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On Monday, 25 August 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) hosted a high-level webinar entitled “Reform UN80: Renewal or Decline? The Future of Multilateralism at the United Nations’ 80th Anniversary.”  The event formed part of ISI’s ongoing consultations to shape its position on global governance reform.   The webinar brought together a distinguished panel of former senior United Nations officials and experts, who reflected on the UN Secretary-General’s Reform UN80 initiative, launched to ensure the organisation remains fit for purpose in a rapidly changing global order.   Key themes   Discussions were structured around four pressing questions:   The true aim of Reform UN80 and whether it represents genuine political renewal or merely administrative streamlining. The UN’s deepening budget crisis, including the political nature of arrears and the impact on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The rise of unilateralism and its implications for multilateral cooperation. The consequences of US-China rivalry for the UN system and the opportunities and risks this creates for the Global South, particularly Africa.   Speakers emphasised that while efficiency measures, such as mandate reviews and budget rationalisation are important, they cannot substitute for political renewal and trust in the UN’s Charter principles. They argued that Africa, and South Africa in particular, have a pivotal role to play in shaping reform outcomes and ensuring that the voices of the Global South are heard.   Conclusion   The consultation concluded that the UN stands at a crossroads: it can either enter a cycle of decline marked by financial fragility and great-power rivalry, or seize this reform moment to rebuild legitimacy, strengthen multilateralism and amplify the Global South’s agency.

The Inclusive Society Institute, represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, attended the Social Services Cluster Media and Stakeholder Briefing held on Thursday, 21 August 2025.   The theme of the briefing was “Ensuring open access and provision of quality social services to the people.” During the briefing, the work undertaken by each of the Committees was discussed as follows:   The Portfolio Committee on Health, Dr Sibongiseni Dhlomo,   will talk about: Tobacco Products and Electronic Delivery Systems Control Bill Operation Dudula at healthcare centres   The Portfolio Committee on Basic Education, Ms Joy Maimela, will talk about: Bela Act Regulations Safety in schools   The Select Committee on Education, Sciences and Creative Industries, Mr Makhi Feni will talk about: Threat of disruptions of schools when they open for 2026 on account of foreign nationals Exploring better ways of working with all civil society organisations on foreigners Legislative interventions, including Labour Migration Policy and Border Management Authority   The briefing provided an important platform for stakeholders to engage on key social development initiatives, highlight progress, and address pressing societal challenges. The Inclusive Society Institute remains committed to contributing towards building an inclusive and equitable society, and its participation in the session reaffirmed this dedication.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   August 2025   Rapporteur: Daryl Swanepoel CONTENTS   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CONTEXT AND RATIONALE KEY THEMES AND FINDINGS POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 1 INTRODUCTION 2 BACKGROUND 3 EVOLVING GEOPOLITICS AND AFRICA’S STRATEGIC NAVIGATION: INSIGHTS FROM THE US-AFRICA-CHINA NEXUS 3.1 SHIFTS IN US FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 3.2 STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA AND AFRICA’S ROLE 3.3 THE US POLICY SHIFT AWAY FROM DEMOCRATIC NORMS 3.4 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC RESPONSE AND AGENCY 3.5 DE-DOLLARISATION AND ECONOMIC AUTONOMY 3.6 INTERNAL CHALLENGES AND FOREIGN POLICY COHERENCE 3.7 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD 3.7.1 ADOPT A POLICY OF STRATEGIC NON-ALIGNMENT 3.7.2 LEVERAGE NATURAL RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT, NOT EXTRACTION 3.7.3 BUILD INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FOR COHERENT FOREIGN POLICY 3.7.4 STRENGTHEN REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 3.7.5 REFRAME AFRICA’S NARRATIVE ON THE GLOBAL STAGE 3.7.6 PURSUE FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY 3.7.7 ANCHOR FOREIGN POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC AND DEVELOPMENTAL VALUES 3.7.8 CONCLUSION 4 NAVIGATING THE AFRICA - CHINA - US NEXUS: STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES IN A LANDSCAPE OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSION: THE TRIANGULAR DIPLOMATIC DYNAMICS 4.1 CHINA’S ROLE IN AFRICA: MORE THAN INFRASTRUCTURE 4.2 THE US DIVERSION STRATEGY: COUNTERING CHINA THROUGH AFRICA 4.3 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC POSITIONING: DUAL ENGAGEMENT WITH A FOCUS ON AUTONOMY 4.4 HOW CHINA SHOULD RESPOND: BUILDING RESILIENCE IN AFRICAN PARTNERSHIPS 4.5 CONCLUSION: TOWARD A TRIANGULAR BALANCE 5 TRIANGULAR TRADE DYNAMICS: US, CHINA AND AFRICA IN ECONOMIC TENSION AND OPPORTUNITY 5.1 CHINA - AFRICA TRADE: SCALE, SPEED AND STRUCTURAL DOMINANCE 5.2 US - AFRICA TRADE: DECLINE, REDEFINITION AND OPPORTUNITY GAPS 5.3 TRADE AS GEOPOLITICAL LEVERAGE: THE RISK OF WEAPONISATION 5.4 AFRICA’S TRADE STRATEGY: TOWARD A BALANCED AND BENEFICIAL REGIME 5.5 CONCLUSION: TRADE AS A STRATEGIC LEVER, NOT A PASSIVE FLOW 6 CONTOURS OF CONTAINMENT: US – AFRICA - CHINA MILITARY AND SECURITY DYNAMICS 6.1 US SECURITY ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA: CONTAINMENT THROUGH COUNTERTERRORISM 6.2 CHINA’S EVOLVING SECURITY ROLE: FROM NON-INTERVENTION TO STRATEGIC POSITIONING 6.3 PEACE AND SECURITY AS A SITE OF COMPETITION, NOT COOPERATION 6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN AUTONOMOUS AFRICAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 6.5 CONCLUSION: FROM THEATRE OF RIVALRY TO ARENA OF SOVEREIGNTY 7 REFLECTIONS ON THE TRIANGULAR HORIZON: RETHINKING POWER, PARTNERSHIP AND PURPOSE 7.1 AFRICA AT THE CENTRE, NOT THE MARGIN 7.2 THE US AND CHINA: FROM COMPETITION TO CONSTRUCTIVE COEXISTENCE? 7.3 A CALL TO REIMAGINE PARTNERSHIP 7.4 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE IS NEGOTIATED, NOT INHERITED 8 FINAL WORD: AFRICA AS THE AUTHOR OF ITS OWN FUTURE IMAGE REFERENCES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   This report sets out to explore the evolving triangular relationship between the United States, China and Africa, which is an increasingly significant nexus that is shaping global power dynamics, trade, security and development. In drawing upon insights from a high-level webinar conducted under Chatham House Rules and guided by supporting reflections and research by the Inclusive Society Institute, the report examines the underlying forces, challenges and strategic options that are available to African policymakers in navigating this complex geopolitical terrain. CONTEXT AND RATIONALE   The return of President Donald Trump to the White House, combined with a resurgent China that has growing global ambitions and the sharpening rivalry between these two global powers, place Africa at a critical juncture. Both Washington and Beijing seek to advance their strategic interests on the continent, economically, diplomatically and militarily and yet their engagement styles, priorities and philosophies differ markedly. And as for Africa, the challenge and the opportunity now lies in it resisting binary choices and instead it should focus on charting a course that is rooted in agency, coherence and long-term development. KEY THEMES AND FINDINGS   Africa must claim its strategic agency  by repositioning itself, not as a passive recipient of global influence, but as a deliberate and autonomous actor. This involves rejecting Cold War-style alignment, defining clear development goals and leveraging global competition so as to secure better terms for trade, investment and technology.   China has established itself as Africa’s largest trading partner and focuses on infrastructure, extractives and bundled finance, whilst  US - Africa trade has declined and remains narrowly focused, but both powers use trade as a geopolitical instrument, often prioritising influence over development outcomes. Africa must therefore factor in the geopolitical and trade dynamics  by pushing for value addition, local manufacturing and regional integration, through initiatives such as the Africa Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Economic autonomy and de-dollarisation   and other emerging trends, including BRICS-led financial alternatives and local currency trade,  now offer new pathways for economic independence, which can help mitigate Africa’s over-reliance on the US dollar, which exposes it to external shocks and limits monetary sovereignty, but it requires strong institutions, regional coordination and political will. Peace and security tensions  are primarily the responsibility of Africans themselves. Currently, the US’s security engagement with Africa is increasingly shaped by counterterrorism and anti-China containment, while China has chosen to move cautiously into peacekeeping and to position itself in strategic geographical locations, but both approaches, nevertheless, risk militarising diplomacy and sidelining African peace frameworks.  Africa must therefore reaffirm ownership of its security agenda and demand transparency, accountability and multilateral cooperation. Africa must control the narrative and norm contestation  by taking control of its own story, one that highlights innovation, leadership and dignity, rather than dependency or vulnerability. Shaping the global narrative is not cosmetic, it is strategic and essential to redefining Africa’s place in world affairs. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS   Pursue a policy of principled non-alignment  in which Africa must maximise its  leverage by avoiding binary choices and engaging with both the US and China, based on clearly defined interests.   Build institutional and negotiation capacity  by strengthening technical expertise across foreign ministries, trade departments and regional bodies so as to ensure effective, sovereign engagement.   Promote Continental coherence  ought to be promoted by using platforms like the African Union and AfCFTA in order to avoid fragmented bargaining and in so doing set minimum standards for trade, debt and digital governance.   Financial and digital sovereignty  ought to be asserted through the continued development of its regional payment systems and data governance frameworks, so that it reflects African priorities, not those imposed externally.   Recalibrate security engagements  by ensuring that external military partnerships align with African peacebuilding goals and support the continent’s own security institutions.   Foster strategic communication and trust-building  by creating platforms for trilateral dialogue, not as adversarial blocs, but as co-stakeholders in global peace, prosperity and reform.   CONCLUSION   Africa sits at the centre of a shifting global order, an order defined not only by who holds power, but also by how that power is exercised. The triangular relationship between the US, China and Africa is not static, it is being actively negotiated. This negotiation must be led by African voices, guided by African values and directed toward African visions of justice, development and dignity.   Therefore, in a world which is fast moving toward multipolarity, Africa must insist on not just being a partner, but so too, a peer. 1 INTRODU CTION   The global geopolitical landscape is undergoing a period of profound transformation, which is marked by the resurgence of the great power syndrome and with shifting global alliances and nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, whose strategic importance is continuing to grow in the eyes of global powers.   The return of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States in 2025 has reignited debates over the nature and trajectory of US foreign policy and in this report the focus is on the US’s engagement with Africa and its increasingly adversarial stance toward China.   In response to these evolving dynamics and to better understand them, the Inclusive Society Institute convened a high-level webinar titled “Building US-Africa relations under the Trump administration and its nexus with China” , which webinar was hosted on 22 July 2025. This platform brought together distinguished thought leaders, policy and military/intelligence analysts from both the United States and South Africa to assess the implications of renewed US leadership on Africa’s development, diplomacy and global positioning.   The core premise of the webinar rested on the assumption that the Trump administration is likely to pursue a more transactional and assertive approach to international relations. This will undoubtedly also apply to Africa. Moreover, its competitive posture against China, will simultaneously be amplified, particularly in areas such as trade, investment, military presence and human rights. The complexity that this evolving relationship between the US and China presents, demands urgent attention and nuanced understanding and for the purposes of this report, also its ripple effects across African nations, lest policymakers are to be caught ill-prepared.   China has an entrenched economic footprint across Africa that spans infrastructure construction and financing, trade partnerships and development aid, and it has over the last few decades presented both opportunities and challenges for African governments. The US, meanwhile, remains a key diplomatic, security and development actor on the continent, whose policies continue to significantly influence both regional stability and governance trends on the continent. It is the intersection of these two global players' interests in Africa, and the risks and openings that it presents, especially for African countries who seek to balance external relations in order to protect domestic priorities, that is the interest of this report.   The webinar therefore sought to interrogate four pivotal questions, namely:   Firstly, what are the expectations of US policy toward Africa under the new Trump administration? Secondly, how might the hardening of US-China relations impact Africa? Thirdly, what stance is the US likely to adopt with regard to its military presence in Africa under the new administration and how will it view the presence of other global powers, such as China, who have operations on the continent? And finally, how should African nations position themselves to engage both the US and China diplomatically, economically and strategically?   This report sets out to present a comprehensive overview and critical analysis of the discussions held during the webinar. Its aim is to distil the key insights offered by panellists, in order to provide contextual understanding of current US-Africa-China dynamics and to offer strategic guidance to African policymakers and stakeholders on how best to navigate this complex trilateral relationship in the years ahead. 2 BACKGROUND   The geopolitical landscape in which Africa operates has shifted dramatically in recent years and it has been propelled by intensifying competition between global powers and a growing awareness within the continent of its own strategic value. Whilst traditionally, the continent has been viewed as the object of foreign influence, and often courted or neglected in cycles, Africa today stands at the intersection of powerful global currents emanating from both East and West and at the heart of this evolving terrain lies the complex trilateral relationship between Africa, the United States and China, a nexus that is increasingly shaping Africa’s policy decisions and long-term developmental path.   With the return of President Donald Trump to the White House, the United States has adopted a more forthright and transactional foreign policy posture and the rhetoric from Washington has grown sharper, signalling a shift not only in tone, but also in strategic orientation. The Trump administration’s scepticism toward multilateralism and traditional alliances, along with its firm stance on countering Chinese global influence, has profound implications for Africa, because now it has to distinguish between rhetorical novelty and genuine policy shifts and it has to respond, not as passive recipients of foreign policy, but as active agents capable of setting the terms of engagement.   Simultaneously, China’s role in Africa has expanded dramatically and has been marked by deepening trade relationships, infrastructure investments and diplomatic outreach. This presence, while often framed in strategic or even ideological terms by external observers, has increasingly become a routine part of Africa’s economic ecosystem, yet, growing global scrutiny of China’s influence, particularly from the US, has added pressure on African states to clarify their positions. The Trump administration’s likely intensification of this contest with China raises questions about how far it may go in discouraging African engagement with Beijing and whether this will manifest through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure or altered aid and investment patterns.   Beyond geopolitics, emerging global economic trends are also challenging Africa to rethink its place in the world economic order and so enters the de-dollarisation debate.   The rising interest in de-dollarisation and the development of alternative financial infrastructure, such as non-SWIFT payment systems and cross-currency trade settlements among BRICS countries, represent a broader push toward economic sovereignty and for many African policymakers, these innovations are more than technical adjustments, they are statements of autonomy and a reassertion of agency in a world where currency and finance remain tools of global influence.   Importantly, this moment presents not only risks, but also opportunities, given that Africa’s leverage is also increasing: its collective voice at the United Nations, its resource base, youthful population and rapidly expanding markets make it an indispensable player in any vision of global progress. Such leverage must, however,  be used wisely, since African countries face a fundamental choice, whether to align passively with the interests of foreign powers or to define their own path, one that is rooted in diversified partnerships, mutual benefit and long-term strategic thinking.   In this shifting environment, the notion that Africa has to “choose” between the East and West is becoming increasingly obsolete and instead, the continent must focus on achieving balance, asserting its priorities, cultivating agency and refusing to be cast merely as the arena in which others compete. As highlighted in the Inclusive Society Institute’s framing of this dialogue, the questions at hand are not just about policy, they are about sovereignty, vision and the role Africa wishes to play in shaping the 21st-century global order.   3 EVOLVING GEOPOLITICS AND AFRICA’S STRATEGIC NAVIGATION: INSIGHTS FROM THE US-AFRICA-CHINA NEXUS    3.1 SHIFTS IN US FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION   Since the return of President Donald Trump to the Oval Office in January, the US’s foreign policy has undergone a pronounced shift, both in terms of its tone and in its structure. Moreover, this transformation is grounded in a deeply nationalistic ethos that prizes unilateral decision-making and which is guided by transactional diplomacy and a reassertion of American primacy in global affairs. Africa, within this framework, is viewed by the administration less as a developmental or strategic partner in a collaborative sense, and more as a transactional space in which it the continent is valued by the Trump-administration primarily for its resources and its geopolitical position vis-à-vis rivals, such as China.   The “America First” paradigm being espoused by the Trump administration favours direct bilateral engagements over multilateral cooperation, resulting in the sidelining of traditional institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation and other multilateral frameworks that have historically been involved in structuring Africa’s global interactions. This approach not only alters diplomatic norms, but also undermines the collective decision-making processes, which leaves smaller nations more exposed to power asymmetries in bilateral negotiations.   Several participants at the webinar highlighted that this policy trajectory is not entirely new, but that it represents an unvarnished continuation of long-standing American ambivalence toward Africa. Past administrations have frequently engaged Africa in fits and starts, they have often reacted to crises or strategic necessities, rather than adopting a consistent and forward-looking longer-term strategy. However, what distinguishes the current administration is the degree of candour and rigidity in its objectives of securing economic benefit, geopolitical leverage and reduced US liabilities in foreign engagements.   Furthermore, the restructuring within the US State Department and the scaling down of USAID’s developmental footprint, signifies a retreat from values-based diplomacy, since the reductions in staffing, particularly in departments focused on democracy, human rights and labour, suggest that soft power tools are being deprioritised in favour of more commercially-driven and profit-centric engagements. In this emerging configuration, African countries are expected to present themselves, not as political partners, but primarily in terms of what economic opportunities they bring to the table, primarily measured by their contributions to US commercial and security interests.   This reorientation challenges African policymakers to critically assess their diplomatic toolkits, because the absence of traditional diplomatic courtesies and institutional platforms, once taken for granted, now necessitates a recalibration of how African states need to frame their bilateral relations with the United States. Instead of navigating established aid and development channels, African states are now having to increasingly deal directly with power centres, be they special envoys, corporate entities or more narrowly focused agencies that operate outside of the traditional diplomatic norms.   3.2 STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA AND AFRICA’S ROLE   One of the most critical geopolitical backdrops to US - Africa relations under the Trump administration is the intensifying competition between the United States and China, and Africa sits squarely within the crosshairs of this rivalry, not as a passive terrain, but as a strategic and economic theatre where influence and access and alliances are continuously contested. The Trump administration’s Africa policy cannot be fully understood without a deep examination of this nexus.   China is deeply entrenched and engaged on the African continent, with a plethora of investments that span infrastructure development, digital ecosystems, critical minerals and diplomatic influence. Moreover,  through mechanisms such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its expansive financing of roads, ports and energy projects, China has positioned itself as a key economic partner for many African nations, with a long-term investment strategy, which is often welcomed by African states, who desperately seek capital and rapid development, even when such investment raises concerns about debt sustainability or political leverage.   The United States, in contrast, has approached this competition with a clear intent to limit China’s influence and as several webinar contributors observed, the Trump administration sees China not only as a rival, but as a threat to American geopolitical primacy. This zero-sum framing has, of course, far-reaching implications for how the US will engage African countries, particularly those with existing or growing ties to Beijing.   Rather than presenting a compelling alternative development agenda, the US has responded with targeted commercial diplomacy, which emphasises trade, security cooperation and critical minerals. A prominent example is the convening of a “mini-summit” with five African leaders from Mauritania, Senegal, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, who were selected less for regional representativeness and more for their access to strategic natural resources. The focus of these engagements, panellists suggested, was not on governance, development or mutual goals, but rather on how the US could benefit from the relationships, especially through control of supply chains that counterbalance China’s hold on the global minerals market.   The selective nature of these partnerships reflects a divide-and-rule tactic that bypasses regional organisations and multilateral consensus, since instead of engaging the African Union or regional blocs, the Trump administration has preferred bilateral deals with countries deemed compliant or strategically expedient. This serves to undermine efforts at African unity and policy coherence and may erode hard-earned continental consensus on issues such as natural resource governance, environmental standards and regional infrastructure integration.   Several analysts expressed concern that African nations are being asked to choose sides in this geopolitical rivalry, but in doing, it would be strategically shortsighted, because African countries would then risk becoming pawns in a larger contest that prioritises external interests over domestic development. Furthermore, the transactional logic of the Trump administration lacks the long-term developmental framing that African nations require, such as commitments to, among others, value addition, industrialisation or human capital investment.   Critically, panellists emphasised that Africa’s best interest lies not in alignment, but in balance and thus by cultivating diversified relationships that extract maximum benefit from both Beijing and Washington, African states can mitigate dependency on either power and enhance their global agency. To do this effectively, however, requires sophisticated diplomacy and intra-African coordination with considerably more investment in policy design and institutional capacity.   The strategic competition between the US and China is likely to continue reshaping the global landscape for years to come, and for Africa, this contest presents both challenges and opportunities and so it will be essential for African leaders to avoid making binary choices. And they should resist short-term temptations, but instead focus on sustainable, inclusive partnerships that serve long-term development goals.   3.3 THE US POLICY SHIFT AWAY FROM DEMOCRATIC NORMS   One of the more consequential shifts under the Trump administration’s foreign policy has been the departure from long-standing US commitments to promoting democratic values abroad, particularly in Africa, where historically the US’s engagement with the continent has included significant investment in democratic institution building, human rights, civil society development and electoral transparency. While these efforts have, at times, been inconsistent or selectively applied, they broadly represented an important normative framework that set their expectations and which gave leverage to reformers across the African states.   Under the current administration, that framework has weakened considerably and as several participants in the webinar highlighted, the Trump administration has significantly de-emphasised both democracy promotion in its rhetoric and in its resourcing. Key offices within the US State Department, including the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, have all seen reductions in staffing and political support and USAID’s traditional development agenda, which often supported governance reform, civil society training and election integrity, is being reframed, marginalised and now cancelled under a more commercial and transactional mandate.   This shift has not gone unnoticed by African governments, with some leaders, particularly those with authoritarian tendencies or fragile democratic institutions, welcoming this change, which for them is interpreted as a reprieve from what they previously viewed as intrusive conditionalities. For them, the reduction in democratic scrutiny from Washington has created more political space for illiberal practices, weakened checks and balances and stalled, or even, reversed progress on constitutional governance and human rights protections in those countries. Several webinar participants noted the enthusiastic responses from authoritarian regimes, some of which have publicly praised the Trump victory as a signal that American pressure on governance issues would abate.   The implications of this retrenchment are far-reaching, because in the absence of strong democratic signals from Washington, autocratic actors are emboldened, while democratic actors, civil society organisations, independent media and reformist politicians, find themselves with fewer external allies and diminished moral and material support. This contributes to a chilling effect across the continent, where some leaders may no longer feel compelled to maintain even the facade of democratic performance, which could conceivably result in the possibility of a democratic and human rights backslide in those societies. Perhaps more troubling, however, is the accompanying shift in priorities within the US - Africa relationship, since where democracy and governance once featured prominently in their bilateral engagements, they have now been displaced by commercial focussed diplomacy and security cooperation. Trade, access to critical minerals and transactional peace agreements are prioritised by the US administration, often with little reference to political or human rights contexts and as one panellist put it, “what matters now is what you have, not how you govern”.   The move away from democracy promotion also serves to undermine long-standing US soft power. For decades, despite its contradictions, America’s reputation as a proponent of democracy lent it moral authority in Africa, particularly among youth populations and civil society, but the retreat from these principles has not only eroded US credibility, it has also opened space for other actors, such as China and Russia, to fill the normative vacuum with alternative governance models that emphasise state prominence in governance, socio-economic development and stability over pluralism and rights.   Webinar participants expressed their concerns that this recalibration of values could have a generational impact. Where democracy was once supported through tangible programmes and high-level diplomatic backing, they may be increasingly viewed by African leaders as optional or expendable. And in this context, it is imperative for African civil society and regional institutions to fill the void and to with renewed energy reaffirm democratic norms and the building indigenous capacity to resist ant possible authoritarian drift.   While there may be strategic logic in pursuing a more interest-driven foreign policy, the long-term costs of abandoning democratic norms - both for African societies and for global democratic order - are substantial, because if democracy is no longer a priority for global powers, the risks of political instability, social unrest and international disengagement with the continent, may very well increase.   In summary then: The US’s policy shift away from democratic norms represents a significant inflection point in Africa’s political trajectory and it now places the onus on African actors themselves to defend democratic gains and to build alliances within and outside the continent - alliances that prioritise accountable governance and the rights of citizens. For many, this may be the ultimate test of African agency and resolve in a rapidly changing world.   3.4 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC RESPONSE AND AGENCY   As global power dynamics evolve and as the great powers reposition themselves, African states find themselves at a pivotal crossroads and having to decide as how to respond to the changing dynamics. The challenge they face is not merely to respond to the external pressures from the United States and China, but, more importantly it is argued, how to reframe Africa’s role in global affairs from that of a reactive subject to a proactive and strategic actor. The continent’s ability to assert its agency in this fluid period of geopolitical transition will not only determine the outcomes of individual diplomatic engagements, but so too the future trajectory of Africa’s development, its autonomy and its global influence.   One of the central themes that was emphasised during the webinar was the need for Africa to reject the outdated binary argument of having to “choose sides” between the West and the East, with several contributors arguing forcefully that such a dichotomy is reductive and detrimental to Africa’s interests and therefore Africa must rather pursue a policy of principled non-alignment, not in the ideological sense of the Cold War era, but as a pragmatic strategy that maximises leverage, that preserves independence and that extracts the best possible terms from all partners.   This approach calls for a renewed focus on sovereign interest articulation, in other words, a clear definition of what each African country wants from its engagements with global powers. These interests must be rooted in long-term development goals, such as industrialisation, education, health, climate resilience, digital transformation and infrastructure and crucially, they must go beyond the allure of short-term financial inflows or extractive deals. Instead they should emphasise partnerships that transfer knowledge, build capacity and promote value addition on the continent.   Participants in the webinar stressed that Africa must professionalise and strengthen its negotiating institutions, which includes enhancing the technical capacity  its diplomatic corps, trade ministries and regional economic communities to effectively bargain with better-resourced counterparts from Washington or Beijing, with a recurring concern being raised about African states entering negotiations without coherent strategies or sufficient data on the true value of their resources and markets, which then puts them on the back footing, limits their bargaining power and reinforces dependency.   