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The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), represented by its Chief Executive, Daryl Swanepoel and the Center for China & Globalization (CCG), represented by their Director for External Relations, John Zhao and Senior Fellow, Philip Xie, met at the CCG’s Head Office in Beijing, China, on Tuesday, 8 April 2025 to explore potential area for cooperation.   Both the CCG and ISI are seized with dialogue and research aimed at bringing about a fairer and more lust multilateral order. And both organisations are studying BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative. Similarly both organisations focus on Global South development in the fields of the economy, research and innovation and human development (including skills and talent development).   The two sides agreed that the overlap in work, conflation of areas of interest and influence within their various spheres warranted closer cooperation. It was decided to further explore how their relationship and cooperation could be deepened and actioned.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, visited the Institute for African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, from 9 – 10 April 2025. He was accompanied by Ms Jenny Wu, a member of the Institute’s Advisory Council. The IAS was represented by their Deputy Director, Prof Xu Wei, Prof Yang Kai, Deputy Director International, and Prof Zhang Qiaowen, Academic Deputy Director.   During the visit the two sides met to discuss and deepen cooperation between the two Institute’s. Among others, they agreed to joint projects related to the programme of the Think-tank 20, which is being hosted in South Africa during 2025. Among the projects agreed was a G20 policy brief development process and the hosting of a T20 Academic Seminar in Cape Town during the second half of 2025.   CEO Daryl Swanepoel, also delivered a guest lecture in his capacity as Distinguished Visiting Professor on Thursday, 10 April 2025. The lecture was titled “ The G20: A Comprehensive Overview & Expectations of South Africa’s Presidency 2025 ” .   Follow the link below to access the guest lecture presentation:

Occasional Paper 4/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. A P R I L 2 0 2 5   Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPAHons, ND: Co. Admin Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University      Abstract   This Economic Brief analyses the country's precarious economic situation, that is characterised by significant domestic challenges and global trade disruptions. Business confidence has been negatively impacted by the historic withdrawal of the National Budget due to the controversy over the Value-Added Tax increases which, although now agreed, has triggered government instability and legal disputes. Deteriorating relations with the United States threatens South African exports and have raised uncertainties regarding South Africa's ongoing participation in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which will seriously impact particularly the automotive and agricultural sectors. Amidst declining business and consumer confidence, economic growth remains stubbornly low. Persistent levels of high unemployment, particular among the youth, inequality and poverty, exacerbate the crisis, and risks social stability. While inflation is projected to moderate, the deep-seated structural weaknesses hinder recovery efforts. The brief emphasises the urgent need for comprehensive reforms to restore confidence, enhance competitiveness, and address systemic issues vital for sustainable growth.   1. Introduction   For the first time in the history of South Africa the National Budget as presented to Parliament by the Minister of Finance had to be withdrawn due to the controversy over a proposed Value-Added-Tax increase. Whilst the budget was subsequently re-introduced and approved, members within the National Executive voted against the budget proposals. Moreover, the budget is being procedurally challenged in the courts.   The aforementioned dynamics does not bode well for business and consumer confidence.   The budget has also been presented against the backdrop of geo-political turmoil. The United States administration initiated global trade war has put the global economy into turmoil. South Africa has not escaped the impact thereof. In fact, the country’s relationship with the United States has been deteriorating at a rapid pace, which has resulted in billions of dollars of aid being withdrawn.   Moreover, South Africa’s continued inclusion in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), an agreement that provides eligible sub-Saharan African countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for over 1,800 products, in addition to the thousands more than 5,000 products eligible for duty-free access under the Generalized System of Preferences programme (Office of the US Trade Representative, N.d.) is uncertain. The author, with the benefit of having had extensive discussions with senior public policymakers within the US, is of the view that unless the relationship between the two countries are rapidly restored, South Africa’s graduation out of AGOA is almost certain. South Africa’s automotive and agricultural sectors will, under such circumstances, be particularly hard hit.   These dramatic turn of events happen within a slow-growth economic environment, with low business and consumer confidence and economic infrastructure backlogs that are inhibiting the further expansion of the economy. Without expanding the economy the high employment rate cannot be addressed. The social stability of the nation is at risk.   This paper assesses the current state of the South African economy, and the prospects for its recovery and growth. It further considers the implications of the 2025 national budget and the emerging ‘global trade wars’ thereon.   This paper is the result of the combined insights of a number of reputable economists and financial analysts that participated in a webinar workshop and additional interviews in the first part of April 2025. The insights have been synergised by the author. The views expressed during the webinar and interviews have informed the content of the paper, but cannot be ascribed to any one of them. The interpretation of the content is that of the author.   The experts consulted include:   Dr Adel Bosch, Senior Economist, Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) Dr Miriam Altman, Strategist, Economist and Social Activist, Altman Advisory Prof William Gumede, Associate Professor, School of Governance, Witwatersrand University Mr Theo Vorster, CEO and Co-founder, Galileo Capital Mr Isaac Matshego, Senior Economist, Nedbank Dr Roelof Botha, Economic Advisor to the Optimum Investment Group Ms Lara Hodes, Economist, Investec   The webinar workshop and interviews were structured in such a way as to address the following five issues:   A prognosis of the current state of the economy The impact of the 2025/2026 national budget proposals thereon The likelihood of meeting the 1,9% GDP growth target Further interventions needed to spur meaningful GDP growth Should US impose tariffs on and graduate South Africa out of AGOA, how serious will the impact be on the South African economy?   In addition to the content generated through the workshop and interviews, some desktop research was done where further expansion, clarity or verification was needed. The main points of the paper is summed up in the text-box below:     The South African National Budget was withdrawn for the first time due to controversy over a proposed Value-Added-Tax increase, highlighting governance issues. After its re-introduction, the budget faced opposition from some within the National Executive, leading to further procedural challenges in court. This has highlighted fractures within the ruling coalition which has further negatively impacted  business confidence. Business and consumer confidence are under duress, which is detrimental to economic growth and recovery. The global trade war initiated by the U.S. has created a tumultuous international economic environment that negatively impacts South Africa. South Africa’s relationship with the U.S. is rapidly deteriorating, resulting in the withdrawal of billions of dollars in aid and support. There is uncertainty regarding South Africa's continued inclusion in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), critical for duty-free access to the U.S. market. Loss of AGOA status could severely impact South Africa’s key sectors, particularly automotive and agriculture. The economy recorded a meagre GDP growth rate of 0.6% in 2024, falling significantly short of the necessary levels for job creation and poverty reduction. Whilst the budget has assumed a 1.9% GDP growth, it is unlikely to be achieved given the structural impediments and global trade turmoil. It is likely to be in the 1% to 1.5% range, making unlikely that the budgeted revenue projections will be achieved. Key indicators highlight low business confidence, with indices hovering around 45 points, indicating a lack of optimism among investors. Consumer confidence continues to decline, reflecting growing scepticism about the economy's recovery and health. The high level of unemployment, currently 33.2%, poses substantial risks to economic stability, especially with youth unemployment at 45.5%. The integration of large segments of the population into the workforce is critical to boosting household consumption and ensuring social stability. South Africa faces chronic poverty and inequality, with some of the highest disparities globally, exacerbating social tensions. Inflation is projected to be around 4.5% in 2025, suggesting moderating prices, though challenges to purchasing power remain. The global “tariff war” could result in upward pressure beyond the 4.5% mark. Overall, the South African economy's fragile recovery is threatened by deep-rooted structural weaknesses, necessitating urgent policy reforms to enhance competitiveness and reduce red tape.