Read the full Occasional Paper by downloading the PDF below. PUBLICATION INFORMATION Title: Who owns South Africa? Testing the claim that 80% of the economy remains in white hands Author(s): Daryl Swanepoel Publication type: Occasional Paper Publication date: October 2026 PUBLISHED BY Inclusive Society Institute | NPO Registration: 235-515 5 High Cape House, 21 Ben Avenue, Vredehoek, Cape Town, 8001, South Africa PO Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010, South Africa Tel: +27 (0)21 201 1589 Email: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za Website: www.inclusivesociety.org.za COPYRIGHT © 2026 Inclusive Society Institute. Unless otherwise expressly indicated, copyright in this publication is owned exclusively by the Inclusive Society Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means without the Institute’s prior written permission, except as permitted by applicable law. Brief extracts may be quoted for criticism, review, research or educational purposes, provided that the authors, title and publisher are appropriately acknowledged. Permission requests should be directed to info@inclusivesociety.org.za. SUGGESTED CITATION Swanepoel, D. 2026. Who owns South Africa? Testing the claim that 80% of the economy remains in white hands. Cape Town: Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER This publication has been prepared for research, discussion and public-information purposes. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Inclusive Society Institute, its Board, staff, funders, partners or associated organisations. While reasonable care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the information at the time of publication, the Institute and the authors make no warranty regarding its completeness, accuracy or continued relevance. This publication does not constitute professional advice. To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Institute and the authors accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on its contents. References to third-party organisations, products, services or websites do not constitute endorsement. The Institute is not responsible for the content, availability or accuracy of external websites. Executive summary A powerful proposition continues to shape South Africa’s transformation debate: that white South Africans still own around 80% of the economy. The precise figure varies, some contemporary political claims put white ownership or control even higher, but the underlying assertion is consistent: that the overwhelming bulk of South Africa’s economy remains in white hands. But there appears to be no comprehensive empirical dataset capable of establishing whether this is in fact the case. This does not mean that racial economic inequality has disappeared. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that wealth remains highly concentrated and that the average white South African household remains substantially wealthier than the average black African household. But average wealth, aggregate racial ownership and ownership of productive economic assets are different measures. They should not be conflated. Available evidence provides good reason to question the 80% proposition. The JSE’s underlying study reported a decade ago already that “black South Africans hold at least 23% of the Top 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)”, comprising “10% held directly” and “13% through mandated investment” (JSE, 2015). The published ownership breakdown estimated white South African investment at 22%, foreign investment at 39% and a further 16% as not yet analysed (JSE, 2015). The importance of beneficial, rather than merely registered ownership is illustrated by the Public Investment Corporation (PIC). Its report states: “During the year under review, the PIC grew assets under management (AuM) to R3.049 trillion by 31 March 2025 from R2.691 trillion the previous financial year.” It adds that the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), its “single largest client (88% of AuM), grew to R2.677 trillion” (PIC, 2025:68). The Government Pensions Administration Agency (GPAA) reports that “the racial demographic of contributing members consist of 74% Africans, 13% Whites, 8% Coloureds, 3% Asians and a <2% population classified as ‘unknown’” (GPAA, 2018:23). Household wealth statistics raise further questions. The Momentum-Unisa report records the following population-group shares in its table: African Black households represented 82.1% of households and 57.3% of household wealth; white households represented 8.6% of households and 32.2% of household wealth; Coloured households represented 6.9% of households and 6.6% of wealth; and Indian/Asian households represented 2.4% of households and 3.9% of wealth (Momentum-Unisa, 2024:6). The report’s exact conclusion is that “The African Black population group possess almost 60% of the value of total household wealth” but “also comprise more than 80% of all households” (Momentum-Unisa, 2024:9). White households therefore remained substantially wealthier on average despite African Black households collectively possessing the larger aggregate share. These findings do not establish the racial distribution of ownership of the South African economy. Household wealth is not synonymous with ownership of productive assets, and survey-based wealth estimates have important methodological limitations. They do, however, demonstrate why the 80% claim should not be treated as an established empirical fact. More importantly, South Africa cannot currently provide a credible alternative figure. After more than three decades of economic transformation policy, this represents a significant weakness in the country’s statistical and policy architecture. If transformation seeks to alter the racial distribution of economic ownership, government should be capable of measuring the outcome. This paper therefore recommends that the B-BBEE Commission lead a funded feasibility study into a National Economic Ownership and Wealth Index, working with Statistics South Africa, the South African Reserve Bank, SARS, the FSCA, CIPC and other relevant institutions. The study should establish which assets and ultimate beneficiaries can be measured credibly; what disclosure requirements, legal safeguards and data-sharing arrangements would be needed; how often results could be produced; and what compliance and administrative costs would arise. A decision to establish the Index should follow from those findings. If transformation has progressed substantially, South Africans should know it. If it has not, policymakers should know that too. Either conclusion is preferable to continuing to conduct one of the country’s most consequential policy debates through estimates, proxies and assertion. Keywords: South Africa; Economic ownership; Racial wealth inequality; Economic transformation; Beneficial ownership; Household wealth; Wealth concentration; B-BBEE; Evidence-based policymaking; National Economic Ownership; Wealth Index 1. Introduction A powerful proposition continues to shape South Africa’s transformation debate: that white South Africans still own around 80% of the economy. The precise figure varies, but the underlying assertion is consistent, that more than three decades into democracy, the overwhelming bulk of South Africa’s economy remains in white hands. This is not merely an historical proposition. It remains firmly embedded in contemporary political discourse. In May 2026, ATM leader Vuyolwethu Zungula told the National Assembly that the “country’s economy is still characterized by oligopolies, which are a few white companies owned by a few white people dominating over 90% of the market share in all industries” (Parliament of South Africa, 2026). The proposition also continues to inform the government’s defence of economic redress. In December 2025, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ronald Lamola invoked Nelson Mandela’s description of “the economic power relations represented by the reality of the excessive concentration of power in a few white hands”, together with Mandela’s warning that South Africa could not overcome its economic crisis while perpetuating “this power structure” (Lamola, 2025). By invoking these words in defence of current policy, Lamola reinforced the government narrative that economic power remains excessively concentrated in white hands, although neither he nor the passage cited a specific percentage. Perhaps the clearest official expression of this narrative came from Tshediso Matona, the B-BBEE Commissioner, the official responsible for monitoring the implementation of the country’s empowerment framework. Addressing a B-BBEE conference in October 2023, Matona stated that “70% of the economy is owned and controlled by 7.9% percent of the population who are White” (Kagiso Capital, 2023:19). The significance of the statement lies not merely in the percentage cited, but in its source: it was advanced by the head of the statutory commission charged with monitoring economic transformation. But Matona also acknowledged the underlying measurement problem, stating that “we don’t read from the same evidentiary base” and lack “a shared view of progress or lack thereof” (Kagiso Capital, 2023:5). His remarks therefore capture the central problem examined in this paper: a precise racial-ownership figure is asserted authoritatively even while the official responsible for monitoring transformation acknowledges that the available evidence is incomplete. There is no question that South Africa remains profoundly unequal. Chatterjee, Czajka and Gethin describe the country as being “characterized by unparalleled levels of wealth concentration” (Chatterjee, Czajka and Gethin, 2022). Racial disparities in average wealth remain substantial, and white South Africans continue to be disproportionately represented among wealthier households. But these facts do not, in themselves, establish that white South Africans collectively own 80%, or indeed the overwhelming majority, of the South African economy. That is the proposition this paper seeks to test. Not whether racial inequality remains severe; it plainly does. Not whether the average white household remains substantially wealthier than the average black African household; the evidence demonstrates that it does. The narrower and more fundamental question is whether white South Africans, collectively, still own the overwhelming majority of South Africa’s economic assets. Surprisingly, the available evidence cannot answer that question with confidence. Indeed, this paper finds no comprehensive empirical dataset capable of establishing the racial distribution of ultimate beneficial ownership across the South African economy. Available evidence provides sufficient reason to question whether aggregate white ownership could still be as high as 80%. But it does not permit a credible alternative economy-wide percentage to be calculated. That is arguably the more important finding. After more than three decades of pursuing economic transformation, South Africa still cannot reliably answer one of the most fundamental questions against which the success of that policy should be assessed: Who ultimately owns South Africa’s economic assets? 2. What does it mean to “own the economy”? There is no single asset called “the economy”. South African economic wealth comprises listed and unlisted businesses, residential and commercial property, agricultural land, pension and provident fund assets, retirement annuities, collective investments, deposits, bonds and other financial and non-financial assets. There is also substantial foreign ownership of South African assets and significant ownership by the state. This immediately exposes a weakness in claims that a particular racial group owns a specified percentage of “the economy”. Such claims frequently move between land ownership, JSE ownership, corporate ownership and household wealth as though these were interchangeable concepts. They are not. A further distinction is equally important: registered ownership is not necessarily beneficial ownership. The name appearing on a shareholder register may belong to an investment institution, pension fund, nominee company, custodian or asset manager. That identifies the legal or institutional holder. It does not necessarily identify the people who ultimately possess the economic interest. This distinction is particularly important in South Africa, because institutional investment represents such a substantial component of financial ownership. 