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The Inclusive Society Institute continues to make significant strides in advancing constitutional literacy and democratic values among secondary school learners in Gauteng Province. On Monday, 23 June 2025, learners from Hercules High School in Pretoria participated in the “Taking the Constitution to the People”  workshop, facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s Gauteng Schools Coordinator. This dynamic workshop was designed to deepen learners’ understanding and appreciation of South Africa’s democratic Constitution, exploring its history, structure, and the fundamental rights and responsibilities enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights. Through an interactive and thought-provoking session, students were guided through the development of the Constitution, the principles that informed its creation, and the critical role it continues to play in shaping governance and society. The session also explored the Founding Provisions, highlighting the core values and freedoms that underpin the Republic of South Africa. A key focus of the workshop was on responsible citizenship, encouraging learners to reflect on their role in upholding the Constitution and contributing to a society that is inclusive, just, and equitable. The learners actively engaged with the content, asking insightful questions and sharing perspectives that demonstrated a growing sense of civic awareness and empowerment. The Inclusive Society Institute’s efforts in Gauteng are part of a broader, ongoing initiative. Similar workshops will be rolled out across various districts, ensuring that more learners are reached and empowered through this important constitutional education programme. By fostering informed and engaged young citizens, the Institute aims to help safeguard the democratic principles on which South Africa was built and to inspire the next generation of civic-minded leaders.

The Inclusive Society Institute is making strides in promoting constitutional literacy and democratic engagement across South Africa, with a strong presence in both the Gauteng and North West Provinces. Through its civic education initiative, “Taking the Constitution to the People”, the Institute has been delivering impactful workshops to Grade 11 and 12 learners, focusing on the imperatives and core principles of the South African Constitution. These workshops are part of a broader mission to empower young people with the knowledge and understanding necessary to become active, informed, and responsible citizens. On Monday, 23 June 2025, the Institute conducted one of these workshops at Daspoort Secondary School in Pretoria. The session was facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s dedicated Schools Project Coordinator for both Gauteng and North West Provinces. His depth of experience and engaging presentation style created an environment that was both educational and inspiring for the learners. The workshop content was carefully curated to align with the learners’ academic curriculum while also broadening their civic knowledge. Topics included the Preamble to the Constitution, which sets out the vision and values of the Republic; the Founding Provisions, which establish the democratic foundations of the state; the Bill of Rights, which articulates the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed to all citizens; and the Chapter 9 Institutions, which serve to protect and strengthen constitutional democracy. Learners responded with great enthusiasm, actively engaging in discussions and asking probing questions. Topics raised included the nature and functioning of democracy, the responsibilities of political parties in governance, and how ordinary citizens can hold public institutions accountable. The learners' curiosity and thoughtfulness were clear indicators of the effectiveness of the workshop in stimulating critical thinking and civic awareness. In addition to delivering constitutional content, the workshop aimed to foster a sense of ownership and responsibility among the youth regarding the democratic processes that shape their country. By emphasizing the role of each individual in sustaining democracy, whether through voting, community involvement, or civic activism, the session encouraged learners to view themselves as key contributors to the nation’s future. This workshop at Daspoort Secondary School is one of many being conducted across districts in Gauteng and the North West, with plans to expand to additional provinces in the near future. The Inclusive Society Institute is firmly committed to building a generation of learners who are not only knowledgeable about their constitutional rights but are also empowered to defend and exercise them in their everyday lives. Through this growing outreach programme, the Institute seeks to nurture a culture of constitutionalism, where democratic values are understood, respected, and lived out by all citizens—starting with the youth in our schools. The journey toward a more inclusive, equitable, and participatory democracy begins with education—and the Inclusive Society Institute is proud to be leading the way.

Occasional Paper 7/2025 This paper is published jointly by the  Inclusive Society Institute and School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University   PO Box 610 Bellville, 7550 South Africa    Copyright © 2025   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute and the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University.    D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University.   JUNE 2025 by Nicola Jo Bergsteedt (BA Drama; BA Hons Journ; MA Journ; PGDip Futures Studies) & Daryl Swanepoel Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University (ND Co Admin; BPAHons; MPA) This is the third in a series of three occasional papers on managing social cohesion in diverse communities. They explore the mechanisms that Singapore, Finland and the United Arab Emirates have deployed in forging socially cohesive societies within their very different environments.  The three papers will ultimately be integrated into a comprehensive synthesis report with the objective of providing a menu of tools for South African policymakers to contemplate for purposes of strengthening their efforts within the South African context. Abstract   The GovDem Survey of the Inclusive Society Institute has revealed that social cohesion in South Africa has not made sufficient progress post-Apartheid. In fact, the level of cohesion has declined of late, reversing the early gains made at the onset of the democratic order ushered in in 1994. This is worrying given the need for cohesion to underpin peace and security, and economic growth in a country, both of which are at worryingly levels in South Africa.   This occasional paper has as its objective the development of a menu of policy interventions aimed at advancing social cohesion, that the policymakers in South Africa may wish to ponder. The paper forms part of a broader study that explores the practices in other diverse communities, notably Singapore, Finland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This paper discusses proposals informed by the UAE case study, notably the Ministry of Tolerance & Co-Existence and the Happiness Programme. It discusses the findings thereof, and advances recommendations for South African policymakers to consider. 1. Introduction   In analysing its extensive 2023 GovDem Survey , the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), an independent public policy research institute, concluded that thirty years into the new South African dispensation, social cohesion had not advanced to optimal levels. In fact, trends were worrying. Context   In 1994 South Africa transitioned from Apartheid South Africa, in which the minority white community controlled all political power, to a new democratic dispensation in which universal suffrage ensured that all South African, regardless of race, shared political power in the country. Hopes were high that a rainbow nation could be forged from the divisions of the past (Austin, 2021). South Africa is celebrating its 30 years of democracy during 2024. In the poll, less than half (48%) of the respondents were of the view that a united nation could be forged out of all the population groups in the country. 31 percent believed it possible. 18 percent did not express a view one way or the other. This sentiment held true across all the major race groups in the country. Only 46 percent of whites believed it feasible, 48% of blacks believed it so, and for Indians and coloureds it was 44 percent and 50 percent respectively (ISI, 2023).   Even more disquieting is the finding that only 39 percent of South Africans believed reconciliation in South Africa is moving in the right direction. This held true across all the race groups, where similar trends existed.   In its definition of social cohesion, the Inclusive Society Institute includes dimensions wider than just race. It also considers religious tolerance, and attitudes towards immigrants, amongst other criteria, as contributors towards social cohesion. The Institute’s recently released South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI), is built on three pillars: demographic integration, extent of connectivity to the country, and sense of community (ISI, 2024). These pillars respond to the three dimensions of social cohesion as argued by Langer et al. (2017), namely inequality, trust and identity. Figure 1: Social Cohesion Triangle (Langer et al., 2017) High levels of inequality, Langer et al. argue, threatens social cohesion in society, in that it erodes relationships, which, in turn, could cause conflict. When trust is missing between members of society, the ability for individuals to collaborate to build the nation is weakened. And a national identity, in contrast to group or ethnic identity, may cause aggressive behaviour amongst members of society to the detriment of stable coexistence.   In South African society, trust amongst the various groups is worryingly high. For example:   In the same GovDem Survey, only 40 percent of White South Africans completely or somewhat trusted their Black compatriots, and similarly only 41 percent Black South Africans completely or somewhat trusted their White compatriots.   Only 48 percent of South Africans completely or somewhat trusted people from a different religion to their own. Only 43 percent of South Africans completely or somewhat trusted people from different nationalities. Similar trends existed across all the major race groups. Of particular concern was the finding that 68 percent of South Africans did not trust immigrants from other African countries. So too, some 66 percent did not trust immigrants from overseas. And likewise, similar trends were registered across all the race groups. (ISI, 2023)   These disappointingly low levels of trust suggest that, as a nation, in terms of demographic integration, South Africa has a long way to go in consolidating social cohesion in the country.   That said, the ISI survey finds that South Africans are slowly starting to forge a nation. Already, 46 percent of South Africans - with similar trends across all race groups - are in favour of associating with compatriots across racial lines, as opposed to only 31 percent who do not like associating with people from different population groups. And already, 52 percent of South Africans – with a similar trend across all race groups – are socialising (entertaining) with compatriots from across racial lines.   Likewise, some 49 percent of South Africans – with similar trends from across all race groups - do attend the church/shul/mosque/religious services of their fellow South Africans.   And 69% of respondents indicated that they wanted a united South Africa.   In considering the second pillar of the ISI’s SASCI, the extent of connectivity to the country, the findings of the survey were equally disappointing. Nine percent of the respondents indicated that they were seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so. Of particular concern was the number of high-income earners and those with tertiary education. Eleven percent of the high-income earners and those with tertiary qualifications were considering emigration. South Africa is experiencing a critical skills shortage across almost all sectors (Business Tech, 2023). For the country to lose more skills and taxpayers would be quite tragic for the country.   The minority communities are the most vulnerable. Fifteen percent and 14 percent of Whites and Indians respectively were considering emigration, as opposed to 8 percent of Black South Africans.   There were two main reasons driving the sentiment:   ·                A lack of confidence in the ability of the economy to deliver jobs for themselves and their family, and a sense that South Africa was failing. Twenty-five percent of respondents cited work opportunities as the reason for them contemplating emigration, and only 23 percent were confident that their children will be able to become part of the South African labour market and that they will find a good job. ·                A sense that South Africa was failing. Twenty one percent of respondents were of the view that the country was failing. Once again, apart from the Coloured community, it was the minority communities – particularly the Indian community – that were most vulnerable. Twenty-three percent of Whites and 41 percent of Indians cited South Africa’s failure as a state as the reason for them considering emigration.   In considering the third pillar of the ISI’s SASCI, namely a sense of community, a far healthier picture emerged. Seventy-five percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that it important to get involved in the community in which they lived, 47 percent agreed or strongly agreed that it was important to actively work for the welfare of their community, and 58 percent said that they actively looked for ways in which they could support people that were less fortunate than themselves. Similar trends were registered across all the race groups.   The survey was however silent as to the extent to which the individual race groups involvement extended across demographic lines. 1.1 About the survey   The aforementioned data is drawn from the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey, which forms part of IPSOS’ Khayabus Survey, the methodology of which is illustrated in the diagrams contained in Figure 2 below   Figure 2: The IPSOS Khayabus (ISI, 2023)   Against this backdrop one must ask: Is enough being done to promote, nurture and ensure social cohesion in South African society? The country’s National Development Plan (NDP) after all recognises that the strategy set out therein needs to be underpinned by social cohesion (NPC, N.d.).   The NDP argues that “leaders throughout society have to balance the power they hold with responsibility, including…promoting social cohesion”, and that it is necessary to broaden social cohesion and unity while redressing the inequities of the past. “South Africa’s own history and the experiences of other countries”, it says, “show that unity and social cohesion are necessary to meet social and economic objectives”. It also argues that social cohesion in society is necessary to narrow the inequality divide (NPC, N.d.).   The NDP is correct, because in socially cohesive societies, where there is a general absence of underlying social conflict, people work together as one towards the well-being of all in society. It works against exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its people the opportunity of upward mobility (SFRI, N.d.). It enables people to be engaged in “a common enterprise”, wherein they can face shared challenges as members of the same community (Maxwell, in SFRI. N.d.). It allows society to share equitably in its prosperity, because cohesive societies are politically stable, thereby allowing them to focus on economic growth (Bris, 2014).   It is therefore encouraging that the National Planning Commission recently proposed the establishment of a Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Council with the objective of developing and monitoring strategies for the promotion of tolerance and the embracing of diversity …for the emergence of a shared South Africa identity and pride” (NPC, 2023).   Some progress has been made in setting up the structures and mechanisms to advance the goal of social cohesion in South Africa.   The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (CRL Rights Commission) has been established in terms of Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution. The primary objectives of the CRL Commission is “(a) to promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities; (b) to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance and national unity among cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and free association; and (c) to recommend the establishment or recognition, in accordance with national legislation, of a cultural or other council or councils for a community or communities in South Africa” (RSA, 1996).   Since its establishment the CRL Commission has tackled several topics that impede social cohesion. The full list of reports contained on the CRL Commission’s official website include: The commercialisation of religion and the abuse of people’s belief systems. Challenges that lead to deaths and injuries at initiation schools in South Africa; The reuse  of graves by local governments: Seeking a solution to the violation of cultural and religious rights of communities through the reuse of graves by local governments; Ukuthwala (the abduction that involves kidnapping a girl or a young woman by a man and his friends or peers to compel the girl or young woman's family to endorse marriage negotiations). The use of official languages by organs of state. Violations of religious rights by members/congregants of church missions; and Civil unrest in Phoenix that allegedly resulted in racially motivated deaths. (CRL Commission, N.d.)   Scrutinisation of the annual and other reports will suggest that the bulk of the Commission’s work has been limited and reactive in nature. No wonder given that the Commission’s annual budget in the 2021/22 financial year amounted to a mere R46,4 million rand (CRL Commission, N.d.). Given the extent of the work needed to tackle the social cohesion deficit, the commission has not been adequately resourced to properly carry out their work.   So too, the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture (DSAC), is mandated to lead nation building and social cohesion through social transformation, but the unit tasked to carry out this mandate is inadequately resourced. The DSAC social cohesion programme includes activities such as the celebration of national days, advocacy platforms on social cohesion, and community conversations (DSAC, N.d.). The unit tasked with carrying out the social cohesion mandate comprises four members of staff (Anon., 2023) and the annual budget for 2024/5 amounts to mere R59,8 million (Treasury, 2024).   On paper it suggests that the government is committed to securing social cohesion in South Africa. It forms an integral part of the NDP, a constitutionally committed commission has been established to promote and protect the rights of the country’s diverse communities, and DSAC has established programmes aimed at promoting social cohesion in South Africa. The lived reality tells a different story: activities are few and limited in nature, the programmes are wholly under-resourced and as evidenced in the ISI’s GovDem Survey, the level of social cohesion is disappointingly low.   What to do?   There are many other countries around the world that have/are faced/facing social cohesion challenges.  Three come to mind, each with different mechanisms to nurture and promote social cohesion within their societies. These are Singapore, Finland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is the focus of this paper. The UAE experience may hold lessons for South Africa, the exploration of which is the object of this dissertation. 1.2 Research question and methodology   The departure points of this study, based on the empirical evidence contained in the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey, as highlighted in the introductory chapter, is that:   Social cohesion, of which, in the South African context, nation-building and reconciliation are crucial elements, is not at an acceptable level. South Africans desire a united nation in which the different communities that compose the nation can work together to build a common future. The South African Constitution places a high premium on a non-discriminatory environment underpinned by social cohesion. That all three spheres of government, that is the executive, legislative and judicial spheres, at its heart, recognise and promote the ideals of the Constitution, that is a united and reconciled South Africa culminating in a socially cohesive society. That the current structures, programmes and resources allocated by the authorities have not yet – thirty years since the transition from Apartheid - delivered the desired level of social cohesion in South Africa.   It recognises the importance of social cohesion in any society that wishes for harmony, stability and prosperity. Thus, more needs to be done to promote such.   What that is, is an open question.   In a case study, the United Arab Emirates model for managing diversity and social cohesion is examined. It aims to provide new options for South Africa’s policymakers to contemplate, by identifying a set of practices that do not currently form part of the South African toolset.   2. The United Arab Emirates Case Study   2.1. Introduction   In today's globalised world, countries are confronted with significant challenges in nurturing social cohesion and tolerance among their diverse populations. Due to its extensive expatriate community that comprises more than 200 nationalities, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stands out as a unique model. This paper explores the frameworks and programmes deployed by the UAE in order to promote tolerance and social cohesion through its Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, and the Happiness Programme. And it considers how these insights may inform similar initiatives in South Africa. The need for social cohesion is underscored by the reality that societies are becoming increasingly diverse due to globalisation, migration, and changing demographics. For post-apartheid South Africa, where previous policies enforced racial division and inequality, the quest for a unified and inclusive society is both a challenge and an imperative. 2.2. Historical Context   To appreciate forming the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence in the UAE, it is important to understand the historical context of the country. It comprises seven Emirates:, namely, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al-Quwain, Fujairah, and Ras Al Khaimah. Prior to its unification in 1971, each of the Emirates had distinct identities which were rooted in shared cultures, traditions, religions, and heritage (Salah, 2024).   Since unification the country has development rapidly, and, together with its phenomenal economic growth, it has attracted expatriates from many diverse countries. This has led to its demographic transformation. The influx of various nationalities since the twentieth century, has resulted in the drastically altered social fabric of the nation. Whilst the diversification brought the richness of different cultures, it also raised the questions as how to maintain social harmony (Salah, 2024).   The majority of residents in the UAE now hail from abroad, which has led to the UAE government's recognition of the importance of ensuring that the Emiratis and the expatriates need to coexist peacefully and productively. This recognition has led to the establishment of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence. It was a strategic response to these developments, since the government needed to foster an environment of mutual respect and understanding among the different communities inhabiting the UAE and considered it crucial for social stability. Its creation signified a proactive approach to potential friction arising from cultural and linguistic differences (Salah, 2024).   2.3. The background to the need for promoting tolerance in the UAE   The UAE is a multi-national and multi-cultural society. The Emirati nationals make up just 10% of the population. The vast majority are expatriates, who have relocated to the UAE from various countries in search of opportunity and a better life (Olimat, 2025).   Expatriates number around 9 million and the Emirati only around 2 million. Accordingly, the UAE hosts a vast array of cultures, languages and traditions. This has created a unique demographic landscape that has brought about both opportunities for enrichment and challenges in terms of social cohesion (Salah, 2024).   The UAE government has recognised the importance of promoting tolerance and understanding among its varied population. As a nation, the UAE has shifted its focus toward fostering a harmonious society where individuals from different backgrounds can coexist peacefully. This recognition led to the establishment of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, which focuses on initiatives that foster respect and acceptance among the of myriad cultures present in the nation. This ministry’s initiatives have been designed to address the challenges posed by diversity whilst simultaneously harnessing the potential that such diversity offers (Olimat).   2.4. The Ministry of Tolerance   The Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence was founded in 2016 and is tasked with promoting the values of tolerance, inclusiveness, and social cohesion within the UAE. The ministry's formation testifies to the UAE's commitment to addressing the issues which can emerge in a multicultural society, such as prejudice and discrimination (Olimat, 2025).   The Ministry of Tolerance functions on several principles:   Promotion of Cultural Understanding: The ministry implements programmes aimed at promoting awareness and appreciation of the various cultures that exist within the UAE. Initiatives have been designed to promote and encourage dialogue and understanding between the Emiratis and the expatriates with regard to their traditions, values, and beliefs. Development of Comprehensive Policies: The ministry has formulated a range of policies that support a culture of tolerance in schools, workplaces, and communities Engaging the Community: Community engagement is important for ensuring the success of initiatives aimed at promoting tolerance. The ministry therefore focuses on outreach programmes that involve various stakeholders, including local communities, businesses, schools, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Monitoring and Evaluation: The ministry assesses the impact of its initiatives through surveys and studies that evaluate the levels of tolerance and cohabitation among residents. This data helps in refining and enhancing programs. (Olimat, 2025).   2.4.1. The role, structure and functions of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence   The UAE's Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence is the country's authority which is dedicated to promoting tolerance, coexistence and respect among its diverse communities. Its work extends beyond mere toleration. It also seeks to promote an understanding and appreciation amongst its citizens for the various cultures that make up the nation.   Outreach and community engagement   Central to the ministry's strategy is community outreach. By engaging with the different cultural groups and organisations, the ministry endeavours to bridge the gaps between the various cultures. These engagements comprise activities such as the hosting of cultural events, forums and workshops, which are intended to facilitate dialogue and cultural exchanges.   The initiatives help to demystify the different customs and traditions of the various communities, which allows for a greater appreciation among community members. Moreover, the ministry focuses on providing platforms that are inclusive and wherein individuals can express their cultural identities. This helps to promote a better understanding between the various ethnic and religious groups. The approach reinforces the idea of diversity being a strength as opposed to being a challenge.   Education as a tool for promoting tolerance   Education is the basis on which of the ministry's mission has been developed. By integrating concepts of tolerance and coexistence into school curricula, the ministry inculcates these values in future generations. Educational workshops and training programmes shed light on the importance of intercultural understanding to both students and educators. This is done in collaboration with educational institutions. Through such collaboration, the ministry develops the resources needed to promote awareness about the diverse cultures within the UAE. These educational initiatives are intended to prepare students to thrive in a multicultural environment and to embrace diversity from a young age.   Legislative provisions   In order to achieve its objectives, the ministry operates within a robust legislative environment. The government has developed laws that are aimed at promoting tolerance and respect among its citizens and residents. The laws provide the foundation for the ministry's actions and initiatives.   Apart from the obvious laws establishing the Ministry of Tolerance & Coexistence, specific laws have been decreed to protect everyone in the UAE, via a solid legislative ground for the environment of tolerance, co-existence and acceptance. For example, the “Federal Law by Decree No (34) of 2023 Concerning Combating Discrimination, Hatred and Extremism” aims to fights discrimination against individuals or groups based on religion, caste, doctrine, race, colour or ethnic origin (UAE, 2023).    So too, Article 25 of the UAE’s highest law, the Constitution, states that “All individuals are equal before the law, and there is no discrimination between citizens of the Union on the basis of origin, nationality, religious belief or social status” (UAE, 1971).   Framework of tolerance   The ministry’s has established guidelines and policies to prohibit discrimination based on race, nationality, or religion. Legal provisions create a safeguard for individuals belonging to minority groups, thereby ensuring their rights are protected under the law. Additional regulations also encourage businesses and other organisations to adopt practices that promote inclusiveness. By promoting a culture of respect in workplaces and public spaces, the ministry helps to nurture a society that embraces diversity and fosters understanding among its members.   Organisational structure and resources   The ministry has a well-defined organisational structure in order to facilitate the effective implementation of its initiatives. In follows a multi-faceted approach so that it can address the various aspects of tolerance and coexistence in a comprehensive manner. Departments and their activities   The ministry has various departments. Each department is tasked with a specific responsibility, such as cultural integration, the development of coexistence regulations, and community outreach.   Cultural integration programmes aimed at promoting mutual understanding and appreciation between Emiratis and expatriates are designed to facilitate cultural exchanges. Education initiatives focus on developing programmes and resources aimed at embedding tolerance-related topics into school curricula and community workshops.   Through community engagement, outreach initiatives that actively involve diverse cultural communities in events, discussions, and collaborative projects are developed.   Facilitated workplace dialogues: The goal is to promote a spirit of inclusiveness and cooperation amongst workers from different backgrounds and nationalities within the workplace. The Ministry started rolling out these workshops within the government departments. Now that most government departments have been covered, it is looking to implement similar workshops within the private sector.   Legislative Affairs: This department focuses on ensuring that rules, guidelines, and regulations promote a culture of inclusivity and respect across the nation.(Salah,   2024)   Resources allocated to the ministry stem from both governmental budgets and partnerships with private organisations and non-profits. By collaborating with various stakeholders, the ministry expands its capacity to implement effective programmes that resonate with the community's needs (Salah, 2024).  2.4.2. Successes, challenges and important Initiatives   Since establishing of the ministry, the UAE has seen considerable progress in the furthering of a tolerant and inclusive society. Several initiatives and events have contributed to this achievement (Salah, 2024).   One of the major successes of the ministry is the promotion of national events that celebrate diversity, such as the 'International Day for Tolerance'. These events highlight the importance of tolerance but they also engage various communities in a manner that brings them together to share experiences and learn from each other.   Additionally, the ministry's partnership with organisations and institutions has resulted in numerous programmes aimed at youth, empowering them to take an active role in promoting tolerance among their peers. Workshops emphasising leadership and interfaith dialogue have proven successful in encouraging young people to appreciate diversity, and to respect their fellow citizens (Salah, 2024).   Despite these successes, the complex nature of cultural integration, management of differing viewpoints, misunderstanding, friction, and even hostility, have meant that challenges still remain (Salah, 2024).   The ministry must navigate these challenges with sensitivity, recognising that some individuals may struggle to adapt to a multicultural society. The ministry is also tasked with addressing concerns surrounding cultural appropriation and the respect of traditions while promoting their integration. Striving for an equilibrium between preserving cultural identities and promoting a unified national identity is an ongoing challenge that requires thoughtful consideration (Salah, 2024).   2.4.3. Governance and stakeholder engagement   Governance within the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence emphasises collaboration, transparency and accountability. The ministry operates in partnership with various governmental and non-governmental entities, fostering open lines of communication among stakeholders.   Stakeholder collaboration   Engagement with community representatives, civil society organisations, and international entities is crucial in shaping the ministry's policies and initiatives. Through consultation with stakeholders, the ministry ensures that diverse perspectives are included in its programmes, thereby allowing for more effective solutions. This collaborative governance model also helps build trust between communities and governmental institutions. When various stakeholders feel involved in the decision-making process, they are more likely to support initiatives that aim to bolster social cohesion.   Community resilience and responses to global events   The ministry is not only tasked with promoting tolerance but it is also tasked with responding to challenges brought on by global events, such as economic crises, geopolitical tensions, or humanitarian crises. (Salah, 2024)   During challenging times, the ministry's response has been crucial in reinforcing the values of respect and understanding among communities. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the ministry organised initiatives aimed at countering misinformation and fostering a spirit of cooperation between communities. By emphasising shared experiences, the ministry helped to mitigate divisions and reinforce social bonds (Salah, 2024).   The ministry also actively participates in dialogues related to global issues, such as climate change, migration, and human rights. These interactions not only position the UAE as a responsible global citizen but also demonstrate the country's commitment to fostering a culture of tolerance that transcends geographic boundaries (Salah, 2024).    2.4.4. Future directions   As the UAE continues to evolve and grow, so too does the role of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, which needs to be poised to adapt its strategies to meet changing and emerging challenges and opportunities that arise within the multicultural landscape.   Innovation in engagement   It is envisaged that future initiatives leverage technology in order to reach a broader audience and to engage individuals in innovative ways. Digital platforms can facilitate virtual cultural exchanges, social campaigns, and online educational resources, making it easier for communities to connect and interact. Moreover, the ministry may focus on strengthening its partnerships with private sector organisations and universities to develop more tailored programmes that target specific cultural groups or demographics. By aligning their initiatives with the needs of particular communities, the ministry can foster deeper connections and encourage wider participation.   Fostering Inter-religious dialogue   In an increasingly interconnected global environment, inter-religious dialogue is vital for promoting understanding and respect among diverse faiths. The ministry is likely to expand its efforts in this area by organising interfaith events, building bridges between religious leaders and communities, and creating platforms for dialogue that emphasise common values. By nurturing inter-religious understanding, the ministry can further reinforce its core mission of fostering a harmonious society that embraces diversity. (Salah, 2024)    2.5. The Happiness Programme   Closely aligned with the work of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, is the UAE's Happiness Programme. The programme has as its objective the creation of an environment in which all residents feel valued and included.   The programme recognises that happiness and social well-being are deeply interconnected. A happy society is one where individuals respect and support each other. The programme therefore encourages government departments and entities to think creatively about how they can enhance the lives of individuals in the UAE. Happiness more often than not leads to a better understanding and acceptance of others, which in turn promotes a more tolerant society (Olimat, 2025).   2.5.1. Key aspects of the Happiness Programme   The key aspects of the programme are:   Public interface design: Initiatives have been tailored to enhance user experiences with public services. The government aims to ensure that citizen engagement with government services is positive since it fosters a sense of belonging and good interaction between the state and its citizens.   By working with the private sector, businesses are encouraged to adopt practices that promote workplace happiness. Happy workers positively impact attitudes in communities. Mental Health Awareness: Mental well-being is recognised as a core component of happiness. Programmes addressing mental health stigma and promoting services play a vital role in community health. (Olimat, 2025)   2.5.2. The programmes and initiatives of the Happiness Programme   The programme employs several initiatives which are aimed at enhancing tolerance and happiness in the community. Often overlapping with those of the Ministry of Tolerance and Co-Existence's, they include:   A cultural awareness programme that involves educational activities tailored to facilitate understanding among different cultural groups. Through workshops and events, shared values and common goals are emphasised to break down barriers between communities. For example, cultural exchange workshops allow residents to engage with art, music, cuisine, and customs from different cultures so as to create empathy and understanding amongst them.   Public campaigns that highlight stories of multiculturalism, that reflect the nation’s values, and which encourage unity among residents are regularly implemented. The UAE has implemented national campaigns that promote coexistence: Campaigns reminding residents of the dignity of every individual, respect across communities, and historical situations of cooperation help mitigate prejudice and foster a collective identity.   Engagement with Youth   The youth are engaged through programmes that promote volunteerism, cultural exchange and civic responsibility. This is done so as to instill the principles of tolerance and understanding at a young age. In so doing, future generations that value inclusivity are cultivated. The youth programme includes activities such as community service days, and interschool cultural events. Furthermore, youth councils provide platforms for young people to contribute to the social dialogue.   International cooperation   The UAE actively seeks to promote its tolerance initiatives on a global scale. This it does by engaging international organisations and by participating in global dialogues called to address tolerance. It aims to position itself on global platforms as a leader in promoting peace, and cultural understanding and tolerance.   The role of policy and infrastructure   The UAE’s approach to governance significantly contributes to social cohesion. It is of the view that the effectiveness of its infrastructure - from advanced technology in government services to a robust legal system - creates an environment of assurance for residents. Seamless and quality public service experiences nurtures and promotes trust in government - trust which is vital for social stability. The satisfaction with government services is often cited as a major factor in residents’ overall happiness.   Government services and technology   To improve access to all necessary services for residents, the UAE government harnesses technology that promotes transparency and efficiency. The availability of online portals for government services allows residents to conveniently interact with government departments and entities. Processes are more efficient and barriers are removed. Enhanced administrative practices ensure responsiveness to community needs. Rule of law and civic responsibility   The country's firm adherence to the rule of law has a positive impact on the fabric of society. The legal and judicial systems are designed to ensure fairness and equity, which creates a sense of security for residents in that they better understand their rights and responsibilities. When grievances arise, mechanisms for resolution reinforce the norms of civic order and mutual respect. With clear legal frameworks in place, citizens know that conflicts will be resolved efficiently and equitably. This creates confidence in the judicial system. and because residents can expect justice and fairness to prevail when disputes occur, community interactions tend to be civil (Olimat, 2025)   2.5.3. Evaluating Social Cohesion in the UAE   There seems to be a dearth of empirical research measuring social cohesion and the impact of the UAE's tolerance programme's on it. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests a positive trend. In various surveys conducted by government bodies, the perception of safety and acceptance among residents is highlighted. This would indicate that tolerance is indeed part of the cultural fabric of the UAE (Olimat, 2025).   Listening to community members’ experiences provides insights into the successes and challenges of ongoing initiatives. Feedback from citizens indicate increasing levels of cultural exchange, participation in community events, and general acceptance of diversity (Olimat, 2025).   Surveys focusing on perceptions of security and community engagement also suggest an increased sense of belonging among residents. The heightened sense of safety seems crucial, since it encourages individuals to participate fully in social and cultural events. This participation promotes a deeper connection to the UAE as a shared home for all its citizens (Olimat, 2025). 3.     Conclusion and recommendations   The journey toward tolerance and social cohesion is of the highest importance for social stability in both the UAE and South Africa. Drawing lessons from the UAE's model can provide valuable insights into initiatives that could be effectively adapted for a South African context. Therefore, a society founded on mutual respect and understanding needs to be constructed through strategic thinking, collaborative actions, and the development of innovative solutions.   To cultivate a culture of tolerance is not merely a governmental responsibility but a shared societal one that requires participation from all citizens.   In South Africa, embracing diversity as a strength rather than a division is essential for holistic national growth. Building a cohesive society rooted in appreciation and respect will lay the foundation for a brighter future where tolerance reigns, enabling all citizens to feel they have a place in their shared national identity.   The world is grappling with rising intolerance and conflict. So the importance of learning from models of successful integration cannot be overstated. By focusing on building communities where individuals embrace differences while recognising shared humanity, we can create pathways toward a more peaceful and harmonious future for all.   By continuously updating policies, fostering intercultural dialogues, and by encouraging engagement at all levels of society, nations can work collaboratively toward a common goal of tolerance — with the ultimate aim of enriching human experience and promoting a culture of acceptance and understanding across the globe.   The establishment of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, and the introduction of the Happiness Programme, have been significant steps towards nurturing a more tolerant and happy society. One that accepts diversity and promotes social cohesion and harmony. Through sustained community engagement, sound legislation, educational initiatives, and innovative responses to world challenges, the ministry is playing a critical and essential role in fulfilling the UAE's commitment to coexistence and mutual respect.   Whilst the journey toward achieving a fully tolerant and harmonious society is ongoing, the continuous efforts of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence and the Happiness Programme affirm its dedication to ensuring that individuals from all walks of life feel valued and respected.   The UAE is a model to other nations needing to manage their diverse communities and to promote social cohesion. As the complexities of cultural diversity is grappled with around the globe, the principles and practices established by the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence serve as a guide for creating inclusive societies. By nurturing the values of tolerance, coexistence, and harmony, the ministry contributes to the nation's internal social fabric. It also positions itself as a global leader in promoting harmonious relationships among diverse populations.   Through its ongoing commitment to the promotion of tolerance, and by creating understanding and respect amongst the different cultures and communities calling the UAE their home, the country's national identity is enhanced.   3.1. Insights for South Africa   South Africa, has a complex history of division and inequality. It can therefore can benefit from the UAE's experiences of promoting social cohesion, since it remains a central challenge requiring initiatives to promote understanding among its diverse communities. The cultural landscape of South Africa is rich, and leveraging this diversity can create a vibrant nation rooted in mutual respect.   The establishing of a structure for tolerance, coexistence and happiness   South Africa should consider the establishment of a dedicated institution or the expansion of the mandates of the existing constitutional Chapter 9 institutions, for purposes of designing and implementing social cohesion programmes alike to those of the UAE. This will help focus efforts aimed at fostering social cohesion in the country. Similarly, a national body with the authority to coordinate social cohesion, tolerance and harmony initiatives could ensure that the various stakeholders involved in the development and implementation that policies are linked. This will encourage its effective implementation at all levels.   Cultural awareness programmes   Implementing comprehensive educational programmes that encourage cultural exchange can promote respect and tolerance among South African communities. Collaborations between schools, community organisations, business and local governments are crucial in implementing these initiatives. Programmes should emphasise the contributions of various cultural groups to South African history and development, highlighting shared values and experiences. Through interactive workshops, local festivals, and shared storytelling events, communities can build bridges of understanding.   Implementing public campaigns and community engagement   Through the implementation of public campaigns that celebrate diversity and shared values, prejudice is eased and inclusivity promoted. They can highlight success stories of intercultural friendships, shared community projects, and mutual support among different groups. The engagement initiatives should involve the various stakeholders, such as businesses, educational institutions, and civil society, in order to strengthen the reach and effectiveness of the campaigns. Incorporating voices from diverse backgrounds ensures that the public relates to and invests in the changes being made.   The utilisation of technology   By leveraging technology to improve access to government services, trust in public institutions is built. This ultimately contributes to greater civic responsibility among citizens. Similarly, enhanced digital platforms for community engagement enables feedback and connection in real time, thereby allowing residents to effectively articulate their needs and concerns. Online platforms can be used to share best practices, facilitate dialogue, and create virtual spaces for cultural exchange, and for broadening the community’s engagement radius.   Youth Engagement   The targeting of young people with programmes aimed at promoting leadership, service, and community involvement can help engender a culture of tolerance and understanding for future generations. Providing mentorship programmes that connect youth from diverse backgrounds can promote understanding and collaboration. Education plays a central role in shaping perspectives. Schools can implement curricula celebrating diversity while emphasising the importance of understanding, empathy, and civic duty.   References   Bris, A. 2014. Social Cohesion – Why it matters. [Online] Available at: https://www.imd.org/research-knowledge/articles/com-april-2014/ [accessed: 7 February 2024]   BusinessTech, 2023. There’s a critical shortage of these shills going into 2023.  [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.sa/news/lifestyle/653227/theres-a-critical-shortage-of-these-skills-in-south-africa-going-into-2023/ [accessed: 7 February 2023]   CRL Commission. N.d. Annual and Other Reports . [Online] Available at: https://www.crlcommission.org.sa/reports/ [Accessed: 7 February 2024]   Department of Sport, Arts and Culture (DSAC). N.d. Annual Performance Plan 2023/24 . [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.dsac.gov.za/sites/default/files/2023-05/DSAC%20APP%202023-2024.pdf [Accessed: 7 February 2024]   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), 2023. GovDem Poll . Cape Town: Inclusive Society Institute.   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2024. The South Africa Social Cohesion Index: Measuring the well-being of a society . [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/the-south-africa-social-cohesion-index-measuring-the-well-being-of-a-society  [accessed: 11 March 2025]   Langer, A.; Stewart, F., Smedts, K. & Demarest, L. 2017. Social Cohesion Index. [Online] Available at: https://www.socialcohesion.info/concepts/arnim-langer-/-francesstewart-/-kristien-smedts-/-leila-demarest [accessed: 7 February 2024].   National Planning Commission (NPC). N.d. National Development Plan 2030. Our future – make it work. [Oline] Available at: ndp-2030-our-future-make-it-workr.pdf [accessed: 7 February 2024]   Olimat, M. 2025. Interview with Dr Muhammed Olimat, Professor, Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, United Arab Emirates.   Republic of South Africa (RSA). 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 . Pretoria: Government Printer.   Salah, M. 2024. Structured interview with on 20  August 2024 with Ms Mai Salah, Senior Official at the Ministry of Tolerance & Coexistence, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.   Scanlon Foundation Research Institute (SFRI). N.d. What is social cohesion?  [Online] Available at: https://scanloninstitute.org.au/what-social-cohesion [accessed: 7 February 2024]   Treasury. 2024. Vote 37: Sport, Arts and Culture . [Online] Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2024/ene/ENE24-Vote37_ChapterTables.xlsx [accessed: 2 April 2024]   United Arab Emirates (UAE). 1971. The Constitution . [Online] Available at: https://uaecabinet.ae/en/the-constitution [accessed: 19 March 2025]   United Arab Emirates (UAE). 2023. Federal Law by Decree No (34) of 2023 Concerning Combating Discrimination, Hatred and Extremism . Aby Dhabi: Presidential Palace.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This paper is published jointly by the  Inclusiv e Society Institute and School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University                      www.inclusivesociety.org.za             www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/economy/sp

The Inclusive Society Institute participated in the Electoral Commission of South Africa’s Symposium on Political Funding, which was held in Durban on 18 and 19 June 2025. The symposium brought together a diverse array of stakeholders, including political parties, researchers, regulators, civil society organisations and representatives of the media, to interrogate and reflect on the current state and future trajectory of party political funding in South Africa.   Representing the Institute was its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, who contributed to the robust discussions on funding transparency, equity and the sustainability of South Africa’s multiparty democracy.   A multi-sectoral engagement on the Future of political funding   The symposium was convened by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and structured over two days, with a series of high-level thematic sessions, which included:   A public session in which the objectives of the symposium were set out, focusing on strengthening transparency, fairness and institutional integrity within the South African political funding regime. A deep dive into the architecture of political funding in South Africa, which featured a keynote address by IEC Deputy CEO Mr George Mahlangu, who offered insights into the Commission’s work in monitoring political finance and enforcing the Political Party Funding Act. A presentation of key findings from new research conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), examining the legal and policy framework regulating political finance in South Africa, as well as public perceptions around compliance and enforcement. A global comparative perspective on political funding, with inputs from international experts exploring best practices and emerging challenges in other electoral democracies. A focused session on cross-jurisdictional research, drawing from comparative experiences around the world to identify policy lessons for South Africa’s regulatory environment.   On the second day, the symposium resumed with a keynote address by the Minister of Finance, who highlighted the critical intersection between public finance management and democratic integrity. Subsequent sessions included:   Reimagining the Purpose, Role and Mandate of Political Funding, which interrogated whether South Africa’s current funding model adequately supports a vibrant and inclusive democratic order. Transparency in Political Funding, featuring new research on the capacity and commitment of key stakeholders, political parties, oversight institutions and civil society, to uphold the principles of openness and accountability. A closing session that examined Transparency in Public and Private Political Funding, addressing the persistent challenges of disclosure, enforcement and public trust, and proposing forward-looking reforms.   The institute’s contribution   Mr Swanepoel’s contribution on day one of the symposium highlighted several pressing concerns around the funding framework. In his remarks, he noted the apparent mismatch between the financial disclosures reported by political parties to the IEC and the scale of expenditure observed during election campaigns.   He cautioned that South Africa had adopted a high-disclosure of private funding of political parties' regime without adequately increasing public funding for political parties, a mismatch that risks undermining the objectives of the Political Party Funding Act, particularly in preventing corruption. Citing research conducted by the Inclusive Society Institute, he pointed out that South Africa spent approximately R20 per eligible voter per year on public funding in 2021, well below international norms for proportional representation systems. While funding has increased since that time, it remains inadequate to support a healthy democratic system.   Swanepoel further warned that if political parties remain underfunded and unable to meet their obligations. They may feel compelled to circumvent the law to secure sufficient campaign resources, thereby weakening the very transparency and integrity the Act seeks to protect.   In response to concerns raised by delegates at the symposium around the revised formula for distributing public funding, now based on a 10% equal share and 90% proportional allocation, he proposed a more inclusive three-tiered approach. This would begin with a small basic allocation to all represented parties to ensure operational viability, followed by the current 10-90 split, because such a model, he argued, would strike a better and more acceptable balance between the need for fairness and electoral performance, while enhancing the sustainability of South Africa’s multi-party democracy.   Conclusion   The ISI welcomed the opportunity to contribute to this important dialogues, since it the Institute was of the view that it helped advance the consolidation of South Africa’s democracy. The Institute remains committed to promoting policy reform that enhances transparency, fairness, and inclusivity within the political landscape.

