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At a time when faith in our democratic and government institutions is fading, The People’s Voice  offers a timely and powerful response. Authored by Daryl Swanepoel  and published by the Inclusive Society Institute , this book is a bold call to action for South Africa’s democracy. It reminds us that public participation is not a privilege, nor is it optional—it is a constitutional right and a democratic necessity. Through incisive legal analysis, compelling case studies, and a deep moral interrogation of post-apartheid governance, Swanepoel exposes the systemic failures that have turned public engagement from an inviolable constitutional mandate into a mere box-ticking exercise. But this is not a work of despair. It charts a path toward inclusive, accountable and effective participatory governance, drawing on insights from constitutional scholars, judicial rulings and grassroots voices. Whether you are a policymaker, academic, civil society activist, or simply an engaged citizen, this book will challenge your assumptions and deepen your understanding. From the Freedom Charter to the Constitutional Court, Swanepoel reminds us that “the people shall govern”  was not a slogan - it was a promise. The People’s Voice  is more than a book. It is a democratic wake-up call. It is about restoring legitimacy, empowering the public, and breathing life back into the soul of South African democracy. ✅ Price:  R200 + delivery 📖 Read it. Reflect on it. Act on it. Because democracy only works when the people are heard. 👉 To order your copy, contact us at info@inclusivesociety.org.za .

Occasional Paper 11/2025   Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   OCTOBER 2025   Daryl Swanepoel Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University (ND Co Admin; BPAHons; MPA)      Abstract   The veto power of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) remains the most contested design feature of contemporary collective security. Abolition is a recurrent demand, yet the legal and political barriers to Charter amendment render it unattainable in practice. This article argues that meaningful reform must pivot from abolishing the veto to regulating its use. After tracing the veto’s historical development and surveying the literature and policy advocacy around abolition, the article examines restraint initiatives (France–Mexico declaration, ACT Code of Conduct, General Assembly resolution 76/262) and proposes a ‘Veto Use Integrity Framework” (VUIF)’. The framework extends conflict-of-interest (COI) abstention logic, creates carve-outs for mass atrocities and humanitarian access and mandates written justification and ex post oversight. While abolition remains a normative ideal, a regulation-first strategy offers the only feasible route to a more legitimate and effective Security Council. This article also advances a complementary amendment to the General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace (UFP) framework. Currently, UFP resolutions are non-binding recommendations. The proposed reform would make them binding when supported by a majority of the P5, thus enhancing the authority of the General Assembly in cases of Security Council paralysis. Draft language for these amendments is included in Annexure A. Introduction The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is simultaneously indispensable and constrained. It is indispensable, because Chapter VII powers enable binding decisions on peace and security, but it also constrained, because Article 27(3) grants each permanent member, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, a veto over “all other matters,” a design choice born of the 1945 bargain to keep the great powers inside the tent (UN, N.d.). The result is an enduring paradox, that is that the veto made the UNSC possible, but it often impairs its ability to respond in the gravest crises. From Rwanda to Syria and Ukraine, the veto or its shadow has been implicated in high-stakes failures to protect civilians and uphold international law and therefore the moral appeal of abolition is obvious, but the practical obstacles are equally stark. The Charter’s amendment rule requires P5 consent, thus making self-abnegation the precondition for change, which is an implausible premise (UN, N.d.). The core claim here is therefore pragmatic. If the veto cannot be abolished, it can be bounded, legally through working methods, procedurally through General Assembly oversight and politically through sustained norm entrepreneurship (Hathaway & Patrick, 2024). It is in this context that the Uniting for Peace mechanism takes on renewed significance: strengthening its authority would provide the General Assembly with a conditional binding role when the Council is paralysed (see Annexure A). Historical background: design, doctrine and practice The League of Nations’ unanimity rule and major-power estrangement shaped the UN’s framers, who concluded that a credible collective security system required guaranteed great-power participation and a blocking right. The “Yalta formula” was therefore inscribed in Article 27: nine affirmative votes (originally seven, amended with Council enlargement) including the concurring votes of the permanent members, with an obligatory abstention when a party is involved in a dispute under Chapter VI or Article 52(3) (UN, N.d.). In practice, “concurring votes” has long been read to include P5 abstentions, not just affirmative votes, so an abstention does not kill a text (Galbraith, N.d.) The operational life of the veto evolved across three phases. During the Cold War, vetoes were frequent and largely bipolar. After 1990, the Council briefly coordinated on major enforcement, for example, Iraq/Kuwait, before veto politics reasserted themselves on accountability and humanitarian