Reforming Global Governance or Building a Parallel Order?

Occasional Paper 13/2025

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OCTOBER 2025

Daryl Swanepoel

Abstract

China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI), announced in 2025 by President Xi Jinping, has drawn extensive international scrutiny. Western commentators often frame it as an attempt to create a parallel system, a rival architecture to the UN-based, liberal order led by the United States and its allies. Yet this paper argues that such criticism, while not necessarily unfounded, is incomplete and at times misplaced.

China’s proposals stem from the manifest failure of the existing global governance framework to reform itself. The United Nations remains structurally frozen in 1945, the Bretton Woods institutions disproportionately represent Western economic power and the rhetoric of a “rules-based order” often masks selective adherence to those very rules by the West.

This paper contends that the West’s unwillingness to share institutional power and to genuinely reform multilateralism has created the vacuum that China now fills. Rather than dismissing the GGI as a threat, policymakers should recognise it as both a symptom of global governance stagnation and a test of whether an inclusive, pluralist order can still be built.

The real challenge is not to condemn China’s initiatives per se, but to address the underlying legitimacy deficit of the current system. The West’s defensive rigidity, more than China’s assertiveness, is driving the fragmentation of multilateral governance.

1. Introduction

When President Xi Jinping announced the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) in early 2025, the initiative was immediately labelled by many Western analysts as a bid by China to reshape the world order in its image (The Diplomat, 2025; Reuters, 2025). The GGI follows two earlier efforts, being the Global Development Initiative (GDI, 2021) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI, 2022), which together with the GGI outline China’s emerging normative vision of global governance.

Critics argue that the GGI represents an attempt to construct a parallel system that would displace, or at least undermine, the existing multilateral institutions created under US and European leadership after World War II (Schuman, Fulton & Gering, 2023), but this paper takes a different view. It argues that the conditions giving rise to the GGI lie not in Beijing’s ambitions alone, but in the stagnation, hypocrisy and exclusion that have paralysed existing global governance structures.

The question, therefore, is not whether China’s initiative is justified, but whether the failure of the United Nations and related bodies to reform leaves the world any real alternative.

2. China’s diagnosis of global governance failure

China’s critique of the post-war order is rooted in its perception that global governance remains dominated by Western power and ideology and in this regard president Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated that the architecture of global governance must reflect the realities of the new world balance. Beijing’s diagnosis can be summarised in three main points.

2.1 An unrepresentative institutional order

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) still enshrines the geopolitical structure of 1945, with Africa, Latin America and much of Asia still remaining without permanent representation, but on the contrary, however, the permanent five (P5) veto system remains firmly in place, where it continues to entrench inequality between the member states by allowing the powerful ones to block reforms that might dilute their influence (CFR, 2025).

2.2 Economic governance skewed toward the West

Voting shares at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank continues to remain weighted in favour of the US and Europe, despite decades of growth in emerging economies, such as in China and India, who together now account for nearly 20% of global GDP (nominal 2023) (Worldometer, N.d.); and yet these two countries hold less than 10% of IMF voting power (IMF, N.d.). Moreover, attempts at reforming the quota regime have stalled repeatedly due to the political resistance of Washington and Brussels against it.

2.3 Normative and ideological bias

China also criticises what it considers value monopolies, being the imposition of liberal democratic norms through conditional aid, sanctions or interventionism, which Beijing argues is a Western-led governance structure that equates legitimacy with liberal democracy and human rights, which dictate serves to marginalise alternative governance models (Dams & Van der Putten, 2015).

This diagnosis, whilst it can be argued self-serving in part, resonates widely in the Global South, where many states view the post-1945 order as inequitable and morally inconsistent.

3. The case for reform: Why China has a point

3.1 Reform paralysis and structural inertia

Calls for reform of global institutions are not new. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document committed to making the Security Council more “representative, legitimate and effective” (UN, 2005). Two decades later, little has changed. The G4 proposal (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) and the African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus, both languish in procedural limbo. The failure to even agree on criteria for membership expansion demonstrates institutional sclerosis.

