Read the full Occasional Paper by downloading the PDF below. PUBLICATION INFORMATION Title: South Africa’s Population Dynamics, Economic Growth, and Employment Prospects, 2030–2045 Authors: Shamsunisaa Miles-Timotheus and Pedzisai Ndagurwa, PhD Publication type: Occasional Paper Publication date: September 2026 PUBLISHED BY Inclusive Society Institute | NPO Registration: 235-515 5 High Cape House, 21 Ben Avenue, Vredehoek, Cape Town, 8001, South Africa PO Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010, South Africa Tel: +27 (0)21 201 1589 | Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za | Website: www.inclusivesociety.org.za COPYRIGHT © 2026 Inclusive Society Institute. Unless otherwise expressly indicated, copyright in this publication is owned exclusively by the Inclusive Society Institute. All rights reserved. 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SOUTH AFRICA’S POPULATION DYNAMICS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS 2030–2045 by Shamsunisaa Miles-Timotheus and Pedzisai Ndagurwa (Ph.D.) Abstract This paper conducts a series of population projections for South Africa and use these projected populations as a base to estimate potential labour market outcomes, namely, unemployment rates, number of employed and the number of the unemployed. Population projections were based on the cohort component method (CCM), making use of a set of fertility, mortality and migration assumptions. The projections of labour market outcomes are conducted based on a set of gross domestic product (GDP) growth assumptions and Okun’s Law coefficients. The Okun coefficients, which measure the unemployment rate elasticity of GDP growth, included an empirically derived coefficient and three imposed coefficients. The results show that South Africa’s population and working-age population will continue to grow across all fertility and mortality scenarios, thereby substantially expanding the labour force. Employment growth over the projection period will likely be insufficient to absorb new entrants to the labour market. Under the empirical Okun scenarios, unemployment remains persistently high, with only marginal differences observed between low (1%), moderate (2.5%), and high (4%) economic growth trajectories. Improved employment responsiveness leads to gradual declines in unemployment rates; however, even under the most favourable conditions, unemployment remains above 30% by 2045. Importantly, the number of unemployed individuals increases across all scenarios, reflecting the scale of labour-supply pressures. The findings highlight that a weak relationship between economic growth and employment in South Africa will result in persistent high unemployment rates and point to the need for addressing the underlying structural nature of unemployment. While demographic change influences the scale of the challenge, it does not resolve the imbalance between labour supply and demand. The study concludes that addressing unemployment will require not only sustained economic growth but also structural reforms to enhance labour absorption. Keywords: South Africa, Population projections, Employment projections, Unemployment, Economic growth, Okun’s Law, Cohort-component method, Working-age population, Labour absorption, Demographic dividend 1. Introduction South Africa’s development path is influenced by both demographic change and economic performance. As a middle-income country facing high unemployment, understanding how these forces interact has become increasingly important for long-term planning. On the one hand, the country has experienced a sustained decline in fertility over recent decades, reflecting increased urbanisation, expanded access to education, and greater use of modern contraception. On the other hand, population momentum continues to drive growth in the absolute size of the population, particularly within the working‑age population. At the same time, South Africa’s economy has recorded persistently low growth rates since the early 2010s, limiting its capacity to generate employment. The coexistence of a growing labour supply and weak demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour has resulted in one of the highest unemployment rates globally. Most analyses of South Africa’s future labour‑market prospects examine either demographic change or economic growth in isolation, rather than integrating the two, as seen in OECD, (2025), van Aardt et al. (2026) and Statistics South Africa (2023). Population projections are typically used to anticipate future demand for services, infrastructure, and social protection, while employment projections often rely on macroeconomic assumptions that treat population trends as fixed or implicit (Buettner, 2022). This separation obscures the fundamental interaction between population dynamics and labour‑market outcomes. Population growth and age structure shape the supply of labour, while economic growth determines the economy’s ability to absorb that labour into productive employment. From a theoretical perspective, this interaction is central to the concept of the demographic dividend, which emphasises that favourable age structures yield economic gains under the right conditions (Bloom et al., 2003). This paper seeks to bridge this analytical gap by integrating cohort‑component population projections with employment projections based on a dynamic version of Okun’s Law and a constrained imposed coefficient. By jointly considering demographic and economic scenarios, the paper provides a more comprehensive assessment of South Africa’s employment prospects over the medium to long-term. Specifically, the paper addresses the following questions: How will South Africa’s population and working‑age population evolve between 2025 and 2045 under alternative fertility assumptions? What will be the employment and unemployment rates for the given GDP growth scenarios? The paper makes three main contributions. First, it provides transparent population projections based on explicit fertility assumptions, highlighting the uncertainty in South Africa’s demographic future. Second, it applies a dynamic Okun’s Law framework to project employment outcomes under alternative growth paths. Third, it combines these elements to generate a scenario matrix that links demographic and economic trajectories, offering policy‑relevant insights for long‑term planning. 2. Demographic and economic context South Africa is situated in the later stages of the demographic transition, characterised by low fertility and mortality alongside continued population growth driven by demographic momentum. Total fertility has fallen substantially from levels above five children per woman in the mid‑twentieth century to around replacement level in recent years. Despite this decline, population growth has not halted. This is because the large cohorts born during earlier periods of higher fertility are now entering or already in the working-age years, creating both opportunities for economic growth and challenges in employment absorption. The working‑age population (15-64 years) is particularly important for economic development, as it represents the potential labour supply. In theory, an increasing share of the working‑age population can generate a demographic dividend in a context with sufficient job creation, skills development, and supportive institutions. In practice, South Africa has struggled to turn this potential into meaningful economic gains. Structural constraints, skills mismatches, and slow economic growth have limited employment creation, resulting in widespread unemployment and underemployment. From an economic perspective, South Africa’s growth performance since the global financial crisis of 2009 has been subdued. Average GDP growth has remained well below the levels required to meaningfully reduce unemployment, averaging 1.3% annually between 2009 and 2025 (World Bank, 2026). While short‑term cyclical factors have played a role, structural issues, including energy constraints, weak investment, and institutional challenges, have constrained growth. Consequently, employment growth has lagged labour‑force growth, particularly among young people. The literature on employment dynamics often draws on Okun’s Law, which posits a negative relationship between economic growth and unemployment. While the strength of this relationship varies across countries and over time, it provides a useful framework for linking macroeconomic performance to labour‑market outcomes. In the South African context, studies have found that the relationship between GDP growth and unemployment is inconsistent (Chiranga et al., 2025). This is consistent with evidence across African countries, where the relationship between growth and unemployment is often weak or absent due to structural or labour market factors (Ibourk & Elayaoui, 2024). Nonetheless, Okun‑type relationships remain valuable for scenario analysis and long‑term projections. 3. Methodology I: Population projections The gold standard method for projecting populations into the future is the cohort-component method (Ernst et al., 2023; Smith et al., 2013). The cohort-component method (CCM) is a well-established formal demographic technique for estimating future population sizes, taking into consideration empirically derived assumptions about fertility, mortality and migration (Preston et al., 2001). The procedure for CCM involves three main steps. First, starting with a current snapshot of the population, broken down by age and sex, we project to the next five years, by forward-surviving each age group by sex, to obtain the number of each cohort that will be alive by the fifth year. Second, we estimate the number of children who will be born alive to women aged 15-49 years over the next five years and add them to the population. Finally, we estimate the net migration for the population by subtracting the total number of people who move out of South Africa and adding those who will move into the country. The base population for the projections is the 2025 mid‑year population estimates for South Africa, disaggregated by five‑year age groups and sex. The projections extend to 2045, with results reported for the years 2030, 2035, 2040, and 2045. 3.1 Fertility assumptions Three alternative fertility scenarios were specified to reflect uncertainty about future fertility trends, namely low-fertility, medium, and high-fertility. The low‑fertility scenario assumes a continued downward trend in fertility, with the total fertility rate (TFR) declining to approximately 1.0 by 2045. The medium‑fertility scenario assumes a more moderate decline, with TFR reaching approximately 1.8 in 2045, representing a realistic continuation of recent trends. The high‑fertility scenario assumes that the TFR remains constant at around 2.26, a situation known in demographic literature as a stalled fertility trend. Fertility declines are projected based on the current TFR of 2.26. To project future fertility, the current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) are scaled down until they are consistent with a target TFR while maintaining the age distribution of fertility. The sex ratio at birth is assumed to be 105 males for every 100 female births. 3.2 Mortality The standard life table approach was used to derive the mortality experiences of the population of South Africa. The population data for the life table were obtained from the 2022 census, and the counts of deaths were obtained from the latest death registration data, which includes all 2022 deaths, including late registrations that were captured in 2023. It is noteworthy that the 2022 census had the highest undercount rates ever recorded in South Africa post-1994, and quality concerns were acknowledged by Statistics South Africa on some of its data, such as fertility. However, the census remains the only data source for national population data. Furthermore, the post-enumeration survey (PES) conducted shortly after each national census has been found to be effective in generating adjustment factors for calibrating final census counts (Gumbo, 2016). Three mortality scenarios were assumed for the projections. The first scenario was the current mortality level based on real data. This was considered a high-mortality scenario, based on 2022 deaths, a period affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The second scenario assumed a medium mortality level, with improvements in mortality to a magnitude of 10% reduction in the number of deaths at each age from the current level. The third scenario assumed a low mortality level, assuming 20% reduction in the number of deaths at each age from the current level. 3.3 Migration Migration is an important component of the population dynamics of South Africa, as it is one of the major destinations on the African continent for international migrants. Over the last intercensal period, 2011-2022, South Africa had an annual average net migration rate (NMR) of 2.9 per 1,000, that is, a net gain (arrivals minus departures) of roughly three persons for every 1,000 people in the country. Net migration was assumed to be constant over the projection period at approximately 56,000 persons per year, reflecting the estimated net migration level observed in the 2022 census. Most migrants entering South Africa are concentrated in the 20-39 age group, and this age distribution is assumed to remain constant throughout the projection period. In the projection process, net migration is incorporated after the population has been aged forward using survival method and after births have been accounted for. 4. Methodology II: Employment projections using Okun’s Law Employment and unemployment projections were conducted using Okun’s Law coefficient, which relates changes in unemployment to changes in gross domestic product (GDP), allowing for lagged effects. It is traced to Okun (1962) who observed an inverse association between unemployment and GDP over short-term periods. In his seminal work, Okun (1962) found that a three-percentage increase in GDP was inversely associated with a one-percentage point decrease in unemployment rate. Some studies conducted after Okun’s seminal work have also confirmed the inverse relationship between GDP shifts and unemployment (Prachowny, 1993; Boďa, & Považanová, 2025). In Other studies, such as by Blackley (1991), this relationship was found to be closer to two-percentage points increase in GDP being associated with one-percentage point decrease in unemployment. Applications of the dynamic version of Okun’s Law specify an empirical GDP-employment relationship that allows for time lags and past trends, allowing for the quantification of the relationship in a temporal continuum (Aguiar‑Conraria, Martins & Soares, 2020). In this study, the dynamic Okun’s coefficient was estimated using an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model. The dynamic Okun is an improvement on the static version which assumes only immediate employment responses to GDP shifts. To obtain the long‑run dynamic Okun coefficient, the sum of short‑run effects is divided by a persistence factor, calculated as one minus the coefficient on lagged unemployment, which accounts for the dependence of unemployment on its past values. The resulting measure represents the long‑run responsiveness of unemployment to GDP shifts, which captures a more structurally accurate understanding of the relationship between economic growth (or decrease, stagnation) and labour market outcomes over time. In this study, the dynamic Okun coefficient was estimated using GDP and employment data from the 2009-2025 period. It is noteworthy that the empirically derived Okun coefficient for South Africa for the period 2009 to 2025, including the COVID-19 pandemic period, contradicted theoretical Okun assumptions, producing a positive coefficient of 0.0193. To mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the GDP-unemployment relationship, the empirical Okun coefficient was estimated using data for the 2009-2019 period, yielding a coefficient of -0.0841. This coefficient, however, represents a weak relationship between economic growth and unemployment reduction in South Africa, a situation observed in most low- to medium-income economies (COVID-19). Some of the reasons cited for the weak Okun coefficient in economies like South Africa’s are that unemployment is driven by structural factors and that GDP growth has been capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive (Habiyaremye et al., 2022; Moloto et al., 2025). Furthermore, GDP growth can stimulate a return to the job market by previously discouraged workers, adding to the additions from cohort shifts, which subdues changes in unemployment rates during times of economic growth (Dinkelman, & Pirouz, 2002; Ngundu & Ngalawa; 2023; Tchereni, 2021). To mitigate the weaknesses of an empirical dynamic Okun coefficient for South Africa and to test prospects of unemployment rates under different GDP-employment regimes, we also used three Okun coefficients (-0.02, -0.1, and -0.2) to capture diverse conditions. Values around -0.02 capture scenarios of minimal employment response, -0.1 represents a typical weak response observed in emerging markets, and -0.2 reflects a stronger, but still plausible, labour market adjustment consistent with empirical evidence (Sovbetov, 2025). Three GDP growth scenarios were specified: a low‑growth scenario of 1% per annum, reflecting prolonged economic stagnation; a moderate‑growth scenario of 2.5%, consistent with partial structural reform and recovery; and a high‑growth scenario of 4%, reflecting sustained reform and improved investment conditions. Employment trajectories were projected under each growth assumption, combined with population projections and a constant labour force participation rate to derive unemployment outcomes. The baseline for the labour force participation rate was derived from the 2025 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) as an annual average, which was 59.5%. The overall estimation procedure proceeded as follows: population projections were conducted by first deriving age‑sex population cohorts for each target year (2030, 2035, 2040, and 2045) using the cohort component method, incorporating survival ratios, age‑specific fertility rates, and age‑specific net migration, using 2025 as the base year. From these projections, the working‑age population (15–64) is aggregated for each period and converted to the labour force by applying a fixed labour force participation rate of 59.5%, the average for the base year 2025. Changes in the unemployment rate are then modelled using a constrained Okun relationship, where GDP growth scenarios of low (1%), medium (2.5%) and high (4%) were translated into marginal adjustments in the unemployment rate using one empirically derived (0.0193) and three imposed (-0.02, -0.1, and -0.2) Okun coefficients. The resulting unemployment rates are applied to the projected labour force to derive the number of unemployed, with employment obtained as a residual. 5. Results I: Population projections Under all mortality and fertility scenarios, South Africa’s total population is projected to continue growing between 2025 and 2045, though at different magnitudes. Projections under low-fertility scenarios produced the slowest population growth and a gradual stabilisation of the working‑age population toward the end of the projection period. The medium‑fertility scenario yields moderate growth, while the high‑fertility scenario results in a substantially larger population and faster expansion of the working‑age group. Age‑structure changes differ markedly across scenarios. Lower fertility accelerates population ageing and reduces youth dependency, while higher fertility sustains a younger age structure but increases pressure on education and labour markets. These dynamics have direct implications for employment prospects when combined with economic growth trajectories. 