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This report has been enabled through the generous support of Telkom Copyright © 2026   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   March 2026   Author: Mari Harris (Ipsos South Africa) Statisticians: Corné Bodenstein (Ipsos South Africa), Lungelo Mkhize (Ipsos South Africa) Editor: Daryl Swanepoel (Inclusive Society Institute)  TABLE OF CONTENTS   Executive Summary 1. Introduction 2. Measuring social cohesion 2.1. Data 2.2. Analytical approach 3. Current level and trend of social cohesion 3.1. Social cohesion in South Africa 3.2. Social cohesion in the nine provinces 4. Structural influences on social cohesion 4.1. Data and methodology 4.2. Results 5. Individual experiences of social cohesion 5.1. Data and methodology 5.2. Identifying four classes of experience of social cohesion 5.3. Socio-demographics of the four classes 6. Social cohesion and subjective well-being 6.1. Provinces – data and methodology 6.2. Individuals 7. Conclusion and the way forward References Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:1440750455 LIST OF TABLES    Table 2.1: Sample sizes of Khayabus Table 2.2: Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 1 Table 2.3: Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 2 Table 2.4: Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 3 Table 3.1: Overall index and dimensions Table 3.2: Overall index in the provinces Table 3.3: Dimension 1.1 – Social networks in the provinces Table 3.4: Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people in the provinces Table 3.5: Dimension 1.3 – "Acceptance of diversity" Table 3.6: Dimension 2.1 – Identification in the provinces Table 3.7: Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions in the provinces Table 3.8: Dimension 2.3 – "Perception of fairness" Table 3.9: Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness in the provinces Table 3.10: Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules Table 3.11: Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation in the provinces Table 4.1: Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table 5.1: 2025 Results: Social Cohesion Dimensions and LCA Table 5.2: Socio-demographic and -economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents Table 6.1: Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Table 6.2: Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents     LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1: Constitutive elements of social cohesion Figure 1.2: Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix A: Indicators of cohesion across time Table A.1: Dimension 1.1 – Social networks results over time Table A.2: Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people results over time Table A.3: Dimension 1.3 – Acceptance of diversity results over time Table A.4: Dimension 2.1 – Identification results over time Table A.5: Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions results over time Table A.6: Dimension 2.3 – Perception of fairness results over time Table A.7: Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness results over time Table A.8: Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules results over time Table A.9: Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation results over time Appendix B: Correlations of social cohesion on the province level Table B.1: Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table B.2: Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Appendix C: Latent class analyses Table C.1: Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Table C.2: Relative class sizes for LCA solutions EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   This report represents the fifth complete application of the South Africa Social Cohesion Index (SASCI). It updates the study published in February 2025 and focuses on the development and trends of social cohesion from 2021 to 2025. To recap, the study follows the measurement concept of the Social Cohesion Radar (SCR), developed by the Bertelsmann Stiftung. As illustrated in a graph in the report, the study assessed social cohesion in three domains:   Social Relations, including the intactness of social networks, general trust in people and acceptance of diversity Connectedness, including identification with one’s place of residence, trust in institutions and perceptions of fairness Focus on the Common Good, including solidarity and helpfulness, respect for social rules and civic participation.   The study uses data collected in the first wave of the Ipsos Khayabus study every year (two or three waves are conducted annually). This is a large-scale representative study of South African adults, conducted face-to-face in the homes and home languages of a randomly selected sample, covering all nine provinces and different types of settlements all over South Africa.   The Bertelsmann concept of defining a country’s level of social cohesion allows scores between 0 (no cohesion) and 100 (maximum cohesion). The decision of which score to regard as sufficiently high is both a normative and a political one.   Currently (2025), the overall level of social cohesion in South Africa as a whole is “moderate” at 56 points. Looking at its development since 2021, the country has achieved a slight increase of 2.5 points.   Since the commencement of the study, the dimension of identification (in the domain of Connectedness) has proved to be the strongest in South Africa, and it is still the case. The score for identification, currently at 76.7, has grown by 3.5 points since 2021. However, the biggest increases over this period were achieved by the measurement of civic participation, which grew 6.2 points since 2021, to now stand at 60.6, and solidarity and helpfulness, which grew 4.1 points, to now stand at 63.1 points.   At the other end of the scale, the lowest scores are still registered for respect for social rules (in the domain of Focus on the Common Good). This score currently measures 42, but it also grew by 1.7 points since 2021 and is now regarded as moderate and no longer low.   Still looking at the overall picture, eight of the nine dimensions registered growth from  2021 to 2025.   All nine provinces also registered moderate scores, clustering in a relatively narrow band, ranging from the Northern Cape at the bottom of the list with 51.7 and the Eastern Cape at the top of the list with 58.9.   This report also presents results from Latent Class Analysis (LCA), a procedure identifying distinct groups in society. Four groups were identified that experience different strengths and deficits in social cohesion in their immediate life contexts.   In the end, the report examines the relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being. The evidence suggests that the quality of society (social cohesion) translates directly into citizens’ quality of life (subjective well-being).   It is exactly the strong positive relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being that underscores the necessity of political action, planning and cooperation between government, business and civil society to improve South Africa’s level of social cohesion. Social cohesion translates the social and economic structures (like performance and output of the economy and living conditions) into the quality of life (issues like happiness, life satisfaction, etc.) directly experienced by individual members of society. In the case that cohesion is neglected, one can expect societal polarisation and instability.   1. INTRODUCTION   Civis Romanus sum [1]   In the latter centuries of the Republic, as Rome grew into a great power, gladiatorial combat became a means of maintaining social cohesion.   To watch the gladiators fight was a key perk of citizenship, a common experience fostering a shared sense of civic Roman identity. [2]   Since the earliest times leaders – religious, military and political – tried to keep their followers, soldiers or citizens/populations together, by inspiring behaviour and attitudes that foster unity of minds and actions. This spirit of social cohesion is thus not at all a new concept. There has recently been more interest in the subject, as proved by various studies and reports – see specifically the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) report titled, “Social Cohesion: Concept and Measurement”, published in 2023. This report states that a plurality of definitions and applications of the concept of social cohesion have been advanced by international governments and academic researchers – and they published a selection of definitions as put together by Statistics Canada in Tabular format (UNECE, 2023:4), which is copied here:   As in previous studies, the research commissioned by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) built on work by Langer et al. (2017) and Leininger et al. (2021). The Langer study used Afrobaromer data from nineteen countries and defined social cohesion in an African context as the interplay of three salient aspects: perceived inequalities, trust (interpersonal and institutional) and identity (national vs ethnic).  The Leininger study also compared African counties. According to its authors, “cohesion is characterised by a set of attitudes and behavioural manifestations that includes trust, an inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good” (Leininger et al., 2021:3). These three attributes unfold into two elements, encompassing horizontal or vertical relations among citizens and the state (see Figure 1.1): social trust and institutional trust, group identity and national identity, intergroup cooperation, and state-society cooperation. (More information about these two studies is published in the 2024 update of this report.)   Figure 1.1:  Constitutive elements of social cohesion (Source: Leininger et al., 2021) This 2025 report uses new data, collected during the first quarter of 2025, but it still aims to provide a theoretically-based and methodologically-sound empirical assessment of social cohesion in the South African society, with the view to deliver credibly on five goals:   To measure the current degree of social cohesion in South Africa as a whole and in each of the nine provinces separately. To track how social cohesion has progressed (or not) from 2021 to 2025. To identify structural characteristics from the thematic fields of the economic situation in the country, inequality and poverty, demographic developments, diversity and modernisation that can promote or hinder social cohesion. To explore which social groups demonstrate high or low levels of social cohesion. To investigate how social cohesion – very broadly seen as the quality of society – relates to citizens’ overall well-being, defined as their quality of life.    As in previous reports, we aimed to achieve these goals with the application and use of the measurement concept as defined by the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar (SCR). This was informed by an initial comprehensive literature review (Schiefer & van der Noll, 2017) and the input of various experts on the topic. It defines social cohesion as the “quality of social cooperation and togetherness of a collective, defined in geopolitical terms, that is expressed in the attitudes and behaviours of its members. A cohesive society is characterised by resilient social relations, a positive emotional connectedness between its members and the community, and a pronounced focus on the common good” (Dragolov et al., 2016:6). These three domains unfold into three dimensions, as illustrated overleaf in Figure 1.2.   Each one of the dimensions comprises three measurements:   The “social networks” domain includes the measurements of social networks, trust in people, and acceptance of diversity. The “connectedness” domain includes the measurements of identification, trust in institutions, and perception of fairness. The “focus on the common good” domain includes the measurements of solidarity and helpfulness, respect for social rules, and civic participation.   Figure 1.2:  Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar (Source : Dragolov et al. (2016))   As in previous reports, this report uses the comprehensive approach of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar in our analysis as the output is logical and insightful.   2. MEASURING SOCIAL COHESION   This section details the data and methodological approaches employed for measuring social cohesion in South Africa. 2.1. DATA   The data collected in this report have been put together over a period of six years (2020 to 2025) using the Ipsos Khayabus study as a vehicle. The Khayabus is an Omnibus study, conducted twice a year via face-to-face interviews in the homes and home languages of a representative sample of South Africans, 15 years and older. As not all the questions are asked to 15-17-year-olds, data have been filtered on the results for those 18 years old and older. In an Omnibus-type study, different clients take the opportunity to include questions on the master questionnaire. In this way the Inclusive Society Institute added questions to the first wave of the study in the form of a section called Gov-Dem-Poll. Data from the 2020 study have been used for preliminary testing, and deep analysis and modelling followed from 2021 onwards.   