Search

Occasional Paper 11/2025   Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   OCTOBER 2025   Daryl Swanepoel Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University (ND Co Admin; BPAHons; MPA)      Abstract   The veto power of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) remains the most contested design feature of contemporary collective security. Abolition is a recurrent demand, yet the legal and political barriers to Charter amendment render it unattainable in practice. This article argues that meaningful reform must pivot from abolishing the veto to regulating its use. After tracing the veto’s historical development and surveying the literature and policy advocacy around abolition, the article examines restraint initiatives (France–Mexico declaration, ACT Code of Conduct, General Assembly resolution 76/262) and proposes a ‘Veto Use Integrity Framework” (VUIF)’. The framework extends conflict-of-interest (COI) abstention logic, creates carve-outs for mass atrocities and humanitarian access and mandates written justification and ex post oversight. While abolition remains a normative ideal, a regulation-first strategy offers the only feasible route to a more legitimate and effective Security Council. This article also advances a complementary amendment to the General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace (UFP) framework. Currently, UFP resolutions are non-binding recommendations. The proposed reform would make them binding when supported by a majority of the P5, thus enhancing the authority of the General Assembly in cases of Security Council paralysis. Draft language for these amendments is included in Annexure A. Introduction The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is simultaneously indispensable and constrained. It is indispensable, because Chapter VII powers enable binding decisions on peace and security, but it also constrained, because Article 27(3) grants each permanent member, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, a veto over “all other matters,” a design choice born of the 1945 bargain to keep the great powers inside the tent (UN, N.d.). The result is an enduring paradox, that is that the veto made the UNSC possible, but it often impairs its ability to respond in the gravest crises. From Rwanda to Syria and Ukraine, the veto or its shadow has been implicated in high-stakes failures to protect civilians and uphold international law and therefore the moral appeal of abolition is obvious, but the practical obstacles are equally stark. The Charter’s amendment rule requires P5 consent, thus making self-abnegation the precondition for change, which is an implausible premise (UN, N.d.). The core claim here is therefore pragmatic. If the veto cannot be abolished, it can be bounded, legally through working methods, procedurally through General Assembly oversight and politically through sustained norm entrepreneurship (Hathaway & Patrick, 2024). It is in this context that the Uniting for Peace mechanism takes on renewed significance: strengthening its authority would provide the General Assembly with a conditional binding role when the Council is paralysed (see Annexure A). Historical background: design, doctrine and practice The League of Nations’ unanimity rule and major-power estrangement shaped the UN’s framers, who concluded that a credible collective security system required guaranteed great-power participation and a blocking right. The “Yalta formula” was therefore inscribed in Article 27: nine affirmative votes (originally seven, amended with Council enlargement) including the concurring votes of the permanent members, with an obligatory abstention when a party is involved in a dispute under Chapter VI or Article 52(3) (UN, N.d.). In practice, “concurring votes” has long been read to include P5 abstentions, not just affirmative votes, so an abstention does not kill a text (Galbraith, N.d.) The operational life of the veto evolved across three phases. During the Cold War, vetoes were frequent and largely bipolar. After 1990, the Council briefly coordinated on major enforcement, for example, Iraq/Kuwait, before veto politics reasserted themselves on accountability and humanitarian files (Wilkinson & O’Sullivan, 2004). Since 2011, Russia and China have used the veto repeatedly on Syria; Security Council Report counts 14 of Russia’s first 19 post-2011 vetoes as Syria-related, with eight of China’s nine in the same period on Syria (UN, 2024). The UN’s own Peace and Security Data Hub maintains an authoritative dataset of all vetoes since 1946 (UN DPPA, N.d). The abolitionist case and its structural limits The normative case against the veto is three-fold. First, it violates sovereign equality by privileging five states. Second, it erodes perceived legitimacy when one state can block action backed by an overwhelming majority. Third, it contributes to preventable harm by enabling stalemate in atrocity settings. Syria supplies the canonical example: Russia and China vetoed multiple resolutions on accountability and humanitarian access, including the 22 May 2014 attempt to refer Syria to the ICC (UN Press, 2014). Earlier, on 4 October 2011, they vetoed a text condemning grave human rights violations (UN Press, 2011). Yet, abolition flounders on black-letter law and bare-knuckle politics. Article 108 demands two-thirds of UN members including all P5 to ratify any Charter amendment (UN, N.d.). Each P5 sees the veto as an existential insurance policy against perceived interventionism (Russia/China) (The Economist, 2022), against constraints on Middle East policy (United States) (Gowan, 2024) or as a lever of global influence in relative decline (United Kingdom/France) (Tardy, 2016). Even if abolition were agreed in principle, the likely consequence would be great-power disengagement, recreating the League’s fatal flaw. From abolition to restraint: existing initiatives Recognising the amendment roadblock, states and civil society have shifted to restraint. Three streams matter. First, the France-Mexico political declaration (2015) calls on the P5 to voluntarily suspend the veto in situations of mass atrocities. Over 100 states have endorsed it (France-Mexico, 2015; GCRP, 2015). Second, the ACT Code of Conduct (2015) asks all  Council members to avoid voting against credible drafts aimed at halting genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. The code was transmitted to the Secretary-General as A/70/621 (GCRP, 2015). Third, the General Assembly’s “veto initiative”, resolution 76/262 (2022), which automatically convenes a GA debate when any veto is cast, raising transparency and reputational costs (UN, 2022). These tools do not nullify the veto, but reframe costs and expectations around its use (Johnstone, 2003). A regulation-first alternative: the Veto Use Integrity Framework (VUIF) If abolition is implausible, the reform frontier is use-regulation that is (i) anchored in existing law and practice, (ii) operationalizable through UNSC working methods and GA oversight and (iii) politically survivable for the P5. 1. Conflict-of-interest (COI) abstention, extended Article 27(3) already provides that “in decisions under Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. Contemporary dysfunctions typically arise under Chapter VII. The VUIF would adopt a Council working-methods note, a presidential note incorporated into the Council’s compendium of practices, extending the COI abstention norm to all substantive  votes when a member is directly implicated (named in the operative text, a belligerent or occupying power or materially supporting parties to the conduct at issue). Disputes over COI would be decided as procedural and thus not subject to veto by nine votes (Council practice on procedural questions and the “double veto” debates) (Security Council Report, 2024). This deliberately uses the Council’s own methods toolkit rather than Charter amendment. 2. Substantive carve-outs: atrocities and humanitarian access The VUIF would codify a presumption against veto in (a) situations where the Secretary-General, OHCHR or a UN investigative mechanism reports a credible risk or commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and (b) resolutions whose primary purpose is humanitarian access, deconfliction or sanctions humanitarian carve-outs. This operationalises the France-Mexico declaration and the ACT Code into Council practice, moving from voluntary pledges to institutionalised  expectations. 3. Transparency and written justification Any veto, or public threat of a veto, would require a written justification submitted before the vote is taken, which justification should address an atrocity-risk assessment and COI. The justification would be annexed to the Council record and automatically transmitted to the GA under 76/262, thereby ensuring rapid and visible scrutiny (UN, 2022). And an independent briefing by SG, ICRC and/or UN investigative bodies, before votes where restraint could apply, would test the credibility of pretexts (Johnstone, 2003). 4. Oversight: scorecards and Uniting for Peace Building on 76/262, the GA would maintain a public scorecard tracking compliance with COI abstention and atrocity/humanitarian carve-outs. Where a veto blocks life-saving action notwithstanding these standards, the GA would move promptly under 377(V) “Uniting for Peace” to recommend collective measures that do not require Council authorisation (UN, 1950). The aim is not to override a veto, but to raise the cost of misusing it and keep alternative tracks moving. At present, however, Uniting for Peace resolutions are only recommendatory. They have political and moral force, but no binding legal effect. In order to close this gap, the proposed amendment would stipulate that where a Uniting for Peace resolution secures support from a majority of the P5, the decision shall be binding on all UN Member States; and abstentions would be treated as non-opposition, unless a permanent member explicitly casts a negative vote. This approach ties General Assembly authority to a measure of great-power concurrence while ensuring that a single veto cannot paralyse action indefinitely. Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A. Complementary reform: Amending the Uniting for Peace framework The Uniting for Peace resolution was designed to empower the General Assembly to act when the Security Council fails due to lack of unanimity among the P5 and in so doing it provides for the Assembly to recommend measures, including collective action, but it does not grant legally binding authority. This limitation has curbed its effectiveness. The proposed amendment would transform Uniting for Peace into a conditional binding mechanism. When a resolution is adopted under UFP and supported by a majority of the P5, it would carry binding effect equivalent to Security Council decisions under Article 25 of the Charter. Certification by the Secretary-General would confirm whether the requisite majority is met, and such certification would be annexed to the GA record. This reform strengthens collective security while maintaining safeguards: no measure could become binding absent concurrence from most permanent members. Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A. Working methods vs. Charter amendment: Pathways for reform A crucial distinction must be drawn between reforms that can be achieved through changes to the Security Council’s working methods or General Assembly practice and those that require a formal amendment of the Charter. Changes through working methods The majority of the proposals contained in the Veto Use Integrity Framework (VUIF) fall into the category of working methods reform. These are adjustments that can be adopted through Security Council presidential notes, incorporated into the Council’s compendium of practices or mandated through General Assembly resolutions without formally reopening the Charter. They include: Conflict-of-interest abstentions .  The requirement in Article 27(3) can be extended to encompass all substantive votes where a permanent member is directly implicated, which can be operationalised through a presidential note. Whilst it will not be legally binding, such guidance would shape practice and be enforceable through procedural votes that are not subject to a veto. Substantive carve-outs .  By establishing a presumption against the veto in cases of mass atrocities and humanitarian access, which builds directly on the France - Mexico and ACT initiatives, these commitments could be codified as standard working practices of the Council. Transparency measures .  Permanent members could be obligated to issue written justifications for actual or threatened vetoes. It can be instituted by Council practice and reinforced by the General Assembly’s 76/262 mechanism, which automatically triggers GA debate. Oversight mechanisms .  Scorecards and reporting systems could be maintained by the General Assembly in order to track compliance with restraint norms. This can be introduced without altering the Charter. In short, regulation of the veto’s use, its conditions, justification and scrutiny, can be advanced through procedural innovations and practice-based reforms. These do not formally curtail the veto right, but they increase reputational and political costs of its misuse. Changes requiring Charter amendment   By contrast, reforms that alter the legal authority of UN organs or the substantive scope of the veto require a Charter amendment under Article 108, meaning approval by two-thirds of the membership including all P5 and these will include:   The abolition or limitation of the Veto by removing or restricting the veto in specific subject areas, for example, atrocity crimes, would require an amendment to Article 27 of the Charter. Changing voting formulas, because any redefinition of “concurring votes” or alteration of the relationship between permanent and non-permanent members in decision-making would necessitate amending Article 27. Binding effect of General Assembly resolutions : At present, Articles 10 - 12 of the Charter limit GA authority to recommendations. The proposal to make Uniting for Peace resolutions binding when supported by a majority of the P5 would thus require a formal Charter amendment to extend the Assembly’s competence. Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A. Implications This distinction underscores why the regulation-first strategy is more feasible in the near term. Changes to working methods can be secured by political agreement and institutional practice. However, the amendment of the Charter, particularly to empower the General Assembly under Uniting for Peace, would mark a structural shift in the allocation of authority under the UN system and faces significant political hurdles given that P5 consent is indispensable. Case illustrations: how regulation would have mattered Syria As already referred to, Russia and China vetoed a draft on 4 October 2011, condemning grave violations, and they later vetoed a text threatening Chapter VII measures. Then on 22 May 2014, they vetoed an ICC referral. Under the VUIF, (i) COI abstention could have been triggered for a state materially supporting parties, (ii) atrocity carve-outs would have strongly counselled against vetoing an accountability referral and (iii) written justifications and a GA scorecard would have elevated reputational costs, potentially shifting bargaining baselines in later humanitarian-access renewals. Rwanda The 1999 Independent Inquiry documented systemic failures that culminated in inaction during the genocide (UN S/1999/1257) (UN, 1999). While there was no formal veto, the logic of VUIF, that is independent briefings before protection votes, a standing atrocity carve-out and a GA backstop, would have created stronger procedural rails against drift. Ukraine  (Crimea, 2014; invasion, 2022) Russia vetoed condemning texts; China abstained (Milano, 2015). Under VUIF, COI abstention would clearly apply to a belligerent, because disputes about applicability would be treated as procedural (no veto) and sent to a vote of nine. Even if Moscow ignored the expectation, the GA scorecard, plus Uniting for Peace, would have deepened the multilateral response record and policy pressure. Why regulation is more feasible than abolition Three reasons. First, law-in-practice. The Council’s working methods and GA practice have been fertile ground for meaningful change without Charter amendment. The 76/262 “veto initiative” has already shifted incentives by guaranteeing post-veto debate. Second, political economy. Constraining use while preserving the right should be tolerable to at least some P5, for example, France has publicly campaigned for atrocity-context restraint (France, 2023). Third, norm dynamics. Once articulated and socialised, expectations of restraint harden, reputational costs accumulate and can change state behaviour at the margin (Johnstone, 2003). Objections include the “soft law” critique, but what if a P5 ignores the framework? The answer is that no single instrument can compel a veto-holder, but coupling Council working methods with GA transparency and Uniting for Peace raises the costs of misuse, keeps humanitarian tracks open in subsidiary bodies and sustains a public record of (non-)compliance that matters over time, for alliance-management, domestic scrutiny and broader legitimacy. Conclusion   Abolishing the veto would be normatively satisfying and under current conditions, politically impossible. The Charter requires the consent of those whose privileges abolition would target and therefore the great-power bargain that sustains the Council would likely collapse without their blocking right. The regulation-first agenda outlined here, COI abstention, atrocity and humanitarian carve-outs, written justification, GA review and Uniting for Peace linkage, does not pretend to dissolve hard power. It does aim to discipline it. This shift reframes the veto from an unreviewable prerogative into a responsibility that must be explained, bounded and, when abused, politically costly.   Coupled with the proposed amendment to the Uniting for Peace framework, which would make certain General Assembly resolutions binding when supported by a majority of the P5, this package of reforms strengthens both oversight and responsiveness. In a world where perfect justice is unattainable, that is how the Security Council and the wider UN system can become more legitimate and effective now, without waiting for a Charter amendment that will not come. References French Republic (France). N.d.. Why France wishes to regulate use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council.  [Online] Available at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations-security-council/why-france-wishes-to-regulate-use-of-the-veto-in-the-united-nations-security-65315/  [accessed 17 September 2025]   French Republic & Republic of Mexico. 2015. Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Case of Mass Atrocities.  Paris/New York. [Online] Available at: https://onu.delegfrance.org/IMG/pdf/2015_08_07_veto_political_declaration_en.pdf  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Galbraith, J. N.d. [Online] Available at: Notes and Comments. EndingSsecurity Council Resolution . Cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/proposals-for-un-security-council-reform/2D26E684DCC727D9D06480E652FB3327 [accessed: 17 September 2025]   Global Centre for the Responsibility to Act (GCRP). 