5.1 Based on high mortality, medium fertility and constant migration trends Based on high (current) mortality, medium fertility, and constant migration trends, South Africa’s population is projected to grow steadily from 63.1 million in 2025 to 73.6 million in 2045. The growth trajectory reflects ongoing demographic momentum. This scenario represents the most plausible pathway, assuming no major shifts in fertility, mortality and migration patterns. Table 1. Projected population under high mortality and medium fertility 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Total Pop 63 100 945 64 999 745 68 282 203 71 170 029 73 627 514 The age-sex structure of South Africa is projected to be dominated by adults in the 25-39 and 50-59-year age groups. Figure 1 below compares the 2025 age-sex structure with the projected one for 2045. There will be just as many 0-9-year-olds as 50-59-year-olds in 2045 if mortality remains constant and fertility decline continues at the current trend. Figure 1. Current mortality, medium fertility and constant migration 5.2 Based on high mortality, high fertility and constant migration trends Assuming fertility remains constant at current levels, population growth is more pronounced, reaching approximately 77 million by 2045. Compared to the baseline year, the higher population size reflects the cumulative effect of sustained fertility, which reinforces the expansion of younger cohorts and contributes to a larger overall population over time. Table 2. Projected population size under a high mortality and high fertility scenario 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Total Pop 63 100 945 65 421 219 69 379 283 73 252 528 77 026 721 With high mortality and fertility remaining high (constant at TFR = 2.26), the age distribution of the population in South Africa will shift upward, with an increasing proportion of the population aged 45 and older. The proportion below 20 years will decrease, but not to the same extent as would occur when fertility decreases (as is the case in Figure 1). Figure 2 below compares the age-sex structures for 2025 and 2045 under high mortality and high fertility. Figure 2. Age-sex structure between 2025 and 2045 in the event of high mortality and high fertility 5.3 Based on high mortality, low fertility and constant migration trends In a low-fertility scenario, in which the total fertility rate declines to 1, population growth slows considerably, reaching 67.9 million by 2045. While the population continues to grow in the short- to medium-term due to demographic momentum, the long-term trajectory indicates gradual stabilisation, with significantly smaller cohort sizes emerging over time. Table 3. Population projections under a high mortality and low fertility scenario 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Total Pop 63 100 945 64 161 084 66 259 684 67 521 285 67 882 220 Under a high mortality and low fertility scenario, South Africa’s age structure will undergo a significant transition by 2045. The age pyramid will have a narrow base that broadens in the youth and adult age groups, as shown in Figure 3 below. Figure 3. Prospective age-sex structure shifts under high mortality, low fertility 5.4 Based on medium mortality, medium fertility and constant migration trends Under medium mortality assumptions and current fertility trends, the population is projected to increase to 74.6 million by 2045. Improvements in mortality contribute to population growth, although the overall trajectory remains similar to the baseline scenario. Table 4. Population projections under the medium mortality and medium fertility scenario 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Total Pop 63 100 945 65 263 570 68 791 966 71 909 082 74 583 188 Assuming continuation of current fertility trends (medium fertility scenario) and a 10% decline in mortality (medium mortality scenario), South Africa will undergo a moderate transition towards an ageing population structure. As shown in Figure 4 below, the proportion of cohorts under 15 years will be smaller than in 2025. As in other scenarios, the 45-64 age group will increase their share of the population. Figure 4. Medium mortality and medium fertility 5.5 Based on medium mortality, high fertility and constant migration trends With both improved survival rates and sustained fertility levels, population growth is further amplified, reaching approximately 78 million by 2045. Table 5. Population projections under the medium mortality and high fertility scenario 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Total Pop 63 100 945 65 686 207 69 893 986 74 002 959 78 003 740 A high fertility regime combined with medium mortality will cause notable shifts in the age structure [Figure 5 below], but to a lesser extent compared to a medium fertility regime. Figure 5. Age-sex structure under medium mortality and high fertility 5.6 Based on medium mortality, low fertility and constant migration trends When fertility declines to below replacement level. Under medium mortality conditions, population growth moderates, reaching 68.8 million by 2045. Although improved mortality supports population increases, the impact of reduced fertility ultimately slows overall growth. Table 6. Population projections under medium mortality and low fertility 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Total Pop 63 100 945 64 422 594 66 760 243 68 240 274 68 801 709 A combination of medium mortality and low fertility will yield a population in 2045 where children below 15 years of age will account for a small proportion of the population [Figure 6]. Figure 6. Age-sex structure under medium mortality and low fertility. 5.7 Based on low mortality, medium fertility and constant migration trends In a low mortality scenario, the population is projected to reach 75.6 million by 2045. The increase reflects the growing number of individuals surviving into older age groups, alongside sustained fertility trends. Table 7. Population projections under low mortality and medium fertility 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Total Pop 63 100 945 65 530 136 69 311 774 72 667 934 75 569 707 The base of South Africa’s age structure will narrow with medium fertility and low mortality, with defined gains in the 50-64 age range [Figure 7]. Figure 7. Age-sex structure under low mortality and medium fertility. 5.8 Based on low mortality, and high fertility This scenario produces the highest population growth, with the total population reaching approximately 79 million by 2045. The combination of low mortality and high fertility leads to substantial expansion across all age groups, reinforcing long-term population growth. Table 8. Population projections under the low mortality and high fertility scenario 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Total Pop 63 100 945 65 953 940 70 418 756 74 773 254 79 011 746 As shown in Figure 8 below, high fertility will slow the transition to an ageing population pyramid compared to medium fertility. Figure 8. Age-sex structure under low mortality and high fertility. 5.9 Based on low mortality, low fertility and constant migration trends Even under low mortality conditions, a decline in fertility to below-replacement level results in slower population growth, with the total population reaching 69.8 million by 2045. While increased longevity sustains growth in older age groups, reduced fertility limits expansion in younger cohorts. Table 9. Population projections under the low mortality and low fertility scenario 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 Total Pop 63 100 945 64 686 840 67 270 802 68 978 945 69 751 806 As shown in Figure 9 below, low mortality and low fertility will result in an age structure with a very narrow base, just as in medium and high mortality scenarios involving low fertility. Figure 9. Age-sex structure under low mortality and low fertility. 5.10 Summary of population projections The population of South Africa is set to continue growing, as seen across all scenarios. The low mortality-high fertility scenario will produce the fastest population growth, while the high mortality-low fertility scenario will produce the slowest growth. The most likely to prevail is the medium mortality, medium fertility scenario. We anticipate that fertility rates will continue the downward 2008-2025 trend (medium fertility scenario), and mortality rates will fall to pre-COVID levels (medium mortality scenario). The likely population estimate for South Africa in 2045 is therefore 75 million. Figure 10. Summary of population prospects by projection scenarios The proportion of the population under 15 years will shrink, although the absolute number will increase. As the current (2025) cohorts in the age groups 0-19 and 25-39 years, to 15-44 and 40-59 years, respectively, they will account for the majority of the population, signifying a transition to a mature population age structure. This has important implications for services and policies such as those aligned to post-secondary education, health for an ageing population. 6. Results II: Employment and unemployment projections Unemployment projections were conducted based on observed demographic events from population data, and these were the scenarios of high mortality, medium fertility, and constant net migration. The sections below, therefore, present the unemployment projections by type of Okun coefficient and GDP growth rate. 6.1 Empirical Okun coefficient and 1% GDP Over the projection period, labour market outcomes deteriorate gradually despite increases in employment. The unemployment rate declines steadily from 32.4% in 2025 to 31.6% by 2045. Although employment increases steadily from 16.1 million in 2025 to 19.9 million in 2045, this growth is insufficient to keep pace with the expanding labour force. As a result, the number of unemployed individuals increases significantly, from 7.7 million to 9.2 million over the same period. Overall, the simultaneous rise in both employment and unemployment highlights a key structural challenge: while jobs will be created with modest GDP growth, they will not be generated at a rate fast enough to offset labour force growth. This leads to persistently high and increasing unemployment, reflecting weak labour-market absorption. Table 10. Unemployment projections based on a dynamic empirical Okun coefficient and 1% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employment Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 32.2% 16 913 153 8 035 634 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 32.0% 18 186 787 8 555 355 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 31.8% 19 278 815 8 979 111 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 31.6% 19 916 143 9 183 610 6.2 Empirical Okun coefficient and 2.5% GDP growth Under a moderate economic growth scenario of 2.5%, labour market outcomes improve marginally compared to the low-growth baseline. While employment increases slightly faster, reaching 20 million by 2045, this remains insufficient to absorb the expanding labour force, which grows to 29.1 million. As a result, unemployment remains persistently high, with slight improvement from 32.4% in 2025 to 31.4% in 2045, only marginally lower than in the 1% growth scenario. The number of unemployed individuals increases to approximately 9.1 million. Overall, the results indicate that moderate economic growth will have a limited impact on the levels of unemployment, reinforcing the existing weak relationship between employment and economic growth in South Africa. Table 11. Unemployment projections based on a dynamic empirical Okun coefficient and 2.5% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employed Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 32.2% 16 921 760 8 027 027 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 31.9% 18 205 239 8 536 902 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 31.7% 19 308 062 8 949 864 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 31.4% 19 956 301 9 143 452 6.3 Empirical Okun coefficient and 4% GDP growth Under this scenario, labour market outcomes deteriorate slightly over time, reflecting the economy’s limited capacity to absorb a growing labour force. The unemployment rate decreases gradually from 32.4% in 2025 to 31.3% by 2045. Employment increases steadily from 16.1 million to just over 20 million over the projection period, indicating continued job creation. However, the number of unemployed individuals still rises in absolute terms, from 7.7 million to slightly over 9.1 million. Overall, the results suggest that even 4% annual GDP growth in the context of the currently existing relationship between economic growth and employment will not be sufficient to reduce unemployment rates meaningfully. Table 12. Unemployment projections based on a dynamic empirical Okun coefficient and 4% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employed Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 32.1% 16 930 367 8 018 419 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 31.9% 18 223 691 8 518 450 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 31.6% 19 337 309 8 920 617 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 31.3% 19 996 459 9 103 295 6.4 Low Okun coefficient and 1% GDP growth In this scenario, labour market outcomes show slight improvement over time, although overall conditions remain challenging. The unemployment rate declines marginally from 32.4% in 2025 to 32.1% by 2045, suggesting a modest strengthening in the economy’s ability to absorb labour. Employment increases steadily from 16.1 million to 19.7 million over the projection period. However, the number of unemployed individuals also rises, from 7.7 million to 9.4 million, due to continued labour force growth. Overall, the results suggest that while employment growth can be realised with a low Okun coefficient, there will be no meaningful impacts on the unemployment rate, and the size of the unemployed population will also grow. Table 13. Unemployment projections based on a low Okun coefficient and 1% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employed Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 32.4% 16 876 357 8 072 429 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 32.3% 18 107 906 8 634 235 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 32.2% 19 153 787 9 104 138 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 32.1% 19 744 474 9 355 280 6.5 Low Okun coefficient and 2.5% GDP growth This scenario reflects a gradual improvement in labour market outcomes over time. The unemployment rate declines slightly from 32.4% in 2025 to 32.0% by 2045, suggesting a modest increase in the economy’s capacity to absorb labour. Employment grows steadily from 16.1million to 19.8 million, indicating continued job creation over the projection period. However, despite this positive trend, the number of unemployed individuals still increases in absolute terms from 7.7 million to just over 9.3 million, driven by ongoing labour force expansion. Overall, while the declining unemployment rate points to incremental improvements in labour market performance, the persistent rise in the number of unemployed highlights the scale of the challenge. Job creation, although improving, remains insufficient to fully counterbalance the growth in labour supply, underscoring the structural nature of unemployment. Table 14. Unemployment projections based on a low Okun coefficient and 2.5% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employed Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 32.3% 16 884 965 8 063 822 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 32.2% 18 126 358 8 615 783 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 32.1% 19 183 034 9 074 892 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 32.0% 19 784 631 9 315 122 6.6 Low Okun coefficient and 4% GDP growth This scenario shows a slightly greater improvement in labour market outcomes over time. The unemployment rate declines from 32.4% in 2025 to 31.9% by 2045, indicating a gradual strengthening in the economy’s ability to absorb labour. Employment increases consistently from 16.1 million to 19.8 million, reflecting steady job creation throughout the projection period. Despite this improvement, the number of unemployed individuals still rises in absolute terms, from 7.7 million to 9.3 million, due to continued labour force expansion. Overall, while the declining unemployment rate suggests incremental progress, the simultaneous increase in the number of unemployed highlights the scale of labour supply pressures. Even under improved conditions, employment growth remains insufficient to fully absorb the growing labour force, reinforcing the persistence of structural unemployment. Table 15. Unemployment projections based on a low Okun coefficient and 1% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employed Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 32.3% 16 893 572 8 055 215 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 32.1% 18 144 810 8 597 331 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 32.0% 19 212 281 9 045 645 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 31.9% 19 824 789 9 274 964 6.7 Medium Okun coefficient and 1% GDP growth This scenario reflects a more noticeable improvement in labour market outcomes over time. The unemployment rate declines steadily from 32.4% in 2025 to 31.4% by 2045, indicating a gradual strengthening in the economy’s capacity to absorb labour. Employment increases consistently from 16.1 million to just below 20 million, indicating stronger job creation than in previous scenarios. However, despite this improvement, the number of unemployed individuals still rises in absolute terms from 7.7 million to more than 9.1 million due to continued labour force growth. Overall, while the declining unemployment rate suggests meaningful progress, the persistence of a large and growing unemployed population highlights the scale of the challenge. Even with improved employment performance, labour demand does not fully keep pace with labour supply, underscoring the structural nature of unemployment. Table 16. Unemployment projections based on a medium Okun coefficient and 1% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employed Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 32.2% 16 922 263 8 026 524 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 31.9% 18 206 317 8 535 824 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 31.7% 19 309 771 8 948 155 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 31.4% 19 958 648 9 141 106 6.8 Medium Okun coefficient and 2.5 % GDP growth This scenario shows a continued improvement in labour market outcomes over time. The unemployment rate declines from 32.4% in 2025 to 31.3% by 2045, indicating a gradual strengthening in the economy’s ability to absorb labour. Employment grows steadily from 16.1 million to almost 20 million, reflecting sustained job creation across the projection period. Despite this progress, the number of unemployed individuals still increases in absolute terms from 7.7 million to approximately 9.1 million, due to the ongoing expansion of the labour force. Overall, while the declining unemployment rate suggests improving labour market performance, the persistence of a large unemployed population highlights the continued imbalance between labour supply and demand. Even under improved conditions, employment growth remains insufficient to fully absorb labour market pressures, reinforcing the structural nature of unemployment. Table 17. Unemployment projections based on a medium Okun coefficient and 2.5% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employed Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 32.1% 16 930 870 8 017 916 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 31.9% 18 224 769 8 517 372 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 31.6% 19 339 018 8 918 908 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 31.3% 19 998 806 9 100 948 6.9 Medium Okun coefficient and 4% GDP growth