Regulating the Veto: A pragmatic path to United Nations Security Council reform

Daryl Swanepoel
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Occasional Paper 11/2025

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OCTOBER 2025

Daryl Swanepoel

Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University

(ND Co Admin; BPAHons; MPA)

Abstract

The veto power of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) remains the most contested design feature of contemporary collective security. Abolition is a recurrent demand, yet the legal and political barriers to Charter amendment render it unattainable in practice. This article argues that meaningful reform must pivot from abolishing the veto to regulating its use. After tracing the veto’s historical development and surveying the literature and policy advocacy around abolition, the article examines restraint initiatives (France–Mexico declaration, ACT Code of Conduct, General Assembly resolution 76/262) and proposes a ‘Veto Use Integrity Framework” (VUIF)’. The framework extends conflict-of-interest (COI) abstention logic, creates carve-outs for mass atrocities and humanitarian access and mandates written justification and ex post oversight. While abolition remains a normative ideal, a regulation-first strategy offers the only feasible route to a more legitimate and effective Security Council. This article also advances a complementary amendment to the General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace (UFP) framework. Currently, UFP resolutions are non-binding recommendations. The proposed reform would make them binding when supported by a majority of the P5, thus enhancing the authority of the General Assembly in cases of Security Council paralysis. Draft language for these amendments is included in Annexure A.

Introduction

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is simultaneously indispensable and constrained. It is indispensable, because Chapter VII powers enable binding decisions on peace and security, but it also constrained, because Article 27(3) grants each permanent member, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, a veto over “all other matters,” a design choice born of the 1945 bargain to keep the great powers inside the tent (UN, N.d.). The result is an enduring paradox, that is that the veto made the UNSC possible, but it often impairs its ability to respond in the gravest crises.

From Rwanda to Syria and Ukraine, the veto or its shadow has been implicated in high-stakes failures to protect civilians and uphold international law and therefore the moral appeal of abolition is obvious, but the practical obstacles are equally stark. The Charter’s amendment rule requires P5 consent, thus making self-abnegation the precondition for change, which is an implausible premise (UN, N.d.). The core claim here is therefore pragmatic. If the veto cannot be abolished, it can be bounded, legally through working methods, procedurally through General Assembly oversight and politically through sustained norm entrepreneurship (Hathaway & Patrick, 2024). It is in this context that the Uniting for Peace mechanism takes on renewed significance: strengthening its authority would provide the General Assembly with a conditional binding role when the Council is paralysed (see Annexure A).

Historical background: design, doctrine and practice

The League of Nations’ unanimity rule and major-power estrangement shaped the UN’s framers, who concluded that a credible collective security system required guaranteed great-power participation and a blocking right. The “Yalta formula” was therefore inscribed in Article 27: nine affirmative votes (originally seven, amended with Council enlargement) including the concurring votes of the permanent members, with an obligatory abstention when a party is involved in a dispute under Chapter VI or Article 52(3) (UN, N.d.). In practice, “concurring votes” has long been read to include P5 abstentions, not just affirmative votes, so an abstention does not kill a text (Galbraith, N.d.)

The operational life of the veto evolved across three phases. During the Cold War, vetoes were frequent and largely bipolar. After 1990, the Council briefly coordinated on major enforcement, for example, Iraq/Kuwait, before veto politics reasserted themselves on accountability and humanitarian files (Wilkinson & O’Sullivan, 2004). Since 2011, Russia and China have used the veto repeatedly on Syria; Security Council Report counts 14 of Russia’s first 19 post-2011 vetoes as Syria-related, with eight of China’s nine in the same period on Syria (UN, 2024). The UN’s own Peace and Security Data Hub maintains an authoritative dataset of all vetoes since 1946 (UN DPPA, N.d).

The abolitionist case and its structural limits

The normative case against the veto is three-fold. First, it violates sovereign equality by privileging five states. Second, it erodes perceived legitimacy when one state can block action backed by an overwhelming majority. Third, it contributes to preventable harm by enabling stalemate in atrocity settings. Syria supplies the canonical example: Russia and China vetoed multiple resolutions on accountability and humanitarian access, including the 22 May 2014 attempt to refer Syria to the ICC (UN Press, 2014). Earlier, on 4 October 2011, they vetoed a text condemning grave human rights violations (UN Press, 2011).