Data are collected in all nine provinces of South Africa, but sample sizes per province differ – depending on the overall population size in each province in comparison to the South African population. We do make use of some disproportionate sampling in the case of provinces with very low population figures, like the mainly arid and rural Northern Cape. In the end the data are weighted by different demographic criteria to reflect the true population spread in the country, according to published sex, age and working status proportions in each province. Data are also projected to overall adult population figures and are as such representative of the South African population, within a margin of error (depending on sample size, response rate and sampling methodology used).   This procedure is followed to provide a mirror image of the views of the overall adult South African population. Thus, the smaller sample size used in some provinces (especially those with smaller populations than Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal) do invoke a larger standard sample error for sample statistics. This means in practical terms that the precision of the measurements for Gauteng is about four times higher than that for the Northen Cape at the same variability in the data. Therefore, we advise caution when interpreting data for provinces in isolation.   The table overleaf provides the achieved sample sizes (N) and population-weighted relative frequencies (%) of respondents over time (from 2020 to 2025) for South Africa as a whole and the nine provinces.   Table 2.1:  Sample sizes of Khayabus Note:  The table shows the absolute count (N) and population-weighted relative frequencies (%) of respondents from South Africa and its nine provinces in Wave 1 of the Khayabus surveys from 2020 to 2025.     2.2. ANALYTICAL APPROACH   A phased methodological approach was employed to select the appropriate survey questions (items/indicators) to measure the nine dimensions of social cohesion in line with the Bertelsmann concept. We then computed scores for each of the nine dimensions and the overall social cohesion index based on the scores.   Item selection was performed by using a multi-step procedure:   Each member of the research team independently identified potential items for measuring the nine social cohesion dimensions. Members of the research team then jointly prepared a pool of items according to face validity.  Items from the pool were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis for each dimension. [3] Finally, we assessed the internal consistency of the scales formed by the selected items to measure pertinent dimensions: Cronbach’s α coefficients should reach .90 for an excellent scale, .80 for a very good scale, .70 for a satisfactory scale, and minimally .30, or, in case of short scales, at least .10 times the number of items in the scale.    Several data preparation steps had to be taken before performing the factor analysis:   Where needed, the response options of the items were reverse coded so that a higher numerical value stands for a more vital expression of the pertinent aspect of cohesion.  The response option of all items was rescaled to range from 0 (weakest expression of cohesion) to 100 (strongest expression of cohesion). If present, missing values on an item were substituted with the sample mean – fortunately the rate of missing values was very low. Below and on the next two pages, Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 document the selected items’ factor loadings and the internal consistencies of the scale these items form for measuring the nine dimensions of social cohesion.   Table 2.2:  Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 1 Note:  The table shows the factor loadings of the items from factor analysis for the pertinent dimensions. Values in parentheses refer to Cronbach's α coefficient of internal consistency of the scale, formed by the items selected to measure the pertinent dimension .   Table 2.3:  Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 2 Note:  The table shows the factor loadings of the items from factor analysis for the pertinent dimension. Values in parentheses refer to Cronbach's α coefficient of internal consistency of the scale, formed by the items selected to measure the pertinent dimension.   a  Loadings and Cronbach's α cannot be computed; substituted with mean from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1   Table 2.4:  Factor loading of items per dimension within Domain 3 Note:  The table shows the factor loadings of the items from factor analysis for the pertinent dimension. Values in parentheses refer to Cronbach's α coefficient of internal consistency of the scale, formed by the items selected to measure the pertinent dimension.   a  Loadings and Cronbach's α cannot be computed; substituted with mean from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1     It is obvious from these three tables that not all dimensions of social cohesion were measured equally well over the five-year period of the study. There were several reasons for this:   The questionnaire offered a limited choice of indicators for some dimensions. This is why not all dimensions could be measured with at least three items. This is relevant to Dimension 2.1 (Identification) and Dimension 3.1 (Solidarity and Helpfulness). Furthermore, for Dimension 2.1 (Identification) an item from the 2020 Khayabus had to be included, to assess citizens’ identification with South Africa in 2021. Not all scales exhibit a high degree of homogeneity (the level of intercorrelation) of the included items. This is particularly true for Dimension 2.1 (Identification) and Dimension 3.3 (Civic Participation). After sorting items via factor analysis, the nine-dimension scores were computed by calculating the arithmetic mean of the items determined to belong to a given factor. The overall cohesion index was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the nine-dimension score. Dimension and index scores for the provinces and the country as a whole were calculated by aggregating the individual-level data to the respective level via the population-weighted arithmetic mean. Scores for the dimensions and the overall index range from 0 (very low cohesion) to 100 (very high cohesion), where:   Scores from 0 to 19.99 can be interpreted as pointing to a very low level of cohesion, Scores from 20 to 39.99 as pointing to a low level of cohesion, Scores from 40 to 59.99 as pointing to a medium level of cohesion, Scores from 60 to 79.99 as pointing to a high level of cohesion, and Scores from 80 to 100 as pointing to a very high level of cohesion.     3. CURRENT LEVEL AND TREND OF SOCIAL COHESION 3.1. SOCIAL COHESION IN SOUTH AFRICA   Table 3.1 below illustrates the annual level and trend (development) of social cohesion in South Africa since 2021. Using the 2021 data as a base, it also shows the year-on-year development of dimensions of cohesion since 2021.   Table 3.1:  Overall index and dimensions Note:  The table shows the scores of South Africa as a whole on the overall index of social cohesion and its dimensions in 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025.   For this table and further tables, scores up to 19.99 (very low cohesion) are shaded in red, scores between 20 and 39.99 (low) are shaded in orange, scores between 40 and 59.99 are shaded in yellow, and scores above 60 (high cohesion) are shaded in green. The table also shows changes over time. Positive changes are given in green, and negative changes are indicated in red. Looking specifically at the findings for 2025, the fact of four green scores is noticed immediately. In the past five years the dimension of “Identification” has consistently delivered green scores, but it was unfortunately the only one. The dimension of “Social Networks” started off well in 2021, but could only manage another green score in 2025, while the dimension of “Solidarity and Helpfulness” achieved green scores for the last two years. In 2025, “Civic Participation” also achieved a green score. It is clear that social cohesion is on a stronger footing than before, with the overall country index improving 2.5 points since 2021 to reflect an overall index of 56 for the year 2025.  Currently, South Africa exhibits four green scores and five yellow scores. It is also an important finding that eight of the nine scores improved when comparing them to the situation in 2021. This is indeed a very positive result.   Another important finding is that the dimension of “Respect for Social Rules” showed an upward movement over the last year (from 2024 to 2025), with the score moving from orange to yellow.   The results show a nuanced profile of social cohesion in South Africa, covering quite a spectrum, from 42 to 76.7. It is notable that each one of the three domains includes at least one green score. When programmes are designed to promote social cohesion in the country, it would be advisable to use the essence of the green scores as main “selling points” to try to achieve movement on the other scores as well. As before, it is clear that the “glue” that holds the country together is still strongly reflected in citizens’ strong identification and affiliation with the country, at a score of 76.7 (3.5 points higher than in 2021).   On the other hand, three issues have the inherent potential to destabilise the South African society, namely:   Acceptance of Diversity (currently at 47.7 points), Perception of Fairness (currently at 47.1 points), and Respect for Social Rules (currently at 42 points). 3.2. SOCIAL COHESION IN THE NINE PROVINCES   The table overleaf shows the social cohesion scores for the nine South African provinces – all scores are in yellow, indicating medium-level index scores for the whole country.    In four provinces (the Eastern Cape, North West, Western Cape and Gauteng) the overall social cohesion score is higher than in the country as a whole. Especially the Eastern Cape and North West showed good progress over the last five years: the score in the Eastern Cape is 7 points higher than in 2021, while the score in North West is 7.6 points higher than in 2021.   The Northern Cape shows the highest points loss (7.5 points), from the 59.2 points measured in 2021 to the 51.7 measured in 2025.  However, it has been mentioned before that findings in the Northern Cape will probably show greater variability and inconsistency than in other provinces, as the sample size is really low. (This vast province houses only 2% of the country’s population.)   Two other provinces also recorded a decline in Social Cohesion when the 2025 findings are compared to those from 2021, although these losses are much smaller than that in the Northern Cape: Limpopo lost 1.2 index points, and the Free State lost 0.9 index points. All other provinces are doing better regarding overall Social Cohesion index points than in 2021.   Table 3.2:  Overall index in the provinces Note:  The table shows the scores of the nine South African provinces on the overall social cohesion index from 2021 to 2025. The table also shows changes over time. Positive changes are highlighted in green, and negative changes are highlighted in red.   The next nine tables will show the nine provinces’ performance on the three domains and nine dimensions of Social Cohesion over the five reporting periods/years. It will become clear that none of the provinces exhibit a consistent profile – in other words, each province has its strong and weak points when it comes to Social Cohesion.   The only exception is the strength of the dimension of identification with the country, which is high across all provinces. THE “SOCIAL RELATIONS” DOMAIN   Table 3.3:  Dimension 1.1 – Social networks in the provinces     Regarding social networks in the provinces, there are two clear groups in the country currently: the green group (good scores) and the yellow group (moderate scores). Social networks work well in the Western Cape, North West, Gauteng and Northern Cape. The other five provinces fare less well on this dimension and four out of the five have lost ground since 2021.     Table 3.4:  Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people in the provinces     Eight out of the nine provinces perform moderately on this dimension. The exception is the Eastern Cape – not only is this province the best overall performer this year, but it succeeded in steadily improving on the Trust in People dimension every year for the last five years and ended on an index score 16.4 points higher than where it started in 2021. Table 3.5:  Dimension 1.3 – "Acceptance of diversity"     All nine provinces registered moderate scores on this dimension. In a country with so many different population groups, a high Gini-coefficient, very different levels of development and educational qualifications, and diversity in terms of home languages and religions, it is perhaps not surprising. However, the process of nation-building should definitely get more attention nationally. The other aspect complicating the sentiment about acceptance of diversity is the issue of immigrants. More about this later. THE “CONNECTEDNESS” DOMAIN   Table 3.6:  Dimension 2.1 – Identification in the provinces     It is clear that Identification is by far the strongest dimension of Social Cohesion in the country, as has been mentioned previously. Seven provinces consistently registered “good” results on this dimension, and in 2025 two provinces, the Eastern and Western Cape, have registered “excellent” results. This is a very strong element of Social Cohesion in South Africa’s favour and can possibly be employed in a clever campaign to help promote some of the other desired opinions and dimensions of Social Cohesion.     