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5 - 6 December 2023, Wellington #integritasza – Coalition-Conference 2023 with the theme Coalition Governance in South Africa: Dedicated Desired State or Destructive Disasters, was held on 5 and 6 December 2023 at the Andrew Murray Centre of Spirituality, in Wellington.  The conference aimed to explore the challenges and opportunities of South African coalition governance, in the context of the 2024 South African national and provincial government elections. Daryl Swanepoel, Stephen Langtry, Edwin Mc Queen and Berenice Marks represented the Inclusive Society Institute at the conference.  Daryl Swanepoel, CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute was one of the keynote speakers. There were many esteemed speakers, amongst others, Prof Jaap de Visser from the Dullah Omar Institute, Dr Heather Thuynsma from the Pretoria University, Dr Harlan Cloete, from the University of Free State as well as Mr China Dodovu, Chair of the CoGTA and he serves the ANC NCOP, Pieter Groenewald, National Leader of the Freedom Front Plus and Mark Willemse, a previous Mayor of the Knysna Municipality. The themes were, problem identification and co-creation of solutions for coalitions as desired futures. Prof Erwin Schwella, who hosted the event, was extremely satisfied with the robust debate and the input of the various speakers.

The Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs and the Select Committee on Security and Justice held Public Hearings on the Electoral Matters Amendment Bill [B42 – 2023] on Tuesday, 6 February 2024. Daryl Swanepoel, CEO of Inclusive Society Institute did a 10-minute submission. Click here to view the presentation Click here to view the submission YouTube recording below (Timestamp: 1:39:03)

22 January 2024 Mr E Mathonsi Committee Secretary Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs National Assembly Parliament of South Africa CAPE TOWN By email: Electoralmattersbill@parliament.gov.za Dear Mr Mathonsi, PUBLIC SUBMISSIONS: ELECTORAL MATTERS AMENDMENT BILL [B 42-2023] The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is a Non-Profit Organisation that has as one of its objectives the promotion of democracy. The ISI therefore feels obliged to scrutinise legislation that impacts the proper functioning of the South African democratic dispensation. It does so by balancing the necessities of the political parties against the public interest. Background The Institute’s departure point is that political parties need to be properly resourced and equipped in order for them to carry out their constitutional mandate. Ill-equipped and under-resourced political office-bearers will merely result in the semblance of democracy, whilst in effect allowing for a well-resourced Executive to act with impunity, and is inherently biased in favour of parties in government. Thus the ISI promotes meaningful public funding of political parties. With regard to the public funding of parties, our studies have shown that where jurisdictions have high disclosure regimes, public funding is far more generous than in those that do not have high disclosures regimes. Thus a consequence of high disclosure requirements is the need for meaningful public funding lest the effective functioning of political parties be compromised. Recent research by the Inclusive Society Institute suggests that the current funding levels in South Africa is not entirely adequate. That said, it is never a good idea for one to determine one’s own remuneration. This is the effect of the proposed amendment of Section 24 of the Political Party Funding Act, 2018 (PPFA). The President – the leader of a political party – and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, which is comprised of representatives of political parties, are to decide adjustments to the donation disclosure thresholds and the maximum annual limits that any one donor may make to a party. In other words, parties determine what the thresholds and limitations are to be. This in the knowledge that the likelihood of a higher number of donations increases the higher the disclosure threshold,  since donors will not have to disclose. Similarly, should the maximum level of annual contributions by a single donor be set at too high a level, the original objectives of the PPFA will be undermined. And whilst the President needs to take a number of factors – as stipulated in Section 26 of the Electoral Matters Amendment Bill -  into account in determining the adjustments, there is a very real danger of falling prey to subjective decisions. It unquestionably constitutes a conflict of interest. Should the conflict of interest not be eliminated from the Bill, it will open the prospects for a legal challenge. Proposal The Institute therefore proposes that the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office-bearers mandate be extended to include the provisions contemplated by Section 26 of the Electoral Matters Amendment Bill. Should the aforementioned proposal not find favour with the Portfolio Committee, then the Institute is compelled to insist that the following minimum amendments be made: That Section 26 of the Electoral Amendment Act be amended to include the Minister of Finance as a party to be consulted by the President when making the regulations for matters contemplated in section 8(2) and (5) of the Political Party Funding Act of 2018. This is necessary since, as previously alluded to, disclosure requirements impacts the level of public funding needed, and the Minister of Finance is best placed to weigh up the required funding of political parties against the fiscal affordability for the state. That an additional factor that the President should take into account be objectively measurable norms and standards with regard to the public funding of political