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to make meaningful progress in promoting democratic values within secondary and tertiary institutions across the North West Province. On Thursday, 19 June 2025, learners from Rabboni Christian High School took part in the “Taking the Constitution to the People”  workshop, facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s Gauteng Schools Coordinator. The workshop aimed to deepen the learners’ understanding and appreciation of South Africa’s democratic Constitution, its historical development, structure, and the fundamental rights and responsibilities enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights. Through an engaging and interactive session, participants were guided through the constitution-making process, the principles that shaped its formation, and its critical role in underpinning the country's governance and social cohesion. The workshop also highlighted the Founding Provisions, which articulate the core values of the Republic and the freedoms to which all South Africans are entitled. A key focus of the session was the idea of responsible citizenship. Learners were empowered to see themselves not just as beneficiaries of constitutional rights, but as active participants in safeguarding democratic ideals and contributing to a more inclusive, equitable, and just society. This workshop forms part of a broader and ongoing initiative by the Inclusive Society Institute to strengthen constitutional literacy and democratic engagement. Similar programmes will continue to be rolled out across various districts of the North West Province, targeting both secondary schools and tertiary institutions. Through these efforts, the Institute seeks to nurture a generation of informed, engaged, and civic-minded individuals who will play a vital role in upholding and advancing South Africa’s democratic legacy.

On Thursday, 19 June 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute’s School Project Coordinator in the North West Province, Patrick Motsepe, facilitated an engaging and insightful constitutional education workshop for Grade 11 learners at Lighthouse Academy. The workshop aimed to equip students with a deeper and more practical understanding of South Africa’s supreme legal document—the Constitution. Moving beyond textbook theory, the session explored the Constitution’s historical context, its structure, and key components such as the Preamble and the country’s national symbols, including the National Anthem and the national flag. Carefully aligned with the learners’ Life Orientation and History curricula, the session offered an enriching learning experience that enhanced both content knowledge and critical thinking skills. As the workshop progressed, learners became increasingly engaged—posing thought-provoking questions, offering their own insights, and actively participating in discussions. Motsepe skillfully facilitated the dialogue, creating an inclusive space where each learner felt empowered to express their views. The workshop also focused on fostering a clearer understanding of the rights, limitations of rights, and responsibilities that come with citizenship in a democratic society. By the end of the session, students left with a greater appreciation of the Constitution’s relevance in their daily lives and their roles as active, informed citizens. To conclude, learners completed a survey designed to assess their comprehension of the workshop content and its application, providing valuable feedback for future programming.

Occasional Paper 6/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. J U N E 2 0 2 5   Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPAHons, ND: Co. Admin   Abstract   As the rivalry between the United States and China intensifies under the Trump administration, the global order is being reshaped in profound and often unpredictable ways. This paper explores how a potential second Trump presidency could escalate this competition and what that means for the rest of the world, particularly Africa.   Drawing from the author’s extensive engagements with US policy experts, think tanks and lawmakers, this position paper offers a forward-looking analysis of how Trump’s likely return to office, with his characteristic emphasis on economic nationalism, strategic decoupling and ideological confrontation, would redefine US-China relations. While much attention is focused on the Indo-Pacific, the paper makes a compelling case that Africa has become a significant, if underacknowledged, theatre in this global rivalry.   Africa finds itself caught in the middle of competing superpowers offering infrastructure, investment and ideological influence, each with strings attached. Whether through trade wars, military posturing or the ideological framing of governance models, the US-China standoff is already shaping African policy choices, development trajectories and diplomatic alignments. The paper uses South Africa as a case study to illustrate how Washington's growing skepticism toward Beijing’s influence could lead to economic, diplomatic and reputational consequences for nations perceived as drifting too close to China.   At its core, the paper argues that African nations must navigate this turbulent period with strategic clarity and assertive diplomacy. Instead of being pulled into a zero-sum competition, countries should leverage the rivalry to diversify partnerships, build institutional resilience and assert a form of updated non-alignment rooted in their own developmental priorities.     1. Introduction: US - China relations as the defining global axis   The global geopolitical landscape is being redrawn by intensifying strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. A prospective second Trump administration, characterised by economic nationalism, ideological confrontation and unilateralism, will define its approach to US - China relations: renewed rigidity and hostility.   While much of the focus centres on the Indo-Pacific, the implications of this rivalry will ripple globally. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, which, while not the core battleground, serves as a critical theatre in which the great-power contest for influence, resources, ideology and markets plays out in consequential ways.   This paper repositions US - China relations as the central lens through which we examine the evolving international system, with Africa presented as an illustrative case study of what smaller and developing states can expect in an era of heightened bipolarity. The objective is not only to project possible scenarios under a second Trump administration, but also to understand how this intensification of global rivalry constrains or enables agency among Global South nations, particularly those like South Africa that play an influential role on their continent.   2. Escalation in US - China relations under a Trump Presidency   2.1 Tariff wars, technology sanctions and economic decoupling   Trump’s first term launched a major economic confrontation with China through a combination of tariffs, export bans and the weaponisation of trade policy. A second term is expected to deepen this decoupling trend.   In 2025, the Biden-Trump transition period has been marked by increasing trade policy uncertainty. Trump-aligned Republicans in Congress have already tabled bills proposing expansion of the 60% blanket tariff on Chinese goods to include categories such as EV batteries, solar panels and rare earth imports and there will be increased scrutiny of US firms sourcing inputs from China through new guidance on "supply chain transparency" (USTR, 2025).   Trade measures:  Trump’s first term launched a major economic confrontation with China through a combination of tariffs, export bans and the weaponisation of trade policy (Bown, 2020; Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020). Now tariffs are flip-flopping, rising as high as 145%, then down again to 30%, temporarily, but the final outcome is still up in the air. Export controls:  Huawei, ZTE and other Chinese tech firms were blacklisted under national security grounds. Campaign rhetoric (2024):  Trump proposed a 10% baseline tariff on all imports and a 60% tariff specifically on Chinese goods (WSJ, 2024; Trump Campaign, 2024).   Likely Implications:   The world may witness a bifurcated economic order, with separate trade and technology ecosystems, forcing countries to choose sides or hedge with complexity. African nations that rely heavily on Chinese capital and technology, such as Ethiopia, Kenya or Zambia, could find themselves caught in the crosshairs of this decoupling. If African manufacturing sectors are integrated into Chinese supply chains, they risk being cut off from US and European markets due to compliance restrictions related to forced labour, technology origin and sanctions.   2.2 Military posturing in the Indo-Pacific   Trump’s “peace through strength” foreign policy led to a bolstered US military presence in Asia and revitalised alliances. The emphasis on containing Chinese military expansionism will likely sharpen further.   The Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia)  was enhanced to counterbalance China’s Indo-Pacific rise (The White House, 2019). Freedom of navigation  operations increased in the South China Sea. Intermediate missile development  resumed after US withdrawal from the INF Treaty.   Likely implications:   Heightened military tensions with the possibility of flashpoints over Taiwan, maritime boundaries and alliances with regional players. The military dynamics will extend diplomatically to Africa as the US scrutinises Chinese military cooperation with African states, including port access in Djibouti and arms trade in southern Africa. African governments that engage militarily or logistically with China may attract US countermeasures.   We have already seen the US Navy in early 2025 resuming joint exercises with the Philippines and expanded rotational deployments in Guam and Darwin, Australia. China’s PLA Navy responded with increased activity around Taiwan and the construction of another artificial island in the South China Sea (DoD, 2025). Trump campaign surrogates have promised to re-enter the INF Treaty only if China agrees to verifiable dismantlement of its medium-range missiles.   2.3 Democracy versus autocracy framing   Trump’s foreign policy often used ideological language to delegitimise China’s global rise, framing it as an existential threat to the liberal order.   Pompeo (2020):  "If we bend the knee now, our children’s children may be at the mercy of the CCP" (Pompeo, 2020). Legislation:  The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act bans imports from Xinjiang linked to forced labour. Human rights reports:  The Trump State Department sharply criticised repression in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang.   Likely implications:   This ideological framing bleeds into foreign aid, partnerships and multilateral diplomacy, especially in Africa where governance models are diverse. Governments seen to be drifting towards China’s governance template, that is centralised authority, party-dominated institutions and limitations on civil society, may find their partnerships with the US becoming strained or withdrawn. Public diplomacy tools will amplify this divide, painting a dichotomy that forces African states into uncomfortable positions.   2.4 Countering China's global expansion   Trump’s team viewed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as “debt trap diplomacy” and advocated alternatives.   Blue Dot Network (2019):  Created to vet infrastructure projects for transparency and sustainability. Prosper Africa:  Meant to scale up US private-sector investment on the continent. PGII (G7):  Though formalised under Biden, Trump-era momentum laid groundwork for infrastructure competition.   Likely implications:   Washington will likely increase pressure on states accepting BRI deals while offering conditional US and Western-backed infrastructure alternatives. For Africa, this means potential access to new finance, but with expectations around transparency, governance reforms and alignment with US-led frameworks like the Build Back Better World agenda or the DFC guidelines. The competition is no longer just about roads and ports; it is about ideological allegiance, digital sovereignty, and strategic dependency.   3. Africa as a strategic testing ground   Africa, rich in natural resources, a rapidly growing population, and critical voting power in international forums, is an increasingly vital arena in the US - China strategic rivalry. While China has deepened its footprint through infrastructure development, concessional lending and digital expansion, a renewed Trump administration would likely see Africa not only as a market, but as a battleground for global influence.   3.1 Pressure to reassess partnerships   A Trump administration is likely to exert strategic pressure on African governments to reduce their dependency on Chinese financing and infrastructure. Washington may leverage bilateral aid, trade access and diplomatic relations to discourage certain forms of Chinese engagement.   Technology and cybersecurity:  The US will oppose the deployment of Huawei and ZTE technologies in African telecoms and surveillance networks, citing risks of espionage. Strategic infrastructure:  Ports, railways and government buildings constructed by Chinese firms may be seen as dual-use facilities, prompting diplomatic concern. Debt diplomacy:  Countries highly indebted to China, such as Angola and Kenya, may be urged to adopt more transparent and multilateral lending frameworks and coerced into aligning with US and Bretton Woods institutions.   Likely outcome:   African states could be forced to reassess relationships not only based on economic benefit, but on the strategic optics and consequences of alignment.   3.2 Competing economic offerings Trump’s economic strategy would likely focus on enhancing US competitiveness in Africa through the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), targeted bilateral trade deals and the mobilisation of private capital.   Reinforced AGOA strategy:  The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) may be restructured to provide preferential access to US markets for countries aligning with US geopolitical interests. Critical minerals engagement:  The US may enter joint ventures with African governments in mining sectors to secure cobalt, lithium and rare earth elements vital to green and defence technologies. Private sector incentives:  US businesses could receive tax benefits and risk insurance to invest in African infrastructure and technology.  While not matching China's scale or speed, these initiatives may appeal to African governments seeking diversification and reduced exposure to Chinese leverage. In March 2025, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) announced a $5 billion investment guarantee facility for American firms investing in African digital infrastructure. The initiative explicitly excludes partnerships involving Huawei or Hikvision technologies (DFC, 2025).   3.3 Ideological influence and civil society tools   In addition to economic levers, the Trump administration would likely amplify ideological messaging through public diplomacy tools.   Civil society support:  US-funded NGOs may be bolstered to promote transparency, democracy and anti-corruption efforts. Narrative framing:  Agencies like USAID and media platforms like Voice of America may cast Chinese influence as undermining good governance. Think-tank engagement:  US institutions may increase collaboration with African academic and policy groups to challenge Beijing’s development model.  These instruments serve not just to compete for hearts and minds, but also to signal to African elites the reputational risks of leaning toward China.   4. Key Congressional and Senatorial role-players and legislative proposals   The US Congress is increasingly active in shaping policy to counter China’s global influence, with several lawmakers taking a leading role in advancing legislation that directly or indirectly impacts Africa.   4.1 Senator Jim Risch (R-ID)   Co-sponsored the Strategic Competition Act , prioritising diplomatic and development expansion to confront China’s influence. Supports increased US diplomatic staffing in African embassies and expanded civil society engagement to counter Chinese investments (U.S. Congress, 2021).   4.2 Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), now Secretary of State   Sponsored the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act , banning imports linked to forced labour in China. It advocates revoking China’s PNTR status, potentially impacting African manufacturing hubs linked to Chinese supply chains, such as Ethiopia (U.S. Department of State, 2020).   4.3 Representative John Moolenaar (R-MI)   Co-founded the Critical Minerals Policy Working Group . Promotes US partnerships in Africa’s mining sector, especially in countries like DRC and Zambia, while discouraging Chinese joint ventures. 4.4 Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) Supports the Outbound Investment Transparency Act , increasing scrutiny of US firms involved in Chinese-linked projects in Africa. 4.5 Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT)   Introduced the Sanctioning Russia Act, a piece of legislation which could impose tariffs on countries that buy sanctioned Russian oil, through which China is directly targeted, African nations with non-aligned foreign policies are nevertheless going to be affected.   In addition to previously mentioned roleplayers, the 2025 Congressional China Strategy Caucus was formally launched, co-chaired by Senator Tom Cotton and Representative Elissa Slotkin. Their proposed “Supply Chain Sovereignty Act” would introduce sanctions on Chinese firms operating in sectors deemed critical to US national security, including medical devices, green tech components, and telecommunications. African nations trading heavily in these sectors may face secondary compliance challenges.   These legislative efforts signify bipartisan momentum in Congress to build a legal framework that will serve to deter deeper African engagement with China. Countries seen are seen as being too closely aligned with Beijing may find themselves penalised economically or diplomatically. 5. Case Study: South Africa in the crosshairs of great- power rivalry   South Africa’s foreign policy, trade orientation and ideological alliances have drawn increasing scrutiny from US policymakers, particularly under a Trump-aligned strategic worldview. As one of the continent’s most politically and economically influential nations and a core BRICS member, South Africa’s trajectory offers an insightful example of how US - China rivalry is reshaping bilateral and regional relations. 5.1 The US - South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025   Introduced in early 2025, this Act mandates the Executive to do a comprehensive review of all diplomatic, military and economic engagements between the United States and South Africa, with provisions that reflect mounting concerns in Washington over Pretoria's growing closeness with both Beijing and Moscow. Specific US concerns include:   Military cooperation:  Reports of joint naval exercises between the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), China’s PLA Navy and Russia’s fleet. Digital sovereignty:  Widespread adoption of Huawei, ZTE and Hikvision technologies in South Africa’s security and telecommunications networks. Ideological alignment:  Continued high-level party-to-party ties between the ANC and the Chinese Communist Party.   Likely US responses:   Suspension or redirection of specific development assistance programmes, particularly in digital infrastructure and defence cooperation. Enhanced scrutiny of dual-use infrastructure projects funded by Chinese entities. Diplomatic signalling to, and subtle coercion of, its regional allies to start distancing themselves from Pretoria’s trajectory.   As of May 2025, the Act has cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Amendments now require a full audit of South African universities’ research partnerships with Chinese state-linked entities. There is increased concern in Washington over reports of joint AI labs co-funded by Huawei and local academic institutions (GAO Report, 2025). 5.2 Reputational and regional implications   The US review of its relationship with South Africa could serve as a warning to other African nations, that they too could follow, thereby reinforcing the risks of overt alignment with China. As South Africa holds prominent roles in continental institutions such as the African Union and SADC, its choices may influence the strategic posture of neighbouring states. Countries that emulate Pretoria’s engagement model may find themselves subject to similar scrutiny, while those that hedge or diversify may be rewarded with deeper Western partnerships. 6. Anticipated impact on China and China - Africa Relations 6.1 Impacts on China   Economic constraints:  US trade and technology restrictions have already begun to limit Chinese export capacity and innovation in high-tech sectors. Semiconductor and rare earth supply chain disruptions could worsen under a renewed Trump presidency. Diplomatic isolation:  Countries such as Australia, Lithuania and Sweden have resisted Chinese pressure, strengthening Western diplomatic coordination. If the US further isolates China in multilateral bodies like the WTO or the UN, its normative influence will shrink. Strategic withdrawal:  Chinese firms increasingly de-risk by delisting from US exchanges and focusing on South - South cooperation or domestic markets. This may reduce Beijing’s presence in contested or high-risk regions, including parts of Africa.   In the first quarter of 2025, China's GDP growth slowed to 4.5% amid tightening US and EU export restrictions on AI chips and advanced semiconductors. The Chinese government announced an acceleration of "dual circulation" policies to reduce reliance on foreign technology. 6.2 Impacts on Africa   Tactical reassessments:  African countries are already re-evaluating the terms of Chinese debt, with loan disbursements from China dropping from $29 billion in 2016 to under $9 billion in 2022 (China Africa Research Initiative, 2023)Strategic. Diversification of funding:  Africa now has access to competing Western initiatives, such as the G7’s PGII and the EU’s €150 billion Global Gateway, offering alternatives to BRI finance with potentially better terms and transparency. Increased scrutiny:  Nations adopting Chinese digital infrastructure (e.g., Kenya, Nigeria) may see reduced eligibility for US aid or face political consequences, which adds pressure on African states to reassess the long-term costs of Chinese technological integration.   According to a World Bank Africa Briefing (2025), concessional finance from China dropped below $7 billion in 2024. By contrast, PGII and Global Gateway disbursements in Africa exceeded $10 billion combined for the first time. Moreover, at least five African countries (Ghana, Senegal, Namibia, Uganda and Rwanda) have launched regulatory reviews of existing BRI agreements due to rising public debt concerns. 7. Strategic Recommendations for African Policymakers   The African experience provides practical lessons for navigating US - China rivalry. Policymakers must proactively shape foreign policy to preserve autonomy while capitalising on opportunities from both East and West. 7.1 Strategic non-alignment as policy doctrine   Africa must revive the spirit of the Non-Aligned Movement and update it for a multipolar 21st century. Rather than neutrality, this entails actively managing relationships with all powers based on developmental needs.   Maintain working ties with both US and Chinese partners. Avoid exclusive alignment with either bloc. Practice competitive diplomacy to extract the best offers.     7.2 Institutional strengthening and resilience   Improve public financial management and debt transparency. Strengthen legal protections around national assets. Enhance policy coordination across ministries to evaluate foreign proposals holistically.   7.3 Continental coordination and multilateralism   Use AU frameworks to issue collective positions on digital governance, foreign investment and debt sustainability. Operationalise AfCFTA to enhance intra-African trade, reducing dependence on external powers. Promote African agency in multilateral reform discussions.     7.4 Monitor legislative risks from the global north   Track new US and EU legislation that could affect African supply chains. Build forecasting units within foreign ministries to anticipate external regulatory shocks. Develop local content requirements and compliance capacity to avoid sudden disqualifications.   New EU legislation in 2025 requires traceability of all critical minerals entering its market. This indirectly affects African exporters who partner with Chinese firms lacking such compliance mechanisms. The African Minerals Transparency Index, developed by UNECA and launched in April 2025, is helping African governments prepare for these evolving standards. 8. Conclusion: Navigating the age of rivalry   The rivalry between the US and China defines the geopolitical epoch and whilst dynamics may have originated in trade and technology, they now affect every global region, especially Africa. As the case of South Africa demonstrates, alignment choices have consequences. The continent must tread a careful path, asserting strategic autonomy, embracing multilateralism and building resilient institutions.   While a renewed Trump administration may intensify the rivalry, the broader arc of global affairs is clear: developing nations must act with vision and conviction if they are to shape their futures rather than be shaped by external powers. Africa’s response to this challenge can serve as a model for the Global South, a model of pragmatic independence, proactive diplomacy and principled engagement.   References   Bown, C.P., 2020. US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart . Peterson Institute for International Economics. [Online] Available at: https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart [Accessed 7 June 2025].   China Africa Research Initiative (CARI), 2023. Chinese Loans to Africa Database . Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. [Online] Available at: https://www.sais-cari.org/data [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Development Finance Corporation (DFC). 2025. DFC Announces $5 Billion Africa Investment Guarantee Facility.  [Online] Available at: https://www.dfc.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). 2025. Guidance on Supply Chain Transparency in Strategic Sectors.  [Online] Available at: https://ustr.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020. Economic Impact of the US-China Phase One Agreement . [Online] Available at: https://ustr.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Pompeo, M., 2020. Communist China and the Free World's Future . Speech at the Nixon Library, 23 July. U.S. Department of State. [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/ [Accessed 7 June 2025].   The White House, 2019. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report . [Online] Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Trump Campaign, 2024. Campaign Rally Transcript, January 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.donaldjtrump.com [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Congress, 2021. Strategic Competition Act of 2021 . [Online] Available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1169 [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). 2025. Annual Indo-Pacific Defense Posture Report. [Online] Available at: https://www.defense.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Department of State, 2020. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2025. Audit of Foreign Research Partnerships at US Academic Institutions.  [Online] Available at: https://www.gao.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (UNECA), 2025. African Minerals Transparency Index Launch Report.  [Online] Available at: https://www.uneca.org   Wall Street Journal, 2024. Trump Proposes Sweeping Tariff Plan . [Online] Available at: https://www.wsj.com [Accessed 7 June 2025].   World Bank, 2025. Africa’s Economic Outlook and Financial Flows Briefing Q1.  [Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org [Accessed 7 June 2025]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   June 2025 This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGPT. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   Co-Convenors: Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability Inclusive Society Institue Rapporteur: Daryl Swanepoel CONTENTS   1 FOREWORD 2 THEMATIC OVERVIEW 2.1 Conceptualising Middle Powers in a fragmented world 2.2 Middle Powers as agents of global balance 2.2.1 A multipolar opportunity 2.2.2 Normative leadership 2.2.3 Strategic tools and leverage 2.3 Strategic incentives for engagement 2.4 Institutional reform and global governance 2.5 From dialogue to action 2.6 Digital transformation and strategic sovereignty 2.7 Conclusion: Claiming agency in a multipolar world 3 GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE ROLE OF MULTILATERALISM Introductory remarks by HE Tarja Halonen, former President of Finland (pre-recorded message) 4 THE ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS IN REBALANCING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE - AN ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE Dr Georgios Kostakos, Executive Director, Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS) 4.1 The geopolitical context: Strains on the global governance system 4.2 Defining middle powers: Criteria and candidates 4.3 Roles in rebalancing global governance 4.4 Tools and leverage available to middle powers 4.5 What’s in it for the middle powers? Incentives and strategic gains 4.6 Constraints and limitations 4.7 Strategic proposals for institutionalising middle power influence 4.8 Conclusion: Strategic necessity and moral imperative 5 REIMAGINING PEACE, POWER, AND JUSTICE IN GLOBAL POLITICS - A CRITICAL REFLECTION ON MULTILATERALISM, THE GLOBAL SOUTH, AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER Ms Febe Potgieter- Gqubule, Head of Policy, African National Congress and former South African diplomat and senior official at the African Union 5.1 The crisis of the Liberal Order and the role of Middle Powers 5.2 Crises as opportunities: Reshaping the global system 5.3 Multilateralism under contestation and reconstruction 5.4 African perspectives on peace, governance, and development 5.5 Regional integration and economic sovereignty 5.6 Education, science and Pan-African solidarity 5.7 Global partnerships and African agency 5.8 Narrative, hope and political imagination 5.9 Coalitions of the willing and Lessons from experience 5.10 Conclusion: Toward a better Africa and a better world 6 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INEQUALITY AND RIGHTS Professor Sakiko Fukudu-Parr, Studley Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School, New York 6.1 Evolution of development thinking 6.2 The human development approach 6.3 Inequality: A structural and normative challenge 6.4 A Rights-based approach to development 6.5 Ethics and measurement in development policy 6.6 The Political economy of intellectual property and innovation 6.7 Institutional and structural obstacles 6.8 Capacity, information and epistemic justice 6.9 Civil Society and participatory approaches 6.10 Rethinking multilateralism and global governance 6.11 Conclusion 7 DISCUSSION: INSIGHTS FROM THE EXPERT DIALOGUE 7.1 Reframing the Middle Power concept: Identity versus agency 7.2 Middle Powers as builders of multilateralism and strategic coalitions 7.3 Africa–US relations: A case study in asymmetric engagement 7.4 Structural constraints and strategic gaps in Africa 7.5 Youth, education and technological transformation 7.6 Towards Implementation: From dialogue to action 7.7 Conclusion: Middle Powers as architects of a multipolar future ANNEXURE: PROGRAMME   Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:2183261550 1 FOREWORD   A loose association of think tanks and individual experts mainly from the Global South, the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) aspires to influence upcoming decisions on the future of global governance. This includes decisions on the reform of the United Nations, so that the states, the communities and the citizens of the Global South no longer feel that they are guests at the mercy of Northern hosts in the halls of global governance, but that they are equal partners, with their own valid perspectives, equal right- and obligation-holders in decision-making and action.   There is a growing realisation and acknowledgement that the “middle power” countries have unique agency to assist developing nations in attaining a dispensation that is fairer, more equitable and just. To this end the GSPN partnered with the Africa Think-tank Dialogue (ATD) to present a session at the ATD’s annual Africa Consultative Meeting - hosted by the Inclusive Society Institute -  over the period 25 – 26 March 2025 in Cape Town, South Africa. The session further explored how the middle powers’ agency could be deployed to find a new balance for the global governance system so that it also serves the interests of the Global South.   Under the theme “The role of the middle powers in (re)balancing the global governance system and reviving multilateralism and the UN”  the meeting surveyed characteristics of these middle powers and pondered potential tactics and strategies that could potentially be employed to advance the ideals of the developing world in an effort to bring about a mutually beneficial outcome that contrasts with the current monopoly of the ‘developed world’ – especially the P5 - in global affairs.   As was concluded when wrapping up the seminar: Middle powers are indispensable to the vision of a fairer, more balanced international order. They represent a bridge between the aspirations of the Global South and the corridors of global power.   What remains is for those in the GSPN and likeminded thinkers and activists around the world, to harness their efforts in activating these powers, to ensure they grasp their strategic agency and to motivate them to use it in order to build the just and equitable world we all deserve.   DARYL SWANEPOEL CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER INCLUSIVE SOCIETY INSTITUTE   2 THEMATIC OVERVIEW   The contemporary global system is being tested by overlapping crises - climate change, geopolitical fragmentation, rising inequality, pandemics and technological disruption. In this period of flux, the traditional power structures that shaped the post-World War II international order are being challenged. Amidst these shifts, middle powers - countries with moderate but meaningful global influence - have emerged as vital actors capable of bridging divides, generating consensus and advancing a more equitable world order.   The Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN), in partnership with the Inclusive Society Institute, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), HumanizaCon and the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD), convened a strategic dialogue in Cape Town (26 March 2025) to examine how middle powers, particularly from the Global South, can recalibrate global governance, revive multilateralism and help democratise international institutions (see the dialogue programme in the Annex). This thematic overview synthesises insights from the expert presentations, as well as critical reflections and exchanges from the policy-oriented dialogue session, underscoring the strategic and moral imperatives of middle power leadership in the 21st century. Summaries of the expert presentations, the dialogue session and the closing remarks follow this overview of issues brought up in the strategic dialogue.   2.1 Conceptualising Middle Powers in a fragmented world   Rather than viewing middle powers through a purely material lens - based on population size, GDP, or military expenditure - this report embraces a behavioural and normative framework. Middle powers are those that:   Operate through diplomacy and consensus-building rather than coercion Champion multilateralism, rule-based governance and equitable development Act as moral voices, mediators and norm entrepreneurs Possess regional legitimacy and policy innovation capacity   This broader conceptualisation includes states like South Africa, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Norway and Singapore - diverse in geography, governance systems and capacities, yet united by their strategic behaviour and global orientation. These countries are not passive “followers” of great powers but active agenda-setters with distinct priorities rooted in their domestic values and historical experiences. 2.2 Middle Powers as agents of global balance   2.2.1 A multipolar opportunity   The erosion of U.S. hegemony, the assertiveness of China, and the proliferation of regional power centres have opened new diplomatic spaces for middle powers. These states, operating in the interstices of bipolar rivalries, have an opportunity to shape norms, negotiate institutional reforms and promote inclusive coalitions. Middle powers have a strategic role in preventing global fragmentation. They can counterbalance unilateralism, resist coercive diplomacy and encourage convergence on pressing issues such as climate action, global health governance, peacebuilding and technological standards. Their ability to connect the Global North and South and the East and West, positions them as indispensable facilitators of global consensus.   2.2.2 Normative leadership   In addition to their mediating role, middle powers carry significant normative weight. Countries like South Africa - through its peaceful transition from apartheid - have moral authority that resonates across the world. Similarly, the development diplomacy of Brazil and the peacebuilding initiatives of Nordic countries exemplify how middle powers can define and diffuse norms related to justice, development and peace.   Their ability to challenge dominant discourses is critical in a world where the liberal order faces a crisis of legitimacy. Middle powers have the opportunity to redefine multilateralism not as a preserve of power politics but as a space for equity, dialogue and pluralism.   2.2.3 Strategic tools and leverage   Middle powers employ a wide array of tools to advance their foreign policy objectives:   Institutional participation   Active roles in the UN General Assembly, the E10 group of non-permanent Security Council members, ECOSOC and other bodies provide platforms for visibility and influence. Though lacking veto power, middle powers can shape debate, rally support and propose reforms.   Multilateral coalitions and forums   Groupings such as BRICS, MIKTA, IBSA and the G20 enable issue-based coalition-building that amplifies middle power voices. These forums often facilitate innovation in trade, technology policy, global finance and development cooperation.   Moral authority, historical legacy, diplomatic capacity and guiding vision   The historical struggle for liberation in South Africa, non-alignment in India, and disarmament leadership in Nordic states imbue these countries with moral legitimacy in the eyes of other nations. This soft power is a key source of diplomatic capital, which can go a long way if served by a competent diplomatic / civil service and is guided by leaders with vision.   Civil society and knowledge networks   Middle powers often benefit from vibrant think tanks, universities and civil society organisations that generate policy knowledge and normative frameworks. These actors support public diplomacy and create policy continuity across electoral cycles.       Development and climate finance   While not comparable to the budgets of great powers, some middle powers (e.g., the Nordics) have leveraged sufficient resources to fund strategic initiatives in climate adaptation, health diplomacy and post-conflict reconstruction, often yielding significant global returns.    2.3 Strategic incentives for engagement   Middle powers pursue global leadership not purely out of altruism but also due to enlightened self-interest. Benefits include:   Enhanced diplomatic influence:  Elevates national profiles and provides leverage in bilateral negotiations. Soft power dividends:  Leadership in global norms enhances product recognition, touristic attraction, education exports and international investment. Crisis resilience:  Active participation in global governance can insulate middle powers from geopolitical coercion and economic shocks. Leadership roles in institutions: Consistent engagement improves the likelihood of securing leadership roles in international organisations, shaping rules from within. Public legitimacy:  Foreign policy that aligns with national identity and democratic values can strengthen domestic support for international engagement. 2.4 Institutional reform and global governance   A core message of the dialogue was that middle powers are essential to the reform of global institutions. The UN Security Council, IMF, World Bank and WTO all reflect outdated power dynamics that exclude or marginalise the Global South.   Reform proposals include:   Semi-permanent Security Council seats  for middle powers to enhance inclusivity without expanding veto power A Global Resilience Council , possibly under ECOSOC, to coordinate responses to climate, health and technological crises New metrics of power  that go beyond military and economic might, focusing on sustainability, well-being and social resilience South-North Think Tank Networks  to harmonise policy research and build shared agendas across geopolitical divides   These reforms require persistent advocacy, coalition diplomacy and innovative institutional design - areas where middle powers can lead effectively.   2.5 From dialogue to action   While much of the discourse affirms the strategic potential of middle powers, a recurring theme is the “implementation gap.” Many well-articulated strategies are undermined by weak follow-through.   Recommendations for action:   Develop concrete roadmaps  with timelines and assigned responsibilities to institutionalise dialogue outcomes. Engage regional bodies  (e.g., AU, Regional Economic Communities) in translating ideas into actionable policies. Involve civil society and diaspora  in monitoring implementation and holding governments accountable. Use strategic moments  such as AU and BRICS summits to coordinate positions and influence global agendas. Invest in leadership development , with a focus on ethics, vision and pan-African solidarity.   These steps must be supported by think tanks, academic institutions and transnational networks like GSPN that provide expertise and continuity. 2.6 Digital transformation and strategic sovereignty   The dialogue identified digital governance as a critical frontier where middle powers can exercise leadership. Technological transformation is reshaping everything from labour markets to geopolitics.   Action areas:   Data sovereignty:  Developing countries must craft their own data protection and regulation frameworks. AI and tech ethics:  Middle powers should advocate for inclusive global AI standards that prioritise rights and sustainability. Tech education and infrastructure: Investment in STEM and vocational training is key to digital agency. Cross-regional innovation hubs:  South-South tech partnerships can accelerate homegrown solutions to local problems.   Middle powers must ensure that digital transformation reinforces, rather than undermines, democratic governance and social equity. 2.7 Conclusion: Claiming agency in a multipolar world   The GSPN dialogue concluded with a compelling vision: middle powers, especially from the Global South, are not peripheral actors in global governance - they are central to its renewal. Their ability to mediate, innovate and build bridges across divides positions them as architects of a more just and multipolar future.   But agency is not automatic - it must be claimed. Strategic clarity, institutional coherence and collective courage are needed. Middle powers must align national interests with global justice, translating ideas into policies and speeches into impact.   As one participant aptly noted: “Let us not allow the report of our dialogue to gather dust on a shelf. Let it walk. Let it speak. Let it lead.”   3 GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE ROLE OF MULTILATERALISM Introductory remarks by HE Tarja Halonen, former President of Finland (pre-recorded message) The current global landscape is marked by increasing instability. The number of wars and conflicts is on the rise, while geopolitical divisions continue to deepen. Simultaneously, inequality, hunger and poverty are worsening worldwide. Fundamental human rights are under severe assault, and democratic institutions along with the rule of law are increasingly threatened in many countries. On top of these socio-political challenges, the planet is rapidly approaching several environmental tipping points - critical thresholds beyond which recovery may be impossible.   Despite these alarming trends, there remains hope through collective action. A just and sustainable future is achievable if nations work together. Historical evidence supports this vision. Although multilateralism is inherently complex and often slow, the progress made in the eighty years since the founding of the United Nations (UN) is significant. The UN has emerged as the leading forum for international cooperation, playing a pivotal role in advancing peace and security, human rights, sustainable development, disarmament and the global response to climate change.   However, the current moment reveals a troubling reality: global divisions appear to be growing stronger than the ties that unite us. To meet the demands of today’s world, a fundamental transformation of the multilateral system is required. The UN must undergo reform and global trust must be rebuilt. This process hinges on mutual respect for international norms, agreements and the rule of law. A rules-based international order remains the cornerstone of peace, stability and shared prosperity.   South Africa, and Africa more broadly, hold an essential role in fortifying the global multilateral framework. There is a pressing need to move beyond confrontation and division and instead focus on collective responses to global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, desertification and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).   To this end, international institutions (including the United Nations) must adapt to the realities of the contemporary world. This includes comprehensive reforms, such as changes to the composition and functioning of the UN Security Council. Proposals like the establishment of a Global Resilience Council under the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) offer promising avenues to accelerate implementation of international agreements like the Paris Climate Accord and enhance development financing.   Think tanks from the Global South also have a crucial role to play. They serve as important partners to their governments and can significantly contribute in international discussions. Collaborations between Global South and Global North think tanks have the potential to amplify voices, enhance policy effectiveness and demonstrate that globalisation can yield mutual benefits.   The call to action is clear: joint efforts must continue. The road ahead demands unity, innovation, and commitment. Although physical presence at meetings such as the one in Cape Town may not always be possible, the shared commitment to dialogue and cooperation remains vital. With dedication and mutual respect, meaningful progress can be achieved. 4 THE ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS IN REBALANCING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE - AN ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE Dr Georgios Kostakos, Executive Director, Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS) In a rapidly evolving global order marked by geopolitical tensions, institutional fatigue, and transnational crises, the concept of "middle powers" has re-emerged as a focal point in discussions on global governance. Georgios Kostakos, in his presentation, articulated a compelling case for the strategic and moral importance of middle powers in shaping a more equitable, effective and resilient international system. This report analyses Dr Kostakos’ s key arguments, examining the geopolitical context, defining characteristics of middle powers, their potential roles, tools at their disposal and the structural challenges they face. 4.1 The geopolitical context: Strains on the global governance system   Kostakos begins by situating the middle power discourse within the broader context of a global system under severe strain. Several trends converge to undermine global cooperation: the rise of new power centres, such as China and the BRICS bloc, the relative decline of traditional Western hegemons and the resurgence of nationalism and populism, which have eroded trust in multilateralism. These shifts are taking place against the backdrop of a fragmented international order where major institutions - particularly the UN Security Council - are often paralysed by power politics and vetoes.   This weakened institutional framework is particularly concerning given the scale and complexity of today’s global crises: climate change, pandemics, cyber warfare, biodiversity loss and economic inequality. These are not isolated challenges but interconnected threats that require sustained, collective action. Yet, the existing global governance structures have largely failed to respond adequately, often bogged down by geopolitical rivalries and bureaucratic inertia. Kostakos described this moment as a form of global adolescence - an unstable yet potentially transformative phase. 4.2 Defining middle powers: Criteria and candidates   The concept of “middle powers” was central to the presentation, and Kostakos took care to outline their distinguishing features. Unlike great powers or small, middle powers hold a unique position - strong enough to influence global affairs but not so dominant as to provoke fear or opposition. They are, in effect, trusted brokers with both credibility and capacity. To qualify as a middle power, a state should possess:   A demonstrated commitment to good governance and respect for the rights of its citizens Relative economic and diplomatic capacity A constructive international role, characterised by adherence to multilateral treaties and norms No engagement in active conflicts and no possession of nuclear weapons.   This definition is deliberately inclusive and globally representative. Kostakos mentioned South Africa, Brazil, Norway, Singapore and Indonesia as examples. He also emphasised the importance of regional forums and alliances, such as the African Union, the Pacific Island Forum, AOSIS and the Non-Aligned Movement, as vehicles for middle power cooperation.   Importantly, the list of middle powers is not fixed. States may grow into or fall out of the category depending on changes in their governance, capacity or international posture. This fluidity reinforces the need for constant evaluation and dynamic coalition-building. 4.3 Roles in rebalancing global governance   Middle powers, according to Kostakos, have a unique opportunity and responsibility, that is to fill the leadership void left by disengaged or self-interested superpowers. Their central location in the global hierarchy makes them well-suited to act as mediators, facilitators and norm-setters. Their ability to interact credibly with both large and small powers provides an essential link in a fragmented international community.   Key roles include:   Mediators and bridge builders:  In an age where big power rivalries often obstruct progress, middle powers can act as neutral arbiters. Historical examples from the Nordic countries in peace negotiations, including in the Middle East and Latin America, illustrate the effectiveness of such states in conflict resolution. Preventive diplomacy:  Kostakos highlighted overlooked crises such as rising tensions between Burundi and Rwanda or Venezuela’s territorial claims on Guyana. These situations, while not globally dominant in media narratives, carry the potential for regional destabilisation. Middle powers could spearhead early intervention mechanisms to de-escalate such conflicts. Advocates for disarmament:  Despite decades of inaction, the UN Charter mandates the eventual reduction of global armaments. Middle powers, free from vested interests in military supremacy, are ideally positioned to reignite discussions on both nuclear and conventional disarmament. Champions of economic equity and development: In the realm of global economics, middle powers can promote alternative models of development that prioritise employment, sustainability and human capital over purely trade-driven growth. They can support equitable implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly in the Global South. Institutional reformers:  Reforming global governance requires both ideas and coalitions. Middle powers can propose new institutional structures, such as a Global Resilience Council or a revamped Security Council membership model, to enhance representation, transparency and functionality. 