Table 3.7:  Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions in the provinces   Another all yellow – i.e. moderate – performance. A campaign addressing Trust  in general, and both the dimensions of trust in other people and trust in institutions, making use of good stories or talking about good experiences might work in the long run. Table 3.8:  Dimension 2.3 – "Perception of fairness"   The scores for the Perception of Fairness are all moderate as well, but on the lower half of the moderate category. South Africans do have an issue with this on many different levels – just think about how many times there are news articles about unfairness, unfair treatment, discrimination and related issues. One positive observation, though, is that all the scores in the provinces (bar one) have increased since 2021. THE “FOCUS ON THE COMMON GOOD” DOMAIN   Table 3.9:  Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness in the provinces     This dimension of Solidarity and Helpfulness is another strong performance area for South Africa and all nine provinces. Eight of the nine provinces are in the “good”/green category and only one in the moderate category in terms of the indices. To be helpful, caring and friendly is a way of life for many in the country.   Table 3.10:  Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules     The dimension of Respect for Social Rules is by far the worst performer in terms of the Social Cohesion indices in South Africa – although many of the scores in the past five years have been much worse than those achieved in 2025. The related aspects of lawlessness, the attitude that “everything goes”, and even the reckless driving behaviour of some motorists count as everyday proof that South Africans have a low regard for rules, regulations and laws. This should not be allowed to continue.   Table 3.11:  Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation in the provinces     With this last dimension of Civic Participation, the pattern looks very similar to the very first dimension of Social Networks – four provinces recording “good”/green scores and five recording yellow/”moderate” scores. This time the Eastern Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo are the best performers, perhaps showing the strong sense of community in the three more rural provinces and even in the mainly metropolitan Gauteng province, where shared issues of service delivery have engendered a stronger sense of community and participation in local issues over the last year or so. It is also interesting that the scores for this dimension have all increased since 2021, with the Northern Cape again being the odd one out.    Although there is certainly still a lot of work to be done in the country concerning support and promotion of Social Cohesion, the index figures in general show a much more positive picture than five years ago, when we were still in the last phase of the Covid-19 pandemic and health, political and economic uncertainties were rife. Although the current situation in the country is not plain sailing, there is more participation and dialogue and the economy is slowly showing some tender green shoots, although growth is still severely inhibited. 4. STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON SOCIAL COHESION   This section focuses on the structural characteristics of the provinces that may have an influence on the promotion or hinderance of social cohesion within the provinces, with the aim of finding evidence on structural determinants of social cohesion. To bring this about, we explore the relationship between the overall level of social cohesion in the nine provinces and selected characteristics of the provinces from different themes, namely, the economic situation, inequality and poverty, demography, diversity and modernisation. The focus on these aspects is not arbitrary, as studies of different societies and the circumstances within them have illustrated empirically that aspects from these themes act as determinants rather than outcomes  of social cohesion (Dragolov et al., 2016; Arant et al., 2017; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Boehnke et al., 2024).     4.1 DATA AND METHODOLOGY   To touch on the economic situation in the provinces, we followed the same procedures as in previous studies and used data on the gross domestic product per capita [4] in South African Rand (ZAR) (Stats SA, 2025), Human Development Index (Global Data Lab, 2024), and unemployment rates – using both the official and expanded definitions of unemployment.   We measured poverty using one subjective indicator – the share of households in a province who perceive themselves as poor (Stats SA, 2024c), and objective indicators concerning three definitions of the poverty line [5] . We employed the Gini index of income inequality and the P90/P10 ratio (own calculations based on CRA, 2023) to measure inequality [6] .   We drew on data from the official Census 2022 in South Africa (Stats SA, 2023a) for the remaining thematic fields. In particular, regarding demographics, we considered population density, the share of urban and rural populations, the share of single and married citizens, and the population’s median age. To tap into diversity, we used the share of blacks, whites, coloureds and Indians/Asians, and other races, the share of immigrants, as well as ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalisation [7] (own calculations based on Stats SA, 2023a).   To measure modernisation, we used the share of citizens with completed primary, secondary and tertiary education, the share of citizens owning a computer and a mobile phone, and the share of the population without access to the internet (annual Khayabus results).   For reasons of data availability, all structural indicators, except GDP per capita, where the 2025 figure is used, refer to the years 2021, 2022 and 2023 (the latest Census was undertaken in 2022). The Khayabus data are from the year when fieldwork was undertaken.  Thereby, some figures precede the most recent measurement of social cohesion. Although the intentional time lag – earlier measurement of the provinces’ structural characteristics and later measurement of social cohesion – introduces a certain degree of temporal order in the analyses, it cannot prove the existence of a causal relationship, but it can increase the plausibility of attributing causality.    Each of the above-listed structural characteristics of the provinces was subjected to a correlation test with the level of social cohesion. Two variables are correlated when changes in one are closely followed by changes in the other. A correlation can be positive (the more variable A, the more variable B) or negative (the more variable A, the less variable B). The strength of the association is reflected in the coefficient correlation, which can range from 0 (no correlation) to ±1 (perfect correlation). Typically, a correlation below .10 is very weak, between .10 and .30 is weak, between .30 and .50 is moderate, and above .50 is strong.   As before, we experimented with both Pearson and Spearman correlations. However, using Pearson correlations the low number of provinces (only nine) means that only extremely high correlations can reach statistical significance. As a parametric test, the Pearson correlations involve assumptions that cannot be fulfilled with the data on the level of provinces. Therefore, we again used Spearman correlations as a non-parametric, assumption-free alternative. A Spearman correlation is, in essence, a Pearson correlation performed on ranked data. The distinction between the two approaches is that a Pearson correlation considers the exact distances between the observations on each variable, whereas a Spearman correlation considers only whether there are differences, regardless of their size.   Both bivariate correlations and correlations partial to GDP were measured, because previous studies in other countries showed that GDP was highly positively related to social cohesion (Dragolov et al, 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). Generally, the more prosperous a society is, the more cohesive it is. Partialling GDP out of a relationship removes the “halo effect” – the influence of GDP on both variables involved. This makes it possible to speak of associations between a given structural characteristic of the provinces and social cohesion, independent of their economic prosperity. 4.2 RESULTS   Table 4.1 (overleaf) documents the relationships between the structural characteristics of the nine provinces and social cohesion per thematic field.   Table 4.1:  Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Note :  The table shows Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and structural characteristics of the provinces, performed on the level of the provinces ( N  = 9). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p  ≤ .05, *** p  ≤ .01. 5. INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCES OF SOCIAL COHESION   This section looks at the data at the level of individual respondents to explore which population or societal groups are at risk of experiencing low cohesion in South Africa. This exercise involved the identification of distinct groups – or classes – of respondents, based on their scores on the nine dimensions of social cohesion.     5.1. DATA AND METHODOLOGY   To classify respondents into groups with distinct experiences of cohesion, we used Latent Class Analysis. “Latent Class Analysis (LCA) is a statistical procedure used to identify qualitatively different subgroups within membership who often share certain outward characteristics. The assumption underlying LCA is that membership in unobserved groups (or classes) can be explained by patterns of scores across survey questions, assessment indicators, or scales” (Weller et al., 2020). The classes of respondents resulting from the analysis are characterised by similarities within the class and dissimilarities across the classes concerning the experience of the nine aspects of cohesion by the respondents who belong to each class. It is also possible to relate class membership to socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics and investigate how the experience of social cohesion is related to individual characteristics.   The Latent Class Analysis produced a best fit for four classes of South Africans [8] :   Critics, 15.5% of the adult population, Integrated Sceptics, 22.5% of the adult population, Middle South Africa, 48.2% of the adult population, and Cohesive Communities, 13.8% of the adult population.     5.2. IDENTIFYING FOUR CLASSES OF EXPERIENCE OF SOCIAL COHESION    Critics (Class 1) are characterised by high identification (like all groups) but critically low acceptance of diversity. They also have low trust in people and in institutions and their perception of fairness and respect for social rules lag behind. This group has the lowest overall social cohesion index score at 40.6.   Integrated Sceptics (Class 2) show well-knit social networks, they have high trust in people and accept diversity, experience solidarity and helpfulness and participate in civic life. Like all South Africans, they agree strongly with the country. However, they fall short on trust in institutions (they are “sceptics”, after all) and exhibit very low levels of respect for social rules and perceptions of fairness. This group has the second-highest overall cohesion index score at 56.5.   Middle South Africa (Class 3) is the biggest group and also the most like the “average South African”, if something like that existed.  They identify strongly with the country and have high solidarity and helpfulness when it comes to society. But, for all the other dimensions, their views are somewhere in the middle. This group has the second-lowest overall social cohesion index score at 55.7.   Cohesive Communities (Class 4) characterise the ideal-typical model of strong cohesion in South Africa, manifesting itself in exceptionally high identification and high scores on all the other dimensions. This group has the highest overall social cohesion index score at 73.4.   A series of chi-square tests of independence suggest that these four classes differ along core socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics.   Table 5.1:  2025 Results: Social Cohesion Dimensions and LCA Note:  The table shows the average score (M) and the standard deviation (SD) of the overall index of social cohesion and its nine dimensions in the four classes of respondents. Scores below 20 are highlighted in red, scores between 20 and 39.99 are highlighted in orange, scores between 40 and 59.99 are highlighted in yellow, scores between 60 and 79.99 are highlighted in green, and scores above 80 are highlighted in blue.     