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author    2. Macroeconomic overview   The South African economy’s recovery is fragile. It remains clouded as growth remains subdued and continues to stagnate. The economy recorded a meagre 0.6% GDP growth rate in 2024. This is way below the threshold necessary to generate significant job creation and to reduce poverty. The growth continues to be slow in spite of the relatively favourable global economic environment during the past years, which would suggests deep-rooted structural weaknesses within the domestic economy.   Key indicators further highlight the severity of the economic malaise:   Business confidence continue to be low. Indices hover around a worrying 45 index points.  (the neutral threshold is 50 points). This is especially troubling given that the low confidence has been sustained below the 50 point mark for at least five years (Trading Economics, N.d.(1)). The below 50 points threshold figure reflects the widespread pessimism and a lack of forward-looking investment sentiment among businesses. For outsiders to invest in the country, the economy will need to be more competitive, for which the ease of doing business will have to be addressed. To this end the levels of red tape will need to be reduced considerably.     Consumer confidence has similarly declined, further illustrating the erosion of public faith in the ability of the economy to mend. Consumer confidence in South Africa decreased to -20 points in the first quarter of 2025 from -6 points in the fourth quarter of 2024 (Trading Economics, N.d.(2)).   This erosion of confidence perpetuates economic underperformance, since businesses delay investment and expansion, while households reduce discretionary spending.   The stubbornly high unemployment rate (32.1%) as at the end of the third quarter of 2024, and especially that of the youth (45.5%) (Stats SA, 2025), undermines South Africa's long-term growth prospects. The failure to integrate large segments of the population into productive employment limits household consumption and contributes to social instability.   Compounding these issues are chronic poverty and high levels of inequality, which are among the highest globally.   Inflation, is expected to be in the region of 4.5% in 2025 (SARB, 2025 (1)), thus showing signs of moderation, but challenges remain. A stable inflation environment is critical for consumer purchasing power. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has limited room to further cut interest rates given the inflationary pressures and the need to maintain financial market stability. Thus, the current monetary policy landscape offers little space for expansionary measures to stimulate demand. Alternative view on the cutting of interest rates   The current real lending rate in South Africa is 7.8%, whilst some argue that it should not be above 5%. The lowering of interest rates are important given that the average real prime rate in our major trading partners is a third of what it is in South Africa. The cost of capital in this country, it is argued, is too high.   It is said that the household debt costs as percentage of household disposable income at the beginning of 2022 was 6.7%, compared with the current 9.1%. If it had stayed at 6.7 the interest rates would not have increased by much, but then consumers would have over the three-year period been able to spend R200 billion more in the economy. This would have provided R50 billion more to play with in the budget and the VAT rate increase would not have been on the table. It is argued that the Reserve Bank is overly concerned with inflation, which approach provides an obstacle to growth in this economy, which is impacting the country’s fiscal stability.   High interest rates do not only refer to the supply side, but also the demand side, which is closely related to the type of investment we seek as a country. Investments in bonds, shares and deposits provide relatively high rates of return. Investors find it more attractive to invest in these instruments that a relatively risk-free, as opposed to investment into plant and machinery which carries much higher risk.   The down side of this is that South Africa seeks investment into real production, since this can boost both exports and jobs.   Also to be considered is the inflationary impact of the punitive US tariff regime on global inflation and the real possibility of a US and global recession, which JP Morgan suggest is a 60% probability (Siddarth, 2025).   The above inflation salary increase for the public service (that is 5.5% against the 4,5% anticipated inflation) (Moloi, 2025) will place further upward pressure on inflation and reduce the revenue available for public services and infrastructure.   The electricity supply, whilst relatively stable over the last few months, continues to plague the economy. The threat of loadshedding remains, and is putting the brake on expansion in manufacturing and other high-energy use sectors. The disruption in the supply of electricity negatively impacts productivity and dampens investor sentiment.  The unpredictable nature of the electricity supply has also led to many companies having to incur additional costs by investing in alternative energy solutions, which reduces the overall competitiveness of the South African business environment and discourages both domestic and foreign investment.   The energy crisis is contributing to a broad sense of societal discontentment in the economy's ability to deliver. The power outages hinder educational institutions, medical facilities and small businesses. It is disrupting their daily operations and is exacerbating inequality between communities that have varying access to alternative energy solutions.   The growing disparities need to be addressed urgently. Government can do so through the introduction of targeted interventions, which could include, for example, subsidies for off-grid solutions and the prioritisation of energy reforms.   The national budget presumes a 1.9% GDP growth for the fiscal year (Treasury, 2025). Given the external shocks triggered by the US tariff war, the impact thereof on global inflation and the upward pressure on local inflation resulting from the VAT increase, together with the underperformance of actual 2024 GDP growth against projected GDP growth (as can be seen from the graph below), and a reduction in consumer spending, it is highly unlikely that the 1.9% target will be realised. It would mean a trebling of GDP growth from 2024 levels, and there is little evidence to suggest that the economic structural deficiencies will be dramatically corrected in the short term. A target of around 1.5% is more realistic, and may even be optimistic.   On the back of expected higher inflation and lower than budgeted GDP growth, it is likely that the revenue targets set in the budget will not be achieved.   In terms of gross fixed capital formation, the National Development Plan envisages increasing it from 17 percent to 30 percent by 2030 (Parliament, 2025). However, when one considers current investor confidence and that the average in emerging markets is around 25%, it seems a little over optimistic.   Fragile Economic Recovery:  South Africa's economy is struggling, with only a 0.6% GDP growth rate in 2024, insufficient for significant job creation and poverty reduction, indicating deep-rooted structural weaknesses. Low Business and Consumer Confidence:  Business confidence remains low at around 45 index points, causing delayed investments and expansions, while consumer confidence is also declining, further reducing discretionary spending. High Unemployment and Inequality:  The unemployment rate stands at 33.2%, with youth unemployment at 45.5%, contributing to social instability and limiting household consumption amidst chronic poverty and inequality. Inflation and Monetary Policy Constraints:  Inflation is expected to moderate at about 4.5% in 2025, but the South African Reserve Bank has limited capacity to cut interest rates, complicating efforts to stimulate demand in a challenging economic environment. Energy Crisis Impact : Persistent electricity supply issues, including the threat of loadshedding, are stifling economic expansion and contributing to societal discontent, necessitating urgent government interventions for targeted energy reforms and support for off-grid solutions.   Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author   3. Fiscal framework and revenue composition   Government revenue is far too heavily dependent on a narrowing and shrinking tax base, which places the South Africa's fiscal framework under considerable strain.   Individual income taxes is the largest contributor to government income. It is followed by value-added tax (VAT), corporate taxes, fuel levies and customs duties. This structure exposes government to significant risks during periods of economic downturn, more so when unemployment rises and real incomes decline.   