parties in other peer democratic jurisdictions. This will ensure that South Africa does not become an outlier, as it will introduce a measure of rationality into the decision-making process. Conclusion The Inclusive Society Institute understands the need for the Electoral Matters Amendment Bill and, in the main, supports the provisions thereof. In particular, it also understands the need for the Section 26 amendment. The Institute, however, is of the view that the current formulation has an in-built conflict of interest. The proposals put forward by the Institute aim to eliminate the conflict of interest, without compromising the substantive need for the amendment. Sincerely yours, DW SWANEPOEL CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER ________________________________________________________________________ PO Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, South Africa, 8010 Spaces ▪ 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square, Cape Town, South Africa, 8001 Tel: +27 (0) 21 201 1589, Email: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za, Website: www.inclusivesociety.org.za, 235-515 NPO PBO 930069173 VP Khanyile (Chairperson), Z Ndevu (Deputy Chairperson), K Millard, K Khoza, S Muller, D Swanepoel (CEO)

17 January 2023 Hon. MS Chabane Chairperson: Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs Parliament of South Africa CAPE TOWN For attention: Mr Eddy Mathonsi Email: electoralact1@parliament.gov.za Dear Hon. Chabane, SUBMISSION AND COMMENTS ON THE ELECTORAL AMENDMENT BILL [B1B-2022] Your call for written submissions and comments on the proposed amendments from the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) to the Electoral Amendment Bill (B1B-2022], refers. The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) would like to take this opportunity to comment on the amendment to clause three and the inclusion of the new clause 23. Clause 3.1 We are pleased that the NCOP, at least in this instance, has acknowledged the importance of ensuring the constitutional requirement for the equal treatment of independent candidates and political parties. That said, we are of the opinion that the threshold remains challenging for independents to achieve, as motivated hereunder: Although it is correct to institute qualifying criteria for independent candidates (and indeed parties as well) to participate in the elections, in that some level of support needs to be demonstrated prior to the IEC incurring logistical costs attached to such participation, the test of reasonableness needs to be satisfied. Should the qualifying criteria be of such a nature that it will be difficult for candidates to achieve, it could very well be interpreted as a scheme to keep independent candidates out of the race. Whilst the Bill may technically provide for independent candidates to participate, in reality (practice) it may very well prove unachievable. Therefore a more reasonable number of seconding votes should be considered. The situation, the Institute believes, will be exacerbated through the tight timelines that will by necessity be set for candidates to secure the seconding signatures. The election already takes place mid-2024, whilst, the Electoral Amendment Bill is still under consideration. This process must be followed by IEC planning, the drafting of rules and regulations, the design of the seconding forms and templates, etcetera. Candidates cannot start collecting signatures until all the uncertainties have been cleared up, which will not leave much time for them to secure the extremely high number of seconding signatures as currently provided for. If anything, independent candidates should require less signatures than political parties, in that parties have more people and infrastructure to gather signatures than would be expected from an independent candidate who is participating as a single person on his/her own. Thus, we reiterate our previously proposed remedy, namely that independent candidates be required to secure the same number of verifiable seconding signatures that new political parties currently need to register, that is 1000. New clause 23 The ISI welcomes the introduction of this new clause that has as its objective the establishment of an Electoral Reform Consultation Panel. The inclusion of this provision provides some comfort that there is an acknowledgment by the Legislature that broader electoral reform is necessary, and that the public requires such reform on an urgent basis. We are of the view that society will not accept a delay in such reform beyond 2029. The ISI wishes to make a few proposals to strengthen the work of the Panel. 23(3)(b): Whilst we are in agreement with the public participation programme proposed, such participation should not be limited to responding to proposed models by the panel only, but should also allow for the public to also proactively make their own proposals with regard to electoral models for the Panel to consider. 23(9)(a) provides for only South African citizens to become members of the panel. It may be prudent to allow for a limited number of international experts (one or two), to become members. This may help ensure that the model ultimately proposed by the panel meets the highest international norms and standards. 