This scenario reflects the greatest improvement in labour market outcomes among those considered. The unemployment rate declines steadily from 32.4% in 2025 to 31.1% by 2045, indicating a gradual but more pronounced strengthening in the economy’s ability to absorb labour. Employment increases consistently from 16.1 million to just over 20 million, representing the highest level of job creation across the scenarios. Despite this improvement, the number of unemployed individuals still rises in absolute terms from 7.7 million to approximately 9 million, driven by continued labour force expansion. Overall, while the declining unemployment rate points to improved labour market performance, the persistence of a large unemployed population underscores the scale of the challenge. Even under the most favourable economic growth conditions, unemployment will not be reduced markedly. Table 18. Unemployment projections based on a medium Okun coefficient and 4% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employed Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 32.1% 16 939 478 8 009 309 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 31.8% 18 243 221 8 498 920 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 31.5% 19 368 265 8 889 661 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 31.1% 20 038 963 9 060 790 6.10 High Okun coefficient and 1% GDP growth This scenario shows a more substantial improvement in labour market outcomes over time. The unemployment rate declines steadily from 32.4% in 2025 to 30.5% by 2045, indicating a stronger capacity of the economy to absorb labour compared to previous scenarios. Employment increases significantly from 16.1 million to 20.2 million, reflecting robust job creation throughout the projection period. Despite these gains, the number of unemployed individuals still rises in absolute terms from 7.7 million to approximately 8.9 million, driven by continued labour force growth. Overall, while the declining unemployment rate suggests meaningful progress and improved labour absorption, where the GDP-employment relationship has greater elasticity. However, the persistence of a large unemployed population highlights the pressure from labour supply expansion, which suggests that higher GDP growth is imperative. Table 19. Unemployment projections based on a high Okun coefficient and 1% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employed Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 31.9% 16 979 645 7 969 141 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 31.5% 18 329 331 8 412 810 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 31.0% 19 504 751 8 753 175 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 30.5% 20 226 366 8 873 388 6.11 High Okun coefficient and 2.5% GDP growth This scenario reflects continued improvement in labour market outcomes over time. The unemployment rate declines steadily from 32.4% in 2025 to 30.4% by 2045, indicating a strengthening in the economy’s ability to absorb labour. Employment increases significantly from 16.1 million to 20.3 million, demonstrating sustained job creation across the projection period. However, despite these gains, the number of unemployed individuals still rises in absolute terms from 7.7 million to just above 8.8 million, due to ongoing labour force expansion. Overall, the results suggest greater employment utility of increase GDP growth to 2.5% per annum compared to 1%. Nonetheless, 2.5% GDP growth will still be insufficient to reduce the number of unemployed in the country. Table 20. Unemployment projections based on a high Okun coefficient and 2.5% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employed Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 31.9% 16 988 253 7 960 534 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 31.4% 18 347 783 8 394 358 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 30.9% 19 533 998 8 723 928 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 30.4% 20 266 523 8 833 230 6.12 High Okun coefficient and 4% GDP growth This scenario represents the greatest improvement in labour market outcomes across the projections. The unemployment rate declines steadily from 32.4% in 2025 to 30.2% by 2045, indicating a notable strengthening in the economy’s capacity to absorb labour. Employment increases substantially from 16.1 million to 20 million, reflecting sustained and relatively robust job creation over the projection period. Despite this progress, the number of unemployed individuals still rises in absolute terms, from 7.7 million to just below 8.8 million, driven by growth in the labour force. Overall, while the declining unemployment rate signals improved labour market performance, the persistence of a large unemployed population highlights the ongoing pressure from labour supply expansion. Even under the most favourable economic growth conditions and a more elastic employment-GDP relationship, unemployment is set to remain above 30%. Table 21. Unemployment projections based on a high Okun coefficient and 4% GDP growth Year Working-age population (15-64) Labour force Unemployment rate Employment Unemployed 2025 39 980 353 23 768 320 32.4% 16 061 442 7 706 878 2030 41 965 999 24 948 787 31.9% 16 996 860 7 951 927 2035 44 982 576 26 742 141 31.3% 18 366 235 8 375 906 2040 47 532 255 28 257 926 30.8% 19 563 245 8 694 681 2045 48 948 282 29 099 753 30.2% 20 306 681 8 793 073 6.13 Summary of unemployment projections Projections of unemployment rates in South Africa for given Okun coefficients and GDP growth rates reveal important patterns [Figure 11 below]. Firstly, any increase in the GDP growth rate will reduce the unemployment rate, but in most cases only marginally. If the current unemployment elasticity of GDP growth (measured by the empirical Okun coefficient), unemployment rates will fall marginally to a lowest possible 31.3% in 2045 from 32.4% in 2025. If the unemployment elasticity of GDP growth weakens, unemployment rates in South Africa will be worse than they are now. Improvements in the unemployment elasticity of GDP growth will lead to more defined reductions in unemployment rates (high Okun coefficients). The results imply that South Africa needs to address structural factors driving unemployment in the country. Addressing the structural factors of unemployment will improve unemployment elasticity of GDP growth, such that even modest economic growth can result in greater decreases in unemployment. Figure 11. Summary of projected unemployment rates 7. Discussion and policy implications The findings of this study highlight a persistent and structurally embedded disconnect between population dynamics, economic growth, and labour market outcomes in South Africa. Across all scenarios, the working-age population and labour force expand substantially over the projection period, driven by demographic momentum. As shown in the population projections, even under declining fertility assumptions, population growth continues in the medium term, reinforcing sustained pressure on the labour market. The employment projections reveal that expanding labour supply will lead to increasing numbers of jobless individuals if the economy does not create sufficient jobs due to the momentum of population growth. Under the employment projections based on the empirical dynamic Okun coefficient, even a relatively strong 4% economic growth is insufficient to meaningfully reduce unemployment rates. Instead, unemployment remains persistently high, with only marginal differences across 1%, 2.5% and 4% GDP growth scenarios. This finding suggests that the relationship between economic growth and employment in South Africa is weak, and in some cases, near-neutral. This projected situation has characterised the South African context over the past three decades, with studies documenting employment contraction in primary sectors like agriculture, forestry and fishing, and mining and quarrying, and demographic momentum as underlying drivers (Bhorat & Oosthuizen, 2008; Hodge, 2009). The application of constrained, partially imposed Okun coefficients provides further insight into the employment prospects for South Africa. Scenarios with higher employment responsiveness show gradual declines in unemployment rates. However, even under the most optimistic assumptions, unemployment remains above 30% in 2045. Importantly, while unemployment rates decline, the absolute number of unemployed individuals continues to increase across nearly all scenarios. This reflects the scale of labour supply growth and highlights the limitations of relying solely on economic growth to solve unemployment. The relationship between demographic and economic factors is central to the projection outcomes. High fertility scenarios amplify labour market pressures by increasing the size of future cohorts entering the labour force, thereby requiring significantly higher levels of job creation to stabilise unemployment. Conversely, low fertility scenarios reduce labour supply pressures but do not eliminate the unemployment challenge, particularly under conditions of weak economic growth. These findings reinforce the argument that the labour market challenges for South Africa cannot be resolved through favourable demographic trends. Overall, the results point to a future characterised by population growth and persistently high unemployment rates in South Africa. The persistence of high unemployment, even under improved economic conditions, reflects underlying issues such as capital-intensive growth and skills mismatches, which limit the economy’s labour absorption capacity. The findings of future population and unemployment projections have several important implications for economic and labour market policies in South Africa, which are discussed below. First, the results indicate that economic growth alone will be insufficient to address unemployment in South Africa, with the continuation of the current GDP-unemployment relationship suggesting a worse outlook. To attain a favourable employment outlook in the face of an unavoidable demographic momentum, South Africa needs to promote labour-intensive primary and secondary sectors such as agriculture, forestry, and manufacturing, as well as render meaningful support to small and medium-sized enterprises, which have greater potential for job creation. By deepening the economic policy’s focus beyond a growth-centric approach, the country will develop labour market resilience that is less prone to global economic shocks, thus maintaining strong employment conditions. Second, there is a need for targeted labour-market interventions to better align labour supply and demand. The persistence of high unemployment alongside increasing positive GDP growth suggests that skills mismatches remain a critical constraint. The policy shift from polytechnic-type post-school education in South Africa to TVET that became primarily concerned with teaching and instruction at the expense of applied technical functions accentuated the skills mismatch in the labour market (Kraak, 2018). It is particularly noteworthy for South Africa that the political and economic restructuring that characterised the transition from apartheid to a democratic dispensation, where government institutions were being privatised and technikons being converted to universities, severely damaged the Design, Engineering, Entrepreneurship and Management (DEEM) function that traditionally implied closer alignment between training and industry skills needs (Kraak, 2008). The strong cooperative relationships previously built up between the state-owned enterprises, the technical colleges and the technikons to train and skill artisans, technicians and technologists were scaled down and, in many instances, permanently lost (Kraak, 2008). It is therefore imperative that South Africa looks to it’s past to make relevant investments in education to better align the workforce with the economy's needs. Finally, the findings underscore the importance of adopting a coordinated policy approach that integrates demographic and economic planning. The interaction between population dynamics and labour market outcomes suggests that policies should not be developed in isolation. Instead, a holistic strategy that considers population trends, economic growth, and labour market conditions simultaneously is required to effectively address unemployment. 8. Conclusion This study conducted population projections by sex and five-year age groups. The projected population sizes of the 15-64 age range were used as a basis to estimate future unemployment rates, using a combination four Okun coefficients and three GDP growth rates. The four Okun coefficients, which measure the unemployment elasticity of GDP growth, were empirical (based on real past data for South Africa from 2009 to 2019), low coefficient (which represent the weakest GDP-unemployment relationship), medium, and high (strongest possible GDP-unemployment relationship in South Africa) coefficients. The results from population projections suggest significant population growth by 2045. The most realistic projected population size by 2045 is 74.6 million, based on the assumption that mortality will decrease from the 2022 level (which was high because of the residual COVID-19 pandemic effects), and that fertility will continue to decrease at the same steady rate as observed between 2022 and 2024. The unemployment projections revealed potential positive labour market outcomes, although only marginal. Should the relationship between GDP growth and unemployment rates that has prevailed in South Africa continue up to 2045 (empirical Okun coefficient), the country will experience marginal decreases in the unemployment rate, to between 31 and 32%. The number of the employed will increase for any GDP growth rate, but so will also be the number of the unemployed. The growth in the numbers of the unemployed will be driven by the momentum of population growth affecting the working age group. Even under declining fertility assumptions, labour supply expands significantly, placing sustained pressure on the labour market. While employment increases across all scenarios, the pace of growth remains too slow to absorb new entrants into the labour force. As a result, unemployment remains persistently high, with only marginal improvements observed even under more favourable economic conditions. Notably, higher GDP growth does not translate into substantial reductions in unemployment, reinforcing the weak responsiveness of employment to economic growth in the South African context. The analysis further shows that variations in demographic assumptions shape the scale of the challenge but do not fundamentally alter its nature. Higher fertility amplifies labour market pressures, while lower fertility moderates them; however, neither scenario resolves the structural imbalance between labour supply and demand. Similarly, stronger employment responsiveness improves outcomes but remains insufficient to significantly reduce unemployment levels. Overall, the findings highlight the relevance of the argument that South Africa’s unemployment challenge is structural rather than cyclical. Economic growth alone is unlikely to generate the scale of employment required to absorb the expanding labour force. Instead, addressing unemployment will require a combination of sustained economic growth, greater employment intensity, and targeted structural reforms to enhance labour-market absorption. Education reforms may be one avenue to address the structural barriers to employment. Furthermore, growth in the labour-intensive sectors is also crucial if South Africa is to realise significant labour market gains. This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the importance of jointly analysing demographic and economic dynamics when assessing future labour market outcomes. Linking population projections with employment scenarios, it provides a more comprehensive understanding of the scale and persistence of unemployment in South Africa. Future research should focus on refining estimates of country-specific Okun coefficients and on exploring sector-specific employment dynamics to further strengthen the evidence base for policy interventions. References Aguiar‑Conraria, L., Martins, M. 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Download the full PDF report here, or read it below. PUBLICATION INFORMATION Title: The Role of Middle Powers in Reshaping Multilateralism - Guidance for and Partnership with the Next United Nations Secretary-General Author: Daryl Swanepoel Published jointly by: Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) and Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) Published: 2026 COPYRIGHT © 2026 Inclusive Society Institute and Global South Perspectives Network. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, stored or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers, except for brief quotations for research, review or other purposes permitted by applicable copyright law. DISCLAIMER This publication synthesises the principal ideas, perspectives and conclusions emerging from the panel discussion. It does not constitute a verbatim record of the proceedings or the individual contributions of the panellists. The views and interpretations expressed in this report should not necessarily be regarded as representing the official views or positions of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN), Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), United Nations, the organisations or institutions represented by the panellists, or any government. Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication. The author and publishers accept no liability for any loss or consequence arising from its use or reliance upon its contents. SUGGESTED CITATION Swanepoel, D. (2026). The Role of Middle Powers in Reshaping Multilateralism: Guidance for and Partnership with the Next United Nations Secretary-General. Inclusive Society Institute & Global South Perspectives Network. USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Artificial intelligence (AI) tools may have been used to assist with the drafting, editing, synthesis and presentation of this report. All substantive content, interpretations and conclusions remain subject to human review and editorial oversight, and responsibility for the final publication rests with the author and publishers. Published jointly by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) and the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN), South Africa, 2026. TABLE OF CONTENTS Report of the Panel Discussion of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) Annual Meeting Panel Composition 1. Introduction 2. Multilateralism at a Crossroads 3. Why Middle Powers matter 4. Beyond Diplomacy: Communication, Narrative and Public Legitimacy 5. Partnering with the next United Nations Secretary-General 6. Towards a Middle-Power Agenda for Renewing Multilateralism 7. Conclusion Cover photo: AI-generated image created using ChatGPT (OpenAI), 2026. REPORT OF THE PANEL DISCUSSION OF THE ACADEMIC COUNCIL ON THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM (ACUNS) ANNUAL MEETING LISBON, PORTUGAL | 1 JULY 2026 PANEL COMPOSITION The panel was moderated by Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), South Africa. The discussion brought together four distinguished contributors representing academia, civil society and international organisations. Dr Cilene Victor is Professor and Researcher in the School of Communication, Marketing and Technology at Universidade Anhembi Morumbi, São Paulo, Brazil. Dr Sudha Reddy is Chairperson of the Foundation for Human Horizon, India. Dr Georgios Kostakos is a former senior official of the United Nations and served as Executive Director of the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), Belgium. Ms Yoriko Yasukawa is a former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General and former Director of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Bureau for Africa, and currently serves as a member of the Earth Trusteeship Initiative, Japan. Together, the panellists brought complementary expertise spanning global governance, multilateral diplomacy, strategic communication, sustainable development and international cooperation, providing a rich and diverse foundation for the discussion. 