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The Journal for Inclusive Public Policy  (JIPP), an official publication of the Inclusive Society Institute, is pleased to invite submissions for Volume 6, Issue 1 , themed:   G20 and the Global South   Submission Deadline:  31 October 2025 The G20 brings together the world’s largest economies (19 countries plus the European Union and the African Union), representing 85% of global GDP, more than 75% of international trade, and two-thirds of the world’s population. While these nations wield immense influence over the global economic order, profound inequalities persist.   The Global South continues to grapple with structural backlogs in infrastructure, poverty reduction, unemployment, sustainable growth, and environmental resilience.   From 1 December 2024 to November 2025, South Africa holds the G20 Presidency, under the theme: Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability .   This issue of JIPP invites submissions that critically engage with the role of the G20 in reshaping international governance to create a more just and equitable world. Contributions should consider how global economic and political structures might be reimagined to empower developing countries to meet their development and sustainability goals.   Suggested Areas of Focus   Authors may align their article with the following Task Force Sub-themes:   Trade & Investment ·         Reforming the multilateral trading system ·         Inclusive investment for sustainable industrialization ·         Value and supply chains for sustainable, inclusive growth   Digital Transformation ·         Connectivity ·         E-government and Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) ·         Regulation of emerging technologies   Financing for Sustainable Development ·         Reforming the IMF and Multilateral Development Banks ·         Debt and development ·         International taxation cooperation Solidarity for Achieving the SDGs ·         Accelerating SDG enablers, reducing negative spillovers ·         Reducing inequalities ·         Food security through sustainable food systems   Climate Action and the Just Energy Transition ·         Equitable mineral value chains ·         Scaling adaptation finance ·         Supporting inclusive Just Energy Transitions ·         Biodiversity–Climate–Environment nexus   Submission Guidelines ·         Language:  English ·         Length:  5,000 – 8,000 words (excluding references and abstract) ·         Abstract:  Up to 250 words ·         Formatting:  Arial, 12pt, 1.5 spacing, justified ·         Referencing:  Harvard style (in-text and reference list) ·         Peer review:  Articles will undergo review by two moderators. ·         Remuneration:  The journal does not provide payment. Contributions are altruistic, with the aim of influencing public policy discourse. ·         Publication:  Electronic   Important Dates ·         Submission deadline:  31 October 2025 ·         Author notification:  11 November 2025 ·         Revised papers due:  09 December 2025   About the Journal for Inclusive Public Policy (JIPP) The Journal for Inclusive Public Policy  is an official publication of the Inclusive Society Institute, committed to advancing a non-racial, non-sexist, socially just, and cohesive society grounded in democratic values.   JIPP publishes peer-reviewed theoretical, empirical, and analytical articles in the fields of Public Policy, Administration, Development, Governance, Political Science, Ethics, and related interdisciplinary areas. While the journal’s focus is South Africa and Africa, it welcomes international contributions with direct relevance to issues facing the continent.   ·         Frequency:  Twice per year   Submission & Queries Please submit manuscripts and direct queries to: jipp@inclusivesociety.org.za   Contribute to shaping the global policy discourse. Submit your article and help reimagine the role of the G20 in building a fairer, more inclusive world.

On 17 September 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute, in partnership with Daily Maverick, hosted the third instalment of its Constitutional Insights by Albie Sachs  webinar series. Building on a four-part podcast with former Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs, the series explores the Constitution, social justice, and the promise of transformation in South Africa, while highlighting the ongoing challenges of building an inclusive and equitable democracy. The third conversation focused on The Power of Mother Tongue Education  — a foundational issue for both educational equity and social inclusion. Leading the discussion was Prof. Mbulungeni Madiba , Dean of the Faculty of Education at Stellenbosch University, whose scholarship and advocacy have been pivotal in advancing multilingualism and linguistic justice in South Africa’s education system. He was joined by public intellectual Prof. William Gumede  and diversity and multilingualism researcher Dr. Robyn Tyler , bringing together expertise from education, research, and public policy. The discussion examined how language policies intersect with identity, equity, and access . Prof. Madiba emphasised that mother tongue education is more than a pedagogical strategy — it is a constitutional imperative that empowers learners, strengthens communities, and affirms cultural and linguistic diversity. Gumede and Dr. Tyler explored the broader societal impact, highlighting how equitable access to mother tongue education can address historical inequalities, enhance learning outcomes, and reinforce the Constitution’s commitment to dignity and equality. The speakers underscored that centring mother tongue education fosters a more inclusive and just society, reflecting the Constitution’s core values in both practice and principle. The conversation also reinforced the idea that multilingual education is a key tool for social cohesion, democratic participation, and community empowerment. This third episode continues the series’ exploration of South Africa’s constitutional landscape, following earlier conversations on citizenship and belonging  and the role of state institutions in upholding democracy . The final episode will focus on creating an inclusive electoral system , completing the series’ examination of critical democratic and constitutional issues.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   August 2025   Rapporteur: Daryl Swanepoel    CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 REFORM UN80: EFFICIENCY MEASURES OR POLITICAL RENEWAL? 1.1 The limits of technocratic reform 1.2 Fidelity to the Charter narrative 1.3 Leadership and the Global South 2 BUDGETARY CHALLENGES: BETWEEN SURVIVAL AND STRATEGIC FOCUS 2.1 The political nature of the budget crisis 2.2 The mandate trap and budget strain 2.3 Doing less, better 2.4 Reform proposals: Accountability and sustainability 2.5 The risk of collapse 2.6 Conclusion 3 UNILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND THE RISE OF REGIONALISM 3.1 The appeal and the limits of transactional unilateralism 3.2 Multilateralism under pressure 3.3 Regionalism: Substitute or complement? 3.4 The leadership vacuum 3.5 Reclaiming multilateralism 3.6 Conclusion 4 US - CHINA RIVALRY, SECURITY COUNCIL PARALYSIS AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 4.1 The dysfunction of the Security Council 4.2 Competing models of reform 4.3 Shifting influence of the United States and China 4.4 Implications for the Global South 4.5 Africa’s strategic role 4.6 Multipolarity and the Charter narrative 4.7 Conclusion 5 LEADERSHIP, ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE AND THE HUMAN FACTOR IN UN REFORM 5.1 Politicisation of senior appointments 5.2 A culture of risk aversion 5.3 Engineers, not only diplomats 5.4 Recruitment, talent and morale 5.5 Accountability and trust 5.6 Conclusion 6 IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA 6.1 Africa as the testing ground for UN relevance 6.2 Security Council reform and Africa’s stake 6.3 Complementarity with the African Union 6.4 Financing reform and Africa’s leverage 6.5 South Africa’s role 6.6 Risks of passivity 6.7 Conclusion 7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7.1 Recommendations 7.2 Final reflection ANNEXURE 1 ANNEXURE 2 ANNEXURE 3 ANNEXURE 4 Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:2153311089 INTRODUCTION In 2025, the United Nations (UN) marks its 80th year of existence and while for it has remained the central institution for fostering international peace, development and cooperation, now, as the global order undergoes profound shifts, the challenges confronting the UN system have grown more complex and urgent. Recognising the need for renewal, the UN Secretary-General launched the UN80 reform initiative, which is aimed at bringing about necessary reform to transition the organisation into one that is fit for purpose in the decades ahead.   As part of these deliberations, the Inclusive Society Institute has sought to deepen its understanding and develop its position on what comprehensive reform of the UN system should entail. To this end, the Institute convened a consultative webinar with a distinguished panel of experts, drawn primarily from former senior UN officials.   The discussion was guided by four questions. First, as the UN reaches its 80th anniversary and embarks on the UN80 reform agenda, what is the true aim of this initiative? Second, given the organisation’s persistent financial difficulties, which is being exacerbated by the withholding of funds by some member states, particularly the United States, alongside increasing demands for peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions, how can the UN realistically resolve its budget crisis? Third, how does the Secretary-General view the rising trend of unilateralism, which is in sharp contrast to the UN’s foundational and Charter commitment to multilateralism? And finally, in the context of the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China, who are both committed to expanding their global influence, what implications do their shifting roles, and sway, within the UN have for the broader institution and particularly for the Global South? 1 REFORM UN80: EFFICIENCY MEASURES OR POLITICAL RENEWAL?   The Secretary-General’s Reform UN80 initiative is framed as a necessary rationalisation exercise. It promises to streamline structures, consolidate offices and address the vast proliferation of mandates that have accumulated since 1945. According to internal estimates, the UN currently operates under more than 40,000 standing mandates, many of which are duplicative or obsolete. This “mandate trap” has become a drain on resources, since it obliges the Secretariat to produce thousands of reports annually with little political impact.   