On 8 December 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) participated in, and chaired, an international dialogue on China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI). The session formed part of the Open Consultation Monday  series hosted by the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN), and attracted participants from across multiple continents.   The consultation explored one of the most pressing questions in contemporary international affairs: Is China filling a global leadership vacuum, or reshaping the rules of global governance in line with its own interests? These questions resonated strongly with the event’s theme: “Dissecting China’s Global Governance Initiative.”   ISI Chief Executive Officer Daryl Swanepoel chaired the session and delivered the opening analytical remarks, setting out the structural context in which the GGI has emerged. His presentation drew on the Institute’s ongoing work on multilateral reform and Global South agency, and offered a balanced, thought-provoking reading of China’s ambitions.   Key themes from the ISI presentation included a system frozen in 1945 and a vacuum created by stalled reform; China’s motivations: both corrective and strategic; global reactions reflect strategic anxieties more than principles; the Global South’s distinctive and pragmatic reading; and the future of multilateralism: adaptation or fragmentation.   The consultation saw extensive engagement from diplomats, academics and former UN officials. Participants interrogated questions of legitimacy, multipolarity, international law and the risks of parallel global systems. The discussion highlighted both the opportunities and uncertainties created by China’s expanding role in multilateral affairs.   This event forms part of the ISI’s broader commitment to shaping debates on inclusive multilateral reform, strengthening Global South agency and contributing to practical pathways for building a fairer international order.

The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) was established in 1961, with the aim of providing a nursery of ideas on what direction Nigeria should take on international affairs. Since inception, the Institute has been organising Conferences, Roundtables and Lectures. These are aimed at addressing current foreign policy issues and anticipating others still on the horizon. The Institute is a specialised instrument of foreign policy formulation in Nigeria. It serves as an intellectual base upon which decision-makers rely for informed opinion and expert advice to make rational choices between contending policy options. NIIA is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. ​ The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever-transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. ​ Whilst the institute undertakes research through the lens of social and national democratic values and principles, it is pragmatic, not dogmatic, in its approach.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) took part in the African Union’s 5th APRM Youth Symposium, held from 10–11 November 2025 at the Pan-African Parliament in Midrand. The event brought together young leaders, policymakers and governance institutions from across the continent to reflect on the Symposium’s central theme, “Youth in Governance: From Promise to Prosperity.”   Attending in his capacity as CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Mr Daryl Swanepoel welcomed the Symposium’s strong emphasis on meaningful youth participation in Africa’s governance and development agenda. He noted that the APRM had succeeded in creating a platform not only for dialogue, but also for evidence-based engagement on the continent’s most pressing youth issues.   As part of the Institute’s contribution to the event, the ISI partnered with The Ichikowitz Family Foundation to facilitate the presentation of the Africa Youth Survey 2024, a comprehensive study capturing the attitudes, aspirations and concerns of young Africans. The survey’s findings were delivered during a dedicated session of the Symposium, offering delegates a data-driven understanding of youth perspectives on governance, democracy, economic inclusion, peace and security, and digital participation.   Mr Swanepoel underscored the value of grounding youth policy deliberations in rigorous empirical evidence. He reflected that the Survey’s insights, particularly around trust in institutions, expectations of political leaders, and the urgent need for economic opportunity, resonate strongly with the Institute’s ongoing work on inclusive governance and social cohesion. He further emphasised that Africa’s young population represents both the continent’s greatest asset and its greatest responsibility, and that governance systems must evolve to reflect this demographic reality.   The ISI applauds the APRM for advancing a continental conversation centred on youth inclusion and looks forward to continued collaboration with partners to strengthen evidence-based policymaking. The Institute will remain engaged in follow-up processes linked to the Symposium’s outcome document, particularly those aimed at deepening participatory governance and amplifying young people’s voices within Africa’s democratic institutions.   The Inclusive Society Institute extends its appreciation to The Ichikowitz Family Foundation for its partnership and for ensuring that the voices of Africa’s youth, captured through their robust continental research, were heard where it matters most.

DevelopmentAid is the world’s premier information service provider for international development aid and economic and humanitarian assistance stakeholders. Our mission is to provide up-to-date and critically relevant information for donors, agencies, consultancies, non-government agencies, and individuals working the international development sector. DevelopmentAid is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The Centre for International Policy – Africa is an independent, non-partisan, not-for-profit organization which aims at broadening the knowledge of international policy and affairs on the continent. The Centre aims to act as a resource for African governments and regional policy-makers to make informed and better foreign and public policy decisions for the betterment of Africa and the welfare of their people. Secondarily, the Centre also aims to promote the participation of academia, business executives, civil society, religious leaders, media and other key stakeholders in the process of decision making. The Centre is a succinct regional think-tank that analyses pressing regional and global challenges and contributes to actionable steps that leaders and citizens can adapt to address them. The centre consists of and is staffed by current and former national and international public policy practitioners, academia and experts who provide in-depth knowledge and skills in specialized areas such as diplomacy, regional integration, security, economics, media and the Sustainable Development Goals. In terms of methodology, CIP-Africa aims to stir up debate of international issues through research and publications, dialogues, media shows, build capacity and contribute actionably to the international development and global governance agenda through strategic projects, partnerships and trainings on the organizations focus areas. CIP-Africa is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

Mashariki Research and Policy Centre (MRPC) is a non-profit, interdisciplinary, and independent think tank headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya. MRPC is a security foresight-oriented institution that informs policy and action through tailored evidence-based analysis in the Greater Eastern Africa region. It provides insights derived from forecasting, trends analysis, simulations and scenario development to anticipate threats in the evolving geostrategic landscape in the fields of conflict trends, geopolitical shifts and environmental security. Since its inception, MRPC has produced research on key regional issues, including the security implications of the EU-Kenya Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the ongoing conflicts in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the impact of Trump-era tariffs on East Africa’s trade resilience. MRPC has also provided training on Preventing and Counter Violent extremism (PCVE) to strengthen counterterrorism efforts within the Eastern Africa region and supported governments with evidence-based forecasts and strategic analysis, solidifying its role as a leader in anticipatory governance in the region. MRPC is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The Africa Policy Institute (API) is dedicated to policy-relevant research and analysis to inform policy-making, contribute practical ideas and solutions to Africa’s problems and to define the continent’s future. Founded in 2007, the Institute leverages its board, centres, knowledge hubs, experts, networks and partners to deliver on its grand vision of a peaceful and prosperous Africa in a just and equitable world. Through research and analysis, policy dialogue and advocacy, training and capacity development, technical and advisory services, API endeavours to bridge the gap between knowledge and policy-making and to inform policy action by governments, regional and global organisations and Africa’s international partners. Covering diverse issues in development, diplomacy, governance, security and geostrategy, the Institute has become a thought leader in China-Africa relations, the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa and climate Change. API's mission is to promote good governance, sustainable development, peace, and prosperity in Africa through research, policy analysis, capacity building, advocacy, and fostering regional and global cooperation. Conducting research and analysis to inform evidence-based policies and decision-making processes in Africa, focusing on governance, development, and security issues. API is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies is a national Non-Governmental Organization registered by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RCC) of Government of South Sudan under Chapter 3, Section 10 of NGOs Act, 2016. It was issued with Certificate of Registration by RRC. The Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies (ISPS) aims to foster greater understanding of the current issues through non-partisan Research and policy analysis, educational services, humanitarian support for the needy population in South Sudan and promotion of arts, music and culture in South Sudan. It aims to assist in capacity building of relevant institutions and individuals in respect to developmental fields. ISPS aims to promote informed and accountable policy and practice that responds to the needs, and well-being of the people of South Sudan. ISPS is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The Transatlantic Institute for South-South Cooperation (TISSC) is a think tank that aims to strengthen South-South transatlantic cooperation, along the Cape Town, Dakar, and Rio de Janeiro axis. Three sub-regions, two continents, and enormous potential for South-South cooperation are at stake. Africa occupies a significant part of its discussions. Its relations with the South American continent and the Caribbean, with which it shares a common destiny, are a key element of its concerns. These regions have converging interests related to maritime geography, cultural history, and the geopolitics of the Global South, which are experiencing renewed interest. In short, it is a rich and unexpected area of regional, continental, transatlantic, and South-South reflection and activity. Its action plan is firmly aligned with the guidelines of the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOCSS). Affiliated with the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), the Africa Think Tank Dialogue (ATD), and the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN), the TISSC shares their commitment to inclusive multilateralism, equity in addressing environmental challenges, and reforms in global financial governance. The TISSC is a progressive movement resolutely committed to structuring the Global South.