2015. Code of Conduct regarding Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.  New York: UN. [Online] Available at: https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/code-of-conduct-regarding-security-council-action-against-genocide-crimes-against-humanity-or-war-crimes/  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCRP). 2015. Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities (overview and signatories).  [Online] Available at: https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/political-declaration-on-suspension-of-veto-powers-in-cases-of-mass-atrocities/  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Gowan, R. 2024. The UN Security Council in the New Era of Great Power Competition. [Online] Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/un-security-council-new-era-great-power-competition?utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 17 September 2024]   Hathaway, O.A. & Patrick, S. 2024. Can the UN Security Council Still Help Keep the Peace? Reassessing Its Role, Relevance, and Potential for Reform.  [Online] Available at:  [accessed: 17 September 2024]   Johnstone, I. 2003. Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument, European Journal of International Law , 14(3), pp. 437–480. [Online] Available at: https://ejil.org/pdfs/14/3/428.pdf  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Milano, E. 2015. Russia’s Veto in the Security Council: Whither the Duty to Abstain   under Art. 27(3) of the UN Charter?.  [Online] Available at: https://www.zaoerv.de/75_2015/75_2015_1_a_215_232.pdf  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Security Council Report. 2024. The Veto: UN Security Council Working Methods.  [Online] Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Security Council Report. 2024. Procedural Vote (working methods explainer).  [Online] Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/procedural-vote.php  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Tardy, T. 2016. 6 France and the United Kingdom in the Security Council.  The UN Security Council in the 21st Century , edited by Von Einsiedel, S.,  Malone, D.M. & Stagno, B.U. Boulder, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016, pp. 121-138.  https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685853730-009   The Economist. 2022. Report: The world divided . [Online] Available at: https://www.economist.com/special-report/2022/10/10/china-seeks-a-world-order-that-defers-to-states-and-their-rulers?utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 17 September 2025]   UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. (UNDPPA). N.d. Security Council Data-Vetoes since 1946.  [Online] Available at: https://psdata.un.org/dataset/DPPA-SCVETOES  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations. N.d. Charter of the United Nations. [Online] Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations (UN). 1950. General Assembly resolution 377 (V) “Uniting for Peace”. [Online] Available at: https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/377%28V%29  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations. 1999. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (S/1999/1257). [Online] Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/405039 [accessed 13 September 2025]. Also summarized at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-inquiry-actions-of-united-nations-during-1994-genocide-rwanda-s19991257  (accessed 17 September 2025).   United Nations (UN). 2022. General Assembly resolution 76/262 (Standing mandate for a GA debate when a veto is cast).  [Online] Available at: https://docs.un.org/en/a/RES/76/262  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations Press. 2011. Security Council fails to adopt draft resolution condemning Syria’s crackdown owing to veto by China, Russian Federation (SC/10403). [Online] Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2011/sc10403.doc.htm  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations Press. 2014. Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court fails as negative votes prevent adoption (SC/11407).  [Online] Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Wilkinson, M.J. & O’Sullivan, C.D. 2004. The UN Security Council and Iraq: Why It Succeeded In 1990, Why It Didn't In 2003, and Why the United States Should Redeem It. [Online] Available at: https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/ad/ad_v9_1/wij01.html ? [accessed: 17 September 2025] Annexure A   DRAFT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 1. Amendment to Article 27 (Voting in the Security Council) Insert a new paragraph after Article 27(3):   “In addition to the provisions above, the Security Council shall adopt working methods ensuring that a permanent member directly involved in a dispute under consideration shall abstain from voting on all substantive matters concerning that dispute. Disputes as to whether a member is directly involved shall be considered procedural and not subject to the veto.”   2. Amendment to Articles 10–12 (Functions and Powers of the General Assembly) Amend Article 10 to add:   “In exceptional circumstances where the Security Council fails to act owing to the lack of unanimity among its permanent members, and the General Assembly considers a matter under the Uniting for Peace procedure, resolutions of the General Assembly shall be binding on all Members of the United Nations if supported by a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council. For the purposes of this Article, abstentions by permanent members shall not count as opposition unless a permanent member explicitly votes against.”   Amend Article 12(1) to add:   “This restriction shall not apply to resolutions adopted under the preceding Article when supported by a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council.”   3. Certification by the Secretary-General   Insert a new clause in Article 98:   “The Secretary-General shall certify whether resolutions adopted under the Uniting for Peace procedure have obtained the support of a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council, and such certification shall be annexed to the official record of the General Assembly.”   These amendments collectively preserve the primary responsibility of the Security Council while ensuring that in circumstances of deadlock, the General Assembly can act with binding authority where a majority of the P5 concur. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

ADDENDUMS ADDENDUM 1   Econometric model for government revenue    Long run equation Long run equation: graph of actual and modelled values Cointegration text of long run equation   The hypothesis of the cointegration test is as follows:   H0: No cointegration.   Source:  Own calculations   The results indicate that the variable is statistically significant (at 1% level), which means that we can reject the null hypothesis (of no cointegration). Short run (ECM) equation [1]     Diagnostic and Stability Tests of the ECM       Final (combined) model: actual and modelled values [2] Forecast [3] : Base case Assumptions (2024-2055): CPI and Inflation: increase of 4.5% per year GDP and RYD: Real increase of 2.0% [4] per year RM3: Real increase of 2,1% per year (Average of last 10 years) Prime: Decline from its current value to 9.5% per year over the next four years (until 20207), and then remain fixed at that value (9,5 based on the average of the last 10 years) Forecast: Graph of actual and forecast ADDENDUM 2   S1 and S2 data     ADDENDUM 3   Impact of an increase in the public sector retirement age   To mitigate some of the risks associated with longevity as highlighted in the report, this addendum looks at an additional scenario, namely an increase in the retirement age of public servants.   As far as South African legislation regarding retirement is concerned, the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 [5] provides broad guidelines by stating that:    Subject to the provisions of this section, an officer, other than a member of the services or an educator or a member of the Agency or the Service, shall have the right to retire from the public service, and shall be so retired, on the date when he or she attains the age of 65 years: Provided that a person who is an employee on the day immediately before the commencement of the Public Service Amendment Act, 1996, has the right to retire on reaching the retirement age or prescribed retirement date provided for any other law applicable to him or her on that day.   According to recent news reports the National treasury stated that ‘there is no standard retirement age that is set by government in South Africa,’ and that ‘Employees in formal employment… have a retirement age that is determined by the employer and the relevant retirement fund, which is not prescribed by government.’ In addition, it confirms that ‘there are no planned changes to the old age grant – which remains available from the age of 60 for men and women’ [6] .   However, as far as the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) is concerned, the normal retirement age for GEPF members is sixty (60) years. The fund notes that ‘The GEPF provides for normal and early retirement, as well as retirement for medical (ill health) reasons. Members whose employment have been affected by restructuring or reorganisation are also able to receive retirement benefits’ [7] . Normal retirement rules further specify that ‘benefits paid depend on whether a member has less than 10 years’ pensionable service, or 10 or more years of pensionable service. Members with less than 10 years’ service receive a gratuity – a once-off cash lump sum that is equal to their actuarial interest in the Fund. Members with 10 or more years’ service receive a gratuity and a monthly pension annuity.’   Against this backdrop, this addendum aims to quantify a scenario in which the retirement age for all public sector workers is set at 65 years of age, starting from 2025. This scenario then includes an amendment of the GEPF rules to increase the normal retirement age to sixty-five (65) years of age.   Quantum of costs   As a starting point one needs to get an estimate of the number of government employees currently in the age bracket of 60-65, as well as their earnings.   The 2022 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) provided a detailed breakdown of public compensation data [8] (see Table 1).  This document indicates that in 2022 around 1,308,123  individuals were employed by the public sector. By dividing the expenditure on salaries and wages by the number of employees per sector, in 2022 the average public sector employee earned R457,209 per year.   Table 1: Public-service salaries (R millions) and headcount (number), 2015-2022   Source:  National Treasury, 2022 MTBPS Annexure B   Although a detail breakdown by age is not provided in the MTBPS document, a parliamentary reply by the then Public Service and Administration Minister Dlodlo stated that ‘131 176 public servants will reach the retirement age of 65 in 2025’ [9] .   By dividing this number of individuals, by the total number of public sector employees, gives an estimate of around 10,1% [10] of public sector employees falling within the 60-65 years age bracket [11] .   To get a value for the pensionable portion of these employees, we assume an average contribution rate of 20,5%  - that is 7,5% by the individual self and 13,0% [12] by the employer. By applying this ratio to the average public sector pay, gives an amount of R93 728 per year per employee. By multiplying this amount by the estimated number of individuals in the 60-65 years age bracket equates to just over R12,3 bn per year of (potential) additional retirement savings (‘contributions’) (see Table 2).   Table 2: Public service employees numbers and costs, 2022   Source:  2022 MTBPS, DPSA, compiled by author   However, there is a (significant) caveat to this scenario, that is that if members retire later, the state needs to continue to pay them their salaries up to their retirement date. Using a similar methodology as explained above, the cost to the state to continue paying individuals aged 60 to 65 years would have amounted to around R59,9 bn [13] for 2022.   To project these values over the forecast period, they need to be adjusted for inflation. Actual inflation is used for 2023-2024 after which inflation of 4.5% per year is used (the same as the assumption use throughout the longevity report [14] ). We also have to assume a fixed level of employment over the forecast period.    According to the GEPF 2023/24 annual report, the value of their ‘funds and reserves amounted to R2.34 trillion on 31 March 2024 and accumulated funds and reserves grew at an average rate of 5.53% per year during the 2015 – 2024 period’ [15]   To get an idea of the retirement value of additional years of service, the annual contributions are adjusted for the inflation as well as the average growth rate, reported by the GEPF. To not overcomplicate the analysis, we exclude the impact of withdrawals [16] from the fund here. Figure 1: Additional salary costs (state) and retirement contributions and values (employees/pensioners), 2022-2055   Source : own calculations   Figure 1 indicates that, initially there exists a sizeable gap (around R48 bn) between the cost of additional salary payments of the state and the value of the accumulated retirement savings. This gap further increases to around R67 bn in 2038. However, thereafter, it is narrowed quickly to the point where the accumulated value of savings equals the additional salary expenses towards the end of the forecast period (i.e. 2054).  In reality this is an ‘accounting gap’ in the sense that the state will continue to have to pay the salaries but that the gap can be seen as a proxy for the ‘value to society’ derived from individuals being able to save additionally towards their own retirement.     Impact on the model   To equate the size of the ‘GAP’ to the model applied in the report, the results are compared to the base scenario, discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the report. Given that the 60 to 65 age cohort is in focus here, it makes little sense to also apply the longevity shock, and it is therefore excluded.   The results indicate that the budget deficit is likely to increase by around 0,5 percentage points, compared to the base scenario during the initial forecast years (i.e. around 2025 to 2040). For 2025 this is equal to a deficit of 6,6% of GDP compared to -5,9% for the base scenario. However, the difference between the GAP and base scenario is expected to gradually decline thereafter to the point where the GAP actually indicates a (marginally) smaller deficit during the final year of the forecast period.   Figure 2: Budget Balance as % of GDP (Base and Retirement GAP)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   As can be expected, larger annual deficits will push the debt to GDP ratio up, breaking 90% of GDP by 2037 compared the base scenario which indicates that it should remain below the 90% level. The difference between the two peaks at 5,0 percentage points around mid-2040’s after which it starts to decline to around 3,1% by the end of the forecast period.   Figure 3: Gross Debt to GDP (Base and Retirement GAP)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   Summary   The aim of this section is to quantify the impact of an increase in the retirement age of public servants from 60 to 65 years of age, on the fiscus.   The results indicate that this will have both a social costs (salary payments) as well as social benefit (retirement savings). Initially the costs will outweigh the benefits but over time, and given growth in the investment portfolio, this is estimated to equalise.   The impact on state finances will be a larger budget deficit and debt, especially during the initial years, that should decline over time.   ADDENDUM 4   Impact of an increase in the qualifying age for the Old Age Grant (OAG)   To moderate some of the risks associated with longevity as highlighted in the report, this addendum looks at another additional scenario, namely an increase in the qualifying age of the States Old Age social grant (OAG).   Chapter 4 of the report provided a detailed analysis of the different expenditure items, expected to be most affected by longevity. Specifically, Figure 37 showed the relative contributions of the three items to the total shock, and highlighted the dominant impact of old age grants, followed by the health services expenditure. Old age grant payments represented on average around 60% of the total combined shock to expenditure.   Chapter 3 of the main report already showed that during the 2024/25 fiscal year around 4,1 million individuals received the old age grant, and this is budgeted to rise to just below 4,5 million by 2027/28. This item represents a significant cost to the state and is also the largest (by cost) of the different social grants. The OAG cost the state R106,8 billion currently and is budgeted to increase to R131,0 billion over the next three years (that is an average rise of 7,0% per annum over the medium term).   Recent developments include that the National treasury confirmed that ‘there are no planned changes to the old age grant – which remains available from the age of 60 for men and women’ [17] .   Given the relevance and prominence of this social assistance related expenditure item, this addendum thus aims to quantify a scenario in which the qualifying age for all recipients of the State’s Old age social grant, is increased to 65 years of age, starting from 2026. However, this is done subject to a phased in approach over five years.   Quantum of costs   The main report already provides detailed estimates of the cost to the State of providing the OAG. As far as this addendum is concerned one needs to calculate the possible ‘saving’ if individuals falling between the ages of 60 to 64, are excluded.    According, to StatsSA, in 2024 South Africa had some 24,6 million individuals older than 60 years, while 8,6 million individuals (or roughly 32.6% of the total older than 60 years) fell in the age bracket 60-64 (See Table 1). Table 1: South Africans aged 60 and above, 2024     Male Female Total % of Total 60-64 866481 1134227 2000708 32.6% 65-69 654162 921092 1575254 25.7% 70-74 459581 697690 1157271 18.9% 75-79 273676 471861 745537 12.2% 80+ 212322 441742 654064 10.7% Total 2466222 3666612 6132834 100.0% Source:  StatsSA, Mid-year population estimates, 2024 [18]   Using this as a proxy, we thus assume that around 30% of AOG recipients are likely to fall within the 60-64 age bracket .   As mentioned above this analysis further assumes that the State will follow a phased in approach, that is where the qualifying age for the OAG is increased by one year per annum starting in 2026. This means that for 2026, only individuals 61 years and older will be viable to receive the grant, in 2027 only those 62 years and older, etc., thus reaching the target of 65 years from 2030 onwards.   To not overcomplicate the analysis, we assume that there are an equal number of individuals in the age cohorts 60 to 64. This translates to a linear, cumulative decline (saving) of around 6% [19] per year between 2026 and 2030. All other assumption related to the base and shocked scenarios remain the same as use in Chapter 4 of the main report.   