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Copyright © 2026   prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Global South Perspectives Network   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of The coordinating entities or any of their office bearers   Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 19 January 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   FEBRUARY 2026   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 2 THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT: SYMBOLIC ADVANCE AND POLITICAL CONTRACTION 3 MULTILATERALISM UNDER PRESSURE: WHEN RULES DEPEND ON RESTRAINT 4 REINTERPRETING THE AFRICAN G20: AGENDA-SETTING AS INFLUENCE 5 CONTESTATION AND LANGUAGE: NORMS UNDER EXPLICIT CHALLENGE 6 EXCLUSION AND PRECEDENT: PROCEDURAL NORMS AT RISK 7 ARTICLE 109 AND THE LIMITS OF FORMAL RENEWAL 8 FROM UNIPOLARITY TO MULTIPOLARITY: FRAGMENTATION AS STRUCTURAL TRANSITION 9 COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: PRAGMATIC COOPERATION IN A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM 10 AGENDA NARROWING: COHERENCE OR RETRENCHMENT? 11 PRESIDENCY CYCLES, CONTINUITY AND THE RISK OF HIATUS 12 FRAGMENTATION AND THE ILLUSION OF EXIT 13 BUREAUCRATISATION AND THE LOSS OF INFORMALITY 14 CONCLUSION: THE G20 BETWEEN STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINT AND ADAPTIVE AGENCY   Cover photo: Image generated using OpenAI’s DALL·E image generation model (2026). Concept developed for the Inclusive Society Institute / Global South Perspectives Network publication. 1 INTRODUCTION   The Open Consultation Mondays webinar on “What is the future of the G20?” took place at a moment when the international system appears to be quietly, but unmistakably, recalibrating itself. This is not a period marked by dramatic institutional collapse, nor by the sudden abandonment of multilateral frameworks. Rather, it is characterised by something more subtle and more unsettling: the gradual loosening of the political consensus that once gave those frameworks coherence and direction.   Multilateralism continues to exist in form, yet increasingly struggles to operate in substance, since rules remain written, but compliance has become selective. Forums still convene, but authority is uneven, contested and often fragile.   Within this unsettled terrain, the G20 occupies a distinctive and revealing position, because unlike treaty-based institutions, it is neither anchored in international law, nor supported by enforcement mechanisms. Its legitimacy rests almost entirely on political consent, procedural convention and the shared understanding that systemically important economies carry a collective responsibility for managing global risk. Where that understanding weakens, the G20 does not simply underperform. It becomes a site where deeper tensions in global governance are exposed.   For this reason, the consultation approached the G20 not as a discrete institution facing episodic difficulty, but as an indicator of broader transformations in how multilateral cooperation is practiced. The central concern was not whether the G20 has delivered particular outcomes, but whether the conditions that once made it a credible and effective forum still hold. 2 THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT: SYMBOLIC ADVANCE AND POLITICAL CONTRACTION   The discussion was framed by the conclusion of the first G20 Summit hosted on the African continent. This G20 in Johannesburg marked an important symbolic expansion of global economic governance, that reflected both the shifting geography of systemic importance and the growing assertiveness of the developing and middle-income economies. Hosting the G20 on African soil carried an implicit challenge to inherited hierarchies within the international system, in that it reinforced the long-standing arguments that global governance must adapt to the contemporary economic realities, rather than remaining tethered to historical precedent.   But the consultation deliberately resisted a purely symbolic reading of the Summit and instead, it situated the African presidency within a longer trajectory in which developing countries have sought to reshape both the content and the normative orientation of global economic governance. The agenda advanced during the presidency foregrounded structural constraints, rather than cyclical fluctuations, directing attention to issues that speak directly to long-term development and systemic vulnerability.   At the same time, the consultation acknowledged that this agenda unfolded within a narrowing political space. Participation by some major economies, most notably the United States, was limited. Contestation over language intensified. And soon after the Summit, developments surrounding the forthcoming presidency introduced new uncertainty regarding the procedural norms of the forum itself. This juxtaposition, between agenda expansion on the one hand and political contraction on the other, framed much of the discussion that followed. 3 MULTILATERALISM UNDER PRESSURE: WHEN RULES DEPEND ON RESTRAINT   A foundational analytical premise of the consultation was that multilateral institutions derive their effectiveness not from formal rules alone, but from the willingness of participants to accept constraint. Rules do not enforce themselves. They function because actors believe that restraint serves their long-term interests better than unilateral action.   When this belief erodes, institutions rarely collapse outright. More often, they hollow out. Procedures continue, but their binding force weakens. Participation becomes conditional, selective or instrumental. The consultation argued that this pattern is increasingly visible across the multilateral system as a whole.   The G20 is particularly exposed to this dynamic. Its informality was originally its greatest strength, allowing rapid coordination in moments of crisis and enabling dialogue among actors with divergent political and economic systems, but informality also carries vulnerability and so when commitment to consensus fades, flexibility can be repurposed to justify exclusion, agenda narrowing or procedural manipulation.   Current tensions within the G20 were therefore framed not as isolated dysfunctions, but as manifestations of a broader shift in global governance, namely a shifting away from rule-bounded cooperation and toward power-mediated engagement. This shift does not eliminate multilateralism, but it fundamentally alters its character, which renders cooperation more contingent and less predictable. 4 REINTERPRETING THE AFRICAN G20: AGENDA-SETTING AS INFLUENCE   A substantial portion of the discussion was devoted to reassessing what constitutes “impact” in contemporary global governance. The consultation challenged evaluation frameworks that privilege attendance by heads of state, the specificity of communiqués or the immediacy of deliverables.   Instead, emphasis was placed on agenda-setting as a form of influence, given that the shaping of the terms of debate can, in a fragmented system, be more consequential than securing immediate commitments. The African presidency was therefore understood as exercising policy and norm entrepreneurship, filling discursive space at a moment when the global narrative is unsettled.   Debt sustainability was foregrounded as a structural issue embedded in the architecture of global finance, rather than as a failure of fiscal discipline and the cost of capital was elevated as a central constraint on development. Climate finance was reframed around access, quality and adaptation, rather than aggregate pledges alone, and critical minerals were positioned within a development and beneficiation discourse that challenges extractive models which externalise value.   The consultation noted that many of these issues transcend the G20 itself. Their significance lies in their capacity to migrate across forums, reinforcing debates in development finance, climate negotiations and regional processes and so, in this sense, influence operates cumulatively, through repetition and coalition-building rather than through singular decisions.   5 CONTESTATION AND LANGUAGE: NORMS UNDER EXPLICIT CHALLENGE   The consultation examined the intensification of contestation within the G20, particularly around language previously regarded as settled, where issues such as climate action, gender, sustainable development and solidarity again became sites of explicit disagreement.   