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The Inclusive Society Institute is on the move in Gauteng Province , conducting “Taking the Constitution to the People”: Know your Rights and responsibilities workshops to schools in and around Gauteng. Patrick Morathi, the Gauteng Province ISI representative for the school's programme, conducted the workshop at Babinaphuti Secondary School in Soshanguve, Block BB, Tshwane North District on 22 July 2024, Monday. A total of 52 Grade 11 learners attended the workshop which seeks to empower learners with a full understanding  of the history of the South African Constitution, how it was crafted, structured and also importantly how it impacts on our daily lives. It also explains citizens' rights and obligations under the constitution. Gauteng Province will continue to see more of such workshops being rolled at its Secondary schools.

The Chairman and CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Prof Zweli Ndevu and Daryl Swanepoel, undertook an outreach visit to New York and Washington over the period 11 to 20 July 2024. The purpose of the outreach was to engage American think tanks and policymakers with the objective of establishing and strengthening the South Africa US think tank dialogue with regard to relations between the two sides and Africa in the broader sense.   The visit also served as a platform for sharing of ideas on how to consolidate democracy and human rights globally, to reform the international multilateral system and the strengthening of trade ties.   The delegation met with representatives of:   US mission to the United Nations The US State Department The New York City Commission on Human Rights The New York City Comptroller Council for Foreign Relations Flushing Chamber of Commerce Director for African Affairs, Office of the US Trade Representative Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University National Endowment for Democracy National Democratic Institute Congressional Research Service Senate Foreign Relations Committee Centre for American Progress   To programme was to designed to:   Discuss best practice and exchange perspectives on addressing social policy issues, such as human rights, anti-corruption, and economic growth; Examine perspectives of civil society and economic practitioners regarding UU business and trade policies; and Explore civil society and US government ap proaches to modernizing the United Nations agenda to better address shared global challenges.

The C20 is the recognised civil society body that feeds into the G20 deliberations. The Inclusive Society Institute is participating therein. The G20 is meeting later this year in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil.   In preparation for the G20 meeting the C20 inception meeting was held in recife, Brazil, from 26 – 28 March 2024. A number of roundtable discussions were held and followed up by discipline specific workshops. Topics discussed were:   Inclusive, anti-racist and democratic economies to eliminate inequalities within and between countries Civil Society response to the Triple Planetary Crisis Promoting Indivisible Rights with regard to health, education and culture, and access to technology The role of international cooperation and philanthropy in financing sustainable development   The are 10 working groups, namely:   Fair, Inclusive and Anti-Racist Economies Food Systems, Hunger and Poverty Environment, Climate Justice and Just Energy Transition Sustainable and Resilient Communities and Disaster Risk Reduction Integrated Health for All Education and Culture Digitalization and Technology Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Philanthropy and Sustainable Development SDG16 – Democratic Governance, Civic Space, Anti-Corruption and Access to Justice, in which working group the Inclusive Society Institute is participating.

The convening think-tanks of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) met in Cascais, Portugal over the weekend of 6 and 7 July 2024 to chart the way forward for the network.   The meeting discussed various aspects of the network, amongst others the it’s organisational development and programme for the coming year, which promises to be exciting and productive. It will include various online and in-person dialogues, interactions with global decisionmakers/organisations and research and publications.   The network also aims to expand its network of participants within the current functional areas of Africa, MENA and South America, and will be reaching out to Asian think tanks in order to bring that region into the network as well.

28 June 2024 Director General For the attention: Mr Nhlamulo Mathye Department of Cooperative Governance Private Bag X804 PRETORIA 0001   By email: Comments.coalitionbill@cogta.gov.za ; Comments.GLAB@cogta.gov.za   Director General,   LOCAL GOVERNMENT: MUNICIPAL STRUCTURES AMENDMENT BILL, 2024: WRITTEN COMMENT   Your invitation for written submissions on the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill, 2024, as published in the Government Gazette No. 50682  of 2024, refers. Thank you for the opportunity.   1. Legal and constitutional concerns   1.1. Insertion of section 12A in Act 117 of 1998 – Change of a mayoral executive system to a collective executive system   This section sets out an amendment that requires a municipality with a mayoral executive system to convert to a collective executive system where no single party has a majority in the council, be it as the result of a declared election or by-election.   In a legal opinion obtained by the Inclusive Society Institute, it is submitted that this section would be in contravention of the prescript in section 155(5) of the Constitution that provincial legislation must determine for each category of municipality the different types of municipalities that may be established in that category in the province.   The more detailed argument is included in the legal opinion, which we attach hereto for your insight.   Whilst the Institute has a further concern with regard to the policy rationality of this clause as set out in point 2 below, a remedy is proposed in the attached legal opinion, namely (insertions underlined):   “ 8. Types of category A municipalities.—There are the following types of category A municipalities:   (a) a municipality with a collective executive system; (b) a municipality with a collective executive system combined with a subcouncil participatory system; (c) a municipality with a collective executive system combined with a ward participatory system; (d) a municipality with a collective executive system combined with both a subcouncil and a ward participatory system; (e) a municipality with a mayoral executive system where one political party holds a majority of seats ; (f) a municipality with a mayoral executive system combined with a subcouncil participatory system where one political party holds a majority of seats ; (g) a municipality with a mayoral executive system combined with a ward participatory system where one political party holds a majority of seats ; and (h) a municipality with a mayoral executive system combined with both a subcouncil and a ward participatory system where one political party holds a majority of seats ”.   A further amendment to section 16 would be required to facilitate changes in the municipality type following elections (whether general or by-elections). Such an amendment to section 16 could take the form of adding a new subsection, namely (insertions underlined):   “ 16. Amendment of section 12 notices —   (4) Following an election or by-election, the MEC for local government in a province must,   (a) determine whether each municipality in the province still meets the conditions for the existing type of that municipality; and (b) if the MEC finds that a municipality no longer meets the conditions for the existing type of municipality, commence the process to amend the section 12 notice in respect of that municipality in terms of subsection (1)(a) ”.   1.2. Amendment of item 13 of Schedule 1 to Act 117 of 1998 - The 1% threshold introduced for allocation of seats   Once again, in line with the legal opinion obtained by the Institute, it is highly questionable as to whether the amendment would pass constitutional muster, since:   1.2.1. It flies in the face of the right to free political choice as set out in section 19 of the Constitution; 1.2.2. It is also likely in conflict with the constitutional requirement in section 157 in that the outcome of the election cannot be viewed as resulting in proportional representation; and 1.2.3. The rationality of the proposed 1% threshold can be questioned on the basis of the lack of rational connection between the proposed rule and the reason given for it.   The legal arguments for the aforementioned assertions is set out in the legal opinion, which has been attached for your insight.   2. Policy concerns   2.1. Change of mayoral executive system to a collective executive system   The Bill, in the proposed amendment of section 43 of Act 117 of 1998, envisages the establishment of coalition governments in municipalities in which no party has a majority of seats on the council. But at the same time the Bill, through the insertion of section 12A in Act 117 of 1998, councils in which no party holds a majority, are automatically converted into a collective executive system.   It is the Institute’s assertion that under an arrangement whereby municipalities are automatically converted into collective executive systems, the need for coalition agreements fall away. It is, however, the Institute’s considered view that the democratic system should be flexible enough to allow for mayoral executive systems through coalitions in instances where no party obtains an outright majority. To this end it is suggested that the Department further amend section 12A as set out hereunder (insertions underlined):   “12A. A municipality with a mayoral executive system, in which no political party obtains a majority of seats when the municipal council is declared elected or after a by-election contemplated in section 25,  and where two or more parties fail to within 30 days from when the elections have been declared, form a coalition in which the parties in the coalition hold a majority of the seats in the council,  must, in accordance with section 16, be changed to a type of municipality with a collective executive system by the MEC for local government within 30 days after the municipal council was declared elected or after a by-election contemplated in section 25”.   The abovementioned amendment would obviously require a revision of our proposed amendment contained in point 1.1. above.   2.2. The 1 percent threshold   In reading the memorandum on the objects of the Bill, it appears that the Department’s motive for the introduction of the 1 percent threshold is twofold. Firstly, to reduce the number of political parties in the system, and secondly, to ensure more stable coalitions.   2.2.1. Reducing the number of small parties   On the issue of eliminating parties that receive less than one percent of the vote, it is the Institute’s assertion that it results in a re-engineering of the will of the people. As voting patterns in previous South African elections have shown, a substantial percentage of votes are cast for parties that receive less than one percentage of the vote. For example, in the last national election, the combined vote of parties in parliament that received less than one percent of the total vote, amounted to 3,42 percent.   Under the system proposed in this Bill, that would have disenfranchised 3,42 percent of the electorate, which would fly in the face of all votes being equal.   Secondly, apart from deviating from the constitutional principle of general proportionality raised earlier in this submission, the electoral system should enable the empowerment of citizen’s political rights as espoused in section 19 of the Bill of Rights. This was again confirmed by the Constitutional Court in their ruling on the Electoral Amendment Act (Case CCT 158/23).   The following points were made in the ruling, amongst others:   The principle of one person one vote is foundational to our representative and participatory democracy.  It is an inherent component of the right to free and fair elections. It is important in a democracy that equality of the vote is complemented with equality of voice.  Any limitation of a right must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom. The electoral scheme must not infringe any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Constitution.   The one percent threshold is inconsistent with the aforementioned.   South Africa’s history has shown us that one cannot assert that small parties are disposable. Under apartheid, the lone anti-apartheid voice of the PFP’s Helen Suzman would have been silenced under the scheme being proposed in the Bill, as would the ability of the Good party to participate in the Executive’s 6th administration. The simple point made here is that small does not mean that the party doesn’t have the capacity to make a valuable contribution in the body politic of the nation.   2.2.2. Stable coalitions   There is no evidence to substantiate the claim that by limiting the number of parties in municipal councils, more stable coalitions will be promoted. Coalitions comprising only larger parties can also be unstable, and coalitions comprising a number of smaller parties can be stable. There are many examples in history where coalitions comprising only larger parties have collapsed. And, in any event, it is absurd to assert that a one percent party will ensure greater stability in a coalition than a 0,99 percent party?   Coalition stability has little to do with the number of parties participating. It has much more to do with the political maturity of the leaders.   Once again, thank you for the opportunity to make our submission to you.   Sincerely yours, DW SWANEPOEL CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER   ________________________________________________________________________ PO Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, South Africa, 8010 Spaces ▪ 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square, Cape Town, South Africa, 8001 Tel: +27 (0) 21 201 1589, Email: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za, Website: www.inclusivesociety.org.za, 235-515 NPO PBO 930069173 VP Khanyile (Chairperson), Z Ndevu (Deputy Chairperson), K Millard, K Khoza, S Muller, D Swanepoel (CEO)

The Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNC) Annual Meeting was held in Tokyo from 19 – 22 June 2024. The Inclusive Society Institute’s Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, was a panellist during the roundtable discussion on Assessing institutional capacities to deliver in a changing world. In an era of shifting geopolitics, the roundtable delve into the evolving roles of intergovernmental institutions on the international stage. The starting point of the discussion was the existing multilateral system centred around the United Nations, and its apparent failure to adequately address today’s global challenges, both traditional peace & security and human security, including sustainable development and human rights. The question to be answered was whether a different configuration of existing institutions and/or new institutional arrangements would allow the tackling of global challenges more efficiently and effectively? The  roundtable attempted to assess the current and potential role of institutions like the G20, BRICS and G7 individually and their interconnections, taking into account the interests of individual states or groups of states, as well as broader human and planetary well-being. The assessment was based on each institution’s performance in terms of challenge/problem identification, awareness-raising, leadership, decision-making and implementation, and grades were allocated according to each institution’s effectiveness, coherence and legitimacy. Other panellists included Richard PONZIO (Stimson Center), Richard KINLEY, who chaired the panel (Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS)),  Cilene Victor DA SILVA (Methodist University of Sao Paulo) and Mohammad Taher Gholi TABAR (University of Religions and Denominations (URD)). Click here for the introductory remarks by Daryl Swanepoel

The Academic Council on the United Nations System ( ACUNS ) held its annual meeting in Tokyo on 20 – 22 June. The Inclusive Society Institute was represented at the meeting by Chair of the Advisory Council, Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, and International Rapporteur, Dr Klaus Kotzé. ACUNS which seeks to unite people active in the work and study of the United Nations is an important platform to better understand and address the most pressing global issues of our time. By looking at a broader range of global issues such as the effects of climate change, pandemics, human insecurity and extremism, the work of ACUNS not only aligns with that of the Institute, but also offers it the opportunity to raise its own concerns. Under this year’s theme, “Global Governance and Sustainable Development: Revitalising Research to Support Multilateral Solutions”, the meeting recognised the urgent need to maintain and adequately reform the global multilateral arrangement, led by the United Nations. In pursuit of equitable and representative reform, the Institute actively participated in the meeting’s various sessions. It was particularly involved in the panel titled “Addressing human security challenges: What would a Global Resilience Council bring?” This panel, which was chaired by Ms Sonjica, was hosted by the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS). FOGGS, a partner of the Institute in the Global South Perspectives Network, is creatively pursuing pathways to ensure appropriate responses to the inadequacies of the current United Nations framework. The Institute will continue to partner with like-minded organisations to ensure effective solutions that address the myriad challenges the world faces.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) organised a brainstorming session between the Institute for Global Dialogue (IDG), the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), the Thabo Mbeki Foundation (TMF) and themselves on Tuesday 11 June 2024, in order to enhance the synchronisation of approaches to UN reform. The IDG and TMF team was led by Dr Philani Mthembu (IDG Executive Director, whilst the FOGGS team was led by their Executive Director, Dr Georgios Kostakos. The ISI team was led by its Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel. The objective of the session was to assess the feasibility and desirability of the UN reform proposals of the various participants, and tom assess areas of overlap and compatibility of the proposals. The aim was to determine whether there is potential for collaboration going forward. On reflection it was agreed that there was a high level of compatibility and that the next step to forge the modalities of the collaboration should be set in motion.

The Inclusive Society Institute’s (ISI), Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel and research associate Ms Nicola Bergsteedt are undertaking a study into managing diverse communities. The second visit of the four case studies was to Helsinki, Finland from 3 to 8 July 2024. A major focus of the learnings from this trip was the social cohesion between Swedish-speaking Finns and Finnish-speaking Finns. The ISI team explored various initiatives and avenues that drive this harmony, highlighting Finland's robust commitment to inclusivity. One of the key engagements was with the Non-Discrimination Ombudsman, Ms Kristina Stenman, where the ISI team gained comprehensive insights into Finland's efforts in promoting equality and combating discrimination. This meeting provided an in-depth understanding of the country's policies and initiatives. Additionally, the team had the opportunity to engage with a Swedish MP, Hon Mr Mikko Ollikainen MP, to discuss the role and functioning of the Swedish People’s Party (SPP) of Finland in the Finnish Parliament. This was followed by a visit to the SPP’s head office where a meeting was held with the Secretary General, Mr Fredik Guseff. The delegation also paid a visit to the Swedish Assembly, where they were hosted by a team led by its Secretary General, Ms Christina Gestrin This discussion highlighted the unique role and impact of the Swedish Assembly, offering a deeper appreciation of its contribution to Finland's social structure. The visit also included a meeting with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, a delegation led by Ms Minna Säävälä, where discussions centered on policies aimed at fostering economic inclusion and job creation. This was folowed by a meeting with Dr Pasi Saukkonen, a social cohesion policy expert at the Foundation for Cultural Policy Research. The meetings provided valuable knowledge on Finland's strategies to ensure broad economic participation and inclusivity. Overall, the visit to Finland was both engaging and educational, equipping the Inclusive Society Institute with a wealth of knowledge and new perspectives. The insights gained from this trip will be compiled into a comprehensive report, which will form part of ISI's ongoing research series that examines social cohesion in four different countries, that is Singapore, Finland, the United Arab Emirates and a to be identified African country. Through these international explorations, the ISI aims to draw valuable lessons and insights to enhance social cohesion in South Africa.

On the 10th of May 2024, a ceremony was held at Freedom Park in Pretoria to commemorate the 30th anniversary of former President Nelson Mandela's landmark inaugural address, delivered on that very same date in 1994. The ceremony was a poignant and powerful reflection on the hard-won freedoms and democratic progress that South Africa has achieved over the past three decades. Daryl Swanepoel, the CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, was invited to deliver a speech, which captured the spirit of Mandela's vision and the ongoing challenges facing the country. Swanepoel spoke about the immense sacrifices and struggles that paved the way for democracy, reminding the audience of the long and arduous journey South Africa has traversed since the dark days of apartheid. He highlighted how Mandela's message of reconciliation, unity, and equality continues to inspire and guide the nation, even as it grapples with stubborn socioeconomic disparities and the need to build a truly inclusive society. Swanepoel's words resonated with the crowd gathered at the historic site, who were moved by his tribute to Mandela's enduring legacy and the unfinished work of transforming South Africa into the just, prosperous, and equitable society that was Mandela's dream. The ceremony was a poignant reminder of the progress made, the work that remains, and the abiding spirit of hope that Mandela's leadership instilled in the hearts of all South Africans. Click here to read the speech by Daryl Swanepoel - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Copyright © 2024 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2024 by Prof Amiena Bayat, Prof Claire Quinn, Prof Julian May & Dr Hemish Govera Original print: New Agenda: South African Journal of Social and Economic Policy, Vol. 2023, No. 90 Published Online: 1 September 2023 Abstract A goal of the United Nations is to end hunger by 2030 but diverse factors, including global warming, conflict and now the war in Ukraine, place that ambition in jeopardy. AMIENA BAYAT, CLAIRE QUINN, JULIAN MAY and HEMISH GOVERA argue that the world can end hunger in Africa if it takes proper note of the framework of the African food systems approach. Introduction The 17 Global Goals that make up the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development includes the goal to end world hunger by 2030. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 aims to ensure that everyone has access to enough food that is nutrient-rich throughout the year by 2030, particularly children and the most vulnerable sections of society. The 2030 target to end world hunger, however, is under threat due to a number of issues, including resource shortages, food insecurity, obesity, malnutrition, climate crisis, inequality, conflicts and environmental degradation. These developments will have an adverse effect on food systems, which are predicted to deteriorate, made worse by the conflict in Ukraine (Global Report on Food Crises, 2022). Food security is a condition in which everyone has physical, social and financial access to enough safe, wholesome food that satisfies their nutritional needs and food preferences so that they can lead active, healthy lives at all times (FAO, 1996). Food security also emphasises the significance of eating a balanced diet (Battersby, 2022; FAO, 2004). Three variables affect food security i.e. whether the geographical region produces enough food to feed its population; whether the food supply is steady and able to withstand risks such as droughts; and whether people are able to access food both physically and financially (Johns Hopkins Center for a Liveable Future, 2016). Food availability refers to supply- side factors and is determined by inter alia stock positions, rates of food production and trade performance. People’s access to food considers the economic and physical aspects of the demand side and is concerned with incomes, expenditure, markets and prices. Utilisation deals with food preferences, the quality and safety of diets, and the intra-household distribution of food. The stability of these factors over time and vulnerability to their fluctuations are also important. The stability dimension includes risks and shocks arising from climate change, political instability, economic conditions and pandemics (FSNet- Africa, 2021). In 2020, the High-Level Panel of Experts of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) proposed adding two further dimensions: agency and sustainability. Agency refers to the capacity of individuals and groups to make their voices heard and make decisions about their food systems. Sustainability refers to the long-term viability of the ecological and social bases of food systems (Clapp et al., 2022). If due attention is not paid to all six dimensions, food security cannot be achieved (Battersby, 2022). A food system can be defined as the process that turns natural and human- made resources and inputs into food (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2007). It is the result of all of the activities and interactions that take place along the entire food value chain, which includes the provision of inputs, the production of agricultural products, transportation, processing, retail, wholesale, and food preparation, as well as consumption and disposal (Bendjebbar and Bricas, 2019). Although each food system functions differently, the majority have some of the same fundamental production, processing, distribution, consumption and waste management procedures. Along with ensuring food security and nutrition, food systems also need to have a positive impact on the environment and the socioeconomic system. This article highlights the African food systems approach as a conceptual framework to identify and formulate transformative interventions to mitigate food system crises which pose significant current and future risks and challenges for food security in South Africa and Africa as a whole. Food insecurity in Africa According to the British Red Cross (2022), Africa is facing a food crisis that could see 146 million people go hungry due to various enduring reasons. In Africa, food availability is at risk from population increase, soil degradation, conflict, deforestation and urban sprawl which crowds out productive land and limits opportunities to extend cropped areas. When combined, these factors significantly increase the vulnerability of food systems, which impacts food access, availability, use and stability placing millions of people at risk of extreme hunger. Food safety is a major concern: a third of world deaths attributable to food safety are in Africa (Bendjebbar and Bricas, 2019). Conflicts have a detrimental impact on food security. In 2017, conflict and disasters displaced an additional 30.6 million people, which affected the food security of 143 African nations and territories. One impact of conflict is stunting, which affects 34% of children under the age of five in countries affected by conflicts compared to 20% of all children of that age in non-conflict countries (Bendjebbar and Bricas, 2019). In South Africa, households are also facing a food insecurity crisis (Battersby, 2022). According to Statistics South Africa (2022), the percentage of South Africa’s population impacted by moderate food insecurity and the number of people categorised as seriously food insecure was 10.1 million (17.3%), while the number of people with severe food insecurity was 4.1 million (7%) in 2019. Abrahams (2022) concurred that food insecurity is a result of income and affordability levels, with roughly 55.5% of South African households living below the upper bound poverty line in a state of food insecurity. Food insecurity was exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, which induced lockdowns that significantly disrupted food supply chains and resulted in the loss of lives and revenue. Data from Statistics South Africa (2020) state that around 23.6% of South Africans faced moderate to severe food insecurity in 2020 as a result of Covid-19, while approximately 14.9% experienced severe food insecurity. The pandemic has seriously hindered efforts to achieve South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP) and the SDGs aim of eliminating hunger by 2030 (Statistics South Africa, 2020). The food systems approach Food systems differ across multiple dimensions according to how food production, distribution and consumption activities are defined with regard to their impact on the environment, societies and economies. The food systems approach takes a more comprehensive approach to agricultural production and offers a framework for understanding how food system changes relate to food security and the environment. The approach considers the various components of the food system as well as the connections between them. It looks at all activities connected to food production, processing, distribution and consumption on the one hand, and the outcomes of these activities in terms of food security (including nutrition), socioeconomic factors (income, employment) and the environment (biodiversity, climate) on the other. Systems thinking is distinguished by its view of behaviour as an interaction between subsystems in which feedback plays a crucial role, as opposed to a straightforward chain of cause-and-effect interactions. The method emphasises the connections between the many components of the food system and the results of systemic actions in terms of socioeconomics, the environment and climate (FSNet-Africa, 2021). This sets system thinking apart from other techniques where interventions are frequently created to make the most use of the available resources (natural resources, labour, capital). In order to increase efficiency and profitability, this typically entails using technical breakthroughs across companies, industries and/or chains (Van Berkum et al., 2018). Other approaches analyse the effects of interventions on the environment (CO2 emissions), the market (prices, incomes) linked to natural resource depletion, whilst not considering feedback from the ecosystem and/ or socioeconomic system for the farm, industry or chain. Food systems thinking provides a chance to add feedback from outcomes outside of those that directly relate to food production and consumption when analysing the results of policy actions. This way of thinking “steps back” from the scene of the intervention (Van Berkum et al., 2018). Additionally, the food system approach emphasises policy directions that affect the food production system rather than just the value chain (Van Berkum et al., 2018). In some situations, strategies for tackling food and nutrition security have placed an undue emphasis on agriculture, portraying the problem as the result of weak production, market imperfections or poor governance. With the emphasis on boosting food production, bridging yield gaps to increase availability and reducing costs and wastage to promote access, the utilisation and stability dimensions as well as the agency of food system players run the risk of being overlooked. It may also deflect attention from factors that contribute to food security but are unrelated to the food system, such as inequality, poverty and prejudice. These cannot be addressed by traditional food and nutrition policies and necessitate an integrated, intersectoral strategy. The holistic food systems approach is a better analytical model than a strategy that merely takes the production component into account (Van Berkum et al., 2018). FSNet-Africa’s approach to the African food system The Food Systems Research Network for Africa (FSNet-Africa) is a collaboration between the University of Pretoria (UP) – which is host of the African Research Universities Association’s (ARUA’s) Centre of Excellence in Sustainable Food Systems – the University of Leeds (UoL) and the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN). FSNet-Africa’s research on African food systems is based on its “Framework for Researching African Food Systems” project, which aims to strengthen the analytical capabilities of food systems researchers through a structured programme of research leadership development. The project presented a conceptual outline of the definitions, components of, and linkages within, the African food systems. It drew on several levels in the operation of food systems and their dynamics and explored the characteristics and challenges confronting the food systems in Africa using the Economic Commission for Africa’s (ECA’s) evidence base. In mapping African food systems, the primary drivers influencing food systems in low-income nations fall into seven groups: bio-physical and environmental; socioeconomic; economic; territorial; demographic; infrastructure and technology; and political and governance. Bio-physical and territorial drivers refer to the availability, pollution and climate with regard to natural resources that shape the production side of food production. Examples of demographic drivers include population expansion, urban crawl and population displacement. These factors have a significant impact on food demand with regard to quantity required, type and quality of food consumed and the context in which food is produced. Innovations in technology and infrastructure are crucial factors in the food system influencing both supply and demand. Social traditions, education, health, values and identity are all examples of socio-cultural drivers. They also include culture, religion and rituals. By affecting lifestyles, social norms, attitudes and cultures with regard to food, these have an impact on diets and the food environment. Political factors include government, laws, conflicts and humanitarian crises, which also have an impact on many factors affecting food systems (Bendjebbar and Bricas, 2019). The framework considers the dynamics of growth and development in a particular environment (nation, region, livelihood zone or sub- national district), modifications to infrastructure and technologies, drivers of power and governance at local, national and international levels, socioeconomic characteristics such as skills and patriarchy, and demographic changes such as health systems and the effects of global pandemics (Van Berkum et al., 2018). The analytical framework includes the institutions, values and cultures that influence preferences and choices in the food system, along with the capitals (combinations of financial, natural, physical, human and social assets used to produce or acquire food), the biological and ecological realms available to the system and the activities carried out by the various actors in the system. The principle of “farm to fork” is present, with food waste and loss occurring at each stage. These activities of a food system may be organised as value chains that are short (low-input subsistence farmer to her family) or long (agro-chemical company to urban consumer via industrialised farms and multinational retail corporations) (Van Berkum et al., 2018). The food system impacts on three conditions/goals essential for human existence and has the potential to guide policies that address all three objectives: security of access to food and nutrition; rural and urban livelihoods, and specifically rural development; and environmental sustainability. The conceptual framework proposes capitals that are relevant to food systems, including political and cultural capitals. Recently digital capital has been identified as a potential new asset that brings together access and use of information and communication technologies (FSNet-Africa, 2021). The model also focuses attention on the interconnected components of the physical environment within which a specific food system operates and includes the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere and lithosphere (Van Berkum et al., 2018). The environment in which food is produced, the environment in which it is consumed, the value chains connecting them, and the waste that occurs are all parts of the food system. When these components are analysed, supply-oriented assessments that concentrate on increasing food production in the face of demographic and climatic pressures may be included. The value chain, which connects supply (production) and demand (consumption), is the subject of midstream-oriented analysis. Here, better institutions and markets as well as lower transaction costs and risks are the keys to improving performance. Demand-oriented strategies place special emphasis on consumer behaviour, food access and cost, and balanced diets. Last but not least, system-wide approaches focus on developing responsive, adaptable food systems through better governance to resolve trade-offs and make use of synergies (Van Berkum et al., 2018). Social institutions are acknowledged as being a part of the food system, although only being tangentially related to food demand/production and food supply/consumption. Instead of organisational structures, institutions in this case are the official and informal rules that govern behaviour. The Framework for Researching African Food Systems identifies these as regulative, normative and cognitive establishments. Regulative institutions refer to public sector conventions, policies and procedures. Normative institutions are not as formal as regulative institutions and are morally controlled. Cognitive institutions guide what is culturally or conceptually acceptable to actors and include priorities, problem agendas, beliefs, paradigms, models of reality and language (Van Berkum et al., 2018). The Framework’s objective was to critically translate evidence generated from the research findings into policy solutions that are feasible and practical interventions aimed at supporting the attainment of Africa’s SDGs. The achievement of the SDGs is viewed as the primary transformative function of the African food system. That is the scope of the transformation’s paths for institutional, social and environmental change, as well as its sustained elimination of famine and universal access to affordable, safe, healthy and nourishing food (SDG 2). This idea emphasises the potential for food systems to improve inclusive and fair livelihood options towards eradicating poverty (SDGs 1, 8 and 10). As a result, dismal developments could result in loss of livelihoods, especially for the most vulnerable individuals, hence escalating inequality and environmental devastation. The realisation of