1. INTRODUCTION The international system is entering a period in which the assumptions that have underpinned multilateral cooperation for much of the post-war era are being fundamentally tested. Intensifying geopolitical rivalry, growing strategic competition among the major powers, and declining confidence in international institutions have combined to create an environment in which collective responses to global challenges have become increasingly difficult. But, paradoxically, the need for international cooperation has never been greater. Climate change, armed conflict, humanitarian crises, food insecurity, migration, technological disruption and sustainable development all transcend national borders and demand solutions that no state can deliver alone. It was against this backdrop that the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN), through the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), convened a panel discussion on "The Role of Middle Powers in Reshaping Multilateralism: Guidance for and Partnership with the New United Nations Secretary-General" during the 2026 Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) Annual Meeting in Lisbon. The discussion proceeded from a central proposition. The future of multilateralism is unlikely to be secured by the major powers acting alone, nor will it be restored through institutional reform in isolation. Rather, the discussion explored whether middle powers, acting more strategically and in closer cooperation with one another, can help stabilise the international system, restore confidence in international law and strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations. The appointment of the next Secretary-General was viewed within this broader context, not as an isolated institutional process, but as an opportunity to renew political leadership within the multilateral system and to establish new partnerships capable of supporting that leadership over the coming decade. A striking feature of the discussion was the degree of convergence among the contributors. Although approaching the subject from different perspectives, the panel collectively argued that middle powers possess attributes that are becoming increasingly important in an era characterised by geopolitical fragmentation. They often maintain constructive relations across competing political groupings; they have established traditions of coalition-building and mediation; they generally rely upon international law and multilateral institutions for their own security and prosperity; and many enjoy credibility across both the Global North and the Global South. These characteristics position them to make a distinctive contribution to renewing multilateral cooperation at a time when dialogue among the major powers has become increasingly constrained. The discussion equally recognised that middle powers cannot simply assume such a role. They constitute a highly diverse group of states with different histories, political systems, strategic interests and regional priorities. Their influence will depend not upon their collective size alone, but upon their willingness to cooperate more consistently around shared objectives. Throughout the discussion, emphasis therefore shifted away from the traditional question of how middle powers should position themselves between competing great powers, towards a more practical consideration of how they might work together to strengthen the institutions and norms upon which effective international cooperation depends. Several themes emerged repeatedly during the discussion. One concerned the importance of moving beyond reactive diplomacy towards sustained, issue-based cooperation among middle powers. Another highlighted the growing significance of communication and public diplomacy in strengthening the legitimacy of multilateralism. A third focused on the need for the next Secretary-General to enjoy not only broad international support during the selection process, but also sustained political backing after assuming office. Running through all these themes was a common conviction that the renewal of multilateralism requires more than institutional reform; it requires renewed political commitment, stronger partnerships and a more compelling vision of international cooperation itself. This report synthesises the principal ideas emerging from the discussion. Rather than presenting the individual papers separately, it considers the broader conclusions that emerged collectively. It examines the changing international environment within which middle powers now operate, the distinctive contribution they can make to strengthening multilateralism, the importance of communication and public legitimacy, the opportunities presented by the appointment of a new Secretary-General, and the practical agenda that emerged for strengthening cooperation among middle powers in support of a more effective, inclusive and resilient multilateral order. Figure 1: The changing context of multilateralism: Key drivers shaping the role of middle powers in a fragmented international order 2. MULTILATERALISM AT A CROSSROADS The discussion proceeded from the shared assessment that multilateralism is confronting one of the most challenging periods in its modern history. Participants agreed that the international system is undergoing a profound political transition in which geopolitical rivalry has increasingly displaced cooperative approaches to global governance. As strategic competition among the major powers intensifies, international institutions have found it progressively more difficult to fulfil the purposes for which they were established. The discussion therefore began not by questioning the relevance of multilateralism, but by examining why its effectiveness has come under increasing pressure. The panel concept note argued that Realpolitik has once again become the dominant organising principle of international relations. This renewed emphasis on power politics threatens many of the gains achieved through decades of post-war multilateral cooperation in peace and security, human rights and sustainable development. Rather than acting as forums for collective problem-solving, international institutions increasingly find themselves operating within a wider environment characterised by strategic rivalry, competing geopolitical interests and declining political trust, and so discussion suggested that this changing context poses one of the most significant challenges to the multilateral system since the establishment of the United Nations. Participants nevertheless cautioned against interpreting the current difficulties as evidence that multilateralism itself has failed, instead they argued that contemporary global challenges reinforce, rather than diminish the necessity of international cooperation. Armed conflict, climate change, pandemics, food insecurity, migration, technological disruption and widening inequality all transcend national boundaries. None can be addressed sustainably through unilateral action or bilateral diplomacy alone. The central paradox confronting the international community is therefore that, precisely when cooperation has become most essential, it has also become more politically difficult to achieve. The discussion also recognised that the pressures facing multilateralism are not solely institutional, because they reflect a broader erosion of confidence in the international system itself. International organisations now operate in an environment where competing political narratives, public scepticism and growing geopolitical polarisation increasingly shape perceptions of their legitimacy and effectiveness, which has made it more difficult to build international consensus, even where common interests clearly exist. The challenge is therefore not confined to improving institutional performance; it extends to rebuilding confidence that multilateral cooperation remains capable of addressing the concerns of states and societies alike. An important contribution to the discussion emphasised that the debate should not become confined to relations between governments alone. The United Nations was established in the name of "We the Peoples," and its success must ultimately be measured by its ability to improve the lives of people, rather than simply manage relations among states, and with this in mind it was argued that multilateralism derives its legitimacy not only from international agreements, but from its capacity to advance peace, human dignity, sustainable development and social justice. The growing disconnect between international institutions and the everyday concerns of citizens therefore represents an important dimension of the current challenge, and therefore renewing multilateralism requires reconnecting global governance with the people it is intended to serve. The discussion further observed that confidence in the multilateral system depends upon the consistent application of its underlying principles, such as international law, the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for sovereignty, human rights and the pursuit of sustainable development that together constitute the normative foundations of the United Nations. Participants expressed concern that perceptions of inconsistency in the application of these principles have weakened public confidence in international institutions, and whether it be in relation to addressing conflict, humanitarian crises or broader questions of international justice, the credibility of multilateralism depends upon the extent to which its principles are seen to apply universally, rather than selectively. Participants also reflected on the widespread calls for institutional reform. There was broad agreement that reform remains necessary if multilateral institutions are to reflect contemporary political realities more accurately, but at the same time, the discussion suggested that structural reform by itself will not resolve the deeper challenges confronting the international system. Institutions function effectively only when Member States remain committed to working through them in pursuit of shared objectives, and so without renewed political commitment to cooperation, even well-designed institutions will struggle to achieve meaningful outcomes. The future of multilateralism therefore depends as much upon political leadership as it does upon institutional architecture. Against this backdrop, the discussion deliberately shifted from diagnosis towards opportunity. Rather than asking whether the multilateral system can survive, participants considered how it might evolve. The panel concept note suggested that one of the most promising opportunities lies in greater strategic cooperation among middle powers. Possessing significant diplomatic reach, material resources and normative credibility, these states are well placed to help stabilise the international system by strengthening dialogue, defending international law and reinforcing the principles of the UN Charter. The discussion therefore framed the present period not simply as one of institutional crisis, but as a moment in which new forms of international leadership may emerge. The panel concluded that the future of multilateralism should not be viewed as a choice between preserving the existing international order or accepting its decline. The more important challenge is to ensure that multilateral cooperation adapts to changing geopolitical realities without abandoning the principles upon which it has been built. That task will require broader leadership, stronger political commitment and new forms of partnership. It was within this context that the discussion turned to the distinctive contribution that middle powers can make to strengthening an increasingly fragile, but no less essential, multilateral system. 3. WHY MIDDLE POWERS MATTER If multilateralism is to be renewed, the question that follows is where the political energy for that renewal might come from. The panel did not suggest that middle powers can or should replace the major powers. The great powers will continue to exercise considerable influence over the international system. Rather, the proposition that emerged was that the space between great-power dominance on the one hand and institutional paralysis on the other has become increasingly important. It is within this space that middle powers have an opportunity to make a more deliberate contribution. This opportunity derives partly from the nature of middle-power influence itself. Middle powers do not generally possess sufficient military, economic or political weight to impose their preferences on the international system. Their influence must consequently be exercised differently. They depend more heavily upon persuasion, coalition-building, mediation, agenda-setting and the legitimacy that comes from working through international institutions. What may traditionally have been regarded as a limitation could, in the present geopolitical environment, become an important advantage. When coercion and confrontation are themselves contributing to international fragmentation, the ability to persuade, convene and bridge differences assumes greater value. The discussion therefore challenged the idea that influence within the international system should be measured primarily by material power. Diplomatic reach matters. Credibility matters. The ability to maintain relationships across political divides matters. So too does a country's willingness to invest in international institutions and to work patiently towards outcomes that enjoy legitimacy beyond its own immediate interests. These are precisely the areas in which middle powers can exercise influence disproportionate to their relative size. There are already indications of what this can mean in practice. The discussion pointed to India's engagement across BRICS, the G20 and broader Global South initiatives; Indonesia's role within ASEAN; Brazil's advocacy around climate justice and South-South cooperation; South Africa's emphasis on international law and stronger Global South representation; and the mediation roles played by Norway, Qatar and Oman. These examples are different in character, but they demonstrate a common point: countries need not dominate the international system in order to influence it. They can create political space, bring parties together, advance issues that might otherwise receive insufficient attention, and maintain channels of engagement across political divides. This becomes particularly important as the divide between the Global North and Global South assumes greater prominence within debates about global governance. The panel recognised the very real differences in history, experience, development and interests that underpin this divide. It nevertheless cautioned against allowing it to become yet another permanent fault line in an already fragmented international system. Middle powers exist on both sides of that divide. This creates the possibility of cooperation that cuts across it, rather than reinforces it. Indeed, the ability to establish such relationships may prove to be one of the most important contributions that middle powers can make to the future of multilateralism. The point is not to find a new position of neutrality between competing camps. Nor is it to suggest that middle powers should somehow remove themselves from the pursuit of national interests. The discussion was clear that middle powers, like all states, have their own interests, domestic political pressures and strategic considerations. They will not always agree, and their interests will sometimes diverge sharply. Any attempt to construct a meaningful middle-power agenda must start by acknowledging this reality, rather than wishing it away. This led to an important distinction in the discussion between the possession of middle-power characteristics and the practice of middle-power diplomacy. One contribution differentiated between "authentic middle powers" and "aspirational great powers." The distinction is useful precisely because it shifts attention away from labels and towards behaviour. A state may possess the material characteristics normally associated with a middle power while increasingly seeking influence through status, dominance or alignment with great-power competition. Conversely, a state demonstrates authentic middle-power behaviour when it uses its influence to encourage dialogue, strengthen mediation, uphold international law and build cooperation across political divides. This raises the question of credibility. If middle powers wish to present themselves as defenders of multilateralism, they must themselves be prepared to uphold its principles consistently. Support for international law loses much of its persuasive force if it changes according to the parties involved. The same applies to human rights and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Middle powers cannot credibly call upon the major powers to respect international norms while themselves treating those norms selectively. Their influence as bridge-builders ultimately depends upon the trust that others are prepared to place in them. There is, therefore, an element of responsibility attached to the opportunity now available to middle powers. Greater influence cannot simply mean acquiring a louder voice in existing institutions or securing a larger share of international decision-making. It must also entail assuming greater responsibility for sustaining the system within which that influence is exercised. The discussion suggested that this means defending international law, supporting institutions even when particular outcomes may be inconvenient, maintaining channels of communication with states with which they disagree, and investing diplomatic resources in finding common ground. This is also why issue-based cooperation featured so strongly in the discussion. Middle powers do not have to agree on everything in order to work together on something. Peacebuilding, climate action, food security, humanitarian response, public health and sustainable development provide areas in which cooperation can be constructed around practical objectives, rather than geopolitical identity. This approach accepts difference, rather than attempting to eliminate it. It asks where interests overlap and whether those areas of convergence can be converted into collective action. There is an important pragmatic dimension to this approach. If middle powers wait for broad geopolitical agreement before acting together, very little is likely to happen. If, instead, they identify areas where cooperation is possible and demonstrate that such cooperation can deliver results, they help preserve the practice of multilateralism itself. Each successful instance of cooperation creates another reason to cooperate again. In this way, issue-based partnerships can become building blocks for something more substantial. But the panel also recognised that this is precisely where the present weakness lies. Middle powers have demonstrated their capacity to cooperate on individual issues, but they have not yet translated that capacity into sustained collective leadership on the future of multilateralism. One contribution was particularly clear on this point: despite the deterioration in the international environment and the growing need for alternative sources of leadership, there is still no sufficiently coherent middle-power initiative aimed at strengthening the global governance system as a whole. This gap matters. Ad hoc cooperation can solve individual problems, but it is unlikely on its own to reshape the direction of the international system. If middle powers are serious about playing a greater role, they will have to move from episodic cooperation towards something more deliberate and sustained. This does not mean creating another geopolitical bloc. That would defeat the very purpose of the exercise. It means developing the habit of consultation, identifying shared priorities and being prepared to act together where collective influence can make a difference. Seen in this way, the potential significance of middle powers lies not in their capacity to become another pole in an increasingly competitive international order. It lies in their ability to resist the logic that every international relationship must eventually resolve itself into competing poles. Their comparative advantage is the ability to connect, rather than divide; to keep dialogue alive when others withdraw from it; and to demonstrate through practical cooperation that differences between states do not have to make collective action impossible. That is the opportunity. But it is not yet the achievement. The central question emerging from the panel was therefore whether middle powers are prepared to convert their considerable individual diplomatic capabilities into a more sustained collective endeavour. If they are, they may become an important stabilising force in the international system. If they are not, the potential identified throughout the discussion will remain precisely that - potential. 