files (Wilkinson & O’Sullivan, 2004). Since 2011, Russia and China have used the veto repeatedly on Syria; Security Council Report counts 14 of Russia’s first 19 post-2011 vetoes as Syria-related, with eight of China’s nine in the same period on Syria (UN, 2024). The UN’s own Peace and Security Data Hub maintains an authoritative dataset of all vetoes since 1946 (UN DPPA, N.d). The abolitionist case and its structural limits The normative case against the veto is three-fold. First, it violates sovereign equality by privileging five states. Second, it erodes perceived legitimacy when one state can block action backed by an overwhelming majority. Third, it contributes to preventable harm by enabling stalemate in atrocity settings. Syria supplies the canonical example: Russia and China vetoed multiple resolutions on accountability and humanitarian access, including the 22 May 2014 attempt to refer Syria to the ICC (UN Press, 2014). Earlier, on 4 October 2011, they vetoed a text condemning grave human rights violations (UN Press, 2011). Yet, abolition flounders on black-letter law and bare-knuckle politics. Article 108 demands two-thirds of UN members including all P5 to ratify any Charter amendment (UN, N.d.). Each P5 sees the veto as an existential insurance policy against perceived interventionism (Russia/China) (The Economist, 2022), against constraints on Middle East policy (United States) (Gowan, 2024) or as a lever of global influence in relative decline (United Kingdom/France) (Tardy, 2016). Even if abolition were agreed in principle, the likely consequence would be great-power disengagement, recreating the League’s fatal flaw. From abolition to restraint: existing initiatives Recognising the amendment roadblock, states and civil society have shifted to restraint. Three streams matter. First, the France-Mexico political declaration (2015) calls on the P5 to voluntarily suspend the veto in situations of mass atrocities. Over 100 states have endorsed it (France-Mexico, 2015; GCRP, 2015). Second, the ACT Code of Conduct (2015) asks all  Council members to avoid voting against credible drafts aimed at halting genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. The code was transmitted to the Secretary-General as A/70/621 (GCRP, 2015). Third, the General Assembly’s “veto initiative”, resolution 76/262 (2022), which automatically convenes a GA debate when any veto is cast, raising transparency and reputational costs (UN, 2022). These tools do not nullify the veto, but reframe costs and expectations around its use (Johnstone, 2003). A regulation-first alternative: the Veto Use Integrity Framework (VUIF) If abolition is implausible, the reform frontier is use-regulation that is (i) anchored in existing law and practice, (ii) operationalizable through UNSC working methods and GA oversight and (iii) politically survivable for the P5. 1. Conflict-of-interest (COI) abstention, extended Article 27(3) already provides that “in decisions under Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. Contemporary dysfunctions typically arise under Chapter VII. The VUIF would adopt a Council working-methods note, a presidential note incorporated into the Council’s compendium of practices, extending the COI abstention norm to all substantive  votes when a member is directly implicated (named in the operative text, a belligerent or occupying power or materially supporting parties to the conduct at issue). Disputes over COI would be decided as procedural and thus not subject to veto by nine votes (Council practice on procedural questions and the “double veto” debates) (Security Council Report, 2024). This deliberately uses the Council’s own methods toolkit rather than Charter amendment. 2. Substantive carve-outs: atrocities and humanitarian access The VUIF would codify a presumption against veto in (a) situations where the Secretary-General, OHCHR or a UN investigative mechanism reports a credible risk or commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and (b) resolutions whose primary purpose is humanitarian access, deconfliction or sanctions humanitarian carve-outs. This operationalises the France-Mexico declaration and the ACT Code into Council practice, moving from voluntary pledges to institutionalised  expectations. 3. Transparency and written justification Any veto, or public threat of a veto, would require a written justification submitted before the vote is taken, which justification should address an atrocity-risk assessment and COI. The justification would be annexed to the Council record and automatically transmitted to the GA under 76/262, thereby ensuring rapid and visible scrutiny (UN, 2022). And an independent briefing by SG, ICRC and/or UN investigative bodies, before votes where restraint could apply, would test the credibility of pretexts (Johnstone, 2003). 4. Oversight: scorecards and Uniting for Peace Building on 76/262, the GA would maintain a public scorecard tracking compliance with COI abstention and atrocity/humanitarian carve-outs. Where a veto blocks life-saving action notwithstanding these standards, the GA would move promptly under 377(V) “Uniting for Peace” to recommend collective measures that do not require Council authorisation (UN, 1950). The aim is not to override a veto, but to raise the cost of misusing it and keep alternative tracks moving. At present, however, Uniting for Peace resolutions are only recommendatory. They have political and moral force, but no binding legal effect. In order to close this gap, the proposed amendment would stipulate that where a Uniting for Peace resolution secures support from a majority of the P5, the decision shall be binding on all UN Member States; and abstentions would be treated as non-opposition, unless a permanent member explicitly casts a negative vote. This approach ties General Assembly authority to a measure of great-power concurrence while ensuring that a single veto cannot paralyse action indefinitely. Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A. Complementary reform: Amending the Uniting for Peace framework The Uniting for Peace resolution was designed to empower the General Assembly to act when the Security Council fails due to lack of unanimity among the P5 and in so doing it provides for the Assembly to recommend measures, including collective action, but it does not grant legally binding authority. This limitation has curbed its effectiveness. The proposed amendment would transform Uniting for Peace into a conditional binding mechanism. When a resolution is adopted under UFP and supported by a majority of the P5, it would carry binding effect equivalent to Security Council decisions under Article 25 of the Charter. Certification by the Secretary-General would confirm whether the requisite majority is met, and such certification would be annexed to the GA record. This reform strengthens collective security while maintaining safeguards: no measure could become binding absent concurrence from most permanent members. Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A. Working methods vs. Charter amendment: Pathways for reform A crucial distinction must be drawn between reforms that can be achieved through changes to the Security Council’s working methods or General Assembly practice and those that require a formal amendment of the Charter. Changes through working methods The majority of the proposals contained in the Veto Use Integrity Framework (VUIF) fall into the category of working methods reform. These are adjustments that can be adopted through Security Council presidential notes, incorporated into the Council’s compendium of practices or mandated through General Assembly resolutions without formally reopening the Charter. They include: Conflict-of-interest abstentions .  The requirement in Article 27(3) can be extended to encompass all substantive votes where a permanent member is directly implicated, which can be operationalised through a presidential note. Whilst it will not be legally binding, such guidance would shape practice and be enforceable through procedural votes that are not subject to a veto. Substantive carve-outs .  By establishing a presumption against the veto in cases of mass atrocities and humanitarian access, which builds directly on the France - Mexico and ACT initiatives, these commitments could be codified as standard working practices of the Council. Transparency measures .  Permanent members could be obligated to issue written justifications for actual or threatened vetoes. It can be instituted by Council practice and reinforced by the General Assembly’s 76/262 mechanism, which automatically triggers GA debate. Oversight mechanisms .  Scorecards and reporting systems could be maintained by the General Assembly in order to track compliance with restraint norms. This can be introduced without altering the Charter. In short, regulation of the veto’s use, its conditions, justification and scrutiny, can be advanced through procedural innovations and practice-based reforms. These do not formally curtail the veto right, but they increase reputational and political costs of its misuse. Changes requiring Charter amendment   By contrast, reforms that alter the legal authority of UN organs or the substantive scope of the veto require a Charter amendment under Article 108, meaning approval by two-thirds of the membership including all P5 and these will include:   The abolition or limitation of the Veto by removing or restricting the veto in specific subject areas, for example, atrocity crimes, would require an amendment to Article 27 of the Charter. Changing voting formulas, because any redefinition of “concurring votes” or alteration of the relationship between permanent and non-permanent members in decision-making would necessitate amending Article 27. Binding effect of General Assembly resolutions : At present, Articles 10 - 12 of the Charter limit GA authority to recommendations. The proposal to make Uniting for Peace resolutions binding when supported by a majority of the P5 would thus require a formal Charter amendment to extend the Assembly’s competence. Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A. Implications This distinction underscores why the regulation-first strategy is more feasible in the near term. Changes to working methods can be secured by political agreement and institutional practice. However, the amendment of the Charter, particularly to empower the General Assembly under Uniting for Peace, would mark a structural shift in the allocation of authority under the UN system and faces significant political hurdles given that P5 consent is indispensable. Case illustrations: how regulation would have mattered Syria As already referred to, Russia and China vetoed a draft on 4 October 2011, condemning grave violations, and they later vetoed a text threatening Chapter VII measures. Then on 22 May 2014, they vetoed an ICC referral. Under the VUIF, (i) COI abstention could have been triggered for a state materially supporting parties, (ii) atrocity carve-outs would have strongly counselled against vetoing an accountability referral and (iii) written justifications and a GA scorecard would have elevated reputational costs, potentially shifting bargaining baselines in later humanitarian-access renewals. Rwanda The 1999 Independent Inquiry documented systemic failures that culminated in inaction during the genocide (UN S/1999/1257) (UN, 1999). While there was no formal veto, the logic of VUIF, that is independent briefings before protection votes, a standing atrocity carve-out and a GA backstop, would have created stronger procedural rails against drift. Ukraine  (Crimea, 2014; invasion, 2022) Russia vetoed condemning