Governance Initiative within a broader architecture of Chinese international initiatives developed over recent years, including the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative. Together, these initiatives were presented as components of an evolving Chinese vision regarding international cooperation and the future organisation of global affairs, linked conceptually to the idea of building a “community with a shared future for humanity.” At the level of principles, the initiative emphasises sovereign equality, strengthened multilateralism centred on the United Nations, respect for international law, inclusive participation, people-centred governance and practical problem solving. Importantly, participants noted that these principles are not in themselves novel. Many mirror longstanding positions advanced by countries of the Global South over decades, including calls for greater representation within international institutions, more equitable development pathways, and reform of governance systems perceived to favour established powers. Indeed, one of the more interesting observations arising from the discussion was that the significance of the GGI may lie less in the originality of its principles and more in the fact that a major power with increasing international influence is now articulating and advancing such positions through a structured global framework. At the same time, speakers highlighted several unresolved questions. Chief amongst these is implementation. While the initiative outlines broad aspirations and principles, it remains relatively limited in terms of concrete institutional proposals, operational mechanisms or clearly defined pathways for reform, questions therefore remain regarding how such ambitions might be translated into practice, particularly in an environment where established powers may be reluctant to dilute influence within existing institutions. Another important issue concerns interpretation and trust, since as with any major power initiative, questions arise as to the extent to which the stated objectives reflect universal aspirations as opposed to national strategic interests. The challenge for China will therefore be whether the initiative evolves beyond being perceived primarily as a Chinese proposal or whether it develops into a genuinely co-owned agenda shaped by diverse actors, particularly across the Global South. For developing countries the implications of these debates are significant. The discussion underscored that governance reform is not simply an abstract institutional matter in that it influences representation in decision-making, access to development opportunities, approaches to global regulation and ultimately whose interests shape the international agenda. The overarching conclusion emerging from the discussion is that the Global Governance Initiative remains at an early stage of development. It should presently be understood less as a detailed blueprint and more as an opening proposition within a much wider debate regarding whether existing systems of global governance remain adequate for an increasingly multipolar world. Perhaps the most important contribution of the initiative is not the answers it currently provides, but the questions it forces the international community to confront: Who should shape the rules of global governance; can institutions built for a different era adequately manage contemporary challenges; and is a more representative, genuinely multipolar international order achievable without producing new forms of rivalry and fragmentation? These are questions that will increasingly define the ongoing debates on multilateralism and international cooperation in the years ahead. 1. INTRODUCTION: WHY THE DEBATE OVER GLOBAL GOVERNANCE MATTERS NOW The question of how the world should be governed is no longer confined to diplomatic circles, United Nations negotiations or academic debates on international relations, since it has increasingly become a practical and urgent question shaped by geopolitical rivalry, technological disruption, climate pressures, economic fragmentation and growing dissatisfaction with institutions established for a markedly different era. The post-Second World War international architecture, centred largely around the United Nations system and accompanied by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, emerged within a particular historical context, a context that was defined by the devastation of global conflict, the concentration of economic and military power amongst a relatively small group of states and a belief that multilateral institutions could provide mechanisms for stability, cooperation and conflict prevention. Eighty years later, the international environment looks fundamentally different: economic influence has shifted considerably toward emerging economies; countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America account for growing shares of global population, production and political influence; technological advances have created entirely new domains requiring governance, from artificial intelligence and digital platforms to cybersecurity and cross-border data flows; and climate change has introduced transnational risks that cannot be managed through unilateral action alone. Meanwhile, international conflicts and renewed great power competition have raised difficult questions regarding the effectiveness, legitimacy and consistency of existing governance mechanisms. At the same time, dissatisfaction with the current international order has become increasingly visible, where critiques have emerged regarding unequal representation within global institutions, perceived inconsistencies in the application of international law and governance arrangements that many argue continue to reflect historical power distributions more than contemporary realities. For many countries in the Global South, these frustrations are not new, because calls for greater equity within global governance structures have featured repeatedly over decades, whether through debates surrounding the New International Economic Order during the 1970s, reform proposals advanced through the G77, or ongoing discussions regarding representation within international financial institutions and the United Nations Security Council. What may be changing, however, is the scale and confidence with which such questions are now being raised and it is within this broader context that China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI) emerges. Introduced in 2025, the initiative presents itself as a framework for reforming aspects of global governance through a series of principles, such as, for example, sovereign equality, strengthened multilateralism, inclusive participation and greater representation for developing countries. Importantly, at least in its stated form, it does not position itself as a rejection of existing institutions, but rather as an effort aimed at reform and adaptation within the current system. Whether one accepts these intentions at face value is a separate question, and one which featured prominently during the discussion. As with any major power initiative, scepticism regarding underlying strategic interests remains inevitable. States do not act in a vacuum, nor are they neutral actors and so China, like other major powers before it, also seeks to shape international norms and institutions in ways consistent with its own interests and worldview. But focusing solely on motives risks overlooking a more important underlying reality, being that the very emergence of initiatives such as the GGI reflects an increasingly widespread perception that aspects of the current governance architecture are under strain and may require adaptation. This raises difficult but unavoidable questions. Can institutions largely designed in the aftermath of the Second World War remain effective in managing twenty-first century challenges? Is greater representation for developing countries compatible with maintaining institutional effectiveness? Can a more multipolar international order emerge without simply replacing one form of dominance with another? And perhaps most fundamentally, is it possible to construct a genuinely shared system of global governance in an era increasingly characterised by strategic competition? These questions formed the backdrop to the Global South Perspectives Network’s Open Consultation Monday discussion on China’s Global Governance Initiative, which discussion explored the rationale behind the initiative, its relationship to broader Chinese foreign policy thinking, its potential implications for existing multilateral institutions and the extent to which it may influence future debates regarding international governance reform. The discussion took place at a particularly significant moment, because not only is the world approaching the eightieth anniversary of the United Nations amid renewed debates concerning institutional reform, but it also does so during a period marked by intensified geopolitical contestation, heightened scrutiny of multilateralism and growing uncertainty regarding the future shape of the international order. Against such a backdrop, debates surrounding governance reform are unlikely to remain peripheral in that they increasingly sit at the centre of wider struggles over influence, legitimacy and the future rules by which international affairs will be conducted. The Global Governance Initiative should therefore be understood not merely as another foreign policy proposal, but as part of a broader and growing contest over how the international system itself evolves in the decades ahead. 2. THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE IN CONTEXT: CHINA’S BROADER ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL INITIATIVES To understand China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI), it is necessary to situate it within a broader and evolving framework of Chinese international engagement developed over more than a decade, because viewed in isolation, the GGI risks appearing as a relatively vague statement of principles concerning multilateralism and institutional reform. However, when the idea is considered alongside China’s earlier initiatives and other diplomatic concepts, it becomes clearer that the GGI forms part of a larger attempt to articulate an alternative vision for international cooperation and global order. Central to this broader vision is the concept advanced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 of building a “community with a shared future for humanity.” This idea has increasingly become a guiding principle within Chinese diplomatic discourse and seeks to answer two interconnected questions: What kind of international order should emerge in the future, and how should countries cooperate in shaping it? At a conceptual level, the notion of a shared future suggests an international system characterised by mutual interdependence, coexistence and collective responses to common challenges. In official Chinese discourse, emphasis is frequently placed on cooperation over confrontation, dialogue over bloc politics, and mutual development rather than zero-sum competition. Critics may question whether practice consistently aligns with rhetoric, but the concept nevertheless provides an important intellectual backdrop to China’s subsequent global initiatives. Over the past few years, this broader vision has increasingly been translated into a series of distinct, but interconnected initiatives. The first was the Global Development Initiative (GDI), which was launched in 2021 during the United Nations General Assembly and it placed emphasis on poverty reduction, sustainable development, South–South cooperation and the implementation of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. At its core, the GDI reflects an argument that development remains unevenly distributed and that the existing approaches have failed to adequately address the disparities between the developed and developing countries. The GDI therefore seeks to place development back at the centre of international cooperation, particularly from the perspective of countries in the Global South. In practical terms, implementation has included the establishment of a Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative within the United Nations and support for various development-oriented projects, but, much like subsequent initiatives, the GDI has often remained stronger in principles than in clearly identifiable institutional transformation. This was followed in 2022 by the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which sought to advance an alternative framing of international security, in that rather than prioritising alliance structures, balance-of-power politics or bloc confrontation, the GSI emphasises concepts such as indivisible security, dialogue, non-interference and collective approaches to stability. Implicit within this framing is criticism of the traditional security architectures, which China argues contribute to instability through exclusionary alliances or unilateral actions. The Global Security Initiative therefore not merely represent a security proposal, but so too an attempt to broaden the debate regarding how security itself is conceptualised within international relations. And then 2023, China introduced the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), which shifted the emphasis toward cultural diversity, civilisational exchange and mutual respect between differing value systems. The initiative can be understood, at least partly, as a response to assumptions regarding the universality of particular political or cultural models. Rather than converging toward a singular global norm, the GCI suggests greater recognition of pluralism in cultural traditions, developmental pathways and societal values. Taken together, these initiatives address different dimensions of international affairs: development, security and civilisation. The Global Governance Initiative, introduced in 2025, may therefore be understood as an attempt to provide a broader governance framework linking these themes together. Where the earlier initiatives focused on specific domains, the GGI turns attention toward the structures through which international decisions are made and implemented. In this sense, governance becomes the umbrella under which questions of development, security, representation, participation and institutional legitimacy intersect. This is important because the initiative appears to reflect an implicit argument that contemporary global challenges cannot be addressed effectively without reforming the governance structures themselves. Viewed from this perspective, the GGI rests upon several underlying assumptions. first, that existing institutions insufficiently reflect contemporary distributions of power and influence; second, that countries in the Global South remain underrepresented within key governance processes; third, that current systems struggle to respond effectively to transnational challenges such as climate change, technological disruption and inequality; and fourth, that more inclusive forms of multilateralism may be required if governance arrangements are to retain legitimacy. Whether these assumptions are accepted in full is open to debate. But they help explain why China increasingly frames governance reform as a necessary component of future international cooperation. Importantly, speakers during the discussion repeatedly emphasised that the Global Governance Initiative does not, at least in its stated form, seek to establish an entirely separate international order or replace institutions such as the United Nations. Rather, it presents itself as a proposal for reform within the existing system. This distinction matters, because the initiative is often interpreted externally through the lens of strategic competition between China and the United States, leading to assumptions that any Chinese governance proposal necessarily represents an effort to construct a rival order. The discussion suggested a more nuanced interpretation may be required. Reform and replacement are not equivalent concepts, even if tensions between them may emerge over time. Indeed, one of the recurring observations during the discussion was that many principles advanced through the GGI are not uniquely Chinese. Calls for stronger representation of developing countries, reform of governance structures, sovereign equality and more inclusive multilateralism have appeared repeatedly within Global South discourse for decades. The significance of the GGI may therefore lie less in originality than in sponsorship. What distinguishes the initiative is that these ideas are now being advanced with the diplomatic, economic and political weight of one of the world’s largest powers behind them. Whether this ultimately contributes to meaningful institutional reform, greater fragmentation or merely another layer of diplomatic rhetoric remains uncertain. What is clearer is that the Global Governance Initiative should not be viewed as an isolated policy proposal. Rather, it forms part of a broader and increasingly coherent effort by China to articulate an alternative vision regarding how international cooperation, representation and governance might evolve in an increasingly multipolar world. 3. WHAT PROBLEM IS THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE TRYING TO SOLVE? Any proposal for reform begins, implicitly or explicitly, with a diagnosis of what is believed to be wrong with the existing system, and so in the case of China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI), the underlying argument is that contemporary global governance structures are increasingly struggling to reflect changing geopolitical realities, address emerging transnational challenges, and maintain legitimacy across a more diverse and multipolar international environment. Although the initiative itself remains relatively brief in formal articulation, the discussion highlighted several interconnected deficiencies that together provide insight into the problems the GGI seeks to address. At the centre of these concerns lies a perceived representation deficit. The institutions underpinning much of contemporary global governance emerged from a particular historical moment following the Second World War. The balance of power at that time differed substantially from today’s realities. Large parts of Africa remained under colonial administration, many contemporary emerging economies had limited influence within international affairs, and the distribution of economic power was concentrated among a relatively small number of states. Over subsequent decades, however, the global landscape has changed considerably. Countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America now account for growing proportions of the world’s population, economic activity and political influence. But critics argue that representation within many governance institutions has not evolved at a comparable pace. Questions surrounding the composition of the United Nations Security Council, voting structures within international financial institutions, and broader agenda-setting processes have repeatedly fuelled perceptions that developing countries remain insufficiently represented within systems whose decisions significantly affect them. This concern is not unique to China, nor is it new. Calls for greater representation of developing countries have featured consistently within Global South discourse for decades. What appears different is the extent to which such concerns are increasingly being articulated alongside broader debates concerning legitimacy and effectiveness. Closely connected to representation is what speakers described as a legitimacy deficit. Institutions do not only derive their legitimacy from formal authority. They also do so from perceptions of fairness, consistency and inclusiveness, because where governance arrangements are viewed as selectively applied or disproportionately influenced by particular actors, questions inevitably emerge regarding credibility. During the discussion, references were made to concerns over unilateral actions by certain countries, perceived inconsistencies in the application of international law and the uneven enforcement of international norms, which concerns contribute to the argument that parts of the existing governance architecture is facing growing challenges in maintaining its universal legitimacy. This does not necessarily imply rejection of international law or multilateral institutions; instead the argument advanced is that legitimacy may depend increasingly upon whether governance systems are seen to operate according to principles applied consistently across states, irrespective of relative power. A third concern centres on effectiveness deficits, in that even where institutions retain legitimacy, questions remain regarding whether existing governance arrangements possess adequate capacity to respond to contemporary global challenges. Issues such as climate change, global inequality, public health crises, food security and financial instability are inherently transnational in that they do not conform neatly to national borders, nor can they be addressed through unilateral action alone. But repeated frustrations regarding the pace of international coordination have contributed to perceptions that existing systems often struggle to produce timely and effective responses. Development was highlighted repeatedly as an example. Despite decades of international commitments, significant disparities persist between developed and developing countries; and similarly, climate governance continues to generate disagreement regarding responsibility, financing and implementation. The persistence of such challenges therefore raise the broader question as to whether the current governance mechanisms remain fit for purpose. Perhaps most striking, however, is the emergence of entirely new domains where governance frameworks remain underdeveloped. This points toward what may be described as governance gaps. Artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, digital platforms, cross-border data governance, biotechnology and even outer space increasingly generate issues requiring international coordination. But institutional arrangements governing such areas often remain fragmented, incomplete or contested. The speed at which technological change is occurring creates additional pressure, because where governance mechanisms traditionally evolve gradually, the technological disruptions frequently advances far more rapidly, providing a widening gap between innovation and regulation which is presenting new challenges for international cooperation. The GGI appears to position itself partly as a response to these emerging gaps, in that it argues for greater cooperation and more inclusive approaches to governance in domains where institutional norms remain unsettled. Underlying all these concerns is a broader structural observation: the world has changed faster than many governance systems designed to manage it. The rise of new economic centres, increased interconnectedness, technological transformation and evolving patterns of influence have altered the context within which international institutions operate, but institutional adaptation often proceeds slowly. From this perspective, the GGI may be understood less as a response to one isolated problem and more as an attempt to address cumulative pressures building across multiple dimensions of governance simultaneously, but whether the initiative ultimately provides workable solutions remains uncertain. Identifying deficiencies is considerably easier than designing reforms capable of reconciling competing interests, maintaining institutional effectiveness and securing broad international support. Indeed, one of the recurring themes emerging from the discussion was that diagnosis alone is insufficient. The more difficult questions concern implementation. How can greater representation be achieved without paralysing decision-making? Can governance become more inclusive while retaining effectiveness? What forms of institutional reform are politically feasible? And can reforms occur through negotiation within existing structures, or do emerging realities inevitably generate new arrangements over time? These remain open questions. But regardless of where one stands on China’s initiative itself, the underlying issues raised by the GGI reflect wider debates that increasingly occupy the centre of contemporary international relations: who governs, whose interests shape governance, and whether systems inherited from a previous era remain adequate for the challenges of the next. 4. THE CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE Although the Global Governance Initiative remains relatively limited in terms of detailed institutional proposals or implementation frameworks, the discussion highlighted that it does articulate a number of underlying principles intended to guide approaches to global governance reform. These principles provide insight into how the initiative conceptualises international cooperation, representation and the functioning of multilateral institutions. A recurring observation throughout the discussion was that these principles are not, in themselves, radically new. Indeed, several speakers noted that many are already embedded within existing international norms, including the United Nations Charter and longstanding Global South reform agendas. The distinction, therefore, may lie less in the novelty of the principles than in renewed efforts to emphasise their implementation and application. The first principle concerns sovereign equality. At its most basic level, sovereign equality reflects the proposition that all states, regardless of economic size, military capacity or geopolitical influence, should enjoy equal respect for their sovereignty, dignity and right to determine domestic developmental pathways; and this includes the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and the idea that countries should participate in global governance processes as equals. The discussion suggested that this principle reflects dissatisfaction with perceived asymmetries within contemporary international relations, where some states are viewed as exercising disproportionate influence over governance processes or where standards are seen to be applied inconsistently and accordingly, from this perspective, sovereign equality is not presented merely as a legal abstraction, but as a challenge to governance arrangements considered insufficiently representative or balanced. The second principle relates to the international rule of law and here, emphasis was placed on the centrality of the United Nations and the importance of international norms being developed through broad consensus and applied consistently. The discussion highlighted concerns regarding selective application of international principles and perceived double standards, which suggests that legitimacy may increasingly depend on whether international law is viewed as operating impartially, rather than reflecting relative power. Importantly, the emphasis remained on reforming and strengthening existing frameworks, rather than replacing them, because throughout the discussion, speakers repeatedly underscored that the initiative presents itself as seeking greater effectiveness within existing multilateral structures rather than advocating abandonment of those structures. A third principle concerns multilateralism. Multilateralism occupies a prominent place within the initiative and was consistently presented as essential for addressing contemporary challenges that transcend national borders, such as climate change, technological disruption, public health risks and economic instability, which were all referenced as examples of issues requiring collective, rather than unilateral responses. Within this framing, multilateralism extends beyond institutional participation alone, it also implies broader consultation, shared agenda setting and increased inclusion of developing countries within governance processes. Again, the underlying critique is not directed at multilateralism itself, but rather at perceptions that current forms of multilateral engagement may insufficiently reflect contemporary distributions of influence and interests. The fourth principle is perhaps less clearly defined: a people-centred approach to governance. Discussion around this concept suggested that the emphasis should not necessarily be interpreted as direct democratic participation in international governance. Rather, it appears to refer more broadly to the proposition that governance systems should ultimately respond to human welfare, development and societal needs. Within this understanding, effectiveness becomes an important consideration. Governance arrangements should not merely exist as institutional structures, but should demonstrate capacity to address practical challenges affecting populations, including development deficits, inequality and security concerns, which links directly to the fifth principle, namely practical outcomes and implementation. The initiative repeatedly emphasises the need for governance systems capable of producing tangible results and in this vein the discussion highlighted concerns that institutions may sometimes retain legitimacy at a formal level, while struggling to deliver meaningful responses to emerging challenges. The focus on implementation therefore reflects an argument that governance reform should ultimately be judged by not only irs principles or institutional design, but also by its effectiveness in addressing contemporary problems. Taken together, these principles point toward an overarching aspiration for a governance system perceived as more representative, more inclusive, more equitable and more effective. But the discussion also surfaced an important tension, questioning why if many of these principles already exist within international discourse, why do governance deficits persist, and why do concerns regarding representation, consistency and effectiveness continue to emerge? This raises the possibility that the challenge may not primarily concern absence of principles, but rather differences regarding interpretation, application and power. In this sense, one of the more interesting observations emerging from the discussion was that the Global Governance Initiative may be understood less as introducing new normative foundations and more as questioning whether existing commitments have been realised in practice. The distinction matters. Introducing new principles implies replacement. Calling for fuller implementation of existing principles implies reform. Throughout the discussion, the latter interpretation appeared to dominate. At the same time, questions remain regarding whether efforts to operationalise such principles would, in practice, produce more substantial shifts in influence and governance arrangements than the language of reform alone might initially suggest. Those questions lead directly to the next issue explored during the discussion: how new the Global Governance Initiative actually is, and whether it represents a departure from earlier Global South calls for governance reform or a continuation of longstanding debates in a new geopolitical context. 5. HOW NEW IS THE GGI REALLY? CONTINUITIES WITH HISTORICAL GLOBAL SOUTH THINKING One of the more thought-provoking themes emerging during the discussion was the suggestion that many of the ideas underpinning the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) are not fundamentally new. Rather than introducing an entirely original framework for international relations, speakers repeatedly observed that the initiative echoes concerns and aspirations that have featured within Global South discourse for decades. This observation is important because it influences how the initiative is interpreted. If the GGI represents a genuinely new normative vision, it might reasonably be viewed as an attempt to construct an alternative international order centred around distinct principles. If, however, it largely reiterates longstanding demands regarding representation, equality and institutional reform, then the initiative may be better understood as a contemporary articulation of older debates, albeit one advanced by a country with significantly greater global influence than many previous proponents. The discussion repeatedly returned to this latter interpretation. Several of the core themes emphasised through the GGI, namely, stronger representation for developing countries, sovereign equality, more inclusive participation in decision making, reform of international governance structures and greater responsiveness to developmental concerns, have long appeared within discussions surrounding Global South engagement with the international system. In this sense, dissatisfaction with current governance arrangements predates China’s recent initiatives by many decades. Countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America have historically questioned whether governance institutions established under very different geopolitical circumstances sufficiently reflect contemporary realities. Concerns regarding unequal influence within international financial institutions, asymmetries in agenda setting and disparities between formal sovereign equality and practical influence have featured repeatedly within debates concerning international reform. What speakers appeared to suggest is that the GGI does not create these concerns so much as consolidate and elevate them within a contemporary geopolitical context. This distinction matters. The significance of the initiative may therefore lie not primarily in originality, but in amplification. An idea expressed by smaller states or dispersed coalitions may struggle to gain traction internationally. Similar arguments advanced by a major power with growing diplomatic, economic and institutional influence potentially acquire greater visibility and strategic weight. The discussion implied that China’s role may therefore be understood partly as transforming longstanding frustrations into a more structured and internationally prominent agenda. At the same time, speakers cautioned against assuming that historical continuity automatically implies identical intentions. Similar principles can be advanced for different reasons and within different contexts. Calls for reform emerge not only from normative commitments regarding fairness or representation, but also from shifting distributions of power. As countries gain influence, their expectations regarding participation within governance processes often evolve accordingly. This raises an important analytical question: does the GGI represent principally an expression of broader Global South aspirations, or does it also reflect China’s own changing position within the international system? The discussion did not provide a definitive answer, nor was one likely expected. Instead, speakers appeared to acknowledge both possibilities simultaneously. On one level, the initiative aligns with longstanding concerns regarding representation and inclusion. On another, it emerges at a moment when China itself occupies a substantially different position within international affairs than many traditional advocates of governance reform. The coexistence of these dynamics complicates simplistic interpretations. Another observation arising during the discussion was that the apparent familiarity of many GGI principles should not necessarily lead to their dismissal. Indeed, speakers suggested almost the opposite. If principles such as sovereign equality, multilateralism and inclusive governance have existed within international discourse for decades, but governance deficits remain, then perhaps the more important question concerns implementation, rather than conceptual innovation. Viewed through this lens, repetition itself may carry significance, because the restating of longstanding principles can function as criticism, implying that accepted commitments have not been realised in practice. The initiative therefore raises an implicit challenge questioning why, if current governance systems already endorse many of these values, do concerns regarding unequal representation and legitimacy persist? This was a line of reasoning that surfaced repeatedly throughout the discussion. Consequently, one possible interpretation of the GGI is that it does not primarily seek to redefine the normative foundations of international order. Rather, it questions whether existing principles have been operationalised equitably and whether governance structures sufficiently reflect them. Again, the distinction between reform and replacement becomes important. Reasserting existing principles while calling for fuller implementation suggests continuity. Proposing entirely new foundations suggests rupture. Throughout the discussion, speakers generally appeared to favour the former interpretation. But even reforms pursued within existing frameworks can generate significant change over time. Indeed, if calls for greater representation, stronger participation by developing countries and more inclusive agenda setting were fully realised, the resulting shifts could alter aspects of global governance considerably. This raises a final and unavoidable question. If the principles themselves are familiar, and if concerns regarding representation and legitimacy have persisted for decades, what explains the limited progress achieved thus far? The answer may lie less in absence of ideas and more in the politics of implementation, competing interests and differing conceptions of whose priorities should shape international institutions. These considerations point toward perhaps the most difficult issue explored during the discussion: how should the intentions underlying the Global Governance Initiative be understood, and to what extent can major power initiatives ever be separated from national strategic interests? 