What distinguished this phase of contestation was not its breadth, but its nature; where the use of previously agreed language as a basis for compromise was resisted by some member states and where normative frameworks that had accumulated over time were no longer uniformly treated as common reference points. The discussion underscored that in consensus-based forums such as the G20, even limited resistance can exert disproportionate influence on the outcomes, because in such fora, even  a small number of dissenting actors can significantly narrow them and recalibrate what is considered to be politically possible. The result is that over time this dynamic reshapes expectations, which weakens the stabilising function of precedent.   This development was interpreted as reflecting a broader environment in which norms themselves are increasingly contested, because as power politics reassert themselves, commitments to shared values become conditional, subject to reinterpretation or outright rejection. 6 EXCLUSION AND PRECEDENT: PROCEDURAL NORMS AT RISK   A critical analytical focus of the consultation concerned the unilateral exclusion of a founding G20 member, South Africa, under the forthcoming presidency, which, while formally framed as temporary, could set a troubling precedent.   The G20’s legitimacy rests on inclusion and shared participation among its members and therefore selective exclusion, even without formal expulsion, undermines this premise. More consequential, however, was the absence of collective resistance from the other members of the G20.   The consultation interpreted this silence of the other members as indicative of the current fragmented political environment in which institutional principles seem to increasingly yield to bilateral calculation. States may object privately, but publicly, they are reluctant to incur political cost by defending procedural norms. This pattern was identified as a key mechanism through which consensus-based systems erode. It does not occur through overt rejection, but through submission; and then over time, the exceptions become normalised, thereby altering expectations and embedding procedural uncertainty within the institution itself. 7 ARTICLE 109 AND THE LIMITS OF FORMAL RENEWAL   Flowing directly from the discussion on exclusion and procedural precedent, the consultation broadened its analytical lens to consider deeper structural constraints affecting institutional reform within the multilateral system. Particular reference was made to the United Nations Charter’s built-in reform mechanisms, notably Article 109, and to the persistent failure to activate them in any meaningful way.   Article 109 was treated as emblematic, rather than exceptional. Its existence demonstrates that the multilateral system is not legally frozen, pathways for comprehensive reform are formally available. Yet its non-use highlights a more fundamental reality: reform is not blocked by legal impossibility, but by political equilibrium. Those actors most empowered to activate reform are frequently those with the least incentive to alter existing arrangements.   This observation underscored a broader point. Institutional stagnation should not be misread as technical failure; instead, it reflects a balance of power in which entrenched advantage is preserved through inaction, where reform becomes conceivable only when shifts in power alter incentive structures and not merely when legal mechanisms exist. The consultation also cautioned against the activating Article 109, due to the profound political risk thereof. In a deeply fragmented and power-contested international system, the opening of the Charter to wholesale revision may yield an order markedly worse than the one it seeks to reform. 8 FROM UNIPOLARITY TO MULTIPOLARITY: FRAGMENTATION AS STRUCTURAL TRANSITION   Building on the discussion of institutional stasis, the consultation situated the current G20 dynamics within the wider historical transition that is underway; a transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order.   The post-Cold War unipolar moment created an enabling environment for consensus-based multilateralism. In such an environment the concentration of power reduced coordination costs, which allowed dominant actors to underwrite the institutions even when the outcomes were imperfect or unevenly distributed. As power diffuses, however, the logic of cooperation changes fundamentally. Consensus becomes harder to sustain, veto power more widely distributed and normative coherence more fragile.   Fragmentation, in this reading, is not synonymous with chaos. It is a structural consequence of multipolarity. The challenge facing institutions such as the G20 is not whether fragmentation exists, but whether it can be governed. Consequently, thinner outcomes, slower consensus and heightened contestation may in fact reflect an adaptation of the system, rather than its failure. 9 COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: PRAGMATIC COOPERATION IN A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM   Against this backdrop, the consultation explored the growing role of coalitions of the willing as pragmatic instruments of cooperation, not as substitutes for multilateralism, but as adaptive responses to institutional gridlock. Coalitions of the willing allow cooperation to proceed where unanimity proves unattainable, and so by enabling a critical mass of states to align around shared objectives, progress can be made without waiting for universal agreement. Their legitimacy of such cooperation will be derived from the coalition’s effectiveness, openness and the capacity to expand. The discussion acknowledged the potential risks associated with such coalition formation, where poorly designed coalitions can entrench fragmentation or reinforce power asymmetries. Yet in the current environment, paralysis was seen as a greater danger than pluralism and therefore carefully structured coalitions may help sustain cooperation, while preserving institutional continuity.   Within this logic, the G20 itself can be understood as an early coalition of the willing, given that it was created as to address systemic risks informally, when the existing institutions multilateral processes proved insufficient.   10 AGENDA NARROWING: COHERENCE OR RETRENCHMENT?   The proposal to narrow the G20 agenda to its original macroeconomic and financial focus was examined in detail. While agenda expansion has strained coherence, the consultation rejected a simplistic return to “back-to-basics”.   The global economy today is structurally different from that of earlier periods. Finance, development, inequality and climate risk are deeply intertwined. Treating development as external to economic governance misreads contemporary risk, in that a finance-only G20 risks managing symptoms, while ignoring the underlying causes.   The distinction advanced was therefore between rationalisation and regression. Streamlining may be necessary, retreat is not.   11 PRESIDENCY CYCLES, CONTINUITY AND THE RISK OF HIATUS   The discussion also noted that the immediate transition following South Africa’s presidency includes a de facto hiatus under the current United States presidency, during which the G20 process is expected to operate with reduced momentum and limited agenda expansion. This interlude was not framed as withdrawal from the forum, but as a period of lowered political investment, with implications for continuity and follow-through on issues elevated during the African presidency. Against this backdrop, cautious hope was expressed by a number of participants in the consultation that the United Kingdom presidency may serve as a point of reactivation, where deferred threads could be picked up and where the G20’s work programme can be re-anchored, even if under a different framing and set of priorities.   The consultation also reflected on the implications of the G20 presidency cycle, particularly the transition from South Africa to the United Kingdom, and thereafter to South Korea. The concern expressed was not one of intent or legitimacy, but of continuity. Presidencies matter because they shape agenda priority and framing, and the risk identified was that issues foregrounded under South Africa’s leadership, notably development constraints, inequality, debt dynamics and the cost of capital, may struggle to retain salience as the forum shifts toward political economies with different strategic reference points. The UK was implicitly associated with a more traditional G7-style orientation, while South Korea was seen as occupying a more ambiguous middle position. The underlying question was whether the momentum created by the African presidency would be carried forward or quietly diluted. Or will it be re-anchored around narrower macroeconomic concerns.   