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US-China rivalry in the Trump era: Global realignments and African theatre

Occasional Paper 6/2025






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J U N E 2 0 2 5

 

Daryl Swanepoel

MPA, BPAHons, ND: Co. Admin


 

Abstract

 

As the rivalry between the United States and China intensifies under the Trump administration, the global order is being reshaped in profound and often unpredictable ways. This paper explores how a potential second Trump presidency could escalate this competition and what that means for the rest of the world, particularly Africa.

 

Drawing from the author’s extensive engagements with US policy experts, think tanks and lawmakers, this position paper offers a forward-looking analysis of how Trump’s likely return to office, with his characteristic emphasis on economic nationalism, strategic decoupling and ideological confrontation, would redefine US-China relations. While much attention is focused on the Indo-Pacific, the paper makes a compelling case that Africa has become a significant, if underacknowledged, theatre in this global rivalry.

 

Africa finds itself caught in the middle of competing superpowers offering infrastructure, investment and ideological influence, each with strings attached. Whether through trade wars, military posturing or the ideological framing of governance models, the US-China standoff is already shaping African policy choices, development trajectories and diplomatic alignments. The paper uses South Africa as a case study to illustrate how Washington's growing skepticism toward Beijing’s influence could lead to economic, diplomatic and reputational consequences for nations perceived as drifting too close to China.

 

At its core, the paper argues that African nations must navigate this turbulent period with strategic clarity and assertive diplomacy. Instead of being pulled into a zero-sum competition, countries should leverage the rivalry to diversify partnerships, build institutional resilience and assert a form of updated non-alignment rooted in their own developmental priorities.

 

 

1. Introduction: US - China relations as the

defining global axis

 

The global geopolitical landscape is being redrawn by intensifying strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. A prospective second Trump administration, characterised by economic nationalism, ideological confrontation and unilateralism, will define its approach to US - China relations: renewed rigidity and hostility.

 

While much of the focus centres on the Indo-Pacific, the implications of this rivalry will ripple globally. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, which, while not the core battleground, serves as a critical theatre in which the great-power contest for influence, resources, ideology and markets plays out in consequential ways.

 

This paper repositions US - China relations as the central lens through which we examine the evolving international system, with Africa presented as an illustrative case study of what smaller and developing states can expect in an era of heightened bipolarity. The objective is not only to project possible scenarios under a second Trump administration, but also to understand how this intensification of global rivalry constrains or enables agency among Global South nations, particularly those like South Africa that play an influential role on their continent.

 

2. Escalation in US - China relations under a

Trump Presidency

 

2.1 Tariff wars, technology sanctions and economic decoupling

 

Trump’s first term launched a major economic confrontation with China through a combination of tariffs, export bans and the weaponisation of trade policy. A second term is expected to deepen this decoupling trend.

 

In 2025, the Biden-Trump transition period has been marked by increasing trade policy uncertainty. Trump-aligned Republicans in Congress have already tabled bills proposing expansion of the 60% blanket tariff on Chinese goods to include categories such as EV batteries, solar panels and rare earth imports and there will be increased scrutiny of US firms sourcing inputs from China through new guidance on "supply chain transparency" (USTR, 2025).

 

  • Trade measures: Trump’s first term launched a major economic confrontation with China through a combination of tariffs, export bans and the weaponisation of trade policy (Bown, 2020; Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020). Now tariffs are flip-flopping, rising as high as 145%, then down again to 30%, temporarily, but the final outcome is still up in the air.

  • Export controls: Huawei, ZTE and other Chinese tech firms were blacklisted under national security grounds.

  • Campaign rhetoric (2024): Trump proposed a 10% baseline tariff on all imports and a 60% tariff specifically on Chinese goods (WSJ, 2024; Trump Campaign, 2024).

 

Likely Implications:

 

The world may witness a bifurcated economic order, with separate trade and technology ecosystems, forcing countries to choose sides or hedge with complexity. African nations that rely heavily on Chinese capital and technology, such as Ethiopia, Kenya or Zambia, could find themselves caught in the crosshairs of this decoupling. If African manufacturing sectors are integrated into Chinese supply chains, they risk being cut off from US and European markets due to compliance restrictions related to forced labour, technology origin and sanctions.