6. REFORM OR STRATEGIC INFLUENCE? THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF INTENTIONS Perhaps the most sensitive issue raised during the discussion concerned not the principles of the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), nor the deficiencies it seeks to address, but rather a more difficult and inevitably contested question: how should the intentions behind the initiative be interpreted? This question emerged repeatedly, sometimes explicitly and at other times implicitly, throughout the discussion. It reflects a broader reality within international relations: major powers rarely advance initiatives that are viewed as entirely detached from national interests and consequently, proposals for governance reform are often evaluated not only according to stated principles, but also according to perceptions regarding underlying strategic objectives. This issue was approached with notable caution and nuance. On one hand, speakers emphasised that the GGI presents itself as an effort aimed at strengthening multilateralism, improving representation, enhancing inclusivity and addressing governance deficits within existing institutions. Repeated reference was made to reform, rather than replacement, with particular emphasis on the continued centrality of the United Nations and existing multilateral structures, a framing that suggests an initiative seeking adaptation within the current order, rather than construction of a parallel system. At the same time, speakers acknowledged that questions regarding motive are both legitimate and unavoidable. States pursue interests. This observation was not presented as criticism of China specifically, but as a broader characteristic of international relations, in that all countries advance ideas, build institutions and support governance arrangements in ways they believe align with their own national priorities and strategic objectives. From this perspective, the relevant question may not be whether interests exist, but rather how those interests interact with the countries’ broader normative claims. Can initiatives simultaneously advance national interests while contributing positively to international governance; must these objectives necessarily be viewed as contradictor; or can they coexist? The discussion stopped short of providing definitive answers but suggested that such tensions should not be ignored. This becomes particularly relevant because many of the principles articulated through the GGI, be it sovereign equality, inclusive participation, multilateralism and stronger representation for developing countries, possess broad appeal beyond China itself. The existence of shared principles, however, does not eliminate scrutiny regarding implementation. Indeed, one of the recurring observations during the discussion was that trust remains an important variable. Whether the initiative evolves into a genuinely co-owned governance agenda or continues to be perceived primarily through the lens of Chinese strategic influence may depend significantly upon participation by other countries, particularly within the Global South. This point was emphasised strongly. Several speakers suggested that the future trajectory of the initiative should not be determined solely by Chinese interpretation. Rather, if the initiative is to gain broader legitimacy, it would require engagement, contribution and shaping by diverse actors across regions and political contexts. The implication is important, because ownership influences legitimacy. An initiative perceived as collectively shaped may generate different responses than one understood principally as an extension of national strategy, regardless of stated intentions. Another issue raised during the deliberations concerned international perceptions with regard to the GGI. It was acknowledged that reactions to the GGI are unlikely to be uniform, where some countries may interpret the initiative as a constructive contribution toward governance reform and stronger representation, whilst others may view it with greater scepticism, seeing it primarily through the prism of geopolitical competition or strategic rivalry. And these differing interpretations may persist irrespective of the initiative’s substantive content. This is especially true in an international environment characterised by heightened strategic competition and growing mistrust among major powers, under which conditions, governance proposals often become interpreted symbolically, reflecting broader geopolitical relationships, rather than being assessed solely on their individual merits. Again, the discussion encouraged caution regarding simplistic conclusions, by warning that the reduction of every initiative to strategic competition risks overlooking legitimate governance concerns, but that conversely, the uncritical acceptance of all normative claims, risks neglecting the realities of international power politics. The challenge therefore lies in maintaining an analytical balance. Perhaps one of the more nuanced observations emerging from the discussion was that these two interpretations need not be mutually exclusive, because the initiative may simultaneously reflect genuine concerns regarding representation and governance deficits, whilst at the same time being aligned with China’s broader strategic interests. These possibilities can coexist. Throughout history, major governance shifts have often emerged where normative arguments and changing distributions of power intersect. This suggests that the central question may ultimately not be concerned as to whether interests are present, but rather whether proposed reforms produce broader benefits, strengthen legitimacy and enable more inclusive participation. In practical terms, the durability of the GGI may therefore depend less on rhetorical commitments and more on whether countries beyond China perceive tangible value in engaging with the initiative. This returns attention to a recurring theme evident throughout the discussion, the GGI’s implementation. Principles can attract support. Aspirations may resonate widely. But governance initiatives are ultimately judged by whether they generate meaningful change, secure broader participation and translate concepts into operational reality. It is here that the discussion became more uncertain. For while speakers devoted considerable attention to principles and aspirations, they also acknowledged that many questions regarding implementation remain unresolved. How might governance reform occur in practice; through existing institutions or new arrangements; how would competing interests be reconciled; and what mechanisms would translate broad principles into concrete outcomes? These questions point toward perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Global Governance Initiative: moving from vision to practice. 7. FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE: THE IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGE If the earlier sections of the discussion focused largely on principles, aspirations and perceived deficiencies within the current international system, a more difficult set of questions emerged when attention turned toward implementation. Indeed, one of the most consistent observations throughout the discussion was that the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), at least in its present form, remains considerably clearer regarding what it seeks to achieve than how those objectives might ultimately be realised. This distinction is significant. The initiative articulates broad principles concerning sovereign equality, multilateralism, inclusivity and governance reform. But participants repeatedly noted that it currently offers relatively limited detail regarding institutional mechanisms, implementation pathways or concrete proposals capable of translating such principles into practice. This should not necessarily be interpreted as unusual. Several speakers suggested that the initiative remains at an early stage of development and may be better understood as a conceptual framework or political proposition, rather than a completed policy programme. In this sense, the GGI functions partly as an invitation to debate, raising questions regarding governance reform before specifying definitive answers. This, however, also creates uncertainty, in that aspirations, however compelling, inevitably encounter practical constraints once questions of institutional reform arise. Governance structures involve power, representation and competing interests. Reform therefore rarely occurs through normative appeal alone. One practical mechanism referenced during the discussion concerns the emergence of Groups of Friends within the United Nations framework. This model has already been used in relation to earlier Chinese initiatives, including the Global Development Initiative and a similar approach appears to be developing around the GGI. But questions remain regarding what such arrangements ultimately achieve beyond signalling support or facilitating dialogue: Do they evolve into vehicles for substantive policy coordination, do they influence institutional reform processes; or do they function primarily as platforms for norm diffusion and coalition building? The discussion did not provide definitive answers. This in itself reflected the reality that developments remain at an early stage. More broadly, implementation raises difficult questions regarding institutional reform itself. Throughout the discussion, repeated reference was made to perceived underrepresentation of developing countries and dissatisfaction with aspects of existing governance arrangements. But identifying deficiencies differs considerably from redesigning institutions capable of addressing them. For example, greater representation may appear desirable in principle, but implementation immediately raises practical questions. How should representation be adjusted? Through changes to voting structures; expanded participation mechanisms; institutional restructuring; informal influence? Similarly, if multilateral processes become more inclusive, how can effectiveness and efficiency be maintained? The discussion suggested that these tensions should not be underestimated. Inclusivity and effectiveness do not always increase simultaneously, since, whilst broader participation may strengthen legitimacy, more actors can also complicate decision making and so governance reform therefore frequently requires the balancing of competing objectives, rather than merely maximising a single principle. Another challenge concerns political resistance, because often, even where broad agreement exists regarding the need for adaptation, established institutions and/or influential actors, rarely relinquish authority or influence voluntarily. This is neither unique to contemporary geopolitics nor specific to any particular country. It reflects a recurring feature of institutional evolution more generally. Consequently, reform proposals often encounter resistance not only because principles are disputed, but because implementation alters distributions of influence. The discussion acknowledged this reality indirectly when considering how existing powers may respond to governance initiatives perceived as shifting representation or influence. Again, this returns attention to one of the recurring themes running throughout the conversation: whether reform can occur within existing structures, or whether changing realities eventually generate pressure for more fundamental adaptation. The Global Governance Initiative appears, at least rhetorically, to favour the former path. Speakers repeatedly stressed that the initiative presents itself as strengthening existing institutions rather than replacing them, with particular emphasis placed on the centrality of the United Nations, but this raises another question. If reforms remain incremental and constrained by existing arrangements, can they adequately address concerns regarding representation and legitimacy? Conversely, if reforms become more ambitious, can they retain broad support? The discussion did not attempt to resolve these tensions. Instead, it highlighted them as part of the complexity surrounding governance reform itself. A further issue concerns credibility through outcomes. Several speakers noted that initiatives ultimately acquire legitimacy not through aspiration alone, but through visible results. This implies that future perceptions of the GGI may depend less upon conceptual framing and more upon whether practical contributions emerge regarding issues such as development, technology governance, climate cooperation or institutional adaptation. In other words, implementation may become the primary test of credibility. This observation is important because it suggests that the significance of the initiative cannot yet be fully assessed. The GGI currently exists in a space between aspiration and institutional reality. Its future influence will depend not only on China’s continued advocacy, but also on broader participation, evolving geopolitical conditions and whether tangible governance outcomes become associated with it. For now, one conclusion appeared relatively clear from the discussion: the initiative should be understood as an evolving process, rather than a completed framework. Its eventual significance remains uncertain. What is less uncertain is that debates regarding implementation force attention toward a broader issue extending beyond China’s initiative itself: what future role existing multilateral institutions, particularly the United Nations, may play within an increasingly contested and multipolar international environment. This question formed another important strand running through the discussion and points toward the wider implications of governance reform debates for the future of multilateralism. 8. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF MULTILATERALISM Although the discussion centred on China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI), an equally important theme running throughout was the future role of the United Nations and the broader trajectory of multilateralism itself. Indeed, one of the more striking observations emerging from the discussion was that the initiative repeatedly positions the United Nations not as an institution to be bypassed, but as one to be strengthened, reformed and retained as central to global governance. This point received considerable emphasis. Speakers noted that the GGI was introduced in the context of the approaching eightieth anniversary of the United Nations, a symbolic moment that inevitably invites reflection on whether institutions established under post-war conditions remain adequately equipped to address contemporary realities. The significance of this timing should also not be overlooked. Anniversaries alone do not create reform, but they often provide opportunities for reassessment and in this case, it suggests that debates surrounding the future of multilateralism is increasingly coinciding with the wider questions regarding legitimacy, representation and effectiveness. Throughout the conversation, the United Nations was frequently presented as simultaneously indispensable and imperfect, in that on the one hand, no comparable institution currently exists with equivalent reach, normative authority or capacity to convene diverse actors around shared challenges. Issues such as climate change, conflict, development and technological governance inherently require forms of international cooperation extending beyond bilateral relationships. And from this perspective, multilateral institutions remain necessary. But necessity does not eliminate criticism. But on the other hand, participants repeatedly referred to concerns regarding representation, uneven influence and institutional responsiveness. Such concerns are not new, nor are they limited to the United Nations. Nevertheless, they contribute to broader arguments that aspects of existing governance arrangements may require adaptation if legitimacy is to be sustained. The discussion therefore did not frame the issue as multilateralism versus unilateralism, but rather as a question of what form future multilateralism should take. This distinction is important. Criticism of existing institutions does not necessarily imply rejection of collective governance, but equally, support for multilateralism does not preclude calls for reform. Indeed, one of the recurring themes throughout the discussion was that reform and preservation may increasingly become interconnected objectives. Preserving institutional relevance may require adaptation. The GGI appears to engage directly with this tension, because, at least in its stated form, the initiative argues for stronger multilateralism centred around broader participation, greater inclusion of developing countries and governance arrangements perceived as more reflective of contemporary realities. But whether such ambitions prove achievable remains uncertain. But the discussion highlighted an important underlying observation, namely that multilateral institutions derive their strength not only from their formal structures, but also from perceptions of legitimacy and shared ownership. As geopolitical distributions shift, expectations regarding participation and influence may also evolve and therefore, institutions perceived as insufficiently adaptive could encounter increasing pressure, which raises difficult questions, such as whether multilateral systems designed within one historical context can evolve sufficiently to remain effective within another; can broader participation be achieved without undermining institutional efficiency; and how can competing interests be reconciled in an environment characterised by greater geopolitical plurality? These questions extend beyond China’s initiative itself. Indeed, they concern the broader challenge of governing within an increasingly multipolar environment. Multipolarity introduces opportunities and risks simultaneously, in that greater distribution of influence may enhance representation and reduce concentration of power, but it may also complicate consensus building and increase fragmentation if competing visions of governance become more pronounced. The discussion touched on this tension without presenting simple conclusions: on one hand, more diverse participation within governance structures could strengthen legitimacy, but on the other hand, increased plurality may generate competing priorities, interpretations and expectations regarding institutional roles. Whether multipolarity ultimately strengthens or weakens multilateralism may therefore depend significantly upon the ability of institutions to accommodate diversity, while maintaining effectiveness and this is not merely a technical challenge. It concerns fundamental questions regarding how international cooperation functions in periods of transition - throughout history, shifts in distributions of power have often generated pressures for institutional adaptation. The contemporary moment may prove no different. The discussion suggested that the significance of initiatives such as the GGI lies partly in forcing these questions into more explicit consideration, because even where agreement regarding solutions remains absent, debates themselves indicate growing recognition that governance systems cannot be assumed static. Consequently, one of the broader implications emerging from the discussion is that the future of multilateralism may increasingly depend on whether institutions can evolve in ways that preserve cooperation while at the same time responding to changing and increasing expectations regarding representation, legitimacy and effectiveness. The Global Governance Initiative should therefore be understood not only as a proposal concerning China’s international outlook, but also as part of a wider conversation regarding whether existing forms of multilateral governance remain sufficient for a world characterised by shifting influence, technological transformation and growing interdependence. These questions carry particular relevance for countries in the Global South, for while governance debates often appear abstract, decisions regarding representation, participation and institutional reform ultimately influence whose priorities shape international agendas and whose voices carry weight within them. This points toward perhaps the most practical question arising from the discussion, namely what these debates mean for Africa and other developing regions navigating an increasingly contested international environment? 9. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR AFRICA AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH? Throughout the discussion, one theme surfaced repeatedly, sometimes explicitly and at other times more indirectly: the future significance of the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) will depend not only on China’s intentions or institutional proposals, but also on how countries of the Global South engage with it. This point is important because debates surrounding governance reform often risk presenting developing countries primarily as recipients of frameworks designed elsewhere. But several speakers appeared to challenge precisely this assumption. Instead, emphasis was placed on participation. Not participation understood merely as endorsement or alignment, but participation in shaping, interpreting and influencing governance agendas themselves. One of the more striking observations emerging during the discussion was the suggestion that countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America should engage not simply as observers of governance reform debates, nor only as audiences for proposals advanced by larger powers, but as co-creators of emerging governance frameworks. The distinction matters. Observers respond to agendas. Co-creators influence them. This reflects a broader issue underpinning many discussions concerning representation within international institutions. Increased participation is not only about numerical inclusion or symbolic presence. It also concerns whose experiences, priorities and developmental realities shape policy agendas and governance outcomes and so from this perspective, debates surrounding the GGI raise questions that extend beyond China itself, because they touch on longstanding concerns regarding whether governance structures adequately reflect the interests and circumstances of countries that have historically exercised less influence within international decision making. The discussion repeatedly highlighted that the Global South is not a singular or uniform category, which observation is significant. Countries grouped under the label of the Global South differ considerably in terms of economic structure, strategic priorities, developmental challenges and geopolitical relationships. Concerns relating to debt, industrialisation, climate vulnerability, technological access, food security or governance reform do not necessarily carry identical weight across contexts. Consequently, speakers suggested that governance initiatives seeking broader legitimacy cannot assume homogeneous interests, the implication being that meaningful participation requires engagement with diversity, rather than aggregation into a single collective identity. Questions regarding development financing, climate adaptation, representation within international institutions and access to emerging technologies intersect directly with broader governance arrangements and therefor institutional reform influences practical outcomes as much as diplomatic symbolism. At the same time, the discussion did not imply that engagement with initiatives such as the GGI should occur uncritically, because the broader caution evident throughout the conversation regarding intentions, implementation and strategic interests applies equally here. Participation and agency are not synonymous with alignment, since countries may engage with governance initiatives while maintaining independent assessment regarding opportunities, risks and compatibility with national priorities. This observation reflected a recurring theme across the discussion, being the importance of strategic autonomy. Although not always articulated explicitly in those terms, several contributions implied that the growing plurality of governance proposals and partnerships potentially creates greater space for countries in the Global South to exercise influence, negotiate priorities and shape outcomes. Whether such opportunities materialise in practice remains uncertain. But the possibility itself reflects changing international dynamics. The discussion also suggested that governance reform debates may increasingly require balancing immediate interests with longer-term considerations regarding institutional evolution, for example, stronger representation within governance processes may appear desirable, but representation alone does not automatically guarantee influence or beneficial outcomes; and similarly, participation in emerging frameworks does not eliminate the need for careful evaluation of implementation and distribution of benefits. This points toward a broader consideration: If the international system is indeed entering a period characterised by greater multipolarity, then countries in Africa and elsewhere may encounter expanding opportunities to influence governance discussions, but greater plurality may also increase complexity, requiring navigation among competing visions, partnerships and institutional arrangements. The discussion stopped short of presenting this as either wholly beneficial or problematic. Rather, the emphasis remained on agency. This may be one of the more important underlying implications emerging from the conversation. Governance reform is not solely a matter concerning major powers or international institutions. It also concerns whether countries historically positioned at the margins of agenda setting acquire greater capacity to shape priorities and outcomes, and so in this sense, the significance of debates surrounding the Global Governance Initiative may extend beyond the initiative itself. The more fundamental question is whether evolving governance discussions contribute to creating conditions where countries of the Global South participate more actively in defining international norms, institutional arrangements and collective responses to shared challenges. Whether this occurs remains uncertain. But the discussion suggested that the answer will depend not only upon proposals advanced by influential states, but equally upon the willingness and capacity of other actors to engage, contest, contribute and shape emerging agendas. This returns attention to the largest question raised throughout the conversation. Beyond institutional reform, representation and implementation lies a deeper issue concerning the nature of international order itself: is it possible to move toward a genuinely multipolar system without simply replacing one form of dominance with another? This question formed one of the most reflective strands of the discussion and leads to the final analytical section of this report. 10. THE BIGGER QUESTION: IS A NON- HEGEMONIC MULTIPOLAR ORDER POSSIBLE? Perhaps the most ambitious question raised during the discussion was not whether China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI) succeeds or fails, nor even whether its principles are desirable, but rather, whether the international order itself can evolve beyond historical patterns of concentrated power. The discussion noted that much of modern international history has been characterised by successive periods of concentrated influence, with leadership shifting between dominant powers, rather than fundamentally transforming the underlying structure of global order. Against this backdrop, one interpretation of the GGI is that it seeks to contribute toward a different possibility: an international environment characterised by broader distribution of influence rather than replacement of one dominant actor by another. This is, however, easier to articulate than to achieve. Speakers repeatedly returned to the proposition that the initiative should be interpreted as reform, rather than replacement, and that China does not present the GGI as an attempt to become a new hegemon. But the discussion also introduced an important note of caution: intentions and outcomes are not always identical, and states rarely describe strategic ambitions in explicitly expansionary terms. This does not invalidate the initiative. Rather, it suggests the need for analytical openness alongside critical scrutiny. One of the more nuanced observations emerging during the discussion was that China may be contributing alternative ideas and alternative vocabularies regarding governance, and that introducing competing frameworks for thinking about international order may itself be constructive – the significance of this lies not only in the content of the ideas, but in creating space for broader debate regarding assumptions often treated as fixed or inevitable within existing governance arrangements and so from this perspective, the value of initiatives such as the GGI may extend beyond immediate implementation. They may function as prompts forcing reconsideration of longstanding questions: Can multilateralism become genuinely more inclusive? Can representation expand without paralysing institutions? Can developing countries exercise greater influence while maintaining cooperative governance? And perhaps most fundamentally, can international order evolve toward greater plurality without reproducing new forms of concentration or dependency? The discussion did not resolve these questions. Indeed, uncertainty appeared central to many contributions. One of the stronger concluding impressions was that the GGI should perhaps be approached with cautious support accompanied by safeguards, reflecting recognition both of the potential value of governance reform and the need to avoid simply shifting toward another form of concentrated influence. This notion of support with guardrails is revealing in that it rejects both uncritical endorsement and automatic dismissal at the same time. Instead, it implies a position of engagement, a willingness to explore alternatives while maintaining scrutiny regarding implementation, inclusivity and long-term implications. Another important theme that emerged concerned time horizons. The discussion suggested that governance transformation, if it occurs, is unlikely to emerge rapidly and instead, initiatives such as the GGI may therefore represent early stages within longer-term processes of institutional adaptation and norm development, where its eventual significance may only become visible over extended periods. This perspective aligns with another recurring observation throughout the discussion, which is that the GGI remains an evolving initiative, rather than a completed framework. Its future trajectory will depend not only on Chinese advocacy, but also on participation by other countries, responses from existing institutions, and whether broader coalitions emerge around specific governance reforms, but ultimately, the most important question raised by the discussion may not concern China alone. It concerns whether the international community possesses the capacity to imagine and construct governance arrangements that better reflect contemporary realities, while preserving cooperation across increasingly diverse interests and priorities, which answer remains uncertain. But one conclusion appears difficult to avoid: debates surrounding governance reform, representation and multipolarity are unlikely to diminish. They are increasingly becoming central to wider conversations regarding legitimacy, influence and the future organisation of international affairs and in this sense, the Global Governance Initiative may prove significant not because it already offers definitive solutions But because it contributes to reopening a debate that many had assumed was largely settled. Conclusion: The Global Governance Initiative as an opening proposition, rather than a blueprint The discussion on China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI) highlighted both the growing contestation surrounding existing governance arrangements and the increasing willingness of states and other actors to articulate alternative visions regarding the future organisation of international affairs. Throughout the conversation, one theme remained consistent: the GGI should presently be understood less as a detailed programme of institutional reform and more as an evolving framework for questioning aspects of contemporary global governance. At its core, the initiative raises concerns regarding representation, legitimacy, inclusivity and effectiveness. It reflects arguments that governance institutions established under markedly different historical conditions may require adaptation in response to shifting geopolitical realities, emerging technologies and growing demands for broader participation by developing countries. But the discussion also repeatedly emphasised that many of the principles associated with the GGI are neither entirely new nor uniquely Chinese. Calls for stronger representation of developing countries, sovereign equality, more inclusive multilateralism and governance reform have featured within Global South discourse over decades. The significance of the initiative may therefore lie not principally in originality, but in the scale and influence with which such arguments are now being advanced. At the same time, participants remained cautious regarding interpretation. Questions concerning implementation, ownership, strategic interests and institutional feasibility surfaced repeatedly throughout the discussion. Recognition of possible value coexisted with acknowledgement that governance initiatives advanced by major powers inevitably invite scrutiny, which tension did not appear to produce outright endorsement or rejection. Rather, a more nuanced position emerged, being an openness to engagement with alternative governance ideas, that is accompanied by continued critical evaluation regarding implementation, inclusivity and long-term implications. The discussion also underscored that the future trajectory of initiatives such as the GGI will not depend solely on China itself. Their eventual significance may be shaped equally by whether other actors, particularly within the Global South, participate actively in interpreting, influencing and co-creating emerging governance agendas. This may prove one of the more important observations arising from the conversation. Debates regarding governance reform are not simply about institutions. They are also about agency: who shapes norms, whose priorities influence agendas, and whether broader participation within governance processes becomes possible. Many uncertainties remain. Whether existing institutions can adapt sufficiently to maintain legitimacy, whether more inclusive forms of multilateralism can emerge without sacrificing effectiveness, and whether a more multipolar international environment produces greater cooperation or greater fragmentation remain unresolved questions. The Global Governance Initiative does not yet answer these questions definitively. What it does appear to do, however, is force renewed consideration of them. In that sense, the initiative may ultimately prove significant not because it provides a completed alternative model of global governance, but because it contributes to reopening a wider debate regarding how international cooperation, representation and legitimacy should evolve in a changing world. As the international system continues to experience geopolitical shifts, technological disruption and increasing demands for institutional adaptation, such debates are likely to become more frequent rather than less. The Global Governance Initiative should therefore perhaps be viewed neither as a settled blueprint nor as a passing diplomatic proposition, but as part of an ongoing conversation regarding the future shape of multilateralism itself. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates. GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North. Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi. GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. MAY 2026 by Lerato Tsebe BA (Political Studies, International Relations & Sociology), BA Hons (Political Studies), University of the Witwatersrand ABSTRACT This paper examines the European Union’s (EU) Global Gateway initiative and its implications for Africa’s development, with a particular focus on South Africa. Launched in 2021, the initiative seeks to mobilise substantial investment in key sectors such as clean energy, digital infrastructure, transport, health, and education, positioning Africa as a central partner in a shifting global economic landscape. It also reflects the EU’s strategic response to increasing competition from global actors, including China and the United States, for influence on the continent. While the Global Gateway is framed as a modern and sustainable development strategy, this paper questions whether it represents a meaningful departure from historically unequal EU-Africa relations. Concerns persist regarding the accessibility of financing, the rigidity of funding conditions, and the risk that European strategic interests may take precedence over African development priorities. The initiative’s reliance on private capital and loan-based financing models further raises questions about debt sustainability and the ability to achieve inclusive growth. South Africa serves as a critical case study due to its status as the EU’s largest trading partner in Africa and a major recipient of Global Gateway funding. Recent investments aimed at supporting renewable energy, infrastructure, and skills development highlight opportunities for advancing green industrialisation and a just energy transition. However, these opportunities will only be realised if investments align closely with national priorities and contribute to long-term structural transformation. The paper identifies key challenges, including limited African participation in decision-making, insufficient focus on local capacity-building, and the potential for externally driven projects to reinforce dependency. To address these issues, it recommends strengthening joint governance, increasing concessional financing, enhancing transparency, and prioritising local value addition. Ultimately, the paper argues that the success of the Global Gateway will depend on its ability to move beyond traditional donor-recipient dynamics and foster a genuinely equal partnership grounded in mutual benefit, shared responsibility, and sustainable development outcomes. 1. INTRODUCTION As the global multilateral order continues to evolve, smaller Global South and Western countries are participating more in the world arena, with Africa being seen as the next big destination for foreign investment – it is set to become a global economic powerhouse. Much of the African continent is youthful and resource-rich, making it attractive to foreign countries with an appetite for economic partnerships. This is especially true in the continent’s renewable and fossil fuels energy sector. Africa is undoubtedly one of the world's energy-rich regions – an appealing prospect for those countries eyeing dominance in the energy space. Within a global arena that is politically charged, economically consequential and fraught with division, the African continent remains at the epicentre of global attention. Russia, China, India and the European Union (EU) are all potential partners for mineral-rich Africa, each having signed agreements with the continent to enhance their mineral and/or economic wealth. However, Europe has maintained a mainstay economic partnership with Africa, one that continues to evolve. The EU remains Africa’s largest trading partner and has recently consolidated its economic prospects on the continent with its novel Global Gateway initiative – a geoeconomic instrument that primarily consolidates the strategic economic areas in which the EU seeks to partner with Africa. The Global Gateway, launched in 2021, is the EU’s strategic investment framework for the clean energy, digital, transport, health and education sectors, aiming to address the continent’s geopolitical challenges. Questions remain, however, about how the Global Gateway will contend with a China dominant across Africa, a financially rich United States, an aggressive yet inexperienced Middle East, and curious Global South partners such as Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil and Singapore. This paper will examine how the EU’s Global Gateway will compete with so many competitors in Africa and how it can anchor its position as a partner for the African continent. The paper will specifically look at South Africa, the EU’s largest trading partner in Africa, and examine the primary policy and governance priorities that can be addressed to strengthen overall EU-Africa relations and advance mutually beneficial outcomes. 2. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S GLOBAL GATEWAY: NOVEL POLICY FRAMEWORK OR OLD WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE? In 2021, at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU launched the Global Gateway Framework. It is widely regarded as its counterstrategy to an encroaching China in Africa, traditionally perceived by the EU as its ‘economic landscape’ in perpetuity. Tied to the African continent for centuries, much of the relationship was initiated during the 300-year-long colonial project, which has left deep scars, particularly from European economic imperialism. Over the years, the Euro-African relationship has taken many forms. Most recently, it has struggled to become a fair and equal political and economic partnership. The geopolitical landscape on which this relationship seeks to establish itself is being shaped by new bi-continental initiatives, largely driven by the European Union, as it aims to position itself as the leading partner for Africa’s political, economic and green energy ambitions. The Global Gateway is “a new European strategy to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors, while also strengthening health, education and research systems across the world ... the Global Gateway is the EU’s contribution to narrowing the global investment gap … the Global Gateway is also fully aligned with the UN’s Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the Paris Agreement” (European Commission, N.d.). It is envisioned that a total of €300 billion will be disbursed into Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean by 2027, with Sub-Saharan Africa receiving the lion's share of €150 billion through the Africa-Europe Investment package. This was the EU’s foundational initiative to strengthen ties with the African Continent. The EU announced its initial investment at the 2022 EU-AU Summit in Brussels, Belgium. The Global Gateway is structured around five pillars of partnership: digital connectivity, climate and energy, transport, health, and education and research (European Commission, 2021). The 2021 Africa-Europe Investment Package, worth €150 billion, focuses on the renewable energy transition, transport corridors, digitalisation, and sustainable agriculture (European Commission, 2022). These projects, announced for implementation across the continent, place a strong emphasis on expanding and strengthening Africa’s renewable energy sector. For the Global Gateway, as of 2023, “ninety key projects were launched worldwide across the digital, energy and transport sectors, while also advancing health, education and research systems globally” (European Commission, N.d.). For the EU, Africa is front of mind and formed the first phase of implementation under the Global Gateway initiative. Given the tense geopolitical climate, and the African continent’s rich mineral wealth, large youth population and massive natural energy endowments, Africa is a highly attractive partner for Western Europe, which lacks many of these key attributes. Taken together, these factors provide strong motivation for Africa to be on the receiving end of the first disbursement of the €300 billion Global Gateway investment initiative. A key feature of the Global Gateway has been the inclusion of the EU’s private sector, European financial institutions and development agencies – collectively referred to as ‘Team Europe’. “This 'Team Europe approach' means joining forces so that our joint external action becomes more than the sum of its parts. By working together and pooling our resources and expertise, we deliver more effectiveness and greater impact. Team Europe consists of the European Union, EU Member States – including their implementing agencies and public development banks – as well as the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)” (European Commission, 2025). Other European regional development banks, such as Germany’s KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), the world's largest development bank, are also a part of this broad coalition of development finance institutions that make up this multi-pronged Team Europe. Well-financed and resource-rich, the members of Team Europe and their respective contributions represent longstanding instruments of Europe’s engagement with Africa, suggesting that their role is more conventional than innovative. Additionally, for Africa and other members of the Global South, the real challenges that remain are the detailed technical terms and conditions governing access to Team Europe’s financing and resources. A longstanding point of political contention between the two continents has been the rigid terms and conditions – another defining feature of EU-Africa relations – which call for further evolution. From the perspective of African economists, academics and analysts, there has been criticism of the enduring relationship between Africa and Europe, particularly regarding new economic development initiatives structured around rigid governance frameworks. For African academics, the Global Gateway and these contentious terms and conditions, “access to finance, the perceived risks of investing on the continent not only results in a higher cost of borrowing from international markets (which can be up to five times more than other regions) but contributes to high debt burdens. Making more concessional capital available is fundamental, and this puts development banks at the centre of scaling affordable climate finance (unfortunately, development banks are also increasingly lending at market rates)” (esi-africa.com). In 2025, the relationship between the European Commission and the World Bank Group broadened, with the World Bank identifying 18 high-impact investments across energy, transport, and digital infrastructure in Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America, designed to move projects from pipeline to financing and, ultimately, to jobs and tangible results (World Bank, 2025). This is essentially the same formula that the Global Gateway adopts. The EU-World Bank relationship has in no way quelled African anxieties, as most African Union (AU) member states have long had a tenuous relationship with the World Bank – seen as a prototype of a financial institution that African countries feel is impenetrable and averse to African-led reforms that would make it more relevant to their realities. Although in its nascent stage, the Global Gateway faces challenges, as critical analysis reveals several structural concerns. Firstly, while the EU emphasises investment in hard infrastructure, there has been insufficient investment in strengthening governance frameworks and fostering local digital innovation (Lunardini et al, 2025). Secondly, the initiative’s geopolitical motivations – particularly competition with China – risk instrumentalising African development for European strategic interests rather than genuinely prioritising African-defined needs (Hackenesch & Bergmann, 2021). Thirdly, the mobilisation of private capital, central to Global Gateway’s financing model, raises questions about profit-driven priorities that may conflict with development imperatives and social equity. To support this third point, at the EU-AU summit in Luanda, it was noted that “debt relief and reform of the international financial architecture were also highlighted, with calls for more transparent restructuring mechanisms and reduced borrowing costs for African states” (APA News, 2015). Thus, although the Global Gateway was a response to the number of participants encroaching on the African economic arena and to the need to continue extending the lifeline of the EU-AU partnership, the perception that the Global Gateway is merely ‘old wine in new bottles’ is reinforced by its inability to address the structural issues of adopting terms and conditions and language that speak to the realities of African countries, and by the incongruencies that the continent faces in the international community. 3. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION South Africa is the EU’s largest trading partner in Africa. Equipped with sophisticated transport infrastructure, an advanced financial architecture, and a tech-savvy population, and considered Africa’s most democratically advanced state, South Africa is an appealing partner for the EU. The country has thus far received the largest disbursement of funds from the Global Gateway coffers. In October 2025, following the March 8th EU-South Africa summit, the country received an additional €12 billion in funds. South Africa initially received €4.7 billion in March from the EU. The funds were intended to help Africa’s most advanced country to focus “on the just energy transition, sustainable infrastructure, digital connectivity and pharmaceutical value chains in South Africa. The objective is to drive inclusive growth and shared prosperity” (Bulbulia, 2025). The second disbursement of funds to South Africa signalled an extension of the EU’s renewable market initiatives in the country and the opportunity to use South Africa’s experience as a prototype to be emulated across Africa. For South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa, the financial endorsement aligned with the country’s development aspirations, “welcome the special focus on skills, small business development, and research and development. This is vital for the development of South Africa’s people, our most valuable resource” (Bulbulia, 2025). Ramaphosa’s remarks are attributed to the fact that skills development and increasing employment opportunities for its people are central to the South African Renewable Energy Masterplan (SAREM) of 2025. The plan is anchored on four priorities: Supporting the local demand for renewable energy and storage by unlocking market demand and system readiness, as a large-scale rollout of renewable energy systems is a critical precondition to achieving the core objectives of SAREM. Driving industrial development by building renewable energy and storage value chains, through localisation drives on both the public and private sector markets and supportive trade and industrial policy. Fostering the inclusive development of renewable energy and battery storage value chains, by driving the transformation of the industry, supporting the development of emerging suppliers, and contributing to a just transition. Building local capabilities in terms of skills and technological innovation to enable the rollout of renewable energy and storage technologies and associated industrial development” (South African Government, 2025). Like the rest of Africa, South Africa is grappling with an unemployment crisis, with more than 30% of its population, mostly young people, unemployed. Thus, the President's acknowledgement of the funds allocated to skills development, which can help to alleviate the pressures of the unemployment crisis, is relevant. South Africa occupies a unique position within the EU-Africa partnership framework. As Africa’s most industrialised economy, a member of the BRICS grouping, and a continental leader in renewable energy development, South Africa is both a critical partner and a bellwether for the success of EU engagement strategies (Alden & Schoeman, 2015). The EU will undoubtedly use its partnership with South Africa as a template for how it will roll out and structure its Global Gateway framework across the African continent. The EU-South Africa “partnership also sends a message of geopolitical alignment, reinforcing the EU’s role as a development and investment partner of choice amid growing global competition for influence in Africa” (Chilamphuma, 2025). This competition for the African continent emanates from different directions – from BRICS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative to the United States of America. The competition for Africa’s future economic prospects is being played out by a variety of determined global actors. Thus, the EU’s relationship with Africa is being challenged to shift from being asymmetrical (with issues pertaining to finance and trade in the EU’s favour) to being mutually reciprocal. “With Global Gateway, the EU entered the race for global infrastructure financing with China by building up its own sphere of influence to foster economic relationships through catapulting trade and investment as geostrategic ‘key EU foreign policy tools’ (European Union External Action, 2022: 253) ... EU member states decided to establish Global Gateway as a new geopolitical instrument” (Heldt, 2023). The engineering of this new foreign policy instrument is “a combination of external and internal factors—the rise of China as a geopolitical power, the shift to private investment to finance development projects, and the transformational leadership of the European Commission— [that] contributed to the adoption of Global Gateway as a new European geopolitical strategy” (Heldt, 2023). For the EU and countries like South Africa, mutual reciprocity needs to manifest specifically in arenas where Africa has traditionally been on the back foot, such as trade agreements, financing mechanisms, and debt and loan financing terms and conditions. The latter issues have been ongoing areas of contention for the EU-Africa relationship. Thus, “as the partnership unfolds, both Brussels and Pretoria appear determined to show that development cooperation can evolve beyond rhetoric - into real, transformative impact” (Chilamphuma, 2025). 4. THE EU-AFRICA RELATIONSHIP: PERPETUAL INCONGRUENCY? Aside from being tasked with evolving, there is also a concern that the EU’s Global Gateway will become the preferred model of development in the African renewable market and that it will serve as a dictation rather than a dialogue, with targeted milestones that could lead to a mutually beneficial partnership between the EU and Africa. In its initial design phase, the EU should have institutionalised African participation across all stages of project identification, design, implementation, and evaluation. The current model, in which European institutions largely determine priorities before presenting them to African partners, perpetuates asymmetry (Carbone, 2013). Global Gateway investments should align with and complement African-led frameworks, particularly the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) (African Union, 2015). For South Africa specifically, alignment with the National Development Plan 2030 is essential to ensure investments address nationally defined priorities rather than externally imposed agendas (National Planning Commission, 2012). Had the EU pursued this initial line of thought, it would have given the framework far greater efficacy and enhanced its offering in an arena dominated by China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which invested $39 billion in Africa in 2025 alone. Although South Africa is the recipient of a substantial financial investment, the relationship between the EU and its largest African economic partner, South Africa, faces challenges. “South Africa’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, reflected in its non-aligned stance on various international issues and deepening ties with China and Russia, complicates EU expectations of alignment on geopolitical matters” (Sidiropoulos, 2021). As in any relationship, there are differences in the way an issue may be addressed. The way the issue is viewed and/or resolved will always be seen through the lens of what is in the best interest of a State. However, differences of opinion on issues such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the current configuration of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in no way constitute an immovable obstacle to their relationship. Progress requires compromise, and continuing the current relationship dynamic between the EU and Africa will stall development. It will stall political and economic development for both sides. Compromise is necessary to ensure long-term strategic alignment and enable African partners to exercise meaningful oversight and course-correction authority (Lunardini et al, 2025). Even under the current framing of the Global Gateway principles and values, “guiding the investments, democratic values and high standards, good governance and transparency, equal partnerships, green and clean, security focused, catalysing the private sector” (European Commission, 2025), these should have been part of a dialogue the EU had with its African counterparts at the engineering phase of the Global Gateway, rather than merely consolidated points of instruction packaged as a new investment package. The Global Gateway project has to move beyond rhetoric to deliver a tangible, transformative impact that is mutually beneficial for Europe and Africa. This evolution is driven by a fast-changing geopolitical climate, where the Global South, Africa in particular, is playing a far more prominent role in global affairs. 5. LOCAL TECHNOLOGY AND LOCAL VALUE ADDITION A critical policy priority is to ensure that infrastructure investments catalyse technology transfer, skills development, and local value addition rather than merely creating dependencies on European technology and expertise. Historical development cooperation has often resulted in turnkey projects that leave little local capacity (Moyo, 2009). Global Gateway must differentiate itself through explicit technology transfer provisions, local content requirements, and investment in technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems. In South Africa, this is particularly relevant to the renewable energy and digital infrastructure sectors. The country’s renewable energy independent power producer procurement programme demonstrates how local content requirements can stimulate domestic manufacturing and job creation (Eberhard et al., 2014). Global Gateway projects should incorporate similar provisions to ensure that solar panel manufacturing, wind turbine component production, and digital infrastructure equipment are progressively localised. Moreover, investment in research and development partnerships between European and African institutions can foster innovation ecosystems that generate locally appropriate solutions rather than merely transferring European technologies (Chataway et al., 2007). South Africa’s established research infrastructure provides a foundation for these partnerships. 6. SUSTAINABLE FINANCING MODELS AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY The financing architecture of Global Gateway must prioritise grant financing and concessional loans over commercial lending, which exacerbates debt burdens. African countries collectively face debt distress, with debt-to-GDP ratios rising significantly, thereby constraining fiscal space for development investments (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2022). Whilst the EU emphasises leveraging private capital, this must not result in unsustainable debt accumulation or profit extraction that undermines development objectives. Questions remain about whether the EU can afford to finance the Global Gateway project at €330 billion, whilst China’s Belt and Road Initiative intends to spend $1.1 trillion, more than triple the envisioned amount for the Global Gateway initiative. “The European Court of Auditors has already questioned whether the EU can mobilize the claimed sums. In other words, Europe claims to support global development without actually committing any new or meaningful financial resources for much-needed infrastructure investments in low-income countries” (Gerasimcikova & Okumu, 2025). In addition, “the so-called billions are to be conjured up through the old toolbox of loans from multilateral development banks and EU member states. Projects from these loans are now rebranded as the Global Gateway” (Gerasimcikova & Okumu, 2025). If the EU wants to compete with other contenders for Africa’s economic partnership, it needs to scrutinise itself internally before it can offer a framework to a debt-ridden continent like Africa. There is scope for compromise here; innovative financing mechanisms, such as debt-for-climate swaps from African countries, could help redirect debt servicing towards renewable energy investments, aligning with Global Gateway priorities. Transparency in financing terms and conditions is essential. Global Gateway projects should publicly disclose their interest rates, repayment terms, collateral requirements, and expected returns to private investors, enabling both the lender and recipient countries to scrutinise the offer in their national Parliaments. 7. CLIMATE JUSTICE AND JUST TRANSITION Global Gateway’s climate and energy pillar must be grounded in climate justice principles that recognise historical responsibility for emissions and differentiated capacities for climate action. For South Africa, which remains heavily dependent on coal-fired electricity generation, a just transition requires substantial investment in renewable energy infrastructure, grid modernisation, and social protection for workers and communities dependent on fossil fuels (Swilling et al, 2016). The EU’s Just Energy Transition Partnership with South Africa, announced in 2021 with an initial commitment of $8.5 billion, provides a model for Global Gateway engagement – but implementation must ensure that financing is genuinely additional, grant-based rather than loan-heavy, and accompanied by technology transfer (Presidential Climate Commission, 2022). Furthermore, Global Gateway investments in renewable energy must prioritise energy access and affordability for African populations rather than merely facilitating green hydrogen exports to Europe. South Africa’s energy generation challenges, with millions lacking reliable access to electricity, demand that renewable energy investments serve domestic needs first. 8. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY For South Africa, Global Gateway’s commitment to sustainability must be operationalised through rigorous environmental and social safeguards. Where mining and infrastructure projects have historically caused environmental degradation and social displacement, particularly affecting marginalised communities, safeguards must be robust and enforced (Cock, 2007). Global Gateway transport corridor investments, for instance, must avoid biodiversity-rich areas, incorporate wildlife corridors, and ensure that land acquisition processes respect community land rights and provide fair compensation. For a country with deeply entrenched racial economic discrepancies, such as South Africa, this is imperative, as there are few other economic avenues for most poor communities to pursue to offset what they will lose. Gender-responsive approaches must also be mainstreamed across all Global Gateway interventions, ensuring that women participate in decision-making, benefit equitably from employment opportunities, and are protected from risks associated with large infrastructure projects (African Development Bank, 2021). For South Africa, gender and youth interventions are envisioned in the Renewable Energy Masterplan, where “a Transformation Fund, aimed at providing capital, but also support guarantees and warrantees (and possibly other support required by beneficiaries, such as skills development), for emerging suppliers into the sector will be established. It will aim to catalyse existing (and additional) funding streams in the sector” (South African Government, 2025). 9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL OUTCOMES Proposed recommendations to strengthen EU-Africa relations through Global Gateway in a manner that advances mutually beneficial outcomes, particularly for South Africa: Establish a Joint EU-AU Global Gateway Governance Council with equal representation and decision-making authority, responsible for strategic direction, priority-setting, and oversight. This is to ensure that the Global Gateway framework remains impartial and meets the needs of both Africa and the EU alike. Reconsider the structure of debt, loans and grants being disbursed to Africa. A more substantive conversation between Europe and Africa needs to take place here. There is room for finance innovation and agility, well outside of the rigid conventional framework. Loosened terms and conditions for Africa could lend the EU a more competitive edge over its peers. Commit a portion of Global Gateway Africa financing as only grants or highly concessional loans to ensure debt sustainability. Mandate local content requirements of 40- 60% and skills development programmes across all Global Gateway infrastructure projects. This will align with local legislation and alleviate the pressure most African countries face, driven by high unemployment rates. Establish independent grievance mechanisms accessible to project-affected communities, led by local communities that interface most with them, especially women. Invest in strengthening African institutions for infrastructure governance, including regulatory agencies and parliamentary oversight capacities, to ensure sustainable management beyond project completion. 7. CONCLUSION The European Union’s Global Gateway African framework offers a significant opportunity to transform EU-Africa relations and address Africa’s infrastructure deficit in ways that support sustainable development and mutual prosperity. However, realising this potential requires confronting historical asymmetries, ensuring genuine African ownership, and prioritising development effectiveness over geopolitical competition. For South Africa specifically, Global Gateway can support the renewable energy transition, digital infrastructure development, and regional integration – but only if investments align with nationally defined priorities and contribute to structural economic transformation rather than merely facilitating European access to critical minerals and markets. The policy and governance priorities identified in this essay provide a framework for strengthening EU-Africa relations in ways that advance mutually beneficial outcomes. Implementing these priorities requires political will from both European and African leaders, sustained engagement with civil society, and a commitment to partnership based on equality, mutual respect, and shared prosperity rather than donor-recipient dynamics. The coming years will reveal whether the EU can transcend historical patterns and forge a genuinely transformative partnership with Africa – or whether Global Gateway will become another iteration of asymmetrical engagement that privileges European interests whilst constraining African possibilities. 8. REFERENCES African Development Bank. 2021. Integrating Gender in Infrastructure Development. Abidjan: African Development Bank. African Union. 2015. Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want. Addis Ababa: African Union Commission. Alden, C. & Schoeman, M. 2015. South Africa’s symbolic hegemony in Africa, International Politics, 52(2): 239-254. APA News. 2015. AU-EU Summit: Leaders pledge deeper peace, trade ties. [Online] Available at: https://apanews.net/au-eu-summit-leaders-pledge-deeper-peace-trade-ties/ [accessed: 17 April 2026]. Brown, W. 2002. The European Union and Africa: The Restructuring of North-South Relations. London: IB Tauris. Bulbulia, T. 2025. Team Europe commits investment package of €11.5bn to South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/team-europe-commits-115bn-of-investment-to-south-africa-2025-10-10 [accessed: 17 April 2026]. Carbone, M. 2013. Between EU actorness and aid effectiveness: The logics of EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, International Relations, 27(3): 341-355. Chataway, J., Chux, D., Kale, D., Wamae, W. & Hanlin, R. 2007. Industry-university-government links in developing countries: Opportunities and obstacles for innovation in the health sector, Science and Public Policy, 34(4): 235-246. Chilamphuma, E. 2025. EU and South Africa Sign Landmark €12 Billion Investment Deal for Green Growth. [Online] Available at: https://furtherafrica.com/2025/10/15/eu-and-south-africa-sign-landmark-e12-billion-investment-deal-for-green-growth/ [accessed: 17 April 2026]. Cock, J. 2007. Sustainable development or environmental justice? Questions for the South African labour movement from the steel valley struggle, Labour, Capital and Society, 40(1/2): 136-156. Couldry, N. & Mejias, U.A. 2019. The Costs of Connection: How Data is Colonizing Human Life and Appropriating It for Capitalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Delputte, S. & Orbie, J. 2014. The EU and donor coordination on the ground: Perspectives from Tanzania and Zambia, European Journal of Development Research, 26(5): 676-691. Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). 2018. South Africa’s Strategic Partnership with the European Union. Pretoria: DIRCO. Eberhard, A., Kolker, J. & Leigland, J. 2014. South Africa’s Renewable Energy IPP Procurement Program: Success Factors and Lessons. Washington, DC: World Bank. European Commission. N.d. Global Gateway Overview. [Online] Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/topics/international-partnerships/global-gateway_en [accessed: 17 April 2026]. European Commission. 2005. Policy Coherence for Development. [Online] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ET/ALL/?uri=LEGISSUM:r12534 [accessed: 17 April 2026]. European Commission. 2007. The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. [Online] Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf [accessed: 17 April 2026]. European Commission. 2020. EU-South Africa Trade Relations. [Online] Available at: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/south-africa_en [accessed: 17 April 2026]. European Commission. 2021. Global Gateway: Up to €300 Billion for the European Union’s Strategy to Boost Sustainable Links Around the World. [Online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433 [accessed: 17 April 2026]. European Commission. 2022. EU-Africa Global Gateway Investment Package. [Online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/attachment/874064/GG_Africa_InvestmentPackage.pdf.pdf [accessed: 17 April 2026]. European Commission. 2025. Team Europe Initiatives. [Online] Available at: https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/team-europe-initiatives_en#what-is-team-europe [accessed: 17 April 2026]. European Investment Bank. 2022. Global Gateway: EIB’s Contribution to EU External Investment Strategy. Luxembourg: EIB. Gerasimcikova, A. & Okumu, P. 2025. The Global Gateway to Nowhere. [Online] Available at: https://africasacountry.com/2025/05/the-global-gateway-to-nowhere [accessed: 17 April 2026]. Griffiths, J. 2020. Blended finance in the poorest countries: The need for a better approach, ODI Briefing Papers. London: Overseas Development Institute. Gutman, J., Sy, A. & Chattopadhyay, S. 2015. Financing African Infrastructure: Can the World Deliver? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Hackenesch, C. & Bergmann, J. 2021. Geoeconomics meets development cooperation: Assessing the implications of Europe’s new Africa strategy, German Institute of Development and Sustainability Briefing Paper. Bonn: IDOS. Heldt, E.C. 2023. Europe’s Global Gateway: A New Instrument of Geopolitics, Politics and Governance, 11(4). Hurt, S.R. 2003. Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP states and the end of the Lomé Convention, Third World Quarterly, 24(1): 161-176. International Renewable Energy Agency. 2022. Green Hydrogen for Industry: A Guide to Policy Making. Abu Dhabi: IRENA. Joint Research Centre. 2025. Global Gateway Support to Transport Corridors in Africa – Consolidated Report. Brussels: European Commission Joint Research Centre. Kwet, M. 2019. Digital colonialism: US empire and the new imperialism in the Global South, Race & Class, 60(4): 3-26. Lunardini, M., Tshuma, D., Keijzer, N., Fattibene, D. & Olivié, I. 2025. Global Gateway and Mattei Plan: Advancing EU–Africa Digital Cooperation for Inclusive Growth. ETTG Policy Brief 8/2025. Brussels: European Think Tanks Group. Manchishi, S. 2025. Why Europe-Africa summit was a missed opportunity for meaningful joint action. [Online] Available at: https://www.esi-africa.com/news/why-eu-africa-summit-was-missed-opportunity-for-meaningful-joint-action/ [accessed: 17 April 2026]. Mehling, M.A., van Asselt, H., Das, K., Droege, S. & Verkuijl, C. 2019. Designing border carbon adjustments for enhanced climate action, American Journal of International Law, 113(3): 433-481. Merry, S.E. 2011. Measuring the world: Indicators, human rights, and global governance, Current Anthropology, 52(S3): S83-S95. Moyo, D. 2009. Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa. London: Allen Lane. National Planning Commission. 2012. National Development Plan 2030: Our Future – Make it Work. Pretoria: The Presidency. Presidential Climate Commission. 2022. South Africa’s Just Transition Framework. Pretoria: Presidential Climate Commission. Public Protector South Africa. 2016. State of Capture Report. Pretoria: Public Protector South Africa. Sidiropoulos, E. 2021. South Africa’s foreign policy in a changing global order, South African Journal of International Affairs, 28(1): 1-18. South African Government. 2025. South African Renewable Energy Masterplan (SAREM). [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202506/south-african-renewable-energy-masterplan.pdf [accessed: 17 April 2026]. Statistics South Africa. 2023. Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Pretoria: Stats SA. Swilling, M., Musango, J. & Wakeford, J. 2016. Developmental states and sustainability transitions: Prospects of a just transition in South Africa, Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 18(5): 650-672. Transparency International. 2020. Infrastructure Governance and Corruption in Africa. Berlin: Transparency International. United Nations. 2007. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. New York: United Nations. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2022. A World of Debt: A Growing Burden to Global Prosperity. Geneva: UNCTAD. World Bank. 2025. Global Gateway Forum: The European Commission and World Bank Group Deepen Partnership for Infrastructure and Jobs. Press Release No. 2026/015/EXC. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2026 The concept outlines the Inclusive Society Institute’s approach to the National Dialogue. The Institute’s contribution will be conducted in two phases: Phase 1 will be a high-level conceptualisation presented at the first summit, followed by phase two, which will entail a comprehensive process fleshing out a detailed policy proposal for submission to the National Dialogue in the run-up to the second dialogue schedules for next year. Background: The National Dialogue The National Dialogue is a multi-stakeholder initiative aimed at fostering open and constructive engagement among South Africans to address the country’s most pressing socio-political and economic challenges. It has been convened in response to the rising political uncertainty, social fragmentation and economic stagnation. The Dialogue seeks to build consensus around a shared national vision and actionable pathways for reform, by bringing together government, civil society, business, labour and other social actors, who must partner to jointly shape a more inclusive, equitable and sustainable future. The National Dialogue is premised on the belief that South Africa’s long-term stability and prosperity can only be secured through collective deliberation and action and by creating a structured forum for honest conversation and collaboration, iin order to generate innovative solutions that are owned and driven by the people of South Africa themselves. The role of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), with its core mission of promoting a socially just, inclusive and equitable South Africa, regards the National Dialogue as a critical opportunity to contribute constructively to the country’s development path. Recognising that economic transformation and social cohesion are inseparable components of national renewal, the ISI will centre its participation on the interplay between economic growth and social justice. ISI’s approach: Economic growth underpinned by social cohesion The ISI will advance the argument that placing the economy on a more acceptable and inclusive growth trajectory is essential, but that such growth must be embedded in a broader framework of social cohesion. This dual focus will ensure that the economic gains are not only sustainable, but are distributed in ways that enhance fairness, that reduce inequality and which fosters unity. Key tenets of this approach include: A pro-growth economic agenda and therefore, the ISI will support policies and proposals that aim to enhance productivity, attract investment, foster entrepreneurship and improve job creation, particularly for the youth and historically the marginalised communities. An economy that is rooted in social justice, which suggests that growth alone is insufficient if it leads to deepening inequality or if it marginalises vulnerable groups and therefore the ISI will advocate for economic policies that are also pro-poor, pro-equity and which ensure access to opportunities, and fair outcomes for all. Social cohesion as an economic imperative, because social stability, trust and a shared identity are not only moral goals, they are economic assets, in that a cohesive society reduces conflict, improves cooperation and enhances resilience and therefore the ISI will champion initiatives that aim to address demographic fairness, cultural inclusion, equitable representation and the elimination of the systemic barriers to participation. Demographic and cultural fairness, which means the recognition of South Africa’s diverse social fabric within economic and institutional frameworks and in which representation, cultural acceptance and equitable participation are central to social stability and inclusive development. Institutional reform and governance for sustainable economic and social outcomes, which requires a capable, transparent and accountable institutions and therefore the ISI will support reforms that rebuild public trust and strengthen democratic governance. The central role of a capable state While the commitment of the private sector and active citizenry is vital to South Africa’s development, their efforts and ability to contribute meaningfully are dependent on the presence of a capable and effective state, because no amount of goodwill or enterprise can succeed in the absence of the institutional scaffolding that only a competent public sector can provide. Public services, infrastructure, law enforcement, education and healthcare, all of which are essential to economic dynamism and social cohesion and which require a state that is both efficient and trustworthy. A capable state is not synonymous with a large or omnipresent state, but rather a government that is strategic, focused and disciplined in its use of resources and mandates. The challenge facing South Africa is not necessarily that the state does too little, but rather that it in fact attempts to do too much with the resources at its disposal, thereby stretching its capacity too thin and undermining performance. This is where the principle of "less is more" must guide a rethinking of the public sector’s role and function. Instead of spreading limited capacity and resources across an overwhelming range of responsibilities, the state should concentrate on a core set of essential functions, where its role is irreplaceable and its impact most significant. These include, among others, maintaining the rule of law, ensuring macroeconomic stability, delivering quality basic education and healthcare, delivering social services, enabling infrastructure and providing a predictable policy environment. By focusing on doing fewer things, but doing them well, the state can rebuild credibility, restore functionality and support the conditions necessary for private initiative and social partnership to flourish. Moreover, a capable state must be underpinned by a professional public administration, clear lines of accountability, merit-based appointments and an uncompromising stance on corruption. These institutional attributes are not technical niceties, they are preconditions for development. In their absence, even the most innovative private sector or most committed civil society will struggle to gain traction. A state that is both strategic and capable becomes a partner in, rather than a barrier to, national renewal. It provides the platform upon which shared prosperity can be built, and without which no social compact can be sustained. Crucially, the ISI believes that it cannot be business as usual, because South Africa cannot continue to do the same things and expect different results and therefore a new trajectory must anticipate necessary sacrifices and a redefined social compact. This includes: Community service and active citizenship must be encouraged. Cultivating a culture of giving, charity and social responsibility must be cultivated. The tax system should be reformed in order to ensure that the super-rich and multinational corporations pay their fair share. Temporary financial sacrifices by those who can afford them, as part of a broader national effort to build a more stable and cohesive society, must be considered. These measures must be understood not as punitive actions or idealistic appeals, but as strategic, forward-looking interventions and a deliberate effort to cushion the nation against the inevitable instability that arises when an economy persistently serves only the privileged few. Without such shared sacrifices, the country risks deepening social fractures that could eventually destabilise the very economy these elites depend on and therefore these sacrifices represent an investment in shared prosperity and national preservation. Expected outcomes Through its participation the ISI aims to contribute to: Building a national consensus on inclusive economic growth as a foundational pillar for societal well-being. Developing policy recommendations that promote both economic performance and social justice. The promotion of stronger collaboration between social partners to implement inclusive development strategies. Enhancing the public discourse on the importance of equity, cohesion and collective responsibility. Building a national commitment to structural change, accountability and long-term shared sacrifice. Conclusion The National Dialogue presents a unique and timely opportunity to reimagine South Africa’s future and therefore the Inclusive Society Institute stands ready to offer thought leadership and convening power to shape a path that reflects the values of social justice, inclusivity and fairness. To turn this vision into a lived reality for all-of-society will require a new paradigm and new thinking that embraces growth, but not without reform and that encourages investment, but not without fairness; and that promotes unity, but not without accountability. Temporary financial sacrifices, community service, and cultural shifts toward greater empathy and inclusion are not burdens, they are safeguards against collapse. They are necessary instruments to avoid the societal rupture that will surely follow if the current economic path continues to favour the few at the expense of the many. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. MARCH 2026 by Lars Gumede BCom (Actuarial Science) ABSTRACT The major powers globally have made cybersecurity a top priority. They see that every aspect of our lives depends on an expanding complex network of cyber systems that are vulnerable to exploitation. That cyberspace is a domain of power and opportunity, but with that comes threat from malicious actors. South Africa is not adequately prepared for this reality. In fact, the country has the third-highest incidence of cyberattacks in the world. Citizens are being scammed, defrauded, robbed and tricked by sophisticated cybercriminal gangs. Businesses are being extorted and held to ransom. The country’s defence organisations and government themselves regularly fall victim to cyberattacks. And the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) is just making it easier for even amateur cyber actors to access dangerous cyber tools. The crisis of cybersecurity in South Africa requires a national project involving all sectors of society: the government, private sector, civil society and citizens. Following the lead of countries around the world that are winning the cybersecurity war, there are three main priorities. First, is putting in place a dedicated cybersecurity organisation; one that is totally free from political appointments and interference and led by the top cyber experts in the country. The second priority is developing a national cybersecurity awareness campaign to strengthen the weakest link in South Africa’s cyber defence: the human element. And third, a national programme of cultivating the next generation of cyber talent is required. Without proper cybersecurity, no nation can be secure. A single cyberattack could descend the country into total anarchy in less than a week. This thought alone should be driving us to act now, together as a nation. INTRODUCTION Cybersecurity is the most important aspect of national security in today’s world. Every facet of our lives depends on cyber systems, and these systems are vulnerable to malicious cyber threat actors. Amateur hackers, cybercriminal gangs and nation-state cyber actors are all engaged in illegal activities targeting South Africa and its people. Malicious software, including spyware, is being deployed against government organisations. Ransomware is being used to extort and hold businesses to ransom. Deepfakes are being deployed against unsuspecting citizens for the purposes of scams, frauds and outright thefts. Worse, the development of artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming this threat landscape into an even bigger one. Due to new AI developments, it has never been easier for cyber actors to get their hands on dangerous cyber tools. This means small-time cyber actors now have access to sophisticated tools once reserved for large organisations and nation-state cyber actors. Furthermore, already sophisticated cyber actors are made even more capable and dangerous. South Africa is currently the wild west of cyber activity, with among the highest incidences of cyberattacks in the world. Government organisations are routinely infiltrated in cyberspace by hacker groups, nation-state actors and even amateur hackers. Private businesses are consistently victims of ransomware and extortion, being forced to pay large amounts to regain control of their systems. Private citizens are frequent victims of deepfakes and associated cybercrimes intended to rob, scam or extort them. The fact that the rest of the continent is even more lawless when it comes to cyberspace is a further strategic issue for South Africa, as countries all over the continent house cybercriminal groups actively targeting the country. As will be seen, there are also plenty of cybersecurity success stories from countries around the world. For the world’s major powers, cyber is a top priority and their primary initiatives are threefold. First, they have dedicated cybersecurity and cyber intelligence organisations that employ their nation’s top cyber experts and coordinate cybersecurity, cyber intelligence, and incident response as well as law enforcement actions with regard to cyber threats and crimes. Second, they have national cybersecurity awareness campaigns, recognising that the weakest link is always the human element. These programmes train citizens in good cyber practises and on how to recognise cyber threats, schemes and scams. Finally, these top nations put great effort into creating and fostering the next generation of cyber talent by giving support to promising young individuals on a large scale. Cybersecurity is the bedrock of every modern nation; without it no nation can be secure. This is a matter of top priority and requires the urgent attention of the entire country: the government, private sector, civil society and citizenry. WHAT IS CYBERSECURITY AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? Cybersecurity is about the protection of data, networks, devices, systems and processes from unauthorised access and interference by known and unknown actors (CISA, 2025). In today’s world, cyber systems are integrated into every facet of our lives, from the devices we carry around like extra limbs, to municipal systems like traffic lights, water infrastructure and electricity grids. These are systems we rely on for the proper functioning of society, and they are all at constant risk of attack, with potentially devastating consequences. Cyberattacks come in many forms. There is malicious software (Malware), which is software designed to take advantage of a system, and forms a part of most modern cyberattacks. There is social engineering (Phishing), also known as human hacking, which aims to trick an individual into granting the attacker access to a system. Phishing attacks often use seemingly normal emails, text messages, phone calls and other methods to trick an individual into taking actions such as sharing personal information and passwords, downloading malware or sending money. Spoofing is an attacker pretending to be someone you know by replicating their email or phone number. There are Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, which seek to overwhelm and flood a system with large amounts of junk traffic in order to crash the system and render it unusable to the legitimate persons using the system. Ransomware is utilised to lock legitimate users out of their systems, demanding payment to unlock them. There are also Zero-Day exploits, which are advanced and novel holes attackers find in a system that allows them access — these are very difficult to detect and rely on the fact that no system is perfect. Another type is Password attacks, in which an attacker attempts to guess the victims passwords or login details. These are just some of the types of cyberattacks and risks faced by governments, companies and individuals (IBM, 2025). According to the Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025 report by the World Economic Forum (WEF), these attacks represent the vast majority of cyber threats to governments, businesses and individuals (WEF, 2025). Figure 1: Most Common Types of Cyberattacks. (Source: Generated by author.) These cyberattacks can come from various sources. Cybercriminal gangs utilise the above techniques in order to extort and rob ordinary citizens. Hackers, whether amateurs (‘script kiddies’) or persons with expert-level experience and skills, are constantly aiming to exploit common systems like mobile devices, computers, corporate and government systems. There are also nation-state actors, which are groups of hackers with the backing of countries, giving them the resources to pull off sophisticated cyber operations. Often these nation-state actors buy technologies from companies engaged in the development of spyware and other cyber or surveillance technologies (IBM, 2025). With all our lives and the smooth functioning of society dependant on cyber systems, this is a matter of the utmost importance. At the click of a button an entire country’s electricity grid can be shut off or its water systems interfered with. In 2015, a Russian hacker group known as ‘Sandworm’ remotely shut down the Ukrainian power grid for six hours, leaving 230,000 residents without electricity (CFR, 2015). In 2010, an Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz was disrupted by the Stuxnet virus, a piece of malicious software developed by American and Israeli intelligence (Baezner & Robin, 2017). In 2024, Israel carried out an operation in which the pagers of thousands of Hezbollah operatives were simultaneously and remotely detonated (Trenta, 2024). In 2014, Chinese state-sponsored hackers exfiltrated blueprints of the Lockheed Martin F35 stealth fighter jet, using the information to support their own fighter jet programme (AFOSI, 2020). In 2018, Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was tracked to his brutal murder by Saudi operatives using advanced spyware built by Israeli company, NSO group (The Guardian, 2021). It is clear that there is an ongoing global cyber war of all against all. The systems we rely on can be infiltrated to such an extent that attackers have more control over our devices than we do — giving them access to everything: our bank details, our personal data and communications, as well as the ability to surveil and sabotage. Now, despite the fact that these acts are often highly sophisticated, they can be prevented. Most advanced cybersecurity systems are near secure enough for their purposes; the issue is the human aspect. Cybersecurity has a PICNIC problem: Problem In Chair, Not In Computer. Most cyber incidents rely on an unsuspecting individual to click on a link or compromise themselves in some way. Being the weakest link, it is essential to address the human aspect. This involves creating awareness about the realities of cybersecurity and exploitation in order not to gently open the door for the attackers. This human component is the most important component in cybersecurity as attackers seek to trick legitimate users into giving them access — this makes the attacks even harder to detect and trace. Unfortunately, there is an entirely new aspect to cyber threats in 2025. Cyber actors are now utilising artificial intelligence (AI) to supercharge their attacks. CYBERSECURITY IN THE AGE OF AI. EVEN MORE URGENT Cybersecurity has been a concern for as long as computers have been around. During World War II, there was a cyber battle between the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany involving building the first advanced computers, building secure encryption to ensure the security of the communications of their respective sides, and attempting to crack the encryption of the other. Breakthroughs by the first cryptographic experts at Bletchley Park in the UK turned the tide of the war and gave birth to the United Kingdom’s cyber intelligence organisation, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). In 2010, the Stuxnet virus, a sophisticated piece of software, caused major disruptions to the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz — the virus was walked through the door on a USB drive by an unsuspecting and naive employee. The top technology companies have been fighting a constant uphill battle with attackers and every few months a new major company is hacked and has data exposed or is held to ransom. It is clear then that the issue of cybersecurity is not new. Unfortunately, there is a new factor at play today making the issue of cybersecurity even more severe: Artificial Intelligence (AI). Using advanced AI, sophisticated hacking tools are widely available to anyone with sufficient motivation, and already sophisticated actors now have even more sophisticated tools. Actors are now utilising AI and their own creativity to come up with extraordinary cyber schemes. For example, in February 2024, on a regular day in Hong Kong, an employee of Arup, a British multinational company, received instructions on a video conference call with his boss and CFO to transfer $25 million (~R500 million) to an external account. Unfortunately for the company and the employee involved, the entire affair was a complex cyber fraud utilising advanced AI. All the persons on the video call were, in fact, deepfakes. The attackers had used voice-cloning and face-generation tools to imitate the real expressions and speech of the company seniors. The target was left with no doubt of the request’s legitimacy and transferred the money, which was then quickly laundered through accounts and cryptocurrency mixers, and is yet to be recovered. What is most concerning about this incident is that all the tools involved are available essentially for free on the internet for anyone with the bravado and willingness to learn these techniques (Gumede, 2024). That means these attacks are only going to get more advanced and the attackers, more creative. Platforms such as ElevenLabs can generate a full audio avatar of a person with just a 30-second clip of the person speaking, and WormGPT (the hacking equivalent of ChatGPT) can generate real-seeming personalised emails, texts and scripts for use in such attacks. Recently, a special kind of AI-powered malware was developed (in proof of concept form) by a Canadian cybersecurity research company. This “Polymorphic malware” uses AI to constantly change and hide itself, allowing it to remain undetected by Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools (HYAS, 2024). This means the malware can behave as if it is alive and actively evade detection by the security defences. The confluence of ordinary cyberattacks and threat actors combined with the developments in AI have brought about a dramatic shift in the cybersecurity landscape. Cybercriminals no longer need specialised skills and abilities in order to carry out these attacks and those who do possess these skills are made even stronger. STATE OF CYBERSECURITY IN SA South Africa is scarily vulnerable in all aspects of cybersecurity and consistently victim to malicious cyber actors, who essentially have free reign to victimise whomever they please. According to the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC), South Africa ranks as the third-highest country globally in terms of cybercrime victims (SABRIC, 2024). An assessment detailed in Interpol’s African Cyberthreat Assessment Report found that nearly 600 cyberattacks are launched every hour at South African businesses, government and civic organisations (Interpol, 2022). Government, the private sector and the citizenry are all being victimised, with little to no response, as there is no dedicated agency for cybersecurity or cybercrimes like there is in most developed nations. Each year, the country loses roughly R2.2 billion due to cyberattacks and incidents, according to the Information and Cybersecurity Centre at the CSIR, which does cybersecurity analysis and statistics. The report by the CSIR also states that over half of all South African companies are victims of ransomware each year and that the average cost of a single large data breach is R53.1 million. Moreover, 88% of South African organisations face between one and five cyber incidents each year (CSIR, 2024). This should come as no surprise, as the country lacks a structured counter to this cyber threat. The National Cyber Policy Framework (NCPF) assigns the Department of Science and Technology (DST) the responsibility of putting in place a national cybersecurity research and development agenda. However, experts such as Prof. Elmarie Biermann and Dr. Noëlle van der Waag-Cowling have assessed a ‘lack of momentum’ in relation to this agenda (Biermann & Cowling, 2018). These critics argue that the legislation introduced in 2018, namely the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, has had no quantifiable effect on the cybersecurity landscape and instead seems to criminalise routine and non-harmful online activities. The primary laws dealing with cybercriminal activity are the Cyber Crimes Act of 2020 and the Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of 2002. The Cyber Crimes Act criminalises hacking, unlawful interception of data, ransomware and similar activities (Cyber Crimes Act, 2020). The Electronic Communications Act gives legal protections to sensitive electronic activities such as electronic transactions and communications (Electronic Communications Act, 2002). The laws are comprehensive (some say too comprehensive as to inhibit perfectly reasonable activity), but enforcement is virtually nil. In March 2012, the NCPF mandated the then Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services (now the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies [DCDT]) to create the Cybersecurity Hub. The Cybersecurity Hub serves as the country’s Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) and coordinates cybersecurity responses and information sharing between departments (Cybersecurity Hub, 2025). It also runs an awareness portal (website) with information on cyber awareness but does not run widespread public information campaigns bringing the message to the people. This cyber hub is being overseen by the Cyber Response Committee of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. Since these structures have not substantively reduced the cyber threat (544 police cases in the face of over 100,000 banking-related cyberattacks alone; an 86% increase year-on-year), opposition parties, led by DA Spokesperson for Justice and Constitutional Development Adv. Glynnis Breytenbach MP, have tabled a bill proposing the creation of an Office of the Cyber Commissioner to oversee cyber activities (DA, 2025). Steps are needed as all sectors of society — public, private, civil and individuals — are under constant cyber victimisation, with little to no consequences from law enforcement. PUBLIC SECTOR Government departments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are under constant attack from and victimisation by cyber actors. Eskom, the national power utility, is under constant attack. According to Sithembile Songo, the chief information security officer (CISO) at Eskom, it faces up to one billion attempted cyberattacks per month, with DDoS attacks being most common and ransomware attacks accounting for more than 100,000. In 2022, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was hacked and its systems disrupted. Then Treasury Minister Enoch Godongwana said that neither SARB nor the South African authorities were able to identify the attack; instead, the FBI (from the United States) “took it upon themselves to notify the oblivious authorities” (Maliti, 2022). In July 2024, Minister of Public Works and Infrastructure Dean Macpherson announced that hackers had stolen R300 million from the department over a period of 10 years of undetected theft (Public Works, 2024). In May 2024, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development was victim to a ransomware attack that compromised over 1,200 sensitive files. In July, National Treasury announced they had found malware on their systems related to an attack on Microsoft Sharepoint and that they were seeking Microsoft’s help in dealing with the issue (BusinessTech, 2025). In Jan 2025, the South African Weather Service suffered a hack that left the systems down and unable to function for two weeks in what it described as a “criminal security breach” (Digital Watch SA, 2025). More recently, in March 2025, Parliament announced the hacking of its social media accounts — an incident which saw attackers using the official social media accounts of the Parliament of South Africa for the purposes of promoting a scam cryptocurrency project. In 2022, the Department of Defence was hacked by a threat actor by the name of ‘Security Notification Attachment’ a.k.a. Snatch. A spokesperson for the department denied any hack took place, saying they were “categorically unwilling to accept information about penetration into the secure government network” (MyBroadband, 2025a). Despite their bizarre denials, 1.6TB of sensitive data from the Department of Defence was published on the website of the attackers and can still be bought on various dark web data broker websites by anyone with the funds, internet and a computer. In 2024, Cybersecurity research company Recorded Future reported that the State Security Agency was amongst a handful of government departments around the world that had been breached by the cyber-espionage group RedNovember (MyBroadband, 2025b). The group uses open-source tools to exploit vulnerabilities in devices linked to the internet to target government and private organisations globally (Recorded Future, 2024). The threat to the country’s security is clear. Hackers can, at will, penetrate all government systems, even sensitive defence systems. Rather than acknowledge this major national security crisis, the Minister of Defence Angie Motshekga told Parliament that “cybersecurity is already inherent in SANDF doctrine” (Teixeira, 2025). In the Department of Defence’s Annual Report for FY2024/25, the DoD notes that it is participating in the discussions to create an Integrated Cybersecurity Centre in the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) cluster. These discussions have been ongoing and there has been no substantive progress yet. In 2018, the DoD stated its aim of creating a cyber capability. However, the head of the SANDF’s cyber command, Brigadier General Mafi Mgobozi, stated before Parliament in 2023 that the new unit was in ‘limbo in relation to finding suitable facilities’ and is currently accommodated in "limited space” at Defence Intelligence headquarters and is, therefore, not able to function optimally (DefenceWeb, 2023). The general has subsequently described the unit as being “partially operational” due to lack of funding (Lesedi, 2023). Considering the lack of a dedicated, well-funded and capacitated agency to deal with the cyber threat, it is likely this trend will continue and government entities will remain vulnerable. Similar types of attacks against government will only become more prevalent. This is echoed by the State Security Agency’s warning that attacks on critical infrastructure are likely to escalate going forward (DefenceWeb, 2025). PRIVATE SECTOR It is not just government that is under constant cyberattack; private sector organisations are also being victimised and their victimisation made worse by the lack of government capability in this area. Cybersecurity researcher Check Point’s Global Threat Intelligence Report, released in July 2025, shows that South African businesses are hit by 2,113 cyberattacks every week (CPR, 2025). Despite this, private sector cybersecurity budgets are low and, more importantly, business awareness of the threats remains low. In a survey mentioned in the report, 80% of IT executives interviewed said they were most confident they could not fall for any kind of phishing attack. However, when tested, 64% of them clicked on a malicious phishing link disguised as a friendly one. Large companies regularly fall victim to data breach and ransom. In April 2025, Cell C announced it had been hacked by cyberattackers, resulting in customer data being stolen. The company stated it was working with the authorities to deal with the issue and mitigate the impact on customers’ service but that it was unclear just how bad the attack had been. It therefore urged its users to be vigilant and assume the worst. In March 2025, the real estate company Pam Golding suffered a cyberattack. As part of the attack, unidentified cyber assailants remotely accessed the company’s customer relationship management software system. This resulted in the personal data of its customers — like contact details, addresses and ID numbers — being exposed (Decision Inc, 2025). In April 2025, the telecommunications operator MTN, Africa’s largest mobile operator, underwent a sustained cyberattack. In a company statement, it said the attackers gained unauthorised access to the personal information of customers in various markets across the continent. In March 2025, Astral Foods, which is South Africa’s largest chicken producer, suffered a breach by unknown cyberattackers. The attack disrupted the company’s ability to produce and distribute its chicken, which saw a temporary nationwide chicken shortage (Decision Inc, 2025). Unfortunately, these threats are not only faced by large businesses, but also by small businesses — often with much worse consequences, as they do not have the capabilities and budgets of large companies. Recent surveys reveal that 47% of South African businesses report experiencing between one and five cybersecurity incidents in the past year (2023), with 88% admitting to at least one security breach (CSIR, 2024). The consequences of poor cybersecurity readiness are devastating. Imagine a local retail business that processes hundreds of transactions daily. One day, employees are greeted with a ransom note on their screens, demanding R500,000 to unlock their encrypted files. Unable to access customer data, inventory records or payment systems, the business grinds to a halt. After several days of downtime, the company reluctantly pays the ransom, only to discover that the data has been deleted. Legal fees, customer compensation, reputational damage and lack of support from authorities further compound the losses. Seventy-one percent of cyber leaders believe that small organisations have reached a critical tipping point in being unable to secure themselves against growing cyber threats, according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025 (WEF, 2025). This is because new AI-boosted cyberattacks have reached a pivotal moment in sophistication, requiring more than business owners are able to do to counter them. INDIVIDUALS Individual citizens are also commonly victim to advanced cyberattacks. Often these attacks are successful due to victims not believing that anybody would go so out of their way to scam them. Yet, there are thousands of ordinary citizens who have been victimised by unscrupulous cybercriminal elements. One notable advanced tactic is the use of AI-powered scams and frauds. In January 2024, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) issued a public warning after persons were fooled by an investment scam that utilised deepfakes (AI-generated videos) of prominent South African businesspersons such as Patrice Motsepe and Johann Rupert. Recently, former Finance Minister Trevor Manuel warned of a scam on social media platforms that featured a deepfake of him, stating that “there are social media posts using [his] image, and artificial voice and pretending to either give people investment advice or requesting that they invest in products that I advise them to” (Fraser, 2025). In October 2025, SARB also issued a statement warning of a deepfake investment scam featuring their chief, Governor Lesetja Kganyago. Major bank FNB made similar public statements, warning of a deepfake scam impersonating bank officers and seeking to trick bank customers into giving the attackers access to their systems, saying that “in some cases, the scams can be incredibly sophisticated, leveraging deepfakes, voice synthesis, and automated chatbots to appear more legitimate” (Illridge, 2025) In fact, instances of deepfake scams have risen by 1200% in the past year, according to a report by TransUnion Africa. “We’re a very digitally orientated country, with internet penetration at about 79%, over 50 million users, and 124 million mobile connections. That gives rise to exploitation,” said Amritha Reddy, Senior Director of Fraud Product Management at TransUnion (Nozulela, 2025). These deepfake scams can also be much more intimate than a social media advertisement using the likeness of a prominent figure. Zoho, a South African cybersecurity company, has warned about much more personal schemes by cybercriminals; impersonating loved ones on WhatsApp. A typical scam such as this works as follows: you get a phone call about something unrelated and over time the attackers develop a large audio file of your voice that can be turned into an audio deepfake. The attackers can then call or send voice notes pretending to be you (Adeyemi, 2025). This issue has led Deputy Minister of Communications Mondli Gungubele to state that the country needs to prepare to protect consumers against scams and cybercrime related to AI. Figure 2: Main cyber risks to government, business, society and the citizenry. (Source: Generated by author) AFRICA Not limited to South Africa, the entire continent is facing a cybersecurity crisis. Cybercrime costs Africa an estimated $3.5 billion (R70 billion) annually, according to a report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and McAfee (Kauder, 2025). According to Interpol, cybercrime accounts for roughly 30% of all reported crimes in both western and eastern Africa. In July 2024, hackers calling themselves ‘Hunters’ breached Kenya’s Urban Roads Authority, then struck again in December against Telecom Namibia, affecting over 500,000 customers. In April, R100 million was stolen from Nigerian fintech company Flutterwave by daring hackers. According to Interpol, hackers routinely exploit Africa’s poor infrastructure and outdated systems. In fact, cybercriminals operating Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) use African organisations as a testing ground for new malware. After South Africa, the most targeted countries, according to Interpol, are Egypt and Morocco, due to their large economies and internet access (Interpol, 2024). The primary cybersecurity initiative in Africa is Interpol’s African Joint Operation against Cybercrime (AFJOC), which is engaged in combating cybercrime across the continent. During Operation Serengeti 2.0 (in 2025), a part of AFJOC and involving 18 African nations as well as the UK, over 1,200 arrests were made and close to R2 billion recovered. The operation also dismantled 11,000 ‘malicious infrastructures’ linked to ransomware, business email compromise and large-scale fraud. Under this operation, the authorities in Angola closed 25 illegal cryptocurrency mining sites operated by 60 Chinese nationals and seized close to R800 million in equipment. In Zambia, police dismantled a R6 billion investment fraud scheme that victimised 65,000 people and uncovered a human-trafficking linked scam that utilised 372 forged passports. In Côte d’Ivoire, authorities arrested the leader of a R30 million inheritance scam. Among the countries participating were Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, alongside the UK and other Interpol members (DefenceWeb, 2025). Due to the rampant cyber lawlessness in the rest of the continent of Africa, South Africa faces an even bigger threat as cybercriminal gangs are targeting South Africa from outside its borders. These challenges make it essential to learn what the most successful cyber countries around the world are doing in order to implement what is proven to work. WHAT TOP COUNTRIES AROUND THE WORLD ARE DOING Countries around the world have implemented all sorts of highly successful cyber initiatives, bringing great benefit to their economies, stability, security and more. In November 2022, after a number of large cyber incidents, such as the breach of Medibank in which the confidential data of millions of Australians was exposed, a new cybercrime task force was set up, known as the ‘Hack the Hackers’ task force. A joint operation by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the country’s cyber intelligence organisation, the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), the task force put together 100 of Australia’s top cyber experts, brought them under one roof and gave them the go-ahead to use offensive cyber tools and tactics similar to those employed by the hackers themselves to hunt down and neutralise cyber threats to Australia (O’Neil, 2023). The task force has already seen major success, including involvement in Operation Checkmate (2025) taking down the BlackSuit/Royal ransomware group, which has extorted more than R6 billion from victims around the world. In Operation Endgame (2024), the task force took down an international botnet infrastructure using more than 200 servers, made dozens of arrests, and carried out the seizure of millions of euros in cryptocurrency (Breached Company, 2025). This task force is reversing the ordinary dynamic between the authorities and cybercriminals by actively hunting down these threat actors, thus creating real consequences for cyber acts against the state. This is a perfect example of how a country should respond to rising cybercrime and cybersecurity threats. In July 2021, Singapore’s Cybersecurity Agency (CSA) launched an initiative called ‘Better Cyber Safe Than Sorry’ — a large-scale cybersecurity public awareness campaign. As explored above, the weakest link in any cyber system is the human aspect. By raising awareness in the populous of cybersecurity essentials, one can substantively reduce the costs of cybercrime. The campaign has four key points: Using strong passwords (with multifactor authentication), recognising the signs of phishing and other social engineering schemes, using up-to-date anti-virus software, and always keeping the software on personal devices up to date (CSA, 2025). The campaign has partnered with major Singaporean e-commerce sites like Shopee, Carousell and hundreds of other stores. It utilises TV ads, bus stop posters and social media to spread the message far and wide. In addition, the CSA runs a ‘Cyber Safe Seniors Programme’ giving multilingual cybersecurity awareness educational content to over 50,000 senior citizens in a bid to prevent those seniors falling victim to cybercrimes and scams. This is a real model for a national cybersecurity awareness campaign (OpenGov Asia, 2021). The United States has long had several dedicated organisations dealing with cyber. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA), the country’s largest intelligence organisation, which deals with signals and cyber intelligence, including tracking sophisticated cyber actors around the world. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the coordinator for all US cyber and infrastructure security (CISA, 2025). The United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the military organisation, has the goal to “Own the Domain” when it comes to cyberspace. Together these organisations work towards ensuring that whatever happens in cyber space, happens to the advantage of the United States (USCYBERCOM, 2025). The successes of these organisations are common knowledge, from monitoring and responding to cyber threats to creating the world’s most advanced cyber tools. Recently, in August 2025, the above organisations issued a warning about the Chinese cyber threat actor known as Salt Typhoon — which had targeted telecommunications companies around the world. The NSA even has its own hacking unit, once known as Tailored Access Operations (TAO), directly targeting adversaries and other threats to America. CISA routinely stress tests the systems of large American companies, with the view of protecting them from foreign threat actors. Such dedicated cyber organisations and agencies are essential for the protection of any major country. In 2000, less than 2% of the population of China had access to the internet (World Bank, 2025). Today China is, of course, a global cyber and internet power. In May 1999, after a US missile destroyed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the first known Chinese cyberattack took place. Early Chinese internet users defaced the websites of several American government departments. Those early hackers from the China Eagle Union and the Honka Union of China were the beginning of Chinese hacking power — now known the world over for sophisticated operations that have successfully brought China up to the level of the United States in science and technology (Lafarge, 2022). Instead of being shunned, these early Chinese hackers were given the support they needed to develop their abilities and given the go-ahead to use their skills for the betterment of the state. As a result, this small group of ‘Honkers’ (derived from the Chinese ‘Hong Ke’) with just 40 hackers, known to western researchers as ‘The Red 40’, which began as a loose network that met in online forums in the 1990s and 2000s, became a global cyber superpower within the short space of a decade or two (Benincasa, 2025). Today, Israel makes up 0.11% of the world’s population. Despite this, it holds one-third (33%) of the world’s cybersecurity unicorns (billion dollar startups). For comparison, the Cape Town—Stellenbosch corridor (South Africa’s ‘Silicon Valley’) had roughly 450 tech companies in 2022, while Israel had 6,500, one for every 1,400 people. This cyber hub has attracted the majority of the top tech companies in the world to open R&D centres in Israel. This was achieved through programmes such as the Talpiot programme and Unit 8200 (Gumede, 2022). The Talpiot programme is a specialised training programme for the top school and high school students in the country and is designed to get them to the level of a university graduate before they even graduate high school, putting these top students on the path to becoming world-class experts in their fields; everything from cyber, sciences, academia and leadership. The top cyber trainees go into Unit 8200, Israel’s signals and cyber intelligence organisation, where they are given the go-ahead to create the world’s most advanced cyber systems and tools. Then, after these tools are replaced and become militarily obsolete, they take these tools to the private sector, starting world-class cyber-tech startups. For this reason, Unit 8200 graduates are coveted by tech companies around the world. This unique programme produced Israel’s extraordinary overachievement in cybersecurity and associated technologies (Gumede, 2022). These examples of the most successful cybersecurity initiatives from around the world each speak to a different essential aspect of this new world: Dedicated cyber organisations, national public awareness campaigns, proactive and offensive operations as well as supporting the next generation of cyber talent, who will create the technologies of the future. WHAT SA SHOULD DO Given that there are already proven examples of successes from around the world, the country must learn from these. South Africa should seek to emulate all of the initiatives outlined above and below. CREATION OF A NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION The creation of a dedicated cybersecurity and intelligence organisation that is well capacitated, well-funded and has clear objectives. This organisation should be staffed by the top experts in the field and not encumbered by political appointments and interference. This organisation should oversee all cyber activities, go after cyber threats to the country in order to restore consequences for cybercrimes, and test all public and private systems for their cyber strength. Such an organisation would oversee the cybersecurity of government departments, infrastructure, corporate systems and products, and the creation of locally made defensive and offensive tools. Most importantly, it should prepare and execute a long-term cyber strategy. CREATION OF A NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PUBLIC AWARENESS AND EDUCATION CAMPAIGN The creation of a publicly accessible (zero-rated) platform as well as widespread messaging to bring awareness to the population about proper cybersecurity practices, to address the weak link ‘PICNIC’ problem of cyber defence. This is particularly essential for older citizens or citizens further away from the tech and internet worlds. Such a campaign would have the effect of raising the cybersecurity awareness of the population, turning all citizens into eyes that can monitor for malicious cyber activities, keeping the citizenry updated on the latest techniques utilised by cybercriminals, and preventing countless persons falling victim to scams, frauds and other criminal activities. CREATION OF A NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR FOSTERING TOP CYBER TALENT This could mean giving support to promising school students or giving internships and work opportunities to top talent. It could also mean taking all persons incarcerated for cyber-related crimes and putting their skills to work to the benefit of the state. This strategy is not without precedent globally or in South Africa; as in the case of the Bishops High School student who hacked ABSA in 2003 and was forced to work for three years at the CSIR’s Cybersecurity Research Lab (M&G, 2003). Such a programme would quickly create a large cohort of cyber experts in all subfields, which will have unquantifiable benefits to the economy, state institutions, employment, and positively affect every other sector of society. Figure 3: South Africa Cybersecurity Action Triangle. (Source: Generated by author) By implementing these initiatives, the country will address the current cyber threat crisis (cybersecurity and intelligence organisation), position itself properly for the future (fostering next-generation talent) and turn all South African citizens into cybersecurity-aware frontline defenders (national awareness campaign). These basics are being employed by every major tech-leading country. CONCLUSION Every facet of our lives depends on cyber systems, and those cyber systems are only becoming more vulnerable to malicious actors . For this reason, the major nations globally have cybersecurity as a top priority. Cyberspace is a domain of power and South Africa is not adequately prepared. Acts in cyberspace are being committed every day by the powers of the world. From the United States deploying a virus to destroy Iranian nuclear plants, Russia shutting down the Ukrainian power grid, and Israel turning innocent-seeming pagers into explosive devices against Hezbollah, to Chinese hackers exfiltrating defence blueprints from US defence companies — it is clear that the domain of cyberspace is the most important in today’s world. It is a domain in which an invisible global war is being constantly fought. Not only is South Africa likely the victim of all manner of nation-state cyber operations, but cyber actors of all types are also running free, constantly victimising South African citizens to the point where South Africa has the third-highest incidence of cyberattacks in the world. Ordinary citizens are being scammed, defrauded, robbed and tricked by sophisticated cybercriminal gangs. Businesses, small and large, are being extorted and held to ransom, resulting in billions of rands in losses and unquantifiable damage to the economy. The country’s defence organisations, which are supposed to secure the country from external threats, are themselves consistently penetrated by cyber threat actors. Government is also victim to these cyberattacks, as are private sector organisations and individuals. The issue of cybersecurity requires a national project involving all sectors of society: the government, private sector, civil society and the population as individuals. This is a defence issue, as the country’s diplomatic communications can be intercepted, the army’s vehicles and planes hacked and disabled, elections influenced, with the only bound being the creativity of the attackers. This is an education and talent issue, as the development of the next generation of cyber experts is needed to create the technologies and strategies of the future. This is also a stability issue, as power grids, water infrastructure, supply chains, food production, can all be hacked and brought to a standstill. Such a thing could descend the country into total anarchy in less than a week. What needs to be done is clear and does not require the reinvention of the wheel. Following the lead of such countries as Australia, the United States, China and most other developed countries, a dedicated cybersecurity organisation is required. One that is totally free from political appointments and interference and led by the top cyber experts in the country. Following the lead of countries such as Singapore, a national cybersecurity awareness campaign is needed to work to strengthen the weakest link in South Africa’s cyber defence, which is the human element. If people have a better understanding of the risks and realities of cybersecurity and cybercrime, this will bring massive benefits to the country — including an immediate and substantial decrease in cybercriminality and victimisation. Following the lead of such countries as Israel, China and the US, a national programme of cultivating the next generation of cyber talent is required. This will create the world-class experts of tomorrow, who will bring knowledge, technologies and security to the country. Without proper cybersecurity, no nation can be secure. This is a matter of top priority and requires the urgent attention of the entire country: the government, the private sector, civil society and the citizenry. REFERENCES Adeyemi, S. 2025. Rising security fears in South Africa as scammers weaponise WhatsApp voice notes. [Online] Available at: https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/ rising-security-fears-in-south-africa-as-scammers-weaponise-whatsapp-voice-notes/m50286d [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI). 2020. Cyber espionage for the Chinese government. [Online] Available at: https://www.osi.af.mil/News/ Features/Display/Article/2350807/cyber-espionage-for-the-chinese-government/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Baezner, M. & Robin, P. 2017. CSS Cyber Defense Project: Hotspot Analysis: Stuxnet. Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. [Online] Available at: https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/ gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2017-04.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Benincasa, E. 2025. Before Vegas: The “Red Hackers” Who Shaped China’s Cyber Ecosystem. Zurich: Center for Security Studies. [Online] Available at: https://css.ethz.ch/en/center/CSS-news/ 2025/07/before-vegas-the-red-hackers-who-shaped-chinas-cyber-ecosystem.html [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Biermann, E. & Cowling, N. 2018. Mind the Gap: Addressing South Africa’s cybersecurity skills shortage. [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/ 2018-07-13-mind-the-gap-addressing-south-africas-cybersecurity-skills-shortage/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Breached Company. 2025. Global Cybercrime Crackdown 2025: A Mid-year Assessment of Major Arrests and Takedowns. [Online] Available at: https://breached.company/ global-cybercrime-crackdown-2025-a-mid-year-assessment-of-major-arrests-and-takedowns/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. BusinessTech. 2025. National Treasury exposed to malware in major Microsoft security breach. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/it-services/832796/national-treasuryexposed-to-malware-in-major-microsoft-security-breach/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Check Point Research (CPR). 2025. Threat Intelligence Report — 14 July 2025. [Online] Available at: https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/14th-july-threat-intelligence-report/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 2015. Compromise of a power grid in eastern Ukraine. [Online] Available at: https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/compromise-power-grid-eastern-ukraine [accessed: 4 March 2026]. CSIR Information and Cybersecurity Centre (CSIR). 2024. About the CSIR Information and Cybersecurity Research Centre. [Online] Available at: https://www.csir.co.za/sites/default/files/ Documents/250154_CSIR%20ICSC%20Booklet_Mining.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Cybersecurity Agency (CSA). 2025. Better Cyber Safe Than Sorry. [Online] Available at: https://www.csa.gov.sg/our-programmes/cybersecurity-outreach/cybersecurity-campaigns/ better-cyber-safe-than-sorry-campaign [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). 2025. What is Cybersecurity? [Online] Available at: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/what-cybersecurity? utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Cybersecurity Hub. 2025. Official website of the South African National CSIRT. [Online] Available at: https:// www.cybersecurityhub.gov.za/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Decision Inc. 2025. SA under siege: Why cybersecurity must be a business imperative. [Online] Available at: https://www.itweb.co.za/article/sa-under-siege-why-cyber-security-must-be-abusiness-imperative/PmxVEMKE6ZpvQY85 [accessed: 4 March 2026]. DefenceWeb. 2023. SANDF Cyber Command operating in “limited space”. [Online] Available at: https://defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-cyber-command-operating-in-limited-space/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. DefenceWeb. 2025. South Africa faces escalating cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure. [Online] Available at: https://defenceweb.co.za/cyber-defence/south-africa-faces-escalatingcybersecurity-threats-to-critical-infrastructure/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Democratic Alliance (DA). 2025. Over 100 000 cyber-attacks while SAPS records just 544 cases – DA pushes for Cyber Commissioner. [Online] Available at: https://www.da.org.za/ 2025/09/over-100-000-cyber-attacks-while-saps-records-just-544-cases-da-pushes-for-cyber-commissioner [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Department of Public Works and Infrastructure, Government of South Africa (Public Works). 2024. Minister Dean Macpherson on R300 million cyber crime theft unearthed at Department Public Works and Infrastructure. [Online] Available at:https:// www.gov.za/news/media-statements/minister-dean-macpherson-r300-million-cyber-crime-theft-uneartheddepartment [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Digital Watch SA. South African weather service hit by cyberattack, affecting critical operations. [Online] Available at: https://dig.watch/updates/south-african-weather-service-hit-by-cyberattack-affecting-critical-operations [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Fraser, L. 2025. Trevor Manuel’s warning for South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/business-opinion/838959/trevor-manuels-warning-for-south-africa/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Gumede, L. 2022. Economic Growth Requires Intelligent Design. [Online] Available at: https://www.sundaytimes.timeslive.co.za/opinion-and-analysis/2022-02-27-economic-growth-requiresan-intelligent-design/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Gumede, L. 2024. AI-powered hackers loom large for SA. [Online] Available at: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2025-04-15-lars-gumede-ai-powered-hackers-loom-largefor-sa/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. HYAS Infosec Inc (HYAS). 2024. BlackMamba: AI-synthesized, polymorphic key logger with on-the-fly program modification. [Online] Available at: https://www.hyas.com/hubfs/ Downloadable%20Content/HYAS-AI-Augmented-Cyber-Attack-WP-1.1.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Illridge, M. 2025. High-tech crime surge in South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/611683-high-tech-crime-surge-in-south-africa.html [accessed: 4 March 2026]. International Business Machines (IBM). 2025. Types of cyberthreats. [Online] Available at: https:// www.ibm.com/think/topics/cyberthreats-types [accessed: 4 March 2026]. International Police Service (Interpol). 2022. Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2022. [Online] Available at: https://www.interpol.int/content/download/19174/file/ 2023_03%20CYBER_African%20Cyberthreat%20Assessment%20Report%202022_EN.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Interpol. 2025. Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2025. International Police Service. [Online] Available at: https://www.interpol.int/en/content/download/23094/file/25COM009248%20- %20Cybercrime_Africa%20Cyberthreat%20Assessment%20Report_Design_2025-05%20v11.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Kauder, S. 2025. Why is Africa Losing Billions to Cybercrime? [Online] Available at: https://www.crowe.com/za/insights/af-53-why-is-africa-losing-billions-to-cybercrimeinsight-web-article [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Lafarge, T. 2022. China’s Hacker Army: The World’s Largest Surveillance Network. [Online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNQ8KRfnVYU [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Lesedi, S. 2023. Funding mars SANDF Cyber Command. [Online] Available at: https://www.military.africa/2023/01/funding-mars-sandf-cyber-command/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Mail & Guardian (M&G). 2003. Hacker stole half-a-million rand from Absa clients. [Online] Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2003-07-22-hacker-stole-halfamillion-rand-from-absa-clients/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Maliti, S. 2022. FBI beat security cluster in identifying cyber hack of the SA Reserve Bank, says Godongwana. [Online] Available at: https://iol.co.za/capeargus/news/2022-12-15-fbi-beatsecurity-cluster-in-identifying-cyber-hack-of-the-sa-reserve-bank-says-godongwana/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. MyBroadband. 2025a. Interview with the hackers who broke into South Africa’s Department of Defence. [Online] Available at: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/505982- interview-with-the-hackers-who-broke-into-south-africas-department-of-defence.html [accessed: 4 March 2026]. MyBroadband. 2025b. Chinese hackers may have breached the South African State Security Agency. [Online] Available at: https://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/612367- chinese-hackers-may-have-breached-the-south-african-state-security-agency.html [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Nozulela, M. 2025. South African Reserve Bank warns public about deepfake investment scam. [Online] Available at: https://iol.co.za/business/2025-09-25-south-african-reserve-bankwarns-public-about-deepfake-investment-scam/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. O’Neil, C. 2023. Press Conference: Cybersecurity Strategy & High Court Decision. Office of Minister for Home Affairs, Government of Australia. [Online] Available at: https:// minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/ClareONeil/Pages/Press-conference-22112023.aspx [accessed: 4 March 2026]. OpenGov Asia. 2021. CSA Launches Campaign to Drive Awareness and Adoption of Cybersecurity Practices. [Online] Available at: https://archive.opengovasia.com/2021/06/28/csa-launchescampaign-to-continue-to-drive-awareness-and-adoption-of-cybersecurity-practices/? c=za [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2002. Electronic Communications Act of 2002. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/ gcis_document/201409/a25-02.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (Parliament). 2020. Cybercrimes Act of 2020. [Online] Available at: https://cybercrimesact.co.za/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Recorded Future. 2024. TAG-100 Uses Open-Source Tools in Suspected Global Espionage Campaign, Compromising Two Asia-Pacific Intergovernmental Bodies. [Online] Available at: https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/tag-100-uses-open-source-tools-in-suspected-global-espionage-campaign [accessed: 4 March 2026]. SABRIC. 2024. Annual Crime Statistics 2024. South African Banking Risk Information Centre. [Online] Available at: https://www.sabric.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/CRIME-STATISTICS-REPORT- 2024.pdf [accessed: 4 March 2026]. The Guardian. 2021. Saudis behind NSO spyware attack on Jamal Khashoggi’s family, leak suggests. [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/18/ nso-spyware-used-to-target-family-of-jamal-khashoggi-leaked-data-shows-saudis-pegasus [accessed: 4 March 2026]. Trenta, L. 2024. Nowhere to Hide: Israel’s Pager Attacks on Hezbollah. [Online] Available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/ commentary/nowhere-hide-israels-pager-attacks-hezbollah [accessed: 4 March 2026]. United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). 2025. Mission & Vision of United States Cyber Command. [Online] Available at: https://www.cybercom.mil/About/Mission-and-Vision/ [accessed: 4 March 2026]. World Bank. 2025. Open Data: Individuals using the Internet (% of population) — China. [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=CN [accessed: 4 March 2026]. World Economic Forum (WEF). 2025. Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025. [Online] Available at: https://reports.weforum.org/docs/ WEF_Global_Cybersecurity_Outlook_2025.pdf#:~:text=Nearly%2047%25%20of%20organization s%20cite%20adversarial%20advances,with%2042%25%20of%20organizations%20reporting%2 0such%20incidents [accessed: 4 March 2026]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre (KRDC) is a Tanzanian research and policy think tank. The centre is known for its research on international relations, pan-Africanism, and global development, often publishing papers and participating in international forums and consultative meetings. The centre emphasises collaboration and the idea of a global community with a shared future for humanity in the context of global governance and the dynamics of the international system. KRDC is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasizes the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The Institute for Global Dialogue is an independent foreign policy think tank based in Tshwane (Pretoria), South Africa. It advances a balanced, relevant and policy-oriented analysis, debate and documentation of South Africa and Africa’s global politics and diplomacy. It strives to promote a broader understanding of the role of foreign policy and diplomacy in the pursuit of national and international development goals. The IGD aims to advance balanced, relevant and policy-oriented analysis, debate and documentation of South Africa and Africa’s global politics and diplomacy. It is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasizes the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The University of Johannesburg is an international university of choice, anchored in Africa and the global South, dynamically shaping a sustainable future. Its Mission is to transform and serve humanity through innovation and the collective and collaborative pursuit of knowledge. Its Core Values: Impact, Innovation, Inclusivity, Integrity. The University is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasizes the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

CAPEC aims to produce scientific work on behalf of the Ivorian administration to inform the government's economic policy. It also serves as a national framework for reflection, research, information, and advice for international institutions, economic operators, and other professional organisations. The specific objectives of CAPEC are to conduct studies and research intended to inform decision-makers and Ivorian socio-economic groups, with the goal of strengthening national capacities for policy analysis and economic development; to offer economic agents a national framework for reflection and scientific engagement that fosters dialogue on major economic issues of interest to Côte d’Ivoire and the sub-region; and to provide ongoing training for administrative staff in the field of macroeconomic and sectoral policy analysis. CAPEC is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasizes the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalised communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

Copyright © 2026 prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Global South Perspectives Network DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of The coordinating entities or any of their office bearers Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 13 April 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context. APRIL 2026 Rapporteur: Klaus Kotzé CONTENTS CONTENTS 1 Introduction: A slippery slope from rules to exceptions 2 Legitimacy trumps legality: The new fault line 3 The enforcement dilemma 4 The fragmentation of order and multilateralism as selective 5 The role of actors beyond the state 6 Continuity and change 7 Reflection Cover photo: Image generated using OpenAI’s DALL·E image generation model (2026). Concept developed for the Inclusive Society Institute / Global South Perspectives Network publication. 1 INTRODUCTION: A SLIPPERY SLOPE FROM RULES TO EXCEPTIONS The discussion on 13 April 2026 was held at a time when international events require particularly clear context. The speaker, Mona Ali Khalil, a recognized public international lawyer with 30 years’ experience in the UN system, offered the discussion context and insight into what is a confounding global situation; a war that has taken on global effects after Israel and America’s attack on Iran. Not only is what is happening another flashpoint, it signifies a gradual shift in the way that rules are interpreted. Or as the session discussed, set aside. Ms Khalil’s presentation was particularly illustrative. She did not focus narrowly on legality, but also drew attention to the broader patterns in global developments. She spoke about the normalisation of exceptions. Current developments indicate that the constraint that the post-war international system once offered is fraying. Increasingly there is a willingness, particularly from superpowers or regional powers, to reinterpret constraints for the sake of political expediency. Ms Khalil’s message was not one of alarm. It was rather measured and diagnostic. The concern was less that international law was disappearing. Instead, that its centre of gravity is moving. While rules may continue to remain in place, it is their application that appears increasingly contingent. Throughout the discussion there was recognition that this shift is not entirely new. Iraq, Libya and other situations were suggested as examples where legal justifications and political motivations sat uneasily alongside one another. It was the cumulative effect that presented a problem. Together, all the instances create a divergence in practice and relationship to law. A subtle result emerges: a shift in the baseline as to how states’ behaviour is judged. This shift is internalised over time. When exceptions accumulate, expectations follow. Where actions once triggered widespread responses from legal, political and other origins, these are now met with muted and fragmented responses. This is dangerous not only for any single breach, but for the culture that recalibrates the perceived normal. The intransigence of the US and Israel in its actions against Iran, and Iran’s belligerence against regional states have significantly contributed to the erosion of global principles. This will have a lasting impact on the future of international law. It was agreed all round that the shifting baseline should be addressed; global leadership was sorely needed. 2 LEGITIMACY TRUMPS LEGALITY: THE NEW FAULT LINE Throughout the conversation, the speaker and discussants returned to the distinction between legality and legitimacy. Though legal arguments continue to be advanced, these are not sufficient to establish a broad acceptance. Recently it has been legitimacy that is doing the heavier work. This means, in practice, that similar actions may be judged very differently depending on the conditions and the agent undertaking the actions. Many discussants noted that double standards have become visible and normalised. Not simply are rules being applied unevenly; they are also unevenly applied. This feeds a sense of disillusionment. Global South actors and other states who have long been subject to the discipline of international norms without always experiencing their consistent protection are directly affected. The speaker suggested that this is not simply a matter of hypocrisy. It also signifies the erosion of a shared reference point. Participants agreed this to be a dangerous precedent. That when legitimacy becomes fragmented, the system no longer operates as a common framework for all parties. It instead becomes a series of overlapping, and sometimes competing, interpretations. There are serious practical consequences for these changes. States may continue to invoke international law, not as a constraint, but as justification. Though formal structures may remain, this will, over time, lead to the increasing hollowing out of what has been the normative system in place since the end of the World Wars. 3 THE ENFORCEMENT DILEMMA The discussion maintained that international institutions must continue to play an important and central role. Where wars of aggression take place, institutions that do not take up their rightful space are threatened with irrelevance. Discussants agreed that bodies such as the United Nations, and its associated legal mechanisms, will always be important in the articulation of norms and clarifying legal positions. Nevertheless, recent international events, particularly the one under discussion, pointed to a gap between articulation and the enforcement of principles. Whereas courts can issue rulings and commissions can produce findings and resolutions, there is a severe limitation as to where these intersect with powerful states and their interests. The capacity and the craft of compelling compliance is often limited. Whereas this is not a new observation, it does appear to become more common and is gaining increasing attention. The International Court of Justice and other such institutions are increasing becoming visible places. Expectation for enforcement is increasing sought, which then drives the politicisation of these places which in essence should be neutral. This adds to the existing structural limitations that have become more apparent. Participants agreed that whereas institutions play a central role, a tension remains. On the one hand, the continued functioning of these institutions provides a degree of continuity. On the other, their inability to ensure consistent enforcement raises questions about their longer-term authority. An institutional paradox emerges. On the one hand, the system remains necessary, but on the other, it appears increasingly insufficient. Some participants suggested a more structural dilemma has formed and is threatening consensus-seeking institutions. When consensus frays, the limits of these designs appear more clearly. It is not simply that institutions fail their mandates. It is the conditions they are operating in that are changing. They are not sufficiently set up to adapt to these situations. 4 THE FRAGMENTATION OF ORDER AND MULTILATERALISM AS SELECTIVE Selective multilateralism was raised as a theme in the discussion. Recent wars and global disturbances, primarily Russia’s war on Ukraine and the pursuit of American primacy, have signalled that engagement between states do not continue to operate within multilateral frameworks. Instead, their engagement has become more strategic and conditional than before. Support for institutions is purported as conditional. Support is offered when national interests are furthered and bypassed when they do not. This suggests a more instrumental approach and not simply a rejection of multilateralism. Participants noted this to be a widespread change in the approach upon which the world has rested upon. A more uneven landscape of overlapping partnerships, agreements and shifting coalitions are taking shape. The varying compliance to common rules threatens the sustainability of world order. This is creating a particularly tenuous situation for the Global South. Its actors do not possess the power nor the influence to shape a fluid and complex environment. Whereas fragmentation opens space for greater Global South participation and influence, at the same time it diminishes trust and predictability between nations. This fragmentation, suggested Ms Khalil, should not be understood purely in negative terms. It reflects real changes in the distribution of power. Whether new forms of coherence can emerge within this more pluralistic setting is the real question. 5 THE ROLE OF ACTORS BEYOND THE STATE A tentative yet significant part of the discussion was about actors outside of the state. Both Ms Khalil and other speakers suggested that civil society, transnational networks and public opinion occupy important roles in shaping the direction of international norms and action. While these actors may lack formal authority; they nevertheless influence the environment within which states operate. This is particularly the case when it regards the by shaping of legitimate narratives. Participants reflected on historical precedents where sustained advocacy had contributed to shifts in international practice. Direct parallels were not drawn, but rather as indications that the system is not entirely closed. It was also often suggested that such forms of influence produce are uneven and often fragile. Civil society pressure, while it may be effective in some contexts, can be largely irrelevant in others. Instead, its impact depends heavily on political openness, media environments, and the willingness of states to respond. As such, a more layered understanding of accountability was introduced. It does not reside solely in formal institutions, but is distributed across multiple sites, such as legal, political and societal domains. All these domains are impacted by each other and have their own clear limitations. Non-state actors were suggested not only to be reactive. They are often anticipatory. By shaping public discourse and signalling emerging norms, civil society and transnational networks can, in certain contexts, alter the incentives facing decision-makers before formal processes are engaged. Institutional accountability is not simply replaced. It can be complementary, particularly in areas where formal mechanisms are slow or constrained. The interaction between these different layers of influence remains uneven, but increasingly relevant. 6 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE The discussion often turned to reflecting on what the tensions under discussion meant for the present and future of the international systems. With the focus on the war in the middle east serving not only as the focal point of the discussion. It also provided a lens through which the broader questions about global conflict and change could be interpreted. Ms Khallil’s suggested a more restrained approach. The current order has taken significant damage. But it was not simply collapsing. She suggested a more ambiguous reality. A situation where the existing frameworks continue to operate. This is taking place under conditions that are increasingly contested. While many people still spoke in the familiar legal language, and institutional processes, and diplomatic engagement continued as before, yet the functioning of the system suggests a gradual shift. This is seen in the manner in the political considerations are made. The ongoing tension in the spiralling war makes this clear. Legal justifications continue to be advanced, and references to established norms remain central to how actions are framed. This is happening at the same time that the world is witnessing a clear divergence in the manner that norms are applied and interpreted. Both the old and the new coexist in an uneven and unsteady way. Increasingly a more uneven landscape is emerging. One where an uneasy continuity and change coexist. All of this suggests that going forward the challenge will be an international situation not of replacement, but of adaptation. Sovereignty, restraint in the use of force, and multilateral cooperation, the core principles in the hitherto system will remain significant and relevant. However, what really matters will increasing be how they are practically applied. Power will become more diffuse and alignments less stable. Altogether consensus will be more difficult to sustain. Interpretation will in effect become more important than whether principles endure. Participants roundly agreed that periods such as this tend to be understood more clearly in retrospect than in the moment itself. The reconfiguration takes time and what may currently appear as inconsistency or drift could be established in time. This is not to say that discussants’ concerns should be diminished, rather it introduces a degree of caution in how the present moment is assessed. The language of crisis, while understandable, may obscure the more gradual and complex nature of the changes underway. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the human consequences and the immediacy of the conflict. It should not be purely abstracted in interpretation. The war in the Middle East brings into sharp focus the lived realities that accompany these broader shifts. People are directly being affected. This is not theoretical, but is experienced in terms of security, displacement and the erosion of everyday stability. These tangible realities anchored the discussion throughout, with speakers roundly condemning the situation and advancing a peaceful outcome. The discussion closed off with participants resisting the temptation to offer simple prescriptions or definitive conclusions. Instead, the speaker and discussants contributed to a more grounded appreciation of the complexity of the moment. They agreed that the global system is and will remain under strain. It was still operative, but that the norms were increasingly under pressure. It was not clear whether this represented a transitional phase or a more enduring transformation. Instead, what is evident is that the interplay between continuity and change will continue to share both the trajectory of the current crisis and the future character of the international order itself. 7 REFLECTION The unifying thread in the April edition of the Monday Consultations was the sense that international law is undergoing a stress test. Less through outright rejection than through gradual reinterpretation. Ms Khalil’s valuable interventions captured this most clearly. Her concern was not that rules no longer exist, but rather that the meaning and need for implementing rules have become questioned and contingent. Power defined by politics, not norms. This is a clear risk over time. Affecting not only how the system functions, but how it is perceived. Uncertainty remains. It is still unclear whether this represents a period of transition or a more enduring shift. It did appear from the discussion that the maintenance of global principles will depend not only on formal commitments. Instead, it will largely depend on states and non-state actors and the willingness they have to treat these as more than instruments of convenience. The effect on ordinary people is more than a theoretical consideration. The developments in the Middle East suggest an increased impact on the lives of citizens in the region and around the world. It serves as a reminder that the erosion of global principles effect people in varying ways. Beyond the language of legality and strategy, it is civilians who bear the immediate burden. This happens through economic disruption, displacement and the unravelling of social and political stability. The effects of war, while decided upon strategic, tactical or doctrinal bases, are experienced on the ground as insecurity, loss and uncertainty about the future. It is the role of governments and citizens around the world to raise and sustain this concern, particularly now. Furthermore, the reverberations and effects of this conflict will continue to be felt globally. Rising geopolitical tensions contribute to economic volatility for people across the world. The shifts in energy and food prices place additional pressures on already fragile systems that are still in recovery from previous shocks. The world is deeply interconnected. Contemporary wars are felt globally. Wars of aggression and external shocks have significant implications and compounding effects on the Global South, where resilience is often stretched. Weakened international norms filters through into the everyday realities of households and communities, shaping livelihoods in ways that profound. It is imperative for leaders and institutions to consider these realities when they develop their plans. The world community must now, more than ever, unite in a message of resistance against wars of aggression. It must advance the utility and importance of institutions and the norms that bind them. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates. GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North. Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi. GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Mrs Berenice Marks as the representative of the Inclusive Society Institute attended an event marking 25 years and the 100 th edition of New Agenda: South African Journal of Social and Economic Policy and celebrating a distinctive partnership between UWC and civil society. The event was held on Tuesday, 21 April 2026 at Iyatsiba Lab, Centre for Humanities Research, Woodstock. The meeting reflected on the enduring role of ideas in shaping a just society. At a time of persistent inequality and stalled transformation, it calls for renewed intellectual courage and public engagement. Ms Marks holds a place in the history of New Agenda, having served as the administrator for its very first edition. A central theme that resonated throughout the speeches was the vital importance of partnership and collaboration. The speakers are distinguished persons from government, academia, civil society and the public sector.  They emphasised that meaningful change can only be achieved through collective effort and shared vision. The event became a platform for reinforcing the value of building bridges between organisations and across sectors in order to address the complex challenges facing society today. Ms Marks’s participation underscored the Inclusive Society Institute’s dedication to these ideals of co-operation.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) participated in a high-level international roundtable on 10 April 2026 examining the future of the global sustainability framework beyond 2030. Convened by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in cooperation with the Hamburg Sustainability Conference (HSC), the dialogue brought together policymakers, think tanks and experts from across Africa, Europe, Asia and the Americas.   The discussion forms part of a broader global process leading to the 2027 SDG Summit, at a time when progress on the Sustainable Development Goals remains off track and trust in multilateral cooperation is under strain.   Contributing an African and Global South perspective, ISI emphasised that future support for any post-2030 framework will depend less on new commitments and more on credible delivery. Central to this is a strengthened “means of implementation” compact, including fair climate finance, improved global tax cooperation, debt sustainability and more inclusive global governance.   On the structure of a future framework, ISI argued for a disciplined revision rather than a simple extension or complete redesign. Retaining the legitimacy of the current SDG architecture, while strengthening implementation and aligning it more closely with regional agendas such as Africa’s Agenda 2063, was identified as the most pragmatic path forward.   The Institute further stressed that legitimacy will hinge on process. A future framework must combine intergovernmental negotiation with structured engagement from civil society, local government and other stakeholders, while avoiding the traditional separation between goal-setting and financing.   As discussions advance toward the Hamburg Sustainability Conference in June 2026 and the 2027 SDG Summit, ISI will continue to advocate for a more balanced global development compact, one that aligns ambition with delivery and restores trust in multilateralism through tangible results.