At a purely administrative level, Reform UN80 seeks to:   Cut across-the-board budgets by 20 percent. Relocate certain functions from high-cost centres such as New York and Geneva to lower-cost duty stations. Reduce the enormous reporting burden, freeing up staff for substantive work. Introduce a Mandate Implementation Review (MIR), which, if carried through, could retire obsolete resolutions and allow the UN to focus on current priorities.   These steps are not insignificant. They represent one of three main “tracks” of the reform, namely, efficiency measures, mandate review and structural changes. Together, these could address some of the organisation’s chronic inefficiencies. 1.1 The limits of technocratic reform   Yet, the consultation revealed broad scepticism about whether such measures alone can save the UN from decline. The critique aligns closely with other warnings that reform debates risk “putting the cart before the horse”. Administrative efficiencies, however desirable, cannot substitute for political renewal. Without addressing the UN’s legitimacy crisis, which is rooted in Security Council paralysis, politicised leadership and erosion of trust, technical reforms risk becoming little more than “housekeeping.”   This tension was summed up in the consultation as the difference between tidying the house and rebuilding its foundations. Reform UN80, if pursued only as a managerial exercise, risks repeating the pattern of previous reform cycles, which introduced efficiencies, but left underlying political dysfunction untouched. 1.2 Fidelity to the Charter narrative   What is missing, participants argued, is a compelling political narrative to accompany the reform. The reflection on the UN Charter emphasised that the institution’s legitimacy derives not from bureaucratic tidiness, but from fidelity to its founding ideals of peace, justice and collective security. Reform UN80 will be judged not by the number of reports eliminated or offices merged, but by whether it strengthens the UN’s ability to fulfil its Charter mandate in a 21st-century context. This requires more than efficiency. It requires political vision, linking reform to the UN’s core purpose of “freeing humanity from the scourge of war.” Without such a vision, the reform risks deepening cynicism within both member states and the Secretariat’s own staff.   1.3 Leadership and the Global South   Another concern is leadership. As pointed out, efficiency drives instil fear among staff when they are presented as across-the-board cuts rather than strategic choices. True reform requires leaders who can articulate priorities, protect the institution’s core functions and build confidence among member states. In this regard the Global South is presented with a unique opportunity. Instead of them being passive recipients of reform that is designed to appease Washington and/or Beijing, these Southern states can seize UN80 as a platform to demand inclusivity, equity and a stronger focus on peacebuilding. Moreover, by asserting their priorities in the reform agenda, they can help ensure that efficiency measures do not eclipse political renewal.   António Guterres Secretary-General of the Unted Nations [1]   2 BUDGETARY CHALLENGES: BETWEEN SURVIVAL AND STRATEGIC FOCUS   The financial crisis of the United Nations is not new, but the scale and persistence of the current crisis place the organisation in uncharted territory. The UN today faces chronic arrears, deliberate late payments and mounting demands from peace operations, humanitarian emergencies and global crises.   The Inclusive Society Institute consultation described the financial situation as “existential.” A briefing note underscored the gravity: as of 2024, the UN faced $2.4 billion in unpaid contributions to the regular budget and $2.7 billion in unpaid peacekeeping contributions. Of this, $1.5 billion was owed by the United States alone. With nearly half the UN’s budget tied to two major powers, the US and China, both of whom are increasingly unreliable payers, the risk of systemic collapse is real. 2.1 The political nature of the budget crisis   The consultation made clear that the UN’s financial problems are not simply technical, they are deeply political. It was argued that “the budget is not the problem, politics is the problem”. Arrears reflect member states’ political ambivalence toward the UN, particularly when they disagree with its actions or priorities. For example:   The US Congress has long used budget withholding as a tool to influence UN policies on Israel/Palestine, peacekeeping or human rights. China, while paying its dues in full, increasingly delays contributions until late in the financial year. Because of budget rules, these late payments cannot be programmed in time, creating artificial liquidity crises and often resulting in refunds.   This undermines not only cash flow, but also confidence in collective responsibility. Smaller states may ask why should they pay on time when the largest powers manipulate the system? 2.2 The mandate trap and budget strain   A critical link between finances and mandates was emphasised. The UN has accumulated over 40,000 standing mandates since 1946. Few have ever been retired, even when they are obsolete. The Secretariat remains obliged to produce reports, run offices and maintain activities that no longer reflect current priorities. This “mandate trap” stretches already limited resources across too many fronts, diluting impact and increasing perceptions of waste.   Reform UN80’s Mandate Implementation Review (MIR) could help rationalise this overload by pruning outdated mandates, but as participants cautioned, unless politically supported, such reviews risk stalling. Member states may resist letting go of mandates they perceive as symbolic victories, even if obsolete, because without discipline at the political level, the budgetary strain will persist.   2.3 Doing less, better   The consultation was unequivocal, saying that the UN cannot continue trying to “do more with less.” Instead, it must do less, but better. This requires a sharper focus on the organisation’s comparative advantages:   Norm-setting and compliance by maintaining and monitoring universal rules on human rights, development, climate and disarmament. Convening and coordination by bringing states and stakeholders together to generate collective responses. Political mediation and peacebuilding by serving as an impartial mediator in crises and by supporting post-conflict transitions.   Conversely, the UN should reduce and/or exit roles where others are better placed, such as, for example, large-scale operational development delivery that could be led by governments, NGOs or regional bodies, which reorientation would not be about downsizing for its own sake, but about applying strategic focus. 2.4 Reform proposals: Accountability and sustainability   The consultation and external commentaries converged on several possible reforms to enhance financial sustainability, which includes:   Linking payments and voting rights : Enforce Article 19 of the Charter, which suspends voting rights for members in arrears, more strictly and extend this principle to Security Council veto rights, where chronic non-payers would lose their ability to block Council action. Revising refund rules : End the practice of refunding late contributions that cannot be spent and instead, retain these funds for future programming. Stabilising peacekeeping finance : Consider assessed contributions to be channelled through regional organisations, such as the African Union, backed by predictable UN funding streams. Political narrative : Above all, strengthen the case for why the UN deserves funding and understanding that no amount of technical efficiency will secure resources without trust in the UN’s political legitimacy.   2.5 The risk of collapse   The consultation drew parallels to the collapse of the League of Nations, which faltered both financially and politically when its largest members refused to sustain it. The UN today faces similar risks. If arrears persist and mandates remain unreformed, the organisation could become hollowed out, be technically alive, but politically impotent.   Yet the UN also retains unique strengths. No other body has its universal membership, legitimacy in norm-setting or convening power. The challenge is to safeguard these by focusing resources strategically and by ensuring financial commitments are honoured. 2.6 Conclusion   The budgetary crisis is the canary in the coal mine for the UN’s future. It reveals the erosion of trust, the paralysis of collective responsibility and the unwillingness of powerful states to sustain the system they helped create. Reform UN80’s administrative measures are necessary, but insufficient. What is required is a political compact on finances, whereby member states must recommit to timely payment, mandate discipline and strategic prioritisation.   If the budget crisis is treated merely as an accounting problem, the UN will continue to limp from one liquidity crunch to the next. If it is treated as a political problem, requiring rules, enforcement and leadership, the organisation can regain stability. In short, fixing the UN’s budget is less about spreadsheets and more about political will. United Nations budget: Who has paid their dues? [2] 3 UNILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND THE RISE OF REGIONALISM   The United Nations was founded on the conviction that peace and security can only be sustained through collective action. The Charter narrative, as the consultation reminded us, was one of binding the use of force to universal rules, taming unilateral power through law and yet, at its 80th anniversary, the UN faces an erosion of this multilateral ethos. This is because states increasingly pursue unilateral and/or transactional arrangements, often sidelining the UN’s mechanisms.   The consultation convened by the Inclusive Society Institute warned that unilateralism, while it may deliver short-term bargains, undermines the foundations of sustainable peace. 3.1 The appeal and the limits of transactional unilateralism   Conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and Asia increasingly feature unilateral or mini-lateral deals, brokered by powerful states or regional actors that prioritise immediate stability or access to resources. These arrangements are pragmatic, but often fragile, because they avoid tackling root causes such as governance failures, inequality or exclusion.   