texts; China abstained (Milano, 2015). Under VUIF, COI abstention would clearly apply to a belligerent, because disputes about applicability would be treated as procedural (no veto) and sent to a vote of nine. Even if Moscow ignored the expectation, the GA scorecard, plus Uniting for Peace, would have deepened the multilateral response record and policy pressure. Why regulation is more feasible than abolition Three reasons. First, law-in-practice. The Council’s working methods and GA practice have been fertile ground for meaningful change without Charter amendment. The 76/262 “veto initiative” has already shifted incentives by guaranteeing post-veto debate. Second, political economy. Constraining use while preserving the right should be tolerable to at least some P5, for example, France has publicly campaigned for atrocity-context restraint (France, 2023). Third, norm dynamics. Once articulated and socialised, expectations of restraint harden, reputational costs accumulate and can change state behaviour at the margin (Johnstone, 2003). Objections include the “soft law” critique, but what if a P5 ignores the framework? The answer is that no single instrument can compel a veto-holder, but coupling Council working methods with GA transparency and Uniting for Peace raises the costs of misuse, keeps humanitarian tracks open in subsidiary bodies and sustains a public record of (non-)compliance that matters over time, for alliance-management, domestic scrutiny and broader legitimacy. Conclusion   Abolishing the veto would be normatively satisfying and under current conditions, politically impossible. The Charter requires the consent of those whose privileges abolition would target and therefore the great-power bargain that sustains the Council would likely collapse without their blocking right. The regulation-first agenda outlined here, COI abstention, atrocity and humanitarian carve-outs, written justification, GA review and Uniting for Peace linkage, does not pretend to dissolve hard power. It does aim to discipline it. This shift reframes the veto from an unreviewable prerogative into a responsibility that must be explained, bounded and, when abused, politically costly.   Coupled with the proposed amendment to the Uniting for Peace framework, which would make certain General Assembly resolutions binding when supported by a majority of the P5, this package of reforms strengthens both oversight and responsiveness. In a world where perfect justice is unattainable, that is how the Security Council and the wider UN system can become more legitimate and effective now, without waiting for a Charter amendment that will not come. References French Republic (France). N.d.. Why France wishes to regulate use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council.  [Online] Available at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations-security-council/why-france-wishes-to-regulate-use-of-the-veto-in-the-united-nations-security-65315/  [accessed 17 September 2025]   French Republic & Republic of Mexico. 2015. Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Case of Mass Atrocities.  Paris/New York. [Online] Available at: https://onu.delegfrance.org/IMG/pdf/2015_08_07_veto_political_declaration_en.pdf  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Galbraith, J. N.d. [Online] Available at: Notes and Comments. EndingSsecurity Council Resolution . Cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/proposals-for-un-security-council-reform/2D26E684DCC727D9D06480E652FB3327 [accessed: 17 September 2025]   Global Centre for the Responsibility to Act (GCRP). 2015. Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.  New York: UN. [Online] Available at: https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/code-of-conduct-regarding-security-council-action-against-genocide-crimes-against-humanity-or-war-crimes/  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCRP). 2015. Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities (overview and signatories).  [Online] Available at: https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/political-declaration-on-suspension-of-veto-powers-in-cases-of-mass-atrocities/  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Gowan, R. 2024. The UN Security Council in the New Era of Great Power Competition. [Online] Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/un-security-council-new-era-great-power-competition?utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 17 September 2024]   Hathaway, O.A. & Patrick, S. 2024. Can the UN Security Council Still Help Keep the Peace? Reassessing Its Role, Relevance, and Potential for Reform.  [Online] Available at:  [accessed: 17 September 2024]   Johnstone, I. 2003. Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument, European Journal of International Law , 14(3), pp. 437–480. [Online] Available at: https://ejil.org/pdfs/14/3/428.pdf  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Milano, E. 2015. Russia’s Veto in the Security Council: Whither the Duty to Abstain   under Art. 27(3) of the UN Charter?.  [Online] Available at: https://www.zaoerv.de/75_2015/75_2015_1_a_215_232.pdf  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Security Council Report. 2024. The Veto: UN Security Council Working Methods.  [Online] Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Security Council Report. 2024. Procedural Vote (working methods explainer).  [Online] Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/procedural-vote.php  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Tardy, T. 2016. 6 France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council.  The UN Security Council in the 21st Century , edited by Von Einsiedel, S.,  Malone, D.M. & Stagno, B.U. Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016, pp. 121-138.  