3. The JSE illustrates the problem The Johannesburg Stock Exchange has frequently been used as a proxy for measuring racial ownership. But available JSE research itself demonstrates why simplistic conclusions should be avoided. Research cited in the public debate reported the following ownership distribution for the Top 100 JSE-listed companies in 2013. The JSE’s published finding was that “black South Africans hold at least 23% of the Top 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)” (JSE, 2015): The JSE used “black” in the context of Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment. The research was undertaken for the JSE by the BEE advisory group Alternative Prosperity and, in its methodological note, the JSE stated that it was “Applying dti Generic Codes of practice (2007) method of calculation to latest research”, adding that “the dti describes its method of calculating black economic interest” (JSE, 2015). “Black” should therefore be understood in the B-BBEE sense, encompassing African, Coloured and Indian South Africans, rather than African South Africans alone. The same research explained that the black ownership estimate included “10% held directly (largely through BEE schemes) and 13% through mandated investment, mostly through individuals contributing to pension funds, unit trusts and life policies” (JSE, 2015). Separate research conducted by Alternative Prosperity for the JSE estimated that direct investments accounted for approximately 24% of total South African investment in the Top 100 JSE-listed companies. Of this, “less than a third” was held by individuals with investment portfolios, equivalent to approximately 7% of total equity capital, comprising about 6% held by white individuals and less than 1% by black individuals (JSE, 2015). The 2013 figures should not be presented as a current racial ownership measure. They are more than a decade old, 16% of holdings remained unanalysed, and the methodology involved estimates of indirect ownership. Subsequent transactions and changes in investment patterns may have altered the distribution, but without an updated comparable measure, neither the direction nor the extent of change can be established with confidence. The historical figures nevertheless demonstrate two important points. First, the available historical evidence does not support treating 80% white ownership of the JSE as an established fact. Second, determining who ultimately owns listed shares requires looking through layers of institutional ownership. That remains a problem today. In 2026, when the Minister of Finance was asked for a racial breakdown of JSE ownership, the response stated: “Data on the racial composition of ownership of shares listed on the JSE is not readily available.” It explained that investments are “often held through multiple layers of intermediaries, including custodians, pension funds, unit trusts, and nominee accounts” and that it is consequently difficult to determine the race of the underlying beneficial investors accurately (Minister of Finance, 2026). More than a decade after the earlier JSE research, therefore, the fundamental measurement problem remains. 4. The PIC and GEPF demonstrate why beneficial ownership matters The Public Investment Corporation provides a particularly clear illustration of the distinction between asset management and underlying economic ownership. At 31 March 2025, the PIC managed R3.049 trillion in assets. The report states that the PIC “grew assets under management (AuM) to R3.049 trillion by 31 March 2025” and that the GEPF, its “single largest client (88% of AuM), grew to R2.677 trillion” (PIC, 2025:68). The PIC therefore does not beneficially own most of the wealth it manages. It invests assets on behalf of clients. The demographic composition of the GEPF is consequently relevant. Government Pensions Administration Agency data for March 2017 stated that “the racial demographic of contributing members consist of 74% Africans, 13% Whites, 8% Coloureds, 3% Asians and a <2% population classified as ‘unknown’” (GPAA, 2018:23): On this measure, more than 85% of contributing members whose population group was identified were African, Coloured or Asian. This does not mean that 85% of the Rand value of GEPF assets can automatically be classified as black-owned. Pension entitlements vary according to remuneration, years of service and other factors. Member numbers and asset values are not interchangeable. But the data make the underlying methodological point clear. A large PIC shareholding in a listed company cannot simply be treated as belonging to the asset manager or the state. Behind it sits a pension fund whose assets ultimately exist to meet obligations to its members and beneficiaries. The same conceptual problem applies to private pension and provident funds, retirement annuities, collective investment schemes and investment-linked savings products. A credible measure of economic ownership must therefore distinguish between the institution administering an asset and the people possessing the underlying economic claim. 5. Aggregate ownership is not average wealth One of the most important distinctions in this debate is between aggregate racial ownership and average or median wealth by race. They answer different questions. South Africa unquestionably exhibits extraordinary wealth inequality. Chatterjee, Czajka and Gethin, using “microdata covering the universe of income tax returns, household surveys, and macroeconomic balance sheet statistics”, estimated the distribution of personal wealth in South Africa (Chatterjee, Czajka and Gethin, 2022). Their table records a wealth share of 85.6% for the top 10% and 54.7% for the top 1% in 2017 (Chatterjee, Czajka and Gethin, 2022). The racial dimension of inequality is also well established in the wider literature. But a large difference between the average wealth of black and white households does not tell us what percentage of aggregate South African wealth each population group collectively owns. The distinction matters, because of South Africa’s demographic composition. Consider a simplified hypothetical economy containing R100 of household wealth. Assume black citizens collectively own R65 and white citizens R35. If the R65 is distributed among 80 black citizens while the R35 is distributed among eight white citizens, average black wealth would be approximately R0.81 per person and average white wealth approximately R4.38. Black citizens would collectively own almost two-thirds of the wealth while the average white citizen would still be more than five times wealthier. The available household evidence illustrates the same distinction. Momentum-Unisa estimated that African Black households held 57.3% of total household wealth in 2023, compared with 32.2% held by white households. Because African Black households accounted for 82.1% of households and white households for 8.6%, estimated average wealth per white household was approximately 5.4 times average wealth per African Black household (Momentum-Unisa, 2024:6). There is no contradiction. The first statistic measures aggregate ownership. The second measures average inequality. A third measure, the population share of each group, indicates whether aggregate ownership is proportionate to population. These three concepts should not be conflated. It is therefore entirely possible for black South Africans collectively to own the majority of a particular category of South African assets while the average white household remains substantially wealthier. If that were the case, it would indicate significant transformation of aggregate ownership while simultaneously demonstrating that profound racial inequality remained. 6. What the household wealth evidence tells us The South African Reserve Bank states: “The net worth of households increased significantly from R7.3 trillion at the end of December 2010 to R18.3 trillion at the end of December 2023.” It adds that non-financial assets contributed an average 34.4% of household net worth, net financial wealth contributed 65.6%, and that “Growth in the market value of pension entitlements and listed shareholdings was the major source of households’ wealth accumulation over this period” (Mokoena & Setshedi, 2024:110). This reinforces the importance of institutional ownership. Much household economic ownership does not appear as shares registered directly in individuals’ names. It exists through pensions, retirement investments and other financial structures. The Momentum-Unisa Household Wealth Index provides an additional perspective, because its 2023 household survey explicitly estimated the distribution of wealth, assets and liabilities by population group. The report states that its “distributional analysis indicated in table 2 is based on household and not individual level” (Momentum-Unisa, 2024:6). Its results were: The result illustrates precisely why aggregate ownership and average prosperity must be distinguished. African Black households collectively accounted for 57.3% of estimated household wealth, compared with 32.2% for white households. But African Black households constituted 82.1% of households, whereas white households represented only 8.6%. White households therefore remained vastly wealthier on average even though African Black households collectively accounted for the larger share of aggregate household wealth. Momentum-Unisa itself notes this disparity: “The African Black population group possess almost 60% of the value of total household wealth, two-thirds of the value of household assets and owes almost 60% of outstanding debt.” It immediately adds: “However, they also comprise more than 80% of all households, suggesting an unequal accumulation of wealth compared to other population groups” (Momentum-Unisa, 2024:9). The report also identifies differences in asset composition: “The African Black household group in general hold more assets via ownership of residential property, other tangible assets and deposits/cash compared to the other population groups.” It adds that “the other three population groups accumulate more of their assets via saving and investments” (Momentum-Unisa, 2024:9). These findings must be interpreted cautiously. Household wealth is not synonymous with ownership of the productive economy. Household surveys also face well-known difficulties in capturing very wealthy households and complex assets such as private companies, trusts and offshore investments. Chatterjee, Czajka and Gethin explain that “there exists no unified administrative database in South Africa measuring wealth at the micro level for the full population” and that the wealth distribution therefore has to be measured “by combining several complementary data sources” (Chatterjee, Czajka and Gethin, 2022). The Momentum-Unisa estimates therefore cannot simply be used to proclaim that black South Africans “own 57.3% of the economy”. But they are highly relevant to another proposition. They provide substantial reason to question whether a blanket assertion that white South Africans still own 80% of South African wealth or the economy can responsibly be treated as established empirical fact. 7. What we know and what we do not The evidence allows several conclusions to be drawn with reasonable confidence. We know that South African wealth remains extraordinarily concentrated. We know that racial disparities in average wealth remain substantial. We know that direct individual shareholding represents only a relatively small component of JSE ownership. We know that pension funds, collective investments and other institutional structures represent substantial economic interests ultimately held for the benefit of individuals. We know that the largest institutional investor in the country, the PIC, manages most of its assets on behalf of the GEPF, whose contributing membership is overwhelmingly black. We have household survey evidence estimating African Black households as collectively possessing a larger share of aggregate household wealth than white households, notwithstanding white households remaining substantially wealthier on average. And we know that foreign ownership constitutes a substantial part of South African listed equity ownership and must be separated from domestic racial ownership. What we do not know is the current racial distribution of ultimate beneficial ownership across the South African economy as a whole. That distinction is the central finding of this paper. 8. Government may have achieved more than it knows There is an important possibility arising from this statistical failure. Government may have been considerably more successful in transforming patterns of economic ownership than it gives itself credit for. Over more than three decades, millions of black South Africans have entered formal employment, accumulated pension rights, acquired homes, established businesses and accumulated investments through retirement funds, collective investment schemes and other financial products. If these forms of beneficial ownership are inadequately reflected in conventional transformation measures, aggregate racial ownership may have changed considerably more than the dominant public narrative suggests. The available evidence does not allow that conclusion to be asserted. But neither does it allow it to be dismissed. Perhaps government has achieved more than it knows. If so, its failure to measure ultimate beneficial ownership means that it is unable to demonstrate one of the potentially most important achievements of the transformation project. 9. But perhaps transformation has not progressed sufficiently The opposite possibility must be treated with equal seriousness. Transformation may have progressed substantially less than intended. Ownership of important productive assets may remain heavily concentrated. Black South Africans may have accumulated substantial pension and household assets while remaining underrepresented in direct entrepreneurial ownership or particular classes of productive capital. If that is the reality, government needs to know that too. Reliable evidence would identify precisely where transformation has stalled, which asset classes remain disproportionately concentrated and where existing policy instruments have failed. It would allow intervention to become more targeted and evidence-based. At present, neither proposition can be adequately demonstrated. If transformation has worked, we should be able to prove it. If it has failed, we should be able to prove that too. Instead, one of the most consequential debates in South Africa continues to rely too heavily on proxies, competing methodologies and frequently repeated claims that eventually acquire the status of fact through repetition. 