Since South Africa's tax base is so small, the over-reliance on individual taxpayers is particularly problematic. With only around 7.9 million taxpayers out of a population of over 60 million, of which 1 million pay 60% of all income tax, and 28 million welfare recipients, there is a serious risk to fiscal sustainability (Business Tech, 2025 (1)).   The regressive nature of VAT further exacerbates the already high levels of inequality, since it disproportionately affects low-income households who spend most of their income on consumption.   The decision to increase VAT by 0.5% - that is from 15% to 15.5% - will undoubtedly have an impact on consumer spending, as well as on inflation. Economists predict the increase could depress GDP growth by up to 0.1% annually and raise inflation by 0.25%. Given the fragile state of consumer confidence, any tax increase could further erode household disposable income and reduce overall demand.     Case study: Potential to reach the budgeted tax target   One of the economists consulted referred to research that he had previously undertaken.   In 2018, VAT was increased from 14% to 15%.  The total VAT that was projected by National Treasury at that time was R348.1 billion. The proposal itself was expected to raise an additional R22.9 billion. But the actual collection, that is the number released by National Treasury about two years later after the first revisions, was R324.8 billion, R23.3 billion below what National Treasury had forecasted.   But that does not tell the full story, because when one examines the breakdown, refunds were estimated at just under R200 billion, but it came in at R229, that is R29 billion more than expected.   This was due to the impact of State Capture. Under the previous Commissioner, the South African Revenue Services (SARS) was weak, there was corruption within the SARS system, and because of the widescale corruption, there was no public buy-in. People were disillusioned, so found ways to cheat the system.   Now that corrective action has been taken at SARS, which Commissioner Edward Kieswetter has to a large extent transformed back into its former efficient state, it is believed that the VAT revenue shouldn’t be far off of the VAT projected should the GDP growth be achieved.   That said, as discussed previously, the likelihood of a GDP growth being achieved is questionable.   Because what also needs to be noted is that most of South Africa’s economic growth over the last decade has been from consumer spending. Unless other areas of the economy and other sectors of the economy can stimulated, household consumption is expected to drive economic growth in the immediate period. It is important to note that consumer spending last year most probably prevented South Africa from going into recession. And the two-pot pension reform, increased household spending towards the end of the year, which further helped.   In the context of consumer driven growth, to raise value added tax, even if  only by 0.5%, will dampen consumer confidence and undermine the consumer spending growth. It is likely to drag down economic growth. In a VAT increase scenario, businesses are likely to pass on the cost to consumers. That, in turn, will drive up inflation. This means that any rise in VAT, even if it's only 0.5%, is unlikely to bring the revenue as envisaged by the Treasury, as it would depress other parts of the economy.   Customs duties, while a smaller component of total revenue, play a significant role in regional economic relations. South Africa collected approximately R160 billion in 2023/4 in customs duties of which it retained only around R80 billion (approximately 50%). The balance was distributed to neighbouring countries through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (SARS, 2024).   Even though only 10% of imports incur duties, these revenues form a crucial fiscal pillar for SACU member countries such as Lesotho, Eswatini, Namibia, and Botswana. Transfers to these countries of around 50%, a figure that vastly surpasses their proportional share of the duty-bearing imports. South Africa 97.4% to the pool (SARS, 2024).This raises questions with regard to the equity and sustainability of the current revenue-sharing arrangements.   The current structure of SACU revenue distribution not only strains South Africa's budget but also creates a dependency syndrome among member countries, where in some cases, these transfers often make up more than 50% of their revenue. It also serves as a disincentive for the diversification of their economies.   Consideration should be given to the re-evaluation of the SACU formula. The new arrangements should balance actual trade values and development needs in order to foster a more equitable regional partnership.     Over-reliance on a Narrow Tax Base : South Africa's government revenue is heavily dependent on individual income taxes from a small taxpayer base, which poses risks to fiscal sustainability and equity. Impact of VAT Increase:  A proposed 0.5% increase in value-added tax (VAT) may negatively affect consumer spending and inflation, potentially dampening economic growth and undermining consumer confidence. Role of Consumer Spending:  Consumer spending has been the main driver of South Africa's economic growth over the past decade, and any tax hikes could reduce household disposable income and overall demand. Customs Duties and SACU Dynamics:  Customs duties contribute significantly to South Africa's revenue but much of this is redistributed to neighbouring countries through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), raising questions about equity and sustainability. Need for SACU Reform:  The revenue-sharing arrangements under SACU strain South Africa's budget and create dependency among member countries, highlighting the need for a re-evaluation of the distribution formula to foster regional equity and diversification.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author    4. Public expenditure and debt dynamics   South Africa's commitment to social support - which includes welfare grants, health and education - is reflected in its public spending. This commitment, however, brings pressure to bear on the national budget. Education receives over R500 billion annually, aimed at improving school infrastructure, teacher remuneration and the provision of other educational resources. But, despite the significant investment, the outcomes remain uneven. The high levels of disparity between urban and rural schools persist.   Social services, such as grants for the elderly, children, and disabled, receives R431 billion annually. These programmes are essential in mitigating poverty and inequality, but cognisance needs also to be taken of its growing share of the budget. As such, they limit fiscal space for other essential functions like infrastructure investment and innovation.   Perhaps most worrying is the rising cost of debt servicing.   As debt-to-GDP levels increase, more of the budget is being absorbed by interest payments that reduce the funds available for development. The fiscal crowding out is becoming a pressing issue, because it is constraining the government's ability to adequately invest in long-term growth drivers, such as economic infrastructure.   The South African government's gross loan debt is projected to reach nearly 75% of GDP in the coming fiscal years (Trading Economics, N.d.(3)), which some consider high. The reality is that South Africa does not has a super-high debt-to-GDP ratio, it just does not have the growth trajectory to support the payments, which is the problem.     Debt per se is not problematic, it what the debt is used for that matters. Investment into economic infrastructure will serve as a stimulus to generate growth and future revenue to service the debt. Unfortunately, the performance in public infrastructure spending is poor. Creating opportunity through the reform of Public Private Partnership (PPP) regulations – which government has started doing - can serve to overcome poor spending performance. An approach similar to the lifting of the embedded electricity generation restrictions enabling the private sector to invest, is another example.   But as confidence in the country's fiscal sustainability declines, borrowing costs may very well increase, further worsening the ability to service the debt burden. This dynamic creates a vicious cycle that can only be broken by sustained fiscal consolidation and/or economic growth.   To mitigate long-term risks, South Africa's approach to public spending needs to be more strategic. Treasury will need to conduct comprehensive spending reviews in order to evaluate efficiency, to eliminate duplication and to improve the outcomes of its spending.   Investments in digital governance and fiscal transparency could enhance accountability and improve budget implementation. So too, a switch to performance-based contracts and incentives to attract the private sector into managing some public services will introduce efficiencies with concomitant savings.   Currently Treasury is making cuts to education and health personnel, which is not sensible for long-range growth and capacity, since this will negatively impact the skills and capacity needed ten years down the line.   