SDGs 12, 14 and 15 depends on the reparative effects of food systems transition on biodiversity and natural resources. Increased resilience and adaptation to risks and shocks at all levels are essential for addressing the challenge of climate change (SDG 13). Promoting demand restraint (i.e. encouraging consumers to choose fewer items of higher nutritional quality over more items of lower quality) and improving governance, coordination, accountability and stakeholder agency are other methods to realise transformative paths (FSNet-Africa, 2021). Regarding African food systems, the continent comprises diverse food cultures and food environments owing to its heterogeneity, with over 2,000 languages and 3,000 ethnic groups across 54 countries. As a result, the biosphere, the globalising political economy and the globalisation of culture are all included in the global food regime, which includes the drivers and mechanisms of a food system. However, the concept of African food systems acknowledges, among other things, the common history of colonialism and underdevelopment and its detrimental effects on Africa’s integration into the global food system and the investments, international partnerships and laws made under the auspices of pan-African governance and institutional experiments, such as the African Union (AU) and ARUA. Other examples include the growing integration of African nations as trading partners, investors, farmers, workers and consumers, which is prioritised by programmes such as the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the shared understanding of the opportunities and challenges that face African governments and citizens as well as how to address them, as encapsulated by Agenda 2063, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the One Africa Voice initiative (FSNet- Africa, 2021). Developments in the African food system indicate a declining employment and agricultural share as well as a slow performance when compared to other regions. The environment for producing food on a worldwide scale has evolved from family farms to industrialised commodity production and ultra-processing (sold through fresh produce marketplaces and small businesses). Food consumption based on mass distribution, globalised trade, etc. are further characteristics of this. Similar structural change is taking place in Africa, and it has improved overall wellbeing while reducing rural poverty (FSNet-Africa, 2021). However, those who work in the food industry are disproportionately affected by poverty, hunger and significant food insecurity. Unfortunately, smallholder farmers have diminishing access to land and receive inadequate compensation as a result of the current trends of capital-intensive, industrialised and large-scale commercial and farmland consolidation. Insecure employment on industrial farms and rural-to-urban migration in pursuit of employment prospects are other detrimental effects. Small-scale enterprises, insufficient utilisation of non-organic inputs and technology, condensed local supply chains and spot-exchange-based market transactions are the main characteristics of many African food systems. However, 60% of the world’s uncultivated arable land is found in Africa, with only 8% of this land area being used for crop production, while its people are overly reliant on agriculture for a living (FSNet- Africa, 2021). The majority of food produced in Africa is produced by small and medium-sized businesses along all value chains, including street vendors in the unorganised sector. This exemplifies how the African food system is represented in context. In spite of this, African food systems and their outcomes are evolving quickly. Over the past three decades, supply linkages between rural and urban areas have grown by 600-800%, which has boosted food availability and accessibility. Between 1990-92 and 2014-16, the prevalence of undernutrition in Africa, which is defined as having insufficient food consumption to meet nutritional energy requirements, decreased from 33% to 23.2% (FSNet-Africa, 2021). Changes are occurring in all areas of food production and consumption in Africa with regard to the food ecosystems, though the effects on changes in poverty, food and nutrition security, and livelihoods are uneven. African food markets are expected to rise sixfold by 2025, with urban demand for processed staples driving the majority of the growth. Between 2010 and 2040, this is anticipated to increase five to tenfold, having a substantial influence on the continent (FSNet-Africa, 2021). FSNet-Africa has proposed certain evidence-based interventions that are essential for aiding stakeholders in the food system to make decisions that are well-informed. This calls for “mapping food systems,” “mapping the policy landscape” and “understanding paths to the plate” across the priority nations of FSNet-Africa. The many functions of participants in the informal food economy, which are largely disregarded by policy, should receive due consideration. The project highlights the necessity for research into the processes by which better agribusinesses and lucrative jobs are created and lost, and why. It also emphasises the necessity of recalibrating the assistance required by players in the formal and informal food sectors to encourage workforce development, small, medium and microenterprises, and the employment of young people (FSNet-Africa, 2021). Conclusion In conclusion, the primary trends influencing African food systems and economies include rapid urbanisation, rising incomes and a growing middle class. These trends work in concert to affect consumer demand and alter consumer lifestyles, tastes and choices. Trends in the supply of staples and increased processed food consumption have westernised African food supply systems and altered the makeup of the labour market in terms of the shares of non-agricultural jobs in country regions. In the same way structural transformation patterns have been reinforced. Building resilient food systems that can withstand risks of climate change and safeguarding the livelihoods of underprivileged and marginalised food stakeholders are among the challenges facing African food systems. Therefore, improved sector governance and integrated African food systems are crucial to the viability of changing to sustainable food systems in Africa. The territorial balance between urban and rural areas, as well as across administrative and related boundaries, should serve as the basis for this. References Abrahams, M. 2022. Over half SA households are food insecure: Women must first pay for transport, electricity, debt, New Agenda: South African Journal of Social and Economic Policy, 86, Institute for African Alternatives, 36-38. Available at https://ifaaza. org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Over-half-SA- households-are-food-insecure.pdf. Accessed 9 November 2022. Battersby, J. 2022. Revised food security policy needed to reshape SA food system. New Agenda: South African Journal of Social and Economic Policy, 86, Institute for African Alternatives, 26-30. Available at https://ifaaza.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ Revised-food-security-policy.pdf. Accessed 9 November 2022. Bendjebbar, P. and Bricas, N. 2019. Major Trends in Food System Drivers, Food Systems at Risk, 25.Available at https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jIa4DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA25&dq= Bendjebbar,+P.+and+Bricas,+N.+2019.+Major+Tren ds+in+Food+System+Drivers&ots=DEm4tgqvZa&si g=fkGMrGU4ivqn-4cZ-pWGEkAK7IU British Red Cross. 2022. Africa food crisis: 146 million people are going hungry. Available at https:// www.redcross.org.uk/stories/disasters-and- emergencies/world/africa-hunger-crisis-100- million-struggling-to-eat. Accessed November 2022. Brunori, G., Bartolini, F., Avermaete, T., Mathjis, E., Brzezina, N., Moragues Faus, A., Sonnino, R. and Marsden, T . 2015. D2.1 “Conceptual framework”. TRANSMANGO FP7 project. Assessment of the impact of global drivers of change on Europe’s food and nutrition security (FNS) KBBE.2013.2.5-01. Available at: https://transmango.files.wordpress. com/2017/09/d2-1-conceptual-framework-final.pdf. Accessed 19 September 2023. Clapp, J., Moseley, W.G., Burlingame, B. and Termine, P. 2022. The case for a six-dimensional food security framework, Food Policy, 102164. FAO. 1996. The State of Food and Agriculture 1996 (No. 29). Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. FAO. 2004. Voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security. Rome: FAO Council. Retrieved from http://www. fao.org/docrep/meeting/009/y9825e/y9825e00. htm FAO. 2022. Joint Analysis for Better Decisions. Available at https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/faoitaly/documents/pdf/pdf_Food_Security_Cocept_Note.pdf. Accessed 1 November 2022. FSNet-Africa. 2021. Framework for Researching African Food Systems. Available at https://fsnetafrica.com/ publications/framework-for-researching-african- food-systems/. Accessed 1 November 2022. Global Report on Food Crises. 2022. Joint Analysis for Better Decisions. Available at https://www.fao.org/3/cb9997en/cb9997en.pdf. Accessed 1 November 2022. Johns Hopkins Centre for a Liveable Future. 2016. Hunger and Food Insecurity. Available at https:// www.foodsystemprimer.org/food-and-nutrition/ hunger-and-food-insecurity. Accessed 1 November 2022. Pinstrup Andersen, P. 2007. Agricultural research and policy for better health and nutrition in developing countries: a food systems approach, Agricultural Economics, 37, 187-198. Statistics South Africa. 2020. Measuring Food Security in South Africa: Applying the Food Insecurity Experience Scale. Available at https://www.statssa. gov.za/?p=15273. Accessed 1 November 2022. Statistics South Africa. 2021. What do South African households look like? Available at https://www. statssa.gov.za/?p=15473. Accessed 1 November 2022. Statistics South Africa. 2022. Measuring Food Security in South Africa: Applying the Food Insecurity Experience Scale. Van Berkum, S., Dengerink, J. and Ruben, R. 2018. The food systems approach: sustainable solutions for a sufficient supply of healthy food, (No. 2018-064). Wageningen Economic Research. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2024 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2024 by Dr Aderonke Ajiboro Abstract One of the topical issues in the socio-political re-organisation of Africa in the 20th century is development, and most recently, sustainable development. Oftentimes, this issue is discussed against the backdrop of the unnerving consequences of the colonial, postcolonial and neocolonial periods in the history of Africa. But why should any society engage in a conscious effort towards development? What will such an effort entail? And why does the attainment of development become needful, especially in Africa? These are some of the questions that are addressed in this paper. The paper aligns with Kwame Gyekye’s functionalist conception of development and tries to examine some recent objections to it. This paper affirms that development is a necessity in any human society, not just as a psychological and historical phenomenon but also as an economic prerogative of any African society in the 21st century. It also gives a critical assessment of the conception of development as exhibited in some African countries. What is Development? The above question is a generic one. As Kwame Gyekye puts it, the concept of development is a ‘multifaceted’ one. It is a deeply philosophical one such as ‘what is knowledge?’, ‘what is truth?’ or ‘what is value?’ (Gyekye, 1988: 14). In which case, there is a need to conceive the term ‘development’ in a wholistic and universally acceptable way, for it to be understood and exemplified in an objective manner. Hence, the question can also be asked, what are the general defining exemplifications of a society that has development or is developed? For Gyekye, there is the constant desire of governments to attain what is called development. This desire in the African situation was also very intense in the wake of the call for independence of African states as well as Third World countries. It is pertinent to note that the appellation of ‘Third World’ stems from the Age of Enlightenment and Industrialisation, where inventions and discoveries of new means and methods of addressing human societal challenges were made in the West. Any society that lacked such indices as those that produced development in the West were summarily classified as not exhibiting the features of development, or basically, as underdeveloped. For Gyekye, “the choice of effective approaches to development is what most people in Africa and other Third World countries are talking about; it is the goal of every government in the Third World … since development has been identified with economic growth” (Gyekye, 1988: 15). Economic growth is a species of development. There are political, social, moral, business, academic development and so on, which are all parts of the genus development, though they may not have a logical relation to development as a whole. The human society is a dynamic one. The flow of thought and deeds in the human society are influenced and bound by circumstances that are beyond individual preferences. Therefore, the ability to attain a uniform or unified standard of a conception of development wellbeing may be difficult. This poses a problem for the conception of development in the society. A collective definitive approach to a particular cause may not be achievable, although the aggregation of common views may be an index for taking a particular view. This, therefore, puts man as the responsible agent for any action that is to be carried out in the society. As Awolowo puts it, “man is the sole creative purpose of the universe” (Awolowo, 1976: 53). In other words, whatever conception or indication of development that is to be evident in any society is ultimately dependent on the organisation of the human fabric that establishes it. This is closely linked with Gyekye’s conception of development. One major point is how his conception of development puts man at the initiating and receptive stages of development. This closely aligns with Nyerere’s idea of freedom and development; in the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere affirms that all proposals made by all socio-political ideologies directed at development should be geared towards the attainment of wellbeing of the people (of Tanzania) (Nyerere, 1968). This implies that whatever purpose development is to serve, it must be to the desirable state of existence for the people. It is therefore appreciable that Gyekye conceives of development in the functionalist way. For him, “to be developed is to have the capability to perform the functions appropriate to the object, such as society or institution, said to be developed. The nature and purpose of the object will determine its specific function. Thus, the functions of the human mind are related to its nature and purpose and would therefore not be the same as those of a political institution, for instance. The functions of the various objects that are said to be developed thus do differ. This is what is intended by my use of the word ‘appropriate’ in the definition just formulated” (Gyekye, 1988: 17). Gyekye opposes an economistic conception of development because it is lopsided and inadequate. It is a view of development that is conceived in terms of the production and increase of the material capacity of the society, such as food production, construction of buildings and roads, good and improved healthcare and so on. There is the tendency to misapply Gyekye’s notion of development to these material outputs as functions that are derivatives of a society experiencing development. However, Gyekye notes that these (material) economic entities are tools to indicate that more fundamental processes of development may not be immediately accessible to a particular society or its critics. A little bit of economic history lends support to this view. Akin Mabogunje notes that there was a buoyant economic landscape in Nigeria before it was tampered with in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by the colonial powers: “The important point to be made here is that a system of towns and cities had developed in Nigeria before the 19th century in response to social, political, and economic forces operating in the country over a long time. Trade was paramount to their existence, and it was trade limited not so much by the distance to be covered as by the amount of goods and services that could be effectively carried over that distance during given intervals of time. In other words, people did cover considerable distances in pursuit of their trade. But since the means of carriage was usually by head porterage or donkeys, the amount that could be moved at any one time was limited. Similarly, since the traders had to trek, the distance that they could cover on one trip to market was circumscribed. In consequence there emerged specialised centres of trading, holding at specific intervals to allow for the time required to move around. Much of this trade was for internal consumption, and only a limited portion of it found its way outside of the country, either to North Africa or through the coastal centres to Europe and the Americas” (Mabogunje, 1965). In the above, Mabogunje paints a picture of a Nigerian society that tried to address its socio-economic challenges given the means available to them. The question of “appropriateness” to the challenge may be raised and not immediately answered, bearing in mind that trade exports may not have been one of the desirable goals in the centuries in question. Also, with the trade economy described above, one could see that there are limitations arising from the influence of Europe – even as an avenue for export – on the economic development of Nigeria, and the decisions of the traders and modes of trading were germane to the trend that the economy will follow. Obviously, the limitations should dispel any notion of trying to create an equating of development per se and economic development on any level. This is not to say that development in the objective sense does not have limitations. In a later work, Aderanti Adepoju (1976) also wrote on an index of development expressed in environmental development. For him, the socio-economic development that is experienced in Nigeria is of a slow pace because of the non-attentiveness of socio-political organisation to the rural areas in embarking on developmental projects and lack of adequate statistics. All these species of development can be regarded as a measure of development in the society. A measure of development, hence, is not synonymous with development itself. In fact, the measure of a thing is external to that thing; it is only an applied entity on what is being measured. If this is granted, Gyekye’s functionalist account may be seen as problematic, because the functions that are meant to be derived from acts produced from development may also be argued as being manifestations of development. However, it is pertinent to note that as much as the functions that Gyekye portrays are not in such a way that it is distinguishable from it. At least a manifestation of an act establishes the occurrence of that act, if it is not the act itself. Furthermore, Ani raises three objections to Gyekye’s conception of development and argues that the conception can be questioned: The first objection is that the ultimate goal of development is economic development. The second is that development is a process that is continuous. The third is that no society can be described as developed if development is a continuous process (Ani, 2017). It is apt to note that Gyekye’s functionalist conception of development is integrative, as Ani concedes. By no means did Gyekye divest economic development or growth from the functionalist conception. The view he emphasises is that economic development does not, in any way, describe the general or objective view that development, as a concept, should be understood. The other two objections raised by Ani are shaky. Continuity and the status of being ‘developed’ does not deny the strength of Gyekye’s argument. Although Gyekye implies that development conceived in the functionalist/behavioural/evolutionary model of the insect is a non-continuous process, it does not expressly suggest that the process is terminal. A state of equilibrium can be attained where a nation can be termed as ‘developed’. The continuous creation of goals, needs and existential challenges of the society, as Ani rightly notes, will always be present. However, this does not imply that the state of being ‘developed’ puts a stop to it. Of what nature then is development? The core idea of development arose as a means of tackling the ever-present challenges of the society and that is why the products of development go beyond a particular sector or problem of the society. It should be aimed at solving or addressing even the predictable or unforeseen one; hence, it is more of an ideological thinking put into practice. This is evident in Nyerere’s view of development as freedom. For Nyerere, freedom is, in a way, a product of development and development arises out of the exercise of total freedom of people in the society. For him, “freedom and development are completely linked together as are chicken and eggs! Without chickens, you get no eggs; and without eggs you soon have no chickens. Similarly. Without freedom you get no development and without development you very soon lose your freedom” (Nyerere, 1973: 25). Although to a large extent the reference that Nyerere makes to development can be seen to be in terms of social and economic development, he is also of the view that these are mere indices to how development should be evident in the society. “For the truth is that development is development of the people. Roads, building, increases of crop output, and other things of this nature, are not development; they are only tools of development. A new road extends a man’s freedom only if he travels upon it. An increase in the number of school buildings is development only if those buildings can be and are being used to develop the minds and the understandings of people … Development which is not development of people … is irrelevant to the kind of future which is created” (Nyerere, 1973: 26). Hence, the nature of development for Nyerere is man-centred; if any proposal for development is not geared towards the freedom and development of the people in the society, that proposal fails as a development strategy. Just as for Gyekye that development cannot be divested of human creative ability (Gyekye, 1988: 43), for Nyerere, development cannot be divested of freedom. A society where freedom is not evident, even if all economic and material resources are available, will not count as a developed society. This suggests that the human intellect, and the ideologies it creates, is central to the kinds of development strategy it proposes and ultimately carries out. Thus, the nature of development is to be seen by its means of conception not necessarily by the means of manifestation and then the impact it has on the creative intellect of the people in the society. The Need for Development in Society In every human society there is the evolution of life and history, existential challenges that spur people on to think about their survival and sustenance. This, in itself, is an issue that attracts deep thought.  It is not clear if there is any human society without a goal of common sustenance at any point in time in the history of societies. The goal and/or the means of attaining the goal may be inadequate or unjust but there, at least, will be a propelling act to arrive at an end. Thus, development in every society is a need just as individuals have needs to satisfy; it is a need that arises out of the creative ability of the people to reflect on their mode of interactive existence and provide solutions to challenging situations. For Gyekye, “development is a directed and purposive activity; it also implies the need for, or the existence of, a human subject as the agent to undertake the developing activity. The reason is that what may be regarded as the trappings or symbols of development such as high industrial output … do not occur fortuitously: they are thought out, deliberated upon, planned and produced by human beings. And this means that, undoubtedly development is a creative act, essentially involving, as it must, the activity of the human intellect” (Gyekye, 1988: 43). The above view is also implied in J.C. Chukwuokolo’s examination of the concept of development. For him, “the developmental stance of any group of people is a product of their perception of the ultimate reality” (Chukwuokolo, 2012). Development therefore has an essential link to the human nature. To be developed or not to be is directly dependent on the people. Ani, however, makes a far-reaching statement by claiming that the African society had no inclination towards development until the modern era (Ani, 2017). Mabogunje’s view, as noted in the last section, shows that the economic history and trade development history established the idea that long before the modern era, the people living in Nigeria have always sought out means to address challenges in their existential conditions (Mabogunje, 1965). The African situation is a particularly interesting one as regards the developmental history of societies. Unlike in the West where Marx tried to fashion out the history of society based on the Communalism to Communism model, Africa traces her history from a traditional/indigenous era to postcolonial/neocolonial era. This goes a long way in affecting the thought patterns of people in the African society. As earlier noted, any development proposal in a society cannot be made outside of the ideological thinking of the people of that society. So, it is by the predominating idea in the society that a development strategy is put into practice. “Any people that see the ultimate reality in terms of idea will over-emphasise aspects of the society that promote idealism. So also is any society that lay much emphasis on matter as the ultimate reality. Such a society will tend to develop material aspects of society at the expense of the other dimensions of reality” (Chukwuokolo, 2012). If this is granted, at least one implication can be deduced from this: No external society has the moral or existential right to dictate or prescribe to another society what the focus of development in its society should be. This is because the lived experience of a people determines their existential needs. Whichever way the nature of their development occurs is dependent on their creative ability to understand and produce their wellbeing out of their perception of reality. Such a society that achieves the goal of development by this means cannot be denied the status. A point that arises out of this implication is that the indices for development in societies may differ, where society A has economic indices for its mark of development, society B may have moral or education indices. Underlying this, and most fundamental, is that the unbound creative ability of the people in the society should be geared towards producing a state of general wellbeing for the people such that is expressive in the development strategies in socio-political organisation. Development as a Moral Goal in Africa Gyekye indicates that development is a moral goal that should be taken seriously in any society (Gyekye, 1988: 42). The ability of the socio-political institution to function satisfactorily in the provision of basic existential needs of its citizens is a moral burden for any political institution. The history of societies in Africa, as earlier noted, is often characterised by the influence of the colonisers and their prescriptions of socio-political and economic organisation after the Africans were left to ‘self-rule’. It is not surprising therefore that the majority of the development proposals that African countries make either individually as a nation or as a continent are not in any way addressing fundamental issues of existence in the continent. The term ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘developing’ is still used to describe the majority of the countries on the continent. This is so, because the human creative impact is bounded by forces internal and external to its society. It is often noted by a lot of African scholars that the development of a society starts with an ideological thinking, where the boundless thoughts of man are given freedom to explore the numerous possibilities of addressing his/her existential challenges. Gyekye affirms that, “ideas are the products of individuals, that is, individual intellects. For this reason, the creative activity, if it is to succeed, requires that free rein be given to the exercise by individual human beings of their initiative, capacity and ingenuity. But the seminal ideas of individuals in the context of societal development, require the participation of others in order to bring them to concrete realisation” (Gyekye, 1988: 43). Political institutions in Africa in postcolonial times have often made their agenda attractive by putting forward the idea of development of the society. A lot of strategies and partnerships are made all in the bid to achieve the development goals. But they seem to be less bothered about the lived experience of the masses; people whose demography make the society or community whatever name it is called. There is a lack of participatory governance as Nyerere proposed, which is a hallmark of personal and societal freedom that foster development. The rush for the ‘exhibition’ of material infrastructures that are of little or no impact on the development of the people robs them of their creative intellect to approach their existential needs with enthusiasm. Amartya Sen is of the view that, “what would be most damaging would be the neglect … of centrally relevant concerns because of a lack of interest in the freedoms of the people involved. An adequately broad view of development is (should be) sought in order to focus the evaluative scrutiny on things that really matter and in particular avoid the neglect of crucially important subjects” (Sen, 1999: 33-34). One interesting point to note is that the result of the agitation for self-rule by Africans in the colonial times did not produce freedom of Africans. In recent times, African leaders have exhibited the acts of dominance that deprive citizens of their freedom, and which ultimately lead to a hindrance of development. A good political institution, as the existential needs of the masses will require, needs to be aware of the compelling needs of the people and equip the people for participation in their development for the wholistic wellbeing of the society. Political officeholders exhibit their freedom to the detriment of other citizens, which is an untoward act. Individual freedom should be geared towards a social commitment and “development should be a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen, 1999: 3). Conclusion Human nature is averse to immobility, of thought or physical action. It is regarded as an abnormality for an individual to be in a state of inertia such as matter. Humans should be allowed to exhibit the activity of their intellect in society even where there may be need for caution and moderation. Even when development is conceived in terms of growth in the biological sense, it is more appreciable to say that an organism has developed rather than say it has merely grown. Many of the societies that are regarded as developed today can be seen to employ strategies that allow for the participation of the individual in the policies of the socio-political institutions. There is an understanding of the creative intellect of the human mind to proffer solutions to existential needs on the individual and societal scale. Most of the proposals to gear Africa towards being developed point at education and leadership as the two main points. The liberation of the human mind is priceless when it is allowed to explore the gifts of nature of societal growth. The framing and understanding of political ideologies are better applied when individuals can, of their own thinking, evaluate and conceive the impact of those ideologies as individuals in a society. There will be no ‘parade’ of the material things as the hub of development for the populace. Africa has for so long treated development as an external conferment by the developed countries. Political leaders have yet to understand that importation of gadgets and machines will not solve the development problem of Africa if the people are not involved in governance and are not listened to. Most African countries are in a dilemma of feasting on the development of other societies and living in an existential state that is, if not against human nature, not geared toward human flourishing. Given the political climate, which is full of anomalies but unfortunately celebrated by those who need intellectual liberation, the development in Africa must be an end that is desired, not just for the economic interest but also that it is morally sought after as a good. References Adepoju, A. 1976. Migration and Development in Nigeria, Manpower and Unemployment Research, 9(2): 65-76 Ani, E.I. 2017. Three Objections to Gyekye’s Functionalist Conception of Development, African Studies Quarterly, 17(1): 2 Awolowo, O. 1976. The Problems of Africa: The Need for Ideological Reappraisal. London: Macmillan Chukwuokolo, J.C. 2012. Evaluating the Philosophical Foundations of Development Theories, Open Journal of Philosophy, 2(4): 224 Gyekye, K. 1988. Development: A Brief Philosophical Analysis, In The Unexamined Life: Philosophy and the African Experience (expanded edition). Ghana: Sankofa Publishing Legon Mabogunje, A.L. 1965. Urbanization in Nigeria: A Constraint on Economic Development, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 13(4): 413-438 Nyerere, J. 1968. The Purpose is Man, In Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism. London: Oxford University Press Nyerere, J. 1973. Freedom and Development. London: Oxford University Press Sen, A. 1999. Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2024 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2024 by Prof William Gumede Abstract Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in South Africa have not fully lived up to their potential – as has been the case in many African countries – to create jobs, beneficiate raw materials, develop new industries, and transfer skills and technology from foreign companies. This paper looks at the global impact of SEZs and the critical factors that lead to either their success or failure. The paper finds that the location of SEZs is no longer a comparative advantage, meaning SEZs will have to be internationally competitive. Their success and competitiveness pivots on SEZs being a well-thought-out part of a national development, growth, and industrial plan. There must be a business case for SEZs – they cannot be established based on political, ideological, and interest-group considerations. They must be governed competently, honestly, and according to consistently implemented laws. They must also operate in ways that safeguard the environment and human rights, especially of the local communities. SEZs must resolve Africa’s industrialisation and technology challenges, by linking African products to global value chains, producing export industries, and securing new technology and skills. Unless SEZs can help African countries accomplish all these important tasks, there is really no business case to establish them. Introduction Special economic zones (SEZs) can still play a critical role in developing new industries, beneficiating raw materials, and diversifying South Africa’s exports. That is, if they are linked to the overall national development strategy, done in full partnership with business, and freed from the public sector’s governance problems – such as incompetence, corruption, and inefficiency – which have stymied SEZs up to now. SEZs, which are also termed export processing zones, free trade zones and free ports, are geographically demarcated areas which governments dedicate to specific industrial development by giving fiscal incentives, regulatory exemptions, and public infrastructure support (Aggarwal, 2008; Asian Development Bank, 2007; Cirera & Lakshman, 2014; Farole & Akinci, 2011; Fruman & Zeng, 2015). It is a key policy tool many high-growth economies in Asia have used to build manufacturing, export capacity, and lift economic growth (IFC, 2016; ILO, 1988; Ishida, 2009; Jayanthakumaran, 2003). The South African government has adopted as a policy objective the establishment of regional industrial zones – Special Economic Zones and Industrial Parks (IPs) – and corridors (Gumede, 2022a; Gumede, 2022b). The SEZs and IPs are recognised amongst the tools that are catalytic economic drivers in regional economy ecosystems. They drive continuous attraction, promotion and retention of direct domestic and foreign investment to achieve transformative industrialisation and sustainable economic growth in South Africa, especially in underperforming regions (Jayanthakumaran, 2003; Johansson & Nilsson, 1997; Cirera & Lakshman, 2014; Litwack & Qian, 1998; Rhee et al, 1990; Rodrik, 2004; Zeng, 2017; UNCTAD, 2019; UN ESCAP, 2019; UNIDO, 2015). The first industrial SEZ was established in 1959 in Shannon, Ireland. The country established the Shannon Free Airport Development Company, a development agency, to establish an industrial free zone, to generate alternative sources of traffic, business and tourism at the Shannon airport and adjacent area. Investors were given special tax concessions, simplified custom operations, and cheap investment attractions. The area was transformed into an air training base, maintenance and repair centre, and a tourist attraction. Global impact of SEZs According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), by 2007, SEZs accounted for US$851 billion-worth of exports – which is around 41% of global exports – and for 68 million direct jobs created (ILO, 1988). Clustering infrastructure, industries, and public goods in one specific region, means that a country can leverage scale to build a critical mass of related, complementary, and synergetic value chain components that need similar skills, technologies, and market links. This forms an ecosystem that boosts economic development, attracts investment, and fosters an environment for innovation. Companies share resources, costs, and infrastructure. The overriding idea is to concentrate limited public funds, resources, and infrastructure on developing or establishing new industries with the help of private sector investment, skills, and technology. Importantly, as Douglas Zhihua Zeng (2017) argues, SEZs “should only be used to address market failures or binding constraints that cannot be addressed through other options. If the constraints can be addressed through countrywide reforms, sector-wide incentives, or universal approaches, then zones might not be necessary”. If successful, SEZs could provide positive spillovers to the rest of the economy. These spillovers can be direct or indirect. The direct impacts are rising economic growth, new manufacturing industries, and beneficiation (Jayanthakumaran, 2003; Johansson & Nilsson, 1997; Cirera & Lakshman, 2014; Litwack & Qian, 1998; Rhee et al, 1990; Rodrik, 2004; Zeng, 2017; UNCTAD, 2019; UN ESCAP, 2019; UNIDO, 2015). It boosts employment, increases local and foreign exchange income. It brings new technology, innovation and skills, and diversifies the economy. It increases the productivity, efficiency and competitiveness of local companies, the productivity of local labour, and the income of local citizens. Figure 1: The growth of SEZs around the world since 1975 (UNCTAD, 2019 SEZs Report) Why do countries establish SEZs SEZs are established because governments lack the skills, resources, and capacity to introduce nationwide reforms to establish conducive environments for investment attraction, industrial upgrading, and infrastructure development. Furthermore, as Douglas Zhihua Zeng argues, governments also established SEZs because they lack the capacity to tackle vested interests, capture, and political opposition to country industrialisation reforms, and then implement it on a smaller, more protected and ring-fenced scale, through SEZs. If a country lacks effective state capacity, public services, and infrastructure such as power, water and transport, SEZs – located in a smaller geographical area – could offer an opportunity to use the limited state capacity, public services and infrastructure to potentially great impact, which could catalyse other parts of the economy. However, if investments can be attracted, industrialisation fostered and technology, knowledge and skills acquired through normal policy avenues, incentives, and state-business partnerships, SEZs are not necessary. SEZs must only be established if constraints such as government corruption, incompetency and red tape cannot be addressed speedily in the broader economy, and SEZs then are established as smaller protective zones where these governance failures are absent. A critical part of the success of SEZs is that they need to be part of the overall national industrial strategy of a country – they must be exempt from the inefficiencies, corruption and mismanagement normally associated with developing country governments and must respond to real market demands (Warr, 1989; Watson, 2001; White, 2011; Wolman, 2014; Zeng, 2017). Some of the purposes of SEZs are to create new industries that do not exist at the time, beneficiate raw materials and so create new value-add industries, attract foreign investment when it is difficult to do so under normal circumstances, and to develop an export economy. SEZs can also be specifically established to transfer new technology, knowledge, and skills that the country lacks, but are critical to industrialisation. The SEZ is almost an incubator, where experimenting, manufacturing, innovation, and learning can happen behind protective barriers – and the final product then exported to global markets. SEZs have been crucial in skills, technology and knowledge transfer and industrial upgrading from basic to value added industries in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Dubai created a successful Dubai Internet City SEZ, which attracted the world’s largest technology companies, such as Microsoft, Oracle, and IBM. Dubai also created universities as special economic zones, bringing in foreign universities, teachers, and technology to accelerate skills transfer, technology upgrading and innovation (Khaleej Times, 2019). Africa, Morocco, and Nigeria set up SEZs to penetrate the European Union market (Bräutigam & Tang, 2010; Farole, 2011; Fruman & Zeng 2015). Rwanda set up SEZs to manufacture new products for exports. Within three years, 3% of Rwanda’s workforce were employed in its new SEZ. Mauritius set up SEZs to produce processed sugar for export. Such was the Mauritian success, that when the sugar industry was at its peak, the country dominated 50% of the EU market for processed brown sugar (Bräutigam & Tang, 2010; Serlet, 2022). The SEZs must be a zone of competent management, corruption-free, devoid of public sector red tape, and effectively integrated within local and global markets. SEZs must have a specific industrialisation purpose and must not become a collection of subsidised warehouses that create jobs artificially at great cost, as has been the case in many failed SEZs in Africa and South Africa. Many researchers worry that SEZs may only develop certain parts of a country, creating “enclaves”, and the impact will not be transferred to the wider economy. The rise of SEZs Taiwan in 1966, Singapore in 1969, and South Korea in 1970 were amongst the first to create SEZs (Asian Development Bank, 2007). Both Singapore and South Korea established SEZs to use their cheap and available labour, to foster labour-intensive, export manufacturing industries and attract foreign investment – based on giving investors incentives for setting up these industries (Lall, 2000). Singapore established SEZs to build a transhipment trade hub, removing goods and service taxes on products. By the 1970s Singapore created specialised SEZs, particularly to build the petroleum refinery-related industry (Koh, 2006). Singapore has established more than 400 companies trading in petroleum and related products since it established its first SEZ in 1969. For another, the creation of the petroleum refinery-related industry has spurred associated and related petroleum business, including professional services, research and development, and marketing and sales. After the Asian financial crisis, these East Asian states changed the focus of their SEZs, as economic circumstances changed, to industrial upgrading, productivity increases and innovation (UNCTAD, 2019; UN ESCAP, 2019; UNIDO, 2015). They moved their SEZs from low-skilled, low-cost labour to value added activities and technology – these economies now had developed high-skilled workforces, for high-skilled labour. For example, these countries introduced technology, biotechnology, science, and software SEZs. China successfully used SEZs as zones of experimenting to develop the market system, while building new industries the country did not have and learning new technologies it lacked. China launched its “Open Door” reforms in 1978 to introduce market reforms in selected regions, in what former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping called “crossing the river by touching the stones” (Shen & Xu, 2011; Sklair, 1991). The Chinese SEZs were zones where the usual government red tape, corruption and ideology were set aside, focusing on securing foreign investment by giving incentives, attracting new technology and knowledge. The Chinese SEZs built new industries, created new jobs and new export industries (Shen & Xu, 2011; Sklair, 1991). It fostered positive spillovers to the economy – new knowledge, new technology, and new management techniques were transferred to other parts of the economy, which lifted economic growth, development, and the country’s competitiveness (Shen & Xu, 2011; Sklair, 1991). It is estimated that SEZs have contributed to 22% of China’s GDP, 41% of the country’s foreign direct investment, and 60% of its exports. China’s technology commercialisation rate is around 10%. However, in SEZs the technology commercialisation rate is around 60%. SEZs in Africa There are an estimated 237 SEZs in Africa, found in 38 countries (Farole, 2011; Fruman & Zeng, 2015). Mauritius introduced Africa’s most successful SEZs. In 1970, the country established its first SEZ to manufacture textiles and garments, food and beverages, and batteries for export. In the Mauritius export processing zone, companies are free to locate anywhere on the island. Mauritius’ 1970 Export Processing Act broke from the typical post-colonial African import substitution strategy to one of an export-led industrialisation strategy. Mauritius was more successful than many African countries in that it focused on export-led growth, and the SEZ was part of its export-led industrialisation strategy, not a standalone policy like in many African countries where SEZs have had pedestrian results (Bräutigam & Tang, 2010). Mauritius allowed duty-free imports of inputs meant to be used to make products for export. The country gave tax holidays to exporters. Exporters were given reduced rates on power, water and building materials – charging rates similar to international competitors. Domestic companies who were exporters received credit from banks at lower interest rates. The Mauritian government was careful to push labour-intensive production, to soak low-skilled unemployment. Cheaper credit was calibrated in such a way that companies did not shirk labour-intensive for capital-intensive production, because of the cheaper capital available. Mauritius’ priority was to get manufacturing going in the country – whether it was foreign owned or not – transferring knowledge, technology, and skills, and so, fostering positive spillovers to the rest of the economy. Mauritius placed no restrictions on foreign ownership of manufacturing companies – unlike many countries in post-colonial Africa. The country has been governed more pragmatically than almost all African countries, by spending more attention on building and maintaining reliable infrastructure. Mauritius, governed for most of its postcolonial history by coalitions, has been Africa’s most stable country – it has managed its public finances prudently and is amongst the least corrupt – which is an immediate attraction for investors (Gumede, 2022a). The country also prioritised making its public service competent. The SEZs were governed competently, honestly, and pragmatically. By 1988, employment in Mauritius’ SEZs was 85% of total manufacturing employment and 31% of total country employment. By the late 1980s, value add produced in SEZs made up 12% of GDP. More recently, Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria were successful in processing cocoa through SEZs, by partnering with Western companies to co-produce chocolate, the value-add of cocoa, for export, rather than exporting raw, unprocessed cocoa (Gumede, 2022a; Gumede, 2022b). The value-add chocolate creates more jobs, and earns more money, than the raw commodity cocoa. Morocco and Nigeria have also recently established successful SEZs in partnership with foreign investors to penetrate the European Union market. Rwanda has successfully established SEZs in partnership with industrial country companies to manufacture new products for exports. SEZs in South Africa: The Tshwane Automotive SEZ The ANC government has adopted the policy of SEZs as one of its pillar strategies to lift growth, boost investment, and increase job creation (Majola, 2023). The South African SEZ programme started with the Industrial Development Zone policy review in 2007 by the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (the dtic). The SEZ Act stipulates that SEZs should have a feasibility study and business case. Most of South Africa’s SEZs are state operated. There are 11 designated SEZs, with nine fully operational. They have attracted 167 operational investors, with total private investment of R21,9 billion, and created almost 20 000 operational jobs. The SEZs include Saldanha Bay in the Western Cape, Dube Trade Port and Richards Bay in KwaZulu-Natal, East London and Coega in the Eastern Cape, Maluti-A-Phofung in the Free State, Musina Makhado in Limpopo, and Tshwane Automotive in Gauteng. The Tshwane Automotive SEZ launched in South Africa in 2019 appears to offer the prospect of being a model SEZ. It secured and was driven by a private sector anchor, Ford Motor Company. The company invested over R15 billion to produce the next generation of Ford Rangers. Ford, the national and provincial governments, and the City of Tshwane are co-governing the SEZ in a public-private partnership. Ford is represented on the management board of the entity, which includes representatives of the dtic, Gauteng Department of Economic Development, and the City of Tshwane. Staff from the Eastern Cape SEZ, Coega, were deployed to assist in the establishment of the Tshwane Automotive SEZ. This is one of the rare occasions where all spheres of government are involved in a governing partnership with the private sector. The Tshwane Automotive SEZ was co-designed from the start with Ford and has been given clean audits since its inception. The government has spent R2 billion on the project, with material inputs for the production aimed at 45%. The SEZ will, in cooperation with Transnet, develop a rail-to-port corridor for vehicle and components exports – which will include Tshwane and Gqeberha, in the Eastern Cape – the completion of which is a critical component that will determine the success of the SEZ. Figure 2: Special Economic Zones in South Africa Critical success factors for SEZs Before a country establishes SEZs it must put together a national industrialisation, economic growth, or long-term development plan (Aggarwal, 2008; IFC, 2016; ILO, 1988; Ishida, 2009; Jayanthakumaran, 2003). Such a plan must be based on an analysis of the state of the country’s economy, its development needs, and its human capital. There must be an assessment of the comparative advantages – the resources – the country has, what it can do with domestic resources, capital, and skills, and what will need to be built with outside help. Related to this, there must be a comprehensive analysis of the country’s comparative position in the global economy, trade, and supply chains. A central pillar of any country’s industrialisation, growth and long-term development strategy is how to build local production capacity (Aggarwal, 2008; IFC, 2016; ILO, 1988; Ishida, 2009; Jayanthakumaran, 2003). Establishing SEZs, for example, could be a mechanism to build local production capacity through attracting foreign investors to the SEZs and then getting them to upgrade local production capacity, by partnering, transferring technology, skills and knowledge, and sourcing inputs from local firms. There must be clear reasons for the establishment of SEZs, including how they fit into the national industrialisation, development, or long-term country economic growth plan (Gumede, 2022a; Gumede, 2022b). For example, if the intention is to attract foreign direct investment – which the country cannot do through traditional methods – the objective of attracting investment through the SEZs must be integrated into the country’s economic growth plan. There must be a business case for SEZs (Zeng, 2017), meaning there needs to be a global demand and a market for the products manufactured in the SEZs. SEZs must be embedded in the comparative advantage of the country. They cannot be established based on political, ideological, and interest-group considerations. It is crucial that SEZs form part of a country’s national long-term development or industrialisation plan, rather than operating as standalone job creation exercises. Once the business case for SEZs has been made, there must be an assessment of the implications of establishing them for existing businesses, institutions, and policies. After this, SEZ laws, policies, and supporting and governing institutions will have to be created. Well-thought out, pragmatic and credible laws, regulations, and institutional frameworks are crucial to govern SEZs. Governments must implement these consistently, honestly, and competently to foster investor, market, and society confidence that SEZs are not simply going to be another avenue for corruption, self-enrichment, and failure (Gumede 2022a; Gumede 2022b). The business environment must be conducive, efficient, and friendly. The costs of doing business – registration, logistics and customs – should be conducive to companies setting up. The public infrastructure – power, rail, and water – for SEZs must be working, reliable, and cost effective. Poor, unreliable or lack of infrastructure is a significant factor increasing the costs of doing business, global pricing competitiveness of products manufactured and of labour utilisation. Sound infrastructure is a vital competitive advantage for investors to set up shop in an SEZ – without it, it makes no sense. SEZs must also be linked to the supply chains of local industry (Jayanthakumaran, 2003; Johansson & Nilsson, 1997; Cirera & Lakshman, 2014; Litwack & Qian, 1998; Rhee et al, 1990; Rodrik, 2004; Zeng, 2017; UNCTAD, 2019; UN ESCAP, 2019; UNIDO, 2015). Local firms must provide the inputs, material, and services to the companies in the SEZs. If local firms do not have the capacity to do so, it will be crucial for governments to also provide them with assistance, incentives, and rebates to enable them to link into the supply chains of the SEZ firms. Doing this considerably maximises the positive spillover effect of SEZs. South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, for example, provide tax rebates, technical assistance, and infrastructure subsidies for local companies to their SEZs, to foster backwards linkages between SEZ companies and local ones. In addition, there must be a clear strategy of how local firms will be linked to the supply chains of the global firms in the SEZs (UNCTAD, 2019; UN ESCAP, 2019; UNIDO, 2015). Many global firms buy more than half of their inputs from other firms and outsource their manufacturing to other smaller firms. In such cases they only retain design, marketing, and research and development functions. It is important that, as part of the industrialisation strategy, a country encourages global firms attracted to the SEZs to source their inputs locally. And if local companies do not have the capacity to produce inputs for global companies, the SEZ strategy must outline how the capacity of local firms could be built up with the support of foreign investors. This would usually involve incentives being given to foreign players to build the capacity of local suppliers through transferring skills, technology, and providing financial support, where necessary. Governments must actively intervene to overcome market failures in the value chains linking local suppliers to that of international investors (Jayanthakumaran, 2003). For example, local suppliers may not know about the opportunities available to produce inputs for international companies. At the same time, the international companies may not know of the existence of local companies with the capacity to provide inputs for their products. In some cases, the inputs of local companies may be of too poor a standard or too costly for global firms. Government SEZ policy must then provide tools to help local firms to produce quality inputs at affordable prices for global investors. Also, in many cases developing country hosts of SEZs employ predominantly unskilled citizens because educational institutions are weak, ineffective, and under-resourced. The SEZs can be a catalyst to establish new training institutions, research, and development centres, and to upgrade existing ones. There must be clear monitoring, evaluation, and assessment mechanisms to ensure that SEZs are on track to meet their stated objectives (Gumede 2022a; Gumede 2022b). There must be benchmarking of SEZs against comparable successful ones elsewhere, and mechanisms need to be in place to intervene if they are in danger of veering off course. Those managing SEZs must be held accountable for delivering on the stated objectives of the entities. China, for example, in 1996 issued an official administrative decree for the compulsory regular evaluation of SEZ performance: SEZs that are poorly managed, not meeting their development targets, and growing too slowly lose their SEZ status. Chinese SEZs are evaluated based on several performance indicators, including knowledge creation and technological innovation – which are measured based on how much the education level of employees has been uplifted – R&D expenditure, the number of R&D institutions and technology innovation incubators established. Another performance indicator is the level of industrial upgrading and how structural optimisation capabilities have been boosted, which are measured by the number of new high-tech companies created, the number of services firms established, the number of intellectual property registrations, and the number of listed companies attracted to the SEZ. The SEZ performance in China is also measured based on how local companies developed in the SEZs penetrate international markets and fare in global competition, by the ratio of their employees who have received education abroad, and the number of intellectual property registrations lodged abroad (Asian Development Bank, 2007). The Chinese SEZ performance is also measured in relation to companies’ sustainable development capacity increases, by way of looking at the number of employees with master’s and doctoral degrees, the increases in taxable revenues, the growth rate of the companies, and the amount of new investment undertaken. SEZs could be fully government or business owned or could be public-private arrangements. In developing countries, the SEZs that have been fully government owned have mostly failed – as all the governance failures of the public sector, such as corruption, incompetence and red tape are also repeated in the SEZs, making them unviable. Public-private arrangements, in which the private sector co-govern and co-manage, have generally been the most successful. An effective, competent, and pragmatic management structure is crucial in managing an SEZ, and sound operational management skills are vital to its success. Many SEZs in African countries and in South Africa fail from the same lack of implementation and execution management capacity found in their public sectors – especially if the same incompetent public sector managers are operating the SEZs. It is also important that the SEZs’ good infrastructure development is from time to time transplanted to the wider region in which they are situated. This means that the infrastructure built for the SEZs must be part of an integrated public infrastructure development programme, whereby the SEZs’ public infrastructure investment would be the anchor of broader infrastructure expansion. Another point is that SEZs are often giant industrial structures that could damage the environment significantly. Therefore, the construction and management of SEZs must be done in such a way that it protects the environment, which many first generation SEZs neglected. Many are now trying to clawback environmental destruction in the wake of mass industrialisation that took place without taking the environment into account. It is very important that SEZ investors be required to report on environmental, sustainability and governance (ESG) performance. Many of the first generation SEZs’ construction also rarely consulted with local communities, civil society, and interest groups. It is essential that new SEZs do not repeat this mistake. If a site chosen to construct the SEZ involves uprooting local communities, acquiring their land and property, the process must be done in consultation with them, fairly and compassionately. Consultations of local communities, civil groups and interest groups are also essential in identifying the local comparative advantages and to link the SEZ investor activities with local input, material, and services – and so, crucial to maximising the positive spillover effect of the SEZs. Why SEZs have failed in many African countries Some SEZs in African countries have failed for the same reasons that development has failed in these countries (Farole, 2011; Fruman & Zeng, 2015). These reasons include SEZs not being integrated as part of a national growth, industrialisation, or long-term development strategy. SEZs are often set up for ad hoc policy objectives, such as only job creation or only attracting foreign investment. In Africa, only Mauritius, Rwanda, and Morocco made SEZs part of their national development strategies. In many African countries, SEZs are often set up for ideological, patronage, and corrupt reasons – and without making a business case. In many cases African governments established SEZs without having anchor private sector investors, with the exception of Mauritius, who was successful with its SEZs in developing a processed sugar export industry because the government partnered with European processing companies. African SEZs have not prioritised linking industries to global value chains (Jayanthakumaran, 2003). They also have not prioritised using SEZs to develop new industries for export. Neither have African countries used SEZs to add value to the primary commodities they export, or to upgrade their countries’ skills, industrial and technology bases. Projects are often not decided based on a business case, but rather on which company gives the largest kickback. A case in point, the CEO of South Africa’s Dube Port SEZ was suspended because of alleged corruption. Many African and South African SEZs are not internationally competitive – and are economically non-viable. To add insult to injury, the public sector governance failures – such as incompetence, corruption, and inefficiency – that often undermine development, delivery and efficiency in South Africa and African countries, are often replicated in SEZs. These problems have stymied SEZs and continue to do so. The legal, regulatory, and institutional structures of SEZs are often lacking or poorly defined – open to different interpretations or not consistently implemented. Furthermore, in some cases, although national governments decree SEZs, they in many instances do not give them the financial, infrastructure or political support they need. New governments, whether national or provincial, often withdraw support for SEZs established by their predecessors. Furthermore, SEZs in African countries often take a long time to put legal, regulatory, and institutional structures in place – and sometimes even longer to operationalise. Incentives are regularly either uncompetitive or overgenerous, undermining local industry outside the SEZs. Business procedures are slowed down by red tape, and special customs and tax are incoherently applied. Governments often do not have an adequate understanding of the requirements of businesses they want to invest in the SEZs. Many African and South African SEZs start without any anchor business investor, which means that the state is the anchor or biggest investor. In South Africa, the most successful SEZ is the Tshwane SEZ, which started with an anchor investor, the Ford company. Public infrastructure in African and South African SEZs is often as bad as in other parts of South Africa, with the supply of power, water, rail, roads, ports, and internet frequently not consistent. This makes it unproductive for investors to set up in SEZs – as the cost of infrastructure is a determining factor. In South Africa, and in many African countries, the governance management structures of SEZs are in many instances run solely by the state – and the corruption, incompetence, and mismanagement that is found there is oftentimes replicated in the SEZs. One of the reasons for the success of the Tshwane SEZ has been the partnership between the government and the private sector, where both co-govern the management structure. Many African and South African SEZs are not linked to their domestic economies, but operate largely as enclaves, disconnected from the national economy and local businesses (Litwack & Qian, 1998). Investors in SEZs are also insufficiently linked to local suppliers. And there are for the most part no special efforts to strengthen the capacity of local suppliers who may not have the capacity to deliver inputs to foreign companies in the SEZs. For another, SEZs also often do not integrate primary, secondary, and tertiary industries into the investor supply chain. Unlike in China, Singapore, or Taiwan, African and South African SEZs regularly do not integrate the boosting of research and development into the industrial value chains of companies in the SEZs (Zeng, 2017). The technical learning, knowledge transfer, and industrial upgrading is therefore not as effective as it has been in many Chinese, South Korean, or Singaporean SEZs. This means that the positive spillover effects of SEZs are absent or minimised. Many African and South African SEZs have faced opposition because they were constructed on sites where local residents had to be forced off their land, moved out of their homes, and their ancestral and historical sites disturbed. This has led to local communities often being hostile to SEZs in their areas. For example, communities opposed the construction of the Makhado, in Limpopo, and Dube Port, in KwaZulu-Natal, SEZs over allegations that their land rights had been trampled on. It is therefore crucial that land, property, and historically sensitive site disputes with local communities over the location of SEZs are resolved in a participatory manner. More importantly, SEZs must not be located on sites where it involves displacing communities, expropriating their property, and desecrating their historical sites. SEZs: Policy lessons for South Africa There has to be a solid business case for creating an SEZ. However, many of South Africa’s SEZs have been established without a credible business case. In 2001, the government established the Coega Industrial Development Zone in Gqeberha to create an integrated steel producing hub. The steel hub was not based on a business case that looked at global demand over the coming years. Not surprisingly, the government struggled to attract initial anchor business investors. The business case for the Musina Makhado SEZ in Limpopo is also not clear. The Musina Makhado SEZ is supposed to be an energy metallurgical cluster centred around a coal cluster, which consists of 20 interdependent industrial plants, including ferrochrome, ferromanganese, stainless steel, high manganese steel and vanadium steel, thermal, coking, coal washery and lime, and cement plants. The Limpopo provincial government said 11 memorandums of understanding have been signed with the Chinese government for investment of around US$1.1 billion. The government said 70% of what would be produced will be exported to China. But there is a real danger that the Musina Makhado SEZ may not align to global demand, so crucial to the success of any SEZ. In September 2021, China’s President Xi Jinping (Volcovici, Brunnstrom & Nichols, 2021) told the United Nations General Assembly that China will not build any new coal-fired power projects overseas, in support of increasing its green and low-carbon energy footprint in developing countries – which raised questions around building a coal cluster SEZ in Limpopo based on exports to China. The South African government often takes a long time to put legal, regulatory, and institutional structures in place for SEZs – and sometimes even longer to operationalise. When finally in operation, business procedures are slowed down by red tape, and special customs and tax are incoherently applied. In comparison, the Hamriyah Free Zone in Sharjah, in the United Arab Emirates could grant a license to establish a business within 24 hours of submitting all the required documents. The problem is that South African national, provincial or city governments often do not have an adequate understanding of the requirements of businesses they want to invest in the SEZ. The government services provided for SEZs are also frequently not tailored for the investors they want to attract. Then Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies announced the formation of the Musina Makhado SEZ in 2017. However, the project has yet to get off the ground. In March 2021, the Limpopo Economic Development and Tourism Department temporarily stopped the project, saying its environmental impact assessment was “insufficient”. The project was also deemed not to have widely consulted with local communities, traditional authorities, and farmers. Countries face heavy competition for foreign investment, which can go anywhere in the world. This means countries cannot afford to give the same or a lesser value proposition to competitor countries. Despite this, incentives to attract private sector investors in South Africa are often uncompetitive. South Africa’s special economic zone tax incentive was introduced into the Income Tax Act, but it is overly bureaucratic compared to other countries’ SEZ tax incentives – for example, to qualify, the Minister of Trade and Industry and Minister of Finance must approve. Qualified companies can get a reduced corporate tax rate of 15% instead of the current 28% rate (SARS, 2018). Furthermore, companies could get an accelerated depreciation allowance of 10% on cost of any new and unused buildings or improvement owned by the qualifying company (SARS, 2018). Morocco, in comparison, has seven Special Economic Zones, with no corporate taxes for the first five years and significantly reduced rates thereafter (Böhmer, 2011). In Morocco, companies have exemption from building and equipment tax for the first 15 years, and goods entering or leaving the SEZ are not subject to laws on foreign exchange. Companies are also exempted from dividends and share taxes when paid to non-residents and a low tax rate of 7.5% if they are paid to locals. Morocco has built a successful aeronautics industry through attracting global aeronautics players to manufacture for export in the country – with the export industry now accounting for US$2 billion in export revenues. It is critical that SEZ industries are linked to the local enterprises – through market opportunities, access to finance, technology, and training (Rifaoui, 2021). Morocco has focused on building full industry ecosystems in the SEZs, using the SEZs to develop an export manufacturing sector in very specific areas. The country has, importantly, ensured that all the firms in the SEZs are industrially interconnected, linked to local players, and the products linked to global supply chains. In South Africa, Coega, after a slow start, has increasingly fostered linkages with local SMMEs. During the 2015-2020 period, there was a 35% SMME procurement participation rate (Coega, 2020). The Hamriyah Free Zone in Sharjah, in the United Arab Emirates, incorporates fiscal incentives, which include complete exemption from taxes, customs and commercial levies; and financial incentives, which include low rents and subsidised energy (Böhmer, 2011). Many global firms want infrastructure incentives to invest in SEZs (Rodríguez-Pose et al, 2022). South Africa not only generally does not offer generous infrastructure incentives, but the country’s infrastructure – power, rail, and ports – is also deteriorating, which is actually a disincentive to attract investors for local SEZs. The success so far of the Tshwane SEZ is instructive for other SEZs in South Africa. The Tshwane Automotive SEZ launched in 2019 was initiated by government securing a private sector anchor investor first – the Ford Motor Company – rather than government being the anchor investor. The Tshwane SEZ is co-governed in a genuine public-private partnership. Most SEZs in South Africa have been state-led and started without a private sector anchor investor. In the Tshwane SEZ, Ford, the national and provincial governments, and the City of Tshwane have been co-governing the SEZ in a public-private partnership from the start. Ford is represented on the management board of the entity, which includes representatives of the dtic, Gauteng Department of Economic Development, and the City of Tshwane. The SEZ has been given clean audits since its inception, and the government has spent R2 billion on the project. In South Africa, SEZs have not been integrated into a long-term development plan, industrialisation, or growth plan. Such a plan must be based on an analysis of the state of the country’s economy, its development needs, and its human capital. Related to this, there has to be a comprehensive analysis of the country’s comparative position in the global economy, trade, and supply chains. In fact, most of the SEZs in South Africa have been set up for ad hoc policy objectives, either by national or provincial governments, such as only job creation or only attracting foreign investment. Many of South Africa’s SEZs operate largely as enclaves, disconnected from the national economy and local businesses. Investors in SEZs are insufficiently linked to local suppliers. There are often no special efforts to strengthen the capacity of local suppliers who may not have the capacity to deliver inputs to foreign companies in the SEZs. For another, SEZs also often do not integrate primary, secondary, and tertiary industries into the investor supply chain. SEZs have also not been able to effectively upgrade South Africa’s skills, industrial and technology bases. Unlike in China, Singapore, or Taiwan, African SEZs also often do not integrate the boosting of research and development into the industrial value chains of companies in the SEZs. The technical learning, knowledge transfer and industrial upgrading in South African SEZs has therefore not been as effective as it has been in many Chinese, South Korean or Singaporean SEZs. This means that the positive spillover effects of SEZs are absent. The problem for South Africa is that SEZs have not delivered the volume of export manufacturing, value add production or employment as expected. Neva Makgetla writes that national government transfers to SEZs amounted to R1.1 billion in 2020-2021, from R600 million in 2013-2014, and after a peak of R1.7 billion in 2017-2018. However, Makgetla rightly says that these figures excluded provincial transfers, which for example in the Eastern Cape ran up to R500 million a year (Makgetla, 2021). According to the dtic figures, in 2021, Coega accounted for half of the private investment to SEZs, the East London IDZ accounted for 20% and the Dube Trade Port for 10% (dtic, 2021; Makgetla, 2021). Over the 2013 to 2019 period, manufacturing employment dropped by 3.7% and valued added manufacturing only rose 0.7% (Makgetla, 2021). Many of South Africa’s SEZs have frequently faced opposition because they were constructed on sites where local residents were forced off their land; or they were constructed without being sensitive to the environment (Buthelezi, 2022). This has often caused the SEZs to face community, court, and civil society challenges – making it difficult for them to get off the ground. There really needs to be greater consultation and involvement of local communities and environmental safeguards when sites for SEZs are identified. Conclusion The location of SEZs is no longer a comparative advantage, which means that SEZs will have to be internationally competitive. SEZs can only be successful and competitive if they are a well-thought-out part of a national development, growth, and industrial plan. There must be a business case for SEZs, based on the country’s comparative advantages, and they must be internationally and locally competitive. They have to be governed competently, honestly, and according to consistently implemented laws. SEZs have to be closely monitored, benchmarked, and have clear goals. They must be held accountable for their performance, and if they fail, they may have to in some cases be reduced as SEZs. They must also operate in ways that safeguard the environment, use green technology, and uphold human rights. SEZs must resolve Africa’s industrialisation challenges, including the inability since colonialism and apartheid to link African products to global value chains. In addition, Africa has not only struggled to add value to its primary commodities, but has also struggled to build manufacturing, diversify product offerings, and produce export industries. Africa has been unable to secure new technology, knowledge, and skills. The reality is that unless SEZs can help African countries accomplish all these important tasks, there is no business case to establish them. 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Chinese Investments in Special Economic Zones in Africa: Progress, Challenges, and Lessons Learned. Washington, DC: World Bank. Yeung, Y. M., Lee, J., & Kee, G. 2009. China’s special economic zones at 30, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 50(2): 222-240. Zeng, D.Z. 2012. China’s Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters: Success and Challenges, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Zeng, D.Z. 2017. Special Economic Zones: Lessons from the Global Experience, PEDL Synthesis Paper Series, 1. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. 