10. The consequences for social cohesion This statistical failure has consequences beyond economic policy. It affects social cohesion. The repeated assertion that white South Africans continue to own approximately 80% of the economy conveys a powerful underlying message: that more than three decades after apartheid, very little has changed. It can reinforce a perception that those who accumulated wealth under the previous economic order have largely resisted transformation while the majority remain excluded from meaningful economic ownership. If that accurately describes South Africa, the country needs to confront it. But if it does not, repeatedly presenting it as fact carries its own social cost. If ownership has become substantially more representative, recognising that progress would not mean declaring transformation complete. It would not negate the large racial differences in average wealth, nor remove the need for further economic inclusion. It would simply allow South Africans to acknowledge progress where progress has occurred. The reverse is equally important. If credible measurement establishes that ownership remains overwhelmingly racially concentrated, the country could confront that reality on the basis of evidence, rather than accusation. Those arguing that transformation has progressed far enough would then have to engage with measurable facts. Either outcome provides something the present debate frequently lacks: a common factual starting point. That has particular value in a society where questions of race, wealth and historical redress remain deeply contested. 11. The missing instrument of transformation policy South Africa has developed an extensive architecture for measuring aspects of transformation. B-BBEE measures ownership structures, management control, skills development, enterprise development and procurement. Employment equity measures occupational representation. Sector charters establish targets. Public procurement increasingly incorporates transformation requirements. These instruments provide important information. But they predominantly measure mechanisms, structures and proxies for transformation. They do not collectively answer the economy-wide outcome question: How is the underlying stock of South African economic wealth ultimately distributed? The consequence is potentially serious. Government may continue concentrating intervention in areas where substantial transformation has already occurred while overlooking areas in which ownership remains highly concentrated. It may underestimate wealth accumulated by black South Africans through institutional investments. Conversely, it may overestimate transformation where formal empowerment structures have not translated into substantial underlying wealth accumulation. Without comprehensive measurement, policymakers cannot know which is occurring. 12. Assess the feasibility of a National Economic Ownership and Wealth Index South Africa should commission a funded feasibility study into a National Economic Ownership and Wealth Index. The B-BBEE Commission should lead the study, working with Statistics South Africa, the South African Reserve Bank, SARS, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority, CIPC, the deeds registration system and relevant public and private institutions. The study should first establish what information is already collected, whether it records racial classification and ultimate beneficial ownership, and whether existing records can lawfully and reliably be linked. It should identify any additional disclosure requirements, data-sharing arrangements, privacy safeguards and legislative or regulatory changes that would be necessary. It should also assess how reported classifications could be validated without assuming that a comprehensive administrative record of each person’s race exists. The study should test the practical ability to trace assets held through pension and provident funds, retirement annuities, collective investment schemes, insurers and other intermediaries to their underlying economic beneficiaries. It should examine listed equities, unlisted businesses, property, deposits and other significant assets, while identifying gaps involving informal and unregistered holdings. Foreign and state ownership would require separate treatment. A proposed methodology should distinguish aggregate ownership by population group from average and median wealth within each group, and report each group’s population share alongside those measures. It should specify which estimates could be produced reliably, how frequently they could be updated, and what uncertainty or exclusions would need to be published with them. Finally, the study should estimate implementation and continuing costs for reporting entities and public institutions, assess institutional capacity and identify a realistic funding source. It should compare a comprehensive administrative index with narrower or survey-based approaches. Only if a credible, lawful and proportionately funded method is demonstrated should government proceed to establish the Index, potentially in stages as data quality improves. 13. Conclusion South Africa knows that it remains profoundly unequal. It knows that average wealth differs substantially by race. It knows that wealth is extraordinarily concentrated among a relatively small proportion of the population. What it does not know with sufficient empirical precision is how the country's aggregate stock of economic assets is ultimately distributed by race. Those are different questions. The frequently repeated claim that white South Africans still own approximately 80% of the economy cannot presently be substantiated through a comprehensive economy-wide measure of ultimate beneficial ownership. There is sufficient empirical evidence to raise serious questions about the figure. But there is not sufficient evidence to replace it responsibly with another economy-wide percentage. That distinction is important. Perhaps transformation has progressed considerably further than South Africans realise. If so, government should be able to demonstrate that progress. Apart from allowing policy effectiveness to be assessed, doing so could contribute to social cohesion by demonstrating that the economy is changing even while substantial inequalities remain. Perhaps transformation has progressed far less than intended. If so, government should be able to demonstrate that failure and identify precisely where intervention is required. Either finding would advance the transformation debate. The present uncertainty does not. After more than three decades of transformation policy, the absence of a credible national measure of ultimate racial economic ownership is itself a policy failure. One cannot credibly manage transformation if one does not measure transformation. South Africa should stop debating one of its most consequential economic questions through competing estimates. A funded feasibility study led by the B-BBEE Commission should establish whether a credible and affordable national measure can be produced, what information and safeguards it would require, and which gaps would remain. Its findings should determine whether an index is warranted and, if so, how it should be built. That study is the necessary first step towards answering, as reliably as the evidence permits, the deceptively simple question at the heart of the transformation debate: Who owns South Africa’s economy? 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Read the full paper by downloading the PDF below. PUBLICATION INFORMATION Title: Six Months of War with Iran: What Has Happened? What Comes Next? Rapporteur: Klaus Kotzé Publication type: GSPN Open Consultation Mondays event report Publication date: September 2026 Event date: 14 September 2026 This report summarises the principal discussions and conclusions arising from the event. PUBLISHER Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) c/o Inclusive Society Institute (Secretariat) 5 High Cape House, 21 Ben Avenue, Vredehoek, Cape Town, 8001, South Africa PO Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010, South Africa Tel: +27 (0)21 201 1589 Email: info@globalsouthperspectives.org Website: www.globalsouthperspectives.org COPYRIGHT Copyright © 2026 Global South Perspectives Network. All rights reserved. Reproduction requires the publisher’s prior written permission, except for brief quotations used for review, research or scholarly citation. SUGGESTED CITATION Kotzé, K. 2026. Six Months of War with Iran: What Has Happened? What Comes Next? Cape Town: Global South Perspectives Network. USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE Artificial intelligence tools may have assisted with the drafting, editing and presentation of this report. All substantive content was subject to human review. Responsibility for the final publication rests with the rapporteur and publisher. DISCLAIMER This report summarises contributions made during a GSPN Open Consultation Mondays event. The views expressed are those of the respective speakers and participants and do not necessarily represent those of GSPN, the Inclusive Society Institute or their affiliated organisations. While reasonable care has been taken to ensure accuracy, no warranty is given regarding the completeness, accuracy or continued relevance of the information. This publication does not constitute professional advice. Neither GSPN nor the authors accept liability for loss or damage arising from reliance on its contents. References to third-party organisations, products, services or websites do not constitute endorsement. GSPNtute is not responsible for external website content, availability or accuracy. CONTENTS 1 What has this war changed? 2 Two vantage points 3 A war of choice and a war of survival 4 Three miscalculations 5 The fortress that Washington removed 6 Geography returns 7 Crossing the conventional threshold 8 What force could not do 9 The costs that were not priced 10 Who would guarantee an agreement 11 Israel’s influence and the president’s decision 12 Nationalism and nuclear weapons 13 Three paths, and what each requires 14 Reflection Cover image: AI-generated using OpenAI’s image generation tool, 23 September 2026. LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Three miscalculations identified in the report Table 2: What military force could and could not achieve Table 3: Potential external roles in a negotiated settlement Table 4: Three possible paths from the current conflict LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Key turning points in the adversarial relationship, as framed in the report Figure 2: Status of the three strategic objectives stated in the discussion Figure 3: Transmission of conflict-related economic pressure beyond the region 1 WHAT HAS THIS WAR CHANGED? The September edition of the Open Consultation Mondays was convened 199 days after the war against Iran began. On the morning of the session the Iran–Gulf meeting on the Hormuz corridor was called off before it could begin. The fighting has slowed and the institutions have spoken. Nothing has been settled. The question put to the session was accordingly narrow: after six months, what has this war achieved, and what should the rest of the world understand about it? Two speakers introduced the discussion. Professor Mohsen Milani, of the Center for Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the University of South Florida, who works on Iranian politics and regional security, was joined by Professor Abel Esterhuyse, of the Department of Strategic Studies at Stellenbosch University and the South African Military Academy. 2 TWO VANTAGE POINTS Professor Milani works on Iranian politics and American foreign policy from a university in Florida; his frame is the regional order in its long duration. Professor Esterhuyse works on strategic theory at a military academy in the Western Cape; his frame is what armed force can and cannot accomplish. Different disciplines, different continents, different formations. They agreed on almost everything that mattered. That the war is existential for Iran and elective for the United States. That the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the turning point which shifted the regional balance in Iran’s favour. That geography has proved decisive, that operational success has not become strategic success, that collapse would bring civil war rather than stability, that Israel’s influence was real and the American president’s responsibility absolute, that China is now the consequential external actor, and that there is no military route out of this war. Professor Esterhuyse opened by saying that what he wished to argue aligned almost entirely with Professor Milani. Two analysts with no reason to align, arriving at the same reading. 