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Copyright © 2026   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   October 2025   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   Contents   Abstract Introduction: A partnership pauses to reflect FOCAC’s institutional journey Cultural and intellectual resonances Governance, multipolarity and the Global South Expanding fields of cooperation Knowledge institutions as architects of the future Youth and intergenerational imagination Looking forward: Toward a shared horizon Conclusion References Abstract   This report reflects on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) through the insights from a joint symposium convened by the Inclusive Society Institute and the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University. It argues that FOCAC has evolved from a primarily developmental platform into a mature, multidimensional partnership that has been shaped by shared intellectual, cultural and governance concerns. The discussions situate China-Africa cooperation within a shifting global order that is marked by multipolarity and a rising Global South agency, emphasising the growing role of knowledge institutions, cultural resonance and youth engagement. The paper reaches the conclusion that FOCAC, at twenty-five, represents a philosophical inflection point, which signals a move away from transactional cooperation and towards deeper intellectual and civilisational co-creation.     1. Introduction: A partnership pauses to reflect   There are moments in the life of international partnerships when the ordinary tempo of cooperation slows, and a deeper rhythm emerges, the rhythm of reflection. The symposium jointly convened by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) and the Institute of African Studies (IAS) at Zhejiang Normal University marked such a moment. Although formally situated within the celebrations of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the gathering quickly moved beyond ceremonial acknowledgement.   What unfolded was a reflective and at times almost contemplative conversation about the meaning of the relationship between China and Africa, the memory that anchors it and the imagination required to carry it forward. Academic exchanges are often framed as technical discussions around data, research and policy and yet in Cape Town, something more elemental surfaced, an awareness that partnerships, much like individuals, reach a point when they must pause, take stock of themselves and rediscover the deeper reasons they exist. Prof. Liu Shu (2025), in opening the symposium, captured this sensibility when he framed the gathering as a response to President Xi Jinping’s message in a letter to African scholars, which he said was not to be treated as a mere diplomatic gesture, but as an invitation to deepen the civilisational and scholarly conscience of the relationship. His remarks reminded participants that research is not a passive adjunct to diplomacy, it is an active instrument through which partnerships think about themselves. Liu’s framing created an atmosphere of attentiveness, the sense that everyone in the room was being asked to listen more carefully than usual, to speak with intention, and to resist the temptation of treating the anniversary as a checklist of achievements. From the outset, the symposium leaned toward introspection, thereby signalling that this anniversary would be measured not only in outcomes, but in how understanding is improved. The keynote reflection by Daryl Swanepoel (2025) reinforced the tone by offering an expansive reading of FOCAC’s institutional development over the past twenty-five years. His account of the Forum’s maturation over a quarter-century emphasised that institutional longevity arises from real alignment, not rhetorical alignment, not ideological alignment, but developmental alignment. He traced how FOCAC began in 2000 as a diplomatic platform designed to stabilise and formalise cooperation, yet gradually grew into a multidimensional developmental machinery encompassing infrastructure, human capital formation, public health, green energy, digital finance and governance reform. The way he narrated FOCAC’s evolution carried a philosophical undercurrent, that institutions, like people, discover themselves over time and they evolve in response to necessity, experience and the subtle accretion of trust. In his telling, FOCAC was not designed fully formed, it became itself through interaction, experimentation and iterative cooperation.   This observation set the stage for the symposium’s broader inquiry, namely that if the first twenty-five years of FOCAC were about discovering institutional purpose, then the next twenty-five must be about deepening institutional meaning. And to understand this meaning requires more than economic metrics, it requires attention to culture, history, intellectual frameworks, identity, symbolism and memory, the human elements that shape how cooperation is understood and lived.   It was precisely this terrain that the symposium sought to explore. 2. FOCAC’s institutional journey   The institutional story of FOCAC is well known in broad outline, yet the symposium revealed a more layered understanding of its development. Swanepoel (2025) described the Forum as being a living architecture that is not a static bureaucratic agreement, but rather, it has developed into a dynamic structure that adapts as Africa’s needs and China’s capabilities evolve. In its earliest years, FOCAC’s focus on infrastructure reflected Africa’s developmental urgency of the time, such as the need for economic infrastructure like roads, power stations, ports, railways and telecommunications that could unlock economic potential and China’s experience with large-scale infrastructure and its capacity to mobilise finance at scale aligned naturally with these priorities.   But as multiple participants noted, the institutional journey did not stop at infrastructure. It broadened into a sophisticated framework for cooperation across diverse fields. What differentiates FOCAC from many other development partnerships, Wang Xiao (2025) observed, is its responsiveness, the capacity to evolve in tandem with Africa’s changing strategic aspirations, for example, when Africa began prioritising industrialisation, FOCAC expanded vocational training, manufacturing cooperation and industrial parks. When digital transformation emerged as a critical frontier, the partnership introduced cross-border e-commerce training, digital customs innovations and partnerships with Chinese technology ecosystems. When Africa’s public health vulnerabilities were exposed during the Ebola crisis and later during COVID-19, new forms of health cooperation emerged, such as the Africa CDC, medical training schemes, hospital twinning arrangements and emergency health infrastructure.   This was echoed by Prof. Liu Hongwu (2025), who described China’s developmental trajectory as having evolved from an agrarian society into a manufacturing powerhouse, which then further evolved into a technological innovator, thereby equipping China with a unique set of experiences from which Africa can selectively draw, but importantly, Africa must guard against simple imitation, because development models must be adapted to local circumstances and not only copied. He then went on to emphasise that China’s experience holds value precisely because it demonstrates that development is possible outside Western frameworks, and under conditions that resonate with African contexts.   Ambassador Gert Grobler (2025) offered a complementary diplomatic perspective, arguing that FOCAC’s durability is a product of consistent engagement, for example, China has shown up, in ministerial meetings, in summit dialogues, in crisis response, in long-term capacity initiatives. International partnerships often falter because intentions fade or political cycles intervene. FOCAC has endured because it has been continuously cultivated and this has created diplomatic reliability and the space for deeper forms of cooperation, which is enabling Africa and China to walk together through shifting global circumstances.   The institutional journey of FOCAC has also has a psychological dimension, which was illuminated by the intervention of Buyelwa Sonjica (2025), who argued that Africa’s engagement with China has helped to disrupt the legacy of dependency that was created by Africa’s colonial and post-colonial relationships with the West. For her, the institutional framework offers not merely aid or investment, but affirmation and a recognition of Africa as a capable, sovereign actor in its own development, a psychological dimension which is not peripheral, in that it shapes how Africans perceive themselves within global systems.   Taken together, the institutional journey of FOCAC emerges not as a linear progression, but as a deepening spiral, where in each cycle the cooperation has broadened the relationship’s scope, expanded its intellectual foundations and refined its ethical commitments.     3. Cultural and intellectual resonances   If the institutional story establishes how Africa and China work together, the cultural story explains why cooperation resonates and it was here that the symposium revealed its most distinctive intellectual contributions.   Stephen Langtry (2025) made a particularly evocative intervention when he dug deeper into the historical presence of the Chinese people in South Africa. Records traced their presence in South Africa from as far back as the 1660s. His storytelling disrupted the common assumption and widely held view that China-Africa relations is a recent development and/or that it has been externally imposed. Instead, it was as he described, a slow, quiet entanglement of lives across centuries, woven through migration, cultural adaptation and shared vulnerability. This historical recovery served an important conceptual purpose, in that  it reframed the partnership between the two sides not as an encounter between strangers, but rather as a renewal of an old relationship, albeit that it’s under-remembered in current times.   Langtry then offered a philosophical meditation on ubuntu and Confucian harmony, identifying an ethical consonance between African and Chinese thought: Ubuntu, with its insistence that “a person becomes a person through other people,” and Confucian harmony, with its emphasis on relational balance and moral self-cultivation, both call for forms of coexistence grounded in reciprocity. For Langtry, these traditions illuminate why China-Africa cooperation has a cultural ease absent in many other external partnerships. They resonate at the level of worldview and they reflect similar intuitions about community, humanity and the moral obligations of leadership. This exploration of cultural resonance found parallel expression in the reflections of Liu Hongwu (2025) when he emphasised that African traditions of pluralism and Chinese traditions of inclusiveness produce a natural affinity. He described how African societies, despite their deep internal diversity, nurture forms of belonging that accommodate difference, which is mirrored in Chinese philosophical traditions that value the similar qualities of harmony without homogeneity. These shared dispositions, Hongwu suggested, helps to explain why the partnership between China and Africa has endured despite the longstanding and often divisive geopolitical turbulence. Sonjica (2025) took the cultural conversation further by introducing the concept of “intangible deliverables,” which she did by describing how encounters with Chinese society has challenged African perceptions, which have been largely shaped by colonial narratives that positioned the West as the primary reference point for modernity. Seeing a non-Western society achieve extraordinary developmental transformation restores African psychological confidence and it enlarges the imagination of what is possible. In her view, these shifts in mental horizons are as important as material infrastructure. Identity, she argued, is a development outcome.   