One practical example raised during the dialogue was the growing importance of critical minerals, such as lithium and rare earths, which are vital to the green transition and the digital economy, where it was argued by the panellist that instead of simply exporting these raw materials, African countries must negotiate deals during their bilateral trade consultations, that include local processing, employment guarantees, infrastructure investment and environmental protections. It was noted that current US efforts to secure access to these minerals often target smaller, less prepared states with weak regulatory frameworks, in that way exposing the risk of “divide and conquer” strategies.   To counteract this, the importance of regional coordination and integration was repeatedly underscored by the participants, with continental frameworks, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and regional blocs, such as ECOWAS and SADC, identified as key tools for creating bargaining coherence and avoiding competitive underbidding among African states. A united African voice, particularly in areas such as, among others, digital governance, tax harmonisation and resource sharing, can shift the continent from the periphery to the centre of global decision-making.   Another dimension of Africa’s agency lies in narrative control, because too often, Africa is spoken about, rather than spoken with. The stories told about Africa in Washington, Brussels and Beijing frequently focus on conflict, poverty or foreign rivalry, rather than innovation, leadership and potential. Several webinar participants called for a concerted effort by African scholars, journalists and leaders to tell Africa’s story on its own terms by highlighting success stories in mobile finance, renewable energy, democratic reform and entrepreneurial growth.   There is also an urgent need for intra-African solidarity, because as countries negotiate with global powers, they must avoid undercutting each other for short-term gain. A race to the bottom in regulatory standards or concessionary tax regimes only benefits external actors at the expense of long-term continental development, so instead, states should adopt common principles for engagement, whether in environmental policy, labour rights or fiscal governance in order to ensure that Africa negotiates from a position of strength.   Of course, asserting agency does not mean ignoring geopolitical realities, since power asymmetries remain significant and the influence of global capital, technology and military infrastructure cannot be wished away. However, as multiple participants noted, Africa does have leverage, such as its growing markets, its young and dynamic population, its natural resources are vast and its strategic geography makes it indispensable to global trade, energy security and climate goals.   The question is whether African governments will seize this moment. Will they invest in long-term strategic thinking? Will they build institutions that outlast administrations? Will they collaborate rather than compete? And will they define and defend a vision of African development that transcends foreign agendas?   The opportunity exists, the stakes are high and/but the responsibility lies with Africa itself. 3.5 DE-DOLLARISATION AND ECONOMIC AUTONOMY   One of the most significant and far-reaching, but under-discussed themes that seems to be emerging in the current geopolitical reordering, is the gradual, but determined shift toward de-dollarisation, which can be vital for Africa’s economic sovereignty and its position in global finance. While this trend is certainly still in its early stages and although the stage of its development varies widely across countries and sectors, it nevertheless represents a subtle, yet powerful assertion of economic autonomy in a world that has traditionally been dominated by US monetary hegemony, but which now seeks de-linking. The process of de-dollarisation of course refers to the broader efforts by countries to reduce their reliance on the US dollar in international trade, financial settlements and foreign reserves and it is not just about adopting new currencies, such as the BRICS currency, for example. For Africa, this shift is partly driven by pragmatism, because dollar-based transactions often entail high costs due to multiple currency conversions, a reliance on correspondent banks and exposure to US monetary policy fluctuations over which they have no control. However, it is also increasingly being driven by political and strategic motivations, particularly in response to the US sanctions regimes and their financial surveillance systems like SWIFT, which give Washington considerable leverage over global capital flows and which African counties believe impacts their own sovereignty. During the webinar, participants highlighted several developments that reflected this shift, notably, the growing momentum behind bilateral trade settlements in local currencies, such as, for example, direct transactions from the South African rand to the Chinese renminbi, which is both economically sound and a symbolically potent step toward financial self-determination. These initiatives have the effect of reducing transaction costs, insulating trade from dollar volatility, as well as diminishing vulnerability to external shocks beyond domestic control. Moreover, the broader BRICS grouping, of which South Africa is a member, has also been actively exploring alternative financial architectures, including cross-border payment systems that bypass the SWIFT network and proposals for a digital or common reserve currency. And while panellists acknowledged that the realisation of a unified BRICS currency remains distant and politically complex, they emphasised that these conversations alone signify a major shift in how emerging economies are starting to think about their own financial sovereignty. For the Trump administration, however, the idea of de-dollarisation is perceived as a direct challenge to US global power, where historically, the dominance of their dollar afforded them unique privileges, not least the ability to finance their own deficits cheaply and to impose extraterritorially sanctions. So from their perspective, any attempt by a country, or a group of aligned countries, to reduce their dollar dependency, especially through coordinated efforts by the US’s geopolitical rivals, such as China and Russia, is met with US suspicion and, in some cases, retaliatory policy. The possibility that the US may respond with secondary sanctions, punitive tariffs and/or diplomatic pressure against countries that actively pursue de-dollarised arrangements was also discussed. These instruments, it was said, could be wielded, not only against the BRICS coordination thereof, but also against other bilateral efforts that are seen as undermining US’s strategic interests. And so, for African countries that are  already contending with economic fragility, high debt burdens and limited access to global capital, such penalties could be highly disruptive and even crippling.   Despite these risks, African governments finds the idea of de-dollarisation an option worth exploring, due to their nations being heavily dependent on the dollar and the tendency for local  currencies to be undervalued, inflation-prone and vulnerable to speculative attacks. And so, by moving away from the dollar and where feasible, it can enable countries to assert greater control over their own domestic monetary policy, thereby encouraging regional trade in local currencies and it can assist in developing homegrown financial instruments that reflect domestic priorities. However, the path to meaningful de-dollarisation it must be said, is not without significant hurdles, since many African central banks remain conservative in their policy orientation and are wary of challenging the existing dominant financial norms. There are also infrastructure challenges, such as underdeveloped financial markets, low digital penetration and regulatory fragmentation, that severely complicates the implementation of cross-border currency systems.   Moreover, intra-African coordination is critical, because without harmonised frameworks, countries may find themselves experimenting in isolation, with limited scalability and/or political support. Institutions such as the African Union, the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) have key roles to play in facilitating such regional financial integration and in standardising trade finance protocols.   Ultimately, de-dollarisation is not a panacea for all of Africa’s financial woes and it will not automatically insulate African economies from external shocks, nor will it eliminate structural weaknesses in governance, productivity or revenue collection. Nevertheless, it is an important step toward diversifying economic risk, asserting agency and reducing over-dependence on any single actor or system.   As the global financial order becomes more multipolar and contested, Africa must ensure that it does not merely adjust to the global new rules, it also has to help shape them. This requires not just technical reforms, but political vision and a recognition that economic autonomy is central to real sovereignty and that in an increasingly transactional world, self-reliance may be the most valuable currency of all.   3.6 INTERNAL CHALLENGES AND FOREIGN POLICY COHERENCE   While external geopolitical shifts command much of the attention in Africa’s engagement with the United States and China, as important are the internal dynamics that are shaping how African countries formulate, coordinate and project foreign policy. And so too, the continent’s ability to respond strategically to the US - China rivalry and to leverage global opportunities in its favour, depends heavily on its internal coherence, institutional maturity and its leadership unity.   A recurring theme discussed in the webinar was the fragmented nature of Africa’s foreign policy landscape, where, although the African Union (AU) and several regional bodies have made strides toward continental coordination, the individual countries’ national interests still dominate and it is often at the expense of the region’s collective strength. In a global system that is  increasingly defined by strategic competition, this fragmentation is counter-productive, because it weakens Africa’s bargaining power and opens the door to divide-and-rule tactics by more powerful states.   It was noted that many African countries lack long-term foreign policy strategies, resulting in diplomatic engagements often being reactive, rather than proactive, and this is due to them being shaped by short-term needs or the preferences of ruling parties, rather than through clear national or regional priorities. This makes it difficult for diplomats to articulate consistent positions and for countries to build reliable partnerships or to push back effectively when they are faced with exploitative or coercive behaviour by external actors. The lack of capacity and resources within many of the African foreign ministries, which is often combined with frequent leadership changes and where there is usually limited cross-party consensus on external affairs, serves to further exacerbate this challenge. Moreover, foreign policy decisions are concentrated in the hands of a few elite individuals and there is  minimal parliamentary oversight or public debate, which not only means diminished transparency, but it also undermines the legitimacy and durability of international countries’ international agreements.   South Africa was cited during the webinar as a case study in complexity. As a member of both BRICS and a partner of the West, it occupies a unique, yet difficult diplomatic space. Its constitutional commitment to values such as democracy, social justice and international solidarity is being tested in that it often clashes with the ideological posture of the Trump administration, which prioritises economic nationalism and which is suspicious of multilateralism. The balancing act that South Africa’s has to play by engaging both Beijing and Washington, while adhering to its constitutional and regional responsibilities, illustrates the nuanced diplomacy required in today’s global context.   But even in South Africa inconsistencies persist, because while rhetorically committed to multilateralism and African solidarity, its actual engagements often in practice reflect its own national self-interest or ambiguous priorities, particularly in contentious global debates such as UN Security Council reform, vaccine diplomacy or the war in Ukraine. These contradictions, participants argued, must also be acknowledged, and resolved, if African leadership is to be credible and effective on the world stage.   Beyond state actors there are frequently bureaucratic and institutional misalignments that hinder strategic coherence, where, for example, Ministries of finance, trade, defence and foreign affairs often operate in silos, with limited coordination or shared analysis. And as a result, their international negotiations on trade, investment or security often proceed without unified positions, which then leads to suboptimal outcomes or even internal contradictions. For instance, trade concessions made by one department may inadvertently undermine environmental protections that are overseen by another, or in another instance, security cooperation agreements may be in conflict with the country’s human rights obligations.   Intra-African dynamics too complicate the continent’s foreign policy picture, where rivalries between regional powers, competition for donor funding and divergent ideological alignments contribute to message fragmentation. While the African Union has sought to build a “One Africa” approach in diplomacy, the reality on the ground often reflects a patchwork of unaligned and sometimes contradictory national agendas which weakens the continent’s collective negotiating position and allows external powers to selectively engage with preferred partners, thereby exacerbating divisions.   To overcome these internal challenges a number of reforms are needed:   Institutional investment in foreign policy capacity, including dedicated think tanks, professional diplomatic training academies and inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms is urgently needed. Long-term strategic planning, anchored in developmental blueprints like Agenda 2063, but operationalised through detailed country-level foreign policy roadmaps that align with national interests and regional objectives have to be undertaken. Increased transparency and public engagement in foreign policy formulation, including the involvement of civil society, academia and parliamentarians in shaping international positions is required. Regional and continental diplomacy frameworks, including common guidelines for resource negotiations, cybersecurity, digital trade and external military cooperation, to reduce fragmentation and to promote African consensus, have to be developed.   The path to foreign policy coherence is not easy, but it is indispensable, because without it, Africa will struggle to navigate an increasingly complex international environment. With it, the continent can move from being a sphere of competition to a sphere of influence and a place where African priorities shape, rather than react to global power dynamics 3.7 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD The discussions culminated in a series of forward-looking insights and strategic imperatives for African nations to ponder. As they navigate a shifting global order that is characterised by intensifying US-China competition, deglobalisation trends and the erosion of traditional multilateral norms, they need to consolidate their efforts. Amid these uncertainties, one message was clear, namely that Africa’s future will be determined not by external decisions alone, but by the continent’s ability to act with clarity, coordination and conviction. Drawing from the insights of the panel, the following policy recommendations are made in order to provide a structured path for African policymakers, institutions and regional bodies that seek to engage global powers, particularly the United States and China, on equitable and sovereign terms.   3.7.1 Adopt a policy of strategic non-alignment   African states should avoid framing their foreign policy within the binary of East versus West and instead of “choosing sides,” the continent must adopt a position of principled non-alignment rooted in self-interest. This does not imply neutrality or disengagement, but rather a sophisticated diplomacy that maximises Africa’s leverage by engaging all actors based on merit, reciprocity and long-term development objectives, because by refusing to be drawn into ideological or strategic rivalries, African countries can create space for creative partnerships, negotiate better terms and avoid becoming proxy arenas for geopolitical competition.     3.7.2 Leverage natural resources for development, not extraction   Africa’s vast deposits of critical minerals and natural resources, such as cobalt, lithium and rare earth elements, should be seen as strategic assets to be carefully stewarded and systematically leveraged, and accordingly the current global demand for these materials, especially in the context of the energy transition and digital infrastructure, gives Africa unprecedented negotiating power.   However, the webinar participants also warned against repeating the same mistakes of the past, which saw raw materials being exported wholesale, with little benefit to local populations and so instead, African states must condition resource access on commitments to local value addition, technology transfer, infrastructure development and environmental sustainability. This will require enhanced geological data, coordinated policy frameworks and transparency mechanisms to prevent corruption and illicit capital flight. 3.7.3 Build institutional capacity for coherent foreign policy   Effective diplomacy begins with strong institutions and so African countries must invest in the professionalisation of their foreign ministries, build cross-sectoral coordination among trade, defence and development agencies and they ought to institutionalise long-term strategic planning.   Foreign policy should not be left to elite circles only or be influenced solely by short-term political calculations. It must be embedded within national development plans, be subjected to parliamentary oversight and it has to be responsive to citizen input. Moreover, governments should cultivate specialised cadres of technocrats who can lead negotiations in areas like digital policy, climate diplomacy and multilateral reform.   3.7.4 Strengthen regional integration and collective bargaining   No single African country, regardless of size or economic standing, can compete with global powers alone, which implies the need for regional and continental integration in order to amplify Africa’s voice and bargaining power. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) must be empowered and resourced to coordinate foreign policy positions, to manage trade disputes and to advance shared priorities.   This includes negotiating as blocs when engaging with external actors on issues such as digital taxation, climate finance or health diplomacy and so too, greater regional alignment can also help deter predatory tactics by external powers that exploit national divisions for strategic gain. 3.7.5 Reframe Africa’s narrative on the global stage   Africa must take charge of its image and the narrative that defines what the continent is about, because for too long, Africa has been portrayed primarily through the lenses of poverty, instability and external dependency, which framing undermines Africa’s agency and obscures the real innovation, leadership and transformation that is taking place across the continent.   Governments, the media and civil society must therefore actively promote a more accurate and empowering narrative, being one that emphasises Africa’s entrepreneurial ecosystems, technological ingenuity, youth-led movements and cultural influence. This is not just about soft power, it’s about setting the terms of engagement and it is needed to shape how the world sees and deals with Africa. 3.7.6 Pursue financial and digital sovereignty   Africa must continue exploring alternatives to traditional financial and digital infrastructures that entrench dependency, which includes, among others, developing regional payment systems, exploring local currency trade agreements and participating in emerging BRICS or South-South financial mechanisms.   Digital sovereignty is equally important, since African countries must assert control over their digital infrastructure, data governance and cybersecurity strategies, whether in negotiations over 5G infrastructure, AI development or digital tax policy. African states must ensure that their digital futures are shaped by their local needs and they should guard against it being dictated by external actors.   3.7.7 Anchor foreign policy in democratic and developmental values   Finally, while external partners may deprioritise democracy, African countries should not, as democratic governance, inclusive growth and social accountability remain the most sustainable foundations for peace and prosperity. Foreign engagement must be guided by these values, and it should not be subordinated to short-term economic or geopolitical expediency.   This means holding firm on human rights, resisting external pressures that undermine domestic institutions and ensuring that foreign partnerships align with the continent’s constitutional and developmental aspirations. 3.7.8 Conclusion   The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency, the strategic assertiveness of China and the broader reordering of the global system all present a moment of challenge and opportunity for Africa, but the choices made by African leaders, institutions and societies in this moment will shape outcomes more than the preferences of external powers.   Africa has leverage, it has agency and it has a voice. The task now is to use them, to negotiate from a place of strength, to pursue partnerships rooted in mutual benefit and to define its own role in a changing world.   As the webinar made abundantly clear: this is not the time to wait for direction. It is the time to act with purpose, unity and vision.   4 NAVIGATING THE AFRICA - CHINA - US NEXUS: STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES IN A LANDSCAPE OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSION: THE TRIANGULAR DIPLOMATIC DYNAMICS   Image: African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia   The triangular relationship between Africa, China and the United States represents one of the most consequential arenas of 21st-century geopolitics and as competition between Washington and Beijing intensifies, Africa’s strategic relevance grows, not only as a source of critical resources and expanding markets, but as a political and ideological battleground where both powers seek to define the norms and direction of global engagement. Under the Trump administration, the US has adopted an increasingly adversarial posture toward China’s role in Africa, which has manifested in direct rhetoric denouncing China’s infrastructure investments as “debt traps,” its technological offerings as security risks and its governance model as incompatible with democratic values. But behind this rhetoric lies a deliberate strategy and that is to counter Chinese influence by framing US engagement in Africa as the more transparent, values-driven alternative. But, this narrative often doesn’t match the financial scale, speed and political consistency that China has brought to the continent over the last two decades.   For Africa, the challenge is to navigate this tension without becoming collateral in a rivalry that is not of its own making. The continent must avoid being reduced to a passive prize in a East – West geopolitical contest and instead, it should adopt a multi-dimensional strategy that embraces the benefits of both relationships while insulating itself from coercion, dependency or forced alignment. 4.1 CHINA’S ROLE IN AFRICA: MORE THAN INFRASTRUCTURE China’s influence in Africa is vast and spans traditional infrastructure financing, such as ports and railways; digital development, for example, telecom networks and smart cities; resource extraction; medical diplomacy; and higher education. Over 50 African countries have signed onto the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Chinese firms are embedded across nearly every sector, from construction and energy to fintech and agriculture.   Importantly, China’s approach has resonated with many African leaders, because it emphasises speed of execution, non-interference in domestic politics and pragmatic engagement. Chinese loans, while often opaque, are usually tied to tangible infrastructure projects, which do not carry the governance conditionalities typical of Western donors and therefore, for states grappling with immediate development needs, this model has proven appealing.   However, this success has not been without consequences, to the contrary, it has been accompanied by rising debt burdens, concerns over labour practices and limited local content in Chinese contracts that have sparked public backlash in some African countries. And as the geopolitical rivalry with the US intensifies, these issues are likely to be amplified, either organically or as part of a deliberate American strategy to discredit China’s presence.   4.2 THE US DIVERSION STRATEGY: COUNTERING CHINA THROUGH AFRICA   The Trump administration’s Africa strategy, while thin on developmental substance, is heavily influenced by its overarching objective to contain China. This is evident in targeted engagements with mineral-rich African states, intensified anti-China rhetoric during bilateral talks and emerging policy tools such as trade incentives, digital infrastructure offerings, e.g. Open RAN, and diplomatic pressure brought to bear in order to have BRI contracts cancelled or revised.   This strategy of diversion and disruption seeks not necessarily to displace China from Africa outright, but to raise the cost of Chinese engagement and sow doubt about its intentions and ultimately aims to push African states toward re-alignment with US-backed alternatives. It is a geopolitical game of optics, influence and ideological framing, one that attempts to undermine trust in China’s partnerships, while at the same time offering selective inducements from Washington. 4.3 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC POSITIONING: DUAL ENGAGEMENT WITH A FOCUS ON AUTONOMY   To safeguard its interests, Africa must resist being pulled into a binary trap and therefore the continent’s strategic posture should rest on three pillars:   Diversified partnerships  in which Africa must maintain strong relationships with both China and the US, using competition between the two to drive better terms, technology transfer and concessional finance. Diplomatic hedging, not allegiance, is the path to sovereignty. Conditional engagement  through which African governments must condition economic access to strategic sectors, particularly digital infrastructure, critical minerals and energy, on clear and enforceable developmental outcomes, whether engaging with China or the US and deals must include provisions for skills development, local sourcing, environmental safeguards and long-term value addition to mineral extraction. Continental coherence  where the African Union and regional economic communities establish continental norms for foreign engagement, outlining standards on debt transparency, environmental sustainability, labour rights and technology governance, which will help curb external actors’ ability to exploit state-by-state fragmentation.   4.4 HOW CHINA SHOULD RESPOND: BUILDING RESILIENCE IN AFRICAN PARTNERSHIPS   China, for its part, must recognise that US strategy in Africa is increasingly designed not to merely offer an alternative development model, but also, for its own domestic foreign policy purposes, to erode trust in China’s intentions, so in response, China is advised to move from a purely transactional approach to one that strengthens political trust, operational transparency and mutual accountability.   Key steps China can take include:   It should increase contract transparency  by proactively publishing the terms of infrastructure and debt agreements which can pre-empt Western accusations of predatory lending and reinforce legitimacy. Deepen local integration  with more Chinese-funded projects incorporating local labour, firms and oversight mechanisms. This is in any event good business practice, since localisation builds goodwill and mitigates claims of neocolonialism. Support African agency  by instead of framing China as Africa’s “alternative” to the West, Beijing should rather openly support Africa’s push for non-alignment and greater international voice, whether at the WTO, IMF or UN Security Council. Invest in soft power  through cultural exchange, academic collaboration and media partnerships, which can prove critical in countering Western narratives and in embedding China’s presence in Africa as multifaceted, and not just infrastructural. Build multilateral development frameworks wherein China should be open to co-financing projects with African and even Western institutions, thereby showcasing a willingness to act collaboratively rather than competitively.     4.5 CONCLUSION: TOWARD A TRIANGULAR BALANCE   The Africa - China - US nexus will continue to define the strategic contours of the continent’s future, but Africa must neither be a buffer zone nor a battleground. It must be an assertive broker of its own destiny.   As the US and China recalibrate their Africa strategies, the one through rivalry, the other through long-term presence, the continent must rise above reactive diplomacy and it must demand fairness, transparency and partnership from both sides. Africa’s message should be clear: “We are open for business, but not for capture. Compete here, yes, but on our terms”. 5 TRIANGULAR TRADE DYNAMICS: US, CHINA AND AFRICA IN ECONOMIC TENSION AND OPPORTUNITY   Image: Coal Mining Operation, South Africa   Trade relationships between Africa, the United States and China form the backbone of the trilateral interactions between the three and it serves as both a point of contention and a platform for potential collaboration. Moreover, as global supply chains reconfigure and the more geopolitical competition has intensified, the more complex,  asymmetrical and strategically charged the trade dynamics among these three players have grown.   Each actor brings distinct motivations, instruments and vulnerabilities to the trading table and therefore an understanding of these dynamics is essential for African policymakers who seek to optimise their position, guard against economic coercion and chart a path toward structural transformation. 5.1 CHINA - AFRICA TRADE: SCALE, SPEED AND STRUCTURAL DOMINANCE   China’s trade relationship with Africa has expanded dramatically over the last two decades, making it the continent’s largest bilateral trading partner, registering trade volumes that have reached over $250 billion in recent years. China imports vast quantities of raw materials, such as oil, copper, cobalt and lithium from Africa, whilst it  exports manufactured goods, machinery, electronics and consumer products to Africa.   Chinese trade with Africa is often embedded in broader financing packages that include concessional loans, infrastructure development and tied procurement contracts, which bundling of trade and finance has allowed China to consolidate its presence in key sectors, particularly in extractives, construction, telecommunications and logistics. However, this relationship is structurally imbalanced, because Africa overwhelmingly exports primary commodities to China, whilst mainly importing finished goods from them. This reinforces a pattern of dependency. Local value addition is limited, despite periodic efforts to encourage Chinese companies to manufacture locally by relocating the manufacturing to  Africa, yet it has occurred only sporadically and at small scale.   Participants in the webinar emphasised that while China’s trade presence has brought short-term growth and infrastructure, it has also entrenched Africa’s position in the global economy as a supplier of raw inputs and if not recalibrated, this model could constrain Africa’s long-term industrial development and competitiveness. 5.2 US - AFRICA TRADE: DECLINE, REDEFINITION AND OPPORTUNITY GAPS In contrast, US - Africa trade has declined in relative terms. Where once a leading trading partner, US trade with Africa now lags behind China, the EU and even intra-African exchanges in some regions and while programmes like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) have offered preferential access to US markets, uptake has been limited to a handful of countries and sectors, primarily textiles, apparel and some agricultural goods.   AGOA, though symbolically important, is seen by many as outdated, unpredictable and skewed toward US commercial interests, moreover, the Trump administration has not prioritised trade with Africa in strategic terms, focusing instead on bilateral deals that align with domestic political imperatives or counter-China objectives.   Webinar participants noted that the US commercial footprint in Africa is thin and largely dominated by extractives, finance and defence-linked services and performing way below its potential, even though the private sector in the US is wa ell-capitalised and technologically advanced. This is because it often views Africa as high-risk and low-margin region, which has led to underinvestment and disengagement. Nonetheless, the US still offers comparative advantages that Africa can leverage, such as access to high-value markets, expertise in services and digital industries, and it has potential for technology partnerships that differ materially from China’s state-led model, however, to unlock these opportunities, Africa must demand more coherence and greater responsiveness from Washington, and particularly as it relates to simplifying market access. 