https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685853730-009   The Economist. 2022. Report: The world divided . [Online] Available at: https://www.economist.com/special-report/2022/10/10/china-seeks-a-world-order-that-defers-to-states-and-their-rulers?utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 17 September 2025]   UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. (UNDPPA). N.d. Security Council Data-Vetoes since 1946.  [Online] Available at: https://psdata.un.org/dataset/DPPA-SCVETOES  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations. N.d. Charter of the United Nations. [Online] Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations (UN). 1950. General Assembly resolution 377 (V) “Uniting for Peace”. [Online] Available at: https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/377%28V%29  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations. 1999. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (S/1999/1257). [Online] Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/405039 [accessed 13 September 2025]. Also summarized at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-inquiry-actions-of-united-nations-during-1994-genocide-rwanda-s19991257  (accessed 17 September 2025).   United Nations (UN). 2022. General Assembly resolution 76/262 (Standing mandate for a GA debate when a veto is cast).  [Online] Available at: https://docs.un.org/en/a/RES/76/262  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations Press. 2011. Security Council fails to adopt draft resolution condemning Syria’s crackdown owing to veto by China, Russian Federation (SC/10403). [Online] Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2011/sc10403.doc.htm  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations Press. 2014. Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court fails as negative votes prevent adoption (SC/11407).  [Online] Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Wilkinson, M.J. & O’Sullivan, C.D. 2004. The UN Security Council and Iraq: Why It Succeeded In 1990, Why It Didn't In 2003, and Why the United States Should Redeem It. [Online] Available at: https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/ad/ad_v9_1/wij01.html ? [accessed: 17 September 2025] Annexure A   DRAFT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 1. Amendment to Article 27 (Voting in the Security Council) Insert a new paragraph after Article 27(3):   “In addition to the provisions above, the Security Council shall adopt working methods ensuring that a permanent member directly involved in a dispute under consideration shall abstain from voting on all substantive matters concerning that dispute. Disputes as to whether a member is directly involved shall be considered procedural and not subject to the veto.”   2. Amendment to Articles 10–12 (Functions and Powers of the General Assembly) Amend Article 10 to add:   “In exceptional circumstances where the Security Council fails to act owing to the lack of unanimity among its permanent members, and the General Assembly considers a matter under the Uniting for Peace procedure, resolutions of the General Assembly shall be binding on all Members of the United Nations if supported by a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council. For the purposes of this Article, abstentions by permanent members shall not count as opposition unless a permanent member explicitly votes against.”   Amend Article 12(1) to add:   “This restriction shall not apply to resolutions adopted under the preceding Article when supported by a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council.”   3. Certification by the Secretary-General   Insert a new clause in Article 98:   “The Secretary-General shall certify whether resolutions adopted under the Uniting for Peace procedure have obtained the support of a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council, and such certification shall be annexed to the official record of the General Assembly.”   These amendments collectively preserve the primary responsibility of the Security Council while ensuring that in circumstances of deadlock, the General Assembly can act with binding authority where a majority of the P5 concur. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

ADDENDUMS ADDENDUM 1   Econometric model for government revenue    Long run equation Long run equation: graph of actual and modelled values Cointegration text of long run equation   The hypothesis of the cointegration test is as follows:   H0: No cointegration.   Source:  Own calculations   The results indicate that the variable is statistically significant (at 1% level), which means that we can reject the null hypothesis (of no cointegration). Short run (ECM) equation [1]     Diagnostic and Stability Tests of the ECM       Final (combined) model: actual and modelled values [2] Forecast [3] : Base case Assumptions (2024-2055): CPI and Inflation: increase of 4.5% per year GDP and RYD: Real increase of 2.0% [4] per year RM3: Real increase of 2,1% per year (Average of last 10 years) Prime: Decline from its current value to 9.5% per year over the next four years (until 20207), and then remain fixed at that value (9,5 based on the average of the last 10 years) Forecast: Graph of actual and forecast ADDENDUM 2   S1 and S2 data     ADDENDUM 3   Impact of an increase in the public sector retirement age   To mitigate some of the risks associated with longevity as highlighted in the report, this addendum looks at an additional scenario, namely an increase in the retirement age of public servants.   