 

2.2 Military posturing in the Indo-Pacific

 

Trump’s “peace through strength” foreign policy led to a bolstered US military presence in Asia and revitalised alliances. The emphasis on containing Chinese military expansionism will likely sharpen further.

 

  • The Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia) was enhanced to counterbalance China’s Indo-Pacific rise (The White House, 2019).

  • Freedom of navigation operations increased in the South China Sea.

  • Intermediate missile development resumed after US withdrawal from the INF Treaty.

 

Likely implications:

 

Heightened military tensions with the possibility of flashpoints over Taiwan, maritime boundaries and alliances with regional players. The military dynamics will extend diplomatically to Africa as the US scrutinises Chinese military cooperation with African states, including port access in Djibouti and arms trade in southern Africa. African governments that engage militarily or logistically with China may attract US countermeasures.

 

We have already seen the US Navy in early 2025 resuming joint exercises with the Philippines and expanded rotational deployments in Guam and Darwin, Australia. China’s PLA Navy responded with increased activity around Taiwan and the construction of another artificial island in the South China Sea (DoD, 2025). Trump campaign surrogates have promised to re-enter the INF Treaty only if China agrees to verifiable dismantlement of its medium-range missiles.

 

2.3 Democracy versus autocracy framing

 

Trump’s foreign policy often used ideological language to delegitimise China’s global rise, framing it as an existential threat to the liberal order.

 

  • Pompeo (2020): "If we bend the knee now, our children’s children may be at the mercy of the CCP" (Pompeo, 2020).

  • Legislation: The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act bans imports from Xinjiang linked to forced labour.

  • Human rights reports: The Trump State Department sharply criticised repression in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang.

 

Likely implications:

 

This ideological framing bleeds into foreign aid, partnerships and multilateral diplomacy, especially in Africa where governance models are diverse. Governments seen to be drifting towards China’s governance template, that is centralised authority, party-dominated institutions and limitations on civil society, may find their partnerships with the US becoming strained or withdrawn. Public diplomacy tools will amplify this divide, painting a dichotomy that forces African states into uncomfortable positions.

 

2.4 Countering China's global expansion

 

Trump’s team viewed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as “debt trap diplomacy” and advocated alternatives.

 

  • Blue Dot Network (2019): Created to vet infrastructure projects for transparency and sustainability.

  • Prosper Africa: Meant to scale up US private-sector investment on the continent.

  • PGII (G7): Though formalised under Biden, Trump-era momentum laid groundwork for infrastructure competition.

 

Likely implications:

 

Washington will likely increase pressure on states accepting BRI deals while offering conditional US and Western-backed infrastructure alternatives. For Africa, this means potential access to new finance, but with expectations around transparency, governance reforms and alignment with US-led frameworks like the Build Back Better World agenda or the DFC guidelines. The competition is no longer just about roads and ports; it is about ideological allegiance, digital sovereignty, and strategic dependency.

 

3. Africa as a strategic testing ground

 

Africa, rich in natural resources, a rapidly growing population, and critical voting power in international forums, is an increasingly vital arena in the US - China strategic rivalry. While China has deepened its footprint through infrastructure development, concessional lending and digital expansion, a renewed Trump administration would likely see Africa not only as a market, but as a battleground for global influence.

 

3.1 Pressure to reassess partnerships

 

A Trump administration is likely to exert strategic pressure on African governments to reduce their dependency on Chinese financing and infrastructure. Washington may leverage bilateral aid, trade access and diplomatic relations to discourage certain forms of Chinese engagement.

 

  • Technology and cybersecurity: The US will oppose the deployment of Huawei and ZTE technologies in African telecoms and surveillance networks, citing risks of espionage.

  • Strategic infrastructure: Ports, railways and government buildings constructed by Chinese firms may be seen as dual-use facilities, prompting diplomatic concern.