4. BEYOND DIPLOMACY: COMMUNICATION, NARRATIVE AND PUBLIC LEGITIMACY While the discussion devoted considerable attention to diplomacy and institutional cooperation, one of its more distinctive contributions was the recognition that the future of multilateralism will depend as much on communication as on negotiation. Effective diplomacy no longer takes place exclusively around negotiating tables or within the formal structures of international organisations. It is increasingly shaped by the ability of states to explain their objectives, build public understanding and develop narratives capable of sustaining confidence in international cooperation. Communication was therefore presented not as a supporting activity, but as an integral component of contemporary diplomacy. This represents an important shift in the way middle-power influence should be understood. Traditionally, diplomatic success has been measured by agreements concluded, coalitions formed or resolutions adopted. The discussion suggested that these remain important, but are no longer sufficient. International politics now unfolds within a global communications environment where governments, international organisations, civil society, academic institutions, media organisations and digital platforms all influence how international developments are interpreted. Diplomatic initiatives that are not understood beyond official circles often struggle to generate the wider political support necessary for their implementation. Middle powers therefore need to communicate not only with one another, but with global audiences. Participants argued that communication strengthens multilateralism in several ways. It helps explain why cooperation remains necessary in an increasingly uncertain international environment. It allows successful initiatives to become examples from which others may learn, it broadens participation in debates that might otherwise remain confined to governments, and most importantly, it contributes to legitimacy. International institutions derive authority not only from legal mandates, but also from public confidence that they continue to serve meaningful purposes. When that confidence weakens, institutional effectiveness is inevitably affected. The discussion suggested that middle powers possess important comparative advantages in this regard. Unlike the major powers, whose international messaging is frequently interpreted through the prism of strategic competition, many middle powers are better positioned to articulate narratives centred on cooperation, dialogue and shared interests. This does not imply that they are politically neutral, nor that they are free of national interests. Rather, it reflects the fact that their diplomatic influence has generally been built through persuasion, rather than coercion. Communication therefore becomes an extension of the very diplomatic methods through which middle powers traditionally exercise influence. Brazil's recent international engagement was discussed as an illustration of this approach. Participants noted the consistency with which themes such as multilateralism, inclusive development, climate justice and stronger Global South participation have been advanced across different international platforms. Although each forum addressed different policy questions, the underlying message remained coherent. This consistency was presented as an important diplomatic asset. It demonstrates that communication is most effective when it forms part of a broader strategic approach, rather than a series of isolated public statements. At the same time, participants recognised that the international communications environment presents significant challenges for middle powers. Global media attention continues to focus predominantly on the actions of the major powers, armed conflict and geopolitical confrontation. Constructive initiatives emerging from middle powers often receive comparatively limited attention, irrespective of their potential significance. As a result, innovative policy proposals frequently fail to shape wider international debate. The discussion therefore suggested that middle powers need to invest more deliberately in communicating both their ideas and their achievements if they wish to influence the broader direction of global governance. The discussion also moved beyond communication as a diplomatic technique to consider the importance of narrative itself. Participants argued that multilateralism currently suffers not only from institutional weaknesses, but also from the absence of a compelling story about its future. Much contemporary debate has become dominated by narratives of rivalry, confrontation and geopolitical competition, and while these realities cannot be ignored, they should not become the only lens through which international affairs are understood. If multilateralism is to regain confidence and legitimacy, it requires a positive narrative capable of inspiring cooperation, rather than merely responding to conflict. In this regard, one contribution argued that hope itself constitutes an important political resource. The discussion observed that international cooperation has contributed significantly to improvements in human development, democratic governance, poverty reduction, education, health and human rights across many parts of the world. These achievements should not be overlooked simply because contemporary international politics is characterised by heightened geopolitical tension. The international community requires a narrative that acknowledges current challenges, while also recognising the progress that cooperation has historically made possible, because without such a narrative, public confidence in multilateralism is likely to continue eroding. Participants further suggested that this narrative should remain firmly people-centred. International institutions ultimately exist not for their own preservation, but to improve human wellbeing. Communication should therefore connect multilateral cooperation to the everyday concerns of people, rather than presenting it solely as an abstract exercise in international diplomacy. Peace, human dignity, equality, justice and sustainable development were repeatedly identified as the values around which such a narrative could be constructed. In doing so, communication would reinforce the reminder contained in the opening words of the UN Charter that the Organisation exists in the name of "We the Peoples." The discussion also identified an important role for universities, think tanks, civil society organisations and policy networks. Building confidence in multilateralism cannot be left exclusively to governments. Research institutions contribute evidence and analysis, civil society connects international debates to communities, and academic networks create opportunities for sustained dialogue across national boundaries. Participants therefore envisaged communication as a genuinely collaborative endeavour extending well beyond official diplomacy. This broader understanding of communication also has implications for the next Secretary-General. Participants suggested that the Secretary-General will need to be more than an effective administrator or skilled diplomat. The Office will increasingly require someone capable of articulating a convincing vision of international cooperation, explaining the continuing relevance of the United Nations and inspiring confidence that multilateralism remains the most effective means of addressing shared global challenges. Middle powers, through coordinated communication and consistent public diplomacy, can become important partners in amplifying that message and broadening its international reach. The discussion therefore concluded that communication should no longer be regarded as peripheral to multilateral diplomacy. It has become one of the means through which diplomacy itself is conducted. Middle powers may succeed in building coalitions, advancing innovative proposals and strengthening international institutions, but unless these efforts are communicated effectively and situated within a compelling narrative about the future of international cooperation, their wider influence is likely to remain limited. Renewing multilateralism will therefore require not only better diplomacy, but also a more persuasive explanation of why multilateralism continues to matter. 5. PARTNERING WITH THE NEXT UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL A distinctive feature of the panel discussion was that it did not treat the appointment of the next Secretary-General of the United Nations as a procedural event, but as a strategic opportunity to strengthen multilateralism itself. Rather than viewing the selection process as an end in itself, participants considered how middle powers might influence both the choice of the next Secretary-General and, more importantly, how they might work in partnership with that person to restore confidence in the United Nations and the wider multilateral system. The discussion proceeded from the recognition that the Office of the Secretary-General occupies a unique position within the international system. Although the Secretary-General exercises neither the executive authority of a head of government nor the political power of the major states, the Office carries considerable moral authority and possesses an important convening function. It has the capacity to shape international agendas, facilitate dialogue, encourage mediation and articulate a vision for international cooperation. The effectiveness of the Office, however, depends not only on the qualities of the individual appointed, but also on the willingness of Member States to provide the political support necessary for the Secretary-General to fulfil these responsibilities. Participants therefore argued that middle powers have an important role to play during the selection process itself. Acting individually, their influence is necessarily limited. Collectively, however, they represent a significant constituency within the United Nations and possess sufficient diplomatic influence to contribute meaningfully to discussions on the qualities required of the Organisation's next leader. The discussion suggested that middle powers should seek to promote leadership criteria centred on integrity, independence, commitment to the United Nations Charter and demonstrated support for effective multilateral cooperation. The objective should not be to advance regional or national preferences, but to strengthen the legitimacy of the Office itself. The panel was equally clear that the appointment of a new Secretary-General should not mark the conclusion of middle-power engagement. Indeed, participants suggested that the more important task begins after the successful candidate assumes office. One of the recurring weaknesses of the multilateral system has been the tendency to regard the Secretary-General as operating largely in isolation from sustained political support by Member States. But effective leadership within the United Nations depends upon governments that are prepared not only to endorse the Organisation's principles, but also to support initiatives aimed at giving practical effect to those principles. The discussion therefore proposed a different model of engagement. Rather than limiting cooperation to formal institutional processes, middle powers should develop a continuing partnership with the Secretary-General around a shared commitment to strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations. Such a partnership would not compromise the independence of the Office, nor would it seek to create an alternative centre of political authority within the Organisation. Its purpose would instead be to provide the political support necessary for the Secretary-General to pursue initiatives that strengthen multilateral cooperation, uphold international law and reinforce confidence in the United Nations. Preventive diplomacy emerged as one of the most important areas for such cooperation. Participants observed that international engagement frequently occurs only after disputes have escalated into violent conflict or humanitarian crisis. Middle powers, by virtue of their often constructive relations across different political groupings, possess considerable potential to support the Secretary-General's efforts to encourage dialogue before positions become irreconcilable. This need not involve formal mediation alone. It includes confidence-building, discreet diplomacy and creating opportunities for continued communication at times when official channels have become strained. Strengthening preventive diplomacy was therefore presented as one of the most practical contributions that middle powers could make to international peace and security. Participants also identified several substantive areas around which closer cooperation could be developed. Climate change, sustainable development, food security, public health, humanitarian response and migration were all cited as examples of global challenges requiring sustained multilateral action. Progress in these areas depends less upon geopolitical competition than upon practical cooperation among states willing to work collectively in pursuit of shared objectives. A closer partnership between middle powers and the Secretary-General could therefore help sustain political momentum around issues where broad international interests continue to converge despite wider geopolitical tensions. The discussion further emphasised that such cooperation should remain firmly anchored in the principles of the United Nations Charter. Respect for international law, peaceful settlement of disputes, sovereign equality, human dignity and sustainable development were repeatedly identified as the normative foundations upon which the partnership should rest. Participants argued that middle powers should support the Secretary-General in defending these principles consistently, recognising that their credibility depends upon their universal application, rather than their selective invocation in particular circumstances. An important practical proposal emerging from the discussion was the possible establishment of a Group of Friends to support the next Secretary-General. Participants suggested that such a group could consist primarily of middle powers committed to strengthening multilateralism and providing sustained political backing for the Office of the Secretary-General. Unlike existing power structures within the United Nations, the purpose of such a group would not be to direct or constrain the Secretary-General, but rather to create greater political space for effective leadership by mobilising support around initiatives consistent with the Charter and the broader interests of the international community. The discussion also recognised that the Secretary-General's effectiveness increasingly depends upon engagement beyond governments alone. Echoing the broader emphasis on a people-centred approach to multilateralism, participants argued that closer relationships should also be fostered with civil society, academia, youth, women, Indigenous communities and other non-state actors. These constituencies not only contribute expertise and practical experience but also strengthen the legitimacy of international decision-making by ensuring that multilateral governance remains connected to the concerns of those it ultimately serves. Middle powers, many of which have extensive experience in participatory governance and multi-stakeholder engagement, are well placed to support the Secretary-General in broadening these relationships. Throughout the discussion there was a clear recognition that the next Secretary-General will assume office at a particularly demanding moment in the history of the United Nations. Expectations are likely to exceed the formal powers of the Office, while geopolitical divisions may continue to constrain institutional decision-making. Participants nevertheless rejected the view that these constraints diminish the importance of the position. On the contrary, they reinforce the need for a Secretary-General capable of exercising principled leadership, supported by Member States willing to invest political capital in strengthening the multilateral system. The panel therefore concluded that the relationship between middle powers and the next Secretary-General should be viewed not as a temporary alignment around a particular appointment, but as the foundation for a broader partnership in support of effective multilateralism. By acting collectively in defence of the Charter, supporting preventive diplomacy, strengthening cooperation around shared global challenges and providing sustained political backing to the Office of the Secretary-General, middle powers can make a practical contribution to restoring confidence in the United Nations and enhancing its capacity to serve the common good. 6. TOWARDS A MIDDLE-POWER AGENDA FOR RENEWING MULTILATERALISM The discussion concluded by turning from diagnosis to action. Having considered the changing geopolitical environment, the distinctive contribution that middle powers can make, the importance of communication, and the opportunities presented by the appointment of a new Secretary-General, participants reflected on what practical agenda should emerge from the discussion. While there was no suggestion that middle powers alone can reshape the international order, there was broad agreement that they can make a far more significant contribution than they presently do if they begin to act with greater strategic purpose and consistency. The first conclusion was that middle powers should move beyond episodic cooperation towards a more sustained habit of strategic consultation. Existing cooperation has demonstrated that middle powers are capable of working effectively together on individual issues. The challenge is to ensure that such cooperation is no longer confined to isolated negotiations or particular international crises. Regular consultation would enable middle powers to identify emerging challenges earlier, exchange perspectives, coordinate positions where appropriate and provide greater continuity in support of multilateral institutions. Such consultation need not create another formal organisation. Indeed, the discussion suggested that flexibility remains one of the principal strengths of middle-power diplomacy. What is required is not another institution, but a stronger political commitment to working together. Secondly, participants argued that middle powers should define themselves less by geopolitical alignment than by the practical issues around which they