5.3 TRADE AS GEOPOLITICAL LEVERAGE: THE RISK OF WEAPONISATION   Trade is no longer merely economic, in that it has now also become a geopolitical tool, with both China and the United States increasingly using it as a tool to reward allies, punish rivals and project influence, and for Africa, this weaponisation of trade poses serious risks.   The Trump administration’s trade strategy toward Africa is heavily influenced by its desire to counter China, for instance, countries deepening economic ties with China could face informal diplomatic pressure or even be excluded from US trade preference schemes. This coercive approach undermines Africa’s trade sovereignty and it exposes countries to strategic whiplash, depending on global alignments. Meanwhile, China’s own trade practices are becoming more selective and strategic. As Beijing responds to global backlash and domestic economic pressures, it may reduce exposure to high-risk African markets or tighten trade conditions and accordingly, African states that fail to meet debt repayment schedules or fail to align with Chinese diplomatic preferences could see disruptions in trade flows, financing or procurement.   This creates an urgent need for Africa to de-risk its trade policy, by building regional value chains, diversifying partners and localising production where possible, because relying on a single dominant partner, be it China or the US, is simply not wise. It makes African economies vulnerable to external shocks, policy shifts and political manoeuvring. 5.4 AFRICA’S TRADE STRATEGY: TOWARD A BALANCED AND BENEFICIAL REGIME   To thrive within this triangular dynamic, African countries will have to take a more deliberate and strategic approach to trade policy, which policy should be grounded in the following principles:   Africa must move beyond commodity exports and will accordingly have to integrate into regional and global value chains, with investment in agro-processing, green minerals refining, pharmaceuticals and digital goods being essential. Full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) must be prioritised, because it can reduce reliance on volatile external markets and moreover, intra-African trade is less exposed to geopolitical manipulation and more conducive to SME growth. African states should negotiate trade agreements collectively, whether with China, the US or the EU, regional blocs and the African Union taking the lead in setting minimum standards and trade objectives. African trade diplomacy must be agile, informed by data and grounded in national development strategies and technical expertise in trade law, digital regulation and investment arbitration will be increasingly critical. Trade agreements must be publicly debated, scrutinised and evaluated against national priorities, because citizens and civil society have a right to know how trade affects jobs, prices and public goods. 5.5 CONCLUSION: TRADE AS A STRATEGIC LEVER, NOT A PASSIVE FLOW The triangular trade relationship among Africa, China and the United States is not static and it is being reshaped by geopolitics, digitalisation and demographic change. While competition between Beijing and Washington presents risks, it also presents opportunities for Africa to demand better terms, deepen industrial capacity and to shift from the periphery to the centre of global commerce.   But, to  seize this moment it will require unity, clarity and resolve. Africa must no longer accept being a market for finished goods and a mine for raw materials, but instead, it must transform itself into a manufacturing hub, a trade rule-maker and a strategic broker that defines its own trade future, on its own terms. 6 CONTOURS OF CONTAINMENT: US – AFRICA - CHINA MILITARY AND SECURITY DYNAMICS   Image: Military Operation, Mozambique   The military and peace and security dimensions of US – Africa - China relations represent one of the most delicate and consequential aspects of the triangular engagement. While trade and development cooperation often garner public attention, it is in the realm of defence, counterterrorism, peacekeeping and strategic access where the geopolitical stakes are highest and where Africa’s sovereignty is most directly challenged.   The webinar discussions revealed a sobering truth, that is that Africa’s security landscape is increasingly entangled in a global competition, but not of its own making. Both the United States and China have intensified their military posturing on the continent, not primarily in response to African security needs, but as part of a broader global rivalry and so for African states, this creates a dual challenge, namely to manage internal and regional security concerns while also navigating external militarisation that may undermine long-term peacebuilding and regional autonomy. 6.1 US SECURITY ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA: CONTAINMENT THROUGH COUNTERTERRORISM   The United States has maintained a long-standing military footprint in Africa, primarily under the banner of counterterrorism, security sector reform and peacekeeping support and through initiatives such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and AFRICOM (US Africa Command), the US has built an extensive web of bases, partnerships and operations across the continent.   However, as participants in the webinar noted, the nature and tone of US military engagement worldwide have shifted significantly under the Trump administration, because now rather than being embedded within a broader developmental or governance framework, security cooperation has become increasingly transactional, bilateral and strategically competitive. This applies particularly in regions where China is expanding its influence and so one can expect a shift in US approach on the African continent as well. This is most evident in East Africa, where the US military presence near Djibouti is now operating alongside China’s first overseas military base in the very same vicinity. What was once framed as counterterrorism assistance is now also about containing the Chinese military ambitions, along with securing sea lanes and monitoring infrastructure corridors funded by Beijing. Critically, African security concerns, such as community-level conflict, state fragility and disarmament, are often subordinated to global counterterrorism priorities, which mismatch has contributed to the militarisation of diplomacy, where security actors become the primary US interlocutors. Governance, peacebuilding and reconciliation are marginalised through such an approach.   Participants expressed concern that such narrow security engagements do little to address the root causes of violence, inequality, youth unemployment and weak institutions and may even serve to exacerbate tensions by reinforcing coercive state behaviour. Moreover, selective partnerships with “strategically useful” regimes, regardless of their democratic credentials, undermines Africa’s long-term stability as envisaged, by for example, the African Union. 6.2 CHINA’S EVOLVING SECURITY ROLE: FROM NON-INTERVENTION TO STRATEGIC POSITIONING   China has traditionally adhered to a foreign policy of non-interference, focusing its Africa strategy on infrastructure, trade and diplomacy, however, over the past decade and particularly in response to US militarisation, China has begun to recalibrate its security posture on the continent.   This evolution is, as already mentioned, most visibly embodied in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base in Djibouti, a strategic site that supports Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean, anti-piracy patrols and logistical supply chains for Belt and Road projects. China has also increased its participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and has become one of the largest contributors of personnel and funding, particularly in South Sudan and Mali. Participants in the webinar interpreted these moves not as a wholesale shift toward US-style military projection, but as a strategic insurance policy and a means for Beijing to protect its citizens, investments and trade corridors in what has become a volatile global environment. However, they also warned that China’s increasing security footprint, if unchecked, could replicate the very patterns of dependency and instrumentalization that China itself once criticised in Western foreign policy.   Unlike the US, China’s security engagements are typically less visible, less conditioned and more state-centric, often focused on regime protection rather than human security. This has implications for how African civil society, opposition parties and fragile communities experience Chinese presence: as both stabilising and exclusionary. 6.3 PEACE AND SECURITY AS A SITE OF COMPETITION, NOT COOPERATION   What emerged clearly from the discussion is that Africa’s security arena is no longer governed by multilateralism, but by rivalry. Rather than cooperating on peacekeeping, conflict prevention or disarmament, the US and China are using Africa as a theatre to test power projection, technological capabilities and alliance-building.   This competition distorts peace and security norms. It diverts attention from African-led conflict resolution mechanisms, such as those under the African Union and ECOWAS, and prioritises short-term containment over long-term conflict transformation.   There is also a growing risk that African military forces may be drawn into proxy arrangements, trained, equipped and financed by competing powers with divergent doctrines and endgames which could fragment regional defence integration, militarise domestic politics and undermine the neutrality of African security institutions.   Moreover, the proliferation of dual-use technologies that is in the main supplied by external players, such as surveillance systems, cyber operations and AI-enabled border control, raises new ethical and governance challenges. African states must take heed of the potential threats and ensure that these tools are not used to entrench authoritarianism or suppress their own civic spaces, particularly when provided without transparency or safeguards.   6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN AUTONOMOUS AFRICAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE   To reclaim their agency in this domain, African nations must reassert ownership over their peace and security agenda, which his involves several strategic imperatives:   They must strengthen the operational and financial independence of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the African Standby Force and early warning systems. Any external military engagement, whether with the US or Chinese, must be assessed against local security needs, conflict dynamics and constitutional mandates, in other words, conditionality should flow both ways. Security cooperation agreements should be transparent and they should therefore be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and to public debate, especially when they involve basic rights, technology transfer and/or counterterrorism laws. Africans must take the lead by creating forums where China, the US and African states can engage on shared security concerns, such as those presented by piracy, arms trafficking and peacekeeping. Moreover, the engagement must not be framed as a zero-sum contest. The root causes of insecurity, poverty, exclusion and environmental degradation, needs to be prioritised over militarised containment. Security must be people-centred, not power-centred.   6.5 CONCLUSION: FROM THEATRE OF RIVALRY TO ARENA OF SOVEREIGNTY   Africa must not be a chessboard for competing empires. Its security landscape is complex, nuanced and deeply rooted in local history and conditions, so while it is to be expected that external actors will inevitably seek strategic footholds, it is incumbent upon African leaders and institutions to themselves define the terms of engagement.   US - China competition on African soil must not be allowed to crowd out African agency, displace peacebuilding norms or militarise the continent’s diplomacy. Instead, Africa must articulate a clear, coherent and sovereign security strategy, one that is principled, pragmatic and centred on the well-being of its people.   7 REFLECTIONS ON THE TRIANGULAR HORIZON: RETHINKING POWER, PARTNERSHIP AND PURPOSE   As the world experiences a period of geopolitical turbulence and political  reconfiguration that has been introduced with the advent of the new Trump administration, so too the triangular relationship between Africa, the United States and China has emerged as a strategic contest. But it is more than that, it is also as a test of the principles of global engagement, sovereignty and solidarity, which are being redefined on the move.   The conversations captured in the webinar underscore a sobering reality, namely that Africa is no longer simply a stage on which others perform, but a site where power is contested, norms are negotiated and futures are forged. But in spite of this centrality, the risk remains that Africa is spoken for, acted upon and pulled in directions that may not serve its long-term aspirations, and so in this moment, a philosophical and strategic recalibration is necessary, not just for Africa, but for all three actors. 7.1 AFRICA AT THE CENTRE, NOT THE MARGIN   It is time for Africa to claim its place as an architect and not a mere accessory of the global order, considering that the continent is home to the world’s youngest population, some of its fastest-growing economies and a trove of critical resources essential for the planet’s energy transition and technological evolution. But beyond statistics lies a deeper truth, one that advocates Africa as a moral and political actor with its own vision, its own history of solidarity and its own stake in shaping what global justice should look like.   To fulfil this role, African states must transcend the temptation of short-term gains, whether mineral royalties or military aid and embrace the harder, longer path of institution building, regional integration and strategic independence. This is not about rejecting partnerships, to the contrary, it about entering into them with clarity, unity and a demand for reciprocity.   The era of passive engagement is over; the future requires Africa to be a broker, a convener and a challenger, capable of working with both East and West while refusing to be defined by either.   7.2 THE US AND CHINA: FROM COMPETITION TO CONSTRUCTIVE COEXISTENCE?   Both Washington and Beijing must re-evaluate their approaches to Africa, not only as a matter of, but as a test of the kind of global actors they wish to be.   For the United States, Africa cannot remain a secondary theatre in its broader competition with China. A truly meaningful US - Africa relationship must go beyond militarised counterterrorism and transactional diplomacy. It must reinvest in the very values that once made America compelling: democratic solidarity, inclusive development, human rights and multilateral cooperation. Africa should not be engaged out of fear of China’s rise, but out of respect for Africa’s rise.   For China, continued influence will depend on whether it can evolve from infrastructure financier to genuine development partner, transparent, responsive and grounded in mutual respect. If China wishes to avoid the pitfalls of the very powers it once criticised, it must support not only roads and rails, but also African governance, agency and accountability.   Both countries must recognise that the African continent is not a void to be filled or a risk to be managed, but a partner to be listened to. Triangular relations must mature from transactionalism to cooperative pluralism, where diverse approaches coexist and local ownership is non-negotiable. 7.3 A CALL TO REIMAGINE PARTNERSHIP   What is ultimately at stake here, is not only influence, but the very philosophy of global engagement raising the question as to whether international relations is doomed to be a zero-sum pursuit of power or whether it can evolve into the mutual recognition of interdependence, dignity and shared purpose.   The path forward will require all three actors to:   Move from suspicion to strategic trust, thereby recognising that cooperation is not capitulation. Institutionalise dialogue, not just bilaterally, but trilaterally as well, with Africa not considered as the object, but as the convenor. Embed development in diplomacy so as to ensure that security, trade and technology serve people before geopolitics. Invest in multilateral reform, through which Africa can be given a real voice in shaping global rules, from the WTO and IMF to the UN Security Council.   The triangular future to be sought for Africa is one that must not be about who dominates who, but it should rather be about design and the co-creation of a global system that is equitable, sustainable and anchored in the dignity of all. 7.4 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE IS NEGOTIATED, NOT INHERITED   The triangular relationship between the US, China and Africa is at a crossroads. It can deepen into a vortex of rivalry, extraction and mistrust or it can be reshaped into a new grammar of cooperation: one that reflects a multipolar, multi-perspective and multi-stakeholder world.   Policymakers on all sides have a choice. They can double down on old logics of power, or they can imagine and enact a new logic, one rooted in fairness, foresight and mutual gain.   Africa will be central to this reimagining, but so too must be the willingness of the US and China to step beyond competition and towards co-existence.   The outcome is not inevitable, it must be negotiated and the time to begin is now.   8 FINAL WORD: AFRICA AS THE AUTHOR OF ITS OWN FUTURE   The triangular relationship between the United States, China and Africa is no longer defined by dominance and deference, it is now shaped by contestation, recalibration and unprecedented possibility for Africa, once written into the margins of global strategy, to now hold the pen.   The choices African leaders, institutions and citizens make in this decisive decade will reverberate far beyond the continent’s borders. They will reshape how power is distributed, how prosperity is pursued and how global partnerships are formed, not through coercion, but through vision.   To China and the United States, the message is clear: Africa will no longer be a passive recipient of foreign strategy. It demands respect, reciprocity and relevance. To Africa’s policymakers, the imperative is urgent: resist the false binaries, assert agency and forge a path that is neither dictated nor dependent, but distinctly African.   The continent is no longer navigating between giants. It is rising among them and those who understand this will not just win Africa’s markets, they will win its trust. IMAGE REFERENCES   Cover page:   African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Source: iStock. African Union Headquarters . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/african-union-headquarters-gm180957062-26498948  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Military, Mozambique, Source: iStock. Armed Forces Marching Holding Bayonets . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/armed-forces-marching-holding-bayonets-gm2174863525-594507140  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Mining, South Africa, Source: iStock. Piece of Large Machinery Used for Coal Mining in an Open Pit in South Africa . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/piece-of-large-machinery-used-for-coal-mining-in-an-open-pit-in-south-africa-gm1440533764-480488486  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Flag of the United States of America, Source: Wikipedia. Flag of the United States (Web Colors) . Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_the_United_States#/media/File:Flag_of_the_United_States_(Web_Colors).svg  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Flag of the African Union, Source: Wikipedia. Flag of the African Union . Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_the_African_Union#/media/File:Flag_of_the_African_Union.svg  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Flag of the People’s Republic of China, Source: Wikipedia. Flag of the People's Republic of China . Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_China#/media/File:Flag_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China.svg  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Page 16:   African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Source: iStock. African Union Headquarters . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/african-union-headquarters-gm180957062-26498948  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Page 20:   Mining, South Africa, Source: iStock. Piece of Large Machinery Used for Coal Mining in an Open Pit in South Africa . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/piece-of-large-machinery-used-for-coal-mining-in-an-open-pit-in-south-africa-gm1440533764-480488486  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Page 24:   Military, Mozambique, Source: iStock. Armed Forces Marching Holding Bayonets . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/armed-forces-marching-holding-bayonets-gm2174863525-594507140  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On 20 August 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute, in partnership with Daily Maverick, hosted the second episode of its Constitutional Insights by Albie Sachs  webinar series. This series builds on a four-part podcast with former Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs, offering South Africans a deeper understanding of the Constitution’s founding values and exploring the challenges of building a more inclusive and accountable democracy. Following the inaugural conversation on “What does it mean to be South African?” , this episode brought together political analyst William Gumede  and constitutional law scholar Prof. Pierre de Vos  to discuss how state institutions can support and uphold South Africa’s constitutional democracy . The dialogue examined the critical role of institutions such as the judiciary, Parliament, Chapter Nine bodies, and the public service in protecting rights, ensuring accountability, and maintaining democratic stability. Both speakers emphasised that the Constitution provides a strong framework for institutional independence, but the effectiveness of these institutions depends on their practical functioning — resisting political interference, maintaining integrity, and remaining responsive to the public. Gumede highlighted the risks posed by corruption and institutional capture, noting that such threats erode public trust and weaken democracy. De Vos stressed the need for institutions to actively uphold constitutional values, enforce the law impartially, and hold those in positions of power accountable. The discussion underscored that South Africa’s democratic resilience relies as much on strong institutions as on an engaged and informed citizenry. The conversation also reflected on lessons from recent political and judicial challenges, demonstrating both vulnerabilities and the remarkable capacity of institutions to safeguard democracy when supported by law and public oversight. The speakers called for continued efforts to strengthen public trust, professionalise the state, and ensure that institutions serve all citizens equally. The remaining episodes in the series will continue to explore pressing constitutional themes, including: The power of mother tongue education What it will take to create an inclusive electoral system Through these conversations, the Constitutional Insights  series aims to foster public reflection, debate, and engagement with the Constitution as a living framework for an inclusive and just South Africa.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is extending its constitutional literacy programme to schools in both Gauteng and the North West Province. These workshops, targeted at Grade 11 and 12 learners, aim to deepen young people’s understanding of the South African Constitution, with a particular focus on its imperatives and foundational principles. On Monday, 28 July 2025, the Institute held one such workshop at Soshanguve South Secondary School. The session was facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, ISI’s Schools Project Coordinator for both provinces. His engaging and interactive approach ensured that learners were not merely passive recipients of information but were actively involved throughout the workshop. The workshop content covered essential aspects of the Constitution, including: The Preamble, which encapsulates the vision and values underpinning South Africa’s democracy. The Founding Provisions, setting out the core principles on which the Republic is built. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of all South Africans. Chapter 9 Institutions, established to safeguard democracy and ensure accountability. Learners displayed a high level of interest and enthusiasm, asking a wide range of thoughtful and challenging questions. Their inquiries touched on topics such as the meaning of democracy in practice, the role and responsibilities of political parties in the governance of the country, and the duty of government to uphold constitutional values. Many learners also drew connections between the Constitution and their everyday lives, highlighting the relevance of such educational interventions. Feedback from both learners and educators at Soshanguve South Secondary School was overwhelmingly positive. Teachers expressed appreciation for the Institute’s efforts, noting that the workshop not only enriched classroom learning but also encouraged learners to think critically about their role as future leaders and active citizens. For many of the participants, this was their first detailed engagement with the Constitution beyond their textbooks, and it left a lasting impression. The Inclusive Society Institute views this initiative as part of its broader commitment to strengthening democracy through civic education. By equipping young people with knowledge about their constitutional rights and responsibilities, the Institute is helping to cultivate a new generation of South Africans who are empowered to participate meaningfully in the democratic process. Looking ahead, ISI intends to continue expanding the reach of these workshops beyond Gauteng and the North West Province. Plans are already underway to roll out the programme to schools in other provinces, ensuring that more learners across the country benefit from this vital educational opportunity. The Institute firmly believes that by investing in the constitutional literacy of today’s youth, it is investing in the democratic resilience of South Africa’s future.

The Vital Role of Participatory Democracy in Building a Just and Inclusive Society By the Inclusive Society Institute in collaboration with the Daily Maverick Participatory democracy acts as a fundamental pillar in our pursuit of a just and inclusive society. As responsible citizens and leaders, it is incumbent upon us to deeply comprehend and uphold the principles that underpin this vision. Justice Albie Sachs, a distinguished former Constitutional Court Judge, offers valuable reflections on a case that exemplifies the importance of Participatory Democracy, the Doctors for Life case. In 2005, Parliament passed four pieces of legislation relating to reproductive healthcare matters. Doctors for Life, a conservative organisation, objected to the passing of this legislation, alleging that the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) had not sufficiently involved the public in the process, in violation of sections 72 and 118 of the Constitution. Section 72 of the Constitution requires the NCOP to facilitate public involvement in legislative processes, while section 118 imposes the same obligation on provincial legislatures. Doctors for Life International, which had conservative views on the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, challenged the proposed law on the grounds that it had not been subject to sufficient public participation in a novel case that pitted representative democracy against participatory democracy. In this particular case's verdict, the Constitutional Court determined that the NCOP had not fulfilled its constitutional duty to encourage public participation in the process of creating laws. The Court established that the NCOP had neglected to request written input from the public regarding the Bills, had not conducted public hearings on the Bills, and had disregarded public opinions when making decisions about the Bills. The word "participatory" does not appear in the Constitution, but section 1(d) refers to a "multi-party system of democratic government." The meaning of this phrase was central to the judgment, which ultimately found that the NCOP had not met its constitutional obligations to facilitate public participation in the legislative process. The Doctors for Life case was a landmark decision that affirmed the importance of public participation in the law-making process. It also highlighted the tension between representative democracy, in which the people elect representatives to make decisions on their behalf, and participatory democracy, in which the people themselves have a more direct role in decision-making. The Doctors for Life matter served as a poignant reminder of the paramount importance of engaging the public in legislative processes. This landmark decision not only reaffirmed the need for participatory justice in South Africa but also continues to provide valuable insights for our democratic institutions. The case is a reminder that participatory democracy is not just an abstract ideal but a fundamental right enshrined in the South African Constitution. It is a right that must be upheld to build a truly democratic society. Our Constitution, as the foundational document of our democracy, envisions a system that goes beyond periodic elections. It calls for a dynamic democracy that actively engages citizens in decision-making. As Justice Sachs eloquently states, the vision is not akin to "sleeping beauty," where democracy is awakened solely during elections. Instead, it demands ongoing public engagement and the recognition of the diverse voices within our society. Participatory democracy yields several benefits for both governance and society. When people are knowledgeable about the law and have been involved in its formulation, they feel a sense of ownership and belonging. This fosters unity amidst diversity, ensuring that all sections of society have an opportunity to contribute meaningfully. Better outcomes are achieved when legislation reflects the realities and aspirations of those most affected by it. Participatory democracy is also particularly vital for groups traditionally marginalised or underrepresented in formal power structures. The Doctors for Life case highlighted the importance of engaging local healers and recognising their expertise. By involving such outlying groups, we strengthen our democracy by embracing the wisdom and experiences of all citizens. The recognition and inclusion of diverse perspectives lead to fairer outcomes and a stronger sense of social cohesion. The Constitutional Court's decision to strike down the law in question demonstrated the court's commitment to upholding participatory justice. It was not an encroachment on Parliament's authority but a necessary consequence of Parliament's failure to fulfil its promise of public engagement. This judgment affirms that reasonable measures must be taken to ensure genuine public involvement, thus emphasising the Court's role as the guardian of constitutional principles. South Africa stands out as a beacon of participatory democracy, with few precedents worldwide of legislation being struck down due to failures in public engagement. We must recognise this unique position and continue to lead by example. The global trend toward disillusionment with traditional political processes calls for revitalising participatory democracy. Rather than sporadic consultations, continuous public engagement is key to rebuilding trust and empowerment. In conclusion, The Doctors for Life case offers us valuable insights into the true essence of participatory democracy. As a living document, our Constitution demands more than just representative democracy; it envisions an active, engaged citizenry. We must embrace the principles of inclusivity, accountability, and openness. By taking reasonable steps to involve the public, we strengthen our democracy and ensure a fair and just society. Let us seize this.

Articles Click on the article title below to read: Beyond rhetoric: Africa-US relations and the search for a rapprochement Dr Efem N. Ubi A critical assessment of Africa-US relations: Lessons from Tanzania Dr Francis A.S.T. Matambalya US-Africa relations: Policy and governance priorities from Kenya's perspective Dr Robert Kabage US-West Africa relations: Strategic dynamics and evolving priorities Dr Assi J.C. Kimou US-South Africa relations and the Trump doctrine Dr Sizo Nkala

The webinar  held on Wednesday, 6 August 2025 on the Local Government Inclusive Growth Index (LGIGI). Was hosted by Infrastructure South Africa in collaboration with the University of Johannesburg, gathered a group of stakeholders committed to advancing equitable development at the municipal level. The session was led by Professor Daniel Meyer, who presented the outcomes and rationale behind establishing a comprehensive index to measure not only economic prosperity but also the overall well-being and inclusion within local communities.   At the virtual gathering, Prof Meyer explored how the LGIGI can serve as a valuable tool for policymakers, decision-makers and community members alike. By identifying persistent inequalities and tracking community progress, the index empowers stakeholders to make informed decisions, allocate resources more effectively and hold leaders accountable for ensuring that growth is truly inclusive. The interactive discussion highlighted the importance of collaborative efforts from all sectors to foster sustained and meaningful economic progress, ultimately aiming for thriving and equitable municipalities across the nation.

