The role of Middle Powers in (re)balancing the Global Governance System and reviving Multilateralism and the UN

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June 2025

This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGPT. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.

Co-Convenors:

Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability

Inclusive Society Institue

Rapporteur: Daryl Swanepoel

CONTENTS

1 FOREWORD

2 THEMATIC OVERVIEW

2.1 Conceptualising Middle Powers in a fragmented world

2.2 Middle Powers as agents of global balance

2.2.1 A multipolar opportunity

2.2.2 Normative leadership

2.2.3 Strategic tools and leverage

2.3 Strategic incentives for engagement

2.4 Institutional reform and global governance

2.5 From dialogue to action

2.6 Digital transformation and strategic sovereignty

2.7 Conclusion: Claiming agency in a multipolar world

3 GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE ROLE OF MULTILATERALISM

Introductory remarks by HE Tarja Halonen, former President of Finland

(pre-recorded message)

4 THE ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS IN REBALANCING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

- AN ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE

Dr Georgios Kostakos, Executive Director, Foundation for Global Governance and

Sustainability (FOGGS)

4.1 The geopolitical context: Strains on the global governance system

4.2 Defining middle powers: Criteria and candidates

4.3 Roles in rebalancing global governance

4.4 Tools and leverage available to middle powers

4.5 What’s in it for the middle powers? Incentives and strategic gains

4.6 Constraints and limitations

4.7 Strategic proposals for institutionalising middle power influence

4.8 Conclusion: Strategic necessity and moral imperative

5 REIMAGINING PEACE, POWER, AND JUSTICE IN GLOBAL POLITICS - A CRITICAL

REFLECTION ON MULTILATERALISM, THE GLOBAL SOUTH, AND THE FUTURE OF

INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Ms Febe Potgieter- Gqubule, Head of Policy, African National Congress and former

South African diplomat and senior official at the African Union

5.1 The crisis of the Liberal Order and the role of Middle Powers

5.2 Crises as opportunities: Reshaping the global system

5.3 Multilateralism under contestation and reconstruction

5.4 African perspectives on peace, governance, and development

5.5 Regional integration and economic sovereignty

5.6 Education, science and Pan-African solidarity

5.7 Global partnerships and African agency

5.8 Narrative, hope and political imagination

5.9 Coalitions of the willing and Lessons from experience

5.10 Conclusion: Toward a better Africa and a better world

6 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INEQUALITY AND RIGHTS

Professor Sakiko Fukudu-Parr, Studley Graduate Program in International Affairs,

The New School, New York

6.1 Evolution of development thinking

6.2 The human development approach

6.3 Inequality: A structural and normative challenge

6.4 A Rights-based approach to development

6.5 Ethics and measurement in development policy

6.6 The Political economy of intellectual property and innovation

6.7 Institutional and structural obstacles

6.8 Capacity, information and epistemic justice

6.9 Civil Society and participatory approaches

6.10 Rethinking multilateralism and global governance

6.11 Conclusion

7 DISCUSSION: INSIGHTS FROM THE EXPERT DIALOGUE

7.1 Reframing the Middle Power concept: Identity versus agency

7.2 Middle Powers as builders of multilateralism and strategic coalitions

7.3 Africa–US relations: A case study in asymmetric engagement

7.4 Structural constraints and strategic gaps in Africa

7.5 Youth, education and technological transformation

7.6 Towards Implementation: From dialogue to action

7.7 Conclusion: Middle Powers as architects of a multipolar future

ANNEXURE: PROGRAMME

Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:2183261550

1 FOREWORD

A loose association of think tanks and individual experts mainly from the Global South, the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) aspires to influence upcoming decisions on the future of global governance. This includes decisions on the reform of the United Nations, so that the states, the communities and the citizens of the Global South no longer feel that they are guests at the mercy of Northern hosts in the halls of global governance, but that they are equal partners, with their own valid perspectives, equal right- and obligation-holders in decision-making and action.

There is a growing realisation and acknowledgement that the “middle power” countries have unique agency to assist developing nations in attaining a dispensation that is fairer, more equitable and just. To this end the GSPN partnered with the Africa Think-tank Dialogue (ATD) to present a session at the ATD’s annual Africa Consultative Meeting - hosted by the Inclusive Society Institute -  over the period 25 – 26 March 2025 in Cape Town, South Africa. The session further explored how the middle powers’ agency could be deployed to find a new balance for the global governance system so that it also serves the interests of the Global South.

Under the theme “The role of the middle powers in (re)balancing the global governance system and reviving multilateralism and the UN” the meeting surveyed characteristics of these middle powers and pondered potential tactics and strategies that could potentially be employed to advance the ideals of the developing world in an effort to bring about a mutually beneficial outcome that contrasts with the current monopoly of the ‘developed world’ – especially the P5 - in global affairs.

As was concluded when wrapping up the seminar: Middle powers are indispensable to the vision of a fairer, more balanced international order. They represent a bridge between the aspirations of the Global South and the corridors of global power.

What remains is for those in the GSPN and likeminded thinkers and activists around the world, to harness their efforts in activating these powers, to ensure they grasp their strategic agency and to motivate them to use it in order to build the just and equitable world we all deserve.

DARYL SWANEPOEL

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

INCLUSIVE SOCIETY INSTITUTE

2 THEMATIC OVERVIEW

The contemporary global system is being tested by overlapping crises - climate change, geopolitical fragmentation, rising inequality, pandemics and technological disruption. In this period of flux, the traditional power structures that shaped the post-World War II international order are being challenged. Amidst these shifts, middle powers - countries with moderate but meaningful global influence - have emerged as vital actors capable of bridging divides, generating consensus and advancing a more equitable world order.

The Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN), in partnership with the Inclusive Society Institute, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), HumanizaCon and the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD), convened a strategic dialogue in Cape Town (26 March 2025) to examine how middle powers, particularly from the Global South, can recalibrate global governance, revive multilateralism and help democratise international institutions (see the dialogue programme in the Annex). This thematic overview synthesises insights from the expert presentations, as well as critical reflections and exchanges from the policy-oriented dialogue session, underscoring the strategic and moral imperatives of middle power leadership in the 21st century. Summaries of the expert presentations, the dialogue session and the closing remarks follow this overview of issues brought up in the strategic dialogue.