In a different tone, Dr Yu Guizheng (2025) emphasised the intellectual responsibility of scholars in shaping cross-cultural understanding. He argued that scholarship cultivates interpretive generosity, which allows societies to see beyond stereotypes and misunderstandings, and in his observation, academic exchange nurture “the capacity to learn from difference. ” This struck at the heart of the symposium’s philosophical endeavour. Meanwhile, the contribution of Berenice Marks (2025), through her recognition of young South African scholars in the G20 essay competition that was co-organised by the ISI and IAS, added a generational layer to cultural resonance. The students’ research, which spanned topics from green development to blue finance and agricultural modernisation, amongst others, showed how young Africans are already engaging China intellectually, and vice versa, shaping their own narratives and resisting reductive framings of the relationship. Their enthusiasm underscored that cultural resonance between the two people’s is not static, to the contrary it is constantly renewed through intergenerational learning.   Together, these contributions, it was argued, transformed culture from a soft addition to cooperation into an analytical cornerstone. The symposium revealed that China-Africa relations resonate because they touch something deep, a shared philosophical orientation toward community, a historical memory of connection, an ethical commitment to relationality and a generational desire for futures not circumscribed by Western paradigms.   4. Governance, multipolarity and the Global South   As the symposium moved from cultural resonance to the broader questions of global governance, the tone shifted in that it now carried the weight of geopolitical complexity. The participants recognised that the twenty-fifth anniversary of FOCAC coincided with a historical inflection point, namely the weakening of unipolar structures, the fragmentation of global consensus and the emergence of new normative frameworks driven by the Global South. In this context, China-Africa cooperation is no longer merely bilateral or developmental in that it has become an intellectual and political site through which the broader debates about the emerging global order is being contested and reimagined.   Prof. Liu Hongwu (2025) argued that a new era of global governance is emerging, which will be an era in which Western institutions no longer monopolise the authority to define global norms. He also suggested that the fragmentation of the West’s dominance is not the result of external challenges alone, but also because of internal contradictions within their own system, which fractures have arisen due to unsustainable societal issues, such as unequal development, the inconsistent application of norms, and the failure to recognise the cultural and political plurality of the contemporary world. It is in this vacuum that Africa and China, who have each in their own way, found themselves increasingly drawn to articulate alternative principles that are grounded in idea of inclusion, sovereignty, developmental fairness and cultural respect.   Hongwu’s perspective resonated with Daryl Swanepoel (2025), who noted that Africa’s agency in global governance has expanded significantly in recent years, which expansion is evidenced by its role in BRICS, its interventions in climate negotiations and in its invitation to join the G20 as a permanent member. He traced how FOCAC has gradually become a platform through which African states coordinate not only development priorities, but also global governance positions. For Swanepoel, this shift is not incidental; it is the product of accumulated trust, institutional maturity and the recognition on both sides that global governance must reflect the lived realities of the majority of the world’s population.   This political dimension of the partnership between China and Africa was echoed in the diplomatic reflections of Ambassador Gert Grobler (2025), who,   his intervention, emphasised the continuity and reliability of China’s support for Africa’s fair and just multilateral participation. Grobler contextualised this support within the broader diplomatic history, by noting that China has consistently advanced African priorities at the United Nations and in other global forums, which he suggested underscored China’s political solidarity not a rhetorical, but as a structural feature of the relationship. Where Hongwu, Swanepoel and Grobler approached global governance through political analysis, Zhan Mengshu (2025) introduced a different, but complementary dimension, being the role that research collaboration plays in shaping governance outcomes. Zhan argued that governance cooperation cannot rest solely on political commitments, in it must be grounded in shared intellectual frameworks, and so she proposed strengthened research networks, joint policy analysis and deeper engagement between think tanks as essential elements of future governance architecture. Her contribution added an epistemological layer to the discourse in that it emphasised that ideas and evidence shape governance outcomes as much as political will. Meanwhile, Wang Xiao (2025) provided a diplomatic anchor for these discussions by reaffirming China’s principled stance on sovereignty, non-interference and mutual respect, where in her remarks she highlighted that China views global governance reform not through ideological confrontation, but through the pursuit of balance, representation and developmental justice. This lens, she argued, is one of the reasons that African states have found China to be a reliable partner in navigating global political complexity.   The symposium’s exploration of global governance was not limited to structural analysis, in that it also engaged with the philosophical undercurrents existing within the international community. Langtry (2025), though primarily concerned with cultural identity, observed that the global governance debates often overlook the role of collective moral imagination, because traditions such as ubuntu and Confucianism offer alternative ethical vocabularies for thinking about international cooperation, both of which vocabularies are grounded in relationality, responsibility and balance. The subtle, yet important dimension to the governance discussion that he was making was that political systems do not operate in moral vacuums, they tend to also reflect underlying conceptions of what it means to be human, and what obligations societies believe they owe one another. This philosophical nuance presented by Langtry complemented Sonjica’s (2025) insistence that governance reform must not only be attentive to institutional efficiency, but that it also has to be conscious to other factors, such as identity, dignity and psychological liberation. In her view, global governance systems that were shaped under colonial or imperial logics, cannot simply be tinkered with, in that they require a far more reaching and complete re-articulation that has to be grounded in the lived experience of those societies that were historically excluded from decision-making due to the imposed logics. For Africa, she argued, global governance cannot merely be considered as a technical question of representation: it must reclaim its authority to shape global norms. Together, these insights painted a picture of China-Africa cooperation as a microcosm of a broader shift in international relations, which shift requires a partnership that should be increasingly aware of its potential, and its responsibility, to contribute to a more inclusive global order. For Africa it is no longer simply about roads and railways, it is now also about the philosophical, political and epistemic frameworks through which the next century of global governance will be written.     5. Expanding fields of cooperation   While governance considerations set the philosophical horizon, the symposium also examined the concrete forms of cooperation that have emerged under FOCAC and yet, even here, the tone remained reflective rather than technocratic. Participants did not simply list projects, they also explored how these initiatives can reconfigure African developmental possibility. Swanepoel (2025) revisited the centrality of infrastructure, noting that although the term has become commonplace, its meaning is often reduced to engineering. Infrastructure, which he argued, is fundamentally about possibility, such as the possibility of travel, trade, education healthcare access and economic participation and it is a precondition for dignity. He described how Chinese-built railways, bridges and power grids have transformed not only the economic landscapes in Africa, but so too the imaginative landscape of what development can look like. This contextual understanding was echoed by Liu Yuankang (2025), whose reflections on digital transformation added a futuristic dimension when he expalined how digital customs systems, smart ports, e-government platforms and educational technologies are becoming new fields of China-Africa collaboration. For him, digital cooperation marks a shift from industrial modernisation to informational modernisation. It creates opportunities for Africa to leapfrog traditional constraints and build governance systems suited to its youthful population. In Liu’s vision, the digital future is not purely technological it is also social, cultural and political.   Public health cooperation also figured prominently in the symposium. Several participants recalled China’s role during the Ebola crisis and later during the COVID-19 pandemic, citing the establishment and strengthening of the Africa CDC, medical training programmes, vaccine cooperation and emergency health infrastructure. These interventions were described by Swanepoel (2025) not as episodic acts of aid, but as manifestations of long-term solidarity which is rooted in shared vulnerability. He pointed to cooperation in the field of health, which he said revealed the underlying principle that lies at the heart of the relationship: that development is inseparable from human security. Agricultural collaboration also emerged as a vital and expanding area of engagement between the two sides. Liu Hongwu (2025) emphasised that China’s experience in agricultural modernisation, that evolved from a smallholder driven agricultural economy to rural industrialisation, holds valuable lessons for Africa’s own food security and rural development. Agricultural technology demonstration centres, hybrid seed cooperation, irrigation projects and training programmes have created practical channels through which Chinese agricultural innovations can be shared and adapted to African contexts. Participants were of the view that agricultural cooperation, while often overshadowed by infrastructure in the public discourse, may ultimately have more transformative long-term effects for the Africa, because it directly impacts the lives of millions of Africans directly. Odile Bulten (2025), approaching cooperation through the lens of governance, underscored the importance of transparency, when, she argued, cooperation grows more complex, for example when it spans digital finance, water management, green energy and urban development: accountability and ethical oversight must grow with it. Because for her, the sophistication of cooperation must be equally matched by the sophistication of governance.   Security cooperation also entered the discussion, though in subtler tones, in that while the symposium did not frame security cooperation in militarised terms, it acknowledged the interconnectedness of development and peace. Whether through maritime security, anti-piracy initiatives, peacekeeping collaborations or counter-terrorism support, China and Africa have begun exploring ways to stabilise the environments necessary for development to flourish. These engagements were framed as being pragmatic responses to shared vulnerabilities, as opposed to being instruments of geopolitical influence. Against the background of Africa facing disproportionate climate risks despite contributing minimally to global emission, climate and environmental cooperation emerged as one of the most future-oriented fields of engagement. Swanepoel (2025) and several Chinese scholars highlighted China’s global leadership in renewable energy technologies, such as solar, wind, hydroelectric and electric vehicles, and its potential role in supporting Africa’s green transition, though for example green industrialisation, climate adaptation, sustainable urban development and ecological protection; which were all identified as areas where cooperation could profoundly influence Africa’s development trajectory.   