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2025 Image credit: OpenAI. Africa-U.S. Relations. 2025. Digital illustration.   by Dr Efem N. Ubi Abstract   The relationship between the United States (US) and Africa has been the subject of considerable debate, with questions about whether it is driven by genuine strategic interests or merely rhetorical commitments. This analysis examines these dynamics, with a focus on the strategic value of Africa in US global power calculations. As great power competition intensifies across Africa, this paper challenges the persistent gap between the US’s diplomatic rhetoric and its strategic prioritisation of Africa. While US officials often emphasise the importance of Africa, operational policy reflects outdated paradigms that undervalue the continent's pivotal role in global power dynamics. This paper interrogates whether Africa holds genuine strategic value in US global power calculations or remains a shallow concern. The article critically examines US trade, security, and diplomatic engagements, comparing them with Africa’s relationships with other advanced and emerging economies. Analysis reveals how the emerging economies have more concretely recognised Africa's strategic value, translating this recognition into sustained engagement that threatens US influence. The article further highlights gaps between policy pronouncements and actual strategic interests in US-Africa engagements. It argues that the US must move beyond rhetorical commitments to Africa and fundamentally reassess its strategic value through a multidimensional lens that recognises Africa's critical importance in the global system. This repudiation requires abandoning outdated foreign policy paradigms that marginalise Africa and embracing a partnership model that acknowledges Africa's unique position in a multipolar world.   Keywords: US-Africa Relations, Power Calculations, Rhetoric vs. Reality, Multilateralism, Sovereignty, Strategic Value, Rapprochement Introduction   Despite acknowledging Africa's growing significance, the United States' (US) strategic engagement with Africa reveals a notable discrepancy between diplomatic rhetoric and actual prioritisation. This is more evident along two key fronts. Firstly, there is a decline in this relationship, as demonstrated by diminishing trade, security cooperation, and diplomatic initiatives when compared to those with China and other emerging powers. Secondly, the dynamics of the relationship reflect an imbalanced hierarchy, characterised by a superordinate and subordinate status. Africa remains secondary in US planning, which hinders partnerships and risks strategic losses to rivals. This disconnect necessitates a more profound and nuanced understanding of US-Africa relations within the current global power dynamics. There is no gainsaying that China and the emerging economies’ expanding global presence further complicates the strategic dimensions of the relationship between the US and Africa (Fulford, 2018).   Notably, Africa has become central in several ways after appearing on the periphery of world history for much of the 19th and 20th centuries. While it is essential to acknowledge China's strategic interests in Africa, particularly concerning the substantial volume and quality of resources required to support a continuous development agenda domestically, we cannot ignore its competition with the United States for exclusive spheres of influence in Africa (Yu, 2022). Africa's strategic importance has increased due to global power competition, particularly between the United States, China, Russia, and the emerging economies. The sheer volume of Africa's strategic value, particularly its resource base, shows its importance. Africa boasts a vast array of strategic mineral wealth. Many of the critical resources of modern society either come directly from the continent or can only be extracted with their assistance (UNEP, N.d.).   However, the questions are: Why is Africa so undermined? What is the US's interest in Africa? Does Africa hold genuine strategic value in US global power calculations or remain a shallow concern? What should be the prognosis towards a rapprochement that will reengineer the relations towards mutual benefit? These are critical questions that this article will examine. The article examines the essential elements that will shape a recalibrated US-Africa partnership model, fostering mutual interests and acknowledging Africa's unique place. Using specific metrics in no precise order, such as security, trade, economic development, etc., this article investigates and evaluates the actual strategic value of Africa within US global power calculations, to bridge critical gaps, enhance understanding, inform policy, and promote a more nuanced, equitable, and effective US-Africa relationship in a rapidly evolving global order.   Historicising US-Africa Relations   US-Africa relations, although multifaceted, span historical, economic, and security dimensions. Historically, the United States' relations with Africa date back to the founding days of the US, the Atlantic slave trade, and the Cold War (Magu, 2018; Nyang, 2005). Regardless of the numerous characteristics that define the relationship between the US and Africa, it is evident that a significant portion of the global population predominantly associates both regions with their Black communities, as well as the political and military dynamics that emerged during the Cold War era (Nyang, 2005) when it became a primary objective of US policy to prevent ideological and political penetration of the region by communism (Ohaegbulam, 1992).   Although successive US administrations have often blamed each other for paying insufficient attention to the needs of the African continent, it is argued that US policy towards Africa is an afterthought (Institute for Democratic Governance, 2014). Africa began to gain prominence in US foreign policy in 1958, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the Bureau of African Affairs within the Department of State. This initiative took place during the Cold War, a period when Africa was viewed as an ideological battleground, with the US seeking to counter the Soviet Union's influence on the continent (Oyebade, 2018). During the Cold War, the US's approach to Africa, as noted by Daniel and Nagar (2016), primarily focused on countering the spread of communism. While this strategy involved supporting various regimes, including those in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia, it often compromised important democratic principles and hindered socioeconomic development. Following 1945, the US positioned itself as an anti-colonial force, striving to advance its own interests while challenging Soviet influence on the continent. This complex dynamic highlights the need for a deeper understanding of how US policies could have more effectively aligned with fostering democracy and development in Africa (Daniel & Nagar, 2016) .   The end of the Cold War led to the US initially reducing its focus on Africa, as it no longer needed to counter Soviet influence on the continent. This shift was characterised by a decrease in diplomatic presence and foreign aid, as well as a diminished focus on economic engagement (Çelik, 2022). According to Hamid, in the post-Cold War era, the US has struggled to establish a coherent African strategy, appearing reactionary compared to China's proactive economic diplomacy. This shift has led to a lack of political resolve and a diminished focus on promoting democratic governance and stability in the region (Lellou, 2024). Despite rhetorical support for democracy and economic development, the policies of Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama remained focused on securitisation. They often supported autocratic regimes, undermining the stated goals of promoting democracy and development. It was not until the early 2000s, following terrorist attacks and the discovery of energy reserves, that US military operations and engagement increased under the Bush administration. Subsequently, interest waned again during the Obama and Trump administrations, with China and the EU surpassing the US as key trade partners (Dagne, 2002). And picked up again under President Biden’s administration. Like every other relationship, the US-Africa relations have seen moments of conflict and moments of reconciliation. The US's oft-shifting rhetoric continues to have a detrimental impact on African nations (Adebajo, 2018).   The fluctuating engagement clearly demonstrates the urgent need to scrutinise the specific policy frameworks that have directed US interactions with Africa, as these frameworks serve as pivotal instruments of influence. The key policy frameworks that have decisively shaped the US-Africa relationship over the years include the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). These initiatives are crucial for understanding and strengthening US-Africa relations. The Challenges with US-Africa Relations   1.              US-Africa Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Africa   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was enacted in 2000 to increase trade and investment between the US and eligible sub-Saharan African countries by reducing tariffs on exports, thereby boosting African exports to the US (Zenebe et al, 2014). However, due to structural inequities, the Act has had limited success in diversifying trade. Many nations benefiting from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) continue to rely mainly on exporting raw materials, resulting in an overall trade volume that remains relatively low compared to other US trading partners. In 2016, testifying before the United States International Trade Commission on deepening the US-Africa trade and investment relationship, Joshua Meltzer opined that “the United States trade relationship with sub-Saharan Africa remains underdeveloped” and has been declining since 2011 (Meltzer, 2016).  Currently, only approximately 1.5% of US exports are to sub-Saharan Africa. It is worth noting that the US and China remain the primary trading partners of numerous African countries.   Depending on the administration, trade between the US and Africa has fluctuated continuously. US-Africa trade was US$100 billion in 2008 but dropped to US$41 billion in 2018. By 2024, trade had increased to US$71.6 billion; however, the uncertainty of 2025 will determine US-Africa trade under President Trump's second term. Compared to China, recent statistics indicate that Africa is China's fastest-growing trade partner, outpacing the growth of China's trade with Latin America and other Asian regions. China has established approximately 2,000 enterprises in Africa, involving a total investment of US$6 billion. China also accounts for 20% of Africa's trade (up from 10% in 2008). In 2024, trade between China and Africa was US$295.5 billion. With this tremendous trade flow, China has taken an increasingly larger chunk of Africa’s external trade, except in the petroleum sector, where the traditional former colonial powers and the United States still maintain strong monopolies. However, it is essential to note that any economic fluctuations or increases in tariffs in these countries will be felt throughout the global supply chain, with Africa being the most affected.   Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa came from a diverse array of source countries. Top investors include China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United States, and India, among others. China, India, and the UAE collectively account for at least 34% of FDI and play a crucial role in driving job creation, capital investment, and project count in many African countries (Sita et al, 2024). Regarding the US, it contributes approximately 13% of Africa’s total investment (Trends, 2024).   In 2017, US foreign direct investment in Africa totalled approximately US$50.4 billion. It decreased to US$43.2 billion in 2019 and scaled up again in 2023 to US$56.29 billion (Tierney, 2025). On the contrary, Chinese FDI in Africa as of 2004 was US$135 million. In 2006, it rose to US$37 billion. In 2012, inflows reached an estimated US$46 billion. Thus, between 2014 and 2018, China invested funds of more than US$72 billion in Africa, creating over 137,000 jobs, making it the largest foreign direct investment contributor to Africa in terms of total capital invested (Afrix, 2025). In 2023 alone, China's FDI capital stock in Africa reached approximately US$42.1 billion. From the data presented, it is clear to see the vast disparity in trade between the two most powerful global economies and Africa. It further demonstrates that there is a problem in US-Africa relations. Figure 1 Source:  China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI), 2025.   The year 2025 marks the expiration of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), presenting an opportunity for both Africa and the United States to reassess and potentially renegotiate the terms of their trade relationship with a more technical and pragmatic focus. Although AGOA primarily emphasises economic engagement through trade preferences, the outcomes have varied. Furthermore, the United States' policy toward Africa encompasses a broader spectrum that extends beyond mere commercial interactions to include security considerations as well.   2.              The Complexities of US Foreign Aid to Africa   US aid is administered by the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), typically allocated from global accounts or programme, such as humanitarian aid, or provided through contributions to multilateral organisations like the United Nations. It is observed that Africa receives approximately US$8 billion annually in aid from the United States, making it the largest recipient of US assistance. In 2022, the top ten recipients of non-emergency aid managed by the State Department and USAID were Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa. However, 70% of annual non-humanitarian aid to Africa is directed towards health programmes, with HIV/AIDS assistance taking the most significant portion of US support for the continent. Other funding initiatives aim to boost agricultural productivity and economic development, enhance security, and promote democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG), as well as improve access to quality education and social services (Congressional Research Service, 2023). Nevertheless, the pressing question remains: How effective has US aid truly been for Africa? Have the promises made been fully realised? Aside from the State Department and USAID, the US government has established other agencies, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), for distributing aid to Africa.    The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an independent US foreign aid agency, aims to promote economic development and good governance in developing countries. Established in 2004, it links aid to governance and policy performance to encourage policy improvements. MCC grants are "compacts" to countries that meet specific criteria, providing substantial funding for infrastructure projects and policy reforms. This promotes economic development in Africa, creating a conducive environment for private sector investment and sustainable growth (US Agency of International Development, N.d.). The effectiveness of the MCC is a subject of ongoing debate and evaluation as well. The MCC's eligibility criteria emphasise neoliberal reforms, utilising scorecards with indicators that promote policies such as economic freedom, good governance, investing in people, and combating corruption (Millennium Change Corporation, 2021). However, many African countries are excluded due to the high eligibility standard. Critics have also noted that MCC projects prioritise US corporate contractors over local firms. Additionally, the competitive bidding process favours large US companies, limiting local businesses' capacity for development and potentially leading to projects that are not fully aligned with local needs. Sometimes, these aids undermine a country’s sovereignty, as seen in the case of Tanzania, where MCC was suspended because the country decided to proceed with an election rerun in Zanzibar that MCC disagreed with (Cooke & Hubner, 2016). Nevertheless, MCC can be described as fairly effective. The degree of effectiveness varies according to the experience of different African countries. The initiative represents a shift towards performance-based aid, but its long-term impact on Africa's development remains to be fully assessed.   Since 2001, the United States has significantly increased its development aid to Africa, with a notable rise in financial commitments and strategic initiatives. The US foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, managed by the State Department and USAID, saw a 340% increase, amounting to an additional US$5.5 billion, alongside US$3.8 billion through Millennium Challenge Account compacts. However, while these figures suggest a robust commitment, they often mask a disconnect between stated objectives and actual impact, contributing to the broader rhetoric-reality gap that undermines US strategic engagement in Africa. Programmes like the Prosperous Africa Initiative have targeted economic sectors such as agribusiness, with efforts to improve technological capabilities in agriculture, as seen in Kenya and Nigeria (Mysheta et al, 2022). However, the effectiveness of this agricultural aid remains contested, with limited evidence of achieving the structural economic transformation necessary for sustainable development.   This inconsistency highlights the challenges the US faces in translating its financial commitments into meaningful strategic influence on the continent (Ssozi et al, 2017). Despite the increase in aid, persistent issues such as poor governance, corruption, and dependency on assistance pose significant obstacles to its effectiveness (Momah, 2018). Often, this aid ends up supporting authoritarian regimes, which complicates efforts to promote the very democracy and human rights (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004) that it was intended to safeguard. Furthermore, the extensive flow of aid into Africa does not necessarily lead to tangible outcomes, as evidenced by the varied experiences of different countries (O’Connell & Soludo, 2001). Dr Akinwumi Adesina, President of the African Development Bank, emphasised that “Africa is not going to be developed by aid; it will be developed through investment”. Therefore, it is essential to create opportunities for the private sector to play a role in addressing some of the continent’s most pressing challenges and contribute to Africa’s key development priorities (Schneidman & Signé, 2018).   Thus, a closer examination of US-Africa aid relations reveals a crisis of intention that is primarily influenced by political interests, prioritisation, and strategic objectives. US foreign aid to Africa faces numerous challenges that necessitate careful consideration. In that stead, a nuanced understanding of local contexts is a sine qua non for an effective aid strategy. By prioritising an informed, responsive, and comprehensive approach that emphasises the empowerment and governance challenges faced by African nations, the US can more effectively address the unique issues these nations encounter, while enhancing the overall impact of foreign aid programmes in achieving long-term development goals.   3.              The US Security Cooperation with Africa without Security   In the realm of security, the United States has faced criticism for its reliance on a military-centric strategy, which can destabilise fragile democracies and potentially provoke proxy wars (Kagwanja, 2006). In response, the US has increasingly emphasised the importance of African-led solutions to security challenges, focusing on partnerships with African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This approach aims to enhance regional security and stability through coordinated efforts, thereby reducing the necessity for direct US intervention (Chido, 2013). Counterterrorism initiatives in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa, have become a central component of the US security strategy. While these efforts have advanced peace processes, they have also intensified insecurity due to their military-centric nature. The integration of counterterrorism into Africa's security agenda has been impeded by inadequate funding and poor coordination with international initiatives (Kagwanja, 2006). Furthermore, the state-centric orientation of these initiatives often undermines human security and has inadvertently enabled predation (Solomon, 2013).   The establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 represents another critical aspect of US-Africa relations that complements and sometimes complicates economic partnerships. AFRICOM is a US military command responsible for military relations with African nations, to promote regional security, stability, and cooperation. Its significance lies in its reflection of Africa's growing strategic importance to the United States, particularly in the areas of counterterrorism, maritime security, and resource protection (Khlopov, 2021). AFRICOM's presence signifies a shift towards a more proactive US military engagement on the continent, underscoring US global power calculations and its desire to maintain influence amidst increasing competition from other global actors, while also generating debate about its impact on African sovereignty and the nature of US-Africa partnerships.   The establishment of AFRICOM has sparked considerable debate over its actual impact, challenging the validity of its claims regarding security enhancement and development support. Critics argue that its militaristic tactics frequently thwart meaningful progress, revealing a stark contrast between its rhetoric and the reality on the ground (Nyiayaana, 2022). Waddington (2013) believes that AFRICOM's benefit to Africa is not mere rhetoric. He states that AFRICOM has conducted joint training exercises that enhance military capabilities, focus on regional security, counter organised crime and maritime piracy, and address militant Islamist extremism, thereby significantly influencing the continent's security architecture (Waddington, 2013). Fah (2010) takes a contrary view, noting that AFRICOM's purported benefits to Africa, such as enhancing peace and security, are seen mainly as rhetoric because local peace-building efforts are undermined (Fah, 2010). Keenan (2008) shared Fah's view, opining that its militarisation has led to increased insecurity, repression, and destabilisation, contradicting the purported humanitarian security-development discourse (Keenan, 2008). Others have argued that it reflects a self-serving US policy focused on terrorism and energy security. Genuine support for African solutions is crucial to overcoming scepticism and aligning US actions with African interests (N’Diaye & Africa, 2009).   The US approach to humanitarian interventions also reveals a gap between rhetoric and action. Following the Cold War, there was a shift from realist principles to more pluralist notions in foreign policy rhetoric, with an emphasis on morality in humanitarian interventions. However, this shift has been inconsistent and case-specific, lacking a comprehensive framework for foreign policy (Prins, 2016). This inconsistency suggests that while rhetoric may emphasise humanitarian concerns, actual interventions are often driven by strategic interests. Presidential rhetoric also plays a crucial role in legislative actions. For example, President Obama's rhetoric in his State of the Union addresses was consistent in credit claiming and symbolic use. Yet, his legislative requests often required congressional cooperation, leading to partial success in policy implementation (Hoffman & Howard, 2012). This suggests that while rhetoric can influence agendas and highlight priorities, actual policy outcomes ultimately depend on legislative processes and cooperation. In the economic domain, presidential rhetoric serves as a tool for economic leadership, influencing public perception and economic behaviour. However, the effectiveness of this rhetoric is constrained by the need for cooperation from other political institutions and the fragmented nature of the American political system (Wood, 2004). This highlights a potential gap between the optimistic economic rhetoric and the practical challenges of policy implementation.   US-Africa Rapprochement: A Desideratum   The relationship between the United States and Africa has been a topic of significant debate lately. These discussions focus on perspectives regarding US relations with Africa. Historically, the United States’ policy towards Africa has vacillated between periods of engagement, indifference, and neglect, often influenced by broader geopolitical considerations. The US-Africa relationship dates back to the Atlantic slave trade and intensified during the Cold War. During the Cold War, the US was primarily concerned with containing communism, which significantly influenced its interactions with African nations. The focus shifted in the post-Cold War era, but the engagement remained sporadic, raising questions about the depth of the US commitment to Africa (Cumbo, 2013). Despite high expectations, particularly during the Obama administration, US-Africa relations have often been characterised by continuity rather than transformative change. For instance, the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit was seen as a pivotal moment, yet it essentially resulted in firmer rhetoric rather than substantial policy shifts. The approach has been described as "smart continuity", focusing on logistics, intelligence, and development rather than revolutionary policy change (Touo, 2021).   The US must acknowledge that as the world undergoes a significant transformation marked by profound geopolitical uncertainty, African nations are actively forging new alliances and redefining their relationships. They are moving decisively beyond traditional aid models to embrace partnerships that do not undermine them but prioritise locally driven development that asserts their strategic autonomy. This shift is characterised by a concerted effort to establish African-defined frameworks. We must acknowledge here that a certain level of estrangement has developed between the US and many countries in Africa, except for those with whom the US has strategic partnerships. There is growing speculation that, by the conclusion of President Trump’s second term, numerous countries in Africa and around the world may experience a strained relationship with the United States if diplomatic efforts are not managed effectively. While not directly tied to US-Africa relations, recent analyses, such as a piece in the Wall Street Journal , suggest that “Trump is Trashing America’s Reputation”. Additionally, a commentary from The Economist  has stated that “Trump’s erratic policy is harming the reputation of American assets”. Steve Dunne, writing for The Conversation , noted that “Throughout the first 100 days of his second term, Trump … has devastated—perhaps irreparably—economic confidence in the US” (Poast, 2025).   Irrespective, Africa never ceases to matter in US foreign policy. US-Africa relations still hold great potential, regardless of the impending challenges. For instance, Mr Biden lucidly captured this when he noted that “African voices, African leadership, African innovation all are critical to addressing the most pressing global challenges ... Africa belongs at the table in every room where global challenges are being discussed and, in every institution, where discussions are taking place” and that “the United States is all in on Africa's future". To demonstrate the importance of Africa to the US, the Biden administration organised a US-Africa summit in December 2022, eight years after the first Summit, which took place in 2014.   The summit, which had delegations from 49 African countries and the African Union, alongside members of civil society and the private sector, came at a time when US-Africa relations had deteriorated to an all-time low, during the first term administration of President Donald Trump, who had a condescending attitude towards African countries and their leaders. While the summit is seen from some quarters as a US guarantee to mend its relationship with Africa, for some others, the summit is also seen as an alleged US obsession to contain China and other emerging powers in the continent, predisposing the essence of the summit within the ambit of extant rivalry and competition between the US and China for Africa. Lest we forget, Africa’s recent explosive demographic growth, accelerating urbanisation, natural and human resources endowment, and economic potentials make the African continent a region of interest to many countries – the more reason, one sees the active participation of powers like China, Russia, and other advanced and emerging economies in a robust engagement with the continent, economically and politically, which on the contrary has come to overshadow US influence and its longstanding relationship with Africa.   Notwithstanding, under the President Biden administration, numerous efforts have been made to seek a rapprochement between the US and Africa, especially after Donald Trump's first term, which was established as one of the worst eras in US-Africa relations. For instance, Biden's 2022 US-Africa summit led to several commitments and planned initiatives aimed at further enhancing the US partnership with Africa in addressing challenges such as conservation, climate change, clean energy transition, supply chain security, investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation. At the summit, Biden pledged to invest at least US$55 billion in Africa in areas such as trade, investment, and energy. There was also a proposed support for the African Union's admission as a permanent member of the G20 (Group of 20). The African Union was eventually admitted as a member in 2023 at the G20 meeting held in New Delhi, India. There was also another promise by the US to invest US$500 million in a key West African port in Benin, aimed at reducing transportation costs. Other commitments include US$350 million, which would be spent on boosting the digital economy. The administration launched the next phase of the Young African Leadership Initiative (YALI) with over US$100 million to build the capacity of young African leaders for the continent’s development. The administration further spearheaded the next phase of AGOA through the Washington AGOA Forum, led by the United States Trade Representative, Katherine Tai (Alorh, 2024).   A memorandum of understanding has been established with the African Continental Free Trade Area, which seeks to "unlock new opportunities for trade and investment" between the United States and Africa, valued at US$3.4 trillion. This agreement aims to promote equitable, sustainable, and inclusive trade. Additionally, during President Biden’s visit to Angola in December 2024, he announced the provision of over US$1 billion in humanitarian assistance to address food insecurity and other urgent needs faced by refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and affected communities across 31 African countries. This commitment builds on the pledge made during the 2022 US-Africa Summit to support African partners in addressing food insecurity. It is worth noting that the visit to Angola marked the first visit of a US president to Sub-Saharan Africa since 2015 (FPC Briefing, 2024). President Biden's approach generally aimed to enhance existing US-Africa relations and ongoing programmes. This includes initiatives such as Prosper Africa, launched in 2018, which seeks to increase two-way trade between African nations and the United States. Additionally, the Clinton-era Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) provides African apparel manufacturers with preferential access to the US market, while the Power Africa initiative, started by President Obama, focuses on connecting millions of Africans to the electricity grid, among other efforts.   The whole effort surreptitiously shows how desperate the US was to restore its relationship with the continent. The central question remains: to what end? Was President Biden's initiative to mend US-Africa relations truly sincere? In other words, did these efforts effectively repair the relationship, or were they merely a strategy for the US to reposition itself in the emerging competition for Africa, particularly in light of Europe’s declining influence and the intensifying rivalry among global powers for Africa's strategic resources, both natural and human?   Despite President Biden's commitment to high-level engagement and the strengthening of commercial ties with Africa, significant challenges persist that hinder the establishment of stronger US-Africa relations, which would guarantee mutual benefits. At the same time, US officials have consistently emphasised the importance of Africa and reaffirmed their commitment to supporting democratic institutions on the continent, advancing lasting peace and security, promoting economic growth, trade, and investment, and supporting sustainable development. On the contrary, operational policy undermines and undervalues the continents in the international system; this was no different from the Biden administration. It further undermines the notion that the powerful and industrialised US, with its success, should serve as a source of inspiration and imitation for other African countries.   This situation leads us to consider the prospects for the current administration, often referred to as Trump 2.0, in terms of its approach to US-Africa relations. If the Biden administration has not fulfilled its commitment to resetting US-Africa relations based on an equal partnership, it definitely will not take place under President Donald Trump's second term in office. The reasons are not far-fetched. The US-Africa policy does not change. It remains the same irrespective of the administration in place. Some of the reasons advanced for this are that the US takes unilateral decisions on Africa without consulting Africans. In his first term, the Donald Trump administration launched an Africa policy that seeks both primacy and partnership on the continent. The US consistently undermines African agencies by pressuring African countries constantly to take a position, even if it is anathema to their survival. This disposition is unlikely to change in his second-term administration. The probabilities remain that the US-Africa relationship in the next four years under Trump will be one of superordinate versus subordinate, and this disposition is expected to have significant and enduring implications for both parties involved (Schneidman & Signé, 2018).   And finally, the imminent superpower rivalry is trivialising and undermining Africa. A point which the Biden administration’s US-Africa strategy noted, where he claimed that China views Africa as “an important arena to challenge the rules-based international order, advance its own narrow commercial and geopolitical interests, undermine transparency and openness, and weaken US relations with African peoples and governments” (Global Times, 2022). Recently, Africa has become a hotspot of superpower rivalry and competition. The question is, competition over what? Is it to have access to strategic resources or to control governments in this sphere? Even if it is to control governments, to what end? Indeed, this rivalry is undermining Africa’s development, and it is indisputable to state that the US and other superpowers view Africa as a resource to be divided among themselves.   Conclusion   To successfully navigate the complexities of a multipolar world, the United States should focus on strengthening economic partnerships and ensuring consistent diplomatic engagement. The United States needs to embrace multilateralism and a new global governance that is both effective and efficient. In particular, its foreign policy towards Africa needs to evolve from traditional aid models toward emphasising tangibility like trade, foreign direct investment, infrastructure development, and technology transfer. By concentrating on enhancing local value chains and supporting African nations in developing their manufacturing capabilities, the US can foster sustainable growth. Africa's significance extends beyond its rich natural resources; its potential for innovation and influence on global norms and institutions underscores its strategic importance in the world today.   