As far as South African legislation regarding retirement is concerned, the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 [5] provides broad guidelines by stating that:    Subject to the provisions of this section, an officer, other than a member of the services or an educator or a member of the Agency or the Service, shall have the right to retire from the public service, and shall be so retired, on the date when he or she attains the age of 65 years: Provided that a person who is an employee on the day immediately before the commencement of the Public Service Amendment Act, 1996, has the right to retire on reaching the retirement age or prescribed retirement date provided for any other law applicable to him or her on that day.   According to recent news reports the National treasury stated that ‘there is no standard retirement age that is set by government in South Africa,’ and that ‘Employees in formal employment… have a retirement age that is determined by the employer and the relevant retirement fund, which is not prescribed by government.’ In addition, it confirms that ‘there are no planned changes to the old age grant – which remains available from the age of 60 for men and women’ [6] .   However, as far as the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) is concerned, the normal retirement age for GEPF members is sixty (60) years. The fund notes that ‘The GEPF provides for normal and early retirement, as well as retirement for medical (ill health) reasons. Members whose employment have been affected by restructuring or reorganisation are also able to receive retirement benefits’ [7] . Normal retirement rules further specify that ‘benefits paid depend on whether a member has less than 10 years’ pensionable service, or 10 or more years of pensionable service. Members with less than 10 years’ service receive a gratuity – a once-off cash lump sum that is equal to their actuarial interest in the Fund. Members with 10 or more years’ service receive a gratuity and a monthly pension annuity.’   Against this backdrop, this addendum aims to quantify a scenario in which the retirement age for all public sector workers is set at 65 years of age, starting from 2025. This scenario then includes an amendment of the GEPF rules to increase the normal retirement age to sixty-five (65) years of age.   Quantum of costs   As a starting point one needs to get an estimate of the number of government employees currently in the age bracket of 60-65, as well as their earnings.   The 2022 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) provided a detailed breakdown of public compensation data [8] (see Table 1).  This document indicates that in 2022 around 1,308,123  individuals were employed by the public sector. By dividing the expenditure on salaries and wages by the number of employees per sector, in 2022 the average public sector employee earned R457,209 per year.   Table 1: Public-service salaries (R millions) and headcount (number), 2015-2022   Source:  National Treasury, 2022 MTBPS Annexure B   Although a detail breakdown by age is not provided in the MTBPS document, a parliamentary reply by the then Public Service and Administration Minister Dlodlo stated that ‘131 176 public servants will reach the retirement age of 65 in 2025’ [9] .   By dividing this number of individuals, by the total number of public sector employees, gives an estimate of around 10,1% [10] of public sector employees falling within the 60-65 years age bracket [11] .   To get a value for the pensionable portion of these employees, we assume an average contribution rate of 20,5%  - that is 7,5% by the individual self and 13,0% [12] by the employer. By applying this ratio to the average public sector pay, gives an amount of R93 728 per year per employee. By multiplying this amount by the estimated number of individuals in the 60-65 years age bracket equates to just over R12,3 bn per year of (potential) additional retirement savings (‘contributions’) (see Table 2).   Table 2: Public service employees numbers and costs, 2022   Source:  2022 MTBPS, DPSA, compiled by author   However, there is a (significant) caveat to this scenario, that is that if members retire later, the state needs to continue to pay them their salaries up to their retirement date. Using a similar methodology as explained above, the cost to the state to continue paying individuals aged 60 to 65 years would have amounted to around R59,9 bn [13] for 2022.   To project these values over the forecast period, they need to be adjusted for inflation. Actual inflation is used for 2023-2024 after which inflation of 4.5% per year is used (the same as the assumption use throughout the longevity report [14] ). We also have to assume a fixed level of employment over the forecast period.    According to the GEPF 2023/24 annual report, the value of their ‘funds and reserves amounted to R2.34 trillion on 31 March 2024 and accumulated funds and reserves grew at an average rate of 5.53% per year during the 2015 – 2024 period’ [15]   To get an idea of the retirement value of additional years of service, the annual contributions are adjusted for the inflation as well as the average growth rate, reported by the GEPF. To not overcomplicate the analysis, we exclude the impact of withdrawals [16] from the fund here. Figure 1: Additional salary costs (state) and retirement contributions and values (employees/pensioners), 2022-2055   Source : own calculations   Figure 1 indicates that, initially there exists a sizeable gap (around R48 bn) between the cost of additional salary payments of the state and the value of the accumulated retirement savings. This gap further increases to around R67 bn in 2038. However, thereafter, it is narrowed quickly to the point where the accumulated value of savings equals the additional salary expenses towards the end of the forecast period (i.e. 2054).  In reality this is an ‘accounting gap’ in the sense that the state will continue to have to pay the salaries but that the gap can be seen as a proxy for the ‘value to society’ derived from individuals being able to save additionally towards their own retirement.     