3 A WAR OF CHOICE AND A WAR OF SURVIVAL Professor Milani opened by naming the paradox at the centre of the conflict. Despite overwhelming military strength, neither the United States nor Israel has achieved its strategic goals. The original objectives were clear enough: to eliminate the threat of Iran’s nuclear programme, to disable its missile and drone capabilities, and, should the opportunity present itself, to bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic. Six months and two wars later - one of twelve days, one of forty - none has been secured. Iran has instead acquired leverage it did not hold before: a measure of control over navigation and the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Professor Esterhuyse sharpened the asymmetry. The war is a war of choice for the United States. For Iran it is a war of survival, and for the Iranian government an existential one. Two parties to the same war, calculating on entirely different terms. Professor Milani made the consequence plain. From the moment the Supreme Leader and the senior leadership were killed, winning, for Iran, meant surviving. It is a low bar. It has been cleared. He added a correction to the language now in general use. The American president has called what occurred regime change. What occurred is change within the regime: the men at the top were killed, and other men hold those offices. That is the difference between removing a government and rearranging one. 4 THREE MISCALCULATIONS Much of Professor Milani’s presentation explained how a misreading of Iran produced this outcome. Three assumptions, each defensible on its own terms, and each wrong. The first was that Iran’s weakened regional position meant that Iran itself was weak. Iranian policy had rested for decades on the axis of resistance: aligned forces in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon - in his description Iran’s most formidable military instrument - the Assad dynasty in Syria, missiles and drones to the Houthis, support to Hamas in Gaza. Before October 2023, he argued, Iran was doing extremely well. That structure has since been dismantled. Soleimani was assassinated in 2020, a case in which one individual mattered more than the institution around him; Assad had fallen, a loss he placed on the same order for Iran as the collapse of the monarchy in 1979 was for the United States; Hamas and Hezbollah were badly struck. Reading this ledger, Washington and Tel Aviv saw a generational opportunity. What they did not distinguish was regional reach from national capacity. The second was that domestic discontent amounted to readiness for regime change. Popular dissatisfaction in Iran is real, long-standing, and requires no special insight to observe. To read it as readiness to remove the government was a badly placed inference. There is a considerable distance between being unhappy with a government and being willing to take to the streets against it. When the attacks came, many Iranians who hold no affection for the Islamic Republic rallied to the defence of the country. Not in support of the government. In support of the territorial integrity of a country they love. The third was that degraded defences meant degraded capability. Iran’s air defence system had been damaged in earlier exchanges, and Israel knew it. Its offensive capability had not been touched. Nor, he suggested, was either government prepared to accept that a state under attack would strike back. Professor Milani had set the argument out in print two weeks before the first campaign, under the title “Iran is not as weak as it seems”. He claimed no foresight for it. He called it logic. Table 1: Three miscalculations identified in the report Source: Synthesis of the report discussion. 5 THE FORTRESS THAT WASHINGTON REMOVED Both speakers treated Iraq as the hinge on which the present situation turns. Professor Esterhuyse argued that the invasion of 2003 shifted the regional balance and should be understood as the turning point in the power politics of the Middle East. Professor Milani said he could not agree more. For three centuries the Ottoman and Persian empires competed for primacy in this space. Iraq was constituted as a Sunni-dominated state and functioned as a fortress against Iranian expansion into the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant, notwithstanding its Shia majority. By removing the Ba’athist state, Washington demolished that fortress, and for the first time in four centuries Iraqi Shias took power in Baghdad. The destruction of the Taliban after 2001 had already removed an adversary on Iran’s other border. There is an irony here that both speakers saw plainly. The regional position Washington set out to dismantle in 2026 was created, in substantial part, by what Washington did in 2003. 6 GEOGRAPHY RETURNS Geography, Professor Milani said, is back. It can compensate for weakness. A state that cannot match an adversary’s arsenal may still sit astride the thing that adversary needs. Professor Esterhuyse endorsed the point and extended it: in Iran’s case geography matters not only geopolitically but operationally, where it determines what an attacking force can physically do. Professor Milani set this in a long frame. The Portuguese took Hormuz in 1507 and levied fees on the ships that passed for more than a century; the Iranians removed them in 1622 with British assistance, and Britain became in time the dominant power in the Gulf. For four centuries, whoever controls the Strait of Hormuz has exercised influence well beyond it. It was widely assumed that Iran’s threat to close the strait was a bluff, on the reasoning that closure would deprive Iran of its own oil revenue. Here too the calculation was made for the wrong kind of state. A country fighting for its existence does not reason as a country pursuing its interests. Iran closed the strait, for a period and with some effect, and struck United States assets and allies in the region. The Houthis, he added, are teaching the same lesson at the Bab el-Mandeb. His conclusion, set out at greater length in a Chatham House article published on the morning of the session, is that the pre-war order will not be restored. 7 CROSSING THE CONVENTIONAL THRESHOLD Professor Esterhuyse approached the same material through military strategy, and opened with two cautions. The first was a set of three rules on the use of force by democratic states, attributed to General Fox Conner, who trained both Eisenhower and Marshall. Never fight unless you have to. Never fight alone. Never fight for long. Measured against that standard, the campaign in Iran fails on all three counts. The second was Colin Gray’s warning that there is nothing to be seen in the foreseeable future. His central point concerned a threshold. The adversarial relationship dates from 1979: the revolution, the failed American operation in the Iranian desert, and American support for Israel. What matters is how it has been conducted since. For more than four decades the United States managed it below the conventional threshold, through diplomacy, through sanctions, and through the threat of force rather than its use. What is new is that the threshold has been crossed for the first time since 1979. He attached the shift to the change of administration in Washington, and was careful to present it as a military reality rather than a partisan one. Its consequences will outlast any presidency. A state that has crossed such a line has established that it will cross it. Figure 1: Key turning points in the adversarial relationship, as framed in the report 8 WHAT FORCE COULD NOT DO Professor Esterhuyse then set out why land power is not a realistic option. Iran’s geography makes invasion and occupation impractical, and the attempt would reproduce Afghanistan. Air power has degraded Iranian capabilities and can continue to do so. What it cannot do is remake a political order or eliminate regional influence. Four things stand in the way: the vastness of Iran’s territory, the hardened infrastructure built over decades, the asymmetric capabilities developed in order to retaliate, and a demonstrated ability to absorb and disperse damage. Air superiority, in his assessment, is unlikely to translate into strategic success. Maritime power runs into capabilities Iran has spent decades designing for precisely this purpose: anti-access and area denial, mass missile and drone capacity, and influence over Hormuz as a chokepoint. Naval forces have also proved unable to address land-based targets. What maritime power has done instead is escalate the conflict into a regional one, and from there into a global economic one. Whatever operational success there was has not translated into strategic success. He placed the operational centre of gravity of this war in the Strait of Hormuz, where American military, economic and political considerations converge. The strategic centre of gravity has shifted elsewhere: to the global economy. Table 2: What military force could and could not achieve Source: Synthesis of the report discussion. Figure 2: Status of the three strategic objectives stated in the discussion 9 THE COSTS THAT WERE NOT PRICED Both speakers were direct about what the war has cost the Americans and Israelis. Professor Esterhuyse set out three consequences. Washington is increasingly perceived in the region as an unreliable partner and an unreliable protector, and the Gulf states are looking to arrangements that do not depend on it. The war has drawn American attention away from other priorities, most obviously Ukraine. And the disruption around Hormuz has produced economic fallout disproportionate to anything the campaign has achieved. American global leadership has taken a knock. That third cost is not borne where the decisions are made. A Brown University study cited during the session put the additional annual burden on an average American household at somewhere in the region of $750 in fuel. The figure was offered as an approximation and should be treated as one; its order of magnitude is the point. Professor Milani set it against the two long wars that preceded this one. Afghanistan lasted two decades and cost some $1.7 trillion, and Americans were unhappy at the deaths and the expenditure, but it did not reach into their household budgets. Nor did Iraq. Iran’s calculation in pressing on the strait is precisely to close that distance. The mirror of that calculation is the American one: that Iran, sanctioned for four decades, will collapse if deprived of oil revenue. Professor Milani doubts this very much, and six months give him the better of the argument. Two governments, each betting that the other’s population breaks first. In states with no reserves to absorb it, the same pressure passes through into food prices, input costs and public budgets. Professor Esterhuyse cited Stephen Kotkin’s account of the West as vulnerable at three points: Central Europe, the Middle East, the Far East. The states that will carry much of the cost sit at none of the three. Figure 3: Transmission of conflict-related economic pressure beyond the region 10 WHO WOULD GUARANTEE AN AGREEMENT Asked what contribution BRICS might make, Professor Milani was candid: as a grouping, a limited one; as individual members, a considerable one, and China above all. China has emerged from this war in a stronger position than any other state. It is the largest economic partner both of Iran and of the Gulf states, and President Xi has signalled an implicit willingness to mediate. In intelligence and military terms, he added, China sits closer to Iran than to the Gulf monarchies. Professor Esterhuyse concurred: China is the one external power with a layered interest here, economic, strategic and opportunistic at once. The significance of this is less about mediation than about guarantee. Professor Milani set out why Iran hesitates to return to the table. It has been burned three times. The nuclear agreement of 2015, endorsed by the permanent members of the Security Council, from which an American administration unilaterally withdrew three years later before imposing crippling sanctions. The negotiations of this year, well advanced, during which the United States attacked. And the Memorandum of Understanding, a fourteen-provision document and, on his recollection, the first signed personally by an American and an Iranian president, from which the United States has since withdrawn. Qatar, Oman and Pakistan can mediate. What they cannot do is make an agreement stick. Professor Esterhuyse went further, and knowingly onto controversial ground, raising a proposal recently aired in the Israeli press: that Russia and China oversee a future understanding between Washington and Tehran, including an arrangement between Washington and Beijing on Iranian oil. He acknowledged how uncomfortable the proposition is. He argued for it regardless, as the available route back to geostrategic stability. Georgios Kostakos put the objection that such an arrangement invites. A settlement reached only among the United States, Russia and China amounts to a directorate. It resolves the war by dividing the world into spheres of influence, and finds its agreement where those spheres overlap. He asked whether there is a place in this for the United Nations, whose incoming Secretary-General takes office shortly, and for the European Union, which secured the original nuclear agreement and whose economies are directly exposed. The responses were honest. They were not encouraging. Professor Milani maintained that the core conflict can only be addressed bilaterally, and that the most useful role for the United Nations and the European Union is to press both parties towards direct talks. He invoked the Cold War precedent: Washington and Moscow maintained embassies and normal relations for decades without friendship. Normalisation, not reconciliation, is the realistic object. Professor Esterhuyse did not see the current administration involving either institution. On NATO he was unambiguous: its focus is Ukraine, Central Europe and Russia, and a defensive alliance will not act collectively in a war of this character. The multilateral route is the one most Global South actors have an interest in. It is also the one to which neither speaker could attach much probability. Table 3: Potential external roles in a negotiated settlement Source: Synthesis of the report discussion. 