Yet, abolition flounders on black-letter law and bare-knuckle politics. Article 108 demands two-thirds of UN members including all P5 to ratify any Charter amendment (UN, N.d.). Each P5 sees the veto as an existential insurance policy against perceived interventionism (Russia/China) (The Economist, 2022), against constraints on Middle East policy (United States) (Gowan, 2024) or as a lever of global influence in relative decline (United Kingdom/France) (Tardy, 2016). Even if abolition were agreed in principle, the likely consequence would be great-power disengagement, recreating the League’s fatal flaw.

From abolition to restraint: existing initiatives

Recognising the amendment roadblock, states and civil society have shifted to restraint. Three streams matter.

First, the France-Mexico political declaration (2015) calls on the P5 to voluntarily suspend the veto in situations of mass atrocities. Over 100 states have endorsed it (France-Mexico, 2015; GCRP, 2015). Second, the ACT Code of Conduct (2015) asks all Council members to avoid voting against credible drafts aimed at halting genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. The code was transmitted to the Secretary-General as A/70/621 (GCRP, 2015). Third, the General Assembly’s “veto initiative”, resolution 76/262 (2022), which automatically convenes a GA debate when any veto is cast, raising transparency and reputational costs (UN, 2022). These tools do not nullify the veto, but reframe costs and expectations around its use (Johnstone, 2003).

A regulation-first alternative: the Veto Use Integrity Framework (VUIF)

If abolition is implausible, the reform frontier is use-regulation that is (i) anchored in existing law and practice, (ii) operationalizable through UNSC working methods and GA oversight and (iii) politically survivable for the P5.

1. Conflict-of-interest (COI) abstention, extended

Article 27(3) already provides that “in decisions under Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. Contemporary dysfunctions typically arise under Chapter VII. The VUIF would adopt a Council working-methods note, a presidential note incorporated into the Council’s compendium of practices, extending the COI abstention norm to all substantive votes when a member is directly implicated (named in the operative text, a belligerent or occupying power or materially supporting parties to the conduct at issue). Disputes over COI would be decided as procedural and thus not subject to veto by nine votes (Council practice on procedural questions and the “double veto” debates) (Security Council Report, 2024). This deliberately uses the Council’s own methods toolkit rather than Charter amendment.

2. Substantive carve-outs: atrocities and humanitarian access

The VUIF would codify a presumption against veto in (a) situations where the Secretary-General, OHCHR or a UN investigative mechanism reports a credible risk or commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and (b) resolutions whose primary purpose is humanitarian access, deconfliction or sanctions humanitarian carve-outs. This operationalises the France-Mexico declaration and the ACT Code into Council practice, moving from voluntary pledges to institutionalised expectations.

3. Transparency and written justification

Any veto, or public threat of a veto, would require a written justification submitted before the vote is taken, which justification should address an atrocity-risk assessment and COI. The justification would be annexed to the Council record and automatically transmitted to the GA under 76/262, thereby ensuring rapid and visible scrutiny (UN, 2022). And an independent briefing by SG, ICRC and/or UN investigative bodies, before votes where restraint could apply, would test the credibility of pretexts (Johnstone, 2003).

4. Oversight: scorecards and Uniting for Peace

Building on 76/262, the GA would maintain a public scorecard tracking compliance with COI abstention and atrocity/humanitarian carve-outs. Where a veto blocks life-saving action notwithstanding these standards, the GA would move promptly under 377(V) “Uniting for Peace” to recommend collective measures that do not require Council authorisation (UN, 1950). The aim is not to override a veto, but to raise the cost of misusing it and keep alternative tracks moving.

At present, however, Uniting for Peace resolutions are only recommendatory. They have political and moral force, but no binding legal effect. In order to close this gap, the proposed amendment would stipulate that where a Uniting for Peace resolution secures support from a majority of the P5, the decision shall be binding on all UN Member States; and abstentions would be treated as non-opposition, unless a permanent member explicitly casts a negative vote. This approach ties General Assembly authority to a measure of great-power concurrence while ensuring that a single veto cannot paralyse action indefinitely. Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A.