Results   The results indicate a noticeable deviation between the base [20] and adjusted (age to 65 years) scenarios over time. During the first five years (implementation phase) the base scenario continues to rise strongly from around R106.8 bn in 2025 to R154.5 bn in 2030. In contrast to this the adjusted scenario remains largely unchanged from R106.8 bn in 2025 to R108.1 bn in 2030. This is as expected given the continued phasing out of qualifying individuals during the implementation phase.    After 2030 both series starts to rise, but with a significant gap between the series evident throughout the forecast period (see Figure 1). Figure 1: OAG costs of base versus adjusted (age 65) scenarios,  2024 to 2055   Source:  National Treasury (base up to 2028), own calculations   When comparing the results to total government expenditure, we get similar trends but with noticeable lower values for the adjusted (age over 65) scenario. Over the whole period the average for the original (shocked) scenario is around 0.5 percentage point compared to 0.3 percentage points for the adjusted (age over 65)  scenario.   Figure 2: OAG shock to expenditure: impact of original (shocked) versus adjusted (age 65) scenarios,  2024 to 2055   Conclusion   The aim of this addendum is to quantify a scenario in which the qualifying age for all recipients of the State’s Old age social grant, is increased to 65 years of age. This was done by using a phase in approach over 5 years, that is from 2026 to 2030.   The results indicate a significant saving in expenditure, averaging around R25 bn per year between 2026 and 2030. This equates to some R126.1 bn over the whole 5-year period.   When comparing the results as a percentage of total government expenditure, the average value for the original (shocked) scenario is around 0.5 percentage point compared to 0.3 percentage points for the adjusted (age over 65)  scenario. That means an (average) ‘saving’ of around 0.2 percentage point of total government expenditure can be realised per year if the qualifying age of the OAG is adjusted to 65 years of age.   Figure 3:             OAG costs of all original versus adjusted (age 65) scenarios,  2024 to 2055   [1]  All non-stationary variables have been differenced appropriately based on stationarity tests. [2]  Evident from the graph is that, in general, the model provides a good fit and trend of the actual values. Some discrepancies between the actual and modelled values are evident towards the later part (2015+). However, these are to both the upper and lower side, meaning we do not have a specific bias in the model. The large fluctuations during the Covid-19 period (2020-2021) likely further complicates the model’s ability to trace the actual values. [3]  To perform a forecast of the dependent variable (government revenue in this instance), the econometric model requires values for all explanatory variables over the forecasting period. Therefore, the need for the assumptions. [4]  This relates to the upper limit of the SARB’s potential growth rate, as discussed in Chapter 2. [5]   Act 103 of 1994 [6]  Daily Maverick, 27 May 2025, available at: No, there is no change to the retirement age [7]   https://gepf.co.za/retirement-benefits/ [8] 2022 MTBPS Annexure B. Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/mtbps/2022/mtbps.aspx [9]   https://www.dpsa.gov.za/thepublicservant/2022/03/09/govt-remains-largest-employer-in-sa-min-dlodlo/ [10]  This figure is likely understated, however it is difficult to determine the exact number of retirees in each age group per year, given the Minister’s broad statement. [11]  This seems in line with other sources such as StatsSA’s Quarterly Labour Force survey, which indicates that the 55-64 years age bracket represented around 7,8 percent of the total labour force in 2025.  P02111stQuarter2025.pdf . [12]  Note that this is the average rate, and that the DPSA states that the ‘rate is higher for members of the services, i.e. Police, Defence and Correctional Services. The employer contributes 16% of the member’s pensionable salary. Members of Intelligence Services also receive 16% of the member’s pensionable salary.’ https://www.dpsa.gov.za/policy-updates/nlrrm/conditions_of_service/pensions/pensions/ .   [13]  131176 (individuals) x R457 209 (average pay per year) [14]  4,5% per annum is the mid-point of South Africa’s official inflation target. [15]   https://gepf.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/GEPF_Annual-Report-2023_24_FINAL.pdf [16]  The GEPF is a defined contribution pension fund meaning that it does not guarantee a specific retirement benefit. Instead, both the employee and employer contribute a certain amount to an individual account, which is then invested, and the retirement benefit depends on the performance of these investments. ( Why withdrawing your pension from the GEPF could be your worst financial decision - Moneyweb ). [17]  Daily Maverick, 27 May 2025, available at: No, there is no change to the retirement age [18] P03022024.pdf [19]  30% assumption / 5 years = 6% per year [20]  Using the shocked scenario provides very similar trends and will thus not also be discussed here. See Figure 3 at the end of the Addendum for a combined graph of all different options and scenarios.    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY   Longevity’s impact on state finances: empirical evidence    The IMF [1]  notes that the economic and fiscal effects of an aging society have been extensively studied and are generally recognized by policymakers, but the financial consequences associated with the risk that people live longer than expected—longevity risk—has received less attention.  In this sense longevity can be defined as the risk that actual life spans of individuals or of whole populations [2]  will exceed expectations . The IMF notes that unanticipated increases in average life span can results from:   ‘ Misjudging the continuing upward trend in life expectancy, introducing small forecasting errors that compound over time to become potentially significant. There is also risk of a sudden large increase in longevity because of, for example, an unanticipated medical breakthrough. Although longevity advancements increase the productive life span and welfare of millions of individuals, they also represent potential costs when they reach retirement [3] .’   Longevity can broadly impact financial stability via two sources namely fiscal sustainability (e.g. as measured by deteriorating debt-to-GDP ratios) and solvency of private financial and corporate institutions (e.g. increases in their liabilities).    The Asian Development Bank Institute [4]  notes that ‘(the) rapid growth of aging population can pose a serious structural challenge to fiscal sustainability. Two main channels are referred to; (1) shrinking working population who are taxpayers, and (2) increasing government expenditures for age- related programs, particularly healthcare expenditure. In other words, the government’s ability to collect tax revenue decreases due to a smaller base of taxpayers while the government expenditure, particular on healthcare spending, continuously increases ’.   Liu and Zhao (2023) links to the above research by stating that ‘The impact of population aging on finance is primarily manifested in the change in the scale and proportion of government fiscal expenditure and the increase in the level of fiscal burden in old age’. In relation to research on population again they note that there are some variabilities in findings on the impact of population aging on fiscal sustainability due to ‘different research subjects and research methods. However, in general they indicate that the academic literature on the matter shows that ‘mainstream research has concluded that population aging significantly increases the fiscal burden and leads to fiscal unsustainability’. The same authors empirically analysed the impact of population aging in100 Chinese cities between 2010 to 2019 and find that population aging significantly inhibits fiscal sustainability, to the extent that each 1% increase in population aging reduces fiscal sustainability by 0.047%. The aging of the population notably inhibits fiscal sustainability through expenditure on healthcare and fiscal expenditure on social security and employment.   Fiscal sustainability in general remains a serious challenge in the Euro Area (EA) countries, especially after the sharp rise in public debt-to-GDP ratios in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. In a 2020 study, Carmen Ramos-Herrera and Sosvilla-Rivero [5]  analysed  data from 11 EA countries over the period 1980–2019 and finds that a higher old-dependency ratio deteriorates the cyclically adjusted government primary balance of a country, especially for countries with a relatively old population and for more indebted economies. They estimate a rise of one percentage point of the old-dependency ratio can generate a reduction of cyclically adjusted government primary balance of up to 54.5 percentage points in these countries.   Governments in particular bear a significant amount of longevity risk. The IMF identifies three main sources namely: (1) through public pension plans, (2) through social security schemes, and (3) as the “holder of last resort” of longevity risk of individuals and financial institutions. They note that ‘ an unexpected increase in longevity would increase spending in public schemes, which typically provide benefits for life. If individuals run out of resources in retirement, they will need to depend on social security schemes to provide minimum standards of living’ [6] .     Methodology    The study uses two methods, namely time series modelling (or an extrapolation method) as well as testing South Africa’s fiscal stance against the European Commission’s S1 and S2 indicators.     Time series analysis   Anderson (2012:4) states that ‘ the standard approach when assessing fiscal sustainability is an extrapolation method to project future public expenditure and revenues. The main steps are to make a decomposition of expenditures and revenues on demographic characteristics of the population in a given base year and combine this with a population forecast to generate paths for future public sector expenditures and revenues .’ He adds that and advantage of this method is that it is ‘ relatively easy to apply’ . However, he cautions that ‘ a problem could be that it relies on an underlying path for the economic development which may not be feasible, and which disregards important adjustment mechanisms. This may bias the assessment of fiscal sustainability in an unknown direction’ .   In deciding which methodology to use, the researcher is guided primarily by the type of data available. When looking at fiscal sustainability, state revenue becomes the limiting or ‘dependent’ variable against which other expenditure items are measured. We therefore first develop a workable model for state revenue, that can then be used for forecasting.     For this study we are working with time series data, which means that a time series econometric model will be utilised. The econometric modelling applied in this study is based on the Engel-Granger method [7] , in which a long term (cointegrated and a priori economic theoretically correct) and short-term error correcting (“ECM”) components are combined, to provide a final (holistic) model. The error term (“equilibrium error”) from the long run model is used to link the long and short run components.   Annual time series data, from 1990 to 2023 is used for the baseline revenue modelling. This implies using least 33 observations. Once an economic meaningful and statistically significant model has been developed, it can be used for out of sample forecasting.   To determine the impact of longevity on the expenditure side of state finances, this report takes guidance from the European Commission’s (“EC”) ageing [8]  and fiscal sustainability [9]  reports. As far as a methodology for determining total age-related public expenditure items, the EC [10]  identifies four main categories namely: health care, long-term care, education and pensions.  As far as the EC’s entire age-related expenditure projection is concerned it entails four steps namely:   Making population projections; Making exogenous macroeconomic assumptions, covering items such as the labour force (participation, employment and unemployment rates), labour productivity and the real interest rate; Estimating the age-related expenditure items; and Aggregating the above to provide an overall projection of age-related public expenditures.   An overview of how the different steps is combined can be seen in Figure 21.   Below is a brief discussion of the main expenditure items identified. However, it is important to note that the methodologies used by the EC are not all applicable to the South Africa economy and/or fiscal realities. For example, South Africa do not have a social security system (as defined by a mandatory publicly managed system). Also as highlighted in the first section of the report, South Africa’s demographics are (likely) more complex, notably the significant difference observed between population groups. Figure 21: Overview of Age-Related Public Expenditures   Source: European Commission (2021), The Ageing Report, 2     Health care    In its 2021 Ageing Report [11] , the EC notes that population ageing may pose a risk to the sustainability of health care financing in two ways:   Firstly, increased longevity, without an improvement in health status, leads to increased demand for services over a longer period of the lifetime, increasing total lifetime health care expenditure and overall health care spending. It is often argued that new medical technologies have been successful in saving lives from a growing number of fatal diseases but have been less successful in keeping people in good health.   Secondly, public health care is often financed by social security contributions of the working population. Ageing leads to an increase in the old age dependency ratio, meaning fewer contributors to the recipients of services. This can result in fewer people contributing to finance public health care in future, while a growing share of older people may require additional health care goods and services.   The impact of increasing longevity on health care expenditure critically depends on the health status of individuals over the additional lifetime (i.e. whether extra years are spent “in good or bad health”). Here a ‘trade off’ can develop between mortality and morbidity, e.g. in some cases mortality has decreased at the expense of increased morbidity, meaning that more years are spent with chronic illnesses. In contrast, if increasing longevity goes in line with an increasing number of healthy life years, then ageing may not necessarily translate into rising health care costs. Therefore, forecasting the health status of any population is challenging due to the difficulties associated with predicting the changes in morbidity and measuring ill-health.   Health spending is under pressure and the 2025 Budget [12]  notes that ‘ R28.9 billion is added to the health budget, mainly to keep about 9 300 healthcare workers in our hospitals and clinics ’. Figure 22 provides the comparison between the health budget from the 2024 and 2025 budgets, with our own calculations indicating a difference (rise) of closer to R37.1 billion for the years 2025 to 2027. There is also a noticeable pickup in the trend over the Treasury’s medium-term forecast compared to the 2024 budget figures.   Table 11: Health expenditure   Source: National Treasury 2024 Budget Review, 54 https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2024/review/Chapter%205.pdf     Figure 22: Total Consolidated Health Expenditure, 2024 and 2025 Budget Source: National Treasury, 2024 and 2025 Budget Reviews   To assess the impact of longevity this research isolates spending on health services (around 85% of the health budget), as these are the items from Treasury’s health budget, most likely to be affected by longevity risk. Population forecasts (using UN forecast) are used to calculate per capita health services spending.   Next an estimation is made of the proportion of this spending going to individuals older than 65 years.   The study assumes that government’s projections (i.e. this study’s base case forecast values) uses an unchanged stance as far as differences in population age groups and longevity is concerned [13] .   The study uses earlier findings and forecasts to model longevity risk using two separate aging effects:   Structural effect : this relates to the size of the population group older than 65 years old, increasing relative to the overall population (so-called pyramid effect), and Old age effect : this considers people literally getting older than expected.   The second (old age) effect is used to ‘reverse’ the per capita data, back to a nominal time series. The combined effect provides a longevity premium which can then be compared to the original times series.     Long-term care   For long-term care the proposed methodology considers the impact of changes in the age-structure and life expectancy of the population, on long-term care spending. It consisted of applying profiles of average long-term care expenditure per capita by age and gender to population forecasts.   The approach aims to maximise the number of factors affecting future long-term care expenditure. This may include [14] :   the future numbers of elderly people (through changes in the population projections used); the future numbers of dependent elderly people (by making changes to the prevalence rates of dependency); the balance between formal and informal care provision; the balance between home (domiciliary) care and institutional care within the formal care system; the costs of a unit of care.   The World Bank [15]  notes that, Similar to other low- and middle-income countries (“LMICs”), the populations in sub-Saharan African countries view the family unit as the primary provider of LTC services for older family members.   The HIV/AIDS epidemic has also strained the traditional family structure in that older adults may have to care for their adult children, sick family members, or grandchildren who are orphaned or left behind by migrant parents … This presents additional challenges as older adults balance their increasingly complex health needs with caregiving responsibilities for their family members.   Financing LTC appears to be a key issue in preventing the expansion of services across the continent. Financing of programs and facilities comes from a variety of sources, including donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious organizations, and out-of-pocket payments. Even in South Africa where 74 percent of facilities are government subsidized , funds from donations and out-of-pocket payments are needed to cover the costs of care provision   South Africa is one of the few sub-Saharan African countries that has residential facilities for the elderly. Sassa [16]  states that ‘if you are a senior citizen with no relatives available to take care of you in the golden age of 60 plus, there’s no need to worry. You can apply for the SASSA Old Age Grant also known as the old age pension and receive support through an old age home provided by the South African Department of Social Development (DSD ).’   