11 ISRAEL’S INFLUENCE AND THE PRESIDENT’S DECISION Daryl Swanepoel asked the counterfactual directly. Absent Israel’s influence, would this war have happened? And given that the war is disliked in the United States and the midterm elections approach, where do the incentives now sit? Both speakers answered the first question in the same way. Israel’s influence was real and material. Professor Esterhuyse observed that no state possesses Israel’s intelligence penetration of the Middle East and of Iran. Israeli discomfort with an Iranian nuclear capability goes back decades and has been acted on militarily more than once since 1979, and 7 October 2023 hardened that reading. On it, the nuclear question served as the argument that brought the Americans across the conventional line. Professor Milani noted that the Israeli prime minister has been candid about urging successive American administrations to act, and that every president from Carter to Biden declined - including the first Trump administration, which withdrew from the nuclear agreement but did not attack. Professor Esterhuyse described the American system as designed to bring collective decision-making to bear. Influence is not decision. The decision belonged to the President of the United States, and so does the responsibility. On timing, the incentives point in opposite directions. Rising oil prices improve the opposition’s prospects in the House, less certainly in the Senate, and Tehran understands this. Both took Mr Swanepoel’s further observation seriously: an administration that has lost the midterms is an administration with fewer restraints, and Professor Milani allowed that an impeachment attempt might give the president more incentive to escalate. Professor Esterhuyse added that Iran has reason to extend the conflict regardless of any election, because the second great vulnerability of American power, after its difficulty converting operational success into political outcomes, is the will of the American public. That vulnerability was exploited in Vietnam. It is being exploited now. Both warned against the assumption that removing the Iranian government would end the matter. Afghanistan absorbed two decades and $1.7 trillion, and the Taliban returned; Iraq is its own answer. Collapse in Iran most likely means civil war, and while Iran and the United States are not at peace the Persian Gulf will not be at peace by itself. Professor Milani put a question worth repeating. Name another state that has endured four decades of crippling sanctions, been attacked by the foremost military power in the world and the foremost in the region, had its leader and its military and intelligence chiefs killed - and survived. The point is not the extent of the government’s support, which he put at between fifteen and twenty per cent. It is that the support is ideological rather than soft, and that the state has institutionalised itself well beyond any single figure. 12 NATIONALISM AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS Mr Mohmmad Taher Gholi Tabar, joining from Iran, described a unity across cultures, faiths and political positions that he had not previously witnessed in his country. He was candid about the ambivalence in it: that many innocent people, including children, have been killed, and that the attacker has nonetheless united the country. He asked whether this might be the final war between Iran and the United States, and whether Iran would withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Professor Milani confirmed the observation and placed it in historical company. Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in September 1980, on intelligence that the revolution had left the country weak and its factions at each other’s throats, and gave the revolution a new lease of life instead. The French and Russian revolutions taught the same lesson: an external attack consolidates what it means to destroy. Governments come and go, and Iran has seen hundreds of dynasties across three and a half thousand years. People may hate their government and love their country. An external attack asks them to choose. They choose the country. On whether this will be the last such war, he was brief: he hopes so, and does not think so. On the nuclear question both speakers were sober. Professor Milani considered withdrawal from the NPT secondary to the atmosphere the war has created. Following the domestic debate closely, he reported hearing young Iranians argue for the first time, and in numbers, that Iran has no choice but to build a weapon, because a state without one can be humiliated. Whether the leadership takes that decision he declined to predict. Opinion, he said, has moved further towards weaponisation than at any point he can recall. Professor Esterhuyse reached the same place by the strategic route, and then went beyond it. If Iran lacked a reason to pursue a weapon before the attack, it has one now, and he expects it to pursue one. He framed the matter through the counterfactual every government in the region is presumably now weighing: would the United States have attacked an Iran that possessed a nuclear weapon? The utility of nuclear weapons has never lain in their use. It lies in possession, and in the deterrence possession confers. He then suggested - and the argument is his, not the meeting’s - that an Iranian deterrent might contribute to the regional balance, between Sunni and Shia, between Arab and Persian, between Israel and its Arab neighbours, that has historically accompanied the Middle East’s more stable periods. This final note itself is a finding. When a serious strategic analyst can propose in an open forum that further nuclear proliferation is a route to regional stability, and can do so in the expectation of being taken seriously rather than dismissed, the proposition tells us less about his judgement than about the ground on which it is now made. It is a measure of how far that ground has shifted. 13 THREE PATHS, AND WHAT EACH REQUIRES Professor Milani set out the alternatives as he sees them. The first is prolonged attrition, in which each side gambles that the other has the lower tolerance for economic pain. The second is intensified economic warfare, which both parties are already waging and which he expects to lead nowhere. The third is a return to negotiation. He has long held that there is no military solution to this conflict, only a political one, and he attached a caveat to the word diplomacy. It is not the dictation of terms. It is give and take. An agreement Iran is invited to accept rather than to negotiate will not hold, and after three withdrawals from three arrangements the demand for reciprocity is not posturing. Professor Esterhuyse reached the same conclusion by the military route. Citing Lawrence Freedman’s argument that the American president has run out of options, he observed that the objectives of this war were never clearly articulated, that early expectations proved over-optimistic, and that strategic reality has since constrained political ambition. No path of escalation remains that does not carry major global consequences. Negotiation is unavoidable, and an exit requires compromise. His formulation: the American president needs to learn the diplomacy of losing well. What that requires is a combination rather than a single instrument. Internal political pressure in both capitals. Economic measures. International diplomacy. And - in his own blunt phrase - that Israel be kept under control. Table 4: Three possible paths from the current conflict Source: Synthesis of the report discussion. 14 REFLECTION The thread running through the September meeting was the distance between military superiority and strategic achievement. The most powerful military coalition in the world has spent six months, two campaigns and fifty-two days of bombardment against Iran, and has not obtained what it went to war for. The nuclear programme has not been eliminated. The government has not fallen. The missile and drone capability persists. And the one unambiguous change in the strategic balance runs the wrong way. What gives that assessment its weight is that it was reached twice, independently. A specialist in Iranian politics working in an American university and a military strategist working at a South African academy share no discipline, no continent, no formation and no audience. Yet on the character of the war, on its origins in 2003, on the primacy of geography, on the limits of every instrument of force, on the consequences of collapse and on the necessity of negotiation, they said the same things in different vocabularies. The lesson reaches beyond this conflict, and it is one the Global South has learned repeatedly at its own expense. Force can destroy. It cannot govern. Professor Esterhuyse’s caution against over-dramatising the present should not obscure what is already legible: the constraints that held this relationship below the conventional threshold have been removed, and removing them proved far easier than restoring them will be. A threshold crossed cannot be uncrossed by declaration. It has to be rebuilt, by parties who no longer trust one another, under the supervision of powers whose own interests are engaged. The gravity of the moment is best measured by what has become sayable within it. A war has produced a surge of nationalism in the country it was meant to destabilise, and an argument for nuclear acquisition in the country it was meant to disarm. Non-proliferation has held for decades on the understanding that possession invites danger rather than confers safety. Six months of this war have made the opposite case more persuasively than any state ever argued it. For the Global South the implications are immediate rather than theoretical. The world is paying for this war: in fuel, in freight, in food, in the cost of borrowing, and in the erosion of the multilateral mechanisms through which smaller states exercise what influence they have. Should the war be resolved by a directorate of great powers, as Mr Kostakos cautioned, the resolution will confirm a distribution of authority in which most of the world is spectator to decisions that determine its conditions. Beneath the strategic accounting sit the people. Iranians are being killed, including the children that the participant from Iran mentioned without emphasis and without rhetorical use. Families across the region and far beyond it are absorbing costs generated in rooms they will never see. The proper response to a war that has settled nothing is not resignation. It is to say, from every platform available, that force has failed on its own terms, that negotiation is the only route remaining. This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network The Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It connects think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East to bring a wider range of Global South perspectives into debates on international affairs and global governance. GSPN was established in response to the need for stronger Southern representation in the institutions and discussions that shape global policy. Its work focuses particularly on United Nations reform and the future of multilateralism. The network provides a space for experts from different regions to exchange ideas, identify shared priorities and contribute proposals grounded in their own experiences. Through research, dialogue and advocacy, GSPN seeks to broaden participation in global decision-making. It also promotes more equitable partnerships between the Global South and North, recognising that effective responses to international challenges require the knowledge and participation of countries across both. Among GSPN’s initiatives is the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, which was presented at a United Nations workshop in New York. The network has also contributed to international dialogue through events including a United Nations civil society workshop held in Nairobi in 2024. GSPN’s mission is to help ensure that Global South countries participate as equal partners in shaping global policy. By connecting perspectives across regions and bringing them into international discussions, the network works towards a fairer, more inclusive and more sustainable international order. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Read the full Occasional Paper by downloading the PDF below. PUBLICATION INFORMATION Title: Population, Growth and Inequality: Has South Africa underestimated the demographic dimension of inequality? Author(s): Daryl Swanepoel Publication type: Occasional Paper Publication date: September 2026 PUBLISHED BY Inclusive Society Institute | NPO Registration: 235-515 5 High Cape House, 21 Ben Avenue, Vredehoek, Cape Town, 8001, South Africa PO Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010, South Africa Tel: +27 (0)21 201 1589 Email: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za Website: www.inclusivesociety.org.za COPYRIGHT © 2026 Inclusive Society Institute. Unless otherwise expressly indicated, copyright in this publication is owned exclusively by the Inclusive Society Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means without the Institute’s prior written permission, except as permitted by applicable law. Brief extracts may be quoted for criticism, review, research or educational purposes, provided that the authors, title and publisher are appropriately acknowledged. Permission requests should be directed to info@inclusivesociety.org.za. SUGGESTED CITATION Swanepoel, D. 2026. Population, Growth and Inequality: Has South Africa underestimated the demographic dimension of inequality? Cape Town: Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER This publication has been prepared for research, discussion and public-information purposes. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Inclusive Society Institute, its Board, staff, funders, partners or associated organisations. While reasonable care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the information at the time of publication, the Institute and the authors make no warranty regarding its completeness, accuracy or continued relevance. This publication does not constitute professional advice. To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Institute and the authors accept no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on its contents. References to third-party organisations, products, services or websites do not constitute endorsement. The Institute is not responsible for the content, availability or accuracy of external websites. Abstract This paper examines whether South Africa’s relatively high population growth has been an underappreciated factor in the country’s persistent income inequality. While inequality is conventionally attributed to historical disadvantage, unequal access to opportunity, high unemployment and weak economic growth, the paper argues that demographic change warrants greater attention. Since 1994, South Africa’s population has increased by more than 50%, placing growing demands on an economy that has struggled to expand productive opportunities at a comparable rate. Using Statistics South Africa data, the paper tests the relative importance of economic and demographic factors through three counterfactual scenarios: actual economic performance with population growth limited to 1% annually; actual population growth with real GDP growth averaging 4%; and a combination of 1% population growth and 4% economic growth. The results show that stronger economic growth would have had by far the greater effect on GDP per capita, but that slower population growth would nevertheless have produced a material additional improvement. Labour-market evidence reinforces the argument: between 2001 and 2023 employment increased by 36.6%, while the number of unemployed people increased by approximately 92.4%. The paper concludes that South Africa’s central challenge is one of economic absorption. Population growth does not inherently produce inequality, but where economic and employment growth fail to keep pace with an expanding working-age population, unemployment accumulates and income inequality can be aggravated. The findings therefore argue for demographic trends and population projections to be incorporated more explicitly into economic scenario planning. South Africa requires substantially stronger economic growth, but the adequacy of that growth should ultimately be judged against the rate at which the population requiring employment and economic opportunity is expanding. Keywords: South Africa; income inequality; population growth; economic growth; GDP per capita; unemployment; employment creation; demographic change; working-age population; economic absorption; scenario analysis. 1. Introduction South Africa's extreme income inequality is generally explained by its history, unequal access to opportunity, exceptionally high unemployment and sluggish economic growth. All are important. But there is another possibility that deserves closer examination: South Africa's relatively high population growth may itself have materially contributed to the problem. Since 1994, South Africa's population has increased from 41.9 million to 63.0 million. Statistics South Africa calculates average annual population growth over the period at approximately 1.4% (Stats SA, 2024:4). That means the population increased by more than 50% in three decades. The question, therefore, is whether South Africa's extreme income inequality is principally a consequence of inadequate economic growth, or whether relatively high population growth has been an important additional driver by expanding the population faster than the economy has been able to productively absorb it. This report tests that proposition through three counterfactual scenarios: Scenario 1: South Africa follows its actual economic trajectory, but population grows at an average of 1% a year from 1994. Scenario 2: Population follows its actual trajectory, but real GDP grows at an average of 4% a year. Scenario 3: Population grows at 1% a year and real GDP grows at 4% a year. The purpose is not to recreate an alternative history. It is to separate the demographic and economic components of the problem and ask which appears to matter most. 2. Population Growth Since 1994 Figure 1: What if South Africa's population had grown more slowly? Actual population compared with 1% annual population growth, 1994–2024 Source: Statistics South Africa, World Population Day in the Context of 30 Years of Democracy from a Statistical Perspective, Report 03-00-22 (2024); author's calculations. South Africa's population increased from 41.9 million in 1994 to 63.0 million in 2024, at an average annual growth rate of approximately 1.4%. Had population instead grown at exactly 1% a year, the same 41.9 million starting population would have reached approximately 56.5 million in 2024. The difference is substantial: 6.5 million fewer people. The counterfactual population was calculated by applying annual population growth of 1% to South Africa’s 1994 population of 41.9 million for 30 years: 41.9 million × (1.01)³⁰ = 56.5 million. Compared with the actual 2024 population of 63.0 million, this is 6.5 million fewer people, or 10.3% below the actual population: (63.0 − 56.5) ÷ 63.0 × 100 = 10.3%. The 1% assumption is deliberately cautious. It does not represent an unusually low population-growth scenario: recent population growth across upper-middle-income countries has been considerably lower. The counterfactual therefore tests the demographic effect using a restrained assumption, rather than an extreme one. Had a lower population-growth rate been applied, the resulting population would have been smaller and the improvement in GDP per capita correspondingly greater. Stats SA identifies births as the primary driver of South Africa's population growth. In its 2023-2024 demographic calculation, approximately 1.22 million births were added, 550,000 deaths deducted and net international migration added 160,000 people (Stats SA, 2024:5). Stats SA's longer-term analysis similarly finds that overall population growth closely follows natural increase, with annual migration contributing only a fraction of overall growth (Stats SA, 2024:6) The difference between the actual and counterfactual trajectories is therefore important. With population growth of 1%, South Africa would in 2024 have had roughly 10% fewer people than it actually had. That would have meant fewer people competing for employment and other economic opportunities, while also reducing pressure on education, healthcare, housing and infrastructure. The question is how much economic difference that might have made. 3. Economic Growth And Output Per Person Figure 2: What happened to economic growth? Real GDP growth, 2017–2024 Source: Statistics South Africa, Gross Domestic Product, Fourth Quarter 2024, Statistical Release P0441 (2025). The economic side of the argument cannot be understated. South Africa's recent growth performance has been exceptionally weak. Real GDP grew by 1.2% in 2017, 1.5% in 2018 and 0.3% in 2019. It contracted by 6.2% in 2020, rebounded by 5.0% in 2021 and then slowed to 1.9% in 2022, 0.7% in 2023 and 0.6% in 2024 (Stats SA, 2025:5). The significance becomes obvious when this is placed alongside population growth. An economy growing at around 1% while its population is also expanding at around that order of magnitude produces very little improvement in economic output per person. That is why the conventional argument for substantially faster economic growth is compelling. But it does not answer the demographic question. If population growth had been lower, the same economic performance would have been spread across fewer people. We can measure that effect. 4. Testing The Demographic Effect Figure 3: Isolating the demographic effect. Actual 2024 outcome compared with 1% population growth Source: Statistics South Africa, World Population Day in the Context of 30 Years of Democracy from a Statistical Perspective, Report 03-00-22 (2024); Gross Domestic Product, Fourth Quarter 2024, Statistical Release P0441 (2025); author's calculations. Actual GDP held constant. This is the first important test of the proposition. Nothing about South Africa's economic performance is changed. The only difference is population growth. Had South Africa experienced exactly the same economic trajectory, but population growth averaged 1%, its population would have been approximately 56.5 million, rather than 63.0 million in 2024. With GDP unchanged, GDP per person would have been approximately 11.6% higher. That is not an insignificant difference. But neither should it be exaggerated. With GDP unchanged, GDP per person would have been approximately 11.6% higher. This is because the same level of GDP would have been shared across a population of approximately 56.47 million rather than 63.02 million. The calculation is 63,015,904 ÷ 56,474,870 = 1.1158, meaning GDP per capita would have been approximately 11.6% higher. That is not an insignificant difference. But neither should it be exaggerated. It does not establish that household incomes would have been 11.6% higher, nor that inequality would have been 11.6% lower. GDP per capita measures average output per person, not its distribution. What it demonstrates is that population growth had a material effect on the relationship between the size of South Africa's economy and the size of the population dependent upon it. The next question is whether that demographic pressure can be observed in the labour market. 5. Employment And Economic Absorption Figure 4: The economy did create jobs. Employment, 2001–2023 Source: Statistics South Africa, World Population Day in the Context of 30 Years of Democracy from a Statistical Perspective, Report 03-00-22 (2024:48). If South Africa's population growth contributed to the inequality problem because the economy could not absorb the expanding population, we should expect to see evidence of this in employment. And we do. But it is more complicated than simply saying that South Africa failed to create jobs. Stats SA records employment increasing from approximately 12.1 million in 2001 to 16.5 million in 2023. That represents approximately 4.4 million additional jobs, an increase of 36.6%. South Africa therefore created millions of jobs. The crucial question is whether it created enough. 5.1. Employment And Unemployment Growth Figure 5: The imbalance that matters - Employment growth versus unemployment growth, 2001–2023 Source: Statistics South Africa, World Population Day in the Context of 30 Years of Democracy from a Statistical Perspective, Report 03-00-22 (2024). This is where the demographic argument becomes considerably more powerful. Between 2001 and 2023, employment increased by 36.6%, but the number of unemployed people increased by approximately 92.4% (Stas SA, 2024:48). The unemployment rate consequently increased from 25.4% in 2001 to 32.4% in 2023 (Stas SA, 2024:50). South Africa was therefore creating jobs at the same time as unemployment was increasing dramatically. That can happen when the number of people requiring employment increases faster than the economy's ability to create it. This is precisely why population growth matters. Stats SA identifies a working-age bulge in South Africa's demographic structure and notes that, if successfully harnessed, it can generate a demographic dividend. But the reverse is equally important. A demographic dividend depends upon productive absorption. If a rapidly expanding working-age population enters an economy incapable of creating sufficient employment, the potential dividend is not realised. Instead, increasing numbers of people remain outside productive employment. The South African figures are consistent with precisely such an absorption problem. 