Complementary reform: Amending the Uniting for Peace framework

The Uniting for Peace resolution was designed to empower the General Assembly to act when the Security Council fails due to lack of unanimity among the P5 and in so doing it provides for the Assembly to recommend measures, including collective action, but it does not grant legally binding authority. This limitation has curbed its effectiveness.

The proposed amendment would transform Uniting for Peace into a conditional binding mechanism. When a resolution is adopted under UFP and supported by a majority of the P5, it would carry binding effect equivalent to Security Council decisions under Article 25 of the Charter. Certification by the Secretary-General would confirm whether the requisite majority is met, and such certification would be annexed to the GA record. This reform strengthens collective security while maintaining safeguards: no measure could become binding absent concurrence from most permanent members.

Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A.

Working methods vs. Charter amendment: Pathways for reform

A crucial distinction must be drawn between reforms that can be achieved through changes to the Security Council’s working methods or General Assembly practice and those that require a formal amendment of the Charter.

Changes through working methods

The majority of the proposals contained in the Veto Use Integrity Framework (VUIF) fall into the category of working methods reform. These are adjustments that can be adopted through Security Council presidential notes, incorporated into the Council’s compendium of practices or mandated through General Assembly resolutions without formally reopening the Charter. They include:

Conflict-of-interest abstentions. The requirement in Article 27(3) can be extended to encompass all substantive votes where a permanent member is directly implicated, which can be operationalised through a presidential note. Whilst it will not be legally binding, such guidance would shape practice and be enforceable through procedural votes that are not subject to a veto.
Substantive carve-outs. By establishing a presumption against the veto in cases of mass atrocities and humanitarian access, which builds directly on the France - Mexico and ACT initiatives, these commitments could be codified as standard working practices of the Council.
Transparency measures. Permanent members could be obligated to issue written justifications for actual or threatened vetoes. It can be instituted by Council practice and reinforced by the General Assembly’s 76/262 mechanism, which automatically triggers GA debate.
Oversight mechanisms. Scorecards and reporting systems could be maintained by the General Assembly in order to track compliance with restraint norms. This can be introduced without altering the Charter.

In short, regulation of the veto’s use, its conditions, justification and scrutiny, can be advanced through procedural innovations and practice-based reforms. These do not formally curtail the veto right, but they increase reputational and political costs of its misuse.

Changes requiring Charter amendment

By contrast, reforms that alter the legal authority of UN organs or the substantive scope of the veto require a Charter amendment under Article 108, meaning approval by two-thirds of the membership including all P5 and these will include:

The abolition or limitation of the Veto by removing or restricting the veto in specific subject areas, for example, atrocity crimes, would require an amendment to Article 27 of the Charter.
Changing voting formulas, because any redefinition of “concurring votes” or alteration of the relationship between permanent and non-permanent members in decision-making would necessitate amending Article 27.
Binding effect of General Assembly resolutions: At present, Articles 10 - 12 of the Charter limit GA authority to recommendations. The proposal to make Uniting for Peace resolutions binding when supported by a majority of the P5 would thus require a formal Charter amendment to extend the Assembly’s competence.

Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A.

Implications

This distinction underscores why the regulation-first strategy is more feasible in the near term. Changes to working methods can be secured by political agreement and institutional practice. However, the amendment of the Charter, particularly to empower the General Assembly under Uniting for Peace, would mark a structural shift in the allocation of authority under the UN system and faces significant political hurdles given that P5 consent is indispensable.

Case illustrations: how regulation would have mattered

Syria

As already referred to, Russia and China vetoed a draft on 4 October 2011, condemning grave violations, and they later vetoed a text threatening Chapter VII measures. Then on 22 May 2014, they vetoed an ICC referral. Under the VUIF, (i) COI abstention could have been triggered for a state materially supporting parties, (ii) atrocity carve-outs would have strongly counselled against vetoing an accountability referral and (iii) written justifications and a GA scorecard would have elevated reputational costs, potentially shifting bargaining baselines in later humanitarian-access renewals.

Rwanda

The 1999 Independent Inquiry documented systemic failures that culminated in inaction during the genocide (UN S/1999/1257) (UN, 1999). While there was no formal veto, the logic of VUIF, that is independent briefings before protection votes, a standing atrocity carve-out and a GA backstop, would have created stronger procedural rails against drift.