The warning about “putting the cart before the horse” applies here. When quick deals are prioritised over long-term legitimacy, short-term stability may be achieved, but the cycle of conflict is likely to continue. The UN’s comparative advantage, namely sustained mediation and inclusive political frameworks, risks being eroded. 3.2 Multilateralism under pressure   The consultation stressed that the UN itself has contributed to the decline of multilateralism by under-investing in its peace and security role. As conflicts doubled over the past two decades, the organisation cut back on peacekeeping and underfunded political missions. The obsession with efficiency and cost-saving, driven by member state pressure, has left the UN less politically engaged at precisely the moment when engagement is most needed.   It was argued that the key challenge is to “operationalise multilateralism”, to make cooperation more than rhetoric, which meant investing in the tools of prevention, mediation and peacebuilding and not just in administrative reshuffles. Multilateralism must be tangible in outcomes, not only aspirational in speeches. 3.3 Regionalism: Substitute or complement?   As the UN’s authority weakens, regional organisations have stepped into the vacuum. The African Union (AU) has deployed peace operations in Somalia, the Sahel and elsewhere; ASEAN has mediated disputes in Southeast Asia; BRICS has positioned itself as a forum for alternative global governance. The consultation viewed this trend with nuance. On one hand, regionalism can act as a substitute when the UN fails to act. But on the other hand, it can serve as a complement to a UN that provides universal legitimacy and normative grounding.   The challenge is institutional design. Currently, UN - regional partnerships are ad hoc, improvised in crises. The mandate trap compounds this problem and the Secretariat is burdened with outdated obligations, leaving little bandwidth to invest in structured regional cooperation. To bring relief and create space for itself Reform UN80 could use the Mandate Implementation Review to prune obsolete obligations, freeing resources to deepen UN - AU frameworks. 3.4 The leadership vacuum   Underlying the drift towards unilateralism and the reliance on regionalism is a leadership vacuum. The UN Secretariat has become risk-averse, more focused on process than on problem-solving. Member states, especially great powers, prioritise national interests over collective responsibility. The result is that multilateralism is often invoked rhetorically, but rarely organised in practice.   Here too, external commentary reinforces the consultation. It was argued that trust and legitimacy must precede structural reform. Without leadership that inspires trust, no amount of efficiency will restore multilateralism and so the UN must demonstrate through practice, through operationalised missions and results that is, that multilateralism delivers. 3.5 Reclaiming multilateralism   The way forward a requires deliberate reinvestment in the UN’s political role, which should include, amongst others:   Strengthening preventive diplomacy by ensuring that political missions are given adequate funding and authority to act early in crises. Institutionalising UN - regional partnerships by creating standing arrangements with the AU, ASEAN and others for financing, planning and joint operations. Cultivating leadership for outcomes by appointing leaders that are willing to take risks, prioritise results over process and articulate a vision for collective action. Mandate discipline, which should include the retiring of obsolete mandates so the UN can focus on present conflicts and avoid spreading itself too thin. 3.6 Conclusion Unilateralism reflects not only the ambitions of powerful states, but also the weaknesses of multilateral institutions. If the UN is to reclaim its Charter promise, it must organise multilateralism, not merely proclaim it. This means freeing itself from outdated mandates, reinvesting in peace and security and institutionalising complementarity with regional organisations.   The consultation and external commentaries converge on the same lesson, namely that without leadership, legitimacy and political will, multilateralism risks becoming a hollow slogan. With them, however, the UN can still embody what one paricipant described as the Charter’s enduring narrative, namely that law, not unilateral power, should govern international relations.   United Nations Peacekeeping [3] 4 US - CHINA RIVALRY, SECURITY COUNCIL PARALYSIS AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH   Among the most destabilising forces in the current international system is the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, because for the United Nations, this rivalry is not an external factor, but a structural crisis, playing out directly within its institutions and paralysing its ability to fulfil its Charter mandate.   Participants attending the Inclusive Society Institute consultation emphasised that the effects of this rivalry are felt most acutely in the Security Council, but it also permeate the wider UN system. This assessment is reinforced by external analysis introduced into the discussion, which analysis highlights how geopolitical competition has transformed the UN into an arena of contestation, rather than a platform for consensus. 4.1 The dysfunction of the Security Council   The Security Council, which is intended to be the engine of collective security, has instead become the primary site of paralysis. US and Chinese positions, often compounded by Russian obstruction, have, for example, blocked decisive responses to conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, Gaza and beyond.   There is persistent gridlock in that resolutions are vetoed or watered down to meaninglessness and even humanitarian carve-outs, once considered non-controversial, are now hostage to great-power bargaining. There has been a decline of peacekeeping due to traditional UN peacekeeping authorisations that have all but ceased and instead, mandates are fragmented or outsourced to regional actors, often with weaker legitimacy and fewer resources. Legitimacy has been lost due to the Council’s inability to act on issues of mass violence, which has eroded confidence among member states and publics alike. This amounts to a betrayal of the Charter’s narrative, which promises that power would be restrained by law.   The consultation argued that without Council reform, no administrative or financial reforms will save the UN from irrelevance. 4.2 Competing models of reform   Several proposals for reforming the Security Council were raised:   Instead of endlessly debating which states deserve new permanent seats, allocate representation by region, where Africa, Asia, Latin America and other regions could hold rotating seats, ensuring inclusivity, while avoiding entrenched hierarchies. Introduce a qualified veto by restricting veto use to cases where proposed resolutions demonstrably contravene the Charter and in so doing, independent legal review, through the UN Office of Legal Affairs or advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, could introduce accountability. Or there could be hybrid approaches thereof, for example, expanded elected membership combined with regional representation and legal limits on the veto, could collectively enhance legitimacy and functionality.   These ideas echoed those in the briefing notes that were introduced into the consultations, which also argued that only bold innovation and not incremental tinkering, will allow the UN to adapt to multipolar realities. 4.3 Shifting influence of the United States and China   Beyond the Council, US and Chinese rivalry manifests across the UN system:   The United States  remains the single largest financial contributor, but increasingly uses budget leverage to constrain the organisation. Arrears and withholding are tools of political influence as much as fiscal policy. China  has expanded its influence and has become the second-largest contributor, has asserted leadership roles in specialised agencies and has positioned itself as a champion of South - South cooperation. But these advancements are also accompanied by concern that Beijing is seeking to align the UN norms with its own governance model.   This dynamic has transformed the UN into a battleground of narratives, with Washington framing itself as a defender of rules-based order and Beijing as a leader of equitable development; and for smaller states, the challenge has become how to navigate these competing visions without being marginalised.   4.4 Implications for the Global South   The consultation emphasised that US - China rivalry is both a risk and an opportunity for the Global South, because:   The South risks becoming an arena of competition, its conflicts instrumentalised by external powers and its priorities sidelined in the process. Rivalry creates strategic space in that just as some states leveraged the Cold War competition to secure aid and concessions, today’s Global South can use competition to advance its own priorities.   Three strategies were emphasised:   First, coalition-building by articulating collective positions through platforms such as the African Union, G77 or BRICS, Southern states can negotiate from strength rather than as isolated actors. Second, agenda-setting. The South must seize initiative by proposing its own frameworks for Security Council reform, financing rules and sustainable development. Waiting passively leaves space for great powers to impose their agendas. And third, leveraging multipolarity. In a world where no single hegemon dominates, the South has more room to assert its agency if it acts collectively. 4.5 Africa’s strategic role   Africa, in particular, emerged in the consultation as central to the future of UN reform. It accounts for the majority of active conflicts addressed by the UN, it contributes the largest number of uniformed peacekeepers, it is home to 54 member states, over a quarter of UN membership and yet it has no permanent seat on the Council.   This imbalance cannot be sustained. Reform UN80 provides an opportunity for Africa to demand regional representation in the Council, structured complementarity between the UN and the African Union and more equitable financial governance.   South Africa was singled out as especially well placed to lead. Its history of negotiated transition gives it symbolic authority, while its role in BRICS and the AU provides practical platforms for influence. As one participant put it, the Global South must not only seek inclusion, but lead in shaping reform. 