5.2. How Population Growth Affects Inequality Figure 6: Why population growth can matter for income inequality. The transmission mechanism Source: Author's synthesis (2026). This is the central proposition. Population growth does not automatically cause inequality. A rapidly growing population that is successfully educated, employed and integrated into a productive economy can increase economic output. But the South African circumstances are different. The economy has struggled to generate sufficient growth and employment to absorb the expanding population. That distinction provides the link between demography and income inequality. A person entering productive employment receives labour income. A person unable to find employment does not. If the number of people unable to enter productive employment grows rapidly, a larger share of the population remains dependent on transfers, informal income or household support, rather than earnings from employment. The result is a widening divide between those participating successfully in the labour market and those excluded from it. This does not prove that population growth caused South Africa's high Gini coefficient. But it provides a credible mechanism through which relatively high population growth can aggravate an already unequal income distribution when economic absorption is inadequate. 6. Comparing The Three Scenarios So, which matters more: economic growth or population growth? This was the question the three scenarios were intended to test. Scenario 1 Lower population growth, actual economic performance: Had population growth averaged 1%, South Africa would have had approximately 56.5 million, rather than 63.0 million people in 2024. With economic performance unchanged, GDP per person would have been approximately 11.6% higher. Population growth therefore clearly matters. Scenario 2 Actual population growth, 4% economic growth: The second scenario asks what would have happened if population followed its actual trajectory, but real GDP had grown at an average of 4% annually from 1994. Stats SA records real GDP at approximately R2.39 trillion in 1994, measured at constant 2015 prices (ISI, 2026:6). Had that economy grown at an average annual rate of 4% for 30 years, real GDP would have reached approximately R7.75 trillion by 2024. With the actual 2024 population of approximately 63.0 million, GDP per person would therefore have been approximately R123,000, compared with the actual outcome of R73,853, roughly 66.6% higher (author’s calculation). Scenario 3 Lower population growth and stronger economic growth: The third scenario combines both changes: population growth averaging 1% annually and real GDP growth averaging 4% annually from 1994. Under these assumptions, real GDP would have reached approximately R7.75 trillion by 2024, while the population would have reached approximately 56.5 million, rather than 63.0 million. GDP per person would therefore have been approximately R137,260, compared with the actual outcome of R73,853, approximately 85.9% higher. This produces the strongest outcome of the three scenarios, as stronger economic growth is combined with a population growing more slowly than it actually did (author’s calculations). Figure 7: What difference would the three scenarios have made? Source: Statistics South Africa, World Population Day in the Context of 30 Years of Democracy from a Statistical Perspective, Report 03-00-22 (2024); Gross Domestic Product: Time Series Data, Fourth Quarter 2024, P0441 (2025); author's calculations. 7. The proposition revisited The analysis began by asking whether South Africa's extreme income inequality is principally a consequence of inadequate economic growth, or whether relatively high population growth has been an important additional driver. The three scenarios suggest that this should not be framed as an either-or question. Population growth clearly matters. Had South Africa experienced exactly the same economic performance, but population growth averaged 1% annually, GDP per person in 2024 would have been approximately 11.6% higher. But the counterfactual also demonstrates that economic growth matters more. Had the population followed its actual trajectory while real GDP grew at an average of 4% annually, GDP per person would have been approximately 66.6% higher. Combining 4% economic growth with 1% population growth produces the strongest outcome, with GDP per person approximately 85.9% higher than the actual 2024 level. The conclusion is therefore not that South Africa's inequality problem is primarily demographic. It is that demography has compounded an economic-growth problem. Faster economic growth would have made by far the larger difference, but slower population growth would have materially amplified its effect. The labour-market evidence reinforces that conclusion. South Africa created millions of jobs, yet between 2001 and 2023 employment increased by 36.6% while unemployment increased by 92.4%. The economy expanded productive opportunity, but not rapidly enough to absorb the growing number of people requiring it. The policy implication is not that South Africa should pursue population reduction as an economic objective. Nor can demographic policy substitute for the need for substantially faster economic growth. The evidence instead points to a two-sided response. First, South Africa needs economic growth and employment creation capable of absorbing its expanding working-age population. The relevant measure of success is therefore not simply whether the economy is creating jobs, but whether it is creating them fast enough relative to the number of people requiring productive employment. Second, demographic considerations need to become a more explicit part of economic planning. This means strengthening voluntary family-planning and reproductive-health services, continuing to expand education and economic opportunity, particularly for women, and ensuring that people have the information and means to make informed choices about family size. It also means systematically incorporating population projections into planning for employment, education, healthcare, housing and infrastructure. Above all, economic and demographic policy should not be treated as separate exercises. Growth targets should be assessed against projected population and working-age population growth. The objective is neither growth alone nor slower population growth alone, but an economy that expands productive opportunity faster than the population requiring it. 8. Conclusion South Africa's sluggish economic growth is unquestionably the dominant part of the country's economic challenge. But the evidence suggests that it is not the whole story. Population growth matters too. The three counterfactual scenarios help illustrate the relative importance of the two. Had population growth averaged 1% annually while economic performance remained unchanged, GDP per person in 2024 would have been approximately 11.6% higher. Had real GDP instead grown at an average of 4% annually while population followed its actual trajectory, GDP per person would have been approximately 66.6% higher. Had both occurred, GDP per person would have been approximately 85.9% higher. The results therefore do not support an argument that population growth, rather than inadequate economic growth explains South Africa's predicament. They point to something more nuanced. Economic growth is the larger part of the equation, but population growth has materially affected the scale of the challenge. The labour-market evidence shows why. South Africa created millions of additional jobs, but unemployment grew considerably faster than employment. The economy was creating productive opportunities, but not rapidly enough to absorb the expanding number of people requiring them. That accumulation of unemployment provides an important mechanism through which relatively high population growth can aggravate an already unequal distribution of income. The policy debate should therefore move beyond the proposition that South Africa simply needs faster GDP growth. It certainly does. But growth must be considered alongside the size and rate of expansion of the population that the economy must educate, employ, house, service and economically absorb. South Africa's central challenge is therefore one of economic absorption: expanding productive opportunity faster than the population requiring it. That requires substantially stronger economic growth and employment creation, while recognising that demographic trends are themselves an important part of long-term economic planning. That is the demographic dimension missing from much of South Africa's inequality debate. References Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2026. True South Africa - Evidence Series: The Economy. Cape Town: Inclusive Society Institute. Statistics South Africa. 2024. Mid-year Population Estimates 2024. Statistical Release P0302. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Statistics South Africa. 2024. World Population Day in the Context of 30 Years of Democracy from a Statistical Perspective. Report 03-00-22. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Statistics South Africa. 2025. Gross Domestic Product, Fourth Quarter 2024. Statistical Release P0441. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. Statistics South Africa. 2025. Gross Domestic Product: Time Series Data, Fourth Quarter 2024. P0441 accompanying time-series dataset. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

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Home Who We Are What We Do Participants Contact Us Picture2 Picture2 1/1 Welcome to the Who We Are The Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD) is an informal collaboration of African think-tanks that have African socio-economic development, governance and a fairer, more inclusive, multilateral order at the heart of their work. As such, the ATD discusses, amongst others: Africa’s governance within the framework of the African Union Arica’s relationship with other regional structures such as the European Union, BRICS, the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the G20 Af rica’s relationship with world powers such as the United States of America, Europe and China Reform of the United Nations and other multilateral organisations in order to reposition Africa's role in the global order How to improve sustainable development in Africa, including required adaptation resulting from Climate Change Who We Are What We Do The African Consultative Meeting is held annually in Cape Town, South Africa Participation in the conferences, seminars, workshops and webinars – both ATD organised and those organised by the participating organisations Participation in the programmes of the Global South Perspectives Network Research Advocacy Early warning mechanism on emerging issues for the continent Promote African reform for more inclusive governance and economic development Act as a catalyst for African reformation and unity What We Do Participants Participants The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (Somalia) Southern Africa Centre for Mediation and Extremism Prevention (South Africa) Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre (Tanzania) Institute for Global Dialogue (South Africa) University of Johannesburg (South Africa) Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa) Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Nigeria) Cellule d’Analyse de Politiques Economiques du CIRES (Côte d’Ivoire) ALESCO (Algeria) Development Aid (Tunisia) Centre for International Policy Africa (Tanzania) Mashariki Research & Policy Centre (Kenya) Institute for Strategic & Policy Studies (South Sudan) Transatlantic Institute for South-South Cooperation (Senegal) Applicants Africa Policy Institute (Kenya) Contact Us Africa Think-tank Dialogue Secretariat administered by the Inclusive Society Institute: Physical Address: 5 High Cape House, 21 Ben Avenue, Vredehoek, Cape Town, South Africa, 8001 Postal Address: PO Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, South Africa, 8010 Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Email: atd@inclusivesociety.org.za Website: www.inclusivesociety.org.za/africa-think-tank-dialogue Contact Us Up