A closer look at the average scores of the four classes on the nine dimensions reveals the aspects of cohesion along which the classes differ from each other (see Table 5.1 above). It is clear that all four classes exhibit a high to very high level of identification.  There is also more convergence than in previous studies on the dimension of solidarity and helpfulness, with three of the four classes now exhibiting good scores. (This dimension stayed at about the same level for Critics in 2025 as in 2024.)   5.3. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE FOUR CLASSES    In this section, the typical individual characteristics for the four classes are explored. As illustrated in Table 5.2 overleaf, socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics are used. The four classes are characterised in the framework of separate chi-square tests of independence between respondents’ class membership and the respective individual characteristics of interest. Table 5.2 documents the population weighted relative frequencies (%) of the socio-demographic and socio-economic categories in the total sample and in each of the four classes as well as the respective results from the chi-square tests of independence and Cramer’s V  coefficient of effect size. Due to the large sample sizes in three of the classes, all nine tests emerged as statistically significant, although some effect sizes are small.   Critics include an overproportion of single young females, with four out of five from the black population group – with home languages corresponding to this finding. They mainly live outside of metropolitan areas, and their education reflects a similar pattern to that of the country, with a slight overproportion of individuals with a lower education. Just over four in ten Critics are unemployed, leading to an effect on personal income. As we have seen in the previous section, the Critics group are not experiencing low levels of social cohesion in the country and their communities.   We have seen that Integrated Sceptics experienced a much higher level of social cohesion. This group tend to be slightly older than the first and display a slight overrepresentation of whites and coloureds than the general South African population. They also come more from married relationships and include an overrepresentation of Afrikaans-speakers, and proportionally more of them live in rural areas. The spread of Integrated Sceptics over the categories of education, working status and income is broadly similar to the general South African patterns.   Middle South Africa – exactly as the name says, this group mainly follows a distribution in different socio-demographic and socio-economic groups similar to the general South African population. If anything, this group is slightly overrepresented in the black population and live more in metropolitan areas than the general population.   Cohesive communities are more male than female and have stronger representation in the 25-to-64 age group than the general population. They show a good spread of home language and population groups but are overrepresented in the Indian/Asian group and almost half live in rural areas or villages. They are overrepresented in the group with secondary education, and are mostly employed, with corresponding higher than average incomes. They experience the highest level of social cohesion of all four groups. Table 5.2:  Socio-demographic and -economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents Note:  The table shows the population-weighed relative frequencies (%) of the categories of the pertinent socio-economic and demographic characteristics in the total sample (N = 3456) and in each of the four classes of respondents (n1 = 532, n2 = 808, n3 = 1637, n4 = 479), the respective result from a chi-square test of independence between the characteristic and class belonging, and Cramer’s V coefficient of effect size. Significance of the estimates in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     6. SOCIAL COHESION AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING   In this section, we check whether the data support the consistent findings from previous studies that high levels of social cohesion are related to greater (subjective) well-being.   Five items from the Khayabus study are used as proxies of well-being, namely:   Think of the way your family lives, would you say that your family is … better off than a year ago / about the same / worse off than a year ago? And how do you think your family’s lives will be in a year’s time? Do you think your family will be … better off than today / about the same / worse off than today? Please think about your children or the children of family or friends. What do you think the future holds for these children? Do you think that … they have a bright future ahead of them / they have a bleak future ahead of them? And your satisfaction with life? Has it … improved / stayed the same / worsened compared to a few months ago? On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate whether you (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) agree, or (5) strongly agree with the following statement: I am seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so.   Analyses on both the level of provinces and of individuals were conducted.     6.1. PROVINCES – DATA AND METHODOLOGY   We aggregated individual responses to the five items to measure well-being on the level of provinces. For each province, we took the respective share of the positive response option for each of the four items with categorically scaled answers (better off, bright future, improved). We applied the same methodological approach as in Section 4, which explored associations between several structured characteristics of the provinces and the index of social cohesion. Appendix B documents the biserial bivariate correlations on the individual level and the bivariate and partial Pearson correlations on the level of provinces. As in Section 4, we report and interpret the results from the Spearman correlations partial for GDP. Table 6.1:  Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Note:  The table shows Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and aspects of subjective well-being on the level of the nine provinces (N = 9). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     These correlations are less strong than those measured in previous studies.     6.2. INDIVIDUALS   To investigate the association between social cohesion and subjective well-being on the individual level, we relate the individual responses to the well-being items to respondents’ membership in the four distinct classes of experiencing social cohesion. As most of the items on well-being are of categorical measurement quality, we apply the approach from Section 5 to describe the four classes based on respondents’ socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The individual experience of social cohesion exhibits strong associations with all four of the indicators of subjective well-being. Table 6.2: Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents Note:  The table shows the population-weighed relative frequencies (%) of the responses to the pertinent aspect of subjective well-being in the total sample (N = 3456) and in each of the four classes of respondents (n1 = 532, n2 = 808, n3 = 1637, n4 = 479), the respective result from a chi-square test of independence between the aspect of well-being and class belonging, and Cramer’s V coefficient of effect size. Significance of the estimates in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     The evidence presented a clear picture. The greatest share of respondents who evaluated their family’s life as better off than a year ago was found in Class 4 (Cohesive Communities). Looking at the two measures of optimism, we found similar evidence. The largest share of respondents believing that their family’s lives would be better off in a year’s time than at the time of the fieldwork, was again found in the Cohesive Communities. Likewise, optimism related to the future of children was also found to be highest in Class 4, and the pattern holds for satisfaction with life, with almost half of Group 4 claiming that their life satisfaction had improved.   In each case the optimism and hope of Cohesive Communities was shared by smaller proportions of Group 3 (Middle South Africa) and by even smaller proportions of Group 2 (Integrated Sceptics).   Group 1 (Critics) in many cases did not strongly express themselves – either positively or negatively – but largely chose the middle options of “stayed the same” when this was offered. In the case of the future of children, where no middle option was offered, more than half of Critics chose the option that children would have a “bleak future”.     7. CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD   The concept and reality of Social Cohesion should form part of the central discussion in a diverse developing country like South Africa.  Thus, this project, which has developed over five years of intense studies and modelling, can contribute constructively to the intensifying and necessary discourse. Looking at the project over the five years, it is possible to see the progress made so far, but also to see what still needs to be done. For instance, the “Critics” group are seriously lagging in positive opinions about themselves and the future of the country. Special attention should be paid to developing a programme to help them see the way out of the dire situations they find themselves in. This group is mainly made up of young women, and it should be possible to mobilise NGOs and the Department in the President’s office that pays special attention to women to concentrate on this group – in a way that can be informed by the findings of this project and measured in future.   However, it would be wrong not to pay any attention to the other three groups: “Integrated Sceptics”, “Middle South Africa” and “Cohesive Communities”. These groups can perhaps be more easily addressed and involved in Social Cohesion programmes, however, it should be noted that the messages designed for each of these groups must be different. They still exhibit very different “group personalities”, have different interests, and support or are concerned about different issues. In this case, some further study and careful planning will be appropriate.   As mentioned at various instances in this report, the glue that holds the South African society together consists to a significant extent of the high level of identification with the country, as illustrated by all four groups/classes of South Africans. This national pride cannot be taken for granted. Today, it rests to a large degree on the shared connection to the country, its history and its people and the sense of belonging we share, and it also finds expression in the shared joy experienced at the success of our sports teams. But this cannot be all; other elements of “nation-building” also need to be identified, built on and shared. Looking at other areas we can develop, South Africans largely share a strong feeling of solidarity and helpfulness when it comes to fellow citizens, and relatively well-functioning social networks.    These aspects can aid in the nation-building project.   On the other hand, serious political and planning attention must also be paid to the widely perceived lack of respect for social rules, as this can easily spark turmoil and unrest. Policymakers might also consider overcoming the perceived lack of fairness of various elements of the political system, likewise, strengthening of the acceptance of diversity is also needed, and trust in institutions needs urgent attention – especially with a view to the coming local government elections.   It also has to be mentioned that overall Social Cohesion in the country has increased over the last two measurement periods and that it is at an overall higher level than 2021 – thus, slow progress has been made. But it is still on a rather moderate level of 56, and is still falling far short of the hope, attitude of reconciliation and common vision of the “Rainbow Nation” of 1994. A lot of work still needs to be done.   To increase the use of this report and aid planning for Social Cohesion development, the report contains a lot of information specifically aimed at each of the provinces. On the one hand it is important to promote social cohesion on a national level, but on the other, each province also displays its own idiosyncrasies and legitimate findings and issues. The overall direction of the Social Cohesion plan should therefore include a separate special focus on each province. It would also be possible to link and disaggregate the analysis of the four groups of South Africans to each province, in order to facilitate the employment of the same building blocks in provinces as on the national scale. The fifth study in this series really proves the stability and usefulness of the study overall and corroborates the fact that the quality of a society (its social cohesion) translates directly into citizens’ quality of life (measured by subjective well-being) – and their optimism for the future. In turn, this can improve political participation, a sense of belonging, participation in the economy, the health of communities, and even the paying of taxes!   