For instance, during his first term, Donald Trump's foreign policy rhetoric often diverged from the actual strategies implemented, especially regarding counterterrorism efforts. 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The Impact of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): An Empirical Analysis of Sub-Saharan African Agricultural Exports , 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, Minneapolis, Minnesota 170590, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2025 Image credit: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID:1695883136   by Dr Francis A.S.T. Matambalya   Abstract   The article offers a glimpse of Africa-US relations, with particular reference to Tanzania. It highlights the dynamics of Tanzania’s integration into the international system, evolution and scope of Tanzania-US relations, positive and negative experiences of cooperation between the two countries, and challenges hindering the development of relations to full potential. The findings show that Africa-US relations predate Africa’s formal colonisation by European imperialist powers. Historically, the US has been, inter alia, a key party in transatlantic trade, including the infamous slave trade. Also, Americans came to Africa as colonisers, explorers and missionaries. Hence, the US is perceived as both a benevolent and malevolent power. During the colonial period, the US – itself an offshoot of the European imperialist system – was an ardent perpetrator of imperialism, and a coloniser. In the post-colonial era, Africa-US relations evolved further espousing cultural, economic, political, and social dimensions. Benefits for Africa include some benevolent action through development assistance, and cooperation in peace and security matters. Contrarily, many examples manifest the US’s malevolent hegemony, including sidelining decisions by African institutions, being party to conflicts on the continent, divergent interests in international fora, resource-greediness, etc. The analysis of the aforementioned issues provides inputs for the design of strategic interventions for strengthening and making Africa-US relations mutually beneficial and respectful. This paper recommends that the architecture of Tanzania-US relations should embrace a mapping of gaps in the framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development in Africa. Consequently, support should focus on building the framework conditions for development, in the areas of governance, diverse non-financial resource capacities, and financial resource capacities. These measures are seen not only as preconditions for meaningful Africa-US relations, but also for achieving strategic autonomy of African countries. This paper is derived from research of the Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre on studies of the dynamics of the international system titled Africa’s Past and Present International Positioning.   Keywords:  colonialism, framework conditions for development, governance institutional frameworks, imperialism, strategic autonomy. Introduction   Arguably several factors shape a state’s foreign policy, and accordingly, foreign relations. Pertinent domestic factors include the country’s culture, history, economic situation, political situation, public opinion, interests and clout of specific power groups, etc. External factors manifest the geo-economics and geo-politics of the day. A blend of these factors determines a country’s hard and soft power, and its ability and method to leverage them in dealing with other actors (state and non-state) in the global system (Dayasanka, 2023; Petrič, 2013).   In this connection, a proficient assessment of Tanzania-US relations requires revisiting several annals on pertinent issues. Besides epochal philosophies, other key records relate to Tanzania’s integration in the global system, within the broad context of Africa’s imperial conquest. Empirical literature offers insights into these issues.   From this backdrop, this paper portrays Africa-US relations, with particular reference to Tanzania. To understand these relations, not only does this paper dwell on the contemporary situation, but it also delves into the past, in order to connect it to the present, and to instructively project the future. Within the constraints of the paucity of research, this paper highlights the subject, leitmotif, and concrete manifestations and outcomes of the relations.   The multidimensional assessment situates the Africa-US relations within its historical context, tracing its dawn to trans-Atlantic slave trade, which preceded the official founding of the US and most African polities. [1]   A major risk of modern scholarly writing is to find oneself echoing the ideas of other people and making no or little contribution through one’s own original perceptions and understanding of the subject matter. To avoid this trap, the author first wrote this paper out of personal normative understanding of the world through exposure to various cultures and intercultural relations. These original perceptions and understandings were then blended with data and information gathered through desk and field research of pertinent issues. The paper systematically fuses lessons from literature and field research.   Background   Tenets of globalisation that created colonial African polities   Today’s African polities are by and large the creation of European powers, as per the Berlin Conference. The process destroyed several existing African nation-states, subsuming them in newly created polities.   Imperialism [2] is the philosophical foundation, guiding societal interactions between the victor and the vanquished. Thus, it is the doctrinaire basis of the making of African colonial polities and governing them. The victor controls the vanquished through various channels: administrative, cultural, diplomatic, economic, military, political, and legal and regulatory. The victor unilaterally engineers and manages the interactions of these spheres to serve its imperial interests.   Moreover, imperialism created and leveraged at least three major instruments to achieve and sustain total control and ‘ripping-off’ of the vanquished. Within this context racial hierarchy  served as an instrument for rationalising discrimination, denial of human rights and dignity to Africans. It was missing word(s) deliberate attack on humanness, identity, self-esteem, physical wellbeing, and mental wellbeing of the vanquished, who were designated as creatures of inferior status. Various means were used to enforce the racial hierarchy code. Already during the 7th century, the Arab conquers of North Africa received higher pay than their Berber colleagues who served in the Arab army (Warmington & Brett, 2024). The British created a special rank for Africans, the effendi , to save the ‘superior’ European soldiers from the ‘embarrassment’ of saluting ‘inferior’ Africans.   Collective exploitation of Africa and the Africans by imperial conquerors acted as an instrument for underlining racial superiority and ensuring broader support in conqueror societies. This justified the exploitation of the vanquished (inferior creatures) by all individual and institutional members of the conqueror race (superior creatures). Colonial powers as ‘hegemons’ in their colonies curtailed the say of the vanquished in societal affairs. The vanquished became irrelevant in the domestic and global arenas. The victors architectured the polities; exercised sovereignty over both domestic and foreign affairs; disrupted traditional political systems; designed and conditioned the elite system to serve colonisers’ interests; dictated victor-vanquished societies built on alien hegemony, power imbalance, multidimensional oppression, and exploitation; institutionalised inequality and parallel societies; formed cosmopolitan societies; and created African diaspora societies.    Primordial globalisation and the making of Tanzania   Commensurate with the general process of the making of present-day African polities, the territory that today bears the name Tanzania has a long history of interactions with external actors and integration into the international system. Starting long before the territory existed in its current configuration, the interactions occurred within and across cultural, economic, political, and social dimensions. A blend of domestic and external forces drove the interactions.   In this context, the subject territory has gone through a roller-coaster of experiences. Intense foreign exploration of present-day Tanzania began in the 7th century, spearheaded by Arabs and Persians, followed by the Portuguese in the 15th century. Up to the 15th century, the interactions were amongst sovereign entities. Key markers include peaceful interactions with ancient Chinese explorers and traders; and largely peaceful relations with Arabia and Europe, though they were based on mercantilist trade, including forceful establishment of trading posts.   The late 15th century presents a turning point. It was the beginning of an extended period of subjugation by slave traders from Arabia, and conquerors from Arabia and Europe. From then onwards subjugation besides mercantilism, conquest, slave trade, landgrab, and colonialism perpetrated by Arabs (through limited territorial conquest and landgrab, colonialism, mercantilism, slave trade) and Europeans (through full territorial conquest and landgrab, colonialism, mercantilism, and limited slave trade) defined the interactions.   Zanzibar was taken by the Portuguese in 1503, who ruled until 1756. Elsewhere, by 1525 the Portuguese had subdued the entire coast of East Africa, including the present-day Tanzania mainland. The Sultanate of Oman seized Zanzibar from Portugal in 1756, and the Arabs ruled the island until 12 April 1964, when they were toppled through a popular revolution by the indigenous African population.   Moreover, in the implementation of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) resolutions on the control of African resources, the British established control over Zanzibar to protect the Arab colonisers (and knighted the Island’s five imperial rulers). Simultaneously, the German Empire eventually established control over what is now mainland Tanzania – which it named Deutsch Ost-Africa (DOA), i.e., German East Africa. Notably, the formalisation of colonial rule in Tanganyika came some 88 years after Zanzibar had been completely subdued by the Arabs. After the defeat of the German empire in World War I, and as per the Versailles Agreement (1919), DOA became a Trust Territory of the League of Nations, administered by the British. The territory’s name was changed to Tanganyika. Tanganyika became Trust Territory of the United Nations Organization (UNO) after World War II, while the United Kingdom (UK) retained the governance mandate of the same.   Outcomes of Tanzania’s primordial integration in the global system   Some of the enduring outcomes of centuries of interactions between domestic and external forces are the development of Kiswahili, superimposition of alien culture, formation of cosmopolitan societies, formation of polities, and racialised relations.   The key factors that favoured the development of Kiswahili include: colonial governance institutions (administration, army, and police); colonial economic set-up (plantations, mines, labour, and settlements); communication between indigenous people and foreigners (e.g., European-African communication); mass communication (education, literacy campaigns, and mass media); and spread of religions (especially major foreign religions) [3] (Batibo, 1989). The impact of a common lingua franca lies in the fact that not only does it streamline communication, but it also reinforces shared societal (national) values and creates a more cohesive and efficient governance of diverse societal matters.   In contrast to Kiswahili, the superimposition of alien culture over more than 100 local African cultures was distinctly detrimental, and is the strategy used to inflict the most damage to African societies. Cultural hegemony sought to erase the African identity, because culture is a society’s software. African traditional systems and values, and their institutions, were designated as ‘inferior’ and ‘outdated’ and systematically destroyed. Thus, Tanzania, became part of culturally mutilated Africa, compartmentalised religiously (between Christianity and Islam) and linguistically (Anglophone, Arab, Francophone, and Lusophone).   Obviously, current borders of Tanzania as a polity are also attributed to the Arab, British, and German colonisers, and did not consider cultural, economic, political, and social relations amongst the local people.   In Tanzania too, colonialism established a code of relations, built on parallel societies of the victor and the vanquished, and characterised by power imbalance between the two. At the centre of this social construct was multidimensional suppression (in all societal spheres). Organisationally, DOA became an integral part of the imperial master country, Germany.   Colonialism inevitably induced the formation of cosmopolitan society in Tanzania – culturally, ethnically, and racially. Over centuries, the territory absorbed people from other African territories, Asia, and Europe. A notable feature of this is the divide between indigenous and non-indigenous factions of society, defined along such lines as economic wellbeing, political participation, etc. In some cases, contradictory interests (cultural and political) manifested the divide (Lindermann, 2023).   Demise of colonialism and formation of the United Republic of Tanzania   The territory’s indigenous people had to endure prolonged periods of struggle for the liberation of Africa and Africans, for Tanzania to become what it is today.   On 9 December 1961, the UK handed independence to the Tanganyika African Union (TANU), which had won the elections.   In Zanzibar, the UK decided to bypass the Afro Shiraz Party (ASP), which had won the election. In 1963, it handed over ‘independence’ to the colonial Sultan, who had dominated the isles for more than 200 years. Six weeks after the Zanzibar revolution, Tanganyika (governed by TANU) and Zanzibar (governed by ASP) united to form the United Republic of Tanzania (URT), in an arrangement that reserved substantial autonomy for Zanzibar.   On 5 February 1977, TANU and ASP united to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Also, in 1992, a multiparty system was re-introduced in the country, and CCM has continued to dominate the URT’s politics to date.   Tanzania international engagement as a post-colonial state   The international relations that Tanzania could forge are closely linked to what it became as a post-colonial state (in the cold war era). In this regard, three fundamental positions show how the country sought to position itself globally: it assumed the role of a centre for African liberation, pursued de facto strategic sovereignty in foreign policy, and became a key player in pan-African activism.   As a centre for African liberation, it became a leading voice for, and host of African liberation struggles, serving as the headquarters of the OAU’s liberation committee, supporting exiled movements and refugees from across the continent (including severing diplomatic relations with the UK from 1965-1968 over UDI).   In pursuance of de facto strategic sovereignty in foreign policy, Tanzanian foreign policy was distinctly ‘value-based’ and non-partisan, as opposed to being ideologically veiled. Through the policy of Ujamaa and self-reliance, Tanzania was in many ways doing things in a totally different way from the rest of the world (CSS, 2024). Achievements included persuading Commonwealth members to reject the readmission of apartheid South Africa, partnering with China (including building the TAZARA from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia in 1970-1975 and campaigning successfully for China’s 1971 re-admission to the UN), and becoming the first country south of the Sahara where East Germany had a diplomatic mission.   As a key player in pan-African activism, which reached fever pitch in the 1960s and 1970s, Tanzania was a prominent hub for Pan-Africanism. The country attracted Pan-Africanist supporters of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Diaspora Africans from the US and the Caribbean, including activists and scholars, made pilgrimages to Tanzania, to learn about and support the nation, and some even to stay. Obviously, some of the positions that Tanzania took contradicted the choices of the US, especially in relation to working with China and the Eastern Bloc or opposing colonialism and white supremacy. Except for Kennedy, no other US President encouraged African liberation (CSIS, 2024). Also, the US only outlawed racial discrimination in 1964, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of the same year: meaning that prior to that, white supremacy policies were still official.   Overview of Tanzania-US relations   Basic knowledge on several issues is helpful in grasping the dynamics and patterns of Tanzania-US relations, so as to form a plausible opinion about them. This paper explicates the framework of the relations (i.e., conceptual and theoretical grounding, determinant factors, philosophical foundations), their genesis and epochs, their avenues/tiers of relations, and their outcomes.   Conceptual and theoretical grounding   Some knowledge of the concepts and theories of foreign policy and foreign relations is helpful in understanding the dynamics and patterns of Tanzania-US relations. These are briefly introduced hereunder.   As concepts, foreign policy and foreign relations are portmanteau terms, with no single commonly agreed definitions. Many scholars have attempted to define these two concepts. In this paper, foreign policy is understood to mean a deliberate system of guidelines that guide the dealings between a given state with other states. A state’s foreign relations are shaped by its foreign policy. Foreign relations refer to multidimensional inter-country interactions in cultural, diplomatic, economic, political, and social spheres. Implicitly, a country’s foreign policy guides its foreign relations. Several theories offer a framework for understanding the patterns and dynamics of interactions between and amongst societies – in the context of states – in the global system.   The theory of realism emphasises the centrality of ‘power politics’ and ‘national interests’ in the architecture of international relations (Morgenthau, 1949; Waltz, 1979). The theory of liberalism emphasises international cooperation and interdependence, and mutual benefits (Voltaire, Locke, Smith, and German thinker Immanuel Kant). The theory of constructivism argues that states’ identities, and (shared) norms and ideas, shape their foreign policy decisions (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; Finnemore, 1996, 2003). Factors shaping foreign policy and relations   Several factors determine a state’s foreign policy (and by extension, foreign relations). Broadly expressed, foreign policy and foreign relations are determined by the intermingling of domestic factors and external factors.   Domestic factors include those within a state’s cultural, economic, political, and social spheres. In this paper, they reflect relations within the society and how these impact the development concerns, interests, opportunities, voice in public opinion, and concrete shaping of and benefits from development actions.   External factors emanate from the global system and reflect the power and actions of actors in that system. Accordingly, a country’s position in the global system is determined by affinity or distance (cultural, diplomatic, economic, historical, natural, political, and social) between itself and other actors (both state and non-state) in the global system. They too impact on a country via interactions at various levels: bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral.   The interplays between external and internal factors determine the blend and brand of states’ ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’, and the prospects to leverage them in dealing with other actors in the global system (Dayasanka, 2023; Petrič, 2013).   Genesis and epochs of the relations   The territories that now constitute the US and the African Continent have had interactions, even before their extant configurations. These relations have evolved from the period when Africa was not yet colonised, to the colonial and post-colonial era in Africa.   From very early times, US looked to Africa for cheap resource inputs in its economy. From the 1500s to 1865, slave trade and slavery were compelling facts of the US economy, and many individual Americans and institutions enjoyed its ‘fruits’. Key corporate profiteers include banks (e.g., predecessors of Citibank, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, etc.); shipping companies; slave trading firms, and several corporate conglomerates, e.g., the Lehman Brothers.   Relations did not favour Africa under colonialism either. Not only was the US part of the Global North, but it was also a key player and determinant of the geo-economical and geopolitical dynamics and patterns. After World War II, it became a key superpower and leader of the Western World, which thrived on imperialism.   During the post-colonial era, Tanzania – a relatively early achiever of independence (in 1961) – became the hub for African liberation. The primary focus of its international engagement became African liberation. This stance put the country in a strategic confrontation with the supporters of the global colonial system.   Avenues of interactions   Tanzania and the US interact bilaterally and in multilateral fora. They established diplomatic ties in 1961 and have since nominally maintained cordial bilateral relations. Moreover, both belong to several multilateral organisations, e.g., the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), United Nations System, and World Trade Organization (WTO). Also, they interact through the US’s cooperation with the African Union (AU); and African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), specifically, East African Community (EAC), and Southern African Development Community (SADC).   Additionally, Tanzanian interests are impacted by unilateral decisions of self-proclaimed and non-inclusive institutions of global governance, e.g., the G-7, G-20, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in which the US is a key player. Ideally, any African perspective of the agenda of these institutions must address the colonial and neo-colonial history and the imbalances they institutionalised against Africa. In reality, this can only be a pipe dream, because the foundational purpose of these institutions is not necessarily aligned with African concerns and interests.   Since 1961, the US and Tanzania have been, at least nominally, sovereign development partners. The partnership has been relatively broad-based, espousing all societal dimensions, i.e., cultural, economic, political, and social.   The US’s support has focused particularly on: economic growth and development, education services, trade development, environmental protection, energy services, healthcare, and democratic governance.   Outcomes of the interactions   The US has had a cross-dimensional impact on Tanzania. In the cultural sphere, today, 63% of the total population practices Christianity, making it the largest religion in Tanzania (CIA Fact Book, in 2023). The diffusion of Christianity in Tanzania is attributed to, amongst other people, American Christian missionaries, who have been involved in spreading Christianity in the country since the 19th century. The American missionaries worked alongside European missionaries and indigenous teachers to establish churches and schools, and to translate the Bible into Kiswahili.   The two countries have maintained bilateral diplomatic relations continuously since 1961. This is significant considering that the country’s diplomatic ties with its former colonisers broke up from February 1965 with West Germany over the East Germany issue, and from 1965-1968 with the UK over the UDI issue. Moreover, both countries belong to a number of international organisations, including the United Nations System, Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), and World Trade Organization. In contrast to relative achievements in bilateral diplomacy, there is little evidence that the two countries have been strategic partners in international fora.   In the economic sphere, the two countries maintain some ties. To highlight, 6.3% of the US’s total exports of US$ 15,843,060,000 to Africa in 2018 went to Tanzania. In the same year, 0.3% of the US’s total imports of US$ 25,078,450,000 from Africa in 2018 came from Tanzania. Moreover, the US has supported Tanzania to attract private investments. Overall, the share of Africa in US world trade was about 1.06% (USDC, 2018). In 2022, the top ten countries (Cayman Islands, China, Canada, UK, Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, South Africa, and France) accounted for 76.4% of total FDI inflows. The US was not amongst the top ten (NBS, BOT & TIC, 2024: 26). [4]   In the political sphere, the US has provided development assistance to Tanzania for capacity-building to encourage democratic governance.   The two countries have also maintained strategic relations in the areas of peace and security, a later addition to the Tanzania-US partnership. Since 2000, the two countries have been engaged in military cooperation (embracing counterterrorism, protection of territorial integrity, and engagement in peacekeeping operations; Professional Military Education (PME); military intelligence; maritime security; and countering the trafficking of illicit goods and narcotics. Tanzania’s National Defense College (NDC) routinely invites the US’s diplomats, as guest lectures in its Security and Strategic Studies Course, which aims at equipping policymakers with knowledge and skills on the management of peace, security and stability at national, regional and global levels.   Positive experiences   The Basis   To understand the benefits to Tanzania from its relations with the US, it is useful to begin by introducing the basis of those benefits, i.e., the legal and regulatory frameworks (LRFs) permitting them, and the organisational framework to manage the development assistance.   The most relevant of the LRFs is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, a US Public Law 87–195 that was approved on 4 September 1961. It is ‘an Act to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and external security, and for other purposes’.   Governance institution for US assistance   On 3 November 1961, the Kennedy administration established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to implement the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and administer economic foreign assistance programmes USAID’s programmes are broadly defined and embrace: alleviating poverty, improving health, providing economic support (including through supporting economic growth and capacity to participate in world trade). Nominally, the Agency’s work is correctly focused: seeking to build resilience in beneficiary communities so that they can thrive independently (CRS, 2025). US support takes into account the US’s international interests, commercial and otherwise (CRS, 2025).   In 2004 the US established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The Agency pursues poverty reduction through economic growth, focusing on countries with good economic policies and the potential for development. The Agency supports country-led projects and offers grants. Tanzania was one of the 32 African countries out of 63 that were eligible to submit proposals for funding under this arrangement (CRS, 2025).   Assistance programmes   Even before the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Peace Corps was the first development assistance programme, from which Tanzania and other African countries benefitted. Since the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, there have been several other programmes, as outlined hereunder.   Peace Corps   The Kennedy administration established the Peace Corps as a development assistance programme. To this effect, President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10924 on 1 March 1961, ‘challenging young Americans to serve humanity by working for peace and development in countries around the world’.   The Peace Corps’ goals include supporting existing economic assistance programmes, assisting beneficiary countries to meet their needs for skilled workers, and fostering understanding between Americans and people of other nations.   Tanganyika became one of the first countries to benefit from the initiative. The first batch of 50 volunteers departed for Tanganyika on 28 August 1961. Since then, over 3,200 volunteers have served in Tanganyika and Tanzania, working in education, agriculture, health, promoting world peace and friendship. In 2024, there were 50 Peace Corps in the country.   Special and differential treatment   Tanzania is eligible, under World Trade Organization (WTO) rule, for special and differential treatment (SDT) concerning market access (MA) to the US. Two of the most important arrangements are the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).   The GSP is a unilateral preferential trade policy (PTP) that provides duty-free access (DFA) to the US market for the more than 5,000 products from designated developing countries, currently 169.   AGOA is also a PTP, providing DFA to the US market for eligible sub-Saharan African countries, currently 32. It covers over 1,800 products, besides those under GSP. Since its enactment in 2000, it is the core of US economic ties with Africa.   Prosper Africa   ‘Prosper Africa’ was established in 2019 by the Trump Administration as a trade and investment promotion initiative. It brings together 17 US Government agencies to connect US and African businesses (i.e., buyers, investors, suppliers). It eases US companies’ access to US Government investment and export support tools. Support to Africa is indirect, i.e., African companies can find export opportunities to the US and attract investment. This market-driven programme is adversarial to the state-backed approaches of China and Russia.   President Biden reinvigorated ‘Prosper Africa’ with an additional US$80 million for investments in infrastructure, clean energy, and healthcare.   Negative experiences   For centuries, Africa’s interests have been hurt by its status as a battleground for superpower conflicts, looking for resources. From this backdrop, the country’s negative experiences emanating from its interactions with the US – which are hinted at in section two – are basically the same as for the rest of Africa. For analytical illumination, these experiences can be broken into three broad categories: experiences expressing the legacy of imperialist world vision, experiences driven by ideological hysteria, and experiences associated with Africa’s stance.5 [5]   Experiences expressing the legacy of imperialist world vision   Since the US is an off-shoot state of European imperial projects, its relations with Africa have been strongly influenced by the imperialistic global vision. The legitimisation of double standards in LRFs permitted a long list of interrelated evils perpetrated on Africa: plundering, depopulating (through slave trade and conquest wars), landgrabbing, colonisation, frustrating liberation efforts, siphoning resources (without evidence of an enduring exhibit of positive engagement), strategically undermining sovereignty, providing ‘below threshold’ (symbolic) assistance, being party to creating and enhancing negative structural legacies (based on racial hierarchy), being party to engineering erratic nation-building, and perpetuating marginalisation in international fora.   Most of the issues referred to in the previous paragraph are relatively clear.   Nevertheless, here are a few examples to illustrate the facts:   Between 1501 (global population was 450 million) and 1867 (global population was 1.2 billion), 13 million Africans were trafficked as slaves across the Atlantic Ocean. At least two million of them, ca. 10-15%, died during their passage. By comparison, the two nuclear bombs dropped on Japan by the US killed 70,000 to 135,000 people in Hiroshima; and 60,000 to 80,000 people in Nagasaki. At least 13 US presidents owned slaves. Paradoxically, men who, on the political podiums, advocated for individual freedom also enslaved people (for example, Historian Edmund S. Morgan). Further noteworthy is that by 1900, Africa’s population had shrunk to only 96,000,000 people, ca. 6% of the global population at the time (Manning, 2013: 7). Though a major power of the time, the US was present at the Berlin Conference, alongside the Austria-Hungarian Empire, Belgium, Kingdom of Denmark, British Empire, French Empire, German Empire, Italy, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kingdom of Portugal, Russian Empire, Kingdom of Spain, Kingdom of Sweden-Norway, and Ottoman Empire (Turkey). In 1822, the US established a colony in Liberia. It named its capital Monrovia (in honour of President James Monroe, who had contributed more US Government money to support the colonisation project). Liberia unilaterally declared independence in 1847 and was recognised by the US on 27 July 1967.   These intrusions left behind enduring negative effects, because, to a large extent, they created appendage economies that lacked strategic autonomy, and the framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development.   Experiences driven by ideological hysteria   Ideological considerations have been the basis for the US to frustrate positive change, taking sides in conflicts, opposing Africa’s interests in international fora, and targeting African countries with hostile measures.   An example of frustrating positive change includes frustrating African liberation efforts (by siding with the coloniser of their reactionary domestic agents). The motive was to position itself against USSR/Russia, other Eastern Bloc States, China, and Cuba, which supported Africa’s liberation. The second example relates to land reforms. The US knows very well that indigenous people did not voluntarily give land to any conqueror, yet it covertly and overtly opposes land reforms, e.g., in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Besides, the US has traditionally been comfortable with revolutionary political leaders like Tanzania’s John Pombe Joseph Magufuli, Patrice Emery Lumumba (Congo), and Sylvanus Olympio (Togo).   Also, within the context of the Cold War, the US has historically taken sides in lethal conflicts in Africa, e.g., civil wars, coup d’états, liberation wars, and other forms of standoffs.   Another sticky issue is the practice by the US of leveraging its clout to blockade African interests in international fora. An example concerning Tanzania is the vetoing of Salim Ahmed Salim as UN Secretariat General on 27 October 1981. It used its veto three times in one day to deny him the position.   On hostile measures, the US repeatedly imposes travel bans for Africans and provides frequent travel advisories against Africa. In 2020, USDA imposed a visa ban on Tanzania (alongside Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan). Also, as recent as 5 September 2024, the USDA issued a travel advisory against Tanzania, ‘due to crime, terrorism, and targeting of LGB persons’.   Tanzania’s relations with the US happen in the context of an Africa that lacks a coherent continental policy towards the US. There is no unity of concern, interest, or action in its dealings with the US. In reality, African countries predominantly engage with them individually rather than collectively (IDEG, 2014). Given the limited bargaining power of small countries like Tanzania, this consolidates and prolongs unbalanced Africa-US relations.   Moreover, in the manifestation of dependency syndrome, the African elite associate Africa-US relations with ‘the US trying to do well for Africa’ rather than ‘Africa and the US doing something good together’ (IDEG, 2014).   Sticky issues eroding the outcomes of Tanzania-US partnership   An obvious outcome of Tanzania-US relations is that instead of enabling the country to develop strategic autonomy and resilience, they have contributed towards perpetuating and even worsening dependency. In this regard, the imperialistic foundation of the relations erodes the outcomes by promulgating a mindset of servitude in partner countries, pursuing the US’s self-centric interests and dominance (culturally, economically, politically, and socially).   