2.1 Conceptualising Middle Powers in a

fragmented world

Rather than viewing middle powers through a purely material lens - based on population size, GDP, or military expenditure - this report embraces a behavioural and normative framework. Middle powers are those that:

• Operate through diplomacy and consensus-building rather than coercion

• Champion multilateralism, rule-based governance and equitable development

• Act as moral voices, mediators and norm entrepreneurs

• Possess regional legitimacy and policy innovation capacity

This broader conceptualisation includes states like South Africa, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Norway and Singapore - diverse in geography, governance systems and capacities, yet united by their strategic behaviour and global orientation. These countries are not passive “followers” of great powers but active agenda-setters with distinct priorities rooted in their domestic values and historical experiences.

2.2 Middle Powers as agents of global balance

2.2.1 A multipolar opportunity

The erosion of U.S. hegemony, the assertiveness of China, and the proliferation of regional power centres have opened new diplomatic spaces for middle powers. These states, operating in the interstices of bipolar rivalries, have an opportunity to shape norms, negotiate institutional reforms and promote inclusive coalitions.

Middle powers have a strategic role in preventing global fragmentation. They can counterbalance unilateralism, resist coercive diplomacy and encourage convergence on pressing issues such as climate action, global health governance, peacebuilding and technological standards. Their ability to connect the Global North and South and the East and West, positions them as indispensable facilitators of global consensus.

2.2.2 Normative leadership

In addition to their mediating role, middle powers carry significant normative weight. Countries like South Africa - through its peaceful transition from apartheid - have moral authority that resonates across the world. Similarly, the development diplomacy of Brazil and the peacebuilding initiatives of Nordic countries exemplify how middle powers can define and diffuse norms related to justice, development and peace.

Their ability to challenge dominant discourses is critical in a world where the liberal order faces a crisis of legitimacy. Middle powers have the opportunity to redefine multilateralism not as a preserve of power politics but as a space for equity, dialogue and pluralism.

2.2.3 Strategic tools and leverage

Middle powers employ a wide array of tools to advance their foreign policy objectives:

• Institutional participation

Active roles in the UN General Assembly, the E10 group of non-permanent Security Council members, ECOSOC and other bodies provide platforms for visibility and influence. Though lacking veto power, middle powers can shape debate, rally support and propose reforms.

• Multilateral coalitions and forums

Groupings such as BRICS, MIKTA, IBSA and the G20 enable issue-based coalition-building that amplifies middle power voices. These forums often facilitate innovation in trade, technology policy, global finance and development cooperation.

• Moral authority, historical legacy, diplomatic capacity and guiding vision

The historical struggle for liberation in South Africa, non-alignment in India, and disarmament leadership in Nordic states imbue these countries with moral legitimacy in the eyes of other nations. This soft power is a key source of diplomatic capital, which can go a long way if served by a competent diplomatic / civil service and is guided by leaders with vision.

• Civil society and knowledge networks

Middle powers often benefit from vibrant think tanks, universities and civil society organisations that generate policy knowledge and normative frameworks. These actors support public diplomacy and create policy continuity across electoral cycles.

• Development and climate finance

While not comparable to the budgets of great powers, some middle powers (e.g., the Nordics) have leveraged sufficient resources to fund strategic initiatives in climate adaptation, health diplomacy and post-conflict reconstruction, often yielding significant global returns.

2.3 Strategic incentives for engagement

Middle powers pursue global leadership not purely out of altruism but also due to enlightened self-interest. Benefits include:

• Enhanced diplomatic influence: Elevates national profiles and provides leverage in bilateral negotiations.

• Soft power dividends: Leadership in global norms enhances product recognition, touristic attraction, education exports and international investment.

• Crisis resilience: Active participation in global governance can insulate middle powers from geopolitical coercion and economic shocks.

• Leadership roles in institutions: Consistent engagement improves the likelihood of securing leadership roles in international organisations, shaping rules from within.

• Public legitimacy: Foreign policy that aligns with national identity and democratic values can strengthen domestic support for international engagement.

2.4 Institutional reform and global governance

A core message of the dialogue was that middle powers are essential to the reform of global institutions. The UN Security Council, IMF, World Bank and WTO all reflect outdated power dynamics that exclude or marginalise the Global South.

Reform proposals include:

• Semi-permanent Security Council seats for middle powers to enhance inclusivity without expanding veto power

• A Global Resilience Council, possibly under ECOSOC, to coordinate responses to climate, health and technological crises

• New metrics of power that go beyond military and economic might, focusing on sustainability, well-being and social resilience

• South-North Think Tank Networks to harmonise policy research and build shared agendas across geopolitical divides

These reforms require persistent advocacy, coalition diplomacy and innovative institutional design - areas where middle powers can lead effectively.

2.5 From dialogue to action

While much of the discourse affirms the strategic potential of middle powers, a recurring theme is the “implementation gap.” Many well-articulated strategies are undermined by weak follow-through.

Recommendations for action:

• Develop concrete roadmaps with timelines and assigned responsibilities to institutionalise dialogue outcomes.

• Engage regional bodies (e.g., AU, Regional Economic Communities) in translating ideas into actionable policies.

• Involve civil society and diaspora in monitoring implementation and holding governments accountable.

• Use strategic moments such as AU and BRICS summits to coordinate positions and influence global agendas.

• Invest in leadership development, with a focus on ethics, vision and pan-African solidarity.

These steps must be supported by think tanks, academic institutions and transnational networks like GSPN that provide expertise and continuity.

2.6 Digital transformation and strategic

sovereignty

The dialogue identified digital governance as a critical frontier where middle powers can exercise leadership. Technological transformation is reshaping everything from labour markets to geopolitics.

Action areas:

• Data sovereignty: Developing countries must craft their own data protection and regulation frameworks.

• AI and tech ethics: Middle powers should advocate for inclusive global AI standards that prioritise rights and sustainability.

• Tech education and infrastructure: Investment in STEM and vocational training is key to digital agency.

• Cross-regional innovation hubs: South-South tech partnerships can accelerate homegrown solutions to local problems.

Middle powers must ensure that digital transformation reinforces, rather than undermines, democratic governance and social equity.

2.7 Conclusion: Claiming agency in a

multipolar world

The GSPN dialogue concluded with a compelling vision: middle powers, especially from the Global South, are not peripheral actors in global governance - they are central to its renewal. Their ability to mediate, innovate and build bridges across divides positions them as architects of a more just and multipolar future.