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Copyright © 2024 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2024 by Dr Douglas Blackmur Abstract The events of the FeesMustFall (FMF) challenge to the South African government’s higher education policies, through its assault on individual universities and the higher education system during the period 2015 to 2017, have seen the emergence of a relatively extensive and varied academic literature. At the time of writing this article – January/February 2024 – the most recent addition is the book by Max Price, “Statues and Storms. Leading through change” (hereinafter Statues and Storms) (Price, 2023). Price was the Vice Chancellor of the University of Cape Town (UCT) from 2008 to 2018. Statues and Storms arguably contains much that is relevant to the quality and development of higher education public policy in South Africa, matters that, however, were not Price’s explicit purpose to address. This article, on the other hand, using Statues and Storms as the point of departure, explores the national public policy significance of certain of the issues and events it documents. Some of the discussion in this article is, at times, speculative and/or conjectural.  The article is a preliminary enquiry which raises certain public policy issues without always offering a final judgement on their significance. It is thus an invitation to scholars to conduct further research which will hopefully both assess the quality of the analysis in this article and unearth further matters not considered here at all. Introduction The events of the FeesMustFall challenge to the South African government’s higher education policies, through its assault on individual universities and the higher education system during the period 2015 to 2017, have seen the emergence of a relatively extensive and varied academic literature. A few examples include Habib (2019), Jansen (2017), Booysen (2016), Chikane (2018), and Benatar (2021). Some of this literature has been discussed previously (see, for example, Blackmur, 2019, 2021, 2023). At the time of writing this article – January/February 2024 – the most recent addition is the book by Max Price, “Statues and Storms. Leading through change” (hereinafter Statues and Storms) (Price, 2023). Price was the Vice Chancellor of the University of Cape Town (UCT) from 2008 to 2018. Both Habib and Jansen were former Vice Chancellors whose books, in common with Price’s, employ a participant observation and engagement method of analysis, as does the book by Chikane, a prominent leader in the FMF movement.  Statues and Storms arguably contains much that is relevant to the quality and development of higher education public policy in South Africa, matters that, however, were not Price’s explicit purpose to address. This article, on the other hand, using Statues and Storms as the point of departure, explores the national public policy significance of certain of the issues and events it documents. The waves of protests that erupted in 2015 constituted a national phenomenon not seen in universities since 1994. It contained a wide range of demands of which reduced fees – and ultimately free higher education to students – and fundamental changes to curricular were the most important. The years between 1994 and 2015 were, however, far from a haven of complete tranquility in South African universities. Concerns over several specific events, such as initiation ceremonies, were prominent in public debate. Any suggestions, however, that these tensions were clear portents of what ultimately became a serious and often violent national challenge to government higher education policy, through rendering the universities ungovernable (Price, 2023: 168), would be a paradigm case of hindsight bias. On the surface, despite these ongoing tensions in the period leading up to 2015, the atmosphere at universities such as UCT nevertheless seemed within the bounds of normality. This is captured in Price’s remarks about UCT graduation ceremonies: “…, I would meet three generations of family members - all of whom took enormous pride in having studied at and graduated from UCT. … more moving was the regular experience of being introduced by a first-generation graduate to her parents from a rural village, … They could not contain their emotions about graduation – their son or daughter now a doctor, accountant, lawyer or engineer. This was the visible evidence that UCT was playing a role in transforming … lives…” (Price, 2023: 9). By 2014, on the other hand, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) had concluded that progress in the higher education transformation project left a great deal to be desired. It decided that, on the basis of “a number of complaints on transformation issues in universities”, it would conduct “a holistic examination of transformation in institutions of higher learning in South Africa”. (SAHRC, 2017: vii). The final Report, issued on 9 December 2016, although overtaken by events in some respects, argued, on the basis of evidence belonging to the period before 2015, that transformation in higher education was unduly slow for a wide range of reasons. These included a lack of a shared understanding of what was meant by ‘transformation’ in the South African higher education context; a lack of institutional will to address transformation issues; lack of commitment to multilingualism; slow progress in changing student and staff demographics; inadequate accommodation, which hindered racial integration in university residences; governance failures; underfunding of universities by the state; ineffective complaints handling systems; subcultures of discrimination and domination within universities; and a lack of adequate oversight by the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) to ensure that institutions of higher learning did in fact transform (SAHRC, 2017: viii-ix). Max Price’s book exposes many policy issues that are not considered in this article. Had space permitted, government policy with respect to the outsourcing of various university services; the politisation of the university; the evolution of the ‘welfare university’; the massification of higher education; the ‘missing middle’ in fees’ policy; and labour law issues in universities would have been analysed in some detail. Three significant public policy areas arising out of Statues and Storms are discussed in this article: the quality of the information and analysis available to the government on the performance of the higher education system; FMF Mark 2 and the adequacy of current public higher education funding policy; and some public policy issues in the decolonisation of higher education curricular. Concluding remarks follow. The quality of the information and analysis available to the government regarding the state of the South African universities and the FMF challenge The evidence collected by the SAHRC in its 2014 enquiry (evidence had also been assembled in 2008, 2010, and 2012 by other public investigations) suggested that all was not well in the South African university system albeit not at or near boiling point. But presumably the full picture was more complex. Max Price later referred to the “colonial institutional landscape and culture of UCT” (Price, 2023: 197). Earlier critics had alleged a racist institutional culture at UCT and in other universities (Chikane, 2018: 25, 37, 39). Such a culture (this term also needs clear definition) does not, however, emerge overnight and was arguably present when Price conducted his due diligence before accepting the post of Vice Chancellor. It was still present eight years into his appointment. This suggests important research questions. Do the records reveal – in the years leading up to the FMF challenge to the university system and to the government – any individual students, any student body, alumni, convocation, staff association, and/or any trade union making submissions on matters that subsequently informed the demands of FMF, to the appropriate senior UCT university management, council, senate, institutional forum, and especially the UCT Ombud, a major source of information and advice to the UCT Council (Mpati et al, 2023)? Were, furthermore, such submissions made to state bodies such as the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA), Council on Higher Education (CHE), Higher Education Quality Committee (HEQC), DHET, Minister and Ministry of Higher Education and Training, Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Higher Education, Science and Innovation, opposition parties, and the media? Did the South African State Security Agency (SSA) offer assessments to the government of the levels of volatility of student politics – accusations were made during the FMF protests of security service, foreign and domestic, involvement (Price, 2023: 301-302)? Did ANC-affiliated student bodies provide similar intelligence? If even a reasonable amount of this communication on the state of the universities was managed and analysed effectively, the principal decision- makers seem not to have taken it seriously, or not to have converted it into concrete policy decisions including plans for timely implementation. Jansen argues that “the universities themselves were caught napping, unprepared for the sudden backlash for which they had neither the resources to meet student demands, the skill to negotiate the new politics, nor the security to protect campus lives and property” (Jansen, 2017: 1). Paradoxically, however, university vice chancellors were excused from this criticism. They, according to Jansen, had for several years warned the African National Congress (ANC) national government of the “dangers of the decline in government subsidies and the steady increase in student fees” (Jansen, 2017: 2; Habib, 2019: x, xii; Price, 2023: 96-105). Perhaps these warnings lacked sufficient credibility: maybe the government believed that they contained an element of crying wolf. And ‘dangers’ could refer to a wide variety of more or less likely financial possibilities. The reasons the government was apparently so poorly informed regarding the very wide range of pressures within the university system in the mid-2000s require identification, analysis and reform of some, perhaps all, of the means by which it develops and implements public higher education policy. A national enquiry into these matters, in order to effectively minimise the chances of being caught again by surprise, is indicated. There may, indeed, be a systemic proneness in government decision-making processes and structures to being “caught napping” across a range of policy matters, which needs to be addressed quickly. The literature on surprise attacks might be drawn upon in this regard. It discusses the risks of an “absence of a mechanism for aggregating, sifting, and analysing warning information flowing in from many sources and for pushing it up to the decision-making level of government” (Posner, 2009: 123). An enquiry arguably should commence with an examination of the quality of the work over the last 15 or so years of the higher education regulatory bodies, CHE and HEQC – its terms of reference must embrace examining the possibility that either or both bodies may have experienced regulatory capture. Surely such bodies ought to have kept, and keep, a watching brief on the changing environment and nature of South African universities, thereby to act as an early warning system to government of stresses in the system that may require a sometimes urgent policy response. At the individual university level, government might amend institutional statutes to require that ‘the skill to negotiate the new politics’ forms part of the selection criteria, and performance contracts, for senior university management including vice chancellors. A further provision consistent with improving public confidence in managerial integrity would be to require all university academics, at and above the position of Dean, and equivalent administrative staff, to display their up-to-date curricula vitae, and copies of their postgraduate thesis(es), on the appropriate website. The legislation governing the activities and responsibilities of the regulatory agencies, moreover, might be amended to endow them with defined, but wide, powers as an economic regulator, with an emphasis on higher education costs, revenues and fees (and any other higher education economic matters they select, or are referred to them by government or other stakeholders). FMF Mark 2? Will current public higher education funding policy survive? Assuming that there is a significant limit in the not-too-distant future to the resources taxpayers (Blackmur, 2023: 42) are prepared to see allocated to higher education, then the cost/revenue pressures that contributed to the massive disruption of the universities by FMF could again become of concern. A repeat performance of the FMF response is arguably thus within the realm of possibility. Even now there are straws in the wind such as a scathing report on the quality of governance and racial issues at UCT, investigations into accusations of inappropriate university initiation ceremonies, allegations of inadequate university student accommodation, and protests over the arguably appalling performance of the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) (Mpati et al, 2023; Hlati, 2024; Kahn, 2024). This helps make the case for major, and urgent, public enquiries into both the costs of the higher education system and its component universities, and the economics of non-taxpayer funding options. These enquiries arguably must, amongst other things, challenge several fallacious sacred cows such as the principle of the desirability of undiluted institutional autonomy, arguments that higher education must not be ‘commodified’, and also is a ‘public good’ – it isn’t (Blackmur, 2023: 43-44). The concept of a ‘public good’ originated in Economics (Backhouse, 2023: 354-355) and is associated with scholars such as Paul Samuelson. It has arguably been over-simplified by a wide variety of non-economists to justify a political position in favour of taxpayer funding of higher education. In this context, a public policy that permits all students to take loans that can cover all the costs of obtaining a qualification arguably ranks highly amongst the options for consideration by an enquiry (Blackmur, 2023). It would, amongst other things, dispose of the concept of the ‘missing middle’, an artifact of a certain specific financial plan, which has distorted public debate and policy thinking (Price, 2023: 108). The element of urgency in these proposals arises because of recent, current, and likely future significant upward pressures on the costs of providing higher education qualifications and other university functions. This is a huge field of analysis (essential reading includes: Moodie, 2016, especially chapters 1 and 2) and only a few issues can be explored even briefly in this article. General inflation is one of these pressures, exchange rate weakness is another. Jonathan Jansen has developed the concept of the ‘welfare university’ (Jansen, 2017: 9-10, 172-193). He has expanded earlier ideas advanced by Charles van Onselen that South African governments were “in danger of confusing … welfare and educational responsibilities to the detriment of both” (Jansen, 2017: 172). This has come to pass. Jansen concludes that “in recent years South African universities have gradually taken on more and more social welfare functions that stretch way beyond what was previously expected from a modern university” (Jansen, 2017: 177). The costs of managing these functions have included those associated with the often significant related expansion of university administrative systems, the costs of many of which are not accommodated in taxpayer subsidies to higher education (Jansen, 2017: 187; Price, 2023: 73, 87, 91). And the prospects for the future are for greater welfarisation in terms of cost and scope (Jansen, 2017: 180, 181, 189). A harbinger of this can be found in the United Kingdom where recent research has examined the “effects of the cost-of-living crisis on students” (Freeman, 2023: 1). This reveals that “universities are being forced to take steps which would have been unthinkable” just a few years ago: “university leaders and students’ union officers have pushed boundaries to get students more help” (Freeman, 2023: 2). The additional costs of such assistance is, however, unsustainable (Freeman, 2023: 3). The terms of reference of the enquiry into the costs and revenues of the university system that this article has advocated would arguably need to include the future of the welfare university in South Africa and the possible consequences of its failure. Thinking about the balance sheet issues facing South African universities would also need to embrace matters such as policies needed to improve staff and capital productivity. Structural issues are also relevant. Higher education debates in South Africa are conducted on the assumption that the vertically integrated structure of qualifications’ production is permanent (design, delivery, assessment, certification). At some point, however, public policy may well need to question the utility of this assumption. Costs may be reduced, and benefits increased, if, for example, the design and/or assessment stages were conducted in independent institutions. Several South African universities suffer certain major adverse pressures on their costs and income that can only possibly be alleviated and reversed through major public policy interventions – of types that do not offend against Rawlsian principles of social justice (Blackmur, 2023: p.42). The source of some of these pressures is to be found in serious corruption in these universities. The evidence for this state of affairs is analysed in Jonathan Jansen’s book “Corrupted. A study of chronic dysfunction in South African universities” (Jansen, 2023). He showed that in some universities there exists looting of “institutional resources on an industrial scale”, some of which is linked to the growth of the welfare university (Jansen, 2023: 5; Price, 2023: 73). Jansen drew attention to the consequent “high costs of institutional instability for staff and students, as well as for the disadvantaged communities surrounding the campus” (Jansen, 2023: 3). Put succinctly, corruption diverts financial and human resources from the academic project, inflates costs, and reduces income, which infusions of additional taxpayer funds can only make worse. A key public policy question is why, as it seems, the national government was unaware of the extent of this systemic malaise. This reinforces the major importance of the earlier proposal here for an urgent national enquiry (with judicial status?) into the methods and performance of the government’s key higher education regulators and advisers such as CHE, HEQC, SAQA, and DHET. Regulatory failure may be one of many possible egregious systemic failures in higher education. There have, to be sure, been ministerial and other interventions in some university activities – since 1998 at least (Jansen, 2023: 254-256). These have been piecemeal examinations on a case-by-case basis: systemic implications, and the extent to which South Africa’s higher education legislation has enabled (or not addressed) opportunities for corruption and other deviations from the purposes of higher education, have been underemphasised. The probable adverse impact of these circumstances on the reputation of the South African higher education system is unlikely to be trivial. Potential consequences are especially important for university revenues. Some university systems, such as that of Australia, for example, earn income from exports of higher education services, which is of national economic significance (Universities Australia, 2020, 2023; Rhodes University Business School, 2023). Such an opportunity will be denied to South Africa under current conditions. Even relatively high performing universities will suffer some collateral damage given that the system’s quality is compromised, and not only to their international activities but also to the acceptability of their qualifications globally. In addition to the problems already raised, seizing these opportunities requires that certain other issues be addressed by South African policymakers. They include ensuring that all South African higher education qualifications are internationally competitive in terms of scholarly and intellectual standards; removing any visa barriers; combatting xenophobia; resisting hostile attitudes in some university quarters to entrepreneurial activity; and insisting on regulation that is hospitable to international trade and investment in higher education. Objections will, of course, be raised to some of these policies. They can, however, be designed and implemented in ways sensitive to some alternative conceptions of the purposes of universities. The extent to which the South African higher education system might benefit from income generated by the export of qualifications will largely depend, however, on the nature of such compromises and whether they discourage international students. If sufficient numbers were deterred this would result in South Africa, perhaps inadvertently, pursuing a policy of autarky in higher education. The extent of any legislative and/or regulatory impediments to innovation in qualifications, and the marketing of higher education services more generally, needs to be identified by appropriate public enquiries. Intelligent removal of such impediments can enhance the flow of third-stream net income. Two examples are offered for consideration. Universities may offer a fee-for-service “walk in” assessment and certification of a person’s knowledge of, say, Strategic Management. Costs would be minimised by employing existing processes. There would be no entry rules, thereby eliminating costs on this account. This is a form of Recognition of Prior Learning (or of recognition of existing skills) without, however, the costs associated with the traditional rule-bound model. Consideration might also be given to allowing students to design some or all of their degree programmes. Such degrees would be issued by, say, the national higher education department, or an appropriate regulatory authority, or a university body such as Universities South Africa. This qualifications’ model could be built on the Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC) system. A major advantage of this system is the relatively low fees, which include the costs of existing, highly credible quality assurance and assessment processes. Appropriate regulation would nevertheless clearly be necessary, as would negotiations with international (and domestic) high reputation universities. This is not, however, the place to present a fully specified MOOC degree model. The important point is that South African higher education public policy, regulation and legislation would require significant amendment if this model were to be awarded a place in the higher education system. The key question is whether, if fully implemented, this model would allow significant numbers of South African tertiary students to obtain high quality degrees at a fraction of current costs. Given the vital importance of this, as demonstrated by the FMF protests and sometimes physically violent agitation, evaluation of a fully specified model is arguably an immediate priority for the national government. Serious opposition to these proposals, however, is predicable to the extent that the MOOC model might attract students away from existing universities. They may be tempted to protect their existing position and status by means that include political pressure, possibly in an informal alliance with HEC and HEQC. These bodies in the past have erected various barriers to entry against international universities attempting to operate in South Africa (Blackmur, 2004; Blackmur, 2006). This brief discussion of some of the cost and revenue pressures in the South African higher education system maintains that there is an element of urgency in conducting the various enquiries that have been recommended (Moodie, 2016). The durability of the 2016-17 settlement with FMF is not guaranteed, indeed it looks increasingly fragile. And there is a wider context in which the future of higher education will be determined. William Gumede has argued that the essential dimensions of this context are “corruption, incompetence and policy populism”, which together may precipitate an economic crisis in which “higher education subsidies, for institutions and students, will have to be scrapped” (Gumede, 2023). Should this come to pass, student reactions are unlikely to be mild or delicate. Decolonisation of higher education curricular: some public policy issues Statues and Storms addressed many aspects of FMF’s insistence that students receive ‘free, quality, decolonised’ higher education (Price, 2023: 69-86, 146, 201-202, 229, 265-6, 283). The notion of decolonised higher education embraces an extremely wide range of concepts and issues, much of which is disputed. Himonga and Diallo assert that “the definition of decolonisation is unsettled, if not contested” (Himonga & Diallo, 2017). They cite Price and Ally in this context as arguing that “decolonisation … should certainly not be reduced to some naïve … desire to return to a pristine, unblemished Africa before the arrival of the settlers” (Himonga & Diallo, 2017). Even this assessment, however, would be considered controversial in some quarters by its use of the word ‘settlers’: just who are the settlers in the long sweep of southern African history? A model of curriculum de-colonisation has been presented by Conrad Hughes, the Campus and Secondary Principal at the International School of Geneva (Hughes, 2021). It repays study as part of the process of getting to grips with some difficult definitional and content matters. It stimulates, amongst other things, certain questions (with few direct answers), for example, about the study of historical writing and analysis in a de-colonised curriculum. Would this deal with slavery in all societies and across all times including modern slavery; with empires and imperialism in similar vein; with the status of women everywhere; with religion; with racial prejudice; with monarchy; with exploitation in all its forms and in every society; and with ‘myths’ in all societies? In common with traditional social science and humanities disciplines, Hughes’s article contains extensive jargon and, particularly to the uninitiated, opaque concepts. What methods of enquiry, furthermore, would be approved? Will Critical Race Theory be adopted as paradigmatic? Does Hughes ask if concepts such as ‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’ possess any epistemological integrity? ‘Great person’ approaches to historical writing are rejected by Hughes on a priori grounds. Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, and Gilles Deleuze are embraced almost uncritically. A principal objection to the Hughes’ model, however, is that he rejects the concept of standards in intellectual and scholarly enquiry (and presumably everywhere else). If this were ultimately to inform the redesign of curricular in South African higher education, then fundamental questions about the value, relevance, credibility, reputation, and future of the universities would be at the top of the public policy agenda, and not only in South Africa. Claims that decolonisation of the curriculum in universities (variously and widely conceptualised) was a “good thing” were certainly a major component of the extensive higher education transformation agenda of FMF. A key question for this article is whether there is a role for government in a process of major curriculum change. Is the nature of university curricular a proper subject for public regulation? Assuming that it is for purposes of discussion, what matters would have to be taken into account if the South African government were contemplating using its powers in this regard? Issues to do with academic freedom (constitutionally protected in South Africa) and institutional autonomy would certainly be raised. These are two of the sacred cows in South African higher education, although arguably rarely respected in principle and/or practice by FMF and some academic staff. To the extent that the FMF assertions regarding, for example, the “toxic” nature of the “institutional culture” in many South African universities were accurate, it may be relevant to observe that such apartheid characteristics apparently continued post-1994 under circumstances ostensibly of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. Both of these thus may well be candidates for a comprehensive reassessment by the government and the regulators of their appropriateness to contemporary and future South African higher education. Given the complex issues associated with definitions of decolonisation, and the wide and often contentious nature of what decolonised curricular might look like, there is a case for government to require that regulators audit samples of redesigned, decolonised curricular against certain principles which, of course, will no doubt be questioned by some. Such curricular samples will, amongst other things, thus be expected to explain and justify their definitions, educational philosophies, and operational details together with analyses of their particular pros and cons. A range of exemplars might thereby be developed over time, from which decolonisation projects might benefit. Such regulation would necessarily have to be conducted in terms of the principles of efficient regulation, which may well require closer public evaluation and supervision of the performance of the regulators themselves. One further advantage of public regulation would be to add credibility to the decolonisation process without stultifying innovation in curriculum design. How do we know, for example, that ‘inappropriate’ colonial thought wouldn’t simply be replaced by, say,  “pseudo-Fanonist  political ideology” or ScienceMustFall nostrums (Price, 2023: 146, 265-266, 283), or by curricular consistent with universities operating more like party political schools than as specified in their legislated purposes (Habib, 2019: 201-204), if each university were to have final authority over the design of decolonised curricular? Matters of academic freedom and institutional autonomy come to the fore here, but as noted earlier, these values have not always commanded respect in the past in all parts of the South African higher education system. Just who might be involved in creating (and eventually revising) decolonised curricular is clearly an important policy matter for government. This decision arguably cannot be left to internal university processes alone: something as revolutionary as the curriculum decolonisation process must be conducted under the protection of a complex of safeguards of the global credibility of South African university qualifications. This discussion by no means exhausts the list of matters that a government considering forms of public intervention, or specific input into certain aspects of university curriculum decolonisation, needs to consider. Other matters include recognising the massive complexity of the decolonisation enterprise in that “good learning design aligns learning goals, learning activities, and assessment”, while culture, careers, and knowledge are “useful concepts for encapsulating three central aspects of university curriculum” (Moodie, 2016: 63-65, 68, 71, 73, 81). To what extent, moreover, are employers’ and students’ views concerning curriculum change to be accepted as dominant contributions; are current structures of subjects, courses, semesters, and assessments to be considered sacrosanct; is the internationalism of curricular an acceptable objective; is it lawful for academics to be assigned ‘decolonial scores’ by students (Price, 2023: 229); are ‘Western’ sports such as soccer to be banned from university campuses; and how are the inevitable conflicts over these, and a multitude of other issues, to be resolved? And unintended consequences and black swans will almost certainly complicate decision-making and execution, perhaps beyond any reasonable expectations. One conclusion is certain. A ‘revolutionary’ reform of higher education curricular, however desirable in itself, will not just be extremely complex. It is likely to be exceptionally costly as well. And perhaps more costly than it could be, given that it is politically impossible in South Africa to contract with private bodies, however well qualified, to participate in the curriculum re-design process. The analysis in this article is, in a sense, back where it started: what should be the sources of funding for the costs associated with the decolonisation of the curriculum? Universities are presumably unable to provide funding from internal sources. Should the taxpayer provide the necessary resources? Does government have the fiscal and political capacity to increase certain taxes, borrow the funds, or redirect public expenditures from other budgets for, say, social grants and/or expanding early childhood education? All of these, especially the latter, raise serious matters of equity and fairness (Blackmur, 2023: 41-43): why should taxpayer funds be devoted to financing curriculum change the benefits of which will accrue almost exclusively to university graduates? Curriculum reform pressures may, moreover, extend beyond issues of decolonisation. Demands may be made to, say, de-gender, or to de-ableist, the curriculum. Responding to these would clearly have major cost implications. Conclusion A paradox confronts researchers of the FMF movement (and all other fallist movements in South African higher education). On the one hand, UCT – and many other universities – was accused of being tainted by a long-standing toxic culture of institutional racism and an inappropriate colonial curriculum. On the other, it seems that more and more students from historically disadvantaged families were increasingly anxious to enrol in degree studies there, even though presumably more culturally appropriate alternatives such as the University of the Western Cape were available. Price’s accounts of proud parents and graduates invites the question as to why such students would wish to study under UCT’s allegedly toxic conditions. And, perhaps more to the point, why were national governments apparently relatively complacent with respect to this culture in what was often called Africa’s premier university? The accusations were not made in secret! The paradox, however, may be more apparent than real. It may well oversimplify extremely complex patterns of decisions and events. It nevertheless stimulates some useful questions and ideas. In addition to the public policy issues raised in this article, others of relevance emanating from the material in Statues and Storms include the nature of government attitudes and policies towards universities as corporate entities, and some of their staff, acting as partisan advocates of specific political, economic, social, religious, cultural, and other ideologies in ways inconsistent with liberal values such as those found in the South African Constitution. Another concerns the extent to which the government is prepared to tolerate the use of violence (physical and/or mental) in the determination of public policy in a democracy, and the proper role of the police on university campuses. If there is a significant possibility that a FMF Mark 2 will challenge the national government in the foreseeable future in ways reminiscent of 2015/17, then government arguably ought to be better prepared than previously. This article argues that such preparation requires, amongst other things, a public enquiry into the quality of the government’s methods of developing higher education public policy and especially into the efficiency of the relevant regulators in providing information and advice on changes in the functioning of the university system. The addition of a University Complaints Regulator to the institutional structure, either as a separate entity or as part of revising existing arrangements, might be the best way of creating an early warning system regarding emerging instabilities in the universities. Such a body might liaise closely with a University Economic Regulator. This would mean that individual university councils would be deprived of their final authority to determine student fees. Other public enquiries advocated in this article include major, and urgent, public examinations of both the costs of the higher education system and its component universities, and the economics of non-taxpayer funding options. This latter is important because it would necessarily expose the model of a full cost student loan system to public analysis and further review beyond that contained in the Heher report (The Presidency, 2017). An essential dimension of this model is typically ignored in public debate: a critical source of funding the current costs of obtaining university qualifications is the future income that graduates earn as a result of their university qualifications. This article has suggested that a review of higher education legislation is also warranted to determine if there are any statutory barriers to the proper functioning of the university system, especially to innovation in qualifications and the development of extra sources of third-stream income. The model for this could be the exhaustive analysis of state and national legislation in Australia in the 1990s as part of a National Competition Policy. There is arguably a place for government engagement in any process of curriculum reform in South African universities. Students, academics, and a host of other stakeholders clearly have vital roles to play. But control of the agenda and of who participates in the process, and especially the making of final decisions, cannot be left exclusively to them: there are risks of conflicts of interest, serious disputes over, say, ideological issues, as well as cost considerations all of which establish a vital public interest, and therefore the major role for government, in the outcomes of curriculum reform. Perhaps the most important of these is the effect of reformed curricular on the international reputation of South African higher education qualifications. A high reputation is an extremely significant national asset. Curriculum matters are, of course, not the only determinant of reputation. The nature and performance of the higher education system is the ultimate influence, and intelligent national higher education public policy, informed by an appropriate historical perspective, is a key to success. 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Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Kahn, T. Auditor-General gives NSFAS an F. [Online] Available at: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/education/2024-02-14-auditor-general-gives-nsfas-an-f/#:~:text=The%20office%20of%20the%20auditor,2021%2F22%2C%20its%20worst%20audit [accessed: 5 March 2024]. Mpati, L., Cachalia, A., Johnson, B., & Hanekom, P. 2023. Independent Investigation into UCT Governance. Final Report. Cape Town: UCT Council. Moodie, G. 2016. Universities, Disruptive Technologies, and Continuity in Higher Education. Toronto and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Posner, R. 2009. A Failure of Capitalism. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Price, M. 2023. Statues and Storms. Leading through change. Cape Town: Tafelberg. Rhodes University Business School. 2023. SA should study how Australia exports degrees. Makhanda/Grahamstown: Rhodes University. South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC). 2017. SAHRC Report. Transformation at Public Universities in South Africa. Pretoria: South African Government Printer. Universities Australia. 2020. The importance of universities to Australia's prosperity. Melbourne: Deloitte Access Economics. Universities Australia. 