Ukraine (Crimea, 2014; invasion, 2022)

Russia vetoed condemning texts; China abstained (Milano, 2015). Under VUIF, COI abstention would clearly apply to a belligerent, because disputes about applicability would be treated as procedural (no veto) and sent to a vote of nine. Even if Moscow ignored the expectation, the GA scorecard, plus Uniting for Peace, would have deepened the multilateral response record and policy pressure.

Why regulation is more feasible than abolition

Three reasons. First, law-in-practice. The Council’s working methods and GA practice have been fertile ground for meaningful change without Charter amendment. The 76/262 “veto initiative” has already shifted incentives by guaranteeing post-veto debate. Second, political economy. Constraining use while preserving the right should be tolerable to at least some P5, for example, France has publicly campaigned for atrocity-context restraint (France, 2023). Third, norm dynamics. Once articulated and socialised, expectations of restraint harden, reputational costs accumulate and can change state behaviour at the margin (Johnstone, 2003).

Objections include the “soft law” critique, but what if a P5 ignores the framework? The answer is that no single instrument can compel a veto-holder, but coupling Council working methods with GA transparency and Uniting for Peace raises the costs of misuse, keeps humanitarian tracks open in subsidiary bodies and sustains a public record of (non-)compliance that matters over time, for alliance-management, domestic scrutiny and broader legitimacy.

Conclusion

Abolishing the veto would be normatively satisfying and under current conditions, politically impossible. The Charter requires the consent of those whose privileges abolition would target and therefore the great-power bargain that sustains the Council would likely collapse without their blocking right. The regulation-first agenda outlined here, COI abstention, atrocity and humanitarian carve-outs, written justification, GA review and Uniting for Peace linkage, does not pretend to dissolve hard power. It does aim to discipline it. This shift reframes the veto from an unreviewable prerogative into a responsibility that must be explained, bounded and, when abused, politically costly.

Coupled with the proposed amendment to the Uniting for Peace framework, which would make certain General Assembly resolutions binding when supported by a majority of the P5, this package of reforms strengthens both oversight and responsiveness. In a world where perfect justice is unattainable, that is how the Security Council and the wider UN system can become more legitimate and effective now, without waiting for a Charter amendment that will not come.

References

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French Republic & Republic of Mexico. 2015. Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Case of Mass Atrocities. Paris/New York. [Online] Available at: https://onu.delegfrance.org/IMG/pdf/2015_08_07_veto_political_declaration_en.pdf [accessed 17 September 2025]

Galbraith, J. N.d. [Online] Available at: Notes and Comments. EndingSsecurity Council Resolution. Cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/proposals-for-un-security-council-reform/2D26E684DCC727D9D06480E652FB3327 [accessed: 17 September 2025]

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Annexure A

DRAFT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

1. Amendment to Article 27 (Voting in the Security Council)

Insert a new paragraph after Article 27(3):

“In addition to the provisions above, the Security Council shall adopt working methods ensuring that a permanent member directly involved in a dispute under consideration shall abstain from voting on all substantive matters concerning that dispute. Disputes as to whether a member is directly involved shall be considered procedural and not subject to the veto.”

2. Amendment to Articles 10–12 (Functions and Powers of the General Assembly)

Amend Article 10 to add:

“In exceptional circumstances where the Security Council fails to act owing to the lack of unanimity among its permanent members, and the General Assembly considers a matter under the Uniting for Peace procedure, resolutions of the General Assembly shall be binding on all Members of the United Nations if supported by a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council. For the purposes of this Article, abstentions by permanent members shall not count as opposition unless a permanent member explicitly votes against.”

Amend Article 12(1) to add:

“This restriction shall not apply to resolutions adopted under the preceding Article when supported by a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council.”

3. Certification by the Secretary-General

Insert a new clause in Article 98:

“The Secretary-General shall certify whether resolutions adopted under the Uniting for Peace procedure have obtained the support of a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council, and such certification shall be annexed to the official record of the General Assembly.”

These amendments collectively preserve the primary responsibility of the Security Council while ensuring that in circumstances of deadlock, the General Assembly can act with binding authority where a majority of the P5 concur.

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