But agency is not automatic - it must be claimed. Strategic clarity, institutional coherence and collective courage are needed. Middle powers must align national interests with global justice, translating ideas into policies and speeches into impact.

As one participant aptly noted: “Let us not allow the report of our dialogue to gather dust on a shelf. Let it walk. Let it speak. Let it lead.”

3 GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE

ROLE OF MULTILATERALISM

Introductory remarks by HE Tarja Halonen, former President of Finland

(pre-recorded message)

The current global landscape is marked by increasing instability. The number of wars and conflicts is on the rise, while geopolitical divisions continue to deepen. Simultaneously, inequality, hunger and poverty are worsening worldwide. Fundamental human rights are under severe assault, and democratic institutions along with the rule of law are increasingly threatened in many countries. On top of these socio-political challenges, the planet is rapidly approaching several environmental tipping points - critical thresholds beyond which recovery may be impossible.

Despite these alarming trends, there remains hope through collective action. A just and sustainable future is achievable if nations work together. Historical evidence supports this vision. Although multilateralism is inherently complex and often slow, the progress made in the eighty years since the founding of the United Nations (UN) is significant. The UN has emerged as the leading forum for international cooperation, playing a pivotal role in advancing peace and security, human rights, sustainable development, disarmament and the global response to climate change.

However, the current moment reveals a troubling reality: global divisions appear to be growing stronger than the ties that unite us. To meet the demands of today’s world, a fundamental transformation of the multilateral system is required. The UN must undergo reform and global trust must be rebuilt. This process hinges on mutual respect for international norms, agreements and the rule of law. A rules-based international order remains the cornerstone of peace, stability and shared prosperity.

South Africa, and Africa more broadly, hold an essential role in fortifying the global multilateral framework. There is a pressing need to move beyond confrontation and division and instead focus on collective responses to global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, desertification and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

To this end, international institutions (including the United Nations) must adapt to the realities of the contemporary world. This includes comprehensive reforms, such as changes to the composition and functioning of the UN Security Council. Proposals like the establishment of a Global Resilience Council under the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) offer promising avenues to accelerate implementation of international agreements like the Paris Climate Accord and enhance development financing.

Think tanks from the Global South also have a crucial role to play. They serve as important partners to their governments and can significantly contribute in international discussions. Collaborations between Global South and Global North think tanks have the potential to amplify voices, enhance policy effectiveness and demonstrate that globalisation can yield mutual benefits.

The call to action is clear: joint efforts must continue. The road ahead demands unity, innovation, and commitment. Although physical presence at meetings such as the one in Cape Town may not always be possible, the shared commitment to dialogue and cooperation remains vital. With dedication and mutual respect, meaningful progress can be achieved.

4 THE ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS IN

REBALANCING GLOBAL

GOVERNANCE - AN ANALYTICAL

PERSPECTIVE

Dr Georgios Kostakos, Executive Director, Foundation for Global Governance and

Sustainability (FOGGS)

In a rapidly evolving global order marked by geopolitical tensions, institutional fatigue, and transnational crises, the concept of "middle powers" has re-emerged as a focal point in discussions on global governance. Georgios Kostakos, in his presentation, articulated a compelling case for the strategic and moral importance of middle powers in shaping a more equitable, effective and resilient international system. This report analyses Dr Kostakos’ s key arguments, examining the geopolitical context, defining characteristics of middle powers, their potential roles, tools at their disposal and the structural challenges they face.

4.1 The geopolitical context: Strains on the

global governance system

Kostakos begins by situating the middle power discourse within the broader context of a global system under severe strain. Several trends converge to undermine global cooperation: the rise of new power centres, such as China and the BRICS bloc, the relative decline of traditional Western hegemons and the resurgence of nationalism and populism, which have eroded trust in multilateralism. These shifts are taking place against the backdrop of a fragmented international order where major institutions - particularly the UN Security Council - are often paralysed by power politics and vetoes.

This weakened institutional framework is particularly concerning given the scale and complexity of today’s global crises: climate change, pandemics, cyber warfare, biodiversity loss and economic inequality. These are not isolated challenges but interconnected threats that require sustained, collective action. Yet, the existing global governance structures have largely failed to respond adequately, often bogged down by geopolitical rivalries and bureaucratic inertia. Kostakos described this moment as a form of global adolescence - an unstable yet potentially transformative phase.

4.2 Defining middle powers: Criteria and

candidates

The concept of “middle powers” was central to the presentation, and Kostakos took care to outline their distinguishing features. Unlike great powers or small, middle powers hold a unique position - strong enough to influence global affairs but not so dominant as to provoke fear or opposition. They are, in effect, trusted brokers with both credibility and capacity.

To qualify as a middle power, a state should possess:

• A demonstrated commitment to good governance and respect for the rights of its citizens

• Relative economic and diplomatic capacity

• A constructive international role, characterised by adherence to multilateral treaties and norms

• No engagement in active conflicts and no possession of nuclear weapons.

This definition is deliberately inclusive and globally representative. Kostakos mentioned South Africa, Brazil, Norway, Singapore and Indonesia as examples. He also emphasised the importance of regional forums and alliances, such as the African Union, the Pacific Island Forum, AOSIS and the Non-Aligned Movement, as vehicles for middle power cooperation.

Importantly, the list of middle powers is not fixed. States may grow into or fall out of the category depending on changes in their governance, capacity or international posture. This fluidity reinforces the need for constant evaluation and dynamic coalition-building.

4.3 Roles in rebalancing global governance

Middle powers, according to Kostakos, have a unique opportunity and responsibility, that is to fill the leadership void left by disengaged or self-interested superpowers. Their central location in the global hierarchy makes them well-suited to act as mediators, facilitators and norm-setters. Their ability to interact credibly with both large and small powers provides an essential link in a fragmented international community.

Key roles include:

• Mediators and bridge builders: In an age where big power rivalries often obstruct progress, middle powers can act as neutral arbiters. Historical examples from the Nordic countries in peace negotiations, including in the Middle East and Latin America, illustrate the effectiveness of such states in conflict resolution.

• Preventive diplomacy: Kostakos highlighted overlooked crises such as rising tensions between Burundi and Rwanda or Venezuela’s territorial claims on Guyana. These situations, while not globally dominant in media narratives, carry the potential for regional destabilisation. Middle powers could spearhead early intervention mechanisms to de-escalate such conflicts.