2023. International Education adds $29 Billion to the Economy. [Online] Available at: https://universitiesaustralia.edu.au/media-item/international-education-adds-29-billion-to-the-economy/ [accessed: 5 March 2024]. The Presidency. 2017. Report of Commission of Inquiry into the Feasibility of making Higher Education and Training Fee-free in South Africa (Heher Report). Pretoria: South African Government Printer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2024 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2024 by Dr Klaus Kotzé Abstract “The Constitution belongs to all of us, not just the ruling party, or one section of South Africa. We all wrote this collectively with our blood, some with their lives, with our tears and with our sweat. We claim it as ours, it enshrines the rights that make us live as South Africans, and we will protect it because it belongs to us” (Ramaphosa, 2012). Introduction South African governance is coming under greater criticism for being poor and ineffective. Instead of expounding on its failures, this paper explores the concept of governance in South Africa and proposes preferential pathways whereby improvement can be found. When governance replaced government at the onset of democratic South Africa, it was a corrective measure responding to the preceding order. Thereby pursuing justice and democracy. Today, a similar, corrective approach is required to intervene and set the country on a better path. Unlike the turn to democracy, today the country is endowed with an instructive Constitution. This paper critically explores the concept and process of governance. It undertakes an exploratory dive into the conceptual meaning of governance in South Africa by looking at how contemporary governance has been shaped by local and global power. It also looks at how the enactment of Constitutional supremacy (rule of law) relates to the preceding system of government, or Parliamentary supremacy (rule by law). It then turns to explore the national loadstar, the Constitution, for perception and guidance as to the ideal processes and practices of governing. Of particular interest is the enactment of Constitutional supremacy through the relationships between the state and citizens. From Government to Governance To perceive contemporary governance, it is useful to contrast it to the previous order. Today, instead of living under the dictat of politicians or institutions, it is the Constitution that directs all subjects of the state (both officials and citizens) to be guided by and give expression to its principles and values. The Constitution provides foundational insight and direction as to the ways and ends of democracy. It guides the re-imagining of governance by strategically charging both leaders and citizens with the responsibility to forge constructive relationships. This interaction forms the pathway to successful, responsive and resolute democracy. For South African governance to succeed, this study highlights that the roles of and relationship between the state and its citizens are indispensable. While much can be and has been said about the failures of the state administration, the citizenry too has been inadequate in constructively discharging its Constitutional. It is, therefore, not only that a re-imagining of public leadership is needed, but a re-imagination of active citizenry; a republican ethos. Governance is not a universal concept that is independent of context and history. To discern South African governance, it must be conceptually located. Under the Parliamentary system in place before the non-racial, democratic era, the concept of ‘rule by law’ reigned. It saw to it that the governing authority and its institutions were able to create and execute laws as it saw fit. Rule by law is thus a “method that governments and people in power use to shape the behaviour of people…this usually has the end goal of psychologically or forcefully persuading people to agree with policy decisions they otherwise would not agree with” (Van Norman Law, 2017). The authority and the people are separated by law. Law is applied by power as tools. Power is imposed upon a people. The concept of power is the individual (or institution) wielding such power. Under the rule of law, the counterpart to rule by law, power is abstracted and resides in philosophical and moral concepts. It is not in institutions, but in concepts, captured in principles such as human dignity and equality, where power lies. These are not ineffable concepts but require people to instil and interpret meaning. The abstraction of power sees to it that it belongs to no-one, yet it prevails over everyone in the state – with the law being circumscribed by the physical borders of the state and its obligations under international law. Laws and ethics are thus captured in a public framework, a loadstar such as the national Constitution. Rule of law is thus the great equaliser. Every citizen is subject to the reign of Constitutional principles. Constitutional supremacy is thus where people pursue and enact the Constitutional ideas and values. These ends (human dignity, equality, etc.) determine and justify the ways they are pursued. As the subjects of the Constitutional state, the citizens are accordingly not ruled over by a prescriptive government. Instead, they have the primary (and note merely latent) responsibility to be the exponents of the Constitutional precepts. An effective and capable Constitutional state rests first on its citizens internalising and then executing its value-based arrangement. They have a secondary charge to ensure that the state representatives pursue the Constitutional ends. Under the rule of law, the role of the state is administrative and bureaucratic. Foucault’s use of governmentality to describe the change from order by law to administrative proceduralism is useful. The conduct of conduct, according to Foucault indicates how “the exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcomes” (Foucault, 1982: 789). Governmentality refers to the guidance of behaviour through productive and positive, rather than restrictive means. A more horizontal system whereby citizens engage each other and the institutions. Where citizens willingly give consent and where individuals participate in the process of governance. As such, “governing is an art involving the imaginative application of intuition, knowledge, and skills to administration and management” (Huff, n.d.). In such a system, it is not the administrative state that governs, but the raft of categories and realm of possibilities that citizens are delineated to and provided. We see that governance, from its Greek origin, ‘kybenan’, which means to steer or guide, is premised upon a clear understanding of ends and the pathways towards these ends. The governing role of global power Global power and norms influence the pursuit of the national order. The timing and context of South Africa’s progression to non-racial democracy have played a determining role in shaping domestic governance. A child of the liberal, democratic era, South Africa has been moulded by global power. Its progression to democracy occurred during what is often referred to as the third wave of democracy. During the 1980’s vast swathes of Latin America and the Asia-Pacific became democratic. After the Soviet Union imploded, Eastern Europe and much of sub-Saharan Africa departed from their Soviet-inspired approaches. With the collapse of a guiding alternative, most of the newly democratic states assumed a normative political framework as influenced by Western liberalism. Whereas the liberation movement led by the African National Congress preferred the redistributive mechanisms inspired by the Soviet Union, the globalised Western dogma persuaded it to follow suit. Together with most of the world, South Africa assumed the guiding norms and practices suggested by the Western-led world. It did so to benefit from the privileges of the international order, but also because of the persuasion of predominant norms. In so doing, democratic South Africa commenced from what can be termed: partial sovereignty. Whereas the Constitution has been central to framing procedural governance, the carrot and stick of global dogma played the central guiding role. Partial sovereignty means that South Africa has led by following the models and processes suggested to it (and the world). According to late Stellenbosch University scholar, Sampie Terreblanche, South Africa acquiesced to the “American economic model” of “anti-statism, deregulation, privatisation, fiscal austerity, market fundamentalism and free trade” (Terreblanche, 2018). The concern raised here is not about which policy is better (or worse). Instead, it is about policy independence and the lessons and maturities that stem from critically pursuing policy selection; what today is referred to as finding local solutions for local problems. Sovereignty has traditionally been understood as absolute. A state is either sovereign and thus steers its own polity and policy, or it is not. If true sovereignty cannot be partial, then partial sovereignty is not fully sovereign. Democratic South Africa has largely aligned its administration to the global orthodoxy of good governance. According to the World Bank, good governance refers to “predictable, open and enlightened policymaking” (World Bank, 1994). “Good governance refers to a prescribed set of international characteristics which guide public institutions to behave in a manner that advances (Western) human rights and a liberal, democratic rule of law” (Kotze, 2020). Such a detached, global perception is emblematic of the singular, hegemonic approach to governance. The political affairs of a time sans time, the ‘end of history’: a time when all alternatives collapse into the prevailing and superior (western liberal) model. Again, the purpose is not to criticise any indicator of good governance. It would be unjustifiable to criticise transparency, responsibility, accountability and responsiveness, the good governance attributes identified by the United Nations’ Human Rights Council. Instead, the concern is of an imposed set of perceptions that are normatively charged to be locally internalised. Instead, the basis of any type of ‘good’ governance is always first the local or national condition. The issues and prevalences on the ground. Not an arrogated proposition of (often elitist) perspectives that emerge from foreign realities. For state sovereignty to be full, not partial, the decisions must be guided by domestic realities, perceived through domestic intelligence and operationalised by local interpreters. This, as is slowly emerging, would resemble an enlightened perception. Instead of a preponderance of ideas that are en vogue, a rigorous approach must emerge as to how to strategically deal with domestic realities. When South Africa submitted to the standardised set of international norms it may have joined what was at that point the ‘right side of history’, but it failed the strategic task at hand. To develop an indigenous approach to governance, one which would assertively deal with the national condition as consigned by the separate development which preceded it. When the national strategy of Reconstruction and Development was shelved in favour of a growth-oriented approach, South Africa capitulated to the international zeitgeist. Partial sovereignty, which enacts an assumed or foisted upon guiding protocol, cannot see the forest for the trees. It denies fully exploring and developing a system fit for the national condition. As a plant will not mature when planted in alien territory, so a polity cannot mature when it is interpreting itself through the tools and views of another. Governance is an intimately spatial and operational practice. Not only are its ends determined by culture and history, but its pathways must also accord to domestic perceptions. Approaches emerge locally and must give expression to the local reality. Objectives are pursued within a specific (cultural and historic) realm. Successful governance is that which attends to the desires and needs of the people through actions that principally align to the Constitution. Here, both civil servants and citizens alike are the enabling agents tasked to operationalise the work processes and rules of governmentality. In doing so they implement the categories tasked to them. On the other hand, when either the governing administration or the citizens decline their agency. Or when either assumes external norms, governance fails. Governance: lessons from our COVID experience Understanding emerges when things change. If the transition from government to global-inspired governance presents the first turn from which to draw, the return to rule by law during the COVID-19 pandemic offers another. When President Ramaphosa invoked the Disaster Management Act on 15 March 2020, he paused the sovereignty of principles and claimed power in the Executive. While the Constitution provides for such an exception, the contradiction of both government and governance existing at the same time ensured an uneasy synthesis. One that recalls the concept of partial sovereignty. “The form of authority during South Africa’s Disaster presents a synthesis of both claiming and rejecting power. As the exception exists within the norm, an irreconcilability persists which to Schmitt’s (1996) critique of liberalism is captured as impotency. South Africa’s execution of the Act presents a case of both claiming contingent power while resigning to an overriding perception of authority” (Kotze, 2020). The former is expressed in the drafting and implementation of regulations, the latter arises from the external guidance from global institutions and specialists. Ramaphosa strategically seized upon the occasion to invoke the exception to the guiding ‘norm’ by rhetorically giving expression to the current reality and by inspiring the nation to play their part.  During the period under the Disaster Management Act, the Act became the temporary national loadstar. A mechanism “to guide”, “manage”, “facilitate disaster management capacity building, training and education”; and “to provide key performance indicators in respect of the various aspects of disaster management” (Government Gazette, 2003). Like the singular perceptions emergent after the Cold War prompted South Africa (and others) to follow their logics, the novel nature of the pandemic did the same. South Africa (and others) followed a containment protocol that was charted by (select) global authorities. It is not unexpected or even random that the approach that eventually cascaded ever more dramatically under the equally cascading dependence of data, proposed an approach that sought to contain and control. In China, the state where the virus was first detected, the guiding maxim of power and thus the very expression of culture is control. It is not unlikely, had the virus exploded in northern Europe, for example, that the initial and subsequent approaches and consequences would have been different. With a very long history and an independent cultural ethos, a state like China is sovereign. Its sovereignty comes from its own sense and expression of self. Sovereignty is claimed, never bestowed. It is enacted when a state and the people practice the values and principles of the political myths, usually captured in a loadstar such as the Constitution or in the national plans. In a partially sovereign state where national myths or political mores are not accepted or pursued, governance is equally circumscribed. While novel and epidemiological dimensions to the COVID pandemic did shape its response, the global reach of governance norms that were not emergent from societies that implemented them were apparent. Most states followed a similar pathway. One which was not intrinsic to its national mores. COVID governance illuminated the sovereign tension in South Africa. The government deployed the accompanying rule-by-law fiat afforded to it by the Disaster Management Act. The abnormal response to the abnormal situation saw to it that the South African government used a combat narrative and war-like response. It imposed curfews and limitations of movement. It deployed the South African Defence Force. Security measures were not taken against the virus but to protect the state from people not following the laws. Public and even private life was controlled and disciplined. Though government implemented norms from abroad, it did so by giving expression to the current reality and through the mechanisms that were provided for it in the Constitution. The end of the disaster-induced exception opened a new chapter to South African governance. While the experience of implementing the exception may not directly serve its counterpart, it is conceptually illustrative. As the regulations were created to respond to the situation at hand. As government pursued and prosecuted the regulations after providing the citizens with categories and the realms of possibility. And, as the citizens observed the regulations, becoming good followers of leadership. So too governance measures should be conceptualised and internalised. Responding to the everyday conditions threatening the nation. Re-imagining governance in South Africa To conclude this paper, it will focus on several approaches where governance can give greater expression to the Constitution. The Preamble of the Constitution ‘walks before’ the subsequent text. It guides the signification of the Constitution and how it should be read. The first thing the Preamble does is to nullify the previous order of differentiation. The first words state: “We, the people of South Africa”. Instead of simply being a cursory phrase, this is a powerful expression of being. It unites all in South Africa. Not only as equals under law, but in the responsibility of purpose. The second directive is the building of a transformative society. One where the past is recognised (“Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land; Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country”) and a just and equal society is collectively built (“Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights”) (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). The transformative nature of the Constitution is such that progress is built over time and through the relationship between citizens. One of the goals set in the Preamble is the improvement in the quality of life of citizens. The current administration has admitted that the state has failed in this regard. It has (rhetorically) committed to become effective, so as to improve the lives of citizens. “To achieve any progress”, said President Ramaphosa in his 2023 State of the Nation address, “we need a capable and effective State. Our greatest weaknesses are in state-owned enterprises and local government” (Ramaphosa, 2023). Mathebula (2023) points to state capability being both human and institutional. According to him, “the Constitution settles the duality of where state capability is located by providing that an organ of the state is any state department, administration, institution, or any other functionary in all spheres of government which exercises power or performs a public function in terms of the Constitution or legislation. In terms of this provision, all public servants are as much an organ of the state as the institutions…This means the most significant focus of any capacity-building interventions should be targeted at the bottom of the pyramid of state personnel” (Mathebula, 2023). Mathebula’s interpretation of the state official as the direct representation of government offers an interesting take on subsidiarity. Usually, subsidiarity, the principle that government should be active where it has maximum effect, is interpreted as the citizen’s engagement with local or municipal government. In South Africa subsidiarity is interpreted from Section 156(4) of the Constitution, that the national and provincial government must assign to the municipality the administration of any matter “that would most effectively be administered locally” (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996).  According to De Visser, the “argument is that lower levels of government are closer to the citizen and can therefore make more intelligent decisions on what citizens want” (De Visser, 2010). The governing administration is, therefore, obliged to devolve governance as close as possible to the citizens. Subsidiarity is further “translated into the protection of lower levels of government against undue interference by national government…The argument is that lower levels of government are closer to the citizen and can therefore make more ‘intelligent’ decisions on what the citizens want” (De Visser, 2010). With trust at its core, the principle manifests in the relationship between the citizens and the civil service. If subsidiarity relates to the structure of power relations, servant leadership can be seen as a human and cultural counterpart. Servant leadership refers to a style of leadership (or governance) that builds faith and authority through positive interactions. It lends to a governance approach whereby the official does not only occupy their public office but instead takes responsibility and accountability as they are rooted in a specific community. As a community member, first, the official does not elevate themselves above the community as is often seen, but rather serves as a servant to the people. A return to and re-imagining of Constitutional governance will also allow for a lucid and new interpretation of the batho pele (people first) principles as first proposed in the 1997 White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery. Batho Pele is designed to give expression to the Constitutional ideals. It is described by then President Mandela as “the relentless search for increased efficiency” and the desire to “turn words into action”. It is through turning words into action that perceptions change and the state is experienced as capable. A central problem in governance is the perception of ineptitude, corruption and other ills. Whereas a style of leadership does not directly address faults that require intervention, what it does do is admit where faults are made and seek to return trust and rekindle the relationship between state and citizenry. Servant leadership presents a governance style that contrasts with a self-serving one. By seeking to take responsibility and accountability, the state, through its officials and institutions, addresses the breakdown of trust at its most immediate (and thus persuasive) point, the face-to-face interaction. Servant leadership displays an aspirational style of governance that is found in the desire to recognize and attend to the priorities of others. It is an approach to governance that supports Mathebula’s claim, that the Constitution “should be elevated to be the most crucial document and conceptualization of civic education” (Mathebula, 2023). By returning to the Constitution as the source of guidance, the state and its officials attend to their Constitutional mandate of service delivery. Preferred service delivery, as has previously been mentioned, is not a top-down, but a relational system. Chapter three of the Constitution lays out co-operative governance. Section 41(1) delineates the principles whereby all spheres of government must co-operate with the people. These principles are, therefore, the means and ways whereby government enter into a relationship with the citizenry to transform the society. In such a cooperative democracy, governance takes place by discussion. Deliberation remains a crucial modality of South African democracy. The orations of leaders such as Desmond Tutu played a central role in rejecting the structure of the state under Apartheid and in determining what kind of country South Africa would aspire to become. It was through the extensive inputs from various sectors of society that the Constitutional Assembly process and the final Constitution of 1996 gained legitimacy. To ensure stayed legitimacy, Section 152 requires the participation of citizens and civil society in the governance processes. These should not be mere tick-box exercises but allow for genuine engagement between the government and the people. It is through these exercises that a better understanding develops. So that services are rendered where they are most needed and in an appropriate manner. A cooperative democracy is thus one where the government can work with the people as there is a common understanding and where relations are cultivated through discourse. It is when the communication channels are open, the goals are common and synchronised, and where the state positions itself as an activator or a coordinator. It does so by doing its job. By mobilising society behind its long-term vision through efficient bureaucracy and effective administration. Whereas, the National Development Plan presents a vision, rather than a plan, it does offer a range of approaches towards achieving the Constitutional goals. It encourages South Africans to enact their belonging. To become active stakeholders in the national pursuit. To see their futures linked to the future of the state. To embrace its opportunities and to invest in their different forms of capital; the success of the state is their success. The dividends of such an approach are manifold. Such an entrepreneurial approach would lend to improved governance. The entrepreneurial state is not a foreign concept in South Africa. When South Africa transitioned to democracy in the early 1990s it undertook a largely entrepreneurial approach. Its leaders and citizens cooperatively proposed and then discussed the various means, ways and ends towards democracy. Whereas the novelty of the situation and the variety of actors ensured entrepreneurialism, the same spirit and approach can again be utilized in a goal-oriented pursuit of positive change. As before, dialogue, cooperation and compromise between different sectors of society is imperative. In toto, a new consensus must be brought about through the active engagement of all citizens. The entrepreneurial vision of the early 1990s advanced the Freedom Charter’s call: “the people shall govern”. For governance to be legitimate, the people expressing their will must be central. Through programmes (such as Reconstruction and Development) and visions (such as Batho Pele), the state has taken a people-centred approach. “While noble and just in their orientation, these programmes have centred power inwards into the administration. It has led to delivery dependency” (Kotze, 2022). The phrase, “the people shall govern”, recalls Abraham Lincoln’s famous line that democracy entails “government of the people, for the people, by the people”. The citizens must claim the state as their own. In his piece: “The problem in South Africa is not democracy but a lack of democrats”, Bailie (2022) draws our attention to the need to cultivate strong followership. In the absence of capable and inspirational government, the loadstar to the people, the Constitution must inspire society to be capable. Courageous followership is needed in the form of “the courage to assume responsibility, the courage to serve, the courage to challenge, the courage to participate in transformation and the courage to take moral action” (Bailie, 2022). Each of these dimensions directs citizens to exercise their responsibility as co-creators of a capable state. Through public reasoning, through engaging the public service and through putting the Constitution into action, a new consensus compounds and the nation is built. References Bailie, Craig. 2022. “The problem in South Africa is not democracy but a lack of democrats”. (Online) Available at Mail & Guardian, 25 November. https://mg.co.za/thought-leader/opinion/2022-11-25-the-problem-in-south-africa-is-not-democracy-but-a-lack-of-democrats/ De Visser, Jaap. 2010. “Subsidiarity in the Constitution”. Conference Workshop Cultural Initiative: European Programme for Reconstruction and Development. Foucault, Michel. 1982. “The Subject and Power”. Critical Inquiry 8(4): 777-795. Government Gazette, 2003. Disaster Management Act, Act 57 of 2002, No. 24252, 15 January. Huff, Richard. n.d. “Governmentality”, (Online) Available at Britanica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/governmentality). Kotzé, Klaus. 2020. “Responding to COVID-19: Emergency Laws and the Return to Government in South Africa”. Javnost: The Public. Kotzé, Klaus. 2022. “A people-driven state is required for national renewal”. (Online) Available at Mail & Guardian, 27 October. https://mg.co.za/thought-leader/opinion/2022-10-27-a-people-driven-state-is-required-for-national-renewal/ Mathebula, Lucky. 2023. “(Re)building a capable state is possible. Here’s what it will require”. Sunday Times, 8 October. Ramaphosa, Cyril. 2012. “Conversation on the Constitution”. Nelson Mandela Foundation. Ramaphosa, Cyril. 2023. “President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2023 State of the Nation Address”. (Online) Available at South African Government, 9 February. https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2023-state-nation-address-9-feb-2023-0000 Terreblanche, Sampie. 2018. “The Co-Optation of the African National Congress: South Africa’s Original ‘State Capture’”. (Online) Available at Pambazuka News, 25 January. https://www.pambazuka.org/node/98467 The World Bank. 1994. Governance: The World Bank’s Experience. Washington, DC: The World Bank. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Van Norman Law. 2017. “Rule of Law vs Rule by Law”. Online at Van Norman Law. https://vannormanlaw.com/rule-law-vs-rule-law/#:~:text=The%20Rule%20of%20Law%20is,equal%20under%20the%20law%20itself - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On the 8th of May 2024, Daryl Swanepoel, the CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, spoke at an event hosted by the non-profit organization My Vote Counts. The event, titled "Democracy: Creating Accountable and Transparent Politics," brought together influential figures from across South African civil society to engage in a critical dialogue about the role of political funding in the country's electoral process. Swanepoel shed light on the pressing issues surrounding transparency and accountability in South African politics, drawing on his extensive expertise and experience in navigating the complex web of political financing. With a keen understanding of the challenges facing South African democracy, Swanepoel delved into the importance of establishing robust systems that ensure the integrity of the electoral system. He highlighted the need for stricter regulations and enhanced disclosure requirements, emphasizing that the public deserves to know the sources and allocation of funds that shape the political landscape. Swanepoel underscored the critical linkage between transparent political financing and the fundamental principles of a healthy democracy, where citizens can make informed decisions and hold their representatives accountable. He also emphasized the need for sufficient public funding, saying that international best practice shows that where there are high disclosure requirements, there tend to be higher public funding, and where there are lower disclosure requirements, there tend to be lower public funding. In South Africa, disclosure requirements were mad stricter, without concomitantly increasing public funding. Click here to read the speech by Daryl Swanepoel - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. 13 SEPTEMBER 2022 Prof Geo Quinot Department of Public Law, Stellenbosch University 1. In New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa [2020] ZACC 11, (“New Nation Movement”), the Constitutional Court held that the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 (“the Act”) was unconstitutional to the extent that it did not provide for individuals to contest elections for membership of the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures independently from political parties. The Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for 24 months to allow Parliament to remedy the defect (the Court subsequently extended the suspension until 10 December 2022). 2. In response to New Nation Movement, Parliament is currently considering the Electoral Amendment Bill (B1-2022) as the means to cure the defects in the Act. On 2 September 2022, the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs called for further public comments on material revisions of the Bill (B1A-2022) (“the Bill”). 3. Several civil society organisations, including the Inclusive Society Institute, have raised concerns regarding the constitutionality of the Bill. This analysis is aimed at considering various aspects of the Bill, in the form put forward for public comment on 2 September 2022, from a constitutional perspective, focusing specifically on those aspects that may be constitutionally suspect. BARRIERS TO ENTRY 4. Section 31B of the Bill sets out the requirements for an independent candidate to contest elections. These include, in section 31B(3)(a), the requirement of nomination requiring an independent candidate to submit “the names, identity numbers and signatures of voters whose names appear on the segment of the voters’ roll for that region or province in which the candidate is standing for election and who support his or her candidature, totalling at least thirty percent of the quota for a seat that was required for a seat in the previous comparable election”. This requirement is analogous to (but not the same as) the requirement in the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996, section 15(3), read with section 26 of the Act. In terms of the latter, a party may only contest elections if it is registered as set out in section 15 of the Electoral Commission Act. This includes a requirement, in section 15(3)(a), that the application for registration be accompanied by “that party’s deed of foundation which … has been signed by the prescribed number of persons who are qualified voters”. 5. The Act and the Bill thus place a limitation on both independent candidates and parties to contest elections in the form of proof of support by a set number of voters. There are, however, important differences between this support limitation as applied to independent candidates and parties respectively. 5.1. In the case of independent candidates, such limitation on contesting elections is more direct in that a party only has to submit such proof of support once when registering as a party and not in each instance that it wishes to contest elections, whereas an independent candidate must submit such proof each and every time they intend to contest an election, regardless of whether the candidate has previously been elected to a seat in the chamber to which the election pertains. 5.2. There is a material difference in the number of voters that must indicate support for independent candidates and parties respectively. In terms of the Regulations for the Registration of Political Parties (GNR.13 of 7 January 2004, as amended), promulgated under the Electoral Commission Act, regulation 3, a party must submit a list of 1000 signatures for registration nationally, 500 signatures for registration in a particular province and 300 signatures for registration in a particular district or metropolitan municipality. In contrast, the Bill sets the number of signatures required by an independent candidate at 30% of the quota for a seat that was required for a seat in the previous comparable election, regardless of what chamber the candidate is contesting for. The exact number of signatures required by independent candidates will thus differ from time to time and between chambers, but will in most instances be significantly more than the set numbers required for parties. For example, in the 2019 national elections, the number of votes required to secure a seat in the National Assembly was approximately between 30 000 and 40 000. On a very basic calculation, this implies that, on the approach adopted in the Bill, an independent candidate will require upwards of 10 000 signatures in support to contest an election for the National Assembly. There is thus more than a tenfold difference in the support requirement as applied to parties and independent candidates respectively. 6. The support limitation raises multiple constitutional concerns. 6.1. Firstly, the limitation imposed by the support requirement is questionable in light of the Constitutional Court’s remarks in New Nation Movement regarding the wording of section 19(3)(b) of the Constitution. The Court interpreted the section as conferring a right on individuals to stand for public office, only limited by the requirement that such individuals must be adults and South African citizens. That is, any additional limitations on an adult citizen to stand for public office, would fall foul of section 19(3)(b) and will only be justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. Throughout his majority judgment in New Nation Movement, Jafta J emphasises the lack of further limitations on the section 19(3)(b) right, for example: “[154] The drafters of our Constitution were quite alive to the fact that one cannot vote unless there is someone she can vote for. In their wisdom they added to the mix the right to contest elections and the right to hold office. The latter right depends on winning the election contest. However, it is significant to note that in plain language, section 19(3) reserves the right to stand for public office which entails contesting elections for adult South Africans. It is them only, who are entitled to be voted into public office. And the words “every adult citizen” at the opening of section 19(3) demonstrate that each adult South African is the bearer of the right to stand for public office and if elected, to hold the office she stood for. This construction is consistent with the language of the provision, which is framed in inclusive terms to prevent the exclusion of some South Africans from exercising those rights as it happened during the apartheid era. This interpretation is also in alignment with international law. It will be recalled that the ICCPR provides that every citizen shall have the right to vote and be elected by secret ballot” (emphasis added). “[158] … Section 19(3)(b) entitles every adult South African who wishes to do so, to contest elections and if elected to hold public office.” “[160] … In unequivocal terms, section 19(3)(b) confers upon every adult South African the right ‘to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office’. Whilst Parliament has the power to pass legislation that regulates the exercise of the right, it cannot enact legislation that prevents the exercise of the right.” “[171] … Without contesting elections, it is impossible for any adult citizen to exercise the right to stand for and hold public office if elected.” There can be little doubt that the support requirement for contesting elections imposes a significant limitation on adult citizen’s right under section 19(3)(b), which reminds one starkly of limitations of a bygone era, such as property-holding criteria that were still prevalent during the earlier parts of the previous century. 