Occasional Paper 14/2025   Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   OCTOBER 2025   Dr Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies Abstract   Thirty years into South Africa’s democratic project, the constitutional promise of participatory governance remains largely unrealised, because whilst the 1996 Constitution enshrines equality, accountability and public involvement, democratic practice has stagnated. Power has become concentrated within political elites and party structures, while citizens have retreated into passivity, thereby reducing democracy to episodic elections. This paper introduces republican constitutionalism as a normative and practical framework to revitalise South Africa’s democracy by re-centring authority in the country’s citizenry. Moreover, by building on transformative and participatory constitutionalism, republican constitutionalism insists that sovereignty should not be a static legal status, but rather, it should be an active, lived practice, which calls for a vigilant, engaged citizenry that demands justification for state action and participates in shaping public life.   This paper diagnoses the systemic failures, centralisation of executive power, weakened institutions and civic disengagement within the South African context. It situates these deficiencies within the historical patterns of exclusion and elite dominance and then goes on to explore how republican constitutionalism can operationalise constitutional ideals through concrete measures, such as the strengthening of local autonomy via subsidiarity, the reforming of the electoral system to introduce constituency-based representation and the institutionalising of public-private partnerships that serve to enhance governance capacity, but in a way that it does not undermine accountability within the governance system. By drawing on historical precedents from the Afrikaner and Black republican traditions, the paper argues for an inclusive and contemporary republicanism, which should be rooted in the country’s constitutional values and ubuntu, which it does by reframing democracy as a shared ethical and political responsibility, with the decentralising of power and the embedding of accountability at every level of governance.   Keywords:  Republican constitutionalism, Participatory democracy, Transformative constitutionalism, South African Constitution, Democratic renewal, Electoral reform, Local autonomy, Ubuntu, Citizen engagement, Decentralisation of power Introduction   After three decades of South African democracy, the citizenry has become detached and estranged from the active civic role the constitution anticipates. Elections have come to represent the only real channel of democratic engagement. The daily work of interrogating and shaping public life has largely been usurped, or left to, political elites. As a result, South African democracy has become unresponsive and unaccountable to the majority of citizens, who are left alienated and disempowered to influence the decisions that affect them.   This position paper proposes republican constitutionalism as a theoretical approach to recentre power to the citizen and revive democracy. As a contemporary expression of people’s power – directed not against  but through the state – it offers a corrective measure to overcentralised, party-centred politics. Given that the democratic order has tended to concentrate power within parties and the executive, a republican constitutionalist approach argues that citizens must practice and embody democracy in their daily lives. This approach reclaims political participation beyond the confines of episodic elections. It holds that power is not merely distributed but claimed and exercised collectively.   The Constitution is South Africa’s lodestar. Yet too little is being done to give expression to its ideals. Rather than waiting for state actors, citizens must employ the constitutional framework to assert their role in public life and demand openness, accountability and justification. Republican constitutionalism, as presented in this paper, proposes a pathway to embrace the Constitution as a living document. It promises to catalyse a people-centred politics that does not see citizens as rights takers, but as active players in reviving democratic energy.     Failures: Centralisation and citizen inaction   Democratic Stagnation South African democracy faces myriad challenges. Instead of strengthening and expanding, South Africa’s democratic gains have plateaued following the transition. Though formally established and functioning in many respects, South Africa’s democracy has not given expression to the Constitutional goals. It has not escaped the deep-seated legacies of the past.   Professor Steven Friedman explores the causes for and nature of South Africa’s democratic stagnation. South Africa’s political and economic institutions are deeply influenced by the past (Friedman, 2021). There is a path dependence in that patterns of exclusion, inequality, power relations and social structure persist from apartheid and colonialism. The negotiated settlement which brought equal rights has not led to the major economic and cultural reforms needed to give effect to democratic ideals. It has not sufficiently challenged existing hierarchies. Persisting structural inequality severely limits the extent to which society can transform. Furthermore, due to economic exclusion and spatial inequality, many South Africans remain outsiders in their own country. They do not have the influence, nor the voice, to effectively participate in the political process and thereby contribute to democratisation (ibid).   The Constitution established democracy. It put in place the ideas and ideals to which to strive. But while procedural democracy established the rule of law and civil liberties, it has not substantively addressed the myriad disparities. To do so would require substantial political as well as societal will.   The elite power, social norms and values formed under apartheid remain dominant. Democracy did not sufficiently change the institutional structure in South Africa. Many of the old institutions remain with minimal transformation. This continues to serve the privileged. The lack of substantive democratisation - adding real layers, meaning and culture to the democratic spirit and giving it substance and character - has resulted in formal but not practical democratic freedoms. The result is that in practice most people cannot exercise their rights; they cannot participate meaningfully or have their voices heard. To Friedman, South Africa has not developed the mechanisms to attend to the inherent tensions between the demands for social justice and existing hierarchies. When these tensions accumulate, they do not get addressed; rather the old patterns are reinforced (ibid).   South Africa remains a bifurcated society. Rather than expanding the meaning of democratic citizenship, pre-existing structures of power and economy endure. Some see this as a constitutional failure. Instead, it is the failure of the state and its citizens to implement what is needed. Democratic stagnation has set in. To escape this impasse, a new debate is needed to rekindle democracy and empower citizens.        State failures South Africa’s democracy has been dominated by political elites and mediated through party structures, with little space for citizen participation. Weak political parties and fragile institutions have undermined state capacity and fostered inertia. The politicisation has become an instrument of party power, creating dependency.   Ivor Chipkin notes that weak capacity is systemic and often results from the politicisation of the bureaucracy. Inconsistent standards in hiring and performance, as well as poor service delivery and oversight, reveal both a suspicion of competence and a lack of accountability. Weak institutional capacity and inadequate institutional machinery explain why so much of the state functions as a box-ticking exercise. Why so few take responsibility beyond procedure (Chipkin, 2023).   There is a clear gap between what policies and laws demand and the state’s capacity to deliver. Much like the Constitutional aims, laws and policies prescribe lofty tasks where the state simply does not have sufficient technical ability. Formal democratic institutions have become detached from the lived realities of citizens.   The government’s response to failures has typically been to consolidate power. The crises at State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the state capture scandal clearly illustrate excessive power centralisation. Roger Southall, in Liberation Movements in Power: Party & State in Southern Africa  (2013), examines how liberation movements in Southern Africa have typically seen themselves as the legitimate embodiment of the state. This leads to the centralised authority within the party, conflating party and state. Once in power, parties marginalise grassroots democratic movements and privilege loyalty over accountability. According to Southall, the ANC’s claim to authority as the liberation movement has been used to resist criticism and narrow the democratic space (Southall, 2013.)   Under the Zuma presidency, executive authority was concentrated in the presidency. The president controlled the appointment of ministers and SOE boards. By bringing the State Security Agency and Hawks under his direct control, it meant that investigations into corruption were selectively pursued or blocked.   The cabinet offered little check on presidential power, while Parliament functioned largely as a party loyalist body rather than a watchdog. The Nkandla scandal, in which state funds were illicitly used to unduly benefit Zuma’s homestead, exemplifies Parliament’s failure to hold the president accountable. It refused to act on the Public Protector’s findings. The extensive failures of MPs to investigate irregularities at SOEs such as ESKOM and SAA, now part of the State Capture saga, shows how executive excess went unchecked.   Centralisation of power is not unique to Zuma. Apart from President Mandela, who diffused power, ANC presidents have moved to consolidate power. The ANC’s cadre deployment committee has long run a parallel process for filling senior positions (Matiwane, 2022). The party has also taken de facto control of other state appointments. This undermines the principle of a professional, impartial civil service (Section 195 of the Constitution), hollowing out of state capacity.   While presenting himself as a reformer, President Ramaphosa has continued this trend, centralising power beyond the post-1994 settlement’s vision. He has amplified and expanded his presidential powers by involving the presidency in nearly every policy area; effectively creating a super presidency by establishing parallel structures, such as the Presidential Climate Commission. These structures often bypass his own ministries. Justified as a means to address state capacity, this consolidates power without adequate accountability.   Rather than practicing cooperative governance, the ANC has entrenched a top-down power command structure. Citizen participation is largely symbolic, not decisive. This elevates politicians above citizens, limiting transparency and accountability. In times of crises or incapacity, the response is to close ranks rather than open governance.   The concentration of power at the top has led to local government failures. Though municipalities are supposed to be autonomous, they are very often dominated by provincial and national party structures. Local decision-making is stifled, and accountability is weakened.   State failure goes beyond corruption and incompetence. It is actively reinforced by excessive concentration of political power in the executive and ruling party. A weakened Parliament, hollowed state institutions, and an incapacitated public service have contributed to democratic stagnation. Citizen acquiescence It is insufficient to blame South Africa’s democratic shortcomings solely on politicians. The citizenry has failed to maintain and to deepen democracy. The post-transition period has seen broad civic passivity, apart from protests largely driven by lower-income groups. Whereas the anti-apartheid struggle was largely powered by people’s power (unions, churches, youth movements), the post-apartheid South Africa has seen civic engagement decline. This is partly due to the ANC’s initial legitimacy following liberation and weakening of civic structures, leaving few channels for participatory, bottom-up democracy.   The Chapter 9 institutions, established as democracy-supporting institutions or a fourth arm of the state to empower citizens, have not been sufficiently engaged. Voter loyalty has maintained the ANC in power despite poor governance and poor service delivery.   While South Africans possess an many mechanisms for participatory power, very few use them in practice. Awareness, knowledge, and skills to engage meaningfully remain marginal. Instead, dependency on the state has become the norm. The Constitution provides for spaces like ward committees and public hearings, yet these are often seen as symbolic; with political parties seen as the real the domains of influence.   The influential community organisations of the 1980s and 1990s have declined or disappeared. Some have migrated into the NGO sector without strong foundations. Citizens continue to struggle to achieve political ends outside formal party structures. Rather than organising collectively, many withdraw from political engagements. Or they rely on the courts. While judicial action is important, legal dependency neglects the power of citizen movements. Courts are slow, costly, and reactive     Solutions: Recentring power to the citizen   If the democratic order’s systemic breakdown lies in concentrated power among political elites, then its renewal lies in power’s diffusion.    Direct citizen participation, the bottom-up democracy of the UDF’s approach, must find renewed expression today. Whereas apartheid’s illegitimacy was a clear target, contemporary grievances are more diffuse. Corruption, inequality, and unaccountability are all single vectors, not a systemic whole. Strategically, the focus should shift from opposition to affirmation. The legitimacy of the democratic state, its founding, institutions and ideals must be actively pursued. Actively lobbied. The constitution is the lodestar.    South Africa is not merely a state. It is a Republic, from the Latin meaning “concern of the people” or “belonging to the people.” As the term “citizen” implies belonging to the city, so too the Republic belongs to the people, and the people to the Republic. This citizen-centred order gives republicanism contemporary relevance as an expression of people’s power.  Republicanism is about enacting freedom. It demands an active and vigilant citizenry to enact legitimacy, to pursue accountability. It rejects passive dependence on political elites.   Drawing from the grassroots democracy of the anti-apartheid movement, republicanism envisages people claiming power, not opposing the state. It calls for a bottom-up democratic order where institutions are solicited, checks and balances prevent power concentration, and politicians held accountable. Republicanism rejects the government as the sole locus of power. Instead, power is dispersed across legislative bodies, the judiciary, civic institutions and local communities. The focus only on political offices is itself an aberration of the constitutional state.   These republican ideals are found in South Africa’s constitutional design. For several reasons (party dominance, party ideology, political centralisation) republicanism remains unrealised. Here the constitution must find expression.     Previous republicanisms   A strategic turn to republicanism promises to activate South Africa’s constitutional principles. To chart a path forward, it is useful to reflect on earlier republican iterations in South Africa. Doing so offers a rare opportunity to reconcile disparate historical experiences. Building a united, contemporary approach. Afrikaner republicanism and Black republicanism were both responses to existing power structures, were pursuant of principles, and were determined towards civil empowerment. Both were also reactions to changes in power relations in a new political reality. Both offer relevant insights for today.     Afrikaner republicanism   (White) Afrikaner republicanism emerged in the 19 th century. Fusing European republican and self-rule ideas in a distinct settler colonial context.  Developed as a reaction to British colonial rule, Afrikaner republicanism sought civic empowerment from British rule; they actively pursued their own interests.   Loyal to a collective identity and in pursuit of Calvinist theology and mythology, Afrikaner republicanism was conceptualised as a religious duty to protect and advance their own. It expressed itself in the desire for self-determination; independence from imperial interference (Giliomee, 2003).   This vision found concrete expression in the independent Boer republics, the Transvaal and Orange Free State, where interests were consolidated into a coherent state ideology, an active expression of independence.     Black republicanism Black republicanism sought a political order grounded in black self-determination. Similar to Afrikaner republicanism, it started as a response to misgovernance and exclusion. Earlier expressions of black republicanism can be traced to African intellectuals hailing from mission-educated circles. Politically mobilising in a principled pursuit for self-expression, it resisted race-based exclusion and persecution. Leaders such as John Tengo Jabuva and Pixley ka Isaka Seme articulated Pan-Africanist views. Positing that Africans both have the right and the capacity to govern themselves. (Lodge, 1983).   Freedom as non-domination, true popular sovereignty, was their central goal. The approach later became guided by the black consciousness movement, which emphasised psychological liberation as a precondition for civil freedom. Whereas Afrikaners had the means and liberties to build civic institutions, black republicanism, which was morphed into a broader democratic republicanism pursuing inclusive terms under the Freedom Charter, was driven by mass democratic movements such as civic associations and trade unions. While its realisation remains lacking, black republicanism found concrete expression in the new constitutional order which recognised the people as sovereign.      Towards a contemporary republicanism   Republicanism today exists in a space. Some opinions focus on the legal constitutional dimensions, others stress autonomy, while still others rally around grassroots organisations. The different views do not preclude a unified approach.   The debate has largely moved on. Equality, inclusivity and representation have been enshrined in the Constitution. The challenge is to turn form into function. To move beyond procedural democracy and make constitutional ideals real. To enact true, experienced transformation.     Transformative constitutionalism remains one of the most influential concepts in South African legal scholarship. Former Chief Justice Pius Langa championed this teleological framework for a just and equitable future. He explained how the constitution should serve as a tool for ongoing economic, social and legal transformation (Langa, 2006). Broad-based transformation, through reconciliation and access to justice should be made real. Not only procedural. This approach, as guided by the injunction of the constitution’s preamble to “recognise the injustices of the past…heal the divisions of the past” (South African Government, 1996) establishes transformation as a permanent, ongoing ideal.   Langa held that constitutional culture cannot simply be about obedience to the law – passive and unengaged. With a sovereign citizenry, state authority cannot summarily be imposed. Power must be justified, with reference to constitutional values. The work of Etienne Mureinik on the power of justification is at the heart of Langa’s framing of transformative constitutionalism. To Mureinik, every law and every act must substantively serve the citizenry. All power must be explained, must be justified. In South Africa, the power of justification is transformative (Mureinik, 1994). It establishes an ongoing relationship between the citizenry and the state.   