  • Debt diplomacy: Countries highly indebted to China, such as Angola and Kenya, may be urged to adopt more transparent and multilateral lending frameworks and coerced into aligning with US and Bretton Woods institutions.

 

Likely outcome:

 

African states could be forced to reassess relationships not only based on economic benefit, but on the strategic optics and consequences of alignment.

 

3.2 Competing economic offerings


Trump’s economic strategy would likely focus on enhancing US competitiveness in Africa through the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), targeted bilateral trade deals and the mobilisation of private capital.

 

  • Reinforced AGOA strategy: The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) may be restructured to provide preferential access to US markets for countries aligning with US geopolitical interests.

  • Critical minerals engagement: The US may enter joint ventures with African governments in mining sectors to secure cobalt, lithium and rare earth elements vital to green and defence technologies.

  • Private sector incentives: US businesses could receive tax benefits and risk insurance to invest in African infrastructure and technology. 


While not matching China's scale or speed, these initiatives may appeal to African governments seeking diversification and reduced exposure to Chinese leverage.

In March 2025, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) announced a $5 billion investment guarantee facility for American firms investing in African digital infrastructure. The initiative explicitly excludes partnerships involving Huawei or Hikvision technologies (DFC, 2025).

 

3.3 Ideological influence and civil society tools

 

In addition to economic levers, the Trump administration would likely amplify ideological messaging through public diplomacy tools.

 

  • Civil society support: US-funded NGOs may be bolstered to promote transparency, democracy and anti-corruption efforts.

  • Narrative framing: Agencies like USAID and media platforms like Voice of America may cast Chinese influence as undermining good governance.

  • Think-tank engagement: US institutions may increase collaboration with African academic and policy groups to challenge Beijing’s development model. 


These instruments serve not just to compete for hearts and minds, but also to signal to African elites the reputational risks of leaning toward China.

 

4. Key Congressional and Senatorial role-players and

legislative proposals

 

The US Congress is increasingly active in shaping policy to counter China’s global influence, with several lawmakers taking a leading role in advancing legislation that directly or indirectly impacts Africa.

 

4.1 Senator Jim Risch (R-ID)

 

Co-sponsored the Strategic Competition Act, prioritising diplomatic and development expansion to confront China’s influence. Supports increased US diplomatic staffing in African embassies and expanded civil society engagement to counter Chinese investments (U.S. Congress, 2021).

 

4.2 Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), now Secretary of State

 

Sponsored the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, banning imports linked to forced labour in China. It advocates revoking China’s PNTR status, potentially impacting African manufacturing hubs linked to Chinese supply chains, such as Ethiopia (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

 

4.3 Representative John Moolenaar (R-MI)

 

Co-founded the Critical Minerals Policy Working Group. Promotes US partnerships in Africa’s mining sector, especially in countries like DRC and Zambia, while discouraging Chinese joint ventures.


4.4 Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL)


Supports the Outbound Investment Transparency Act, increasing scrutiny of US firms involved in Chinese-linked projects in Africa.


4.5 Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT)

 

Introduced the Sanctioning Russia Act, a piece of legislation which could impose tariffs on countries that buy sanctioned Russian oil, through which China is directly targeted, African nations with non-aligned foreign policies are nevertheless going to be affected.

 

In addition to previously mentioned roleplayers, the 2025 Congressional China Strategy Caucus was formally launched, co-chaired by Senator Tom Cotton and Representative Elissa Slotkin. Their proposed “Supply Chain Sovereignty Act” would introduce sanctions on Chinese firms operating in sectors deemed critical to US national security, including medical devices, green tech components, and telecommunications. African nations trading heavily in these sectors may face secondary compliance challenges.

 

These legislative efforts signify bipartisan momentum in Congress to build a legal framework that will serve to deter deeper African engagement with China. Countries seen are seen as being too closely aligned with Beijing may find themselves penalised economically or diplomatically.