APPENDICES   APPENDIX A: INDICATORS OF COHESION ACROSS TIME    This Appendix documents the population-weighted relative frequencies of the response categories of the indicators used to calculate the social cohesion scores in this report. The reported values pertain to the respective percentage distributions in the total sample for each year of data collection.   Table A.1:  Dimension 1.1 – Social networks results over time     Table A.2:  Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people results over time       Table A.3:  Dimension 1.3 – Acceptance of diversity results over time     Table A.4:  Dimension 2.1 – Identification results over time   *values stem from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1 ( N  = 3758) .  Table A.5:  Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions results over time *values stem from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1 (N = 3758).   Table A.6:  Dimension 2.3 – Perception of fairness results over time   Table A.7:  Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness results over time Table A.8:  Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules results over time     Table A.9:  Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation results over time   * values stem from Khayabus 2020 - Wave 1 ( N  = 3758).     APPENDIX B: CORRELATIONS OF SOCIAL COHESION ON THE PROVINCE LEVEL   Table B.1:  Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Note:  The table shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and structural characteristics of the provinces, performed on the level of the provinces (N = 9). For comparison, the table further shows the biserial correlations on the level of individuals (N = 3172). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01.     Table B.2:  Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Note:  The table shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations (bivariate and partial for GDP) between the overall index of social cohesion and aspects of subjective well-being on the level of the nine provinces (N = 9). For comparison, the table further shows the biserial correlations on the level of individuals (N = 3172). Significance of the coefficients in a two-sided test: p ≤ .10, * p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01. APPENDIX C: LATENT CLASS ANALYSES   This Appendix documents goodness-of-fit indices for the various LCA models specified.   Table C.1:  Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Note:  The table documents goodness-of-fit indices of the different solutions from latent class analysis. AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. 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Subjective poverty in South Africa. Findings from the General Household Surveys 2019 and 2022 . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa. 2025. Estimation of regional gross domestic product for South Africa: Experimental estimates . Pretoria: Stats SA.   Wasserstein, R. L., Schirm, A. L. & Lazar, N. A. 2019. Moving to a World Beyond “ p  < 0.05”. The American Statistician, 73(sup1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2019.1583913   Weller, B. E., Bowen, N. K. & Faubert, S. J. 2020. Latent Class Analysis: A guide to best practice. Journal of Black Psychology, 46(4), 287–311. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095798420930932 [1]  “I am a Roman citizen.” [2]  Holland, T. & Sandbrook, D. 2024. The rest is History Returns . London: Bloomsbury. p71. [3]  Factor analysis is a statistical sorting procedure that analyses the matrix of item intercorrelations to identify items with a highly similar subgroup. The various subgroups of items (called factors) allow us to assess whether or not the items were selected appropriately according to their face validity as per the different dimensions of social cohesion. An important selection criterion is the item’s factor loading, which reflects how strongly an item is correlated with the other items sorted into the given factor. Item loadings should typically exceed .40 to be seen as sufficiently high. Items exhibiting sufficiently high factor loadings were retained. [4]  In line with the customary practice in economic research and previous SASCI studies, we transform the raw values by taking their natural logarithm ( ln ). [5]  Individuals below the food poverty line cannot afford enough food to obtain the minimum daily energy requirement for adequate health. Individuals below the lower-bound poverty line are unable to afford both adequate food and non-food items and have to sacrifice food for essential non-food items. Individuals below the upper-bound poverty line can afford adequate food and essential non-food items. In 2022, the food poverty line was at R663, the lower-bound poverty line at R945, and the upper-bound poverty line at R1,417, according to the Centre for Risk Analysis (CRA, 2023). [6]  The Gini coefficient measures income inequality in the population as a whole: It ranges from 0 (perfect equality among all individuals) to 1 (perfect inequality, where one individual has all income). The P90/P10 ratio contrasts the income at the 90 th  percentile of the income distribution to the income at its 10 th percentile (OECD, 2021). [7]  Fractionalisation is the probability that two randomly selected individuals are not from the same group (ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.) (Alesina et al, 2023). The corresponding indices for ethnic/linguistic/religious fractionalisation range from 0 (all individuals are from the same ethnic, linguistic, religious group) to 1 (each individual belongs to a separate ethnic, linguistic, religious group). [8]  The names chosen for each class refers to the opinions and characteristics defining the class.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026   This paper is published jointly by the  Inclusive Society Institute and School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University   PO Box 610 Bellville, 7550 South Africa  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report was prepared with the assistance of AI technology, including ChatGPT.   Certain images may have been generated specifically for this report using AI-assisted image generation (OpenAI) and do not depict identifiable individuals. Images are illustrative and contextual in nature.   FEBRUARY 2026   Author: Prof Tania Ajam & Daryl Swanepoel   A SUMMARY OF THE DELIBERATIONS AT THE 2025 STELLENBOSCH SCHOOL OF PUBLIC LEADERSHIP’S WINELANDS CONFERENCE ON THE IMPACT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF AI ON PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURES   The future impact of AI on the country’s democracy will depend on the governance choices that its public policymakers make today. If they design systems that focus on the needs and rights of the citizens, that ensure strong human oversight, use AI to strengthen fairness and administrative justice, and if they deploy it in ways that support reflective reasoning, rather than replace it, then the technology can deepen inclusion and enhance democratic participation. However, without such safeguards, AI could weaken institutions, erode cognitive autonomy and concentrate power in technological systems that are not publicly accountable, and which can reshape democratic life in ways democratic societies never intended.   Artificial Intelligence has evolved into one of the defining forces in contemporary governance and yet its character and consequences remain profoundly contested. The presentations delivered at the 2025 Winelands Conference at the Asara Wine Estate in Stellenbosch on 22-24 October 2025 demonstrate that AI’s impact on democratic life cannot be understood in narrow technical terms. Instead, AI must be interpreted as a political, institutional, social, cognitive and normative phenomenon. Its application reshapes how authority is exercised, how public services are organised, how citizens engage the state, how collective decisions are made and even how people think.   In this sense, AI does not merely introduce new tools; it inaugurates a new terrain of governance in which the boundaries between human and machine, and between carbon and silicon, become increasingly blurred. The question of whether AI serves as a gateway to inclusion or a risk to democracy, therefore depends not on technology alone, but also on how societies structure its use, how its institutions regulate and govern it and how citizens relate to it.   Prof Ayad Al-Ani’s presentation offers a compelling starting point for this expanded inquiry. He situates AI within a long historical arc in which technological shifts have decentralised capabilities that were once exclusive to elites. While universal basic income remains a distant objective, AI may, in the meantime, serve as a form of “universal technological provision”, granting individuals access to advanced intelligence through personal devices. In what Al-Ani characterises as the era of “abundant intelligence”, AI potentially democratises cognitive capacity itself with political implications: In a situation characterized by economization and digitization of all spheres of life, an “intimate relationship between human and machine may be the only utopia that is left”.   This shift may mark a deeper transformation in the distribution of power. Intelligence, which was once dependent on formal education, professional training or institutional access, has now become a more widely accessible resource that is being delivered through personalised AI systems that individuals can deploy as their cognitive “partners”.   Al-Ani illustrates that this transformation has immediate implications for citizenship and public administration. He envisions a dual AI architecture consisting of a citizen proxy/avatar and a digital intelligent public agent (see infographic 1). The citizen proxy is conceived as an AI assistant that not only identifies options, and completes and authenticates tasks, but interprets rights, translates bureaucratic requirements into everyday language and acts on behalf of the citizen in navigating state systems. This proxy can communicate across relevant languages and can adjust to social contexts, such as speaking to elders with respect and to youth with an informal and accessible tone. And it can operate through widely used platforms, such as WhatsApp or USSD, which is making it viable for individuals who have limited data access or digital literacy. By preparing complex applications, checking eligibility, assembling and storing documents, guiding users step-by-step and even escalating unresolved issues to human authorities, the proxy reduces the layers of administrative friction that have historically excluded the poor, the rural, the disabled and the digitally marginalised.   The public agent, in turn, functions as the government-facing component that verifies identity, processes applications, validates consent, executes transactions and ensures data minimisation. Together, the citizen and public AI agent, communicating and interacting directly through secure communication protocols, constitute a socio-technical system that potentially enables citizens to exercise their rights more effectively, facilitates more efficient delivery of public services, and significantly reduces bureaucratic barriers. In the longer term, it can be assumed, public agents will evolve into “digital public employees”—AI systems endowed with autonomy to manage more complex service processes, coordinate with humans, and make certain operational decisions independently. This presents an "event horizon" scenario where effective supervision of technology remains uncertain.   Infographic 1:  AI-Mediated Public Service Architecture (Source: Author, 2025)   Al-Ani’s examples illustrate the practical democratizing potential of this architecture. In this future scenario, a citizen in Limpopo could apply for a social grant using voice prompts in Sepedi, an informal trader could log a power outage and track the municipality’s response, a student applying for educational funding could rely on the proxy to gather the necessary documentation and monitor progress. These examples demonstrate how AI can address gaps in service delivery and administrative justice, particularly for communities that have traditionally faced barriers to accessing public institutions. However, it is foreseeable that advancements in digital interactions among AI agents will extend beyond the scope of public services. It is equally likely that these new forms of interaction will shape citizens’ participation in political processes: individuals may utilize agents to engage in such processes, and the resulting data will offer policymakers a more empirical basis for informed decision-making. Yet, Al-Ani’s analysis is not limited to empowerment, in that he also warns of an emerging risk he terms PSYOP capitalism, which is illustrated vividly in the emotionally resonant AI avatars displayed in his presentation. He noted that these systems, which are owned by technology companies and thus merely give the impression of being “our partners”, are engineered to simulate empathy, companionship and emotional presence. By forming bonds with users,   AI creates possibilities for subtle behavioural influence, with the line between assistance and persuasion becoming increasingly difficult to detect, because, when systems understand users’ preferences, vulnerabilities and emotional states, they gain the ability to shape behaviour in ways that may not be consciously perceived by the users.   