Impact on the model   To equate the size of the ‘GAP’ to the model applied in the report, the results are compared to the base scenario, discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the report. Given that the 60 to 65 age cohort is in focus here, it makes little sense to also apply the longevity shock, and it is therefore excluded.   The results indicate that the budget deficit is likely to increase by around 0,5 percentage points, compared to the base scenario during the initial forecast years (i.e. around 2025 to 2040). For 2025 this is equal to a deficit of 6,6% of GDP compared to -5,9% for the base scenario. However, the difference between the GAP and base scenario is expected to gradually decline thereafter to the point where the GAP actually indicates a (marginally) smaller deficit during the final year of the forecast period.   Figure 2: Budget Balance as % of GDP (Base and Retirement GAP)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   As can be expected, larger annual deficits will push the debt to GDP ratio up, breaking 90% of GDP by 2037 compared the base scenario which indicates that it should remain below the 90% level. The difference between the two peaks at 5,0 percentage points around mid-2040’s after which it starts to decline to around 3,1% by the end of the forecast period.   Figure 3: Gross Debt to GDP (Base and Retirement GAP)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   Summary   The aim of this section is to quantify the impact of an increase in the retirement age of public servants from 60 to 65 years of age, on the fiscus.   The results indicate that this will have both a social costs (salary payments) as well as social benefit (retirement savings). Initially the costs will outweigh the benefits but over time, and given growth in the investment portfolio, this is estimated to equalise.   The impact on state finances will be a larger budget deficit and debt, especially during the initial years, that should decline over time.   ADDENDUM 4   Impact of an increase in the qualifying age for the Old Age Grant (OAG)   To moderate some of the risks associated with longevity as highlighted in the report, this addendum looks at another additional scenario, namely an increase in the qualifying age of the States Old Age social grant (OAG).   Chapter 4 of the report provided a detailed analysis of the different expenditure items, expected to be most affected by longevity. Specifically, Figure 37 showed the relative contributions of the three items to the total shock, and highlighted the dominant impact of old age grants, followed by the health services expenditure. Old age grant payments represented on average around 60% of the total combined shock to expenditure.   Chapter 3 of the main report already showed that during the 2024/25 fiscal year around 4,1 million individuals received the old age grant, and this is budgeted to rise to just below 4,5 million by 2027/28. This item represents a significant cost to the state and is also the largest (by cost) of the different social grants. The OAG cost the state R106,8 billion currently and is budgeted to increase to R131,0 billion over the next three years (that is an average rise of 7,0% per annum over the medium term).   Recent developments include that the National treasury confirmed that ‘there are no planned changes to the old age grant – which remains available from the age of 60 for men and women’ [17] .   Given the relevance and prominence of this social assistance related expenditure item, this addendum thus aims to quantify a scenario in which the qualifying age for all recipients of the State’s Old age social grant, is increased to 65 years of age, starting from 2026. However, this is done subject to a phased in approach over five years.   Quantum of costs   The main report already provides detailed estimates of the cost to the State of providing the OAG. As far as this addendum is concerned one needs to calculate the possible ‘saving’ if individuals falling between the ages of 60 to 64, are excluded.    According, to StatsSA, in 2024 South Africa had some 24,6 million individuals older than 60 years, while 8,6 million individuals (or roughly 32.6% of the total older than 60 years) fell in the age bracket 60-64 (See Table 1). Table 1: South Africans aged 60 and above, 2024     Male Female Total % of Total 60-64 866481 1134227 2000708 32.6% 65-69 654162 921092 1575254 25.7% 70-74 459581 697690 1157271 18.9% 75-79 273676 471861 745537 12.2% 80+ 212322 441742 654064 10.7% Total 2466222 3666612 6132834 100.0% Source:  StatsSA, Mid-year population estimates, 2024 [18]   Using this as a proxy, we thus assume that around 30% of AOG recipients are likely to fall within the 60-64 age bracket .   As mentioned above this analysis further assumes that the State will follow a phased in approach, that is where the qualifying age for the OAG is increased by one year per annum starting in 2026. This means that for 2026, only individuals 61 years and older will be viable to receive the grant, in 2027 only those 62 years and older, etc., thus reaching the target of 65 years from 2030 onwards.   To not overcomplicate the analysis, we assume that there are an equal number of individuals in the age cohorts 60 to 64. This translates to a linear, cumulative decline (saving) of around 6% [19] per year between 2026 and 2030. All other assumption related to the base and shocked scenarios remain the same as use in Chapter 4 of the main report.   Results   The results indicate a noticeable deviation between the base [20] and adjusted (age to 65 years) scenarios over time. During the first five years (implementation phase) the base scenario continues to rise strongly from around R106.8 bn in 2025 to R154.5 bn in 2030. In contrast to this the adjusted scenario remains largely unchanged from R106.8 bn in 2025 to R108.1 bn in 2030. This is as expected given the continued phasing out of qualifying individuals during the implementation phase.    