23(9)(b) provides for the Minister to consult the Commission in the appointment of members to the panel. The ISI proposes the insertion of Parliament in the place of, or in addition to, the Commission. This is to ensure free-thinking by the panel, unhindered by the potential bias and/or preferences that the Commission may have. This amendment would help remove any perceived or real conflict of interest and preference of candidate to achieve the Commission’s preferred outcome. In closing, the Inclusive Society Institute wishes to place on record, that whilst it is appreciative of some of the amendments made by both the Portfolio and Select Committees, there remains areas of contention, as can be gleaned from our previous submissions (attached as Annexure A), that the Institute will continue to challenge. Once again, thank you for the opportunity to make this submission. Sincerely yours, DW SWANEPOEL CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER ________________________________________________________________________ PO Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, South Africa, 8010 Spaces ▪ 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square, Cape Town, South Africa, 8001 Tel: +27 (0) 21 201 1589, Email: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za, Website: www.inclusivesociety.org.za, 235-515 NPO PBO 930069173 VP Khanyile (Chairperson), Z Ndevu (Deputy Chairperson), K Millard, K Khoza, S Muller, D Swanepoel (CEO)

1 November 2022 Hon. Ms. S Shaikh MP Chairperson: Select Committee on Security and Justice Parliament of South Africa CAPE TOWN By email: ElectoralAmendB1B2022@parliament.gov.za Dear Hon. Shaikh, SUBMISSION ON ELECTORAL AMENDMENT BILL [B1B-2022] Thank you for the opportunity to make this submission in response to your call for public submissions and comments on the aforementioned bill. The Inclusive Society Institute has actively participated in the National Assembly Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs’ deliberation on the aforementioned bill. Whilst progress has been made on a number of fronts, the Institute remains concerned with regard to a number of clauses in the bill that we are of the view will not pass constitutional muster. This submission to the select committee (SC) repeats the concerns we raised with the portfolio committee. It comprises two parts, the first being the Inclusive Society Institute’s (ISI) overall assessment of the bill under consideration, and in the second, we make specific comments on the clauses we believe requires amendment. Part 1: General comments The Institute is of the view that a golden opportunity was missed, namely that Parliament should, in our opinion, have been more responsive to the broader public’s insistence on wider electoral reform, that would offer a greater degree of accountability and representivity than the current system does. To this end, the ISI again attaches (as Annexure A) our electoral proposals for consideration. We do so in light of the overwhelming view by civil society that the current proposals are neither responsive to the will of the people, nor constitutional, and not workable. To this end, the ISI would, in the event of a further extension being granted by the Constitutional Court, support the withdrawal of the current bill in favour of introducing legislation that responds more adequately to public opinion and the 2020 Constitutional Court judgement, as represented by the vast majority of civil society organisations engaged with electoral reform. It does so against the backdrop of most, if not all, submissions made in response to the portfolio committee’s (PC) call for comment; and the majority view of the Ministerial Advisory Committee (MAC). We are also aware of the correspondence addressed to the PC by the Chairperson of the MAC, cautioning against the feasibility of the existing bill under consideration. The Institute is also cognisant of the Independent Electoral Commission’s (IEC) anxiety with regard to having sufficient time to properly prepare for the 2024 general election, and that a constituency-based election requiring the establishment of a Demarcation Board would not allow for sufficient time to prepare for the elections. However, it may be possible, as a transitional arrangement, to introduce a Multi-Member Constituency (MMC) system that is based on the already demarcated district and metropolitan boundaries already in place. In such instance, the ISI is of the view, that there will be sufficient time for the IEC to prepare for the 2024 election. At the very least, should the aforementioned proposal not be feasible, a legally-binding commitment to broader electoral reform in time for the 2029 general election needs to be made. The President has in any event, in his response to the Zondo-Commission report, alluded to this need, and thus it simply requires a codification thereof in the bill before the select committee. The ISI is therefore, in the absence of a will to effect broader reform at this juncture, proposing a two-step approach: Firstly, the passage of the existing before the SC in preparation for the 2024 general election, and secondly, the introduction bill of broader electoral reform in time for the 2029 general election. This, of course, with the proviso that the current bill before Parliament is able to pass constitutional muster; and it is in this regard that we have some concerns. It is the ISI’s considered opinion that the current bill is fatally flawed, the main contention being that it, amongst others, goes against the first founding principle of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, namely that our democratic dispensation requires equality in the advancement of human rights and freedoms. In the legislation before the National Assembly, parties and independent candidates are not treated equally. This is because independent candidates are juxtaposed against political parties, and not candidates representing political parties. To achieve an outcome which is proportional, in general, under the proposed system, is not possible. We attach hereto, as Annexure B, our own legal opinion, as it relates to specific clauses, for your consideration. (Please note that the legal opinion is drafted in response to the PC B1-2022 version of the bill). Part 2: Specific comments in response to the SC’s call In this part, the ISI highlights some of