This raises profound democratic concerns, in that unacknowledged influence undermines the autonomy necessary for civic judgement, whereas democracy depends on transparent persuasion and free choice. AI systems capable of shaping behaviour through psychological immersion therefore challenge these constitutional assumptions.   The normative and institutional implications of these developments are articulated with precision by Prof Martijn van der Steen, when he argues that AI introduces fundamental questions that are both political and normative. It raises the political issue of who decides, because AI systems are increasingly making decisions that were once reserved for humans. That, in turn, raises the issue of who protects, because institutions must determine how to safeguard citizens from algorithmic error, bias, hallucinations or harm. And it raises the issue of who dominates, because AI systems often depend on technological infrastructure controlled by private actors whose interests do not always align with public values. Van der Steen argues that these questions cannot be approached with naïveté. He contends that democratic societies must avoid both naïve optimism and apocalyptic pessimism about AI, and  instead ground their understanding of AI in its observable consequences.   Van der Steen’s concept of siliconization illustrates the gravity of these shifts. When algorithms, data systems and sensors become deeply – and often inconspicuously - embedded in public governance, silicon-based systems then begin to shape administrative logics that were once exclusively human. Traditional bureaucracies - that is carbon-based systems  reliant on human judgement - may find themselves weakened if they cannot adapt to algorithmic demands. The institutional future, according to van der Steen, is not predetermined.   His three scenarios illustrate possible trajectories. His X-Curve scenario presents a world where algorithmic authority accelerates while human institutions decline. This is the scenario that poses the greatest democratic risk, as democratic oversight mechanisms fail to keep pace with technological change. The Double-S scenario, in turn, imagines a more balanced ecosystem in which human and machine capabilities reinforce each other, a scenario which aligns far more closely with a vision of AI serving democratic aims. The Watchful Waiting scenario, on the other hand, reflects a more cautious evolution to the introduction of AI, where gradual adaptation occurs without dramatic disruption. These three scenarios underscore that the democratic impact of AI will depend on the choices that the democratic institutions make.   Infographic 2:  AI and Institutional Capacity: Three Possible Trajectories (Source: Author, 2025)   Dr Gray Manicom’s analysis grounds these theoretical insights in practice by examining how AI is already embedded in South African governance and the examples he raised illustrate that AI is not a distant prospect. AI is, for example, already shaping visa adjudication, tax assistance, information retrieval and climate forecasting today. The Lwazi AI assistant at SARS enhances taxpayer support, the AI-enabled visa adjudication system at Home Affairs speeds decision-making, the GovSearch tool provides quick access to government documentation and the Itiki drought prediction system, which integrates indigenous knowledge with machine learning, supports farmers and communities facing climate-related risk. These are practical examples that show that AI can improve efficiency and expand service delivery, but they also, at the same time, demonstrate how deeply AI is becoming integrated into administrative processes, which is raising questions about fairness, transparency, procedural justice and human oversight. To illustrate this, one can cite the example of a visa application denied by AI, which may bring about efficiency gains, but it remains a decision with life-altering consequences. It must therefore be open to human review and explanation. The cognitive dimension of AI’s influence is articulated powerfully in the work of Linda Snippe, whose research does not only examine the institutional or political impacts of AI, but more so its effects on human decision-making. She compares unaided decision-making with decision-making supported by delegative AI and decision-making supported by conversational AI and her findings reveal that conversational AI produces the highest perceived decision quality across multiple datasets, particularly in early and middle phases of decision-making where critical thinking, creativity and problem framing are most essential. Snippe’s interpretation draws upon Cognitive Fit Theory and Dual-Process Theory, which theories, she argues, propose that delegative AI encourages fast, intuitive thinking by providing immediate answers with limited engagement. Conversational AI, on the other, she submits, encourages slow, reflective thinking by prompting users to articulate, question and refine their own ideas, which iterative dialogue with themselves, engages the cognitive processes associated with analytical reasoning. Snippe’s findings illustrate that AI is not merely a source of information, because it can also shape the cognitive pathways through which decisions emerge, an insight that has profound implications for democracy. Because the health of democratic institutions depends on the capacity of citizens to evaluate information, reason through complexity and participate in public deliberation and therefore, if conversational AI strengthens these capacities by scaffolding reflective reasoning, it may enhance democratic participation, but if delegative AI becomes dominant, citizens may increasingly outsource judgement to machines, which will weaken the cognitive autonomy of citizens. Furthermore, the integration of emotionally persuasive AI systems, as highlighted by Al-Ani, will intensify this risk, because should these systems guide decisions through psychological influence, the democratic choice that individuals make, may become vulnerable to manipulation.   Taken together, the Winelands presentations reveal that AI is simultaneously an opportunity and a threat. An opportunity in that it expands inclusion by reducing administrative barriers, supporting multilingual access and empowering citizens with personalised tools, and it offers efficiency gains and improved service delivery. It can also strengthen deliberative reasoning through conversational engagement. But equally so, one should recognise the potential threat to democratic norms when authority is shifted toward opaque algorithmic systems, in that it  may challenge institutional oversight and enable subtle but pervasive forms of influence that could erode cognitive independence and democratic institutions. The future of AI hinges on the choices that public policymakers make now. If governments design citizen-centred systems like Al-Ani’s proxy and agent model, retain strong human oversight as van der Steen argues, use AI to strengthen administrative justice as shown in cases which Manicom highlights, and support reflective reasoning, rather than cognitive outsourcing as Snippe’s research advises, then AI can deepen democratic inclusion. However, without such safeguards, AI risks accelerating institutional erosion, diminishing cognitive autonomy and can lead to the concentration of power in unaccountable technological and commercial systems.   In this analysis, one conclusion emerges clearly: AI’s democratic consequences are not a product of fate, but of governance. Societies that design AI with intentionality, transparency and an unwavering commitment to public value may gain a more inclusive and effective democratic order. Those that fail to do so may find that the most powerful technology of the century has quietly reshaped their institutions, their politics, and their citizens’ minds.   Infographic 3:  AI’s Democratic Impact: A Matter of Choice (Source: Author, 2025)     This policy brief draws on the presentations made by the undermentioned academics at the Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership’s Winelands Conference that was held from 22 – 24 October 2025.   Al-Ani, Ayad. Einstein Center Digital Future, Berlin Manicom, Gray. Policy Innovation Lab, Stellenbosch University Snippe, Linda. Inholland University of Applied Sciences Van der Steen, Martijn. Erasmus University, Rotterdam   The synthesisation of this policy brief has been aided through the use of AI, which has drawn solely from the presentations made by the aforementioned academics. The brief has subsequently been amended, verified and edited by the author.       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026   prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Global South Perspectives Network   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of The coordinating entities or any of their office bearers   Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 19 January 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   FEBRUARY 2026   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 2 THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT: SYMBOLIC ADVANCE AND POLITICAL CONTRACTION 3 MULTILATERALISM UNDER PRESSURE: WHEN RULES DEPEND ON RESTRAINT 4 REINTERPRETING THE AFRICAN G20: AGENDA-SETTING AS INFLUENCE 5 CONTESTATION AND LANGUAGE: NORMS UNDER EXPLICIT CHALLENGE 6 EXCLUSION AND PRECEDENT: PROCEDURAL NORMS AT RISK 7 ARTICLE 109 AND THE LIMITS OF FORMAL RENEWAL 8 FROM UNIPOLARITY TO MULTIPOLARITY: FRAGMENTATION AS STRUCTURAL TRANSITION 9 COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: PRAGMATIC COOPERATION IN A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM 10 AGENDA NARROWING: COHERENCE OR RETRENCHMENT? 11 PRESIDENCY CYCLES, CONTINUITY AND THE RISK OF HIATUS 12 FRAGMENTATION AND THE ILLUSION OF EXIT 13 BUREAUCRATISATION AND THE LOSS OF INFORMALITY 14 CONCLUSION: THE G20 BETWEEN STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINT AND ADAPTIVE AGENCY   Cover photo: Image generated using OpenAI’s DALL·E image generation model (2026). Concept developed for the Inclusive Society Institute / Global South Perspectives Network publication. 1 INTRODUCTION   The Open Consultation Mondays webinar on “What is the future of the G20?” took place at a moment when the international system appears to be quietly, but unmistakably, recalibrating itself. This is not a period marked by dramatic institutional collapse, nor by the sudden abandonment of multilateral frameworks. Rather, it is characterised by something more subtle and more unsettling: the gradual loosening of the political consensus that once gave those frameworks coherence and direction.   Multilateralism continues to exist in form, yet increasingly struggles to operate in substance, since rules remain written, but compliance has become selective. Forums still convene, but authority is uneven, contested and often fragile.   Within this unsettled terrain, the G20 occupies a distinctive and revealing position, because unlike treaty-based institutions, it is neither anchored in international law, nor supported by enforcement mechanisms. Its legitimacy rests almost entirely on political consent, procedural convention and the shared understanding that systemically important economies carry a collective responsibility for managing global risk. Where that understanding weakens, the G20 does not simply underperform. It becomes a site where deeper tensions in global governance are exposed.   For this reason, the consultation approached the G20 not as a discrete institution facing episodic difficulty, but as an indicator of broader transformations in how multilateral cooperation is practiced. The central concern was not whether the G20 has delivered particular outcomes, but whether the conditions that once made it a credible and effective forum still hold. 2 THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT: SYMBOLIC ADVANCE AND POLITICAL CONTRACTION   The discussion was framed by the conclusion of the first G20 Summit hosted on the African continent. This G20 in Johannesburg marked an important symbolic expansion of global economic governance, that reflected both the shifting geography of systemic importance and the growing assertiveness of the developing and middle-income economies. Hosting the G20 on African soil carried an implicit challenge to inherited hierarchies within the international system, in that it reinforced the long-standing arguments that global governance must adapt to the contemporary economic realities, rather than remaining tethered to historical precedent.   