Not only must power be justified, but it also requires an interrogating citizenry. If the government is to justify its decisions and actions, the citizen must have a meaningful opportunity to participated and deliberate. This is the participative democracy that the constitution makes requirements for under Sections 59, 72 and 118 (South African Government, 1996).   Participation is essential. Landmark judgments such as Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly  (2006) and Matatiele Municipality v President  (2006) confirm that public participation must be substantive. Participatory constitutionalism animates the culture of justification.   Substantive engagements between citizens and their representatives promise to shift democracy from episodic elections to an everyday practice where people participate on an ongoing basis. Justification promises accountability.       Republican constitutionalism   Republican constitutionalism builds upon the transformative and participatory frameworks. Mamphela Ramphele writes that too many South Africans treat democracy as if it were delivered by the state. Citizens wait for the state and consider episodic voting as their sole democratic duty (Ramphele, 2012). Yet, citizenship is not about entitlements. Citizens are not the clients of the state but co-rulers. They must actively exercise their responsibility and participate in shaping society (Ramphele, 2012).   Republican constitutionalism extends beyond liberal rights, which define citizenship merely as a legal status. It envisions a model where a republican ethos of vigilance, insistence on justification, and active involvement in governance prevails. At its core, a people-centred approach that stresses popular sovereignty.    The capture of the democratic project by party politics is a betrayal of the Constitution’s vision. The republican approach, whereby citizens reclaim their political subjectivity, is an assertion of autonomy from party-political or governmental control.   Republican constitutionalism offers a response to the failures of the democratic project. It provides a credible way to give expression to the Constitution’s aspirations. A contemporary, inclusive republicanism need not pursue only negative freedoms, as seen in Afrikaner and Black republicanism. Its pursuit should not only be limited to constraining executive dominance but should focus on broadening democratic life. With the Constitution as lodestar, republicanism can be reframed as an active process, one that pursues positive freedoms in everyday life.   Such an approach extends beyond formal institutions. It draws from Afrikaner republicanism's insistence on independence and unites it with Black republicanism’s emphasis on universal suffrage to establish an inclusive sovereignty. In so doing, it decentralises power: each citizen becomes a node of accountability, collectively opposing the arbitrary exercise of authority.   Pursuant of principles, constitutional republicanism moves the debate from form to function, focusing on governance, participation and accountability. Whereas earlier republicanisms opposed the system and viewed democracy as something to be won, democratic culture today must be practised in the present through shared leadership. It must be built through justification and oriented toward the common good. Instead of a single Volk, the republican identity is rooted in the constitutional values such as equality and dignity.   Republicanism insists that no one rules alone. The devolution of power, understood as relational between individuals, is a true expression of ubuntu. Ubuntu is grounded in mutual recognition, care and solidarity. It affirms the individual’s inalienable connection to the community. Ubuntu sees participation not as a duty imposed from the outside, but as an ethical response to belonging to a community. Shared life is the basis of political legitimacy.   South African democracy needs revitalisation through ubuntu, not only through elite bargains. While many fora and community initiatives are establishing laudable civic-driven solutions, such as fixing potholes or supporting local clinics, these should be driven by ubuntu, not captured by private or business interests. Initiatives that respond to state failure by serving private interests alone (e.g. private security) do not offer equitable or sustainable solutions to democratic stagnation. They fail to address the consolidation of power and public disillusionment. Such examples of elite capture avoid the root causes of democratic decay and risk precipitating systemic socio-political collapse.   Walking away from the state is not an option. Nor is it outsourcing agency and responsibility to private actors. The state will be empowered when the citizenry is collectively empowered.      Active citizenry: Giving expression to constitution   Active citizenry is more than symbolic. It is the most direct way to make the Constitution come alive in everyday life. From reporting issues to standing for public office, there are many ways to substantiate public life.  The Constitution provides for involvement in Parliament, provincial legislatures, and municipal councils. Community-based organisations such as school governing bodies and ward committees are spaces where citizens co-govern.   Citizens should not wait for the government to enact public participation processes. They must actively engage political process, including by pursuing:       Greater local autonomy Subsidiarity is the principle that demands decisions to be taken closest to the people. While not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, subsidiarity is an important concept in the constitutional design. Read together, Sections 151(3) and 151(4) of the Constitution entrench municipalities right to govern their own affairs, subject to national and provincial oversight only where necessary (South African Government, 1996).   Too often, municipal authority is undermined and usurped by higher spheres of power. Local decisions are overridden or stalled by provincial departments. Party politics lead to local interference, and capacity issues are used to justify top-down control. These actions erode accountability and obscure responsibility, leaving citizens in the dark.   Local authority can function better by reinforcing municipal self-government. Clearer limits on provincial oversight will create the conditions for genuine autonomy. An autonomy that depends on the requisite local skills and resources. It is critical to invest in local government training and retain professional skills locally. Communities can also develop frameworks where national government, universities and the private sector second professionals into the municipal systems.   When local governments are empowered, public participation becomes more practicable. When the chain of contact is shortened, when citizens see their inputs driving local decision-making, trust and cooperative relationships can grow.   Citizens should become directly involved in the business of politics. They must seek active involvement in ward committees, ratepayers’ associations and other fora to strengthen local oversight. Municipal budgets and service-delivery plans can then be monitored, and integrated development plans influenced to reflect community priorities. Such actions drive accountability from the lowest point possible.    A third, hybrid approach combining public and private participation is already developing in South Africa. This approach emerges where citizens step into vacuums left by the state. Filling potholes, forming community policing forums, or drilling boreholes where taps have run dry. These initiatives show civic energy and innovation.   However, at the risk of deepening inequality and establishing unaccountable structures, it is critical that these initiatives work with the state, not against it. Every effort must be made to institutionalise public-private partnerships with municipalities. The example of Business for South Africa (B4SA) offers a successful example for municipalities to emulate. B4SA has raised private sector funds for targeted initiatives, supporting technical experts and helping to solve acute problems.   When citizens commit to and invest in local public-private initiatives – beyond private services benefitting only themselves - they give effect to local autonomy and strengthen local governance capacity. For example, citizens can help municipalities improved procurement and service-tracking systems, thereby enhancing transparency and reducing undue provincial interference.     Electoral reform Appropriate reform of the electoral system stands to significantly move authority closer to the citizenry. The Electoral Reform Consultation Panel (ERCP) was established by Parliament in 2023 to study possible reforms, consult the public, and make recommendations for a more legitimate and accountable electoral system. Established in accordance with the Electoral Amendment Act of 2023, the ERCP is the most authoritative electoral reform panel to date.   On 18 September, the ERCP reports were tabled before Parliament. The panel submitted both an original as well as an alternative report. The key difference lies in their recommendations. Whereas the original report explicitly recommends reform that will give expression to greater political accountability, the alternative found that the current system, with minor tweaks, could be maintained. Parliament should now be lobbied to reject the latter.   The original report aligns with the arguments made in this paper. It makes a compelling case for reviving citizen-centred democracy in South Africa. It “strongly recommends that Parliament consider electoral reform to strengthen the relationship between voters and their representatives” (Home Affairs, 2025). It proposes that South Africa adopt a hybrid electoral model that retains proportional representation but introduces constituencies -  either with smaller multi-member or single-member constituencies (ibid). The recommendations are proposed “in light of the findings and concerns emerging from public consultations … we heard the same concerns over and over again. Across provinces, languages, stakeholder groups, rural and urban locations – the lack of accountability was the common theme” (ibid, 120 and 112).   The report presents a foundation for a republican-constitutionalist future. Not only is it influenced by public participation, but it also seeks to address democratic weaknesses by moving the political power closer to the citizen.  Constituency-based reform would not merely tweak representation but could help revive democracy along republican lines.   Under the current purely proportional representation system, voters do not directly elect Parliamentarians. Representatives are accountable upward to their parties, not downward to the voters. This arrangement fuels alienation. Parliament, controlled by parties, is distant and unresponsive to local concerns. Citizens thus become passive participants in episodic elections. Party centralism leads to power accumulation at the top, to party structures and to the government’s executive.   Constituency-based electoral systems promise to decentralise power. Giving effect to greater citizen involvement in public life. When Parliamentarians are directly elected by and therefore held accountable by citizens, power flows to (and from) the citizen, not to the party. A candidate’s electability will be determined by their reputation among voters. Party bosses will rely on local candidates, rather than the other way around.   The bottom-up power structure creates arenas in which citizens can substantiate public life. While municipal elections already function in this model, South Africa’s politics is dominated by the national level. Constituency offices and town-hall meetings, where Parliamentarians provide a direct link to national decision-making, could re-energise civic engagement at the municipal level.    When Parliamentarians derive their legitimacy from voters, they will be required to constantly justify and defend their decisions. Stronger deliberation will help revive and mobilise community-based politics. Disillusioned citizens, those who have withdrawn from politics due to corruption or unresponsiveness, may once again see politics as a shared public space. Skilled potential leaders, currently deterred by party dominance, could be drawn back into public life. Beyond leadership renewal, citizens themselves may feel empowered to organise and engage when representation is directly tied to where they live. Constituencies, therefore, not only promote pluralism but promise to breathe life into a new era of active citizenry.     Conclusion   This paper has proposed republican constitutionalism as a pathway to revive South African democracy. Thirty years after 1994, the promises of the Constitution remain largely formal. The substance of the constitutional project, its accountability and participatory spirit, has been undermined by weak institutions, political centralisation and the withdrawal of citizens from public life. As an effect, democracy has been hollowed out, reduced to a procedural politics revolving around elections and dominant parties. The top-down power structure treats citizens as bystanders rather than active participants.    Reviving democracy and giving real expression to the Constitution will empower citizens as sovereign. They must once again become the active subjects of political power, demanding openness, justification and accountability. Republican constitutionalism seeks to decentralise authority through greater local autonomy, reforms that empower citizens, and public-private partnerships that strengthen, rather than counter the state. Republican constitutionalism expands upon the participatory and transformative constitutionalist approaches to reactive civic culture and to restore the constitution as the lodestar of public life.   Republican constitutionalism responds directly democratic stagnation. It recognises that democracy cannot simply be left to the elites. It must be enacted, defended and lived by citizens themselves. Only through this active, shared engagement can South Africa reclaim the spirit of the Constitution and renew its democratic life.   References   Chipkin, I. (2023) South Africa: An Agenda for Reform . Policy Brief, 1(1). Johannesburg: New South Institute.   Friedman, S. (2021) Prisoners of the Past: South African Democracy and the Legacy of Minority Rule . Johannesburg: Wits University Press.   Giliomee, H. (2003) The Afrikaners: A Biography of a People . Cape Town: Tafelberg.   Home Affairs (2025) Electoral Reform Consultation Panel: Original Report . Department of Home Affairs. Available at: https://www.dha.gov.za  (Accessed: 7 October 2025).   Langa, P. (2006) ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’, Stellenbosch Law Review , 17(3), pp. 351–360.   Lodge, T. (1983) Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 . Johannesburg: Ravan Press.   Matiwane, Z. (2022) ‘Minutes show ANC ran “parallel process” to fill top government jobs: DA’, Sowetan Live , 5 January. Available at: https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-01-05-minutes-show-anc-ran-parallel-process-to-fill-top-government-jobs-da  (Accessed: 7 October 2025).   Mureinik, E. (1994) ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’, South African Journal on Human Rights , 10(1), pp. 31–48.   Ramphele, M. (2012) Conversations with My Sons and Daughters . Johannesburg: Penguin Books.   South African Government (1996) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 . Available at: https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-04-feb-1997  (Accessed: 7 October 2025).   Southall, R. (2013) Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa . Cambridge: Boydell & Brewer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute participated in a high-level panel discussion titled “Türkiye’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Assistance in the Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts”, organised by the Communication Directorate of the Türkiye Presidency and held in Johannesburg on 21 November 2025 on the margins of the G20 Leaders’ Summit. The event formed part of South Africa’s G20 Presidency programme, which is anchored in the theme “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability.” The panel explored Türkiye’s growing role in humanitarian diplomacy, its experience in mediation, and the emerging opportunities for deeper South–South cooperation in addressing global crises.   The session brought together leading academics, policy practitioners and civil society voices. The panel was moderated by Prof. Dr. Kılıç Buğra Kanat (Penn State University), with contributions from Prof. William Gumede, Prof. Dr. Erman Akıllı, Dr. Liaqat Alli Azam, Dr. Tunç Demirtaş and Mr. Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute. The discussion examined Türkiye’s evolving humanitarian diplomacy model, which in recent years has become a central pillar of its foreign policy. The panel contextualised Türkiye’s increasing international footprint, from its role in peace facilitation in regions such as Karabakh, Libya, Syria and Ukraine, to its leadership in humanitarian operations through institutions like AFAD, TİKA and the Turkish Red Crescent. The Black Sea Grain Initiative was highlighted as an example of how results-oriented diplomacy can generate practical, confidence-building outcomes.   The panellists also reflected on the shrinking humanitarian capacity of the United Nations system, with global need expanding faster than the resources available to the multilateral system. This widening gap has created space, and necessity, for middle-income countries (MICs) to assume more proactive roles in humanitarian action and crisis mediation.   Contribution by the Inclusive Society Institute   ISI CEO Daryl Swanepoel delivered substantive remarks focusing on the opportunities emerging for greater middle-income country leadership in humanitarian diplomacy. Drawing on the South African and Turkish experiences, he emphasised that as the UN system comes under increasing fiscal and operational strain, middle-income countries must show greater solidarity with one another and step forward to help fill the vacuum in global humanitarian leadership. Mr. Swanepoel described Türkiye’s humanitarian diplomacy model as practical, agile and impactful, noting its visible interventions during crises such as the Syrian refugee emergency and its rapid mobilisation capacity in humanitarian response. He placed this within the broader African context as South Africa hosts the G20 for the first time on the continent.   Importantly, he underscored that humanitarian action serves both moral and national-interest objectives. While the primary beneficiaries are people in crisis, countries that step up gain durable diplomatic relationships, soft power, regional stability and opportunities for cooperation in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.   A proposal for Middle-Income leadership   In his remarks, Mr. Swanepoel tabled a concrete proposal for elevating MIC cooperation through a Türkiye-South Africa Humanitarian Solidarity Initiative, open to participation by other willing middle-income partners. The proposal comprises three pillars:   A joint humanitarian and mediation platform, combining diplomatic networks, analytical capacity and mediation experience to support peace efforts and humanitarian corridors in regions where MICs countries have longstanding ties. A South–South humanitarian facility, co-sponsored by Türkiye and South Africa and other interested MICs, focused on “forgotten crises” that receive limited attention from major donors. Contributions may include funding, logistics, medical teams, engineering support and training. A capacity-building partnership among think tanks, universities and civil society to train young diplomats and humanitarian professionals in mediation, negotiation and crisis response. He emphasised that such a platform would not replace the UN but complement it, providing agility and regional insight that traditional institutions sometimes lack.