The SASSA website [17]  notes that ‘ old age homes, also called retirement homes or assisted living facilities, are special residences for seniors who require different levels of care and assistance. Depending on the home, services typically include services such as housing and meals, personal care, health monitoring, and transportation’     To qualify for admission to a government-subsidized old age home the individual must:   Be aged  60  or older Be a South African citizen with a valid  ID document Receive the  SASSA Old Age Grant  or other pension fund Need full-time frail care due to health issues  (provide medical report) Have no family or other means to be properly cared for. However, to get aggregated data on public old age homes in South Africa is challenging.  Some information is provided by the Western Cape Government [18]  which notes that ‘ in the Western Cape, there is a total of 300 old age homes of which, 117 are funded by the provincial DSD. For the 2020/21 financial year, R 250 million has been budgeted towards services for older persons .’     Given that the Western Cape accounts for roughly 12% of the total SA population, we can use the R250 million to estimate a total for South Africa of R2,1 billion [19]  in 2020/2021.     Education    The methodology related to education spending considers the expected demographic and labour market developments, notably the  ratio of students to working-age population. The hypothesis is that a reduced ratio of students to working-age population should leads to a reduction in the ratio of total education expenditure to GDP. It does not assume a general rise in the education levels but analyses the effects of expected demographic and labour market developments given the present enrolment and cost situation.   The EC [20]  noted however that ‘ The projections of reduced education expenditure depend on a number of variables. As no underlying trend in enrolment rates is included, wealth effects on the demand side, or investment considerations e.g. related to the Lisbon objectives, could lead to savings being even more limited. The same can happen if expenditure per student should rise relative to GDP per worker, e.g. because of smaller classes or an increase in relative wages . In addition, ‘ enrolment and/or cost levels (could) increase more than what follows from the projections, because of implemented or planned legislation or other policies. This is especially relevant for enrolment in tertiary education. As education is to a large extent an investment in future human capital, many (countries) may also wish to direct any savings arising from demographic developments (rather to) increases in quality or intensity .’   Funding of education (notably tertiary education) in  South Africa remains complex, notably since the ‘FeesMustFall’ campaigns and the announcement by former President Zuma at the beginning of 2018 that ‘ free higher education will be provided to all new first year students from families earning less than R350 000 per year [21] ’ . Since then, changes have been made e.g. to change the support from a bursary scheme to a loan and partial bursary scheme [22] . The main entity offering free higher education is the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) [23]  via fully subsidised government bursaries to qualifying students.   Given the complexities with which to determine the trade-off between demographic changes versus possible changes in legislation or other policies, this item is excluded from the analysis of this report. Pensions (Old age grants)   The EC’s methodology includes social security and other public pensions as well as mandatory private pensions. Social security and other public pensions are broken down into two main categories:   old-age and early retirement pensions (including minimum and earnings-related pensions), with a preference to include also disability and widow’s pensions paid out to persons over the standard retirement age; other pensions (disability, survivors’, partial pensions without any lower age limit, including minimum and earnings-related pensions).   Making this relevant to South Africa, this study will analyse likely change due to longevity in the spending on old age grants.     SASSA notes that ‘ the Old Age Grant, also known as the Old Age Pension, is a South African social welfare program offering financial support to elderly citizens who are 60 years or older and have no income. Administered by SASSA Status check, this grant is available to South African citizens, refugees, and permanent residents. Eligibility is determined through a means test that evaluates the applicant’s income and assets. Once approved, recipients receive monthly payments [24] ’   According to the SASSA website [25] , social assistance (grants) is subject to a means test, which implies that SASSA evaluates the income and assets of the person applying to determine if these are below a stipulated amount. This currently (2024) amounts to an income of not more than R86 280  if you are single or R172 560 if married. The asset threshold is set at not more than 1 227 600 if you are single or R2 455 200 if you are married. The payments to individuals are  R 2 180 per month and R2 200 for individuals older than 75 years [26] . Table 12: Social Protection Expenditure   Source: National Treasury, 2025 Budget Review  https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2025/review/Chapter%205.pdf    During the 2024/25 fiscal year around 4,1 million individuals received the old age grant, and this is budgeted to rise to just below 4,5 million by 2027/28. This item represents a significant cost to the state and is also the largest (by cost [27] ) of the different social grants. Old age grants cost the state R106,8 billion currently and is budgeted to increase to R131,0 billion over the next three years (that is an average rise of 7,0% per annum over the medium term) (see Tabel 12).   Like the methodology for LTC,  the grant data already applies to individuals 60 years and older, and we do not need to apply a structural (‘pyramid’) effect [28] . Therefore, only an old age effect is applied. Other assumptions    As far as this research is concerned, important macroeconomic assumptions include that:   Trends observed during the last ten (10) [29]  years will continue. Inflation is assumed to remain at 4.5% per year, that is the mid-point of the SARB’s  inflation target. GDP growth to average 2.0% per year, linked to the SARB’s potential growth calculations The time horizon for forecasting will be 20 to 30 years. Additional scenarios can include the assumption that a basic income grant is introduced at the food-poverty line.      S1 and S2 indicators   An important starting point for the analysis is to determine a definition for fiscal sustainability. However, this is not as straight forward as it might seem. The European Commission (EC) (2006:3) [30]  notes that ‘ the issue of debt or fiscal sustainability is a multifaceted one and there is no agreed definition on what a sustainable debt position is  . The same commission luckily also provides a detailed definition of debt sustainability, specifically within the context of budgetary challenges posed by ageing populations, namely:   A definition of sustainability is derived from the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. It imposes that current total liabilities of the government, i.e. the current public debt and the discounted value of all future expenditure, should be covered by the discounted value of all future government revenue over an infinite horizon. In other words, the government must run sufficiently large primary surpluses in the future to cover the increasing cost of ageing and to pay off interest on outstanding debt. ( European Commission, 2006:3).   This definition (related to the intertemporal budget constraint) has become known as the so-called S2 indicator. Anderson (2012:2 [31] ) provides an interesting angle to the discussion by noting that intertemporal budget constraint definitions do not take a stand on whether current policies are optimal, or desirable, but rather asks whether they are feasible    In addition, the EC notes that the assessment of long-term sustainability of public finances should go beyond answering the question whether current policies are sustainable or not. ‘ An estimation of the size of the budgetary imbalances is also needed. This is provided by sustainability gap indicators that measure the size of a permanent budgetary adjustment’ . This additional condition is known as the S1 indicator and focusses on a country reaching a pre-determined level of debt to GDP.   Since its inception these indicators have also been revised and a 2023 report [32]  by the EC notes that ‘ (t)he S2 indicator measures the fiscal effort needed to stabilise public debt over the long term. The revised S1 indicator measures the fiscal effort required to bring the government debt-to-GDP ratio to 60% in 2070 [33] , hence capturing vulnerabilities due to high debt levels. The methodological approach differs from the Fiscal Sustainability Report 2021, which determined long-term fiscal risks based on the S2 indicator and the DSA results. The revised S1 indicator provides a better long-term complement to the S2 indicator, as based on a similar time horizon. ’   The EC’s uses the following equation to forecast the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio:   (Equation 1)   Where:   Related to the impact of ageing on the S2 indicator, it is explained that (ceteris paribus)  the higher the projected cost of ageing, the more difficult it is to fulfil the intertemporal budget constraint, as higher revenue – in present terms – is required to cover these costs, in addition to the other non-interest expenditure and debt service (European Commission, 2023:71) [34]   In practice, various types of fiscal balances exist, which according to the IMF [35] , often ‘ relate to special issues or circumstances and are only partial approaches and indicators for assessing complex situations . Some of the diffident types include:   Current fiscal balance:  this represents the difference between current revenue and current expenditure. It provides a measure of the government's contribution to national savings. When positive, it suggests that the government can at least finance consumption from its own revenue. Primary balance:  this balance excludes interest payments from expenditure. It can be said to provide an indicator of current fiscal effort, since interest payments are predetermined by the size of previous deficits. For countries with a large outstanding public debt relative to GDP, achieving a primary surplus is normally viewed as important, being usually necessary (though not sufficient) for a reduction in the debt/GDP ratio. Cyclically adjusted or structural balances [36] :  this item seek to provide a measure of the fiscal position that is net of the impact of macroeconomic developments on the budget. This approach takes account of the fact that, over the course of the business cycle, revenues are likely to be lower (and such expenditure as unemployment insurance benefits higher) at the trough of the cycle. Thus, a higher fiscal deficit cannot always be attributed to a loosening of the fiscal stance but may simply reflect that the economy is moving into a trough.   According to the National Treasury, ‘ the government's fiscal balance before accounting for interest payments on its outstanding debt. It is calculated as the difference between total government revenues and total non-interest expenditures. A positive primary balance indicates that the government’s revenues exceed its non-interest spending, while a negative primary balance suggests a shortfall [37] ’.   As far as its relevance to fiscal studies Bond Economics [38]  notes that ‘ the standard working assumption is that the primary balance is the result of fiscal policymakers, and that they do not wish to depart from this set policy. For example, they do not want to be forced to raise or lower taxes, as that has political consequences. The same holds true for programme spending. The usual interpretation of holding the trajectory of the primary balance fixed is to see whether the current fiscal policy settings are "sustainable" ’ However, the same source also cautions that ‘ the basic problem is that it makes very little sense for fiscal policymakers to care about the primary balance. Taxes are not imposed in the form of absolute levels; they are almost always imposed as percentages of nominal incomes and activity (e.g., income and sales taxes). As such, the tax component of the primary balance will shift based on the economic cycle, even if policy settings are unchanged…The net result is that the primary budget balance moves in a counter-cyclical fashion with the business cycle (deficits rise during recessions) ’.   In applying the EC’s methodology to this research, the development of the primary budget balance will be analysed to determine its relevance to the overall debt trajectory (S2) and to quantify what it should be to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio down to 70% of GDP [39]  by 2055 (S1).  Factors impacting longevity will be included via the adjusted expenditure figures, as discussed in the previous section. CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS    As explained in Chapter 3, the analysis uses two methods, namely time series modelling (or an extrapolation method) as well as testing South Africa’s fiscal stance against the European Commission’s S1 and S2 indicators.     Time Series Analysis  At its core, fiscal analysis boils down to two items namely government revenue and expenditure. When looking at fiscal sustainability, state revenue becomes the limiting or ‘dependent’ variable against which expenditure items are measured. This section therefore first presents a workable model for state revenue, that is used for forecasting.    From here a base scenario  is created in which existing expenditure trends (evident during the past 5 to 10 years), are extrapolated and compared to the estimated development in revenue (as obtained from the econometric model).   The next step it to apply shocks to the base scenario, notably by changing expenditure items that are likely to be impacted most by longevity risks.  Additionally, the implementation of a BIG (Basic Income Grant), is also analysed.     Government revenue model and forecast   Econometric model    A time series can be defined [40] as a set of observations on the values that a variable takes at different times. Such data is usually collected at regular time intervals, such as daily (e.g. stock prices, weather), monthly (e.g. inflation, money supply), quarterly (e.g. GDP), annually (e.g. government budgets) or even at longer time intervals.   Although time series analysis is used heavily in econometric studies, it does present specific problems, notably the assumption that underlying time series are stationary. In short, stationarity can be defined as a time series for which the mean and variance do not vary systematically over time.   However, by using cointegration techniques, as proposed by the econometricians Clive Granger and Robert Engle, or generally referred to as the ‘Engel-Granger’ [41] type analysis, time series that are non-stationary can be shown to share the same common trend so that regression analysis will be meaningful (i.e., not spurious). They are thus said to be cointegrated. Economically speaking, variables will be cointegrated if they have a long-term, or equilibrium, relationship between them. [42] Short run disequilibrium is likely to still exist, but this is corrected by the error correction mechanism (“ECM”), [43]  as also proposed by the Engel-Granger method.   The econometric modelling used for government revenue in this Report is based on the Engel-Granger method, in which a long term (cointegrated and a priori economic theoretically correct) and short-term error correcting (“ECM”) components are combined, to provide a final (holistic) model.  The error term (equilibrium error) from the long run model is used to link the long and short run components. Therefore, this term (i.e. its coefficient and statistical properties) becomes very important in the ECM, as also discussed in more detail below.   Annual time series data, from 1990 to 2023 is used for the baseline revenue modelling. This implies using 33 observations. All data was sourced from the South African Reserve Bank, National Treasury and Statistics South Africa. Because budget data is usually reported in fiscal years, the researcher must take cognisance of other economic variables provided in calendar years, which could impact the comparability of the different datasets. Fortunately, the SARB also provides calendar year values for most of the major state finance line items. The revenue model presented here is therefore run on annual (calendar) year data [44] .   The long run component of the modelling process is done to obtain a cointegrated, long-term trend, or equilibrium relationship between variables. In this sense one wants to rather use fewer variables, that are likely to have theoretically sound economic impacts on the dependent variable. For this purpose, GDP and household disposable income was used and it was confirmed that there does exist a cointegrating relationship between the long run variables (see details in Addendum 1).   The short run component, also known as the error correction mechanism (“ECM”), is defined as the part of the model that corrects for disequilibrium. Variables included in the ECM included household disposable income, the prime interest rate, money supply (“M3”) and inflation. In addition to this the long run component are included (as required) via the residual variable from the long run equation (i.e. ‘Res_Rev’). All variables were differenced appropriately for stationarity and the relevant diagnostic and stability tests confirmed. The detailed specifications and estimated results are provided at the end of this chapter in Addendum 1   In general, the model indicates a good fit as the modelled values closely follows the trend of the actual values (see Figure 23). Some discrepancies are evident towards the later part (around 2020). However, these are to both the upper and lower side, meaning we do not have a specific direction of bias in the model. The large fluctuations in the data itself during the Covid-19 period (2020-2021) likely further complicates the model’s ability to trace the actual values. Figure 23: Revenue Model: Actual and Fitted Values (Real, R millions)   Source:  Own calculation     Revenue forecast   Out of sample forecasting is performed next,  for the period 2024 to 2055 – that is over a period of three decades. The assumptions for the explanatory variables are as follows:   CPI and Inflation: increase of 4.5% per year (as per the mid-point of the SARB’s inflation target) GDP: Real increase of 2.0% [45] per year RYD: Real increase of 1,2% per year (average of last 10 years) RM3: Real increase of 2,1% per year (average of last 10 years) Prime: Decline from its current value to 9.5% per year over the next four years (until 20207), and then remain fixed at that value (9,5 based on the average of the last 10 years)     Base scenario    To make the results from the revenue model comparable to expenditure, the real values are deflated using the CPI. This indicates a continued upwards trend in (nominal) government revenue. Over the short term the modelled annual growth in revenue picks up from 2.3% in 2023 (actual) to 6.9% and 7.7% during 2024 and 2025 respectively. Over the long term (2030 and beyond) the growth rate settles on around 7.1% per year.  