4.4 Tools and leverage available to middle powers   While not as resource-rich as major powers, middle powers have several underutilised tools at their disposal. Kostakos detailed a diverse arsenal of mechanisms for influence, ranging from formal institutional roles to informal networks and moral authority.   UN platforms:  The General Assembly and E10 (the 10 elected members of the Security Council) are primary forums that offer visibility and strategic access to decision-making. G77 and coalition voting blocs:  Within the UN, middle powers often anchor coalitions such as the G77, where their leadership can sway major decisions, especially on development, human rights and climate action. Moral and political legitimacy: Countries like South Africa, with legacies of peaceful democratic transitions, carry moral weight that can help frame global debates and mobilise support from both governments and civil society. Catalytic financing:  Nordic countries have historically funded global initiatives with relatively small investments that have had outsized impacts, especially in climate diplomacy and peacebuilding. Civil society networks:  By partnering with NGOs, academic institutions, and think tanks, middle powers can develop and disseminate innovative policy ideas. These partnerships are crucial for shaping global norms and applying domestic pressure for international engagement. North-South bridging:  One of the most significant strengths of middle powers is their capacity to transcend regional and ideological divides. Whether through the G20, BRICS, or regional organisations, they can forge pragmatic partnerships across traditional fault lines. 4.5 What’s in it for the middle powers? Incentives and strategic gains   Beyond altruistic global engagement, middle powers stand to gain substantially from a proactive role in international affairs. Kostakos presented a strong case for the strategic and reputational benefits of middle power leadership:   Greater diplomatic clout:  Taking initiative in multilateral affairs enhances a state’s diplomatic profile and influence over international norms and policy agendas. Geopolitical insulation:  In a world where major powers increasingly weaponize economics and alliances, middle power coalitions can provide a buffer against coercion or marginalisation. National prestige and economic spillovers: Global leadership often translates into increased tourism, investment and export opportunities, particularly in sectors like education, healthcare, and clean energy. Enhanced domestic legitimacy:  Engagement in international initiatives that align with national values (e.g., anti-apartheid history, climate leadership) can bolster domestic support for governments. Access to multilateral positions: Active participation in global governance enhances prospects for securing leadership roles in international organisations - creating pathways for influence and norm-setting.   This logic of “enlightened self-interest” is crucial to building domestic support for international engagement, particularly in societies where immediate socio-economic challenges dominate the political agenda. 4.6 Constraints and limitations   Kostakos acknowledged the many obstacles middle powers face:   Resource scarcity:  Many middle powers lack the military, financial or institutional capacity to drive global change. This is especially true for smaller economies or states with domestic crises. External pressure:  Major powers may attempt to curtail the international ambitions of middle powers through political threats or economic penalties. Examples abound in diplomatic history where small initiatives were quashed under pressure. Institutional inertia:  Multilateral institutions often favour continuity over change, with secretariats and leadership structures closely aligned with dominant powers. Middle powers must work harder to gain traction. Domestic ambivalence:  Citizens may question the relevance of international engagement when facing unemployment, poverty or inequality at home. Leaders must communicate the long-term value of global leadership clearly and persuasively. Coalition management:  Middle power coalitions can be difficult to sustain due to differing priorities, ideological diversity and regional rivalries. Building and maintaining trust across such a diverse group is a persistent challenge.   Nonetheless, Kostakos argued that strategic collaboration, targeted initiatives and creative diplomacy can overcome many of these limitations. 4.7 Strategic proposals for institutionalising middle power influence   To maximise their impact, Kostakos proposed the institutionalisation of middle power roles through several creative avenues:   Security Council reform:  Instead of expanding permanent membership, he proposes semi-permanent, elected positions for middle powers. These would provide continuity without replicating the dysfunctional veto system. Global Resilience Council:  A new body, outside traditional power hierarchies, that could coordinate global responses to transnational threats - climate change, pandemics, cybercrime - with middle powers at its core. Informal networks and precedents: Drawing on past examples like the “The Six Nation Peace Initiative,” Kostakos called for nimble, cross-regional groupings that can develop and promote common positions on issues like disarmament, development and peacebuilding.   These proposals blend pragmatism with vision, emphasising reform over revolution and building on existing diplomatic capital. 4.8 Conclusion: Strategic necessity and moral imperative   Dr Kostakos presented a compelling vision of middle powers as the pivotal actors in the 21st-century global order. They possess the balance of credibility, capacity and principle needed to navigate an increasingly fragmented international landscape. While not free from limitations, their unique position allows them to mediate, innovate and lead where others cannot or will not.   In a world where multilateralism is increasingly endangered, the proactive engagement of middle powers is not merely desirable, it is essential. Their ability to create inclusive coalitions, propose realistic reforms and lead by example offers a pathway toward a more just, equitable and sustainable global order.   If the international community is to avoid sliding into prolonged disorder or bipolar competition, the centre must hold. And at the centre are the middle powers - steady, principled and indispensable. 5 REIMAGINING PEACE, POWER, AND JUSTICE IN GLOBAL POLITICS - A CRITICAL REFLECTION ON MULTILATERALISM, THE GLOBAL SOUTH, AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER Ms Febe Potgieter- Gqubule, Head of Policy, African National Congress and former South African diplomat and senior official at the African Union In a world shaped by shifting geopolitical dynamics, overlapping crises and rising disillusionment with Western-dominated systems of governance, the time has come to reassess the meanings of peace, power and justice. Drawing exclusively from the insights presented by Ms Potgieter-Gqubule, this report explores the evolving role of middle powers, the struggles and aspirations of the Global South and the imperative of inclusive multilateralism in crafting a more equitable international order. The reflection is grounded in historical developments, regional dynamics in Africa and global structural trends, offering a layered understanding of how transformation can be imagined and enacted in the 21st century. 5.1 The crisis of the Liberal Order and the role of Middle Powers   The liberal international order, long championed by the West as the foundation of global peace and cooperation, is undergoing a legitimacy crisis. This moment should not be seen as an anomaly but as part of a broader historical pattern in which international orders are reshaped through crises. Middle powers - states that are not hegemonic but hold significant regional or strategic influence - emerge in this landscape as critical agents of balance, reform and advocacy.   Historically, middle powers have played vital roles in fostering cooperation and navigating bipolar or unipolar tensions. From the establishment of the United Nations after World War II to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, these states have asserted alternative paths that resist binary choices between great powers. The Bandung Conference of 1955 and the creation of the G77 in 1964 were emblematic of efforts by middle and developing powers to reclaim agency and promote developmental and peace-oriented agendas outside the rigid Cold War framework.   Today, the identity and influence of middle powers are more heterogeneous. Countries such as South Africa, Brazil, India, Türkiye and Singapore represent different economic sizes, political systems and geographic roles, yet they share a commitment to multilateralism, regional leadership and a broader understanding of development and justice. Their influence is not always rooted in hard power but often in moral authority, regional legitimacy, or economic strategy. South Africa, for instance, derives part of its middle power identity from its role in the African continent, its moral standing post-apartheid and its active participation in multilateral forums such as BRICS, the African Union (AU) and the G20.   5.2 Crises as opportunities: Reshaping the global system   Potgieter underscored that crises - be they global health emergencies, conflicts, or economic disruptions - are not merely destructive; they are also generative. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the vulnerabilities of global systems and the shortcomings of Western-led responses. Countries in the Global South, often left behind in vaccine access and economic recovery, began to question the fairness of global governance structures. Yet, these same crises sparked new forms of cooperation. Africa’s collective response through the Africa CDC, the AU’s health diplomacy and joint procurement strategies revealed the continent’s potential for self-determination.   These responses show that crises can open political and strategic space for innovation and transformation. They expose the fragility of dominant systems while simultaneously demonstrating the value of coordinated regional and multilateral action. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa (2013–2016) was another such moment. While Western nations divided responsibilities along former colonial lines, the AU launched ASEOWA, mobilising African health workers and institutions to deliver frontline assistance. This pan-African initiative not only saved lives but also strengthened regional infrastructure and laid the foundation for the Africa CDC.   Crucially, these actions highlight a broader lesson: effective responses to global crises are not the monopoly of the powerful. Middle powers and regional institutions - when acting in solidarity and with strategic vision - can forge new pathways for peace, development and justice.   5.3 Multilateralism under contestation and reconstruction   A central concern raised by Potgieter is the fate of multilateralism in a fractured global order. The post-war multilateral institutions - the United Nations, IMF, World Bank, WTO - have been instrumental in shaping norms and rules. However, they have also been complicit in reproducing inequalities. Their governance structures are often skewed in favour of the Global North, with decision-making power concentrated in the hands of a few.   Middle powers have responded by pushing for institutional reform and alternative platforms. South Africa, India, Brazil and others have used their participation in BRICS, the G20 and the Non-Aligned Movement to advocate for a fairer global economic architecture. Reform of the United Nations Security Council, democratisation of the World Bank and IMF voting shares,and restructuring global trade rules are among the long-standing demands.   Potgieter emphasised that middle powers tend to be strong proponents of multilateralism, not only because it offers a counterweight to great power domination, but also because it aligns with their vision of collective problem-solving. For countries that cannot unilaterally impose their will, multilateralism becomes both a shield and a vehicle for change. Their advocacy is thus rooted in both pragmatism and principle.   Additionally, the role of middle powers in shaping norms around peace, security and development is deeply tied to their commitment to inclusive governance. South Africa’s role in G20, its focus on integrating the African agenda into global discourse and its calls for solidarity and justice are part of this broader effort. This is not merely about representation, it is about reorienting the normative foundations of global cooperation. 5.4 African perspectives on peace, governance,and development   A significant portion of the presentation reflected on Africa’s role in the world, both as a site of marginalisation and as a source of innovative thinking and leadership. Despite its historical exclusion from the commanding heights of global governance, Africa possesses immense strategic assets: abundant natural and mineral resources, a youthful population, expanding urban centres and growing regional institutions.   Yet, the continent continues to face challenges related to governance, conflict and socio-economic development. Potgieter was candid about the need for good governance, transparency and citizen empowerment. She highlighted the African Peer Review Mechanism as a promising tool for promoting accountability. Similarly, she acknowledged the growing participation of young people and women in political leadership as positive trends that must be nurtured.   Peace and development are framed not as sequential but as mutually reinforcing. The African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the NEPAD initiative stress that without investing in human development and economic transformation, peace will remain fragile. This integrated approach rejects the narrow “peace first, development later” logic that has often dominated international peacebuilding frameworks.   The AU’s African Standby Force, the continental peace architecture and the emphasis on “silencing the guns” are examples of efforts to localise conflict resolution and security governance. They demonstrate a move away from dependence on external actors and a growing belief in African solutions to African problems. 5.5 Regional integration and economic sovereignty   The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a landmark initiative aiming to accelerate intra-African trade, industrialisation and regional integration. Potgieter pointed to its significance not only in economic terms but as a political project of continental unity. Its success depends on regional infrastructure, harmonised regulations and the political will to overcome nationalistic barriers.   Encouragingly, African countries have exceeded infrastructure investment targets under the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), with substantial contributions coming from within the continent. This counters the narrative of dependency and illustrates Africa’s capacity for self-financed development.   Potgieter invoked the words of Desmond Tutu, who criticised African leaders’ dependency on foreign aid for basic infrastructure. Her message is clear: Africa must recognise its achievements, build on its successes and claim its agency in defining its developmental path. 5.6 Education, science and Pan-African solidarity   Human development, especially education and scientific collaboration, is emphasised as a foundation for long-term transformation. The Pan-African University, a flagship initiative of the AU, exemplifies efforts to create a network of postgraduate centres across the continent that nurture scientific excellence, build transnational academic networks and foster a sense of pan-African identity.   This investment in education has concrete political and social implications. It promotes mobility, dialogue and mutual understanding among African scholars and professionals, laying the groundwork for future cooperation. The example of RUFORUM (Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture), which grew from a handful of universities to over 130 members, shows how small initiatives can scale up into transformative networks when driven by clear purpose and vision. 5.7 Global partnerships and African agency   Africa’s engagement with external partners, whether in the US, Europe, China, or the Middle East, must be guided by a clear and strategic understanding of its own interests. Potgieter stressed that Africa must define what it wants from these relationships, moving away from passive recipient roles to assertive partnership-building.   The African Union Commission is tasked with coordinating these engagements and ensuring that continental priorities are reflected. Africa's diaspora, referred to as the continent's “sixth region,” is identified as an underutilised resource for investment, knowledge exchange and narrative reshaping.   Institutional capacity is key to all these efforts. The African Union, the African Development Bank and the Africa CDC are examples of institutions that have demonstrated their value in times of crisis. While leadership challenges have sometimes hindered their effectiveness, there is a clear recognition that strengthening these institutions is vital for Africa’s voice on the global stage. 5.8 Narrative, hope and political imagination   Perhaps one of the most profound interventions in the text is the discussion on narrative. Africa, Potgieter argued, must reclaim its story - not as one of perpetual crisis, but as one of resilience, creativity and potential. She recounted how an outsider described Africa as a bird surrounded by poisonous snakes, so paralysed by fear that it forgets it can fly. This metaphor speaks to the psychological and political work of decolonisation: remembering one's agency, asserting one's worth and imagining futures beyond inherited constraints.   Reclaiming narrative is about more than positive messaging - it is about shifting power. The way Africa is perceived affects how it is treated, funded, engaged with and respected. It influences diplomatic priorities, investment patterns, and global solidarity. Telling a fuller story - one that includes successes, innovations and leadership - helps dismantle Afro-pessimism and rebuild confidence in the continent’s future. 5.9 Coalitions of the willing and Lessons from experience   Change often begins with a few. Potgieter shared the story of RUFORUM as an example of how small groups of actors can catalyse continental change. The lesson here is that waiting for consensus from all 55 African countries can stall progress. Instead, coalitions of the willing, that is those ready to act, can pilot innovations that others later adopt.   This approach applies to peacebuilding, industrialisation, education and governance reforms. Africa must embrace experimentation, learn from both failures and successes and remain agile in the face of complexity. 5.10 Conclusion: Toward a better Africa and a better world   Potgieter concluded her reflection with two powerful historical and contemporary examples. The liberation of African countries from colonialism was a long, difficult process, but it was ultimately successful because of collective commitment and perseverance. Similarly, Africa’s response to the Ebola crisis demonstrated the power of regional solidarity, institutional coordination and indigenous leadership.   The message is clear: transformation is possible. But it requires courage, imagination, solidarity and sustained effort. Middle powers, the Global South and African actors are not just passive subjects of global systems - they are co-creators of future orders.   In times of uncertainty and flux, there is an opportunity to redefine the rules of the game. The principles of justice, equality, diversity and mutual respect must be the foundation. And Africa, with its youth, institutions and ideas, is not on the margins of that future - it is at its centre.     6 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INEQUALITY AND RIGHTS Professor Sakiko Fukudu-Parr, Studley Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School, New York This report is based on the insights shared by Professor Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, an eminent development economist and former Director of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Reports (HDRs). Through her speech, Fukuda-Parr offered a compelling reflection on the transformation of development thought over the past several decades, particularly through the lens of human rights, inequality and the political economy of global governance. Her insights are shaped by decades of professional experience and personal commitment to justice-oriented development policy. 6.1 Evolution of development thinking   The trajectory of development thinking, according to Fukuda-Parr, can be divided into distinct intellectual and policy paradigms. The dominant paradigm of the post-World War II period was heavily growth-centric, prioritising industrialisation and GDP growth as the primary indicators of national progress. This model, grounded in modernisation theory, viewed development as a linear transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ societies, largely measured in economic terms.   However, by the late 1980s, this growth-focused approach faced growing criticism. Rising income inequality, persistent poverty, and environmental degradation exposed the shortcomings of equating growth with prgress. The turning point came with the 1990 launch of the first Human Development Report, which Fukuda-Parr was intimately involved in producing. The HDR introduced a paradigm shift by asserting that “people are the real wealth of nations.” This marked the emergence of a new approach that emphasised the expansion of people’s capabilities and freedoms.   6.2 The human development approach   The human development approach reframed the goals of development around people’s well-being, rather than material wealth alone. Fukuda-Parr explained how this approach drew heavily from the work of Amartya Sen, who argued that development should be about increasing people’s freedoms to lead the kinds of lives they value. These freedoms span multiple domains, such as health, education, political participation and cultural inclusion.   A major innovation was the development of new indicators, particularly the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI combines measures of life expectancy, education and income to provide a composite picture of well-being. Although imperfect, it provided a more multidimensional view of development and challenged the primacy of GDP as the sole metric of success.   Over time, additional indices were introduced to better capture disparities, such as the Gender Development Index (GDI), the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). These tools helped reveal inequalities and deprivations that GDP alone could not. Fukuda-Parr underscored that these indices are not just technical instruments but also normative statements about what societies should value. 6.3 Inequality: A structural and normative challenge   Fukuda-Parr identified inequality as a central and persistent challenge to human development. While many countries have made strides in reducing poverty, the gap between the richest and poorest - both within and across countries - has widened dramatically. This inequality is not incidental but systemic, driven by economic structures, policy choices and global institutions that favour the wealthy and powerful.   She drew attention to how inequality is not merely about income, but about access to power, voice, resources and opportunities. Inequality undermines the democratic process, exacerbates social tensions and limits the potential for inclusive development. Importantly, she critiqued mainstream economic theories for treating inequality as a natural or necessary byproduct of growth, rather than as a problem to be solved.   She also critiqued the idea that the market is the best mechanism for allocating resources. Markets can be efficient, but they are not inherently fair. When left unchecked, they produce and reproduce inequalities. Fukuda-Parr called for development policy to explicitly tackle inequality through redistributive measures, affirmative action and social protection. 6.4 A Rights-based approach to development   A significant part of Fukuda-Parr’s address focused on the rights-based approach to development. She asserts that framing development in terms of human rights provides both a moral and legal foundation for policy. Rights are not gifts from the state but entitlements that all individuals possess by virtue of their humanity.   This framework shifts the focus from charity to justice and from needs to obligations. Governments are duty-bearers, legally obligated to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Citizens are rights-holders, entitled to claim their rights. This approach fosters accountability, participation and equality.   The Human Development Reports gradually adopted this perspective, beginning with the 2000 report, which emphasised human rights and development. Fukuda-Parr notes that this was a controversial move at the time, as some governments and institutions resisted the integration of rights into development. Nonetheless, it marked a crucial evolution in thinking, highlighting that freedom from want and freedom from fear are integral to development. 6.5 Ethics and measurement in development policy   Fukuda-Parr is particularly attentive to the ethical dimensions of development. She emphasised that development is not a neutral or purely technical endeavour. It involves value judgments about what matters, who matters and how benefits and burdens are distributed.   Measurement tools like the HDI are useful, but they can also mask underlying injustices. For example, an increase in average income may conceal deepening inequalities. She warned against technocratic reductionism - the tendency to focus on what is easily measurable rather than what is important. She calls for an “ethical audit” of development policies to assess their alignment with values of dignity, justice and equity.   Furthermore, she critiqued the global dominance of Western-centric knowledge systems that often marginalise alternative epistemologies. Development discourse, she argued, needs to be decolonised to reflect diverse experiences, particularly those from the Global South. This includes acknowledging the contributions of non-Western thinkers, valuing indigenous knowledge and resisting the imposition of universal solutions. 6.6 The Political economy of intellectual property and innovation   One of the most critical topics Fukuda-Parr addressed was the political economy of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and technological innovation. She discussed the paradox that, although developing countries fought for flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement (such as compulsory licensing), they seldom utilise them.   Fukuda-Parr highlighted how intellectual property laws, originally designed to incentivise innovation, have evolved into tools of monopoly capitalism. Wealthy nations and corporations use patents to consolidate control over knowledge and restrict access, particularly in essential sectors like health and agriculture. During the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine inequities starkly illustrated how IPRs can obstruct equitable access.   She underscored that many developing countries have legal provisions - enshrined in the TRIPS agreement - that allow them to circumvent patents during emergencies. However, fear of political retaliation, lack of legal infrastructure and ideological adherence to strong IP protection prevent their use. She argued for a reassessment of IPR policies and calls on national governments to prioritise public health and development over corporate profit.   6.7 Institutional and structural obstacles   Fukuda-Parr outlined several institutional barriers that hinder effective use of development tools and flexibilities. She identified three interrelated obstacles: vested interests, ideological bias and institutional silos.   Powerful actors - both domestic elites and international corporations - often resist reforms that threaten their economic interests. Ideologically, the belief in market solutions and private property as the ultimate good limits policy imagination. Institutions like the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and national IP offices operate in silos, disconnected from broader development goals.   Additionally, regional institutions in Africa, such as OAPI and ARIPO, historically failed to integrate compulsory licensing or prioritise development objectives. Their frameworks were influenced more by legal formalism than developmental pragmatism. She called for these institutions to be reformed, democratised and reoriented toward public welfare.   6.8 Capacity, information and epistemic justice   Another critical point raised is the so-called “capacity gap.” Fukuda-Parr questioned whether the issue is truly a lack of capacity or rather a lack of information and appropriate knowledge. She identified a deep-seated epistemic injustice in how development knowledge is produced, validated and disseminated.   Much of the prevailing knowledge on IP and innovation is based on Euro-American experiences, which are not always relevant for African countries or other parts of the Global South. She emphasised the importance of building local knowledge systems that reflect local realities and needs. She also advocates for the democratisation of development education and policy spaces to include more diverse voices. 6.9 Civil Society and participatory approaches   Fukuda-Parr strongly supports participatory development and the role of civil society. She recognises that real change is often driven from below, by communities demanding rights, transparency and justice. Participatory development is not just a methodology but a principle - it respects people as active agents, not passive recipients.   She highlighted that civil society organisations were instrumental in challenging TRIPS and advocating for health rights during the HIV/AIDS and COVID-19 crises. Such efforts demonstrate the power of collective action and the importance of political agency in development. 6.10 Rethinking multilateralism and global governance   In her concluding reflections, Fukuda-Parr critiqued the current model of multilateralism as deeply unequal. While multilateral institutions provide important platforms, they often reproduce global power hierarchies. High-income countries dominate agenda-setting, resource allocation and rule-making, marginalising the voices of the Global South.   She called for a more democratic and equitable multilateral order, one that supports national policy autonomy and development-oriented reform. This includes revisiting global trade rules, reforming institutions like the WTO and IMF, and creating spaces for Southern-led initiatives.   Multilateralism, she insisted, must be rooted in solidarity - not just cooperation among elites but genuine engagement with marginalised peoples and nations. National policies, too, must be aligned with international frameworks in a way that reflects local priorities and ensures justice. 6.11 Conclusion   Sakiko Fukuda-Parr’s address offered a profound and multifaceted analysis of the state of development thinking today. From the evolution of the human development approach to the critique of intellectual property regimes, from the ethics of measurement to the politics of global governance, her insights underscore a simple yet powerful truth: development must serve people, not markets.   Her reflections compel us to reimagine development as a deeply ethical, political and participatory process. It must be grounded in justice, guided by rights and informed by diverse knowledge systems. Addressing inequality, resisting neo-colonial structures and embracing alternative paradigms are essential steps toward a more equitable global order.   In an era marked by uncertainty, crisis and profound injustice, Fukuda-Parr’s vision is both a critique and a call to action. It reminds policymakers, practitioners, scholars and citizens alike that human dignity, freedom and solidarity must be at the heart of any meaningful development agenda.      7 DISCUSSION: INSIGHTS FROM THE EXPERT DIALOGUE   This comprehensive report synthesises key reflections and perspectives from the high-level multi-stakeholder dialogue on the evolving role of middle powers in global politics. Drawing extensively from African perspectives, the discussion reframes traditional assumptions about middle power diplomacy and highlights the urgent need for strategic agency, cohesive continental voice and bold institutional innovation.    7.1 Reframing the Middle Power concept: Identity versus agency   Conventional definitions of middle powers, which rest heavily on tangible indicators such as economic output, population, or military strength, have often proved inadequate in capturing the diverse strategic behaviours of these states. This dialogue urged a shift from positional metrics to behavioural frameworks - understanding middle powers by what they do rather than what they are.   Participants emphasised that middle powers exhibit dynamic agency: they actively shape international norms, mediate disputes, form strategic coalitions and promote multilateralism. This reconceptualization rejects a passive, derivative view of middle powers as simply “followers” of great powers and instead recognises them as norm entrepreneurs, agenda-setters and system reformers.   For Africa, this rethinking is not just  -  is political and developmental. It means moving beyond the reactive posture that often characterises engagements with major powers like the United States, and toward a more assertive, coherent and principled diplomacy that reflects African priorities.   7.2 Middle Powers as builders of multilateralism and strategic coalitions   Middle powers have historically found strength through coalition-building and issue-based alliances. The dialogue highlighted how this continues to be a primary mechanism through which such states amplify their influence. Coalitions like MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, Australia) and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) serve not only as coordination platforms but as laboratories of policy innovation and norm diffusion.   For Africa, regionalism and pan-African initiatives such as the African Union (AU) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are central to projecting middle power influence. However, the fragmentation within African diplomatic stances and the inconsistent alignment of national, regional and continental interests weaken these platforms.   The discussion underscored the necessity for Africa to speak with one voice on key global issues. Unity, it was argued, is not about uniformity, but coherence - agreeing on fundamental principles of sovereignty, self-determination and equitable global governance. Only then can Africa wield moral and strategic authority in shaping international discourse.   7.3 Africa–US relations: A case study in asymmetric engagement   The dialogue offered a candid assessment of Africa’s strategic relationship with the United States, framed largely as a partnership of non-equals. While diplomatic language often invokes mutual respect, real-world practice is marred by dominance, unilateralism and a divide-and-rule approach from Washington.   One illustrative example is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which, while providing some market access to African exports, has disproportionately benefited a handful of countries, with South Africa receiving the bulk of trade advantages. Even so, its share remains marginal on the global trade scale. Participants emphasised that Africa must recalibrate trade frameworks to better align with domestic industrialisation and development strategies.   Criticism was also directed at how US foreign policy adapts to changing administrations - oscillating between engagement and neglect, often dictated by ideological swings, such as those seen under Trump’s “America First” doctrine. These shifts tend to undermine long-term policy consistency and multilateral cooperation.   Nonetheless, it was acknowledged that within certain institutional arrangements, relations between Africa and the US remain characterised by respect for democratic principles and shared objectives in areas such as health, education and peacekeeping. This  duality - coexistence of dominance and cooperation - requires African diplomats to engage with finesse, as one speaker put it, navigating these contradictions without compromising national and continental integrity.   7.4 Structural constraints and strategic gaps in Africa   While the discussion celebrated the continent’s vast potential, it was also unflinching in its critique of internal challenges. Several enduring constraints undermine Africa’s ability to exercise middle power diplomacy effectively:   Underdeveloped intra-African trade, which limits regional economic integration. Corruption and governance weaknesses, which erode public trust and state legitimacy. Lack of strategic economic independence, leaving African states vulnerable to debt cycles and conditional aid. Incoherent foreign policy coordination, which often leads to contradictory stances on the global stage.   The speakers also flagged Afro-pessimism - a persistent narrative that views Africa through a lens of dependency and dysfunction - as a psychological and political barrier to agency. Challenging this narrative requires deliberate intellectual, cultural and policy reorientation, spearheaded by Africans themselves. 7.5 Youth, education and technological transformation   Another key focus of the discussion was the future of African agency, particularly as it relates to intergenerational renewal, education and technology. The youth expressed concern about the lack of opportunities for meaningful participation and succession in leadership. Their call was simple yet urgent: Create space for us. Equip us. Trust us.   The shift in the global economy, driven by digitalisation and automation, demands a radical overhaul of Africa’s education systems. A mismatch between qualifications and market needs - especially the surplus of humanities graduates and the shortage of skilled artisans - has created a paradox of educated unemployment.   The example of Singapore’s vocational education reforms was cited as a possible model, where national strategies align educational curricula with the future economy. In Africa, this will require not only investment in TVET colleges and STEM education, but also a cultural shift that recognises the dignity and value of technical skills.   If middle powers are to shape the global technological order, they must also invest in data sovereignty, digital governance and artificial intelligence policy. Africa must not be a passive consumer of global tech trends - it must become a regulator, innovator and norm-setter in its own right. 7.6 Towards Implementation: From dialogue to action   Perhaps the most important theme emerging from the dialogue was the implementation gap. Africa, as noted, is rich in ideas but poor in follow-through. The failure to implement resolutions, policies and frameworks has become a chronic impediment to progress. To remedy this, several recommendations were made Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, the Deputy Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute:   Develop a roadmap for implementing the outcomes of such dialogues, with clearly assigned responsibilities and timelines. Engage AU institutions, regional economic communities (RECs) and national governments in translating insights into policy. Mobilise civil society, academia and diaspora communities to advocate for accountability and inclusion. Leverage strategic moments, such as AU Summits, to present united positions and influence continental agendas. Invest in leadership development, with a focus on ethics, vision and pan-African solidarity.   In this regard, the role of organisations like the Inclusive Society Institute and collaborative platforms such as the Africa Think-tank Dialogue (ATD) are seen as pivotal. These bodies must not only convene but consolidate knowledge, sustain momentum and embed implementation mechanisms. 7.7 Conclusion: Middle Powers as architects of a multipolar future   Middle powers, particularly from the Global South, are indispensable to the vision of a fairer, more balanced international order. In the African context, they represent a bridge between the continent’s grassroots aspirations and the corridors of global power.   However, this role will not be inherited - it must be claimed through strategic clarity, institutional coherence and collective courage. Africa’s future as a middle power actor depends on its ability to mobilise internal strengths, confront its weaknesses honestly and assert its place in the evolving multipolar world.   The dialogue ended with a call not just to remember the insights shared, but to act on them decisively. As one participant noted, “Let us not allow this report to gather dust on a shelf. Let it walk. Let it speak. Let it lead.” ANNEXURE: PROGRAMME     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) continues to advance its constitutional education initiative across the Gauteng and North West provinces through its flagship programme, Taking the Constitution to the People: Know Your Rights and Responsibilities . This outreach initiative is designed to educate Grade 11 and 12 learners, as well as students in tertiary institutions, about the significance of the South African Constitution and the role it plays in shaping democratic citizenship. As part of this campaign, a workshop was conducted on 27 May 2025 at Langeni City College in Brits, facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, ISI’s Schools Project Coordinator. A total of 34 Grade 12 learners participated in the session, which provided them with a comprehensive overview of the historical context, formulation, and structure of the Constitution. The workshop also emphasized the practical implications of constitutional rights and responsibilities in the daily lives of South African citizens. The initiative aims to empower young people - particularly those of voting age - with the knowledge necessary to participate meaningfully in democratic processes and uphold the principles enshrined in the Constitution. Further workshops are scheduled to take place throughout educational institutions in Gauteng and North West, as the Institute strengthens its commitment to fostering constitutional literacy and civic responsibility among South Africa’s youth.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is intensifying its civic education efforts across the Gauteng and North West provinces through its initiative, “Taking the Constitution to the People: Know Your Rights and Responsibilities.”  This outreach programme, aimed primarily at Grade 11 and 12 learners in schools and tertiary institutions, is designed to deepen young South Africans’ understanding of constitutional democracy and active citizenship. On 29 May 2025, Patrick Motsepe, ISI Schools Project Coordinator, facilitated one such workshop at Rock of Springs College in Brits. The session was attended by 30 Grade 12 learners, many of whom are approaching or have reached voting age. The workshop provided a comprehensive overview of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, including its historical development, structure, and significance in everyday life. Special emphasis was placed on the rights and responsibilities of citizens under the Constitution, and how these underpin a democratic and socially cohesive society. The session was designed to be highly interactive. Learners were encouraged to engage with the material through open dialogue, asking questions and responding to real-life scenarios presented by the facilitator. This participatory format helped to reinforce key concepts and promote critical thinking. At the conclusion of the workshop, participants completed a survey to assess their understanding of the content, with particular focus on constitutional principles, democratic governance, and social cohesion. This initiative forms part of the ISI’s broader mandate to foster informed, responsible citizenship. Additional workshops are scheduled to be rolled out in various educational institutions across Gauteng and North West in the coming months.

As part of its commitment to promoting democratic values and active citizenship, the Inclusive Society Institute continues to deliver on its initiative of “Taking the Constitution to the People.”  Through a series of targeted educational workshops, the Institute is actively working to foster a culture of constitutional literacy, civic responsibility, and social cohesion among young South Africans. The initiative has gained considerable momentum in both the Gauteng and North West provinces, where the Institute has been engaging directly with learners in secondary schools and students at tertiary institutions. These engagements are tailored to promote a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, particularly among youth who are approaching or have reached voting age. Central to this initiative is Patrick Motsepe, the Provincial Schools Project Coordinator for the Inclusive Society Institute. With diligence and a deep sense of purpose, Motsepe has been instrumental in coordinating and delivering these sessions to ensure they are impactful, accessible, and aligned with educational objectives. On Tuesday, 27 May, the Institute conducted a workshop at Excellers SA College for a cohort of Grade 12 learners. The session provided students with an interactive and insightful exploration of South Africa’s foundational legal framework. Designed with the developmental needs of young people in mind, the workshop covered key constitutional principles, the Bill of Rights, democratic governance, and the responsibilities of citizens in a constitutional democracy. Importantly, the content of these workshops is directly aligned with the Life Orientation and History syllabi prescribed by the national curriculum. These subjects already address themes of values, human rights, and social cohesion - making the workshop a powerful complementary tool in reinforcing classroom learning through a practical, real-world lens. By bridging academic content with lived civic realities, the workshops aim to not only educate but also inspire a generation of young people to take ownership of their role in a democratic society. The reception from learners and educators has been overwhelmingly positive, with many participants noting the relevance and timeliness of the sessions, especially in a year where the country continues to reflect on three decades of constitutional democracy. Looking ahead, the Inclusive Society Institute plans to expand the reach of this programme, with more workshops scheduled at various educational institutions across both provinces in the coming months. This expansion reflects the Institute’s strategic objective of embedding constitutional values at the grassroots level, particularly among youth who are key to sustaining and advancing South Africa’s democratic project. Through initiatives such as these, the Inclusive Society Institute reaffirms its role as a catalyst for meaningful dialogue, civic empowerment, and inclusive nation-building — ensuring that the Constitution remains not just a document, but a living, guiding force in the lives of all South Africans.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, participated in the International Tax Reform Summit which was held in Johannesburg on 27 May 2025. The summit was organised by the Alternative Information and Development Centre, the Institute for Economic Justice, Oxfam, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation.   The programme included four sessions:   Session 1: International Tax Reform: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa in the context of the G20 Session 2: Towards a Shared Progressive Tax Agenda for Africa at the UN Session 3 : Taxing the Super-Rich to Finance SDGs, Climate Action, and Addressing Inequality Session 4 : Joint Advocacy strategy discussion with comms teams ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Background as provided by the Summit organisers   There are fundamental shifts in the international political economy. As the world grapples with climate change, poverty, and inequality, there is an opportunity to tackle these challenges by reforming the international tax system.   Negotiations for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax and Cooperation (UN Tax Convention) are ongoing and at the same time, South Africa has taken up the G20 presidency in 2025 - a first for an African country, which provides a great opportunity for South Africa to advance developing countries' proposals in international tax negotiations.   The SARS commissioner highlighted that the country has a tax gap of R700 - R800 billion, of which R300 - R560 billion is due to tax evasion, aggressive tax planning, and the rest is in uncollected debt and outstanding tax returns and debt currently under dispute. This is not limited to South Africa. It is estimated that in 2024, global revenue losses due to cross-border abuse amounted to $492 billion, of which $347.6 billion was due to corporate tax abuse by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), and $144.8 billion was due to undeclared assets by wealthy individuals. There are increasing calls to capacitate the South African Revenue Services (SARS) to address tax abuse and illicit financial flows (IFFs) and introduce a wealth tax.   Africa faces a disproportionate burden of these harmful tax practices. For instance, from 1980 to 2018, Africa lost $1.3 trillion due to illicit financial flows and $88.6 billion annually due to capital flight. Therefore, SA’s G20 presidency should ensure that the international tax system effectively tackles IFFs and capital flight, and taxes the wealthy to advance Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The G20 under the Brazilian presidency championed an initiative for taxing high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) globally with a minimum tax of 2% of their wealth, which would enhance progressivity in tax systems across the world while mobilizing between $200–$390 billion annually. Brazil managed to include language on taxing HNWIs both in the Ministerial G20 Declaration on International Taxation and on the G20 Head of States Declaration , marking a historic milestone for the group of 20 that addressed this issue for the first time. South Africa   has a unique opportunity to provide full political support to this agenda during its presidency, playing a coordinating role by outlining a strategy to ensure the continuity of Brazil’s agenda.   The SA G20 Presidency provides an opportunity for South African key stakeholders to develop a coherent response advocating for the G20 - SA Presidency to make progress from the steps taken in Brazil. This is even more relevant considering the recent call from President Ramaphosa, alongside President Sanchez (Spain) and President Lula (Brazil), to protect and reinforce multilateralism, having the taxation of global wealth as a key component of this initiative.   Against this context, it is important for progressive civil society actors such as trade unions, civil society organisations, academic experts, parliamentarians, think tanks, and policymakers to discuss these developments and build a long-term strategy on international tax that takes into account domestic and international developments. Noting that SA is one of the high-ranking unequal societies in the world, it is important to reflect on the contemporary tax reforms and consider their gendered impacts.   The symposium will focus on international tax reform efforts such as the UN Tax Convention and the proposal to tax the super-rich led by Brazil’s G20 presidency.