3.2 Double standards and the erosion of normative authority

Western states, and in particular the United States, have often undermined their own claims to uphold a rules-based order, for example, the 2003 invasion of Iraq without UN authorisation (MacAskill & Borger, 2004), the 2011 intervention in Libya that exceeded the UN mandate (Miller, 2022), and the selective recognition of international court rulings, and the US rejection of the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment in 1986. This has eroded confidence in Western stewardship of international law.

3.3 A system in crisis

The failures of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions during COVID-19, the climate crisis and global debt distress further expose governance gaps, where, for example, the World Health Organization was sidelined during the pandemic, while the Paris Agreement remains underfunded and politically fragile. The West’s dominance in rule-making, combined with its paralysis in collective action, leaves space for alternative leadership.

In this sense, China’s argument that reform is overdue is not revisionist, it is factual. The current system is both unrepresentative and ineffective.

4. The critics’ case: The “parallel system” concern

Despite this, Western and some Asian commentators argue that the GGI is not about reform, but about replacement and they identify several strands of evidence to support the “parallel system” thesis:

4.1 Institutional duplication

China’s creation of new bodies, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank and now GGI-linked forums, they argue, appears to mirror existing Western-led institutions rather than integrate with them (The Diplomat, 2025). Their concern is that these structures will operate under Chinese normative and financial leadership.

4.2 Normative divergence

Whereas the liberal order prioritises individual rights, transparency and intervention for humanitarian purposes, China’s GGI stresses sovereignty, non-interference and developmental pragmatism, which the critics thereof argue, could serve to legitimise authoritarianism and to reduce global accountability (Schuman, Fulton & Gering, 2023).

4.3 Selective multilateralis

China participates vigorously in some global institutions, such as, for example, UN peacekeeping and the World Trade Organization, but it bypasses others through its own platforms such as the Belt and Road Forum and/or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This selective engagement suggests a dual-track strategy.

4.4 Strategic influence

Some fear that the GGI provides a normative shield for Chinese geopolitical expansion, enabling Beijing to align states through debt dependency, technology standards and diplomatic patronage and therefore they argue the GGI’s purpose is not inclusivity, but hegemony under a different banner (Schuman, Fulton & Gering, 2023).

These critiques cannot, one supposes, be dismissed out of hand, even though sound and logical counter-arguments can be readily made by antagonists. But at its core, critics overlook the most fundamental and basic question. If the existing system refuses to reform, is the emergence of alternatives not inevitable?

4.5 Moral double standards and selective legitimacy

Critics of China’s global initiatives often imply that Beijing’s pursuit of its own national interests is somehow illegitimate or destabilising, as though the promotion of national interest were a prerogative reserved for Western powers and yet, if leadership in global governance is deemed acceptable for the United States or Europe, on what ethical or moral grounds is it denied to China? The notion that a multipolar distribution of influence is inherently problematic betrays a deeper attachment to hierarchy rather than principle, because what is being defended is not an objective standard of governance, but a particular configuration of power that privileges one set of actors over others.

Equally striking is the inconsistency in how the West evaluates the political systems of its adversaries, because whereas China’s non-liberal governance model is routinely cast as incompatible with global leadership, Western states have long maintained strategic partnerships with even more authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, where they often overlook grave human rights violations in favour of energy security and regional influence. This selective tolerance undermines the moral authority of the liberal order itself, because, if democracy and human rights are invoked only when geopolitically convenient, then the critique of China’s model becomes less a defence of universal values and more an instrument of strategic containment.

These contradictions expose the moral and structural double standards at the heart of Western criticism and therefore the question is not why China seeks to shape global governance, but why others resist change that would make it genuinely representative.

5. Who really blocks reform? The West’s defensive rigidity

The paralysis of global governance is not primarily due to Chinese obstruction, but to Western defensiveness. The evidence lies in three domains:

5.1 Security Council reform

Despite rhetorical support for “African representation” and “greater legitimacy,” the United States, the United Kingdom and France have consistently avoided endorsing concrete reform models that would dilute their veto power (Muruthi, 2024). Europe has also resisted consolidation of its two permanent seats (UK and France) into a single one, preserving overrepresentation.