Public Spending and Budget Pressure : South Africa allocates significant funds to social support, including education and welfare grants, but this creates pressure on the national budget and limits fiscal capacity for other essential functions. Education Investment vs. Outcomes:  Although over R500 billion is spent annually on education to enhance infrastructure and resources, disparities between urban and rural schools persist, indicating uneven outcomes. Growing Debt Servicing Costs:  Rising debt-to-GDP levels, projected to approach 75%, result in a larger portion of the budget being consumed by interest payments, which hinders investment in growth-oriented infrastructure. Need for Strategic Spending:  South Africa must adopt a more strategic approach to public spending, including spending reviews to improve efficiency, eliminate duplication, and enhance outcomes, while investing in digital governance and fiscal transparency. Impact of Budget Cuts:  Current cuts to education and health personnel by Treasury may adversely affect long-term growth prospects and the development of essential skills and capacity needed for future economic stability.   Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author 5. Infrastructure investment and economic revitalisation   Infrastructure investment serves as a major catalyst for economic recovery. It is therefore assuring that the 2025–2026 budget has allocated more than R1 trillion for the development and revitalisation of the country's energy and transport infrastructure (Magubane, 2025), since these investments will address key supply-side constraints, facilitate trade, and attract foreign direct investment (FDI).   However, for this to materialise, the existing implementation gap will have to be addressed, since projects are often held up in the planning stage as a result of bureaucratic inefficiency, the lack of project preparation, and insufficient feasibility assessments. Realising the benefits of infrastructure spending will require urgent improvements in project management capacity, procurement efficiency, and intergovernmental coordination.   Structural reforms have begun to create space for greater private sector participation, particularly through public-private partnerships (PPPs). These frameworks aim to de-risk infrastructure projects and leverage private capital in order to supplement public investment. Successful examples in the energy sector serve as a model that can be replicated and expanded to other sectors such as transportation, logistics, and housing.   Government should be the flywheel that crowds in capital. It should accept that it hasn’t got all the capital and it can’t do everything, but it can be the flywheel. It can allow infrastructure projects or supply chains or the regulatory environment to act as the stimulant to expand capital investment beyond its own sources.   The infrastructure backlogs in municipalities also needs to be urgently addressed. Inadequate water, sanitation and road infrastructure, serves as a barrier to development and hinders productivity and the communities' quality of life. Municipalities often lack technical expertise and financial management capacity, leading to underspending and inefficient use of grants. National government must play a proactive role in capacity-building and oversight.   In addition to conventional infrastructure, digital infrastructure is emerging as a key enabler of economic growth and development. Through the expansion of broadband access, particularly in underserved rural areas, new opportunities in education, healthcare and e-commerce can be unlocked. Government should, therefore, prioritise digital inclusion as a strategic component of its long-term infrastructure planning.   Special attention will also have to be given to reviving the manufacturing sector, which has all but collapsed. In the late 1980’s manufacturing contributed 25% to South Africa’s GDP. It now stands at around 9%. Contraposed to this, Malaysia also stood at 25% in the late 1980’s, but manufacturing now contributes around 30% to their GDP.   In this regard, more attention needs to be given to the beneficiation of minerals and other raw materials.   Infrastructure Investment Significance:  The 2025–2026 budget allocates over R1 trillion for energy and transport infrastructure, which is crucial for economic recovery, addressing supply-side constraints, facilitating trade, and attracting foreign direct investment. Implementation Challenges:  To realise the benefits of infrastructure spending, the existing implementation gap must be closed, requiring improvements in project management, procurement efficiency, and intergovernmental coordination. Private Sector Participation:  Structural reforms are fostering greater private sector involvement through public-private partnerships (PPPs), which can de-risk projects and enhance public investment in various sectors. Municipal Infrastructure Backlogs : Urgent action is needed to address inadequate municipal infrastructure, such as water and sanitation, which hampers development and quality of life. The national government should assist municipalities with capacity-building and oversight. Digital Infrastructure Expansion:  Prioritising digital infrastructure, especially broadband access in rural areas, is essential for economic growth and can unlock new opportunities in education and healthcare. Digital inclusion should be a key focus in long-term infrastructure planning.   Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author     6. The investment climate and private sector dynamics   Due to policy uncertainty, infrastructure constraints, and the private sectors limited confidence in the government's ability to deliver the required reforms that will enable economic growth, current investment levels remain weak.   Investors are hesitant to commit capital when returns on safer instruments, such as government bonds, offer risk-free and guaranteed yields of 6% or more. This crowding out effect is particularly significant for sectors like manufacturing and agriculture, where risk-adjusted returns are less certain.   For the private sector to flourish, it requires less red tape, and a clearer and more supportive regulatory environment. Delays in licensing, opaque decision-making processes and shifting policy signals deter investment. To address these challenges a streamlined regulatory regime, improved transparency, and a commitment to policy continuity is needed.   There are also concerns about South Africa's potential growth rate. A decade ago, potential growth was estimated at around 3.5%, but this figure has likely declined due to institutional decay and lost capacity. Rebuilding institutional effectiveness—particularly at the municipal and provincial levels—is essential for restoring investor confidence.   Foreign direct investment has also been impacted by perceptions of corruption, weak enforcement of contracts, and limited investor protections. South Africa must strengthen the rule of law, improve dispute resolution mechanisms, and instil confidence amongst investors so that they believe that they will have recourse to fair treatment.   To reinvigorate local investment, the government should support small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs), which are critical to job creation. It should take steps to improve access to finance, to simplifying tax compliance, and to tailor support programmes that will empower entrepreneurs and stimulate grassroots economic activity.   Impacting each of these interventions are the real and perceived anti-growth policies. The recently promulgated Expropriation Act being one example, where the ambiguity as to what constitutes ‘’property” and under what circumstance expropriation without compensation may occur lead antagonists to suggest that property rights are under threat. What is needed as a minimum is clearer definition; which definition should be defined collaboratively between the state, the private sector, civil society, and professionals in order to ensure that all sectors of the economy are in sync and sing from the same hymn sheet.   Such clarity will also reduce the potential for misunderstanding such as that of the current US administration who have embarked on punitive measures against South Africa based on what some infer to be a false narrative (Mbembe & Gilmore, 2025). The reality is, however, that differences in interpretation do exist.   Investment Hesitation:  Current investment levels in South Africa are weak due to policy uncertainty, infrastructure issues, and low confidence in the government's reform capabilities, leading investors to favour safer, guaranteed returns like those from government bonds. Regulatory Challenges : A clearer, more supportive regulatory environment is necessary for the private sector to thrive, as delays, opaque decision-making, and shifting policies deter investment. Streamlining regulations and improving transparency are critical steps. Concerns About Growth:  South Africa's potential growth rate has declined from an estimated 3.5% due to institutional decay. Rebuilding effective institutions, especially at municipal and provincial levels, is essential for restoring investor confidence. Foreign Investment Issues:  Perceptions of corruption, weak contract enforcement, and limited investor protections are hindering foreign direct investment. Strengthening the rule of law and improving dispute resolution mechanisms are needed to rebuild investor trust. Support for SMEs and Clarity on Expropriation:  Government support for small and medium enterprises (SMMEs) is vital for job creation. Additionally, clearer definitions around property rights and expropriation are necessary to prevent misunderstandings that may lead to international tensions and miscommunications.