This compares very well to the historic average growth of 7.2% per year recorded by this item during the last decade.    As explained in the methodology section, government expenditure is forecasted using an extrapolation (moving  averages) method. To obtain the likely long-term trend in expenditure, it is increased by 6,9% [46] per year – equal to the average rise in this item during the last decade.    Figure 24: Revenue Model: Actual and Forecasted (@1,5% and 2% GDP growth) (Real, R millions)   Source:  Own calculation   Figure 25: Base Scenario: Long term Estimates for Revenue and Expenditure (Nominal, R millions)   Source : SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   Evident from the comparison of the two long term forecasts, is that expenditure continue to outperform revenue over the forecast period. Reasons for this include that, government is currently running a budget deficit, meaning that expenditure starts from a higher value. Also, despite the higher projected growth rate in revenue (7.1% from 2030 onwards) compared to 6.9% average for expenditure, revenue is struggling to make inroads into expenditure, even over the 30-year time horizon.   Another way of looking at this is to calculate the projected budget balance, which indicates a gradual decline from a deficit 6,0% of GDP in 2023 to around -5.8% in 2030 and only dipping below -5.5% of GDP from 2050 onwards (see Figure 26).   This means that under the base scenario the budget deficit is expected to remain negative, albeit declining, over the forecast horizon.   In addition, this means that state debt will continue to climb to fund the annual deficits. Given a rise of 2.0% per year in GDP, debt is expected to continue rising but also to stabilise just below 90% of GDP around the middle of the 2040’s.   However, if the economy only manages to record growth of 1.5%, the debt level is expected to continue accelerating, reaching 90% of GDP in roughly a decade (i.e. around 2034).   Figure 26: Budget Balance as % of GDP (@1,5% and 2% GDP growth) Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   Figure 27: Gross Debt to GDP (@1,5% and 2% GDP growth) Source: SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   Evident from the above is that in order for debt levels to remain below 90% of GDP [47] , the economy will have to grow by a level of at least 2,0% per year [48] . Any value less than this will mean a continued upwards trend, i.e. to clearly unsustainable debt levels. However, the aim of this section is to establish a base scenario on which further analysis can be performed. For this reason, it the (more optimistic) 2,0% per year GDP assumption  will be applied during the remaining of this Section.      Longevity impact scenario    The aim of this section is to quantify and analyse the impact of longevity on a selection of government expenditure items, as identified in the methodology. The items will be quantified individually after which the combined impact will be analysed against the forecast results from the base scenario model.     Health care    The impact on healthcare is calculated by only using health services related spending (around 85% of the total health budget) and using population forecasts to calculate per capita figures. Two separate aging effects are then analysed namely a structural effect (relative size of the population older than 65 to the total population) and an old age effect (people living longer than expected).    Initially health services spending is calculated by using 84.8% of total health expenditure up to 2027 (for which National Treasury data is available), after which it is forecasted by using the 10-year average ratio of this item to total expenditure.     Structural effect   Per capita health services expenditure is calculated , and from there the proportion of this relevant to the elderly (65+) is calculated using a fixed ratio of 6,5% of the population (i.e. the ratio where this age group was at 2024). A second scenario uses an increasing ration (i.e. individuals over 65 years old increasing from 6.5% to 11.2% of the total population).  Figure 4.6 provides the results of the two scenarios. Figure 28: Per Capita Spending by Elderly (65+) on Health Services (Base and Shocked Scenario)   Source:  Own calculations     Old age effect:   In addition, a longevity effect(i.e. the risk that life expectancy is underestimated) need to be added, which is done by applying an aging coefficient (around 0.5 percent per year) to only the population older than 65 years [49] . In brief this increases the size of the 65+ population group in 2055 by around 1.4 million individuals. The ‘new’ total population is then calculated by replacing the old age group with the new numbers. See Figure 29 for the impact of this adjustment. This adjusted population data is used to re-calculate the nominal rand values.   Figure 29: Total Population (Base and Alternative Scenario)   Source : Own calculations Total healthcare effect   The results indicates that the gap (difference) between the base and shocked scenario will continue to increase over the forecast period, reaching and amount of R110,0 billion in 2055.   Figure 30: Health Services (Base and Shocked Scenario)   Source:  Own calculations   Another way to look at this is to compare the gap to total government expenditure, which indicates a shock starting at less than 0.1% of total expenditure around 2030 but rising to around 0.6% of total expenditure in 2055 (see Figure 31).   Figure 31: Health Shock to Expenditure   Source : Own calculations     Long-term care   For long-term care the analysis focus on the impact of changes in life expectancy of the population. Specifically, how these factors are likely to impact the cost of providing public old age homes by the South African Department of Social Development (“DSD”).   As mentioned in the methodology section, it proved difficult to find aggregated data on public old age homes. Some data from the Western Cape Government indicated that in 2020/21 this province spent R250 million on services for older persons.   Using this as a benchmark we estimate a spending for South Africa of around R2,1 [50] billion during the same year.   As base scenario this amount is inflated (using an annual inflation rate of 4.5 % per year). This takes LTC spending from around R2.4 billion in 2024 to R9.4 billion in 2055.   To determine the likely impact of longevity on these figures, a shocked scenario is then developed. As the data already applies to individuals 60 years and older, we do not need to apply a structural (‘pyramid’) effect [51] . Therefore, only an old age effect is applied.   The resultsare presented in Figure 32, which indicates a difference between the base and shocked scenario reaching R500 million in 2040 and further increasing to around R1.5 billion by 2055.   Figure 32: Long term care (“LTC”) Costs (Base and Shocked Scenario)   Source:  Own calculations    Compared to total government expenditure, the LTC shock is fairly small [52] , rising to around only a 10 th  of a percent by 2055.   Figure 33: LTC Shock to Expenditure Source:  Own calculations     Pensions (Old age grants)   The analysis focus on how changes in life expectancy of the population could impact pension payments. Specifically, how this is likely to affect the cost of social assistance payments (so called old age grants).   Like previous sections, a base and shocked scenario is developed. The base scenario uses data from the National Treasury up to 2027/28 after which the item is expected to increase equal to the 10-year average (that is 8.6% per year for old age grants).   The shocked scenario uses this same base data and forecasts but applies an old age coefficient to capture the impact of people in general living longer than expected.   The results are presented in Figure 34 which indicates a difference between the base and shocked scenario reaching R30 billion in 2040 and further increasing to around R195 billion by 2055. Figure 34: Pension Costs (Base and Shocked Scenario)   Source:  Own calculations   The results indicate a relatively large gap averaging 0,5% of total expenditure over the forecast period.  Annual values of more than 1% of total expenditure is reached from 2050 onwards  (see Figure 35).   Figure 35: Pension Shock to Expenditure   Source:  Own calculations     Combined (Health, LTC and pensions)   By adding the three items (Health, LTC and pension), the total impact is derived. In rand value the impact (shock) on total government expenditure is expected to increase over the forecast period, reaching around R40 billion in 2040, and increasing to over R300 billion by 2055.   In percentage terms, this is equal to an average rise of around 0,8% of expenditure over the period, with annual values reaching 1,0% in 2040 and peaking at 1,7% in 2055 (see Figure 36).    Figure 36: Total Shock to Expenditure (R value and %)   Source:  Own calculations   Figures 37 shows the relative contributions of the three items to the total shock, which clearly indicates the dominant impact of old age grants, followed by the health services effect.   Figure 37: Total Shock to Expenditure (Components)   Source:  Own calculations Impact on fiscus   The last part of this section is to consider the impact of the shocked expenditure values on South Africa’s overall fiscal stance. This is done by comparing it to the modelled revenue values and base scenario developed in Section Four. Note that the base scenario using 2% GDP growth [53] is used for comparison.   The base scenario indicated that the budget deficit is expected to peak at 5.8% of GDP around the mid-2030s,after which it will gradually decline to around 5,4% by the end of the forecast period. In contrast to this, the shocked scenario does not see a peak, but instead for the deficit to continue increasing (worsening) over the forecast period, to reach just below 6% of GDP in 2055 (see Figure 38)   Figure 38: Budget Balance as % of GDP (Base and Shock)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   In addition, this means that state debt will continue to climb to fund the annual deficits. In the base scenario debt is expected to stabilise just below 90% of GDP around the middle of the 2040’s. Again, in contrast the shocked scenario does not see a peak, but indicates a continual rise, breaking the 90% level around mid-2040’s and climbing to 93% of GDP by 2055. On average this will mean a higher debt to GDP ratio of around 1.8 percentage points over the forecast period.    Figure 39: Gross Debt to GDP (Base and Shock)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts     Impact of longevity and Basic Income Grant (“BIG”)    As a last part of this section, the aim is to analyse the impact of a possible Basic Income Grant (“BIG”) being implemented. The assumption here is that the existing (temporary) Covid-19 SRD grant be transferred to a basic income grant. The 2025 Budget indicates that around 8,3 million individuals are receiving the SRD at a cost of R35,5 billion to the state.   We assume that the BIG will be implemented at the food poverty line, which is R796 per month (“StatsSA [54] ”). To provide this to 8,3 million individuals will cost the state around R79,3 billion per year. That is roughly double the amount of the SRD.   In addition, we assume that part of the individuals receiving the grant could in future also need old age assistance, thus the values are also adjusted for and ageing coefficient. The BIG is assumed to be implemented in 2025.   The results indicate that the budget deficit is likely to increase by around 1 percentage points, compared to the shocked scenario. For 2025 this is equal to a deficit of 7,0% of GDP, which is expected to gradually decline to around 6,6% by the end of the forecast period.    Figure 40: Budget Balance as % of GDP (Base, Shock and BIG)   Source:  SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts   As can be expected this will push the debt to GDP ratio up even further, now breaking 90% by 2033 and 100% in 2044. This also adds a significant increase over the shocked scenario, of an average of 8,1 percentage points higher over the forecast period.   Figure 41: Gross Debt to GDP (Base, Shock and BIG)   Source: SARB data, Own calculations and forecasts     S1 and S2 indicators   The S2 indicator measures the fiscal effort needed to stabilise public debt over the long term while the S1 indicator measures the fiscal effort required to bring the government debt-to-GDP ratio to a measurable target at a specific date in future. Both these indicators have a strong focus on the development of the primary budget balance, that is the difference between total revenue and non-interest expenditure, and how this in turn affects the trajectory of government debt levels.    This section first looks at general trends in South Africa’s budget and primary budget balances after which the two indicators are analysed. This builds on the work of Section Four, in as far as the longevity impact on expenditure has already been developed and can thus be further utilised here.     Overview of fiscal balances   An overview of the post-1990 trends in South Africa’s fiscal balances, indicate three distinct periods:   Prior to 1994:  Worsening of fiscal stance as the state ran continued larger deficits, reaching -7.5% of GDP in 1993. 1994 to pre 2008/09 GFC: The improved economic climate re South Africa, after 1994 is evident as the fiscal deficits got smaller, to a point where surpluses were recorded during 2005 and 2006. The primary balance improved significantly and recorded surpluses, averaging around 3% of GDP, during the period 1995 to 2008. Also noticeable during this period is the narrowing in the gap between the fiscal budget and primary balances (In figure 4.19 this is evident from the light blue and orange lines converging during the period). Post 2008/09 GFC: There is a clear switch in sentiments during (and after) the 2008/09 Global Financial Crisis as a large fiscal deficit of -4.7% is recorded in 2009, while the primary deficit records -2.6% of GDP. Both these indicators remain in negative territory (deficits) until 2019, during which a widening (divergence) between the two are again observed (likely as debt starts to increase, driving up debt-service costs). The further severe impact of the Covid-19 crisis is evident in large deficits recorded during 2020-21.   Figure 42: South Africa’s Budget and Primary Balances, 1990 to 2022 Source:  World Bank   Comparing developments in the primary balance to government debt, shows a decline in debt levels between 2000 to 2007 (that is when large primary surpluses were run). 2008 again indicates an inflection point, that is a sharp and sudden reversal in trends as debt starts to climb post the 2008/09 GFC, while the primary balance falls and records deficits for the remainder of the period  (up to 2022) (see Figure 43).      As far as more recent developments the Treasury seems to be committed to focus on establishing and maintaining a primary surplus. The 2025 Budget Review [55] notes that ‘ government projects a main budget primary surplus of 0.5 per cent of GDP, which will increase to 0.9 per cent in 2025/26 ’ and that this ‘will achieve a longstanding ambition to stabilise debt next year through the strengthening primary surplus. The fiscal strategy will continue to manage fiscal risks, support essential services and encourage economic growth .’    Figure 43: Primary Balance and Debt, 2000 to 2022   Source:  World Bank   It is evident that the state is also looking for potential fiscal anchors ‘ to support responsible borrowing and spending. In 2025/26, the debt stabilising main budget primary surplus will serve as the fiscal anchor, with larger primary surpluses planned for the remainder of the decade to reduce debt as a proportion of GDP [56] ’.   However, worrying are statements [57] made after the 2025 budget by the Minister of Finance regarding a change in the budget’s focus from ‘ spending cuts to higher taxes’ , as these could undermine the proposed fiscal anchors as well as outlook of the primary balance. There also remain some uncertainty over some budgeted proposals (notably the implementation of the proposed VAT hike(s)).    Table 13: 2025 Budget: Main Budget Framework   Source:  2025 Budget Review, 31     S2 indicator    The S2 indicator measures the fiscal effort needed to stabilise public debt over the long term. In this case we use equation 1  (see Chapter Three) to estimate the future trend of debt. The starting point is to forecast data for the explanatory variables, after which Dt (the debt-to-GDP ratio) is calculated.   The primary budget balance plays a critical role in these calculations and is obtained as the difference between revenue and non-interest expenditure. To obtain non-interest expenditure, we use the (shocked) expenditure values (obtained earlier in this Chapter [58] ) from which debt service costs are subtracted. This is then expressed as percentage of GDP, using the nominal GDP values. Over the medium term (2026 to 2028) National Treasury’s projections [59] from the 2025 budget is used (see the last row in Table 4.1 above). To forecast the values, the 10-year average (i.e. 2019 – 2028) is used, which equals a value of -0.5% to GDP.    To limit the number of ‘moving parts’ the forecasts for the nominal GDP and nominal interest rates (Repo) are kept pegged at their 2024 values. Figure 44: Primary Balance and Debt Forecast (S2), 2002 to 2055   Source: National Treasury and own calculations   Using the above, the debt trajectory is expected to continue increasing and breach 90% of GDP by 2038 and 100% around mid-2040s.   Further interesting conclusions include that the debt level continues to rise as long as the primacy balance remains negative, albeit by a small margin.      S1 indicator    As explained previously, the S1 indicator will be modified to measures the fiscal effort required to bring South Africa’s government debt-to-GDP ratio to 70% by 2055.   From the S2 scenario we know that any negative value will not be sufficient to stabilise the debt trajectory. Therefore, it is evident that the value for PB needs to be some positive value. By testing different forecast scenario’s, it was determined that a primary surplus of at least 1.15% of GDP needs to be maintained throughout the forecast period to bring the debt level down to 70% of GDP by 2055 .   This compares well to National Treasury’s statement (see Section Four) that the ‘primary surplus will increase to 0.9 per cent in 2025/26’ and that this ‘will achieve a longstanding ambition to stabilise debt’. Albeit that this research indicates that an even higher surplus will be required to actually drive down the debt level. Figure 45: Primary Balance and Debt, S1 Adjusted   Source:  Own calculations     S1 and S2 criteria     The European Commission provides various criteria against which to compare the results. This includes a decision tree (see Figure 46) and threshold levels for the different indicators (see Table 47).   