5. Case Study: South Africa in the crosshairs of great-

power rivalry

 

South Africa’s foreign policy, trade orientation and ideological alliances have drawn increasing scrutiny from US policymakers, particularly under a Trump-aligned strategic worldview. As one of the continent’s most politically and economically influential nations and a core BRICS member, South Africa’s trajectory offers an insightful example of how US - China rivalry is reshaping bilateral and regional relations.


5.1 The US - South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025

 

Introduced in early 2025, this Act mandates the Executive to do a comprehensive review of all diplomatic, military and economic engagements between the United States and South Africa, with provisions that reflect mounting concerns in Washington over Pretoria's growing closeness with both Beijing and Moscow. Specific US concerns include:

 

  • Military cooperation: Reports of joint naval exercises between the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), China’s PLA Navy and Russia’s fleet.

  • Digital sovereignty: Widespread adoption of Huawei, ZTE and Hikvision technologies in South Africa’s security and telecommunications networks.

  • Ideological alignment: Continued high-level party-to-party ties between the ANC and the Chinese Communist Party.

 

Likely US responses:

 

  • Suspension or redirection of specific development assistance programmes, particularly in digital infrastructure and defence cooperation.

  • Enhanced scrutiny of dual-use infrastructure projects funded by Chinese entities.

  • Diplomatic signalling to, and subtle coercion of, its regional allies to start distancing themselves from Pretoria’s trajectory. 


As of May 2025, the Act has cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Amendments now require a full audit of South African universities’ research partnerships with Chinese state-linked entities. There is increased concern in Washington over reports of joint AI labs co-funded by Huawei and local academic institutions (GAO Report, 2025).


5.2 Reputational and regional implications

 

The US review of its relationship with South Africa could serve as a warning to other African nations, that they too could follow, thereby reinforcing the risks of overt alignment with China. As South Africa holds prominent roles in continental institutions such as the African Union and SADC, its choices may influence the strategic posture of neighbouring states.

Countries that emulate Pretoria’s engagement model may find themselves subject to similar scrutiny, while those that hedge or diversify may be rewarded with deeper Western partnerships.


6. Anticipated impact on China and China - Africa

Relations


6.1 Impacts on China

 

  • Economic constraints: US trade and technology restrictions have already begun to limit Chinese export capacity and innovation in high-tech sectors. Semiconductor and rare earth supply chain disruptions could worsen under a renewed Trump presidency.

  • Diplomatic isolation: Countries such as Australia, Lithuania and Sweden have resisted Chinese pressure, strengthening Western diplomatic coordination. If the US further isolates China in multilateral bodies like the WTO or the UN, its normative influence will shrink.

  • Strategic withdrawal: Chinese firms increasingly de-risk by delisting from US exchanges and focusing on South - South cooperation or domestic markets. This may reduce Beijing’s presence in contested or high-risk regions, including parts of Africa.

 

In the first quarter of 2025, China's GDP growth slowed to 4.5% amid tightening US and EU export restrictions on AI chips and advanced semiconductors. The Chinese government announced an acceleration of "dual circulation" policies to reduce reliance on foreign technology.


6.2 Impacts on Africa

 

  • Tactical reassessments: African countries are already re-evaluating the terms of Chinese debt, with loan disbursements from China dropping from $29 billion in 2016 to under $9 billion in 2022 (China Africa Research Initiative, 2023)Strategic.

  • Diversification of funding: Africa now has access to competing Western initiatives, such as the G7’s PGII and the EU’s €150 billion Global Gateway, offering alternatives to BRI finance with potentially better terms and transparency.

  • Increased scrutiny: Nations adopting Chinese digital infrastructure (e.g., Kenya, Nigeria) may see reduced eligibility for US aid or face political consequences, which adds pressure on African states to reassess the long-term costs of Chinese technological integration.

 

According to a World Bank Africa Briefing (2025), concessional finance from China dropped below $7 billion in 2024. By contrast, PGII and Global Gateway disbursements in Africa exceeded $10 billion combined for the first time. Moreover, at least five African countries (Ghana, Senegal, Namibia, Uganda and Rwanda) have launched regulatory reviews of existing BRI agreements due to rising public debt concerns.