From 27 to 29 March 2026, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), in partnership with the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), and in association with the Africa Think-tank Dialogue, Foundation Max van der Stoel, Olof Palme International Center, Foundation Jean Jaurés and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, co-hosted a high-level EU-Africa Consultative Meeting in Cape Town. Held at the Pullman Hotel, Cape Town, the engagement brought together policymakers, academics, and civil society leaders to reflect on the future trajectory of EU-Africa relations in the context of a rapidly shifting global order.   The meeting opened with a welcome dinner, setting the tone for what would become a candid and forward-looking dialogue. Formal proceedings commenced the following morning with opening remarks from FEPS and ISI leadership, alongside a keynote address by Hon. Supra Mahumapelo, Chairperson of South Africa’s Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation. ISI CEO Daryl Swanepoel moderated the opening exchanges, framing the discussions around the need for a more balanced, equitable and strategic partnership between Europe and Africa.   The first day of discussions focused on economic transformation, sustainability and human mobility. The opening session on trade highlighted the urgency of rebalancing economic relations. Participants emphasised that while trade remains central to both regions, existing frameworks have not sufficiently supported Africa’s industrialisation ambitions. Greater focus is needed on local value chains, fair labour standards, and rebuilding a credible rules-based trading system.   This was followed by a session on green industrialisation, where discussions centred on aligning European investment instruments - particularly the Global Gateway - with African development priorities. Participants stressed that the green transition must move beyond extractive models and instead support sustainable industrial growth, job creation, and long-term capacity building on the continent.   The conversation then turned to migration and human mobility. Here, participants challenged dominant narratives that frame migration primarily as a security concern. Instead, the discussion emphasised migration as a driver of development, noting that most African migration takes place within the continent. A more balanced, rights-based and development-oriented approach to migration governance was widely supported.   The second day shifted focus to global governance, multilateralism and peace and security. Discussions highlighted growing divergences in how Europe and Africa experience the current international order. While the EU has historically benefited from existing multilateral structures, many African countries continue to face structural disadvantages rooted in their limited representation in global institutions.   Participants engaged critically with the need to reform international financial systems, address debt vulnerabilities, and advance tax justice. There was strong consensus that EU-Africa cooperation in multilateral forums will be essential to driving meaningful reform and ensuring a more inclusive global economic architecture.   The final session addressed the crisis in the global peace and security system. With rising conflict levels and increasing strain on the United Nations, participants explored opportunities for joint EU–Africa leadership in advancing UN reform, strengthening conflict prevention, and reinforcing commitments to the UN Charter.   Throughout the engagement, the Inclusive Society Institute played a central convening and intellectual role. ISI not only co-hosted the meeting but also moderated key sessions and contributed to shaping the strategic direction of the discussions. The Institute’s emphasis on inclusive development, balanced partnerships and multilateral reform was a consistent thread across the dialogue.   The meeting reaffirmed that EU-Africa relations remain critically important, but that the partnership must evolve. Moving forward, a shift towards genuine co-development, mutual accountability and shared leadership in global governance will be essential.   For ISI, the engagement forms part of its broader commitment to advancing Africa’s voice in international policy debates and contributing to the development of a more just and inclusive global order.   EU-Africa Consultative Meeting 2026 - Agenda:

Copyright © 2026   prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Global South Perspectives Network   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of The coordinating entities or any of their office bearers   Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 19 January 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   MARCH 2026   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   CONTENTS 1 The middle power concept in a changing international system 2 Geopolitical ruptures and the erosion of global norms 3 Strategic autonomy and the limits of alignment 4 Reaffirming international law and collective norms 5 Domestic politics and the foreign policy of middle powers 6 Perceptions of middle powers in a multipolar world 7 Institutional reform and the limits of structural change 8 The diplomatic role of middle powers 9 Conclusion   Cover photo: Image generated using OpenAI’s DALL·E image generation model (2026). Concept developed for the Inclusive Society Institute / Global South Perspectives Network publication.   1 THE MIDDLE POWER CONCEPT IN A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM   The dialogue began with what might appear to be a simple question: what exactly do we mean when we speak of “middle powers”? It is a term that has circulated in the literature of international relations for decades. Yet the more one reflects on it, the more elusive the definition becomes.   Middle powers clearly do not possess the capacity of great powers to reshape the international system or to impose outcomes unilaterally. At the same time, though, they are far from insignificant actors, in that many possess extensive diplomatic networks, credible economic weight, often also military capabilities, and a meaningful presence within international institutions. And whereas they might not be the architects of the global order, neither are they mere spectators. They occupy an intermediate position somewhere between the dominant global actors and those states whose influence remains largely regional.   What emerged quite quickly during the exchange was just how diverse this category of states really is. Countries commonly described as middle powers differ widely in geography, population size, economic structure and political influence. Some combine large territories and advanced economies with relatively small populations. Others possess vast populations and strong regional influence, but a more limited global reach. What brings together these countries into the “middle power” category, therefore, is not uniform material capability, but a shared capacity to influence international debates/activities through diplomacy, coalition-building and engagement within multilateral frameworks.   Historically, middle powers have often played a quiet but important role in sustaining the multilateral system. At different moments they have acted as intermediaries between larger powers, helping to facilitate compromise and maintain channels of international cooperation. The geopolitical and geo-economic environment in which they now operate, though, appears to be changing, and changing rapidly.   This leads to what might be described as the central challenge for middle powers in our times. They depend on a system of functioning norms for their independence, peace and prosperity. Yet they rarely possess the power to shape or enforce these norms. In a world where major powers appear increasingly willing to operate outside established norms, middle powers find themselves under growing pressure to protect and help adapt the very system on which they depend. 2 GEOPOLITICAL RUPTURES AND THE EROSION OF GLOBAL NORMS   As the conversation unfolded, attention gradually shifted to the broader international environment, in which middle powers now find themselves operating. There was a growing concern that the international system may be entering a period of deeper disruption, perhaps not collapse, but certainly a moment of unsettling, radical change. Recent developments were frequently mentioned in this regard, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the escalation of violence in Gaza following the Hamas attack on Israel, and the latest confrontation involving Iran. Each of these crises has intensified geopolitical tensions, but more importantly, they have also exposed deep disagreements about how international law should be interpreted and applied.   What seemed to trouble many participants was not simply the occurence of large-scale conflict. The international system has always been marked by crises of one kind or another. Rather, it was the growing perception that some powerful states appear increasingly willing to reinterpret, or bypass, international norms when it suits their interests, while the rest of the states and multilateral institutions stand idly by.   Even if that may not hold fully true, or may be temporary, the perception matters. When the rules of the system appear negotiable, confidence in the system itself begins to erode. Several participants suggested that the cumulative effect of these developments may be creating what could be described as a kind of normative vacuum in international politics. In other words, if those actors with the greatest power to uphold international law appear less committed to doing so, the credibility of the international legal order inevitably comes under strain.   In such circumstances, the responsibility for defending the principles of multilateral cooperation may increasingly fall on a wider group of states. Middle powers, in particular, have a direct interest in preserving a stable and predictable international environment as, unlike great powers, they rely heavily on rules and institutions to manage global politics. Can they rise to the occasion and proactively defend the norms- and rules-based system that they depend on, even if that means that they may have to face off the greater powers that are breaking the rules?   This tension lay at the heart of much of the discussion that followed. 3 STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND THE LIMITS OF ALIGNMENT   How do middle powers manage their relationships with larger powers and can they achieve strategic autonomy vis-à-vis those larger powers? Strategic autonomy refers to the ability of a state to pursue its national interests without becoming overly dependent on, or constrained by, more powerful actors. Not a simple thing for sure.   Economic (inter)dependence, security alliances and geographic realities often bind middle powers closely to larger partners, thereby forming relationships that can narrow their room for manoeuvre. They shape trade patterns, security arrangements and, in many cases, the assumptions that quietly guide foreign policy thinking.   One example raised during the exchange illustrated this the above point particularly well. Canada’s economic and security relationship with the United States has historically been exceptionally close. For decades that relationship provided both stability and reassurance. It allowed the country to pursue an active multilateral diplomacy while operating within a relatively predictable strategic environment.   More recently, however, political developments have prompted a reassessment of that environment. Questions have begun to emerge about the reliability of long-standing assumptions. And when such questions arise, governments naturally begin to look for ways to diversify their options. Efforts are therefore underway to broaden economic partnerships and to deepen diplomatic engagement with other regions, including Europe and Asia. The objective is not necessarily to abandon existing relationships, instead it is to reduce dependence on any single partner and create a little more strategic space.   This example fed into a broader reflection about alignment in an increasingly polarised international system. Terms such as non-alignment, selective alignment and active non-alignment surfaced repeatedly during the discussion. The terminology differed, but the underlying instinct was often the same. States need flexibility. They need the freedom to cooperate with different partners on different issues without being drawn too deeply into the rivalries of larger powers. In this sense, the language of non-alignment may simply reflect a pragmatic effort to preserve foreign-policy choice.   Yet the discussion also acknowledged a harder truth. Strategic autonomy cannot simply be declared. It must be built. And many middle powers still find themselves operating within structural constraints that make such autonomy difficult to achieve in practice. 4 REAFFIRMING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COLLECTIVE NORMS   At a certain point the discussion returned to a question that sits quietly beneath many debates about international politics: what happens when confidence in the rules of the system begins to erode?   Several participants reflected on the growing perception that respect for international law may be weakening. If the rules governing sovereignty, the use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes are no longer widely observed, the international system begins to look very different. It becomes less predictable. And far more unstable.   Against this backdrop, an interesting idea surfaced during the exchange. Some participants suggested that middle powers might consider taking the initiative in convening a global gathering aimed at reaffirming the foundational principles of the international order.   The historical reference point for such an initiative would be the Bandung Conference of 1955. That meeting brought together newly independent states from Asia and Africa to articulate principles of peaceful coexistence, sovereignty and mutual respect. It later helped shape the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War.   Of course, the circumstances today are very different. The world of the twenty-first century is not the world of decolonisation. Yet the underlying impulse behind Bandung, the collective reaffirmation of international norms, still resonates. A contemporary equivalent would therefore serve a somewhat different purpose. Rather than responding to colonial structures or Cold War divisions, such a gathering could reaffirm the legitimacy of the international legal order at a moment when its authority appears increasingly contested. It could provide an opportunity for states to restate their commitment to the principles embedded in the United Nations Charter and the broader framework of international law. Just as importantly, it could open space for dialogue among countries that still share an interest in preserving a cooperative and rules-based international order. 5 DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF MIDDLE POWERS   At this point the conversation shifted somewhat inward. Up to now much of the discussion had focused on the external environment in which middle powers operate. But foreign policy, as several participants reminded the group, rarely exists in isolation from domestic politics.   In many cases the international behaviour of middle powers is closely shaped by developments at home, where changes in leadership, electoral pressures and shifting political coalitions can all influence how governments position themselves internationally. Thus, foreign policy priorities may change quite quickly when domestic political circumstances change.   Periods of strong engagement with multilateral institutions can therefore be followed by phases in which governments adopt a more cautious or inward-looking posture. This is not unusual; it is, in fact, often part of the natural cycle of democratic politics.   Domestic pressures can also limit the attention governments are able to devote to international initiatives, as electoral cycles, internal controversies and institutional tensions frequently draw political energy inward. When this happens, diplomatic engagement abroad can become more difficult to sustain.   Brazil was mentioned during the dialogue as a useful illustration of this dynamic: The country has long been recognised as an important advocate of multilateral cooperation and South–South partnerships. Its foreign policy trajectory, though, has also reflected changes in domestic political leadership and internal debates.   Recent efforts to reassert Brazil’s global diplomatic profile illustrate how leadership choices can reshape a country’s international engagement. However, ongoing domestic political debates continue to influence both the tone and the direction of Brazil’s foreign policy, leading to major changes depending on whether a Lula or a Bolsonaro is in power 6 PERCEPTIONS OF MIDDLE POWERS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD   At one stage the dialogue turned to a set of findings that provided a useful empirical lens through which to view many of the issues under discussion. Reference was made to the Körber Emerging Middle Powers Initiative, an international research project supported by the Körber Foundation. The project surveys foreign policy experts across several middle powers, in order to understand how policymakers and analysts interpret the changing dynamics of global governance.   The countries included in the survey, among them Brazil, India, South Africa and Germany, represent very different political and geopolitical contexts. Yet taken together, the findings offer an interesting window into how middle powers themselves understand their evolving position within the international system.   One observation in particular stood out: Across several of the surveyed countries there appears to be a clear preference for maintaining strategic autonomy, rather than aligning too closely with any single major power. Put simply, this means that many experts believe that these countries favour the avoidance of rigid geopolitical blocs and instead prefer pursuing partnerships that remain flexible and that can shift depending on the issue at hand. This instinct is perhaps not surprising, given that middle powers often operate in environments where rigid alignments carry real risks. Flexibility allows them to cooperate with different actors while preserving room for manoeuvre.   At the same time, the survey revealed some interesting differences in perception between parts of the Global North and the Global South. Respondents in Northern countries tended to view the global role of the United States more positively. In parts of the Global South, however, attitudes were noticeably more sceptical. The reverse was true regarding China’s role in international affairs.   These differences are important in that they remind us that the category of “middle powers” does not describe a unified geopolitical bloc. Rather, it encompasses a diverse group of states shaped by very different historical experiences, strategic environments and foreign policy priorities.   The survey also revealed a noticeable degree of pessimism regarding the prospects for global institutional reform. Support for multilateralism remains widespread among experts in the surveyed countries. Confidence that major institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, will undergo meaningful reform in the near future, however, appears to be far more limited.   Taken together, these findings point to both the possibilities and the constraints facing middle powers in an increasingly complex, unpredictable and evolving international order. 7 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE LIMITS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE   The conversation then turned more directly to the question of institutional reform and in particular, participants reflected on the possibility of convening a review conference under Article 109 of the United Nations Charter.   ARTICLE 109 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE REVIEW CONFERENCE MECHANISM   Article 109 of the United Nations Charter provides for the convening of a General Conference of UN Member States for the purpose of reviewing the Charter.   The provisions of article 109 outline three key elements:   1 Convening of a Review Conference   A Charter Review Conference may be convened if it is approved by a two-thirds majority in the United Nations General Assembly, and supported by at least nine members of the United Nations Security Council.   At the conference itself, each UN member state participates on an equal basis, with one vote per state.   2 Adoption of proposed Charter changes   If the conference recommends alterations to the Charter, these must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of UN member states.   3 Ratification of outcomes   Any recommended Charter changes only enter into force once they are ratified according to the constitutional procedures of two-thirds of UN member states, including all five permanent members of the Security Council (each of the P5 thus has a veto in the ratification process).   In practice, this means that although a UN Charter Review Conference could be convened without the consent of the five permanent members of the Security Council, any amendments to the Charter would ultimately require the ratification by all five to come into force.    In theory, such a conference could examine the functioning of the UN and propose amendments to the Charter. In practice, however, any amendments would ultimately require ratification by the permanent members of the Security Council, thus giving those states critical influence – in effect a veto - over the outcome of the process.   This reality raises difficult questions about the practicality of pursuing major structural reforms through existing institutional mechanisms of the United Nations. Several participants in fact noted that opening the Charter to revision could even weaken certain protections, if the process were to be dominated by the interests of powerful states. For that reason, the discussion returned repeatedly to the need for caution when considering initiatives aimed at institutional redesign. 8 THE DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS   As the conversation moved toward its concluding stages, attention returned to a practical question: how exactly might middle powers exercise influence in an international system that is becoming increasingly fragmented?   There was broad agreement amongst the participants that middle powers still possess the ability to shape international debates, and that the challenge lies less in the existence of that potential and more in how it is exercised.   One idea that surfaced during the discussion was the possibility of closer coordination among middle powers, but this suggestion quickly prompted an important caution, when several participants warned against the temptation to organise middle powers into a formal bloc or alliance structure.   At first glance, such an arrangement might appear attractive. By acting collectively, middle powers could achieve greater leverage in international negotiations. The risk, though, is that a new grouping of middle powers might simply reproduce the same bloc politics that already complicate cooperation within the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. Put plainly, the formation of a middle-powers bloc could deepen the fragmentation it seeks to overcome and so instead, a more subtle approach to diplomacy was needed. Middle powers may need to rely less on formal alliances and more on flexible and pragmatic forms of cooperation.   Issue-based coalitions are one example of pragmatic middle power cooperation, and could help advance issues like climate action or pandemic response. Coordinated diplomatic initiatives within existing multilateral institutions are another example. In some cases, the most important role may simply be convening dialogue among states whose geopolitical positions differ. Historically, middle powers have often played precisely this kind of intermediary role, because whilst they are not themselves dominant powers, they are frequently able to maintain relationships with multiple actors at the same time. They can thus act as bridge-builders between competing geopolitical camps and facilitate conversations that might otherwise prove difficult. This form of influence is not always visible. It does not resemble traditional power politics, but it can be surprisingly important.   Middle powers may prove most effective not when they attempt to compete directly with great powers, but when they help sustain dialogue, reaffirm shared norms and build consensus around practical responses to global challenges; because their influence often operates quietly and sometimes almost invisibly. Seen from this perspective, the strength of middle powers lies less in formal institutional authority and more in what might be described as diplomatic entrepreneurship. Acting as conveners, mediators and agenda-setters, they can help set the tone and direction of international debates, even in periods of heightened geopolitical rivalry. 9 CONCLUSION   What the dialogue ultimately revealed was a picture of middle powers navigating a world that is becoming increasingly uncertain and an international system that is clearly undergoing a period of transformation. Geopolitical rivalry is intensifying, confidence in established institutions is weakening, and rules that once appeared relatively settled are now being questioned more openly.   Middle powers do not stand outside these developments, instead they are deeply affected by them. Domestic political pressures, economic dependencies and differing regional priorities all shape the extent to which these states are able to act collectively on the global stage. In practice, their room for manoeuvre is often narrower than the rhetoric of diplomacy might suggest.   But the discussion also produced a quieter, but important observation, namely that  middle powers should not be underestimated. Their influence rarely lies in the ability to impose outcomes or reshape the balance of power. Rather, it often lies in something less dramatic, but no less valuable: sustaining dialogue, reaffirming international norms and keeping open the channels of cooperation that allow the international system to function.   In this sense, the role of middle powers may be less about power in the traditional sense and more about the stewardship of the UN’s values and the rules-based order. They might not be able to determine the future of the global order on their own, but they can certainly help preserve the principles and institutions that make international cooperation possible.   In a period of geopolitical turbulence, that may prove to be a contribution of considerable significance.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.   GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.   Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.   GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) participated prominently in the National Planning Commission’s Social Cohesion Roundtable, held in Pretoria on 3-4 March 2026, where the Institute presented the 2025 update of the South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI). Acknowledgement is given to Telkom, who has been supporting the SASCI project from its inception. Telkom was represented by its Group CFO, Nonkululeko Dlamini, who also delivered a speech during the session.   The roundtable brought together policymakers, academics, civil society leaders and public institutions to reflect on the state of social cohesion in South Africa and to explore strategies for strengthening national unity in the context of persistent inequality, historical legacies and contemporary political challenges.   The event formed part of the National Planning Commission’s broader work on social cohesion and nation-building and was convened under the theme “Social Cohesion: Going Back to the Fundamentals.”   A national dialogue on the foundations of cohesion   The roundtable programme reflected a deliberate effort to engage deeply with the structural drivers of cohesion in South Africa. Discussions addressed themes such as the legacies of apartheid, land and economic inequality, the role of traditional leadership, migration and citizenship debates, language and identity, and strategies to address unemployment and poverty.   Participants included a wide range of scholars, policy experts and public figures who contributed to group discussions and panel sessions examining both the historical roots and contemporary manifestations of social division in South Africa.   The discussions were structured around the idea that social cohesion cannot be reduced to notions of harmony alone, but must grapple with deeper questions of justice, redress and shared nationhood.   Presentation of the South African Social Cohesion Index   On the second day of the roundtable, the Inclusive Society Institute presented the 2025 update of the South African Social Cohesion Index, with ISI Chief Executive Officer Daryl Swanepoel delivering the keynote speech introducing the findings of the report. A detailed presentation was then made my Mari Harris, the Institute’s Polling and Data Science consultant.   The South African Social Cohesion Index is a scientifically grounded instrument developed by the Inclusive Society Institute in partnership with Constructor University in Bremen, Germany, and represents one of the most comprehensive attempts to measure social cohesion in an African context.   The Index measures cohesion across multiple dimensions including: trust between citizens, trust in institutions, perceptions of fairness, acceptance of diversity, solidarity and civic participation, respect for social rules and national identification.   Rather than relying on anecdotal perceptions about the state of the nation’s social fabric, the Index provides an empirical and longitudinal measurement tool that allows policymakers and researchers to track trends in social cohesion over time. Key findings: A fragile, but improving social fabric   The 2025 update of the Index provides a nuanced picture of the state of South Africa’s social cohesion. The overall national score now stands at 56 out of 100, placing South Africa within the moderate cohesion category. While this suggests that the country’s social fabric remains intact, it also highlights the continuing vulnerability of several underlying dimensions of cohesion.   Encouragingly, the data shows that social cohesion has improved for the second consecutive year, suggesting that the country may have reached the bottom of a difficult cycle and begun a gradual recovery.   At the same time, several dimensions remain fragile, particularly perceptions of fairness, acceptance of diversity and respect for social rules. These areas represent structural pressure points that require sustained policy attention.   Social cohesion as national infrastructure   In his address at the roundtable, Swanepoel emphasised that social cohesion should not be treated as a “soft” policy topic, but rather as a critical component of national stability and economic development.   Drawing on international research, he highlighted the strong relationship between cohesion and economic performance, arguing that societies characterised by trust, fairness and shared identity are better positioned to attract investment, sustain reform and manage diversity.   He noted that: “Social cohesion is the invisible infrastructure of a nation. If we strengthen it deliberately, it becomes the foundation of long-term stability and growth. If we neglect it, the costs will not remain abstract, they will be economic, institutional and social.”   Informing the National Dialogue process   The roundtable discussions and the presentation of the Social Cohesion Index form part of the National Planning Commission’s broader efforts to inform the National Dialogue process currently being prepared in South Africa.   Participants emphasised that strengthening cohesion will require coordinated action across government, business, civil society, faith communities and the media, as well as sustained efforts to address structural inequality and expand economic opportunity.   The Inclusive Society Institute remains committed to continuing its work on measuring and analysing social cohesion in South Africa and will continue to provide the South African Social Cohesion Index as an annual evidence-based tool to support public policy and national dialogue on the future of the country.