12 FRAGMENTATION AND THE ILLUSION OF EXIT   The discussion also addressed the proliferation of alternative groupings and parallel institutions, which should not be viewed  as straightforward substitutes for established forums. Fragmentation may very well create tactical openings, but it could also magnify power asymmetries. Negotiations in such fragmented environments could lead to smaller and middle-income states losing their collective leverage. 13 BUREAUCRATISATION AND THE LOSS OF INFORMALITY   A reflective strand of the consultation focused on the increasing bureaucratisation of the G20, where procedural density has expanded considerably, coupled with extensive negotiation over text that crowds out essential less formal political dialogue.   The G20 was originally conceived as an informal space for candid engagement and in the current environment that is marked by mistrust and fragmentation, such relational spaces may be increasingly important. Dialogue, the consultation argued, is not ornamental. It is infrastructural. 14 CONCLUSION: THE G20 BETWEEN STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINT AND ADAPTIVE AGENCY   The consultation underscored that the G20 should no longer be assessed against expectations formed in a different structural era. Its present tensions reflect deeper constraints embedded in the contemporary international order.   Formal reform pathways exist, but remain politically blocked and fragmentation is structural, rather than episodic and therefore, consensus, where it emerges, will be partial and issue-specific.   Within this environment, the G20 remains ambiguous, but consequential. It cannot restore a lost consensus, nor can it substitute for comprehensive institutional reform. Its value lies in functioning as a flexible platform for coordination, agenda-setting and selective alignment.   The future of the G20, like that of multilateralism itself, will be shaped by political choice, by whether states remain willing to accept constraint in pursuit of cooperation that is imperfect, but still necessary.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.   GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.   Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.   GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   October 2025   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   Contents   1 INTRODUCTION: Contextualising the conversation 2 THE CONSULTATION: Framing the questions in an era of systemic drift 3 ANALYTICAL EXPANSION OF THE FOUR CORE QUESTIONS 3.1 China’s dual impulse: Corrective and strategic at once 3.2 Great-Power reactions: Anxiety, ambivalence and the defence of hierarchy 3.3 Global South perspectives: Resonance without alignment 3.4 Implications for the future of multilateralism: Between adaptation and fragmentation 4 DEEPENING THE DISCUSSION: PERSPECTIVES AND COUNTER PERSPECTIVES 5 BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR A GLOBAL SOUTH STRATEGY 6 LOOKING AHEAD: THEMES FOR FUTURE CONSULTATION 7 CONCLUSION: CHOOSING BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND FRAGMENTATION Cover photo: AI generated 1 INTRODUCTION Contextualising the conversation   The Global South Perspectives Network enters this new phase of publishing its Monday Consultations at a moment when the international system appears suspended between epochs. One can sense a world taking stock of itself, as if pausing briefly before deciding what kind of order it wishes to inhabit next. The structures inherited from 1945 still stand, at least in name and legal form, yet their gravitational pull has weakened. Power has become more diffuse, expectations more plural and the consensus that once underpinned multilateralism has thinned with time.   It is within this atmosphere of transition that China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI) has emerged. It is an initiative that has not only intensified existing debates about global power but has also illuminated the deeper uncertainties defining this historical moment. Some interpret the GGI as a strategic challenge to a familiar order, whilst others see it as a direct response to the reform inertia that has plagued multilateral institutions for decades. Many in the Global South recognise in it an echo of long-articulated frustrations, a sense, so to say, that the current system speaks the language of universality, yet often operates through hierarchies that privilege the few over the many.   This consultation, one of many held under the Monday Consultations banner, brought together analysts, practitioners and observers from across the global community, each contributing to a shared inquiry into what the GGI represents and what its emergence might mean for the future of global governance.   This analytical brief offers an expanded account of that conversation. It does not merely document the dialogue, it attempts to interpret it, so as to situate the remarks, questions and insights within the broader currents shaping the transition from an older order to whatever may come next. In doing so, it aims to provide a reflective and grounded contribution to the growing discourse on how the Global South might navigate a system that is neither stable, nor yet fully transformed.     2 THE CONSULTATION Framing the questions in an era of systemic drift   The consultation began by acknowledging a simple, but often overlooked truth, that global governance is no longer anchored to the geopolitical realities that produced it. The architecture designed in 1945, so elegant in conception, so ambitious in spirit, now struggles under the weight of contemporary demands. Its foundational assumptions have eroded, yet its institutional form has remained largely intact.   The United Nations Security Council still mirrors the balance of power at the end of the Second World War. The Bretton Woods institutions continue to reflect an economic geography that no longer exists. And even when the international system has pledged reform, as it did in the 2005 World Summit, implementation has consistently failed to materialise.   In this context, the emergence of the GGI appears less surprising and more inevitable. The world has been signalling its desire for reform for decades, but reform has proven elusive. Where institutions fail to adapt, the system creates the very spaces into which new actors step. China’s initiative thus becomes not merely a Chinese story, but a symptom of a deeper systemic malaise.   The consultation therefore sought to explore four interlocking questions: whether China is filling a vacuum or rewriting rules; how other great powers are responding; how the Global South interprets the initiative; and what this means for the future of multilateralism. These questions framed the discussion, but did not confine it and instead, they opened a broader reflection on the contingencies of this moment in world affairs.     3 ANALYTICAL EXPANSION OF THE FOUR CORE QUESTIONS   3.1 China’s dual impulse: Corrective and strategic at once   A central theme emerging from the discussion was the recognition that the GGI cannot be reduced to a single motive in that it reflects both a critique and an ambition, both a response to structural inequities and a desire to shape the evolving order. This duality is not a contradiction. It is a characteristic of rising powers throughout history.   China’s argument begins with the claim that the multilateral system suffers from a legitimacy deficit, frozen, as it were, in the institutional imagination of 1945. The Initiative positions itself as a corrective to this democratic stagnation. Yet the GGI also grows out of a decade-long pattern of parallel institution-building: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank of BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative, and now the GGI’s associated platforms. In combining critique with construction, China demonstrates both frustration with the existing order and confidence in its capacity to propose alternatives.   This dual impulse, being simultaneously reformist and strategic, was widely noted in the consultation. It reflects a broader truth, that no major power seeks to reform the world in ways that negate its own interests. The more revealing question is not China’s ambition, but the conditions that have rendered that ambition consequential. If the existing institutions had evolved with greater agility, the space within which the GGI now operates might have been narrower. As it stands, the system itself has created the void that the GGI seeks to fill.     3.2 Great-Power reactions: Anxiety, ambivalence and the defence of hierarchy   The consultation examined how other major powers interpret the GGI and what these reactions reveal about their own strategic anxieties.   