6.2. The second problem with the support requirement is the differentiated manner in which it is applied to parties compared to independent candidates. This differentiation, as noted in para 5 above, lies both in the repeated nature of the requirement resting on independent candidates versus the once-off requirement for parties and the material difference in the number of signatures required. This differentiation can be viewed as denying independent candidates equal enjoyment of the political rights in section 19 of the Constitution. Since the choice to contest an election, i.e. exercise the section 19(3)(b) right, as an independent candidate, rather than through a political party, is closely linked to freedom of association in section 18 and freedom of conscience in section 15 of the Constitution as well as a person’s dignity, as set out by Madlanga J in his majority judgment in New Nation Movement, the differentiation imposed by the support requirement can be viewed as unfair discrimination under section 9 of the Constitution given that the grounds of differentiation are conscience, which is a listed ground in section 9(3) causing differentiation on that ground to be presumed unfair discrimination, political association and that the differentiation impedes a person’s dignity. The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 supports the latter point in that it defines discrimination as “any act … including a … law, rule, practice, condition … which … imposes burdens … on, or withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from any person on one or more of the prohibited grounds” and defines “prohibited grounds” as including any “ground … where discrimination based on that … ground … undermines human dignity”. 7. In its current form in the Bill, it is highly questionable whether the requirement that independent candidates must submit a list of signatures from voters equalling 30% of the quota required to fill the contested seat in the previous election, prior to them being allowed to contest the election, will pass constitutional muster. 8. It is proposed that the provision in section 31B(3)(a) pertaining to the list of signatures to be submitted by independent candidates, either be, 8.1. removed in its entirety; or 8.2. replaced by a requirement identical to that placed on political parties in section 15(3)(a) of the Electoral Commission Act, read with regulation 3 of the Regulations for the Registration of Political Parties (GNR.13 of 7 January 2004, as amended), namely that an independent candidate should only be required to submit a list of supporting voter signatures once and in the same number as that applied to parties. ALLOCATION OF SEATS 9. Schedule 1A in the Bill sets out how seats will be allocated to independent candidates and parties contesting elections for the National Assembly respectively. A fundamental difference between independent candidates and parties in the way that National Assembly seats are allocated is that independent candidates only compete for half of the seats (so-called “regional seats”). A region, in effect, refers to a province. Political parties, in contrast, compete for regional seats as well as the other half of the seats (so-called “compensatory seats”). Compensatory seats are thus filled exclusively by political parties. Parties must submit fixed lists of nominated candidates for both regional and compensatory seats. A candidate may be nominated by a political party on both regional and compensatory seat lists, but the combined total of candidates on the regional and compensatory seat lists may not exceed the total number of seats. 10. Another material difference between allocation of seats to parties and independent candidates relates to calculation of votes across regions (provinces). An independent candidate can only win a seat within a particular region/province, based on the total number of votes cast in favour of that candidate within that region/province. Any votes cast for the candidate in another region/province is in effect forfeited by that candidate. That is, such votes are not taken into account in determining whether the candidate is allocated a seat. In contrast, when the total number of seats allocated to a political party is calculated, the aggregate of all votes cast for that party across all regions/provinces is used to determine the party’s total number of allocated seats, in the form of the combined regional and compensatory seats. Political parties thus benefit from votes cast across regions/provinces, whereas independent candidates do not. 11. Viewed from an individual candidate’s perspective, there is accordingly a material difference between the exercise of their section 19(3)(b) right based on whether they contest the election as an independent candidate rather than a nominee of a political party. That is, the right to hold office, if elected, differs in content materially in a given election between independent and party nominated candidates. That difference lies in the content of the phrase ‘if elected’ as set out in the Bill and discussed in paras 9 and 10 above. Simply put, the number of votes required to be elected differs materially between the two categories of candidates. 12. While viewed separately, it can probably be argued that the manner of allocating seats to independent candidates and political parties respectively in the Bill will not fall foul of section 19(3)(b) of the Constitution, the differentiation between the two categories raises constitutional concerns. Along the same lines as argued in para 6.2 above in respect of the support requirement, the differentiation between types of candidates in how seats are allocated will quite likely fall foul of section 9 of the Constitution. An aggravating factor is the fact that the Bill does not adopt a similar approach in the allocation of seats in provincial legislatures. For those seats, the different types of candidates are treated the same in the allocation calculation. That raises serious doubts as to the justifiability of the differentiation in allocating seats in the National Assembly. 13. It is recommended that the division of National Assembly seats in regional seats and compensatory seats be removed from the Bill and that the allocation of all seats in the National Assembly be done on an equal basis between independent candidates and political parties, along the same lines as that for provincial legislatures. 14. The combined effect of the proposed rules in the Bill that an independent candidate may contest an election for a seat in the National Assembly in more than one region, but may not aggregate the votes received across regions in order to be allocated a seat, calls into question whether the system created in the Bill amounts to an electoral system that “results, in general, in proportional representation” as required by section 46(1)(d) of the Constitution. The effect of these two rules in the Bill, read together, is that there may be significant distortion between the votes cast nationally and the allocation of seats. The representation in the National Assembly may thus not be, in general, proportional to the votes cast, given the potentially large number of votes that are discarded in the process of seat allocation. 15. This problem may be addressed by either restricting the participation of independent candidates to one region, as is the case for party nominated candidates, or allowing independent candidates to aggregate votes across regions in the allocation of seats. END - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Click here to go back Chapter 5: Findings This Chapter is dedicated to the findings of the interviews conducted with party-funding experts from political parties, party-aligned foundations and/or electoral commissions in the countries evaluated in this study. The findings are in relation to the answers provided to the questions posed in terms of the questionnaire as outlined in the preceding Chapter, which is aimed at gaining an understanding of the various dimensions of party funding in said jurisdictions. 5.1 The public party-funding regime of Germany Party funding from the public purse in Germany has two dimensions. On the one hand, public funds are transferred directly to parties, be it to the party entities themselves or to support their representatives in the legislatures. On the other hand, significant public funds are transferred to party-aligned foundations. 5.1.1 Public funding of German political parties 5.1.1.1 Restrictions of private donations to political parties Whilst there is no upper limit as to what an individual or entity may donate to a political party, the donation has to be declared to the President of the Bundestag if it exceeds €50,000 in a particular year, and if it exceeds €10,000 in a particular year, it needs to be published in the party’s financial statements (Nietan, 2022). The limits are aggregated from across the whole country, all levels of government and all structures of the party (Öhm, 2022). That said, there are a number of legal restrictions conclusively articulated in Article 25 of the Political Parties Act. The restrictions are that: Donations of more than €1,000 in cash may not be accepted. The acceptance of donations from political foundations, corporations, associations of persons and estates which, according to the statutes, the foundation business or the other constitution and according to the actual management, exclusively and directly serve charitable, benevolent or ecclesiastical purposes (sections 51 to 68 of the Tax Code) is inadmissible. Excluded from the right of political parties to accept donations are also donations from parliamentary parties and groups and from parliamentary groups of municipal councils (local assemblies). The acceptance of donations from outside the area of application of this law, that is, outside the Federal Republic, is also inadmissible unless: the donations are from the assets of a German within the meaning of the Basic Law, of a citizen of the European Union or of a business enterprise, of which more than 50 per cent of the shares are owned by Germans within the meaning of the Basic Law, or by a citizen of the European Union, or whose head office is in a member state of the European Union the donation is from a person from national minorities in their ancestral homeland, which are made to them from states bordering the Federal Republic of Germany and in which members of their ethnicity live the donation made by a foreigner does not exceed €1,000. (Nietan, 2022) Furthermore, donations from the following sources are inadmissible: Donations made to professional associations with the understanding that they will be passed on to a political party Donations from companies that are wholly or partly owned, managed or operated by the public sector, if the direct participation of the public sector exceeds 25 per cent Individual donations exceeding €500 where the donors cannot be identified, or if it is recognisable that the donation is being forwarded from an unnamed third party Donations granted to the party in expectation of, or in return for, a certain economic or political advantage Donations raised by a third party in return for a fee to be paid by the party which exceeds 25 per cent of the value of the raised donation. (Nietan, 2022) 5.1.1.2 The various forms of public funding that German parties are entitled to Direct party funding The party is entitled to partial state funding. This is governed by Article 18, Part G. According to this provision, parties receive funds as partial financing of the activities generally incumbent upon them under the Basic Law. The benchmarks for the distribution of state funds are the success a party achieves with voters in European, federal (Bundestag) and state (Landtag) elections, the total amount of its membership dues and mandate holder contributions, and the volume of donations from individuals it received. In 2020, all parties together received a total amount of €197,482,200 (Nietan, 2022). Directly to elected representatives in addition to salaries The elected representative, for example, a member of the Bundestag, is entitled to "compensation”. This is governed by Section 48(3) of the Law on the Legal Relationships of Members of the German Bundestag (Members of Parliament – AbgG). According to this, members of Parliament are entitled to appropriate compensation that guarantees their independence. The amount of the compensation must correspond to the significance of the MP's special office and the responsibility and burden associated with it. In addition, it must also take into account the rank accorded to the mandate in the constitutional structure (Nietan, 2022). The compensation paid to members of Parliament amounts to €10,323.29 per month. A tax-free expense allowance is added to the compensation as part of the so-called official allowance. This lump sum is adjusted annually on 1 January to the cost of living and is currently €4,583.39 per month. They can also claim business travel expenses as well as associated expenses (Nietan, 2022). Furthermore, members of the Bundestag receive employee allowances amounting to €23,205 per month (Nietan, 2022). In 2020, all members of the Bundestag together received a total amount of €475,026,000, inclusive of their salaries and personal allowances. The amount in addition to their salaries and allowances – that is, the allowance to enable them to employ staff to assist them – amounted to €166,519,080 for 2022. This is calculated by taking the number of members of Parliament, which is currently 598 (Deutscher Bundestag, N.d.), multiplied by the monthly allowance (€23,205), multiplied by twelve to calculate the annual total. To the parliamentary groups in the Parliament The parliamentary groups in Parliament are entitled to cash and non-cash benefits. This is governed by Section 50 of the Parliamentary Groups Act (AbgG). According to this Act, parliamentary groups are entitled to cash and non-cash benefits from the federal budget in order to fulfil their duties. The specific amount of money made available for the financing of parliamentary groups in the federal budget thus results exclusively from the federal budget. In 2020, all parliamentary groups in the Bundestag together received a total amount of €119,369,000 (Nietan, 2022). Reimbursement for election expenses There is no direct claim for reimbursement of election expenses (Nietan, 2022). Other public funding Apart from partial state funding according to Section 18 of Part G, parties are generally not directly entitled to other forms of public funding (Nietan, 2022). 5.1.1.3 Incentives to encourage individuals/corporates to make donations to political parties In terms of Article 34(g) of the Income Tax Act, donations to political parties are deductible from taxable income up to a total of €3,300 for singles, and up to €6,600 for married couples (Nietan, 2022). Furthermore, individuals may deduct fifty percent of their party membership contributions from their taxable income (Öhm, 2022). 5.1.1.4 Indirect public funding During election campaigns, political parties may run election advertising on public television and radio, free of charge. Private stations may only charge parties at cost price (Nietan, 2022). In terms of Section 68 of the Interstate Media Treaty, parties must be granted appropriate broadcasting time during elections for the German Bundestag. In return, they are reimbursed for their prime costs when at least one state list has been approved for them. Furthermore, parties and other political associations shall be entitled to appropriate broadcasting time during their participation in the elections of members from the Federal Republic of Germany for the European Parliament, in return for reimbursement of the cost price, if at least one election proposal has been approved for them (Nietan, 2022). Section 11 of the Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) State Treaty (ZDF-StV) stipulates that parties may run election advertising free of charge on the stations of ZDF during election campaigns. The same is regulated for the stations of the First German Television (ARD) in the state broadcasting laws (Nietan, 2022). It is difficult to objectively determine the value of such free and subsidised media (Nietan, 2022). 5.1.1.5 Private versus public funding of political parties ratio According to Nietan (2022), private funding, which includes membership fees and contributions from trade unions, forms the bulk of the parties’ funding, but public funding is also a significant portion of funding for the parties. 5.1.1.6 Quantifiable public funding to support political parties The public funding for the political parties at a national level in Germany for 2022 amounted to at least €483,4 million, made up as follows: (Nietan, 2022) The above calculation is conservative, in that, in addition to the aforementioned, needs to be added the indirect support to parties, for example, the free and subsidised media advertising during campaigns, which is significant, but difficult to objectively estimate. 5.1.2 Funding to party-aligned political foundations In addition to the public funding of political parties, the democratic dispensation of Germany is strengthened through the public funding of party-aligned political foundations. The purpose of the funding is to promote the development of plurality of political participation in the democratic dispensation (Öhm, 2022). At the federal level, each party that has been represented in the Bundestag for at least two periods, is entitled to nominate a political foundation to receive public funding, which is determined and administered by the Bundestag. It forms part of the national budget and appears as line items in various ministries. Funds are allocated to the various foundations on the basis of the proportional strength in the Bundestag of their ideologically aligned political parties. The core funding of the politically aligned foundations is included in the budget of the Ministry of the Interior, whilst further project funding is included in the budgets of the Ministries of Economic Cooperation and Development, Education and Research, and Foreign Affairs (Öhm, 2022). Political foundations may use the funding for: Civic education Scholarships Hosting of party archives Research International cooperation Whilst the use of the funds is quite flexible, it must fit within the parameters of the Bundestag’s special provisions for the funding of political foundations and may not be used for party campaigning. Furthermore, whilst political representatives may not participate in their political party capacity, they may do so as experts in the activities of the foundations, but they need to maintain a strict arm’s length three months prior to an election, during which period they may not cooperate with political parties in any form or manner. Furthermore, they may not directly fund any foreign political party or trade union (Öhm, 2022). That said, there are significant benefits for political parties and the democratic dispensation as a whole. Parties benefit in that the foundations serve as think-tanks that develop ideas, policies and legislative proposals from their own ideological point of view, provide civic education and training in which party members and public representatives may participate as active citizens, and they create ideology-linked international networks, all of which would have fallen to the parties in the absence of such foundations. And as already stated, the democratic dispensation is strengthened through the promotion of democratic pluralism (Öhm, 2022). The public funding for the political foundations in Germany for 2022 amounted to €451 million, made up as follows: *Conservative estimate. Allocation is in fact higher, but also includes allocations to non-political organisations. (Öhm, 2022) 5.1.3 Germany–South Africa Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 5.1.3.1 PPP in relation to direct public funding to political parties The equivalent purchasing power of €483,400,000 allocated to the German political parties at a USD 2021 PPP factor of 0.741488 (OECD, N.d.) equates to USD 651,932,331. In turn, at a USD:ZAR 2021 purchasing power parity factor of 7.168097 (OECD, N.d.) it equates to R4,673,114,184. (Allocation in German euro ÷ DEU:USD PPP factor) x USD:ZAR PPP factor That is: (€483,400,000 ÷ 0.741488) x 7.168097 651,932,331 x 7.168097 = ZAR 4,673,114,184 5.1.3.2 PPP in relation to funding to politically aligned foundations The equivalent purchasing power of €451 million allocated to the German political party aligned foundations at a USD 2021 PPP factor of 0.741488 equates to USD 608,236,411. In turn, at a USD:ZAR 2021 purchasing power parity factor of 7.168097 (OECD, N.d.) it equates to R4,359,897,594. (Allocation in German euro ÷ DEU:USD PPP factor) x USD:ZAR PPP factor That is: (€451,000,000 ÷ 0.741488) x 7.168097 608,236,411 x 7.168097 = ZAR 4,359,897,594 5.1.3.3 PPP in relation to the funding of the German party-political dispensation as a whole The combined value of public funds allocated directly to political parties and to politically aligned foundations in Germany currently amounts to €934,4 million per annum. At South African PPP, it amounts to around R9,033,011,778. 5.1.3.4 Public annual-spend per person on political parties and foundations Given that the German population older than 15 years – the age at which political awareness starts manifesting – as of 2021 was around 72,390,000 million people, (Statista, 2022b), it means that the public purse funds political parties at the national level and their politically aligned foundations to an amount of around R125 per person per annum. That is around R65 per person to the political parties and around R60 per person per annum to the political foundations. These figures are derived through the simple calculation of dividing the total spends from the public purse at South African PPP by the total population of Germany. 5.2 The public party-funding regime of Sweden Party funding in Sweden also has two dimensions. The first being funding directly to the party, and the second to party-aligned foundations. 5.2.1 Public funding of Swedish political parties 5.2.1.1 Restrictions of donations to political parties There are no restrictions on private funding to political parties in Sweden, except for the fact that donations may not be made anonymously. Any donation to a political party needs to be declared and the party, in turn, has to declare such donation to the authorities (Jonsson, 2022). 5.2.1.2 The various forms of public funding that Swedish political parties are entitled to In terms of public funding, all monies go directly to the party, either to the party headquarters or to the party groups within the Parliament. The total amount of this direct public funding contribution to the political parties in Sweden amounts to around SEK 400 million (Jonsson, 2022). In terms of determining the allocations to the various parties, around twenty-five percent of the total allocation is allocated equally to the parties represented in the national Parliament, whilst the remaining seventy-five percent is allocated proportionally based on the parties’ percentage share of the total number of MPs in the national Parliament (Jonsson, 2022). No public funding is made available to Members of Parliament (MPs) to, for example, assist them in running constituency offices, or to support their constituency work. The rationale for this, is that in Sweden voters vote for parties on a proportional representation basis and not on a constituency basis. Of course, parties are free to make allocations to MPs to set up offices and organise constituency activities. In such event, however, the allocation is made out of the party resources and does not constitute an additional allocation from the state (Jonsson, 2022). The only other source of public funding to the political parties is a limited contribution towards defraying election expenses, which elections are normally held every four years. In total, this amounts to around only SEK10 million (Jonsson, 2022). The Swedish public funding of political parties is therefore a very simple system, which they consider important to ensure transparency as to the amount of public funds being channelled to political parties. Since there is a single identifiable source, there is no ambiguity or need to research and compile a list of contributions from a multitude of state entities (Jonsson, 2022). 5.2.1.3 Incentives to encourage individuals/corporations to make donations to political parties Entities making donations to political parties in Sweden may, in terms of the party-funding legislation, make the donations without being subjected to paying donations tax. On the flipside, political parties need also not pay donations tax on donations received from any entity (Jonsson, 2022). 5.2.1.4 Indirect public funding Given the simplicity of the Swedish public funding system, there are no sources of indirect public funding. For example, no free time is given on the public broadcaster platforms. If parties wish to advertise, they will pay normal commercial rates. This does, however, not preclude broadcasters to host normal actuality and news programmes in which political parties are free to participate (Jonsson, 2022). 5.2.1.5 Private funding versus public funding of political parties ratio Generally speaking, ninety percent of party funding comprises public funding, and only ten percent comprises private funding. There are two exceptions, namely the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Centre Party. The SDP receives considerable funding from dividends they receive from companies that they own, including a major lottery company. And the Centre Party receives income from their capital investments. Some years ago, they sold newspaper companies that they owned, from which sale they generated considerable income, which they converted into capital investments (Jonsson, 2022). The SDP receives around twenty-nine percent of their income from their company investments and around only one percent from private individuals and/or entities, and seventy percent from public funding. The Centre Party also receives around seventy percent from public funding and around thirty percent from their capital investments (Jonsson, 2022). The SDP also receives some contributions from the trade unions, which in the last year amounted to some SEK 8 million (Jonsson, 2022). Thus, in summary, the bulk of party funding to political parties in Sweden is public funding, without which, parties would not be able to function effectively. 5.2.1.6 Quantifiable funding to support political parties The public funding for the political parties at a national level in Sweden for 2022 amounted to at least SEK 400 million. In addition to the aforementioned, is a limited amount of around SEK 10 million as a contribution towards off-setting election expenses, held every four years. Thus, over a four-year period it would amount to around SEK 2,5 million. For the purposes of this study, given the limited nature of the income, it is not taken into consideration when undertaking the comparative study. 5.2.2 Funding to party-aligned political foundations As in Germany, Sweden also has politically aligned foundations. But in contrast to the German foundations, who have both a domestic and international focus, in Sweden they are tasked with mainly international solidarity and advocacy. They play a very limited role in Swedish politics and policy development. They work globally for democracy, human rights, peace and social justice, and support sister parties and organisations in official development assistance (ODA) countries (Sundström, 2022). Unlike Germany, there is no annual funding mechanism for the foundations. The Swedish foundations apply to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) for project funding and for the funding of communication activities (Sundström, 2022). 5.2.2.1 Quantifiable funding to support political foundations Whilst funding varies from year to year, the total amount of funding is in the region of SEK 100 million (Sundström, 2022). 5.2.3 Sweden–South Africa Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 5.2.3.1 PPP in relation to direct public funding to political parties The equivalent purchasing power of SEK 400 million allocated to the Swedish political parties at a USD 2021 PPP factor of 8.708853 (OECD, N.d.) equates to USD 45,930,273. In turn, at a USD:ZAR 2021 purchasing power parity factor of 7.168097 (OECD, N.d.) it equates to R329,232,656. (Allocation in Swedish krona ÷ SEK:USD PPP factor) x USD:ZAR PPP factor That is: (SEK 400,000,000 ÷ 8.708853) x 7.168097 45,930,273 x 7.168097 = ZAR 329,232,656 5.2.3.2 PPP in relation to funding to politically aligned foundations The equivalent purchasing power of SEK 100 million allocated to the Swedish political party aligned foundations at a USD 2021 PPP factor of 8.708853 equates to USD 11,482,568. In turn, at a USD:ZAR 2021 purchasing power parity factor of 7.168097 (OECD, N.d.) it equates to R82,308,164. (Allocation in Swedish krona ÷ SEK:USD PPP factor) x USD:ZAR PPP factor That is: (SEK 100,000,000 ÷ 8.708853) x 7.168097 11,482,568 x 7.168097 = ZAR 82,308,164 5.2.3.3 PPP in relation to the funding of the Swedish party-political dispensation as a whole The combined value of public funds allocated directly to political parties and to politically aligned foundations in Sweden currently amounts to SEK 500 million per annum. At South African PPP it amounts to around R411,540,820. 5.2.3.4 Public annual-spend per person on political parties and foundations Given that the Swedish population as of 2021 was 10,517,669 (Statista, 2022c), of which 8,589,000 are older than fifteen (Statista, 2022c), it means that the public purse funds political parties at the national level and their politically aligned foundations to an amount of around R48 per person per annum. That is, around R38 per person to the political parties and around R10 per person per annum to the political foundations. These figures are derived through the simple calculation of dividing the total spends from the public purse at South African PPP by the total population of Sweden. 5.3 The public party-funding regime of the Netherlands 5.3.1 Public funding of Swedish political parties 5.3.1.1 Restrictions of donations to political parties A new law called the “Financing of Political Parties Act” processed by the Ministry of the Interior came into effect on 1 January 2023. The new law has stricter provisions in terms of transparency measures but will not impact the quantum of public funding to the political parties materially (Bartelsman, 2022). In the Netherlands system there is a lot of focus on transparency. Any private donation exceeding €4,500 has to be registered with the Kiesraad. As from 1 January 2023 this has been reduced to €1000. The Kiesraad then publish the list of donations annually online. For natural persons the name and city and amount are published, but for entities the name of the entity, the full address and amount is published (Bartelsman, 2022). There is a limit with regard to anonymous donations. Currently, no anonymous donation exceeding €1,000 may be accepted. Should an anonymous donation be received that exceeds €1000, the amount exceeding €1000 has to be transferred by the party to the Ministry of the Interior. This has been reduced to €250 as from 1 January 2023 (Bartelsman, 2022). With effect from 1 January 2023, the upper threshold limit for donations from any person or entity is €100,000 per annum (Bartelsman, 2022). Any donation above €10,000 has to be registered with the Ministry of the Interior within three working days of its receipt (Bartelsman, 2022). And as from 1 January 2023 no donation may be received from outside of the Netherlands, except from Dutch citizens living abroad. In other words, only Dutch citizens and/or entities may make donations to the political parties registered in the Netherlands (Bartelsman, 2022). 5.3.1.2 The various forms of public funding that the Netherlands political parties are entitled to An annual subsidy, adjusted annually for inflation, is made available to political parties that have at least one member elected to either the Upper or Lower House of Parliament; and the party needs to have a registered party membership of at least 1000. The quantum per party is determined based on three criteria: There is a base amount that is divided equally between qualifying parties. The current basic grant is €316,823 per annum per party, with one or more seats in either the House of Representatives or the Senate. An additional amount is divided pro rata amongst the parties based on the number of representatives in Parliament. They receive €93,574 per annum per seat that a political party has. And yet a further amount that is divided pro rata based on the number of registered party members – “For each member a political party has, they receive an amount that equals €3,412,190 divided by the total number of members of all parties”. With the new law that has come into effect in January 2023, the aforementioned amounts have been reduced to €263,823 for the basic grant, €80,694 per seat and €2,966,317 for the membership subsidy (Bartelsman, 2022). The total quantum of the subsidy, inclusive of the core funding and the funding to the institutes/youth formations, currently amounts to €27,646,000 million per annum in total (Bartelsman, 2022). The aforementioned funding is paid over directly to the political parties. In addition, there is funding made available to the groups within Parliament, for which an amount of €41,649,000 is set aside by the Parliament. This is intended to fund the work of the parties’ elected representatives to carry out their parliamentary duties in Parliament (Bartelsman, 2022). There are no election spending caps for political parties in the Netherlands (Bartelsman, 2022). 5.3.1.3 Incentives to encourage individuals/corporations to make donations to political parties There are incentives made available to individuals and entities, provided that the parties are registered as public benefit foundations. Parties are free to decide if they want this status or not. In such case, donations may be deducted from one’s income taxes (Bartelsman, 2022). 5.3.1.4 Indirect public funding Free advertising slots are made available on the public broadcasters, not only during election periods, but throughout the political parties’ term of office. The number of slots is divided equally amongst all parties, but the order of running the adverts is determined through the drawing of lots (Bartelsman, 2022). The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science decides on what the total amount of hours to be dedicated for these purposes will be. Additional hours are made available during election campaigns for the House of Representatives and the European Union. For 2022, 53 hours and 50 minutes were made available for radio broadcasts and 12 hours and 45 minutes for television broadcasts. In addition to the 12 hours and 45 minutes on television, there is a further 12 hours and 45 minutes set aside for recurring broadcasts. During elections, each participating party is assigned 20 minutes of radio broadcasts and 18 minutes of television broadcasts. There is no reimbursement for election expenses (Bartelsman, 2022). 5.3.1.5 Private funding versus public funding of political parties ratio The exact split is not readily available, but in a 2014 exercise conducted by the Kiesraad to determine the dependency of political parties on public funding, the ratio was found to be around 35:65 percent public to private funding. This has changed over time. It is now estimated that the ratio is around 50:50, and with the rules becoming more stringent, it is anticipated that the parties will trend towards a higher reliance on public funding (Bartelsman, 2022). 5.3.1.6 Quantifiable funding to support political parties The public funding for the political parties at a national level in the Netherlands for 2022 amounted to at least €69,295 million, made up as follows: 5.3.2 Public funding to political foundations The Netherlands believe that in a democracy it is important for political parties to gain new members (through their youth organisations), and to develop their policies (through their political science institutes). It is also deemed important, due to globalisation, to maintain and build connections with likeminded political parties in other countries. Thus, public funds are allocated to institutes established by the parties for these purposes (Bartelsman, 2022). The political party itself submits a request for public funding to the Democracy Department of the Ministry of the Interior. As part of their application, they would have to indicate whether or not they have a youth organisation, political science institute and/or an institute for international activities. Should they fulfil the admissibility criteria for these institutions, the money will be given to the political party itself, which then has to give it to respective institutions. This money cannot be used by the political party for other means. These funds are included in the €27,646,000 alluded to in paragraph 5.3.1.2. above. The following amounts are currently allocated: Each party with a political science institute receives a basic grant of €136,262 and an additional amount of €14,006 per seat. Each party with a youth organisation receives an amount per seat that equals €546,224 divided by the total number of seats of the parties with a youth organisation. They also receive an amount for each member of the youth organisation that equals €546,224 divided by the total amount of members of youth organisations. But a youth organisation needs to have at least 100 members between the ages of 14 and 27 years who pay a yearly contribution. Each party with an institute for international activities receives an amount that equals €698,628 divided by the total number of parties that have an institute for international activities. Additionally, they receive an amount per seat that equals €1,005,343 divided by the total number of seats of political parties with an institute for international activities. As from January 2023, the new division is: Youth organisations will receive a basic grant of €214,344 divided by the number of youth organisations. They will receive an amount per seat that equals €696,618 divided by the total number of seats of political parties with a youth organisation. For each member, the youth organisations receive an amount that equals €160,758 divided by the total number of members of the youth organisations. For the political science institutes the basic grant will change to €195,849, and the amount per seat will change to €20,372. (Bartelsman, 2022) 5.3.3 The Netherlands–South Africa Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 5.3.3.1 PPP in relation to direct public funding to political parties The equivalent purchasing power of €69,295,000 allocated to the Netherlands political parties at a USD 2021 PPP factor of 0.770 (OECD, N.d.) equates to USD 89,993,506. In turn, at a USD:ZAR 2021 purchasing power parity factor of 7.168097 (OECD, N.d.) it equates to R645,082,184. (Allocation in euro ÷ Netherlands euro:USD PPP factor) x USD:ZAR PPP factor That is: (€69,295,000 ÷ 0.770) x 7.168097 89,993,506 x 7.168097 = ZAR 645,082,184 5.3.3.2 Public annual-spend per person on political parties and foundations Given that the Netherlands population as of 2021 was 17,48 million (Statista, 2022d), of which 84,45 percent – that is, 14,761,860 – are older than fifteen (Statista, 2022d), it means that the public purse funds political parties at the national level and their politically aligned foundations to an amount of around R43,70 per person per annum. 5.4 The public party-funding regime of South Africa Party funding to political parties in South Africa is made via the Independent Electoral Commission and from the budget of Parliament. There is no public funding made available to party-aligned political foundations. 5.4.1 Public funding of South African political parties The restrictions and conditions attached to both private and public funding to political parties in South Africa has been fully covered in the Legislative Review (Chapter 3) of this paper. In terms of the public funding, all monies go directly to the party, either to the party headquarters via the Independent Electoral Commission or to the party groups within the Parliament. The total amount of this direct public funding to the political parties as administered by the Independent Electoral Commission amounts to R342,077 million (RSA, 2022). No public funding is made available directly to Members of Parliament (MPs) to, for example, assist them in running constituency offices, or to support their constituency work. But funds are made available to parties represented in Parliament in three forms: To fund constituency offices and constituency work, an amount of R372,131,088 To assist party leaders in Parliament to run their offices, an amount of R12,425,832 To the party groups represented in Parliament for them to carry out their parliamentary work, an amount of R127, 312,728. That is a total amount of R511,869,648 (Parliament, 2022). There are no provisions in South African law for the state to make a contribution towards the defraying of party election expenses (Anonymous, 2022). 