Taken together, these expanding fields of cooperation between China and Africa illustrated how FOCAC has evolved into a multidimensional ecosystem. It is not a single initiative, but a constellation of interlinked programmes that touch almost every aspect of African life, including economic, social, political, cultural, environmental and technological, amongst others. The symposium therefore articulated a vision of cooperation that is not only expansive, but integrative and a system that seeks to address development holistically, rather than piecemeal.     6. Knowledge institutions as architects of the future   If cooperation is to be integrative, then knowledge institutions must be central. This was perhaps the most consistent and unifying theme of the symposium. There was a shared realisation among participants that the future of the China-Africa relationship will be shaped not only by government decisions, but by the intellectual infrastructure that thinkers, scholars, universities and research institutes create.   Prof. Liu Shu (2025) framed the entire symposium as an academic response to President Xi’s call for deeper scholarly engagement, advancing the idea that intellectual labour is foundational, not decorative. And scholars, he argued, do not merely observe the cooperation between the two sides, they conceptualise it, critique it and they provide the interpretive frameworks that shape the policy decisions that impact it.   Dr Yu Guizheng (2025) added depth to this idea by describing academic communities as custodians of interpretive generosity, in that they are institutions that model how to read another culture without distortion, how to absorb complexity without flattening it and how to allow oneself to be transformed by intellectual encounter: a perspective that suggests that scholarship is not only analytical, but also relational, and it builds trust by reducing cultural distance between people’s.   Meanwhile, Zhan Mengshu (2025) provided a practical blueprint for strengthening academic cooperation, which plan proposes research mobility programmes, co-authored publications, joint conferences, interdisciplinary initiatives and policy-oriented research platforms. For Zhan, think tanks and universities are not ancillary to development, they are laboratories of governance innovation.   Odile Bulten (2025) emphasised that the intellectual ecosystem also carries responsibilities. Scholars must hold both African and Chinese institutions accountable and they must ensure that cooperation is transparent, ethical and socially responsive. Her intervention served to remind participants that knowledge institutions are not neutral spaces, but moral actors in their own right. This emphasis on knowledge resonated strongly with Daryl Swanepoel’s (2025) reflection that Africa’s engagement with China must increasingly be guided by Africa’s own intellectual resources, because, he argued, African think tanks must develop the conceptual tools to interpret China from African vantage points. And it must be interpreted not through Western paradigms and not through overly romanticised lenses, but through grounded, rigorous and contextually sensitive analysis.   It was fitting that Berenice Marks (2025), representing youth scholarship, demonstrated that this intellectual future is already emerging. The students honoured at the symposium, for their essays on green development, blue finance, agricultural resilience and sustainable trade, exemplified the next generation of Africa-China scholars. Their work signalled that knowledge cooperation is not a future aspiration, but a living practice already shaping new imaginaries of development.   In this sense, the symposium revealed that think tanks and universities are not simply observers of China-Africa cooperation. They are its architects. They produce the ethical, conceptual and analytical foundations on which future cooperation will rest.     7. Youth and intergenerational imagination   Amid the intellectual, political and cultural depth of the symposium, the voices of young scholars stood out not as an addendum, but as a revelation, because their essays, curated by Berenice Marks (2025) through the G20 essay awards, brought into focus the generational horizon against which China-Africa cooperation must now define itself. If the first twenty-five years of FOCAC established the structural and diplomatic scaffolding of the relationship, the next twenty-five will be shaped by the imaginations and capacities of those who were not yet born when FOCAC began. This intergenerational shift constituted one of the symposium’s most quietly profound moments.   The winning students’ research offered a window into the intellectual consciousness of Africa’s emerging thinkers. Their essays, exploring blue finance ecosystems, opportunities in the grain trade corridors, green development strategy and sustainable agricultural futures, were technically sophisticated, but more importantly, they were conceptually open. They approached their research not through inherited anxieties or romanticised projections, but with a grounded curiosity that has been shaped by their lived realities as young Chinese and Africans that are learning to navigate a multipolar world.   What struck many of the participants was how naturally the youth seemed to integrate China and Africa into their cognitive maps of global development, because unlike earlier generations who grew up in a world structured by Western hegemony and Cold War binaries, contemporary students see the world as a multiplicity of actors, ideas and systems. The African youth, for example, do not perceive China as an external force, but as a normal, inevitable part of the global landscape and one with which engagement is not only possible, but necessary. This generational shift carries enormous implications for the future of China-Africa relations and it means that cooperation will increasingly be shaped not by the logic of geopolitical alignment, but by the logic of shared problem-solving.   For Buyelwa Sonjica (2025), this generational emergence represents one of the most important “intangible deliverables” of the relationship between the two sides. Youth engagement nurtures psychological liberation by expanding the horizons of what Africa believes itself capable of achieving and therefore, when young Africans encounter Chinese innovation, modernisation and cultural self-confidence, they internalise a different story about global possibilities, which is one not limited by the historical narratives of colonial dependency. This shift in self-understanding, she argued, is foundational to development.   From a philosophical standpoint, the symposium’s younger participants offered something even more valuable, they brought into the conversation a sense of temporal humility. They reminded everyone that the institutions, narratives and assumptions shaping China-Africa relations today will be judged, inhabited and revised by people whose relationships to history, culture and identity differ fundamentally from those who currently steer policy. Their imaginations will define the next arc of cooperation more profoundly than any summit declaration.   Youth, then, are not merely participants in the China-Africa relationship, they are its future custodians. Their capacity to think beyond inherited narratives, to engage China and Africa analytically, rather than ideologically, and to situate Africa’s developmental trajectory within a broader global ecosystem gives hope that the next quarter-century of FOCAC, will be more intellectually sophisticated, more culturally grounded and more globally attuned than the last.     8. Looking forward: Toward a shared horizon   As the symposium moved toward its final reflections, it became clear that the participants were not only attempting to assess the past twenty-five years of FOCAC, but also to intuit the shape of its future. And so each voice contributed a different facet of the emerging horizon, which together formed a compelling vision of what China-Africa cooperation could become in the next historical cycle.   For Swanepoel (2025), the future lay in aligning FOCAC with China’s four global initiatives of development, security, civilisation and governance. He argued that these frameworks were not abstract policy instruments, in that they represent a coherent worldview that is rooted in global interdependence. In his reading, the Global Development Initiative (GDI) encourages pragmatic cooperation, the Global Security Initiative (GSI) emphasises stability without coercion, the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI) affirms cultural plurality, and the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) invites adaptation, rather than imposition, which together offer a philosophical architecture that resonates deeply with Africa’s own aspirations for dignity, agency and self-determined development.   Wang Xiao (2025) offered a further complementary perspective that is rooted in diplomatic experience, by emphasising that China’s path of modernisation, which is marked by poverty reduction, technological advancement and cultural preservation, provides an alternative reference point for African societies seeking to chart their own developmental futures. Importantly, she underscored that China does not present its experience as a model to be copied, but as a set of lessons to be adapted, which  humility, she argued, is essential for sustaining trust in the relationship.   Liu Hongwu (2025), by drawing on his long engagement with African philosophy and political systems, suggested that the next phase of cooperation must embrace an ethic of “civilisational humility,” because, he argued, true partnership requires acknowledging that no single society holds a monopoly on wisdom. China must remain open to learning from Africa’s models of pluralism, social resilience and communal identity and Africa, in turn, must draw from China’s developmental pragmatism and institutional experimentation without subordinating its cultural identity. Hongwu’s reflection restored a moral dimension to the future of FOCAC, which is to be one grounded in mutual learning, rather than competitive assertion.   Zhan Mengshu (2025) projected the conversation into the realm of intellectual architecture and for her, the future of China-Africa cooperation hinges on long-term research collaboration. Joint studies on climate adaptation, digital governance, rural development, peacebuilding, sustainable industry and public administration will produce the intellectual capital that informs policy. Zhan argued that strengthening academic mobility, co-authorship and institutional partnerships will help ensure that cooperation remains analytically grounded and responsive to new challenges.   Meanwhile, Liu Yuankang (2025) envisioned a digitally integrated future in which Africa’s technological ecosystems, fintech, e-government, smart infrastructure and digital trade, become central pillars of cooperation, which digital transformation, he predicted, would reshape not only Africa’s economic life, but also its political institutions, social networks and cultural expressions. Digitalisation, in his telling, is not merely a tool but a new developmental ontology.   Odile Bulten (2025) extended this forward-looking vision by emphasising governance integrity as the backbone of future cooperation, which will become even rmore important as cooperation widens into more complex domains, such as renewable energy, water security, artificial intelligence and environmental protection, transparency and public participation must remain central, because, in her words “without ethical governance, cooperation risks losing legitimacy”. For Ambassador Grobler (2025), the future will require steady diplomatic stewardship, because, as he reminded participants, partnerships only endure when they are cultivated consistently, especially during periods of global instability; and that requires diplomacy, trust-building and institutional continuity as essential anchors.   Finally, the reflections inspired by youth contributions offered the most hopeful dimension of all, being the recognition that futures are not shaped by documents or communiqués, but instead, by imagination. Young scholars demonstrated that Africa approaches China not with deference or suspicion but with clarity, curiosity and critical engagement. The partnership is no longer defined only by senior policymakers, it is alive in the minds of those who will inherit the global order being constructed today.   