But the consultation deliberately resisted a purely symbolic reading of the Summit and instead, it situated the African presidency within a longer trajectory in which developing countries have sought to reshape both the content and the normative orientation of global economic governance. The agenda advanced during the presidency foregrounded structural constraints, rather than cyclical fluctuations, directing attention to issues that speak directly to long-term development and systemic vulnerability.   At the same time, the consultation acknowledged that this agenda unfolded within a narrowing political space. Participation by some major economies, most notably the United States, was limited. Contestation over language intensified. And soon after the Summit, developments surrounding the forthcoming presidency introduced new uncertainty regarding the procedural norms of the forum itself. This juxtaposition, between agenda expansion on the one hand and political contraction on the other, framed much of the discussion that followed. 3 MULTILATERALISM UNDER PRESSURE: WHEN RULES DEPEND ON RESTRAINT   A foundational analytical premise of the consultation was that multilateral institutions derive their effectiveness not from formal rules alone, but from the willingness of participants to accept constraint. Rules do not enforce themselves. They function because actors believe that restraint serves their long-term interests better than unilateral action.   When this belief erodes, institutions rarely collapse outright. More often, they hollow out. Procedures continue, but their binding force weakens. Participation becomes conditional, selective or instrumental. The consultation argued that this pattern is increasingly visible across the multilateral system as a whole.   The G20 is particularly exposed to this dynamic. Its informality was originally its greatest strength, allowing rapid coordination in moments of crisis and enabling dialogue among actors with divergent political and economic systems, but informality also carries vulnerability and so when commitment to consensus fades, flexibility can be repurposed to justify exclusion, agenda narrowing or procedural manipulation.   Current tensions within the G20 were therefore framed not as isolated dysfunctions, but as manifestations of a broader shift in global governance, namely a shifting away from rule-bounded cooperation and toward power-mediated engagement. This shift does not eliminate multilateralism, but it fundamentally alters its character, which renders cooperation more contingent and less predictable. 4 REINTERPRETING THE AFRICAN G20: AGENDA-SETTING AS INFLUENCE   A substantial portion of the discussion was devoted to reassessing what constitutes “impact” in contemporary global governance. The consultation challenged evaluation frameworks that privilege attendance by heads of state, the specificity of communiqués or the immediacy of deliverables.   Instead, emphasis was placed on agenda-setting as a form of influence, given that the shaping of the terms of debate can, in a fragmented system, be more consequential than securing immediate commitments. The African presidency was therefore understood as exercising policy and norm entrepreneurship, filling discursive space at a moment when the global narrative is unsettled.   Debt sustainability was foregrounded as a structural issue embedded in the architecture of global finance, rather than as a failure of fiscal discipline and the cost of capital was elevated as a central constraint on development. Climate finance was reframed around access, quality and adaptation, rather than aggregate pledges alone, and critical minerals were positioned within a development and beneficiation discourse that challenges extractive models which externalise value.   The consultation noted that many of these issues transcend the G20 itself. Their significance lies in their capacity to migrate across forums, reinforcing debates in development finance, climate negotiations and regional processes and so, in this sense, influence operates cumulatively, through repetition and coalition-building rather than through singular decisions.   5 CONTESTATION AND LANGUAGE: NORMS UNDER EXPLICIT CHALLENGE   The consultation examined the intensification of contestation within the G20, particularly around language previously regarded as settled, where issues such as climate action, gender, sustainable development and solidarity again became sites of explicit disagreement.   What distinguished this phase of contestation was not its breadth, but its nature; where the use of previously agreed language as a basis for compromise was resisted by some member states and where normative frameworks that had accumulated over time were no longer uniformly treated as common reference points. The discussion underscored that in consensus-based forums such as the G20, even limited resistance can exert disproportionate influence on the outcomes, because in such fora, even  a small number of dissenting actors can significantly narrow them and recalibrate what is considered to be politically possible. The result is that over time this dynamic reshapes expectations, which weakens the stabilising function of precedent.   This development was interpreted as reflecting a broader environment in which norms themselves are increasingly contested, because as power politics reassert themselves, commitments to shared values become conditional, subject to reinterpretation or outright rejection. 6 EXCLUSION AND PRECEDENT: PROCEDURAL NORMS AT RISK   A critical analytical focus of the consultation concerned the unilateral exclusion of a founding G20 member, South Africa, under the forthcoming presidency, which, while formally framed as temporary, could set a troubling precedent.   The G20’s legitimacy rests on inclusion and shared participation among its members and therefore selective exclusion, even without formal expulsion, undermines this premise. More consequential, however, was the absence of collective resistance from the other members of the G20.   The consultation interpreted this silence of the other members as indicative of the current fragmented political environment in which institutional principles seem to increasingly yield to bilateral calculation. States may object privately, but publicly, they are reluctant to incur political cost by defending procedural norms. This pattern was identified as a key mechanism through which consensus-based systems erode. It does not occur through overt rejection, but through submission; and then over time, the exceptions become normalised, thereby altering expectations and embedding procedural uncertainty within the institution itself. 7 ARTICLE 109 AND THE LIMITS OF FORMAL RENEWAL   Flowing directly from the discussion on exclusion and procedural precedent, the consultation broadened its analytical lens to consider deeper structural constraints affecting institutional reform within the multilateral system. Particular reference was made to the United Nations Charter’s built-in reform mechanisms, notably Article 109, and to the persistent failure to activate them in any meaningful way.   Article 109 was treated as emblematic, rather than exceptional. Its existence demonstrates that the multilateral system is not legally frozen, pathways for comprehensive reform are formally available. Yet its non-use highlights a more fundamental reality: reform is not blocked by legal impossibility, but by political equilibrium. Those actors most empowered to activate reform are frequently those with the least incentive to alter existing arrangements.   This observation underscored a broader point. Institutional stagnation should not be misread as technical failure; instead, it reflects a balance of power in which entrenched advantage is preserved through inaction, where reform becomes conceivable only when shifts in power alter incentive structures and not merely when legal mechanisms exist. The consultation also cautioned against the activating Article 109, due to the profound political risk thereof. In a deeply fragmented and power-contested international system, the opening of the Charter to wholesale revision may yield an order markedly worse than the one it seeks to reform. 8 FROM UNIPOLARITY TO MULTIPOLARITY: FRAGMENTATION AS STRUCTURAL TRANSITION   Building on the discussion of institutional stasis, the consultation situated the current G20 dynamics within the wider historical transition that is underway; a transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order.   The post-Cold War unipolar moment created an enabling environment for consensus-based multilateralism. In such an environment the concentration of power reduced coordination costs, which allowed dominant actors to underwrite the institutions even when the outcomes were imperfect or unevenly distributed. As power diffuses, however, the logic of cooperation changes fundamentally. Consensus becomes harder to sustain, veto power more widely distributed and normative coherence more fragile.   Fragmentation, in this reading, is not synonymous with chaos. It is a structural consequence of multipolarity. The challenge facing institutions such as the G20 is not whether fragmentation exists, but whether it can be governed. Consequently, thinner outcomes, slower consensus and heightened contestation may in fact reflect an adaptation of the system, rather than its failure. 9 COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: PRAGMATIC COOPERATION IN A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM   Against this backdrop, the consultation explored the growing role of coalitions of the willing as pragmatic instruments of cooperation, not as substitutes for multilateralism, but as adaptive responses to institutional gridlock. Coalitions of the willing allow cooperation to proceed where unanimity proves unattainable, and so by enabling a critical mass of states to align around shared objectives, progress can be made without waiting for universal agreement. Their legitimacy of such cooperation will be derived from the coalition’s effectiveness, openness and the capacity to expand. The discussion acknowledged the potential risks associated with such coalition formation, where poorly designed coalitions can entrench fragmentation or reinforce power asymmetries. Yet in the current environment, paralysis was seen as a greater danger than pluralism and therefore carefully structured coalitions may help sustain cooperation, while preserving institutional continuity.   Within this logic, the G20 itself can be understood as an early coalition of the willing, given that it was created as to address systemic risks informally, when the existing institutions multilateral processes proved insufficient.   10 AGENDA NARROWING: COHERENCE OR RETRENCHMENT?   The proposal to narrow the G20 agenda to its original macroeconomic and financial focus was examined in detail. While agenda expansion has strained coherence, the consultation rejected a simplistic return to “back-to-basics”.   The global economy today is structurally different from that of earlier periods. Finance, development, inequality and climate risk are deeply intertwined. Treating development as external to economic governance misreads contemporary risk, in that a finance-only G20 risks managing symptoms, while ignoring the underlying causes.   The distinction advanced was therefore between rationalisation and regression. Streamlining may be necessary, retreat is not.   11 PRESIDENCY CYCLES, CONTINUITY AND THE RISK OF HIATUS   The discussion also noted that the immediate transition following South Africa’s presidency includes a de facto hiatus under the current United States presidency, during which the G20 process is expected to operate with reduced momentum and limited agenda expansion. This interlude was not framed as withdrawal from the forum, but as a period of lowered political investment, with implications for continuity and follow-through on issues elevated during the African presidency. Against this backdrop, cautious hope was expressed by a number of participants in the consultation that the United Kingdom presidency may serve as a point of reactivation, where deferred threads could be picked up and where the G20’s work programme can be re-anchored, even if under a different framing and set of priorities.   The consultation also reflected on the implications of the G20 presidency cycle, particularly the transition from South Africa to the United Kingdom, and thereafter to South Korea. The concern expressed was not one of intent or legitimacy, but of continuity. Presidencies matter because they shape agenda priority and framing, and the risk identified was that issues foregrounded under South Africa’s leadership, notably development constraints, inequality, debt dynamics and the cost of capital, may struggle to retain salience as the forum shifts toward political economies with different strategic reference points. The UK was implicitly associated with a more traditional G7-style orientation, while South Korea was seen as occupying a more ambiguous middle position. The underlying question was whether the momentum created by the African presidency would be carried forward or quietly diluted. Or will it be re-anchored around narrower macroeconomic concerns.   