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author     7. Trade and international relations   South Africa's external trade environment is under pressure due to the emergence of global protectionist tendencies and shifting international trade alliances. The unilaterally imposed punitive tariffs of the United States call into question the feasibility of continuing exports to them at current levels, which can have a significant impact on the economy, given that the US accounts for 8% of South African exports (Mohamed & Moloi, 2025). Source: Stanlib in Daily Investor (15 April 2025)   Exporters will have to find new markets for their products as South African products and produce in the US will become expensive and uncompetitive. This is however not a short term solution as one market cannot be shut down today, and a new market opened tomorrow. It will take time to develop. In the interim manufacturers need to survive in the short term; the possibility of some not, is real.   Automotive exports could be particularly hard hit, posing a direct threat to this vital manufacturing sector. The auto industry supports thousands of jobs and is a major contributor to export earnings. The 25% tariff that has been imposed could be devastating for local producers, especially for small and medium enterprises that lack the capital to absorb such shocks.   Negotiations with key trade partners like the United States must be prioritised to preserve favourable terms under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).  Potentially, up to 200,000 jobs (125,000 in automotive industry alone) (Libera, 2025) may be threatened. AGOA in 2024 accounted for about 46% of total exports to the US (Business Tech, 2025 (2)), and somewhere between 3% - 4% of total exports. Although this may appear to be a small exposure, it does have an impact downstream, because a lot of the exposure is concentrated in certain sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing – particularly motor vehicles and component parts.   One economist pointed out that many manufacturers of component parts are not large enterprises and thus do not have the balance sheet to support shocks of this magnitude. Some concessions need to be considered.   At the same time, diversification of trade partners—especially within Africa and Asia—can reduce dependence on any single market. The strategic planning in this regard should assume South Africa’s graduation out of AGOA, especially given the fractious  relationship between US and South Africa.   Regional trade also needs reform. SACU revenue sharing, as noted, is skewed and lacks transparency. South Africa effectively subsidises the budgets of its neighbours, with little reciprocal benefit. These arrangements must be re-evaluated to ensure long-term fiscal fairness and regional economic stability.   The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) presents a unique opportunity to expand intra-African trade. However, success will depend on harmonising standards, improving logistics and investing in cross-border systems and infrastructure. In order for South Africa to position itself as a regional trade hub, it should play a leadership role in operationalising AfCFTA.   Global Trade Pressures:  South Africa's trade is facing challenges due to rising global protectionism, particularly with the imposition of US tariffs, which threaten the viability of exports to the US, accounting for 8% of South African exports. Need for Market Diversification:  Exporters must find new markets as US tariffs make South African products less competitive; however, this is a long-term process and short-term survival for manufacturers is critical. Impact on Automotive Industry:  The automotive sector, a significant contributor to jobs and export earnings, is especially vulnerable to the 25% tariff imposed by the US, which could adversely affect small and medium enterprises. Importance of Trade Negotiations:  Prioritising negotiations with key partners like the US is crucial to maintaining favorable trade terms under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and preventing potential job losses of up to 200,000. Regional Trade Reform and AfCFTA:  South Africa needs to reform regional trade arrangements for fairness and stability while seizing the opportunity presented by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to enhance intra-African trade through improved logistics and standards.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author     8. Social Considerations: Welfare, consumption and human capital   Social grants support millions of South Africans and serve as an important consumption driver. However, this model is not sustainable in the long term. With only a small proportion of the population paying income tax, the balance between support and dependency must be carefully managed.   Consumer spending has historically driven economic growth, but this trend is weakening due to wages that have been stagnating and persisting inflationary pressures. The recent introduction of the two-pot pension system, which allows partial early withdrawals, offers short-term liquidity but may undermine long-term savings.   Investing in human capital is paramount. The educational outcomes we now have in the public schooling system are quite unsatisfactory. According to one of the world’s leading development economists and specialist on education reform, Professor Lant Pritchett, South Africa is the single biggest learning underperformer relative to GDP per capita among low and middle income countries. In short, we get extremely poor education outcomes despite our high levels of public expenditure (Schirmer, 2023).     Education must be re-imagined and vocational training must be aligned with market needs. Programmes that promote entrepreneurship, digital literacy, and technical skills that can empower citizens to contribute productively to the economy, must be rolled-out.   Healthcare is another key pillar of human development. The proposed National Health Insurance (NHI) aims to provide universal access but faces funding, infrastructure, and administrative hurdles. A phased, consultative approach is necessary to ensure that healthcare reforms are inclusive and fiscally sustainable.   9. Institutional capacity, integrity and governance   Poor governance and corruption have been a recurring themes in South Africa's economic stagnation. State capture has significantly eroded institutional integrity, and has affected everything from procurement processes to service delivery. Rebuilding trust requires transparent governance, accountability, and a capable public sector.   That is, however, only part of the story. The reality is that we have been in as low growth economy for decades – we have an institutional problem, and constraints.   The first part of the constraint has the infrastructure SOEs, Transnet, Eskom, the water boards, etcetera, which are in disarray. Their roles in lifting growth by investing and driving infrastructure are not that strong anymore. And the breakdown of infrastructure has also driven up inflation, prices, the cost of living and the cost of doing business; and it has eroded savings. It has a deterring effect, or at least threatens to deter future investment. The Reserve Bank, for example, has warned that a breakdown in infrastructure is threatening the stability of South Africa's financial system also (SARB, 2024 (2)).   Municipal governments, which are key to local economic development, suffer from under-capacity and corruption. Reforms in municipal finance, procurement and service delivery will be crucial to achieving inclusive growth.   Improving the ease of doing business must remain a top priority. Urgent attention needs to be given to measures such as digitising licensing processes, reducing red tape, and clarifying land rights, all of which can unlock significant investment.   Civil society and the media are important watchdogs that enhance and ensure accountability. These institutions must be strengthened so as to ensure the protection of the freedom of expression and similarly, civic engagement must be encouraged, as both are vital components of a resilient democracy and economy.     10. Strategic recommendations and conclusion   South Africa's economic revival requires a multifaceted approach:   Accelerate infrastructure implementation: Shovel-ready projects need to be expedited and public project management capacity must be improved. Reform revenue sharing: Revise SACU arrangements for equitable fiscal contributions and reduced dependency. Promote private investment: Lower barriers to entry, improve investor protection, streamline regulatory approvals and reduce the levels of red tape. Target key sectors: Provide targeted incentives to revive agriculture, manufacturing, energy, and construction. Rebuild institutions: Focus on governance, transparency, and public sector training at all levels of government. Diversify trade and exports: Strengthen regional and Asian trade ties to reduce vulnerability to Western protectionism. Support SMEs: Simplify tax compliance and provide financial support to small businesses and start-ups. Foster innovation and skills: Increase investment in R&D, higher education and vocational training. Strengthen civic institutions: Empower watchdog organisations and ensure freedom of the press and civil participation.     