PAIA Manual Manual in terms of Section 51 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (the “act”) 1. Instruction 1.1. The Inclusive Society Institute, founded in 2019, is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The Inclusive Society Institute's work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever-transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the Inclusive Society Institute also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. Whilst the institute undertakes research through the lens of social and national democratic values and principles, it is pragmatic, not dogmatic, in its approach. 1.2. This manual outlines the implementation of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) (and aspects of Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA)) at the Inclusive Society Institute, and lists the primary records held by the institute, which can be accessed in accordance with the provisions of law. It further sets out how people can access information in terms of POPIA. 2. Institute contact details The Chief Executive Officer, as head of the institute, and through the delegation of authority by the Institute’s board, has been appointed as the Information Officer, whose details appear hereunder for purposes of dealing with all matters in connection with requests for information on the Inclusive Society Institute’s behalf, and to ensure compliance with the PAIA statute. 2.1. Designated/duly authorised persons: Information Officer: Daryl Swanepoel (Chief Executive Officer) Deputy Information Officer: Edwin Mc Queen (Corporate Services Officer) 2.2. Contact Details: Postal Address: P.O. Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010 Street Address: 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square , Cape Town, 8001 Telephone Number: 021 201 1589 Email: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za 3. Description of guide referred to in section 10 3.1.The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has compiled a guide, as required by Section 10 of the Act, containing such information as may reasonably be required by a person who wishes to exercise any right contemplated in this Act. It is available in all of the official languages. The Guide is available for inspection, inter alia, at the office of the Human Rights Commission, located at 29 Princess of Wales Terrace, corner York and St. Andrews Street, Parktown, Johannesburg, Gauteng and at www.sahrc.org.za For further information please contact the SAHRC: E-mail: paia@sahrc.org.za Postal address: Private Bag 2700, Houghton, 2041 Telephone: 011 484 8300 Fax: 011 484 0582 Click here to view or download the guide. 4. The Act 4.1.The PAIA statute grants a requester access to records of a private body, if the record is required for the exercise or protection of appropriate legal rights. If a public body lodges a request, the public body must be acting in the public interest. 4.2.Requests in terms hereof shall be made in accordance with the prescribed procedures, and where applicable at the rates provided. The forms and tariffs are dealt with in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Act. 4.3.Requesters are referred to the Guide in terms of Section 10 which has been compiled by the South African Human Rights Commission, which will contain information for the purposes of exercising Constitutional Rights. The Guide is available from the SAHRC. 4.4.The contact details of the Commission are: Postal Address: Private Bag 2700, Houghton, 2041 Telephone Number: 011 877 3600 Fax Number: 011 403 0625 Website: www.sahrc.org.za 5. Records automatically available 5.1. The following Records are automatically available without a person having to request access in terms of the Act: 5.1.1. The web page www.inclusivesociety.org.za is accessible to anyone who has access to the Internet. The Inclusive Society Institute’s website hosts the following categories of information: 5.1.1.1. Products and Services 5.1.1.2. Membership (individual and corporate) 5.1.1.3. Media reports and releases 5.1.1.4. Reports, Occasional Papers and Journal for Inclusive Public Policy 5.1.2. Product and promotional brochures/pamphlets 5.1.3. News and marketing information 5.1.4. Corporate communications 5.1.5. Other literature intended for public viewing 6. A pplicable legislation 6.1. Legislation 6.1.1. Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 6.1.2. Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 6.1.3. Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 6.1.4. Businesses Act 71 of 1991 6.1.5. Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 6.1.6. Competition Act 89 of 1998 6.1.7. Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 6.1.8. Copyright Act 98 of 1978 6.1.9. Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 6.1.10. Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 6.1.11. Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 6.1.12. Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 6.1.13. Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 6.1.14. Insurance Act 27 of 1943 6.1.15. Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997 6.1.16. Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 6.1.17. Justice of the Peace and Commissioners of Oaths Act 16 of 1963 6.1.18. Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 6.1.19. National Qualifications Framework Act 67 of 2008 6.1.20. Nonprofit Organisations Act 71 of 1997 6.1.21. Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 6.1.22. Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 6.1.23. Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 6.1.24. Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 6.1.25. Protection of Business Act 99 of 1978 6.1.26. Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 6.1.27. Skills Development Levies Act 9 of 1999 6.1.28. Co-operatives Act 14 of 2005 6.1.29. Fund-raising Act 107 of 1978 6.1.30. National Credit Act 34 of 2005 6.1.31. Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 6.1.32. Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 6.1.33. Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 6.1.34. Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act 4 0f 2002 6.1.35. Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 7. Schedule of records 7.1. General information about the Inclusive Society Institute can be accessed via the internet on www.inclusivesociety.org.za which is available to all persons who have access to the internet 7.2.The subjects on which the private body holds records and the categories on each subject in terms of Section 51(1)(e) are as listed below. Please note that a requester is not automatically allowed access to these records and that access to them may be refused in accordance with Sections 62 to 69 of the Act: 8. Purpose of processing of personal information 8.1. The Inclusive Society Institute processes personal information: 8.1.1. To support engagement with the media 8.1.2. To support engagement with service providers 8.1.3. To support engagement with members, customers and the general public 8.1.4. To support engagement with industry bodies 8.1.5. To support the recruitment and management of staff 8.1.6. To support relationships with statutory and other authorities 8.1.7. To support sales and marketing activities 9. Data subjects categories and their personal information 9.1. The following data subjects, and personal information processed, have been identified by the organisation: 9.1.1. Employees: record of employee life cycle 9.1.2. Funders and donors: records as maintained by Public Affairs 9.1.3. Members 9.1.4. Corporate Customers 9.1.5. General public: tracking general enquiries and web site visits 9.1.6. Industry bodies: membership records 9.1.7. International Affiliates 9.1.8. Media: records of media interactions 9.1.9. Service providers: record of service provider life cycle 9.1.10. Statutory and other authorities: contact details 10. Planned recipients of personal information 10.1. Employee Provident Fund 10.2. Employee Benefits providers (Wellness, tax assist etc.) 10.3. Trade union 10.4. Medical Schemes 10.5. Recruitment Agencies 10.6. Telecommunication providers 10.7. Financial institutions 10.8. Funders and donors 10.9. Industry bodies 10.10. Operators (service providers) 10.11. Statutory authorities 10.12. Media 11. Planned trans-border flows of personal information 11.1. Flows to international affiliates. 11.2. Flows to operators (service providers) 11.3. Flows to donors and funders. 11.4. Flows through the use of social media. 12. Security measures to protect personal information 12.1. Physical security measures 12.2. Access controls 12.3. Home and mobile measures 12.4. Internal security measures 12.5. Cyber security measures 12.6. Anti-spam measures 12.7. Anti-virus measures 12.8. Firewalls 12.9. Password control 12.10. Training in information security and other POPIA requirements 12.11. Selective training of key staff 12.12. Policies for information security 12.13. Comprehensive coverage of all IT-related issues 12.14. Audits of information security 12.15. Provisions around security in all provider contracts/agreements 13. Form of request 13.1. The requester must complete Form C and submit this form together with a request fee, to the person delegated to deal with requests (for “the Information Officer”). 13.2. The form must be submitted using any of the methods noted below: 13.2.1. Postal Address: PO Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, 8010 13.2.2. Physical Address: 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square , Cape Town, 8001 13.2.3. Tel: 021 201 1589 13.2.4. E-mail: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za 13.3. The requester must provide sufficient detail on the request form to enable the designated head to identify the record and the requester: 13.3.1. The requester should indicate which form of access is required. 13.3.2. The requester should indicate if any other manner is to be used to inform the requester and state the necessary particulars to be so informed. 13.3.3. The requester must identify the right that is sought to be exercised or to be protected and provide an explanation of why the requested record is required for the exercise or protection of that right. 13.3.4. If a request is made on behalf of another person, the requester must then submit proof of the capacity in which the requester is making the request to the satisfaction of the designated head of the private body. 13.3.5. A requester who seeks access to a record containing personal information about that requester is not required to pay the request fee. 13.3.6. Every other requester, who is not a personal requester, must pay the required request fee 13.3.7. The Information Officer must notify the requester (other than a personal requester) by notice, requiring the requester to pay the prescribed fee (if any) before further processing the request. 13.3.8. The fee that the requester must pay to a private body is currently R50,00. The requester may lodge an application to the court against the tender or payment of the request fees. 13.3.9. After the Information Officer has made a decision on the request, the requester must be notified in the required form. 13.3.10. If the request is granted then a further access fee must be paid for the search, reproduction, preparation and for any time that has exceeded the prescribed hours to search and prepare the record for disclosure. 13.4. The Inclusive Society Institute has the right to reject any request for information submitted in terms of Sections 62 to 70 of Chapter 4 of PAIA. 14. Availability of the manual 14.1.This manual is available for inspection at the Head Offices of the Inclusive Society Institute, free of charge, or from the SAHRC. Signature omitted for security reasons, signed copy available on request. Information Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute: Daryl Swanepoel Signed copy available on request. 15. Fees in respect of private bodies 15.1. The following is a breakdown of the fees structure for the purposes of determining the manner in which fees relating to a request for access to a record of a private body, are to be calculated: 15.1.1. In accordance with Part III of Regulation 187 published in the Government Gazette on 15 February 2002: 15.1.1. The fee for a copy of the manual as contemplated in regulation 9(2)(c) is R1,10 for every photocopy of an A4-size page or part thereof. 15.1.2. The fees for reproduction referred to in regulation 11(1) are as follows: 15.1.2.1 For every photocopy of an A4-size page or part thereof R1,10 15.1.2.2 For every printed copy of an A4-size page or part thereof held on a computer or in electronic or machine-readable form R0,75 15.1.2.3 For a copy in a computer-readable form on USB R 70,00 15.1.2.4 For a transcription of visual images, for an A4-size page or part thereof R 40,00 15.1.2.5 For a copy of visual images R 60,00 15.1.2.6 For a transcription of an audio record, for an A4-size page or part thereof R 20,00 15.1.2.7 For a copy of an audio record R 30,00 15.1.2. The request fee payable by a requester, other than a personal requester, referred to in Regulation 11(2) is R50,00. 15.1.3. The access fees payable by a requester referred to in Regulation 11(3) are as follows 15.1.3.1 For every photocopy of an A4-size page or part thereof R 1,10 15.1.3.2 For every printed copy of an A4-size page or part; thereof held on a computer or in electronic or machine-readable form R 0,75 15.1.3.3 For a copy in a computer-readable form on USB R 70,00 15.1.3.4 For a transcription of visual images, for an A4-size page or part thereof R 40,00; 15.1.3.5 For a copy of visual images R 60,00 15.1.3.6 For a transcription of an audio record, for an A4-size page or part thereof R 20,00; 15.1.3.7 For a copy of an audio record R 30,00 15.1.3.8 To search for and prepare the record for disclosure, R 30,00; for each hour or part of an hour reasonably required for such search and preparation. 15.1.4. For purposes of section 54(2) of the Act, the following applies: 15.1.4.1 Six hours as the hours to be exceeded before a deposit is payable 15.1.4.2 One third of the access fee is payable as a deposit by the requester. 15.1.5. The actual postage is payable when a copy of a record must be posted to a requester. Note: This manual is based on “EXAMPLE OF A MANUAL FOR A PRIVATE BODY” issued by the South African Human Rights Commission, amended to meet the needs of the Inclusive Society Institute, with further additions to enhance its usefulness and comply with the Protection of Personal Information Act, No. 4 of 2013