12 FRAGMENTATION AND THE ILLUSION OF EXIT   The discussion also addressed the proliferation of alternative groupings and parallel institutions, which should not be viewed  as straightforward substitutes for established forums. Fragmentation may very well create tactical openings, but it could also magnify power asymmetries. Negotiations in such fragmented environments could lead to smaller and middle-income states losing their collective leverage. 13 BUREAUCRATISATION AND THE LOSS OF INFORMALITY   A reflective strand of the consultation focused on the increasing bureaucratisation of the G20, where procedural density has expanded considerably, coupled with extensive negotiation over text that crowds out essential less formal political dialogue.   The G20 was originally conceived as an informal space for candid engagement and in the current environment that is marked by mistrust and fragmentation, such relational spaces may be increasingly important. Dialogue, the consultation argued, is not ornamental. It is infrastructural. 14 CONCLUSION: THE G20 BETWEEN STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINT AND ADAPTIVE AGENCY   The consultation underscored that the G20 should no longer be assessed against expectations formed in a different structural era. Its present tensions reflect deeper constraints embedded in the contemporary international order.   Formal reform pathways exist, but remain politically blocked and fragmentation is structural, rather than episodic and therefore, consensus, where it emerges, will be partial and issue-specific.   Within this environment, the G20 remains ambiguous, but consequential. It cannot restore a lost consensus, nor can it substitute for comprehensive institutional reform. Its value lies in functioning as a flexible platform for coordination, agenda-setting and selective alignment.   The future of the G20, like that of multilateralism itself, will be shaped by political choice, by whether states remain willing to accept constraint in pursuit of cooperation that is imperfect, but still necessary.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.   GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.   Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.   GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Publications Memoirs of the Stalwarts The individual episodes of the living archives series will be transcribed and converted to written biographies. Each biography will represent a chapter in a book to be published for purposes of capturing for posterity the historical contributions of the numerous stalwarts and activists that sacrificed themselves in order to bring about the current democratic dispensation. The international anti-apartheid activists During the period of South Africa’s liberation struggle, many international activists participated in actions of solidarity with the ANC and the broader liberation movement. They came from many countries, notably the United Kingdom, Europe and the USA. Their individual contributions collectively mobilised public opinion in favour of the anti-apartheid effort. This opinion undeniably contributed towards the coordinated international action against the apartheid regime, and ultimately towards the ushering in of democracy in South Africa. The envisaged book will comprise several chapters, with individual chapters being allocated to both well-known and as well as largely unknown individuals, and celebrities. It will tell their life stories, their contribution to South Africa’s liberation struggle, and their assessment of its democratic achievements and outcomes. Journal for Inclusive Public Policy The ISI intends to publish a biannual academic journal, which it aims to have accredited as its reputation gets established. The journal will comprise peer-reviewed articles and research on matters of public policy, across all disciplines, and inclusive democracy. Given the ISI’s value system, the content of the journal will contain bias for contributions authored from a social and national democratic ideological position. The objectives of the institute are that the journal will contribute to the body of knowledge and that it will provoke public policy dialogue. Social Democrat magazine The biannual magazine aims to promote nation-building and reconciliation, social democracy, good governance and patriotism. It will be widely distributed to members of aligned political parties and civil society organisations and the general public. It will be available in both print and digital format. Content will be varied and will include articles such as those profiling leaders and role-players in society, human achievements, policy initiatives, arts, sports and culture, matters of policy and legislation, the economy and infrastructure delivery, the history of the liberation movement, etcetera.

Liberation Archives The constitution of the ISI mandates the institute to host a comprehensive archive on the broader liberation movement. Currently these archives are fragmented and hosted by various entities at several sites, locally and abroad. This project aims to, in the first instance, develop a single portal to access all the sites, with an overarching search engine across all sites. In the second instance, it will actively search and gather material not yet lodged at an archive. Thirdly, it will create its own material for lodging in its own institutional archive. The ‘Liberation Archives’ will be promoted as a primary source of information of the liberation movement. It could be accessed by the general public for research purposes, including scholars and students who regularly need such information for projects. Similarly, it will be geared to be used as a source of information for public promotion and civic information purposes. The ANC Archives website has been set up specifically to facilitate research into the 100 year history of the African National Congress, the oldest liberation movement in the World. Up Bodleian Libraries - Archive of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. The Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) archive contains material from its the beginnings of the Movement in the late 1950s as the Boycott Committee to a few years after is dissolution in 1994 and the creation of its successor organisation, Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA). The archive contains minutes, papers and correspondence of the Executive and National Committees , as well as similar material from the other sub-committees formed. There are papers relating to the AAM's relations with the British Government, political parties, international organisations and local anti-apartheid groups in the UK and overseas, and material created in the course of its campaigns. The archive contains a significant number of posters, photographs, artworks and badges, and some other objects. Up Anti-Apartheid Movement. Forward to Freedom tells the story of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and its campaigns to support the people of South Africa in their fight against apartheid. The AAM also campaigned for freedom for Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola, and against South Africa’s attacks on its neighbours. Up Constitution Hill is a living museum that tells the story of South Africa’s journey to democracy. The site is a former prison and military fort that bears testament to South Africa’s turbulent past, and today, is the home to the country’s Constitutional Court. The online exhibition and curated archive tells the known and unknown stories of the making and working of the South African Constitution. It curates the rich archival history of constitution-making in our country. Up The International Institute of Social History in the Netherlands, serves science and society on a global scale. At an international level they generate and offer reliable information and insights about the origins, effects and consequences of social inequality. Gain access here to their Anti-Apartheid and Southern Africa Collection Up Liliesleaf is one of South Africa’s foremost national heritage sites. Between 1961 and 1963, Liliesleaf served as the secret headquarters and nerve centre of the ANC, SACP, Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Congress Alliance. Up Physical Archives not yet digitised Bodleian Libraries - Archive of the Bishop Ambrose Reeves Trust. Comprises: South Africa Racial Amity Trust (SARAT), 1965-85; Bishop Ambrose Reeves Trust (BART) minutes and publications, 1980-96; conferences and projects, 1987-93; and general files, 1974-95. Up Bodleian Libraries - Archive of End Loans to Southern Africa. Comprises of publications, memoranda, correspondence, minutes, confrence papers, and papers relating to the End Loans to Southern Africa (ELTSA) campaign. Material dates from 1974 to 1995. Up Bodleian Libraries - Archive of Ronald Press. Papers of Ronald Press concerning his life as an activist and trade unionist in South Africa and in exile in Britain. The papers include certificates, correspondence and articles by Press on subjects including science, Marxism, trade unionism, Southern African politics and his work for Umkhonto we Sizwe. There are also some photographs, video tapes and badges and some papers relating to trade unions and World War I from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Up Bodleian Libraries - Correspondence and papers of Archbishop Trevor Huddleston. Correspondence and papers relating to Huddleston's work, the organisations in which he was involved, and his friends and colleagues. Included are sermons, speeches, photographs, audio-visual material and newspaper cuttings. There is also correspondence and papers collected by Joe Rogaly, Eric James and Robin Denniston (Huddleston's biographers) and Ernest and Lorna Huddleston (Huddleston's father and stepmother). Up Bodleian Libraries - Papers of Howard Barrell. Research material collected by Barrell for his DPhil thesis, comprising transcripts of interviews with ANC leaders and members, and documents by or about the ANC which in Barrell's opinion are rare; with list of material taken from his bibliography. Up Bodleian Libraries - Papers of the Namibia Support Committee. Minutes and papers of policy-making bodies, 1981-1993 Records relating to the Committee's London administration, including minutes, accounts, funding applications, correspondence, papers relating to staff and membership, press releases and reports, [1981-1993] Records of the Campaign Against Namibian Uranium Contracts (CANUC), including minutes, funding applications, correspondence, reports, papers relating to particular campaigns and events, and publications, [1977-1992] Campaign reports, minutes, publications, photographs, etc. relating to the SWAPO Women's Solidarity Campaign (SWSC), 1980-1991 Campaign leaflets, correspondence, photographs, etc. relating to the Health Collective, 1977-1989 Papers relating to the Release All Political Prisoners campaign, with lists of Namibian political prisoners, 1984-1986 Reports, minutes, leaflets, etc. relating to the Trade Union Group, 1977-1991 Papers relating to other campaigns and projects, 1980-1993 Papers relating to national events organised by the Committee, 1980-1992 Publications and related papers, 1979-1993 Memoranda, correspondence, reports, minutes, posters, etc. produced by and relating to local Namibia Support Groups, 1986-1991 Minutes, correspondence, etc. relating to inter-agency campaigns with Committee representation, 1988-1992 Papers of other British and international organisations, 1977-1992 Papers of other Namibian organisations, c1969-1993 Photographs, [1967-1991] Merchandise and banners, 1970s-1990s Up Bodleian Libraries - Papers of Stephen Clingman relating to Bram Fischer, c.1908-c.1998. The collection comprises papers relating to the Fischer family (boxes 1-19), papers relating to legal and political cases in which Bram Fischer was involved (boxes 20-21) and papers relating to Bram Fischer's trial, illness and death (boxes 22-25). Box 4 contains a guide and background to the archive compiled by Yvonne Malan, including an explanation of abbreviations and a list of prominent people appearing in the archive. Yvonne Malan has also translated some of the material in Afrikaans and the translations can be found in the relevant boxes. Note: The papers are mainly photocopies of correspondence and newspaper cuttings. Up More to come, watch this space! Up

Seminars & Conferences Annual Lecture - Durban - Cape Town - Johannesburg This will be a three-part annual series, with events in Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg. The lectures will advance two objectives, the first being to address some of the burning issues confronting society, and the second to advance nation-building and reconciliation. Eminent persons and role models who have served with distinction the democratic emancipation of the South African people, or who have excelled in the fields of politics, public policy, culture and economic development, will be selected to deliver speeches at annual prestigious events. They will be invited to deliver keynote and thought-provoking speeches on crucial matters confronting society. Through the combined participation of the speakers, who will be drawn from the broader spectrum of South African society, the ISI aims to promote inclusivity and unity, by broadly including the diversity of the South African people.