Taken together, these perspectives pointed toward a shared horizon defined by intellectual depth, moral imagination, cultural respect, ecological responsibility, technological adaptability and political courage.   The symposium agreed that the next twenty-five years of FOCAC will require not only new policies, but so too new philosophical commitments that need to be grounded in empathy, curiosity and a willingness to reimagine global relations from the vantage point of the Global South.     9. Conclusion   By the time the symposium drew to a close, what lingered, was not the particularities of each intervention, but the subtle harmony of the whole, because it became clear that the partnership between Africa and China has moved far beyond the transactional logic that often characterises South-South cooperation. It has become a space where memory, identity, knowledge and aspiration converge. A space where infrastructure is inseparable from meaning, where governance is inseparable from dignity, where culture is inseparable from development, and where imagination is inseparable from policy.   FOCAC at twenty-five is not simply an institutional milestone, it is a philosophical moment. It signals that Africa and China are ready to engage one another at the depth where civilisations speak, not only through trade and investment, but through worldviews, ethical commitments and shared futures. The symposium made visible the full spectrum of voices required to sustain such a partnership: Liu Shu grounding the dialogue intellectually, Swanepoel mapping its structural architecture, Wang Xiao affirming its diplomatic integrity, Liu Hongwu offering its philosophical foundation, Langtry illuminating its cultural memory, Sonjica revealing its moral and psychological dimensions, Yu Guizheng articulating its epistemic humility, Zhan Mengshu expanding its scholarly horizons, Odile Bulten grounding it in governance integrity, Liu Yuankang charting its technological pathways, Ambassador Grobler anchoring it in diplomatic continuity and Berenice Marks showing that the dreams and inquiries of the young will carry the partnership into the next quarter-century.   In this way, the symposium revealed that FOCAC is not merely an agreement between governments, but a site of intellectual and moral co-creation. It is a place where Africa and China learn to think together, to dream together and to confront the deep challenges of the twenty-first century together. And if there is a single insight to carry forward, it is this: partnerships endure when they allow themselves to grow, to deepen, to question, to imagine and, above all, to become more fully human.     10. References   Bulten, O. 2025. Symposium Notes on Governance, Transparency and Civil Society Participation.  Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Grobler, G. 2025. Video Address to the ISI-IAS Symposium.  Delivered at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Hongwu, L. 2025. Reflections on Global Governance, Civilisational Inclusion and Africa–China Cooperation. Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Langtry, S. 2025. Cultural, Historical and Philosophical Reflections on China-Africa Relations.  Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Marks, B. 2025. Presentation of G20 Youth Essay Awards and Reflections on Youth Participation in Africa-China Cooperation. Delivered at the ISI-IAS Symposium, Cape Town.   Mengshu, Z. 2025. Research Collaboration and Knowledge Partnership Proposals for Strengthening FOCAC Mechanisms. Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Shu, L. 2025. Opening Reflections on the Intellectual Responsibilities of Africa-China Scholarship.  Delivered at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Sonjica, B. 2025. Reflections on Identity, Intangible Deliverables and the Moral Foundations of Cooperation.  Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium, Cape Town.   Swanepoel, D. 2025. FOCAC at Twenty-Five: Institutional Reflections and Future Pathways.  Keynote Address delivered at the ISI–IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Wang, X. 2025. Diplomatic Reflections on Mutual Respect and Shared Futures in China-Africa Cooperation.  Delivered at the ISI-IAS Symposium, Cape Town.   Yu, G. 2025. Remarks on Academic Communities as Custodians of Interpretive Understanding.  Presented at the ISI-IAS Symposium on the 25th Anniversary of FOCAC, Cape Town.   Yuankang, L. 2025. Digital Transformation and Africa’s Technological Future: Opportunities for China-Africa Cooperation. Delivered at the ISI–IAS Symposium, Cape Town.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2026   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   October 2025   Author: Daryl Swanepoel   Contents   1 INTRODUCTION: Contextualising the conversation 2 THE CONSULTATION: Framing the questions in an era of systemic drift 3 ANALYTICAL EXPANSION OF THE FOUR CORE QUESTIONS 3.1 China’s dual impulse: Corrective and strategic at once 3.2 Great-Power reactions: Anxiety, ambivalence and the defence of hierarchy 3.3 Global South perspectives: Resonance without alignment 3.4 Implications for the future of multilateralism: Between adaptation and fragmentation 4 DEEPENING THE DISCUSSION: PERSPECTIVES AND COUNTER PERSPECTIVES 5 BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR A GLOBAL SOUTH STRATEGY 6 LOOKING AHEAD: THEMES FOR FUTURE CONSULTATION 7 CONCLUSION: CHOOSING BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND FRAGMENTATION Cover photo: AI generated 1 INTRODUCTION Contextualising the conversation   The Global South Perspectives Network enters this new phase of publishing its Monday Consultations at a moment when the international system appears suspended between epochs. One can sense a world taking stock of itself, as if pausing briefly before deciding what kind of order it wishes to inhabit next. The structures inherited from 1945 still stand, at least in name and legal form, yet their gravitational pull has weakened. Power has become more diffuse, expectations more plural and the consensus that once underpinned multilateralism has thinned with time.   It is within this atmosphere of transition that China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI) has emerged. It is an initiative that has not only intensified existing debates about global power but has also illuminated the deeper uncertainties defining this historical moment. Some interpret the GGI as a strategic challenge to a familiar order, whilst others see it as a direct response to the reform inertia that has plagued multilateral institutions for decades. Many in the Global South recognise in it an echo of long-articulated frustrations, a sense, so to say, that the current system speaks the language of universality, yet often operates through hierarchies that privilege the few over the many.   This consultation, one of many held under the Monday Consultations banner, brought together analysts, practitioners and observers from across the global community, each contributing to a shared inquiry into what the GGI represents and what its emergence might mean for the future of global governance.   This analytical brief offers an expanded account of that conversation. It does not merely document the dialogue, it attempts to interpret it, so as to situate the remarks, questions and insights within the broader currents shaping the transition from an older order to whatever may come next. In doing so, it aims to provide a reflective and grounded contribution to the growing discourse on how the Global South might navigate a system that is neither stable, nor yet fully transformed.     2 THE CONSULTATION Framing the questions in an era of systemic drift   The consultation began by acknowledging a simple, but often overlooked truth, that global governance is no longer anchored to the geopolitical realities that produced it. The architecture designed in 1945, so elegant in conception, so ambitious in spirit, now struggles under the weight of contemporary demands. Its foundational assumptions have eroded, yet its institutional form has remained largely intact.   The United Nations Security Council still mirrors the balance of power at the end of the Second World War. The Bretton Woods institutions continue to reflect an economic geography that no longer exists. And even when the international system has pledged reform, as it did in the 2005 World Summit, implementation has consistently failed to materialise.   In this context, the emergence of the GGI appears less surprising and more inevitable. The world has been signalling its desire for reform for decades, but reform has proven elusive. Where institutions fail to adapt, the system creates the very spaces into which new actors step. China’s initiative thus becomes not merely a Chinese story, but a symptom of a deeper systemic malaise.   The consultation therefore sought to explore four interlocking questions: whether China is filling a vacuum or rewriting rules; how other great powers are responding; how the Global South interprets the initiative; and what this means for the future of multilateralism. These questions framed the discussion, but did not confine it and instead, they opened a broader reflection on the contingencies of this moment in world affairs.     3 ANALYTICAL EXPANSION OF THE FOUR CORE QUESTIONS   3.1 China’s dual impulse: Corrective and strategic at once   A central theme emerging from the discussion was the recognition that the GGI cannot be reduced to a single motive in that it reflects both a critique and an ambition, both a response to structural inequities and a desire to shape the evolving order. This duality is not a contradiction. It is a characteristic of rising powers throughout history.   China’s argument begins with the claim that the multilateral system suffers from a legitimacy deficit, frozen, as it were, in the institutional imagination of 1945. The Initiative positions itself as a corrective to this democratic stagnation. Yet the GGI also grows out of a decade-long pattern of parallel institution-building: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank of BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative, and now the GGI’s associated platforms. In combining critique with construction, China demonstrates both frustration with the existing order and confidence in its capacity to propose alternatives.   This dual impulse, being simultaneously reformist and strategic, was widely noted in the consultation. It reflects a broader truth, that no major power seeks to reform the world in ways that negate its own interests. The more revealing question is not China’s ambition, but the conditions that have rendered that ambition consequential. If the existing institutions had evolved with greater agility, the space within which the GGI now operates might have been narrower. As it stands, the system itself has created the void that the GGI seeks to fill.     3.2 Great-Power reactions: Anxiety, ambivalence and the defence of hierarchy   The consultation examined how other major powers interpret the GGI and what these reactions reveal about their own strategic anxieties.   The United States has framed the initiative as destabilising, even revisionist. Yet this rhetorical posture contrasts sharply with its longstanding resistance to institutional reforms it professes to support. Whether in IMF quota adjustments or Security Council redesign, Washington’s defence of the “rules-based order” often coincides with a defence of inherited privileges.   Europe’s position differs in tone, but not always in substance, because while sharing Western concerns about China’s intentions, European actors remain deeply protective of institutional arrangements that grant disproportionate influence to a continent whose demographic and economic weight has steadily declined. The two permanent Security Council seats held by France and the United Kingdom, for example, exemplify this disjuncture between contemporary realities and institutional persistence. India, Japan and other Asian powers were described as occupying a space of strategic ambivalence. They are frustrated by the inertia of the system, but wary of a Sinocentric alternative, and they are conscious of their own role as regional poles within an increasingly plural global landscape.   What emerges from these reactions is not a coherent response to China, but a diverse set of anxieties about losing position within the existing hierarchy. Debates about global governance reform, in this sense, are inseparable from debates about power. The GGI becomes a prism through which the deeper insecurities of established and emerging powers are refracted.     