If we start with the S2 indicator as calculated for South Africa, the debt level in 2032 is expected to be 80,4%, placing the country in the medium (‘between 60% and 90% of GDP’) risk category. However as far as the debt trajectory is concerned, it is evident that it should ‘still increase at end of projection’ placing the country in the high category. According to the decision tree (Figure 46), at least one high risk item is sufficient to conclude that South Africa will fall in the high-risk category as far as overall (i.e. S2) debt sustainability is concerned .   Figure 46: Decision Tree for Assessment of Fiscal Sustainability Risks   Source: European Commission [60] , p183   As far as S1 is concerned the criteria state that ‘ the risk classification derived from S1 depends on the amount of fiscal consolidation needed to reduce debt to 60% of GDP over the medium term. When this requires a large effort of more than 2.5% of GDP on top of the baseline assumptions, this identifies a high risk. When no additional effort is needed as debt is already projected to stand below 60% of GDP, corresponding to a negative S1, the risk is low. For intermediate values of S1, the risk is medium [61] ’.   Figure 47:  Debt Sustainability Thresholds   Source: European Commission [62] , p185   Important to note is that, in this research both the forecast horizon (2055 rather than2070) and point target (70% of GDP instead of 60% of GDP) differs from that used by the EC, which complicates then comparison   However, using the required correction value of 1.15% of GDP as calculated above, this will put South Africa in the ‘intermediate’ or ‘medium risk’ category as far as the S1 indicator is concerned. Combining the S2 and S1 indicator puts South Africa in a ‘high/medium’ overall risk category. CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS    The aim of this study is to assess the impact of longevity (i.e. people living longer than expected) on fiscal sustainability in South Africa. These risks were quantified using time series econometrics as well as the European Commission’s S1 and S2 fiscal sustainability indicators.   As far as demographics is concerned the study finds evidence that South Africa’s are indeed ‘living longer’,  as indicated by measures for the median age as well as life expectancy. Looking at recent demographic trends, South Africa’s median age increased from 22 years in 1996 to 28 years by 2022, thus placing the country at the upper end of the ‘intermediate’ age category.  Over the last 22 years, total life expectancy rose by 11.8 years, or roughly 0.54 years per year. By extrapolating from here, life expectancy could rise by between 10.7 years (2045) and 16.1 years (2055) taking life expectancy to respectively 77.2 years (2045) and 82.6 years (2055).   At the same time evidence of ageing is found, notably South Africa’s population aged 65 and higher, increasing from 4,0 percent of the total population in 1994, to 6,5 percent in 2023. The growth rate among elderly (60 years and older) measured 2.84% in 2024 – that is almost 1.5 percentage points higher than that of the overall population. As far as it expected future trend, and depending on different assumptions, the population aged 65 and higher is estimated to increase to between 9,0% and 11,2% of the population in 2055 (in 30 years’ time) - that is almost double the current size.     An overview of the fiscal and economic environment show that South Africa finds itself in a bind as far as its state finances are concerned. South Africa has been accumulating significant amounts of debt during the last decade with gross loan debt rising from 23.6% of GDP in 2009 to 73.8% of GDP in 2024.   A (time series) econometric model is used to model and forecast government revenue, while expenditure is forecasted using recent (five to ten-year average) growth rates. Using these a base scenario is developed against which various shocks can be analysed. The study finds that even under the base scenario, significant fiscal pressure is already evident, including a high probability of continued budget deficits and a concomitant increase in debt levels.   Three age-related public expenditure items (health care, long-term care and old age grant payments) are analysed. The study finds that the combined impact of the three items is equal to an average rise of around 0,8% of total expenditure over the forecast period, with annual values reaching 1,0% in 2040 and peaking at 1,7% in 2055. As far as relative contribution the dominant impact is due to extra expected spending for old age grants, followed by the health services effect.   The combined expenditure shock is tested against the base scenario. The base scenario indicated that the budget deficit is expected to peak at 5.8% of GDP around the mid-2030s, after which it will gradually decline to around 5,4% by the end of the forecast period. In contrast the shocked scenario does not peak but instead predicts a continue increase in the deficit over the forecast period, to reach just below 6% of GDP by 2055. In addition, state debt will continue to climb to fund the annual deficits. The shocked scenario does not see a peak, but indicates a continual rise, breaking the 90% level around mid-2040’s and climbing to 93% of GDP by 2055. On average this will mean a higher debt to GDP ratio of around 1.8 percentage points over the forecast period.    An additional scenario is analysed wherein a Basic Income Grant (“BIG”) implemented at the food poverty line (currently R796 per month), replaces the (temporary) Social Relive of Distress (“SRD”) grant. To provide this to 8,3 million individuals will cost the state around R79,3 billion per year. The results indicate that the budget deficit is likely to increase by around 1 percentage point, compared to the shocked scenario. For 2025 this is equal to a deficit of 7,0% of GDP, which is expected to gradually decline to around 6,6% by the end of the forecast period. This pushes the debt to GDP ratio up further, and indicates that it will break 90% of GDP by 2033 and 100% in 2044.   Related to the European Commission’s S2 indicator, this study finds that the debt trajectory is expected to continue increasing and breach 90% of GDP by 2038 and 100% around mid-2040s. In addition, it becomes evident that the debt level will continue to rise as long as the primacy balance remains negative, albeit by a small margin.   As far as the S1 indicator is concerned, it is determined that a primary surplus of at least 1.15% of GDP needs to be maintained throughout the forecast period, to bring the debt level down to 70% of GDP by 2055.   Comparing the results from the S1 and S2 indicators to the EC’s debt sustainability criteria, puts South Africa at a ‘high/medium’ overall risk category.   The study therefore concludes that longevity poses a significant additional risk to South Africa’s long term fiscal sustainability, given South Africa’s existing fiscal pressures.   In closing, South Africa can find guidance from the IMF regarding proposals on how to mitigate longevity risk to countries in general:   The IMF notes that: a three-pronged approach should be taken to address longevity risk, with measures implemented as soon as feasible to avoid a need for much larger adjustments later. Measures to be taken include: (1) acknowledging government exposure to longevity risk and implementing measures to ensure that it does not threaten medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability; (2) risk sharing between governments, private pension providers, and individuals, partly through increased individual financial buffers for retirement, pension system reform, and sustainable old-age safety nets; and (3) transferring longevity risk in capital markets to those that can better bear it. An important part of reform will be to link retirement ages to advances in longevity. If undertaken now, these mitigation measures can be implemented in a gradual and sustainable way. Delays would increase risks to financial and fiscal stability, potentially requiring much larger and disruptive measures in the future [63] .   CLICK HERE TO CONTINUE TO ADDENDUMS       [1] https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781616352479/ch004.xml   [2]  Important is to differentiate between whole populations or aggregate longevity risk, as opposed to individual (or ‘idiosyncratic’) risk which refers to individuals outliving their financial resources. The focus in this research is on firstly mentioned, i.e. the risk that a population on average live longer than expected.  [3]   Chapter 4: The Financial Impact of Longevity Risk in: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2012 [4]   https://t20japan.org/policy-brief-aging-population-impacts-fiscal-sustainability/   [5]  Fiscal Sustainability in Aging Societies: Evidence from Euro Area Countries ( https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347529813_Fiscal_Sustainability_in_Aging_Societies_Evidence_from_Euro_Area_Countries ) [6]   Chapter 4: The Financial Impact of Longevity Risk in: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2012 [7]  See Enders W. (2004). Applied econometric time series. 2nd edit. Wiley, pp. 1-9; Stock, J.H and Watson M.M (2012) Introduction to econometrics. 3rd edit. Pearson, pp. 691-701  [8]  Two ageing report are available, for 2006 and 2021  https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/economic-and-financial-affairs-publications_en . [9]   https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/economic-and-financial-affairs-publications_en . [10]  The 2006 report also included a category for unemployment benefits, however this was excluded in the 2021 report The impact of ageing on public expenditure - Publications Office of the EU   [11]   The 2021 Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States (2019-2070) - European Commission , 107-109 [12]   https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2025/excelFormat.aspx   [13]  This is a relational expectation as no indications to counter this is evident from the budget documents. Also keep in mind that Treasury’s forecasts usually focus merely on the medium term, i.e. a rolling three years forecast period, during which the impact of longevity risks are of little concern.   [14]  European Commission (2006), The impact of ageing on public expenditure - Publications Office of the EU  p. 139 [15]   World Bank Document [16]   Old Age Homes for SASSA Pensioners - Sassa Check [17]   Old Age Homes for SASSA Pensioners [March 2025] [18]   All Residential facilities for Older Persons must be registered | Western Cape Government [19]  This figure seems in line with findings from other academic research on funding elder care in South Africa, see Funding elder care in South Africa: New report | UCT News [20]  Ibid. 164 [21]   What does free higher education actually mean in South Africa? - Hypertext [22]   Government making strides in fee-free tertiary education drive – The Mail & Guardian [23]   https://www.nsfas.org.za/content/bursary-scheme.html   [24]   SASSA Old Age Grant – How to Apply, Approve Grant? [25]   https://www.sassa.gov.za/Pages/Older-Persons-Grant.aspx   [26]   Old age pension | South African Government [27]  Note that in term of number of recipients the child support grant is biggest, with around 13,2 million recipients in 2024/25 [28]  Technically this report defines the old age grouping as individuals 65 years and older, however for the sake of not overcomplicating the analysis, we use the data as given (thus also including individuals from 60 years old) [29]  A ten-year average is chosen to provide a bit of a longer time period and to diminish some of the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on most variables [30] https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication7903_en.pdf [31]  Anderson, T.M. (2012). Fiscal sustainability and fiscal policy targets. Economics Working Papers, 2012-15 . AARHUIS University. [32] https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/Chapter%20III%20Long-term%20fiscal%20sustainability%20analysis.pdf [33]  This end date (i.e. 2070) was likely selected to link the findings of this report to the 2021 Ageing Report, that was published in May 2021 also by the EC, see The 2021 Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States (2019-2070) - European Commission ( europa.eu )  This study focus mainly on the next 30 years, thus the fiscal target needs to be adjusted (‘loosened’), to e.g. an interim target of 70% of GDP by 2055.  [34] https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/Chapter%20III%20Long-term%20fiscal%20sustainability%20analysis.pdf [35]   IMF Pamphlet Series - No. 49 -Guidelines for Fiscal Adjustment - How Should the Fiscal Stance Be Assessed? [36]  The IMF (ibid.), adds that ‘ The usefulness of these indicators is limited by difficulties in identifying potential and trend output, and, consequently, in distinguishing cyclical and underlying elements of the fiscal deficit ’ [37]  2025 Budget Review [38]   Bond Economics: What Is the Primary Fiscal Balance, And Why Its Use Should Be Avoided [39]  Note the departure from the EC’s objective of a 60% Debt to GDP ratio by 2070, due to the shorter forecast period used in this study.  [40]  Gujarati, D.N, & Porter, D.C. (2009). Basic Econometrics. Fifth edition. McGraw-Hill International Edition. p 22       [41]  See Enders W. (2004). Applied econometric time series. 2 nd  edit. Wiley, pp. 1-9; Stock, J.H and Watson M.M (2012) Introduction to econometrics. 3 rd  edit. Pearson, pp. 691-701 [42]  Gujarati, D.N, & Porter, D.C. (2009). Basic Econometrics. Fifth edition. McGraw-Hill International Edition. p. 762 [43]  Ibid., Pp. 764-765; Stock & Watson (2012) pp. 700-701 [44]  This should also be kept in mind when comparing the values to, e.g. data provided in the various National Treasury Budget documents. However as this study is more interested in the long term trends, the short term discrepancies between the fiscal and calendar year values are of less importance.  [45]  This relates to the upper limit of the SARB’s potential growth rate, as discussed in Chapter 2. To illustrate the impact of different growth scenario’s, the forecast using 1,5% GDP growth is added to this section. The significant impact of this ‘relatively small’ difference in growth performance should be evident over the longer term. Similarly, the assumptions about various of the other explanatory variables, notably the level of inflation can also have significant impacts on the results, especially given the relatively long forecasting time frame.  The aim here is however to establish a base scenario from which further shocks can be analysed and not necessarily on sustainability analysis per se. [46]  The average rise is calculated using the latest fiscal year data. [47]  Broadly in line with the OECD’s guidelines as discussed in Section 2.1. However, even at the current (2024) level of around 75% debt to GDP South Africa is already in trouble as it is at the ‘ability to stabilise the economy’ level. [48]  By default, the other assumptions listed above will also have to materialise  [49]  One can argue that this is still underestimating the impact of longevity as this should actually be applied to the population as a whole. However for the purpose of this study, applying it to only the elderly (65+) population should be sufficient. [50]  Also see Funding elder care in South Africa: New report | UCT News [51]  Technically this report defines the old age grouping as individuals 65 years and older, however for the sake of not overcomplicating the analysis, we use the data as given (thus also including individuals from 60 years old) [52]  Evident however is that the amount included here are for servicing of the facilities while items such as capital outlay, etc. should also be included to provide a fuller indication of costs associated with old age care. But as explained data for this remains scarce.  [53] Likely any of the GDP growth scenarios can be used as ‘base’ as we focus on the changed between the base and shocked versions not necessarily the absolute level. [54]   https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03101/P031012024.pdf   [55]   https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20Budget/2025/review/FullBR.pdf   [56]  Ibid. 25 [57]   ‘Spending cuts were not effective, now we look to higher tax revenue’ – Godongwana - Moneyweb [58]  Note that this item includes the longevity related ‘shocks’ [59]  It should be noted that National Treasury’s projections are rather optimistic, given the longer-term trend in the primary balance. This, by implication also provides a ‘more optimistic’ forecast of debt trajectory. [60]   Fiscal Sustainability Report 2021 (Volume) [61]  Ibid., 181 [62]  Ibid. [63]   Chapter 4: The Financial Impact of Longevity Risk in: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2012   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Embracing a society that is built on social and national democratic values Public Policy Research & Analysis Democratic Education, Briefings, Seminars & Conferences Publications & Liberation Archive Portal Featured Activity Journal for Public Policy (JIPP) call for submission of articles Our Latest Activities The impact of longevity on fiscal sustainability in South Africa Release of Report Fanie Joubert 24 hours ago Inclusive Society Institute partners with Stellenbosch University’s School for Public Leadership for the 18th International Winelands Conference: 22 – 24 October 2025: Stellenbosch Conference Inclusive Society Institute 6 days ago US-Africa relations: The case of South Sudan Release of Occasional Paper Melha Biel Oct 15 Up