4.6 Multipolarity and the Charter narrative   One of the analyses of the Charter narrative is instructive here. The Charter was meant to constrain great powers under law, ensuring that smaller states would not be permanently subordinated. The current paralysis of the Security Council is therefore not merely dysfunctional, it is a profound breach of the Charter’s spirit.   The Global South’s demand for reform is, at its core, a demand for fidelity to the Charter itself. The caution is again relevant in that structural reforms without political will mean little. Reform will only matter if it restores trust in the UN as an impartial forum of collective security. 4.7 Conclusion   The US - China rivalry is both the UN’s greatest challenge and, paradoxically, its greatest opportunity. It paralyses the Security Council, distorts agency agendas and corrodes trust in multilateralism. Yet, it also creates the conditions for the Global South, especially Africa, to assert a stronger role.   The consultation, reinforced by external analyses, points to a clear path, namely that bold innovation in Security Council reform, coalition-building by the South and leadership that reclaims the Charter’s promise that law, not power, governs the international system.   At 80, the jury is still out as to whether the UN will decide to remain a stage for great-power competition or whether it will evolve into a genuinely multipolar platform for collective security. 5 LEADERSHIP, ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE AND THE HUMAN FACTOR IN UN REFORM   Beyond mandates, budgets and geopolitics, the fate of UN reform ultimately rests on people. Those who lead the organisation, those who staff it and the cultures they inhabit. The Inclusive Society Institute consultation stressed that without a fundamental renewal of leadership and organisational ethos, even the most elegant reform packages will falter. External commentary echoes this. It cautions that reforms that focus on bureaucratic rearrangements without tackling political trust and leadership are “putting the cart before the horse”. 5.1 Politicisation of senior appointments   The UN’s leadership deficit is rooted in the politicisation of appointments, where senior positions are often awarded through bargaining among powerful states, rather than through meritocratic and transparent selection. This produces:   Variable quality when competence and vision is subordinated to nationality. When leaders feel beholden to their patron states, rather than the UN’s mandate, accountability may be compromised. A patronage culture is instilled when appointees replicate political logics in their own hiring, which perpetuates a cycle of politicisation.   One of the participants highlighted this directly when he cautioned that structural reforms cannot succeed without leadership accountability and warning that without changing how leaders are chosen and held to account, Reform UN80 will repeat past cycles of limited results. 5.2 A culture of risk aversion   The consultation with the UN experts identified a pervasive risk-averse culture that spread across the Secretariat, where leaders and staff are often more concerned with avoiding mistakes than they are with solving problems and this has manifested in:   Process obsession which has resulted in decision-making being slowed down by endless consultations and burdensome procedures. Political cautiousness, resulting in reluctance to act decisively for fear of antagonising powerful states. Conformity being rewarded with career advancement being linked to compliance, not innovation.   The “mandate trap” analysis mentioned earlier in the report reinforces this diagnosis and charges that the accumulation of thousands of outdated mandates has created a bureaucratic environment where staff are trapped in servicing obsolete processes, which leaves little space for creative problem-solving. The risk aversion is not just cultural, it is institutionalised through workload and reporting requirements. 5.3 Engineers, not only diplomats   The consultation proposed a cultural shift, namely that the UN must cultivate leaders who are not only diplomats, but also engineers of solutions, which would mean valuing leaders who:   Are prepared to take calculated risks in pursuit of results. Focus on innovation rather than to merely manage. Will hold themselves accountable to outcomes and not just procedural compliance. Ground their decisions in field realities and not just headquarter dictated  processes.   The Charter was not designed to create a self-perpetuating bureaucracy, but, rather, a living institution of political problem-solving and therefore leaders who embody this spirit are essential, if the UN is to remain true to its founding ideals. 5.4 Recruitment, talent and morale   A related concern is recruitment and staff morale. The UN was envisioned as a forum for the “best and brightest” from across the globe, however, today, politicisation, quota pressures and bureaucratic stagnation seem to limit diversity and innovation.   Reform proposals from the consultation and external analyses converged on the need for the UN to:   Broaden its recruitment pipelines beyond entrenched networks so as to ensure diversity of geography and expertise. Strengthen meritocracy by establishing independent search committees with public shortlists and performance-based contracts for senior officials. Encourage mobility be requiring senior staff to gain field experience, thereby ensuring a leadership hat is grounded in realities. Reward innovation by recognising risk-taking and creativity and not only compliance with procedure.   It was noted that leadership renewal cannot be separated from accountability and therefore, senior officials must be tied to measurable outcomes. Without such mechanisms, staff morale will continue to decline under cycles of reform fatigue and uncertainty. 5.5 Accountability and trust   Both the consultation and external sources converge on a central insight, namely that trust is the true currency of reform. It stresses that without political trust, structural or bureaucratic reform is meaningless and it therefore needs accountability mechanisms that restore confidence in leadership.   Recommendations include:   Binding performance contracts for senior officials. Independent oversight of leadership performance, with consequences for failure. Transparency in appointments to restore trust in impartiality.   Only by linking leadership to accountability can the UN cultivate the credibility necessary for member states to sustain it financially and politically. 5.6 Conclusion   Leadership and culture are the linchpins of UN reform. Politicised appointments, risk-averse culture and weak accountability have created an organisation that manages process, but struggles to deliver results. Reform UN80 will succeed only if it goes beyond administrative streamlining to address the human factor and moreover, who leads, how they are chosen, what culture they embody and how they are held accountable.   The ISI was reminded that the UN was designed as a political project of collective will, not as a technocratic machine, and that should warn us that efficiency without trust is hollow. Outdated mandates embed inefficiency and inertia and leadership accountability must be central.   Together, these insights affirm the consultation’s conclusion that without cultural renewal, even the most carefully designed reforms will falter. 6 IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA   The 80th anniversary of the United Nations is not only a global milestone, but a decisive moment for Africa. The continent is both a primary stakeholder in the UN and one of its most underrepresented voices. Africa hosts the majority of active conflicts on the UN agenda, provides the largest share of peacekeepers and absorbs a disproportionate share of humanitarian assistance. Yet, Africa has no permanent seat on the Security Council, limited influence in budgetary decisions and often finds its priorities overshadowed by great-power rivalries.   The Inclusive Society Institute consultation, reinforced by recent analyses, underscored that the success or failure of Reform UN80 will be judged most visibly on the continent. 6.1 Africa as the testing ground for UN relevance   The UN’s credibility is often tested in Africa. From the peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to humanitarian operations in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, Africa has been the proving ground for the UN’s capacity to deliver. Yet, repeated shortcomings, underfunded mandates, ambiguous missions and abrupt withdrawals, have left deep frustrations.   As was emphasised, this is not only a resource problem, but a political problem. Missions falter because they are shaped more by the interests of external powers than by the needs of African populations. For the UN to remain relevant, reform must prioritise political renewal in Africa, not just administrative reshuffles. 6.2 Security Council reform and Africa’s stake   Africa’s exclusion from permanent Security Council membership is the most glaring example of systemic inequity, because in spite of accounting for over a quarter of UN membership and the majority of peacekeeping mandates, Africa remains a bystander in the Council’s permanent decision-making.   Participants supported innovative proposals that could break the deadlock:   Regional representation , with the allocation Council seats to regions and allowing Africa to hold a permanent voice through rotational arrangements. Qualified veto restrictions , which will prevent the abuse of the veto by subjecting it to legal review under the Charter and hereby ensuring that Africa’s concerns are not perpetually blocked by great-power rivalries.   This aligns with the insights that affirm that the Charter was designed to prevent domination by the strongest and to guarantee universality of voice. Africa’s demand for Council reform is thus not only about representation, but also about fidelity to the Charter’s spirit of equality. 6.3 Complementarity with the African Union   The African Union (AU) has increasingly taken on peace and security roles where the UN has been absent or gridlocked, with examples that include AMISOM in Somalia and regional interventions in Mali, but AU missions often face crippling funding shortages.   The UN experts consulted stressed the need for structured complementarity between the UN and AU, which would require predictable financing arrangements, joint planning mechanisms and burden-sharing that respects both global legitimacy and regional ownership.   