The United States has framed the initiative as destabilising, even revisionist. Yet this rhetorical posture contrasts sharply with its longstanding resistance to institutional reforms it professes to support. Whether in IMF quota adjustments or Security Council redesign, Washington’s defence of the “rules-based order” often coincides with a defence of inherited privileges.   Europe’s position differs in tone, but not always in substance, because while sharing Western concerns about China’s intentions, European actors remain deeply protective of institutional arrangements that grant disproportionate influence to a continent whose demographic and economic weight has steadily declined. The two permanent Security Council seats held by France and the United Kingdom, for example, exemplify this disjuncture between contemporary realities and institutional persistence. India, Japan and other Asian powers were described as occupying a space of strategic ambivalence. They are frustrated by the inertia of the system, but wary of a Sinocentric alternative, and they are conscious of their own role as regional poles within an increasingly plural global landscape.   What emerges from these reactions is not a coherent response to China, but a diverse set of anxieties about losing position within the existing hierarchy. Debates about global governance reform, in this sense, are inseparable from debates about power. The GGI becomes a prism through which the deeper insecurities of established and emerging powers are refracted.     3.3 Global South perspectives: Resonance without alignment   One of the consultation’s clearest insights was the divergence between Western and Global South interpretations of the GGI. Across Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, China’s critique of the global system finds significant resonance. Many states recognise their own frustrations in China’s diagnosis: an unrepresentative system, inconsistent application of norms and a persistent sense of marginalisation within the institutions of global governance.   But resonance does not imply alignment. The Global South’s response is more subtle and more pragmatic. It reflects a recognition that the GGI, whatever its motivations, acknowledges grievances that the established custodians of the system have long neglected. For middle powers such as South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia and Türkiye, the GGI represents neither a new orthodoxy, nor a threat to be resisted, but an additional space in which agency may be exercised.   This pragmatic reading acknowledges both opportunity and risk, where the opportunity lies in leveraging competing centres of global influence to expand the negotiating space for developing countries; and where risk arises if parallel systems evolve into competing regimes that will deepen fragmentation and erode the universality that multilateralism aspires to maintain.   The consultation also highlighted the concerns of civil society, whose voices is said to adde further nuance to the discourse. Their concerns about transparency, governance standards and human rights are not solely directed at China, but also at the West, whose selective approach to human rights diplomacy, they argue, has undermined the West’s own credibility. These tensions reflect the broader philosophical question that asks who has the authority to define legitimacy, and to whom is that authority accountable?   3.4 Implications for the future of multilateralism: Between adaptation and fragmentation   Perhaps the most reflective portion of the consultation centred on what the GGI and the reactions it provokes tell us about the trajectory of multilateralism itself.   Multilateralism, it was suggested, stands at a crossroads. Not because China challenges it, but because those entrusted with its stewardship have allowed it to stagnate. The institutions that once embodied the hope of a cooperative world have become, in some respects, the custodians of their own paralysis. Three observations shaped the discussion. The first is that alternatives arise when institutions fail to adapt. The GGI’s emergence is therefore as much a reflection of institutional stasis as of Chinese ambition.   The second is that multipolarity is now an unavoidable reality, because whether acknowledged or resisted, it is shaping the contours of global politics. No single actor can unilaterally impose its vision of the world and any future order will, therefore, be layered, plural and hybrid. The third observation is that containment strategies are unlikely to succeed. The GGI resonates not because it is Chinese, but because it speaks to structural inequities that many states experience directly. The more the initiative is dismissed rather than engaged, the more its appeal may grow.   The consultation thus returned repeatedly to a reflective tension: the world must navigate between the dangers of fragmentation and the necessity of adaptation. The GGI may well be the first major test of whether the existing system can accommodate new voices and new institutional forms without fracturing.     4 DEEPENING THE DISCUSSION: PERSPECTIVES AND COUNTER PERSPECTIVES   The conversation unfolded with a richness that exceeded the scope of the initial questions, drawing the participants into deeper reflections on the philosophical foundations of global governance.   One participant argued that legitimacy, far from being an ambiguous construct, requires universal standards, because without legitimacy grounded in representation and participation, multilateralism risks becoming a façade for power politics. Another countered that universalism itself is often claimed by those who historically benefited from defining it and so the question then becomes: who determines what counts as legitimate? The Charter may offer the anchor, but interpretation remains contested.   Others reflected on the tension between international law and the so-called “rules-based international order.” For many states, the latter is seen not as a neutral framework, but as a flexible vocabulary used to justify inconsistent action. The consultation suggested that a re-centring of the Charter, rather than a reliance on ad hoc interpretations, might offer firmer ground for a renewed multilateralism.   Concerns about multipolarity also surfaced, with one participant suggesting that multipolarity offers the promise of inclusivity, but also the risk of disorder, because he proffered, without strong institutions capable of coordinating the interests of multiple poles, the world may slide toward spheres of influence reminiscent of earlier eras. Yet the consultation resisted fatalism, by suggesting that multipolarity need not replicate the past, as it can be shaped into something more collaborative, provided the institutional imagination is revived. Another theme that surfaced was the paralysis surrounding Security Council reform. While Africa’s demand for two permanent seats remains consistent, the question of which  states should hold them continues to divide the continent, which is an internal divergence that mirrors similar divides across the Global South. These divergences, therefore, suggests that reform requires not only a redrawing of institutional lines, but indeed also a re-articulation of the principles upon which representation should rest.     5 BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR A GLOBAL SOUTH STRATEGY   The discussion illuminated several implications for the Global South’s approach to global governance., one being that there is growing recognition that the Global South is no longer a passive recipient of global norms, but an active co-author of emerging institutional debates. The GGI, regardless of its origin, provides a platform through which long-standing concerns about equity and representation can be expressed more forcefully.   A second implication is the need for greater coherence within the Global South itself, because internal divergences weaken negotiating power and slow reform. Yet the consultation suggested that these divergences, if openly acknowledged, rather than suppressed, can become sources of creative institutional design, such as the proposal that regional representation should be explored, rather than expanding the Security Council along national lines.   A third implication is the need to balance opportunity and caution. China’s initiative should be neither romanticised, nor rejected in that its possibilities lie in the space between endorsement and opposition.  