Media Coverage - 2025 Oct 21, 2025 Europe’s moral moment: A diplomatic call for justice and peace in Palestine Katoikos.world: Georgios Kostakos and Daryl Swanepoel Up Oct 16, 2025 When power refuses to evolve: Rethinking GlobalGovernance Katoikos.world: Daryl Swanepoel Up Oct 12, 2025 Lessons from global multilingual success stories show crucial role of mother tongue education Daily Maverick: William Gumede Up Oct 2, 2025 Assassination and the Fragile Fabric of Social Cohesion Rational Standard Up Oct 1, 2025 Violence and Extortion in South Africa’s Construction Sector: Mitigation Efforts and Way Forward Springer Nature Link Up Sep 30, 2025 2025 Provincial Economic Review and Outlook Western Cape Government Up Sep 21, 2025 Albie Sachs — we must see language not as a battleground, but as a gift Daily Maverick: Nicola Bergsteedt Up Sep 18, 2025 How Trump’s tariffs could affect the aviation industry Business Day: Emil Gumede Up Sep 14, 2025 The United Nations at 80: Real reform or ritual? Mail & Guardian: Daryl Swanepoel Up Sep 11, 2025 UN at 80: Reform or ritual? Katoikos.world: Daryl Swanepoel Up Sep 9, 2025 The Utility of Digital Currencies in Mitigating U.S. – South Africa Trade Tensions SA Financial Markets Journal Up Sep 6, 2025 The rising cost of matric balls: a celebration or expensive headache Cape Argus: Tracy-Lynn Ruiters Up Sep 6, 2025 The rising cost of matric balls: a celebration or expensive headache Business Report: Tracy-Lynn Ruiters Up Sep 6, 2025 The rising cost of matric balls: a celebration or expensive headache IOL: Tracy-Lynn Ruiters Up Sep 3, 2025 The role of state institutions in supporting constitutional democracy Daily Maverick Up Sep 3, 2025 Where do migrants fit in the Rainbow Nation? African diaspora raises alarm over migrants' rejection IOL: Jonisayi Maromo Up Sep 2, 2025 The Inclusive Society Institute notes a increase tensions, particularly towards nationals from African Radio 786 Up Sep 2, 2025 Distrust of African immigrants linked to employment status, survey finds The Mercury: Jonisayi Maromo Up Sep 2, 2025 Rising distrust of African immigrants could spark instability, warns Inclusive Society Institute The Mercury: Jonisayi Maromo Up Sep 2, 2025 Rising distrust of African immigrants could spark instability, warns Inclusive Society Institute eNCA The South African Morning Up Sep 2, 2025 Survey reveals rising distrust of African immigrants in SA eNCA The Morning Show Up Sep 1, 2025 Survey Reveals That South Africans’ Distrust of Immigrants Could Lead to Instability Briefly: Tebogo Mokwena Up Sep 1, 2025 Rising distrust of African immigrants could spark instability, warns Inclusive Society Institute Magic 828 Up Sep 1, 2025 包容性社会研究所警告 —— 南非民众对来自非洲其他国家移民信任度下降可能引发动荡 红色木團 Up Sep 1, 2025 Rising distrust of African immigrants could spark instability, warns Inclusive Society Institute The Star: Jonisayi Maromo Up Sep 1, 2025 Rising distrust of African immigrants could spark instability, warns Inclusive Society Institute IOL: Jonisayi Maromo Up Sep 1, 2025 GovDem Survey Reveals Rising Distrust Toward African Immigrants in South Africa SAfm: Mari Harris Up Aug 30, 2025 Meer as `kumbaya-oomblik' Die Burger: Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 30, 2025 Survey reveals rising distrust of African immigrants in SA Newzroom Afrika Up Aug 28, 2025 Malema Found Guilty of Hate Speech: Court Warns of Dangerous Incitement joburg(etc) Up Aug 28, 2025 Malema hit with hate speech guilt — court condemns call to ‘kill racists’ African Insider Up Aug 28, 2025 Julius Malema found guilty of hate speech by Equality Court iReport South Africa Up Aug 28, 2025 SA Human Rights Commission to pursue sanctions against Malema after hate speech ruling news24 Up Aug 28, 2025 Malema guilty of hate speech with his call to kill The Citizen Up Aug 27, 2025 Nasionale dialoog méér as ’n ‘kumbaya-oomblik’ Netwerk 24 Up Aug 26, 2025 GovDem survey revealing deepening distrust of African immigrants is an alarm bell Daily Maverick: Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 26, 2025 Warning against inflated illegal immigration figures eNCA Up Aug 26, 2025 One year into GNU and trade department is missing in action Business Day: Tumi Tsehlo Up Aug 24, 2025 Operation Dudula: SA guarantees Mozambicans protection Weekly SA Mirror Up Aug 23, 2025 Operation Dudula’s vigilante crusade meets Parliament’s fury Sunday Tribune: Sizwe Dlamini Up Aug 23, 2025 Operation Dudula’s vigilante crusade meets Parliament’s fury Sunday Tribune: Sizwe Dlamini Up Aug 23, 2025 Operation Dudula’s vigilante crusade meets Parliament’s fury IOL: Sizwe Dlamini Up Aug 20, 2025 The watchdogs of democracy – the vital role of SA’s state institutions Daily Maverick: Nicola Bergsteedt Up Aug 20, 2025 Africa’s future must be funded by Africans Business Day: Odile Bulten & Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 12, 2025 Explainer: The National Dialogue CapeTalk: Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 11, 2025 National Dialogue is not about politicians talking, it’s about people doing Mail & Guardian: Klaus Kotzé Up Aug 6, 2025 Empowering small-scale fisheries Business Day: Samantha Williams Up Aug 3, 2025 Die land brand, maar Cyril is hand om die blaas met bevryder-broeders Netwerk24 Up Aug 1, 2025 Steps SA simply must take in an effort to secure a US trade deal Daily Maverick: William Gumede Up Jul 31, 2025 Net praat sonder ekonomiese groei sal land niks baat nie Die Burger: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 30, 2025 Africa, the US and the East: In search of balance in a changing world BuyPE.co.za Up Jul 29, 2025 Africa, the US and the East: In search of balance in a changing world Mail & Guardian: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 29, 2025 South African Don urges swift action to avert US tariffs, boost investment African Telescope: Olakunle Oyedunmola Up Jul 28, 2025 SA must take drastic action to avert US tariffs deadline and unblock investment Daily Maverick: William Gumede Up Jul 24, 2025 The National Dialogue: Solidarity not just a Moral Idea, it’s an Economic Necessity for South Africa African News Agency Up Jul 24, 2025 The National Dialogue: Solidarity not just a Moral Idea, it's an Economic Necessity for South Africa The Star: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 24, 2025 The National Dialogue: Solidarity not just a Moral Idea, it's an Economic Necessity for South Africa IOL: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 23, 2025 Niks sal kom van praat sonder ekonomiese groei nie Netwerk24: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 20, 2025 The challenge of cohesion: Lessons from Singapore for South Africa’s diverse tapestry Daily Maverick: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 16, 2025 Bank of China Johannesburg Branch and South African Inclusive Society Institute jointly organized a questionnaire survey on Chinese investors Tide News Up Jul 2, 2025 DA's call for civil society to boycott the National Dialogue Radio 786: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 2, 2025 National Dialogue | Call for all to engage and participate eNCA: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 1, 2025 Let’s not allow disagreements to derail national effort - ISI reacts to DA news24: Amanda Khoza Up Jul 1, 2025 Electoral Reform - Time to do it properly IRR: Marius Roodt Up Jun 25, 2025 Exploring political party funding disclosures msn.com: Zandile Khumalo Up Jun 25, 2025 Exploring political party funding disclosures eNCA: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 24, 2025 South Africa’s Youth Eye the Exit: Brain Drain Gathers Steam joburg(etc): Zaghrah Up Jun 23, 2025 Managing Diversity in South Africa: Learning from the UAE experience IOL: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 23, 2025 Managing diversity in South Africa: Learning from the UAE experience Trending Online Up Jun 23, 2025 Emigration warning for South Africa BusinessTech: Malcolm Libera Up Jun 23, 2025 4 years of the Political Funding Act: what works, what doesn’t – and what’s next? News24: Jan Gerber Up Jun 20, 2025 Equitable tax regime absent for very rich and multinationals Business Day: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 17, 2025 Suid-Afrika is verwond, maar nie verslaan IOL: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 17, 2025 Rethinking Leadership: A Diplomatic Reflection on US Global Primacy in a Changing World IOL: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 17, 2025 Rebuilding trust with the National Dialogue The Witness: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 13, 2025 Rebuilding trust is key to social cohesion Mail & Guardian: Tania Ajam & Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 13, 2025 'Kill the Boer' is legal but not wise in our fragile nation Daily maverick: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 12, 2025 Lied 'wettig, maar dwaas' Die Burger Up Jun 12, 2025 Inclusive Social Development: Promoting social inclusion and reducing inequality Parliamentary Research Unit Up Jun 12, 2025 Rebuilding trust — the imperative of the National Dialogue for SA’s future Daily Maverick: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 11, 2025 Inclusive Society Institute welcomes dialogue idea Newzroom Afrika: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 11, 2025 South Africa secures R26bn infrastructure loan eNCA: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 11, 2025 ‘Kill the Boer’ is wettig, maar onwys in brose SA Netwerk24: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 10, 2025 ConCourt shuts door on AfriForum over "Kill the Boer": Why they got it wrong BizNews: Sara Gon Up Jun 10, 2025 ConCourt shuts door on AfriForum over "Kill the Boer": Why they got it wrong IRR: Sara Gon Up Jun 10, 2025 AI and social media: A double-edged sword that demands responsibility Daily & Guardian: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 10, 2025 The ConCourt refused leave to appeal “Kill the boer” – was this wrong? Daily Friend: Sara Gon Up Jun 4, 2025 Words that wound — ‘Kill the Boer’ is legal, but not wise for a fragile South Africa Daily Maverick: Daryl Swanepoel Up May 31, 2025 Rich people flooding out of South Africa Daily Investor Up May 31, 2025 White Paper on National Labour Migration Policy for South Africa Department of Employment and Labour, South Africa Up May 28, 2025 Going for growth: Structural reforms are needed for economic recovery News24: William Gumede Up May 25, 2025 Grok 'white genocide' misinformation shows need for African-tailored AI algorithms BuyPE.co.za Up May 23, 2025 Grok reveals need for African AI Mail & Guardian: Nkateko Joseph Mabasa Up May 23, 2025 Grok reveals need for African AI Pressreader Up May 20, 2025 Budget: Building economic resilience through three strategic interventions Mail & Guardian: Jan van Heerden & Daryl Swanepoel Up May 16, 2025 SA op dieselfde vlak in terme van menseregte as Australië en VSA Valley FM Up May 15, 2025 Menseregte-barometer: Só vergelyk SA met ander G20-lande Netwerk24: Ané van Zyl Up May 15, 2025 Internal Question Paper National Council of Provinces Up May 7, 2025 SA's economy growth outlook growing increasingly dim Ladies House Up May 7, 2025 SA's economy growth outlook growing increasingly dim The Citizen: Ina Opperman Up May 1, 2025 South Africa: Why finance minister Godongwana will stay despite budget mess The Africa Report: Carien du Plessis Up Apr 28, 2025 New survey shows South Africans are not feeling tangible benefits from the GNU Radio 702: Mari Harris Up Apr 26, 2025 GNU popular, but people frustrated and sceptical: poll Daily Friend Up Apr 25, 2025 VAT deal saves the GNU just in time, as survey shows SA is fed up Daily Maverick: Ferial Haffajee Up Apr 23, 2025 Nation-building or nation-breaking? The GNU needs an identity reset Daily Maverick: Ferial Haffajee Up Apr 14, 2025 The fragility of the Government of National Unity — the risk is palpable Daily Maverick: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 4, 2025 DA wil nog aanbly in RNE - vir eers Die Burger: Dennis Delport, Llewellyn Prince en Raymond Willemse Up Apr 3, 2025 RNE | Peiling toon twyfel oor positiewe samewerking in regering van nasionale eenheid Netwerk24 Up Apr 3, 2025 Ipsos survey on the state of the GNU You FM: Mari Harris Up Apr 3, 2025 DA se deelname aan RNE bly in die weegskaal Netwerk24: Dennis Delport, Llewellyn Prince en Raymond Willemse Up Apr 2, 2025 Climate finance mechanisms must not deepen inequalities BusinessDay: Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 26, 2025 Hoe Musk en de Afrikaner lobby Trump bespelen nrc Up Mar 18, 2025 Focus on the 2024 Social Cohesion Index Research SAfm: The Morning Brief Up Mar 17, 2025 Consul General Pan Qingjiang celebrates women's cooperation between China and South Africa IOL: Jonisay Maromo Up Mar 6, 2025 Sports as a tool for unity MP Update: Tshepang Mokoena Up Mar 6, 2025 Sports as a tool for unity Bushbuckridge News Up Mar 5, 2025 Deputy President Paul Mashatile: Social Cohesion Dialogue EinPressWire Up Mar 5, 2025 Mashatile champions sports as a unifying force in SA sanews.gov.za Up Mar 5, 2025 South Africa: Mashatile Champions Sports As a Unifying Force in South Africa All Africa Up Mar 5, 2025 Sport as a Unifying Force: Paul Mashatile Calls for Greater Social Cohesion Devdiscourse Up Mar 4, 2025 Deputy President Paul Mashatile: Social Cohesion Dialogue gov.za Up Feb 28, 2025 Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Issues Discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Haberler Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum canligaste Up Feb 28, 2025 “Türkiye-Africa Media Forum” was held in Istanbul Ogretmenler Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum eurovizyon Up Feb 28, 2025 Türkiye-Africa Media Forum: The model implemented by Türkiye needs to be known more across the continent Milli Iradenin Sesi Star Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum 24 SAAT Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication issues were discussed at the Türkiye-Africa Media Forum. SonDakika Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Avrupa Gazete Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Bengü Türk Up Feb 28, 2025 Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Emphasis on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Gelen Harberler Up Feb 28, 2025 Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum aksiyon.com.tr Up Feb 28, 2025 Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Haberport Up Feb 28, 2025 Türkiye-Africa Media Forum: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication 8Sutun Up Feb 28, 2025 Public diplomacy and strategic communication discussed at Türkiye-Africa Media Forum Anadolu Agency Up Feb 28, 2025 “Türkiye-Africa Media Forum” was held in Istanbul İletişim Başkanlığı Up Feb 24, 2025 A national dialogue must be people-centred for SA to thrive Mail & Guardian: Klaus Kotzé Up Feb 21, 2025 Is technology bad for social cohesion in SA? It seems so Times LIVE: Mpho Mcnamee Up Feb 19, 2025 Trump tariff fest poses a threat to SA exports Business Day: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 19, 2025 Make plans to secure the US market because Trump tariffs will hurt Business Day: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 14, 2025 2024 Social Cohesion Index eNCA The South African Morning: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 13, 2025 Limpopo has more social cohesion levels than KZN - Research eNCA: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 12, 2025 Citizens Corner: Social cohesion on the decline, how do we turn things around? SAfm The Talking Point: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 12, 2025 Indeks meet Sosiale Kohesie in Suid-Afrika vandag NG Kerk in Oos-Kaapland: Danie Mouton Up Feb 12, 2025 Being proudly South African is powerful unifying force iTWeb: Serame Taukobong Up Feb 12, 2025 Insights from the 2024 SA social cohesion index Cape Times: Mpho Mcnamee Up Feb 12, 2025 Insights from the 2024 SA social cohesion index The Mercury: Mpho Mcnamee Up Feb 12, 2025 Our pride in being South African is the glue that holds us together Engineering News Up Feb 7, 2025 Cooperative government is key to a prosperous future for SA Daily Maverick: William Gumede Up Feb 7, 2025 Planning is vital to reduce climate 'transition shock' Farmer's Weekly SA: Annelie Coleman Up Feb 7, 2025 The South Africa Social Cohesion Index: Measuring the well-being of a society Polity Up Feb 7, 2025 Planning is vital to reduce climate 'transition shock' Farmer's Weekly: Annelie Coleman Up Feb 5, 2025 Keynote address by Deputy President Shipokosa Paulus Mashatile at the launch of the 2024 South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI), Western Cape The Presidency Up Feb 5, 2025 Social Cohesion Index | 'Building the country together' - Paul Mashatile SABC News Up Feb 5, 2025 2024 Social Cohesion Index | 'SA compares favourably with countries like Germany': Daryl Swanepoel SABC News: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 5, 2025 Launch of 2024 Social Cohesion Index Research SABC News: Keith Khoza Up Feb 4, 2025 Deputy President Mashatile to deliver keynote address at the launch of the 2024 Social Cohesion Index Research The Presidency Up Feb 4, 2025 The annual BPI lecture TimesLIVE Up Jan 30, 2025 With the GNU comes hope, a sense of fresh energy and new talent Daily Maverick: William Gumede Up Jan 26, 2025 AI will supercharge South African businesses City Press: Lars Gumede Up Jan 20, 2025 Forging a unique South African identity Mail & Guardian: William Gumede Up Jan 10, 2025 Strategies for a green economy in SA BusinessDay: William Gumede Up Jan 7, 2025 What we can learn from global public sector AI successes BusinessDay: Lars Gumede Up Up

Media Releases & Op-eds Oct 17, 2025 Op-ed: When power refuses to evolve: Rethinking global governance by Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 27, 2025 Press Release: Inclusive Society Institute on Malema hate speech ruling by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 27, 2025 Press Release: GovDem survey reveals rising distrust toward African immigrants in South Africa by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 22, 2025 Press Release: Inclusive Society Institute warns against inflated illegal immigration figures and unlawful vigilantism by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 21, 2025 Op-ed: The watchdogs of democracy: The vital role of South Africa's state institutions by Nicola Bergsteedt Up Aug 20, 2025 Op-ed: Africa's future must be funded by Africans by Odile Bulten & Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 12, 2025 Op-ed: The National Dialogue is not about politicians talking. It is about people doing by Klaus Kotzé Up Jul 30, 2025 Op-ed: Navigating Africa's future in the face of shapeshifting global forces by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 30, 2025 Op-ed: Rebuilding trust: The imperative of the National Dialogue for South Africa's future by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 30, 2025 Op-ed: Africa, America and the East: In search of balance in a shifting world by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 25, 2025 Op-ed: Empowering small-scale fisheries for a sustainable and inclusive Blue/Oceans Economy in South Africa by Samantha Williams Up Jul 25, 2025 Op-ed: The National Dialogue: It cannot be business as usual - Social cohesion is key to South Africa's economic renewal by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 25, 2025 Op-ed: The National Dialogue: Solidarity is not just a moral ideal by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 22, 2025 Op-ed: Weaving a nation: Lessons from Singapore for South Africa's cohesion journey by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 17, 2025 Op-ed: A just global tax system - Balancing idealism and realism in the Developing World's fight for fairness by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 17, 2025 Op-ed: Rethinking leadership: A diplomatic reflection on US global primacy in a changing world by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 1, 2025 Press Release: A time for unity and collective action - Withdrawal from National Dialogue is counter-productive by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jun 22, 2025 Op-ed: Managing diversity in South Africa: Learning from the UAE experience by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 22, 2025 Press Release: Inclusive Society Institute CEO calls for just and inclusive global financial reform at the Think-Tank 20 (T20) Mid-Year Conference by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jun 18, 2025 Press Release: Political funding disclosure must match public support - Swanepoel by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jun 10, 2025 Op-ed: AI and social media: A double-edged sword that demands global responsibility by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 10, 2025 Press Release: Inclusive Society Institute welcomes World Bank Infrastructure Development Loan by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jun 6, 2025 Op-ed: Words