Here, the “mandate trap” analysis is relevant, because freeing the UN from outdated mandates could allow resources to be redirected into deeper partnerships with the AU, ensuring missions are fit for purpose and sustainable. 6.4 Financing reform and Africa’s leverage   The UN’s budget crisis affects Africa disproportionately, since many of its largest missions are based on the continent. When the US withholds funds or China delays payments, African operations are the first to suffer. $2.4 billion in arrears to the regular budget and $2.7 billion to peacekeeping, translates directly into resource gaps in African missions.   The consultation therefore suggested that Africa has a vested interest in budgetary reform. Proposals such as suspending veto rights for chronic non-payers or revising refund rules for late contributions are not abstract governance issues but immediate survival strategies for African operations. 6.5 South Africa’s role   South Africa, as one of Africa’s most prominent states, has both an opportunity and a responsibility to shape Reform UN80. Several avenues were highlighted:   South Africa can use its credibility as a mediator to convene African and Global South voices around a unified reform agenda. As a member of BRICS, South Africa can channel Southern perspectives into global reform debates, thereby ensuring that multipolarity does not marginalise Africa, but serves rather to empower it. By generating proposals on Security Council reform, financial accountability and UN - AU complementarity, South Africa’s role can move beyond advocacy to actual agenda-setting. South Africa’s negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy offers it symbolic weight when advocating for inclusive and negotiated solutions in the UN.   Unless Africa more broadly, and South Africa in particular, starts to insist on trust and political will before structure, the continent risks being sidelined by technocratic reforms that do not address its core concerns. 6.6 Risks of passivity   The greatest risk for Africa is passivity, because by doing nothing, the US - China rivalry could easily reduce the continent to an arena of competition, where its conflicts are instrumentalised and its priorities sidelined. That said, however, it should also be noted that the rivalry also creates strategic space in that by building coalitions through the AU, BRICS and other platforms, Africa can advance its own agenda and prevent being marginalised.   The Global South must not merely seek inclusion, but lead reform debates. For Africa, this means moving from the margins to the centre of UN reform, not as petitioners, but as co-authors of the future multilateral order. 6.7 Conclusion   Africa stands at the heart of the UN’s 80th anniversary reform debates given the continent’s disproportionate exposure to conflict and humanitarian crises, which is coupled with its systemic underrepresentation, thereby making it both the UN’s greatest stakeholder and its greatest test.   Reform UN80 will be judged in Africa. If reform strengthens Security Council representation, institutionalises UN - AU complementarity and stabilises financing, Africa stands to gain. If reform remains narrowly technocratic, the continent risks deeper neglect.   For South Africa, the opportunity is to act as a bridge and thought leader, turning rhetorical commitments into concrete proposals. By doing so, it can help ensure that Reform UN80 is not another cycle of administrative tinkering, but a genuine renewal of the Charter’s promise, namely that all voices, especially those of the Global South, matter in shaping international peace and security. President Cyril Ramaphose at the United Nations [4] 7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS   The UN at its 80th anniversary stands at a crossroads. It was founded on the bold promise of the Charter, to free humanity from the scourge of war, to affirm faith in rights and equality, and to ensure that power was restrained by law. As the meeting observed, the Charter is more than a legal instrument, it is a narrative of global hope and collective restraint, but that narrative is under unprecedented strain.   The Inclusive Society Institute consultation’s assessment is stark:   Reform UN80 is necessary, but insufficient, because whilst the streamlining of structures, the consolidation of offices and the cutting reports may improve efficiency, without political renewal these measures risk becoming a hollow exercise. Participants warned that focusing on bureaucracy without addressing legitimacy is “putting the cart before the horse”. The budget crisis is political, not technical. It was pointed out that arrears now exceed $5 billion, with the US responsible for $1.5 billion. This suggests that the matter is not merely about liquidity, but about political ambivalence as powerful states use finances as leverage. Unilateralism and mandate overload is eroding multilateralism, with 40,000 mandates weighing down the UN and this, combined with the rise of transactional unilateral deals, risks the UN being sidelined unless it operationalises multilateralism with real outcomes. Great-power rivalry paralyses the Security Council, but empowers the Global South, because whilst the US - China contest threatens to hollow out the UN, it also creates strategic space for Africa, BRICS and other Southern actors to assert leadership. The reforms will require a decisive leadership and culture. Moreover, politicised appointments, the risk-averse culture and the weak accountability within the UN system need to changes, because the current ways are undermining the UN’s ability to adapt. Without a shift to accountable and outcome-driven leadership, reforms will stall.   The choice is therefore stark: renewal or decline. Renewal requires courage, vision and fidelity to the Charter’s spirit. Decline will follow if reform remains technocratic and timid. 7.1 Recommendations   Based on the consultation and reinforced by external analysis, the following recommendations are advanced:   A. Re-anchor reform UN80 in the Charter’s promise Prioritise peace and security . Place political engagement, conflict prevention and mediation at the heart of Reform UN80, not just managerial restructuring. Connect reform to the Charter narrative . Efficiency should be framed not as an end in itself, but as a way to deliver on the Charter’s vision of peace, rights and justice.   B. Address the political nature of finances Arrears need to be linked to accountability . Enforce Article 19 suspensions more consistently and explore extending this principle to veto rights for chronic non-payers. End perverse refund rules . Retain late contributions for future programming instead of reimbursing them. Focus the budget on comparative advantage . Do less, better, concentrate resources on norm-setting, convening and mediation while scaling back duplicative delivery roles. C. Escape the mandate trap Mandate Implementation Review (MIR).  Use Reform UN80 to prune obsolete mandates. Without political discipline from member states, efficiency reforms will collapse under the weight of outdated obligations.   D. Rebuild multilateralism Operationalise multilateralism . Demonstrate its value through preventive diplomacy, political missions and field outcomes, not rhetoric. Institutionalise regional complementarity . Predictable financing and planning frameworks need o be established with the AU, ASEAN and others. E. Security Council reform Pursue regional representation . Break the deadlock on Council reform by allocating seats by region rather than states, with provisions for internal rotation so as to ensure inclusivity. Introduce a qualified veto , which restricts the use of the veto to cases which demonstrably contravene the Charter and such a veto should be subject to legal review. F. Leadership and organisational culture Depoliticise appointments . Create independent recruitment committees, introduce public shortlists and introduce performance contracts for senior leaders. Shift culture from process to outcomes . Promote leaders who innovate, take risks and deliver, and address the structural roots of risk-aversion by reducing reporting burdens and mandate overload.   G. Empower the Global South Move from inclusion to leadership . The South must not only demand seats at the table, but it should propose its own frameworks for reform. Leverage multipolar platforms .  Use the AU, G77 and BRICS to articulate collective positions and resist fragmentation by avoiding to be sucked in by the great-power rivalry.   H. Africa and South Africa Seize Africa’s central role .  Press for Council representation, predictable UN - AU financing and budget accountability. South Africa as thought leader .  Use its diplomatic credibility and platforms to bridge divides, articulate Southern perspectives and ensure Africa is not marginalised. 7.2 Final reflection   The UN at 80 faces a decisive choice. The organisation can continue to be hollowed out by arrears, unilateral deals and geopolitical rivalry, sliding toward the irrelevance that doomed the League of Nations or it can reclaim its Charter promise by focusing on peace and security, disciplining mandates, reforming finances, renewing leadership and amplifying the voices of the Global South.   The consultation and external analyses converge on one clear lesson, namely that technical reforms alone will not save the UN. What is required is political imagination, trust and courage. Reform UN80 will only succeed if it goes beyond efficiency to fidelity, that is fidelity to the Charter’s spirit of collective security, equality and justice.   If this challenge is met, the UN’s 80th anniversary will be remembered not as the beginning of decline, but as the rebirth of multilateralism for a multipolar century.   ANNEXURE 1   What is the aim of reform UN80?   Reform UN80 is framed by the Secretary-General as a comprehensive effort to modernise and streamline the United Nations system on the occasion of its 80th anniversary. At its core, the reform seeks to:   Enhance efficiency by reducing duplication across the Secretariat, consolidating structures and relocating some functions to lower-cost duty stations. Reduce administrative burden by cutting the excessive number of mandated reports required by the General Assembly and Security Council, many of which add little political value. Rationalise mandates through the proposed Mandate Implementation Review (MIR), which aims to prune thousands of outdated or duplicative mandates that date back decades.   