It could evolve into a strategic engagement that recognises its potential to reshape global governance without surrendering the normative aspirations that the Global South holds for a fair and inclusive system.   6 LOOKING AHEAD: THEMES FOR FUTURE CONSULTATION   The discussion pointed toward several directions for future exploration, including, amongst others, the evolving relationship between international law and competing rule-making systems, the institutional implications of multipolarity, the governance of digital, financial and technological domains and the future of development finance in a world no longer dominated by the Bretton Woods institutions. All emerged as themes that merit deeper reflection.   The GGI will not be the last initiative to challenge the global governance status quo. But by beginning here, the Monday Consultation Series establishes a foundation for understanding how global governance might evolve if the voices of the Global South are treated not as peripheral commentary, but as central contributions.   7 CONCLUSION: CHOOSING BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND FRAGMENTATION   The consultation closed with an observation that captures the philosophical spirit of the discussion, namely that the world is not choosing between a Western order and a Chinese order. It is choosing between an order capable of evolving and an order condemned to fragment.   China’s GGI is a reminder that global governance can stagnate only for so long before alternatives arise. Whether those alternatives deepen fragmentation or contribute to renewal depends on the willingness of established institutions to open themselves to reform and on the ability of emerging actors to articulate their visions with clarity and coherence.   In this sense, the GGI is not simply a Chinese proposal. It is a mirror held up to the international community, reflecting both the failures of the present and the possibilities of a different future.   The Global South Perspectives Network offers this analytical brief as the first step in an ongoing dialogue. Much remains to be explored, questioned and re-imagined. But this consultation has made one truth clear: global governance is at its most vibrant when the conversation is shared.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.   GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.   Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.   GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026   prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Global South Perspectives Network   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of The coordinating entities or any of their office bearers   Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 19 January 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   FEBRUARY 2026   Author: Dr Klaus Kotzé   CONTENTS   1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 THE ATTACK ON VENEZUELA: A NEW PRECEDENT IN THE USE OF AMERICAN FORCE 3 VIOLENCE AS A SYSTEMIC PHENOMENON, NOT AN ANOMALY 4 EROSION OF EMPATHY AND THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 5 GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVES: CONSTRAINTS AND STRATEGIC AGENCY 5.1 COLLECTIVE DE-RISKING AND STRATEGIC DECOUPLING 5.2 INSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL AND NORM REINFORCEMENT 5.3 SHARED NARRATIVE AND MORAL RECLAMATION 6 REGIONAL AND GLOBAL RIPPLE EFFECTS 7 CONCLUSION - A CALL FOR DELIBERATE INTERRUPTION Cover photo: Microsoft Copilot 2026, AI generated illustration depicting U.S.–Venezuela geopolitical tensions, M365 Copilot image generation tool. 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   On 3 January, the United States launched a major military operation against Venezuela that resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. This event marked the most direct U.S. military intervention in Latin America in decades and represents a fundamental rupture in the norms governing state sovereignty and the use of force. Experts convened by the Global South Perspectives Network assessed this event not as an isolated crisis but as a critical inflection point in global order, one with ramifications far beyond Venezuela. Their discussion made three core claims:   The attack signals a deep break-down of international norms, where force can be deployed unilaterally under broad pretences. It accelerates a global shift toward systemic violence, undermining institutions designed to contain conflict and protect sovereign equality. For the Global South, traditional responses based on deference or hedging are no longer sufficient; instead, collective strategies of agency, resilience and institutional renewal must be pursued.   This brief synthesises this expert conversation and explores the Venezuela operation’s effects on the international system’s current crisis, the pathways for Global South responses, and the broader consequences for the future of multilateralism and global governance.     2 THE ATTACK ON VENEZUELA: A NEW PRECEDENT IN THE USE OF AMERICAN FORCE   The U.S.’ operation in Venezuela, widely documented as involving air strikes on strategic installations in and around Caracas and the exfiltration of President Maduro, represents an unprecedented direct assault on another sovereign state’s leadership by U.S. forces in recent history.   What distinguishes this from previous military interventions is not just its scale but its apparent disregard for multilateral legal constraints. According to expert commentary, the operation violates core principles of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.   Consultation participants underscored that this attack, framed by U.S. authorities as a counter-narco-terrorism and stabilisation operation, is emblematic of a broader pattern in which coercion is normalised, and legal norms are treated as optional rather than foundational.   3 VIOLENCE AS A SYSTEMIC PHENOMENON, NOT AN ANOMALY   A central theme of the expert discussion was that contemporary global violence is no longer episodic, confined to specific wars or crises. Instead, it has become systemic, embedded in institutional behaviours, strategic logics, and narratives that reward escalation. Speakers drew historical parallels to early twentieth-century upheavals, when incremental violations of norms eventually culminated in widespread conflict. They argued that the Venezuela attack, like past military precedents, risks opening new floodgates rather than resolving discrete problems.   This systemic view of violence was reinforced by a public health analogy: unchecked violence spreads much like an epidemic through exposure, imitation and reinforcement. Without continuous mechanisms of interruption, the patterns of force used in one context are readily replicated elsewhere. In this framing, the international system lacks effective institutional capacity to contain contagion once precedent for the use of force is established.     4 EROSION OF EMPATHY AND THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS   Consultation participants highlighted that the attack on Venezuela exposes a profound empathy deficit in global political discourse. Suffering, displacement and disruption caused by military action are now so frequently broadcast that they risk becoming background noise, tolerated consequences rather than urgent moral challenges. Institutions designed to mediate interstate conflict, above all the United Nations, were described as increasingly unable to enforce their own norms or to offer meaningful political mediation. This is not merely institutional failure; it is a crisis of legitimacy. When the greatest military powers disregard the system they helped to build, the normative foundation of multilateralism is hollowed out.   This erosion was illustrated starkly by the swift reactions of world leaders and civil society: some came out to condemn the U.S. action as a violation of international law and a threat to sovereignty, while others celebrated it as bold leadership. This polarisation further undermines the possibility of unified, normative responses that reinforce peaceful conflict resolution. It challenges the very edifice of global order.     5 GLOBAL SOUTH PERSPECTIVES: CONSTRAINTS AND STRATEGIC AGENCY   For states in the Global South, the Venezuela crisis presented several pressing questions about agency, sovereignty and strategic alignment. Historically, many of these states have balanced relations with major powers to secure trade, investment and development partnerships. The Venezuela episode suggests that reliance on normative deference, or on the continuation of established diplomatic frameworks, may no longer be sufficient. Various speakers emphasised that while formal sovereignty remains a principle of international relations, practical sovereignty is increasingly compromised by the unilateral actions of powerful states. In effect, the traditional security guarantees and legal frameworks that once offered a measure of insulation against external intervention are no longer reliable.   