• Advocates for disarmament: Despite decades of inaction, the UN Charter mandates the eventual reduction of global armaments. Middle powers, free from vested interests in military supremacy, are ideally positioned to reignite discussions on both nuclear and conventional disarmament.

• Champions of economic equity and development: In the realm of global economics, middle powers can promote alternative models of development that prioritise employment, sustainability and human capital over purely trade-driven growth. They can support equitable implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly in the Global South.

• Institutional reformers: Reforming global governance requires both ideas and coalitions. Middle powers can propose new institutional structures, such as a Global Resilience Council or a revamped Security Council membership model, to enhance representation, transparency and functionality.

4.4 Tools and leverage available to middle

powers

While not as resource-rich as major powers, middle powers have several underutilised tools at their disposal. Kostakos detailed a diverse arsenal of mechanisms for influence, ranging from formal institutional roles to informal networks and moral authority.

• UN platforms: The General Assembly and E10 (the 10 elected members of the Security Council) are primary forums that offer visibility and strategic access to decision-making.

• G77 and coalition voting blocs: Within the UN, middle powers often anchor coalitions such as the G77, where their leadership can sway major decisions, especially on development, human rights and climate action.

• Moral and political legitimacy: Countries like South Africa, with legacies of peaceful democratic transitions, carry moral weight that can help frame global debates and mobilise support from both governments and civil society.

• Catalytic financing: Nordic countries have historically funded global initiatives with relatively small investments that have had outsized impacts, especially in climate diplomacy and peacebuilding.

• Civil society networks: By partnering with NGOs, academic institutions, and think tanks, middle powers can develop and disseminate innovative policy ideas. These partnerships are crucial for shaping global norms and applying domestic pressure for international engagement.

• North-South bridging: One of the most significant strengths of middle powers is their capacity to transcend regional and ideological divides. Whether through the G20, BRICS, or regional organisations, they can forge pragmatic partnerships across traditional fault lines.

4.5 What’s in it for the middle powers?

Incentives and strategic gains

Beyond altruistic global engagement, middle powers stand to gain substantially from a proactive role in international affairs. Kostakos presented a strong case for the strategic and reputational benefits of middle power leadership:

• Greater diplomatic clout: Taking initiative in multilateral affairs enhances a state’s diplomatic profile and influence over international norms and policy agendas.

• Geopolitical insulation: In a world where major powers increasingly weaponize economics and alliances, middle power coalitions can provide a buffer against coercion or marginalisation.

• National prestige and economic spillovers: Global leadership often translates into increased tourism, investment and export opportunities, particularly in sectors like education, healthcare, and clean energy.

• Enhanced domestic legitimacy: Engagement in international initiatives that align with national values (e.g., anti-apartheid history, climate leadership) can bolster domestic support for governments.

• Access to multilateral positions: Active participation in global governance enhances prospects for securing leadership roles in international organisations - creating pathways for influence and norm-setting.

This logic of “enlightened self-interest” is crucial to building domestic support for international engagement, particularly in societies where immediate socio-economic challenges dominate the political agenda.

4.6 Constraints and limitations

Kostakos acknowledged the many obstacles middle powers face:

• Resource scarcity: Many middle powers lack the military, financial or institutional capacity to drive global change. This is especially true for smaller economies or states with domestic crises.

• External pressure: Major powers may attempt to curtail the international ambitions of middle powers through political threats or economic penalties. Examples abound in diplomatic history where small initiatives were quashed under pressure.

• Institutional inertia: Multilateral institutions often favour continuity over change, with secretariats and leadership structures closely aligned with dominant powers. Middle powers must work harder to gain traction.

• Domestic ambivalence: Citizens may question the relevance of international engagement when facing unemployment, poverty or inequality at home. Leaders must communicate the long-term value of global leadership clearly and persuasively.

• Coalition management: Middle power coalitions can be difficult to sustain due to differing priorities, ideological diversity and regional rivalries. Building and maintaining trust across such a diverse group is a persistent challenge.

Nonetheless, Kostakos argued that strategic collaboration, targeted initiatives and creative diplomacy can overcome many of these limitations.

4.7 Strategic proposals for institutionalising

middle power influence

To maximise their impact, Kostakos proposed the institutionalisation of middle power roles through several creative avenues:

• Security Council reform: Instead of expanding permanent membership, he proposes semi-permanent, elected positions for middle powers. These would provide continuity without replicating the dysfunctional veto system.

• Global Resilience Council: A new body, outside traditional power hierarchies, that could coordinate global responses to transnational threats - climate change, pandemics, cybercrime - with middle powers at its core.

• Informal networks and precedents: Drawing on past examples like the “The Six Nation Peace Initiative,” Kostakos called for nimble, cross-regional groupings that can develop and promote common positions on issues like disarmament, development and peacebuilding.

These proposals blend pragmatism with vision, emphasising reform over revolution and building on existing diplomatic capital.

4.8 Conclusion: Strategic necessity and moral

imperative

Dr Kostakos presented a compelling vision of middle powers as the pivotal actors in the 21st-century global order. They possess the balance of credibility, capacity and principle needed to navigate an increasingly fragmented international landscape. While not free from limitations, their unique position allows them to mediate, innovate and lead where others cannot or will not.

In a world where multilateralism is increasingly endangered, the proactive engagement of middle powers is not merely desirable, it is essential. Their ability to create inclusive coalitions, propose realistic reforms and lead by example offers a pathway toward a more just, equitable and sustainable global order.

If the international community is to avoid sliding into prolonged disorder or bipolar competition, the centre must hold. And at the centre are the middle powers - steady, principled and indispensable.

5 REIMAGINING PEACE, POWER, AND

JUSTICE IN GLOBAL POLITICS - A

CRITICAL REFLECTION ON

MULTILATERALISM, THE GLOBAL

SOUTH, AND THE FUTURE OF

INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Ms Febe Potgieter- Gqubule, Head of Policy, African National Congress and former

South African diplomat and senior official at the African Union

In a world shaped by shifting geopolitical dynamics, overlapping crises and rising disillusionment with Western-dominated systems of governance, the time has come to reassess the meanings of peace, power and justice. Drawing exclusively from the insights presented by Ms Potgieter-Gqubule, this report explores the evolving role of middle powers, the struggles and aspirations of the Global South and the imperative of inclusive multilateralism in crafting a more equitable international order. The reflection is grounded in historical developments, regional dynamics in Africa and global structural trends, offering a layered understanding of how transformation can be imagined and enacted in the 21st century.