3.3 Global South perspectives: Resonance without alignment   One of the consultation’s clearest insights was the divergence between Western and Global South interpretations of the GGI. Across Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, China’s critique of the global system finds significant resonance. Many states recognise their own frustrations in China’s diagnosis: an unrepresentative system, inconsistent application of norms and a persistent sense of marginalisation within the institutions of global governance.   But resonance does not imply alignment. The Global South’s response is more subtle and more pragmatic. It reflects a recognition that the GGI, whatever its motivations, acknowledges grievances that the established custodians of the system have long neglected. For middle powers such as South Africa, Brazil, Indonesia and Türkiye, the GGI represents neither a new orthodoxy, nor a threat to be resisted, but an additional space in which agency may be exercised.   This pragmatic reading acknowledges both opportunity and risk, where the opportunity lies in leveraging competing centres of global influence to expand the negotiating space for developing countries; and where risk arises if parallel systems evolve into competing regimes that will deepen fragmentation and erode the universality that multilateralism aspires to maintain.   The consultation also highlighted the concerns of civil society, whose voices is said to adde further nuance to the discourse. Their concerns about transparency, governance standards and human rights are not solely directed at China, but also at the West, whose selective approach to human rights diplomacy, they argue, has undermined the West’s own credibility. These tensions reflect the broader philosophical question that asks who has the authority to define legitimacy, and to whom is that authority accountable?   3.4 Implications for the future of multilateralism: Between adaptation and fragmentation   Perhaps the most reflective portion of the consultation centred on what the GGI and the reactions it provokes tell us about the trajectory of multilateralism itself.   Multilateralism, it was suggested, stands at a crossroads. Not because China challenges it, but because those entrusted with its stewardship have allowed it to stagnate. The institutions that once embodied the hope of a cooperative world have become, in some respects, the custodians of their own paralysis. Three observations shaped the discussion. The first is that alternatives arise when institutions fail to adapt. The GGI’s emergence is therefore as much a reflection of institutional stasis as of Chinese ambition.   The second is that multipolarity is now an unavoidable reality, because whether acknowledged or resisted, it is shaping the contours of global politics. No single actor can unilaterally impose its vision of the world and any future order will, therefore, be layered, plural and hybrid. The third observation is that containment strategies are unlikely to succeed. The GGI resonates not because it is Chinese, but because it speaks to structural inequities that many states experience directly. The more the initiative is dismissed rather than engaged, the more its appeal may grow.   The consultation thus returned repeatedly to a reflective tension: the world must navigate between the dangers of fragmentation and the necessity of adaptation. The GGI may well be the first major test of whether the existing system can accommodate new voices and new institutional forms without fracturing.     4 DEEPENING THE DISCUSSION: PERSPECTIVES AND COUNTER PERSPECTIVES   The conversation unfolded with a richness that exceeded the scope of the initial questions, drawing the participants into deeper reflections on the philosophical foundations of global governance.   One participant argued that legitimacy, far from being an ambiguous construct, requires universal standards, because without legitimacy grounded in representation and participation, multilateralism risks becoming a façade for power politics. Another countered that universalism itself is often claimed by those who historically benefited from defining it and so the question then becomes: who determines what counts as legitimate? The Charter may offer the anchor, but interpretation remains contested.   Others reflected on the tension between international law and the so-called “rules-based international order.” For many states, the latter is seen not as a neutral framework, but as a flexible vocabulary used to justify inconsistent action. The consultation suggested that a re-centring of the Charter, rather than a reliance on ad hoc interpretations, might offer firmer ground for a renewed multilateralism.   Concerns about multipolarity also surfaced, with one participant suggesting that multipolarity offers the promise of inclusivity, but also the risk of disorder, because he proffered, without strong institutions capable of coordinating the interests of multiple poles, the world may slide toward spheres of influence reminiscent of earlier eras. Yet the consultation resisted fatalism, by suggesting that multipolarity need not replicate the past, as it can be shaped into something more collaborative, provided the institutional imagination is revived. Another theme that surfaced was the paralysis surrounding Security Council reform. While Africa’s demand for two permanent seats remains consistent, the question of which  states should hold them continues to divide the continent, which is an internal divergence that mirrors similar divides across the Global South. These divergences, therefore, suggests that reform requires not only a redrawing of institutional lines, but indeed also a re-articulation of the principles upon which representation should rest.     5 BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR A GLOBAL SOUTH STRATEGY   The discussion illuminated several implications for the Global South’s approach to global governance., one being that there is growing recognition that the Global South is no longer a passive recipient of global norms, but an active co-author of emerging institutional debates. The GGI, regardless of its origin, provides a platform through which long-standing concerns about equity and representation can be expressed more forcefully.   A second implication is the need for greater coherence within the Global South itself, because internal divergences weaken negotiating power and slow reform. Yet the consultation suggested that these divergences, if openly acknowledged, rather than suppressed, can become sources of creative institutional design, such as the proposal that regional representation should be explored, rather than expanding the Security Council along national lines.   A third implication is the need to balance opportunity and caution. China’s initiative should be neither romanticised, nor rejected in that its possibilities lie in the space between endorsement and opposition.  It could evolve into a strategic engagement that recognises its potential to reshape global governance without surrendering the normative aspirations that the Global South holds for a fair and inclusive system.   6 LOOKING AHEAD: THEMES FOR FUTURE CONSULTATION   The discussion pointed toward several directions for future exploration, including, amongst others, the evolving relationship between international law and competing rule-making systems, the institutional implications of multipolarity, the governance of digital, financial and technological domains and the future of development finance in a world no longer dominated by the Bretton Woods institutions. All emerged as themes that merit deeper reflection.   The GGI will not be the last initiative to challenge the global governance status quo. But by beginning here, the Monday Consultation Series establishes a foundation for understanding how global governance might evolve if the voices of the Global South are treated not as peripheral commentary, but as central contributions.   7 CONCLUSION: CHOOSING BETWEEN EVOLUTION AND FRAGMENTATION   The consultation closed with an observation that captures the philosophical spirit of the discussion, namely that the world is not choosing between a Western order and a Chinese order. It is choosing between an order capable of evolving and an order condemned to fragment.   China’s GGI is a reminder that global governance can stagnate only for so long before alternatives arise. Whether those alternatives deepen fragmentation or contribute to renewal depends on the willingness of established institutions to open themselves to reform and on the ability of emerging actors to articulate their visions with clarity and coherence.   In this sense, the GGI is not simply a Chinese proposal. It is a mirror held up to the international community, reflecting both the failures of the present and the possibilities of a different future.   The Global South Perspectives Network offers this analytical brief as the first step in an ongoing dialogue. Much remains to be explored, questioned and re-imagined. But this consultation has made one truth clear: global governance is at its most vibrant when the conversation is shared.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.   GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.   Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.   GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Concept note 1/2026 Copyright © 2026   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa                                                                       235-515 NPO                  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   JANUARY 2026 The concept outlines the Inclusive Society Institute’s approach to the National Dialogue. The Institute’s contribution will be conducted in two phases: Phase 1 will be a high-level conceptualisation presented at the first summit, followed by phase two, which will entail a comprehensive process fleshing out a detailed policy proposal for submission to the National Dialogue in the run-up to the second dialogue schedules for next year.     Background: The National Dialogue   The National Dialogue is a multi-stakeholder initiative aimed at fostering open and constructive engagement among South Africans to address the country’s most pressing socio-political and economic challenges. It has been convened in response to the rising political uncertainty, social fragmentation and economic stagnation. The Dialogue seeks to build consensus around a shared national vision and actionable pathways for reform, by bringing together government, civil society, business, labour and other social actors, who must partner to jointly shape a more inclusive, equitable and sustainable future.   The National Dialogue is premised on the belief that South Africa’s long-term stability and prosperity can only be secured through collective deliberation and action and by creating a structured forum for honest conversation and collaboration, iin order to generate innovative solutions that are owned and driven by the people of South Africa themselves.     The role of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI)   The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), with its core mission of promoting a socially just, inclusive and equitable South Africa, regards the National Dialogue as a critical opportunity to contribute constructively to the country’s development path. Recognising that economic transformation and social cohesion are inseparable components of national renewal, the ISI will centre its participation on the interplay between economic growth and social justice.     ISI’s approach: Economic growth underpinned by social cohesion   The ISI will advance the argument that placing the economy on a more acceptable and inclusive growth trajectory is essential, but that such growth must be embedded in a broader framework of social cohesion. This dual focus will ensure that the economic gains are not only sustainable, but are distributed in ways that enhance fairness, that reduce inequality and which fosters unity.   Key tenets of this approach include:   A pro-growth economic agenda and therefore, the ISI will support policies and proposals that aim to enhance productivity, attract investment, foster entrepreneurship and improve job creation, particularly for the youth and historically the marginalised communities.   