This reality prompts a reassessment of strategic options. The experts identified three broad response pathways for the Global South:     5.1 COLLECTIVE DE-RISKING AND STRATEGIC DECOUPLING   Rather than isolated hedging or alignment with existing power blocs, Global South countries could explore collective strategies of de-risking. This would reduce dependence on external patronage that can be leveraged coercively. This could involve expanding trade among each other in the Global South, diversifying diplomatic partnerships, and strengthening regional security architectures. Collective de-risking would not be isolationist, but rather a coordinated effort to build resilience that reduces vulnerability to unilateral coercion.     5.2 INSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL AND NORM REINFORCEMENT   Various speakers stressed the need for reinvigorating multilateral institutions with broader legitimacy and balanced authority. This includes reforming U.N. mechanisms to ensure that no single power can override established norms with impunity. Reformed and new platforms where Global South voices are not marginalised are now more needed than ever.   Institutional renewal also means developing mechanisms capable of sustained engagement, rather than episodic crisis management, to interrupt cycles of violence effectively.     5.3 SHARED NARRATIVE AND MORAL RECLAMATION   The attack on Venezuela and the inaction from the global community crystallises a broader cultural crisis: a weakening of collective commitment to humanitarian norms and shared global responsibility. Global South actors can play a leading role in articulating and popularising alternative narratives that resist the normalisation of coercive violence and emphasise cooperation over dominance.     6 REGIONAL AND GLOBAL RIPPLE EFFECTS   Various participants suggested that the Venezuela episode will have far-reaching effects on regional stability and global geopolitics. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the fear of contagion, whether political, economic, or military, has already driven shifts in diplomacy, migration pressures and security postures. The crisis has the potential to deepen emigration flows, strain host-state resources and heighten regional militarisation.   Beyond the Western Hemisphere, the attack reinforces concerns about great powers using force various spurious pretexts, including counterterrorism or transnational crime. If unchallenged, the precedent set in Venezuela will likely lower thresholds for intervention elsewhere, eroding the protective value of sovereignty as a principle.     7 CONCLUSION - A CALL FOR DELIBERATE INTERRUPTION   The experts in the Global South Perspectives Network concluded that the attack on Venezuela is more than a geopolitical flashpoint; it is a wake-up call. The international order is currently oscillating between inertia and escalation, and the path it follows will depend on whether political actors choose to invest in deliberate mechanisms of interruption and renewal or allow systemic violence to self-perpetuate.   The Global South finds itself at a crossroads: continue to navigate within the existing architecture, or contribute to shaping a more resilient, equitable and normatively grounded framework for global governance.         - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.   GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.   Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.   GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

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POPI Policy Protection of personal information policy 1. Policy statement 1.1. The Inclusive Society Institute processes personal information of its employees, members, clients, suppliers, and other data subjects from time to time. As such, it is obliged to comply with the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013 (“POPIA”) as well as the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000 (“PAIA”). 1.2 In line with this, the Inclusive Society Institute is committed to protecting its members’/clients’/supplier’s/employees’ and other data subjects’ privacy and ensuring that their personal information is used appropriately, transparently, securely and in accordance with applicable laws. 1.3 This Policy sets out the manner in which the Inclusive Society Institute deals with such personal information and provides clarity on the general purpose for which the information is used, as well as how data subjects can participate in this process in relation to their personal information. 1.4 In addition to this policy, the institute has also developed a manual and made it available as prescribed under the PAIA Act. Where parties/requesters submit requests for information disclosure in terms of this manual, internal measures have been developed, together with adequate systems to process requests for information or access thereto. 2. Objectives 2.1. To ensure legislative compliance (POPIA and PAIA ) in respect of all personal information that the Inclusive Society Institute collects and processes. 2.2. To inform employees and clients as to how their personal information is used, disclosed and destroyed. 2.3. To ensure that personal information is only used for the purpose for which it was collected. 2.4. To prevent unauthorised access to and use of personal information. 3. Definitions 3.1. “Biometric information” means the physical, physiological, or behavioural identification, including finger printing, amongst others. 3.2. “Processing” means: 3.2.1. The collection, receipt, recording organisation, collation, storage, updating, modification, retrieval, alteration, consultation or use; 3.2.2. Dissemination by means of transmission, distribution or making available in any form; 3.2.2. Merging, linking, erasure or destruction of information. 3.3. “PAIA” means the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000. 3.4. “POPIA” means the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013. 3.5. “Regulator” means the Information Regulator established in terms of POPIA. 4. Collection of personal information 4.1. The Inclusive Society Institute collects and processes various items of information pertaining to its employees, members, clients, suppliers and other data subjects. The information collected is based on need and it will be processed for that need/purpose only. Whenever possible, the Inclusive Society Institute will inform the relevant party of the information required (mandatory) and which information is deemed optional. 4.2. The employee, member or client will be informed of the consequence/s of failing to provide such personal information and any prejudice which may be incurred due to non-disclosure. For example, the Inclusive Society Institute may not be able to employ an individual without certain personal information relating to that individual or the organisation may not be in a position to render services to a client in the absence of certain information which is required. 4.3. The Inclusive Society Institute will process information in a manner that is lawful and reasonable (i.e., will not infringe the privacy of the individual or company). 4.4. Where consent is required for the processing of information, such consent will be obtained. 4.5. Information will be processed under the following circumstances: 4.5.1. When carrying out actions for the conclusion or performance of a contract; 4.5.2. When complying with an obligation imposed by law on the Institute; 4.5.3. For the protection of a legitimate interest of the data subject; 4.5.4. Where necessary, for pursuing the legitimate interests of the Institute or of an authorised third party to whom the information is supplied. 4.6. Examples of the personal information the Inclusive Society Institute collects includes, but is not limited to: 4.6.1. Information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of an employee; 4.6.2. Information relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal or employment history (this includes disciplinary action) of an employee; 4.6.3. Banking and account information; 4.6.4. Contact information; 4.6.5. Trade union membership and political persuasion; 4.6.6. Any identifying number, symbol, email address, telephone number, location information, online identifier or other particular assignment related to the employee, member or client; 4.6.7. The biometric information of the employee, member, client or data subject; and 4.6.8. The personal opinions, views or preferences of an employee (also performance appraisals or correspondence) and the views or opinions of another individual about the person. 