choose to cooperate. One of the strengths of issue-based cooperation is that it enables countries with different political traditions and strategic relationships to work together where genuine common interests exist. The discussion repeatedly identified areas such as peacebuilding, sustainable development, climate change, food security, humanitarian assistance and public health as examples where middle powers are already demonstrating the value of practical cooperation. Expanding such collaboration would not only deliver tangible international benefits but also reinforce confidence that multilateralism remains capable of producing meaningful outcomes. A third conclusion concerned the continued defence of international law and the United Nations Charter. Throughout the discussion there was broad agreement that middle powers have a particular interest in preserving an international system governed by agreed rules, rather than by the exercise of power alone. Their own security and prosperity frequently depend upon the predictability, stability and legitimacy that such a system provides. Participants therefore suggested that middle powers should continue to champion the peaceful settlement of disputes, sovereign equality, respect for international law and the strengthening of multilateral institutions. At the same time, they recognised that such advocacy will remain credible only if these principles are applied consistently and without political selectivity. The discussion also reinforced the importance of building broader partnerships around multilateralism. Governments alone cannot renew international cooperation. Universities, think tanks, civil society organisations, youth, women, Indigenous communities and the private sector all possess knowledge, experience and networks that can strengthen international policymaking. Participants therefore envisaged a more inclusive model of multilateralism in which governments continue to exercise political leadership while drawing more systematically on the expertise and practical experience of wider society. Such partnerships would not only improve policy outcomes but also strengthen the legitimacy of international institutions by reconnecting them with the people they ultimately serve. Another important conclusion concerned the need to strengthen communication as an integral component of middle-power diplomacy. The discussion suggested that many constructive international initiatives fail to achieve broader influence, because they are insufficiently communicated. Middle powers should therefore invest more deliberately in public diplomacy, strategic communication and the development of narratives that explain the continuing relevance of international cooperation. This requires more than public relations. It calls for a coherent and consistent explanation of why multilateral institutions remain indispensable in addressing the increasingly interconnected challenges confronting humanity. In this regard, communication should be understood as a strategic instrument of diplomacy rather than simply a means of reporting diplomatic activity. Participants also returned to the importance of maintaining a long-term perspective. The immediate international environment is inevitably dominated by crises that demand urgent attention, but the renewal of multilateralism cannot be achieved through crisis management alone, in that it requires sustained investment in institutions, relationships and political trust over time. The discussion therefore encouraged middle powers to adopt a longer strategic horizon by identifying areas where continued cooperation can strengthen the resilience of the international system, even when short-term political circumstances become more difficult. Finally, the discussion returned to the central proposition with which the panel had begun. The future of multilateralism will not be secured by the major powers acting alone, nor by institutional reform in isolation. It will depend upon whether a broader group of states is prepared to assume greater responsibility for the health of the international system. Middle powers are uniquely positioned to make that contribution, because they possess diplomatic credibility across different regions, experience in coalition-building, and a strong interest in preserving an international order based on cooperation and international law. Whether they choose to exercise that potential more strategically remains an open question. The discussion nevertheless concluded that the opportunity now exists for middle powers to become a more influential force in shaping the next phase of multilateral cooperation. In this sense, the discussion was ultimately one of cautious optimism, in that it acknowledged the seriousness of the challenges confronting the international system, while rejecting the assumption that fragmentation is inevitable. The multilateral system has evolved continuously since the establishment of the United Nations, adapting to changing geopolitical realities while remaining anchored in the principles of the Charter. The discussion suggested that the emergence of more active and strategically aligned middle powers may represent the next stage in that evolution, because by working together more consistently, communicating more effectively and supporting principled international leadership, they have the opportunity to help renew confidence in multilateralism and strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to respond to the challenges of an increasingly complex world. Figure 2: From discussion to action: A practical middle-power agenda for renewing multilateralism through strategic cooperation, partnership with the next United Nations Secretary-General, and strengthened public legitimacy. 7. CONCLUSION The discussion began with a concern about the future of multilateralism, but it concluded with a more fundamental reflection on the future of international leadership. The question before the panel was never whether middle powers should replace the major powers as the dominant actors in global governance. Rather, it was whether they are prepared to assume greater responsibility for preserving and renewing a multilateral system upon which all states ultimately depend. The discussion suggested that this question has become increasingly urgent as geopolitical rivalry places growing strain on the institutions established to promote international cooperation. A clear consensus emerged that the challenges confronting the international community cannot be addressed through unilateral action or through great-power politics alone, because climate change, humanitarian crises, food insecurity, migration, technological disruption and armed conflict require sustained cooperation across regions and political traditions. In this environment, middle powers possess important comparative advantages. Their experience in coalition-building, mediation, bridge-building and support for international law positions them to become important contributors to a more stable and effective multilateral order. That potential, however, will only be realised if they are prepared to act more strategically and more consistently than has generally been the case to date. The discussion nevertheless resisted any tendency to romanticise middle powers. Throughout the panel there was recognition that they are as diverse in their interests and political priorities as any other group of states. They pursue national interests, operate under domestic political constraints and will not always agree on international questions. Their future contribution therefore depends less on what they are than on how they choose to exercise their influence. The distinction drawn between authentic middle powers and aspirational great powers captures this point well. Ultimately, the defining characteristic of middle-power leadership is not the accumulation of influence but the willingness to use influence to strengthen dialogue, uphold international law, support cooperation and advance human dignity. An equally important conclusion concerned the need to reconnect multilateralism with the people it is intended to serve. The discussion repeatedly returned to the opening words of the United Nations Charter - "We the Peoples" - as a reminder that the purpose of multilateralism extends beyond the management of relations among states, and that its success should ultimately be measured by its contribution to peace, justice, sustainable development and the dignity of the human person. If international cooperation is to regain public confidence, it must once again demonstrate its relevance to people's everyday lives, which will require governments, international institutions and civil society alike to place human wellbeing at the centre of global governance. The panel also highlighted the growing importance of communication in shaping the future of multilateralism, because international cooperation can no longer depend solely upon successful negotiations among governments. It must also be explained, understood and supported by broader publics. Communication therefore emerged as a strategic resource through which middle powers can strengthen legitimacy, broaden participation in international debate and articulate a more compelling vision of global cooperation. Equally, the discussion recognised that the international community requires a more hopeful narrative; one that acknowledges contemporary challenges while also recognising the considerable progress achieved through decades of multilateral cooperation. Such a narrative should not deny the realities of geopolitical competition, but neither should it allow those realities to define the limits of what remains possible through international partnership. The appointment of the next Secretary-General was identified as a particularly important opportunity to translate these ideas into practice. The discussion argued that the successful candidate will require more than broad international support during the selection process. The Secretary-General will also require sustained political backing from Member States committed to strengthening the United Nations and defending the principles of the Charter. Middle powers, acting collectively, are well placed to provide such support through closer consultation, stronger issue-based cooperation, enhanced preventive diplomacy and, potentially, through the establishment of a Group of Friends dedicated to supporting the work of the Secretary-General while fully respecting the independence of the Office. Perhaps the most significant conclusion to emerge from the discussion is that the future of multilateralism should not be viewed solely through the lens of institutional reform. Reform remains important, but institutions cannot substitute for political leadership, nor can new structures compensate for the absence of trust and cooperation among states. Renewing multilateralism is ultimately a political project, that will require governments to be prepared to invest in dialogue, to uphold international law consistently, to support effective international institutions and to work together in pursuit of the common good. Middle powers possess many of the attributes necessary to help lead that process. The question now is whether they are prepared to do so. The discussion therefore concluded on a cautiously optimistic note. It recognised that the multilateral system is under considerable pressure, but it rejected the assumption that its decline is inevitable. The institutions of international cooperation have adapted before, and they can adapt again. Their future will depend not only on the decisions of the major powers, but also on the willingness of a broader community of states to assume greater responsibility for sustaining an international order founded on dialogue, cooperation and respect for international law. Middle powers have an opportunity to become an important part of that process. By working more strategically with one another, partnering more closely with the next Secretary-General, communicating a more compelling vision of international cooperation and remaining firmly anchored in the principles of the United Nations Charter, they can help shape a more inclusive, resilient and effective multilateral order for the decades ahead. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Read the full journal, including this article, by downloading the PDF below. Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026. by Prof Wynand Goosen Abstract The rapid diffusion of generative artificial intelligence (AI) across education, professional practice, and decision-making has transformed human reasoning into a hybrid process in which humans and machines jointly generate interpretations, judgments, and knowledge claims. While critical thinking is widely promoted as a safeguard against automation bias and uncritical reliance on AI outputs, growing empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that critical thinking alone is insufficient in AI-mediated environments. Instead, effective reasoning depends on metacognition, the monitoring, regulation, and evaluation of one’s own cognitive processes, extended to include reflection on machine-generated contributions (Flavell, 1979; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Metacognition implies thinking on an extended basis. This extended basis identifies “consequence” as the missing link. Understanding the real impact of any form of thinking, whether originating from natural humans or artificial intelligence. This article reconceptualises metacognition as secondary thinking: a supervisory cognitive layer that governs how humans engage with, evaluate, and rely on AI systems. Drawing on cognitive psychology, education, human–computer interaction, and decision sciences, the paper argues that secondary thinking is the central mechanism through which epistemic agency, trust calibration, and responsibility are maintained in human–AI reasoning (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Liao & Sundar, 2022). Three core claims are advanced. First, generative AI shifts cognition from an individual activity to a distributed human–machine system, intensifying the need for metacognitive regulation (Hutchins, 1995; Hollan et al., 2000). Second, critical thinking in AI-supported contexts is contingent on secondary thinking, which determines when and how analytical evaluation is activated (Bjork et al., 2013; Halpern, 2014). Third, failures of secondary thinking explain phenomena such as automation bias, cognitive offloading, and over-trust in fluent AI outputs (Skitka et al., 2000; Kasneci et al., 2023). The article establishes a conceptual foundation for understanding secondary thinking as a mediator between machine cognition and human judgment, preparing the ground for a structured literature survey and the development of an integrative Human–AI Metacognitive Mediation (HAMM) model in subsequent sections. Keywords: Metacognition; Secondary Thinking; Critical Thinking; Human–AI Collaboration; Generative Artificial Intelligence; Distributed Cognition; Automation Bias; AI Literacy 1. Introduction: From Individual Cognition to Hybrid Human–AI Reasoning The integration of generative artificial intelligence (AI) into everyday cognitive work has fundamentally altered how reasoning is performed across educational, professional, and organisational contexts. Tasks such as writing, analysing information, planning, problem-solving, and decision-making now increasingly involve sustained interaction with AI systems capable of producing fluent, context-sensitive, and seemingly reasoned outputs. These systems do not merely support cognition at the margins or automate routine functions; rather, they participate directly in the generation, structuring, and evaluation of ideas. In many contemporary settings, AI-generated outputs function as primary cognitive inputs, the starting point for reasoning rather than its endpoint, thereby reshaping how judgments are formed. As a consequence, cognition can no longer be adequately understood as a purely internal process confined to the individual mind. Instead, reasoning unfolds within hybrid human–machine systems, in which cognitive labour is distributed across human intuitions, analytical processes, and machine-generated contributions (Salomon, 1993; Hutchins, 1995; Kirsh, 2010). Within such systems, reasoning outcomes (consequences) emerge not from isolated human deliberation or automated computation alone, but from the interaction between fast human judgments, AI-generated outputs, and the regulatory processes that govern their integration. The consequences, or impact, of the integrated human and artificial thinking suggest a level of “metacognition” —thinking in such a way that we understand the real consequences. This reconceptualisation is consistent with foundational work in distributed cognition, which demonstrates that reasoning routinely extends beyond the individual to include artefacts, representations, technologies, and social structures that shape how problems are framed and solved (Salomon, 1993; Hutchins, 1995). Generative AI intensifies this dynamic by functioning not only as an external resource but as an active contributor to reasoning, proposing arguments, synthesising evidence, generating counterfactuals, and simulating inferential pathways. In practice, humans increasingly co-think with AI systems, engaging them as interlocutors within cognitive activity rather than as neutral tools executing predefined instructions. This shift fundamentally alters the epistemic conditions under which reasoning occurs. When AI systems contribute directly to the content and structure of reasoning, questions of agency, responsibility, authorship, and justification become distributed rather than singular. The apparent coherence, confidence, and completeness of AI-generated outputs can obscure their probabilistic and non-semantic foundations, while their speed and scale can reduce opportunities for reflective human oversight. As a result, epistemic risk no longer arises solely from human bias or error, but from mismanaged interaction between human judgment and machine-generated contributions. Against this backdrop, a foundational epistemic question emerges: What forms of thinking enable humans to remain responsible epistemic agents when reasoning with and through AI? In educational and professional discourse, critical thinking is commonly positioned as the primary response to this challenge (Facione, 2015; Ennis, 2016). Learners and practitioners are urged to evaluate AI outputs, interrogate assumptions, verify sources, and resist uncritical acceptance. While normatively compelling, this response implicitly assumes that critical thinking is continuously available and readily activated. However, extensive research in cognitive psychology demonstrates that critical thinking is effortful, situational, and conditionally deployed, rather than a default mode of reasoning (Kuhn, 1999; Halpern, 2014). Analytical evaluation requires sustained attention and cognitive control, and it is frequently not activated in environments characterised by time pressure, informational overload, or reduced perceived effort. When tasks appear fluent, complete, or cognitively efficient, as is often the case with generative AI outputs, individuals are more likely to rely on surface plausibility than on sustained analytical scrutiny. Empirical evidence further indicates that analytical reasoning is governed by higher-order regulatory processes rather than operating autonomously. Individuals do not engage in continuous critical evaluation; instead, such evaluation is triggered by signals of uncertainty, contradiction, or epistemic risk. In the absence of these signals, even highly trained individuals may accept outputs unreflectively, particularly when those outputs align with prior beliefs or expectations. AI-mediated environments systematically attenuate many of the cues that typically prompt scrutiny—such as visible uncertainty, hesitation, or