A meeting of the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue organised by the Inclusive Society Institute Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context   MAY 2025   Rapporteur: Daryl Sw anepoel CONTENTS   1 AFRICA THINK-TANK DIALOGUE 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2.1 US - Africa relations from an African perspective 2.2 US–Africa relations from a US perspective 2.3 Convergences and Divergences 2.4 Conclusion 3 OPENING SESSION 3.1 Welcoming remarks Prof Zweli Ndevu, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa) 3.2 Setting the Scene - Navigating Africa’s Future: Multilateral Reform, Global Relations, and Development  Finance Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer, Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa) 3.3 Navigating Geopolitical Currents: South Africa–United States Relations During the 2025 G20 Presidency Dr Philani Mthembu, Executive Director, Institute for Global  Dialogue (South Africa) 3.4 Navigating Global Shifts: South Africa’s Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World Hon. Alvin Botes, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa) 4 SESSION 1: US AFRICA RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AFRICA 4.1 Beyond Rhetoric: Reimagining Africa - U.S. Relations in a Multipolar World Prof. Efem Ubi, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Nigeria) 4.2 United States–Africa Relations — Historical Legacy, Contemporary Challenges, and Future Perspectives Ms Aïcha Karafi, President, Tunisian Association of Local Governance (Tunisia) 4.3 The Importance of African Agency in US–Africa Relations Dr Melha Rout Biel, Executive Director, Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies (South Sudan) 4.4 Evolving US–West Africa Economic Relations - Implications for Côte d’Ivoire Prof Assi Kimou, Deputy Director, CIRES Economic Policy Analysis Unit (Cote d’Ivoire) 4.5 Pan-Africanism, African Diplomacy, and Development - A Critical Analysis Prof. Francis Matambalya, Chief Executive Officer, Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre (Tanzania) 4.6 Africa and the United States - Reimagining a Strategic and Equitable Partnership Amb Omar Mjenga, President and CEO, Centre for International Policy Africa (Tanzania) 4.7 Reimagining US–Africa Relations - Priorities, Challenges, and Strategic Pathways Dr Zine Barka, Independent Public Finance Analyst (Algeria) 4.8 US–South Africa Relations in the Era of Trumpism - A Critical Reflection Dr Sizo Nkala, Senior Researcher, Centre for Africa-China Studies, University of Johannesburg (South Africa) 4.9 US–Africa Relations in the Era of ‘America First’ - A Kenyan Perspective Brigadier (Rtd) Dr Robert Kabage, Executive Director, Mashariki Research and Policy Centre (Kenya) 5 SESSION 2: U.S. – AFRICA RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES 5.1 Understanding African Fragility Through U.S. National Security Perspectives Dr Dylan Craig, Associate Professor, Department of Security Studies, U.S. National War College (United States of America) 5.2 U.S. - Africa Relations in a Time of Geopolitical Transition - Policy, Challenges, and the South African Case Ambassador Michelle Gavin, Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (United States of America) 5.3 The Changing US-Africa Policy Dynamic - Context, Challenges, and Opportunities Dr Anne Griffin, Independent US-Africa policy expert associated with the Centre for American Progress (United States of America) 5.4 Discussion 1 AFRICA THINK-TANK DIALOGUE   The Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD) is an informal collaboration of African think-tanks that have African socio-economic development, governance and a fairer, more inclusive, multilateral order at the heart of their work.   As such, the ATD discusses, amongst others:   Africa’s governance within the framework of the African Union Arica’s relationship with other regional structures such as the European Union, BRICS, the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the G20 Africa’s relationship with world powers such as the United States of America and China Reform of the United Nations and other multilateral organisations in order to reposition Africa's role in the global order How to improve sustainable development in Africa, including required adaptation resulting from Climate Change    Activities   The African Consultative Meeting is held annually in Cape Town, South Africa Participation in the conferences, seminars, workshops and webinars – both ATD organised and those organised by the participating organisations Participation in the programmes of the Global South Perspectives Network Research Advocacy Early warning mechanism on emerging issues for the continent Promote African reform for more inclusive governance and economic development Act as a catalyst for African reformation and unity     2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   The 2025 Africa Consultative Meeting (ACM), held under the auspices of the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD), convened a diverse range of African policy experts, academics, diplomats, and civil society actors to assess the evolving contours of US - Africa relations in a multipolar world.   Against the backdrop of shifting geopolitical alliances, intensifying global competition, and mounting demands for reform in multilateral governance, the meeting sought to interrogate both historical legacies and contemporary dynamics shaping engagement between the United States and African nations.   This report synthesises the insights and debates that emerged over the two-day event, offering a nuanced and multidimensional account of the challenges, opportunities, and strategic imperatives underpinning this complex relationship.   2.1 US - Africa relations from an African perspective   African scholars and policymakers presented a deeply reflective and, at times, critical account of the trajectory of US - Africa relations. A recurrent theme was the persistence of asymmetry in the partnership—where Africa is often treated as a recipient of aid and influence, rather than as a strategic actor with agency and voice. This imbalance, rooted in colonial legacies and exacerbated by Cold War geopolitics, continues to shape both the form and content of American engagement on the continent.   One of the key critiques raised was the framing of engagement through the lens of “relations” rather than “cooperation.” As Prof. Efem Ubi argued, “relations” imply a hierarchical connection with limited mutuality, while “cooperation” denotes equality and shared purpose. African actors expressed dissatisfaction with rhetorical commitments to democracy and development that are not matched by consistent action or genuine partnership.   Security engagement was another focal point of concern. African leaders noted that while US military aid and counterterrorism support may yield short-term stability, they often fail to address root causes such as poverty, youth unemployment, and poor governance. Moreover, US military presence on African soil - especially in the Sahel - led to governance vacuums and unintended civilian harm, raising questions about long-term effectiveness.   Finally, there was a strong emphasis on African agency. As Dr. Melha Rout Biel noted, African nations must set their own priorities, drive their own development strategies, and assert their voices in multilateral forums. Institutional mechanisms such as the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offer blueprints for such autonomy, but realising their potential requires external partners, including the US, to support - not supplant - Africa-led initiatives.    2.2 US–Africa relations from a US perspective   From the American perspective, Africa represents both a challenge and an opportunity. The continent’s demographic dynamism, natural resource wealth, and emerging consumer markets make it an area of strategic interest. However, US policy remains heavily influenced by security imperatives, geopolitical rivalries, and concerns about governance.   Recent years have seen a mix of engagement strategies. Under the Biden administration, there has been a renewed emphasis on multilateralism, democracy promotion, and climate finance. Yet, inconsistencies remain. For example, the absence of key US officials at G20 meetings hosted by South Africa was seen by many Africans as a sign of waning American commitment to multilateral dialogue.   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been a cornerstone of US economic policy toward Africa, offering duty-free access to US markets. Yet its uneven implementation, selective eligibility criteria, and limited support for value-added exports have diminished its impact. Moreover, its potential termination looms as a key concern for countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa.   Investment and trade remain robust in certain sectors. US firms have a significant footprint in mining, manufacturing, and services in South Africa and Nigeria, among others. However, much of this investment is concentrated in resource extraction rather than industrial transformation or skills development. American stakeholders acknowledge that a shift is needed - from short-term interests to long-term partnerships that contribute to Africa’s structural transformation.   Soft power remains a key asset in the US approach. Programmes in education, health, and cultural exchange - along with historic anti-apartheid solidarity and ongoing collaboration among think tanks and civil society - offer a foundation of goodwill. The challenge is to translate these people-to-people ties into a more coherent and strategic policy framework.   2.3  Convergences and Divergences   Despite tensions and asymmetries, there are important areas of convergence between African and American interests. These include:   Climate resilience and just energy transitions : Both sides recognise the need for urgent climate action, and there is agreement on the importance of increased climate finance. African leaders, however, stress that such finance must come in the form of grants, not loans that exacerbate debt burdens. Peace and security:  There is mutual interest in stabilising regions such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. However, there is disagreement over the methods - Africans favour holistic, locally led peacebuilding, while the US often favours militarised responses. Democracy and governance:  Both parties support democratic governance, but African actors are wary of what they perceive as moralistic or inconsistent US advocacy - particularly when American strategic interests override democratic principles. Digital technology and innovation: Africa’s young population and growing tech sector represent opportunities for collaboration. Programmes that support digital infrastructure, STEM education, and startup ecosystems are potential win-win areas for partnership.    Conversely, several divergences persist:   Trade and economic policy:  Africa seeks more inclusive trade frameworks and diversification, whereas US trade policy remains fragmented and protectionist in certain sectors. Moreover, unilateral mechanisms like AGOA do not always align with continental initiatives such as AfCFTA. Multilateralism and global governance reform: African countries are calling for structural changes in the UN Security Council, IMF, and World Bank to better reflect contemporary power dynamics. The US has shown limited support for these reforms, preferring to retain its dominant position. Superpower rivalries:  African states seek to engage with a variety of global actors—China, Russia, India, the EU - based on national interests. US pressure to “choose sides” undermines Africa’s preference for non-alignment and strategic autonomy. Perceptions and narratives:  Misperceptions, media stereotypes, and historical grievances continue to complicate relations. For example, African nations resent being summoned to summits in Washington and treated as passive recipients of aid rather than equal partners.    2.4 Conclusion   The ACM’s discussions reveal that US-  Africa relations are at a pivotal juncture. The relationship is evolving, but still constrained by historical baggage, policy inconsistencies, and structural inequalities. For the partnership to be sustainable and mutually beneficial, several principles must guide future engagement:   Equity and respect:  The US must recognise Africa as a co-equal actor in international affairs. This requires a shift from paternalism to partnership, from aid dependency to co-investment. African agency:  African nations must lead in defining the terms of engagement. US policy must align with continental frameworks such as Agenda 2063 and AfCFTA, not circumvent them. Institutional reform:  The United States should support Africa’s call for reform of global institutions to ensure fair representation and voice. This includes backing permanent African seats on the UN Security Council. People-centred diplomacy:  Engagement must go beyond government-to-government interaction. Civil society, academia, youth, and the diaspora have critical roles to play in deepening ties and countering misinformation. Strategic vision:  Both sides must move beyond transactionalism and embrace a long-term vision grounded in shared prosperity, global justice, and sustainable development.   The ACM reaffirms that Africa’s time is now. With strategic foresight, united leadership, and supportive international partnerships, the continent can rise as a global force. The United States has a vital role to play - but only if it is willing to listen, learn, and evolve alongside a continent that is increasingly shaping its own future. 3 OPENING SESSION   3.1 Welcoming remarks Prof Zweli Ndevu, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa)  The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) was honoured to once again host the Africa Think-tank Dialogue (ATD) in Cape Town. We drew together think-tanks from all corners of Africa to deliberate, strategize and develop policy positions that will promote sustainable development on the continent and a fairer and more just international order that aims to advance greater equitability in development cooperation.   The Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD) is an informal collaboration of African think-tanks that have African socio-economic development, governance and a fairer, more inclusive, multilateral order at the heart of their work.   As such, the ATD discusses, amongst others:   Africa’s governance within the framework of the African Union Arica’s relationship with other regional structures such as the European Union, BRICS, the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the G20 Africa’s relationship with world powers such as the United States of America and China Reform of the United Nations and other multilateral organisations in order to reposition Africa's role in the global order How to improve sustainable development in Africa, including required adaptation resulting from Climate Change   The ATD has in the past discussed weighty issues such a multilateral reform, the superpowers rivalry in relation to influence in Africa. At the last African Consultative Meeting, the ATD deliberated Africa-China relations.   The theme of this year’s Africa Consultative Meeting was US-Africa relations. It came at an opportune time when the US administration is challenging the status quo as it relates to international cooperation and the multilateralism. How Africa responds today will establish the international hierarchy and define the social structure for years to come. It is the responsibility of African think tanks, such as those that were gathered at the African Consultative Meeting, to contemplate a roadmap that will both advance the African cause, whilst retaining good bilateral and multilateral relationships. And then to promote these proposals within their individual spheres of influence.   That said, as Africans we should not fall into the trap of talking to and about ourselves. We also need to understand and talk to our international partners in order to retain and expand mutually beneficial cooperation across the globe. We were therefore blessed to have amongst us influential think-tanks and experts from both the United States and beyond.   We were struck by the frankness of the engagement and the genuine desire from all sides to find a way forward that serves both the American and African people and our shared future. Together we are all stronger, divided we are all weak. 3.2  Setting the Scene - Navigating Africa’s Future: Multilateral Reform, Global Relations, and Development  Finance Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer, Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa) Africa finds itself at a defining historical moment—straddling the challenges of sustainable development, climate resilience, fragile peace, and global inequality. As the world’s youngest continent with vast natural resources and strategic geopolitical importance, Africa must assert itself more forcefully in global decision-making forums. The continent’s leadership, intellectuals, and civil society are increasingly stepping up to make meaningful contributions towards transforming governance systems, both domestically and internationally. In this presentation, Daryl Swanepoel drew from the recent deliberations at the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD) to set the scene for the two-day dialogue, He examined three critical themes: Africa’s relations with global powers, the need for multilateral reform, and the pursuit of climate justice through equitable finance.   3.2.1  Evolving relations with global powers   Africa's relations with major global actors, particularly the United States, form a cornerstone of its broader foreign policy objectives. These relationships have historically been complex and uneven, shaped by a blend of development aid, security partnerships, and economic dependencies. The legacy of colonialism and Cold War-era interventions left behind a framework that often placed Africa in a reactive rather than proactive position.   Today, there is growing consensus that Africa must recalibrate its relations with global powers toward mutual respect and strategic partnership. Under President Joe Biden, the United States has taken steps toward a more constructive and collaborative approach, emphasising trade, investment, and shared growth. However, this trajectory is neither linear nor guaranteed. The prior Trump administration pursued a more transactional model, centred on short-term security interests and reduced foreign aid - policies that raised legitimate concerns about long-term development sustainability.   The return of such an administration, or similar ideological shifts elsewhere, could again marginalise African interests. Particularly worrying are recent changes to U.S. tariff policies that could jeopardise access to trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). As such, Africa must not only engage more proactively but also diversify its partnerships beyond traditional allies. Increasing engagement with emerging powers like China, India, and Brazil provides a broader diplomatic and economic base, but must be balanced carefully to avoid new forms of dependency.   In this regard, Africa’s approach to foreign policy must be guided by clarity of interest, regional cohesion, and strategic assertiveness. While external powers will continue to play an important role, the continent's internal unity and capacity to speak with one voice will determine its leverage in global negotiations.   3.2.2  The demand for multilateral reform   Africa’s exclusion from key decision-making bodies, particularly at the United Nations, has long been a source of frustration and activism. The UN Security Council, arguably the most powerful body in global governance, still reflects the post-World War II power structure. Despite comprising more than 50 countries and 1.4 billion people, Africa has no permanent representation on the Council. This lack of representation undermines Africa’s ability to influence international peace and security policies that directly impact its own stability.   African leaders, through platforms like the African Union (AU), are pushing for structural reforms to address this disparity. The AU’s Common African Position on UN Security Council reform is one such initiative aimed at achieving a fairer distribution of power within the international system. This demand is not merely symbolic; it is about institutional equity and the right to co-determine global norms.   Multilateral reform also extends to economic and financial institutions. Africa remains underrepresented in the decision-making bodies of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). These institutions have significant influence over African economies through loan terms, trade rules, and macroeconomic policy prescriptions. Reforming their governance structures is essential to ensure that African voices shape policies rather than merely respond to them.   Strengthening regional mechanisms is also critical to Africa’s multilateral strategy. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a landmark achievement, aiming to unify African markets, enhance competitiveness, and foster regional value chains. By leveraging such platforms, Africa can present a united front in global trade and investment negotiations, enabling the continent to drive rather than follow international economic trends.   3.2.3  Climate Finance and the Pursuit of Justice   Climate change presents one of the most existential threats to Africa’s future. The continent is experiencing rising temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, droughts, and flooding—disrupting agriculture, livelihoods, and ecosystems. Yet, Africa contributes less than 4% to global greenhouse gas emissions. This stark imbalance has become central to Africa’s advocacy for climate justice. At COP29 and other climate summits, wealthier nations pledged financial support to help developing countries transition to clean energy. While these commitments appear promising, their implementation reveals deeper issues. Much of the financial support is being offered in the form of concessional loans rather than grants. This shifts the financial burden to the very countries least responsible for the climate crisis.   As discussed in the ATD, there are two key concerns with this model. First, concessional loans add to Africa’s debt burden. Many African countries are already struggling to meet existing debt obligations. Asking them to borrow more – under the guise of climate support - essentially forces them to pay for the damage caused by others. This is not only unjust; it is economically unsustainable.   Second, most concessional loans are issued in strong currencies like the U.S. dollar or the euro. Because African countries must repay in these currencies, they face significant currency risk.   A compelling example cited was the effect of a €100 million loan to South Africa’s. Due to exchange rate fluctuations between 2015 and 2024, the total repayment costs increased by nearly 23%, even though the loan carried a low interest rate. These risks often go unacknowledged in global policy circles, yet they have devastating effects on African economies.   To address these challenges, the ATD should propose three policy recommendations:   Shift from loans to grants:  Wealthy nations must offer more grant-based finance to ensure climate transitions do not trap developing countries in unsustainable debt cycles. Currency risk management:  Financial instruments should be structured to allow African countries to borrow and repay in local currencies. Lenders, who are better equipped to manage currency volatility, should absorb this risk as a form of developmental aid. Reform Bretton Woods Institutions:  The IMF and World Bank must adopt more flexible, inclusive, and climate-sensitive lending policies. This includes reducing interest rates, extending grace periods, and factoring in vulnerability to climate risks.   In short, without just climate finance, Africa’s development aspirations will be continually undermined. The world cannot claim to fight climate change while perpetuating financial mechanisms that disadvantage the most vulnerable.   3.2.4  Governance, peace, and security: A continental challenge   Africa’s aspirations for development are also contingent on peace and political stability. While there have been notable improvements in certain regions, persistent conflicts, civil unrest, and extremist violence continue to undermine progress. From terrorist activities in the Sahel and Somalia, to conflicts in Ethiopia’s Tigray region and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), insecurity remains a widespread challenge.   Governance failures, corruption, and weak institutions exacerbate these security threats. Poor governance often erodes public trust, increases inequality, and provides fertile ground for extremist ideologies. At the same time, conflicts consume public resources that could otherwise be used for social services and infrastructure development.   Yet, African nations are increasingly recognising the importance of addressing these root causes. The AU and regional economic communities like ECOWAS are becoming more proactive in conflict mediation and peacekeeping. The AU’s Peace and Security Council has deployed missions to conflict zones and facilitated diplomatic negotiations. ECOWAS has shown leadership in addressing military coups and political crises in West Africa.   One of the more promising developments is the establishment of the African Standby Force, designed to enable rapid and coordinated responses to crises. It reflects a growing commitment to African-led solutions, grounded in the continent’s specific realities. However, implementation remains uneven due to resource and capacity constraints.   Funding remains a significant hurdle. Security operations are expensive, and most African states operate under tight budgets. Competing needs - such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure often take precedence, leaving security underfunded. This shortfall has made African nations reliant on foreign assistance, creating a paradox: the continent needs external support to manage security but also seeks sovereignty and ownership over these very issues.   The influence of external powers, while helpful in the short term, can also realign local priorities in ways that do not serve Africa’s long-term interests. This calls for a delicate balancing act - leveraging global support without surrendering agency.   3.2.5  Toward African agency and strategic sovereignty   The Africa Think-Tank Dialogue and other consultative forums are vital in nurturing a new generation of African thought leaders and policy-makers. These platforms serve as incubators for ideas, strategies, and early warning systems that feed directly into national and regional policy-making. They also create opportunities for cross-border knowledge exchange, allowing for more coherent and context-sensitive strategies.   The goal is to build resilient institutions that can withstand external shocks, adapt to changing global dynamics, and promote African-led solutions. From multilateral diplomacy to climate finance, and from peacekeeping to economic integration, the journey toward self-determination is multifaceted and ongoing.   3.2.6  Conclusion   Africa stands at a crucial juncture in its development trajectory. The choices made today will shape the continent’s ability to address climate change, secure peace, and assert its rightful place in global governance. This report has highlighted the urgent need for more equitable global partnerships, reforms in multilateral institutions, and just climate finance mechanisms.   Africa’s challenges are significant - but so are its opportunities. With bold leadership, strategic unity, and sustained investment in governance and institutions, Africa can redefine its future.   The international community must also ensure that it plays its part by acknowledging the historical responsibilities, honouring financial commitments, and reforming global systems to reflect the realities of the 21st century.   Only through mutual respect, fairness, and solidarity can we build a future that is not only greener and safer but also more just and inclusive for all. 3.3  Navigating Geopolitical Currents: South Africa–United States Relations During the 2025 G20 Presidency Dr Philani Mthembu, Executive Director, Institute for Global  Dialogue (South Africa)  As South Africa assumes the presidency of the G20 in 2025, it does so amid a complex and evolving geopolitical climate. Its leadership is under the global microscope, tasked not only with setting a compelling agenda for inclusive economic growth and sustainability, but also with navigating intricate diplomatic relationships, particularly with the United States. In this presentation Dr Philani Mthembu explored the evolving dynamics between South Africa and the US, focusing on the G20 context, historical diplomatic trends, current tensions, economic interdependence, and the role of non-state actors and misinformation.   3.3.1  South Africa’s G20 presidency and US participation   The year 2025 is a pivotal one for South Africa, as it undertakes the responsibilities of G20 presidency. Under the banner of solidarity, equality, and sustainability, South Africa aims to influence global discourse and policy. The G20 foreign ministers and finance meetings held in Johannesburg earlier this year endorsed these themes, reinforcing South Africa’s capacity to steer international attention.   However, the absence of US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio and US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, from these early high-level G20 meetings signalled ambivalence. While officials from the US were present, the lack of high-level participation raised concerns about the US's commitment to multilateralism, particularly in the wake of a renewed "America First" approach and scepticism toward international commitments. This absence, while not a formal boycott, hinted at the de-prioritisation of the G20 within US foreign policy calculations.   South Africa must therefore calibrate its diplomatic strategies to manage both high-level government relations and second-track diplomacy involving think tanks, civil society, and business. These parallel channels of engagement are not only essential for bridging diplomatic gaps but also for ensuring continuity of cooperation amid shifting political leadership in Washington.   3.3.2  Managing a strategic but tense relationship   Despite the visible friction, South Africa has made strides in engaging key international stakeholders, notably receiving support from the European Union and China. The EU-South Africa Summit demonstrated strong solidarity and resulted in key agreements, further reinforcing South Africa’s leadership role within the Global South and the broader G20 context.   The bilateral relationship between South Africa and the US remains strategic but marked by inherent tensions. Over the past 30 years, despite common values such as democratic governance, their international policy postures have often diverged. South Africa’s reformist stance toward global governance structures contrasts with the US’s defence of the existing international order.   This divergence has historical roots.   In 1990, Nelson Mandela's remarks during a US town hall, in response to criticism of his engagements with leaders such as Fidel Castro and Yasser Arafat, underscored South Africa's independent foreign policy tradition. Mandela reminded audiences that during the apartheid struggle, the US government was largely absent, whereas other nations, now often labelled as adversaries by the US, offered concrete support. This ethos of foreign policy independence continues to shape South Africa's global outlook.   3.3.3  Historical and current points of friction   Past frictions between the US and South Africa have been sharpened during both Trump administrations. During the first Trump presidency, South Africa resisted pressures to align with the US in its geopolitical confrontation with China. This included continued engagement with Chinese firms such as Huawei, despite US objections. South Africa also opposed the US’s pro-Israel policies, including moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem and recognising Israeli settlements in Palestine.   In addition, US recognition of Morocco’s claim over Western Sahara contradicted South Africa’s longstanding support for Sahrawi self-determination. These policy differences were exacerbated by the imposition of tariffs on South African steel and aluminium—measures perceived by some as indirect responses to South Africa’s foreign policy stances.   Significantly, these tensions are not solely tied to one administration. Under President Biden, the US House of Representatives passed the South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act in 2024, which questioned whether South Africa’s foreign policy undermined US interests. This bipartisan scepticism reveals deep-seated differences in global outlook between the two nations.   3.3.4  The economic dimension: Trade and investment   Despite political friction, the economic relationship between South Africa and the US remains robust and mutually beneficial. South Africa is the United States’ largest trading partner in Africa. In 2023, the US exported goods worth $7.1 billion to South Africa, while importing $13.98 billion—primarily composed of critical metals and minerals like platinum, chrome, manganese, and gold. These resources are essential for US national security, particularly in high-tech manufacturing and defence.   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has facilitated duty-free access for specific South African goods into the US market since 2000. AGOA was instrumental in boosting South Africa’s automotive exports from $195 million in 2000 to $1.8 billion in 2013. However, the future of AGOA is uncertain. Discontent among US lawmakers about the agreement’s scope and utility could lead to its reconfiguration or dissolution.   If AGOA is terminated, the economic repercussions for South Africa would be relatively modest but still noteworthy. The Brookings Institution estimates a 2.7% decline in total exports to the US and a 0.06% decrease in GDP. Sectors like automotive manufacturing and food and beverages would be disproportionately affected. However, South Africa’s exports have diversified significantly, especially toward the European Union. By 2022, only 10% of automotive exports went to the US, down from 25% in 2013.   Moreover, many of South Africa’s exports—particularly metals and minerals—do not rely on AGOA preferences, limiting the impact of a potential withdrawal. Most of these goods face tariffs between 3% and 5%, and South African exporters are already accustomed to these non-preferential trading conditions.   3.3.5  Investment and employment interlinkages   Beyond trade, the investment landscape underscores the mutual benefits of the bilateral relationship. Approximately 600 US companies operate in South Africa, employing around 148,000 South Africans. Meanwhile, 22 South African firms have operations in the US, employing about 7,000 American citizens. These cross-border economic linkages create a web of interdependence that makes full-scale disengagement unlikely.   These figures also emphasise that South Africa is not a passive recipient of aid or trade favours. It is an active investor, a producer of globally essential resources, and a regional economic leader. As such, its relations with the US should be understood within a framework of mutual strategic interest rather than aid dependency.   3.3.6  Role of non-state Actors and multi-track diplomacy   A defining feature of US–South Africa relations has been the strength of non-state actor engagement. South African think tanks, civil society groups, and research institutions continue to collaborate with US-based counterparts, especially within the G20’s Think-tank 20 (T20) framework. This networked diplomacy fosters continuity and mitigates the effect of short-term political turbulence.   Indeed, the legacy of anti-apartheid solidarity in the US remains a powerful reservoir of goodwill. South African actors can—and must—engage with diverse US audiences, including those who do not share their worldviews. The country must broaden its reach beyond historical allies, engaging business groups, faith communities, and academic networks that can serve as conduits for diplomatic dialogue.   3.3.7  Countering misinformation and reframing the narrative   Another significant challenge is the proliferation of misinformation. This has manifested in public statements and even executive orders from the US accusing South Africa of human rights violations, land grabs, and anti-minority policies. These claims, largely unfounded, have had real diplomatic consequences, including the expulsion of ambassadors and legislative investigations.   South Africa must adopt a multi-pronged strategy to counteract such narratives. This includes direct engagement with critics, proactive public diplomacy, and mobilising its diaspora and international allies. Domestic outreach is equally important. Speaking with groups like AfriForum, Solidarity, and other Afrikaner organisations—not just to defend policies, but to listen and explain—is crucial for defusing disinformation.   Moreover, South Africa should work with figures who maintain influence in both societies, such as renowned sportspeople, business leaders, and cultural icons. These individuals can serve as informal ambassadors, reshaping perceptions and building trust.   3.3.8  Ambassadorial vacuums and strategic appointments   Currently, neither South Africa nor the US has an ambassador in the other’s capital. While this reflects diplomatic strain, it also presents an opportunity. South Africa must carefully consider the profile of its next ambassador—someone capable of engaging not only with policymakers but also with the business community, media, and civil society.   This is not a moment for panic but for strategic planning. The ambassadorial appointment should reflect South Africa’s long-term vision for the relationship and its evolving role in global affairs.   3.3.9  Conclusion   The relationship between South Africa and the United States is layered and multifaceted, marked by both cooperation and contestation. In 2025, as South Africa holds the G20 presidency, it must manage this relationship with strategic foresight and diplomatic agility. While the US may not prioritise the G20 or multilateralism in the current geopolitical climate, this should not deter South Africa from pursuing its broader goals of reforming global governance and promoting inclusive development.   Despite policy differences, the mutual economic dependency, robust civil society links, and shared democratic values offer a foundation for continued engagement. South Africa must maintain a multi-pronged strategy—combining diplomacy, economic partnerships, and public engagement—to assert its sovereignty, defend its interests, and shape a new geopolitical landscape.   This moment represents not only a challenge but also an opportunity for South Africa to reaffirm its role as a pivotal middle power in a changing world order. Through strategic engagement, pragmatic diplomacy, and diversified alliances, South Africa can turn this complex geopolitical moment into a defining one for its international standing. 3.4  Navigating Global Shifts: South Africa’s Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World Hon. Alvin Botes, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa) South Africa’s foreign policy is currently being tested by a range of internal and external pressures—from domestic socio-economic challenges to major transformations in the global geopolitical order. In his address Deputy Minister Botes laid out the foundations of the country’s evolving foreign policy stance. The speech emphasised themes such as Pan-Africanism, the shift towards a multipolar world, the significance of trade relations, and the critical role of both state and non-state actors in advancing the African developmental agenda.   The speech offered a comprehensive analysis of how South Africa is navigating the increasingly complex global landscape while trying to uphold its developmental objectives and regional commitments.    3.4.1  Pan-Africanism as the ideological anchor   Pan-Africanism remains the ideological foundation of South Africa’s foreign policy, shaping its diplomatic engagements and multilateral alignments.   The speech opened with a tribute to the late Sam Nujoma, founding President of Namibia and a towering figure in Africa’s decolonial struggle. Quoting Nujoma’s call for Africans to support each other and heal the wounds of colonialism themselves, the deputy minister reaffirmed that African unity and agency must underpin any foreign policy discourse.   This ideological commitment manifests through South Africa’s support of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, particularly its emphasis on regional peace, prosperity, and integration. The AU’s “Silencing the Guns” initiative is framed as a vital step toward creating a conducive environment for development. Without security and stability no meaningful progress can be made on economic transformation or social upliftment.   3.4.2  The global order in flux: From Unipolarity to Multipolarity   The deputy minister outlined the erosion of unipolarity and the emergence of a new multipolar world order, in which power is more evenly distributed among various global actors. He traced this development historically, beginning with the Cold War era’s ideological bipolarity—between the capitalist bloc led by the United States and the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union.   Following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the United States emerged as the singular global hegemon. However, as the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted in a referenced quote, this unipolarity was an anomaly—a product of specific historical conditions. The world is now reverting to a more balanced configuration, featuring multiple centres of power including China, Russia, the European Union, and emerging middle powers like India and South Africa.   This shift has deep implications for global governance and multilateralism. While South Africa supports a rules-based international order, the speaker warned of a "spirited pushback" against multilateralism from some quarters, particularly in the West. He highlighted recent U.S. withdrawals from key multilateral organisations and agreements as a cause for concern.   3.4.3  Multilateralism and global governance reform   South Africa envisions itself as a champion of multilateralism. The country’s diplomatic efforts are increasingly focused on reforming global governance institutions to make them more inclusive and representative of the Global South. The UN, World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank continue to reflect outdated power structures, often marginalising African voices.   The upcoming 80th anniversary of the United Nations in 2025 is seen as a critical opportunity to renew global commitments to cooperation and justice. South Africa has been vocal at forums like the Summit of the Future and UN General Assembly (UNGA) in advocating for transformation of these institutions.   What should also be stressed is the need for genuine multilateralism that goes beyond rhetoric. Token representation of African countries without meaningful influence must give way to more equitable participation in global decision-making.    3.4.4  The Strategic imperative of BRICS+   South Africa’s participation in BRICS+ — an expanded configuration that now includes Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran — has elevated its profile but also increased scrutiny. The deputy minister observed that this membership brings both opportunities and challenges. It enhances South Africa’s bargaining power but may also expose it to punitive trade measures from Western powers wary of BRICS' growing influence.   For instance, proposed U.S. tariffs on imports from developing countries—20% for most and up to 60% for China—could indirectly affect BRICS+ partners like South Africa. The country must therefore prepare for a more confrontational global economic environment where alignments carry real economic consequences.    3.4.5  Revisiting AGOA and the AfCFTA Imperative   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a key trade instrument enacted by the U.S., is up for review in September. South Africa has historically benefited from AGOA, but Botes suggested a reassessment will be made of its current structure.   As Africa moves toward greater economic integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), unilateral trade arrangements must align with the continent’s collective interests.   The concern is that AGOA, in its current form, may undermine AfCFTA if it encourages bilateralism over multilateralism. Some African states have already begun negotiating separate trade deals with the U.S., bypassing the AfCFTA framework. Such practices, the speaker warned, threaten to fragment Africa’s economic vision and reduce its collective leverage.    3.4.6  The Sahel and non-state actors in African security   Africa’s security landscape is increasingly influenced by both external powers and non-state actors. Deputy Minister Botes cited examples from the Sahel and Djibouti, regions that host multiple foreign military bases—including from the U.S., China, and France. These deployments, while ostensibly aimed at stabilising conflict zones, also reflect a contest for strategic influence.   Non-state actors are also gaining prominence. However, their role is often ambiguous. While some contribute positively to peacebuilding and development, other - like the former Wagner Group, Blackwater, or domestic entities like AfriForum and Solidarity - are accused of distorting national narratives or promoting destabilising agendas. He emphasised that South Africa must redefine the role of such actors, ensuring they support rather than subvert the country's foreign policy objectives.    3.4.7  Economic diplomacy and industrial development   Economic diplomacy is a cornerstone of South Africa’s international engagement. The country’s largest bilateral trading partner is the People’s Republic of China, with trade commitments totalling over R100 billion in recent years. However, the deputy minister stressed that trade volumes alone are insufficient—what matters is their impact on domestic employment, skills development, and local industrialisation.   South Africa must insist on value addition and beneficiation in its trade deals, especially with strategic partners. For instance, the automotive sector’s growth has historically depended on G7 investment, creating a paradox where former colonial powers now play a vital role in industrialisation. The challenge is to convert this dependency into a mutually beneficial relationship that aligns with national interests.    3.4.8  The dilemma of bilateralism within multilateral aspirations   Botes highlighted a critical tension: while Africa champions collective development through the AfCFTA, many countries continue to pursue bilateral trade deals with external powers. This undermines the spirit of Pan-Africanism and weakens the continent’s bargaining position in global forums.   South Africa finds itself in a difficult position, torn between advancing its national interests and preserving continental unity. He argued that true Pan-Africanism must be reflected not just in rhetoric but in economic strategy. Countries must resist the temptation to pursue short-term gains at the expense of long-term regional solidarity.    3.4.9  Ubuntu diplomacy and core foreign policy principles   Ubuntu - a Southern African philosophy centred on human dignity, mutual respect, and solidarity - serves as the moral compass for South African diplomacy. The deputy minister reiterated that the country’s foreign policy must reflect Ubuntu principles, particularly in its treatment of vulnerable populations and engagement with international crises.   This commitment was evident in South Africa’s submission to the International Court of Justice in 2024 regarding allegations of genocide. He called this act a moral high point, reflecting the country's ethical obligations on the global stage.    3.4.10  Domestic realities and international posturing   Domestic conditions continue to influence foreign policy decisions. Deputy Minister Botes pointed to high unemployment, poverty, and inequality as national grievances that foreign policy must address. He criticised groups that promote false narratives - like the claim of a white genocide in South Africa - as distorting public discourse and diverting attention from real challenges.   Official statistics from Stats SA reveal that 73% of white households fall within the top income quintile, contradicting claims of systemic marginalisation. He called for a clear and honest portrayal of South Africa’s socio-economic realities as a foundation for both domestic cohesion and international credibility.    3.4.11  G20 Presidency and global responsibilities   As South Africa chairs the G20, it faces the responsibility of representing African interests on a global platform. Botes welcomed the U.S.'s willingness to participate in the G20 Troika but emphasised the need for sustained engagement and leadership. He noted that U.S. disengagement from global forums has weakened multilateral cooperation and called for a recommitment to shared global responsibilities.    3.4.12  The SDG crisis and Africa’s developmental lag   Only 17% of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have been met globally, with just five years remaining before the 2030 deadline. Africa’s performance, in particular, is hindered by conflict, weak institutions, and underinvestment. The deputy minister  emphasised the need for intensified efforts from both African states and international partners.   South Africa expects the new African Union Commission leadership to play a transformative role in achieving Agenda 2063 and SDG targets. The AU must act as a unifying force and advocate for Africa’s interests in global governance structures.    3.4.13  Conclusion: A foreign policy of balance and vision   South Africa’s foreign policy is defined by its quest for balance - between competing global powers, between multilateralism and national sovereignty, and between ideological commitments and practical realities. The country seeks to leverage its middle-power status to advocate for a more just, equitable, and multipolar world order.   While significant challenges lie ahead - including trade tensions, regional instability, and domestic socio - Africa remains committed to a foreign policy grounded in Pan-Africanism, Ubuntu diplomacy, and strategic autonomy.   Deputy Minister Botes’ speech offered a roadmap for the future, one in which South Africa asserts itself not as a passive participant, but as a principled actor in global affairs, deeply invested in the fate of Africa and the broader international community.