4.7. The Inclusive Society Institute shall not process special personal information without complying with the specific provisions of the POPI Act. Special information includes personal information concerning: 4.7.1. the religious or philosophical beliefs, race or ethnic origin, trade union membership, political persuasion, health, sex life or biometric information of a data subject; or 4.7.2. the criminal behaviour of a data subject, where such information relates to the alleged commission by a data subject of any offence committed or the disposal of such proceedings 4.8. Collection of employee information: 4.8.1. For the purposes of this Policy, employees include potential, past and existing employees of the Inclusive Society Institute. Independent contractors are treated on the same basis where the collection of information is concerned. 4.8.2. When appointing new employees/contractors, the Inclusive Society Institute requires information, including, but not limited to that listed above, from prospective employees/contractors, in order to process the information on the system/s. Such information is reasonably necessary for the Institute’s record purposes, as well as to ascertain if the prospective employee/contractor meets the requirements, for the position which he/she is being appointed to/contracted for and is suitable for appointment. 4.8.3. The Inclusive Society Institute will use and process such employee information, as set out below, for purposes including, but not limited to, its employment records and to make lawful decisions in respect of that employee and its business. 4.8.4. Use of employee information: Employees’ personal information will only be used for the purpose for which it was collected and intended. This includes, but is not limited to: 4.8.4.1. Submissions to the Department of Labour; 4.8.4.2. Submissions to the Receiver of Revenue; 4.8.4.3. For audit and recordkeeping purposes; 4.8.4.4. In connection with legal proceedings; 4.8.4.5. In connection with and to comply with legal and regulatory requirements; 4.8.4.6. In connection with any administrative functions of the Institute; 4.8.4.7. Disciplinary action or any other action to address the employee’s conduct or capacity; 4.8.4.8. In respect of any employment benefits that the employee is entitled to; 4.8.4.9. Pre- and post-employment checks and screening; and 4.8.4.10. Any other relevant purpose of which the employee has been notified. 4.8.5. Should information be processed for any other reason; the employee will be informed accordingly. Collection of 4.9. Collection of Member/Client/Supplier information: 4.9.1. For purposes of this Policy, clients include potential, past and existing members and clients. Suppliers include all vendors which contract with the Inclusive Society Institute, whether once off or recurring, in respect of products and services. 4.9.2. The Inclusive Society Institute collects and processes its members’, clients’ and suppliers’ personal information, such as that mentioned hereunder. The type of information will depend on the need for which it is collected and will be processed for that purpose only. Further examples of personal information collected from clients include, but is not limited to: 4.9.3. The Inclusive Society Institute also collects and processes member/clients’ personal information for marketing purposes in order to ensure that its products and services remain relevant to its clients and potential clients. 4.9.4. Use of member/client/supplier information: 4.9.4.1. The member/client/supplier’s personal information will only be used for the purpose for which it was collected and as agreed. This may include, but not be limited to: 4.9.4.2. Providing products or services to members/clients; 4.9.4.3. In connection with sending accounts and communication to a member/client in respect of services rendered; 4.9.4.4. Payment of suppliers and communication in respect of services rendered; 4.9.4.5. Referral to other service providers; 4.9.4.6. Confirming, verifying and updating member/client/supplier details; 4.9.4.7. Conducting market or customer satisfaction research; 4.9.4.8. For audit and record keeping purposes; 4.9.4.9. In connection with legal proceedings; and 4.9.4.10. In connection with and to comply with legal and regulatory requirements or when it is otherwise allowed by law. 4.10. Disclosure of personal information 4.10.1. The Inclusive Society Institute may share employees’ and member/clients/suppliers’ personal information with authorised third parties as well as obtain information from such third parties for reasons set out above. 4.10.2. The Inclusive Society Institute may also disclose employees’ or member/clients/suppliers’ information where there is a duty or a right to disclose in terms of applicable legislation, the law or where it may be necessary to protect the rights of the organisation or it is in the interests of the data subject. 5. Safeguarding of personal information and consent 5.1. The Inclusive Society Institute shall review its security controls and processes on a regular basis to ensure that personal information is secure. 5.2. It will take appropriate, reasonable technical and organisational measures to prevent loss or damage or unauthorised destruction of personal information, and unlawful access to or processing of personal information. This will be achieved by – 5.2.1. Identifying internal and external risks; 5.2.2. Establishing and maintaining appropriate safeguards; 5.2.3. Regularly verifying these safeguards and their implementation; 5.2.4. Updating the safeguards; and 5.2.5. Implementing generally accepted information security practices and procedures. 5.3. The Inclusive Society Institute shall appoint an Information Officer and Deputy Information Officer who is/are responsible for compliance with the conditions of the lawful processing of personal information and other provisions of POPIA. 5.3.1. Information Officer details 5.3.1.1. Information Officer Name: Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer Telephone number: 021 201 1589 Postal address: P O Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010 Physical address: 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square, Cape Town, 8001 Email address: ceo@inclusivesociety.org.za 5.3.1.2. Deputy Information Officer Name: Edwin Mc Queen, Corporate Services Officer Telephone number: 021 201 1589 Postal address: P O Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010 Physical address: 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square , Cape Town, 8001 Email address: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za 5.4. The specific responsibilities of the Information Officer and his/her Deputy include – 5.4.1. The development, implementation, monitoring and maintenance of a compliance framework; 5.4.2. The undertaking of a personal information impact assessment to ensure that adequate measures and standards exist in order to comply with the conditions for the lawful processing of personal information; 5.4.3. The development, monitoring and maintenance of a manual, as well as the making available thereof, as prescribed in section 51 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 of 2000); 5.4.4. The development of internal measures, together with adequate systems, to process requests for information or access thereto; and 5.4.5. To ensure that Institute staff awareness sessions are conducted regarding the provisions of the Act, regulations made in terms of the Act, codes of conduct, or information obtained from the Regulator. 5.5. Employment contracts/addendums thereto, containing relevant consent clauses for the use and storage of employee information, or any other action so required, in terms of POPIA, must be signed by every employee. 5.6. On an ongoing basis, all suppliers, insurers and other third-party service providers are required to sign a service level agreement guaranteeing their commitment to the Protection of Personal Information. 5.7. Consent to process client/member/supplier information is obtained from clients/members (or a person who has been given authorisation from the client/member to provide the client/member’s personal information) and suppliers at sign on/appointment/contracting. 