partial explanations—thereby increasing the likelihood that critical thinking remains dormant. These regulatory processes are captured by metacognition, broadly defined as awareness and control of one’s own thinking (Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Metacognition enables individuals to monitor uncertainty, evaluate progress, and adjust cognitive strategies. In AI-mediated reasoning, however, metacognition must operate at an expanded scope. It must regulate not only human thought processes, but also reliance on machine-generated outputs, including decisions about when to accept, interrogate, override, or suspend AI assistance (Liao & Sundar, 2022). Despite this necessity, research on metacognition, critical thinking, and human–AI interaction remains fragmented. Educational psychology has developed robust models of self-regulation yet typically treats cognition as individual (Schraw & Dennison, 1994). Human–AI interaction research has focused extensively on usability, trust, and performance, but with limited integration of metacognitive theory (Parasuraman et al., 2000). Meanwhile, educational discussions of generative AI often frame critical thinking as a static skill to be preserved, rather than as a conditionally activated process governed by metacognitive mediation (Holmes et al., 2023). This fragmentation obscures a central insight: failures in human–AI reasoning are frequently not failures of critical thinking capacity, but failures of metacognitive regulation within hybrid systems. When regulatory oversight is weak, critical thinking may never be activated, regardless of an individual’s expertise or intent. This article addresses that gap by advancing secondary thinking as the supervisory mechanism that mediates between human cognition and machine-generated contributions. Building on this insight, the article proposes the Human–AI Metacognitive Mediation (HAMM) model, which conceptualises reasoning in AI-mediated environments as a multi-layered, recursively regulated system. Within this model, secondary thinking governs the activation of critical thinking, the calibration of trust in AI systems, and the integration of machine outputs into human judgment. By foregrounding metacognitive mediation, the HAMM model provides a coherent theoretical foundation for understanding epistemic agency, accountability, and responsible reasoning in the age of generative AI. 2. Metacognition as Secondary Thinking Metacognition has long been defined as “knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena”, encompassing the processes by which individuals plan, monitor, and regulate their thinking (Flavell, 1979). This foundational formulation established that cognition is not limited to first-order processes such as perception, inference, or memory retrieval, but also includes higher-order awareness of how those processes unfold and how effectively they serve one’s goals. Subsequent theoretical models refined this view by distinguishing between metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive monitoring, and metacognitive control, emphasising that effective reasoning depends not only on the content of thought, but on the continuous oversight and regulation of cognitive activity (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Efklides, 2008). Across decades of empirical research, metacognition has been shown to predict learning quality, problem-solving success, and error detection across a wide range of domains and age groups. Importantly, these effects are most pronounced in complex, uncertain, or ill-structured task contexts in which individuals must decide not only how to think, but whether their current understanding is adequate and when to revise their approach (Zimmerman, 2002; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). These characteristics closely resemble the cognitive demands imposed by AI-mediated reasoning environments. In this article, metacognition is conceptualised functionally as secondary thinking—a supervisory layer of cognition that operates on thinking rather than as thinking. This distinction is analytically important. Secondary thinking does not directly generate ideas, arguments, or solutions; instead, it governs the conditions under which such cognitive products are produced, evaluated, and revised. Framed in this way, secondary thinking functions as a form of cognitive governance, shaping the reliability, depth, and epistemic quality of reasoning rather than its immediate outputs. More specifically, secondary thinking regulates cognition through several interrelated functions. It involves monitoring the coherence, plausibility, and uncertainty of one’s own reasoning, allowing individuals to recognise gaps in understanding or mismatches between confidence and justification (Schraw, 1998; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). It also includes evaluating the reliability, scope, and limitations of AI-generated outputs, particularly in light of the probabilistic and opaque nature of generative models (Van den Bosch & Bronkhorst, 2018; Liao & Sundar, 2022). A further function of secondary thinking is detecting cognitive conflict, such as discrepancies between intuitive judgments and analytical considerations, or between human reasoning and machine suggestions (Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich et al., 2016). Finally, secondary thinking supports strategic control, enabling individuals to decide when to rely on AI, when to override it, and when to seek alternative sources or verification (Parasuraman et al., 2000; Endsley, 2017). This framing clarifies the role of metacognition in AI-mediated reasoning. Rather than treating metacognition as a generic learning skill or background trait, secondary thinking is understood as a dynamic regulatory mechanism that governs the interaction between human cognition and machine cognition. It operates above both intuitive, fast processes and deliberate analytical processes, coordinating their deployment in response to contextual demands and epistemic risk (Bjork et al., 2013). Crucially, secondary thinking is not automatically triggered. Its activation depends on task design, perceived stakes, time pressure, and the presence of explicit reflective cues. In environments where AI systems produce fluent, confident, and seemingly authoritative outputs, the absence of such cues can suppress secondary thinking altogether. Under these conditions, even highly educated individuals may accept outputs uncritically, mistaking coherence, confidence, or stylistic sophistication for epistemic correctness (Williams et al., 2022). This vulnerability underscores the central importance of secondary thinking in hybrid human–AI reasoning systems. 3. Critical Thinking in AI-Mediated Contexts Critical thinking is typically defined as purposeful, reflective judgment involving the analysis and evaluation of arguments, evidence, and assumptions (Facione, 1990; Ennis, 2016). Within higher education and professional practice, it is widely regarded as a cornerstone competence, underpinning informed decision-making, complex problem-solving, ethical judgment, and responsible participation in knowledge-based societies. Critical thinking is often positioned as a safeguard against error, bias, and misinformation, particularly in environments characterised by informational abundance, competing claims, and epistemic uncertainty. In policy discourse and educational reform, it is frequently presented as the primary defence against the epistemic risks associated with digital technologies and automated systems. However, a substantial body of research demonstrates that critical thinking is neither context-free nor continuously active. Rather than operating as a default cognitive mode, critical thinking is situational, effortful, and strongly shaped by higher-order regulatory processes that govern attention, effort allocation, and strategy selection (Halpern, 2014; Kuhn, 2015). Individuals do not constantly evaluate the quality of information they encounter. Instead, analytical reasoning is selectively engaged in response to cues such as uncertainty, perceived risk, contradiction, or explicit demands for justification. When these cues are absent, even well-trained individuals may rely on surface plausibility rather than deliberate evaluation. From a cognitive perspective, critical thinking requires sustained attention, effortful processing, and the inhibition of intuitive or habitual responses. These demands make it cognitively costly and therefore selectively deployed. Individuals are more likely to engage in critical scrutiny when they perceive high stakes or epistemic danger, and less likely to do so when tasks appear familiar, efficient, or well-structured. Consequently, critical thinking is highly sensitive to features of the surrounding cognitive environment, including time pressure, perceived task difficulty, motivational factors, and the availability of external cognitive supports. Environments that reduce effort or signal completion can unintentionally suppress analytical engagement. In AI-supported environments, this conditionality becomes especially pronounced. Generative AI systems can, under appropriate conditions, scaffold critical thinking by exposing users to alternative perspectives, counterarguments, illustrative examples, and structured explanations that prompt comparison, evaluation, and synthesis (Chi, 2009; Kerrigan & Azevedo, 2022). When AI is used dialogically and reflectively—through iterative prompting, critique, explanation requests, or justification cycles—it can function as a cognitive partner that extends rather than replaces human reasoning capacity. Empirical work suggests that such reflective use of AI can enhance argument quality, conceptual integration, and depth of understanding, particularly when users remain actively engaged in evaluating the AI’s contributions (Xie et al., 2024). At the same time, generative AI can suppress critical thinking, particularly when its outputs are fluent, confident, and presented as complete or authoritative solutions. In these cases, AI reduces perceived task difficulty and creates an impression that cognitive work has already been done, encouraging cognitive offloading and premature closure (Kasneci et al., 2023). This suppression is amplified by well-established cognitive biases, most notably the tendency to equate linguistic fluency with epistemic reliability (Kahneman, 2011). As Bender and Koller (2020) argue, the surface coherence of language-model outputs can obscure underlying inaccuracies, fabrications, or unsupported inferences, creating a powerful illusion of understanding that discourages further scrutiny. Importantly, in such cases, critical thinking is not absent because users lack the relevant skills, dispositions, or educational preparation. Rather, it is absent because it is never activated. The cognitive environment created by generative AI often removes or attenuates the signals—such as visible uncertainty, hesitation, partial reasoning, or error—that typically prompt analytical evaluation. Without these epistemic triggers, individuals may default to acceptance, particularly when AI outputs align with prior beliefs, expectations, or goals. As a result, critical thinking remains latent, even among individuals with substantial training and experience in analytical reasoning and professional judgment. These observations indicate that critical thinking alone cannot adequately explain reasoning quality in AI-mediated contexts. Instead, critical thinking is governed by secondary thinking, which determines when analytical evaluation is warranted, how intensively it should be applied, and whether AI outputs should be accepted, questioned, or rejected (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Bjork et al., 2013). Secondary thinking monitors epistemic risk, detects overconfidence, and initiates reflective scrutiny when conditions demand it. Without such metacognitive oversight, critical thinking cannot reliably fulfil its epistemic function within hybrid cognitive systems, regardless of an individual’s formal competence, experience, or intentions. 4. Machine Cognition, Automation Bias, and Distributed Responsibility Although contemporary AI systems do not possess cognition in the human sense, they increasingly perform functions that simulate the outward characteristics of reasoning. These include generating explanations, synthesising large bodies of information, identifying patterns across datasets, and proposing decisions or action pathways that resemble deliberative judgment (Miller, 2019; Bender et al., 2021). In interactive contexts, these outputs are linguistically fluent, context-sensitive, and often structurally indistinguishable from human-authored reasoning. They follow the conventions of argumentation, explanation, and narrative coherence that humans associate with understanding and rational agency. As a result, users frequently respond to AI systems as if they were epistemic agents—entities capable of knowing, reasoning, and justifying—rather than as computational artefacts executing statistical inference. This functional resemblance has profound cognitive consequences. Humans are evolutionarily and socially predisposed to attribute understanding, intention, and authority to entities that produce coherent language and plausible explanations. Language fluency, in particular, acts as a powerful cue for competence and trustworthiness. In the case of generative AI, this attribution occurs despite extensive evidence that such systems operate through probabilistic pattern completion rather than semantic comprehension, intentional reasoning, or truth-directed inference (Bender & Koller, 2020; Ji et al., 2023). The system does not “know” what it states, nor does it possess commitments to truth, evidence, or justification. The growing disjunction between epistemic appearance and epistemic reality therefore becomes a central source of risk in AI-mediated reasoning. Crucially, the problem is not simply that users misunderstand how AI systems work at a technical level. Rather, AI systems actively reshape the epistemic environment in which judgments are formed. Generative AI reduces informational friction by presenting outputs that are immediate, confident, syntactically complete, and often framed as solutions rather than as provisional suggestions. Traditional cues that signal uncertainty—hesitation, partial explanations, visible effort, acknowledged gaps, or expressions of doubt—are largely absent. This absence alters the cognitive ecology of reasoning, shifting users toward acceptance rather than interrogation. Even when errors or inconsistencies are present, the smoothness of presentation can suppress the impulse to scrutinise. One of the most robustly documented consequences of this altered epistemic environment is automation bias, defined as the systematic tendency to over-rely on automated systems, particularly when they appear authoritative, consistent, or cognitively efficient (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Skitka et al., 2000). Research across aviation, healthcare, finance, and military decision-making consistently demonstrates that individuals frequently defer to automated recommendations even when contradictory evidence is available or when the system is demonstrably fallible. Importantly, automation bias persists among experts and does not reliably diminish with experience alone, especially under conditions of cognitive load, time pressure, or task complexity (Mosier & Skitka, 2018). In AI-mediated reasoning, automation bias manifests in distinct but related forms. Users may accept AI-generated explanations without verification, fail to notice hallucinated citations or fabricated claims, or defer judgment to the system when outputs align with prior beliefs or goals. Generative AI intensifies these effects by masking epistemic uncertainty behind linguistic fluency, thereby exploiting well-known cognitive heuristics that equate coherence with correctness (Kahneman, 2011). The result is not blind trust in technology per se, but a subtle recalibration of epistemic vigilance in which scrutiny is deferred unless explicitly triggered. A key construct for understanding these dynamics is trust calibration, defined as the alignment between a user’s confidence in an AI system and the system’s actual reliability in a given context (Van den Bosch & Bronkhorst, 2018; Liao & Sundar, 2022). Miscalibrated trust produces two symmetrical failure modes: over-reliance, in which erroneous or inappropriate outputs are accepted, and under-reliance, in which valuable assistance is dismissed or ignored. Importantly, trust calibration is not achieved solely through improvements in system accuracy, transparency, or explainability. It is fundamentally a metacognitive accomplishment, requiring users to recognise uncertainty, reflect on system limitations, assess contextual appropriateness, and dynamically adjust reliance strategies (Gigerenzer, 2020). From the perspective of distributed cognition, reasoning outcomes remain human responsibilities, even when machines contribute substantially to the cognitive process (Hutchins, 1995). Cognitive artefacts can extend, scaffold, and transform reasoning by externalising memory, generating representations, or accelerating comparison. However, they do not assume epistemic agency. The delegation of cognitive labour—such as information retrieval or synthesis—does not entail the delegation of epistemic accountability. Decisions, interpretations, and justifications ultimately remain attributable to human agents. Ethical and epistemic responsibility therefore cannot be offloaded to machines, regardless of their apparent sophistication or autonomy. Within this distributed cognitive system, secondary thinking emerges as the mechanism through which responsibility is exercised and maintained. Secondary thinking governs how AI outputs are interpreted, how trust is dynamically calibrated, and how final judgments are justified and defended. It enables users to step back from fluent outputs, interrogate their reliability, and reflect on how machine-generated content has shaped their reasoning process. By regulating the interaction between human judgment and machine-generated contributions, secondary thinking supports epistemic vigilance, accountability, and adaptive reliance within hybrid human–AI reasoning systems (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). 