4 SESSION 1: US AFRICA RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AFRICA   4.1 Beyond Rhetoric: Reimagining Africa - U.S. Relations in a Multipolar World Prof. Efem Ubi, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Nigeria) The dynamic between Africa and the United States has long been characterised by a blend of aspiration and frustration, cooperation and imbalance. Despite decades of engagement, there is a prevailing sense that the relationship lacks depth, equity, and genuine mutual interest. In his presentation Professor provided a comprehensive analysis of Africa - U.S. relations, the persistent challenges, and a proposed path toward a more equitable and cooperative partnership.   4.1.1  Framing the discourse: Africa's position in U.S. calculations   The United States has consistently stated its commitment to Africa - supporting democratic institutions, fostering economic growth, and promoting peace and security. However, in practice, these promises often remain unfulfilled. The paradox between stated U.S. policy and its operational execution, suggests that Africa remains undervalued in the global political and economic hierarchy.   One of the central critiques is the terminology used to frame the relationship: the emphasis on “relations” rather than “cooperation.” Relations imply a loose connection, potentially hierarchical or distant, while cooperation implies equality, shared goals, and collaborative effort. This distinction reflects a deeper issue in how Africa is perceived and treated by global powers, particularly the U.S.   4.1.2  Strategic value and interests: A one-sided equation   There is growing concern that Africa is viewed more as an object of external interest than as an actor with its own agency. This asymmetry is evident in the way African nations are routinely analysed through the lens of U.S. interests—be it strategic military bases, natural resources, or geopolitical leverage—without equal consideration for Africa's developmental goals and aspirations.   Ubi criticised the preoccupation with understanding foreign powers’ interests in Africa - especially China's - at the expense of defining and pursuing Africa’s own interests. The need, then, is to reorient the discourse so that Africa becomes the subject, not the object, of international relations. Africa must assert its priorities in areas such as industrialisation, infrastructure development, and sovereign decision-making.    4.1.3  Unilateralism and superpower rivalries   A recurring theme in the speech was the frustration with the U.S. and other superpowers’ tendency to make unilateral decisions concerning Africa, often without consultation. This dynamic reflects a broader pattern of global governance that excludes African voices, undermines African agency, and perpetuates dependency.   Superpower rivalry - particularly between the U.S. and China - is seen as deeply detrimental to Africa’s development. Rather than fostering cooperation for Africa's advancement, these powers use the continent as a stage for their competition, reminiscent of the colonial-era scramble for Africa. Prof. Ubi recalled the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, where Africa was divided without any African input, and warns that contemporary rivalries risk repeating that historical injustice.    4.1.4  The case for multipolarity and dispersed power   The emergence of a multipolar world presents both a challenge and an opportunity for Africa. Moving away from unipolar or bipolar dominance allows Africa to engage with a variety of partners and pursue more balanced relationships. The concept of "disperse hegemonism" -  where no single power dominates globally - offers a framework for such a future.   South–South cooperation, as seen in groupings like BRICS, provides an alternative model. These coalitions allow developing nations to collaborate based on shared interests rather than subordination. Africa's increasing involvement in such alliances underscores its desire for a more inclusive global order.    4.1.5  Security, instability, and the legacy of inequality   The persistent instability across the African continent, especially in the Sahel region, is linked to both internal governance challenges and the legacy of external interference. The resurgence of military coups in West  Africa - Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and others - is viewed as a reaction to systemic injustice and a failure to address root causes of inequality.   Prof, Ubi stressed that military takeovers will not cease until structural inequalities are resolved. Addressing the root causes - economic marginalisation, lack of industrialisation, and poor infrastructure - is essential. Treating only the symptoms while ignoring the foundational issues will perpetuate the cycle of unrest. 4.1.6  Economic engagement: Aid vs. empowerment   U.S. economic engagement in Africa has often been dominated by humanitarian aid, which, while necessary in crises, does little to build long-term capacity. He called for a shift from aid-centred strategies to empowerment-focused economic policies that prioritise infrastructure, industrialisation, and value-added production.   Despite some positive trends - such as the U.S.–Africa trade increasing to $71 billion - the overall U.S. investment in Africa remains inconsistent and modest compared to emerging powers like China and India. For example, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) skyrocketed from $135 million in 2005 to over $42 billion in recent years, demonstrating a more consistent and aggressive engagement model.   Prof. Ubi emphasised that Africa needs infrastructure, intermodal connectivity, and job-creating industries - not just short-term aid packages. U.S. companies should be encouraged to outsource and offshore operations to Africa, generating employment and technological transfer. Such partnerships would be mutually beneficial and go beyond paternalistic assistance.    4.1.7  Comparative approaches: U.S. vs. China   One of the starkest contrasts in Africa’s international partnerships lies in how China and the U.S. engage the continent. China operates with all 54 African countries, while the U.S. tends to focus only on strategic partners. This selective engagement reflects a hierarchy that marginalises many African nations and undermines continental unity.   Professor Ubi recounted a personal anecdote during Nigeria's struggle against terrorism, where the U.S. refused to supply necessary weapons, while China and Russia stepped in to assist. This example illustrates how strategic calculations - rather than shared humanity or solidarity - often guide U.S. decisions, to the detriment of long-term trust and cooperation. 4.1.8  Constructivism, interdependence, and changing narratives   International relations theories such as constructivism and complex interdependence are cited to underline the importance of perception and mutual interests. He argued that the U.S. must stop acting as a "Big Brother" and instead embrace the notion of interdependence, where both sides contribute and benefit equally.   There is a call for a fundamental change in how Africa is perceived - not as a problem to be solved, but as a partner with immense potential. This requires discarding outdated narratives and embracing a more respectful and balanced approach to international engagement. 4.1.9  The failure of prescriptive development models   The presentation also critiqued development models imposed by external institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s were highlighted as a clear example of failed prescriptions that led to economic stagnation rather than progress. None of the 27 African countries that implemented SAPs emerged stronger, highlighting the need for homegrown development strategies.   Africa must stop outsourcing its development to external actors and instead invest in deliberate, long-term plans rooted in local contexts. Prof Ubi urged African nations to adopt pragmatic five- or ten-year development strategies that are followed consistently and are resilient to external shocks or donor dependency. 4.1.10  Recommendations: Toward a rapprochement   To move beyond rhetoric and toward meaningful rapprochement, several strategic actions were proposed:   Reframe the relationship as cooperation: Shift the narrative from "relations" to "cooperation," emphasising equality, partnership, and shared goals. Promote mutual interests:  African nations must clearly articulate and pursue their own interests in all engagements, rather than being passive recipients of foreign agendas. Support Industrialisation and infrastructure: Replace humanitarian aid models with investments in production, manufacturing, and infrastructure that create lasting value. Encourage inclusive trade:  Expand the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to include support for value-added goods and diversification of exports. Reform global governance:  Advocate for a multipolar world where African voices are heard, and decisions are made collectively, not unilaterally. End superpower rivalries in Africa: Global powers must stop using Africa as a battleground for strategic competition and instead collaborate for the continent’s development. Support sovereignty and agency:  Avoid pressuring African countries into taking sides in global conflicts. Respect their sovereignty and right to independent foreign policy. Invest in African institutions: Encourage investment in local institutions and communities to foster stability, accountability, and long-term development.    4.1.11  Conclusion   Africa-U.S. relations stand at a crossroads. The legacy of unfulfilled promises, imbalanced power dynamics, and neglected agency must give way to a new era of cooperation, mutual respect, and shared prosperity. The United States must reassess its approach, moving from control and conditionality to partnership and empowerment. Likewise, Africa must take the reins of its development, articulate its goals, and seek partnerships that respect its sovereignty and potential.   As Prof. Ubi poignantly noted, development is not an accident - it is deliberate, strategic, and long-term. For Africa to rise, and for U.S.–Africa cooperation to thrive, both sides must act with purpose, humility, and vision.   4.2  United States–Africa Relations — Historical Legacy, Contemporary Challenges, and Future Perspectives Ms Aïcha Karafi, President, Tunisian Association of Local Governance (Tunisia) The relationship between the United States and Africa has evolved over several centuries, shaped by an intricate mix of history, politics, economics, security interests, and human development imperatives. From the dark era of the transatlantic slave trade to the ideological battles of the Cold War and the current dynamics of trade and diplomacy, the US–Africa partnership has been marked by fluctuations and asymmetries. Today, it faces the dual challenge of recalibrating old paradigms while navigating new global realities, such as rising Chinese influence and calls for greater African agency.   The presentation by Ms Aïcha   provided a comprehensive overview of the evolution of US–Africa relations, examining historical legacies, current tensions, and potential future directions for a more balanced and mutually beneficial partnership.   4.2.1  Historical Context   4.2.1.1  The transatlantic slave trade and its legacy   Between the 16th and 19th centuries, the transatlantic slave trade saw the forced deportation of over 12.5 million Africans to the Americas, with roughly 50,000 reaching the territory now known as the United States. This mass human trafficking had devastating demographic and social consequences for Africa. Nearly 2 million Africans died during the Middle Passage—a mortality rate of about 15%. West Africa alone lost up to 20% of its population, severely undermining the region’s economic productivity, social cohesion, and long-term development potential.   For the United States, slavery was foundational to its early economic growth. On the eve of the Civil War, the economic value of enslaved individuals was estimated at $3 billion, a figure that would amount to between $75 and $100 billion today. Cotton, produced predominantly by enslaved labour, accounted for 60% of US exports during the mid-19th century, underpinning the nation's rise as a global economic power.   The legacy of slavery continues to affect perceptions and relations. While the transatlantic slave trade legally ended in the 19th century, its moral and psychological consequences linger in collective memory, shaping African scepticism toward Western powers, including the United States.   4.2.1.2  The Cold War: Strategic interests over development   During the Cold War (1946–1991), the US viewed Africa through the lens of ideological competition with the Soviet Union. Africa became a geopolitical chessboard, with Washington providing over $1.5 billion in military and economic aid to curb Soviet influence.   Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) received over $300 million in American aid from 1965 to 1990. Angola’s civil war exemplifies how superpower rivalry exacerbated internal African conflicts. The war, stoked by both US and Soviet support for rival factions, led to over 500,000 deaths and the displacement of millions. This era entrenched authoritarian regimes supported for strategic purposes, sidelining democratic governance and long-term development.   4.2.2  Post-Cold War shift: Economic engagement and soft power   With the end of the Cold War, the United States gradually shifted its focus from ideological rivalry to economic diplomacy. The enactment of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000 marked a significant development. AGOA allowed eligible African countries to export goods to the US duty-free. While the initiative aimed to boost African exports and encourage market-based economic reforms, its actual impact has been modest.   In 2021, African exports under AGOA reached $7.6 billion, consisting mainly of oil, textiles, and agricultural products. However, this represents only 1–2% of total US trade, pointing to the structural limitations of the programme. Moreover, AGOA remains unidirectional: it primarily benefits countries that meet US-defined eligibility criteria, reinforcing dependency rather than equal partnership.   4.2.3  Humanitarian engagement and health diplomacy   The launch of PEPFAR (President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) in 2003 demonstrated a significant humanitarian commitment. Over $100 billion has been invested in combating HIV/AIDS, saving an estimated 25 million lives by 2023 and drastically reducing mortality by nearly 50%. More than 18 million individuals across Africa are currently on antiretroviral treatment due to this programme.   In addition, US official development assistance to Africa totalled around $8 billion in 2020, primarily directed toward health, education, and agriculture. However, this aid is often criticised for lacking coordination with local priorities, relying heavily on US-based contractors, and failing to ensure sustainable outcomes.   4.2.4  Contemporary Challenges in US–Africa Relations   4.2.4.1  Trade Imbalances and structural asymmetries   Africa’s total trade with the US in 2022 was $64 billion, of which $26 billion represented African exports. In contrast, the US exported $48 billion to Africa, highlighting a trade imbalance that favours the US. This asymmetry is further underscored by the limited diversification of African exports, which remain concentrated in low-value goods such as raw materials and textiles.   Despite efforts like AGOA, the economic relationship is still predominantly extractive. African countries are calling for more equitable trade arrangements that promote industrialisation and value addition on the continent.    4.2.4.2  The China factor   China’s growing influence has dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape in Africa. With bilateral trade reaching $254 billion in 2021 and investments totalling over $150 billion since 2005, China is now Africa’s largest trading partner. Much of this investment targets infrastructure—roads, ports, railways—and extractive industries.   While critics argue that China engages in "debt diplomacy," many African governments view Chinese aid and investment as faster, less conditional, and more responsive to national development goals than traditional Western assistance. The US, by contrast, is often seen as promoting conditionality, requiring political or economic reforms that are not always locally popular or relevant. 4.2.4.3  Mutual misperceptions and cultural disconnects   Public perceptions reflect underlying tensions. A 2020 Afrobarometer survey indicated that 59% of Africans held a favourable view of the US, compared to 63% for China. On the other side, only 45% of Americans viewed Sub-Saharan Africa positively. These views are shaped by media portrayals, limited cultural exchanges, and historical narratives that perpetuate stereotypes on both sides.   Such misunderstandings undermine mutual trust and complicate diplomatic relations, making it harder to build enduring partnerships grounded in respect and shared values.   4.2.4.4  Governance and corruption as barriers   Corruption remains a major obstacle to US investment. Transparency International reports that most African countries score below the global average of 43/100 in governance indices. The cost of corruption in Africa is estimated at $148 billion annually, deterring American firms that fear reputational damage or legal complications.   While the US has imposed anti-corruption sanctions in several African states, these measures often lack corresponding diplomatic efforts to build transparent institutions. Without coordinated strategies, punitive approaches can further marginalise African states from global economic networks. 4.2.4.5  Security engagement and humanitarian consequences   The US maintains a significant military presence in Africa, focusing on counterterrorism and maritime security. However, military interventions, drone operations, and support for regional militaries have occasionally produced civilian casualties and governance vacuums.   These interventions cost the US roughly $2 billion annually but have mixed results. Some critics argue that excessive militarization undermines democratic institutions and displaces resources from development-focused engagement.   4.2.5 The structural dependence problem   Programmes like AGOA and PEPFAR are largely shaped by American strategic interests. This one-sided design reduces African agency in determining the scope and focus of bilateral cooperation. For example, South Africa—Africa’s most industrialised economy—exports around 10% of its goods to the US. Yet it has limited input into the renewal or reform of AGOA.   The broader aid architecture promotes dependency rather than ownership. To transform this dynamic, African countries must be given space to define the rules of engagement and co-create frameworks that align with their national priorities. 4.2.6  Toward a new strategic partnership   A future-oriented US–Africa relationship must prioritise:   Investment over Aid:  Replace conditional assistance with direct investments in African-led projects, especially in manufacturing, green energy, and digital technology. Support for Continental Initiatives: Align with Africa’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to deepen regional integration. Capacity-Building:  Fund training programmes, research institutions, and vocational education to build a skilled African workforce. Local Ownership:  Shift power toward African governments and civil society actors in the planning and execution of development projects. Balanced Narrative:  Promote educational and cultural exchanges to challenge stereotypes and foster mutual understanding.    4.2.7  Country focus: Tunisia   Tunisia exemplifies both the promise and the challenges of US–Africa engagement. As a small North African market facing political instability, it has remained on the periphery of US foreign policy. Yet Tunisia holds significant potential in education, renewable energy, and tourism. With targeted investment and political support, it could serve as a model for equitable and inclusive development in the region.   4.2.8  Conclusion   US–Africa relations are at a critical juncture. The legacy of the past continues to weigh heavily, but the future remains open to new possibilities. By moving beyond aid dependency and toward a partnership of equals, both sides can benefit. The United States must recognize Africa not just as a recipient of charity or a theatre of competition with China, but as a continent of sovereign states with ambitions, agency, and potential.   A recalibrated relationship rooted in respect, mutual benefit, and shared values can redefine 21st-century diplomacy and development.   4.3  The Importance of African Agency in US–Africa Relations Dr Melha Rout Biel, Executive Director, Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies (South Sudan) In the evolving landscape of international relations, the engagement between the United States and African nations remains a critical axis of global diplomacy. However, for decades, this relationship has been shaped more by external imperatives than by African priorities. As the global order undergoes profound shifts—marked by the rise of multipolarity, renewed geopolitical competition, and increasing calls for equity in international governance—there is a growing recognition that the success of US–Africa relations hinges on a central principle: African agency.   This report delves into the concept of African agency, contextualises its relevance in historical and contemporary US–Africa relations, and outlines the structural changes needed to make this principle a reality. It draws on core ideas presented in the source text to argue for a transformation in how African agency is perceived, respected, and operationalised.   4.3.1  Historical context and structural power asymmetries   Understanding the importance of African agency requires a reckoning with the history of external engagement on the continent. US–Africa relations have traditionally been shaped by asymmetrical power dynamics that emerged from colonial legacies, Cold War geopolitics, and donor-recipient paradigms. Throughout the 20th century, US foreign policy toward Africa was driven largely by strategic interests—such as access to natural resources, countering Soviet influence, and managing migration and security threats—rather than a genuine commitment to Africa’s development or political empowerment.   In practice, this translated into policy prescriptions often rooted in neoliberal economic reforms, military assistance programmes, and externally imposed governance models. African states were treated not as equal partners, but as laboratories for foreign aid experiments or as pawns in broader global rivalries. The resultant aid-dependency and loss of policy sovereignty undermined African self-determination, while limiting the continent’s ability to negotiate on its own terms.   These legacies still cast a long shadow, influencing how African states are perceived and how their voices are integrated (or excluded) in global forums such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. 4.3.2  The rise of multipolarity: A strategic inflection point   The 21st century has witnessed significant changes in the global order, with the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the growing influence of middle powers such as India, Turkey, and Brazil. This shift toward multipolarity has redefined the strategic calculus of many African states, providing them with new diplomatic and economic options.   China’s Belt and Road Initiative, for instance, has poured billions of dollars into African infrastructure, offering an alternative model of engagement that challenges Western dominance. Russia has also deepened ties with several African countries through military cooperation, arms sales, and energy deals. Meanwhile, regional blocs like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) have strengthened the continent’s internal economic integration and negotiating power.   This changing environment presents both opportunities and risks. On one hand, African countries can leverage competition among external actors to maximise benefits and reduce dependency. On the other hand, the return of great power rivalry could lead to new forms of neo-colonialism or strategic manipulation if African agency is not consciously prioritised. 4.3.3  Defining African agency   At its core, African agency refers to the capacity of African actors—states, institutions, civil society, and individuals—to make independent choices, set priorities based on domestic needs, and shape international engagement in ways that advance their interests. It involves more than token participation in global affairs; it demands meaningful leadership, agenda-setting power, and accountability to African citizens rather than to external stakeholders.   Practicing African agency entails:   Policy autonomy:  The ability to design and implement policies free from undue foreign influence. Ownership of development:  Driving national and continental development strategies grounded in local knowledge and contexts. Representation:  Ensuring African voices are adequately and authentically represented in global governance institutions. Norm entrepreneurship:  Contributing to the evolution of international norms on security, democracy, and sustainability from an African perspective.   4.3.4  African institutions as engines of agency   The institutionalisation of African agency is most visible in the role of the African Union (AU), regional economic communities (RECs), and platforms like the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). These bodies have become increasingly assertive in articulating common positions and coordinating responses to continental challenges, such as conflict mediation, public health, and climate change.   The AU’s Agenda 2063 serves as a long-term blueprint for Africa’s development, grounded in principles of inclusivity, sustainability, and sovereignty. It envisions an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens. For US policy to be aligned with African agency, it must engage with these frameworks as foundational—not peripheral—documents.   Furthermore, the AfCFTA marks a significant step in building a continent-wide economic bloc that enhances bargaining power in global trade negotiations. For the US, supporting such African-led initiatives rather than imposing bilateral agreements that fragment the continent is essential for building trust and legitimacy. 4.3.5  Challenges to operationalising African agency   While the normative case for African agency is strong, several structural and political obstacles hinder its full realisation:   Fragmentation and lack of coordination: Despite rhetorical commitments to unity, African states often diverge on key issues due to differing national interests, political regimes, and external allegiances. This weakens collective bargaining efforts. Weak institutional capacity:  Many African institutions, including the AU, struggle with limited funding, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and a lack of enforcement mechanisms. This impairs their ability to implement continental decisions effectively. External conditionalities:  Aid and investment from Western and multilateral donors often come with conditions that limit policy space. Whether it is austerity measures, governance benchmarks, or military cooperation agreements, these conditions can undermine sovereignty. Perceptions and narratives:  African actors continue to face patronising attitudes from Western policymakers and media, which frame the continent as a place of perpetual crisis rather than of agency and innovation. This narrative gap affects how African agency is received abroad.   Addressing these challenges requires action on both sides: African states must invest in political will, institutional development, and intra-continental solidarity, while the US must shift its approach from managing Africa to partnering with Africa. 4.3.6  Toward a new model of US–Africa engagement   If African agency is to be respected and enhanced, the United States must adopt a fundamentally different approach to its engagement with the continent. This includes:   Listening first:  Policy frameworks should be shaped in consultation with African partners, not imposed from Washington. Listening tours, joint working groups, and continuous dialogue with AU bodies can foster mutual understanding. Aligning with African priorities : US aid, trade, and security policies should support existing African strategies such as Agenda 2063 and the AfCFTA. This ensures coherence and prevents duplication or contradiction. Supporting capacity-building:  Rather than just providing technical assistance, the US should help build long-term institutional capacities in governance, public health, education, and infrastructure. Championing reform in global institutions: The US should advocate for fairer representation of Africa in institutions like the UN Security Council and the IMF. This demonstrates a commitment to justice, not just charity. Encouraging mutual accountability: Transparency and accountability should be bilateral. The US should hold itself to the same standards it expects of African partners—on issues like human rights, transparency, and corruption. 4.3.7  Conclusion   As Africa becomes an increasingly central player in global affairs—home to the youngest population, vast natural resources, and rising economic potential—its agency cannot remain an afterthought in international engagement. For US–Africa relations to be meaningful, sustainable, and mutually beneficial, they must be founded on respect for African self-determination.   This is not simply a matter of moral obligation but of strategic foresight. A partnership rooted in African agency will be more resilient, more innovative, and more capable of addressing the complex challenges of the 21st century. In turn, African states must continue to assert their voice, strengthen regional cohesion, and build institutions that reflect the aspirations of their people.   Only then can the narrative of Africa as a subject of foreign influence be transformed into one of Africa as a sovereign actor shaping its own destiny—and contributing to a more balanced, equitable world order.   4.4  Evolving US–West Africa Economic Relations - Implications for Côte d’Ivoire Professor Assi Kimou, Deputy Director, CIRES Economic Policy Analysis Unit (Cote d’Ivoire) The relationship between the United States and Africa, particularly West Africa and Côte d’Ivoire, has been shaped by historical neglect, shifting priorities, and transactional policies under successive US administrations. This contribution by Professor Kimou explores the contemporary dynamics of the US - Africa economic partnership, focusing on trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), development assistance, immigration, and security cooperation. It seeks to understand the evolving role of the US in Côte d’Ivoire’s development trajectory and assess the prospects and risks associated with these shifting dynamics.   4.4.1  Changing trends in US - Africa economic relations   Over the decades, the US - Africa relationship has seen fluctuating levels of engagement. While diplomatic and political ties have persisted, economic relations have often been characterised by marginalisation. African countries, including Côte d’Ivoire, have not always been central to US foreign economic policy. When initiatives have been introduced - such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) - they often focused disproportionately on raw material extraction, particularly oil, with limited strategic investment in structural economic transformation.   The recent US approach, particularly under President Trump’s administration, adopted a more transactional nature, focusing on advancing American interests. This shift marked a departure from multilateral and development-oriented engagement. As a result, Africa’s importance in US foreign policy, though rhetorically acknowledged, often failed to translate into robust economic support or long-term investment strategies.    4.4.2  Trade dynamics and AGOA: A mixed blessing   AGOA, enacted in 2000, was intended to enhance market access to the US for qualifying sub-Saharan African countries. Côte d’Ivoire emerged as one of its beneficiaries, anticipating substantial growth in exports. In 2019, the country’s AGOA-related exports were valued at approximately $1 billion, with projections of increasing to over $3.5 billion by 2025. However, this potential remains precarious. If AGOA were discontinued or significantly reduced, Côte d’Ivoire stands to lose billions in trade revenue, severely impacting its balance of payments and development plans.   AGOA’s benefits, while real, are limited in scope. They focus largely on unprocessed goods, reinforcing Africa's traditional role in the global supply chain as a supplier of raw materials. The absence of policies that support local value addition, technology transfer, or industrial capacity building reduces AGOA’s transformative potential for countries like Côte d’Ivoire.   4.4.3  Foreign direct investment (FDI): Quality over quantity   Another pillar of US economic engagement with Africa is FDI. Although the US maintains a relatively modest FDI footprint on the continent compared to the European Union and China, the nature of these investments is critical. Only around 30% of US FDI targets manufacturing, whereas the EU allocates 40% of its FDI to sectors that support structural transformation, including industrial development and infrastructure.   For Côte d’Ivoire, the implications are clear: a heavier reliance on US FDI risks reinforcing extractive economic models unless there is a pivot toward industrial and human capital development. Declining FDI trends in Côte d’Ivoire and West Africa overall highlight the urgent need for a strategic overhaul, encouraging investment in manufacturing, technology, and services.   4.4.4  Foreign aid and development assistance: A shrinking commitment   USAID has historically been a key development partner for West African countries. However, data indicates that 68 project awards totalling over $360 million are slated for termination in West Africa. These projects span critical sectors such as agriculture, education, health, and governance. Côte d’Ivoire, facing serious security challenges related to violent extremism, has already seen the closure of crucial counterterrorism programmes.   Health is particularly vulnerable. In 2020, USAID and PEPFAR accounted for over 55% of Côte d’Ivoire’s HIV/AIDS funding, while the national government contributed less than 10%. A modelling study conducted to simulate different funding scenarios showed that if the funding gap were not met, up to 76,000 people could die from AIDS-related causes between 2020 and 2025. Even under a “stable” scenario, where the government maintains treatment for those already on antiretroviral therapy, the impact on public health would be profound.   Economically, the cessation of HIV funding would decrease GDP by an estimated 0.35 percentage points by 2025. This demonstrates the tight interlinkages between health aid and macroeconomic stability in developing countries.   4.4.5  Immigration, education, and remittances: An overlooked economic channel   US immigration policy also plays a significant role in shaping Africa’s economic fortunes. The number of West African students in the United States has grown by 66% in recent years, with most enrolled in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields. These students represent an investment in the continent’s future capacity for innovation and economic development.   However, if the US imposes restrictive immigration or visa policies, the educational and economic pipeline may be disrupted. For Côte d’Ivoire, maintaining this educational link is crucial, as it builds a cadre of highly skilled professionals essential for national development.   Remittances are another critical dimension. Between 2014 and 2023, West African countries received between $6–7 billion in remittances from the US. Côte d’Ivoire alone received between $300–400 million annually. This inflow surpasses many forms of foreign aid and is a vital source of household income, investment capital, and economic resilience. Restrictive immigration policies could reduce remittance flows, thereby weakening economic stability in the region.   4.4.6  Strategic imperatives for Côte d’Ivoire   Given these challenges, Côte d’Ivoire must pursue a multi-pronged strategy to safeguard and diversify its development prospects:   Enhance domestic resource mobilisation: The government must reduce its dependency on external funding by improving tax collection, broadening the tax base, and curbing corruption. Efforts should also focus on formalising the informal sector to increase public revenue. Invest in industrialisation and value addition:  Rather than exporting raw cocoa or rubber, Côte d’Ivoire should invest in processing industries. This will create jobs, enhance export value, and reduce vulnerability to global commodity price fluctuations. Leverage the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA):  Regional integration under the AfCFTA offers Côte d’Ivoire access to a broader market. This can serve as a buffer against international policy shifts while promoting intra-African trade and industrial cooperation. Pursue strategic partnerships:  While maintaining ties with the US, Côte d’Ivoire should deepen relations with other global powers such as the EU, China, India, and emerging economies. Diversifying partnerships reduces reliance on any single country and enhances bargaining power. Promote dialogue with the US:  Despite the transactional nature of recent US policies, Côte d’Ivoire should continue engaging in dialogue with American stakeholders. Advocating for sustained AGOA benefits, educational exchange programmes, and security cooperation remains essential.   4.4.7  Conclusion   Côte d’Ivoire stands at a crossroads in its economic relationship with the United States. While historical neglect and recent transactional shifts pose significant challenges, there remain opportunities for recalibrating the relationship. By investing in domestic capacity, fostering regional integration, and pursuing a diversified foreign policy, Côte d’Ivoire can chart a sustainable and sovereign path forward.   At the same time, it is essential for the US to reconsider its strategic posture toward Africa. Long-term engagement, built on mutual benefit and development cooperation, would not only serve African interests but also contribute to global stability and shared prosperity. The future of Côte d’Ivoire and West Africa hinges on responsive policymaking—both domestically and in Washington. 4.5  Pan-Africanism, African Diplomacy, and Development - A Critical Analysis Prof. Francis Matambalya, Chief Executive Officer, Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre (Tanzania) Pan-Africanism is more than an abstract ideological ideal; it is a historically rooted, practical response to centuries of colonisation, slavery, underdevelopment, and cultural erasure. Emerging in the late 19th and early 20th centuries among intellectuals and activists of African descent, the ideology calls for the unity, self-determination, and collective advancement of African peoples on the continent and in the diaspora. Prof. Matambalya, in his presentation, evaluated Pan-Africanism as a framework for contemporary African diplomacy, development, cultural resurgence, and global agency. he emphasised the ideology’s transformative potential, critiques its limitations, and suggests ways forward for African states and societies.    4.5.1  Pan-Africanism as a framework for African unity   Pan-Africanism emerged as a liberation philosophy rooted in the experiences of slavery, colonialism, and racism. Figures such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and Amílcar Cabral envisioned a unified Africa that could assert its sovereignty and build an equitable, dignified future for its peoples.   At its core, Pan-Africanism calls for:   Political unity to resist imperialist domination Economic cooperation to reduce dependence on foreign aid and capital Cultural solidarity that celebrates African heritage Institutional frameworks for collective governance and policy-making   Historical examples such as the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and its successor, the African Union (AU), reflect institutional attempts to realise these goals. However, continental unity remains a work in progress, hampered by political fragmentation, elite nationalism, and weak enforcement of collective decisions.   4.5.2  The role of education in post-colonial reconstruction   Education is central to any meaningful Pan-African project. In many African countries, formal education remains structured around colonial legacies, privileging Western epistemologies, languages, and paradigms. This contributes to a disconnection between knowledge production and the lived realities of African societies.   Decolonising education involves:   Reclaiming indigenous knowledge systems, oral traditions, and spiritual philosophies Promoting African languages as mediums of instruction Training a new generation of critical thinkers, engineers, scientists, and public leaders attuned to the continent's developmental challenges The model proposed by the Dar es Salaam school of thought in the 1960s and 70s—where education was linked directly to development planning, local empowerment, and socialist values—remains relevant today.   Institutions such as the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the African Studies Association are actively engaged in fostering independent research, curriculum reform, and scholarly exchange rooted in African worldviews.   4.5.3  African diplomacy and the global order   Post-independence African diplomacy was initially guided by anti-colonial solidarity and non-alignment during the Cold War. However, the global political economy of the 1980s and 1990s, marked by neoliberal reforms and structural adjustment programmes, diminished Africa’s diplomatic leverage. In the contemporary era, the global order is being reshaped by multipolarity, with emerging powers challenging Western dominance.   A Pan-African approach to diplomacy requires:   Coherent and coordinated foreign policy positions at multilateral forums (UN, WTO, COP summits) The establishment of African-led peacekeeping and conflict resolution mechanisms Enhanced capacity for trade negotiation and dispute arbitration   For instance, the African Union's role in mediating conflicts in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel demonstrates an evolving regional diplomatic capacity. Likewise, Africa’s Common Position on Climate Change, articulated in forums such as COP27, highlights efforts to build consensus on global issues.   However, progress is hindered by overlapping regional groupings, language and legal system differences, and the uneven capacity of states to implement continental decisions. 4.5.4  Ideological clarity and the challenges of elite capture   A significant limitation of modern Pan-Africanism is its frequent co-optation by ruling elites. Pan-African rhetoric is often used to justify state interests, suppress dissent, or secure legitimacy without advancing tangible liberation outcomes.   Key issues include:   State-centrism: Pan-Africanism is often reduced to elite summits and diplomatic platitudes, with limited popular participation Contradictory alliances: Some states proclaim Pan-African values while partnering with exploitative foreign powers or repressing internal opposition Donor dependency: Many Pan-African initiatives rely on external funding, undermining ideological sovereignty and grassroots ownership   Reinvigorating the movement requires reclaiming Pan-Africanism as a people-driven, revolutionary project grounded in justice, equity, and democratic accountability. Civil society, trade unions, and youth movements play a critical role in this reclamation.   4.5.5  Economic sovereignty and structural transformation   Africa’s integration into the global economy remains extractive and unequal. The continent exports raw materials and imports finished goods, locking many countries into neocolonial economic relationships. True development requires structural transformation of economic systems to achieve self-reliance and inclusive growth.   Key elements include:   Industrialisation: Building manufacturing capacity and promoting agro-industrial value chains Regional integration: Using mechanisms like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to boost intra-African trade and economies of scale Technology and innovation: Investing in research, green energy, and digital economies that leapfrog traditional development models Land and food sovereignty: Reclaiming land for equitable use, supporting smallholder farmers, and protecting seed diversity from corporate capture   Moreover, Africa’s debt burden continues to pose a threat to sovereignty. Structural adjustment and debt repayment have diverted resources away from social services. Debt cancellation and the establishment of continental financial institutions (e.g., an African Monetary Fund) are frequently proposed as remedies. 4.5.6  Geopolitical alignment and strategic autonomy   Africa’s strategic location and natural wealth make it a key player in 21st-century geopolitics. Relationships with the U.S., China, Russia, the EU, India, and Gulf states must be navigated with caution and foresight. A Pan-African approach rejects dependency and asserts the right of African nations to determine their development paths.   China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s engagement in security and energy, and the West’s renewed interest in Africa all present opportunities and risks. African states must ensure that:   Infrastructure and security agreements serve long-term developmental goals Natural resources are leveraged for value-added growth, not raw export Strategic partnerships are diversified to avoid one-sided dependencies   The principle of “African solutions to African problems” remains vital in addressing regional crises and reducing reliance on foreign intervention. 4.5.7  Cultural liberation and identity reconstruction   Cultural decolonisation is central to psychological liberation. Colonialism imposed European norms, languages, and values while denigrating African belief systems and traditions. Reversing this cultural violence involves recovering pride in African identity and cultivating a cultural renaissance.   This includes:   Restitution of stolen cultural artifacts held in Western museums Investment in African film, literature, and visual arts as tools of expression and resistance Support for Pan-African cultural festivals and heritage programmes Reforming educational curricula to reflect African histories and contributions   Youth-led movements in music (Afrobeats, Amapiano), fashion, and literature are already leading this resurgence. Afrocentrism, once dismissed as fringe, has gained global visibility and respect, creating transnational cultural bonds. 4.5.8  Contemporary relevance and youth engagement   Young people under 35 make up over 60% of Africa’s population. Their demographic weight and digital fluency position them at the forefront of contemporary Pan-Africanism. From student movements to climate strikes and entrepreneurial networks, youth are reshaping the narrative of African futures.   Initiatives such as:   The African Youth Charter Regional youth parliaments and leadership programmes Tech hubs and digital advocacy platforms Pan-African podcasting and social media communities   are giving voice to a generation that demands inclusion, justice, and transformation. Issues like climate change, gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and employment are central to this generation’s activism. Their Pan-Africanism is intersectional, global in outlook, and unapologetically assertive. 4.5.9  Institutional frameworks and continental governance   The African Union and regional economic communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, SADC, and EAC provide mechanisms for collective action. However, these institutions face chronic challenges:   Funding deficits Overlapping mandates Political interference from member states Limited enforcement capacity   Agenda 2063—the AU’s development blueprint—articulates a long-term vision of “The Africa We Want,” grounded in integration, peace, and prosperity. While symbolically powerful, the implementation of such frameworks depends on national buy-in, citizen participation, and institutional reform.   Proposals to strengthen AU legitimacy include:   Creating a Pan-African Parliament with legislative powers Streamlining RECs to avoid duplication Increasing contributions from member states to reduce foreign dependency Establishing an independent African Court of Justice 4.5.10  Conclusion   Pan-Africanism remains an indispensable ideology and praxis for addressing Africa’s historical traumas and contemporary aspirations. Its enduring relevance lies in its comprehensive vision—one that combines political unity, economic transformation, cultural affirmation, and global justice.   To fulfil its promise, Pan-Africanism must move beyond rhetoric. It must become a living framework for policymaking, institutional design, and mass mobilisation. This requires the active engagement of African states, grassroots movements, intellectual communities, and diaspora networks.   Africa stands at a crossroads. The choices made today—regarding diplomacy, education, economics, and culture—will shape the continent's place in the 21st century. By embracing a bold, decolonised, and people-centred Pan-Africanism, Africa can chart a path toward liberation, resilience, and unity. 4.6  Africa and the United States - Reimagining a Strategic and Equitable Partnership Ambassador Omar Mjenga, President and CEO, Centre for International Policy Africa (Tanzania) The dynamics of United States–Africa relations have long been shaped by asymmetries in power, historical legacies, and shifting global interests. The reflections presented by Ambassador Omar Mjenga capture key themes that define the current and future trajectories of Africa–US engagement. They explore Africa's evolving geopolitical relevance, structural imbalances in global diplomacy, and the urgent call for Africa to assert itself on the world stage—not merely as a beneficiary of aid but as an active shaper of its destiny. This report synthesises those insights into a structured narrative, assessing the past and present, and offering a vision for a more balanced future.   4.6.1  Africa’s strategic priorities and the vision of unity   Africa’s contemporary policy engagements span six interrelated domains: defence, peace, and security; foreign policy and decision-making; democracy and global governance; gender and women's issues; energy and climate change; and international economic policies. These pillars reflect the continent's broad-based aspirations for transformation and its desire to reposition itself as a global influencer.   Central to this vision is a united Africa. Unity is not merely rhetorical; it implies deeper integration, coherent policies, and consolidated diplomatic leverage. Ambassador Mjenga reflected on the transformative leadership of Kofi Annan, the first African Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the thwarted candidacy of Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, whose pan-Africanist credentials and advocacy for China’s reintegration into the UN likely provoked Western resistance. These anecdotes illustrate the complex interplay between African ambition and global power politics.   4.6.2  Perceptions of Africa and its place in global diplomacy   Perceptions shape policy. Mjenga contrasts how Africa views itself with how it is perceived globally, particularly in the West. While Africa is the fastest-growing region with enormous natural and demographic resources, it remains marginalised in global institutions and narratives. This contradiction is starkly highlighted by a diplomatic exchange involving US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Gabon's President Ali Bongo, in which African efforts to include the continent on the UN Security Council agenda were met with scepticism.   The statement that without Africa, the Security Council would have “no business” underscores the centrality of the continent’s challenges and opportunities to global peace and development. Yet, Africa remains too often the subject of external decisions rather than a participant in shaping outcomes.   4.6.3  The Legacy of the past and the weight of history   No discussion of US-Africa relations is complete without acknowledging the historical roots of the relationship, particularly the transatlantic slave trade. This foundational injustice has framed much of the structural imbalance that still characterises engagement between Africa and Western powers.   Contemporary interactions—whether through trade agreements like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) or aid programmes like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—are seen not as benevolent acts but as partial redress for historical exploitation. Referencing Frantz Fanon, Ambassador Mjenga argues that development in the West is built on African extraction, and Africans should not beg for opportunities like AGOA—they should demand restitution and equity.   4.6.4  A call for dignity in engagement   The ambassador raises a critical question about dignity and respect in diplomatic relations. Why, he asks, are African heads of state always summoned to Washington for the US-Africa Summit? Why are they herded into buses like tourists, when no Western leader would accept such treatment abroad?   This rhetorical critique points to deeper issues of self-respect and sovereignty. Africans, he argues, are sometimes disrespected because they do not demand respect. For Africa to command equal treatment, it must first believe in and assert its own value. This includes behaving geopolitically with the same confidence and assertiveness that countries like Russia and China exhibit toward the US.   4.6.5  The impact of US domestic politics on Africa   US policy towards Africa varies significantly depending on the administration in power. The speaker critiques the administration of former President Donald Trump for erasing Africa from the US foreign policy map. Trump’s first term saw no visits to Africa, diminished foreign aid, and a travel ban that affected several African nations. If a second term is similar, Africa should brace for further marginalisation, with engagement restricted primarily to security and humanitarian issues.   