An economy that is rooted in social justice , which suggests that growth alone is insufficient if it leads to deepening inequality or if it marginalises vulnerable groups and therefore the ISI will advocate for economic policies that are also pro-poor, pro-equity and which ensure access to opportunities, and fair outcomes for all.   Social cohesion as an economic imperative , because social stability, trust and a shared identity are not only moral goals, they are economic assets, in that a cohesive society reduces conflict, improves cooperation and enhances resilience and therefore the ISI will champion initiatives that aim to address demographic fairness, cultural inclusion, equitable representation and the elimination of the systemic barriers to participation.   Demographic and cultural fairness, which means the recognition of South Africa’s diverse social fabric within economic and institutional frameworks and in which representation, cultural acceptance and equitable participation are central to social stability and inclusive development.   Institutional reform and governance  for sustainable economic and social outcomes, which requires a  capable, transparent and accountable institutions and therefore the ISI will support reforms that rebuild public trust and strengthen democratic governance.     The central role of a capable state   While the commitment of the private sector and active citizenry is vital to South Africa’s development, their efforts and ability to contribute meaningfully are dependent on the presence of a capable and effective state, because no amount of goodwill or enterprise can succeed in the absence of the institutional scaffolding that only a competent public sector can provide. Public services, infrastructure, law enforcement, education and healthcare, all of which are essential to economic dynamism and social cohesion and which require a state that is both efficient and trustworthy.   A capable state is not synonymous with a large or omnipresent state, but rather a government that is strategic, focused and disciplined in its use of resources and mandates. The challenge facing South Africa is not necessarily that the state does too little, but rather that it in fact attempts to do too much with the resources at its disposal, thereby stretching its capacity too thin and undermining performance. This is where the principle of "less is more" must guide a rethinking of the public sector’s role and function.   Instead of spreading limited capacity and resources across an overwhelming range of responsibilities, the state should concentrate on a core set of essential functions, where its role is irreplaceable and its impact most significant. These include, among others, maintaining the rule of law, ensuring macroeconomic stability, delivering quality basic education and healthcare, delivering social services, enabling infrastructure and providing a predictable policy environment. By focusing on doing fewer things, but doing them well, the state can rebuild credibility, restore functionality and support the conditions necessary for private initiative and social partnership to flourish.   Moreover, a capable state must be underpinned by a professional public administration, clear lines of accountability, merit-based appointments and an uncompromising stance on corruption. These institutional attributes are not technical niceties, they are preconditions for development. In their absence, even the most innovative private sector or most committed civil society will struggle to gain traction.   A state that is both strategic and capable becomes a partner in, rather than a barrier to, national renewal. It provides the platform upon which shared prosperity can be built, and without which no social compact can be sustained.   Crucially, the ISI believes that it cannot be business as usual, because South Africa cannot continue to do the same things and expect different results and therefore a new trajectory must anticipate necessary sacrifices and a redefined social compact. This includes:   Community service and active citizenship must be encouraged. Cultivating a culture of giving, charity and social responsibility must be cultivated. The tax system should be reformed in order to ensure that the super-rich and multinational corporations pay their fair share. Temporary financial sacrifices by those who can afford them, as part of a broader national effort to build a more stable and cohesive society, must be considered.   These measures must be understood not as punitive actions or idealistic appeals, but as strategic, forward-looking interventions and a deliberate effort to cushion the nation against the inevitable instability that arises when an economy persistently serves only the privileged few. Without such shared sacrifices, the country risks deepening social fractures that could eventually destabilise the very economy these elites depend on and therefore these sacrifices represent an investment in shared prosperity and national preservation.     Expected outcomes   Through its participation the ISI aims to contribute to:   Building a national consensus on inclusive economic growth as a foundational pillar for societal  well-being. Developing policy recommendations that promote both economic performance and social justice. The promotion of stronger collaboration between social partners to implement inclusive development strategies. Enhancing the public discourse on the importance of equity, cohesion and collective responsibility. Building a national commitment to structural change, accountability and long-term shared sacrifice.     Conclusion   The National Dialogue presents a unique and timely opportunity to reimagine South Africa’s future and therefore the Inclusive Society Institute stands ready to offer thought leadership and convening power to shape a path that reflects the values of social justice, inclusivity and fairness.   To turn this vision into a lived reality for all-of-society will require a new paradigm and new thinking that embraces growth, but not without reform and that encourages investment, but not without fairness; and that promotes unity, but not without accountability. Temporary financial sacrifices, community service, and cultural shifts toward greater empathy and inclusion are not burdens, they are safeguards against collapse. They are necessary instruments to avoid the societal rupture that will surely follow if the current economic path continues to favour the few at the expense of the many. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Media Coverage - 2026 Jan 21, 2026 Why Africa’s terrorism crisis is a governance crisis first Daily Maverick Up Jan 21, 2026 Why Africa's Terrorism Crisis Is a Governance Crisis First All Africa Up Jan 21, 2026 Dispute over Greenland: Conflict Prevention Possibilities under the UN Charter Katoikos Up Jan 18, 2026 Klaus Kotzé: American primacy revised — terra nova in the 21st century Business Day Up Jan 13, 2026 Daryl Swanepoel: Het ons boedel oorgegee? Netwerk24 Up Jan 12, 2026 After the Scroll: A Reflection of South Africa's Mood and the Need for Rational Hope IOL Up Jan 12, 2026 After the Scroll: A Reflection of South Africa's Mood and the Need for Rational Hope Business Report Up Jan 11, 2026 2026 local elections: South Africa braces for a surge in hung councils IOL Up Jan 11, 2026 South Africa's municipal elections: The rise of hung councils and coalition governance Daily News Up Jan 9, 2026 When Words Wound the Nation: Social Media, Racism, and Social Cohesion African News Agency Up Jan 7, 2026 Right of Reply: Growth, equality and the question we keep avoiding BizNews Up Jan 7, 2026 Record high interest rates are a self-inflicted economic blow BusinessDay Up Up

Reports FOCAC AT TWENTY-FIVE: A reflective inquiry into a matured partnership Daryl Swanepoel 2 days ago Dissecting China's global governance initiative Daryl Swanepoel Jan 12 VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA - Trends, Drivers and Pathways to Resilience Odile Bulten Jan 7 Quantifying the impact of restrictive monetary policy on the South Africa economy since 2022 Roelof Botha & Ilse Botha Dec 11, 2025 G20 Socio-Economic Rights Barometer Inclusive Society Institute Dec 5, 2025 The impact of longevity on fiscal sustainability in South Africa Fanie Joubert Oct 29, 2025 REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL - Regional Union representation as a pathway to legitimacy and effectiveness Daryl Swanepoel Oct 8, 2025 AFRICA'S SECURITY IN TRANSITION: An examination of Africa's contemporary peace and stability challenges Odile Bulten Sep 24, 2025 REFORM UN80 - Renewal or Decline? The future of multilateralism at the United Nation's 80th anniversary Daryl Swanepoel Sep 17, 2025 RISING DISTRUST: GovDem survey shows sharp increase in anti-immigration sentiment in South Africa Daryl Swanepoel Sep 3, 2025 FINANCING AFRICA ON AFRICA’S TERMS: Rethinking development sovereignty in a shifting global order Odile Bulten Aug 27, 2025 CROSSROADS: Navigating the US-Africa-China triangle in a changing global order Daryl Swanepoel Aug 20, 2025 Advancing equitable climate finance for developing nations: A moral, ethical and pragmatic imperative Daryl Swanepoel Jul 2, 2025 The role of Middle Powers in (re)balancing the Global Governance System and reviving Multilateralism and the UN Daryl Swanepoel Jun 4, 2025 2025 African Consultative Meeting Daryl Swanepoel May 21, 2025 Human Rights Barometer for G20 Members Inclusive Society Institute Apr 24, 2025 Gearing the economy for growth: Economic resilience through strategic macroeconomic interventions Jan van Heerden Apr 2, 2025 Decolonisation of education: Not a destination, but a continuous journey Klaus Kotzé Feb 19, 2025 The South Africa Social Cohesion Index: Measuring the well-being of a society - 2024 UPDATE Georgi Dragolov & Klaus Boehnke Feb 5, 2025 Inclusive Society Institute releases the 2024 South African Social Cohesion Index Inclusive Society Institute Feb 5, 2025 The South Africa Social Cohesion Index: Measuring the well-being of a society Georgi Dragolov & Klaus Boehnke Nov 26, 2024 Effectively addressing human challenges: What would a Global Resilience Council bring? Klaus Kotzé Aug 21, 2024 Africa Consultative Meeting: Bringing African voices together Klaus Kotzé May 9, 2024 Reflections on the Zero Draft of the Pact for the Future Nicola Jo Bergsteedt Apr 11, 2024 Danish Labour Market Model: Lessons for South Africa Nicola Jo Bergsteedt Feb 21, 2024 Coalition Government: Lessons from Finland Olivia Main Feb 7, 2024 Overview of the Construction Mafia Crisis in South Africa Mariaan Webb Jan 24, 2024 Building the Future: Construction Industry Summit Mariaan Webb Nov 8, 2023 Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform Klaus Kotzé & Daryl Swanepoel Sep 15, 2023 The shape of the Electric Vehicle revolution in SA and the possible impact thereof on the Eskom grid Ilze-Marie le Roux Jun 28, 2023 Understanding gender inequality Percept Actuaries and Consultants May 3, 2023 Measuring Social Cohesion in South Africa Daryl Swanepoel Apr 19, 2023 The feasibility of establishing a Basic Income Grant in South Africa Roelof Botha Mar 8, 2023 Is South Africa's democracy properly funded? Daryl Swanepoel Feb 22, 2023 Understanding youth inequality Percept Actuaries and Consultants Feb 8, 2023 ISI Annual Lecture 2022 Inclusive Society Institute Feb 1, 2023 Sustainable population and possible standards of living Inclusive Society Institute Jan 25, 2023 South Africa can find inspiration in Denmark's social model Inclusive Society Institute Dec 15, 2022 Developing an effective response to addressing Xenophobia in SA - An ISI Roundtable Inclusive Society Institute Sep 21, 2022 ANC 6th National Policy Conference - Inclusive Society Institute Insights Inclusive Society Institute Sep 14, 2022 Rejuvenating South Africa's Economy - the tourism industry's potential Inclusive Society Institute Sep 7, 2022 South Africa's growth potential in absence of economic speed bumps Inclusive Society Institute Aug 17, 2022 Inequality and Demography Inclusive Society Institute Jul 27, 2022 Report: Proposed National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council Inclusive Society Institute Jul 20, 2022 Social preconditions for advancement towards a welfare state Inclusive Society Institute Jun 15, 2022 Economic research consolidation: Developing a blueprint for the South African economy Inclusive Society Institute May 18, 2022 Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - Labour sector input Inclusive Society Institute May 11, 2022 Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - A perspective from the Agriculture Industry Inclusive Society Institute May 3, 2022 1 2 Up