Promulgating a mindset of servitude   In realpolitik, imperialism is perhaps the strongest constituency in a country like Tanzania. Its pressure is omnipresent and bears heavily on the elite, whose society is subject to imposition of alien values (cultural, economic, political, and social). In response to this pressure and as a coping mechanism to bear the risks of imperialism, often the elite opt to collaborate with the imperial power. This has, in turn, led to two consequences. First, imperialism is blamed for promulgating a mindset of servitude in peripheral countries, blocking strategies. Second, this conduct exposes Africa-US relations to criticism, because on many occasions, it has appeared to promulgate a mindset of servitude by frightening the elite and eroding their confidence (e.g., putting them on travel ban lists), leading to the elite invariably being branded as aristocratic, despotic, undemocratic, unpatriotic, etc.   Self-centric interests and dominance   Inter-superpower antagonism – e.g., between the USSR and US – shows that each superpower perceives its societal values to be the best not only for itself, but for everyone else (Ogunbambi, 1982). Moreover, superpowers have been ready to inflict heavy damage challengers, to defend their assumed ‘value supremacy’.   On the one hand, the US is perceived to be extremely self-centred, with foreign affairs ‘seldom an issue of concern’ (Taşpınar, 2010). On the other hand, the US has a strong influence in Tanzania, cutting across all societal dimensions. It projects its ‘value supremacy’ through various channels: corporate (i.e., economic) activities, education, film, media, music, political interactions, religion, etc. However, the architecture of Tanzania-US and EAC-US bilateral economic agreements (in the areas of trade and investments) has been criticised by local scholars for being heavily US-centric (Pay & Gitonga-Mutethia, 2021).   In the political arena, Tanzania is subject to the bipartisan agreement commitment (of the Democrats and Republicans) to advancing US geopolitical interests in Africa (Gnanguênon, 2024; Lellou, 2024).   Overall, the US’s engagement in Tanzania is usually overtly or covertly adversarial to China and Russia. Its architecture is more concerned with containing the influence of these adversaries than assisting the country achieve concrete development objectives related to building strategic autonomy and resilience.   To exacerbate the limitations, the depth of support has largely remained under the threshold of required resources and US’s capacity to support: scarce financial resources have been spread thin (i.e., across far too many initiatives); cooperation outcomes have been person-based, hence stronger during certain periods (e.g., in the 1960s during the Kennedy administration) than others; and conditions of access to grants have been used to spy on local institutions.   Reflections for building mutually beneficial relations   Strategic action to strengthen and make Africa-US relations mutually beneficial and respectful should be guided by at least three basic considerations: the essentiality of resetting the relations, need for US to become a benevolent strategic partner of Africa, and strategic focus on the architecture of the relations.   Essentiality of resetting and leveraging Africa-US relations   ‘Positive’ Africa-US relations are essential for two reasons: lessons from Africa’s legacy as a backwater of the world, and the fitness of the US as a partner. As explained in the previous chapters, at least parts of Africa and the African people, whether within the African continent or in the diaspora, have largely been a backwater of the world since the Middle Ages. Moreover, as delineated in chapter 2, especially in subsection 2.2 to 2.5, the circumstances, in the postcolonial African polities, implied that they would not have much leverage in international affairs. Unsurprisingly, today Tanzania, alongside other African countries, is still a backwater of the world.   Also, given its capabilities, the US can be a positive game changer in Africa’s development, in the same way it did for Western Europe after World War II, and with other friendly countries – e.g., South Korea [6] , Taiwan, etc. – thereafter. It can assist Africa to set up effective framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development. A measure of ideal partnership would be the support from the US to bolster strategic autonomy and resilience.   Tanzania lags behind in terms of framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development. Consistent with the fundamental logic of building its own capacities, Tanzania needs to be strategically less reliant by building and enhancing critical capacities for development. In this context, issues related to peace and security are seen as necessary outcomes of the development achieved.   In terms of strategic focus, the new Africa-US relations should break from the traditional North-South relations, driven by imperialistic ideals and fictitious commitments. It should be modelled as a Partnership for Building Strategic Autonomy (PBSA), capable of catalysing transformative development in Africa.   Its aims should be to consolidate good governance institutional frameworks; enhance their productive resource capacities; address the development restraints linked to historical injustices (to create a level playing field for all societal groups); strengthen (African) strategic alliances; strengthen the enforcement of governance ethics; and leverage the African diaspora.   Measures to build mutually beneficial relations   To expedite the process of transforming to a higher level of development, Tanzania needs to build resilience so that it can thrive independently. Most importantly, it needs to embark on a path to strategic autonomy.   However, inter-societal interdependencies are not only inexorable but appropriate, and genuine allies should nurture them. Hence, strategic autonomy does not mean binary choice between dependence and independence or between engagement and decoupling. It is more about mutually beneficial and respectful interdependencies (Helwig & Sinkkonen, 2022).   Building Tanzania’s strategic autonomy can be achieved through international cooperation with viable partners, in which case a benevolent partner of the calibre of the US can play a strategically vital role.   Therefore, the prime concern in assessing Tanzania-US relations was to understand the character and impact of the foreign policy pursued by the US, and, in consequence, to propose the kind of cooperation measures that ought to be adopted by the two partner countries. The key question was: Is the US’s foreign policy imperialistic or not? Invariably, does it contribute to creating the necessary conditions for strategic autonomy in Tanzania, or suppress them?   Based on the reflections in the previous sections, this section describes a Partnership for Building Strategic Autonomy (PBSA), defined as a capacity development project focusing on four broad pillars: capacities for good governance, FiR capacities, productive resource capacities, and flanking measures. These capacities are preconditions for achieving both strategic autonomy, and a conducive environment for sustainable peace, security, and stability.   Consolidating good governance institutional frameworks   Governance is certainly one of the major failings in Tanzania and other African countries. [7] It is innately linked with poor development performances across all spheres of society. The several factors that erode the effectiveness of the governance institutional frameworks (GIFs) are linked to, inter alia, legal and regulatory frameworks (LRFs), governance organisational frameworks (GOFs), professional competency deficiencies of policy and lawmakers (PLMs) and policy and law implementors (PLIs) [8] , and leadership deficiencies of the political elite [9] .   Hence, it is necessary that the US-Tanzania partnership supports a new era and vision of African governance; in which these handicaps are addressed systematically and sustainably.   Well-designed LRFs should promote a ‘rule of adhocracy’ [10] , instead of the prevailing ‘rule of bureaucracy’, using lessons from Tanzania’s tea industry survey 2023 as a case study (TBT, 2024).   The governance organisational frameworks (GOFs) [11] determine organisational efficiency. Particular focus should be on countering the proliferation of state actors (e.g., government agencies, authorities, etc.) in general, and ‘weed institutions’, in particular. Given its knowledge, skills capital, and experience, the US could show the way in pursuing the appropriate reforms, ranging from scaling down to eliminating entire organisations, in order to promote governance efficiency.   The professional competence of the elite is critical in achieving and safeguarding the strategic autonomy of a given entity. Hence their strategy should involve professionalising technical leadership of policy and lawmakers (PLMs) and policy and law implementors (PLIs) from both the public and private sectors. This requires building institutional capacities for (deepening) good conduct, and professional competency and confidence of the elite on a continuous basis.   Political leadership is a vital determinant of a society’s strength. At every epoch, good leadership has been responsible for driving performance through strategic thought, mobilization, and action. Africa too has had its share of brilliant leaders. Thus, PBSA should make Tanzania build a governance system that ensures continuity and safeguards the development dynamics initiated by visionary leaders. Concrete measures can focus on strengthening institutions for nation-building (e.g., establishing non-partisan national endowments for democracy), institutions for democratic development (i.e., strong, independent judiciaries, free and fair electoral systems, media freedom, and a robust civil society).   Productive resource capacities   Productive resource capacities (PRCs) determine a country's ability to produce goods and services, ultimately driving economic growth and development. This refers to both FiR capacities and NFiR capacities.   Although financial development is essential for economic performance (King & Levine, 1993), Tanzania lacks it (ACBF, 2015; Allen et al., 2012; Baltagi et al., 2009; King & Levine, 1993; Rajan & Zingales, 2003). Overall, the capacity concerning challenge is high (the highest category) in 17.8% of African countries, including Tanzania (ACBF, 2015). Boosting the country’s FiR capacities requires addressing corruption, deficient LRFs, fiscal unsustainability, illicit financial flows, and revenue collection anomalies.   The PBSA should address the various NFiR capacities to unleash Tanzania’s development potential and make Tanzania-US relations bear mutually beneficial outcomes. This underlines the need for Tanzania to create robust productive capacities targeting at least five dimensions: entrepreneurship, knowledge and skills, organisations (institutions), physical infrastructure, and technology.   Flanking measures   In addition to consolidating GIFs, and building PRCs, several measures are critical for addressing genuine concerns related to the societal configuration in Tanzania and other African countries, so as to fully unleash and capitalise on the potential for development. Key measures are mitigating development restraints linked to historical injustices, strengthening African strategic alliances, and strengthening the enforcement of governance ethics.    Addressing development restraints linked to historical injustices   The imperialistic racial hierarchy system introduced by colonisers throughout Africa created castes in societies. The system of race-based castes institutionalised cultural, economic, political, and social discrimination. In this arrangement, the people of African descent were marginalised in their own countries and throughout the world.   Thus, recognising and supporting corrective action against historical injustices is crucial not only for honouring and upholding the dignity of the people of African descent, but also for broadly unleashing the development potential embedded in the various societal groups in African countries.   In this regard, counteracting the societal distortions caused by the system of race-based castes and affirmative action system can help. Key to this is access to opportunities: business and economic, education, health care, and political ones.   As the US was quick to come up with the Marshall Plan to reconstruct the European economies after World War II, it should also acknowledge the historical and contemporary adverse effects of slave trade and imperialism on people of African descent and commit itself to addressing the structural legacies attributed to imperialism and colonialism [12] .   Strengthening African strategic alliances   The barriers to African strategic autonomy are also compounded by several other factors. One example is what Pay and Gitonga-Mutethia (2021) refer to as the ‘collateral damage' caused by national action that disregards the collective African dimension. An example is Kenya ignoring its legal commitments under regional economic communities (RECs) and bilaterally signing a trade agreement with the EU and US, instead of doing it under the umbrella of the East African Community (EAC) Common Market.   Another example is the resistance by African polities to cede power to supra-national institutions (that they have themselves created), which is one of the main reasons for the relative dysfunctionality of African RECs, compared to RECs from other regions of the World.   The two factors alluded to in the previous paragraphs imply a lack of African strategic alliances. The US has plenty of experience in effective management of strategic alliances. Hence, a reset of the Africa-US partnership should also focus on strengthening intra-African strategic alliances, as well as strategic alliances between Africa and other regions, beyond the usual rhetoric and symbolism.   Strengthening the enforcement of governance ethics                   Governance ethics is a major concern regarding the conduct of the African elite. In an expression of frustration, critics have designated the African elite as ‘corruptocracies’, ‘chaosocracies’, and ‘terrorocracies’ (Van Wyk, 2007). They blame them for deficiencies in patriotism and commitment to societal interests.   The perceptions of corruption illuminate the scope of the challenge. In spite of a stark cross-country contrast, the continent as a whole ranks poorly on the global corruption index. In 2023, only five countries had scores of 50 or above, i.e., Seychelles (71), Cabo Verde (64), Botswana (56), Rwanda (51), and Mauritius (51). [13] Tanzania’s score was 40. The pan-African score of 33 was the lowest of any major region in the world (Statista, 2024).   In order to achieve genuine change, with the assistance of their international partners including the US, Africa must build the right institutional frameworks for the development of a cadre of competent, conscious, devoted, and patriotic political stewards at all levels.   Leveraging the African diaspora   The US has what all other imperialist states lack: a huge African diaspora. This is a resource that can serve as an inter-societal bridge for engagement (Lellou, 2024). For what can it be leveraged? For Tanzania’s renewal and transformation towards strategic sovereignty and resilience, in a similar manner to the pan-African movement of the 1960s and 1970s.   For example, the large African communities in the US can be involved in creating connections that enhance mutually beneficial and respectable cooperation in all societal spheres: cultural, economic, political, and social. Conclusions and the way forward   Concluding observations   This paper set out to examine Africa-US relations, with particular reference to Tanzania. Concerning Africa as a whole, it illuminated the organisation of African societies before colonial conquest, systematic conquest of Africa, and tenets of primordial globalisation that impacted the making of African elites.   Referring to Tanzania, the paper revisited several issues, including the chronology of its integration into the international system, lasting outcomes of its integration into the international system, genesis and setting of relations with the US, evolution and scope of those relations, impact (positive and negative) of the relations on the country, and challenges hindering the development of relations to full potential.   The overall verdict is that contrary to diplomatic rhetoric, Africa-US relations have not been mutually beneficial and respectful, a challenge enduring to-date. A perennial underdog in the global system, Africa has served the pursuits of imperialistic powers, including the US. The US has dealt with Africa in an antagonistic, lop-sided, and truculent manner, and has not prioritised mutually beneficial relations. The US’s view of the world through the lens of a superpower has determined its African policy, contributing to plunder, depopulation, landgrab, colonisation, conflict perpetration, counter-liberation efforts, economic exploitation and provision of ‘below threshold’ assistance, clashing of interests, blockading, and undermining sovereignty. Its relations are still clearly exploitative.   Hence, by most measures, Africa-US interactions have generated overwhelmingly negative experiences, linked to imperialistic excesses, ideological hysteria, and a dependence mindset and syndrome of the African elite.   The overall impact of these negative experiences is the marginalisation of Africa, placing it on the periphery of global affairs. The experiences have created scepticism about US’s discourteous involvement in African affairs.   Nevertheless, Africa-US interactions have not been a complete zero-sum game for Africa. Several positive outcomes can be attributed to their relations. They include the creation of LRFs to manage development assistance; and establishment of assistance programmes, e.g., Peace Corps, SDT related to trade, and Power Africa, which are outlined in section 4.   Therefore, specifically, the paper recommends a reset of Africa-US relations, to ensure that they deliver results based on mutual benefits and respect. The relationship should be built on a new approach that distinguishes the new Africa-US policy from the previous one in vision, content, and action. In these new relations, the US should recognise Africa’s polities as sovereign entities, support them in building strategic autonomy and resilience, and advocate for their genuine interests in fair treatment in the global arena by all bilateral and multilateral partners.   Way forward   This research paper contends that despite past and contemporary challenges, resetting the US’s engagement in Africa, though not insurmountable, is a tough task. Business as usual will not be able to turn around the trend.   Therefore, a new strategy – built on the belief of ‘humanity is one and indivisible’ as propagated by Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere – must emphasise engagement at all levels focused on mutually beneficial and respectful outcomes. 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[2] Imperialism considers itself to have an absolute moral right and considers it the duty of the nation to exploit other nations. Africa was exploited by a collective European nation that perpetrated imperialism. [3] Other factors include: demographic imbalance (compelling minorities to learn Kiswahili); historical identity; symbols of national, racial, and cultural identity; immigration and nomadism; social prestige; traditional trade and settlements; and urbanisation. [4] In 2022, Tanzanian shares of global FDI inflows and Africa FDI inflows were 1% and 2.5% respectively (NBS, BOT % TIC, 2024: 12). Moreover, from 2019 to 2022, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) accounted for 31.9% of FDI inflows. The US was not amongst the top ten (NBS, BOT & TIC, 2024: 26). [5] The readiness for the US to interact positively and constructively with Tanzania is presumably eroded by a lack of ‘cultural and ideological affinity’. [6] The US played a crucial role in South Korea's economic transformation, providing comprehensive assistance in embracing grants, loans, technical assistance, investments, and preferential treatment in trade (with the US absorbing most of the country’s exports). [7] Both GIFs and GOFs aim to establish structures and processes for effective decision-making, accountability, and transparency. GIFs focus on broader societal structures (i.e., LRFs and norms that govern a society or a particular sector); while GOFs focus on specific entities or groups (e.g., government entities, corporate entities, CSOs, etc.). [8]  Due to lack of professional development frameworks (PDFs) capable of producing competent professionals. [9] Due to lack of institutionalised frameworks for producing competent political stewards. [10] In an organisational management setting, adhocracy culture describes a model that fosters decentralisation, individual initiative, and organic decision-making. It deviates from a rigid system of authority or procedures, by focusing on consistently adapting methods by giving employees who are closest to the action permission to do their work and solve problems as they see fit. [11]  The GOFs focus on the internal structures and processes within a specific entity. [12]  In 2019, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the fundamental rights of people of African descent. The resolution called for a comprehensive perspective on colonialism and slavery acknowledging their historical and contemporary adverse effects on people of African descent. However, being largely symbolic, these measures have not translated into practical and effective instruments for addressing the structural legacies attributed to colonialism. A note on the US: While being able to very quickly come up with the Marshall Plan to reconstruct the European economies after World War II, it has not even acknowledged the historical and contemporary adverse effects of slave trade and imperialism on people of African descent. Therefore, there is no commitment to addressing the structural legacies attributed to colonialism. [13] Implicitly, in spite of some achievements, there is still widespread corruption because the court system is one of the most corrupt institutions, routinely covering up heinous crimes committed by various branches of the elite. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2025 Image credit: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID:1679934878   by Dr Robert Kabage   Abstract   From the periods of colonialism, the slave trade, the Cold War until now, United States (US) engagements with Africa have been, as any other nation would do, steered by its national and strategic interests. The inauguration of Donald Trump as US President on 20 January 2025 marked a significant shift in the US’s foreign policy. The administration’s “America First” policy, which emphasises US national interests, economic protectionalism, and reduced foreign intervention, is disrupting America’s foreign policy in a significant way. Many countries, including Kenya and others in Africa, are forced to realign their bilateral relations with those of the US, in order to maximise mutual benefits. Apart from planning to cut or restructure US civilian foreign aid and development assistance under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which has disrupted various humanitarian and development programmes in Kenya, Africa, and indeed globally, the new policy seeks to reduce or completely withdraw US budgets from many multilateral engagements such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and Paris Agreement, among others. On the military front, many members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe, who have traditionally relied on the US for their security guarantees, have been compelled to rethink their military strategy, with a reduced role of the US in mind. By reviewing existing literature and policy documents such as the new Executive Orders by President Trump, this paper concludes that, indeed, the US seeks to prioritise its national interests over multilateral engagements seen as not directly benefitting the country. It recommends that Kenya and Africa should realign their priorities in relation to the US, even as they seek to explore alternative financing and relations with other states.   Keywords: America First, USAID, Trump2, Kenya, Africa Introduction   From the periods of colonialism, the slave trade, the Cold War until now, United States (US) engagements with Africa have been, as any other nation would do, steered by its national and strategic interests (Schraeder, 1994). The inauguration of Donald Trump as US President on 20 January 2025 marked a significant shift in the country’s foreign policy, and Africa will have to adjust its bilateral relations so as to strategically realign its interests with those of the US. There is no doubt that the Trump administration’s “America First” policy, which emphasises US national interests, economic protectionalism, and reduced foreign intervention, is disrupting America’s foreign policy in a significant way. The “America First” policy, which prioritises the US’s interests in peace and security, trade and international development (Trachenberg, 2024), adopted by the Trump II (Trump’s second term) administration has compelled many allies in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and Africa to reassess their bilateral and multilateral relations so as to realign them to those of the US for mutual benefits. Globally, multilateralism suffered a setback as the US withdrew from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris Agreement. In Europe, the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the continuity of its policies and practices is now in doubt, after the US took a relatively different position from many of its NATO allies in Europe, especially in relation to the Russia-Ukraine war. The US trade rivalry with China is also likely to be resurgent, as was the case with the first Trump administration, when the US sought to tame China’s increasing influence in the tech space.   For the rest of the Third World, where Africa and Kenya fall, the US’s reduction or complete stopping of development and humanitarian assistance means that many will struggle with budget deficits and must seek alternatives. For Kenya and Africa, where many programmes funded by USAID have been disrupted, African countries may have to restructure their budgets and seek alternative sources of funding, if the freeze takes longer or assistance is completely cut. While the US has been a strong partner in development and humanitarian assistance, this is likely to reduce drastically during the Trump II administration, as the US seeks to cut government spending locally and internationally.   While multipolarity has been gaining ground, as the US sought to focus more on domestic policy and reducing its multilateral engagements, multilateralism is even more strained under the Trump II administration. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are increasingly projecting their self-interest onto the UNSC, significantly weakening the ability of the Council to effectively deliver on its mandate. The withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and the WHO also demonstrates the increased weakening of multilateralism under Trump II. Consequently, the profile of other global actors like Russia and China are on the rise, even as Europe and others in Asia and Africa continue to reassess and realign their interests with the US. The Trump II administration, which is right-leaning, aligns with the rise of far-right political parties in Europe, who seek to limit immigration and keep their societies in their traditional and conservative state, hence undermining the much-touted globalisation and universality of the western hegemony.   Methodological and Theoretical Note   This is a desktop research paper aimed at unpacking the preliminary scenarios that could shape the Trump II administration’s policies by systematically reviewing available literature and providing foresight into possible ways that Kenya could realign its bilateral relations with the US, so as to strategically benefit from this sudden shift of the US’s policy under Trump II. It is based on realist theory. It best explains the competitive nature of states while they seek to protect their own interests and project their power (Morgenthau, 2014: 53). It argues that states are self-interested, that the world is anarchical and therefore self-help is imminent in pursuit of self-preservation.   Although Fukuyama (2020: 298) in his End of History had predicted that history was converging at the time, and that universal political economy was imminent, his prediction failed to materialise as universality failed to take root and as states challenged western hegemony. While the end of the Cold War put realism on the defensive when the tides moved in favour of globalisation and universality of politics and economics (Williams et al, 2005), realism has powerfully bounced back after the western liberal model failed to be accepted universally, putting into question the ability of states to act together multilaterally. Consequently, the 21st century has seen a resurgence of realism, where power is slowly but steadily being concentrated at the state level, and where the liberal euphoria of universality of norms is being greatly challenged.   Key Issues   International Peace and Security   The “America First” policy, which prioritises the US’s interests in peace and security is disrupting the conventional belief within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership that the US will defend NATO members in the case of military attacks, especially from the dreaded Russia. The US under Trump II is demanding that NATO members should increase their military budgets and build the individual capacities of their militaries, and that they should not rely solely on the US for security guarantees and protection. The Trump II administration is threatening to upend the conventional position that the US’s military power was meant to protect and project the western liberal international order founded on Bretton Woods (Dombrowski, 2025: 27). A recent meeting in France of major military powers in Europe — France, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Poland — are crafting a plan for security guarantees for Ukraine, even as they seek to assert their military cooperation and capabilities without the US (Vincent, 2025: para 1 and 2).   In the case of Kenya, a Major Non-Nato Ally (MNNA) of the US designated by President Joe Biden in 2024, the country could harness its military capacities by strengthening historical military collaboration with the US especially in areas of mutual interest, like the fight against terrorism, that have led to military cooperation such as the Manda Bay and Mombasa military bases (Negash & Salih, 2023: 110). The Trump II administration has, however, demonstrated that it intends to scale down the US’s funding and involvement in military missions abroad, as demonstrated by the recent freezing of funding for Kenyan-led security missions in Haiti (Reuters, 2025: para 1). It is also not yet clear whether the Trump II administration considers the designation of Kenya as an MNNA by the Biden administration as a priority and aligning to its interests. While Kenya’s designation as an MNNA of the US may remain unchanged, the Trump II administration has a history of reversing the policies and initiatives of its predecessors, and this should not come as a surprise with regards Kenya’s MNNA status, especially in the event that it does not align with US military priorities. While Trump II may not be very enthusiastic about military multilateralism, this could provide an opportunity to pursue bilateral relations that are custom-made for Kenya-US mutual relations. Kenya could thus use its MNNA status as leverage to seek bilateral military/security cooperation with the US outside the multilateral security arrangement. It may also be strategic to seek other security cooperation arrangements with other countries, by invoking the strategic ambiguity posture of non-alignment, so as not to jeopardise the existing Kenya-US agreements.   Most importantly, Kenya ought to rethink its financing of security operations, to enhance domestic funding from its budget, which ultimately gives it more autonomy to exercise the country’s sovereignty in promoting peace and security within Kenya and in other friendly countries. At approximately 1% of the total government budget (SIPRI, 2023), Kenya’s military budget may need enhanced financial support.   Gender and Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI)   The Trump II administration has taken a more conservative view of gender and sexuality, with President Trump arguing that one can only either be male or female. According to Trump:   “It is the policy of the United States to only recognize two sexes, male and female. These sexes are not changeable and are grounded in fundamental and incontrovertible reality. Under my direction, the Executive Branch will enforce all sex-protective laws to promote this reality, and the following definitions shall govern all Executive interpretation of and application of Federal law and administration policy.” (Executive Order 14168, Section 2, Para 1)   Trump’s position on sexuality has emphasised the binary nature of sexuality as man and woman, reversing the Biden administration’s policy on sexuality, which sought to protect the fluidity and grey nature of sexuality, emphasising the protection of sexual minorities such as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer (LGBTQ) individuals. While the Trump II administration’s position on gender and sexuality aligns with Africa’s predominant conservative view on sexuality, it exposes sexual minorities to further marginalisation and discrimination. While Botswana, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, and South Africa have decriminalised same-sex relations, LGBTQ persons remain criminalised in other countries including Kenya. This shift in the US’s policy on gender and DEI means that programmes initially funded by USAID under gender and diversity could face budget cuts and freeze. This could also significantly entrench this policy shift beyond the US, and could see other countries adopting the same view, by limiting community support and tolerance for LGBTQ persons.   While LGBTQ and same sex marriage is prohibited by Kenyan law, such minority groups exist in our communities, and the Supreme Court of Kenya has ruled that queer persons have a right to associate, just like any other Kenyan, and have a right to register their support group association (Daily Nation, 2023).   Aid, Global Health and International Development   The freezing of USAID’s programmes, especially those deemed as not aligning with Trump’s policy of “America First”, is a wakeup call for Kenya and Africa, to reduce dependency and step up domestic financing especially of critical sectors like public health. In Kenya, former USAID programmes meant to combat HIV, TB, and Malaria have been negatively impacted, with effects expected to manifest in the next few months. Among other issues, President Trump has also signed an Executive Order withdrawing the US from the World Health Organization (WHO) (The White House, 2025a), signalling the US’s desire to cut back on its involvement in multilateral global health architecture led by the WHO.   The USAID’s freezing of funding for Kenya’s programmes especially in the public health sector requires urgent attention from the government of Kenya, to not only enhance its domestic budget for public health, but also to seek alternative donors as a matter of urgency in the short term. To avoid progress made in combating HIV, TB, and Malaria from being rolled back, Kenya should indeed consider this one of its top priorities. Most importantly, Kenya should in future consider funding critical sectors such as public health entirely from its consolidated fund, to avoid shocks occasioned by the unpredictability of external funding. It is also important to note that domestic funding of public health will ensure that it is Kenya’s priority areas in public health that are upheld, and not external donors’ own interests in any project they fund.   