5. Synthesis of the Literature: Secondary Thinking as a Mediator in Human–AI Reasoning The preceding sections establish three interlocking premises that together reframe how reasoning must be understood in AI-mediated contexts. First, cognition in AI-rich environments is increasingly distributed across human and machine agents, rather than confined to the individual mind. Second, critical thinking—while indispensable to sound judgment—does not operate continuously or autonomously in such environments; its activation is conditional and effortful. Third, metacognitive regulation, conceptualised in this article as secondary thinking, is required to govern reasoning processes within hybrid cognitive systems. This section synthesises findings across educational psychology, cognitive science, and human–AI interaction research to demonstrate that secondary thinking operates not merely as an auxiliary skill, but as a mediating mechanism that determines how machine-generated contributions influence human judgment. Within educational psychology, decades of empirical research consistently demonstrate that metacognition is a stronger predictor of learning quality, error detection, transfer, and long-term retention than cognitive ability or domain knowledge alone (Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Zimmerman, 2002; Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Learners with strong metacognitive skills are better able to monitor their understanding, detect misconceptions, allocate effort strategically, and adapt their approaches when faced with difficulty. These advantages are especially pronounced in ill-structured problem-solving contexts, where there is no single correct solution path and where success depends on evaluating the adequacy and reliability of one’s reasoning strategies (Efklides, 2008). In such contexts, progress hinges less on executing procedures and more on regulating cognition itself. Crucially, these metacognitive advantages are not limited to formal learning settings. They generalise to any environment characterised by uncertainty, complexity, and incomplete information—conditions that closely resemble contemporary AI-mediated reasoning contexts. Generative AI systems introduce precisely the circumstances under which metacognitive regulation becomes essential: informational abundance, reduced cognitive effort, and asymmetric epistemic authority between human users and machine-generated outputs. When AI systems rapidly generate fluent explanations, summaries, or recommendations, users must decide not only what to accept, but whether acceptance is warranted at all. These decisions are inherently metacognitive. Parallel insights emerge from the literature on human–automation interaction and decision sciences. Decades of research on automation bias demonstrate that individuals frequently over-rely on automated systems, even when those systems are demonstrably fallible or when contradictory evidence is available (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Skitka et al., 2000). This over-reliance is exacerbated under conditions of cognitive load, time pressure, or perceived system authority, and persists even among highly trained professionals (Mosier & Skitka, 2018). Importantly, these failures cannot be adequately explained by lack of expertise, motivation, or training. Instead, they reflect breakdowns in metacognitive monitoring, particularly failures to recognise uncertainty, question reliability, or recalibrate trust in light of contextual cues. Research on generative AI in educational and professional settings further reinforces this interpretation. Studies consistently show that passive engagement with AI outputs—such as copying, accepting, or minimally editing generated content—is associated with shallow processing, reduced cognitive effort, and uncritical acceptance of plausible but flawed information (Ji et al., 2023; Kasneci et al., 2023). In contrast, when AI use is embedded within reflective and metacognitively demanding practices—including self-explanation, justification prompts, comparison of alternatives, or iterative critique—reasoning quality improves substantially (Kerrigan & Azevedo, 2022; Xie et al., 2024). Learners and practitioners in these conditions demonstrate greater awareness of uncertainty, stronger argumentation, and improved ability to detect errors or inconsistencies. Taken together, these findings indicate that AI itself is neither inherently beneficial nor inherently detrimental to human cognition. Rather, its cognitive impact is conditional, shaped by how individuals regulate their interaction with machine-generated outputs. AI can function as a powerful cognitive scaffold when it is used within a metacognitively regulated framework that encourages reflection, evaluation, and strategic control. Conversely, AI can function as a cognitive substitute when such regulation is absent, leading to cognitive offloading, automation bias, and diminished epistemic vigilance. Synthesised across these literatures, a central explanatory insight emerges: secondary thinking governs whether AI functions as a cognitive scaffold or as a cognitive substitute. When secondary thinking is active, individuals monitor both their own reasoning and the AI’s contributions, calibrate trust appropriately, and engage critical thinking when warranted. Under these conditions, AI supports exploration, comparison, and epistemic reflection. When secondary thinking is inactive or suppressed, AI reduces epistemic friction, obscures uncertainty, and encourages uncritical acceptance, thereby suppressing reasoning rather than enhancing it. This mediating role of secondary thinking provides the missing theoretical bridge linking metacognition research, critical thinking theory, and human–AI interaction studies. It explains why similar AI tools can produce radically different cognitive outcomes across users and contexts, and why interventions focused solely on improving AI accuracy or transparency are insufficient. Without attention to the metacognitive processes that regulate human–AI interaction, critical thinking cannot reliably fulfil its epistemic function within hybrid cognitive systems. By positioning secondary thinking as a mediator rather than a peripheral skill, this synthesis reframes human–AI reasoning as a metacognitively governed system. This reframing sets the foundation for the Human–AI Metacognitive Mediation (HAMM) model developed in the following section, which formalises these relationships and articulates their implications for education, leadership, and AI literacy. 6. The Human–AI Metacognitive Mediation (HAMM) Model 6.1 Conceptual Architecture Building on the preceding synthesis, the Human–AI Metacognitive Mediation (HAMM) model is proposed as an integrative theoretical framework for understanding reasoning in AI-mediated environments. The model is designed to explain how and why interactions between human cognition and machine-generated outputs produce variable epistemic outcomes, ranging from enhanced reasoning and learning to automation bias and cognitive offloading. Rather than conceptualising reasoning as a linear sequence in which human input is followed by machine output and then acceptance or rejection, the HAMM model frames human–AI reasoning as a dynamic, recursive system governed by metacognitive oversight. At the core of the HAMM model is the claim that reasoning quality in AI-mediated contexts is not determined solely by the accuracy of AI systems or the critical thinking ability of users. Instead, it is shaped by the regulatory processes that govern how human cognition and machine-generated contributions are integrated, monitored, and revised over time. Secondary thinking functions as the supervisory mechanism that coordinates this integration, ensuring that reasoning remains adaptive, context-sensitive, and epistemically responsible. The model comprises three interacting layers, each of which plays a distinct but interdependent role in hybrid reasoning: Layer 1: Primary Cognitive Inputs The first layer consists of primary cognitive inputs, which include fast, automatic human processes—such as heuristics, intuitions, emotional responses, and prior beliefs—as well as machine-generated outputs produced through probabilistic inference and pattern recognition. These inputs are characterised by speed and efficiency, allowing rapid generation of ideas, interpretations, and responses. However, they are also epistemically opaque, offering little intrinsic assurance of reliability or justification (Kahneman, 2011; Bender & Koller, 2020). In human cognition, primary processes are adaptive but vulnerable to bias and overconfidence. In machine cognition, outputs are fluent and scalable but indifferent to truth, meaning, or epistemic commitment. The HAMM model treats both sources symmetrically at this level: they provide raw material for reasoning, not warranted conclusions. Importantly, the model highlights that AI-generated content enters the reasoning process at the same level as intuitive human judgments, making regulatory oversight essential. Layer 2: Critical Thinking Processes The second layer comprises critical thinking processes, involving deliberate evaluation of claims, evidence, assumptions, and alternatives (Facione, 1990; Ennis, 2016). At this level, individuals assess coherence, consistency, relevance, and justification, including those associated with AI-generated outputs. Critical thinking enables comparison of alternatives, detection of inconsistencies, and evaluation of evidentiary support. Crucially, the HAMM model explicitly rejects the assumption that critical thinking is continuously active. Instead, it is treated as a conditionally deployed cognitive resource. Activation depends on perceived uncertainty, task demands, epistemic risk, and—most importantly—metacognitive signals originating from the supervisory layer. Without such activation, primary inputs may pass directly to judgment without scrutiny, regardless of their origin. Layer 3: Secondary Thinking (Metacognitive Mediation) The third layer consists of secondary thinking, conceptualised as metacognitive mediation. This supervisory layer performs three central regulatory functions: monitoring, control, and reflection. It monitors uncertainty, coherence, and conflict between human judgments and AI-generated suggestions; it controls reliance strategies by deciding when to defer to AI, when to override it, and when to seek alternative sources; and it supports reflection on epistemic assumptions, biases, and prior outcomes (Flavell, 1979; Efklides, 2008). Secondary thinking determines when critical thinking is activated, how intensively it is applied, and whether reliance on AI should be increased, reduced, or suspended. It thus functions as the gatekeeper of analytical engagement, ensuring that critical thinking is deployed where it is epistemically warranted rather than indiscriminately or not at all. A defining feature of the HAMM model is the recursive interaction among these layers. Outputs from critical thinking feed back into secondary thinking, updating trust calibration, confidence judgments, and future reliance strategies. Over time, this recursive process supports learning, adaptation, and the development of AI-specific metacognitive skills, allowing users to become more discerning and reflective participants in hybrid reasoning systems. 6.2 Theoretical Propositions From the conceptual architecture of the HAMM model, several theoretically grounded propositions follow. These propositions articulate testable relationships that link metacognitive regulation, AI use, and epistemic outcomes: a. Secondary thinking positively predicts calibrated trust in AI systems.Individuals with stronger metacognitive monitoring and control are better able to align their confidence in AI outputs with the system's actual reliability, thereby avoiding both over- and under-reliance. b. Trust calibration mediates the relationship between AI use and reasoning quality. AI use enhances reasoning outcomes only when trust is appropriately calibrated; miscalibration leads either to automation bias or to the rejection of valuable cognitive support. c. High AI fluency combined with weak secondary thinking increases susceptibility to automation bias.Fluent, confident AI outputs suppress analytical engagement when metacognitive oversight is weak, particularly under conditions of cognitive load or time pressure. d. Metacognitive scaffolds enhance epistemic outcomes in generative-AI tasks. Design features such as reflective prompts, uncertainty visualisations, self-explanation routines, and justification requirements activate secondary thinking and improve reasoning quality, transfer, and epistemic accountability (Azevedo et al., 2010; Xie et al., 2024). Together, these propositions position secondary thinking as the central explanatory variable linking machine cognition to human judgment and epistemic outcomes. They provide a theoretically coherent basis for empirical testing and for the design of educational, professional, and organisational interventions aimed at improving human–AI reasoning. 7. Implications for Education, Leadership, and AI Literacy 7.1 Doctoral and Higher Education Doctoral and advanced higher education constitute high-stakes epistemic environments in which originality, rigour, transparency, and accountability are central to scholarly legitimacy. Doctoral candidates are expected not only to produce novel contributions to knowledge, but also to demonstrate mastery over reasoning processes, evidentiary standards, and epistemic justification. In this context, the increasing reliance on generative AI for activities such as literature exploration, conceptual framing, methodological planning, data analysis, and academic writing introduces profound opportunities alongside equally significant risks. Empirical studies indicate that unregulated use of generative AI can result in hallucinated or fabricated citations, superficial synthesis of literature, erosion of argumentative coherence, and diminished engagement with primary sources (Ji et al., 2023; Kasneci et al., 2023). These risks are not merely technical or procedural; they are fundamentally epistemic. When AI-generated content is incorporated without reflective scrutiny, the integrity of scholarly reasoning is compromised, even when surface-level outputs appear coherent or sophisticated. The HAMM model reframes AI use in doctoral education not as a productivity shortcut to be managed through prohibition or detection, but as an object of metacognitive scrutiny. From this perspective, the core educational challenge is not whether doctoral candidates use AI, but how they regulate its influence on their reasoning processes. Secondary thinking becomes a central scholarly competence, enabling candidates to monitor how AI-generated suggestions shape their conceptual decisions, argumentative structure, and interpretation of evidence. Practically, this implies that doctoral education should incorporate explicit metacognitive practices related to AI use. These may include reflective AI-use logs, structured justification of AI-assisted decisions, and critical annotation of AI-generated outputs. Supervisory practices can also be adapted to foreground reasoning transparency, asking candidates not only what conclusions they reached, but how AI tools influenced the path to those conclusions. In this way, AI becomes a catalyst for deeper epistemic reflection rather than a threat to scholarly rigour. 7.2 Leadership and Strategic Decision-Making In leadership and executive contexts, AI systems are increasingly deployed for forecasting, risk modelling, scenario planning, policy analysis, and strategic decision-making. These applications place AI at the core of organisational judgment, often under conditions of uncertainty, time pressure, and high consequence. While AI promises enhanced analytical capacity and efficiency, it also amplifies well-documented cognitive vulnerabilities, particularly automation bias, when outputs align with intuitive judgments or reduce perceived cognitive effort (Green & Chen, 2019; Raisch & Krakowski, 2021). Leaders are especially susceptible to these dynamics because strategic decisions often involve ambiguous data, competing priorities, and limited feedback loops. Fluent AI-generated recommendations can create an illusion of certainty or objectivity, leading leaders to overestimate the reliability of algorithmic outputs or to defer judgment prematurely. In such contexts, failures are rarely attributable to lack of intelligence or experience. Instead, they reflect insufficient regulation of how machine-generated insights are interpreted and integrated into human judgment. The HAMM model positions secondary thinking as a core leadership capability. Effective leaders must be able to step back from AI outputs, interrogate underlying assumptions, recognise model limitations, and reflect on how cognitive biases—both human and algorithmic—shape decision outcomes. Secondary thinking supports epistemic humility by reminding leaders that AI systems are probabilistic, context-dependent, and value-laden rather than neutral arbiters of truth (Floridi, 2019; Gigerenzer, 2020). Leadership development programmes should therefore move beyond instrumental AI training and incorporate metacognitive components. AI-augmented decision simulations, followed by structured debriefs focused on reasoning processes rather than outcomes alone, can help leaders develop awareness of trust calibration, over-reliance, and cognitive offloading. Such practices align strategic competence with epistemic responsibility, ensuring that AI enhances rather than displaces human judgment. 7.3 AI Literacy Frameworks Current AI literacy frameworks typically emphasise technical understanding, ethical awareness, and the ability to critically evaluate AI outputs (Long & Magerko, 2020). While these dimensions are essential, they often underemphasise the metacognitive regulation of human–AI interaction. As a result, AI literacy is frequently framed as knowledge about AI rather than competence in managing how AI reshapes one’s own thinking. The HAMM model extends existing AI literacy frameworks by positioning secondary thinking as a foundational literacy component. From this perspective, AI literacy involves not only understanding what AI systems can and cannot do, but also recognising how interaction with AI alters cognitive effort, attention allocation, confidence judgments, and epistemic vigilance. Literate users are those who can monitor their reliance on AI, detect when critical thinking is being suppressed, and deliberately re-engage analytical scrutiny when warranted. Embedding secondary thinking into AI literacy initiatives has implications across educational and professional domains. Curricula should incorporate reflective prompts, uncertainty interrogation, and explicit discussion of cognitive offloading and automation bias. Rather than focusing solely on correct use of tools, AI literacy should cultivate awareness of how reasoning itself changes in AI-mediated environments. By foregrounding metacognitive regulation, the HAMM model reframes AI literacy as a form of cognitive self-governance. This reframing aligns AI education with broader goals of epistemic agency, responsible judgment, and human flourishing in technologically mediated societies. 8. Conclusion This article demonstrates that the central cognitive challenge of the AI era is not a deficit of critical thinking, but a deficit of effective metacognitive regulation in hybrid human–AI reasoning systems. By integrating metacognition theory, critical thinking research, and human–AI interaction studies, it shows that secondary thinking mediates the epistemic impact of machine cognition. The HAMM model provides a theoretically grounded explanation for automation bias, cognitive offloading, and trust miscalibration, while offering actionable implications for education, leadership, and AI literacy. As AI systems become increasingly embedded in cognitive and societal processes, human agency will depend not only on what we think, but on our capacity to think about how we think with machines. References Azevedo, R., Moos, D.C., Johnson, A.M. and Chauncey, A.D. 2010. 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Human–machine reconfigurations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van den Bosch, K. and Bronkhorst, A. 2018. Trust calibration, Cognitive Systems Research, 50, pp. 92–107. Veenman, M.V.J. 2016. Metacognition in science education, International Journal of Science Education, 38(4), pp. 1–17. Williams, J.J., Lombrozo, T. and Rehder, B. 2022. The illusion of explanatory depth, Cognitive Science, 46(4), e13125. Xie, Y., Liu, X. and Bradshaw, A. 2024. Generative AI and argument quality, Educational Technology Research and Development, 72, pp. 1–24. Zimmerman, B.J. 2002. Becoming a self-regulated learner, Theory Into Practice, 41(2), pp. 64–70. Zuboff, S. 2019. The age of surveillance capitalism. London: Profile Books. This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

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About Us zkhiphani.co.za The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever-transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. Whilst the institute undertakes research through the lens of social and national democratic values and principles, it is pragmatic, not dogmatic, in its approach.

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