Media Releases & Op-eds Jan 22, 2026 Op-ed: Why Africa's terrorism crisis is a governance crisis first by Odile Bulten and Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 14, 2026 Op-ed: After the scroll: A reflection on South Africa's mood and the need for rational hope by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 14, 2026 Op-ed: When words wound the nation: Social media, racism and social cohesion by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 7, 2026 Op-ed: Growth, equality and the question we keep avoiding by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 7, 2026 Op-ed: Record high interest rates - A self-inflicted economic blow by Roelof Botha & Daryl Swanepoel Up Dec 15, 2025 Op-ed: The illusion of leverage: Why racial escalation never ends well by Daryl Swanepoel Up Dec 15, 2025 Op-ed: What Buys gets wrong: Equality is not totalitarianism by Daryl Swanepoel Up Dec 10, 2025 Op-ed: Toward an inclusive electoral system: Reclaiming accountability without reproducing apartheid lines by Nicola Bergsteedt Up Nov 26, 2025 Op-ed: The veto isn't going away, but it needs to be civilised by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 24, 2025 Op-ed: Raising the Age: Why South Africa must rethink the old age grant threshold by Fanie Joubert & Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 22, 2025 Op-ed: South Africa's betrayal of its people: How our lawmakers are gutting the promise of public participation by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 22, 2025 Op-ed: Africa’s security crossroads: Why the continent’s future hangs in the balance by Odile Bulten & Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 18, 2025 Op-ed: Living longer, paying more: Why South Africans must confront the fiscal risks of longevity by Fanie Joubert & Daryl Swanepoel Up Oct 17, 2025 Op-ed: When power refuses to evolve: Rethinking global governance by Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 27, 2025 Press Release: Inclusive Society Institute on Malema hate speech ruling by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 27, 2025 Press Release: GovDem survey reveals rising distrust toward African immigrants in South Africa by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 22, 2025 Press Release: Inclusive Society Institute warns against inflated illegal immigration figures and unlawful vigilantism by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 21, 2025 Op-ed: The watchdogs of democracy: The vital role of South Africa's state institutions by Nicola Bergsteedt Up Aug 20, 2025 Op-ed: Africa's future must be funded by Africans by Odile Bulten & Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 12, 2025 Op-ed: The National Dialogue is not about politicians talking. It is about people doing by Klaus Kotzé Up Jul 30, 2025 Op-ed: Navigating Africa's future in the face of shapeshifting global forces by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 30, 2025 Op-ed: Rebuilding trust: The imperative of the National Dialogue for South Africa's future by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 30, 2025 Op-ed: Africa, America and the East: In search of balance in a shifting world by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 25, 2025 Op-ed: Empowering small-scale fisheries for a sustainable and inclusive Blue/Oceans Economy in South Africa by Samantha Williams Up Jul 25, 2025 Op-ed: The National Dialogue: It cannot be business as usual - Social cohesion is key to South Africa's economic renewal by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 25, 2025 Op-ed: The National Dialogue: Solidarity is not just a moral ideal by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 22, 2025 Op-ed: Weaving a nation: Lessons from Singapore for South Africa's cohesion journey by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 17, 2025 Op-ed: A just global tax system - Balancing idealism and realism in the Developing World's fight for fairness by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 17, 2025 Op-ed: Rethinking leadership: A diplomatic reflection on US global primacy in a changing world by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 1, 2025 Press Release: A time for unity and collective action - Withdrawal from National Dialogue is counter-productive by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jun 22, 2025 Op-ed: Managing diversity in South Africa: Learning from the UAE experience by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 22, 2025 Press Release: Inclusive Society Institute CEO calls for just and inclusive global financial reform at the Think-Tank 20 (T20) Mid-Year Conference by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jun 18, 2025 Press Release: Political funding disclosure must match public support - Swanepoel by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jun 10, 2025 Op-ed: AI and social media: A double-edged sword that demands global responsibility by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 10, 2025 Press Release: Inclusive Society Institute welcomes World Bank Infrastructure Development Loan by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jun 6, 2025 Op-ed: Words that wound: "Kill the boer" is legal, but not wise for a fragile South Africa by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 30, 2025 Op-ed: Going for growth: Structural reforms needed for economic recovery by William Gumede Up May 21, 2025 Op-ed: G20 Human Rights Barometer: A red flag for global accountability by André Gaum & Daryl Swanepoel Up May 20, 2025 Op-ed: Going for growth: Structural reforms needed for economic recovery by William Gumede Up May 20, 2025 Op-ed: Economic resilience through strategic interventions by Jan van Heerden & Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 22, 2025 Op-ed: The Fragility of the Government of National Unity: A Critical Examination by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 3, 2025 Press Release: South Africans express doubts about GNU's cooperation and effectiveness by Ipsos and Inclusive Society Institute Up Mar 24, 2025 Op-ed: The urgency of fair climate finance for developing nations by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 12, 2025 Op-ed: No national dialogue if deferred by Klaus Kotzé Up Feb 12, 2025 Op-ed: Trump tariff fest threatens South African exports by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 21, 2025 Op-ed: A credo for a new South Africaness by William Gumede Up Dec 2, 2024 Op-ed: Trump threatens 100% tariffs on BRICS countries by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 29, 2024 Op-ed: How cohesive is South African society? by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 29, 2024 Op-ed: South Africa's Social Cohesion Crisis by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 27, 2024 Media Release: Launch of the South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI) at the Social Cohesion Roundtable hosted by the National Planning Commission at the Union Buildings, Pretoria, on 26 November 2024 by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 22, 2024 Op-ed: The Electoral Reform consultation panel call for public submissions by Daryl Swanepoel Up Oct 22, 2024 Op-ed: Strong enforcement needed to curb Human Rights abuses by André Gaum and Daryl Swanepoel Up Oct 2, 2024 Op-ed: The National Dialogue: Pathway to a people's plan for South Africa by Klause Kotzé Up Sep 12, 2024 Op-ed: Proposed Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill is flawed by Daryl Swanepoel Up Sep 12, 2024 Op-ed: Can South Africa learn from Finland's model for social cohesion by Nicola Bergsteedt and Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 23, 2024 Op-ed: Government of National Unity met with positive response by Roelof Botha & Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 22, 2024 Op-ed: South Africa’s national interest must be people-centred and pragmatic by Klaus Kotzé Up Jul 1, 2024 Op-ed: A new council for better global governance by Buyelwa Sonjica and Dr Klaus Kotzé Up Jul 1, 2024 Op-ed: Assessing institutional capacities to deliver in a changing world by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 25, 2024 Op-ed: Proposed Government of National Unity promises an exciting and inclusive future by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 24, 2024 Op-ed: South Africa is getting healthier? by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 3, 2024 Op-ed: South Africa is getting safer? by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 21, 2024 Op-ed: Voluntary Government of National Unity - an alternative to messy coalition government by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 21, 2024 Op-ed: China is an important African partner by Klaus Kotzé Up May 21, 2024 Op-ed: A constructive contribution to re-energize South Africa by Buyelwa Sonjica and Klaus Kotzé Up May 6, 2024 Op-ed: 2024 National Assembly Election: Two ballot papers - both of equal importance by Jørgen Elklit Up Apr 26, 2024 Op-ed: Developing an instrument to assess levels of social cohesion in SA by Klaus Boehnke and Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 17, 2024 Media Release: Scrapping of Gauteng e-Tolls welcomed, but defaulters still have to pay by Inclusive Society Institute Up Apr 16, 2024 Op-ed: The manifold challenges facing SA's Higher Education government policy by Dr Douglas Blackmur Up Apr 12, 2024 Op-ed: Voter registration mechanism needs to change by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 12, 2024 Op-ed: Managing social cohesion in diverse communities by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 3, 2024 Op-ed: Misrepresenting Polls Does Democracy A Disservice by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 25, 2024 Op-ed: UN summit of the future: On track to nowhere? by Nicola Bergsteedt and Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 11, 2024 Media Release: Mistrust in immigrants threatens social cohesion by Inclusive Society Institute Up Mar 5, 2024 Op- ed: A Critical Review of the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 21, 2024 Op-ed: Embracing Flexicurity: Lessons from Denmark by Nicola Bergsteedt Up Feb 9, 2024 Op-ed: Navigating the complexities of coalition politics in South African municipalities by Nondumiso Sithole Up Feb 9, 2024 Op-ed: Growth drivers coming to the fore by Roelof Botha and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 7, 2024 Op-ed: Coalitions: Lessons from Finland by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 1, 2024 Media Release: Intent to emigrate remains disturbingly high by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jan 23, 2024 Op-ed: Who do we listen to? The human cost of war and its global impact by Buyelwa Sonjica Up Jan 16, 2024 Op-ed: Economic pandemic: Organised crime’s stranglehold on South Africa by Daryl Swanepoel Up Dec 14 , 2023 O p-ed: Leveraging Special Economic Zones for Growth by William Gumede Up Nov 29 , 2023 Op-ed: Many ethical hurdles to overcome in managing global population growth by Motsamai Molefe Up Nov 28 , 2023 Op-ed: Turnaround of construction sector is South African economy’s bellwether by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 20 , 2023 Op-ed: The United Nations must reform to represent the interests of the Global South by Klaus Kotzé Up Oct 18 , 2023 Op- ed: Reimagining Global Governance: A Call for Equitable and Resilient Systems by Daryl Swanepoel Up Oct 13 , 2023 Op-ed: Why Building Global Resilience Is the Best Investment We Can Make Now by Buyelwa Sonjica Up Oct 4 , 2023 Op- ed: Re-modeling the BRICS New Development Bank by William Gumede Up Sep 21 , 2023 Op- ed: Growth drivers coming to the fore by Roelof Botha & Daryl Swanepoel Up Sep 19 , 2023 Op- ed: The Progressive Realisation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: Albie Sachs' Pioneering Role by Nicola Jo Bergsteedt Up Aug 17 , 2023 Op-ed: Ensuring Administrative Justice for a Truly Inclusive Society by Inclusive Society Institute in collaboration with the Daily Maverick Up Jul 25 , 2023 Op-ed: The Vital Role of Participatory Democracy in Building a Just and Inclusive Society by