Conclusion   South Africa stands at a crossroads. The choices made in the next few years will determine whether the country continues on a path of stagnation or begins a journey toward inclusive and sustainable growth.   The building blocks exist: a diversified economy, a young population, and robust institutions that, though weakened, can be rebuilt and restored.   But for it to be achieved, action must be decisive and coordinated. By implementing bold reforms, investing in infrastructure and human capital, and by fostering a culture of accountability, South Africa can reclaim its position as a dynamic emerging market and a leader on the African continent.     References   Business Tech. 2025 (1). South Africa has 7.9 million taxpayers funding 28 million grant recipients. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/budget-speech/816563/south-africa-has-7-9-million-taxpayers-funding-28-million-grant-recipients/ [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Business Tech. 2025 (2). R70 billion disaster for South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/821032/r70-billion-disaster-for-south-africa/  [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Libera, M. 2025. South African province in crisis, and 125,000 jobs at risk. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/5-things/820748/south-african-province-in-crisis-and-125000-jobs-at-risk/ [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Magubane, K. 2025. BUDGET 2025 | R1-trillion infrastructure drive 'will jolt economy to higher level'. [Online] Available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times-daily/business/2025-03-12-budget-2025-r1-trillion-infrastructure-drive-will-jolt-economy-to-higher-level/  [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Mbembe, A. & Gilmore, R.W. Trump’s attacks on South Africa are a punishment for independence. [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/mar/07/trumps-attacks-on-south-africa-are-a-punishment-for-independence  [accessed: 14 April 2025]   Mohamed, S. & Moloi, T. 2025. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/PBO/Budget_Analysis/2025/17-02-2025/PBO_Pre-budget_brief_South_Africas_trade_relations_with_the_USA.pdf [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Moloi, D. 2025. DPSA Issues Circular Announcing Public Service Cost of Living Adjustments 2025/26.  [Online] Available at: https://www.dpsa.gov.za/thepublicservant/2025/04/03/dpsa-issues-circular-announcing-public-service-cost-of-living-adjustments-2025-26/#:~:text=In%20light%20of%20this%20resolution,with%20effect%20from1%20April%202025. [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Office of the US Trade Representative. N.d. Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) [Online] Available at: https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa [accessed: 14 April 2025]   Parliament. 2025. 2025 Budget Analysis. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/PBO/Budget_Analysis/2025/3-march/18-03-2025/PBO_2025_Budget_analysis_18_March_2025.pdf [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Schirmer, S. 2023. South Africa’s failing education system. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.cde.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/The-Silent-Crisis-South-Africas-failing-education-system.pdf  [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Siddarth, S. 2025. Global brokerages raise recession odds; J.P. Morgan sees 60% chance [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/jpmorgan-lifts-global-recession-odds-60-us-tariffs-stoke-fears-2025-04-04/ [accessed: 14 April 2025]   South African Reserve Bank (SARB). 2025 (1). Statement of the MPC March 2025. [Online] Available at: https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/statements/monetary-policy-statements/2025/march#:~:text=The%20overall%20result%20of%20these,the%20better%20fuel%2Dprice%20projections. [accessed: 15 April 2025]   South African Reserve Bank (SARB). 2025 (2). Reserve Bank warns poor infrastructure is a major threat to SA's financial system.  [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/reserve-bank-warns-that-poor-infrastructure-is-a-major-threat-to-sas-financial-system-20241129  [accessed: 15 April 2025]   South African Revenue Services (SARS). 2024. Media release: Joint media statement National Treasury and South African Revenue Service on the release of the 17th annual edition of Tax Statistics. [Online} Available at: https://www.sars.gov.za/latest-news/media-release-joint-media-statement-national-treasury-and-south-african-revenue-service-on-the-release-of-the-17th-annual-edition-of-tax-statistics/#:~:text=In%20the%202023/24%20fiscal,9%20billion%20(R32. [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025. Statistics South Africa on official unemployment rate in third quarter of 2024. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/statistics-south-africa-official-unemployment-rate-third-quarter-2024-12-nov#:~:text=The%20official%20unemployment%20rate%20was,persons%20to%208%2C0%20million [accessed 15 April 2025]   Trading Economics. N.d.(1) South Africa Business Confidence. [Online] Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/business-confidence [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Trading Economics. N.d.(2). South Africa Consumer Confidence. [Online] Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/consumer-confidence [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Trading Economics. N.d.(3). South Africa Government Debt-to-GDP. [Online] Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/government-debt-to-gdp#:~:text=In%20the%20long%2Dterm%2C%20the,according%20to%20our%20econometric%20models. [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Treasury.2025. 2025 Budget. Budget Review. [Online] Available: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20Budget/2025/review/FullBR.pdf [accessed: 15 April 20125] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

POPI Policy Protection of personal information policy 1. Policy statement 1.1. The Inclusive Society Institute processes personal information of its employees, members, clients, suppliers, and other data subjects from time to time. As such, it is obliged to comply with the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013 (“POPIA”) as well as the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000 (“PAIA”). 1.2 In line with this, the Inclusive Society Institute is committed to protecting its members’/clients’/supplier’s/employees’ and other data subjects’ privacy and ensuring that their personal information is used appropriately, transparently, securely and in accordance with applicable laws. 1.3 This Policy sets out the manner in which the Inclusive Society Institute deals with such personal information and provides clarity on the general purpose for which the information is used, as well as how data subjects can participate in this process in relation to their personal information. 1.4 In addition to this policy, the institute has also developed a manual and made it available as prescribed under the PAIA Act. Where parties/requesters submit requests for information disclosure in terms of this manual, internal measures have been developed, together with adequate systems to process requests for information or access thereto. 2. Objectives 2.1. To ensure legislative compliance (POPIA and PAIA ) in respect of all personal information that the Inclusive Society Institute collects and processes. 2.2. To inform employees and clients as to how their personal information is used, disclosed and destroyed. 2.3. To ensure that personal information is only used for the purpose for which it was collected. 2.4. To prevent unauthorised access to and use of personal information. 3. Definitions 3.1. “Biometric information” means the physical, physiological, or behavioural identification, including finger printing, amongst others. 3.2. “Processing” means: 3.2.1. The collection, receipt, recording organisation, collation, storage, updating, modification, retrieval, alteration, consultation or use; 3.2.2. Dissemination by means of transmission, distribution or making available in any form; 3.2.2. Merging, linking, erasure or destruction of information. 3.3. “PAIA” means the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000. 3.4. “POPIA” means the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013. 3.5. “Regulator” means the Information Regulator established in terms of POPIA. 4. Collection of personal information 4.1. The Inclusive Society Institute collects and processes various items of information pertaining to its employees, members, clients, suppliers and other data subjects. The information collected is based on need and it will be processed for that need/purpose only. Whenever possible, the Inclusive Society Institute will inform the relevant party of the information required (mandatory) and which information is deemed optional. 4.2. The employee, member or client will be informed of the consequence/s of failing to provide such personal information and any prejudice which may be incurred due to non-disclosure. For example, the Inclusive Society Institute may not be able to employ an individual without certain personal information relating to that individual or the organisation may not be in a position to render services to a client in the absence of certain information which is required. 