5.1 The crisis of the Liberal Order and the role

of Middle Powers

The liberal international order, long championed by the West as the foundation of global peace and cooperation, is undergoing a legitimacy crisis. This moment should not be seen as an anomaly but as part of a broader historical pattern in which international orders are reshaped through crises. Middle powers - states that are not hegemonic but hold significant regional or strategic influence - emerge in this landscape as critical agents of balance, reform and advocacy.

Historically, middle powers have played vital roles in fostering cooperation and navigating bipolar or unipolar tensions. From the establishment of the United Nations after World War II to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, these states have asserted alternative paths that resist binary choices between great powers. The Bandung Conference of 1955 and the creation of the G77 in 1964 were emblematic of efforts by middle and developing powers to reclaim agency and promote developmental and peace-oriented agendas outside the rigid Cold War framework.

Today, the identity and influence of middle powers are more heterogeneous. Countries such as South Africa, Brazil, India, Türkiye and Singapore represent different economic sizes, political systems and geographic roles, yet they share a commitment to multilateralism, regional leadership and a broader understanding of development and justice. Their influence is not always rooted in hard power but often in moral authority, regional legitimacy, or economic strategy. South Africa, for instance, derives part of its middle power identity from its role in the African continent, its moral standing post-apartheid and its active participation in multilateral forums such as BRICS, the African Union (AU) and the G20.

5.2 Crises as opportunities: Reshaping the

global system

Potgieter underscored that crises - be they global health emergencies, conflicts, or economic disruptions - are not merely destructive; they are also generative. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the vulnerabilities of global systems and the shortcomings of Western-led responses. Countries in the Global South, often left behind in vaccine access and economic recovery, began to question the fairness of global governance structures. Yet, these same crises sparked new forms of cooperation. Africa’s collective response through the Africa CDC, the AU’s health diplomacy and joint procurement strategies revealed the continent’s potential for self-determination.

These responses show that crises can open political and strategic space for innovation and transformation. They expose the fragility of dominant systems while simultaneously demonstrating the value of coordinated regional and multilateral action. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa (2013–2016) was another such moment. While Western nations divided responsibilities along former colonial lines, the AU launched ASEOWA, mobilising African health workers and institutions to deliver frontline assistance. This pan-African initiative not only saved lives but also strengthened regional infrastructure and laid the foundation for the Africa CDC.

Crucially, these actions highlight a broader lesson: effective responses to global crises are not the monopoly of the powerful. Middle powers and regional institutions - when acting in solidarity and with strategic vision - can forge new pathways for peace, development and justice.

5.3 Multilateralism under contestation and

reconstruction

A central concern raised by Potgieter is the fate of multilateralism in a fractured global order. The post-war multilateral institutions - the United Nations, IMF, World Bank, WTO - have been instrumental in shaping norms and rules. However, they have also been complicit in reproducing inequalities. Their governance structures are often skewed in favour of the Global North, with decision-making power concentrated in the hands of a few.

Middle powers have responded by pushing for institutional reform and alternative platforms. South Africa, India, Brazil and others have used their participation in BRICS, the G20 and the Non-Aligned Movement to advocate for a fairer global economic architecture. Reform of the United Nations Security Council, democratisation of the World Bank and IMF voting shares,and restructuring global trade rules are among the long-standing demands.

Potgieter emphasised that middle powers tend to be strong proponents of multilateralism, not only because it offers a counterweight to great power domination, but also because it aligns with their vision of collective problem-solving. For countries that cannot unilaterally impose their will, multilateralism becomes both a shield and a vehicle for change. Their advocacy is thus rooted in both pragmatism and principle.

Additionally, the role of middle powers in shaping norms around peace, security and development is deeply tied to their commitment to inclusive governance. South Africa’s role in G20, its focus on integrating the African agenda into global discourse and its calls for solidarity and justice are part of this broader effort. This is not merely about representation, it is about reorienting the normative foundations of global cooperation.

5.4 African perspectives on peace,

governance,and development

A significant portion of the presentation reflected on Africa’s role in the world, both as a site of marginalisation and as a source of innovative thinking and leadership. Despite its historical exclusion from the commanding heights of global governance, Africa possesses immense strategic assets: abundant natural and mineral resources, a youthful population, expanding urban centres and growing regional institutions.

Yet, the continent continues to face challenges related to governance, conflict and socio-economic development. Potgieter was candid about the need for good governance, transparency and citizen empowerment. She highlighted the African Peer Review Mechanism as a promising tool for promoting accountability. Similarly, she acknowledged the growing participation of young people and women in political leadership as positive trends that must be nurtured.

Peace and development are framed not as sequential but as mutually reinforcing. The African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the NEPAD initiative stress that without investing in human development and economic transformation, peace will remain fragile. This integrated approach rejects the narrow “peace first, development later” logic that has often dominated international peacebuilding frameworks.

The AU’s African Standby Force, the continental peace architecture and the emphasis on “silencing the guns” are examples of efforts to localise conflict resolution and security governance. They demonstrate a move away from dependence on external actors and a growing belief in African solutions to African problems.

5.5 Regional integration and economic

sovereignty

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a landmark initiative aiming to accelerate intra-African trade, industrialisation and regional integration. Potgieter pointed to its significance not only in economic terms but as a political project of continental unity. Its success depends on regional infrastructure, harmonised regulations and the political will to overcome nationalistic barriers.

Encouragingly, African countries have exceeded infrastructure investment targets under the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), with substantial contributions coming from within the continent. This counters the narrative of dependency and illustrates Africa’s capacity for self-financed development.

Potgieter invoked the words of Desmond Tutu, who criticised African leaders’ dependency on foreign aid for basic infrastructure. Her message is clear: Africa must recognise its achievements, build on its successes and claim its agency in defining its developmental path.

5.6 Education, science and Pan-African

solidarity

Human development, especially education and scientific collaboration, is emphasised as a foundation for long-term transformation. The Pan-African University, a flagship initiative of the AU, exemplifies efforts to create a network of postgraduate centres across the continent that nurture scientific excellence, build transnational academic networks and foster a sense of pan-African identity.