However, the consultation and supporting analyses stress that the true aim of reform must go beyond managerial efficiency. Without political renewal, Reform UN80 risks being another cycle of bureaucratic housekeeping. The UN was created to prevent war and foster peace, unless reform strengthens its ability to mediate conflicts, engage in preventive diplomacy and uphold the Charter’s principles, it will not restore legitimacy.   Thus, the aim of Reform UN80 should not be narrowly understood as cost-saving or restructuring. Its deeper purpose must be to re-anchor the UN in its founding mission, ensuring that efficiency gains are harnessed to deliver political results, strengthen multilateralism and meet the expectations of member states and peoples in a multipolar world.   ANNEXURE 2   How does the UN solve its budget problem, given the withholding of funds by some (the USA in particular), coupled with increased peace missions and humanitarian crises?   The UN’s budget crisis is one of its most pressing existential challenges. The organisation currently faces billions of dollars in unpaid contributions, as of 2024, $2.4 billion in regular budget arrears and $2.7 billion in peacekeeping arrears, with the United States alone responsible for $1.5 billion. At the same time, demands on the UN are expanding, with a rising number of conflicts, complex humanitarian emergencies and peace operations.   The consultation concluded that this is not simply a financial problem, but a political one, since arrears and delayed payments are being deployed as deliberate tools of influence This is especially true for powerful states who create artificial liquidity crises, which then undermine trust and destabilise missions, particularly in Africa.   The UN can address this only through bold reforms by:   Ensuring   accountability for arrears by strictly enforcing Article 19 of the Charter, which provides for the suspension of voting rights for chronic non-payers, and consider linking veto powers in the Security Council to financial compliance. Revising financial rules to end the practice of refunding unspent late contributions and instead the funds should be retained for future programming in order to stabilise budgets. Introducing strategic prioritisation which adopts a “do less, better” approach, thereby focusing resources on areas of unique comparative advantage (norm-setting, convening and mediation), while reducing overstretched delivery roles. Changing the political narrative with the aim of rebuilding trust and legitimacy by connecting financial reforms to outcomes and showing member states that resources will translate into results.  In short, solving the budget problem requires political will, accountability mechanisms and strategic discipline, without which the UN risks following the League of Nations into irrelevance. ANNEXURE 3   What is the Secretary-General’s view concerning the growing trend towards unilateralism compared with the UN’s notion of multilateralism?   The Secretary-General’s consistent position is that unilateralism cannot substitute for multilateralism. And yet, transactional deals are often brokered by powerful states or coalitions. But while they may provide short-term stability, they fail to resolve the structural causes of conflict. Moreover, in developing the deals, key stakeholders are frequently excluded, which deals  then lack legitimacy and collapse once immediate incentives shift.   In contrast to the transactional deals, the UN’s commitment to multilateralism is grounded in its Charter and in the principle that collective action is the only sustainable basis for peace and security. The UN provides legitimacy, inclusivity and the capacity to mediate disputes impartially, attributes that unilateral or mini-lateral arrangements cannot replicate.   The consultation noted, however, that the UN has not lived up to this role. Years of underinvestment in peace and security, combined with the “mandate trap” of servicing outdated obligations, have left the organisation less engaged just as unilateralism has gained ground. The Secretary-General therefore urges member states to support reforms that operationalise multilateralism, not just invoke it rhetorically. This means:   Reinvesting in preventive diplomacy and political missions. Institutionalising partnerships with regional organisations, for example, the AU and ASEAN) to act as first responders within a global framework. Cultivating leadership that delivers outcomes, not just process.  The Secretary-General’s view is clear: multilateralism must be made tangible through results. Without this, the world will slide further toward fragmented unilateralism, undermining the very foundations of the UN system. ANNEXURE 4   Given the stand-off between the USA and China, how does the UN consider their changing influences and roles within the UN system? And what does this mean for the Global South?   The rivalry between the United States and China is reshaping the UN from within.   On the one hand, the United States , the UN’s the largest contributor, is using its arrears and late payments to exert influence and to weaken the UN’s financial stability in order to coerce support for its foreign policy interests. On the other hand, China, now the second-largest contributor, is expanding its leadership in UN agencies and presenting itself as a champion of South - South cooperation, while also promoting its own governance models.   This rivalry has paralysed the Security Council and is turning it into an arena of obstruction, where vetoes block action on crises from Syria to Ukraine and beyond. Furthermore, it also polarises the broader UN debates, as each side seeks to advance their own competing visions of world order.   For the Global South, this rivalry presents both risks and opportunities, in that the South could either be reduced to a passive arena for great-power competition, with its conflicts instrumentalised and its priorities sidelined or it could tactically use the multipolarity to creates space for its own agency. By building coalitions through the African Union, BRICS, G77 and other platforms, the South can articulate and advance its own reform agenda and it can leverage rivalry to extract commitments and ensure its voices are central.   Africa stands at the centre of this dynamic. It is the testing ground for the UN’s legitimacy, the largest contributor of peacekeepers and yet systemically underrepresented in decision-making. Reform UN80 provides an opportunity to press for regional representation on the Council, predictable UN - AU financing and a stronger African voice in governance.   For South Africa in particular, this moment is pivotal. As a bridge between Africa, the Global South, and emerging powers, it has both moral authority and strategic positioning to shape the reform agenda. The implication is clear: if Africa and the South act collectively and proactively, they can turn great-power rivalry from a risk into a historic opportunity for influence. Top of Form   [1]  United Nations (n.d.) Secretary-General speaking at a media briefing  [Photograph]. UN Cyprus Talks. Available at: https://uncyprustalks.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_width_image/public/field/image/sg3.jpg (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under fair dealing in South Africa. No permission obtained. [2]  Statista via Newsweek (n.d.) United Nations member contributions to UN budget  [Infographic]. Available at: https://d.newsweek.com/en/full/1534981/unites-nations-member-contributions-statista.jpg?w=1200&f=d66b63c5cbd3385e0117d0e131988928 (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under fair dealing (review/reporting purposes) in accordance with South African law; permission not secured. [3]  United Nations (n.d.) UN peacekeepers at the 2023 Ghana Ministerial  [Photograph]. United Nations Peacekeeping. Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/styles/1200x500/public/field/image/ghana_ministerial.jpeg?itok=MLjHVz3B (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under South African fair dealing (reporting/commentary). No permission obtained. [4]  United Nations (2023) Speaker at the UN General Assembly, 2023 UN General Debate  [Photograph]. United Nations General Assembly. Available at: https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/styles/max_1300x1300/public/2023-09/un71000505.jpg?itok=dzDGdPF_ (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under South African fair dealing for reporting/commentary on current events. No permission obtained.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

What We Do POLICY RESEARCH & ANALYSIS Research to develop and analyse public policy, and assess its implementation CIVIC EDUCATION Civic education aimed at promoting democratic participation, good citizenry and the values espoused by the institute DIALOGUE EVENTS Organise dialogue events aimed at engaging the broader public, policy experts and the political establishment, civil society and sectoral interest groups in policy development and democratic processes PUBLICATIONS Produce publications on politics, public policy and civil issues INTERNATIONAL & MULTILATERAL COOPERATION Facilitate international & multi-lateral cooperation between like-minded political and civil-society organizations to advance the value system and ideas advocated by the institute DEMOCRACY TRAINING Undertake training programmes aimed at equipping political and civil-society formations to fulfill their democratic responsibilities effectively