Inclusive So ciety Institute in collaboration with the Daily Maverick Up Jul 12 , 2023 Op -ed: The global development and security initiatives: Safeguarding our global village by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 12 , 2023 Op -ed: Navigating China-Africa cooperation within a globally constrained environment by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 12 , 2023 Op -ed: New global trade and investment thinking by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 3 , 2023 Op -ed: Trust – the ‘glue’ that binds society together – is missing in SA by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 29 , 2023 Op-ed: Gender inequality - Men’s involvement in care: Contemplating the glass escalator by Nicole Daniels, Jodi Wishnia and Daryl Swanepoel Up May 22 , 2023 Op-ed: The personal is political: our families are blueprints for society by Jodi Wishnia and Daryl Swanepoel Up May 15 , 2023 Op-ed: Understanding gender inequality in caregiving and families by Nicole Daniels and Daryl Swanepoel Up May 9 , 2023 Me d ia Release: Intent to emigrate decreases but remains a risk Findings from the Inclusive Society Institute's GovDem Poll Up May 8 , 2023 Op-ed: Beyond Colonialism: Türkiye's Unique Approach to Africa by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 2 , 2023 Media Release: Mistrust in immigrants remains alarmingly high Findings from the Inclusive Society Institute's GovDem Poll Up Apr 25 , 2023 Med ia Release: An opposition coalition at the national level is highly unlikely Findings from the Inclusive Society Institute's GovDem Poll Up Apr 17 , 2023 Media Release: Comment on President Ramaphosa assents to the Electoral Amendment Bill by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 13, 2023 Media Release: Writing off outstanding E-Tolls under the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 22, 2023 O p-e d: A strong democracy comes with a price tag – and it’s worth every cent by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 22, 2023 Op-e d: Social Cohesion: Getting Symbolism, Action and Rhetoric Right by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 8, 2023 M edia Release : Inclusive Society Institute calls on President Ramaphosa to consider constitutionality of Electoral Amendment Bill by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 3, 2023 Op-e d: Born free, but not fair: Solutions to tackle youth inequality and unemployment in South Africa - Considered solutions to closing the gap on youth inequality and unemployment by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 28, 2023 Op-e d: Born free, but not fair: 5 ways we can support SA’s teens to stay in school w ithout interventions along their life cycle, kids could well become the “disaffected youth” as early inequality gets compounded from birth, through school, and beyond. by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 20, 2023 Op-e d: Born free, but not fair: Setting the foundation for long-term learning and earning Interventions that support childhood development in the first 1,000 days of a child’s life have the potential to radically shift South Africa’s current inequality crisis. by Michelle Flowers and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 16, 2023 Op-e d: Multi-Member Constituency model trumps Single Seat Constituency model by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 14, 2023 Op-ed: Born free, but not fair by Nicole Daniels and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 8, 2023 Op-ed: Coalitions must be built on trust and generosity by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 8, 2023 Op-ed: Born free, but not fair: Understanding youth inequality Youth inequality accumulates over a life course, but there are critical moments where policy and programming can intervene to alleviate inequality and safeguard more just futures for young people by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 3, 2023 Op-ed: Sustainable population and possible standards of living by Anton Cartwright Up Feb 3, 2023 Op-ed: Automatic voter registration: removing the thorn in the side of SA’s democracy by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 23, 2023 Op-e d: African Philosophy and Social Justice: The inclusiveness and limitations of a continent’s political thought by Mutshidz Maraganedzha Up Jan 20, 2023 Op-e d: Rise civil society: A new year’s resolution by Klaus Kotzé Up Jan 13, 2023 Op-ed: End the Social Compact tug-of-war: Lessons from Denmark by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 9 , 2022 Op-Ed: Parliament persists in passing an unconstitutional Electoral Amendment bill by Inclusive Society Institute Up Nov 2 , 2022 Op-Ed: Democratising the United Nations by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 27 , 2022 Op-Ed: A people-driven state is required for national renewal by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 24 , 2022 Op-Ed: Contractionary fiscal consolidation versus expansionary stimulus implications for growth, employment and debt by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 16 , 2022 Op-Ed: The world is on shaky ground, with South Africa no different by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 12 , 2022 Op-Ed: UN Security Council Reform - A New Approach to Reconstructing the International Order by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 06 , 2022 Op-Ed: The need for an evidence-based response to addressing Xenophobia in SA. The importance of addressing the real drivers of Xenophobia and Xenophobic vilolence. by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 15, 2022 Op-Ed: SA must pull up its socks or tourism rebound may be short-lived by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 08, 2022 Op-Ed: Challenges and solutions for local economic development in the City of Ekurhuleni by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 05, 2022 Op-Ed: Climate change adaptation and resilience: An analysis of some Global and National Measures by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 29, 2022 Media Release: Proposals to remedy current deficiencies in the proposed NHI bill by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 23, 2022 Op-Ed: Grease the gears so the economic wheels can turn by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 27, 2022 Op-Ed: As long as we keep failing our youth, the cycle of inequality will remain unbroken by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 21, 2022 Media Release: Trust deficit between civil society and SAPS is flaming lawlessness in South Africa by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 05, 2022 Op-Ed: Challenges and opportunities to enhance social mobilisation to combat corruption by Prof Evangelos Mantzaris Up Jun 28, 2022 Op-Ed: Towards a national commitment by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up May 26, 2022 Op-Ed: Social Cohesion: Taking stock of South Africa’s socio-political strategy by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up May 26, 2022 Op-Ed: Get the basics right to reboot growth by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 11, 2022 Op-Ed: The preconditions for a South African welfare state by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up Apr 11, 2022 Op-Ed: Leveraging ideas of hope to reduce inequality in South Africa by Anja Smith, Jodi Wishnia, Carmen Christian and Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 11, 2022 Op-Ed: The Russia-Ukraine conflict: Impact on South Africa, fellow BRICS members and Africa by William Gumede Up Apr 07, 2022 Op-Ed: The establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 06, 2022 Op-Ed: Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - a labour sector perspective by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 28, 2022 Op-Ed: Efficient logistics needed to keep agri-exports on the right track by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 14, 2022 Op-Ed: Back to basics to better economy - Getting fundamentals right will reverse economic woes by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 10, 2022 Op-Ed: Crisis in Europe highlights critical importance of self-sufficient, secure and stable energy production by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 16, 2022 Social Democracy: A pathway for South Africa's development by Dr Klause Kotzé Up Feb 03, 2022 WEF Global Risks Report 2022 suggests it cannot be business as usual Up Feb 02, 2022 Preventing corruption is the key by Willie Hofmeyr Up Jan 31, 2022 South Africa investing in the ICT sector is a no-brainer by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 28, 2022 The effects of corruption by Prof Pregala Solosh Pillay Up Jan 17, 2022 Anti-corruption agencies need to be nurtured by Prof Andrew Spalding Up Jan 13, 2022 Different types of anti-corruption agencies by Drago Kos Up Jan 12, 2022 Construction sector: A friend in need is a friend indeed. Let the private sector help Up Dec 7, 2021 Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - a retail sector perspective Up Dec 3, 2021 Speech delivered by Vusi Khanyile, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute, to the Integritasza Conference, Wellington, South Africa Up Nov 11, 2021 ISI meets Deputy Minister of Finance - Present NHI and Inequality research outcomes Up Nov 8, 2021 Op-Ed: Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - A SMME sector perspective Up Nov 8, 2021 Op-Ed: South Africa needs an urgent national security and intelligence assessment Up Nov 2, 2021 ANC support dips, but it is still best placed to win local government election Up Nov 2, 2021 Op-Ed: SA's Jekyll and Hyde economy has investors second guessing Up Sep 16, 2021 Op-Ed: Would you choose NHI as our universal health care scheme if you knew the costs twenty years from now? Up Sep 15, 2021 Op-Ed: Local government challenges: How far have we come? Up Sep 8, 2021 Op-Ed: South African courts: Are they guilty of judicial overreach or merely upholding the rule of law? Up Sep 6, 2021 Op-Ed: Assessing crime intelligence in South Africa Up Aug 27, 2021 Op-Ed: Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden administration and its nexus with China Up Aug 26, 2021 Achieving wellbeing equa lity for South Africans: a dream that shouldn’t be deferred by the Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 13, 2021 Op-Ed: Reviving factories can fire up a much-needed growth engine Up Aug 11, 2021 South Africa's developmental model: The significance of state-owned enterprises Up Jun 23, 2021 Challenging climate change: The transition to a sustainable economy Up Jun 10, 2021 No quick fixes for SA's woes but glimmer of hope on the horizon Up May 31, 2021 Restoring faith in South Africa key to rejuvenating the economy Up May 5, 2021 Survey suggests voter support for party system in SA Up Apr 8, 2021 ISI presents electoral system proposals to IEC Up Mar 16, 2021 COVID-19: Severe blow to long-term employment prospects Up Jan 28, 2021 Speech by Daryl Swanepoel, CEO, Inclusive Society Institute, South Africa: International Conference on Poverty Alleviation: China's rationale, Beijing, China Up Jan 25, 2021 Op-Ed: Slowing the population growth is vital for South Africa's economic recovery Up Dec 11, 2020 Op-Ed: The US-China-Africa nexus under a Biden administration Up Dec 11, 2020 Op-Ed: ISI Annual Lecture with Justice Albie Sachs Prosperity through inclusivity Up Aug 13, 2020 Op-Ed: South African and the 12th summit of BRICS Up Aug 12, 2020 Op-Ed: Universal Health Coverage pathways for South Africa Areas of misalignment between stakeholders on the NHI Bill require further engagement Up Aug 11, 2020 Universal Health Coverage pathways for South Africa Areas of misalignment between stakeholders on the NHI Bill require further engagement Up Aug 3, 2020 Op-Ed: COVID-19 US-China discord and its impact on Sino-South African relations Up Jul 21, 2020 LGBT+ survey findings Survey on everyday experience of the LGBT+ communicy finds inequality and discrimination still rife, and mental health potentially a crisis in the making Up Jul 14, 2020 National health insurance Bill Parliament's Portfolio Committee would be well-advised first to obtain legal clarity on constitutionality Up May 20, 2020 COVID-19 ANC members and supporters show overwhelming support for government measures and ANC leadership, but are concerned about the future of the economy Up Apr 17, 2020 COVID-19 Survey: COVID-19 and its impact on the SMME sector Up Up