The Shaanxi (China) - Western Cape (South Africa) Economic and Trade Cooperation Negotiation Conference, held on 19 September 2024, at the Rockefeller Hotel in Cape Town, brought together key stakeholders to foster economic collaboration. Organized by the CCPIT Shaanxi Sub-Council and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), with support from the China-Africa Silk Road Industry Cooperation Promotion Center, the event was a platform for discussions and the signing of agreements.   The conference began with opening remarks by Mr Li Jun, Vice Governor of Shaanxi Province, and Alderman James Vos, City of Cape Town’s Mayoral Committee Member for Economic Growth. This was followed by the signing of trade agreements between New Airline Group and VALUE Group, as well as between Shaanxi Tourism Group and Ridgemorvilla Estate, showcasing the potential for tourism and transportation sector growth.   Mr Tang Changan from the Chinese Consulate-General and Ms Erica Joubert from Wesgro, delivered speeches emphasizing the mutual benefits of China-South Africa trade partnerships. Deputy Chairperson of the ISI, Ms Buyelwa Sonjica also shared her insights. The event concluded with a business matching and negotiation session, paving the way for future investments and strengthened economic ties between the Shaanxi Province and the Western Cape.

Occasional Paper 13/2025   Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   OCTOBER 2025   Daryl Swanepoel Abstract   China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI), announced in 2025 by President Xi Jinping, has drawn extensive international scrutiny. Western commentators often frame it as an attempt to create a parallel system, a rival architecture to the UN-based, liberal order led by the United States and its allies. Yet this paper argues that such criticism, while not necessarily unfounded, is incomplete and at times misplaced.   China’s proposals stem from the manifest failure of the existing global governance framework to reform itself. The United Nations remains structurally frozen in 1945, the Bretton Woods institutions disproportionately represent Western economic power and the rhetoric of a “rules-based order” often masks selective adherence to those very rules by the West.   This paper contends that the West’s unwillingness to share institutional power and to genuinely reform multilateralism has created the vacuum that China now fills. Rather than dismissing the GGI as a threat, policymakers should recognise it as both a symptom of global governance stagnation and a test of whether an inclusive, pluralist order can still be built. The real challenge is not to condemn China’s initiatives per se, but to address the underlying legitimacy deficit of the current system. The West’s defensive rigidity, more than China’s assertiveness, is driving the fragmentation of multilateral governance.     1. Introduction   When President Xi Jinping announced the Global Governance Initiative  (GGI) in early 2025, the initiative was immediately labelled by many Western analysts as a bid by China to reshape the world order in its image (The Diplomat, 2025; Reuters, 2025). The GGI follows two earlier efforts, being the Global Development Initiative  (GDI, 2021) and the Global Security Initiative  (GSI, 2022), which together with the GGI outline China’s emerging normative vision of global governance. Critics argue that the GGI represents an attempt to construct a parallel system  that would displace, or at least undermine, the existing multilateral institutions created under US and European leadership after World War II (Schuman, Fulton & Gering, 2023), but this paper takes a different view. It argues that the conditions giving rise to the GGI lie not in Beijing’s ambitions alone, but in the stagnation, hypocrisy and exclusion that have paralysed existing global governance structures.   The question, therefore, is not whether China’s initiative is justified, but whether the failure of the United Nations and related bodies to reform leaves the world any real alternative.     2. China’s diagnosis of global governance failure   China’s critique of the post-war order is rooted in its perception that global governance remains dominated by Western power and ideology and in this regard president Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated that the architecture of global governance must reflect the realities of the new world balance. Beijing’s diagnosis can be summarised in three main points.   2.1 An unrepresentative institutional order   The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)  still enshrines the geopolitical structure of 1945, with Africa, Latin America and much of Asia still remaining without permanent representation, but on the contrary, however, the permanent five (P5) veto system remains firmly in place, where it continues to entrench inequality between the member states by allowing the powerful ones to block reforms that might dilute their influence (CFR, 2025).     2.2 Economic governance skewed toward the West   Voting shares at the International Monetary Fund (IMF)  and World Bank  continues to remain weighted in favour of the US and Europe, despite decades of growth in emerging economies, such as in China and India, who together now account for nearly 20% of global GDP (nominal 2023) (Worldometer, N.d.); and yet these two countries hold less than 10% of IMF voting power (IMF, N.d.). Moreover, attempts at reforming the quota regime have stalled repeatedly due to the political resistance of Washington and Brussels against it.     2.3 Normative and ideological bias   China also criticises what it considers value monopolies, being the imposition of liberal democratic norms through conditional aid, sanctions or interventionism, which Beijing argues is a Western-led governance structure that equates legitimacy with liberal democracy and human rights, which dictate serves to marginalise alternative governance models (Dams & Van der Putten, 2015).   This diagnosis, whilst it can be argued self-serving in part, resonates widely in the Global South , where many states view the post-1945 order as inequitable and morally inconsistent.     3. The case for reform: Why China has a point   3.1 Reform paralysis and structural inertia   Calls for reform of global institutions are not new. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document committed to making the Security Council more “representative, legitimate and effective” (UN, 2005). Two decades later, little has changed. The G4 proposal  (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) and the African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus,  both languish in procedural limbo. The failure to even agree on criteria for membership expansion demonstrates institutional sclerosis.     3.2 Double standards and the erosion of normative authority   Western states, and in particular the United States, have often undermined their own claims to uphold a rules-based order, for example, the 2003 invasion of Iraq without UN authorisation (MacAskill & Borger, 2004), the 2011 intervention in Libya that exceeded the UN mandate (Miller, 2022), and the selective recognition of international court rulings, and the US rejection of the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment in 1986. This has eroded confidence in Western stewardship of international law.     3.3 A system in crisis   The failures of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions during COVID-19, the climate crisis and global debt distress further expose governance gaps, where, for example, the World Health Organization  was sidelined during the pandemic, while the Paris Agreement  remains underfunded and politically fragile. The West’s dominance in rule-making, combined with its paralysis in collective action, leaves space for alternative leadership.   In this sense, China’s argument that reform is overdue is not revisionist, it is factual. The current system is both unrepresentative and ineffective.     4. The critics’ case: The “parallel system” concern   Despite this, Western and some Asian commentators argue that the GGI is not about reform, but about replacement and they identify several strands of evidence to support the “parallel system” thesis:     4.1 Institutional duplication   China’s creation of new bodies, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) , the New Development Bank  and now GGI-linked forums, they argue, appears to mirror existing Western-led institutions rather than integrate with them (The Diplomat, 2025). Their concern is that these structures will operate under Chinese normative and financial leadership.     4.2 Normative divergence   Whereas the liberal order prioritises individual rights, transparency and intervention for humanitarian purposes, China’s GGI stresses sovereignty , non-interference and developmental pragmatism , which the critics thereof argue, could serve to legitimise authoritarianism and to reduce global accountability (Schuman, Fulton & Gering, 2023).     4.3 Selective multilateralis   China participates vigorously in some global institutions, such as, for example, UN peacekeeping and the World Trade Organization, but it bypasses others through its own platforms such as the Belt and Road Forum  and/or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation . This selective engagement suggests a dual-track strategy.     4.4 Strategic influence   Some fear that the GGI provides a normative shield for Chinese geopolitical expansion, enabling Beijing to align states through debt dependency, technology standards and diplomatic patronage and therefore they argue the GGI’s purpose is not inclusivity, but hegemony under a different banner (Schuman, Fulton & Gering, 2023).   These critiques cannot, one supposes, be dismissed out of hand, even though sound and logical counter-arguments can be readily made by antagonists. But at its core, critics overlook the most fundamental and basic question. If the existing system refuses to reform, is the emergence of alternatives not inevitable?     4.5 Moral double standards and selective legitimacy   Critics of China’s global initiatives often imply that Beijing’s pursuit of its own national interests is somehow illegitimate or destabilising, as though the promotion of national interest were a prerogative reserved for Western powers and yet, if leadership in global governance is deemed acceptable for the United States or Europe, on what ethical or moral grounds is it denied to China? The notion that a multipolar distribution of influence is inherently problematic betrays a deeper attachment to hierarchy rather than principle, because what is being defended is not an objective standard of governance, but a particular configuration of power that privileges one set of actors over others.   Equally striking is the inconsistency in how the West evaluates the political systems of its adversaries, because whereas China’s non-liberal governance model is routinely cast as incompatible with global leadership, Western states have long maintained strategic partnerships with even more authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, where they often overlook grave human rights violations in favour of energy security and regional influence. This selective tolerance undermines the moral authority of the liberal order itself, because, if democracy and human rights are invoked only when geopolitically convenient, then the critique of China’s model becomes less a defence of universal values and more an instrument of strategic containment. These contradictions expose the moral and structural double standards at the heart of Western criticism and therefore the question is not why China seeks to shape global governance, but why others resist change that would make it genuinely representative.     5. Who really blocks reform? The West’s defensive rigidity   The paralysis of global governance is not primarily due to Chinese obstruction, but to Western defensiveness. The evidence lies in three domains:     5.1 Security Council reform   Despite rhetorical support for “African representation” and “greater legitimacy,” the United States, the United Kingdom and France have consistently avoided endorsing concrete reform models that would dilute their veto power (Muruthi, 2024). Europe has also resisted consolidation of its two permanent seats (UK and France) into a single one, preserving overrepresentation.     5.2 IMF and World Bank quotas   The United States Congress has repeatedly delayed or diluted quota realignments that would increase China’s and other emerging economies’ voting shares and as a result, the IMF remains structurally anchored in the 1980s global economy (Truman, 2014). The message to the Global South is clear - reform is promised, never delivered.     5.3 Selective multilateralism by the West   Western actors have increasingly relied on minilateral  clubs, such as the G7, G20, Quad and AUKUS, that privilege likeminded members over universal representation. Critics in the Global South see this as precisely the fragmentation they accuse China of promoting.   Thus, the West condemns China’s parallelism while practicing its own.     6. Understanding China’s strategy: Pragmatic or revisionist?   6.1 Institutional experimentation, not replacement   China’s behaviour often reflects pragmatic experimentation rather than outright revisionism. For example, the AIIB  works in partnership with the World Bank and adheres to many of its safeguards. The New Development Bank  co-finances projects with existing institutions (NDB, 2022). These  are not acts aimed at destroying the existing order, but rather, appear to be strategic diversification.     6.2 Normative innovation   By emphasising sovereignty and “development before democracy,” China offers an alternative development logic that resonates with many non-Western states (Qasem, Van Dongen & De Ridder, 2011) and so whilst this challenges liberal orthodoxy, it also highlights the pluralism of governance models in a post-Western world.   6.3 Self-interest and systemic correction   Of course, Beijing’s motives are not altruistic, they serve to expand its influence and China’s strategic interests. But is it not so that all great powers, including the US, have historically shaped global rules in their image and so the key question should rather focus on whether China’s initiatives remain open to multilateral participation or whether it is bound to evolve into hierarchical patronage systems.     7. The way forward: Towards co-reform, not containment   The choice for policymakers is not between defending a decaying order and submitting to a Chinese one. It is whether to co-reform global governance before fragmentation becomes irreversible.     