4.3. The Inclusive Society Institute will process information in a manner that is lawful and reasonable (i.e., will not infringe the privacy of the individual or company). 4.4. Where consent is required for the processing of information, such consent will be obtained. 4.5. Information will be processed under the following circumstances: 4.5.1. When carrying out actions for the conclusion or performance of a contract; 4.5.2. When complying with an obligation imposed by law on the Institute; 4.5.3. For the protection of a legitimate interest of the data subject; 4.5.4. Where necessary, for pursuing the legitimate interests of the Institute or of an authorised third party to whom the information is supplied. 4.6. Examples of the personal information the Inclusive Society Institute collects includes, but is not limited to: 4.6.1. Information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of an employee; 4.6.2. Information relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal or employment history (this includes disciplinary action) of an employee; 4.6.3. Banking and account information; 4.6.4. Contact information; 4.6.5. Trade union membership and political persuasion; 4.6.6. Any identifying number, symbol, email address, telephone number, location information, online identifier or other particular assignment related to the employee, member or client; 4.6.7. The biometric information of the employee, member, client or data subject; and 4.6.8. The personal opinions, views or preferences of an employee (also performance appraisals or correspondence) and the views or opinions of another individual about the person. 4.7. The Inclusive Society Institute shall not process special personal information without complying with the specific provisions of the POPI Act. Special information includes personal information concerning: 4.7.1. the religious or philosophical beliefs, race or ethnic origin, trade union membership, political persuasion, health, sex life or biometric information of a data subject; or 4.7.2. the criminal behaviour of a data subject, where such information relates to the alleged commission by a data subject of any offence committed or the disposal of such proceedings 4.8. Collection of employee information: 4.8.1. For the purposes of this Policy, employees include potential, past and existing employees of the Inclusive Society Institute. Independent contractors are treated on the same basis where the collection of information is concerned. 4.8.2. When appointing new employees/contractors, the Inclusive Society Institute requires information, including, but not limited to that listed above, from prospective employees/contractors, in order to process the information on the system/s. Such information is reasonably necessary for the Institute’s record purposes, as well as to ascertain if the prospective employee/contractor meets the requirements, for the position which he/she is being appointed to/contracted for and is suitable for appointment. 4.8.3. The Inclusive Society Institute will use and process such employee information, as set out below, for purposes including, but not limited to, its employment records and to make lawful decisions in respect of that employee and its business. 4.8.4. Use of employee information: Employees’ personal information will only be used for the purpose for which it was collected and intended. This includes, but is not limited to: 4.8.4.1. Submissions to the Department of Labour; 4.8.4.2. Submissions to the Receiver of Revenue; 4.8.4.3. For audit and recordkeeping purposes; 4.8.4.4. In connection with legal proceedings; 4.8.4.5. In connection with and to comply with legal and regulatory requirements; 4.8.4.6. In connection with any administrative functions of the Institute; 4.8.4.7. Disciplinary action or any other action to address the employee’s conduct or capacity; 4.8.4.8. In respect of any employment benefits that the employee is entitled to; 4.8.4.9. Pre- and post-employment checks and screening; and 4.8.4.10. Any other relevant purpose of which the employee has been notified. 4.8.5. Should information be processed for any other reason; the employee will be informed accordingly. Collection of 4.9. Collection of Member/Client/Supplier information: 4.9.1. For purposes of this Policy, clients include potential, past and existing members and clients. Suppliers include all vendors which contract with the Inclusive Society Institute, whether once off or recurring, in respect of products and services. 4.9.2. The Inclusive Society Institute collects and processes its members’, clients’ and suppliers’ personal information, such as that mentioned hereunder. The type of information will depend on the need for which it is collected and will be processed for that purpose only. Further examples of personal information collected from clients include, but is not limited to: 4.9.3. The Inclusive Society Institute also collects and processes member/clients’ personal information for marketing purposes in order to ensure that its products and services remain relevant to its clients and potential clients. 4.9.4. Use of member/client/supplier information: 4.9.4.1. The member/client/supplier’s personal information will only be used for the purpose for which it was collected and as agreed. This may include, but not be limited to: 4.9.4.2. Providing products or services to members/clients; 4.9.4.3. In connection with sending accounts and communication to a member/client in respect of services rendered; 4.9.4.4. Payment of suppliers and communication in respect of services rendered; 4.9.4.5. Referral to other service providers; 4.9.4.6. Confirming, verifying and updating member/client/supplier details; 4.9.4.7. Conducting market or customer satisfaction research; 4.9.4.8. For audit and record keeping purposes; 4.9.4.9. In connection with legal proceedings; and 4.9.4.10. In connection with and to comply with legal and regulatory requirements or when it is otherwise allowed by law. 4.10. Disclosure of personal information 4.10.1. The Inclusive Society Institute may share employees’ and member/clients/suppliers’ personal information with authorised third parties as well as obtain information from such third parties for reasons set out above. 4.10.2. The Inclusive Society Institute may also disclose employees’ or member/clients/suppliers’ information where there is a duty or a right to disclose in terms of applicable legislation, the law or where it may be necessary to protect the rights of the organisation or it is in the interests of the data subject. 5. Safeguarding of personal information and consent 5.1. The Inclusive Society Institute shall review its security controls and processes on a regular basis to ensure that personal information is secure. 5.2. It will take appropriate, reasonable technical and organisational measures to prevent loss or damage or unauthorised destruction of personal information, and unlawful access to or processing of personal information. This will be achieved by – 5.2.1. Identifying internal and external risks; 5.2.2. Establishing and maintaining appropriate safeguards; 5.2.3. Regularly verifying these safeguards and their implementation; 5.2.4. Updating the safeguards; and 5.2.5. Implementing generally accepted information security practices and procedures. 5.3. The Inclusive Society Institute shall appoint an Information Officer and Deputy Information Officer who is/are responsible for compliance with the conditions of the lawful processing of personal information and other provisions of POPIA. 5.3.1. Information Officer details 5.3.1.1. Information Officer Name: Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer Telephone number: 021 201 1589 Postal address: P O Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010 Physical address: 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square, Cape Town, 8001 Email address: ceo@inclusivesociety.org.za 5.3.1.2. Deputy Information Officer Name: Edwin Mc Queen, Corporate Services Officer Telephone number: 021 201 1589 Postal address: P O Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010 Physical address: 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square , Cape Town, 8001 Email address: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za 5.4. The specific responsibilities of the Information Officer and his/her Deputy include – 5.4.1. The development, implementation, monitoring and maintenance of a compliance framework; 5.4.2. The undertaking of a personal information impact assessment to ensure that adequate measures and standards exist in order to comply with the conditions for the lawful processing of personal information; 5.4.3. The development, monitoring and maintenance of a manual, as well as the making available thereof, as prescribed in section 51 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 of 2000); 5.4.4. The development of internal measures, together with adequate systems, to process requests for information or access thereto; and 5.4.5. To ensure that Institute staff awareness sessions are conducted regarding the provisions of the Act, regulations made in terms of the Act, codes of conduct, or information obtained from the Regulator. 5.5. Employment contracts/addendums thereto, containing relevant consent clauses for the use and storage of employee information, or any other action so required, in terms of POPIA, must be signed by every employee. 5.6. On an ongoing basis, all suppliers, insurers and other third-party service providers are required to sign a service level agreement guaranteeing their commitment to the Protection of Personal Information. 