This investment in education has concrete political and social implications. It promotes mobility, dialogue and mutual understanding among African scholars and professionals, laying the groundwork for future cooperation. The example of RUFORUM (Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture), which grew from a handful of universities to over 130 members, shows how small initiatives can scale up into transformative networks when driven by clear purpose and vision.

5.7 Global partnerships and African agency

Africa’s engagement with external partners, whether in the US, Europe, China, or the Middle East, must be guided by a clear and strategic understanding of its own interests. Potgieter stressed that Africa must define what it wants from these relationships, moving away from passive recipient roles to assertive partnership-building.

The African Union Commission is tasked with coordinating these engagements and ensuring that continental priorities are reflected. Africa's diaspora, referred to as the continent's “sixth region,” is identified as an underutilised resource for investment, knowledge exchange and narrative reshaping.

Institutional capacity is key to all these efforts. The African Union, the African Development Bank and the Africa CDC are examples of institutions that have demonstrated their value in times of crisis. While leadership challenges have sometimes hindered their effectiveness, there is a clear recognition that strengthening these institutions is vital for Africa’s voice on the global stage.

5.8 Narrative, hope and political imagination

Perhaps one of the most profound interventions in the text is the discussion on narrative. Africa, Potgieter argued, must reclaim its story - not as one of perpetual crisis, but as one of resilience, creativity and potential. She recounted how an outsider described Africa as a bird surrounded by poisonous snakes, so paralysed by fear that it forgets it can fly. This metaphor speaks to the psychological and political work of decolonisation: remembering one's agency, asserting one's worth and imagining futures beyond inherited constraints.

Reclaiming narrative is about more than positive messaging - it is about shifting power. The way Africa is perceived affects how it is treated, funded, engaged with and respected. It influences diplomatic priorities, investment patterns, and global solidarity. Telling a fuller story - one that includes successes, innovations and leadership - helps dismantle Afro-pessimism and rebuild confidence in the continent’s future.

5.9 Coalitions of the willing and Lessons from

experience

Change often begins with a few. Potgieter shared the story of RUFORUM as an example of how small groups of actors can catalyse continental change. The lesson here is that waiting for consensus from all 55 African countries can stall progress. Instead, coalitions of the willing, that is those ready to act, can pilot innovations that others later adopt.

This approach applies to peacebuilding, industrialisation, education and governance reforms. Africa must embrace experimentation, learn from both failures and successes and remain agile in the face of complexity.

5.10 Conclusion: Toward a better Africa and a

better world

Potgieter concluded her reflection with two powerful historical and contemporary examples. The liberation of African countries from colonialism was a long, difficult process, but it was ultimately successful because of collective commitment and perseverance. Similarly, Africa’s response to the Ebola crisis demonstrated the power of regional solidarity, institutional coordination and indigenous leadership.

The message is clear: transformation is possible. But it requires courage, imagination, solidarity and sustained effort. Middle powers, the Global South and African actors are not just passive subjects of global systems - they are co-creators of future orders.

In times of uncertainty and flux, there is an opportunity to redefine the rules of the game. The principles of justice, equality, diversity and mutual respect must be the foundation. And Africa, with its youth, institutions and ideas, is not on the margins of that future - it is at its centre.

6 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INEQUALITY

AND RIGHTS

Professor Sakiko Fukudu-Parr, Studley Graduate Program in International Affairs, The

New School, New York

This report is based on the insights shared by Professor Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, an eminent development economist and former Director of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Reports (HDRs). Through her speech, Fukuda-Parr offered a compelling reflection on the transformation of development thought over the past several decades, particularly through the lens of human rights, inequality and the political economy of global governance. Her insights are shaped by decades of professional experience and personal commitment to justice-oriented development policy.

6.1 Evolution of development thinking

The trajectory of development thinking, according to Fukuda-Parr, can be divided into distinct intellectual and policy paradigms. The dominant paradigm of the post-World War II period was heavily growth-centric, prioritising industrialisation and GDP growth as the primary indicators of national progress. This model, grounded in modernisation theory, viewed development as a linear transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ societies, largely measured in economic terms.

However, by the late 1980s, this growth-focused approach faced growing criticism. Rising income inequality, persistent poverty, and environmental degradation exposed the shortcomings of equating growth with prgress. The turning point came with the 1990 launch of the first Human Development Report, which Fukuda-Parr was intimately involved in producing. The HDR introduced a paradigm shift by asserting that “people are the real wealth of nations.” This marked the emergence of a new approach that emphasised the expansion of people’s capabilities and freedoms.

6.2 The human development approach

The human development approach reframed the goals of development around people’s well-being, rather than material wealth alone. Fukuda-Parr explained how this approach drew heavily from the work of Amartya Sen, who argued that development should be about increasing people’s freedoms to lead the kinds of lives they value. These freedoms span multiple domains, such as health, education, political participation and cultural inclusion.

A major innovation was the development of new indicators, particularly the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI combines measures of life expectancy, education and income to provide a composite picture of well-being. Although imperfect, it provided a more multidimensional view of development and challenged the primacy of GDP as the sole metric of success.

Over time, additional indices were introduced to better capture disparities, such as the Gender Development Index (GDI), the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). These tools helped reveal inequalities and deprivations that GDP alone could not. Fukuda-Parr underscored that these indices are not just technical instruments but also normative statements about what societies should value.

6.3 Inequality: A structural and normative

challenge

Fukuda-Parr identified inequality as a central and persistent challenge to human development. While many countries have made strides in reducing poverty, the gap between the richest and poorest - both within and across countries - has widened dramatically. This inequality is not incidental but systemic, driven by economic structures, policy choices and global institutions that favour the wealthy and powerful.

She drew attention to how inequality is not merely about income, but about access to power, voice, resources and opportunities. Inequality undermines the democratic process, exacerbates social tensions and limits the potential for inclusive development. Importantly, she critiqued mainstream economic theories for treating inequality as a natural or necessary byproduct of growth, rather than as a problem to be solved.

She also critiqued the idea that the market is the best mechanism for allocating resources. Markets can be efficient, but they are not inherently fair. When left unchecked, they produce and reproduce inequalities. Fukuda-Parr called for development policy to explicitly tackle inequality through redistributive measures, affirmative action and social protection.