This disengagement creates a geopolitical vacuum that may be filled by emerging powers such as China and Russia. The US’s inconsistent and incoherent approach to Africa weakens its influence and invites others to step in with more sustained and strategic commitments.   4.6.6  Trade and the future of AGOA   Currently, 32 African countries qualify for AGOA, but only a small handful—approximately five nations—account for the vast majority of its benefits. This imbalance demonstrates the limited utility of AGOA as a development tool for the broader continent.   With AGOA set to expire, Mjenga urges African leaders to prepare for its potential non-renewal. Quoting a Swahili proverb, he stresses the importance of readiness and foresight: “Whenever you see your colleague being shaved, prepare your head.” Africa must not wait passively for Washington’s decision; it must strategise for alternatives that enhance self-reliance and regional integration.   4.6.7  Demographics and the African advantage   Africa’s greatest asset may well be its people. With a rapidly growing population and a burgeoning youth demographic, the continent is poised to play a decisive role in the global economy. By 2050, three out of every ten young people in the world will be African.   This demographic dividend could fuel massive economic growth—if properly harnessed. Strategic investment in education, infrastructure, and entrepreneurship will be key. Moreover, Africa must negotiate with global partners from a position of strength, offering not just natural resources but a vibrant labour market and consumer base.   4.6.8  Policy recommendations for a balanced partnership   The report outlines several key recommendations for reshaping US-Africa relations into a more balanced and mutually beneficial partnership:   Leverage Strengths: The US should stop focusing narrowly on countering China and Russia in Africa. Instead, it should capitalise on its comparative advantages—such as democratic institutions, technology, and higher education—to offer value-based partnerships. Develop a Coherent Strategy: Current US policy in Africa is reactive and fragmented. A unified, long-term strategy is essential, one that integrates economic development, security, good governance, and regional cooperation. Foster Local Leadership: Through initiatives like the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), the US should continue to support the emergence of competent, ethical, and innovative African leadership. Empower the Diaspora: African diasporas in the US and beyond can serve as bridges for trade, investment, and cultural exchange. They should be more actively engaged in shaping bilateral relations. Support Institutional Capacity: Instead of imposing external aid structures like USAID, the focus should shift to building strong African institutions that can manage their own development agendas.   4.6.9  Toward self-reliance and continental resilience   The dismantling of USAID, while viewed by some as a blow to Africa, is seen as an opportunity. Drawing from Tanzania’s founding father Julius Nyerere, Ambassador Mjenga reminded the audience of the foundational enemies of African development: poverty, ignorance, and disease. These challenges are best met through domestic resource mobilisation, industrial policy, and regional cooperation—not through dependency on Western aid.   President Uhuru Kenyatta’s response to USAID’s collapse was emblematic of a new wave of thinking: that Africa must now build its own capacity, leverage its own resources, and lead its own development. This pivot toward sovereignty and self-determination could be the foundation for a stronger, more independent Africa.   4.6.10  Conclusion   The speaker closes with an African proverb: “The hand that feeds the other is higher than the one that receives.”  This metaphor captures the asymmetry that continues to define Africa’s engagement with powers like the United States. But the message is clear: it is time for Africa to raise its own hand—to be the one that gives, negotiates, and sets the terms.   The future of US-Africa relations must be built on dignity, mutual respect, and strategic clarity. Africa is not a passive recipient of goodwill. It is a continent rich in potential, steeped in history, and ready to claim its place in the world. For the United States, the opportunity lies not in dominating Africa but in partnering with it—for shared prosperity in an increasingly multipolar world.   4.7  Reimagining US–Africa Relations - Priorities, Challenges, and Strategic Pathways Dr Zine Barka, Independent Public Finance Analyst (Algeria) The evolving dynamics of US–Africa relations continue to shape the trajectory of development, governance, and security across the African continent. The key themes explored by Dr Barka concerned governance priorities, investment, foreign aid, and Africa’s place in the global geopolitical system. It builds upon those reflections to analyse the state of US–Africa relations, review the legacies of recent US presidents in shaping the continent’s prospects, and offer actionable strategies for African states in response to changing global political currents.   4.7.1  Africa’s developmental landscape: A brief overview   Africa faces numerous and interconnected challenges that hinder sustainable development and prosperity. These range from weak trade integration and security vulnerabilities to insufficient investment and a heavy reliance on external aid. The continent’s share of global trade remains strikingly low—between 2 to 3%—a statistic that underscores Africa's marginal position in the global economic order. Notably, African countries trade more extensively with external partners, such as the US and the European Union, than with one another. This fragmented intra-African trade landscape underlines the urgent need for deeper regional integration, a goal championed by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).   Investment is another critical lever for development. While public and private investment are key to growth, many African nations struggle to mobilise domestic resources. Inadequate capital circulation, poorly designed fiscal policies, and weak financial institutions often obstruct efforts to self-finance development. Although aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) serve as alternatives, they come with trade-offs, including policy conditionalities and dependence on external actors. The result is a developmental paradox: while Africa is rich in human and natural resources, it remains poor in terms of infrastructure, industrial output, and technological innovation.   Security and stability are equally pivotal. The Security Threat Index for 2024 highlights the diverse risk profiles across African countries. Mauritius, for example, ranks high in terms of reliability, while Libya remains near the bottom due to persistent conflict. Foreign investors heavily weigh these indicators, and nations perceived as unstable often struggle to attract meaningful investment. A stable political environment, therefore, is not just a domestic priority but a prerequisite for global engagement.   4.7.2  The US and Africa: A presidential legacy perspective   The United States has played a multifaceted role in Africa over the last three decades, with varying degrees of commitment, success, and controversy. The engagement has been shaped by the foreign policies of successive US presidents, each leaving a distinct mark on US–Africa relations.   4.7.2.1  Bill Clinton: Trade Not Aid   President Bill Clinton's administration (1993–2001) was characterised by a strategic shift from aid to trade. The hallmark of his Africa policy was the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), enacted in 2000. AGOA aimed to stimulate economic growth and reduce poverty by allowing nearly 30 African countries to export thousands of goods duty-free to the US market. The agreement reflected Clinton’s belief in free trade as a developmental tool.   Clinton’s commitment extended beyond trade. In response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, he pledged $30 million to the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, underscoring the US role in post-conflict recovery. He also supported health campaigns in Nigeria and skill development in South Africa. In 1994, Clinton announced a $600 million aid package to South Africa, signifying strong diplomatic ties with the post-apartheid government under Nelson Mandela.   4.7.2.2  George W. Bush: Humanitarian Leadership   By a considerable margin, George W. Bush is the most respected US president in Africa, largely due to his administration's monumental health initiatives. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), launched in 2003, stands as one of the largest global health programmes in history. Covering 54 countries, including regions like Western Sahara, PEPFAR has saved an estimated 13 million lives by providing antiretroviral therapy to individuals living with HIV/AIDS.   Bush's approach to Africa was primarily humanitarian, driven by health diplomacy. His administration emphasised disease eradication, health infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance, which earned bipartisan support and widespread acclaim across the continent. However, the longevity and sustainability of such programmes remain under threat due to political shifts in the US. 4.7.2.3  Barack Obama: Symbolism and Youth Empowerment   As the first African-American president, Barack Obama’s election in 2008 sparked tremendous hope across Africa. Many believed that his heritage would translate into transformative policies for the continent. During his two terms (2009–2017), Obama made four visits to Africa, spanning seven countries. These visits reflected a recognition of the continent's growing strategic importance.   Obama’s signature initiatives included the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and the Mandela Washington Fellowship. These programmes focused on empowering youth through leadership training, skills development, and professional networking. Collectively, they aimed to build a new generation of African leaders capable of navigating the complexities of governance and globalisation.   Despite his popularity, some critics argue that Obama’s policies did not dramatically shift the structural foundations of US–Africa relations. His administration's cautious foreign policy and focus on multilateralism sometimes lacked the bold interventions that marked his predecessor’s legacy. 4.7.2.4 Joe Biden: Multilateralism and Global Inclusion   President Joe Biden’s approach to Africa, since assuming office in 2021, has emphasised reintegration into global institutions and renewed multilateralism. One of his early acts was halting the US withdrawal from the World Health Organisation (WHO), reversing a decision made by the Trump administration. Additionally, Biden strongly advocated for the inclusion of the African Union (AU) in the G20—a milestone achieved in 2023.   Biden also supports Africa’s quest for greater representation in global governance. He has called for two permanent African seats on the UN Security Council and endorsed reforms that reflect the continent’s demographic and geopolitical weight. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reinforced this stance by describing Africa as a "major geopolitical force" shaping past, present, and future global dynamics. 4.7.2.5  Donald Trump: Disengagement and Strategic Competition   In stark contrast, President Donald Trump’s tenure (2017–2021) was marked by disengagement and scepticism toward multilateralism. His administration proposed cuts to USAID, a major conduit for development funding to Africa. Furthermore, Trump initiated the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord and WHO—decisions that undermined collaborative global health and climate action.   Trump’s Africa policy was largely framed by strategic rivalry with China and Russia. He encouraged African states to align with the US in geopolitical contests rather than advancing a substantive developmental agenda. This transactional approach left many African leaders concerned about the future of US engagement and the erosion of long-standing aid programmes like PEPFAR.   4.7.3  Algeria’s position: Advocating continental representation   As a prominent voice in African diplomacy, Algeria has called for an end to the continent’s marginalisation in global affairs. Aligned with the African Union’s 2009 consensus and the Sirte Declaration, Algeria advocates for fair representation of Africa in the United Nations, especially the Security Council. It seeks a geopolitical realignment that reflects the continent’s growing influence and demographic significance.   Algeria’s position reflects broader African demands for equitable participation in global decision-making processes. As a member of the AU and other regional organisations, Algeria underscores the need for consensus, strategic unity, and institutional reforms.   4.7.4  Strategic imperatives: How Africa should respond   In a world increasingly defined by great power competition, resource scarcity, and geopolitical uncertainty, African countries must adopt a unified and strategic approach to international engagement. The threat of renewed isolationism, particularly under potential Trump 2.0 leadership, demands urgent introspection and policy recalibration.   First, African nations must strengthen regional bodies such as ECOWAS, SADC, and the East African Community (EAC). These organisations are essential for fostering collective security, economic integration, and political coordination. Revisiting their mandates, reforming their structures, and enhancing their capacities are crucial steps toward continental self-reliance.   Second, Africa should safeguard and diversify funding sources for critical sectors like health, education, and infrastructure. With foreign aid under potential threat, domestic resource mobilisation and South-South cooperation must become central pillars of the development strategy.   Third, Africa must assert its sovereignty in global forums. This includes demanding equitable representation in institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and UN Security Council. It also involves forming strategic alliances that serve African interests, rather than merely aligning with external powers for short-term gains.   Finally, African leaders must demonstrate vision, courage, and accountability. The African Union Commission should be led by individuals with a deep commitment to the continent’s future and the capacity to navigate complex global dynamics. Leadership is the keystone upon which Africa’s resilience and progress will depend.   4.7.5  Conclusion   US–Africa relations have evolved over decades, shaped by the personalities and policies of successive American presidents and the shifting aspirations of African nations. While trade, aid, and diplomacy remain foundational, the current geopolitical environment requires Africa to take greater ownership of its destiny. Whether confronting future uncertainties under a disengaged US administration or seizing opportunities in a multipolar world, Africa must act with unity, purpose, and strategic foresight.   The continent’s future lies in its own hands—and with bold leadership, institutional reform, and collective resolve, Africa can shape a new era of global engagement that truly reflects its aspirations, dignity, and potential.   4.8  US–South Africa Relations in the Era of Trumpism - A Critical Reflection Dr Sizo Nkala, Senior Researcher, Centre for Africa-China Studies, University of Johannesburg (South Africa) The dynamics of US–South Africa relations have shifted significantly over the years, moving from a period of high diplomatic engagement and mutual optimism in the post-apartheid era to a phase of strain and uncertainty, particularly during the administration of President Donald J. Trump. In the presentation delivered by Sizo Nkala from the Centre for Africa-China Studies at the University of Johannesburg, a comprehensive and thought-provoking exploration of this evolving bilateral relationship was presented, grounded in the political ideology popularly known as the “Trump Doctrine” or “Trumpism.”   This report synthesises Nkala’s key insights into the nature of the Trump administration’s foreign policy approach and its implications for US–South Africa relations. It contextualises these developments within the broader trajectory of the bilateral relationship, examining how historical goodwill has deteriorated in the face of growing ideological divergence and the aggressive reassertion of American nationalism.   4.8.1  Understanding the Trump doctrine   Central to Nkala’s analysis is the contention that Donald Trump, despite perceptions to the contrary, possesses a coherent—if unpopular—ideological framework guiding his political and diplomatic conduct. Contrary to critics who view Trump’s decisions as erratic or uninformed, Nkala argues that there is method and consistency to Trump’s approach, particularly in terms of foreign policy. Termed the “Trump Doctrine,” this framework is grievance-based and deeply rooted in economic nationalism, populism, and unilateralism.   The Trump Doctrine, according to Nkala, is premised on several interrelated grievances:   Deindustrialisation of the American economy: Trump has long expressed concern over the offshoring of American manufacturing jobs, particularly to countries like China and South Africa. This issue resonates with his core support base—the white, male working-class population—who have been disproportionately affected by industrial decline. Unprofitable international alliances and organisations: Trump has demonstrated a clear aversion to multilateral commitments, criticising the United Nations, NATO, and other institutions as being burdensome to American taxpayers. He believes that the US gains little from these relationships, and he has acted to withdraw from or defund them. Exploitative trade deals: Trump frequently decries trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and NAFTA (now replaced by USMCA) as detrimental to American interests. Although he rarely mentions the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Nkala posits that such arrangements are also viewed unfavourably within Trump’s ideological orbit. Immigration and border security: Another pillar of the Trump Doctrine is the scapegoating of immigrants. Trump has framed immigration as a threat to American security and prosperity, using inflammatory rhetoric and implementing stringent deportation policies. Opposition to military interventions: Trump’s isolationist tendencies are reflected in his disdain for prolonged foreign military entanglements. He has pledged to end “unwinnable wars” and has shown little interest in deploying peacekeepers, particularly in Africa.   These grievances are addressed through a set of “corrective measures,” including the imposition of tariffs, withdrawal from multilateral agreements (such as the Paris Climate Accord, the Iran Nuclear Deal, and UNESCO), and a transactional approach to diplomacy that prioritises American economic and political supremacy. 4.8.2  Personality and policy: The Trump effect   Nkala emphasises the importance of Trump’s personality in shaping US foreign policy. Traits such as narcissism, spitefulness, and confrontational behaviour are not just personal quirks but central to understanding his political methodology. Trump’s tendency to act in a “lose-lose” manner—imposing tariffs that hurt both allies and domestic constituencies, for example—is indicative of his inclination to prioritise political messaging and symbolic victories over practical outcomes.   This personality-driven approach contributes to the volatility of US foreign relations and has had a profound impact on South Africa, where long-standing diplomatic norms have been disrupted. Trump’s confrontational stance often results in symbolic acts of hostility—such as the dismissal of ambassadors or the withdrawal of aid—that signal a broader ideological departure from previous administrations. 4.8.3  From Mandela to mistrust: The evolution of US–South Africa relations   The presentation also offered a valuable historical perspective on US–South Africa relations. In the immediate aftermath of apartheid, South Africa was widely celebrated as a beacon of democracy and reconciliation. Nelson Mandela’s presidency inspired global admiration, and the United States quickly moved to solidify ties with the new democratic government.   In 1994, the Clinton administration extended a $600 million package to support South African development. That same year, the “Investing in People” Conference was held in the US to mobilise American investment in South Africa, and a US–South Africa Business Development Committee was established. A year later, the Binational Commission, co-chaired by then-Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and US Vice President Al Gore, institutionalised high-level diplomatic engagement between the two nations.   This era was characterised by optimism, mutual respect, and frequent communication. South Africa was included in the US Market Initiative in 1995, aimed at promoting it as a key investment destination. These efforts underscored Washington’s view of South Africa as a strategic partner and model of democratic transition in a region often marked by instability. 4.8.4  A rapid decline   Fast forward to the Trump era, and the relationship appears to have deteriorated significantly. According to Nkala, several recent developments illustrate this decline: The abrupt dismissal of the South African ambassador to the US. The permanent suspension of US aid programmes in South Africa as of February 2025. Trump’s inflammatory invitation to members of the Afrikaner community to flee “brutalities” allegedly perpetrated by the South African government. US accusations of human rights violations in South Africa.   These events reflect a breakdown in diplomatic protocol and mutual trust. The absence of ambassadors in both Washington and Pretoria—contrasted with the twice-yearly meetings between high-ranking officials in the 1990s—is emblematic of this shift. The mutual commitment that once defined the relationship has been replaced by suspicion, ideological divergence, and policy disconnect.   Nkala attributes this regression primarily to the Trump Doctrine, which views international engagement through the lens of grievance and zero-sum competition. South Africa, once seen as a promising partner, is now perceived as a drain on American resources and a symbol of the very globalism that Trump seeks to dismantle. 4.8.5  Beyond Trump: A structural shift?   One of the most important arguments presented in the paper is that Trumpism may outlast Donald Trump himself. While Trump is its most visible and vocal proponent, the ideological tenets of Trumpism—economic nationalism, unilateralism, and opposition to liberal internationalism—have gained traction within segments of the American political establishment. As such, the current trajectory of US–South Africa relations may not simply be reversed with a change in leadership.   This insight invites scholars and policymakers in Africa to rethink their engagement strategies with the United States. Rather than assuming that a post-Trump administration will automatically revert to past norms, African governments must prepare for a long-term realignment of American foreign policy interests. This includes recognising the growing domestic pressures within the US that shape its external conduct, from protectionism to isolationism.   4.8.6  Conclusion   The transformation of US–South Africa relations in the age of Trumpism is both stark and instructive. What began as a hopeful partnership anchored in shared democratic values has become a tense and fragile relationship defined by suspicion and policy divergence. Through a detailed exploration of the Trump Doctrine, Sizo Nkala’s presentation shed light on the ideological undercurrents shaping this shift and offers a cautionary perspective on the future of African engagement with the United States.   By understanding Trumpism not as a temporary anomaly but as a potentially enduring political ideology, scholars and policymakers are better positioned to navigate the evolving geopolitical landscape. South Africa, and the African continent more broadly, must engage with the United States with a clear-eyed recognition of the new terms of engagement—terms defined less by shared ideals and more by transactional logic and nationalist sentiment.   In the end, the challenge lies in crafting an African foreign policy that is resilient, strategic, and forward-looking—one that anticipates not just who is in the White House, but what kind of America the world must deal with in the years to come. 4.9  US–Africa Relations in the Era of ‘America First’ - A Kenyan Perspective Brigadier (Rtd) Dr Robert Kabage, Executive Director, Mashariki Research and Policy Centre (Kenya) The dynamics of US–Africa relations have undergone substantial transformation in recent years, particularly under the influence of the "America First" policy doctrine introduced by the Trump administration. This unilateral and nationalist policy framework prioritises US interests above multilateral commitments and global partnerships, thereby presenting both challenges and opportunities for African states. In his presentation,  Brigadier (Retired) Dr. Kabage, CEO of Mashariki Research and Policy Centre, examined the implications of this policy for Africa, with a specific emphasis on Kenya’s strategic responses. 4.9.1  Background and institutional context   The Mashariki Research and Policy Centre, headquartered in Nairobi, is a leading think tank that provides policy-oriented analysis on matters of security, geopolitics, economic growth, and sustainability. Established in February of the previous year, the centre celebrated its first anniversary with the publication of the Mashariki Security Journal . This publication underscores the centre's commitment to fostering a knowledge platform for addressing peace and security challenges across Eastern Africa.   The institution plays a crucial role in offering foresight and research-driven solutions to the region's most pressing issues, from political instability to identity-based conflicts and environmental degradation.   In light of the shifting geopolitical landscape, Dr. Kabage’s presentation addressed the critical policy and governance priorities necessary to reconfigure and strengthen US-Africa relations, grounded in a realist theoretical framework that emphasises national interest and strategic autonomy. 4.9.2  Theoretical framework: Realism in international relations   The analysis rests on the realist theory of international relations, which views states as rational actors driven by the pursuit of power and national interests. From this perspective, the "America First" policy reflects a logical extension of realism, where the US seeks to consolidate its geopolitical advantage through unilateral action and selective alliances. Realism asserts that in an anarchic international system, survival, economic power, and military strength are paramount. This theoretical lens helps contextualise recent shifts in US foreign policy and their ramifications for African states.   4.9.3  Key findings from the study   4.9.3.1  Historical context of US-Africa relations   Historically, US engagement with Africa—from the colonial and slave trade eras to the Cold War and beyond—has been driven by strategic self-interest. The Trump administration's emphasis on "America First" has merely made these interests more explicit, reshaping existing agreements and partnerships. This reality calls for a more honest and pragmatic reassessment of what African states expect and require from international partnerships moving forward.   4.9.3.2  Impact on peace and security cooperation   The traditional US role within NATO and its strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies, such as Kenya, has been affected. Under the current policy, NATO allies are expected to increase their military expenditures and develop independent defence capacities. Kenya, designated a major non-NATO ally, previously benefitted from US defence cooperation, particularly in anti-terrorism operations. However, this relationship is now under strain. The freezing of funding for Kenya’s leadership of a peacekeeping mission in Haiti exemplifies the trend towards decreased US international military engagement. This development underscores the need for Kenya and its regional partners to invest in indigenous peacekeeping mechanisms and self-funded security strategies.   4.9.3.3  Foreign aid and development assistance   A significant consequence of the "America First" doctrine is the withdrawal or reduction of US foreign aid. The freezing of USAID funding has had profound effects in Kenya, especially in the health sector. Programmes addressing HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria face severe highlights the risks of dependence on external donors for essential healthcare services. Such cuts also affect agricultural development, emergency relief, and small enterprise growth, thereby hampering overall national development.   4.9.3.4  Withdrawal from global health institutions   The US withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) signals its intent to disengage from global health governance. This deprives African countries of vital technical support and capacity building. For Kenya, this necessitates urgent reforms in domestic healthcare financing and infrastructure development to maintain progress toward universal health coverage. The public health threat is compounded by emerging global pandemics, which require coordinated international responses - responses now hindered by US disengagement.   4.9.3.5  Climate Action and Environmental Sustainability   The US exit from the Paris Agreement and its reduction of climate funding have negatively affected African nations. Kenya, which derives over 80% of its energy from renewable sources, has been particularly impacted. Climate action is central to Kenya's development strategy, offering benefits such as food security, disaster resilience, and sustainable agriculture. The reduction in US climate finance endangers these gains. Furthermore, the loss of US advocacy on global climate platforms weakens the ability of African nations to push for adaptation financing and technology transfers needed to combat the growing threat of climate change.   4.9.3.6 Gender, diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI)   The current US policy framework marginalises global DEI efforts. Cuts to USAID funding have undermined programmes promoting women’s health, education, and economic empowerment. Kenya, in the context of recent legal advancements for minority rights, faces the challenge of internally sustaining inclusion initiatives without external support. The risk is that marginalised populations, including the LGBTQ+ community, may experience setbacks in legal and social recognition due to the withdrawal of external funding and advocacy that previously supported these rights.   4.9.4  Immigration and labour mobility   US immigration restrictions pose barriers to African professionals and students seeking opportunities in America. With migration avenues tightening, countries like Kenya must reconsider their economic models that rely on labour exports. Emphasis must shift towards domestic job creation, economic diversification, and investment promotion to absorb the national workforce. African governments will need to introduce skills development, technical training, and enterprise financing initiatives to support youth employment and reduce dependency on foreign labour markets.   4.9.5  Strategic recommendations   In response to these policy shifts, Dr  Kabage proposes several strategic recommendations aimed at recalibrating Kenya’s - and by extension Africa’s - foreign and domestic policy posture.   4.9.5.1  Diversify development funding   African nations should reduce overreliance on Western aid by seeking alternative partnerships with emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Strengthening regional institutions like the African Development Bank is also critical for financial self-reliance. These partnerships must be structured around mutual benefit and equitable terms to ensure long-term sustainability. 4.9.5.2  Enhance domestic healthcare financing   To counterbalance foreign aid reductions, governments must increase allocations for health in national budgets. Public-private partnerships should be expanded to boost infrastructure and service delivery, ensuring continuity of critical health services. Local pharmaceutical production and regional procurement frameworks can also enhance medical resilience.   4.9.5.3    Community-driven climate solutions   Kenya and other African states must adopt grassroots approaches to climate adaptation and mitigation. Local investment in renewable energy, water management, and sustainable agriculture will foster environmental resilience and economic independence. Community engagement in climate governance will also improve policy relevance and implementation efficiency.   4.9.5.4  Support local industries and entrepreneurship   Economic sovereignty requires fostering local enterprise. Policymakers should develop frameworks that incentivise small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), encourage innovation, and promote industrialisation to reduce import dependency and create employment. Entrepreneurial hubs, business incubators, and skills training centres should be expanded to catalyse local value chains.   4.9.5.5  Boost intra-African trade and regional integration   The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offers a viable pathway to strengthen intra-African commerce. Harmonising trade policies, eliminating tariffs, and investing in regional infrastructure will enhance economic resilience and reduce external vulnerabilities. Kenya, for example, stands to gain significantly by leveraging AfCFTA to access larger markets, stimulate industrialisation, and foster regional value chains. This integration not only boosts economic diversification but also fosters political unity and continental self-reliance.   4.9.5.6  Expand diplomatic and economic alliances   Beyond traditional partnerships with Western countries, African nations must engage strategically with rising global powers and alternative trading blocs. Dr Kabage pointed to Kenya’s Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union as a viable model amidst uncertainty over the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Furthermore, proactive engagement with BRICS nations could open new avenues for trade, investment, technology transfer, and diplomatic influence. These relationships should be pursued with a clear-eyed assessment of national interests to avoid replicating exploitative dependencies.   4.9.5.7  Improve resource governance   One of the most pressing internal challenges across African states remains poor resource management. According to Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Treasury, simply halving corruption levels could enable the country to service all its public debt obligations. This astonishing insight underscores the critical importance of enforcing transparent procurement systems, strengthening public financial management, and holding officials accountable. Proper resource allocation and reduced wastage would dramatically reduce reliance on foreign aid and debt, enabling countries to fund development goals independently.   4.9.6  Opportunities amidst the challenge   While the "America First" doctrine has introduced considerable strain into US-Africa relations, it also creates opportunities for African countries to reassess and redefine their positions within the global order. Reduced aid and disengagement from multilateralism should not merely be viewed as abandonment, but as a wake-up call for the continent to embrace strategic autonomy.   This shift encourages Africa to take greater ownership of its development agenda. It prompts policymakers to invest in local innovation, adopt resilient health and education systems, modernise agriculture, and harness digital technologies. In the long run, the lessons drawn from navigating external policy shocks can cultivate stronger governance institutions, broaden economic opportunities, and enhance continental unity.   4.9.7  Conclusion   The “America First” policy signals a fundamental recalibration of US foreign engagement that has cascading effects on Africa. While this repositioning presents immediate challenges - such as reduced foreign aid, disrupted security arrangements, and limited migration – it also underscores the necessity for African nations to pursue economic and strategic independence.   Kenya's experience, as articulated by Dr Kabage, provides a valuable lens through which these dynamics can be understood and addressed. Rather than lamenting the loss of traditional aid structures, Kenya and other African countries must pivot toward new partnerships, strengthen intra-African collaboration, and reform internal governance.   By embracing a proactive and pragmatic foreign policy, investing in local capabilities, and promoting inclusive development, Africa can transform external uncertainties into opportunities for self-empowerment. The path forward will require bold leadership, collaborative continental action, and an unwavering commitment to self-determined growth.

5  SESSION 2: U.S. – AFRICA RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES   5.1  Understanding African Fragility Through U.S. National Security Perspectives Dr Dylan Craig, Associate Professor, Department of Security Studies, U.S. National War College (United States of America) This report analyses the evolving conception of African fragility from the vantage point of U.S. national security and foreign policy. Based on the reflective and insider perspective from a Dr Dylan Craig who teaches at the U.S. National War College. It offers rare insight into the priorities, internal dynamics, and persistent tensions within American policy toward Africa.   This report is structured into three main sections. First, it outlines the traditional U.S. conception of African fragility as rooted in geopolitical alignment. Second, it presents a detailed examination of the current administration’s reconfiguration of fragility around geoeconomic priorities. Finally, it discusses the institutional continuity that tempers the impact of these shifts and maintains certain persistent logics in U.S.-Africa relations.    5.1.1  Historical conceptions of African fragility: Geopolitical imperatives   From the early 2000s, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the onset of the global war on terror, the U.S. regarded African fragility largely through a geopolitical lens. Fragile states were not necessarily the poorest, most corrupt, or most violent - but those whose political alignments with the U.S. were in flux or at risk. Stability, from a U.S. perspective, was defined less by the well-being of a population and more by the consistency of a regime’s alignment with American strategic objectives.   During this era, the American objective in Africa was to secure allies in the fight against terrorism and to counter the growing influence of rivals like China and Russia. Thus, support was often extended to governments willing to cooperate on counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, or U.S. military operations - regardless of domestic governance standards. Violent extremist organisations (VEOs) were treated as threats not purely because of their violent methods or ideologies, but because they jeopardised regimes aligned with U.S. interests.   This approach led to a form of instrumentalism in U.S. policy: domestic African issues such as poverty, corruption, and lack of rule of law were addressed not on humanitarian or democratic grounds, but because they undermined the durability of U.S.-friendly regimes. For example, corruption was a concern to the extent that it enabled Chinese-style “debt trap diplomacy,” making U.S. engagement comparatively less competitive.   Initiatives like AGOA were emblematic of this geopolitical logic - providing preferential trade access in exchange for alignment with liberal democratic norms and U.S. interests. Aid, military assistance, and diplomatic attention flowed disproportionately to countries that played by these rules, creating a seller’s market for geopolitical loyalty. Countries like Djibouti, Malawi, and Eswatini leveraged their alignment for significant benefits, showing that even small states could wield disproportionate influence under the geopolitical fragility framework.   5.1.2  The Shift to geoeconomic fragility: A new paradigm   The current U.S. administration marks a clear departure from the above approach. African fragility is no longer chiefly assessed through the lens of political alignment or multilateral diplomacy. Instead, a geoeconomic framing now dominates Washington’s thinking. This paradigm evaluates African states based on their economic utility to global supply chains, their integration with American and allied markets, and their potential to support U.S. economic competitiveness.   Critical minerals, rare earths, energy resources, and logistical positioning are now the primary considerations. Fragility, under this new framework, arises not from ideological deviance or geopolitical wavering, but from being economically irrelevant. States that fail to link meaningfully with global trade and investment flows are increasingly viewed as dispensable.   This transformation significantly affects U.S. engagement. Military aid, diplomatic attention, and development assistance are increasingly reserved for regions with geoeconomic salience. This redefinition of priorities poses new risks for countries that were previously considered important due to strategic alignments, but which now fall outside key economic circuits.   The consequences of this shift are profound. A clear example discussed by Dr Craig is the case of Malawi’s mango exports. Despite the high quality and market potential of Malawian produce, limited reciprocal trade opportunities make sustained engagement unattractive for U.S. private sector actors. Unlike Chinese or Gulf state enterprises - backed by state-led strategic objectives - U.S. businesses demand profitability and reciprocal trade. This illustrates the fundamental structural limitations of U.S. capitalism when confronted with asymmetrical trade relationships, which are common in African economies.   As a result, future engagement may depend not on bilateral U.S.-Africa mechanisms, but on Africa’s capacity to build trade networks with intermediary powers such as Türkiye, Indonesia, and Gulf states. Infrastructure projects - like Turkish-funded port development in The Gambia - are shaping new trade corridors that may eventually link Africa with U.S. markets, indirectly sustaining American commercial interests without direct government intervention. This is a more palatable model to administrations sceptical of foreign aid and direct funding mechanisms.   Nevertheless, some American institutions remain active. The Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Development Finance Corporation continue to operate, often with less scrutiny than USAID, which has suffered significant funding cuts. These institutions are being retooled to support private-sector-led growth in strategic sectors like energy, digital infrastructure, and transportation. The continuation of these programmes signals that the U.S. is not abandoning Africa - it is merely reconfiguring its tools in line with market-driven logic.   5.1.3 Institutional inertia and the role of security bureaucracies   Despite changes in presidential administrations and policy rhetoric, U.S. engagement with Africa remains deeply shaped by long-standing institutional cultures and professional networks. Dr Craig draws attention to the enduring role of national security professionals educated at institutions like the National War College, where future military and civilian leaders are trained together over the course of a year.   These individuals, shaped by their formative years during the global war on terror, still carry with them a mindset attuned to the threats of violent extremism, multilateral engagement, and traditional security partnerships. Even if official policy shifts away from such concerns, the bureaucracy - composed of individuals steeped in earlier doctrines - often continues to act on prior assumptions.   A telling anecdote involves a student and pilot of a V-22 Osprey aircraft, who described his view of Africa in terms of “runways”- that is, regions where he could feasibly operate. This illustrates a physical, operational logic that constrains U.S. engagement. If American military platforms cannot reach a region, or if there is no logistical infrastructure to support activity there, that area effectively disappears from the operational map. Thus, U.S. foreign policy is not only shaped by values and interests but also by pragmatic constraints of access, basing, and overflight.   The role of international fellows—military officers and civil servants from allied nations—at the National War College also reinforces personal diplomacy. Relationships formed during this training often become valuable informal channels through which future collaboration is brokered. This "rolodex diplomacy" ensures that even in the absence of formal treaties or direct engagement, institutional memory and personal trust can facilitate cooperation. Moreover, many of these individuals remain in service for decades, long outlasting any given administration. As such, policy ideas introduced during their formative training may shape practice for years to come, regardless of political turnover in Washington. This underscores the importance of engaging not just with top-level political appointees, but with the enduring strata of career professionals who shape, implement, and sustain U.S. foreign policy.   5.1.4  Conclusion   The U.S. conception of African fragility has evolved from a focus on political alignment and ideological loyalty to a more transactional, market-driven assessment of economic relevance. This geoeconomic turn reflects broader shifts in global power competition, particularly with China, and a domestic political environment in the U.S. that is increasingly sceptical of foreign aid and multilateral commitments.   Yet, this shift is not total. The legacy of past policies, institutional inertia, and the enduring influence of professional security networks continue to shape how the U.S. engages with Africa. While political rhetoric may emphasise economic interests, the individuals implementing policy are often guided by strategic, humanitarian, or relational concerns that were central to previous eras.   For African states, this dual reality presents both opportunities and challenges. Those with geoeconomic relevance - through natural resources, trade corridors, or market size - are well positioned to maintain or expand U.S. engagement. However, countries without such assets may find themselves increasingly marginalised unless they can strategically align with intermediary partners or develop economic niches that appeal to U.S. private sector interests.   Simultaneously, African governments must continue to invest in long-term institutional relationships, ensuring their representatives are embedded in the professional networks that shape U.S. policy. Military-to-military cooperation, educational exchanges, and second-track diplomacy offer durable pathways for influence that transcend political cycles.   In an era where Africa risks being treated merely as a site of extraction or ignored altogether if economically irrelevant, the imperative is clear: African nations must build economic resilience, strengthen strategic partnerships, and engage proactively with both the visible and invisible hands of U.S. foreign policy.   5.2  U.S. - Africa Relations in a Time of Geopolitical Transition - Policy, Challenges, and the South African Case Ambassador Michelle Gavin, Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (United States of America) The United States' relationship with Africa has historically rested on a foundation of bipartisan consensus, pragmatic diplomacy, and mutual interests. However, recent political dynamics, particularly under the Trump administration, have disrupted this continuity, replacing long-held foreign policy traditions with a more transactional and unpredictable approach. Ambassador Gavin explores the evolution of U.S.-Africa policy, the structural challenges in its implementation, and the implications of this shift for the U.S.-South Africa relationship in particular.   5.2.1  A legacy of engagement and its erosion   For decades following the Cold War, U.S.-Africa relations operated within a relatively stable bipartisan framework. The American foreign policy establishment, irrespective of the administration in power, consistently identified its strategic interests in Africa across domains such as peace and security, trade and investment, democracy promotion, and joint efforts to tackle global challenges like climate change and pandemics. Initiatives such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) under President Clinton, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) under President George W. Bush, and Power Africa and Feed the Future under President Obama, exemplified this approach.   Yet, despite their ambition, these programmes yielded mixed results. AGOA, intended to drive trade through duty-free access to U.S. markets, saw limited success in generating meaningful investment or transforming economic landscapes in Africa. Similarly, while PEPFAR achieved monumental success in combating HIV/AIDS and saving millions of lives, it monopolised an overwhelming share of U.S. foreign assistance to Africa - at times consuming up to 80% of funds - thereby limiting flexibility to address other African priorities such as job creation and governance reform.   This expansive and idealistic policy landscape began to fray in recent years. The Trump administration’s foreign policy marked a departure from strategic engagement to one marked by inward-looking nationalism and transactional diplomacy. The collapse of bipartisan consensus, coupled with a broader identity crisis within U.S. political institutions, now casts doubt over the reliability and sustainability of American engagement with Africa.   5.2.2  Structural and bureaucratic constraints   The implementation of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa has always been complicated by structural and institutional limitations. A relatively small and under-resourced Africa policy community in Washington has contributed to widespread knowledge gaps, especially among senior decision-makers tasked with global responsibilities. These gaps manifest in discomfort or reluctance when it comes to serious engagement with African partners.   Moreover, the U.S. legislative system imposes additional constraints. All major foreign assistance initiatives, from PEPFAR to Power Africa, require congressional appropriation and authorisation. Congressional oversight, driven by taxpayer accountability and domestic scrutiny, can frustrate and complicate foreign partnerships. For example, reports of human rights abuses by African governments receiving U.S. aid can prompt congressional backlash and halt programmes, regardless of the broader strategic rationale behind them.   The U.S. private sector, another potential pillar of engagement, remains largely disconnected from government foreign policy. Unlike in China, where the state and private actors often operate in concert, U.S. businesses act independently. Their investment decisions are dictated by profit motives and a rudimentary understanding of Africa’s diverse economic landscapes, often failing to differentiate between vastly different markets such as Ethiopia and Zambia.   Additionally, outdated bureaucratic configurations further impede coherent engagement. The State Department's Africa Bureau excludes North African nations like Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, which fall under the Near Eastern Bureau. This arbitrary division reflects legacy Cold War frameworks rather than present-day geopolitical or cultural realities.   5.2.3  The role of Congress and the decline of oversight   Historically, Congress played a critical role as a counterbalance to the executive branch in foreign policy. A defining example is the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, passed in defiance of President Reagan’s veto, showcasing the power of civil society mobilisation and legislative will. However, this tradition of congressional independence and oversight is diminishing.   The Trump administration has altered this dynamic significantly. Whereas earlier congressional action often reinstated foreign assistance funds cut by the executive, today's Congress is less assertive and increasingly partisan. The erosion of consensus around U.S. national interests and the rise of short-term political thinking threaten the consistency and credibility of American foreign policy. This institutional drift undermines long-term planning and deprives African partners of a reliable interlocutor.   5.2.4  The geopolitical landscape: Multipolarity and perception   As the U.S. retreats from its historical leadership role, the world moves steadily toward multipolarity. The Trump administration’s disdain for multilateralism, combined with global actors such as Russia and China asserting themselves more forcefully, reshapes the rules of engagement. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s infrastructure diplomacy through the Belt and Road Initiative, and Gulf state investments in African states all point to a shifting balance of power.   