5.4.2 Indirect public funding Political parties participating in national and/or municipal elections benefit from free public election broadcasts (PEBs). The public broadcasters are compelled to offer parties free advertising time on their programmes during the official election period. Private and community broadcasters may also offer PEBs, but must then comply with the regulations as set out by the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). The benefit only extends to the time slots and not to the production costs of the advertisements (RSA, 2014). Broadcast Service Licensees (BSLs) that broadcast PEBs must make available, “every day, throughout the election broadcast period, ten (10) time-slots of fifty (50) seconds each” for the broadcast of PEBs (RSA, 2019b). The formula for airtime allocation in respect of PEBs is: There is a basic allocation (25%) of slots allocated to all parties contesting seats in the National Assembly. Fifteen percent (15%) of slots to be allocated to all parties based on the current seats in the National Assembly. A further fifteen percent (15%) of slots allocated to all parties based on current seats in the Provincial Legislature pro rata. Fifteen percent (15%) of slots to be allocated according to the number of candidates fielded by parties in the National Assembly list. Fifteen percent (15%) of slots to be allocated according to the number of candidates fielded by parties in the National Assembly regional list. Fifteen percent (15%) of slots to be allocated according to the number of provincial legislature candidates fielded by parties throughout the country. (RSA, 2014) 5.4.3 Private funding versus public funding of political parties ratio In an interview with a political party financing expert, the expert suggested that South African political parties are still largely dependent on private sources of funding. The ratio of private to public funding has, however, materially declined post the introduction of the PFPP Act. Whilst the ratio used to be around two-thirds to one-third, it has narrowed to around sixty percent to forty percent (Anonymous, 2022). 5.4.4 Quantifiable funding to support political parties The public funding for the political parties at a national level in South Africa for 2022 amounted to R853,946,648 million, made up as follows: 5.4.5 Public annual-spend per person on political parties Given that the South African population as of 2022 was around 60,6 million (Statista, 2022a), of which 43,587,000 are older than fifteen (Statista, 2022a), it means that the public purse funds political parties at the national level to an amount of around R19,59 per person per annum. Chapter 6: Discussion of findings The findings of this study suggest that the South African democracy, as it pertains to the funding of political parties, is substantially inadequate for them to perform their constitutional obligations. In reaching this conclusion, three factors were considered: The amount of public funds allocated to the political parties The interplay between political parties and politically aligned foundations The impact of the private funding of political parties’ transparency regulations on the funding of political parties. But first, a note on why it is important to ensure that political parties are enabled and capacitated to function effectively. It is recognised that public trust in political parties around the world has declined. On average, in 2021, only four out of ten citizens trust their governments (OECD, N.d.). For South Africa, it is equally bleak. In an IPSOS survey undertaken on behalf of the Inclusive Society Institute in 2022 (ISI, 2022), it was found that there was extremely low trust in South African political parties. The indexed trust score, for example, was only 8 for the ANC, -28 for the DA and -23 for the EFF. This is in large measure due to citizens not experiencing democratic dividends that have sufficiently improved their lives, and government ineptness and corruption that have undermined development and progress. To generalise their view, democracy serves only the political elite. Given these sentiments, it is safe to assume that taxpayers are reluctant to throw public money to political parties and will be even more reluctant to usher in a more favourable dispensation. Which makes the findings of this study particularly difficult to promote. But public distrust and reluctance needs to be weighed against the greater damage that will be caused to democracy and societal progress, should the political parties not be able to effectively carry out their constitutional functions. Consider: The quality of legislation when political parties do not have the means to properly evaluate their impact on society, their constitutionality, and even whether it is fiscally affordable. This often leads to bad legislation, poor governance, and fiscal stress. The effectiveness of political parties to hold government leaders to account, because they do not have the means to investigate, and test decisions, or to legally challenge unlawful and unconstitutional measures. There are ample examples around the world where democracies have slid into totalitarianism because parties have, due to insufficient means, been incapable of mounting effective challenges. The widening gap between public representatives and their voters due to them not being able to properly service their constituents. For them to do so requires offices, staff, and administrative and logistical support, all of which require means. The feeding of populist rhetoric and the promotion of ‘pie-in-the-sky’ policy proposals emerging from party policy development processes, when parties do not have the means to empirically research, interrogate, cost and consult their proposals. This is most probably the single most important contributor to the notion of politicians making empty promises, which, in turn, feeds distrust in democracy and the political dispensation. The difficulty to effectively participate in the ‘battle of ideas’ when parties do not have the means to communicate the policy proposals and views. To do so requires a media presence, advertising and effective campaigning, all of which will come to nought in the absence of funds. And then the electorate ask why there are no credible alternatives, whilst viable alternatives could very well be available, but not communicated. It is with these considerations in mind, that the public policymakers need to, in the author’s view, be bold and withstand any public critique of improvements to the South African public funding of political parties’ dispensation. Any reasonable and informed citizen should understand the difficulties for the range of political parties to deliver an effective political programme on a combined mere R19,59 per person per annum budget, which is the current reality. And then there is the question of corruption and political trickery through the misappropriation of state resources, and the use of sometimes dubious private funding. The popular argument goes somewhere along the lines of ‘private money and politics should not mix’. But how is politics practiced when there is no money. This study has again underlined, in the interest of clean governance, the need for transparency in the private funding of political parties. But the reality is that transparency comes at a cost, since it leads to less private funding in the democratic dispensation. And thus, to avoid the collapse of parties and the democratic dispensation, the resultant vacuum of private funding needs to be offset with public funding. The general rule is that when transparency regulations are low, it can be expected that private donations will be easier to obtain, and therefore public funding can be less generous. But the inverse also holds true. When transparency regulations are strict, private donations to the political parties will dry up, and therefore, in order to ensure effective party participation in the political order, equitable public funding needs to be made available. In South Africa, this study reveals, the introduction of welcome strict rules related to the public declaration of private funding of political parties, was not accompanied by the requisite compensatory fiscal adjustment to the public funds to be made available to the political parties, to enable them to effectively perform their duties. 6.1 Comparative analysis: The amount of public funds allocated to the political parties in selected jurisdictions In this section, a comparison is made as to the public funds that are made available to fund the democratic dispensation in the four jurisdictions that form part of this study. In the first table hereunder, the amounts budgeted from the public purse in 2022 are shown, and in the second table, what it equates to per person per annum. All currencies have been converted from their local denomination to South African rand and are reflected at purchasing power parity. From the above breakdowns, one can draw a clear conclusion that the South African political party public funding regime is inadequate when compared to the other jurisdictions. This statement is made against the backdrop of all the jurisdictions being, in the main, dependent on public funding. Whilst it could have been argued that South Africa prior to the introduction of the PFPP Act could endure minimum public funding, in that they were receiving generous private funding, the introduction of the Act has changed the playing field. South African parties are currently heavily dependent on public funding, which funding is, unquestionably, insufficient. When considering the amounts allocated directly to the parties (not including the independent foundations), South African parties receive a mere third of those in Germany, and around half of those in Sweden and the Netherlands. This is reflected at purchasing power parity, therefore comparing apples with apples. In addition to the public funds made available to the political parties, it is a well-established convention to fund politically aligned foundations as well. In Germany and Sweden these foundations, whilst politically aligned, are independent and autonomous, and thus the public funding is made to them directly. In the Netherlands there is a symbiotic relationship between the party and the foundations, and thus their funding is made through the parties. Germany has a particularly generous public funding regime for the political foundations. For South Africa to follow suit would be acutely aspirational and, in the author’s view, not realistic within the current environment. That said, the functioning of the politically aligned foundations seems to be an intricate part of the holistic operation of the party-political environment, since they play an enormously important role in the development of public policy and facilitate, in large measure, the ‘battle of ideas’, so important in any well-functioning modern democracy. It appears to be a glaring omission within the South African political scene. Furthermore, the foundations play an crucial role in establishing and maintaining inter-party liaison and cooperation between themselves and likeminded parties internationally. This is important given globalisation and the pivotal role of multilateral institutions. For parties to promulgate and explain their policy positions within the international community, requires from them to connect and coordinate globally. This too, is a glaring omission within the South African party-political environment. Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations This study into whether the South African political parties are adequately funded to carry out their constitutional mandate has revealed that there is indeed an urgent need for the policymakers to re-assess the funding of democracy in South Africa. One cannot expect quality participation within the democratic machinery, if the resources to enable and capacitate such is insufficient. The author also suggests that it is fair to conclude that the introduction of the PFPP Act has materially impacted the parties’ ability to attract funding. Coupled with an inadequate response by Treasury to significantly increase the public funding of political parties, the vibrancy and efficiency of South Africa’s democratic dispensation is threatened. Political parties form the bedrock of any democracy, and if they are not able to function effectively, society must accept that the quality of democracy will be undermined. What has become clear through this study is that when transparency rules relating to the disclosure of funders of political parties is increased, a decline in such donations to parties is inevitable. There is a clear linkage between transparency rules on the one hand, and the private funding of political parties on the other. It is apparent from the country studies contained in this research, that the common truth appears to be that when transparency rules are increased, they should be accompanied by a concomitant increase in public funding. This has not been the case in South Africa. The legislature has introduced stringent disclosure rules that rank amongst the strictest in the world, yet the public funding of parties has not significantly changed since pre-introduction of the PFPP Act. This is an obvious deficiency that requires urgent attention by the policymakers. 7.1 Conclusions Five general conclusions are drawn from the study: Democracy comes with a price tag, and it is not cheap. As with anything, if it is not properly funded, society will have to lower its expectations as to what their democracy will deliver. The carrying out of electoral and civic awareness campaigns, proper policy research, international cooperation, connectivity with the electorate, etcetera, are all crucial for a well-functioning and people-orientated democratic dispensation. If parties are underfunded, they will not be able to meet the legitimate expectation of the citizenry. There is a trade-off to be made between competing budget interests. For example, between public services, such as social benefits, and the funding of democracy. But both are equally important. The quality of public services depends on the quality of public representation, and the quality of public representation depends on a fair share of the budget. An underfunded democracy will inevitably result in mediocre party performance within the democratic dispensation. The tension between the executive arm of government and the legislature is deepened when political parties are not adequately equipped to carry out their oversight role, since under-capacitated political parties cannot be expected to compete on an equal footing to the executive, who have considerable means at their disposal. When examining the adequacy of public funding, it needs to be considered in a holistic fashion. One has to weigh the total contribution to parties, direct and indirect, from the public purse. That is, both to parties as institutions, and to empower parties within the legislature. But also, to external structures, such as think-tanks and foundations that feed the democratic policy contestation. This is an important feature of the European dispensation considered in this study, but which is blatantly absent within the South African dispensation. Benchmarking against the jurisdictions that form the baseline study of this research would suggest that the South African democracy, insofar as it relates to the public financing of political parties, is materially underfunded. 7.2 Recommendations The author ventures three recommendations for public policymakers to ponder: Treasury should materially increase its contribution to the Represented Political Party Fund (RPPF) administered by the Independent Electoral Commission, to more realistic levels. Failure to do so will undoubtedly result in the weakening of political parties at the expense of a well-functioning democracy. It is common cause that the policy development processes of political parties and their international work, amongst others, are not adequately catered for in the South African dispensation. Policymakers should consider the introduction of such politically aligned think-tanks/foundations in order to strengthen the empirical underpinning of the policy discourse in the country. This is a crucial deficiency in the South African system. The promotion and introduction of ill-informed national policy can prove disastrous for socio-economic stability and fiscal sustainability. These dangers are heightened when political role-players propagate irrational and untested policy ideas. Political think-tanks can play an important role to moderate the national policy dialogue. Whilst it is apparent that South Africa cannot afford as generous a dispensation as that of Germany, funding along similar lines to that in the Netherlands and Sweden is achievable. The PFPP Act should not serve to discourage private funding to political parties. Political parties are important to democracy and a culture of contributing to the political dispensation should be encouraged. 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The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. 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Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8001 South Africa All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of the their respective Board or Council members. Efficacy of the National Housing Policy in the provision of low-cost housing in the Metropolitan Municipalities of South Africa by Moloto Johannes Sekhobela [M.Sc (Public Finance Management), M.Com (Economics)] Abstract The primary aim of the national housing policy is to create sustainable communities and to improve the quality of life for the people of South Africa through the provision of housing. This paper will examine the efficacy of the national housing policy in the provision of low-cost housing in the metropolitan municipalities of South Africa, by using the Shift-Share Analysis of informal settlements and the housing backlog, based on information obtained from Rex-Data of Global Insight (2021). An increase in informal settlements and the housing backlog signify policy ineffectiveness while a decrease in informal settlements and the housing backlog indicate policy effectiveness. The Shift-Share Analysis is a technique used to understand regional contributions to the development of a national economy, in terms of the regional economy, political economy, urban studies, geography and marketing. South Africa has eight metropolitan municipalities spread across five of the nine provinces: City of Cape Town (Western Cape Province); eThekwini (Kwa-Zulu Natal Province); Mangaung (Free State Province); Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City (Eastern Cape Province); and Ekurhuleni , City of Johannesburg , and City of Tshwane (Gauteng Province). The national housing policy was found, on average, to be effective. However, the individual metros indicate otherwise. In six of the eight metros i.e. City of Cape Town (CPT), eThekwini (ETH), Ekurhuleni (EKU), Nelson Mandela Bay (NMA), City of Tshwane (TSH) and Buffalo City (BUF) the policy was effective while in the remaining two, City of Johannesburg (JHB) and Mangaung (MAN), the policy was ineffective. Key words - National housing policy, shift-share analysis, metropolitan municipalities, informal settlements and housing backlog Introduction The objective of this study is to examine the efficacy of the national housing policy in delivering low-cost housing in the Metropolitan Municipalities of South Africa, that is, City of Cape Town (CPT), eThekwini (ETH), Mangaung (MAN), Nelson Mandela Bay (NMA), Buffalo City (BUF), Ekurhuleni (EKU), City of Johannesburg (JHB), and City of Tshwane (TSH). ( RSA, 2019). Increased urbanisation, population growth and migration to big cities led to high rates of unemployment, poverty, homelessness and an increase in informal settlements, (Govender & Reddy, 2019). Levenson (2019) estimated the proportion of urban to rural population in South Africa to be 69% / 31% in 2020, 70% / 30% in 2030, 72% / 28% in 2040 and 80% / 20% in 2050. The African National Congress (ANC) government introduced a White Paper on Housing as a response to the housing challenges faced by the majority of black South Africans. The provision of low-cost housing is intended to afford poor communities access to the property market, wealth creation, address market failures and reduce asset poverty. A fixed-amount capital subsidy of R1500 is provided to households earning R3500 per month and below, to build a (15x20) m2 house, as a way of offering a sustainable human settlement, healthy environment and sustainable livelihoods (Amisi, Marais & Cloete, 2018; Ojo-Aromokudu & Loggia, 2017) Housing is not only a basic, fundamental human right but it adds to people’s sense of belonging, ownership, identity, citizenship and self-sufficiency. Adequate housing includes the need for privacy and personal space, security and protection from harsh environmental elements, social development and integration. The number of people living in informal settlements and the size of the housing backlog reflects the challenges in housing provision for the poor (Marutlulle, 2021). Overview of housing in South Africa Housing Mandate The Department of Human Settlements (DHS) derives its mandate from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996). Section 26 of the Constitution deals with housing and states that everyone must enjoy the right to adequate housing and the state must ensure the progressive realisation of this right and that no one must be evicted or have their homes demolished without an order of court (RSA, 1996). Policy, legislative framework and strategic objectives The policy and legislative framework of the DHS (RSA, 2020) includes, but is not limited to the: White Paper on Housing (1994), Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements (2004), Housing Consumer Protection Measures Act (1998), Rental Housing Act (1999), Home Loan and Mortgage Disclosure Act (2000), Housing Code (2000), Social Housing Policy (2005), Social Housing Act (2008), Property Practitioners Act (2019), Housing Development Agency Act (2008), Community Schemes Ombudsman Services Act (2011) and Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (2013). Housing challenges Misuse of low-cost houses Low-cost houses are intended to improve the living conditions of the poor by providing a safe and stable place of abode that may enhance their prosperity, health and education. However, some homeowners misuse these low-cost houses by selling them without following proper procedures, renting them out unlawfully, turning them into business dwellings without permission and making additions and/or alterations that violate the municipal by-laws and regulations (Charlton, 2018). State capacity to provide low-cost housing The municipalities are unable to deliver housing to low-income households due to the lack of human and financial capacity, contradictory national policies, mandate creep and poor inter-governmental coordination (Gumede, 2021). Poor delivery of low-cost houses stems from lack of accountability, absence of performance and consequence management and lack of consultation with beneficiary communities. The above failures lead to corruption in granting of housing subsidies, selection of building contractors and allocation of houses to the rightful beneficiaries resulting in duplication, wastage, unfinished infrastructure projects such as schools, roads, bridges and dams (Marutlulle, 2021; Gumede, 2021). Gumede (2021) posits firstly, that reciprocal cooperation between the state, communities, business, organised labour and non-governmental organisations determines the capacity of the state to deliver basic services including housing. Secondly, a zero-tolerance policy against corruption, high levels of policy coordination, planning, implementation, and a functional monitoring and evaluation system. Availability of land Acquisition of land and housing delivery is hampered by the slow, complex identification and allocation of developed land, the government’s reluctance to deal decisively with private land ownership and land speculation. The lack of urban development strategies and the failure of the national government to regulate land markets exacerbates the problem (Marutlulle, 2021). Housing policies post-1994 increased spatial inequalities by building houses for the poor on the outskirts of cities, increasing their transport costs and the cost of accessing public and social services such as education, health and employment (Knipe, 2019). As a result, the housing backlog grows bigger than delivery in every major city, because of the growing gap between housing provision and the demand, fiscal constraints, and over-reliance on private consultants (Levenson, 2019). Literature review Pre-neoliberalism Before neoliberalism, good housing consisted of government regulated land and housing policies, subsidised construction, strong tenant protections and high-quality housing standards (Listerborn, Molina & Richard, 2020). Governments provided land, housing and finance directly to beneficiaries for servicing of sites and upgrading of informal settlements. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Habitat influenced housing policies in developing countries in the 1970s because they were struggling with the provision of housing for low-income groups. (Taruvinga & Mooya, 2018). However, these housing programmes became unsuccessful due to land acquisition problems, lack of financial sustainability, poor cost recovery and replicability problems for the infrastructure (Taruvinga & Mooya, 2018). In order to overcome the housing challenges, low-income households resorted to self-organised buildings because of their lack of income or access to mortgage finance and credit (Grubbaer, 2019). Neoliberal housing policies Governments moved from direct provision of housing to policies that are market-oriented because of cost over-runs, failed subsidy allocation and designs that compromised adequate housing for the poor. The state became an enabler rather than a provider by creating a legal and institutional framework conducive for private- sector home building for low-income households (Taruvinga & Mooya, 2018). According to Beswick, Imilan & Olivera (2019), neoliberalism entails the interaction of the state, private sector, and financial institutions in providing a market-based housing solution to the poor. The state provides a regulatory and institutional framework that creates conditions that are conducive for the private sector to participate. During the 1990s and 2000s, Latin American countries moved away from direct state provision of public housing towards market provision where the emphasis is on home-ownership and the housing finance system. Taruvinga & Mooya (2018) argue that neoliberal housing policy favours minimum government intervention in the housing market, promotes home-ownership, private property rights and binding financial commitments. Governments provide instruments that address constraints in property rights development, access to mortgage finance, subsidy rationalisation and infrastructure for residential land development, land regulations and organisation of the building industry. Neoliberalism stimulates economic growth by promoting homeownership, subsiding developers and agencies, driving use-value (basic need) and exchange value (asset). The state acts as a private company, which uses economic growth as its social policy to solve social and housing crises (Di Feliciantonio & Aalbers, 2017; Listerborn et al., 2020). Neoliberalism: challenges faced by developing countries Access to mortgage finance and credit by the poor The World Bank, IMF and the UN-Habitat use neoliberalism to target struggling developing countries with huge public debts, decreasing public finance and increasing welfare burden. Neoliberalism promotes the building of houses for middle and high-income groups as a way of capital accumulation to the exclusion of the poor through high house prices and the inability of the low-income households to access mortgage finance and credit (Sengupta, 2019). Socio-spatial practices Neoliberal social housing models result in unequal socio-spatial practices in the provision of social housing. The poor are displaced to the periphery of cities where land is cheap resulting in gentrification, social exclusion and uneven socio-spatial segregation, leading to a compromise in human sustainable development, community empowerment and environmental quality. The vulnerable groups’ cost of accessing public and social amenities such as public transport, health, education and employment increases as result (Dattwyler, Rivas & Link, 2019; Stiphany & Ward, 2019). In instances where low-income communities have a perception that their constitutional rights to adequate housing are denied and their sense of belonging is diminished, they may resort to informal settlements and slums as a solution to their housing problems (Lata, 2020). Public housing: a social or economic concept? Housing policies should have a social rather than an economic character. The capitalist approach to maximise the exchange value of housing at the expense of use-value undermines governments’ objective of providing affordable or social housing to low-income groups. Markets reduce housing to an economic rather than a social one, because of the profit motive (Shimbo, 2019; Santoro, 2019). Economic stability Taruvinga & Mooya (2018) contend that market stability and by extension economic stability is a prerequisite for long-term, low-cost housing finance by the private sector. The inability of developing countries to effectively and efficiently implement neoliberal housing policy in the low-income segment may be due to, inter alia, macroeconomic instability, fluctuating inflation, foreign exchange risk, and short-term investment horizons. Methodology The traditional and static shift-share analysis method and the Rex-Database of Global Insight (2021) are used in this study to conduct an empirical investigation into the efficacy of South Africa’s National housing policy in the provision of low-cost housing in the metropolitan municipalities of South Africa. The shift-share analysis method seeks to determine the change in a system by comparing the change in an area of interest with a relevant reference region. Change is sub-divided into three components, that is, National Growth or Share, Industry Mix or Structural Effect, and Competitive Share or Regional Shift (Lingzhi, 2021; Tissot-Daguette & Grether, 2021). According to Melchor-Ferrer (2020) and Li and Fang (2019), shift-share is a method that was originally designed to analyse changes in regional employment mapped against national or provincial growth but was later applied to various other fields of the economy. This method can also be used to quantify the development of an industry in a region and comparatively analyse it against the regional average. The shift-share analysis method has been criticised by Firgo and Fritz (2016) for its failure to determine a region’s performance independent of its sectoral structure. Thus, the dynamic regression shift-share analysis is recommended as a remedy. Empirical results Equation (1) defines Total Change in Regional informal settlements (R) as the sum of National Share Effect (N), Industry Mix Effect (M) and Regional Competitive Effect (S). R = N + M + S (1) Total National Informal Settlements change is defined as: IS (v) = IS (f) –IS (i) (2) Where IS (v) is the change in absolute terms, IS (f) is the total in the final period and IS (i) is the total in the initial period. % change in National share: IS (%) = [(IS (f) – IS (i)/ IS (i))*100] (3) The total change in Regional (metropolitan) informal settlements (Rm) is the difference between informal settlements in the final and initial periods Rm = Mf – Mi (4) Where R is the total change, Mf is the informal settlements in the final period while Mi is informal settlements in the initial period. The percentage of total regional change growth is represented by: Rm (%) = [(Mf - Mi)/Mi)*100] (5) The national share effect (N) is determined by: N = Mi1[ IS %] + Mi2[IS %] + . . . . + Min[IS %] (6) Where N is the total national effect of informal settlements, M is informal settlements in metropolitans 1, 2 . . ., up to n, in the initial period i and IS (%) is the national average informal settlements growth rate. Thus, the industry mix effect (M), is defined as: M = MR1 (Mi1) + MR2 (Mi2) + . . . . + MRn (Min) (7) Where M is the industry mix, MR is the marginal rate of growth in metropolitans 1, 2, 3…up to n and Mi is the metropolitans’ informal settlement in the initial year. Informal Settlements Table 5.1.1 below, summarises the changes in national informal settlements for the period from 2009 to 2018. Table 5.1.1 Changes in National Informal Settlements, 2009-2018 Source: Rex Data, 2021 (Author’s own calculations) IS (%) is equal to -10% according to Table 5.1.1. above. This means that the national average growth in informal settlements decreased by 10%. Four provinces had growths, EC (46%), KZN (16%), NC (10%) and LIM (9%) while five provinces declined, FS (-31%), GP (-22%), MP (-21%), NW (-19%) and WC (-8%). The changes in the metros’ informal settlements for the period from 2009 to 2018 are summarised in Table 5.1.2 below. The total informal settlements R (%) decline is -28%. This means that informal settlements in the metros are declining at approximately two and half times more than the national average of -10%. Informal settlements are declining in all metros in the following order, with the highest being NMA (-69%), and the lowest CPT (-9%). The decline in eight Metros is high with double digits and CPT is the only one with a single digit. Of note is the decline in the EC metros, NMA and BUF that are above 60%, followed by ETH in KZN that is above 50%. Table 5.1.2 Changes in Regional Informal Settlements, 2009-2018 Source: Rex Data, 2021 (Author’s own calculations) The national effect (N) indicates the extent to which metros’ informal settlements would have grown if each grew at the same rate as the national average. Table 5.1.3 below, is the summary of the national effect in the metros between 2009 and 2018. From Table 5.1.3 below, Informal settlements in the metros would have decreased by this number if they declined at the national average rate of -10%.The decline in the metros is approximately two and half times more than the national effect. This is because eight metros, except CPT, are declining at faster rates than the national average. CPT is the only metro that is declining slower, -9%, than the national average, -10%. The last column of Table 5.1.3 below, captures the difference in the totals of national effect and regional effect, R-N, -196 551, which is a decline. Growth is found only in CPT. The rest are declining with the highest being ETH (-69 272) and the lowest being MAN (-6 694). Table 5.1.3 National Share Effect (N), Informal Settlements, 2009-2018 Source: Rex Data, 2021 (Author’s own calculations) Industry mix effect (M) shows how change in the metros’ structures factor into the overall growth of the national informal settlements. The industry mix effect (M) for the metros for the period from 2009 to 2018 is summarised in Table 5.1.4 below. The marginal rate of growth (MR%) is the difference between the provincial growth and the national average growth. It appears in the third column of Table 5.1.4 The total industry mix effect (M) is, according to Table 5.1.4, equal to 9398, which is an increase, because it is positive. The metros’ structure makes a positive contribution to national, however, that is not sufficient to reduce the national effect decline of -109 648. The industry mix grows positively in four metros, ETH (38 529), BUF (28 690), NMA (22 648) and CPT (3 625). Four metros experienced a decline, JHB (-29 718), EKU (-26 498), TSH (-20 761) and MAN (-7 116). Table 5.1.4 Industry Mix Effect (M), Informal Settlements, 1996-2018 Source: Rex Data, 2021 (Author’s own calculations) Regional competitive share effect (S) is the degree to which the metropolitans’ performance is better or worse than the national. R = N + M + S (14) Therefore S = R-N-M = -306 199-(-109 648)-(9 398) = -306 199+109 648-9 398 = -205 949 Table 5.1.5 Regional Competitive Share Effect (S=R-N-M), 2009-2018 Source: Rex Data, 2021 (Author’s own calculations) The negative total regional competitive share effect suggests that the metros’ informal settlements declined by 205 949. However, not all metros are declining. JHB (15 026) and MAN (422) show growth. The highest decline is found in ETH (-107 801) and the lowest is in CPT (- 1 298). Housing Backlog Table 5.2.1 below is a summary of the changes in national housing backlog, for the period from 2009-2018. Table 5.2.1 Changes in National Housing Backlog, 2009-2018 Source: Rex Data, 2021 (Author’s own calculations) Total change in housing backlog, the third column of Table 5.2.1 is defined as: B (v) = B (f) – B (i) (8) Where B (v) is the change in absolute terms, B (f) is the total in the final period and B (i) is the total in the initial period. The last column, B (%) is defined by: B (%) = [(B (f) – B (i)/ B (i))*100] (9) B (%) is equal to 9% according to Table 5.2.1 above. A positive total means that the national average growth in housing backlog is increasing. Six provinces recorded growth with the highest in NC (32%) and the lowest in EC (4%). Kwa-Zulu Natal (0%) showed neither growth nor decline. FS (-7%) and LIM (-3%) are the only two provinces that recorded decline. The changes in metros’ housing backlog for the period from 2009 to 2018 are summarised in Table 5.2.2 below. Table 5.2.2 Changes in Regional Housing Backlog, 2009-2018 Source: Rex Data, 2021 (Author’s own calculations) The total change in metros’ housing backlog (R) is the difference between the housing backlog in the final and initial periods. R = Bf – Bi (10) Where R is the total change, Bf is the housing backlog in the final period while Bi is housing backlog in the initial period. The last column in Table 5.2.2 is the percentage growth in housing backlog represented by: R (%) = [(Bf - Bi)/Bi)*100] (11) Total average growth percentage, 12%, is the average percentage growth of housing backlog in the metros. This means that the housing backlog in the metros is growing faster than the national average of 9%. Housing backlog is growing in five metros, with the highest in CPT (31%) and the lowest in BUF (1%). There is a decline in three metros, NMA (-37%), ETH (-13%) and MAN (-4%). The national share effect (N) indicates the extent to which the metros’ backlog would have grown if each metro grew at the same rate as the national average. Table 5.2.3 is the summary of the national share effect in housing backlog in the metros between 2009 and 2018. Table 5.2.3 National Share Effect (N) Housing Backlog, 2009-2018 Source: Rex Data, 2021 (Author’s own calculations) The national effect (N) is determined by: N = Bi1[ B(%)] + Bi2[B(%)] + . . . . + Bin[B(%)] (12) Where N is the total national effect of informal settlements, B is the backlog in metropolitans 1, 2 . . ., up to n, in the initial period i and B (%) is the national average growth rate in the housing backlog. From Table 5.2.3 above, the total national effect is 110 613. The housing backlog in the metros would have increased by this number if it grew at the national average growth rate of 9%.The actual average growth rate of 12% in the metros resulted in the actual average growth of 143 299 which is greater than the actual average national growth of 110 613. The last column of Table 5.2.3 above captures the difference in national effect and the regional effect, R-N. The difference is positive, 32 686, indicative of growth. Four metros show growth, the highest is JHB (51 785) and the lowest is TSH (4 996). The remaining four metros recorded a negative difference indicative of a decline in the housing backlog. The highest decline is ETH (-43 794) and the lowest is MAN (-5 180). 