While donor countries like the US should prioritise the humanitarian needs of beneficiaries and not their own interests, as the US has done with its “America First” policy, the reality is that international development assistance has never actually sought to empower the communities they support but have instead entrenched their interests in the development projects they finance. This has led some scholars, like Dambisa Moyo in her Dead Aid, to argue that development assistance is not in fact empowering African countries and others in the South, but rather, it is making them more subservient to the countries of the North, further worsening existing inequalities that favour the West (Moyo, 2010: 1-5).   As an illustration, the Trump II administration has suspended aid to South Africa, protesting against the enactment of the Expropriation Act 13 of 2024 in South Africa, which allows the South African government to acquire land, in special instances, for public interest. According to the Trump II administration, the sanction on South Africa is meant to protect white farmers, who are supposedly in danger of their land being compulsorily acquired without compensation (The White House, 2025b). This US policy does not however address the realities of inequalities in South Africa, where black South African land was forcefully acquired during apartheid, leaving many black South Africans in abject poverty, a legacy that has continued to bedevil the rainbow nation. Aid in this case is seen as a tool for external control and manipulation for selfish interest.   Climate Action   While climate action has attracted international attention over global warming, the Trump II administration is not enthusiastic about climate action and has through an Executive Order indicated the US’s desire to be exempted from the Paris Agreement (The White House, 2025c). According to the administration, the Paris Agreement in its current form does not prioritise the interests of the US, which he claims burdens the US taxpayers to channel money into countries that do not need it, while undermining US interests in the process.   While Kenya had positioned itself as the champion of climate action in Africa, this strategic position is likely to be adversely impacted by the US’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, considering that the US was a major financier of the climate action. While the extent of the implication of US’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is yet to be fully felt, it is likely to significantly roll back progress made in the implementation of the agreement. Although the climate change debate is essential for the survival of humanity, Trump’s scepticism mirrors that of many ordinary people, the hustlers in the Kenyan sense, who are often left behind in the climate change debate and action plans. To the ordinary Mwananchi, who is not able to attend the elitist global climate summits locally and internationally to get facts and statistics, the climate change agenda may simply pass as non-existent, or having to do with the elites in society, yet the climate change ramifications mostly affect the poor and vulnerable, mostly in Africa.   In Kenya, the climate change agenda should thus continue, with a focus on making climate mitigation people-centred and grassroots-driven, without necessarily depending on the global climate financing architecture. Consequently, there is a need to model the climate change agenda from the grassroots level – the bottom-up approach as opposed to the present top-down approach. This way, the ordinary person will understand the implications of climate change and, hence, make individual behavioural changes that will help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help preserve biodiversity.   One way for Kenya to champion the climate debate is by involving its youthful populations in the climate agenda, especially because climate change will mostly impact on future and younger generations. It is for this reason that in Europe the climate action debate has gained traction by involving young and youthful environmental activists, leading to influential environmental student campaigns like the “Fridays for Future” movement, which has mobilised millions of students into climate action by pushing for political action to remedy climate change.   Through its actions, the “Fridays for Future” campaign was recognised by the United Nations Environmental Program in 2019 as a champion of the earth (UNEP, 2019). In this regard, Kenya and Africa need to consider incorporating climate change courses into the education system from the primary through to the tertiary level. Governments too must incentivise green initiatives and businesses, to ensure that they favourably compete with others as they innovatively devise climate-friendly technologies   US Immigration Policy and Africa’s Labour Export   As the world’s largest economy worth approximately US$30 trillion, followed by China with approximately US$20 trillion, the US hegemony remains a powerful force to reckon with even in an increasingly multipolar world. Trump campaigned on the slogan of “America First”, which is a nationalist view that prioritises American interests by especially cutting down on the US’s budget on multilateral institution and aid spending. Trump’s campaign, and now his administration, is also laced with strong anti-immigrant sentiments, who are often projected as “illegal immigrants and dangerous criminals”. While legal immigrants in the US have nothing to worry about, these sentiments generally project immigrants— whether legal or illegal— as unwanted and unwelcome to the US.   What has hit closer to home is the Trump administration ordering a temporary freeze on USAID activities, which could potentially upend health systems in Kenya and many other countries in Africa and beyond. Trump’s populist views in the US are not unique, as far-right political parties in Europe are also gaining ground, with seven European Union (EU) member states— Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and Slovakia now having far-right parties within government. Many other far-right parties in other EU countries have also had a strong showing in recent elections, including in Austria, France, and Germany. These parties are generally considered conservative, and they seek to promote and protect traditional institutions, customs, and values. Consequently, immigrants are perceived as interfering with these customs and values, leading to their “othering” as outsiders. In some extreme cases, far-right parties could entertain and even promote fascist and Nazist views— characterised by authoritarianism, ultra-nationalism, and dictatorship, as was the case in Nazi Germany and fascist Italy under Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini—both blamed for the ravages of the Second World War. But why should the rise of these far-right political parties and conservatism in the US and Europe call for our rethink of immigration and labour export as promoted by the current Kenyan government?   First, conservative parties are generally anti-immigration, and labour migrants are likely to face more stringent conditions before being allowed to migrate. Those who have migrated are also more likely to face legal and policy hurdles that will tend to prioritise nationals over migrants in terms of job opportunities, hence affecting their labour mobility. Secondly, entrenched conservative views and ideologies are likely to strengthen racist views, especially against Africans in the diaspora. This will make it difficult for migrant Kenyans (Africans) to be accepted and to integrate into communities where they settle. As is already the case, many will have to navigate and contend with racist-motivated hate and, sometimes, crime—remember here, the extreme case of 20 May 2020 when George Floyd, a Black-American man, was murdered in cold blood by white policeman Derek Chauvin in Minneapolis. Thirdly, labour migration will only benefit a tiny and almost negligible fraction of unemployed youths, and there is an increased need to focus on the more than 99% who will never get an opportunity to migrate. More economic stimulus packages and a more investor-friendly business and entrepreneurial environment will need to be created to encourage business start-ups to grow. Kenya’s MPESA brand is clear testament that Kenya is indeed a Silicon Savannah, and the country should focus on generating more such opportunities and beyond. Fourthly, while labour migration may appear like it is easing unemployment in the short term, it is likely to actually exacerbate unemployment and poverty levels in the long term. This is because taxpayers have spent millions of shillings to educate and train such young and promising human resources, only for them to work abroad in a clear case of brain drain and further strengthen the capacities of countries in the north, which are already benefitting from unequal trade that favours them and disadvantages Africa and Kenya. Kenya especially needs more skilled labour than the developed north does, and the current labour migration is prompted more by push and not pull factors—the lack of opportunities at home.   There is a need for the Kenyan government to think more strategically about labour migration and go beyond the normal rhetoric and politics of labour export, which gloss over the real youth bulge that is about to explode for lack of job opportunities. This is because although the average unemployment rate in Kenya stands at about 12.7%, the youths (15-34 years), comprising 35% of the Kenyan population, have the highest unemployment rate, at 67% (Federation of Kenyan Employers, 2024).   Conclusion   The Trump II administration has indeed prioritised US interests in global affairs, and multilateralism is likely to suffer the most during his reign. While the full scale of his policies is yet to fully manifest, it is clear that Africa is not his top priority, a clear divergence of US-Africa relations, and even that of US-EU relations, which have almost always aligned and remained mutual. The disruption is therefore not just limited to Kenya and Africa, but indeed the whole world.   Policy Recommendations   As Kenya and indeed Africa continues to navigate the possible implications of the Trump II administration, there are a number of recommendations for the Kenyan government and other governments in Africa:   There is a need to prioritise financing of public health from the consolidated fund, to avoid disruption caused by unpredictable external financing like the USAID freeze. There is a need for governments in Africa to diversify sources of funding and development finance, beyond the traditional US and European Union. Lessons may be drawn from looking at the East policy of the NARC administration from 2003 and the China Belt and Road Initiative, which have massively improved Africa’s infrastructure, its neo-colonial pitfalls notwithstanding. Global issues like climate mitigation action plans must be driven from the grassroots level and in a de-colonial approach, to ensure it is Afro-centric, not Eurocentric and elitist as is presently the case. Kenyan and African governments should look into ways of spurring local industries and entrepreneurship, to limit the effects of international shocks like those caused by radical shifts in US foreign policy that may negatively affect livelihoods. There is a need to create jobs locally, with export of labour only being in strategic areas to avoid brain drain and unfavourable working conditions for Africans abroad. Incentives such as tax breaks for new businesses, and regional frameworks such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) that seek to liberalise intra-African trade may spur trade and industry in Africa. Kenyan and indeed African governments must strategically realign in a multipolar world and must pragmatically explore their available options to navigate international trade and finance, including working closely with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), now BRICS+, who seek to offer an alternative to the declining and now unpredictable western-liberal hegemony.   References   Daily Nation. 2023. Supreme Court reaffirms LGBTQ right to associate . [Online] Available at: https://nation.africa/kenya/news/supreme-court-reaffirms-  lgbtq-right-to-associate-4366506  [accessed: 22 July 2025].   Dombrowski, P. 2024. Trump, Project 2025 and American Grand Strategy, Survival , 66(6): 17-32.   Federation of Kenyan          Employers. 2024. Youth Unemployment . [Online] Available at: https://www.fke-kenya.org/policy-issues/youth-employment [accessed: 22 July 2025].   Fukuyama, F. 2020. The End of History? In: The New Social Theory Reader . UK: Routledge.   Morgenthau, H.J. 2014. A realist theory of international politics, In: The Realism Reader . UK: Routledge.   Moyo, D. 2010. Dead aid: Why aid makes things worse and how there is another way for Africa . New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.   Negash, M.H. & Salih, M. 2023. The US Military Bases in the Post- 9/11 Horn of Africa, International Journal of African Renaissance Studies , 18(1): 92-117.   Reuters. 2025. Trump freezes funding for Kenya-led security mission in Haiti . [Online] Available at: https://ntvkenya.co.ke/news/trump-freezes-funding-for- kenya-led-security-mission-in-haiti/ [accessed: 22 July 2025].   Schraeder, P. 1994. United States Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change . UK: Cambridge.   Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2023. Military Expenditure (% of GDP).  [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPRT.KD [accessed: 22 July 2025].   The White House. 2025a. Executive Order Withdrawing the United States from the World Health Organization . [Online] Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-the-worldhealth-organization/ [accessed: 22 July 2025].   The White House. 2025b. Executive Order Addressing Egregious Actions of the Republic of South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/addressing-egregious-actions-of-the-republic-of-south-africa/ [accessed: 22 July 2025].   The White House. 2025c. Executive Order Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements . [Online] Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/putting-america-first-in-international-environmental-agreements/ [accessed: 22 July 2025].   Trachenberg, M. 2024. Is there Life after NATO? [Online] Available at: https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/there-life-after-nato [accessed: 22 July 2025].   UNEP. 2019. Fridays for Future Movement – Inspiration and Action . [Online] Available at: https://www.unep.org/championsofearth/laureates/2019/frida ys-future-movement [accessed: 22 July 2025].   USA Government. 2025. Executive Order 14168, Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government.   Vincent, E. 2025. Europe Allies Work on Security Guarantees for Ukraine . [Online] Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/ 03/13/european-allies-work-on-security-guarantees-for- ukraine_6739101_4.html [accessed: 22 July 2025].   Williams, M.C., Smith, S., Biersteker, T., Brown, C., Cerny, P., Grieco, J. & Groom, A.J.R. 2005. The realist tradition and the limits of international relations (Vol. 100) . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. 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Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2025 Image credit: istockphoto.com | Stock illustration ID:917211566   by Dr Assi J.C. Kimou   Abstract   This paper explores the evolving nature of US-West Africa relations, with a particular focus on Côte d'Ivoire as a strategic partner. Historically marginal in American foreign policy, Africa has gained prominence due to shifting global dynamics and growing strategic interests in security and economic development. US engagement in Côte d'Ivoire is structured around key pillars: political stability, inclusive economic growth, security sector reform, and human capital development. However, this longstanding partnership is being reshaped by rising geopolitical competition from China and Russia, as well as the impact of the Trump administration's transactional foreign policy approach. The analysis identifies emerging trends in security and economic cooperation and assesses their implications for Côte d'Ivoire and the broader West African region. The paper argues that sustaining and deepening US-West Africa relations will require a recalibration of partnerships, grounded in mutual interests and responsive to regional aspirations. It concludes with a call to action, emphasising the need for improved domestic resource mobilisation, anti-corruption measures, expanded regional trade through the AfCFTA, diversified global partnerships, and continued US-Africa dialogue to strengthen trade and security cooperation.   Introduction   Africa has long been a marginal player in United States (US) foreign policy. American engagement in Africa has gone through different phases, reflecting the changing priorities of US foreign policy and global geopolitical dynamics. Today, Africa represents an increasingly strategic space for the United States, both in terms of security – especially in the fight against terrorism –and economically, with the rise in trade and investment. However, the growing presence of other international players, especially China and Russia, has complicated the geopolitical equation in Africa, challenging the traditional influence of the US on the continent.   In West Africa in general – and specifically with Côte d'Ivoire, established at the country's independence in 1960 – diplomatic relations with the United States have been built on a foundation of multidimensional cooperation, combining development, security, and governance issues. Historically marked by a certain stability, these relations have gradually evolved to adapt to regional dynamics and changes in American foreign policy.   Today, Washington is promoting a strategic vision for Côte d'Ivoire based on three key objectives: political stability, economic dynamism, and strategic alignment with American interests in West Africa.   The focus will be on, firstly, democratic consolidation, through active support for electoral processes and strengthening the rule of law. Secondly, the stimulation of inclusive economic growth, through the development of private investment, the modernisation of energy infrastructures and preferential access to the American market via the AGOA mechanism. Thirdly, reform of the security sector, with particular emphasis on the fight against terrorism and the professionalisation of the armed forces. Fourthly, the improvement of human capital through programmes in the fields of health, education, and adaptation to climate change.   Nevertheless, this historic partnership is facing growing challenges in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment. China's expansion, marked by massive investment in infrastructure, and Russia's growing influence in West Africa, notably through paramilitary actors and openly anti-Western diplomacy, are adding complexity to the strategic landscape and calling into question the traditional leadership of the United States in the region.   This situation, combined with the inauguration of Donald Trump and his more transactional approach to international relations, led to a reconfiguration of US priorities, potentially shifting Washington's policies toward West Africa – particularly in trade, investment, and security cooperation. This brief explores the contours of the US-Africa relationship, focusing on two main areas: security and economic relations, by providing tentative answers to the following questions:   What are the current trends of US-West Africa relations? What is the expected impact of the new dynamic on West African economies in general? Côte d'Ivoire particularly? What are the prospects for West Africa? 1. US Development Aid: from strong humanitarian support to aid cuts   1.1. Health system and agriculture are likely to be the most hit sectors   For decades, the US has increased support for African development through financial and technical aid in health, education, governance, and agriculture – primarily via the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Between 2000 and 2020, US development aid tripled, with significant funding for health (HIV/AIDS [via PEPFAR], malaria, and other diseases), clean water, and food security. The new US administration under the leadership of President Donald Trump cut USAID funding. Under Trump, the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), led by Elon Musk, targeted government spending, with USAID identified as inefficient. A summary of terminated USAID awards shows 68 such terminations for a total estimated cost of US$316,279,020. Separating it by sector indicates: Agriculture: US$68 million in TEC, US$41.6 million obligated; Education: US$2.5 million in TEC, US$10 million obligated; Governance: US$9.4 million in both TEC and obligated; Health: US$19.6 million in TEC, US$19.8 million obligated; Infrastructure: Minor investment (US$10 000); Technology: US$368 000; Logistics: US$200 000; and Other/Unclassified: US$216 million in TEC, US$125 million obligated (see Graph 1) (USAID, 2025). Graph 1: Terminated USAID fund   Source: Authored from USAID data.   The Fight against HIV/AIDS at stake in Côte d’Ivoire   As Côte d'Ivoire's leading bilateral partner in the health sector, the United States has invested more than US$2 billion since 2004, structuring its action around three strategic pillars: the fight against endemic diseases, the strengthening of health systems, and pandemic preparedness. This partnership has produced remarkable results in the response to the country's major health challenges. PEPFAR (Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) is the cornerstone of this cooperation, with a historic investment of US$1.7 billion since 2004, including US$111 million in 2021 alone. This crucial programme provides 75% of the antiretrovirals used in the country and enables 240,000 Ivorians living with HIV to access treatment, with an impressive viral suppression rate of 89% (214,000 patients).   There is also a sustained commitment to the fight against malaria, with annual funding of US$25 million, which has helped to reduce malaria-related mortality by 40% since 2010. At the same time, USAID's maternal and child health programmes, with funding of US$12.5 million in 2021, have led to significant improvements in the care of mothers and newborns.   In the face of pandemic threats, the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) has strengthened Côte d'Ivoire's capacity to detect and respond to epidemics. This preparedness was particularly evident during the COVID-19 crisis, with a donation of 4.8 million doses of vaccine and direct financial aid of US$13 million.   American technical expertise, embodied by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which has been present since 1987, has enabled major advances to be made. The Retro-CI laboratory, the flagship of this cooperation, became the only World Health Organization (WHO) reference centre for HIV diagnostics in West Africa in 2021, symbolising the excellence of this health partnership.   These massive, targeted investments have transformed Côte d'Ivoire's healthcare landscape, making the United States a key partner in building a more resilient healthcare system that is accessible to the entire population.   The consequences of the cessation of USAID funding are likely to reflect the results of the study conducted by the Cires Economic Policy Analysis Unit (CAPEC) (2018) to assess the economic and health benefits of investing additional funds into Côte d'Ivoire's national response to HIV, to a significant reduction in international funding. This study, titled ‘Invest now or pay later’, estimated the costs associated with interrupting the cycle of HIV transmission by 2020 .   Three simulation scenarios were adopted by the study: the Status quo scenario, showing an unchanged level of funding due to an equal compensation of the resources lost by the government; Optimistic scenario,  or a 37% increase in public funding to purse the government’s health goals for compensation despite a drop in international support; and the Pessimistic scenario,  indicating a 20% reduction in the health-related budget, a gap that is not filled by public funding. Table 1: Summary of microsimulation health-related results: 2020-2025   Source: CAPEC, 2018   In terms of health outcomes, if the government's efforts are based on the stable scenario, 4,740 lives would be saved and 17,493 new infections avoided. And if these efforts result in more than proportional funding of around 37% compared with 2016, then 42,387 lives could be saved and almost 50,000 new infections avoided.   In financial terms, moving from the stable scenario to the optimistic scenario requires average annual funding of FCFA 6.3 billion. Moving from the stable scenario to the pessimistic scenario results in a drop in funding of around FCFA 12.67 billion per year. Cumulative tax revenue losses range from FCFA 13.16 billion for the pessimistic scenario to FCFA 8.68 billion for the stable scenario and FCFA 5.67 billion for the optimistic scenario.   In all three scenarios, economic growth in Côte d'Ivoire will slow . In the status quo scenario, GDP will fall by 0.005 percentage points  between 2016 and 2019. This decline will continue until 2025 , when it will reach 0.035 points (see Graph 2). Graph 2: Tentative macroeconomic impacts of aid cuts: trend in GDP   Source: CAPEC, 2018   Military and security cooperation between the United States and Côte d'Ivoire   Security cooperation between the United States and Côte d'Ivoire is a major focus of their strategic partnership. Over the period 2020-2024, the United States has allocated an average annual budget of US$12 to 15 million dollars to strengthen the capabilities of the Ivorian security forces. This financial support is divided between several key programmes, including the IMET (International Military Education and Training) programme, which has been allocated US$2.5 million a year to train 50 to 70 Ivorian officers in the United States, and the ACOTA (African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance) programme, which has received US$3.8 million since 2020 to develop peacekeeping capabilities.   The impact of this cooperation can be measured by concrete results. Between 2015 and 2023, American programmes will have trained 5,400 members of the armed and security forces, including 1,200 women, covering a wide range of specialisations: 60% in counterterrorism, 20% in intelligence, 15% in logistics, and 5% in human rights. Côte d'Ivoire's active participation in regional exercises such as Flintlock (counterterrorism) and Obangame Express (maritime security), with 150 soldiers involved in 2023 alone, demonstrates the growing operationality of Ivorian troops. On the ground, this collaboration has produced tangible results with the securing of four strategic military bases in the north of the country, including Odienné and Bouna, and the equipping of three modern command centres. Intelligence sharing has helped to thwart 12 potential terrorist attacks between 2022 and 2023, while more than 450 weapons were seized thanks to American technical assistance between 2021 and 2023.   Performance indicators show significant progress: 18 terrorist attacks have been prevented since 2020, including six at the borders, and the response time to threats has been reduced by 40% over the same period. These advances have helped to position Côte d'Ivoire as a key player in regional stability in West Africa, confirming the effectiveness of this security partnership in the face of contemporary challenges.   2. Restrictive Immigration Policies: remittances and access to the US Higher Education system in jeopardy   Educational and cultural cooperation between the United States and West Africa is an important pillar of bilateral relations. Every year, some 50 Ivorians benefit from exchange programmes run by the US Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, notably through the prestigious Fulbright scholarships, which enable Ivorian students and researchers to study at American universities. At the same time, American teachers and academics regularly come to Côte d'Ivoire to share their expertise, creating a fruitful academic dialogue between the two nations.   Graph 3: Number of West African Students in the United States Source: Author However, an analysis of student flows over the last decade (2014-2024) reveals contrasting trends. While the West African region as a whole has seen a significant 66% increase in the number of students going to the United States, Côte d'Ivoire has seen more modest growth.   Besides limiting West African students’ access to the US higher education system, another implication of the US’s restrictive immigration policy is the number of remittances flows at stake for the region.   In West and Central Africa, remittances show overall growth, rising from around US$ 6 billion in 2014 to almost US$ 7 billion in 2023, with a notable drop in 2016 (around US$ 3.9 billion), followed by a gradual recovery up to 2023. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the amounts are much lower than in the region as a whole, fluctuating around US$ 300 to 400 million a year. A significant increase can be seen in 2021 (around US$ 750 million), followed by a return to previous levels. Nevertheless, the cost of a dire restriction will be higher due the number of African citizens expelled from the US by the new US administration.    Graph 4: Remittances of West African migrants living in the United States   Source: Author   3. Economic and Trade Relations: A Changing Dynamic 3.1. From Aid to Trade: the questioning of the AGOA close market opportunity for West African economies   US-Africa economic relations have shifted over decades, alternating between strong interest and relative neglect. Africa offers a growing market with abundant natural resources and a young, dynamic population. The US has adapted its trade strategy to encourage exchange and investment. However, trade remains limited, and competition from China and India poses major challenges.   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) , launched in 2000 under the Clinton administration, aimed to offer African countries preferential access to the US market.  It removed tariffs on certain products to boost African exports and economic growth through trade rather than aid.   AGOA helped triple non-oil exports  from Africa to the US, diversifying imports to include agriculture, textiles, and automobiles. For example, South Africa  became a top exporter, notably in the auto sector ( US$2.1 billion in 2021 ), with a 1,643.6% increase  in the first year of AGOA; Nigeria exported US$1.4 billion in 2021 , mainly oil; and Kenya , third with US$603 million , led by apparel exports.   Other beneficiaries include Ghana (plant roots, travel goods), Mauritius (chocolate, basketry), Mali (buckwheat), Mozambique (sugar, nuts, tobacco), Togo (legumes), and Madagascar, Ethiopia, Lesotho (textiles).   Despite AGOA’s benefits, trade remains focused on raw materials, especially oil. In 2021, Nigeria’s oil exports under AGOA made up most of its US trade. Only 18 African countries  have national strategies to maximise AGOA opportunities, causing regional disparities. The US International Trade Commission (ITC) notes major export gains by South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya.   A graph from USITC / Department of Commerce (www.AGOA.info)  shows total AGOA exports from 2000–2022, highlighting strong growth until 2008, followed by volatility tied to commodity prices and policy shifts.     Graph 5: AGOA beneficiaries exports to the United States   Source: USITC / Department of Commerce ( www.AGOA.info )   The US remains a key Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) player in Africa but lags behind the European Union (EU) and China in scale and diversity. US FDI is mostly in extractives (oil and mining), while others invest more in infrastructure and manufacturing. Only 13% of US FDI targets manufacturing, compared to over 40% for the EU.   Each US administration has prioritised different aspects of engagement with Africa. The Trump presidency (2017–2021) marked a shift toward transactional bilateral relations , focused on American interests  (“America First Policy”) and reducing multilateral involvement. Trump’s approach emphasised competition with China and Russia , seeking to curb their growing influence while reducing US development programmes. Trump questioned AGOA’s value to US companies and hinted at revising or replacing it with more favourable bilateral trade deals.   3.2. Cote d’Ivoire will need to resettle new market opportunities   Trade relations between the United States and Côte d'Ivoire are characterised by a structural surplus in favour of Côte d'Ivoire. Over the period from 2014 to 2025, US imports of Ivorian goods regularly exceeded exports to Côte d'Ivoire. The peak of this surplus is observed in 2019, with a total of US$924 million in imports compared with US$278 million in US exports, giving a trade surplus of US$645 million in favour of Côte d’Ivoire.   US imports from Côte d'Ivoire remained strong overall over the period, hovering around US$1 billion between 2014 and 2018. However, these imports declined in 2019 and 2020, probably due to the volatility of world commodity prices and the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. From 2021 onwards, imports resumed their growth and reached a new peak in 2024 at around US$1.05 billion. US exports to Côte d'Ivoire continued to grow. They rose from US$239 million in 2014 to US$596 million in 2024, reflecting a strengthening of bilateral economic relations. This trend reflects growing demand from the United States for capital goods, vehicles, industrial machinery, pharmaceuticals, and agri-food products. From 2023 onwards, trade flows will show a convergence of import and export volumes. By 2024, the gap between the two will have narrowed to around US$109 million.   The privileged framework of the AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) is the main lever for this economic cooperation, allowing 78 Ivorian companies to export to the United States duty-free by 2022. Côte d'Ivoire's main exports include cocoa (the country is the world's leading producer), petroleum products and agricultural by-products, which together account for more than 85% of Ivorian sales to the United States.   US investment in Côte d'Ivoire is growing steadily, with an increase of 40% between 2015 and 2020. These investments are mainly concentrated in three key sectors: energy (including hydrocarbons and renewable energies), digital technologies (innovative solutions for agriculture and health) and financial services. Several American multinationals have set up production and processing facilities in Côte d'Ivoire, taking advantage of the country's economic stability and its position as a regional hub in West Africa.   The prospects for developing this economic relationship are based on several strategic axes. Côte d'Ivoire is actively working on the local processing of its raw materials, particularly cocoa, with a view to exporting higher value-added products. At the same time, the United States is supporting the development of Côte d'Ivoire's logistics and port infrastructures, which are essential for facilitating trade. The emergence of a consumer middle class is also opening up new opportunities for American products and technologies on the Ivorian market.   The two governments are also working closely together to improve the business climate, simplify customs procedures, and promote public-private partnerships. Training programmes on American norms and standards are regularly organised for Ivorian entrepreneurs and exporters. These concerted efforts position Côte d'Ivoire as a privileged economic partner of the United States in the West African region, with promising growth prospects in the medium and long term. The complementary nature of the two economies and the positive dynamics of trade suggest that this mutually beneficial cooperation will deepen in the years to come.   Conclusion   US-Africa relations have significantly evolved, shaped by strategic interests and shifting global dynamics. Africa is now a key player in US foreign policy, especially in security and trade. Yet challenges persist – mainly in diversifying economic ties and adapting to geopolitical competition from China and Russia.   