In this environment, perceptions of the U.S. as a self-interested, unreliable partner deepen. When African states experience delayed debt relief, higher costs for capital, and marginalisation in global crises like COVID-19 or climate change, it reinforces the narrative that global systems are intentionally skewed against them. Even when the U.S. is not the principal actor responsible for these delays, its dominant role in global institutions makes it the face of perceived injustice.   This creates fertile ground for U.S. adversaries to gain traction by exploiting dissatisfaction and amplifying grievances. The structural inequalities in the global system, while genuine, become political tools in the broader contest for influence in Africa.   5.2.5  The collapse of norms and rise of transactionalism   The Trump administration's foreign policy is characterised by a strong aversion to norms, multilateral frameworks, and historical accountability. It eschews long-standing U.S. commitments to democracy, anti-corruption, and institutional reform. Announcements that key enforcement mechanisms like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) will no longer be actively enforced during a review period further underscore this shift.   Simultaneously, prominent unelected figures such as Elon Musk play increasingly visible roles in shaping international relationships, blurring the lines between national and private interests. Deals involving figures like Musk, who is active in both U.S. defence and business interests in Africa, reinforce perceptions of U.S. opportunism rather than principled engagement.   The administration’s resistance to acknowledging historical injustices - evident in its attacks on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives and affirmative action - extends to international affairs. U.S. policy no longer considers past exploitations or legacies of colonialism as relevant to current policy design, even as African partners continue to invoke them in diplomatic dialogues.   5.2.6  South Africa: From kinship to estrangement   The U.S.-South Africa relationship, once considered a cornerstone of post-Cold War cooperation, is emblematic of the broader drift in American foreign policy. Following South Africa’s liberation, the U.S. positioned itself as an enthusiastic supporter of the country’s democratic transition. It was seen as a validation of the American experiment in democracy and multiracial governance. But over time, divergent perspectives and unmet expectations eroded this kinship. From South Africa’s vantage point, the U.S. has often been hypocritical, preaching democracy abroad while ignoring repression among its allies. Meanwhile, Americans increasingly view South Africa’s positions on global issues, such as its non-aligned stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, as evidence of anti-Western alignment.   BRICS - a bloc of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Ethiopia, Egypt Iran and the United Arab Emirates - has become a particular point of tension. American scepticism of BRICS stems from its perception as an anti-Western alliance, despite its member states’ diverse ideologies. Growing frustration on both sides has replaced earlier enthusiasm, and recent developments under the Trump administration risk further deterioration.   5.2.7  The danger of demonisation and misinformation   A dangerous aspect of current U.S. discourse is the proliferation of misinformation and the politicisation of media. Allegations of a "genocide" against white farmers in South Africa, though widely debunked by credible sources, continue to circulate in certain corners of the American media landscape. In an era where media consumption is highly siloed and politicised, disinformation can fuel foreign policy decisions divorced from facts.   This poses a direct risk to countries like South Africa. A Trump administration seeking to “make an example” of South Africa for political gains could act based on misinformation, with serious diplomatic consequences. The erosion of trust in facts and institutions within the U.S. further compounds this challenge, leaving African partners uncertain about who or what speaks for America.   5.2.8  Looking ahead: Civil society and the hope for renewal   Despite the bleak outlook under current leadership, civil society remains a resilient force in U.S. foreign engagement. During apartheid, American civil society played a vital role in mobilising support for South African liberation. That potential still exists today, even if it is not being harnessed effectively at present.   The possibility of congressional resurgence or civil society reactivation offers a glimmer of hope. Yet, the path ahead remains uncertain. The United States is undergoing a profound political and institutional crisis. Its democratic institutions, once considered bedrocks of stability, are under strain. The international implications of this crisis are significant, particularly for U.S. partnerships with countries that have historically looked to it as a model or ally.   5.2.9  Conclusion   U.S.-Africa policy is at a crossroads. The long-standing bipartisan consensus has eroded, and structural, institutional, and ideological constraints are reshaping the contours of engagement. In an increasingly multipolar world, African states are recalibrating their partnerships and expectations. South Africa, once a symbol of democratic hope and shared values, now finds itself on tenuous footing with a U.S. administration that views the world through a transactional, nationalist lens.   What lies ahead depends not only on electoral outcomes in the United States but also on how African states assert their agency, diversify their partnerships, and navigate a world where American reliability can no longer be taken for granted. 5.3  The Changing US-Africa Policy Dynamic - Context, Challenges, and Opportunities Dr Anne Griffin, Independent US-Africa policy expert associated with the Centre for American Progress (United States of America) Dr Anne Griffin - an independent U.S. expert affiliated with the Centre for American Progress - offered a deeply reflective and context-rich analysis of the evolving policy dynamics between the United States and Africa. Framed by personal experiences in activism, scholarship, and policy, her presentation unpacked the seismic changes in U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration, dissected the implications for Africa and the diaspora, and emphasised the role of civil society, research, and advocacy in navigating this historic moment.   The report is divided into five core sections: (1) Contextual background and personal journey, (2) Historical and contemporary policy shifts, (3) Characteristics of the new policy paradigm, (4) Challenges to US-Africa relations, and (5) Recommendations and advocacy pathways. The insights offered serve as both critique and call to action, especially for civil society actors, researchers, and diasporic networks engaged in redefining U.S.-Africa relations.   5.3.1  Contextual background and personal journey   Dr Griffin opened her presentation by situating her perspectives within the context of her personal and professional journey. Raised in New Jersey by a mother who was both a professor and activist during the Civil Rights Movement, Griffin was instilled early with a strong sense of advocacy and social justice. Her upbringing involved active participation in protests and community activism from as young as seven years old. This foundation in activism - deeply influenced by cultural nationalism and Pan-Africanist thinking - shaped her lifelong commitment to policy and advocacy.   Her academic trajectory reflects a deep engagement with African affairs: an undergraduate major in Pan-Africanism, a graduate degree comparing the anti-apartheid and Civil Rights Movements, and doctoral research on student transformation post-apartheid. Griffin’s 22-year residence in Africa further solidified her perspective, grounding her scholarship in direct experience with community-led development, capacity building, and leadership training. Her multifaceted career - as a policy analyst on Capitol Hill, a think tank researcher, and a diaspora advocate - underpins the analytical lens she brought to the topic.   This background illustrates how personal history and professional engagement intertwine to produce a nuanced understanding of policy dynamics. It also affirms the importance of lived experience in interpreting geopolitical shifts. Griffin’s story underscores the powerful role of women leaders and activists in shaping both historical and contemporary advocacy for African and diasporic issues.   5.3.2  Historical and contemporary policy shifts   Dr. Griffin's second focus was to interpret the present US-Africa policy dynamic in light of historical trends. Acknowledging previous speakers’ contributions to the historical overview of US-African relations, she instead concentrated on interpreting the policy shifts seen in recent years - especially those under the Trump administration. She characterised the recent changes as “seismic,” describing a political climate of “shock and awe” in which longstanding policies and norms were dismantled swiftly and unilaterally.   Among the key developments she identified were:   Reductions in foreign aid and the sidelining of USAID. The uncertain future of PEPFAR, a hallmark of US-Africa health diplomacy. Escalating deportation plans for undocumented immigrants, which disproportionately affect Africans in the diaspora. A retreat from multilateral climate agreements, which threatens cooperative efforts around the Just Energy Transition.   These shifts, Griffin argued, signify a reorientation of U.S. foreign policy towards a doctrine of “America First,” where domestic security and profitability override principles such as solidarity, equality, and sustainability. The Trump administration’s approach, she explained, marks a fundamental rupture with decades of bipartisan commitment to moral leadership and global cooperation.   Griffin’s reference to back-channel diplomacy, which she practiced while at a progressive think tank in Washington, DC, underscores the complexity of shaping policy outcomes in an era where conventional diplomatic pathways are often bypassed. Furthermore, she urged the audience to view these changes not just as administrative adjustments, but as a profound redefinition of how the U.S. sees its role in the world.   5.3.3  Characteristics of the new policy paradigm   Dr Griffin delved deeply into what she identified as the key features of the new U.S. policy paradigm toward Africa and the broader world. These features illustrate a significant departure from value-based foreign policy to a model defined by transactionalism and raw power.   5.3.3.1  Strategic targeting of USAID   One of the first casualties of the new policy orientation was USAID. Griffin noted that the choice was not accidental; the Trump administration likely targeted foreign aid because of public misconceptions about its size and efficacy. In the popular American imagination, foreign aid is often exaggerated in scope and impact. By cutting USAID, the administration could demonstrate decisive action with minimal political backlash, especially in a context where many Americans feel alienated from the needs of “those over there.”   She highlighted how this misinformed perception reveals a deeper problem: the lack of connection felt by many Americans to global struggles. She positioned the diaspora as a potential corrective to this detachment, capable of injecting urgency and relational understanding into foreign policy debates. Without strong educational efforts and narrative correction, the reduction in foreign aid risks being normalised, thereby undermining decades of development cooperation.   5.3.3.2  America First: Security and profit over principle   Griffin painted the new doctrine as one that unapologetically prioritises American interests, especially security and economic gain. This emphasis marks a shift from policy shaped by ethical commitments—such as democracy promotion or human rights—to one driven by nationalism and isolationism.   The Trump administration, in Griffin’s words, sought to exhibit “power over principle.” She referenced Senator Marco Rubio’s boycott of the G20 summit hosted by an African country on grounds that the event promoted values like solidarity and sustainability - values now at odds with U.S. policy priorities. This rejection of multilateralism and cooperative diplomacy raises critical questions about the role of the United States in shaping a just international order. It also signals to African nations that diplomatic respect and engagement can no longer be assumed, but must be actively negotiated.   5.3.3.3  Disruption of traditional alliances   The new policy approach also involves a retreat from traditional alliances and a willingness to act unilaterally. For decades, both progressives and conservatives in the U.S. have debated the need to reimagine global financial and governance structures. However, Griffin argued that the Trump administration’s disruptive approach destroyed existing structures without offering credible replacements.   Now, with traditional systems dismantled, the central challenge is determining what will replace them. Who will define the new architecture? And on what principles will it be based? She noted the growing vacuum in leadership as an opportunity for African nations and diasporic stakeholders to exert influence and redefine the narrative.   5.3.4  Challenges to US-Africa relations   The presentation identified several challenges that impede a constructive US-Africa relationship in the current context.   5.3.4.1  Erosion of multilateral trust   As the U.S. distances itself from global agreements and institutions, African countries face uncertainty about the reliability of the U.S. as a partner. Abrupt changes—such as PEPFAR’s uncertain status—undermine years of trust-building and programmatic collaboration. A failure to provide consistent support for development and climate resilience weakens long-term planning and reduces the impact of joint initiatives.   5.3.4.2  Weakening of Advocacy Infrastructure   The disbanding of initiatives such as the Presidential Advisory Council on Diaspora Engagement exemplifies a broader trend of dismantling participatory mechanisms. These initiatives previously provided structured avenues for civil society and diaspora communities to contribute to policy debates. Their loss represents not only a symbolic step backward but a practical barrier to inclusion.   5.3.4.3  Underutilised Diaspora Potential   Griffin emphasised the untapped power of the African diaspora in the U.S. While remittances continue to flow to the continent, political and advocacy engagement remains sporadic and insufficiently organised. Mobilising this group is crucial to confronting misinformation and restoring meaningful engagement in U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.   The diaspora holds potential as a strategic bloc that can influence elections, shape discourse, and elevate African interests in Washington. However, this influence can only be realised through coordinated action and institutional support.   5.3.5  Recommendations and advocacy pathways   In concluding her remarks, Dr. Griffin issued a robust call for advocacy, civic engagement, and reimagined partnerships. She outlined several key recommendations for stakeholders seeking to shape the future of US-Africa relations constructively.   5.3.5.1  Centring advocacy in policy change   Dr Griffin believes that advocacy - grounded in rigorous research - is essential to influencing policy. She urged think tanks and civil society organisations to move from research to action. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), for instance, is a promising initiative, but she argued that its success will depend on sustained advocacy and clearly defined timelines. Advocacy must be forward-looking, realistic, and inclusive of the voices most affected by change.   5.3.5.2  Empowering the diaspora   The diaspora must be recognised not only for its economic contributions but also for its potential as a political force. Griffin called for renewed efforts to organise, fund, and empower diaspora organisations to serve as intermediaries between U.S. institutions and African communities. A stronger diaspora voice can drive home the interconnectedness of African and American futures and ensure that policies reflect this dual reality.   5.3.5.3  Rebuilding participatory structures   With official mechanisms like the diaspora council dismantled, alternative platforms must be built. Griffin referenced organisations such as the African Diaspora Network, the African Women’s Leadership Network, and the Advocacy Network for Africa (ADNA) as potential conveners of renewed civic engagement. These groups can help bridge the gap between grassroots movements and high-level decision-makers, fostering an ecosystem of informed activism.   5.3.5.4  Confronting misinformation   Finally, Griffin emphasised the need to develop a stronger counter-narrative to challenge widespread misinformation. Civil society, academics, and journalists must collaborate to disseminate accurate information and foster a deeper understanding of global interdependence. In an age of disinformation, narrative becomes a tool of power, and reclaiming it is essential for policy justice.   5.3.6  Conclusion   Dr. Anne Griffin’s address offered a powerful and timely reflection on the evolving US-Africa policy landscape. Her message was clear: while the challenges are considerable - ranging from declining aid and isolationism to diasporic disengagement - there are also significant opportunities to shape a more just and inclusive future.   Drawing on her experience as an activist, scholar, and policy expert, she called for renewed commitment to advocacy, a revitalised role for the diaspora, and the reconstruction of participatory institutions. She invoked a strong belief in the power of organised communities to push back against political retrenchment and misinformation.   As the global order is redefined, the principles of solidarity, equality, and sustainability - long sidelined - must once again become central to international engagement. The African diaspora, in particular, has a critical role to play, not only in bridging communities but also in amplifying voices of justice and progress.   In the spirit of that young girl in New Jersey raising her fist for justice, this report echoes Griffin’s optimism that through collective purpose, rigorous scholarship, and sustained advocacy, change is not only possible - it is essential.   5.4  Discussion   The discussion that followed the formal presentation was both rich and wide-ranging, touching on a variety of important themes, particularly relating to African development, global politics, the role of the diaspora, and concerns about shifting geopolitical dynamics. Multiple participants provided their perspectives, grounded in both personal experience and broader political analysis.   5.4.1  The Role of the diaspora and returning talent   One of the central themes was the issue of brain drain and the potential of the African diaspora to contribute to development. A delegate recounted the experiences of highly educated Africans in the diaspora who are underutilised, often reduced to menial jobs despite their qualifications. A notable example was given of a former South Sudanese minister who, despite holding a PhD, was unable to secure employment in the UK beyond security work. Upon returning home, he resumed a significant role in governance. This anecdote was used to underline the mismatch between the qualifications of Africans abroad and the opportunities available to them, both overseas and at home.   It was further stressed that returning diaspora members are often met with limited support and a lack of institutional recognition, which discourages repatriation and reintegration. The delegate urged African governments to create favourable conditions for the return of skilled citizens by offering them meaningful opportunities and by valuing their international experience. Ghana was mentioned as an example of a country actively encouraging African-Americans and other members of the diaspora to return and contribute to national development.   5.4.2  Corruption and structural governance failures   The discussion also dealt heavily with the issue of corruption, which was described as a fundamental obstacle to Africa’s progress. Delegates acknowledged that corruption is pervasive and systemic in many African countries, where holding political office is often seen as a route to personal enrichment rather than public service. Comparisons were drawn with countries like China, which maintains a near-zero tolerance for corruption—underscoring how different governance cultures can dramatically affect development trajectories.   One participant lamented the reality in many African states where, once a person becomes a minister or president, public resources are treated as personal property, with little accountability. The delegate emphasised that this mindset erodes institutional trust and undermines development efforts. There was a strong call for reforms that reduce corruption, increase transparency, and ensure that political officeholders are subject to oversight.   5.4.3  Youth empowerment and the role of technology   Another key issue raised was the generational divide in African governance. The delegate highlighted an incident from their time on the South Sudanese Appointments Committee, where older officials rejected younger candidates for senior positions simply based on their age. The argument was made that youthfulness should not be a disqualifier, especially when younger individuals may be more adept with modern technology and better aligned with contemporary governance challenges.   In this context, the importance of embracing technology as a critical developmental tool was stressed. The delegate drew on personal experiences of seeing technological entrepreneurship in countries like China, where individuals conduct business entirely through their mobile phones. A contrast was made with Africa, where even those with computers often lack the training or confidence to use them effectively. He advocated for a cultural and educational shift, starting from kindergarten, to foster technological literacy and innovation in Africa. Mastering technology, it was argued, would allow African nations to add value to their own raw materials and participate more competitively in global markets.   5.4.4  The Importance of research and capacity building   Building state capacity through research and training was another major point of discussion. One participant described earlier efforts in post-war South Sudan, where a wide range of civil servants, including President Salva Kiir, were sent for training in South Africa in collaboration with the University of South Africa (UNISA). Despite these efforts, the implementation of what was learned remained a challenge. Many of those trained were unable to effectively apply their knowledge, particularly in using computers and digital systems, due to entrenched limitations and resistance within the bureaucracy.   There was frustration expressed over how useful research and curriculum development efforts often go unused by government agencies. The delegate warned that failure to institutionalise continuous training and capacity-building hampers the ability of public servants to adapt to rapidly changing policy and technological environments.   5.4.5  Reassessing US foreign policy and international relations   Attention then turned to international politics, particularly US foreign policy under the Trump administration. A question was raised about the perceived inconsistency and volatility in US relationships with allies like Canada and Europe. In response, another delegate interpreted these shifts as part of a broader strategy of economic nationalism and political signalling, aimed more at domestic audiences and economic gains than at actual strategic realignment. For example, the US’s apparent hostility towards NATO was seen not as a desire to dismantle the alliance, but rather as a method to pressure European allies into increasing defence spending—often on American weapon systems.   Greenland and Canada were referenced in the same vein. Rhetoric about ‘conquering’ or acquiring these territories was interpreted as performative, designed to create noise and uncertainty in service of deeper trade negotiations or political branding.   5.4.6  Is the United States drifting toward dictatorship?   Another provocative question concerned whether the United States could be considered to be exhibiting dictatorial tendencies. The delegate expressing this concern noted what they saw as a disregard for law and international norms, raising alarms about potential authoritarian drift. Responding to this, another participant argued that while the Trump administration indeed projects an anti-establishment and authoritarian style, the real test lies in the strength of institutional checks and balances.   The independence of the judiciary, the resilience of the press, and the public’s reaction to government actions were all cited as critical factors. The point was also made that democracy does not automatically guarantee benign international behaviour. Historically, even liberal democracies have inflicted harm on Africa through colonialism and economic exploitation.   5.4.7  US-Africa relations and the Future of AFRICOM   A final question dealt with the future of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), particularly in the context of military bases such as the one in Djibouti. Although this issue was not explored in depth, the question reflects ongoing concern about the militarisation of US-Africa relations and the implications for sovereignty and regional stability.   5.4.8  Reflection on the United Nations and multilateralism   There was a related concern about the United States’ relationship with the United Nations. Participants expressed unease about the potential erosion of multilateralism, especially given previous US withdrawals from agencies like UNESCO and the WHO. One delegate viewed the early nomination of a new US ambassador to the UN as a possibly hopeful sign of continued engagement, though acknowledged that the tone of US policy remains unpredictable and sometimes antagonistic.   5.4.9  Conclusion   The discussion offered a comprehensive exploration of multiple interlinked challenges facing Africa today - ranging from internal governance issues like corruption and youth marginalisation to external factors such as international diplomacy and geopolitical shifts. It revealed a strong desire among participants to confront these issues honestly, and a recognition that Africa must be proactive in shaping its own development trajectory, leveraging the expertise of its diaspora, embracing technological innovation, and asserting itself in the global arena.   The reflections on US foreign policy also revealed a healthy scepticism and critical engagement with the broader international system, particularly its implications for African sovereignty and agency.     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to play a pivotal role in fostering democratic engagement and constitutional awareness among South Africa’s youth, with a strong emphasis on secondary and tertiary educational institutions in Gauteng Province. In line with its mission to promote social justice, democratic governance, and civic responsibility, the Institute hosted another successful session of its flagship programme, “Taking the Constitution to the People,” on Wednesday, 21 May 2025. The workshop took place at Impact College in Soshanguve and was attended by 26 learners. The session was expertly facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s Gauteng Schools Coordinator, who has been instrumental in driving the organisation’s outreach and education efforts within the province. The workshop was designed to deepen learners’ comprehension of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, particularly its origins, the context in which it was developed, and its centrality to the country’s democratic framework. This initiative forms part of a broader campaign by the Inclusive Society Institute to ensure that young South Africans are not only aware of their rights and freedoms but are also equipped with the knowledge and motivation to actively participate in shaping the democratic society envisioned in the Constitution. Throughout the workshop, learners were guided through a structured exploration of the Constitution’s historical development, from the oppressive systems of the past to the inclusive democratic dispensation that emerged in 1994. Key attention was given to the principles that informed the drafting of the Constitution, including non-racialism, non-sexism, human dignity, equality, and the supremacy of the rule of law. The facilitators led discussions on the importance of these values in consolidating democracy and promoting national unity. A central focus of the session was Chapter 2 of the Constitution— The Bill of Rights —which outlines the fundamental rights afforded to all people in South Africa. Learners engaged with the concepts of equality, human dignity, freedom of expression, access to education, and socio-economic rights, among others. Importantly, the workshop did not merely present these rights in abstract; it contextualised them within the lived realities of South Africans, encouraging learners to reflect on how constitutional values can be applied in their communities. Furthermore, the workshop delved into the Founding Provisions  of the Constitution, emphasizing the foundational values on which the South African state is built. The session highlighted the Constitution’s role not only as a legal document but as a moral and social compass for the nation. By providing a platform for dialogue and critical thinking, the Institute facilitated a space where young people could question, understand, and ultimately internalize the principles of constitutional democracy. An equally important dimension of the session was the emphasis on responsible citizenship . Learners were encouraged to see themselves not only as beneficiaries of constitutional rights but also as active agents in the promotion and protection of those rights. The concept of civic responsibility was brought to life through discussions on participation in democratic processes, community service, respect for the rights of others, and the rejection of discrimination, violence, and corruption. The workshop was marked by a high level of engagement, with learners asking thoughtful questions and sharing their perspectives on the role of youth in building an inclusive and just society. The feedback from participants was overwhelmingly positive, with many expressing a renewed sense of purpose and a clearer understanding of the importance of the Constitution in their everyday lives. The Inclusive Society Institute’s commitment to constitutional education is not limited to one-off events. The Gauteng programme represents a long-term, province-wide strategy that aims to reach a wide spectrum of young people across all districts. Similar workshops are scheduled to take place throughout the academic year in both secondary and tertiary institutions, reaffirming the Institute’s belief that education is a powerful tool for social transformation and democratic consolidation. By instilling a strong foundation of constitutional literacy and civic awareness, the Inclusive Society Institute seeks to nurture a new generation of South Africans who are informed, empowered, and committed to the democratic ideals enshrined in the Constitution. The ongoing rollout of the “Taking the Constitution to the People” initiative is a testament to the Institute’s unwavering dedication to building a society that is truly inclusive, equitable, and governed by the rule of law.

The Peacemaking Reflection Group – an association of primarily former senior UN officials – held there annual retreat over the period 7 – 9 May 2025.   The objective was to brainstorm the current state of the world and the place/role of multilateralism, especially the state and role of the United Nations and how the UN could be strengthened to effectively act for the broader good of humanity and the planet. The retreat outcome is expected to culminate in a strategic plan of action for the PRG in support of multilateralism and the UN.   The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel and the Executive Director of the Institute for Global Governance, Dr Philani Mthembu made a joint external intervention on multilateralism and UN reform through the African lens.

Occasional Paper 5/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. M A Y 2 0 2 5     Prof William Gumede Former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; former Senior Associate Member and Oppenheimer Fellow,   St Antony’s College, Oxford University; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg).   Abstract   The danger of a global economic downturn because of the wide-ranging tariffs introduced by the US, the 30% tariffs specifically on South African exports, the cutting of development aid the prospect of the country being cut from African Growth and Opportunity Act market access, means that the country is looking at a potential massive economic meltdown. A break-up of the current Government of National Unity will unleash further political and economic turmoil.   The National Treasury’s GDP growth forecast of 1.9% in 2025 is based on optimistic assumptions and fails to reflect the country’s ongoing structural obstacles to growth, including its public service, governance, policy and debt woes. The solution will not be found in doggedly following the same strategy of consumer and welfare-led growth, which puts pressure on public finances, and stagnates economic growth and job creation. It will also not be found in the pockets of already struggling citizens or the 12% who pay tax – increasing VAT and tax will simply dampen consumer confidence. No-one should be expected to pay more for broken systems that only continue to deteriorate. Rather, the answer lies in the governing ANC genuinely tackling corruption, advocating for merit-based competence, strengthening the rule of law, protecting property rights, and letting go of populist and ideological anti-growth, anti-business and anti-job-creation policies. A new growth path must be based on boosting infrastructure, manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and renewable energy. And it must be collaboratively led by a partnership between the government, private sector, civil society and professionals. The solution is not new, but it is becoming ever more urgent to action.      Introduction   If South Africa (SA) stays on its current economic policy path, or becomes more economically populist, and if it is unable to strike a compromise deal with the United States (US), it is unlikely to get even the 1.9% GDP economic growth predicted by the National Treasury in the 2024/2025 Budget.   The Treasury’s economic strategy to lift economic growth focuses on maintaining macroeconomic stability, implementing structural reforms, building state capability, and supporting growth-enhancing public infrastructure investment (Godongwana, 2025).   The National Treasury predicts real GDP growth of 1.9% in 2025, an upward revision from the 1.7% projected in the 2024 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS). Over the medium term, economic growth is projected to average 1.8%. The past decade has seen the economy grow only 0.8% per year (Neethling, 2025). Whereas, the country’s population has been growing at 1.5% per year.   The Treasury growth forecasts assume higher investment, recovery in household consumption, declining inflation, moderately rising employment, improving household balance sheets, and easing structural constraints on growth. However, the Treasury growth forecast appears to be overly optimistic (Bloomberg, 2025a).   The finance, trade, and agriculture sectors have in recent times contributed positively to GDP growth (Gumbi, 2025). However, contractions in manufacturing, energy, transport, and government services have undermined growth.   The Treasury does not appear to consider the continued structural obstacles to growth, such as the continued lack of state capacity because of public service, state-owned entity (SOE), infrastructure and municipal failures, caused by corruption, incompetence, and the many anti-growth policies (Jooste, Liu & Naraidoo, 2013). High levels of business regulation also undermine growth.   Moreover, global uncertainties threaten economic growth. US President Donald Trump has unleashed widespread global tariffs, including 30% against South Africa, and has cut development funding to the country. The US’ withdrawal of development aid – significant amounts of which were going to state, public, and civil society institutions – has left a big hole in South Africa’s public finances.   On 4 April 2025, US Congressman Ronny Jackson also introduced the US-South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025, which calls for a full review of the bilateral relationship between the US and South Africa. It insists on sanctioning senior South African government and ANC officials who support US “adversaries”.   The Budget estimates a revenue shortfall of R16.7 billion in the 2025/2026 year. The Treasury revenue estimates are based on expected infrastructure investment, while there is very little meaningful new infrastructure built that would justify such an optimistic infrastructure-led revenue. Furthermore, the structural hurdles undermining infrastructure development include corruption, ineffective SOEs and development finance institutions (DFIs), ideological opposition by many ANC groups to involving the private sector in service delivery, the Expropriation Law (which undermines property rights), many anti-business laws, and potential domestic and global economic turmoil unleashed by the US President Donald Trump’s wide-ranging global tariffs against allies and adversaries alike ( Shalal , 2025).   The Treasury revenue estimates are also overly optimistic – built on misplaced growth forecasts (Neethling, 2025). US tariffs will push up inflation and interest rates in emerging markets, including South Africa, and worse, will lead to a global economic downturn. Low global growth means lower demand for South  Africa ’s minerals and products. The unprecedented overhaul of global trade caused by the Trump administration will negatively impact on business and consumer sentiment, spending and investment, dragging down global GDP growth. There is also a real possibility that the US may unleash sanctions against South Africa, and individual ANC leaders, for long-standing anti-Americanism.   The ANC’s insistence on governing as if it is the sole majority-party, rather than it being part of a multiparty Government of National Unity (GNU) – which entails involving partners in decision-making, appointments, and policymaking – is threatening to break up the current GNU, with the real danger that the Democratic Alliance will exit. This will plunge South Africa into political turmoil. Add to this the US administration’s 30% tariffs against South African exports and its cutting of development aid to the country, and South Africa will be thrusted into a massive economic crisis.   The National Treasury’s forecasts are also based on unrealistically favourable macroeconomic outlooks, misplaced assumptions that there will be improved investor confidence, a stable supply of electricity, continued interest rate drops, and that South Africa will become a declining risk premium.   The reality is that South Africa’s business environment remains uncertain. A positive business outlook is one of the reasons for the Treasury and others’ positive economic forecasts, based on the assumption that the Government of National Unity following the May 2024 general elections would bring political stability, which would be the impetus for economic reform and, in turn, boost private investment and GDP growth (Bishop, 2025). However, as will be discussed later in this paper, the ANC, governing as if it is still the majority government, and not a multiparty GNU government, adopting ANC party policies without consulting partners, is putting the GNU at risk, undermining political stability. SA’s fallout with US President Donald Trump’s administration will also negatively impact on the economy, and on the country’s political stability.    Policy instability, infrastructure bottlenecks, and public service and SOE failures have undermined business confidence, investment flows, and lowering of the country’s risk profile (Jacobs, 2025a). State infrastructure SOEs, in power, logistics and transport – key to the economy – have undermined the economy’s expansion. They have undermined trade exports. The severe loadshedding has been reduced, however, parts of the economy had already collapsed, with business closures, which means that the return of power has not boosted economic activity. The country has seen declining real per-capita income, persistent unemployment, pervasive poverty, and one of the highest inequality rates in the world. Productivity has also declined.   The Treasury’s national expenditure estimates are also understated. Given the lack of political will to tackle the structural impediments to growth, such as poor governance, lack of professionalisation in the public service, and corruption, it is very likely that new bailouts for SOEs and DFIs will be required. New laws, policies and regulations that are motivated more by ideology, populism, and wishful thinking, rather than pragmatism and cost-benefit analyses, and that will be opposed in courts, will further increase expenditure.   South Africa is facing the real possibility of a debt crisis. Government’s gross debt is now projected to stabilise at 76.2% of GDP in 2025/26. However, government does not include SOE debt in its debt projections, even though that debt is likely to increase, given the lack of political will to tackle the causes of SOE and government failure: political cadre appointments, captured preferential black economic empowerment procurement, and government reluctance to hold failing SOEs – which are managed by political cadre appointees – accountable, for fear of alienating ANC party factions.   South Africa needs to build and fund a R390 billion expansion of the national grid so it can connect more power plants. South Africa’s electricity transmission network is owned by Eskom. Eskom provides more than 80% of South Africa’s electricity. It has neglected the maintenance of plants, and has not build enough new ones, and the two built, Medupi and Kusile, announced in 2007, ran eight years late and beyond budget. It was planned to cost R163 billion, but the likely final price is now more than R460 billion. Both Medupi and Kusile are still not functioning at full capacity.   Eskom plans to build 14,218 kilometres of power lines over the 10 years. This is three times the capacity it has built over the past decade. Eskom also have to increase its transformer capacity six-fold. Given the fact that Eskom struggled to built Medupi and Kusile, its capacity to build new infrastructure is in question. Eskom plans to source from the capital markets after the 2026 financial year to finance new transmission infrastructure. It plans to a mix of equity and debt. ANC leaders have insisted that the state lead these infrastructure projects, rather than the private sector (Bloomberg 2024).   The Treasury revised down the contingency reserve, which is currently sitting at R21.6 billion over the medium term, a wholly inadequate sum to mitigate the risks of unforeseen crises – now a real possibility for South Africa, given the factors raised above.   Consumer and welfare-led growth   Much of the economic growth over the past decade came from consumer spending (Hausmann et al, 2022). Unless other areas of the economy lift, household consumption is expected to drive economic growth in the immediate future. In fact, consumer spending likely prevented South Africa from sinking into a recession last year (Thukwana, 2025). It makes up around 60% of local GDP, and so, raising value-added tax (VAT) could dampen consumer confidence – and drag down economic growth (Jacobs, 2025b; Qwelani, 2025).   STANLIB economist Kevin Lings calculated that 138% of South Africa’s economic growth over the last 10 years has come from retail spending, with a significant proportion of that going to imported items (Lings, 2025). Mining and manufacturing have declined, and as a result, so to have their employment statistics and foreign exchange earnings.   A sizeable proportion of consumer spending is through state welfare grants – South Africa has a whopping 28.7 million people on welfare grants, and only 7.4 million personal income taxpayers. This means that 44% of the country’s population is on social grants, and it depends on 12% taxpayers (SASSA, 2025). This undermines the country’s fiscal sustainability. It means that increases in social development come without increases in tax revenue. Even worse, it comes with increases in the state’s wasteful expenditure, revenue leakages, misallocated state capital, and capital flight – due to the combination of corruption, state and SOE incompetence by political cadre-appointees, and anti-growth policies.    Welfare-led growth is unsustainable, as it puts pressure on public finances, and stagnates economic growth and job creation. Public debt continues to rise, with debt servicing now the largest expenditure in the Budget. State capacity and infrastructure delivery are not improving, because of the same issues of corruption and incompetence by political cadre-appointees. South Africa’s tax base is concentrated in a narrow band of high-income earners, who are highly globally mobile. Domestic anti-growth policies, continued state failure, corruption, and incompetence will force them to leave to other domiciles. Furthermore, global economic downturns – as a result of the worldwide impact of the US government’s global tariffs – will negatively impact on the incomes of high-net individuals (Goldman Sachs, 2025).   In the last quarter of 2024, manufacturing shrank 0.6%, mining dropped 0.2%, and construction fell 0.4%. Trade grew 1.4% and finance 1.1%, according to Statistics South Africa (Stats SA, 2023). For 2024, as a whole, growth rose 0.6%. Withdrawals under last year's “two-pot” pension reform had increased household spending towards the end of the year. Sixty-one percent (61%) of consolidated non-interest spending over the medium term is allocated to the social wage. This is not sustainable in the long-term.   South Africa's economy saw modest growth in the fourth quarter of last year, helped by a recovery in agricultural output. Agriculture expanded 17.2% in the fourth quarter of 2024 on the back of increased activity in field crops and animal products (Thukwana, 2025). However, agriculture is heavily influenced by climate change, extreme weather events, and anti-growth policies. The Expropriation Act, which allows for expropriation of property without compensation, will undermine agriculture investment certainty.   South Africa’s manufacturing industry continued to decline (Pule, 2023), dropping as a percentage of GDP from 21% in 1994 to 12% in 2021, meaning the country is deindustrialising. Manufacturing employment at the end of 2022 declined by 12%, compared to 2009. Between 2005 and 2021 the manufacturing industry lost 309 000 jobs, according to Stats SA. High levels of crime, power outages, infrastructure decline, no sustainable industrial policies, but rather, restrictive regulations, state failures, and a poor economic environment caused mainly by government, has led to this sector’s decline.   Although mining has carried the South African economy during difficult times, it has also consistently declined since 1994 (Chamber of Mines, 2015). The downward trend has been masked by commodity booms. Since 1994, South Africa’s mining output has broadly decreased by 0.4% annually, with gold decreasing by 85% during that period. The decline is not as a result of market conditions, but rather, it is due to power collapse, regulatory failures, corruption, capture of empowerment programmes and policies, and administrative incompetence in the departments overseeing mining (Parker, 2025). Incompetence, corruption, and lack of transparency has led to a massive backlog of exploration and mining permits – resulting in loss of investment (Jacobs, 2024).    More recently, local ‘development’ mafias and “zama zamas” have captured mining operations, leading to the informalisation of the mining sector. Typically, like in all other sectors, year after year, government have promised beneficiation, processing, and value-add product development – which has come to nothing. In 2014, South Africa had 35% of Africa’s exploration budget; now it has only 7%, meaning the future development of the country’s mining is imperilled (Miller, 2025). Mining companies have been deterred from investing in greenfield projects, focusing on maintaining current operations.   The gold industry, the bedrock of South Africa’s modern development, is the most symbolic example of the decline. Until 2006, the country was the world’s largest gold producer. South Africa has now dropped to eighth, with production down 80% over the past 35 years. China is now the largest producer. The gold workforce used to be over 500 000-strong. It now has under 94 000 employees. Switzerland is currently the world’s gold trading centre, with the largest refineries, which naturally should have been South Africa. The Bank of England stores many countries’ physical gold reserves, which bring these countries investment, employment, and revenues. South Africa’s decline into corruption, incompetence, and poor planning means that it is not seen as a holder of other countries’ gold. Paul Miller (2025) writes that South Africa “has lost two decades of new geological knowledge that could have been used to attract investment, support new discoveries, and develop the industry”.    In the 1990s, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) had around 850 listed companies. This has dropped to under 300, including some companies that have dual listings (Van Cuyck & Ahmed, 2024). The last few years have seen fewer large iconic companies emerging. And some of South Africa’s historic companies have been taken over by foreign companies or are the subject of takeovers. The de-listings are partially the result of the cost of regulation, compliance, and reporting, but also because of a difficult economic environment (Pask, 2024).   Based on data reported by the exchange operator, the JSE, 2023 was the eighth year in a row that foreign investors dumped South African equities, taking the total since 2016 to $53 billion. Foreign investors have been cautious of South Africa’s high corruption, high crime, anti-business policies, infrastructure collapses, and power outages (Bloomberg, 2025b). The Expropriation Act, the introduction of the National Health Insurance (NHI), and the fallout with the US – unless rectified with more pragmatic policies – are likely to slow down growth in 2025. Before the Expropriation Act and fallout with the US, the economy was predicted to modestly accelerate in 2025, as a result of an envisaged recovery in real household incomes caused by low inflation and falling interest rates boosting consumer confidence. However, this sentiment has been turned on its head. A continued fall-out between South Africa and the US will likely increase inflation – and the Reserve Bank is likely to maintain interest rates, rather than reduce them, which will undermine consumer confidence (Steenkamp, 2019).   Graph 1: National Treasury’s estimates of individuals and taxable income for the 2024/25 financial year.   Constraints on growth   South Africa’s democratic, political, economic, and rules-maintaining institutions have deteriorated – which has contributed to the country’s economic decline. Property rights are vulnerable. Rule of law in many parts has collapsed, the lower courts are inefficient and policing ineffective. Corruption is systemic. State capacity in many parts of the public services, among state-owned entities, and local government has been eroded. Crime is out of control. The state cannot efficiently enforce laws, rules, or policies. Infrastructure has collapsed in many areas. Many sectors of the economy, such as public transport, mining, and construction, have become informalised. The country has been deindustrialising.   Given this grim picture, an external economic shock, such as a prolonged fallout with the US Donald Trump administration, will have a disproportionately debilitating impact on the South African economy. The obstacles to most of these are political, social, and patronage-based, rather than technical, which is harder to reform. The political culture of the country has made corruption, incompetence, and misbehaviour acceptable – if it is done by those who share a similar colour, party, and ideology. Standard Bank Chief Economist Goolam Ballim rightly argued recently that while many of the constraints to growth “are largely technical, crime and corruption involve significant social elements which cannot be engineered or mechanically altered”, but needs political will from ruling elites (Jacobs, 2025a).   The International Monetary Fund (IMF) ranks South Africa as the most difficult place to do business globally among 49 countries in the IMF’s ease of doing business index (IMF, 2025; Jacobs, 2025b). The IMF highlights excessive regulation and government inefficiencies that hinder economic growth. It argues that halving SA’s restrictive business regulations relative to its emerging market peers could increase medium-run output by 9% and boost employment (IMF, 2025).   Gross fixed capital formation, which is an important factor of investment in capital assets, has regularly fallen (Sachs, 2021). The weakness in capital investment points to ongoing uncertainties in the business environment, as investors remain wary of policy instability, infrastructure bottlenecks, and economic volatility. Policymakers underestimate the impact of state failure, corruption, incompetence, and anti-growth policies on the economy, reducing revenue and undermining business confidence.   Lack of inclusive compromises on key policies, the NHI, the Expropriation Law, apparent refusal to renegotiate aspects of the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA) Bill to make it more inclusive, and perceived anti-American foreign policies have caused investment, capital, and skills flight.   