7. Strategic Recommendations for African Policymakers

 

The African experience provides practical lessons for navigating US - China rivalry. Policymakers must proactively shape foreign policy to preserve autonomy while capitalising on opportunities from both East and West.


7.1 Strategic non-alignment as policy doctrine

 

Africa must revive the spirit of the Non-Aligned Movement and update it for a multipolar 21st century. Rather than neutrality, this entails actively managing relationships with all powers based on developmental needs.

 

  • Maintain working ties with both US and Chinese partners.

  • Avoid exclusive alignment with either bloc.

  • Practice competitive diplomacy to extract the best offers. 

 

7.2 Institutional strengthening and resilience

 

  • Improve public financial management and debt transparency.

  • Strengthen legal protections around national assets.

  • Enhance policy coordination across ministries to evaluate foreign proposals holistically.

 

7.3 Continental coordination and multilateralism

 

  • Use AU frameworks to issue collective positions on digital governance, foreign investment and debt sustainability.

  • Operationalise AfCFTA to enhance intra-African trade, reducing dependence on external powers.

  • Promote African agency in multilateral reform discussions. 

 

7.4 Monitor legislative risks from the global north

 

  • Track new US and EU legislation that could affect African supply chains.

  • Build forecasting units within foreign ministries to anticipate external regulatory shocks.

  • Develop local content requirements and compliance capacity to avoid sudden disqualifications.

 

New EU legislation in 2025 requires traceability of all critical minerals entering its market. This indirectly affects African exporters who partner with Chinese firms lacking such compliance mechanisms. The African Minerals Transparency Index, developed by UNECA and launched in April 2025, is helping African governments prepare for these evolving standards.


8. Conclusion: Navigating the age of rivalry

 

The rivalry between the US and China defines the geopolitical epoch and whilst dynamics may have originated in trade and technology, they now affect every global region, especially Africa. As the case of South Africa demonstrates, alignment choices have consequences. The continent must tread a careful path, asserting strategic autonomy, embracing multilateralism and building resilient institutions.

 

While a renewed Trump administration may intensify the rivalry, the broader arc of global affairs is clear: developing nations must act with vision and conviction if they are to shape their futures rather than be shaped by external powers. Africa’s response to this challenge can serve as a model for the Global South, a model of pragmatic independence, proactive diplomacy and principled engagement.

 

References

 

Bown, C.P., 2020. US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart. Peterson Institute for International Economics. [Online] Available at: https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

China Africa Research Initiative (CARI), 2023. Chinese Loans to Africa Database. Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. [Online] Available at: https://www.sais-cari.org/data [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

Development Finance Corporation (DFC). 2025. DFC Announces $5 Billion Africa Investment Guarantee Facility. [Online] Available at: https://www.dfc.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). 2025. Guidance on Supply Chain Transparency in Strategic Sectors. [Online] Available at: https://ustr.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020. Economic Impact of the US-China Phase One Agreement. [Online] Available at: https://ustr.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

Pompeo, M., 2020. Communist China and the Free World's Future. Speech at the Nixon Library, 23 July. U.S. Department of State. [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/ [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

The White House, 2019. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. [Online] Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

Trump Campaign, 2024. Campaign Rally Transcript, January 2024. [Online] Available at: https://www.donaldjtrump.com [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

U.S. Congress, 2021. Strategic Competition Act of 2021. [Online] Available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1169 [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). 2025. Annual Indo-Pacific Defense Posture Report. [Online] Available at: https://www.defense.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

U.S. Department of State, 2020. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2025. Audit of Foreign Research Partnerships at US Academic Institutions. [Online] Available at: https://www.gao.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (UNECA), 2025. African Minerals Transparency Index Launch Report. [Online] Available at: https://www.uneca.org

 

Wall Street Journal, 2024. Trump Proposes Sweeping Tariff Plan. [Online] Available at: https://www.wsj.com [Accessed 7 June 2025].

 

World Bank, 2025. Africa’s Economic Outlook and Financial Flows Briefing Q1. [Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org [Accessed 7 June 2025].


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This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals.


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