The Trump administration introduced a more transactional approach , changing the nature of cooperation. The future of US-Africa relations will depend on both sides’ ability to balance priorities in security, development, and economic partnership – while addressing global challenges collaboratively.   An analysis of relations between the United States and Côte d'Ivoire reveals a strategic partnership structured around complementary pillars of regional stability, economic cooperation, and sustainable development. The density and diversity of the areas of cooperation (health, security, economy, education) reflect Washington's clear desire to strengthen its foothold in West Africa, by relying on a partner that is considered stable, dynamic, and strategically well positioned.   The results achieved, particularly in the fight against HIV/AIDS, the strengthening of military capabilities, and the increase in trade, bear witness to a partnership with high added value for Côte d'Ivoire. However, this privileged relationship is now evolving in a more competitive international environment, marked by the rise of new players such as China and Russia, which are redefining the geopolitical balance on the continent.   As a result, the relationship between the United States and Côte d'Ivoire must deal with the growing challenges of sovereignty, diversification of partnerships, and reconfiguration of alliances. To remain attractive, American cooperation will have to be more agile, inclusive, and tailored to Côte d'Ivoire's national development aspirations. In this respect, the ability of both countries to renew the terms of their partnership – by focusing on innovation, training, and skills transfer – will be decisive in meeting the challenges of the 21st century and consolidating a more balanced and resilient bilateral relationship.   From these findings, make a call for action by:    Increasing domestic resource mobilisation through efficient tax policy enhanced domestic resource mobilisation; Fighting against corruption for efficient public resources management; Increasing regional trade under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA); Enhancing and developing new/other strategic partnership for the expansion of markets in the global economy; Keeping the dialogue open with the US to improve trade relations and security cooperation. References   Adibe, J. 2017. Issues in USA-Africa relations under Donald Trump, African Renaissance , 14(1-2): 7–15.   Belghiti, A. 2024. Les États-Unis d’Amérique et l’Afrique : une relation en redéfinition perpétuelle . [Online] Available at: https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2024-05/PP_06-24_D.%20Alaoui%20Belghiti.pdf  [accessed: 23 July 2025].   CAPEC. 2018. Modélisation du Financement de la Prise en Charge du VIH et son Impact Économique en Côte d'Ivoire . Research report for Abt Associates/USAID.   Fixter, C. 2015. The USA-Africa Command and USA Foreign Policy on Africa . [Online] Available at: https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/4557b341-86be-4a5a-9e88-e59625438ae4/content [accessed: 23 July 2025].   Forje, J.W. 2017. USA-Africa Relations under President Trump: Towards improving socioeconomic aspects of migration, integration, development and poverty alleviation policies, African Renaissance , 14(1-2): 39-65.   Shubin, V. 2017. Book Review: “USA–Africa: The Policy of President B. Obama Administration. 2009–2014” and “USA–Africa: The Policy of President B. Obama Administration. 2015–2016. Chronicle of Events” by Andrey Urnov, Revista Brasileira de Estudos Africanos , 2(4).   Simo, R. 2018. The AGOA as stepping stone for USA–Africa free trade agreements, Journal of International Trade Law and Policy , 17(3): 115–131. [Online] Available at: [accessed: 23 July 2025].   USAID. 2025. USAID Terminated Awards . [Online] Available at: https://healthpolicy-watch.news/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/USAID-Terminated-Awards_2025-03-06_Clean.pdf [accessed: 23 July 2025].   Online sources   US Department of State – Côte d’Ivoire Country Page: https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/cote-divoire https://history.state.gov/countries/cote-divoire https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-cote-divoire/ Open Doors – International Students Data: https://opendoorsdata.org/data/international-students/all-places-of-origin/ US Census Bureau – Foreign Trade Statistics: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) Resources – USITC / Dept. of Commerce: http://www.AGOA.info - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2025 Image credit: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID:1931756215   by Dr Sizo Nkala   Abstract   South Africa and the United States (US) have had a dramatic diplomatic fallout since the beginning of Donald Trump’s second term as the US President. Trump has outrageously accused the South African government of committing a genocide against its white citizens, unceremoniously dismissed the South African Ambassador to the US, slapped South Africa with a punitive trade tariff regime, snubbed South Africa’s G20 presidency, and contrived a controversial refugee resettlement programme exclusively for white Afrikaners in South Africa who claim that they are being persecuted. This paper seeks to understand the state of US-SA relations through the lens of the Trump Doctrine or Trumpism. Steeped as it towards isolationist, pro-Israeli, white supremacist, anti-globalisation and zero-sum tendencies, it should come as no surprise that South Africa has been a target of Trumpism. South Africa’s anti-Israel and pro-China and Russia foreign policy, its hosting of a significant number of American companies, and its trade surplus with the US put it at odds with the Trump Doctrine. The US-SA relationship appears to be going downhill without any off-ramp. It looks like it is going to be a four-year winter for a bilateral relationship that once stood as a model for broader US-Africa relations.   Introduction   Since his return to the White House for a second term, Donald Trump has taken the world by storm. He has turned the decades-old US foreign policy on its head through, among other ways, swinging a wrecking ball on multilateral institutions, pulling the US out of global agreements, pursuing protectionist economic policies, and tearing up traditional alliances and relationships with US allies. Countries like China, Canada, Mexico, and Ukraine, among others, have been caught in the crosshairs of the Trump administration. In Africa, South Africa has singularly drawn the ire of President Donald Trump. In less than three months of Trump’s return, South Africa has been the subject of hostile executive orders issued by the White House, has had its ambassador unceremoniously expelled on flimsy grounds, and slapped with punitive tariffs of up to 31% reserved for countries labelled ‘worst offenders’ in their trade relationships with the US. That said, this paper seeks to understand the transformation of the US-South Africa relationship through the prism of Trumpism or the Trump Doctrine. It argues that South Africa’s bilateral relationship with the US is going through the shock of the Trump doctrine, which is likely to disrupt South Africa’s trade map as it threatens the country’s US$14 billion exports to the US market. The first section delves deeper into the concept of Trumpism, while the section that follows traces the South Africa-US relationship from the demise of apartheid in 1994 to the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2019. In the third section, the paper discusses a shift in the bilateral relationship in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, highlighting growing diplomatic friction over South Africa’s foreign policy choices. The fourth and final section trains the spotlight on the trajectory of the relationship in the eventful first three months of Trump’s second administration, with Trumpism going full steam.    Understanding Trumpism   The trajectory of the US-South Africa relationship will, for at least the next four years, be shaped, as it already is, by what observers have called Trumpism or the Trump Doctrine (Anton, 2019; Bentley & David, 2021). Loosely defined, Trumpism is a shorthand reference to the set of ideas, attitudes, beliefs, personality traits, and behavioural patterns that underpin US President Donald Trump’s domestic and international politics. The ‘America First’ mantra is the primary idea from which every other element ascribed to Trumpism derives.  America First is a clarion call to end decades of America’s exploitation under the post-1945 liberal international order of which it was ironically the chief architect (Curran, 2018; Stockman, 2025). There are several foundational grievances of Trumpism. These include the de-industrialisation of America and the loss of manufacturing jobs for the country’s mostly white male working class, whose support has been indispensable in his political success, the country’s entanglement in a network of unprofitable and ill-conceived alliances and burdensome international organisations, its involvement in unwinnable wars in far flung regions of the world, partaking in exploitative trade deals, and lax border security, which has triggered an enormous influx of immigrants (Baron 2017; Curran, 2018; Milanovic, 2024).   As such, the doctrine proposes a compendium of measures as an antidote to the aforementioned ills, with a view to Making America Great Again (MAGA). Chief among these measures are economic statecraft underpinned by economic nationalism, which involves the arbitrary and unilateral imposition of tariffs on rival and friendly countries alike, renegotiation of or withdrawal from what are perceived to be unfair trade deals, and cajoling companies who depend on the US market to invest in the country (Ettinger, 2019; Kimmage, 2025; Schweller, 2018). To reduce the burden of global governance on the US, the Trump administration has pulled out of multilateral institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The US has also cut funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which it has accused of being anti-Israel and directed the State Department to review the country’s participation in the entire gamut of intergovernmental organisations, conventions, and treaties (The White House, 2025a). The rationale being that streamlining its participation in these institutions will save some money and grant the US some latitude for action which is tantamount to putting the country first (Clarke & Ricketts, 2017).   Further, Trump has questioned the wisdom of US security alliances with countries such as South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Ukraine, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). According to the Trumpian logic, these alliances are a drain on the US resources which have to be channelled towards the security of other countries. Another symbolic but nonetheless significant expression of ‘America First’ has been the ruthless liquidation of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which, since 1961, has administered the US government’s foreign assistance programmes. The Trump administration contended that the USAID was acting contrary to US national interests despite being entirely funded by American taxpayers. Further, scapegoating immigrants, especially those from poor South American countries, ramping up deportation rates and tightening border security to prevent the influx of immigrants, is a fundamental component of Trumpism (Dombrowski & Reich, 2017).   For these reasons, Trumpism has been variously described as realist, isolationist, disruptive, sovereignty-orientated, confrontational, anti-global, and unsentimental, among other things (Mahmood & Cheema, 2018; Stockman, 2025). Others have emphasised Trump’s personality traits such as unpredictability, spitefulness, narcissism, and erraticism (Bentley & David, 2021; Bew & Jones, 2018; McCarthy-Jones, 2025). Another less emphasised but equally important component of Trumpism, which is a continuity from previous administrations, is being pro-Israel. This is perhaps the only alliance which, despite its heavy exertion on the American taxpayers, has been exempt from Trump’s criticism. All these elements of the Trump Doctrine are key to understanding the Trump administration’s foreign policy decisions in general and its posture towards South Africa in particular. The next section delves deeper into the evolution of the US-South Africa relationship in the past three decades, which has contributed to placing South Africa on the wrong side of Trumpism.   Post-Apartheid US-South Africa Relations: A Background   South Africa’s relatively peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 and the compelling story of Nelson Mandela, the country’s first democratically elected president, drew a lot of goodwill from countries around the world including the United States. The US did not waste time in embracing the new South Africa, which it viewed as a potential strong example for democracy, stability, and economic prosperity in Africa – a region bedevilled by poverty, authoritarianism, and violent conflict (Bridgman, 1999; Ploch, 2011; Powell, 2001). To demonstrate its commitment to South Africa, the US offered the country a US$600 million trade, investment, and development package in May 1994. A month later it hosted the Investing in People conference, where the SA-US Business Development Community was formed to intensify economic ties (Bridgman, 1999). Early in 1995, a Bi-National Commission (BNC) was launched following Nelson Mandela’s visit to Washington in October 1994. Only Mexico, Russia, and Egypt had similar structures with the US at the time (Mills, 1999). The BNC was chaired by then US Vice President Al Gore and his South African counterpart Deputy President Thabo Mbeki. It would meet twice a year to discuss cooperation in several areas including human resources development, defence, agriculture, trade and investment, sustainable energy, and conservation, among others.   The fact that both countries committed to maintain lines of communication at such a high level demonstrated their mutual commitment to the bilateral relationship. South Africa was also one of only 10 countries to be included in the US Big Emerging Market initiative in 1995, which meant that it was to be promoted as an investment destination for US companies (James, 1995). In 1999 South Africa and the US signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).  As a result of these efforts trade between the two countries grew from US$4 billion in 1994 to US$7 billion in 2001. Economic cooperation thrived despite differences over trademark issues involving McDonald’s, Burger King, and Toys R Us, and a legal wrangle on intellectual property rights for medicines (Ostergard, 1999).   In 2000, South Africa joined the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) – a US initiative that enabled selected African countries to export a range of products to the US market duty-free. In the 21 st  century economic ties grew in leaps and bounds, which saw South Africa being the US’ largest trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa, with bilateral trade reaching US$21 billion in 2024. The US is now one of the biggest sources of foreign direct investment in South Africa, with over 600 US companies operating in various sectors of the South African economy. The US foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in South Africa stands at US$7.9 billion, while South Africa’s FDI stock in the US is US$6.25 billion (Select USA, 2024).   The two countries have also cooperated on defence and security issues. The US and South Africa worked together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in 1995. After being lobbied by the US, South Africa helped mobilise support from the Global South countries to support the extension of the NPT (Onderco & Van Wyk, 2019). Underwood (2008) notes that the US Department of Defense (DoD) helped with military education and training programmes for the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in 1993 and 1994. The US-funded Project Phidisa provided treatment to members of the SANDF living with HIV/AIDS. South Africa was also part of the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Programme, conducted by the DoD to improve the peacekeeping capabilities of African militaries (ACOTA), while it has also participated in the Shared Accord exercises led by the US (Cook, 2013; Banerjee & Thomas, 2021; Underwood, 2008).   Further, the South African government approved the historic visit of the US aircraft carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, in 2008, while its navy participated in training exercises with a US guided missile destroyer, the USS Arleigh Burke in 2009 (Ploch, 2011). South Africa and the US worked together in the late 1990s in tackling terrorist groups in South Africa like People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), which had executed numerous bombing campaigns in South Africa. The US helped train South African personnel in investigating and preventing terrorism who later evolved into the once prominent but now-defunct Scorpions – a unit that was housed in the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) tasked with investigating corruption and organised crime. South Africa expedited the extradition of Khalfan Mohammed, who was one of the masterminds of the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, to the US (Firsing, 2012a). The two countries also cooperated on the global war on terror as South Africa sympathised with the US following the 9/11 attacks.   However, South Africa was not afraid to pursue an independent foreign policy that was at times at odds with the US foreign policy. Pretoria refused to drop its bilateral relations with countries such as Iran, Cuba, and Libya – which were considered anti-American (Firsing, 2012b). At the UN, South Africa has largely voted differently from the US and its allies. It has voted in favour of 99 resolutions condemning Israel, while sponsoring 41 anti-Israel resolutions. The country has abstained from 75 of the 111 non-Israel condemnatory resolutions, voted against 17 and voted in favour of only 19. It voted against resolutions on countries like Syria, China, North Korea, and Myanmar on allegations of human rights abuses (Primorac, 2024). According to Graham (2022), in its three terms (2007-2008, 2011-2012, 2019-2020) as an elected UN Security Council member South Africa aligned with China and Russia (so-called P2) in its voting patterns against the so-called P3 (the US, France, and the UK).   In 2008, South Africa voted with Russia and China to stop targeted UN sanctions on individual members of the Robert Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe. The sanctions would have included an arms embargo and the appointment of a UN Special Representative on Zimbabwe. South Africa also voted against western proposals for sanctions on Sudan and Iran, arguing that the imposition of sanctions would only serve to harden the targeted regimes. South Africa’s anti-US attitude may have been caused by the fact that the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), was still on the US terror watch list until 2008. South African government officials, including Nelson Mandela, still had to get waivers from the State Department to travel to the US (Firsing, 2012b). It was only in July 2008 that the US passed the Anti-Apartheid Visa Bill into law, which removed the ANC from the terror watch list. South Africa also strenuously opposed the establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). The former Minister of Defense, Mosiuoa Lekota, refused to meet with the first AFRICOM Commander, arguing that Africa needs African solutions to African problems (Neethling, 2015).   Aid and development assistance have also been an important part of the US-South Africa relationship for the last 30 years. The US Agency for International Development (USAID), the agency responsible for managing and distributing development assistance on behalf of the US government, set up its regional headquarters in South Africa (Primorac, 2024). Since 2001, South Africa has received over US$10 billion in aid from the US in various areas such as peace and security, food security, infrastructure, agriculture, education, governance, and health, among others. As the chart below shows, health has received 86% of the total aid, largely because of the intensity of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa, which is home to over 20% of the people living with HIV/AIDS (Mokale, 2024). Figure 1: Distribution of US development assistance in South Africa (2001-2024)   Source: ForeignAssistance.gov, 2025   Over the years, South Africa has been the largest beneficiary of the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR), having secured about US$8 billion since 2003. Under the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) the US committed to providing US$1 billion of the US$8.5 billion package meant to help South Africa reduce its dependency on coal and transition to cleaner sources of energy. The country generates more than 80% of its energy from coal. The US Power Africa programme, which was introduced by the first Trump administration in 2020, has to date supported more than 3 100 megawatts of electricity generation projects through mobilising private sector investments. The US government has disbursed US$83 million to support ICT infrastructure expansion in South Africa (Primorac, 2024). Moreover, South Africa’s Aspen Pharmacare received US support to build its vaccine manufacturing capabilities. As such, although the two countries have had significant foreign policy differences, they have managed to respectfully disagree but still maintain cordial relations. However, as the next section will show, the relationship has deteriorated in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic over serious disagreements on foreign policy choices.   Post-Covid-19: Deteriorating Relations   Since 2020, the relationship between South Africa and the US has been on a downward spiral. Differences emerged over the handling of the Covid-19 global pandemic. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa criticised the western countries for hoarding Covid-19 vaccines, leaving Africa and other regions without any supplies. The United States was one of the biggest hoarders of the Covid-19 vaccines (Chironda, 2021). Upon the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, the US and South Africa adopted different positions, with the US openly supporting Ukraine and condemning Russia while South Africa adopted a neutral position and refused to condemn or isolate Russia (Seekings & Saunders, 2022). South Africa’s decision to hold military exercises with Russia and China on the first anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine did not go down well with Washington. For the first time, the White House expressed its disapproval of South Africa’s actions, saying it was going to present a diplomatic challenge to South Africa (Carter, 2023). The South African government defended the move, saying the exercise was pre-planned and was a normal part of its relations with Russia and China. Washington demonstrated its growing frustration with Pretoria’s foreign policy when, in March 2023, some members of the US House of Representatives introduced a resolution seeking a thorough review of US-South Africa relations in light of the country’s joint military exercises with China and Russia. Although the resolution did not pass both houses of Congress at the time, it reflected a growing disillusion in Capitol Hill with South Africa’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war (Fabricius, 2023).   In an unprecedented press conference two months later, then US Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety made astonishing claims, saying that a sanctioned Russian cargo ship was loaded with ammunition and weapons at the Simon’s Town naval base in Cape Town. The Ambassador warned that “the arming of the Russians is extremely serious, and we do not consider this issue to be resolved.” However, the South African government denied the claims, saying they were not backed by any evidence (Fihlani & Moloney, 2023). Although an independent inquiry into the matter later found no evidence to support the Ambassador’s claims, it was not enough to stop the deterioration of the bilateral relationship (Gregory, 2023). Mr Brigety’s accusations seemed to have galvanised an anti-South Africa sentiment in the US Congress, which was demonstrated when a bipartisan group of US legislators wrote a letter to the Joe Biden administration in June 2023 asking it to move the AGOA Forum, which was due to be held in September of that year, from South Africa because of its deepening relationship with Russia. The legislators said they were “seriously concerned that hosting the 2023 AGOA Forum in South Africa would serve as an implicit endorsement of South Africa’s damaging support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” (Al Jazeera, 2023).   The relationship was tested again when South Africa took Israel, a staunch ally of the United States, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in December 2023 accusing it of the intention to commit genocide in its war against Hamas in Gaza. The White House through the National Security Council spokesperson, John Kirby, swiftly dismissed South Africa’s allegations, saying they were “counterproductive and completely without any basis in fact whatsoever” (Feinberg, 2024). This was the strongest public rebuke yet from a White House that had strived to choose its words carefully in expressing its displeasure over South Africa’s foreign policy choices. In June 2024, the House of Representatives voted to pass amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act, which would require the Biden administration to make a determination on whether South Africa’s foreign policy decisions undermine the US national security and foreign policy interests. The White House would also be obliged to give a full report of the country’s defence cooperation with South Africa (Fabricius, 2024). It seems the amendments were part of preparing the grounds for South Africa’s possible disqualification from AGOA, whose eligibility criteria includes that beneficiaries must not act in a manner that undermines US foreign policy and national security interests. South Africa is the biggest beneficiary of the AGOA scheme, exporting goods worth US$3 billion annually to the US under the arrangement. Nonetheless, the amendments did not make it to the final National Defense Authorization Act passed by the Democrat-controlled Senate in December 2024. South Africa had narrowly escaped yet another comeuppance in the US Capitol. But after the return of Donald Trump to the White House and the Republicans’ victory in the Senate and House of Representatives elections, South Africa’s fortunes in terms of its relationship with the US took a nosedive.   Enter Donald Trump 2.0: The Breakdown in Bilateral Relations from Domestic Politics to Foreign Policy   US-South Africa relations under the second Donald Trump administration got off to a rocky start. This is due in large part to the proximity of a small group of right-wing conservative figures such as Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, David Sacks, and Joe Pollack – who all have roots in apartheid South Africa – to the Trump administration. Elon Musk, the tech billionaire who donated almost US$280 million to Trump’s 2024 election campaign and Joe Pollak, the Senior Editor-at-Large of the ultra-conservative pro-Trump Breitbart News, who is currently touted as the next US Ambassador to South Africa, have been very vocal in their criticism of the South African government’s policies (Davis, 2024). They have both peddled unsubstantiated claims of white genocide and confiscation of property in South Africa. This is a narrative which Trump has advanced as a pretext to his hostile actions towards South Africa. While Peter Thiel, another tech billionaire who moved to apartheid South Africa as a child and reportedly supported apartheid policies as a university student in the US and co-founded Pay Pal with Musk, is not in the Trump administration, his former mentee is the current Vice President of the US James D Vance (Matthews, 2024).   As such, the rapid succession of diplomatic fallouts between South Africa and the US since Trump’s return to the White House comes as no surprise. It all started with the US President Donald Trump expressing his disapproval of South Africa’s Expropriation Act, which was signed into law by the South African President Cyril Ramaphosa on the 23 rd  of January 2025 – just three days after Trump’s return to office. The law gives the government the power to confiscate privately owned land for public purposes such as building public infrastructure and for public interests like land reform. Although the law stresses that those whose land is confiscated will be compensated at market rates, it also mentions that nil compensation may be possible in cases where land is being held for speculative purposes with no developments, the land has been abandoned by the owner, and where the value of the land is equivalent to or less than state investment in the land (South African Government, 2024).   What looked like a purely domestic issue soon made global headlines when, on the 2 nd of February, Trump posted a statement on the social media platform, Truth Social, saying that "South Africa is confiscating land and treating certain classes of people VERY BADLY. I will be cutting off all future funding to South Africa until a full investigation of this situation has been completed!" (Bartlett, 2025). This diplomatic tension showed no signs of abating when US Secretary of State Marco Rubio posted on the X platform on the 5 th  of February announcing that he “will NOT attend the G20 summit in Johannesburg. South Africa is doing very bad things. Expropriating private property. Using G20 to promote ‘solidarity, equality, and sustainability’. In other words: DEI and climate change. My job is to advance America’s national interests, not waste taxpayer money or coddle anti-Americanism” (Rubio, 2025). South Africa hosted the G20 Foreign Ministers meeting on the 20 th  of February and Secretary Rubio was not in attendance as he had indicated in his post. In apparent reference to the US, President Ramaphosa made defiant remarks in his State of the Nation Address (SONA) on the 6 th  of February, lamenting the “rise of nationalism and protectionism, the pursuit of narrow interests and the decline of common cause”. He continued, saying that “We will not be bullied” (Davis, 2025).     The plot thickened when, on the 7 th  of February, President Trump signed an Executive Order titled “Addressing the Egregious Actions of the Republic of South Africa” (The White House, 2025). The Order accused the South African government of planning to seize the land owned by the white Afrikaner ethnic group through the controversial Expropriation Bill. Apparently referring to legislation such as the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE) of 2013, the Employment Equity Act of 1998, and the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA) Act of 2024, which were passed to address the injustices of apartheid, the executive order went on to charge Ramaphosa’s administration with promoting racial discrimination policies against the white minority in South Africa in employment, education, and business and promoting hate-filled rhetoric against the said minorities. President Trump was also aggrieved by South Africa’s case against Israel in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where it accused Israel of committing a genocide in the Gaza strip in Palestine, and Pretoria’s close relations with Iran.   As a result, the order pulled the plug on US aid and assistance to South Africa. It also offered to promote the resettlement in the US of members of the Afrikaner ethnic group “escaping government-sponsored race-based discrimination, including racially discriminatory property confiscation” (The White House, 2025b).  Asked a few days later about whether he was going to attend the G20 Summit to be hosted by South Africa at the end of 2025 in light of the accusations in the executive order, President Trump said “we will see what happens, but the South African government is very bad and very dangerous to a lot of people. There are tremendous things going on including the confiscation of property and worse … much worse than that” (Forbes Breaking News, 2025). He made all these allegations without citing any evidence. In its response, the South African government expressed disappointment at the order’s factual inaccuracies and its failure to “recognise South Africa's profound and painful history of colonialism and apartheid” (South African Government, 2025b).   At the end of February 2025, the US permanently suspended all of its aid programmes to South Africa including the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which funded about 17% of South Africa’s HIV/AIDS budget (Jones & Ngcobo, 2025). The decision to permanently suspend aid in South Africa came after President Ramaphosa, together with the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, the Colombian President, Gustavo Petro, and Varsha Gandikota, the coordinator of Progressive International, published an article in the influential Foreign Policy  magazine reiterating their condemnation of Israel’s actions in Palestine, challenging Trump’s proposal to take over the Gaza strip, and committing to ensure that Israel is held accountable for its actions (Ramaphosa et al, 2025). The article confirmed that South Africa was not going to drop its case against Israel at the ICJ. Matters came to a head on the 15 th  of March 2025 when South Africa’s Ambassador to the US, Ebrahim Rasool, was declared persona non grata by Secretary Rubio after the critical remarks he made about the US government while participating in a webinar organised by a South African thinktank. Ambassador Rasool accused Donald Trump of spearheading a white supremacist movement, citing the Make America Great Again (MAGA) grouping in the US, which propelled Trump to the White House. Rubio posted on his X account, saying that Rasool was no longer welcome in the US and that he was a race-baiting politician who hates America and Donald Trump (Looker, 2025). It was the first time an ambassador was expelled between the two countries, thus marking the lowest point in their relationship.   South Africa was also one of the 57 countries to be slapped with Donald Trump’s punitive reciprocal tariffs. Trump argued that these countries’ trade surpluses with the US were due to the tariff and non-tariff barriers they impose on US exports. South Africa had a trade surplus of over US$8 billion in its bilateral trade with the US. Under the reciprocal tariffs, South Africa’s exports to the US would be subjected to a 31% tariff rate, which was going to make the country’s exports significantly less competitive. However, the reciprocal tariffs were paused for 90 days on the 9 th  of April, with the Trump administration calling on affected countries to negotiate trade deals with the US. If the state of the bilateral relationship of late is anything to go by, it is clear that South Africa will not be in the front of the queue for a trade deal with the US.   Conclusion   The Trump administration has plunged the US-South Africa bilateral relationship into an uncharted territory. From being the poster child of the US liberal international order in sub-Saharan Africa for the past 30 years as evidenced by Washington’s conscious efforts to cultivate trade, investment, and aid ties, South Africa has suddenly become a rogue state that undermines US foreign policy interests and disregards human rights in the eyes of Donald Trump. South Africa is now described in terms traditionally reserved for countries like Sudan, Angola, and Zimbabwe, which have long been the objects of America’s ire. More than anything, South Africa is paying for being on the wrong side of Trumpism. The country runs a healthy trade surplus of over US$8 billion with the US, is home to over 20% of the total US foreign direct investment stock in sub-Saharan Africa and is a major beneficiary of the US aid projects such as PEPFAR and AGOA. All these are cardinal sins in the zero-sum logic underpinning the Trump doctrine of America First. 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United States relations with South Africa: why now is a critical time to strengthen them, African Security Review , 17(1): 6-19. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za