In a VAT-increase scenario, businesses are likely to pass on the costs to consumers, which will, in turn, drive up inflation. This means that any rise in VAT is unlikely to bring in revenue as envisaged by the Treasury, as it would depress other parts of the economy (Gumede, 2014, 2025). In a study unrelated to SA’s VAT debate, the World Bank reported that over-reliance by emerging markets on VAT to generate revenue slows GDP growth, as it reduces household consumption – the effects are even worse in countries with high inequality levels (Tanzi & Zee, 2001).   South Africa saw high interest rate hikes during the period leading up to and including 2022 and 2023. Recent repo rate reductions, including the latest lowering of the repo rate by 25 basis points, have been marginal, at best. South Africa’s household debt is high, with the debt-to-disposable income ratio at a high 61.6% in the fourth quarter of 2023. Fuel prices have risen 12% year-on-year . If the government insists on also increasing value-added tax, it will undermine the purchasing power of consumers, spiking any economic recovery (National Assembly, 2025).    The Reserve Bank will have to review the policy of inflation targeting. State and state infrastructure failure is a significant contributor to inflation, as citizens have to use private companies to deliver ‘public’ services because the state has failed to deliver effective policing, education, energy, and health. This means that South Africans pay double: taxes for the state and state infrastructure services that are not being delivered, and taxes for private public services. Businesses then increase prices for products and services to factor in state failure.   But runaway administrative prices – which is the prices of products, services, and utility rates set by state-owned entities, government utilities, and municipalities – also contribute significantly to inflation (Gumede, 2022). Administrative prices are either set directly by state entities, or are strongly influenced by them, rather than by market forces. In normal private markets, where there are competitors to provide products and services, the price and quantity of these are set by the mechanisms of demand and supply. Prices for products and services in such open markets are usually forged depending on the demand for them, the availability of supply, and the multiplicity of providers from which to choose. However, goods and services provided by government entities are often supplied through monopolies with no competition, and customers have no other alternative than to get cheaper or better-quality products elsewhere. The government entities can then set prices at arbitrary levels, even if the quality of these products and services is poor.   The business model of most government agencies is based on increasing prices to make up for increased costs and revenue losses, rather than using market-related pricing – as is the case with Eskom, where prices are increased even if demand declines, and the quality of supply drops (Gumede, 2022). Crucial infrastructure SOEs, such as Transnet, which are monopolies, also often set prices that are disconnected from the quality, cost, and market absorption rate of services they provide.   The quality of government entities’ services, products, and aftercare services often does not reflect the prices they charge. Municipalities often set rate, water, and refuse prices at levels unrelated to those that equivalent private sector establishments would charge, but without any concomitant standards in service delivery. For example, the Transnet National Ports Authority issued a tariff increase of 19.74% for the 2021/22 financial year. In 2003, the South African Reserve Bank warned that administered prices, specifically by SOEs such as Eskom, Transnet, and Telkom, were fuelling runaway inflation.   Furthermore, the regulatory processes involved in setting prices for government services and products are woefully ineffective. Regulation is meant to correct government market failures, as in the case of ineffective price setting by state entities, which have no competition, by ensuring that they set prices more realistically (Gumede, 2022).     South African Reserve Bank Governor Lesetja Kganyago recently said the country’s 25-year-old inflation targeting regime is out of date and might be inhibiting faster growth and making the economy less competitive (Mutizwa, 2025). The inflation targeting framework helped lower interest rates from above 20% in 2000 to 7.5% now, and helped reduce macroeconomic volatility. The government adopted the inflation targeting regime in 2000, when it was set at between 3-6%. “The South African target is now rather dated, reducing our competitiveness and opportunity to generate faster and more sustainable growth,” Kganyago said. There will have to be a review on what is an optimal inflation targeting perimeter given South Africa’s structural rigidities, state failure, and the rapidly changing global macroeconomic policy trajectory.   Graph 2: Foreigners have sold South African stocks (JSE, Bloomberg).       Infrastructure neglect   Deteriorating infrastructure has undermined new investment, industrialisation, and growth. Infrastructure has declined because of corruption, mismanagement, maintenance neglect, underinvestment, and lack of long-term planning (Jacobs, 2025c). In fact, most of the infrastructure SOEs, such as Transnet, Eskom, and the waterboards, are in disarray. And many municipalities, the key infrastructure developers, are marred with corruption, incompetence, and poor planning.   The same can be said for the myriad of state infrastructure development plans and forums, including the Reconstruction and Recovery Plan and initiatives such as Operation Vulindlela, which have become virtual talkshops. Structures – such as the National Logistics Crisis Committee and Investment and Infrastructure Office – set up to play an oversight and coordination role, and provide governance over infrastructure, have not been able to provide the coordination, direction, or accountability promised (Lightfoot, 2023).   The breakdown of infrastructure drives up inflation, just as state, SOE, and policy failures do, as it drives up prices, the cost of living, cost of business, and erodes savings and deters future investment. The Reserve Bank has warned that the breakdown in infrastructure threatens the stability of the financial system.   Loadshedding, for example, has caused not only the loss of lives, but of businesses, capital, skills, employment, and investment. It has contributed to South Africa’s low-growth path, possibly taking away up to 3% of possible growth. South Africa needs around R150 billion per year just to replace the destroyed infrastructure, let alone build new infrastructure.   “The sustained deterioration in critical infrastructure poses direct operational risks that could disrupt the functioning of the financial system,” said the Reserve Bank in its latest Financial Stability Review. “While electricity availability appears to be gradually returning to historical trends, other critical infrastructure such as the supply and quality of water and transport infrastructure – especially rail, port and road networks – continues to degrade.”   Nedbank’s Chief Economist Nicky Weimar rightly said that after decades-long lack of investment in developing and maintaining infrastructure, the country’s economic infrastructure has imploded (Jacobs, 2025c). This means “our general supply curve is at a very low level. Even if demand accelerates, the moment it starts to strain supply, prices go up, interest rates go up, demand slows again.” Sadly, as Wiemar stated, if South Africa lifts growth to 3%, the power outages will return as there is not enough energy capacity to sustain the growth.   Restoring energy is a critical structural reform that is urgently needed. Unfortunately, reforms have been opposed by powerful interest groups who are benefiting from the energy crisis. As part of the structural reforms, the private sector has to partner – again, there is strong ideological opposition by some groups in the ANC and opposition party spinoffs from the ANC to private partnership in delivery. The energy reforms will have to focus on bringing on board renewable energy, cleaning coal in the way the Japanese are doing, bringing on board biofuels as Brazil has done, investing in gas development – whether in SA or in neighbouring countries – boosting energy grid infrastructure, and cleaning up Eskom, the state energy utility.   Current power infrastructure does not support higher growth   South Africa’s power grid built during the apartheid-era is centred around coal-power stations and the north of the country, which delivers power to the country’s main economic heartland in what is now Gauteng. Renewable energy currently comes mostly from the Cape areas – the Northern, Western, and Eastern Cape. Integrating the coal and renewable energy grid points, as well as potentially new energy sources such as biofuels and gas, is crucial to sustainably solving SA’s power problems.   The grid infrastructure of the country at the moment is not enough to handle rising energy production. The government announced a grid infrastructure expansion that would include over 14 000km of transmission lines and new substations. The problem is that many promises of infrastructure have been made in the past – with little delivery, due to a lack of state capacity, the manipulation of empowerment policies, and preferential procurement to give contracts to politically connected businesses who do not have the capacity.   The construction of new lines and substations is proceeding at a snail’s pace. The lack of transmission infrastructure is undermining attempts to bring new electricity on board. An example that after calling for bids that would double wind-power purchases from private contractors, the government did not award any of the contracts because it was not possible to connect the projects to any transmission infrastructure. Raine Adams, an analyst at fund manager Allan Gray, wrote in a note (2024) to clients that grid shortages pose a risk to the estimated 66 gigawatts of wind and solar plants that are already at various stages of development. As a structural reform, key strategic projects must be excluded from empowerment, preferential procurement conditions, and given on capacity merit.   Water provision has also plunged. Many of the water infrastructure SOEs, municipal entities, and boards have fallen into disarray. The provision of water in many of South Africa’s cities and towns has deteriorated to such an extent that many citizens are without water for long periods during water outages. South Africa’s freshwater sources are under threat of wastewater contamination. Many state waste water treatment works (WWTWs) are collapsing across the country, threatening ecological disaster in surrounding areas (Thorne, 2025a).   Water expert and environmental advisor Anthony Turton told BusinessTech: “The simple truth is that WWTWs are slowly rendering the country’s drinking water unusable. Without sounding dramatic, South Africa is slowly committing ecocide – national suicide by poisoning its own drinking and crop production water” (Thorne, 2025b).   The lack of reliable water has also caused the flight of businesses, investment, and skills and increased inflation, unemployment, and has undermined growth. “Load shedding has been supplanted by the water security crisis, which poses a similar if not greater threat to the quality of life and economic prospects of all South Africans,” said President Cyril Ramaphosa in his 2025 January 8th statement.   Transnet, the state-owned logistics giant responsible for South Africa’s ports, rail, and pipelines is, like Eskom, a major contributor to the country’s low-growth path. Transnet has a R136 billion debt burden. Its inefficiencies are causing bottlenecks at ports and limiting rail freight, undermining trade. It costs the economy over R1 billion per day. S&P has placed Transnet on credit watch, cautioning that the SOE’s cash flow is not likely to improve fast enough to stabilise its debt levels. Transnet has been burdened with governance issues, political appointees, corruption in procurement and ideological policies from government. It undermines South Africa’s competitiveness; increases prices, inflation, business collapse, and unemployment; and has undermined growth.   Investec Chief Economist Annabel Bishop calculated that Transnet’s lack of capacity to meet demand has reduced GDP growth by around 3% per annum. “This is likely to remain the major limitation on GDP growth this year for South Africa, with modest inroads made on capacitating Transnet only expected to add a per cent to growth, as South Africa’s GDP lifts by 1.8% y/y in 2025,” according to Bishop. Because of the decline of the railways, due to lack of maintenance, corruption, and mismanagement, Transnet estimates it needs to invest R200 billion to restore the railways back to capacity.   It will be a waste of money to invest in Transnet without bringing in merit-based management, cleaning up procurement by exempting the organisation from preferential procurement rules, and discarding ideological objections to having the organisation fully partnering with the private sector in delivering infrastructure services. Transnet needs a social pact between itself, the private sector, civil society, and professional organisations to co-deliver services and clean up the organisation. It is estimated that Transnet’s poor performance cost the economy R353 billion in 2023.     South Africa’s failing infrastructure SOEs and Development Finance Institutions are constraints on growth   The Government’s Reconstruction and Recovery Plan identified infrastructure development as a key vehicle for poverty alleviation, job creation, and economic growth. However, currently South Africa’s SOEs, particularly the infrastructure ones, are a major structural constraint on growth. The country’s state DFIs are similarly in crisis and lack the capacity and funding to significantly accelerate infrastructure development funding.     Thanks to corruption, incompetence, lack of capacity, and high debt levels, they are not able to manage any significant infrastructure build. They have been unprofitable, with large debts, and are in financial distress, having to regularly receive bailouts. According to the Department of Public Enterprises, between 2012 and 2023 the debt levels of the largest 10 SOEs rose by R313.6 billion. Government had to bail out these SOEs with R318.1 billion during that period.   The Treasury projected contingent liabilities at R1.17 trillion in 2025/26, mainly due to SOEs. Unless there is serious action taken to tackle the political interests behind the governance failure, corruption, and inefficiencies of SOEs, the debt-to-GDP trajectory could worsen.   Fixed investment by infrastructure SOEs fell 50% between 2013 and 2023 – where they invested 3.5% of GDP in 2013, this dropped to 1.6% of GDP in 2023. Just to get back to the 2013 SOE fixed investment levels, SOEs must invest around R134 billion. Investec has calculated that not only must SOEs bring their fixed investment levels to the 2013 levels of R134 billion; they need to invest an additional R240 billion to get to a 5% of GDP target.   Furthermore, in total, SOEs need to spend R1.75 trillion over five years to overcome the infrastructure neglect and simultaneously bring on board new critical infrastructure. Rationally, SOEs do not have the competence, the balance sheets, and the capacity – given their high debt levels, and many have their procurement captured by interest groups. The private sector will have to be brought on board on a large scale to deliver infrastructure.   The infrastructure SOEs and municipal entities will have to be prioritised for reform. The structural reforms to turnaround infrastructure SOEs must include merit-based appointments – with no preferential procurement – performance contracts with employees, and linking salary increases and benefits with performance. Where infrastructure SOEs obviously do not have the capacity, they must partner with the private sector to co-deliver services or fully outsource to the private sector to deliver (Ter-Minassian, 2017).    Graph 3: State infrastructure performance (Nedbank, Eskom, Stats SA & SARB, 2025).     The 2024/25 Budget   On 12 March 2025, the Minister of Finance, Enoch Godongwana, delivered the National Budget Speech, following a postponement on 19 February 2025. Controversy has centred around the proposed fiscal measure to increase the value-added tax (VAT) rate by 0.5 percentage points in 2025/26, followed by another 0.5 percentage points in 2026/27, which will result in a 16% VAT rate by 2026/27. The 2025 Fiscal Framework and Revenue Proposal with the 0.5% VAT increase was voted in on 2 April 2025. The Democratic Alliance (DA) is taking it to court.   The DA, many ANC members, and civil society organisations are opposed to this, saying it will negatively impact poor households – and that ways can be found to generate revenue elsewhere, such as cutting public sector waste, mismanagement, and corruption. Pushing for taxes to overcome revenue shortages is the wrong strategy. SA has reached the ceiling of raising taxes (Gumede, 2014, 2025). The state – owing to corruption; incompetence; state failure; growth-reduction populist policies such as the NHI, Expropriation Bill, and anti-American foreign policies; marginalisation of minorities and large parts of SA’s diverse society, political views and ideas – has lost the credibility to get SA’s relatively smaller taxpaying citizens and corporates to pay more taxes, as taxpayers cannot see value for money when it comes to the taxes they are already paying.    Within the ANC there have been two views on taxes over the past decades: popular among the masses, the first is to raise taxes for the ‘rich’. This view argues that the country’s well-off are under-taxed and that taxing the ‘rich’ is a lesser form of wealth tax, and importantly, taxing the rich will mean less electoral erosion for the ANC. The second view is the VAT option, because that is seen as spreading the tax over larger constituencies and is not ‘direct’. However, this tax is seen as more electorally damaging as it disproportionally impacts the working and lower middle-classes.    The ANC development model has been to increase taxes to recover losses caused by state inefficiencies, mismanagement, corruption, and ideological and populist policies; at the same time the government has cut capital spending, and entrepreneurial, technology, research and innovation budgets, while increasing social development budgets (Gumede, 2025). This is the wrong approach to fill revenue gaps. The savings should rather be made by decreasing state inefficiencies, mismanagement, corruption, and ideological and populist policies. However, the reality is that tackling these issues is politically difficult, as it would mean taking on powerful interest groups within the ANC and government – which could cause disruptions in the party. According to the Laffer Curve, there is a tipping point where increasing taxes will be so onerous that revenue will decline as people try not to pay taxes (Trabandt & Uhlig, 2011; Wanniski, 1978). Obviously, a high tax-to-GDP ratio can be argued for if there is a quality return for the taxes – better public services, reduced incompetence, and more accountability.   South African Revenue Service Commissioner Edward Kieswetter (2025) rightly argues that higher tax rates do not automatically result in increased tax revenues. Kieswetter says taxes must be seen by the public as being “equitable”. If not, it undermines trust and inadvertently hampers compliance and revenue collection (Kieswetter, 2025).   The focus overwhelmingly should be on keeping taxes as they currently are or reducing them, while aggressively increasing state efficiency, cutting corruption, boosting competency – which is at the heart of performance – and stopping wastages that occur on account of captured empowerment programmes, captured procurement, and the deployment of politically connected but incompetent public sector and SOE officials. There has to be better capital allocation by the state to prioritise growth sectors. State capital allocated as part of fiscal responses to boost economic sectors often does not reach its intended targets, diverted to patronage, captured empowered programmes, or simply not given to those who can make a critical difference. A case in point of the latter was the government’s Covid-19 loan guarantee scheme to rescue struggling businesses, which saw less than 10% implementation by June 2021 (Hausmann et al, 2022).    Despite a new three-year wage agreement to reduce budget uncertainty, managing the public sector wage bill remains challenging. A sustainable approach to remuneration and productivity is needed to align with long-term fiscal plans and ensure effective service delivery. However, public service trade unions are important ANC constituencies – and the party has been very unwilling to take them on by reducing the public sector wage bill.   Similarly, given the failure of the state, the private sector, civil society, and professionals must be brought in to help the state co-deliver public services and infrastructure. However, there is an ideological objection by some ANC groups to involving the private sector, civil society, and non-ANC professionals in delivering public services or infrastructure. This is a structural impediment which slows down the adoption of policies that would enhance public-private partnerships.   The simplification of public-private partnership regulations is good news, as attracting private collaboration will be essential to solving some of the country’s largest challenges, such as water, rail, and electricity.   The Budget reported that South Africa’s 2024/25 budget deficit was R31.8 billion higher than projected in the 2024 Budget Review , as revenue collection fell below expectations. The government’s gross debt stock is expected to increase from R5.69 trillion in 2024/25 to R6.81 trillion in 2027/28. South Africa’s net loan debt – gross loan debt less cash balances – will increase from R5.47 trillion to R6.70 trillion over the same period. The Budget predicts SA’s gross loan debt to stabilise at 76.2% of GDP in 2025/26.   In the 2025/26 fiscal year, the government will pay a total of R424.9 billion to service debt, which translates into R1.1 billion per day to service its debt.  Servicing debt is now larger than social welfare. Finance Minister Enoch Godongwana said debt redemptions were R73.8 billion lower than estimated a year ago because the government’s bond-switch programme continued to exchange shorter-dated for longer-dated bonds. This meant, according to Godongwana, SA’s gross borrowing requirement, consisting of the budget deficit, maturing debt, and Eskom’s debt-relief deal, dropped from a projected R457.7 billion to R415.7 billion for 2024/25 – 6.1% to 5.6% of GDP.   The Budget says that debt will gradually decrease – and debt services will decrease after this fiscal year. This is very optimistic. Debt is unlikely to stabilise while the underlying factors that contribute to debt remain. Furthermore, as Efficient Group Chief Economist Dawie Roodt has pointed out, South Africa’s debt burden is larger than the official debt numbers presented in the 2025 Budget. He said this is because the National Treasury did not account for the government’s obligations and liabilities, including the approved guarantees for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or the risks posed by municipalities’ debt to Eskom. Roodt has strongly argued for the Treasury to include both explicit and implicit debts in its outstanding debt estimates – which is currently not the case. Explicit debt is officially recognised in government accounts and includes government borrowings and guaranteed loans. Implicit debt is not recorded as debt in financial documents but represents expected future financial obligations – guarantees for SOEs, such as Eskom and Transnet, and municipal debts are part of these.   The fact that South Africa’s debt portfolio is weighted to domestic lenders, appears to have lulled many into complacency. If the business environment continues to decline, investors could sell and move their capital to foreign assets, which will make SA’s fiscal position worse. In the past few years there has been a rise in borrowing from the international development finance, which has increased since 2020.    The problem is, opposition to the structural reforms needed to reduce debt levels, the deficit, and increase revenue is mostly political, ideological, interest-based, and from corrupt groups – with strong powers to resist reforms. Many of the structural reforms being implemented so far have focused on technical aspects, capacity-building, and increasing or reducing budget allocations. Many of the non-technical, but rather political, ideological, interest-based, and corruption factors that drive the level of the budget deficit, the performance of the public service, and SOE and municipal liabilities, are not easy to tackle.   Many parts of the public service, SOEs, municipalities, and management of state infrastructure are beset with governance challenges, largely because of politically appointed, but incompetent leaders, widespread corruption, the capture of procurement policies, mismanagement, and ideologically-based regulations, policies and priorities – the solutions to these are mostly political. And up until now, there has been very little apparent political will to tackle these sources of governance challenges. Political appointees to the public service, SOE and state infrastructure management, vested political interest, ideological and corrupted policies have led to state failure, have undermined growth and the flourishing of private companies, the formation of new business, and the attracting of investments – undermining revenue generation.   Graph 4: Gross tax revenue as a proportion of GDP (National Treasury & SARS).       Assumptions underlying the Budget   The challenge is how to bring sustainability to South Africa’s public finances. Key to doing so is to reduce debt, increase revenues, improve the efficiency of the public service and SOEs, increase productivity, and lift economic growth.   To start, there has to be a political acceptance that growth is top priority. Many ANC politicians do not genuinely think growth should be at the centre of economic policy, arguing wrongly that to do so will be promoting ‘neo-liberalism’. Policies that undermine growth will have to be jettisoned. This means the NHI Bill must be reined in, and a middle-way must be cobbled together that introduces a dual public-private health system, not a fully nationalised state health system. The NHI Bill as it currently stands is threatening the sustainability of public finances, destroying value, will cause capital and skills flight, all of which will undermine growth. The Expropriation Law is also a concern as, firstly, it goes against the Constitution, which allows for expropriation of property for public interest purposes, but with compensation. And secondly, as it is, the Law undermines property rights.   State sectors that are catalytic to growth will have to be prioritised (Schröder & Storm, 2020). State failure is a big reason for low growth. In the short-to-medium term, state departments and SOEs that are fundamental to growth should be prioritised for professionalisation, corruption should be slashed, and competence increased, to increase productivity and lift performance. At least senior leadership of these organisations must be merit-based. Consequence management must be enforced. And preferential procurement requirements in growth-prioritised state sectors must be lifted.   Critical infrastructure SOEs and DFIs should be prioritised for reforms – and for public-private partnerships to co-deliver services; or where state institutions are so hollowed out, to hand over delivery to the private sector. Laws, regulations, and rules that obstruct public-private partnerships should be jettisoned.   Key growth catalysing municipalities and metros should also be identified and prioritised for professionalisation, corruption curbing, merit-based administrative appointments and procurement. In areas of deep failure in critical state departments and SOEs that have no prospect of immediately being turned around because of vested political, ideological, and trade union interests, the private sector must be brought in to deliver. Essentially, this will mean putting SA on a two-track structural economic reform programme: prioritising the key state growth sectors for reform, while outliers will come along.   There will have to be a review of South Africa’s inflation targeting monetary policy framework, given the continued structural rigidities, state failures, and the changing global economy – as it is, after 25 years, under new political and economic conditions – corruption, state failure and low-growth, potentially undermining economic growth.   Key catalytic growth sectors will have to be prioritised. Manufacturing remains important – its declining trend needs to be reversed. Agriculture is critical. It is important that land reform is not populist, emotional, ideological and revenge-driven, but rather, that it focuses on securing food; fostering an agricultural, manufacturing, processing, and technology industrial hub; and fostering related artisan, technical, and research skills. This would mean partnering with the private sector to bring back artisan programmes, agricultural technical institutions – especially in the rural areas – and fostering agriculture technology.    Lack of rule of law is also a constraint on economic growth. There has to be rule of law. Crime has to be tackled seriously. And the police, prosecuting and justice system have to be reformed to bring merit-based competency, fight corruption, and partner with business, civil society, communities and professionals. Insecure property rights is another binding constraint on growth. Incidents where property, development projects, businesses and houses, mines, and transport assets are hijacked by mafias, whether “zama zamas”, taxi organisations or political groups, will have to be brought to heel visibly. Sadly, property rights, rule of law, and rules-based social behaviours – without which economic growth cannot take place – are not taken seriously by many of South Africa’s political formations, trade union groups, and other formations.   Despite the usually superficial statements that mining is critical, very little has been done to encourage its expansion. South Africa has not taken any serious actions to beneficiate, process, or refine minerals. Mining laws, policies, and rights allocations are in many cases captured by politically connected figures, mafias, such as the “zama zamas”, and trade union interests – which is yet another obstacle to growth.   Graph 5: Total SA Mining Output (Minerals Council South Africa & Stats SA).   Impact of leaving AGOA, possible sanctions   The US introduced a 30% tariff increase on all South African imports into the US, announced by US President Donald Trump on 2 April 2025. The US accounts for 9% of South African exports, and over 600 US companies have investments in South Africa. South Africa exports 21.3% of its goods to the European Union (EU).    Losing preferential access to the US market through the African Growth and Opportunity Act or increased tariffs for South Africa’s products, will make these less competitive in the US market (Baskaran, 2024). Even the alternative of negotiating a bilateral trade deal with the US could take a long time to unfold.    Mining exports have protected South Africa during difficult economic periods. For now, some South African minerals – platinum group metals (PGMs),  coal ,  gold , manganese, and chrome – are excluded from the US tariffs. However, diamonds, steel, iron-ores and concentrates, metal jewellery, granulated slag from the  manufacturing  of iron or  steel , will be subject to the tariffs (Arnoldi, 2025). South Africa’s exports of mineral  products  and precious metals to the US came to R65.3 billion in 2024, with PGMs accounting for 76.3% of the total.   However, all this can change, depending on whether South Africa continues with its current old-style, counter-productive engagement with the Trump administration – not accepting accountability for long-standing anti-Americanism, for threatening South African and US property, land, and business interests through the Expropriation Act, for persistently marginalising minorities in state governance, and for blame-shifting the SA-US fallout on right-wing Afrikaner groups (Botes, 2023).   A 30% tariff on SA products will make exporting to the US unviable. It will have heavy negative direct and indirect economic consequences. Products immediately impacted include fresh produce, wine, and motor vehicles. The 30% will reduce SA exports, employment, household incomes, and government revenues. Upwards to 200 000 jobs may be threatened, and a reduction of up to 2% of GDP is likely.   If SA can retain the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) preferences, while non-AGOA SA products are under the increased tariffs, it may be less devastating. Nevertheless, whether the 30% tariff includes or excludes AGOA products, it will impact on the mining, manufacturing, and agriculture sectors. The mining and agriculture sectors have in recent times been the economic saving sectors for SA. And both these sectors have multiplier impacts on other industries, which means if these sectors are negatively impacted, it will also have negative spillover effects on downstream sectors.   Political actors and groups who reckon South Africa can quickly pivot from the US market to alternatives, such as BRICS, have a case of wishful thinking, as a loss of the US market cannot be immediately replaced. Of course, BRICS and non-BRICS countries in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, the European Union, and Canada, offer alternative trade options and could help mitigate US losses. However, for example, Russia’s trade with South Africa represents only 1.7% of the country’s total trade, exports and imports with the BRICS economies in 2022. Globally, Russia was the destination for only 0.2% of South Africa’s exports during the same time (Siegle, 2023). Russia contributes less than 1% of the foreign direct investment  in Africa (Siegle, 2023). A transition to new markets cannot be achieved overnight. Worse, SA’s state trade negotiation capacity is currently possibly at its weakest – most over-ideological, least agile and opportunity-minded – since the end of apartheid. State capacity has been eroded in state trade structures, as in other parts of the state, through cadre deployment, exclusion of minorities, and informalisation.   China may be South Africa’s largest trading partner by volume, but it mostly takes South Africa’s raw material, not manufactured products – it has trade barriers, but sends manufactured products to South Africa, which displaces local jobs. US companies manufacture in South Africa, meaning they have larger multiplier impacts. The Chinese government often demands exemptions from local labour, empowerment, and affirmative laws. US companies generally actively institute diversity, local supplier development, and affirmative action and social responsibility programmes – meaning they stimulate the economy in many other ways too, than only direct trade.   The US also provides development aid, not only through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through other state departments, through sub-programmes from US organisations receiving development aid from US non-governmental organisations and philanthropic foundations – directly funding South African state agencies, NGOs, and the private sector. China does not offer developmental aid – state, private, and philanthropic – on such a scale.   Neither will the African Free Trade Area be an immediate alternative. Thirty-four out of 54 African countries are in some or other conflict, and systemically unstable, which has made African free trade virtually impossible to implement on scale. African economies do not have the diverse, sophisticated consumer wealth that the US offers.   Graph 6: Debt Service Costs, Source Budget Review     US Trump administration tariffs heralding structural changes in the global economy   The wide-ranging tariffs introduced by US President Donald Trump will push structural changes in the global economy. In recent times, the world has seen mainly cyclical changes. US President Trump, on 2 April 2025, announced reciprocal tariffs that include all nations, not just a smaller group of 10 to 15 countries with the biggest trade imbalances. This new tariff plan has been dubbed "Liberation Day". US tariffs will push up inflation and interest rates in emerging markets, including South Africa, and lead to a global economic downturn.   South Africa may be part of the global formations such as BRICS and the G20, however, its economy has become marginal. South Africa’s economy is a small one, the size of which has declined dramatically since the end of apartheid – from being in the top 20, to the late 30s, it is now, sadly, in the same league as African economies such as Nigeria, while South Africa’s emerging peers Poland, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea have all risen to become $1 trillion GDP economies. There is a real danger that South Africa may lose out to most in the structural changes the global economy is undergoing, because many of its political leaders still operate ideologically in the Cold War era, are anti-business, continue to insist on anti-growth economic policies, and lack the resolve to tackle systemic state failure – which is an impediment to growth.   A fallout with the US will increase South Africa’s risk premium as an investment, capital, and development destination. It will result in global companies being reluctant to commit capital in South Africa. Many US companies and institutional investors may pull the plug. Companies will also be reluctant to pledge long-term capital because of the uncertainty. It will raise the cost of South Africa’s debt. It will also put pressure on the rand currency in relation to the US dollar.   On 4 April 2025, US Congressman Ronny Jackson introduced the US-South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025, which calls for a full review of the bilateral relationship between the US and South Africa. It calls for sanctioning senior South African government and ANC officials who support US “adversaries” (Fraser, 2025), which include China, Russia, and Iran. “South Africa has brazenly abandoned its relationship with the United States to align with China, Russia, Iran, and terrorist organizations, a betrayal that demands serious consequences,” said Jackson. “This legislation ensures we conduct a comprehensive review of this supposed ‘ally’ while also holding accountable any corrupt officials.”   The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) released its Financial Stability Review (FSR) in 2023, highlighting the likely impact of secondary sanctions on the financial stability of South Africa. The rand would be under pressure – and would be fragile and volatile (Soobyah & Steenkamp, 2019). The country’s risk premium would increase. There would likely be large selloffs of local bonds. During the 2023 fallout between South Africa and the US over evidence from the US that a Russian ship was on-loading weapons, local companies suffered heightened scrutiny by offshore banks when they made payments to foreign suppliers in the recent weeks, undermining their ability to do business.   If there are sanctions against South Africa, US dollar payments via the international payment system, SWIFT, could be sanctioned, as is the case with Russia. According to the Reserve Bank, secondary sanctions would mean a tightening or termination of correspondent banking relationships and increasing costs of cross-border payments. This would also directly impact countries in the South African Development Community (SADC) region using South African banks for cross-border transactions. The rand is part of the 18 currencies that participate in the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) system – regulated and supervised by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The SARB says that should secondary sanctions be imposed on South Africa, the CLS may remove the rand from the system, which would then expose South African banks to principal risks when settling foreign exchange transactions in CLS currencies, increasing settlement risk for South African banks.   It will also make it difficult for SA banks to make or receive any payments from correspondent banks in US dollars. The US may expand sanctions to include payments in euros or pounds. All of this will make it onerous to finance any trade or investment flows. The Reserve Bank says sanctions “will be catastrophic for the South African economy and has the undeniable potential to trigger a financial crisis”. It says the South African financial system will not be able to function if it is not able to make international payments in US dollars – which will impact on the economy and financial markets. Over 90% of South Africa’s international payments, of all currencies, are done through the SWIFT international payment system. South Africa is heavily dependent on foreign savings, capital, and investments (Loewald, Faulkner & Makrelov, 2019). The country’s current account deficit is widening. In the past few years, South Africa has experienced massive foreign investment outflows. Grey listing of the country because of high levels of corruption, illegal financial flows, and ineffective state policing; anti-business and anti-growth policies and laws; state failure; and infrastructure collapse have increased these outflows. Sanctions against South Africa will only heavily inhibit further foreign investment flows.   Graph 7: SA Mining, Manufacturing and Retail Activity (Stats SA & Stanlib).     Interventions needed to lift GDP growth   South Africa needs to and can grow itself out of its economic struggles. Economic growth is critical for reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio (Dybczak & Velculescu, 2025). Fiscal consolidation needs economic growth (Maupa, Makwiramiti, Padayachee, Nemataheni & Paine, 2019). It needs political will. It needs competent public institutions to oversee the reform programme. It needs a clear, coordinated, pragmatic plan. If state performance is not improved, corruption not cut significantly, wastages through captured empowerment programmes not eliminated, and anti-growth policies not stopped, SA will have no choice but to drastically cut expenditure.   As mentioned, the ANC development model has been to increase taxes to recover losses caused by state inefficiencies, mismanagement, corruption, and poor policies. Related to that, the government has cut capital spending, entrepreneurial, technology, research and innovation, while increasing social development budgets. Although raising taxes for the ‘rich’ is popular among the masses – and will lead to less electoral erosion for the ANC – it should not be an option. In a similar vein, raising VAT would disproportionally impact the working and lower-middle classes. Clearly, increases in taxes cannot be justified when public service delivery declines, and incompetence, corruption, and lack of accountability continues to rise (Gumede, 2014, 2025).   It is very likely that the high taxes – combined with poor public services, high corruption, and incompetence – are now damaging to the economy (Gumede, 2014, 2025). The Katz Commission (1996) in its third report   recommended the Treasury set a ceiling of 25% as the maximum tax-to-GDP ratio. The purpose of a tax ceiling would be to mitigate a negative outcome – if taxes are too high, they become damaging to the economy, as argued in the Laffer Curve proposition (Trabandt & Uhlig, 2011; Wanniski, 1978). National Treasury has rejected this ceiling proposal.   The warrants repeating: The focus overwhelmingly should be on keeping taxes as they currently are or reducing them, while aggressively increasing state efficiency, cutting corruption, boosting competency – which is at the heart of performance – and stopping wastages that occur on account of captured empowerment programmes, captured procurement, and the deployment of politically connected but incompetent public sector and SOE officials. There has to be better capital allocation by the state to prioritise growth sectors. State capital allocated as part of fiscal responses to boost economic sectors often does not reach its intended targets, diverted to patronage, captured empowered programmes, or simply not given to those who can make a critical difference. A case in point of the latter was the government’s Covid-19 loan guarantee scheme to rescue struggling businesses, which saw less than 10% implementation by June 2021 (Hausmann et al, 2022).    The ongoing SOE and DFI crises remain threats to national fiscal sustainability, public service delivery, and growth (Williams, 2022). The public sector, SOEs, and DFIs will have to be genuinely professionalised. This means that merit in appointments and procurement must be introduced – at least at the SOEs and DFIs critical to growth. There has to be greater accountability and oversight over spending. There has to be an increased efficiency in government spending, eliminating wasteful expenditure and mismanagement. But there also has to be more efficient allocation of state human capital to priority growth sectors. Deployment, affirmative action without adequate skills, and trade union protection of poorly performing state employees makes efficient allocation of state human capital to oversee implementation of projects almost impossible. The state will have to prioritise investments in infrastructure to support long-term economic growth (Lawrence, Eichenbaum & Rebelo, 2010). However, such initiatives must be in partnership with the private sector. There are many other viable non-tax revenue alternatives, including cutting corruption, inefficiencies, and waste – at least in the ministries and departments, SOEs, and DFIs critical for growth. Cancelling cadre deployment, preferential procurement at the ministries and departments, SOEs and DFIs is critical for growth.   Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) should be the pillar of South Africa’s growth efforts. SMEs are estimated to provide close to 90% of all employment globally. For the past 30 years, South Africa's growth strategy wrongly prioritised essentially ‘big’ state-led growth, meaning getting the ‘big’ state to create jobs. Clearly, this was a flawed growth strategy. Because ‘big’ state became captured, appointments and procurements have often been made based on political affiliation or patronage, and it adopted ideological, populist, and anti-growth policies, causing the strategy to fail at delivering growth.   The interventions needed to lift GDP growth are largely political, social, and vested interest, rather than technical. Fiscal consolidation cannot happen without tackling these. If South Africa does not take a more reconciliatory stance towards the Trump administration, retaliation from them will undermine growth. The South African engagement with the Trump administration must be on the basis that the fallout with the US, unless resolved, may tank South Africa’s economy, at the worst possible moment, massively increasing deindustrialisation, dis-investment and de-skilling, which will deepen poverty, unemployment, and business closures.   A key structural reform needed is to bring in the private sector, civil society, and professional associations to help with public service delivery and tackle development, state, institutional, infrastructure, and policy failure.   The best way forward would be to negotiate a compromise through an SA Incorporated approach, which would involve not only the ANC, but also the Government of National Unity partners, organised business, civil society, non-ANC experts, and South Africans based in the US who are in Trump's inner circle. Critically, it is going to be important that the new SA ambassador to the US not be someone associated with the ANC, but could be drawn from the non-ANC GNU partners, a business leader actively doing successful business in the US, or a South African civil society figure, not associated with the ANC, but respected in the US, or a South African within the Trump circle based in the US.   It is crucial for the turnaround of the economy that the GNU partners with business, civil society, and professionals to form a kind of GNU+, to help provide new ideas, capacity, and energy to turn around the country’s broken state, broken economy, and broken society. Importantly, this partnership should be based on co-delivery, co-implementation, and co-ideas generation. It has to be real co-creation partnership, not government only seeking the help of business, civil society, and professionals in instances of full state collapse. Nevertheless, partnership is particularly important in mission-critical state, policy, and resource failures.     Conclusion   The Treasury’s economic strategy the past decade has been focused on maintaining macroeconomic stability, implementing structural reforms, building state capability, and supporting growth-enhancing public infrastructure investment. The Treasury’s 12-year fiscal consolidation strategy has failed to reduce debt-to-GDP and deficit ratios or the structural challenges, because these problems have their origins in politics, which is beyond the Treasury remit. In fact, the Treasury has found it hard to pursue fiscal consolidation, avoiding more debt, and cutting expenditure to keep public finances together.   However, the Treasury’s efforts have been undermined by the lack of political will in the governing ANC to genuinely tackle corruption, bring merit-based competence, strengthen the rule of law, protect property rights, and let go of populist and ideological anti-growth, anti-business and anti-job-creation policies. Furthermore, the Treasury is constrained by the lack of a conducive environment for job creation and investment. This is not the Treasury’s fault, as the national government is responsible for this. The national government has consistently fostered a hostile environment for business, investment, and job creation by not tackling the rule of law, corruption and incompetence, by adopting anti-business and anti-growth laws, policies and public stances.   Instead of infrastructure-led growth, South Africa got consumer and welfare-led growth, which is not sustainable. It is not possible to change the country’s growth path without tackling the structural inhibitors such as corruption, incompetence, state, SOE, DFI, and municipal failure, and anti-growth, anti-business policies. A new growth path must be based on boosting infrastructure, creating a manufacturing mining processing complex, especially around critical minerals, an agriculture industrial complex, expanding renewable energy, establishing a biofuels industry, expanding SMEs, and fostering new industries that South Africa lacks, but which the world needs. 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It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to advance its efforts in promoting constitutional literacy and democratic values within secondary schools across Gauteng Province. On Tuesday, 22 April 2025, a total of 76 learners from Northwood Secondary School, located in Central Pretoria, participated in the Institute’s “Taking the Constitution to the People” workshop. The session was facilitated by Mr Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s Gauteng Schools Coordinator. The primary objective of the workshop was to deepen learners’ understanding and appreciation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa—its historical evolution, structural framework, and the fundamental rights and responsibilities articulated in Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights. Delivered through an interactive and pedagogically sound approach, the session provided learners with a comprehensive overview of the constitutional drafting process, the guiding values underpinning its development, and its ongoing significance in shaping democratic governance and societal cohesion. A particular emphasis was placed on the Founding Provisions of the Constitution, which articulate the foundational values of human dignity, equality, and freedom. Furthermore, the workshop underscored the importance of responsible citizenship, equipping participants with the knowledge and motivation to actively contribute to the consolidation of a just, inclusive, and democratic society. The Inclusive Society Institute remains steadfast in its commitment to this initiative. In collaboration with various Districts within Gauteng Province, the Institute will continue to implement similar workshops in secondary schools throughout the region. Through this sustained engagement, the Institute seeks to cultivate a generation of informed, civically engaged, and socially responsible citizens who are equipped to uphold and advance the democratic principles upon which the Republic of South Africa is founded.

#PublicDebtisPublic is new public platform on sovereign borrowing terms and conditions. The platform draws on available data rather than trying to get reporting directly from countries or private creditors.   It is an initiative of the Sovereign Debt Forum and Massive Data Institute (MDI) at Georgetown’s Mc Court School of Public Policy.   The #PublicDebtIsPublic is an initiative of the Sovereign Debt Forum and Massive Data Institute (MDI) at Georgetown’s McCourt School of Public Policy. The Gates Foundation will also share an update on its debt portfolio and why it decided to support this initiative.   A Webinar was organised by the TRUST ACCOUNTABILITY &  INCLUSION COLLABORATION   on 5 May 2025 to introduce the platform to public policy practitioners. The Inclusive Society Institute’s Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, attended.   The ISI is currently preparing for the UN Finance For Development Summit scheduled for the end of June 2025, where it will be arguing for fairer and more just Climate Financing for developing nations. It is concerned with current models that may well be over-indebting nations.