7.1 Recognising the legitimacy of Chinese concerns   China’s call for reform aligns with long-standing demands from Africa, Latin America and South Asia. Engaging Beijing as a stakeholder, rather than as a rival, could revitalise multilateral institutions.     7.2 Reforming Western leadership   The West must abandon its zero-sum instinct to guard institutional privileges and concede that representation, especially in the Security Council and IMF, is not weakness, but strategic adaptation to reality. A truly rules-based order requires rules that evolve.     7.3 Integrating parallel mechanisms   Instead of treating Chinese initiatives as external threats, Western and other actors could integrate them into a layered system of global governance. For instance, aligning AIIB and World Bank standards or linking the GGI’s development principles with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), could yield complementarity rather than competition.     7.4 Promoting transparency and standards   The key challenge for China is to make its initiatives transparent, inclusive and rules-based. Without institutionalised accountability, the GGI risks becoming another rhetorical framework and therefore constructive engagement from other powers could encourage higher standards rather than isolation.     8. Conclusion   The Global Governance Initiative should be understood as both a critique and a consequence of Western dominance and institutional stagnation. While critics warn of a parallel system, it is the failure of the existing system  that opens the door for and renders such parallelism inevitable.   Critics of “parallelism” would do well to ask whether their own resistance to reform has not, in fact, produced the very conditions that now empower China to lead in shaping alternative multilateral models. The paralysis of UN reform, perpetuated by those who benefit from the status quo, has created both the need and the space for innovation elsewhere. Had the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions evolved to reflect 21st-century realities, there would have been little justification or opportunity for Beijing to advance the Global Governance Initiative as a rival framework and so in that sense, the emergence of parallel structures is not merely a Chinese project, but a by-product of Western obstruction. The failure to democratise global governance has not preserved legitimacy, instead it has forfeited it and in doing so, ceded moral and institutional leadership to those willing to fill the vacuum.   Condemning China’s initiatives without addressing the deeper governance crisis is both hypocritical and self-defeating. Reform is overdue, not because China demands it, or out of fear for Chinese parallelism, but because global legitimacy depends on it.   The challenge for policymakers is to move beyond moral grandstanding and embrace shared reform: to rebuild a multilateral order that reflects not only Western ideals, but global realities. References   Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 2025. The UN Security Council.  [Online] Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council [Accessed 13 October 2025].   Dams, T. & Van der Putten, F. 2015. China and Liberal Values in International Relations. 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[Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-pushes-new-global-order-flanked-by-leaders-russia-india-2025-09-01/  [accessed: 13 October 2025   Schuman, M., Fulton, J. & Gering, T. 2023. How Beijing’s newest global initiatives seek to remake the world order . [Online] Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-beijings-newest-global-initiatives-seek-to-remake-the-world-order/?utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 14 October 2025]   The Diplomat. 2025. What China Wants with Global Governance.  [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/what-china-wants-with-global-governance/  [accessed: 13 October 2025]   Truman, M. 2014. IMF reform is Waiting  on the United States. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb14-9.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 14 October 2025]   United Nations (UN). 2005. 2005 World Summit Outcome. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf [accessed: 14 October 2025]   Worldometer. N.d. GDP by country. [Online] Available at: https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/ [accessed: 14 October 2025] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 12/2025   Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   OCTOBER 2025   Daryl Swanepoel Abstract   This analysis examines South Africa’s 2025 G20 presidency as a pivotal moment of moral and strategic redefinition in global governance. Guided by the theme “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability,” the presidency seeks to humanise multilateralism by placing values ahead of metrics. The report interprets the presidency’s agenda, which ranges from inclusive industrialisation and AI governance to financial reform, as a deliberate attempt to infuse justice into the economic discourse. It identifies both enthusiasm and resistance among G20 members, where the Global South views the presidency as emancipatory, whilst the advanced economies, particularly the United States, appear to react warily to its moral framing. The analysis anticipates a likely “19 + 1” outcome that will reflect partial consensus which suggests a new norm for diversity within unity. China’s constructive neutrality and Europe’s mediating role is predicted to sustain the dialogue amid philosophical divergence. Ultimately, the report concludes that South Africa’s leadership reorients the G20 toward a more equitable and humane multilateral order, which, if successfully concluded, will establish a precedent where solidarity and sovereignty may coexist within global cooperation Introduction   As the world moves toward the 2025 G20 Summit under South Africa’s presidency, the tone of global governance feels both unsettled and newly alive, and it is in this context that the forum, once regarded as an engine of macroeconomic coordination, now finds itself a stage for moral and strategic realignment. The South African presidency, framed under the theme “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability,”  arrives not merely as a logistical rotation, but as a philosophical intervention, one that asks whether a multilateral system forged in crisis can evolve toward equity, justice and shared accountability.   This report offers an interpretive and anticipatory reading of that presidency, a forward-looking analysis that does not claim privileged insight, but derives its conclusions from observation, inquiry and expert inference . It synthesises the official G20 Concept Note, the tone and substance of preparatory dialogues and the broader geopolitical mood. Rather than predicting events as foregone conclusions, it reads the atmosphere, the patterns of behaviour, the calibrated silences and the language of diplomacy to anticipate how this presidency may unfold and what its eventual declaration might signify.   South Africa’s leadership emerges at a moment when the G20’s cohesion is strained by geopolitical rivalries, competing economic ideologies and divergent visions of justice. Yet, precisely in this turbulence lies its significance. The presidency has introduced a vocabulary of values  into a forum that has long preferred the neutrality of metrics . It has brought back words such as solidarity  and equality , words that unsettle the technocratic rhythm of G20 deliberation, but resonate deeply with the developmental aspirations of the Global South.   The analysis that follows explores the aspirations, expectations and challenges of this presidency; the dynamics among major actors, including the United States, China, Europe and the broader Global South; and the probable contours of the final declaration. The report approaches these developments not as closed outcomes, but as evolving signals, to be read, interpreted and weighed.   Ultimately, the question this assessment seeks to illuminate is not whether the South African presidency will succeed in a conventional sense, but whether it can redefine what success means: whether moral conviction, strategic inclusivity and institutional endurance can coexist within a single multilateral frame. 1. Reading the room   Few presidencies in the G20’s two-decade history have carried the emotional and intellectual weight of South Africa’s. From the moment the theme “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability”  was announced, it was clear that this would not be an ordinary turn at the helm. It is a presidency animated not only by policy ambition, but by moral architecture, a determination to make the G20 mean something more than the sum of its communiqués.   In reading the room, one senses that this presidency is less about technocratic coordination and more about a quiet philosophical insurgency. It asks whether multilateralism, hollowed by transactionalism, can still feel humane. It asks whether a forum born in crisis can evolve into one capable of conscience. And it asks whether the world, fractured by mistrust, can rediscover solidarity, not as sentiment, but as practice.   These are not rhetorical questions. They are the animating logic behind every sentence of the South African concept note and the tone that underlies the diplomatic choreography captured in the year’s preparatory dialogues. 2. Aspirations: A rehumanised Global Agenda   The presidency’s concept note, both a manifesto and an agenda, lays out a triadic ethos: Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability.   Each term carries both historical weight and contemporary provocation:   Solidarity  recalls the moral economies of the liberation era, that no nation can prosper in isolation from others’ suffering. Equality  confronts the hierarchy implicit in the global financial and technological systems. Sustainability  refuses the notion that ecological balance can be divorced from social justice.   The note proposes to translate these into six concrete deliverables: inclusive industrialisation, food security, AI and data governance, a “Cost of Capital Commission,” a renewed Compact with Africa, and a twenty-year institutional reflection on the G20 itself. These are not random themes. Each theme connects a moral claim to a policy lever. Food security is recast as global stability. AI governance becomes a question of sovereignty. Cost of capital turns from a technical ratio into a justice issue.   From a reading of the note, one infers a conscious inversion of the usual order: values first, economics later. It is this inversion, humane rather than transactional multilateralism, that sets the stage for both inspiration and contestation. 3. The early signals: Promise meets resistance   Observers who have followed the preparatory meetings note two simultaneous currents: genuine curiosity and cautious resistance. The Global South delegations, particularly those long frustrated by slow reforms of financial architecture, find the presidency’s framing liberating. For them, it gives language to a frustration that has simmered for years.   Advanced economies, however, appear wary. The source of tension is not the policy content, since many of the deliverables overlap with ongoing G20 priorities, but rather the lexicon . To some, solidarity sounds like obligation and equality  like redistribution. The presidency’s moral language, though drawn from its own history of social negotiation, unsettles those who prefer the technocratic neutrality of “growth,” “resilience” and “innovation.”   From the pattern of reactions described in the transcript, one can infer that this is less a dispute over substance than semantics. Yet semantics in diplomacy are never trivial. Words determine ownership. To accept solidarity  is to admit interdependence; to accept equality is to acknowledge hierarchy; to accept sustainability  as justice is to concede moral responsibility. It is at that level — the symbolic rather than the structural — that the battle lines have been drawn. 4. Negotiating around philosophy: The US factor   The United States’ engagement with this presidency has been deliberate, but defensive.   Its representatives have participated in the working groups, but often with the stated concern that the thematic framing risks “ideologizing” the G20. In practice, this has translated into consistent efforts to reshape phrasing - “resilience”  instead of “solidarity” , “inclusion”  instead of “equality” .   The reasoning for predicting a non-unanimous outcome arises from several converging signs:   Repeated textual interventions aimed at diluting the moral vocabulary. Lower-level participation in key tracks, signalling reduced political investment. Public statements that challenge the very framing of the presidency’s theme.   Put together, these signals suggest a posture of participation without endorsement, what analysts often call “engaged abstention.” The United States will almost certainly attend the summit, but is expected to disassociate from the final declaration on principle.   This inference does not stem from conjecture, but from the pattern: a year-long choreography of distance. If consensus holds among all others, the most likely outcome will be a “19 + 1” scenario, a formula already anticipated within the presidency’s own contingency planning. It is a prediction drawn not from drama, but from diplomatic arithmetic.     5. The quiet centre: China’s constructive ambiguity   If Washington defines the opposition, Beijing defines the equilibrium.   Throughout the process, China’s behaviour has been marked by strategic neutrality, neither opposing the presidency’s themes, nor championing them. Yet this neutrality is not indifference, it is calculus.   China’s interests align naturally with several of South Africa’s priorities: reform of financial institutions, cost of capital fairness and digital sovereignty. However, overt alignment would risk deepening perceptions of bloc politics. Thus, Beijing has chosen the middle ground, an enabling silence.   In negotiation terms, this posture functions as lubrication. It prevents polarisation, allowing the Global South’s agenda to mature without triggering Western defensiveness. The reasoning for this inference lies in the recurring note of “China being neutral” and in the absence of recorded disputes in tracks where its positions would ordinarily provoke. In other words, neutrality becomes a form of quiet endorsement, a subtle diplomacy of presence without posture.     6. Europe between worlds   The European members, ever the custodians of consensus, have taken on the role of textual mediators.   