After 2030 both series starts to rise, but with a significant gap between the series evident throughout the forecast period (see Figure 1). Figure 1: OAG costs of base versus adjusted (age 65) scenarios,  2024 to 2055   Source:  National Treasury (base up to 2028), own calculations   When comparing the results to total government expenditure, we get similar trends but with noticeable lower values for the adjusted (age over 65) scenario. Over the whole period the average for the original (shocked) scenario is around 0.5 percentage point compared to 0.3 percentage points for the adjusted (age over 65)  scenario.   Figure 2: OAG shock to expenditure: impact of original (shocked) versus adjusted (age 65) scenarios,  2024 to 2055   Conclusion   The aim of this addendum is to quantify a scenario in which the qualifying age for all recipients of the State’s Old age social grant, is increased to 65 years of age. This was done by using a phase in approach over 5 years, that is from 2026 to 2030.   The results indicate a significant saving in expenditure, averaging around R25 bn per year between 2026 and 2030. This equates to some R126.1 bn over the whole 5-year period.   When comparing the results as a percentage of total government expenditure, the average value for the original (shocked) scenario is around 0.5 percentage point compared to 0.3 percentage points for the adjusted (age over 65)  scenario. That means an (average) ‘saving’ of around 0.2 percentage point of total government expenditure can be realised per year if the qualifying age of the OAG is adjusted to 65 years of age.   Figure 3:             OAG costs of all original versus adjusted (age 65) scenarios,  2024 to 2055   [1]  All non-stationary variables have been differenced appropriately based on stationarity tests. [2]  Evident from the graph is that, in general, the model provides a good fit and trend of the actual values. Some discrepancies between the actual and modelled values are evident towards the later part (2015+). However, these are to both the upper and lower side, meaning we do not have a specific bias in the model. The large fluctuations during the Covid-19 period (2020-2021) likely further complicates the model’s ability to trace the actual values. [3]  To perform a forecast of the dependent variable (government revenue in this instance), the econometric model requires values for all explanatory variables over the forecasting period. Therefore, the need for the assumptions. [4]  This relates to the upper limit of the SARB’s potential growth rate, as discussed in Chapter 2. [5]   Act 103 of 1994 [6]  Daily Maverick, 27 May 2025, available at: No, there is no change to the retirement age [7]   https://gepf.co.za/retirement-benefits/ [8] 2022 MTBPS Annexure B. Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2022/mtbps.aspx [9]   https://www.dpsa.gov.za/thepublicservant/2022/03/09/govt-remains-largest-employer-in-sa-min-dlodlo/ [10]  This figure is likely understated, however it is difficult to determine the exact number of retirees in each age group per year, given the Minister’s broad statement. [11]  This seems in line with other sources such as StatsSA’s Quarterly Labour Force survey, which indicates that the 55-64 years age bracket represented around 7,8 percent of the total labour force in 2025.  P02111stQuarter2025.pdf . [12]  Note that this is the average rate, and that the DPSA states that the ‘rate is higher for members of the services, i.e. Police, Defence and Correctional Services. The employer contributes 16% of the member’s pensionable salary. Members of Intelligence Services also receive 16% of the member’s pensionable salary.’ https://www.dpsa.gov.za/policy-updates/nlrrm/conditions_of_service/pensions/pensions/ .   [13]  131176 (individuals) x R457 209 (average pay per year) [14]  4,5% per annum is the mid-point of South Africa’s official inflation target. [15]   https://gepf.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/GEPF_Annual-Report-2023_24_FINAL.pdf [16]  The GEPF is a defined contribution pension fund meaning that it does not guarantee a specific retirement benefit. Instead, both the employee and employer contribute a certain amount to an individual account, which is then invested, and the retirement benefit depends on the performance of these investments. ( Why withdrawing your pension from the GEPF could be your worst financial decision - Moneyweb ). [17]  Daily Maverick, 27 May 2025, available at: No, there is no change to the retirement age [18] P03022024.pdf [19]  30% assumption / 5 years = 6% per year [20]  Using the shocked scenario provides very similar trends and will thus not also be discussed here. See Figure 3 at the end of the Addendum for a combined graph of all different options and scenarios.    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Books The People's Voice: Public Participation and the Soul of South African Democracy Daryl Swanepoel 18 hours ago Editorial Policy Up

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Embracing a society that is built on social and national democratic values Public Policy Research & Analysis Democratic Education, Briefings, Seminars & Conferences Publications & Liberation Archive Portal Featured Activity The People's Voice: Public Participation and the Soul of South African Democracy Books Our Latest Activities The People's Voice: Public Participation and the Soul of South African Democracy Books Daryl Swanepoel 18 hours ago Regulating the Veto: A pragmatic path to United Nations Security Council reform Release of Occasional Paper Daryl Swanepoel 2 days ago The impact of longevity on fiscal sustainability in South Africa Release of Report Fanie Joubert Oct 29 Up