This report has been enabled through the generous support of Telkom Copyright © 2026   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   March 2026   Author: Mari Harris (Ipsos South Africa) Statisticians: Corné Bodenstein (Ipsos South Africa), Lungelo Mkhize (Ipsos South Africa) Editor: Daryl Swanepoel (Inclusive Society Institute)  TABLE OF CONTENTS   Executive Summary 1. Introduction 2. Measuring social cohesion 2.1. Data 2.2. Analytical approach 3. Current level and trend of social cohesion 3.1. Social cohesion in South Africa 3.2. Social cohesion in the nine provinces 4. Structural influences on social cohesion 4.1. Data and methodology 4.2. Results 5. Individual experiences of social cohesion 5.1. Data and methodology 5.2. Identifying four classes of experience of social cohesion 5.3. Socio-demographics of the four classes 6. Social cohesion and subjective well-being 6.1. Provinces – data and methodology 6.2. Individuals 7. Conclusion and the way forward References Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:1440750455 LIST OF TABLES    Table 2.1: Sample sizes of Khayabus Table 2.2: Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 1 Table 2.3: Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 2 Table 2.4: Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 3 Table 3.1: Overall index and dimensions Table 3.2: Overall index in the provinces Table 3.3: Dimension 1.1 – Social networks in the provinces Table 3.4: Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people in the provinces Table 3.5: Dimension 1.3 – "Acceptance of diversity" Table 3.6: Dimension 2.1 – Identification in the provinces Table 3.7: Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions in the provinces Table 3.8: Dimension 2.3 – "Perception of fairness" Table 3.9: Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness in the provinces Table 3.10: Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules Table 3.11: Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation in the provinces Table 4.1: Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table 5.1: 2025 Results: Social Cohesion Dimensions and LCA Table 5.2: Socio-demographic and -economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents Table 6.1: Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Table 6.2: Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents     LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Constitutive elements of social cohesion Figure 1.2: Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix A: Indicators of cohesion across time Table A.1: Dimension 1.1 – Social networks results over time Table A.2: Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people results over time Table A.3: Dimension 1.3 – Acceptance of diversity results over time Table A.4: Dimension 2.1 – Identification results over time Table A.5: Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions results over time Table A.6: Dimension 2.3 – Perception of fairness results over time Table A.7: Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness results over time Table A.8: Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules results over time Table A.9: Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation results over time Appendix B: Correlations of social cohesion on the province level Table B.1: Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table B.2: Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Appendix C: Latent class analyses Table C.1: Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Table C.2: Relative class sizes for LCA solutions EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   This report represents the fifth complete application of the South Africa Social Cohesion Index (SASCI). It updates the study published in February 2025 and focuses on the development and trends of social cohesion from 2021 to 2025. To recap, the study follows the measurement concept of the Social Cohesion Radar (SCR), developed by the Bertelsmann Stiftung. As illustrated in a graph in the report, the study assessed social cohesion in three domains:   Social Relations, including the intactness of social networks, general trust in people and acceptance of diversity Connectedness, including identification with one’s place of residence, trust in institutions and perceptions of fairness Focus on the Common Good, including solidarity and helpfulness, respect for social rules and civic participation.   The study uses data collected in the first wave of the Ipsos Khayabus study every year (two or three waves are conducted annually). This is a large-scale representative study of South African adults, conducted face-to-face in the homes and home languages of a randomly selected sample, covering all nine provinces and different types of settlements all over South Africa.   The Bertelsmann concept of defining a country’s level of social cohesion allows scores between 0 (no cohesion) and 100 (maximum cohesion). The decision of which score to regard as sufficiently high is both a normative and a political one.   Currently (2025), the overall level of social cohesion in South Africa as a whole is “moderate” at 56 points. Looking at its development since 2021, the country has achieved a slight increase of 2.5 points.   Since the commencement of the study, the dimension of identification (in the domain of Connectedness) has proved to be the strongest in South Africa, and it is still the case. The score for identification, currently at 76.7, has grown by 3.5 points since 2021. However, the biggest increases over this period were achieved by the measurement of civic participation, which grew 6.2 points since 2021, to now stand at 60.6, and solidarity and helpfulness, which grew 4.1 points, to now stand at 63.1 points.   At the other end of the scale, the lowest scores are still registered for respect for social rules (in the domain of Focus on the Common Good). This score currently measures 42, but it also grew by 1.7 points since 2021 and is now regarded as moderate and no longer low.   Still looking at the overall picture, eight of the nine dimensions registered growth from  2021 to 2025.   All nine provinces also registered moderate scores, clustering in a relatively narrow band, ranging from the Northern Cape at the bottom of the list with 51.7 and the Eastern Cape at the top of the list with 58.9.   This report also presents results from Latent Class Analysis (LCA), a procedure identifying distinct groups in society. Four groups were identified that experience different strengths and deficits in social cohesion in their immediate life contexts.   In the end, the report examines the relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being. The evidence suggests that the quality of society (social cohesion) translates directly into citizens’ quality of life (subjective well-being).   It is exactly the strong positive relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being that underscores the necessity of political action, planning and cooperation between government, business and civil society to improve South Africa’s level of social cohesion. Social cohesion translates the social and economic structures (like performance and output of the economy and living conditions) into the quality of life (issues like happiness, life satisfaction, etc.) directly experienced by individual members of society. In the case that cohesion is neglected, one can expect societal polarisation and instability.   1. INTRODUCTION   Civis Romanus sum [1]   In the latter centuries of the Republic, as Rome grew into a great power, gladiatorial combat became a means of maintaining social cohesion.   To watch the gladiators fight was a key perk of citizenship, a common experience fostering a shared sense of civic Roman identity. [2]   Since the earliest times leaders – religious, military and political – tried to keep their followers, soldiers or citizens/populations together, by inspiring behaviour and attitudes that foster unity of minds and actions. This spirit of social cohesion is thus not at all a new concept. There has recently been more interest in the subject, as proved by various studies and reports – see specifically the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) report titled, “Social Cohesion: Concept and Measurement”, published in 2023. This report states that a plurality of definitions and applications of the concept of social cohesion have been advanced by international governments and academic researchers – and they published a selection of definitions as put together by Statistics Canada in Tabular format (UNECE, 2023:4), which is copied here:   As in previous studies, the research commissioned by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) built on work by Langer et al. (2017) and Leininger et al. (2021). The Langer study used Afrobaromer data from nineteen countries and defined social cohesion in an African context as the interplay of three salient aspects: perceived inequalities, trust (interpersonal and institutional) and identity (national vs ethnic).  The Leininger study also compared African counties. According to its authors, “cohesion is characterised by a set of attitudes and behavioural manifestations that includes trust, an inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good” (Leininger et al., 2021:3). These three attributes unfold into two elements, encompassing horizontal or vertical relations among citizens and the state (see Figure 1.1): social trust and institutional trust, group identity and national identity, intergroup cooperation, and state-society cooperation. (More information about these two studies is published in the 2024 update of this report.)   Figure 1.1:  Constitutive elements of social cohesion (Source: Leininger et al., 2021) This 2025 report uses new data, collected during the first quarter of 2025, but it still aims to provide a theoretically-based and methodologically-sound empirical assessment of social cohesion in the South African society, with the view to deliver credibly on five goals:   To measure the current degree of social cohesion in South Africa as a whole and in each of the nine provinces separately. To track how social cohesion has progressed (or not) from 2021 to 2025. To identify structural characteristics from the thematic fields of the economic situation in the country, inequality and poverty, demographic developments, diversity and modernisation that can promote or hinder social cohesion. To explore which social groups demonstrate high or low levels of social cohesion. To investigate how social cohesion – very broadly seen as the quality of society – relates to citizens’ overall well-being, defined as their quality of life.    As in previous reports, we aimed to achieve these goals with the application and use of the measurement concept as defined by the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar (SCR). This was informed by an initial comprehensive literature review (Schiefer & van der Noll, 2017) and the input of various experts on the topic. It defines social cohesion as the “quality of social cooperation and togetherness of a collective, defined in geopolitical terms, that is expressed in the attitudes and behaviours of its members. A cohesive society is characterised by resilient social relations, a positive emotional connectedness between its members and the community, and a pronounced focus on the common good” (Dragolov et al., 2016:6). These three domains unfold into three dimensions, as illustrated overleaf in Figure 1.2.   Each one of the dimensions comprises three measurements:   The “social networks” domain includes the measurements of social networks, trust in people, and acceptance of diversity. The “connectedness” domain includes the measurements of identification, trust in institutions, and perception of fairness. The “focus on the common good” domain includes the measurements of solidarity and helpfulness, respect for social rules, and civic participation.   Figure 1.2:  Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar (Source : Dragolov et al. (2016))   As in previous reports, this report uses the comprehensive approach of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar in our analysis as the output is logical and insightful.   2. MEASURING SOCIAL COHESION   This section details the data and methodological approaches employed for measuring social cohesion in South Africa. 2.1. DATA   The data collected in this report have been put together over a period of six years (2020 to 2025) using the Ipsos Khayabus study as a vehicle. The Khayabus is an Omnibus study, conducted twice a year via face-to-face interviews in the homes and home languages of a representative sample of South Africans, 15 years and older. As not all the questions are asked to 15-17-year-olds, data have been filtered on the results for those 18 years old and older. In an Omnibus-type study, different clients take the opportunity to include questions on the master questionnaire. In this way the Inclusive Society Institute added questions to the first wave of the study in the form of a section called Gov-Dem-Poll. Data from the 2020 study have been used for preliminary testing, and deep analysis and modelling followed from 2021 onwards.   Data are collected in all nine provinces of South Africa, but sample sizes per province differ – depending on the overall population size in each province in comparison to the South African population. We do make use of some disproportionate sampling in the case of provinces with very low population figures, like the mainly arid and rural Northern Cape. In the end the data are weighted by different demographic criteria to reflect the true population spread in the country, according to published sex, age and working status proportions in each province. Data are also projected to overall adult population figures and are as such representative of the South African population, within a margin of error (depending on sample size, response rate and sampling methodology used).   This procedure is followed to provide a mirror image of the views of the overall adult South African population. Thus, the smaller sample size used in some provinces (especially those with smaller populations than Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal) do invoke a larger standard sample error for sample statistics. This means in practical terms that the precision of the measurements for Gauteng is about four times higher than that for the Northen Cape at the same variability in the data. Therefore, we advise caution when interpreting data for provinces in isolation.   The table overleaf provides the achieved sample sizes (N) and population-weighted relative frequencies (%) of respondents over time (from 2020 to 2025) for South Africa as a whole and the nine provinces.   Table 2.1:  Sample sizes of Khayabus Note:  The table shows the absolute count (N) and population-weighted relative frequencies (%) of respondents from South Africa and its nine provinces in Wave 1 of the Khayabus surveys from 2020 to 2025.     2.2. ANALYTICAL APPROACH   A phased methodological approach was employed to select the appropriate survey questions (items/indicators) to measure the nine dimensions of social cohesion in line with the Bertelsmann concept. We then computed scores for each of the nine dimensions and the overall social cohesion index based on the scores.   Item selection was performed by using a multi-step procedure:   Each member of the research team independently identified potential items for measuring the nine social cohesion dimensions. Members of the research team then jointly prepared a pool of items according to face validity.  Items from the pool were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis for each dimension. [3] Finally, we assessed the internal consistency of the scales formed by the selected items to measure pertinent dimensions: Cronbach’s α coefficients should reach .90 for an excellent scale, .80 for a very good scale, .70 for a satisfactory scale, and minimally .30, or, in case of short scales, at least .10 times the number of items in the scale.    Several data preparation steps had to be taken before performing the factor analysis:   Where needed, the response options of the items were reverse coded so that a higher numerical value stands for a more vital expression of the pertinent aspect of cohesion.  The response option of all items was rescaled to range from 0 (weakest expression of cohesion) to 100 (strongest expression of cohesion). If present, missing values on an item were substituted with the sample mean – fortunately the rate of missing values was very low. Below and on the next two pages, Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 document the selected items’ factor loadings and the internal consistencies of the scale these items form for measuring the nine dimensions of social cohesion.   Table 2.2:  Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 1 Note:  The table shows the factor loadings of the items from factor analysis for the pertinent dimensions. Values in parentheses refer to Cronbach's α coefficient of internal consistency of the scale, formed by the items selected to measure the pertinent dimension .   Table 2.3:  Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 2 Note:  The table shows the factor loadings of the items from factor analysis for the pertinent dimension. Values in parentheses refer to Cronbach's α coefficient of internal consistency of the scale, formed by the items selected to measure the pertinent dimension.   a  Loadings and Cronbach's α cannot be computed; substituted with mean from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1   Table 2.4:  Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 3 Note:  The table shows the factor loadings of the items from factor analysis for the pertinent dimension. Values in parentheses refer to Cronbach's α coefficient of internal consistency of the scale, formed by the items selected to measure the pertinent dimension.   a  Loadings and Cronbach's α cannot be computed; substituted with mean from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1     It is obvious from these three tables that not all dimensions of social cohesion were measured equally well over the five-year period of the study. There were several reasons for this:   The questionnaire offered a limited choice of indicators for some dimensions. This is why not all dimensions could be measured with at least three items. This is relevant to Dimension 2.1 (Identification) and Dimension 3.1 (Solidarity and Helpfulness). Furthermore, for Dimension 2.1 (Identification) an item from the 2020 Khayabus had to be included, to assess citizens’ identification with South Africa in 2021. Not all scales exhibit a high degree of homogeneity (the level of intercorrelation) of the included items. This is particularly true for Dimension 2.1 (Identification) and Dimension 3.3 (Civic Participation). After sorting items via factor analysis, the nine-dimension scores were computed by calculating the arithmetic mean of the items determined to belong to a given factor. The overall cohesion index was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the nine-dimension score. Dimension and index scores for the provinces and the country as a whole were calculated by aggregating the individual-level data to the respective level via the population-weighted arithmetic mean. Scores for the dimensions and the overall index range from 0 (very low cohesion) to 100 (very high cohesion), where:   Scores from 0 to 19.99 can be interpreted as pointing to a very low level of cohesion, Scores from 20 to 39.99 as pointing to a low level of cohesion, Scores from 40 to 59.99 as pointing to a medium level of cohesion, Scores from 60 to 79.99 as pointing to a high level of cohesion, and Scores from 80 to 100 as pointing to a very high level of cohesion.     3. CURRENT LEVEL AND TREND OF SOCIAL COHESION 3.1. SOCIAL COHESION IN SOUTH AFRICA   Table 3.1 below illustrates the annual level and trend (development) of social cohesion in South Africa since 2021. Using the 2021 data as a base, it also shows the year-on-year development of dimensions of cohesion since 2021.   Table 3.1:  Overall index and dimensions Note:  The table shows the scores of South Africa as a whole on the overall index of social cohesion and its dimensions in 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025.   For this table and further tables, scores up to 19.99 (very low cohesion) are shaded in red, scores between 20 and 39.99 (low) are shaded in orange, scores between 40 and 59.99 are shaded in yellow, and scores above 60 (high cohesion) are shaded in green. The table also shows changes over time. Positive changes are given in green, and negative changes are indicated in red. Looking specifically at the findings for 2025, the fact of four green scores is noticed immediately. In the past five years the dimension of “Identification” has consistently delivered green scores, but it was unfortunately the only one. The dimension of “Social Networks” started off well in 2021, but could only manage another green score in 2025, while the dimension of “Solidarity and Helpfulness” achieved green scores for the last two years. In 2025, “Civic Participation” also achieved a green score. It is clear that social cohesion is on a stronger footing than before, with the overall country index improving 2.5 points since 2021 to reflect an overall index of 56 for the year 2025.  Currently, South Africa exhibits four green scores and five yellow scores. It is also an important finding that eight of the nine scores improved when comparing them to the situation in 2021. This is indeed a very positive result.   Another important finding is that the dimension of “Respect for Social Rules” showed an upward movement over the last year (from 2024 to 2025), with the score moving from orange to yellow.   The results show a nuanced profile of social cohesion in South Africa, covering quite a spectrum, from 42 to 76.7. It is notable that each one of the three domains includes at least one green score. When programmes are designed to promote social cohesion in the country, it would be advisable to use the essence of the green scores as main “selling points” to try to achieve movement on the other scores as well. As before, it is clear that the “glue” that holds the country together is still strongly reflected in citizens’ strong identification and affiliation with the country, at a score of 76.7 (3.5 points higher than in 2021).   On the other hand, three issues have the inherent potential to destabilise the South African society, namely:   Acceptance of Diversity (currently at 47.7 points), Perception of Fairness (currently at 47.1 points), and Respect for Social Rules (currently at 42 points). 3.2. SOCIAL COHESION IN THE NINE PROVINCES   The table overleaf shows the social cohesion scores for the nine South African provinces – all scores are in yellow, indicating medium-level index scores for the whole country.    In four provinces (the Eastern Cape, North West, Western Cape and Gauteng) the overall social cohesion score is higher than in the country as a whole. Especially the Eastern Cape and North West showed good progress over the last five years: the score in the Eastern Cape is 7 points higher than in 2021, while the score in North West is 7.6 points higher than in 2021.   The Northern Cape shows the highest points loss (7.5 points), from the 59.2 points measured in 2021 to the 51.7 measured in 2025.  However, it has been mentioned before that findings in the Northern Cape will probably show greater variability and inconsistency than in other provinces, as the sample size is really low. (This vast province houses only 2% of the country’s population.)   Two other provinces also recorded a decline in Social Cohesion when the 2025 findings are compared to those from 2021, although these losses are much smaller than that in the Northern Cape: Limpopo lost 1.2 index points, and the Free State lost 0.9 index points. All other provinces are doing better regarding overall Social Cohesion index points than in 2021.   Table 3.2:  Overall index in the provinces Note:  The table shows the scores of the nine South African provinces on the overall social cohesion index from 2021 to 2025. The table also shows changes over time. Positive changes are highlighted in green, and negative changes are highlighted in red.   The next nine tables will show the nine provinces’ performance on the three domains and nine dimensions of Social Cohesion over the five reporting periods/years. It will become clear that none of the provinces exhibit a consistent profile – in other words, each province has its strong and weak points when it comes to Social Cohesion.   The only exception is the strength of the dimension of identification with the country, which is high across all provinces. THE “SOCIAL RELATIONS” DOMAIN   Table 3.3:  Dimension 1.1 – Social networks in the provinces     Regarding social networks in the provinces, there are two clear groups in the country currently: the green group (good scores) and the yellow group (moderate scores). Social networks work well in the Western Cape, North West, Gauteng and Northern Cape. The other five provinces fare less well on this dimension and four out of the five have lost ground since 2021.     Table 3.4:  Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people in the provinces     Eight out of the nine provinces perform moderately on this dimension. The exception is the Eastern Cape – not only is this province the best overall performer this year, but it succeeded in steadily improving on the Trust in People dimension every year for the last five years and ended on an index score 16.4 points higher than where it started in 2021. Table 3.5:  Dimension 1.3 – "Acceptance of diversity"     All nine provinces registered moderate scores on this dimension. In a country with so many different population groups, a high Gini-coefficient, very different levels of development and educational qualifications, and diversity in terms of home languages and religions, it is perhaps not surprising. However, the process of nation-building should definitely get more attention nationally. The other aspect complicating the sentiment about acceptance of diversity is the issue of immigrants. More about this later. THE “CONNECTEDNESS” DOMAIN   Table 3.6:  Dimension 2.1 – Identification in the provinces     It is clear that Identification is by far the strongest dimension of Social Cohesion in the country, as has been mentioned previously. Seven provinces consistently registered “good” results on this dimension, and in 2025 two provinces, the Eastern and Western Cape, have registered “excellent” results. This is a very strong element of Social Cohesion in South Africa’s favour and can possibly be employed in a clever campaign to help promote some of the other desired opinions and dimensions of Social Cohesion.     Table 3.7:  Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions in the provinces   Another all yellow – i.e. moderate – performance. A campaign addressing Trust  in general, and both the dimensions of trust in other people and trust in institutions, making use of good stories or talking about good experiences might work in the long run. Table 3.8:  Dimension 2.3 – "Perception of fairness"   The scores for the Perception of Fairness are all moderate as well, but on the lower half of the moderate category. South Africans do have an issue with this on many different levels – just think about how many times there are news articles about unfairness, unfair treatment, discrimination and related issues. One positive observation, though, is that all the scores in the provinces (bar one) have increased since 2021. THE “FOCUS ON THE COMMON GOOD” DOMAIN   Table 3.9:  Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness in the provinces     This dimension of Solidarity and Helpfulness is another strong performance area for South Africa and all nine provinces. Eight of the nine provinces are in the “good”/green category and only one in the moderate category in terms of the indices. To be helpful, caring and friendly is a way of life for many in the country.   Table 3.10:  Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules     The dimension of Respect for Social Rules is by far the worst performer in terms of the Social Cohesion indices in South Africa – although many of the scores in the past five years have been much worse than those achieved in 2025. The related aspects of lawlessness, the attitude that “everything goes”, and even the reckless driving behaviour of some motorists count as everyday proof that South Africans have a low regard for rules, regulations and laws. This should not be allowed to continue.   Table 3.11:  Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation in the provinces     With this last dimension of Civic Participation, the pattern looks very similar to the very first dimension of Social Networks – four provinces recording “good”/green scores and five recording yellow/”moderate” scores. This time the Eastern Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo are the best performers, perhaps showing the strong sense of community in the three more rural provinces and even in the mainly metropolitan Gauteng province, where shared issues of service delivery have engendered a stronger sense of community and participation in local issues over the last year or so. It is also interesting that the scores for this dimension have all increased since 2021, with the Northern Cape again being the odd one out.    Although there is certainly still a lot of work to be done in the country concerning support and promotion of Social Cohesion, the index figures in general show a much more positive picture than five years ago, when we were still in the last phase of the Covid-19 pandemic and health, political and economic uncertainties were rife. Although the current situation in the country is not plain sailing, there is more participation and dialogue and the economy is slowly showing some tender green shoots, although growth is still severely inhibited. 4. STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON SOCIAL COHESION   This section focuses on the structural characteristics of the provinces that may have an influence on the promotion or hinderance of social cohesion within the provinces, with the aim of finding evidence on structural determinants of social cohesion. To bring this about, we explore the relationship between the overall level of social cohesion in the nine provinces and selected characteristics of the provinces from different themes, namely, the economic situation, inequality and poverty, demography, diversity and modernisation. The focus on these aspects is not arbitrary, as studies of different societies and the circumstances within them have illustrated empirically that aspects from these themes act as determinants rather than outcomes  of social cohesion (Dragolov et al., 2016; Arant et al., 2017; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Boehnke et al., 2024).     4.1 DATA AND METHODOLOGY   To touch on the economic situation in the provinces, we followed the same procedures as in previous studies and used data on the gross domestic product per capita [4] in South African Rand (ZAR) (Stats SA, 2025), Human Development Index (Global Data Lab, 2024), and unemployment rates – using both the official and expanded definitions of unemployment.   We measured poverty using one subjective indicator – the share of households in a province who perceive themselves as poor (Stats SA, 2024c), and objective indicators concerning three definitions of the poverty line [5] . We employed the Gini index of income inequality and the P90/P10 ratio (own calculations based on CRA, 2023) to measure inequality [6] .   We drew on data from the official Census 2022 in South Africa (Stats SA, 2023a) for the remaining thematic fields. In particular, regarding demographics, we considered population density, the share of urban and rural populations, the share of single and married citizens, and the population’s median age. To tap into diversity, we used the share of blacks, whites, coloureds and Indians/Asians, and other races, the share of immigrants, as well as ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalisation [7] (own calculations based on Stats SA, 2023a).   To measure modernisation, we used the share of citizens with completed primary, secondary and tertiary education, the share of citizens owning a computer and a mobile phone, and the share of the population without access to the internet (annual Khayabus results).   For reasons of data availability, all structural indicators, except GDP per capita, where the 2025 figure is used, refer to the years 2021, 2022 and 2023 (the latest Census was undertaken in 2022). The Khayabus data are from the year when fieldwork was undertaken.  Thereby, some figures precede the most recent measurement of social cohesion. Although the intentional time lag – earlier measurement of the provinces’ structural characteristics and later measurement of social cohesion – introduces a certain degree of temporal order in the analyses, it cannot prove the existence of a causal relationship, but it can increase the plausibility of attributing causality.    Each of the above-listed structural characteristics of the provinces was subjected to a correlation test with the level of social cohesion. Two variables are correlated when changes in one are closely followed by changes in the other. A correlation can be positive (the more variable A, the more variable B) or negative (the more variable A, the less variable B). The strength of the association is reflected in the coefficient correlation, which can range from 0 (no correlation) to ±1 (perfect correlation). Typically, a correlation below .10 is very weak, between .10 and .30 is weak, between .30 and .50 is moderate, and above .50 is strong.   As before, we experimented with both Pearson and Spearman correlations. However, using Pearson correlations the low number of provinces (only nine) means that only extremely high correlations can reach statistical significance. As a parametric test, the Pearson correlations involve assumptions that cannot be fulfilled with the data on the level of provinces. Therefore, we again used Spearman correlations as a non-parametric, assumption-free alternative. A Spearman correlation is, in essence, a Pearson correlation performed on ranked data. The distinction between the two approaches is that a Pearson correlation considers the exact distances between the observations on each variable, whereas a Spearman correlation considers only whether there are differences, regardless of their size.   Both bivariate correlations and correlations partial to GDP were measured, because previous studies in other countries showed that GDP was highly positively related to social cohesion (Dragolov et al, 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). Generally, the more prosperous a society is, the more cohesive it is. Partialling GDP out of a relationship removes the “halo effect” – the influence of GDP on both variables involved. This makes it possible to speak of associations between a given structural characteristic of the provinces and social cohesion, independent of their economic prosperity. 4.2 RESULTS   Table 4.1 (overleaf) documents the relationships between the structural characteristics of the nine provinces and social cohesion per thematic field.   Table 4.1:  Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Note :  The table shows Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and structural characteristics of the provinces, performed on the level of the provinces ( N  = 9). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p  ≤ .05, *** p  ≤ .01. 5. INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCES OF SOCIAL COHESION   This section looks at the data at the level of individual respondents to explore which population or societal groups are at risk of experiencing low cohesion in South Africa. This exercise involved the identification of distinct groups – or classes – of respondents, based on their scores on the nine dimensions of social cohesion.     5.1. DATA AND METHODOLOGY   To classify respondents into groups with distinct experiences of cohesion, we used Latent Class Analysis. “Latent Class Analysis (LCA) is a statistical procedure used to identify qualitatively different subgroups within membership who often share certain outward characteristics. The assumption underlying LCA is that membership in unobserved groups (or classes) can be explained by patterns of scores across survey questions, assessment indicators, or scales” (Weller et al., 2020). The classes of respondents resulting from the analysis are characterised by similarities within the class and dissimilarities across the classes concerning the experience of the nine aspects of cohesion by the respondents who belong to each class. It is also possible to relate class membership to socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics and investigate how the experience of social cohesion is related to individual characteristics.   The Latent Class Analysis produced a best fit for four classes of South Africans [8] :   Critics, 15.5% of the adult population, Integrated Sceptics, 22.5% of the adult population, Middle South Africa, 48.2% of the adult population, and Cohesive Communities, 13.8% of the adult population.     5.2. IDENTIFYING FOUR CLASSES OF EXPERIENCE OF SOCIAL COHESION    Critics (Class 1) are characterised by high identification (like all groups) but critically low acceptance of diversity. They also have low trust in people and in institutions and their perception of fairness and respect for social rules lag behind. This group has the lowest overall social cohesion index score at 40.6.   Integrated Sceptics (Class 2) show well-knit social networks, they have high trust in people and accept diversity, experience solidarity and helpfulness and participate in civic life. Like all South Africans, they agree strongly with the country. However, they fall short on trust in institutions (they are “sceptics”, after all) and exhibit very low levels of respect for social rules and perceptions of fairness. This group has the second-highest overall cohesion index score at 56.5.   Middle South Africa (Class 3) is the biggest group and also the most like the “average South African”, if something like that existed.  They identify strongly with the country and have high solidarity and helpfulness when it comes to society. But, for all the other dimensions, their views are somewhere in the middle. This group has the second-lowest overall social cohesion index score at 55.7.   Cohesive Communities (Class 4) characterise the ideal-typical model of strong cohesion in South Africa, manifesting itself in exceptionally high identification and high scores on all the other dimensions. This group has the highest overall social cohesion index score at 73.4.   A series of chi-square tests of independence suggest that these four classes differ along core socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics.   Table 5.1:  2025 Results: Social Cohesion Dimensions and LCA Note:  The table shows the average score (M) and the standard deviation (SD) of the overall index of social cohesion and its nine dimensions in the four classes of respondents. Scores below 20 are highlighted in red, scores between 20 and 39.99 are highlighted in orange, scores between 40 and 59.99 are highlighted in yellow, scores between 60 and 79.99 are highlighted in green, and scores above 80 are highlighted in blue.     A closer look at the average scores of the four classes on the nine dimensions reveals the aspects of cohesion along which the classes differ from each other (see Table 5.1 above). It is clear that all four classes exhibit a high to very high level of identification.  