POPI Policy Protection of personal information policy 1. Policy statement 1.1. The Inclusive Society Institute processes personal information of its employees, members, clients, suppliers, and other data subjects from time to time. As such, it is obliged to comply with the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013 (“POPIA”) as well as the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000 (“PAIA”). 1.2 In line with this, the Inclusive Society Institute is committed to protecting its members’/clients’/supplier’s/employees’ and other data subjects’ privacy and ensuring that their personal information is used appropriately, transparently, securely and in accordance with applicable laws. 1.3 This Policy sets out the manner in which the Inclusive Society Institute deals with such personal information and provides clarity on the general purpose for which the information is used, as well as how data subjects can participate in this process in relation to their personal information. 1.4 In addition to this policy, the institute has also developed a manual and made it available as prescribed under the PAIA Act. Where parties/requesters submit requests for information disclosure in terms of this manual, internal measures have been developed, together with adequate systems to process requests for information or access thereto. 2. Objectives 2.1. To ensure legislative compliance (POPIA and PAIA ) in respect of all personal information that the Inclusive Society Institute collects and processes. 2.2. To inform employees and clients as to how their personal information is used, disclosed and destroyed. 2.3. To ensure that personal information is only used for the purpose for which it was collected. 2.4. To prevent unauthorised access to and use of personal information. 3. Definitions 3.1. “Biometric information” means the physical, physiological, or behavioural identification, including finger printing, amongst others. 3.2. “Processing” means: 3.2.1. The collection, receipt, recording organisation, collation, storage, updating, modification, retrieval, alteration, consultation or use; 3.2.2. Dissemination by means of transmission, distribution or making available in any form; 3.2.2. Merging, linking, erasure or destruction of information. 3.3. “PAIA” means the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000. 3.4. “POPIA” means the Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013. 3.5. “Regulator” means the Information Regulator established in terms of POPIA. 4. Collection of personal information 4.1. The Inclusive Society Institute collects and processes various items of information pertaining to its employees, members, clients, suppliers and other data subjects. The information collected is based on need and it will be processed for that need/purpose only. Whenever possible, the Inclusive Society Institute will inform the relevant party of the information required (mandatory) and which information is deemed optional. 4.2. The employee, member or client will be informed of the consequence/s of failing to provide such personal information and any prejudice which may be incurred due to non-disclosure. For example, the Inclusive Society Institute may not be able to employ an individual without certain personal information relating to that individual or the organisation may not be in a position to render services to a client in the absence of certain information which is required. 4.3. The Inclusive Society Institute will process information in a manner that is lawful and reasonable (i.e., will not infringe the privacy of the individual or company). 4.4. Where consent is required for the processing of information, such consent will be obtained. 4.5. Information will be processed under the following circumstances: 4.5.1. When carrying out actions for the conclusion or performance of a contract; 4.5.2. When complying with an obligation imposed by law on the Institute; 4.5.3. For the protection of a legitimate interest of the data subject; 4.5.4. Where necessary, for pursuing the legitimate interests of the Institute or of an authorised third party to whom the information is supplied. 4.6. Examples of the personal information the Inclusive Society Institute collects includes, but is not limited to: 4.6.1. Information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of an employee; 4.6.2. Information relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal or employment history (this includes disciplinary action) of an employee; 4.6.3. Banking and account information; 4.6.4. Contact information; 4.6.5. Trade union membership and political persuasion; 4.6.6. Any identifying number, symbol, email address, telephone number, location information, online identifier or other particular assignment related to the employee, member or client; 4.6.7. The biometric information of the employee, member, client or data subject; and 4.6.8. The personal opinions, views or preferences of an employee (also performance appraisals or correspondence) and the views or opinions of another individual about the person. 4.7. The Inclusive Society Institute shall not process special personal information without complying with the specific provisions of the POPI Act. Special information includes personal information concerning: 4.7.1. the religious or philosophical beliefs, race or ethnic origin, trade union membership, political persuasion, health, sex life or biometric information of a data subject; or 4.7.2. the criminal behaviour of a data subject, where such information relates to the alleged commission by a data subject of any offence committed or the disposal of such proceedings 4.8. Collection of employee information: 4.8.1. For the purposes of this Policy, employees include potential, past and existing employees of the Inclusive Society Institute. Independent contractors are treated on the same basis where the collection of information is concerned. 4.8.2. When appointing new employees/contractors, the Inclusive Society Institute requires information, including, but not limited to that listed above, from prospective employees/contractors, in order to process the information on the system/s. Such information is reasonably necessary for the Institute’s record purposes, as well as to ascertain if the prospective employee/contractor meets the requirements, for the position which he/she is being appointed to/contracted for and is suitable for appointment. 4.8.3. The Inclusive Society Institute will use and process such employee information, as set out below, for purposes including, but not limited to, its employment records and to make lawful decisions in respect of that employee and its business. 4.8.4. Use of employee information: Employees’ personal information will only be used for the purpose for which it was collected and intended. This includes, but is not limited to: 4.8.4.1. Submissions to the Department of Labour; 4.8.4.2. Submissions to the Receiver of Revenue; 4.8.4.3. For audit and recordkeeping purposes; 4.8.4.4. In connection with legal proceedings; 4.8.4.5. In connection with and to comply with legal and regulatory requirements; 4.8.4.6. In connection with any administrative functions of the Institute; 4.8.4.7. Disciplinary action or any other action to address the employee’s conduct or capacity; 4.8.4.8. In respect of any employment benefits that the employee is entitled to; 4.8.4.9. Pre- and post-employment checks and screening; and 4.8.4.10. Any other relevant purpose of which the employee has been notified. 4.8.5. Should information be processed for any other reason; the employee will be informed accordingly. Collection of 4.9. Collection of Member/Client/Supplier information: 4.9.1. For purposes of this Policy, clients include potential, past and existing members and clients. Suppliers include all vendors which contract with the Inclusive Society Institute, whether once off or recurring, in respect of products and services. 4.9.2. The Inclusive Society Institute collects and processes its members’, clients’ and suppliers’ personal information, such as that mentioned hereunder. The type of information will depend on the need for which it is collected and will be processed for that purpose only. Further examples of personal information collected from clients include, but is not limited to: 4.9.3. The Inclusive Society Institute also collects and processes member/clients’ personal information for marketing purposes in order to ensure that its products and services remain relevant to its clients and potential clients. 4.9.4. Use of member/client/supplier information: 4.9.4.1. The member/client/supplier’s personal information will only be used for the purpose for which it was collected and as agreed. This may include, but not be limited to: 4.9.4.2. Providing products or services to members/clients; 4.9.4.3. In connection with sending accounts and communication to a member/client in respect of services rendered; 4.9.4.4. Payment of suppliers and communication in respect of services rendered; 4.9.4.5. Referral to other service providers; 4.9.4.6. Confirming, verifying and updating member/client/supplier details; 4.9.4.7. Conducting market or customer satisfaction research; 4.9.4.8. For audit and record keeping purposes; 4.9.4.9. In connection with legal proceedings; and 4.9.4.10. In connection with and to comply with legal and regulatory requirements or when it is otherwise allowed by law. 4.10. Disclosure of personal information 4.10.1. The Inclusive Society Institute may share employees’ and member/clients/suppliers’ personal information with authorised third parties as well as obtain information from such third parties for reasons set out above. 4.10.2. The Inclusive Society Institute may also disclose employees’ or member/clients/suppliers’ information where there is a duty or a right to disclose in terms of applicable legislation, the law or where it may be necessary to protect the rights of the organisation or it is in the interests of the data subject. 5. Safeguarding of personal information and consent 5.1. The Inclusive Society Institute shall review its security controls and processes on a regular basis to ensure that personal information is secure. 5.2. It will take appropriate, reasonable technical and organisational measures to prevent loss or damage or unauthorised destruction of personal information, and unlawful access to or processing of personal information. This will be achieved by – 5.2.1. Identifying internal and external risks; 5.2.2. Establishing and maintaining appropriate safeguards; 5.2.3. Regularly verifying these safeguards and their implementation; 5.2.4. Updating the safeguards; and 5.2.5. Implementing generally accepted information security practices and procedures. 5.3. The Inclusive Society Institute shall appoint an Information Officer and Deputy Information Officer who is/are responsible for compliance with the conditions of the lawful processing of personal information and other provisions of POPIA. 