5.7. Consent to process client/member/supplier information is obtained from clients/members (or a person who has been given authorisation from the client/member to provide the client/member’s personal information) and suppliers at sign on/appointment/contracting. 6. Direct marketing 6.1. The institute shall ensure that: 6.1.1. It does not process any personal information for the purpose of direct marketing (by means of any form of electronic communication, including automatic calling machines, SMS’s or e-mail) unless the data subject has given his, her or its consent to the processing, or is an existing customer. 6.1.2. It will only approach data subjects, whose consent is required and who have not previously withheld such consent, once in order to request the consent. This will be done in the prescribed manner and form. 6.1.3. The data subjects will only be approached for the purpose of direct marketing of the Inclusive Society Institute’s own products or services. In all instances, the data subject shall be given a reasonable opportunity to object, free of charge and in a manner free of unnecessary formality, to such use of his, her or its electronic details at the time when the information is collected. 6.1.4. Any communication for the purpose of direct marketing will contain details of the identity of the sender or the person on whose behalf the communication has been sent and an address or other contact details to which the recipient may send a request that such communications cease. 7. Transfer of information outside of South Africa 7.1. The Inclusive Society Institute will not transfer personal information about a data subject to a third party who is in a foreign country unless one or more of the following apply: 7.1.1. the third party is subject to a law, binding corporate rules or a binding agreement which provides an adequate level of protection of personal information and effectively upholds principles for reasonable processing of the information; 7.1.2. the data subject consents to the transfer; 7.1.3. the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the Institute; 7.1.4. the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the Institute and a third party; or 7.1.5. the transfer is for the benefit of the data subject, and it is not reasonably practicable to obtain the consent of the data subject to that transfer and if it were reasonably practicable to obtain such consent, the data subject would be likely to give it. 8. Recording systems 8.1. Video footage and/or voice/telephone calls that have been recorded, processed and stored constitute personal information. As such the Inclusive Society Institute will make all employees, members, clients or data subjects aware as to the use of any recording systems. 9. Security breaches 9.1. Should the Inclusive Society Institute detect a security breach on any of its systems that contain personal information, it shall take the required steps to assess the nature and extent of the breach in order to ascertain if any information has been compromised. 9.2. The Inclusive Society Institute shall notify the affected parties should it have reason to believe that their information has been compromised. Such notification shall only be made where the organisation can identify the data subject to which the information relates. Where it is not possible it may be necessary to consider website publication and whatever else the Information Regulator prescribes. 9.3. Notification will be provided in writing by means of either: 9.3.1. Email; 9.3.2. registered mail; or 9.3.3. the organisation’s website 9.4. The notification shall provide the following information where possible: 9.4.1. Description of possible consequences of the breach; 9.4.2. Measures taken to remedythe breach; 9.4.3. Recommendations to be taken by the data subject to mitigate adverse effects; and 9.4.4. The identity of the party responsible for the breach. 9.5. In addition to the above, the Inclusive Society Institute shall notify the Regulator of any breach and/or compromise to personal information in its possession and work closely with and comply with any recommendations issued by the Regulator. 9.6. The following will apply in this regard: 9.6.1. The Information Officer will be responsible for overseeing the investigation; 9.6.2. The Information Officer will be responsible for reporting to the Information Regulator within 3 working days of a breach/ compromise to personal information; 9.6.3. The Information Officer will be responsible for reporting to the Data Subject(s) within 3 working days, as far as is reasonable and practicable, of a breach/ compromise to personal information. 9.6.4. The timeframes above are guidelines and depending on the merits of the situation may require earlier or later reporting. 10. Access and correction of personal information 10.1. Employees and members/clients have the right to request access to any personal information that the Inclusive Society Institute holds about them. 10.2.Employees and members/clients have the right to request the Inclusive Society Institute to update, correct or delete their personal information on reasonable grounds. Such requests must be made to the Information Officer (see details above) or to the Inclusive Society Institute’s head office (see details below). 10.3. Where an employee or member/client objects to the processing of their personal information, the Inclusive Society Institute may no longer process said personal information. The consequences of the failure to give consent to process the personal information must be set out before the employee or client confirms his/her objection. 10.4. The member/client or employee must provide reasons for the objection to the processing of his/her personal information. 10.4.1 Head office details 10.4.2 Name: Inclusive Society Institute 10.4.3 Telephone number: 021 201 1589 10.4.4 Postal address: Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010 10.4.5 Physical address: 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square , Cape Town, 8001 10.4.6 Email address: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za 11. Retention of records 11.1. The Inclusive Society Institute is obligated to retain certain information, as prescribed by law. This includes but is not limited to the following: 11.1.1. With regard to the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and the Companies Amendment Act No. 3 of 2011, hard copies of the documents mentioned below must be retained for 7 years: 11.1.2. Any documents, accounts, books, writing, records or other information that a company is required to keep in terms of the Act; 11.1.3. Notice and minutes of all meetings, including resolutions adopted; 11.1.4. Copies of reports presented at the annual general meeting; and 11.1.5. Copies of annual financial statements required by the Act and copies of accounting records as required by the Act. 11.2. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act No. 75 of 1997, as amended, requires the organisation to retain records relating to its staff for a period of no less than 3 years. 12. Amendments to this policy 12.1. Amendments to this Policy will take place from time to time subject to the discretion of the Inclusive Society Institute and pursuant to any changes in the law. Such changes will be brought to the attention of employees, members and clients where it affects them. 13. Requests for information 13.1. In terms of requests to be processed under POPIA, the following forms shall be used – 13.1.1. Objection to the processing of personal information – a data subject who wishes to object to the processing of personal information in terms of section 11(3)(a) of the Act, must submit the objection to the responsible party. 13.1.2. Request for correction or deletion of personal information or destruction or deletion of record of personal information – a data subject who wishes to request a correction or deletion of personal information or the destruction or deletion of a record of personal information in terms of section 24(1) of the Act, must submit a request to the responsible party. 13.1.3. Request for data subject’s consent to process personal information – a responsible party who wishes to process the personal information of a data subject for the purpose of direct marketing by electronic communication must submit a request for written consent to that data subject. 13.1.4. Submission of complaint – Any person who wishes to submit a complaint contemplated in section 74(1) of the Act must submit such a complaint to the Regulator on Part I of Form 5. A responsible party or a data subject who wishes to submit a complaint contemplated in section 74(2) of the Act must submit such a complaint to the Regulator on Part II. 13.2. In terms of requests for information under PAIA, the provisions of the PAIA Sec 51 Manual must be complied with. 13.3. Any requests and/ or advice can be directed to the Information Officer set out in this policy and in the Sec 51 PAIA manual.

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Polling GovDem Poll This comprehensive poll will be designed to inform political strategy and public policy. Samples will be drawn to assess party-political support patterns and shifts, to assess public opinion on government performance and support for government policy initiatives. Questions will also be included to gain empirical data to support the various research projects of the ISI.