They are sympathetic to the sustainability and climate aspects of the presidency’s agenda, but cautious about its justice rhetoric. Their behaviour, frequent proposals to “balance” language, encourage “shared ownership” and avoid “politicisation,” suggests a genuine effort to prevent a rift within the G20.   From these actions one can infer two motives:   A pragmatic desire to keep the G20 intact as one of the few surviving global forums. A self-perceived responsibility to bridge moral ambition and institutional realism.   Europe thus functions as the hinge by restraining US rigidity while moderating Global South assertiveness. It is precisely this middle-space diplomacy that has kept negotiations alive despite profound philosophical divergence.   7. Attendance as political semiotics   As the summit approaches, attendance itself has become a form of expression.   Every level of representation signals intent.   From available evidence and diplomatic briefings, it appears that all G20 members will participate, but not all equally.   The Global South  will attend in full force, at head-of-state level, projecting ownership of an agenda that speaks their vocabulary. The United States , by contrast, is expected to send a high-ranking representative, most probably Vice President Vance, rather than the head of state, a gesture that signifies both acknowledgement and disapproval. European leaders  will likely attend personally, underscoring their commitment to keeping the G20 functional.   This configuration, full attendance, but unequal enthusiasm, is telling. It implies that even in dissent, no member can afford absence. The G20, for all its ideological tension, remains the only round table where the G7 and BRICS sit together.   Thus, the presidency will measure its success not only by who signs the declaration, but by who shows up. In a divided world, presence itself is a form of legitimacy.     8. Consensus without unanimity   How, then, might a declaration emerge in such an atmosphere?   Diplomatic precedent suggests that unanimity, though desirable, is not essential for legitimacy. What matters is whether the declaration reflects the shared work  of the year’s process.   The reasoning follows a clear line:   The presidency has invested heavily in institutional discipline, strong sherpa coordination, thematic task forces and inclusive engagement groups. The major deliverables are technically sound and enjoy broad (if uneven) support. The textual disagreements are philosophical, not procedural.   This combination points to a partial consensus, a declaration signed by nineteen members, with one formal disassociation. In practical terms, this is the “efficient frontier” of agreement: maximal inclusion without surrendering principle. It allows progress while acknowledging plurality.   Such an outcome, rather than undermining the G20, may redefine its modern purpose, that is to reflect not unanimity, but honest diversity. The G20 becomes less a choir and more an orchestra, dissonant, but still capable of harmony.     9. Patterns beneath the process: What the presidency reveals   Through this presidency, several larger trends become visible:   The moralisation of multilateralism: The return of words like solidarity  and equality  to the diplomatic vocabulary marks a shift from managerial to moral leadership. The decentralisation of influence: With the Global South commanding both agenda and attention, the gravitational pull of global decision-making continues to move away from the North Atlantic axis. The normalisation of partial consensus: The “19 + 1” outcome, once unthinkable, may become a precedent, an institutional mechanism for managing irreconcilable difference without collapse. The rise of inclusive diplomacy: The expanded engagement groups and the planned Social Summit broaden legitimacy beyond states, anchoring global governance in civil participation.   Each of these conclusions emerges from triangulating the presidency’s written concept, its procedural innovations and the tone of deliberations recorded through the year.     10. Looking forward: The US presidency in 2026   The next rotation, the United States in 2026, looms large in every conversation.   Observers expect a retrenchment presidency, one that will seek to “return the G20 to basics.”   This forecast rests on observable precedents:   US interventions during the South African year consistently narrowed scope to macroeconomic stability, competitiveness and innovation. Early planning documents indicate a likely thematic pivot toward “Resilience, Growth and Opportunity.” Domestic political climate favours an agenda that is pro-market, sovereignty-oriented and sceptical of redistributive narratives.   From these elements, one can reason that the US presidency will likely re-centre the G20 around traditional economic coordination, pruning the moral and developmental expansion introduced by South Africa.   It may:   Replace the Cost of Capital Commission with a more technocratic financial transparency review. Replace the AI-for-development agenda to frameworks on AI safety and innovation. Reframe sustainability as a market opportunity rather than a justice imperative.   However, institutional inertia ensures that not everything can be rolled back. Once a concept is anchored in G20 working structures, as South Africa’s task forces already are, it tends to persist in some form. Thus, many of the presidency’s innovations will likely survive as diluted continuities rather than reversals. 11. The structural implications: A Tale of two G20s   By late 2025, one can discern the outlines of two G20s coexisting within a single architecture:   A Northern G20 , which is driven by economic orthodoxy and institutional preservation. A Southern G20 , which is animated by equity, reform and moral legitimacy.   The South African presidency serves as the hinge between them. Its experiment tests whether these two identities can coexist without rupture, whether solidarity and sovereignty can be spoken in the same forum.   If it succeeds in securing a declaration endorsed by nineteen, the precedent will be profound, that the G20 can tolerate principled dissent without losing cohesion. If it fails, the risk is not collapse, but trivialisation, a return to communiqués devoid of conviction. 12. Reading the road ahead   To “read the room” at this moment is to sense both fatigue and possibility.   The fatigue is palpable, years of crisis management have turned cooperation into routine. Yet the possibility lies in the presidency’s quiet insistence that meaning still matters .   The signals are everywhere:   Delegates debate words as though they were moral propositions. Smaller nations speak with a confidence born of shared grievance. Even the sceptics seem aware that the vocabulary of equality, once reintroduced, cannot easily be erased.   From these atmospherics, the prediction emerges organically, not as prophecy, but as deduction. A declaration will likely be achieved, bearing the triad Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability , endorsed by all but one. The dissent will be loud, but the message louder: that global governance no longer belongs exclusively to its architects, but increasingly to its participants. 13. Conclusion: The experiment in motion   The South African G20 presidency is not merely an event in diplomacy, it is a mirror held up to the world.   It reflects a longing for moral coherence amid geopolitical entropy and it reclaims the words solidarity, equality and sustainability that had become uncomfortable in the vocabulary of power.   Its success will not be measured by unanimity, but by endurance. By how long those words continue to echo in the communiqués and corridors of what comes next.   As the presidency nears its summit and the United States prepares to inherit the mantle, one suspects that the most lasting outcome will be intangible: a shift in tone, a change in expectation, a sense that the G20, for all its imperfections, might still be capable of conscience.     References   G20. 2025 . Conce pt note and calendar. G20 South Africa 2025 Presidency . [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/20241205v-FINAL-G20-CONCEPT-NOTE-SOUTH-AFRICA.pdf [accessed: 15 October 2025]   Diplomatic and policy experts. 2025. A series of interviews was conducted by the author with authoritative diplomats and policy experts.   T20. 2025. The author is a Co-Lead of the Solidarity for the Achievement of the SDGs Task Force - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Global South Media and Think Tank Forum China-Africa Partnership conference opened on the Thursday 14 th November 2025. The conference was held to explore ways to strengthen cooperation, to further promote common ways for shared global governance and to impart exchanges of knowledge by amplifying the Global South’s collective voice. The forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists and policymakers from across Africa and China to discuss the evolving partnership and its role in reshaping international institutions under the theme: "Reforming Global Governance: New Roles and Visions for China-Africa Cooperation." The event was attended by key panelists, including Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to South Africa, Wu Peng; the Chairman of Independent Media and co-chair of the BRICS Media Forum, Dr Iqbal Survé; Executive Mayor of the City of Johannesburg, Dada Morero; Consul General of China in Johannesburg, Pan Qingjiang; Lu Yansong, Editor-in-Chief of Xinhua News Agency and African Union Director of Information and Communication, Leslie Richer.The two-day conference, co-hosted by Xinhua News Agency, the African Union (AU) and South Africa's Independent Media, among other partners, gathered more than 200 representatives from over 160 media outlets, think tanks, government organizations and other institutions from China and 41 African countries, as well as the AU. Inclusive Society Institute, Advisory Council Member Ms. Nondumiso Alice Sithole was requested to be a panelist member and represented the Institute at the forum. The institute has become a key strategic partner in the South Africa and is African think-tank community. Ms. Sithole’s speech highlighted aspects on “the core pathways for China and Africa to jointly advance modernization, their global contributions and worldwide impact”. She delivered a speech which commended the intergovernmental relations between the two sides, the initiatives by China in supporting the African countries as a whole, specifically when it comes to the continent progressing towards better development goals. However she also drew attention to the trade deficit and proposed some solutions as to how it can be addressed by both sides, one being commodity beneficiation to occur on the African continent before export. Lastly, she emphasized the importance of the two sides continuing to explore appropriate partnership models that are fit for purpose in so far as it concerns the respective partner-countries individually.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), together with the Institute of African Studies at Zhejiang Normal University (IAS ZJNU), hosted a landmark international symposium in Cape Town on Monday, 17 November 2025, to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The event brought together scholars, policy experts and representatives from think-tanks and academic institutions across more than a dozen countries, reaffirming the strategic depth, intellectual vibrancy and future trajectory of China-Africa partnership. Held at the Heritage Site of the First Nations, the symposium explored FOCAC’s historical evolution, its concrete development achievements across the continent and its emerging role within a rapidly shifting global governance landscape. Opening session: Reflecting on 25 years of cooperation   The opening ceremony, moderated by Prof. Liu Shu, set the tone for an intellectually rich programme. Keynote addresses were delivered by:   Mr Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute Ambassador Gert Grobler, former senior South African diplomat Ms Wang Xiao, Acting Consul General of China in Cape Town Prof. Liu Hongwu, Dean of the Institute of African Studies, ZJNU  Speakers reflected on FOCAC’s evolution into a highly institutionalised platform that has shaped cooperation across infrastructure development, trade expansion, human capacity building, public health and digital connectivity. Panel discussions: Advancing knowledge partnerships   Discussion Part 1: The changing architecture of FOCAC Moderated by Dr Yu Guizheng, this session featured presentations by:   Ms Odile Bulten, ISI Coordinator of the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue Dr Zhan Mengshu, Assistant Researcher at IAS, ZJNU Speakers highlighted the growing centrality of think-tank diplomacy  in shaping the next phase of China-Africa cooperation. They emphasised that intellectual partnerships now constitute a vital component of FOCAC’s institutional ecosystem. Discussion Part 2: New voices and emerging research   The second discussion panel, chaired by Ms Buyelwa Sonjica (former Cabinet Minister and ISI Deputy Chairperson), included contributions from:   Mr Stephen Langtry, ISI Advisory Council member and Editor of the Journal for Inclusive Public Policy Mr Liu Yuankang, PhD Candidate, University of Cape Town  The dialogue reinforced the importance of cross-cultural research, youth scholarship and multidisciplinary collaboration in sustaining long-term China-Africa partnerships.   Closing reflections: Introducing a new research frontier   In his closing remarks, Mr Daryl Swanepoel offered a strategic reflection that extended beyond the day’s deliberations. While reaffirming the maturity and long-term significance of FOCAC, he introduced a proposal that IAS and ISI jointly explore a new frontier in China-Africa research: the alignment of FOCAC with China’s Four Global Initiatives (Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilization Initiative, Global Governance Initiative).   He noted that:   FOCAC provides the operational framework for cooperation; The Four Global Initiatives offer a conceptual narrative shaping China’s global engagement; The alignment of the two could open a fresh pathway for integrated, future-oriented cooperation.  Swanepoel suggested that ISI and IAS consider pioneering the first systematic study on this intersection, potentially through joint research, policy dialogues, and broader collaborative networks. He further praised the Institute of African Studies at ZJNU for its leading intellectual role in strengthening the policy foundations of FOCAC, noting its “policy rigour, scholarly leadership and strategic depth.”