6. Direct marketing 6.1. The institute shall ensure that: 6.1.1. It does not process any personal information for the purpose of direct marketing (by means of any form of electronic communication, including automatic calling machines, SMS’s or e-mail) unless the data subject has given his, her or its consent to the processing, or is an existing customer. 6.1.2. It will only approach data subjects, whose consent is required and who have not previously withheld such consent, once in order to request the consent. This will be done in the prescribed manner and form. 6.1.3. The data subjects will only be approached for the purpose of direct marketing of the Inclusive Society Institute’s own products or services. In all instances, the data subject shall be given a reasonable opportunity to object, free of charge and in a manner free of unnecessary formality, to such use of his, her or its electronic details at the time when the information is collected. 6.1.4. Any communication for the purpose of direct marketing will contain details of the identity of the sender or the person on whose behalf the communication has been sent and an address or other contact details to which the recipient may send a request that such communications cease. 7. Transfer of information outside of South Africa 7.1. The Inclusive Society Institute will not transfer personal information about a data subject to a third party who is in a foreign country unless one or more of the following apply: 7.1.1. the third party is subject to a law, binding corporate rules or a binding agreement which provides an adequate level of protection of personal information and effectively upholds principles for reasonable processing of the information; 7.1.2. the data subject consents to the transfer; 7.1.3. the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the Institute; 7.1.4. the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the Institute and a third party; or 7.1.5. the transfer is for the benefit of the data subject, and it is not reasonably practicable to obtain the consent of the data subject to that transfer and if it were reasonably practicable to obtain such consent, the data subject would be likely to give it. 8. Recording systems 8.1. Video footage and/or voice/telephone calls that have been recorded, processed and stored constitute personal information. As such the Inclusive Society Institute will make all employees, members, clients or data subjects aware as to the use of any recording systems. 9. Security breaches 9.1. Should the Inclusive Society Institute detect a security breach on any of its systems that contain personal information, it shall take the required steps to assess the nature and extent of the breach in order to ascertain if any information has been compromised. 9.2. The Inclusive Society Institute shall notify the affected parties should it have reason to believe that their information has been compromised. Such notification shall only be made where the organisation can identify the data subject to which the information relates. Where it is not possible it may be necessary to consider website publication and whatever else the Information Regulator prescribes. 9.3. Notification will be provided in writing by means of either: 9.3.1. Email; 9.3.2. registered mail; or 9.3.3. the organisation’s website 9.4. The notification shall provide the following information where possible: 9.4.1. Description of possible consequences of the breach; 9.4.2. Measures taken to remedythe breach; 9.4.3. Recommendations to be taken by the data subject to mitigate adverse effects; and 9.4.4. The identity of the party responsible for the breach. 9.5. In addition to the above, the Inclusive Society Institute shall notify the Regulator of any breach and/or compromise to personal information in its possession and work closely with and comply with any recommendations issued by the Regulator. 9.6. The following will apply in this regard: 9.6.1. The Information Officer will be responsible for overseeing the investigation; 9.6.2. The Information Officer will be responsible for reporting to the Information Regulator within 3 working days of a breach/ compromise to personal information; 9.6.3. The Information Officer will be responsible for reporting to the Data Subject(s) within 3 working days, as far as is reasonable and practicable, of a breach/ compromise to personal information. 9.6.4. The timeframes above are guidelines and depending on the merits of the situation may require earlier or later reporting. 10. Access and correction of personal information 10.1. Employees and members/clients have the right to request access to any personal information that the Inclusive Society Institute holds about them. 10.2.Employees and members/clients have the right to request the Inclusive Society Institute to update, correct or delete their personal information on reasonable grounds. Such requests must be made to the Information Officer (see details above) or to the Inclusive Society Institute’s head office (see details below). 10.3. Where an employee or member/client objects to the processing of their personal information, the Inclusive Society Institute may no longer process said personal information. The consequences of the failure to give consent to process the personal information must be set out before the employee or client confirms his/her objection. 10.4. The member/client or employee must provide reasons for the objection to the processing of his/her personal information. 10.4.1 Head office details 10.4.2 Name: Inclusive Society Institute 10.4.3 Telephone number: 021 201 1589 10.4.4 Postal address: Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010 10.4.5 Physical address: 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square , Cape Town, 8001 10.4.6 Email address: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za 11. Retention of records 11.1. The Inclusive Society Institute is obligated to retain certain information, as prescribed by law. This includes but is not limited to the following: 11.1.1. With regard to the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and the Companies Amendment Act No. 3 of 2011, hard copies of the documents mentioned below must be retained for 7 years: 11.1.2. Any documents, accounts, books, writing, records or other information that a company is required to keep in terms of the Act; 11.1.3. Notice and minutes of all meetings, including resolutions adopted; 11.1.4. Copies of reports presented at the annual general meeting; and 11.1.5. Copies of annual financial statements required by the Act and copies of accounting records as required by the Act. 11.2. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act No. 75 of 1997, as amended, requires the organisation to retain records relating to its staff for a period of no less than 3 years. 12. Amendments to this policy 12.1. Amendments to this Policy will take place from time to time subject to the discretion of the Inclusive Society Institute and pursuant to any changes in the law. Such changes will be brought to the attention of employees, members and clients where it affects them. 13. Requests for information 13.1. In terms of requests to be processed under POPIA, the following forms shall be used – 13.1.1. Objection to the processing of personal information – a data subject who wishes to object to the processing of personal information in terms of section 11(3)(a) of the Act, must submit the objection to the responsible party. 13.1.2. Request for correction or deletion of personal information or destruction or deletion of record of personal information – a data subject who wishes to request a correction or deletion of personal information or the destruction or deletion of a record of personal information in terms of section 24(1) of the Act, must submit a request to the responsible party. 13.1.3. Request for data subject’s consent to process personal information – a responsible party who wishes to process the personal information of a data subject for the purpose of direct marketing by electronic communication must submit a request for written consent to that data subject. 13.1.4. Submission of complaint – Any person who wishes to submit a complaint contemplated in section 74(1) of the Act must submit such a complaint to the Regulator on Part I of Form 5. A responsible party or a data subject who wishes to submit a complaint contemplated in section 74(2) of the Act must submit such a complaint to the Regulator on Part II. 13.2. In terms of requests for information under PAIA, the provisions of the PAIA Sec 51 Manual must be complied with. 13.3. Any requests and/ or advice can be directed to the Information Officer set out in this policy and in the Sec 51 PAIA manual.