that wound: "Kill the boer" is legal, but not wise for a fragile South Africa by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 30, 2025 Op-ed: Going for growth: Structural reforms needed for economic recovery by William Gumede Up May 21, 2025 Op-ed: G20 Human Rights Barometer: A red flag for global accountability by André Gaum & Daryl Swanepoel Up May 20, 2025 Op-ed: Going for growth: Structural reforms needed for economic recovery by William Gumede Up May 20, 2025 Op-ed: Economic resilience through strategic interventions by Jan van Heerden & Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 22, 2025 Op-ed: The Fragility of the Government of National Unity: A Critical Examination by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 3, 2025 Press Release: South Africans express doubts about GNU's cooperation and effectiveness by Ipsos and Inclusive Society Institute Up Mar 24, 2025 Op-ed: The urgency of fair climate finance for developing nations by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 12, 2025 Op-ed: No national dialogue if deferred by Klaus Kotzé Up Feb 12, 2025 Op-ed: Trump tariff fest threatens South African exports by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 21, 2025 Op-ed: A credo for a new South Africaness by William Gumede Up Dec 2, 2024 Op-ed: Trump threatens 100% tariffs on BRICS countries by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 29, 2024 Op-ed: How cohesive is South African society? by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 29, 2024 Op-ed: South Africa's Social Cohesion Crisis by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 27, 2024 Media Release: Launch of the South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI) at the Social Cohesion Roundtable hosted by the National Planning Commission at the Union Buildings, Pretoria, on 26 November 2024 by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 22, 2024 Op-ed: The Electoral Reform consultation panel call for public submissions by Daryl Swanepoel Up Oct 22, 2024 Op-ed: Strong enforcement needed to curb Human Rights abuses by André Gaum and Daryl Swanepoel Up Oct 2, 2024 Op-ed: The National Dialogue: Pathway to a people's plan for South Africa by Klause Kotzé Up Sep 12, 2024 Op-ed: Proposed Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill is flawed by Daryl Swanepoel Up Sep 12, 2024 Op-ed: Can South Africa learn from Finland's model for social cohesion by Nicola Bergsteedt and Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 23, 2024 Op-ed: Government of National Unity met with positive response by Roelof Botha & Daryl Swanepoel Up Aug 22, 2024 Op-ed: South Africa’s national interest must be people-centred and pragmatic by Klaus Kotzé Up Jul 1, 2024 Op-ed: A new council for better global governance by Buyelwa Sonjica and Dr Klaus Kotzé Up Jul 1, 2024 Op-ed: Assessing institutional capacities to deliver in a changing world by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 25, 2024 Op-ed: Proposed Government of National Unity promises an exciting and inclusive future by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 24, 2024 Op-ed: South Africa is getting healthier? by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jun 3, 2024 Op-ed: South Africa is getting safer? by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 21, 2024 Op-ed: Voluntary Government of National Unity - an alternative to messy coalition government by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 21, 2024 Op-ed: China is an important African partner by Klaus Kotzé Up May 21, 2024 Op-ed: A constructive contribution to re-energize South Africa by Buyelwa Sonjica and Klaus Kotzé Up May 6, 2024 Op-ed: 2024 National Assembly Election: Two ballot papers - both of equal importance by Jørgen Elklit Up Apr 26, 2024 Op-ed: Developing an instrument to assess levels of social cohesion in SA by Klaus Boehnke and Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 17, 2024 Media Release: Scrapping of Gauteng e-Tolls welcomed, but defaulters still have to pay by Inclusive Society Institute Up Apr 16, 2024 Op-ed: The manifold challenges facing SA's Higher Education government policy by Dr Douglas Blackmur Up Apr 12, 2024 Op-ed: Voter registration mechanism needs to change by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 12, 2024 Op-ed: Managing social cohesion in diverse communities by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 3, 2024 Op-ed: Misrepresenting Polls Does Democracy A Disservice by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 25, 2024 Op-ed: UN summit of the future: On track to nowhere? by Nicola Bergsteedt and Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 11, 2024 Media Release: Mistrust in immigrants threatens social cohesion by Inclusive Society Institute Up Mar 5, 2024 Op- ed: A Critical Review of the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 21, 2024 Op-ed: Embracing Flexicurity: Lessons from Denmark by Nicola Bergsteedt Up Feb 9, 2024 Op-ed: Navigating the complexities of coalition politics in South African municipalities by Nondumiso Sithole Up Feb 9, 2024 Op-ed: Growth drivers coming to the fore by Roelof Botha and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 7, 2024 Op-ed: Coalitions: Lessons from Finland by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 1, 2024 Media Release: Intent to emigrate remains disturbingly high by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jan 23, 2024 Op-ed: Who do we listen to? The human cost of war and its global impact by Buyelwa Sonjica Up Jan 16, 2024 Op-ed: Economic pandemic: Organised crime’s stranglehold on South Africa by Daryl Swanepoel Up Dec 14 , 2023 O p-ed: Leveraging Special Economic Zones for Growth by William Gumede Up Nov 29 , 2023 Op-ed: Many ethical hurdles to overcome in managing global population growth by Motsamai Molefe Up Nov 28 , 2023 Op-ed: Turnaround of construction sector is South African economy’s bellwether by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 20 , 2023 Op-ed: The United Nations must reform to represent the interests of the Global South by Klaus Kotzé Up Oct 18 , 2023 Op- ed: Reimagining Global Governance: A Call for Equitable and Resilient Systems by Daryl Swanepoel Up Oct 13 , 2023 Op-ed: Why Building Global Resilience Is the Best Investment We Can Make Now by Buyelwa Sonjica Up Oct 4 , 2023 Op- ed: Re-modeling the BRICS New Development Bank by William Gumede Up Sep 21 , 2023 Op- ed: Growth drivers coming to the fore by Roelof Botha & Daryl Swanepoel Up Sep 19 , 2023 Op- ed: The Progressive Realisation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: Albie Sachs' Pioneering Role by Nicola Jo Bergsteedt Up Aug 17 , 2023 Op-ed: Ensuring Administrative Justice for a Truly Inclusive Society by Inclusive Society Institute in collaboration with the Daily Maverick Up Jul 25 , 2023 Op-ed: The Vital Role of Participatory Democracy in Building a Just and Inclusive Society by Inclusive So ciety Institute in collaboration with the Daily Maverick Up Jul 12 , 2023 Op -ed: The global development and security initiatives: Safeguarding our global village by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 12 , 2023 Op -ed: Navigating China-Africa cooperation within a globally constrained environment by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 12 , 2023 Op -ed: New global trade and investment thinking by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 3 , 2023 Op -ed: Trust – the ‘glue’ that binds society together – is missing in SA by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 29 , 2023 Op-ed: Gender inequality - Men’s involvement in care: Contemplating the glass escalator by Nicole Daniels, Jodi Wishnia and Daryl Swanepoel Up May 22 , 2023 Op-ed: The personal is political: our families are blueprints for society by Jodi Wishnia and Daryl Swanepoel Up May 15 , 2023 Op-ed: Understanding gender inequality in caregiving and families by Nicole Daniels and Daryl Swanepoel Up May 9 , 2023 Me d ia Release: Intent to emigrate decreases but remains a risk Findings from the Inclusive Society Institute's GovDem Poll Up May 8 , 2023 Op-ed: Beyond Colonialism: Türkiye's Unique Approach to Africa by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 2 , 2023 Media Release: Mistrust in immigrants remains alarmingly high Findings from the Inclusive Society Institute's GovDem Poll Up Apr 25 , 2023 Med ia Release: An opposition coalition at the national level is highly unlikely Findings from the Inclusive Society Institute's GovDem Poll Up Apr 17 , 2023 Media Release: Comment on President Ramaphosa assents to the Electoral Amendment Bill by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 13, 2023 Media Release: Writing off outstanding E-Tolls under the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 22, 2023 O p-e d: A strong democracy comes with a price tag – and it’s worth every cent by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 22, 2023 Op-e d: Social Cohesion: Getting Symbolism, Action and Rhetoric Right by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 8, 2023 M edia Release : Inclusive Society Institute calls on President Ramaphosa to consider constitutionality of Electoral Amendment Bill by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 3, 2023 Op-e d: Born free, but not fair: Solutions to tackle youth inequality and unemployment in South Africa - Considered solutions to closing the gap on youth inequality and unemployment by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 28, 2023 Op-e d: Born free, but not fair: 5 ways we can support SA’s teens to stay in school w ithout interventions along their life cycle, kids could well become the “disaffected youth” as early inequality gets compounded from birth, through school, and beyond. by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 20, 2023 Op-e d: Born free, but not fair: Setting the foundation for long-term learning and earning Interventions that support childhood development in the first 1,000 days of a child’s life have the potential to radically shift South Africa’s current inequality crisis. by Michelle Flowers and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 16, 2023 Op-e d: Multi-Member Constituency model trumps Single Seat Constituency model by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 14, 2023 Op-ed: Born free, but not fair by Nicole Daniels and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 8, 2023 Op-ed: Coalitions must be built on trust and generosity by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 8, 2023 Op-ed: Born free, but not fair: Understanding youth inequality Youth inequality accumulates over a life course, but there are critical moments where policy and programming can intervene to alleviate inequality and safeguard more just futures for young people by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 3, 2023 Op-ed: Sustainable population and possible standards of living by Anton Cartwright Up Feb 3, 2023 Op-ed: Automatic voter registration: removing the thorn in the side of SA’s democracy by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 23, 2023 Op-e d: African Philosophy and Social Justice: The inclusiveness and limitations of a continent’s political thought by Mutshidz Maraganedzha Up Jan 20, 2023 Op-e d: Rise civil society: A new year’s resolution by Klaus Kotzé Up Jan 13, 2023 Op-ed: End the Social Compact tug-of-war: Lessons from Denmark by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 9 , 2022 Op-Ed: Parliament persists in passing an unconstitutional Electoral Amendment bill by Inclusive Society Institute Up Nov 2 , 2022 Op-Ed: Democratising the United Nations by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 27 , 2022 Op-Ed: A people-driven state is required for national renewal by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 24 , 2022 Op-Ed: Contractionary fiscal consolidation versus expansionary stimulus implications for growth, employment and debt by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 16 , 2022 Op-Ed: The world is on shaky ground, with South Africa no different by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 12 , 2022 Op-Ed: UN Security Council Reform - A New Approach to Reconstructing the International Order by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 06 , 2022 Op-Ed: The need for an evidence-based response to addressing Xenophobia in SA. The importance of addressing the real drivers of Xenophobia and Xenophobic vilolence. by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 15, 2022 Op-Ed: SA must pull up its socks or tourism rebound may be short-lived by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 08, 2022 Op-Ed: Challenges and solutions for local economic development in the City of Ekurhuleni by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 05, 2022 Op-Ed: Climate change adaptation and resilience: An analysis of some Global and National Measures by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 29, 2022 Media Release: Proposals to remedy current deficiencies in the proposed NHI bill by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 23, 2022 Op-Ed: Grease the gears so the economic wheels can turn by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 27, 2022 Op-Ed: As long as we keep failing our youth, the cycle of inequality will remain unbroken by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 21, 2022 Media Release: Trust deficit between civil society and SAPS is flaming lawlessness in South Africa by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 05, 2022 Op-Ed: Challenges and opportunities to enhance social mobilisation to combat corruption by Prof Evangelos Mantzaris Up Jun 28, 2022 Op-Ed: Towards a national commitment by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up May 26, 2022 Op-Ed: Social Cohesion: Taking stock of South Africa’s socio-political strategy by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up May 26, 2022 Op-Ed: Get the basics right to reboot growth by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 11, 2022 Op-Ed: The preconditions for a South African welfare state by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up Apr 11, 2022 Op-Ed: Leveraging ideas of hope to reduce inequality in South Africa by Anja Smith, Jodi Wishnia, Carmen Christian and Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 11, 2022 Op-Ed: The Russia-Ukraine conflict: Impact on South Africa, fellow BRICS members and Africa by William Gumede Up Apr 07, 2022 Op-Ed: The establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 06, 2022 Op-Ed: Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - a labour sector perspective by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 28, 2022 Op-Ed: Efficient logistics needed to keep agri-exports on the right track by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 14, 2022 Op-Ed: Back to basics to better economy - Getting fundamentals right will reverse economic woes by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 10, 2022 Op-Ed: Crisis in Europe highlights critical importance of self-sufficient, secure and stable energy production by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 16, 2022 Social Democracy: A pathway for South Africa's development by Dr Klause Kotzé Up Feb 03, 2022 WEF Global Risks Report 2022 suggests it cannot be business as usual Up Feb 02, 2022 Preventing corruption is the key by Willie Hofmeyr Up Jan 31, 2022 South Africa investing in the ICT sector is a no-brainer by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 28, 2022 The effects of corruption by Prof Pregala Solosh Pillay Up Jan 17, 2022 Anti-corruption agencies need to be nurtured by Prof Andrew Spalding Up Jan 13, 2022 Different types of anti-corruption agencies by Drago Kos Up Jan 12, 2022 Construction sector: A friend in need is a friend indeed. Let the private sector help Up Dec 7, 2021 Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - a retail sector perspective Up Dec 3, 2021 Speech delivered by Vusi Khanyile, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute, to the Integritasza Conference, Wellington, South Africa Up Nov 11, 2021 ISI meets Deputy Minister of Finance - Present NHI and Inequality research outcomes Up Nov 8, 2021 Op-Ed: Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - A SMME sector perspective Up Nov 8, 2021 Op-Ed: South Africa needs an urgent national security and intelligence assessment Up Nov 2, 2021 ANC support dips, but it is still best placed to win local government election Up Nov 2, 2021 Op-Ed: SA's Jekyll and Hyde economy has investors second guessing Up Sep 16, 2021 Op-Ed: Would you choose NHI as our universal health care scheme if you knew the costs twenty years from now? Up Sep 15, 2021 Op-Ed: Local government challenges: How far have we come? Up Sep 8, 2021 Op-Ed: South African courts: Are they guilty of judicial overreach or merely upholding the rule of law? Up Sep 6, 2021 Op-Ed: Assessing crime intelligence in South Africa Up Aug 27, 2021 Op-Ed: Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden administration and its nexus with China Up Aug 26, 2021 Achieving wellbeing equa lity for South Africans: a dream that shouldn’t be deferred by the Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 13, 2021 Op-Ed: Reviving factories can fire up a much-needed growth engine Up Aug 11, 2021 South Africa's developmental model: The significance of state-owned enterprises Up Jun 23, 2021 Challenging climate change: The transition to a sustainable economy Up Jun 10, 2021 No quick fixes for SA's woes but glimmer of hope on the horizon Up May 31, 2021 Restoring faith in South Africa key to rejuvenating the economy Up May 5, 2021 Survey suggests voter support for party system in SA Up Apr 8, 2021 ISI presents electoral system proposals to IEC Up Mar 16, 2021 COVID-19: Severe blow to long-term employment prospects Up Jan 28, 2021 Speech by Daryl Swanepoel, CEO, Inclusive Society Institute, South Africa: International Conference on Poverty Alleviation: China's rationale, Beijing, China Up Jan 25, 2021 Op-Ed: Slowing the population growth is vital for South Africa's economic recovery Up Dec 11, 2020 Op-Ed: The US-China-Africa nexus under a Biden administration Up Dec 11, 2020 Op-Ed: ISI Annual Lecture with Justice Albie Sachs Prosperity through inclusivity Up Aug 13, 2020 Op-Ed: South African and the 12th summit of BRICS Up Aug 12, 2020 Op-Ed: Universal Health Coverage pathways for South Africa Areas of misalignment between stakeholders on the NHI Bill require further engagement Up Aug 11, 2020 Universal Health Coverage pathways for South Africa Areas of misalignment between stakeholders on the NHI Bill require further engagement Up Aug 3, 2020 Op-Ed: COVID-19 US-China discord and its impact on Sino-South African relations Up Jul 21, 2020 LGBT+ survey findings Survey on everyday experience of the LGBT+ communicy finds inequality and discrimination still rife, and mental health potentially a crisis in the making Up Jul 14, 2020 National health insurance Bill Parliament's Portfolio Committee would be well-advised first to obtain legal clarity on constitutionality Up May 20, 2020 COVID-19 ANC members and supporters show overwhelming support for government measures and ANC leadership, but are concerned about the future of the economy Up Apr 17, 2020 COVID-19 Survey: COVID-19 and its impact on the SMME sector Up Up