6.4 A Rights-based approach to development

A significant part of Fukuda-Parr’s address focused on the rights-based approach to development. She asserts that framing development in terms of human rights provides both a moral and legal foundation for policy. Rights are not gifts from the state but entitlements that all individuals possess by virtue of their humanity.

This framework shifts the focus from charity to justice and from needs to obligations. Governments are duty-bearers, legally obligated to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Citizens are rights-holders, entitled to claim their rights. This approach fosters accountability, participation and equality.

The Human Development Reports gradually adopted this perspective, beginning with the 2000 report, which emphasised human rights and development. Fukuda-Parr notes that this was a controversial move at the time, as some governments and institutions resisted the integration of rights into development. Nonetheless, it marked a crucial evolution in thinking, highlighting that freedom from want and freedom from fear are integral to development.

6.5 Ethics and measurement in development

policy

Fukuda-Parr is particularly attentive to the ethical dimensions of development. She emphasised that development is not a neutral or purely technical endeavour. It involves value judgments about what matters, who matters and how benefits and burdens are distributed.

Measurement tools like the HDI are useful, but they can also mask underlying injustices. For example, an increase in average income may conceal deepening inequalities. She warned against technocratic reductionism - the tendency to focus on what is easily measurable rather than what is important. She calls for an “ethical audit” of development policies to assess their alignment with values of dignity, justice and equity.

Furthermore, she critiqued the global dominance of Western-centric knowledge systems that often marginalise alternative epistemologies. Development discourse, she argued, needs to be decolonised to reflect diverse experiences, particularly those from the Global South. This includes acknowledging the contributions of non-Western thinkers, valuing indigenous knowledge and resisting the imposition of universal solutions.

6.6 The Political economy of intellectual

property and innovation

One of the most critical topics Fukuda-Parr addressed was the political economy of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and technological innovation. She discussed the paradox that, although developing countries fought for flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement (such as compulsory licensing), they seldom utilise them.

Fukuda-Parr highlighted how intellectual property laws, originally designed to incentivise innovation, have evolved into tools of monopoly capitalism. Wealthy nations and corporations use patents to consolidate control over knowledge and restrict access, particularly in essential sectors like health and agriculture. During the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine inequities starkly illustrated how IPRs can obstruct equitable access.

She underscored that many developing countries have legal provisions - enshrined in the TRIPS agreement - that allow them to circumvent patents during emergencies. However, fear of political retaliation, lack of legal infrastructure and ideological adherence to strong IP protection prevent their use. She argued for a reassessment of IPR policies and calls on national governments to prioritise public health and development over corporate profit.

6.7 Institutional and structural obstacles

Fukuda-Parr outlined several institutional barriers that hinder effective use of development tools and flexibilities. She identified three interrelated obstacles: vested interests, ideological bias and institutional silos.

Powerful actors - both domestic elites and international corporations - often resist reforms that threaten their economic interests. Ideologically, the belief in market solutions and private property as the ultimate good limits policy imagination. Institutions like the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and national IP offices operate in silos, disconnected from broader development goals.

Additionally, regional institutions in Africa, such as OAPI and ARIPO, historically failed to integrate compulsory licensing or prioritise development objectives. Their frameworks were influenced more by legal formalism than developmental pragmatism. She called for these institutions to be reformed, democratised and reoriented toward public welfare.

6.8 Capacity, information and epistemic justice

Another critical point raised is the so-called “capacity gap.” Fukuda-Parr questioned whether the issue is truly a lack of capacity or rather a lack of information and appropriate knowledge. She identified a deep-seated epistemic injustice in how development knowledge is produced, validated and disseminated.

Much of the prevailing knowledge on IP and innovation is based on Euro-American experiences, which are not always relevant for African countries or other parts of the Global South. She emphasised the importance of building local knowledge systems that reflect local realities and needs. She also advocates for the democratisation of development education and policy spaces to include more diverse voices.

6.9 Civil Society and participatory approaches

Fukuda-Parr strongly supports participatory development and the role of civil society. She recognises that real change is often driven from below, by communities demanding rights, transparency and justice. Participatory development is not just a methodology but a principle - it respects people as active agents, not passive recipients.

She highlighted that civil society organisations were instrumental in challenging TRIPS and advocating for health rights during the HIV/AIDS and COVID-19 crises. Such efforts demonstrate the power of collective action and the importance of political agency in development.

6.10 Rethinking multilateralism and global

governance

In her concluding reflections, Fukuda-Parr critiqued the current model of multilateralism as deeply unequal. While multilateral institutions provide important platforms, they often reproduce global power hierarchies. High-income countries dominate agenda-setting, resource allocation and rule-making, marginalising the voices of the Global South.

She called for a more democratic and equitable multilateral order, one that supports national policy autonomy and development-oriented reform. This includes revisiting global trade rules, reforming institutions like the WTO and IMF, and creating spaces for Southern-led initiatives.

Multilateralism, she insisted, must be rooted in solidarity - not just cooperation among elites but genuine engagement with marginalised peoples and nations. National policies, too, must be aligned with international frameworks in a way that reflects local priorities and ensures justice.

6.11 Conclusion

Sakiko Fukuda-Parr’s address offered a profound and multifaceted analysis of the state of development thinking today. From the evolution of the human development approach to the critique of intellectual property regimes, from the ethics of measurement to the politics of global governance, her insights underscore a simple yet powerful truth: development must serve people, not markets.

Her reflections compel us to reimagine development as a deeply ethical, political and participatory process. It must be grounded in justice, guided by rights and informed by diverse knowledge systems. Addressing inequality, resisting neo-colonial structures and embracing alternative paradigms are essential steps toward a more equitable global order.

In an era marked by uncertainty, crisis and profound injustice, Fukuda-Parr’s vision is both a critique and a call to action. It reminds policymakers, practitioners, scholars and citizens alike that human dignity, freedom and solidarity must be at the heart of any meaningful development agenda.

7 DISCUSSION: INSIGHTS FROM THE

EXPERT DIALOGUE

This comprehensive report synthesises key reflections and perspectives from the high-level multi-stakeholder dialogue on the evolving role of middle powers in global politics. Drawing extensively from African perspectives, the discussion reframes traditional assumptions about middle power diplomacy and highlights the urgent need for strategic agency, cohesive continental voice and bold institutional innovation.