5.2.4 Industry Mix Effect (M) shows how the metropolitans’ structures factor into the overall growth of the national housing backlog. The industry mix effect (M) for the metros for the period from 2009 to 2018 is summarised in Table 5.2.4 below. Table 5.2.4 Industry mix effect (M), housing backlog, 2009-2018 Source: Rex Data, 2021 (Author’s own calculations) The industry mix effect (M) is the product of the metros’ housing backlog in the initial year and the marginal rate of growth. The marginal rate of growth (MR %) is the difference between the provincial growth and the national average growth, the third column of Table 6.2.4. Thus, the industry mix effect (M), is defined as: M = MR1 (Bi1) + MR2 (Bi2 ) + . . . . + MRn (Bin) (13) Where M is the industry mix, MR is the marginal rate of growth in metropolitans 1, 2, 3…up to n and Mi is the metropolitans’ housing backlog in the initial year. The total industry mix (M), is according to Table 5.2.4, equal to 60 546, which is a growth. Four metros show growth with the highest being CPT (42 840) and the lowest being TSH (13 055). Decline is recorded in the remaining four, the highest is ETH (-18 220) and the lowest is NMA (-2 144). Regional competitive effect (S) is the degree to which the metros’ performance is better or worse than the national growth. Equation (14) defines Total Change in Regional housing backlog (R) as the sum of National Share Effect (N), Industry Mix Effect (M) and Regional Share Effect (S). Table 5.2.5 below is a summary of the Regional Competitive Effect. R = N + M + S (14) Therefore, S = R-N-M = 143 299-(110 613)-(60 546) = -27 860 Table 5.2.5 Regional competitive share Effect (S=R-N-M), 2009-2018 Source: Rex Data, 2021 (Author’s own calculations) The total regional competitive share effect suggests that the metros’ housing backlog declined by -27 860. The following two metros show growth, JHB (33 281) and MAN (1 284). Six metros indicated a decline, ETH (-25 574), NMA (-17 501), EKU (-8 795), TSH (-8 509), BUF (-2 013) and CPT (-48). Comparison of Regional Competitive Effects (RCEs): Informal Settlements & Housing backlog Table 5.3.1 below is the comparison of regional competitive effects for informal settlements and housing backlog. Table 5.3.1 Regional competitive effects: Informal settlements & housing backlog Source: Rex Data, 2021 (Author’s own calculations) The totals of regional competitive effects for both informal settlements and housing backlog in Table 5.3.1 above, are declining, -205 949 and -27 860, respectively. Informal settlements are, on average, declining faster that the housing backlog. A decline in informal settlements and housing backlog is indicative that the housing policy is, on average, effective. However, the picture in individual metropolitan municipalities is different. There is a decline in informal settlements and housing backlog in the CPT, ETH, EKU, NMA, TSH and BUF metros. The housing policy is therefore effective in these metros. In JHB and MAN informal settlements and housing backlog are increasing. An increase in both is indicative of housing policy being ineffective in these metros. Recommendations Policy makers should focus their attention, without neglecting the other metropolitans, on JHB and Mangaung, and mechanisms that will accelerate the reduction in the housing backlog. Expedite the accreditation of municipalities on all three levels to enable them to manage the resources and processes related to the upgrading and resettlement of informal settlements in full. The Department of Human Settlements must prioritise in-situ upgrading, resettlement and a phased funding mechanism for informal settlements in JHB and MAN. Shortcomings of the study and scope for further research Due to the unavailability of reliable and accurate data for housing delivery in municipalities, data relating to informal settlements and housing backlog was used to examine the efficacy of the National Housing Policy in the Metropolitan Municipalities of South Africa. Unfortunately, the Shift-Share Analysis (SSA) used in this regard is a static method and does not capture the dynamism and interaction between the metros in the periods under review. In addition, SSA does not show causality and it is, therefore, difficult to pinpoint the causes of trends and deviations. Further research into policy options and policy improvements aimed at providing municipalities autonomy to implement housing delivery effectively and efficiently, based on the merits of each municipality, is needed. The outcomes could assist policy-makers and stakeholders in planning and implementing differentiated policies that would benefit the poor. Conclusion The primary aim of the National Housing Policy is to create sustainable communities and to improve the quality of life of the people of South Africa, through the provision of low-cost housing. The study examined the effectiveness of the National Housing Policy using informal settlements and housing backlog data for the period 2009-2018. Increased urbanisation, population growth and migration to the cities has led to an increase in informal settlements and a housing backlog. Post 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) introduced a White Paper on housing in order to address housing for the poor. They provided a subsidy of R1500 for households earning R3500 per month and less to build a (15x20) m2 house. Housing challenges in South African include misuse of low-cost housing and lack of capacity by the municipalities to deliver low-cost houses effectively and efficiently. Compounding this problem is a lack of accountability by all levels of government, failure to consult stakeholders and corruption. Neoliberalism is a market-oriented policy involving the state and the private sector that is intended to provide housing for the poor. However, this policy has unintended consequences that actually result in the exclusion of the poor in favour of middle and high-income groups. Low-income households have limited or even no access to mortgage finance or credit. Developing countries find it difficult to implement neoliberalism to the advantage of the poor because of their ailing economies. The Shift-Share Analysis method, which subdivides regional employment into three components, that is, National Share Effect, Industrial Mix Effect and Regional Competitive Effect, was used to examine the changes in informal settlements and the housing backlog in South Africa. The national housing policy was, on average, found to be effective because the totals of the Regional Competitive Effects for Informal Settlements and Housing Backlog are negative, -205949 and -27860 respectively. Individually, six of the eight metros, that is, CPT, ETH, EKU, NMA, TSH and BUF have negative Regional Competitive Effects for Informal Settlements and Housing Backlog, an indication that the national housing policy is effective in these metros. The national housing policy was, however, found to be ineffective in JHB and MAN because their Regional Competitive Effects for Informal Settlements and Housing Backlog are positive. Recommendations to expedite low-cost housing through policy and mechanisms designed to reduce informal settlements and the housing backlog, are proposed. References Amisi, M., Marais, L. & Cloete, J.S. 2018. The appropriateness of a realist review for evaluating the South African Housing Subsidy Programme. 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University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This article has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8001 South Africa All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of the their respective Board or Council members. Ubuntu and the State by Dr Motsamai Molefe [MA (Developmental Studies), Phd (Philosophy)] Introduction This article explores the question of what constitutes a good society in light of African thought. Two important considerations relate to my raising and framing the question of a what constitutes a good society. Firstly, when I talk of a good society, I imagine the question to be relevant within the context of normative political philosophy, or simply put, political theory. In this light, this talk of a good society is not an empirical one, where I look into this or that society as a basis for determining what counts as a good or a bad one. Rather, I will be creating a theoretical construction or exposition of a good society, which can then be used to evaluate our various political realities concerning the state or status of our societies in terms of whether they are good or bad. Secondly, by talk of a good society, my focus is on our collective lives as regulated by the state and its subsidiaries (social institutions) through which it effects its policies and goals. In other words, when I talk of a good society I am, in this instance, limiting my focus to the state and its duties towards its citizens. Since the focus is on the construction of a good society I will then need to specify the axiological basis of determining a good state and its role. In this article, I will invoke or deploy ubuntu ethics as the axiological basis for judging what counts as a good society (qua evaluating the state and its duties towards its citizens). Ubuntu ethics is a salient African axiological system that has for centuries informed African thought and practice. Ubuntu ethics, as a moral system, is captured by the aphorism ‘A person is a person through other persons’. Though this terse expression does have metaphysical implications about personal or social identity – that it is possible only in social relationships with others - it is its normative package that will be useful in grounding an account of a good society (Ramose, 1999; Metz, 2007). One of the important dimensions of ubuntu that I will rely on to account for a good society is its under-explored aspect of the dignity of human beings. My exposition of ubuntu as a moral-political system will reveal that it embodies ethics of dignity, where it imagines a good society as one that respects the dignity of its citizens. The respect associated with human dignity requires that a society ought to have three features, namely, it should regard citizens (1) as inviolable; (2) empower them and (3) create equal conditions of social, political and economic existence for them. Three considerations motivate this exposition of ubuntu ethics to account for a good society. Firstly, empirical conditions in many parts of Africa suggest that we are still far from having what we might consider to be good societies. Social, political and economic conditions in many parts of Africa do not even begin to approximate a plausible vision of a good society. This article emerges to offer a theoretical lens to evaluate the empirical conditions of Africa. What is interesting about this article is that the lens it offers us is an African one. Secondly, related to the above, the literature in general that has reflected on the condition of African societies has tended to rely on foreign theoretical frameworks and concepts to reflect and evaluate social conditions in Africa. For example, post-independence leaders were fixated on Marxism or socialism as the proper theoretical and practical remedy for the ills of our societies, and they believed that it offered plausible accounts of a good society (Nkrumah, 1967; Gyekye, 1997). Recently, scholars of African thought have been fixated on the concept and theory of human rights as necessary and satisfactory to conceptualize a good society (Gyekye, 1997; Metz, 2011; Oyowe, 2014; Matolino, 2014). I am not convinced that socialism can offer us a satisfactory account of a good society or that it is most compatible with African ideals as some of its proponents tend to believe (see Gyekye, 1995). In my published work, I have offered arguments as to why rights are not only foreign to African ethical thought, but I have also suggested reasons why we should not take them seriously (Molefe, 2019). The third consideration revolves around my dissatisfaction with the literature that has attempted to deploy ubuntu to construct a good society. In relation to the above, some scholars have sought to interpret Ubuntu as a rights-based ethical and political system (Metz, 2011; Matolino, 2014; Oyowe, 2014). I find rights-based approaches to be at odds with the kind of philosophical anthropology and moral psychology characteristic of ubuntu ethics. Whereas rights tend to construe the agent and her relation to society in ways that take ontological and moral individualism as a point of departure, ubuntu ethics tends to imagine an agent as already and always connected and implicated with others in social and political issues, where they ought to understand themselves as sharing a common destiny – I am because we are (Menkiti, 1984). Ubuntu ethics tend to imagine an agent not as a maker of claims against others in society, rather it imagines him to be operating on the logic of other -or in terms ofrelational duties that create a positive and productive community of sharing and participating in life (Fineberg, 1970; Tutu, 1999). Here, I will propose my own moral-political interpretation of ubuntu ethics, which does appeal to human rights, [S1] [MM2] although it is considers human dignity to be a foundational category in African thought. I must be the first to admit that the above outline of issues in African political thought is very rough. However, I believe it is sufficient to justify a sketch of an alternative ubuntu-based account of a good society. To pursue this end, I will structure this article as follows. I will divide it into two major sections, the first of which focuses on moral theory. In this section, I will elaborate on ubuntu as a moral philosophy. I will highlight its three crucial features, namely ethical humanism, human dignity, and the telos or goal of morality that involves that acquisition of virtue or excellence[S3] [MM4] . The second section focuses on political theory. Here, I will appeal to the concept of human dignity as a macro-ethical concept that specifies three crucial duties of a state in creating a good society, namely the creation of non-humiliation, empowerment and equalizing conditions for citizens. In what follows, I offer an exposition of ubuntu as an ethical theory. Ubuntu ethics It is my view that ubuntu is characterized by four features (here, I will only focus on three). These features can be extracted or read from the aphorism definitive of it – ‘A person is a person through other persons’. This phrase has three segments that revolve around the concept of a person. Notice that the concept of a person occurs three times in the saying: (1) a person, (2) is a person and (3) through other persons. These three instances of the word person involve different concepts of aperson which, when carefully analyzed, are ethically informative. The first instance of the word ‘person’ is a reference to the ontological notion of a person, which merely refers to a human being – you and I. . The starting point and building block of ubuntu ethics is the fact that there are beings like you and I. This ontological notion of a human being grounds two ethical insights of ubuntu ethics, namely: (a) ethical humanism and (b) human dignity. The second instance of the concept of a person refers to the final good prescribed by ubuntu ethics, which requires the agent to achieve (c) personhood, which is a status term that denotes virtue or moral excellence. The last instance of the concept of a person, in the phrase ‘through other persons’ signals the importance of robust and productive (d) social relationships as an indispensable feature of moral growth and perfection. In what follows next, I offer an exposition of ethical humanism associated with ubuntu ethics. Ethical humanism The concept of a person in African thought, or, at least, its first instance in the aphorism of ubuntu ethics, refers to the fact of being human. It occurs, first, precisely because it serves as the moral foundation of ubuntu ethics. In other words, ubuntu ethics takes ethical naturalism as a point of departure. In other words, it grounds the entire enterprise of morality in some facts of nature. The kind of moral foundationalism associated with ubuntu ethics may be construed in terms of ethical humanism because it accounts for the essence of morality by appealing to some aspect of human nature (be it human needs, interests, dignity and so on). This should not come as a surprise given that the dominant metaphysical picture of African cosmology places human beings at a central spot in the hierarchy of being (Mbiti, 1971). In this metaphysical scheme, human beings are below God and other supersensible beings (ancestors) but they are above the animal and vegetable kingdoms (see Magesa, 1997; Shutte, 2001). The theatre of morality plays itself out largely in the human, natural and social sphere (Magesa, 1997). This is the case because it is human agents that ultimately have the duty to connect the spiritual, human and environmental communities (Imafidon, 2013). It is in this light that this comment by Steve Biko (1978) is informative about ethical humanism as a characteristic of ubuntu ethics – One of the most fundamental aspects of our culture is the importance we attach to (hu)man beings. Ours has always been a (hu)man-centred society. We believe in the inherent goodness of (hu)man(ity). We enjoy (hu)man for himself … Hence in all we do we always place (hu)man first.” (Biko, 1978). For another, consider this comment by Kwasi Wiredu, one of the leading African philosophers, where he states that “… the first axiom of all Akan axiological thinking is that man or woman is the measure of all value” (Wiredu, 1996: 65). The idea that emerges here is that ubuntu ethics understand human beings to be the very defining standard or measure of morality. In other words, the insight that emerges is that morality is intrinsically connected with the reality and presence of human beings. The importance attached to human beings, in this instance, relates directly to the claim that to engage on morality is to be engaged in relation to n a human affair, which has as its essence, human interests and issues. The implication of this view is that African moral thought is opposed to ethical supernaturalism – the claim that morality derives from some spiritual or divine feature[S5] [MM6] . I am aware that some might object to ethical humanism for its failure to include animals in the moral community. The essence of the objection against ethical humanism is that it is anthropocentric. I have elsewhere proposed that the kind of anthropocentrism associated with ubuntu ethics is a robust one insofar as it is a weak kind of it rather than the strong one (Molefe, 2020). Now that we have a sense that some aspect of human nature grounds the entire project of morality, we ought to inquire about this feature and its nature. The feature that does the best job in explaining the central place that human beings occupy in the African metaphysical system is human dignity. Human dignity Note that above Biko makes three claims about the status of human beings in African cultures. He notes that we attach importance to them; human beings are believed to be inherently good; and that human beings come first. Why do human beings come first? Why believe that they are inherently good? And, why attach importance to them? The reason for this is not hard to find. It is encapsulated by the notion that human beings are understood to be bearers of dignity. The notion of dignity is used in moral philosophy to capture the moral preciousness or worth of human beings (Donnelly, 2015). This moral worth captured by the concept of human dignity is understood to be inherent or intrinsic insofar as it is a function of our human nature, or of our metaphysical make-up. That is, the view that there is a distinctive aspect of our nature, which makes us intrinsically valuable (Rosen, 2012). I think Biko has the idea of human dignity in mind when he attaches inherent goodness to human beings. I say so because the inherent goodness in question is not one that involves our actions and characters, it is one that considers our status as human beings as one that is naturally attended by inherent goodness – the kind that we do not achieve or cannot lose. The idea that human beings have dignity is pervasive in African thought. Gyekye (1992) grounds his political theory of moderate communitarianism by appealing to the idea of human dignity. Jack Donnely (1982), though he argues that the idea of human rights is absent - at least historically - in African institutions, goes on to observe that the notion of human dignity is present and central in their institutions. Scholars that take human rights seriously in African thought tend to take the idea of human dignity to be present and important in African thought (Metz, 2011; Oyowe, 2014). Mogobe Ramose (2010: 302), a leading scholar of ubuntu ethics, explains the importance of human dignity in this fashion – The practice of feta kgomo o tsware motho … requires moral education based upon the principles of sharing, concern for another and the subordination of wealth to the dignity of the human person as motho. The saying fetamotho o tsware motho, roughly interpreted, attaches the status of dignity to motho (a human being or a person) relative to a cow (which in this instance represents both nature and economic value). In other words, in all of the natural sphere and all economic standards, the value of a human being is incomparable and superlative. The question still stands, however, concerning what, according to ubuntu ethics, accounts for the intrinsic value of human beings. The answer that emerges in the literature finds expression in the writings of Ifeanyi Menkiti (1982) and Kwame Gyekye (1982). Both these thinkers express the idea that human beings are intrinsically valuable because they possess the capacity to pursue personhood or virtue (or, ubuntu). They talk of “the capacity for moral sense” or even “the innate capacity for virtue” (Menkiti, 1984: 177; Gyekye, 1992: 111). It is this capacity that explains the inherent goodness of human beings – their intrinsic worth. It also explains why human beings can be held morally responsible because they are essentially defined by the capacity to participate and grow morally. In short, human beings, according to ubuntu ethics, have dignity because they possess the capacity for virtue. It is only human beings that have this capacity, or that at least have to the extent that they do. In what follows, I turn to the third aspect ubuntu ethics. The Final good Ubuntu ethics prescribes the achievement of ubuntu as the chief goal of our moral existence. Here, I draw a distinction between ubuntu ethics, as a moral system, from ubuntu as the goal that the agent ought to achieve. The reader will notice that sometimes to have ubuntu is just the same as being called a person, in the normative sense. Notice, for example, Tutu (1999: 35) speaks in this fashion regarding what it means to have ubuntu – When we want to give high praise to someone we say, “Yu, u nobuntu”; “Hey, so-and-so has ubuntu.” Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you have. It is to say, “My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up in yours.” Notice that the possession or achievement of personhood, which signals the status of excellence, is attended by more or less similar virtues – …norms, ideals, and moral virtues can be said to include generosity, kindness, compassion, benevolence, respect, and concern for others; in fine, any action or behaviour that conduces to the promotion of the welfare of others (Gyekye, 1992: 113). To achieve personhood or ubuntu is a function of nurturing a good character. That is, a character that is exuberant with virtues or excellences. It is important to notice that the virtues associated with ubuntu are relational ones. That is, these are the kinds of virtues that require and emerge in social relationships. You cannot have these virtues all by yourself. Or, to use the language employed by Gyekye, these are virtues premised in the human ability to demonstrate concern for others. Hence, another way to make sense of the virtues that are characteristic of ubuntu ethics is that they are generally other-regarding. In other words, I will achieve ubuntu to the extent that I relate positively and productively with others by way of learning and expressing other-regarding duties. Hence, the expression ‘I am because we are’ captures African moral thought appositely. It is a moral system that essentially imagines agents in terms of their connectedness and their flourishing as individuals requires this connectedness. One might here object to ubuntu ethics for its failure to accommodate self-regarding duties. This objection arises because ubuntu ethics places emphasis on social relationships and other-regarding duties. In my view, a careful reading of ubuntu ethics will show that it can be understood in terms of the analogy of the two sides of the coin. The one side of the moral coin of ubuntu ethics captures self-regarding duties and the other one concerns other-regarding duties. These are two sides of the same coin. It is by positively relating with others (other-regarding duties) that I realize or nurture my own character (self-regarding). My good as an agent is not divorced or opposed to social relationships and my other-regarding duties (see Lutz, 2009). We can now summarize ubuntu ethics. Ubuntu ethics is grounded on the ontological status of our humanity. Ubuntu is grounded in humanity because human beings, metaphyiscally speaking, occupy a central position in the hierarchy of being, and, morally speaking, human beings are the standard of all moral values. The value associated with human beings is explained[S7] [MM8] in terms of human dignity, which captures the intrinsic and superlative status of human beings. We theoretically explained the intrinsic worth associated with human beings with reference to their capacity for virtue. It is this capacity that explains why we expect human beings to be morally responsible and that accounts for the general expectation that human beings ought to pursue personhood or ubuntu. Finally, we explained the moral goal of agents in ubuntu ethics as the pursuit and acquisition of ubuntu (virtue). The virtues characteristic of an agent that has ubuntu tend to be other-regarding ones. With this sketch of ubuntu as a moral theory, we can turn to the question of what is to count as a good society. Ubuntu, Human Dignity and the State Above, we explained that ubuntu ethics is both an ethics of dignity and of virtue. The ethics of dignity is primary and explains why we expect human beings to be able to pursue and achieve virtue. It is because human beings have the capacity for virtue that we consider them to have intrinsic worth and it is because of the self-same capacity that we do expect them to be able to achieve virtue. It is this aspect of ubuntu ethics as an ethics of dignity that grounds our attempt to construct an ubuntu-inspired conception of a good society. To articulate such an ubuntu-based account of a good society, I will use the idea of human dignity as a macro-ethical concept. ‘Macro-ethical concepts’ are those that deal with[S9] [MM10] social institutions, or, in our case, the entire arrangement of society. This is contrasted with ‘Micro-ethical concepts’, which are those ethical concepts that regulate moral relationships in a private or personal and/or small-scale interpersonal relationships among individuals. I am appealing to the idea of human dignity as a macro-ethical concept because we have seen the tendency in the literature and practice to use it as such. One prominent example where this is the case is in relation to the discourse and practice of human rights. In this literature, the concept of human dignity is deployed, at least in the dominant interpretation, as a grounding or foundational term (Harbemas, 2010; Hughes, 2011). It serves as the normative basis for imagining a good society. A good society is one that is organized around the recognition of the human dignity of individuals. The device or instrument of human rights emerges precisely in the recognition, protection and promotion of human dignity (Donnelly, 2009). The state, through Constitutions and their Bill of Rights, aim to respect and protect human dignity. In this light, the idea of human dignity is the concept that normatively informs the character of our modern civilization. The same ought to be the case in relation to ubuntu ethics. I say so precisely because ubuntu is premised on the inherent goodness of human beings and their moral priority status in the natural world over other naturally existing things. In ubuntu ethics, a good society is one whose social institutions (in terms of their rules, policies and as agents) act from the position of being cognizant of the dignity of human agents. The aim of the state, according to ubuntu ethics, is to be responsive to the moral preciousness of human beings. But what does it mean to claim that a good society is one where the state, in terms of its rules, policies and conduct towards its citizens, is regulated by the grounding value of human dignity? The literature in moral-political philosophy associates the notion of human dignity with three functions. It is these functions that we can rightly ascribe to the state. Some scholars associate the notion of human dignity, as a micro-and-macro-ethical concept, with constraints and empowerment (Beyleveld and Brownsword, 2001). Other scholars associate it with stringent constraints, strong duties to aid others and equality (Jaworska & Tannenbaum, 2013). I will deal with the three functions associated with human dignity as the basis to outline the role of the state, starting with constraints or agent-centred-restriction (Hurley, 2005). Constraints and the Role of the State The idea of constraints denotes deontological restrictions. By ‘deontological restrictions’ I mean the imposition of limits over means we could employ to achieve important social goals. At the heart of the idea of constraints is the idea that certain ways of treating human beings are wrong, wronging (harming) and are almost absolutely forbidden (Kittay, 2005). A common example of how this idea of constraints work is by refusing to kill one healthy person for the sake of saving five other sick people – it is anti-maximizing[S11] [MM12] , all things being equal (Metz, 2007). It is wrong to kill an innocent and healthy person for the sake of helping other sick and dying persons – no human being ought to be used as a means to an end. The basic idea is that the idea of human dignity sets a very high protective parameter around beings of dignity (Toscano, 2011). It regards their status of dignity as both inalienable and inviolable. In other words, because human beings have dignity, we have a duty to treat them with the utmost respect. Part of what is involved in treating persons with utmost respect involves not violating them. The insight that emerges here is that the idea of human dignity captures the universal negative duties we have not to harm other beings of dignity. In this light, we can note that according to ubuntu ethics the state has a duty to recognize and protect human inviolability. The kind of violation we have in mind is deeper than a mere offence (that one might take when someone says you are ugly). It is the kind that undermines one in terms of their status as a person – it causes injury to one’s sense of self-respect as a human being. It is a radical or fundamental kind of harm that goes to the extent of stripping one of their humanity (Kaufmann et al, 2010). Personal and social practices like those of racism, xenophobia, sexism and chauvinism are injuring in this fundamental sense. They dehumanize people on the basis of arbitrary or biological features and strip them of their humanity.. Colonization, slavery and apartheid are all perfect instances of states organized on the basis of the violation and dehumanization of human beings. They were premised, in their nature and function, precisely on denuding fellow human beings of their dignity and sense of self-respect as human beings. The positive role of the state as imagined in ubuntu ethics involves the removal of dehumanizing human conditions. Things like the social evil of white supremacy and racism, tribalism and xenophobia, gender-based violence and femicide, genocides and so on. The state, on this moral-political view, has a duty to create conditions that recognize and respect the inviolability of human beings and create social conditions that ensure its protection. The state also has a duty to advance the interests of the vulnerable in society like children, minority groups, disabled individuals, women, foreigners and so on. In this light, the very first role of the state, according to ubuntu ethics, is the removal of conditions that undermine the human beings’ status as persons. The state is also required to create conditions conducive for human flourishing. This leads us to the aspect of empowerment. Empowerment and the Role of the State The idea of empowerment refers to the creation of personal and social conditions that enables the development and expression of human capabilities. According to ubuntu ethics, the most important capacity to be developed is the capacity for virtue. It is not enough that we have removed social conditions that harm our humanity. More is required. The state has a duty to create social conditions that enable human beings to flourish. This is where the state ought to set up proper, sustainable public goods for human functioning and flourishing. By ‘public goods’ I have in mind things such as access to efficient and effective public health, the availability of decent and meaningful public education, access to decent conditions of existence in terms of human settlement, with sanitation, roads and important amenities like gyms, shops, safety; the availability of economic opportunities, be it in terms of entrepreneurship or employment. In this light, the state has a duty to develop policies and their accompanying social institutions that will enable human flourishing. It is said, both in public discourse and even in literature that ubuntu no longer exists in our societies. Such claims, though they have rhetorical push, fail to properly understand the issue, at least this is my view. The issue, in many societies, is not the death of ubuntu per se. What is actually happening is that we have not removed conditions that dehumanize human beings and we have not further created socio-conditions that enables the human person to develop their capacity for virtue. Ubuntu will remain, or seem, to be dead when we do not have a state that creatively creates conditions that will enable its emergence in our midst as a reality. This duty rests with the state - to create public conditions that enable individuals to flourish. We cannot and should not expect much - in terms of ubuntu - from human agents when we have left them in conditions of squalor, marginality, exclusion and penury. In this light, the state has a duty to create and expand social opportunity structures for all human beings in society. In ubuntu ethics, the creation and expansion of these structures, is captured in terms of the idea of the common good (see Wiredu, 1992). By the ‘common good’, scholars of African thought have in mind the meeting of basic human needs so that each and every human being may lead a satisfactory human existence. Henry Odera Oruka (1989) conceptualizes these basic needs in terms of what he calls the human minimum, which he understands to involve the state proving subsistence, public health and proper education (Oruka, 1991). It is the provision of these basic three public goods that enables the development of robust agents that can live full and fulfilling lives. These goods must be made available to every person. Why each person? Equality and Role of the State The answer to the above question is encapsulated by the idea of equality – the basic claim that each person counts and counts equally. How do we account for the equality of human beings? We account for it by refencing the notion of human dignity. One of the fundamental functions associated with the modern notion of human dignity is that it is characterized by social egalitarianism (Rosen, 2012). The basic idea is that if all human beings have dignity, none have it more than others, and, therefore, we owe them equal moral regard. Our dignity, remember, is a function of us merely possessing the capacity for virtue. Anyone that possesses this capacity, all things being equal, is equal to every other person with the same capacity. If this claim of social egalitarianism is true, it follows that the state has a duty to equally protect all its citizens from harm and to create empowering conditions for all of them. In this light, ubuntu ethics recognizes all human beings as equal and deserving of our utmost moral regard. We must therefore come to the conclusion that the role of the state, in light of ubuntu ethics, is to create a society that pivots on the recognition of the human dignity of all human beings. This status of human dignity associated with human beings creates three duties for the state. The state must create non-humiliating human conditions, to enable conditions for the development of the capacities and talents of individuals, and to do so in a social context characterized by egalitarianism. Conclusion This article explored the question of a good society in light of ubuntu ethics. It construed ubuntu ethics in terms of ethical humanism, the primacy of human dignity and the agent’s chief goal of moral excellence. It deployed the primacy of human dignity as the basis for imagining a good society. It associated the idea of human dignity with three crucial functions – non-humiliation, empowerment and egalitarianism. It conceptualized the role of the state in light of ubuntu ethics as one that systematically extirpates humiliating conditions, creates empowering conditions, and constructs a society where all human beings are equal and are so treated. The aim of this article was to give the reader a rough sense of the role that ubuntu ethics attaches to the state. I am aware that this article leaves many important questions hanging. There is the question of why we must accept the account of dignity in terms of the capacity for virtue. Or, even if we accept the view that human dignity is a function of the capacity for virtue, what is the nature of this capacity, how does it differ from other accounts of human dignity, and why must we take it seriously? We can also ask questions about the kind of state characteristic of ubuntu – is it a perfect or imperfect state. These are the questions I will turn to in future research. It suffices, for now, to merely give a sketch of an account of ubuntu and the roles it attaches to the state in accounting for a good society. References Beyleveld, Deryck and Roger Brownsword (2001). Human Dignity in Bio-ethics and Biolaw. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Donnelly, J. (1982). 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Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Odera Oruka, H. 1991. The Philosophy of Liberty: An Essay on Political Philosophy. Nairobi: Standard Textbooks Graphics and Publishers. Wiredu, K. (1996). Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This article has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za