5.3.1. Information Officer details 5.3.1.1. Information Officer Name: Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer Telephone number: 021 201 1589 Postal address: P O Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010 Physical address: 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square, Cape Town, 8001 Email address: ceo@inclusivesociety.org.za 5.3.1.2. Deputy Information Officer Name: Edwin Mc Queen, Corporate Services Officer Telephone number: 021 201 1589 Postal address: P O Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010 Physical address: 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square , Cape Town, 8001 Email address: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za 5.4. The specific responsibilities of the Information Officer and his/her Deputy include – 5.4.1. The development, implementation, monitoring and maintenance of a compliance framework; 5.4.2. The undertaking of a personal information impact assessment to ensure that adequate measures and standards exist in order to comply with the conditions for the lawful processing of personal information; 5.4.3. The development, monitoring and maintenance of a manual, as well as the making available thereof, as prescribed in section 51 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 of 2000); 5.4.4. The development of internal measures, together with adequate systems, to process requests for information or access thereto; and 5.4.5. To ensure that Institute staff awareness sessions are conducted regarding the provisions of the Act, regulations made in terms of the Act, codes of conduct, or information obtained from the Regulator. 5.5. Employment contracts/addendums thereto, containing relevant consent clauses for the use and storage of employee information, or any other action so required, in terms of POPIA, must be signed by every employee. 5.6. On an ongoing basis, all suppliers, insurers and other third-party service providers are required to sign a service level agreement guaranteeing their commitment to the Protection of Personal Information. 5.7. Consent to process client/member/supplier information is obtained from clients/members (or a person who has been given authorisation from the client/member to provide the client/member’s personal information) and suppliers at sign on/appointment/contracting. 6. Direct marketing 6.1. The institute shall ensure that: 6.1.1. It does not process any personal information for the purpose of direct marketing (by means of any form of electronic communication, including automatic calling machines, SMS’s or e-mail) unless the data subject has given his, her or its consent to the processing, or is an existing customer. 6.1.2. It will only approach data subjects, whose consent is required and who have not previously withheld such consent, once in order to request the consent. This will be done in the prescribed manner and form. 6.1.3. The data subjects will only be approached for the purpose of direct marketing of the Inclusive Society Institute’s own products or services. In all instances, the data subject shall be given a reasonable opportunity to object, free of charge and in a manner free of unnecessary formality, to such use of his, her or its electronic details at the time when the information is collected. 6.1.4. Any communication for the purpose of direct marketing will contain details of the identity of the sender or the person on whose behalf the communication has been sent and an address or other contact details to which the recipient may send a request that such communications cease. 7. Transfer of information outside of South Africa 7.1. The Inclusive Society Institute will not transfer personal information about a data subject to a third party who is in a foreign country unless one or more of the following apply: 7.1.1. the third party is subject to a law, binding corporate rules or a binding agreement which provides an adequate level of protection of personal information and effectively upholds principles for reasonable processing of the information; 7.1.2. the data subject consents to the transfer; 7.1.3. the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the Institute; 7.1.4. the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the Institute and a third party; or 7.1.5. the transfer is for the benefit of the data subject, and it is not reasonably practicable to obtain the consent of the data subject to that transfer and if it were reasonably practicable to obtain such consent, the data subject would be likely to give it. 8. Recording systems 8.1. Video footage and/or voice/telephone calls that have been recorded, processed and stored constitute personal information. As such the Inclusive Society Institute will make all employees, members, clients or data subjects aware as to the use of any recording systems. 9. Security breaches 9.1. Should the Inclusive Society Institute detect a security breach on any of its systems that contain personal information, it shall take the required steps to assess the nature and extent of the breach in order to ascertain if any information has been compromised. 9.2. The Inclusive Society Institute shall notify the affected parties should it have reason to believe that their information has been compromised. Such notification shall only be made where the organisation can identify the data subject to which the information relates. Where it is not possible it may be necessary to consider website publication and whatever else the Information Regulator prescribes. 9.3. Notification will be provided in writing by means of either: 9.3.1. Email; 9.3.2. registered mail; or 9.3.3. the organisation’s website 9.4. The notification shall provide the following information where possible: 9.4.1. Description of possible consequences of the breach; 9.4.2. Measures taken to remedythe breach; 9.4.3. Recommendations to be taken by the data subject to mitigate adverse effects; and 9.4.4. The identity of the party responsible for the breach. 9.5. In addition to the above, the Inclusive Society Institute shall notify the Regulator of any breach and/or compromise to personal information in its possession and work closely with and comply with any recommendations issued by the Regulator. 9.6. The following will apply in this regard: 9.6.1. The Information Officer will be responsible for overseeing the investigation; 9.6.2. The Information Officer will be responsible for reporting to the Information Regulator within 3 working days of a breach/ compromise to personal information; 9.6.3. The Information Officer will be responsible for reporting to the Data Subject(s) within 3 working days, as far as is reasonable and practicable, of a breach/ compromise to personal information. 9.6.4. The timeframes above are guidelines and depending on the merits of the situation may require earlier or later reporting. 10. Access and correction of personal information 10.1. Employees and members/clients have the right to request access to any personal information that the Inclusive Society Institute holds about them. 10.2.Employees and members/clients have the right to request the Inclusive Society Institute to update, correct or delete their personal information on reasonable grounds. Such requests must be made to the Information Officer (see details above) or to the Inclusive Society Institute’s head office (see details below). 10.3. Where an employee or member/client objects to the processing of their personal information, the Inclusive Society Institute may no longer process said personal information. The consequences of the failure to give consent to process the personal information must be set out before the employee or client confirms his/her objection. 10.4. The member/client or employee must provide reasons for the objection to the processing of his/her personal information. 10.4.1 Head office details 10.4.2 Name: Inclusive Society Institute 10.4.3 Telephone number: 021 201 1589 10.4.4 Postal address: Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010 10.4.5 Physical address: 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square , Cape Town, 8001 10.4.6 Email address: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za 11. Retention of records 11.1. The Inclusive Society Institute is obligated to retain certain information, as prescribed by law. This includes but is not limited to the following: 11.1.1. With regard to the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 and the Companies Amendment Act No. 3 of 2011, hard copies of the documents mentioned below must be retained for 7 years: 11.1.2. Any documents, accounts, books, writing, records or other information that a company is required to keep in terms of the Act; 11.1.3. Notice and minutes of all meetings, including resolutions adopted; 11.1.4. Copies of reports presented at the annual general meeting; and 11.1.5. Copies of annual financial statements required by the Act and copies of accounting records as required by the Act. 11.2. The Basic Conditions of Employment Act No. 75 of 1997, as amended, requires the organisation to retain records relating to its staff for a period of no less than 3 years. 12. Amendments to this policy 12.1. Amendments to this Policy will take place from time to time subject to the discretion of the Inclusive Society Institute and pursuant to any changes in the law. Such changes will be brought to the attention of employees, members and clients where it affects them. 13. Requests for information 13.1. In terms of requests to be processed under POPIA, the following forms shall be used – 13.1.1. Objection to the processing of personal information – a data subject who wishes to object to the processing of personal information in terms of section 11(3)(a) of the Act, must submit the objection to the responsible party. 13.1.2. Request for correction or deletion of personal information or destruction or deletion of record of personal information – a data subject who wishes to request a correction or deletion of personal information or the destruction or deletion of a record of personal information in terms of section 24(1) of the Act, must submit a request to the responsible party. 13.1.3. Request for data subject’s consent to process personal information – a responsible party who wishes to process the personal information of a data subject for the purpose of direct marketing by electronic communication must submit a request for written consent to that data subject. 13.1.4. Submission of complaint – Any person who wishes to submit a complaint contemplated in section 74(1) of the Act must submit such a complaint to the Regulator on Part I of Form 5. A responsible party or a data subject who wishes to submit a complaint contemplated in section 74(2) of the Act must submit such a complaint to the Regulator on Part II. 13.2. In terms of requests for information under PAIA, the provisions of the PAIA Sec 51 Manual must be complied with. 13.3. Any requests and/ or advice can be directed to the Information Officer set out in this policy and in the Sec 51 PAIA manual.

About Us zkhiphani.co.za The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever-transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. Whilst the institute undertakes research through the lens of social and national democratic values and principles, it is pragmatic, not dogmatic, in its approach.