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) proudly participated in the 2025 Think20 (T20) Summit, held in Sandton, Johannesburg, the first T20 Summit convened on African soil under South Africa’s G20 Presidency. Represented by CEO Daryl Swanepoel, the Institute contributed to deliberations aimed at shaping policy recommendations for G20 leaders on matters of global governance, digital transformation, sustainable development financing and multilateral reform.   Mr Swanepoel also participated in his official capacity as Co-Lead of T20 Task Force 4, which focused on Solidarity for the Achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This task force’s mandate, as reflected in the T20 South Africa Communique, included strengthening global cooperation, addressing persistent inequalities and ensuring that SDG implementation reflects the developmental priorities of the Global South.   Overview of the Summit   The two-day summit gathered global experts, academics, think-tank leaders, policymakers and multilateral actors. The sessions, as outlined in the official programme, covered a broad spectrum of strategic issues including global governance reform, WTO modernisation, digital public infrastructure, MDB reform, food system resilience, climate transitions and post-2030 development frameworks.   Key themes emerging from Summit discussions included:   Revitalising Global Governance   Discussions emphasised the need to strengthen multilateral cooperation amid fragmentation and geopolitical rivalry. The opening plenaries explored how the G20 can reinforce institutional legitimacy and act as a bridge-builder across regions and sectors.   Digital public infrastructure, AI and digital sovereignty   Sessions highlighted that digital transformation must be human-centred and rights-based, with Africa’s perspectives integrated into global conversations on data governance, e-governance and artificial intelligence.   Trade system reform and inclusive growth   The summit reinforced the urgency of WTO reform to address modern trade realities, including digital trade regulations, subsidy regimes and the participation of developing economies in global value chains.   Financing for sustainable development Several plenaries positioned international financial architecture reform, including MDB capital expansion, debt restructuring innovations and fairer global tax rules, as essential components of a transition to a more equitable global economy. These themes strongly intersected with the policy areas covered by ISI’s ongoing research.   Climate action and energy transitions   The programme featured discussions on green industrialisation, green minerals, disaster resilience and whole-of-society transitions, an area of high relevance to South Africa’s just transition agenda.   ISI’s contribution through Task Force 4   As Co-Lead of T20 Task Force 4: Solidarity for the Achievement of the SDGs, Mr Swanepoel played a strategic role in shaping the task force's intellectual agenda and final recommendations to the G20.   Task Force 4’s focus areas included:   Advancing social protection systems Strengthening global solidarity and equity Addressing intersecting crises such as poverty, inequality and climate vulnerability Ensuring that SDG delivery frameworks remain responsive to Global South priorities The task force’s contributions were incorporated into the final 2025 T20 Communique presented at the Summit.   Strategic importance for South Africa and the Global South   ISI’s participation ensured that South African civil society and research voices were strongly represented in shaping the global agenda. The Summit highlighted:   Africa’s growing leadership within the G20 system The need for inclusive and just global policy frameworks The importance of South-South cooperation, reflected in contributions from India, Brazil and other emerging powers The G20’s unique opportunity to address systemic inequities affecting developing nations   Reflections and way forward   The Summit reinforced the urgency of building a more equitable and sustainable global development model. As ISI continues its work across governance, development and multilateral reform, insights from the T20 process will directly inform the Institute’s policy positions, research outputs and domestic and international engagements.   The ISI will remain an active contributor to:   Ongoing SDG implementation strategies National and regional dialogues on global governance reform South Africa’s broader contributions to the G20 Presidency’s legacy Strengthened collaboration with international think-tank networks   Conclusion   The Inclusive Society Institute’s participation in the T20 Summit reflects its expanding role as a thought leader in South Africa’s national policy discourse and its growing footprint in global policy networks. Through its leadership in Task Force 4 and engagement across summit platforms, the ISI has contributed meaningfully to shaping the G20’s development agenda during a historic African presidency.

At a time when faith in our democratic and government institutions is fading, The People’s Voice  offers a timely and powerful response. Authored by Daryl Swanepoel  and published by the Inclusive Society Institute , this book is a bold call to action for South Africa’s democracy. It reminds us that public participation is not a privilege, nor is it optional—it is a constitutional right and a democratic necessity. Through incisive legal analysis, compelling case studies, and a deep moral interrogation of post-apartheid governance, Swanepoel exposes the systemic failures that have turned public engagement from an inviolable constitutional mandate into a mere box-ticking exercise. But this is not a work of despair. It charts a path toward inclusive, accountable and effective participatory governance, drawing on insights from constitutional scholars, judicial rulings and grassroots voices. Whether you are a policymaker, academic, civil society activist, or simply an engaged citizen, this book will challenge your assumptions and deepen your understanding. From the Freedom Charter to the Constitutional Court, Swanepoel reminds us that “the people shall govern”  was not a slogan - it was a promise. The People’s Voice  is more than a book. It is a democratic wake-up call. It is about restoring legitimacy, empowering the public, and breathing life back into the soul of South African democracy. ✅ Price:  R200 + delivery 📖 Read it. Reflect on it. Act on it. Because democracy only works when the people are heard. 👉 To order your copy, contact us at info@inclusivesociety.org.za .

Occasional Paper 11/2025   Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   OCTOBER 2025   Daryl Swanepoel Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University (ND Co Admin; BPAHons; MPA)      Abstract   The veto power of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) remains the most contested design feature of contemporary collective security. Abolition is a recurrent demand, yet the legal and political barriers to Charter amendment render it unattainable in practice. This article argues that meaningful reform must pivot from abolishing the veto to regulating its use. After tracing the veto’s historical development and surveying the literature and policy advocacy around abolition, the article examines restraint initiatives (France–Mexico declaration, ACT Code of Conduct, General Assembly resolution 76/262) and proposes a ‘Veto Use Integrity Framework” (VUIF)’. The framework extends conflict-of-interest (COI) abstention logic, creates carve-outs for mass atrocities and humanitarian access and mandates written justification and ex post oversight. While abolition remains a normative ideal, a regulation-first strategy offers the only feasible route to a more legitimate and effective Security Council. This article also advances a complementary amendment to the General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace (UFP) framework. Currently, UFP resolutions are non-binding recommendations. The proposed reform would make them binding when supported by a majority of the P5, thus enhancing the authority of the General Assembly in cases of Security Council paralysis. Draft language for these amendments is included in Annexure A. Introduction The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is simultaneously indispensable and constrained. It is indispensable, because Chapter VII powers enable binding decisions on peace and security, but it also constrained, because Article 27(3) grants each permanent member, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, a veto over “all other matters,” a design choice born of the 1945 bargain to keep the great powers inside the tent (UN, N.d.). The result is an enduring paradox, that is that the veto made the UNSC possible, but it often impairs its ability to respond in the gravest crises. From Rwanda to Syria and Ukraine, the veto or its shadow has been implicated in high-stakes failures to protect civilians and uphold international law and therefore the moral appeal of abolition is obvious, but the practical obstacles are equally stark. The Charter’s amendment rule requires P5 consent, thus making self-abnegation the precondition for change, which is an implausible premise (UN, N.d.). The core claim here is therefore pragmatic. If the veto cannot be abolished, it can be bounded, legally through working methods, procedurally through General Assembly oversight and politically through sustained norm entrepreneurship (Hathaway & Patrick, 2024). It is in this context that the Uniting for Peace mechanism takes on renewed significance: strengthening its authority would provide the General Assembly with a conditional binding role when the Council is paralysed (see Annexure A). Historical background: design, doctrine and practice The League of Nations’ unanimity rule and major-power estrangement shaped the UN’s framers, who concluded that a credible collective security system required guaranteed great-power participation and a blocking right. The “Yalta formula” was therefore inscribed in Article 27: nine affirmative votes (originally seven, amended with Council enlargement) including the concurring votes of the permanent members, with an obligatory abstention when a party is involved in a dispute under Chapter VI or Article 52(3) (UN, N.d.). In practice, “concurring votes” has long been read to include P5 abstentions, not just affirmative votes, so an abstention does not kill a text (Galbraith, N.d.) The operational life of the veto evolved across three phases. During the Cold War, vetoes were frequent and largely bipolar. After 1990, the Council briefly coordinated on major enforcement, for example, Iraq/Kuwait, before veto politics reasserted themselves on accountability and humanitarian files (Wilkinson & O’Sullivan, 2004). Since 2011, Russia and China have used the veto repeatedly on Syria; Security Council Report counts 14 of Russia’s first 19 post-2011 vetoes as Syria-related, with eight of China’s nine in the same period on Syria (UN, 2024). The UN’s own Peace and Security Data Hub maintains an authoritative dataset of all vetoes since 1946 (UN DPPA, N.d). The abolitionist case and its structural limits The normative case against the veto is three-fold. First, it violates sovereign equality by privileging five states. Second, it erodes perceived legitimacy when one state can block action backed by an overwhelming majority. Third, it contributes to preventable harm by enabling stalemate in atrocity settings. Syria supplies the canonical example: Russia and China vetoed multiple resolutions on accountability and humanitarian access, including the 22 May 2014 attempt to refer Syria to the ICC (UN Press, 2014). Earlier, on 4 October 2011, they vetoed a text condemning grave human rights violations (UN Press, 2011). Yet, abolition flounders on black-letter law and bare-knuckle politics. Article 108 demands two-thirds of UN members including all P5 to ratify any Charter amendment (UN, N.d.). Each P5 sees the veto as an existential insurance policy against perceived interventionism (Russia/China) (The Economist, 2022), against constraints on Middle East policy (United States) (Gowan, 2024) or as a lever of global influence in relative decline (United Kingdom/France) (Tardy, 2016). Even if abolition were agreed in principle, the likely consequence would be great-power disengagement, recreating the League’s fatal flaw. From abolition to restraint: existing initiatives Recognising the amendment roadblock, states and civil society have shifted to restraint. Three streams matter. First, the France-Mexico political declaration (2015) calls on the P5 to voluntarily suspend the veto in situations of mass atrocities. Over 100 states have endorsed it (France-Mexico, 2015; GCRP, 2015). Second, the ACT Code of Conduct (2015) asks all  Council members to avoid voting against credible drafts aimed at halting genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. The code was transmitted to the Secretary-General as A/70/621 (GCRP, 2015). Third, the General Assembly’s “veto initiative”, resolution 76/262 (2022), which automatically convenes a GA debate when any veto is cast, raising transparency and reputational costs (UN, 2022). These tools do not nullify the veto, but reframe costs and expectations around its use (Johnstone, 2003). A regulation-first alternative: the Veto Use Integrity Framework (VUIF) If abolition is implausible, the reform frontier is use-regulation that is (i) anchored in existing law and practice, (ii) operationalizable through UNSC working methods and GA oversight and (iii) politically survivable for the P5. 1. Conflict-of-interest (COI) abstention, extended Article 27(3) already provides that “in decisions under Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. Contemporary dysfunctions typically arise under Chapter VII. The VUIF would adopt a Council working-methods note, a presidential note incorporated into the Council’s compendium of practices, extending the COI abstention norm to all substantive  votes when a member is directly implicated (named in the operative text, a belligerent or occupying power or materially supporting parties to the conduct at issue). Disputes over COI would be decided as procedural and thus not subject to veto by nine votes (Council practice on procedural questions and the “double veto” debates) (Security Council Report, 2024). This deliberately uses the Council’s own methods toolkit rather than Charter amendment. 