5.2 IMF and World Bank quotas

The United States Congress has repeatedly delayed or diluted quota realignments that would increase China’s and other emerging economies’ voting shares and as a result, the IMF remains structurally anchored in the 1980s global economy (Truman, 2014). The message to the Global South is clear - reform is promised, never delivered.

5.3 Selective multilateralism by the West

Western actors have increasingly relied on minilateral clubs, such as the G7, G20, Quad and AUKUS, that privilege likeminded members over universal representation. Critics in the Global South see this as precisely the fragmentation they accuse China of promoting.

Thus, the West condemns China’s parallelism while practicing its own.

6. Understanding China’s strategy: Pragmatic or revisionist?

6.1 Institutional experimentation, not replacement

China’s behaviour often reflects pragmatic experimentation rather than outright revisionism. For example, the AIIB works in partnership with the World Bank and adheres to many of its safeguards. The New Development Bank co-finances projects with existing institutions (NDB, 2022). These  are not acts aimed at destroying the existing order, but rather, appear to be strategic diversification.

6.2 Normative innovation

By emphasising sovereignty and “development before democracy,” China offers an alternative development logic that resonates with many non-Western states (Qasem, Van Dongen & De Ridder, 2011) and so whilst this challenges liberal orthodoxy, it also highlights the pluralism of governance models in a post-Western world.

6.3 Self-interest and systemic correction

Of course, Beijing’s motives are not altruistic, they serve to expand its influence and China’s strategic interests. But is it not so that all great powers, including the US, have historically shaped global rules in their image and so the key question should rather focus on whether China’s initiatives remain open to multilateral participation or whether it is bound to evolve into hierarchical patronage systems.

7. The way forward: Towards co-reform, not containment

The choice for policymakers is not between defending a decaying order and submitting to a Chinese one. It is whether to co-reform global governance before fragmentation becomes irreversible.

7.1 Recognising the legitimacy of Chinese concerns

China’s call for reform aligns with long-standing demands from Africa, Latin America and South Asia. Engaging Beijing as a stakeholder, rather than as a rival, could revitalise multilateral institutions.

7.2 Reforming Western leadership

The West must abandon its zero-sum instinct to guard institutional privileges and concede that representation, especially in the Security Council and IMF, is not weakness, but strategic adaptation to reality. A truly rules-based order requires rules that evolve.

7.3 Integrating parallel mechanisms

Instead of treating Chinese initiatives as external threats, Western and other actors could integrate them into a layered system of global governance. For instance, aligning AIIB and World Bank standards or linking the GGI’s development principles with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), could yield complementarity rather than competition.

7.4 Promoting transparency and standards

The key challenge for China is to make its initiatives transparent, inclusive and rules-based. Without institutionalised accountability, the GGI risks becoming another rhetorical framework and therefore constructive engagement from other powers could encourage higher standards rather than isolation.

8. Conclusion

The Global Governance Initiative should be understood as both a critique and a consequence of Western dominance and institutional stagnation. While critics warn of a parallel system, it is the failure of the existing system that opens the door for and renders such parallelism inevitable.

Critics of “parallelism” would do well to ask whether their own resistance to reform has not, in fact, produced the very conditions that now empower China to lead in shaping alternative multilateral models. The paralysis of UN reform, perpetuated by those who benefit from the status quo, has created both the need and the space for innovation elsewhere. Had the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions evolved to reflect 21st-century realities, there would have been little justification or opportunity for Beijing to advance the Global Governance Initiative as a rival framework and so in that sense, the emergence of parallel structures is not merely a Chinese project, but a by-product of Western obstruction. The failure to democratise global governance has not preserved legitimacy, instead it has forfeited it and in doing so, ceded moral and institutional leadership to those willing to fill the vacuum.

Condemning China’s initiatives without addressing the deeper governance crisis is both hypocritical and self-defeating. Reform is overdue, not because China demands it, or out of fear for Chinese parallelism, but because global legitimacy depends on it.

The challenge for policymakers is to move beyond moral grandstanding and embrace shared reform: to rebuild a multilateral order that reflects not only Western ideals, but global realities.

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