7.1 Reframing the Middle Power concept:

Identity versus agency

Conventional definitions of middle powers, which rest heavily on tangible indicators such as economic output, population, or military strength, have often proved inadequate in capturing the diverse strategic behaviours of these states. This dialogue urged a shift from positional metrics to behavioural frameworks - understanding middle powers by what they do rather than what they are.

Participants emphasised that middle powers exhibit dynamic agency: they actively shape international norms, mediate disputes, form strategic coalitions and promote multilateralism. This reconceptualization rejects a passive, derivative view of middle powers as simply “followers” of great powers and instead recognises them as norm entrepreneurs, agenda-setters and system reformers.

For Africa, this rethinking is not just  -  is political and developmental. It means moving beyond the reactive posture that often characterises engagements with major powers like the United States, and toward a more assertive, coherent and principled diplomacy that reflects African priorities.

7.2 Middle Powers as builders of

multilateralism and strategic coalitions

Middle powers have historically found strength through coalition-building and issue-based alliances. The dialogue highlighted how this continues to be a primary mechanism through which such states amplify their influence. Coalitions like MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, Australia) and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) serve not only as coordination platforms but as laboratories of policy innovation and norm diffusion.

For Africa, regionalism and pan-African initiatives such as the African Union (AU) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are central to projecting middle power influence. However, the fragmentation within African diplomatic stances and the inconsistent alignment of national, regional and continental interests weaken these platforms.

The discussion underscored the necessity for Africa to speak with one voice on key global issues. Unity, it was argued, is not about uniformity, but coherence - agreeing on fundamental principles of sovereignty, self-determination and equitable global governance. Only then can Africa wield moral and strategic authority in shaping international discourse.

7.3 Africa–US relations: A case study in

asymmetric engagement

The dialogue offered a candid assessment of Africa’s strategic relationship with the United States, framed largely as a partnership of non-equals. While diplomatic language often invokes mutual respect, real-world practice is marred by dominance, unilateralism and a divide-and-rule approach from Washington.

One illustrative example is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which, while providing some market access to African exports, has disproportionately benefited a handful of countries, with South Africa receiving the bulk of trade advantages. Even so, its share remains marginal on the global trade scale. Participants emphasised that Africa must recalibrate trade frameworks to better align with domestic industrialisation and development strategies.

Criticism was also directed at how US foreign policy adapts to changing administrations - oscillating between engagement and neglect, often dictated by ideological swings, such as those seen under Trump’s “America First” doctrine. These shifts tend to undermine long-term policy consistency and multilateral cooperation.

Nonetheless, it was acknowledged that within certain institutional arrangements, relations between Africa and the US remain characterised by respect for democratic principles and shared objectives in areas such as health, education and peacekeeping. This  duality - coexistence of dominance and cooperation - requires African diplomats to engage with finesse, as one speaker put it, navigating these contradictions without compromising national and continental integrity.

7.4 Structural constraints and strategic gaps in

Africa

While the discussion celebrated the continent’s vast potential, it was also unflinching in its critique of internal challenges. Several enduring constraints undermine Africa’s ability to exercise middle power diplomacy effectively:

• Underdeveloped intra-African trade, which limits regional economic integration.

• Corruption and governance weaknesses, which erode public trust and state legitimacy.

• Lack of strategic economic independence, leaving African states vulnerable to debt cycles and conditional aid.

• Incoherent foreign policy coordination, which often leads to contradictory stances on the global stage.

The speakers also flagged Afro-pessimism - a persistent narrative that views Africa through a lens of dependency and dysfunction - as a psychological and political barrier to agency. Challenging this narrative requires deliberate intellectual, cultural and policy reorientation, spearheaded by Africans themselves.

7.5 Youth, education and technological

transformation

Another key focus of the discussion was the future of African agency, particularly as it relates to intergenerational renewal, education and technology. The youth expressed concern about the lack of opportunities for meaningful participation and succession in leadership. Their call was simple yet urgent: Create space for us. Equip us. Trust us.

The shift in the global economy, driven by digitalisation and automation, demands a radical overhaul of Africa’s education systems. A mismatch between qualifications and market needs - especially the surplus of humanities graduates and the shortage of skilled artisans - has created a paradox of educated unemployment.

The example of Singapore’s vocational education reforms was cited as a possible model, where national strategies align educational curricula with the future economy. In Africa, this will require not only investment in TVET colleges and STEM education, but also a cultural shift that recognises the dignity and value of technical skills.

If middle powers are to shape the global technological order, they must also invest in data sovereignty, digital governance and artificial intelligence policy. Africa must not be a passive consumer of global tech trends - it must become a regulator, innovator and norm-setter in its own right.

7.6 Towards Implementation: From dialogue

to action

Perhaps the most important theme emerging from the dialogue was the implementation gap. Africa, as noted, is rich in ideas but poor in follow-through. The failure to implement resolutions, policies and frameworks has become a chronic impediment to progress.

To remedy this, several recommendations were made Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, the Deputy Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute:

• Develop a roadmap for implementing the outcomes of such dialogues, with clearly assigned responsibilities and timelines.

• Engage AU institutions, regional economic communities (RECs) and national governments in translating insights into policy.

• Mobilise civil society, academia and diaspora communities to advocate for accountability and inclusion.

• Leverage strategic moments, such as AU Summits, to present united positions and influence continental agendas.

• Invest in leadership development, with a focus on ethics, vision and pan-African solidarity.

In this regard, the role of organisations like the Inclusive Society Institute and collaborative platforms such as the Africa Think-tank Dialogue (ATD) are seen as pivotal. These bodies must not only convene but consolidate knowledge, sustain momentum and embed implementation mechanisms.

7.7 Conclusion: Middle Powers as architects

of a multipolar future

Middle powers, particularly from the Global South, are indispensable to the vision of a fairer, more balanced international order. In the African context, they represent a bridge between the continent’s grassroots aspirations and the corridors of global power.

However, this role will not be inherited - it must be claimed through strategic clarity, institutional coherence and collective courage. Africa’s future as a middle power actor depends on its ability to mobilise internal strengths, confront its weaknesses honestly and assert its place in the evolving multipolar world.

The dialogue ended with a call not just to remember the insights shared, but to act on them decisively. As one participant noted, “Let us not allow this report to gather dust on a shelf. Let it walk. Let it speak. Let it lead.”

ANNEXURE: PROGRAMME

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This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals.

Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za

Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589

Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za