2. Substantive carve-outs: atrocities and humanitarian access The VUIF would codify a presumption against veto in (a) situations where the Secretary-General, OHCHR or a UN investigative mechanism reports a credible risk or commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and (b) resolutions whose primary purpose is humanitarian access, deconfliction or sanctions humanitarian carve-outs. This operationalises the France-Mexico declaration and the ACT Code into Council practice, moving from voluntary pledges to institutionalised  expectations. 3. Transparency and written justification Any veto, or public threat of a veto, would require a written justification submitted before the vote is taken, which justification should address an atrocity-risk assessment and COI. The justification would be annexed to the Council record and automatically transmitted to the GA under 76/262, thereby ensuring rapid and visible scrutiny (UN, 2022). And an independent briefing by SG, ICRC and/or UN investigative bodies, before votes where restraint could apply, would test the credibility of pretexts (Johnstone, 2003). 4. Oversight: scorecards and Uniting for Peace Building on 76/262, the GA would maintain a public scorecard tracking compliance with COI abstention and atrocity/humanitarian carve-outs. Where a veto blocks life-saving action notwithstanding these standards, the GA would move promptly under 377(V) “Uniting for Peace” to recommend collective measures that do not require Council authorisation (UN, 1950). The aim is not to override a veto, but to raise the cost of misusing it and keep alternative tracks moving. At present, however, Uniting for Peace resolutions are only recommendatory. They have political and moral force, but no binding legal effect. In order to close this gap, the proposed amendment would stipulate that where a Uniting for Peace resolution secures support from a majority of the P5, the decision shall be binding on all UN Member States; and abstentions would be treated as non-opposition, unless a permanent member explicitly casts a negative vote. This approach ties General Assembly authority to a measure of great-power concurrence while ensuring that a single veto cannot paralyse action indefinitely. Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A. Complementary reform: Amending the Uniting for Peace framework The Uniting for Peace resolution was designed to empower the General Assembly to act when the Security Council fails due to lack of unanimity among the P5 and in so doing it provides for the Assembly to recommend measures, including collective action, but it does not grant legally binding authority. This limitation has curbed its effectiveness. The proposed amendment would transform Uniting for Peace into a conditional binding mechanism. When a resolution is adopted under UFP and supported by a majority of the P5, it would carry binding effect equivalent to Security Council decisions under Article 25 of the Charter. Certification by the Secretary-General would confirm whether the requisite majority is met, and such certification would be annexed to the GA record. This reform strengthens collective security while maintaining safeguards: no measure could become binding absent concurrence from most permanent members. Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A. Working methods vs. Charter amendment: Pathways for reform A crucial distinction must be drawn between reforms that can be achieved through changes to the Security Council’s working methods or General Assembly practice and those that require a formal amendment of the Charter. Changes through working methods The majority of the proposals contained in the Veto Use Integrity Framework (VUIF) fall into the category of working methods reform. These are adjustments that can be adopted through Security Council presidential notes, incorporated into the Council’s compendium of practices or mandated through General Assembly resolutions without formally reopening the Charter. They include: Conflict-of-interest abstentions .  The requirement in Article 27(3) can be extended to encompass all substantive votes where a permanent member is directly implicated, which can be operationalised through a presidential note. Whilst it will not be legally binding, such guidance would shape practice and be enforceable through procedural votes that are not subject to a veto. Substantive carve-outs .  By establishing a presumption against the veto in cases of mass atrocities and humanitarian access, which builds directly on the France - Mexico and ACT initiatives, these commitments could be codified as standard working practices of the Council. Transparency measures .  Permanent members could be obligated to issue written justifications for actual or threatened vetoes. It can be instituted by Council practice and reinforced by the General Assembly’s 76/262 mechanism, which automatically triggers GA debate. Oversight mechanisms .  Scorecards and reporting systems could be maintained by the General Assembly in order to track compliance with restraint norms. This can be introduced without altering the Charter. In short, regulation of the veto’s use, its conditions, justification and scrutiny, can be advanced through procedural innovations and practice-based reforms. These do not formally curtail the veto right, but they increase reputational and political costs of its misuse. Changes requiring Charter amendment   By contrast, reforms that alter the legal authority of UN organs or the substantive scope of the veto require a Charter amendment under Article 108, meaning approval by two-thirds of the membership including all P5 and these will include:   The abolition or limitation of the Veto by removing or restricting the veto in specific subject areas, for example, atrocity crimes, would require an amendment to Article 27 of the Charter. Changing voting formulas, because any redefinition of “concurring votes” or alteration of the relationship between permanent and non-permanent members in decision-making would necessitate amending Article 27. Binding effect of General Assembly resolutions : At present, Articles 10 - 12 of the Charter limit GA authority to recommendations. The proposal to make Uniting for Peace resolutions binding when supported by a majority of the P5 would thus require a formal Charter amendment to extend the Assembly’s competence. Draft amendment text is provided in Annexure A. Implications This distinction underscores why the regulation-first strategy is more feasible in the near term. Changes to working methods can be secured by political agreement and institutional practice. However, the amendment of the Charter, particularly to empower the General Assembly under Uniting for Peace, would mark a structural shift in the allocation of authority under the UN system and faces significant political hurdles given that P5 consent is indispensable. Case illustrations: how regulation would have mattered Syria As already referred to, Russia and China vetoed a draft on 4 October 2011, condemning grave violations, and they later vetoed a text threatening Chapter VII measures. Then on 22 May 2014, they vetoed an ICC referral. Under the VUIF, (i) COI abstention could have been triggered for a state materially supporting parties, (ii) atrocity carve-outs would have strongly counselled against vetoing an accountability referral and (iii) written justifications and a GA scorecard would have elevated reputational costs, potentially shifting bargaining baselines in later humanitarian-access renewals. Rwanda The 1999 Independent Inquiry documented systemic failures that culminated in inaction during the genocide (UN S/1999/1257) (UN, 1999). While there was no formal veto, the logic of VUIF, that is independent briefings before protection votes, a standing atrocity carve-out and a GA backstop, would have created stronger procedural rails against drift. Ukraine  (Crimea, 2014; invasion, 2022) Russia vetoed condemning texts; China abstained (Milano, 2015). Under VUIF, COI abstention would clearly apply to a belligerent, because disputes about applicability would be treated as procedural (no veto) and sent to a vote of nine. Even if Moscow ignored the expectation, the GA scorecard, plus Uniting for Peace, would have deepened the multilateral response record and policy pressure. Why regulation is more feasible than abolition Three reasons. First, law-in-practice. The Council’s working methods and GA practice have been fertile ground for meaningful change without Charter amendment. The 76/262 “veto initiative” has already shifted incentives by guaranteeing post-veto debate. Second, political economy. Constraining use while preserving the right should be tolerable to at least some P5, for example, France has publicly campaigned for atrocity-context restraint (France, 2023). Third, norm dynamics. Once articulated and socialised, expectations of restraint harden, reputational costs accumulate and can change state behaviour at the margin (Johnstone, 2003). Objections include the “soft law” critique, but what if a P5 ignores the framework? The answer is that no single instrument can compel a veto-holder, but coupling Council working methods with GA transparency and Uniting for Peace raises the costs of misuse, keeps humanitarian tracks open in subsidiary bodies and sustains a public record of (non-)compliance that matters over time, for alliance-management, domestic scrutiny and broader legitimacy. Conclusion   Abolishing the veto would be normatively satisfying and under current conditions, politically impossible. The Charter requires the consent of those whose privileges abolition would target and therefore the great-power bargain that sustains the Council would likely collapse without their blocking right. The regulation-first agenda outlined here, COI abstention, atrocity and humanitarian carve-outs, written justification, GA review and Uniting for Peace linkage, does not pretend to dissolve hard power. It does aim to discipline it. This shift reframes the veto from an unreviewable prerogative into a responsibility that must be explained, bounded and, when abused, politically costly.   Coupled with the proposed amendment to the Uniting for Peace framework, which would make certain General Assembly resolutions binding when supported by a majority of the P5, this package of reforms strengthens both oversight and responsiveness. In a world where perfect justice is unattainable, that is how the Security Council and the wider UN system can become more legitimate and effective now, without waiting for a Charter amendment that will not come. References French Republic (France). N.d.. Why France wishes to regulate use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council.  [Online] Available at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations-security-council/why-france-wishes-to-regulate-use-of-the-veto-in-the-united-nations-security-65315/  [accessed 17 September 2025]   French Republic & Republic of Mexico. 2015. Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Case of Mass Atrocities.  Paris/New York. [Online] Available at: https://onu.delegfrance.org/IMG/pdf/2015_08_07_veto_political_declaration_en.pdf  [accessed 17 September 2025]   Galbraith, J. N.d. [Online] Available at: Notes and Comments. 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(UNDPPA). N.d. Security Council Data-Vetoes since 1946.  [Online] Available at: https://psdata.un.org/dataset/DPPA-SCVETOES  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations. N.d. Charter of the United Nations. [Online] Available at: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations (UN). 1950. General Assembly resolution 377 (V) “Uniting for Peace”. [Online] Available at: https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/377%28V%29  [accessed 17 September 2025]   United Nations. 1999. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (S/1999/1257). [Online] Available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/405039 [accessed 13 September 2025]. Also summarized at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-inquiry-actions-of-united-nations-during-1994-genocide-rwanda-s19991257  (accessed 17 September 2025).   United Nations (UN). 2022. 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[accessed: 17 September 2025] Annexure A   DRAFT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 1. Amendment to Article 27 (Voting in the Security Council) Insert a new paragraph after Article 27(3):   “In addition to the provisions above, the Security Council shall adopt working methods ensuring that a permanent member directly involved in a dispute under consideration shall abstain from voting on all substantive matters concerning that dispute. Disputes as to whether a member is directly involved shall be considered procedural and not subject to the veto.”   2. Amendment to Articles 10–12 (Functions and Powers of the General Assembly) Amend Article 10 to add:   “In exceptional circumstances where the Security Council fails to act owing to the lack of unanimity among its permanent members, and the General Assembly considers a matter under the Uniting for Peace procedure, resolutions of the General Assembly shall be binding on all Members of the United Nations if supported by a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council. For the purposes of this Article, abstentions by permanent members shall not count as opposition unless a permanent member explicitly votes against.”   Amend Article 12(1) to add:   “This restriction shall not apply to resolutions adopted under the preceding Article when supported by a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council.”   3. Certification by the Secretary-General   Insert a new clause in Article 98:   “The Secretary-General shall certify whether resolutions adopted under the Uniting for Peace procedure have obtained the support of a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council, and such certification shall be annexed to the official record of the General Assembly.”   These amendments collectively preserve the primary responsibility of the Security Council while ensuring that in circumstances of deadlock, the General Assembly can act with binding authority where a majority of the P5 concur. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. 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