There is also more convergence than in previous studies on the dimension of solidarity and helpfulness, with three of the four classes now exhibiting good scores. (This dimension stayed at about the same level for Critics in 2025 as in 2024.)   5.3. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE FOUR CLASSES    In this section, the typical individual characteristics for the four classes are explored. As illustrated in Table 5.2 overleaf, socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics are used. The four classes are characterised in the framework of separate chi-square tests of independence between respondents’ class membership and the respective individual characteristics of interest. Table 5.2 documents the population weighted relative frequencies (%) of the socio-demographic and socio-economic categories in the total sample and in each of the four classes as well as the respective results from the chi-square tests of independence and Cramer’s V  coefficient of effect size. Due to the large sample sizes in three of the classes, all nine tests emerged as statistically significant, although some effect sizes are small.   Critics include an overproportion of single young females, with four out of five from the black population group – with home languages corresponding to this finding. They mainly live outside of metropolitan areas, and their education reflects a similar pattern to that of the country, with a slight overproportion of individuals with a lower education. Just over four in ten Critics are unemployed, leading to an effect on personal income. As we have seen in the previous section, the Critics group are not experiencing low levels of social cohesion in the country and their communities.   We have seen that Integrated Sceptics experienced a much higher level of social cohesion. This group tend to be slightly older than the first and display a slight overrepresentation of whites and coloureds than the general South African population. They also come more from married relationships and include an overrepresentation of Afrikaans-speakers, and proportionally more of them live in rural areas. The spread of Integrated Sceptics over the categories of education, working status and income is broadly similar to the general South African patterns.   Middle South Africa – exactly as the name says, this group mainly follows a distribution in different socio-demographic and socio-economic groups similar to the general South African population. If anything, this group is slightly overrepresented in the black population and live more in metropolitan areas than the general population.   Cohesive communities are more male than female and have stronger representation in the 25-to-64 age group than the general population. They show a good spread of home language and population groups but are overrepresented in the Indian/Asian group and almost half live in rural areas or villages. They are overrepresented in the group with secondary education, and are mostly employed, with corresponding higher than average incomes. They experience the highest level of social cohesion of all four groups. Table 5.2:  Socio-demographic and -economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents Note:  The table shows the population-weighed relative frequencies (%) of the categories of the pertinent socio-economic and demographic characteristics in the total sample (N = 3456) and in each of the four classes of respondents (n1 = 532, n2 = 808, n3 = 1637, n4 = 479), the respective result from a chi-square test of independence between the characteristic and class belonging, and Cramer’s V coefficient of effect size. Significance of the estimates in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     6. SOCIAL COHESION AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING   In this section, we check whether the data support the consistent findings from previous studies that high levels of social cohesion are related to greater (subjective) well-being.   Five items from the Khayabus study are used as proxies of well-being, namely:   Think of the way your family lives, would you say that your family is … better off than a year ago / about the same / worse off than a year ago? And how do you think your family’s lives will be in a year’s time? Do you think your family will be … better off than today / about the same / worse off than today? Please think about your children or the children of family or friends. What do you think the future holds for these children? Do you think that … they have a bright future ahead of them / they have a bleak future ahead of them? And your satisfaction with life? Has it … improved / stayed the same / worsened compared to a few months ago? On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate whether you (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) agree, or (5) strongly agree with the following statement: I am seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so.   Analyses on both the level of provinces and of individuals were conducted.     6.1. PROVINCES – DATA AND METHODOLOGY   We aggregated individual responses to the five items to measure well-being on the level of provinces. For each province, we took the respective share of the positive response option for each of the four items with categorically scaled answers (better off, bright future, improved). We applied the same methodological approach as in Section 4, which explored associations between several structured characteristics of the provinces and the index of social cohesion. Appendix B documents the biserial bivariate correlations on the individual level and the bivariate and partial Pearson correlations on the level of provinces. As in Section 4, we report and interpret the results from the Spearman correlations partial for GDP. Table 6.1:  Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Note:  The table shows Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and aspects of subjective well-being on the level of the nine provinces (N = 9). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     These correlations are less strong than those measured in previous studies.     6.2. INDIVIDUALS   To investigate the association between social cohesion and subjective well-being on the individual level, we relate the individual responses to the well-being items to respondents’ membership in the four distinct classes of experiencing social cohesion. As most of the items on well-being are of categorical measurement quality, we apply the approach from Section 5 to describe the four classes based on respondents’ socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The individual experience of social cohesion exhibits strong associations with all four of the indicators of subjective well-being. Table 6.2: Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents Note:  The table shows the population-weighed relative frequencies (%) of the responses to the pertinent aspect of subjective well-being in the total sample (N = 3456) and in each of the four classes of respondents (n1 = 532, n2 = 808, n3 = 1637, n4 = 479), the respective result from a chi-square test of independence between the aspect of well-being and class belonging, and Cramer’s V coefficient of effect size. Significance of the estimates in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     The evidence presented a clear picture. The greatest share of respondents who evaluated their family’s life as better off than a year ago was found in Class 4 (Cohesive Communities). Looking at the two measures of optimism, we found similar evidence. The largest share of respondents believing that their family’s lives would be better off in a year’s time than at the time of the fieldwork, was again found in the Cohesive Communities. Likewise, optimism related to the future of children was also found to be highest in Class 4, and the pattern holds for satisfaction with life, with almost half of Group 4 claiming that their life satisfaction had improved.   In each case the optimism and hope of Cohesive Communities was shared by smaller proportions of Group 3 (Middle South Africa) and by even smaller proportions of Group 2 (Integrated Sceptics).   Group 1 (Critics) in many cases did not strongly express themselves – either positively or negatively – but largely chose the middle options of “stayed the same” when this was offered. In the case of the future of children, where no middle option was offered, more than half of Critics chose the option that children would have a “bleak future”.     7. CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD   The concept and reality of Social Cohesion should form part of the central discussion in a diverse developing country like South Africa.  Thus, this project, which has developed over five years of intense studies and modelling, can contribute constructively to the intensifying and necessary discourse. Looking at the project over the five years, it is possible to see the progress made so far, but also to see what still needs to be done. For instance, the “Critics” group are seriously lagging in positive opinions about themselves and the future of the country. Special attention should be paid to developing a programme to help them see the way out of the dire situations they find themselves in. This group is mainly made up of young women, and it should be possible to mobilise NGOs and the Department in the President’s office that pays special attention to women to concentrate on this group – in a way that can be informed by the findings of this project and measured in future.   However, it would be wrong not to pay any attention to the other three groups: “Integrated Sceptics”, “Middle South Africa” and “Cohesive Communities”. These groups can perhaps be more easily addressed and involved in Social Cohesion programmes, however, it should be noted that the messages designed for each of these groups must be different. They still exhibit very different “group personalities”, have different interests, and support or are concerned about different issues. In this case, some further study and careful planning will be appropriate.   As mentioned at various instances in this report, the glue that holds the South African society together consists to a significant extent of the high level of identification with the country, as illustrated by all four groups/classes of South Africans. This national pride cannot be taken for granted. Today, it rests to a large degree on the shared connection to the country, its history and its people and the sense of belonging we share, and it also finds expression in the shared joy experienced at the success of our sports teams. But this cannot be all; other elements of “nation-building” also need to be identified, built on and shared. Looking at other areas we can develop, South Africans largely share a strong feeling of solidarity and helpfulness when it comes to fellow citizens, and relatively well-functioning social networks.    These aspects can aid in the nation-building project.   On the other hand, serious political and planning attention must also be paid to the widely perceived lack of respect for social rules, as this can easily spark turmoil and unrest. Policymakers might also consider overcoming the perceived lack of fairness of various elements of the political system, likewise, strengthening of the acceptance of diversity is also needed, and trust in institutions needs urgent attention – especially with a view to the coming local government elections.   It also has to be mentioned that overall Social Cohesion in the country has increased over the last two measurement periods and that it is at an overall higher level than 2021 – thus, slow progress has been made. But it is still on a rather moderate level of 56, and is still falling far short of the hope, attitude of reconciliation and common vision of the “Rainbow Nation” of 1994. A lot of work still needs to be done.   To increase the use of this report and aid planning for Social Cohesion development, the report contains a lot of information specifically aimed at each of the provinces. On the one hand it is important to promote social cohesion on a national level, but on the other, each province also displays its own idiosyncrasies and legitimate findings and issues. The overall direction of the Social Cohesion plan should therefore include a separate special focus on each province. It would also be possible to link and disaggregate the analysis of the four groups of South Africans to each province, in order to facilitate the employment of the same building blocks in provinces as on the national scale. The fifth study in this series really proves the stability and usefulness of the study overall and corroborates the fact that the quality of a society (its social cohesion) translates directly into citizens’ quality of life (measured by subjective well-being) – and their optimism for the future. In turn, this can improve political participation, a sense of belonging, participation in the economy, the health of communities, and even the paying of taxes!   APPENDICES   APPENDIX A: INDICATORS OF COHESION ACROSS TIME    This Appendix documents the population-weighted relative frequencies of the response categories of the indicators used to calculate the social cohesion scores in this report. The reported values pertain to the respective percentage distributions in the total sample for each year of data collection.   Table A.1:  Dimension 1.1 – Social networks results over time     Table A.2:  Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people results over time       Table A.3:  Dimension 1.3 – Acceptance of diversity results over time     Table A.4:  Dimension 2.1 – Identification results over time   *values stem from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1 ( N  = 3758) .  Table A.5:  Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions results over time *values stem from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1 (N = 3758).   Table A.6:  Dimension 2.3 – Perception of fairness results over time   Table A.7:  Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness results over time Table A.8:  Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules results over time     Table A.9:  Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation results over time   * values stem from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1 ( N  = 3758).     APPENDIX B: CORRELATIONS OF SOCIAL COHESION ON THE PROVINCE LEVEL   Table B.1:  Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Note:  The table shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and structural characteristics of the provinces, performed on the level of the provinces (N = 9). For comparison, the table further shows the biserial correlations on the level of individuals (N = 3172). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     Table B.2:  Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Note:  The table shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and aspects of subjective well-being on the level of the nine provinces (N = 9). For comparison, the table further shows the biserial correlations on the level of individuals (N = 3172). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01. APPENDIX C: LATENT CLASS ANALYSES   This Appendix documents goodness-of-fit indices for the various LCA models specified.   Table C.1:  Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Note:  The table documents goodness-of-fit indices of the different solutions from latent class analysis. AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion. saBIC: sample-size-adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion. APCM: Average Probability of Class Membership.     Table C.2: Relative class sizes for LCA solutions Note:  The table shows the population-weighed relative sizes of the classes (% of total sample) for different solutions from Latent Class Analysis. Percentages may not sum row-wise up to 100 due to rounding errors. N = 3172.     REFERENCES   Abrahams, C. 2016. Twenty years of social cohesion and nation-building in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 42(1), 95–107. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43900558   Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. & Wacziarg, R. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth , 8, 155–194. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024471506938   Apraku, A., Moyo, P. & Akpan, W. 2018. Coping with climate change in Africa: an analysis of local interpretations in Eastern Cape, SA. Development Southern Africa , 36(3), 295–308. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2018.1482199   Arant, R., Dragolov, G. & Boehnke, K. 2017. Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2017 . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Arant, R., Larsen, M. & Boehnke, K. 2016. Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Bremen . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Ballantine, C., Chapman, M., Erwin, K. & Maré, G. (Eds.). 2017. Living together, living apart? Social cohesion in a future South Africa . South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=496   Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.). 2018. What holds Asian societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Boehnke, K., Berrueto, A., Dragolov, G. & Ocampo Villegas, P. 2019. Are value preferences and social cohesion interconnected? The case of Mexico. Acta de Investigación, 9(2). http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fpsi.20074719e.2019.2.262   Boehnke, K., Dragolov, G., Arant, R. & Unzicker, K. 2024. Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2023 . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Burns, J., Hull, G., Lefko-Everett K. & Njozela, L. 2018. Defining social cohesion  (SALDRU Working Paper 216). Cape Town: SALDRU, UCT.   Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA). 2023. Assets and Incomes . Johannesburg: Centre for Risk Analysis.   Delhey, J. & Boehnke, K. 2018. Conceptualizing social cohesion in Asia, In Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.), What holds Asian societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar  (pp. 29-48). Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Delhey, J., Dragolov, G. & Boehnke, K. 2023. Social Cohesion in International Comparison: A Review of Key Measures and Findings. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 75, 95-120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-023-00891-6   Dragolov, G., Ignácz, Z. S., Lorenz, J., Delhey, J., Boehnke, K. & Unzicker, K. 2016. Social cohesion in the Western world. What holds societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar . Switzerland: Springer International. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32464-7   Global Data Lab. 2024. Subnational HDI (v8.0) . [Online] Available at: https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/table/shdi/ZAF/ [accessed: 24 September 2024].   Langer, A., Stewart, F., Smedts, K. & Demarest, L. 2017. Conceptualising and measuring social cohesion in Africa: Towards a perceptions-based index. Social Indicators Research, 131, 321-343. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1250-4   Larsen, M. M. & Boehnke, K. 2016. Measuring Social Cohesion in the Kyrgyz Republic. Social Cohesion Index . University of Central Asia's Institute of Public Policy and Administration Working Paper No. 36, Bishkek.   Leininger, J., Burchi, F., Fiedler, C., Mross, K., Nowack, D., von Schiller, A., Sommer, C., Strupat, C. & Ziaja, S. 2021. Social cohesion: A new definition and a proposal for its measurement in Africa  (Discussion Paper 31/2021). Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). https://doi.org/10.23661/dp31.2021.v1.1   OECD. 2021. Old-age income inequality. In Pensions at a Glance 2021: OECD and G20 Indicators . Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/d1a5a309-en   Schiefer, D. & van der Noll, J. 2017. The essentials of social cohesion: A literature review. Social Indicators Research, 132(2), 579-603. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1314-5   Statistics South Africa. 2023a. Census 2022 . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa. 2023b. Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Quarter 4: 2022 . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa. 2024a. Estimation of regional gross domestic product for South Africa: Experimental estimates . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa. 2024b. Population Estimates . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa.2024c. Subjective poverty in South Africa. Findings from the General Household Surveys 2019 and 2022 . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa. 2025. Estimation of regional gross domestic product for South Africa: Experimental estimates . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Wasserstein, R. L., Schirm, A. L. & Lazar, N. A. 2019. Moving to a World Beyond “ p  < 0.05”. The American Statistician, 73(sup1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2019.1583913   Weller, B. E., Bowen, N. K. & Faubert, S. J. 2020. Latent Class Analysis: A guide to best practice. Journal of Black Psychology, 46(4), 287–311. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095798420930932 [1]  “I am a Roman citizen.” [2]  Holland, T. & Sandbrook, D. 2024. The rest is History Returns . London: Bloomsbury. p71. [3]  Factor analysis is a statistical sorting procedure that analyses the matrix of item intercorrelations to identify items with a highly similar subgroup. The various subgroups of items (called factors) allow us to assess whether or not the items were selected appropriately according to their face validity as per the different dimensions of social cohesion. An important selection criterion is the item’s factor loading, which reflects how strongly an item is correlated with the other items sorted into the given factor. Item loadings should typically exceed .40 to be seen as sufficiently high. Items exhibiting sufficiently high factor loadings were retained. [4]  In line with the customary practice in economic research and previous SASCI studies, we transform the raw values by taking their natural logarithm ( ln ). [5]  Individuals below the food poverty line cannot afford enough food to obtain the minimum daily energy requirement for adequate health. Individuals below the lower-bound poverty line are unable to afford both adequate food and non-food items and have to sacrifice food for essential non-food items. Individuals below the upper-bound poverty line can afford adequate food and essential non-food items. In 2022, the food poverty line was at R663, the lower-bound poverty line at R945, and the upper-bound poverty line at R1,417, according to the Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA, 2023). [6]  The Gini coefficient measures income inequality in the population as a whole: It ranges from 0 (perfect equality among all individuals) to 1 (perfect inequality, where one individual has all income). The P90/P10 ratio contrasts the income at the 90 th  percentile of the income distribution to the income at its 10 th percentile (OECD, 2021). [7]  Fractionalisation is the probability that two randomly selected individuals are not from the same group (ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.) (Alesina et al, 2023). The corresponding indices for ethnic/linguistic/religious fractionalisation range from 0 (all individuals are from the same ethnic, linguistic, religious group) to 1 (each individual belongs to a separate ethnic, linguistic, religious group). [8]  The names chosen for each class refers to the opinions and characteristics defining the class.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026   This paper is published jointly by the  Inclusive Society Institute and School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University   PO Box 610 Bellville, 7550 South Africa  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report was prepared with the assistance of AI technology, including ChatGPT.   Certain images may have been generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature.   FEBRUARY 2026   Author: Prof Tania Ajam & Daryl Swanepoel   A SUMMARY OF THE DELIBERATIONS AT THE 2025 STELLENBOSCH SCHOOL OF PUBLIC LEADERSHIP’S WINELANDS CONFERENCE ON THE IMPACT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AI ON PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURES   The future impact of AI on the country’s democracy will depend on the governance choices that its public policymakers make today. If they design systems that focus on the needs and rights of the citizens, that ensure strong human oversight, use AI to strengthen fairness and administrative justice, and if they deploy it in ways that support reflective reasoning, rather than replace it, then the technology can deepen inclusion and enhance democratic participation. However, without such safeguards, AI could weaken institutions, erode cognitive autonomy and concentrate power in technological systems that are not publicly accountable, and which can reshape democratic life in ways democratic societies never intended.   Artificial Intelligence has evolved into one of the defining forces in contemporary governance and yet its character and consequences remain profoundly contested. The presentations delivered at the 2025 Winelands Conference at the Asara Wine Estate in Stellenbosch on 22-24 October 2025 demonstrate that AI’s impact on democratic life cannot be understood in narrow technical terms. Instead, AI must be interpreted as a political, institutional, social, cognitive and normative phenomenon. Its application reshapes how authority is exercised, how public services are organised, how citizens engage the state, how collective decisions are made and even how people think.   In this sense, AI does not merely introduce new tools; it inaugurates a new terrain of governance in which the boundaries between human and machine, and between carbon and silicon, become increasingly blurred. The question of whether AI serves as a gateway to inclusion or a risk to democracy, therefore depends not on technology alone, but also on how societies structure its use, how its institutions regulate and govern it and how citizens relate to it.   Prof Ayad Al-Ani’s presentation offers a compelling starting point for this expanded inquiry. He situates AI within a long historical arc in which technological shifts have decentralised capabilities that were once exclusive to elites. While universal basic income remains a distant objective, AI may, in the meantime, serve as a form of “universal technological provision”, granting individuals access to advanced intelligence through personal devices. In what Al-Ani characterises as the era of “abundant intelligence”, AI potentially democratises cognitive capacity itself with political implications: In a situation characterized by economization and digitization of all spheres of life, an “intimate relationship between human and machine may be the only utopia that is left”.   This shift may mark a deeper transformation in the distribution of power. Intelligence, which was once dependent on formal education, professional training or institutional access, has now become a more widely accessible resource that is being delivered through personalised AI systems that individuals can deploy as their cognitive “partners”.   Al-Ani illustrates that this transformation has immediate implications for citizenship and public administration. He envisions a dual AI architecture consisting of a citizen proxy/avatar and a digital intelligent public agent (see infographic 1). The citizen proxy is conceived as an AI assistant that not only identifies options, and completes and authenticates tasks, but interprets rights, translates bureaucratic requirements into everyday language and acts on behalf of the citizen in navigating state systems. This proxy can communicate across relevant languages and can adjust to social contexts, such as speaking to elders with respect and to youth with an informal and accessible tone. And it can operate through widely used platforms, such as WhatsApp or USSD, which is making it viable for individuals who have limited data access or digital literacy. By preparing complex applications, checking eligibility, assembling and storing documents, guiding users step-by-step and even escalating unresolved issues to human authorities, the proxy reduces the layers of administrative friction that have historically excluded the poor, the rural, the disabled and the digitally marginalised.   The public agent, in turn, functions as the government-facing component that verifies identity, processes applications, validates consent, executes transactions and ensures data minimisation. Together, the citizen and public AI agent, communicating and interacting directly through secure communication protocols, constitute a socio-technical system that potentially enables citizens to exercise their rights more effectively, facilitates more efficient delivery of public services, and significantly reduces bureaucratic barriers. In the longer term, it can be assumed, public agents will evolve into “digital public employees”—AI systems endowed with autonomy to manage more complex service processes, coordinate with humans, and make certain operational decisions independently. This presents an "event horizon" scenario where effective supervision of technology remains uncertain.   Infographic 1:  AI-Mediated Public Service Architecture (Source: Author, 2025)   Al-Ani’s examples illustrate the practical democratizing potential of this architecture. In this future scenario, a citizen in Limpopo could apply for a social grant using voice prompts in Sepedi, an informal trader could log a power outage and track the municipality’s response, a student applying for educational funding could rely on the proxy to gather the necessary documentation and monitor progress. These examples demonstrate how AI can address gaps in service delivery and administrative justice, particularly for communities that have traditionally faced barriers to accessing public institutions. However, it is foreseeable that advancements in digital interactions among AI agents will extend beyond the scope of public services. It is equally likely that these new forms of interaction will shape citizens’ participation in political processes: individuals may utilize agents to engage in such processes, and the resulting data will offer policymakers a more empirical basis for informed decision-making. Yet, Al-Ani’s analysis is not limited to empowerment, in that he also warns of an emerging risk he terms PSYOP capitalism, which is illustrated vividly in the emotionally resonant AI avatars displayed in his presentation. He noted that these systems, which are owned by technology companies and thus merely give the impression of being “our partners”, are engineered to simulate empathy, companionship and emotional presence. By forming bonds with users,   AI creates possibilities for subtle behavioural influence, with the line between assistance and persuasion becoming increasingly difficult to detect, because, when systems understand users’ preferences, vulnerabilities and emotional states, they gain the ability to shape behaviour in ways that may not be consciously perceived by the users.   This raises profound democratic concerns, in that unacknowledged influence undermines the autonomy necessary for civic judgement, whereas democracy depends on transparent persuasion and free choice. AI systems capable of shaping behaviour through psychological immersion therefore challenge these constitutional assumptions.   The normative and institutional implications of these developments are articulated with precision by Prof Martijn van der Steen, when he argues that AI introduces fundamental questions that are both political and normative. It raises the political issue of who decides, because AI systems are increasingly making decisions that were once reserved for humans. That, in turn, raises the issue of who protects, because institutions must determine how to safeguard citizens from algorithmic error, bias, hallucinations or harm. And it raises the issue of who dominates, because AI systems often depend on technological infrastructure controlled by private actors whose interests do not always align with public values. Van der Steen argues that these questions cannot be approached with naïveté. He contends that democratic societies must avoid both naïve optimism and apocalyptic pessimism about AI, and  instead ground their understanding of AI in its observable consequences.   Van der Steen’s concept of siliconization illustrates the gravity of these shifts. When algorithms, data systems and sensors become deeply – and often inconspicuously - embedded in public governance, silicon-based systems then begin to shape administrative logics that were once exclusively human. Traditional bureaucracies - that is carbon-based systems  reliant on human judgement - may find themselves weakened if they cannot adapt to algorithmic demands. The institutional future, according to van der Steen, is not predetermined.   His three scenarios illustrate possible trajectories. His X-Curve scenario presents a world where algorithmic authority accelerates while human institutions decline. This is the scenario that poses the greatest democratic risk, as democratic oversight mechanisms fail to keep pace with technological change. The Double-S scenario, in turn, imagines a more balanced ecosystem in which human and machine capabilities reinforce each other, a scenario which aligns far more closely with a vision of AI serving democratic aims. The Watchful Waiting scenario, on the other hand, reflects a more cautious evolution to the introduction of AI, where gradual adaptation occurs without dramatic disruption. These three scenarios underscore that the democratic impact of AI will depend on the choices that the democratic institutions make.   Infographic 2:  AI and Institutional Capacity: Three Possible Trajectories (Source: Author, 2025)   Dr Gray Manicom’s analysis grounds these theoretical insights in practice by examining how AI is already embedded in South African governance and the examples he raised illustrate that AI is not a distant prospect. AI is, for example, already shaping visa adjudication, tax assistance, information retrieval and climate forecasting today. The Lwazi AI assistant at SARS enhances taxpayer support, the AI-enabled visa adjudication system at Home Affairs speeds decision-making, the GovSearch tool provides quick access to government documentation and the Itiki drought prediction system, which integrates indigenous knowledge with machine learning, supports farmers and communities facing climate-related risk. These are practical examples that show that AI can improve efficiency and expand service delivery, but they also, at the same time, demonstrate how deeply AI is becoming integrated into administrative processes, which is raising questions about fairness, transparency, procedural justice and human oversight. To illustrate this, one can cite the example of a visa application denied by AI, which may bring about efficiency gains, but it remains a decision with life-altering consequences. It must therefore be open to human review and explanation. The cognitive dimension of AI’s influence is articulated powerfully in the work of Linda Snippe, whose research does not only examine the institutional or political impacts of AI, but more so its effects on human decision-making. She compares unaided decision-making with decision-making supported by delegative AI and decision-making supported by conversational AI and her findings reveal that conversational AI produces the highest perceived decision quality across multiple datasets, particularly in early and middle phases of decision-making where critical thinking, creativity and problem framing are most essential. Snippe’s interpretation draws upon Cognitive Fit Theory and Dual-Process Theory, which theories, she argues, propose that delegative AI encourages fast, intuitive thinking by providing immediate answers with limited engagement. Conversational AI, on the other, she submits, encourages slow, reflective thinking by prompting users to articulate, question and refine their own ideas, which iterative dialogue with themselves, engages the cognitive processes associated with analytical reasoning. Snippe’s findings illustrate that AI is not merely a source of information, because it can also shape the cognitive pathways through which decisions emerge, an insight that has profound implications for democracy. Because the health of democratic institutions depends on the capacity of citizens to evaluate information, reason through complexity and participate in public deliberation and therefore, if conversational AI strengthens these capacities by scaffolding reflective reasoning, it may enhance democratic participation, but if delegative AI becomes dominant, citizens may increasingly outsource judgement to machines, which will weaken the cognitive autonomy of citizens. Furthermore, the integration of emotionally persuasive AI systems, as highlighted by Al-Ani, will intensify this risk, because should these systems guide decisions through psychological influence, the democratic choice that individuals make, may become vulnerable to manipulation.   Taken together, the Winelands presentations reveal that AI is simultaneously an opportunity and a threat. An opportunity in that it expands inclusion by reducing administrative barriers, supporting multilingual access and empowering citizens with personalised tools, and it offers efficiency gains and improved service delivery. It can also strengthen deliberative reasoning through conversational engagement. But equally so, one should recognise the potential threat to democratic norms when authority is shifted toward opaque algorithmic systems, in that it  may challenge institutional oversight and enable subtle but pervasive forms of influence that could erode cognitive independence and democratic institutions. The future of AI hinges on the choices that public policymakers make now. If governments design citizen-centred systems like Al-Ani’s proxy and agent model, retain strong human oversight as van der Steen argues, use AI to strengthen administrative justice as shown in cases which Manicom highlights, and support reflective reasoning, rather than cognitive outsourcing as Snippe’s research advises, then AI can deepen democratic inclusion. However, without such safeguards, AI risks accelerating institutional erosion, diminishing cognitive autonomy and can lead to the concentration of power in unaccountable technological and commercial systems.   In this analysis, one conclusion emerges clearly: AI’s democratic consequences are not a product of fate, but of governance. Societies that design AI with intentionality, transparency and an unwavering commitment to public value may gain a more inclusive and effective democratic order. Those that fail to do so may find that the most powerful technology of the century has quietly reshaped their institutions, their politics, and their citizens’ minds.   Infographic 3:  AI’s Democratic Impact: A Matter of Choice (Source: Author, 2025)     This policy brief draws on the presentations made by the undermentioned academics at the Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership’s Winelands Conference that was held from 22 – 24 October 2025.   Al-Ani, Ayad. Einstein Center Digital Future, Berlin Manicom, Gray. Policy Innovation Lab, Stellenbosch University Snippe, Linda. Inholland University of Applied Sciences Van der Steen, Martijn. Erasmus University, Rotterdam   The synthesisation of this policy brief has been aided through the use of AI, which has drawn solely from the presentations made by the aforementioned academics. The brief has subsequently been amended, verified and edited by the author.       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za