its concerns that emanates from the legal opinion contained in Annexure B. The SC is urged to take note of the various other nuances contained in the opinion. Amendment to 31A The Institute would like to acknowledge the constructive proposed changes to section 31A, as well as the other positive proposals by the PC, not least those related to Schedule 1A. Even though we must again express our concerns regarding the distance between independent candidates and the electorate resulting from the system being proposed by the PC - due to the large regional electoral battlefields – which is in in contrast to the ISI’s MMC-based system that will result in greater accountability and representivity due to the elected representative being closer to the voters, and therefore more responsive to them, given the constitutional need for equality, the idea of permitting independent candidates to be nominated in as many regions as they like, is supported. That said, the proposal, read with the provision in Schedule 1A that independent candidates contesting in more than one region cannot aggregate their vote, results in independent candidates not being treated equally to parties, and is thus, in our view, unconstitutional. It does not allow for an independent candidate that may have sufficient national support to reach the quota, but not so in in particular region, to gain a seat in Parliament, whilst, a small political party with an equal distribution of votes, could be elected via the compensatory list. The remedy, the Institute suggests, lies in allowing for independent candidate votes across the country to be aggregated and by removing the division of National Assembly seats in regional seats and national compensatory seats. See the Institute’s comment below on the amendment to Schedule 1A. The Institute would also wish to ask the SC to give sufficient consideration to the practicalities with regard to the ballot papers. Already, given the large number of political parties that contest elections, South Africa has unwieldly ballot papers. Add to this the additional independent candidates, which could quite easily far exceed 50 nationally, the length of ballot paper will undoubtedly be extremely daunting to most voters. Amendment to 31B(3)(a) Once again, the principle of equality is breached, in that independent candidates will require in excess of between 13,000 and 18,000 supporting signatures, whilst a party, at its formation, only requires 1,000 signatures, should it contest a national election, and less, when contesting provincial or municipal elections. Cognisance needs also to be taken of section 19(3)(b) of the Constitution, which posits that any additional limitations on an adult citizen to stand for public office is not permissible, suffice for it being justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. The ISI’s legal opinion suggests that the support requirement for contesting elections imposes a significant limitation on adult citizens’ rights under section 19(3)(b). The remedy, the Institute believes, is to either remove it in its entirety; or replace it by a requirement identical to that placed on political parties in section 15(3)(a) of the Electoral Commission Act, read with regulation 3 of the Regulations for the Registration of Political Parties (GNR.13 of 7 January 2004, as amended), namely that an independent candidate should only be required to submit a list of supporting voter signatures once and in the same number as that applied to parties. Furthermore, the number of signatures should not be that high that it could be viewed as a scheme to eliminate independent candidates from participating. Thus, the current signature required for parties to register, should not be significantly adjusted. Allocation system as provided for in Schedule 1A In that independent candidates can only compete for half the available seats in parliament, that is 200 seats, and political parties may compete for the same 200 regional seats and a further 200 compensatory seats, it means a mathematical improbability that the constitutional requirement for the election outcome to result in general proportionality can be achieved. As per the ISI’s legal opinion, “while viewed separately, it can probably be argued that the manner of allocating seats to independent candidates and political parties respectively in the bill will not fall foul of section 19(3)(b) of the Constitution, the differentiation between the two categories raises constitutional concerns…the differentiation between types of candidates in how seats are allocated will quite likely fall foul of section 9 of the Constitution” and the in general proportionality provision. An aggravating factor is the fact that the bill does not adopt a similar approach in the allocation of seats in provincial legislatures. For those seats, the different types of candidates are treated the same in the allocation calculation. That raises serious doubts as to the justifiability of the differentiation in allocating seats in the National Assembly. To this end the Institute offers two possible remedies: But first, there are two aspects to consider. In the first instance, in addition to Froneman’s assertion that the system should not fail the proportionality test, Judge Jafta, in the same Constitutional Court ruling, noted that it was not only about disenfranchising citizens, but it cannot be that some people’s voices “count more than others in our representative democracy”. He states that the rationale goes beyond disenfranchisement, but also to the distortion of equality in political voice, that is the voters’. Therefore, the Institute’s conclusion is that a vote for an independent candidate must be of equal value to that of a party, at least insofar as it will not distort proportionality, in general. The discarding of non-aggregated votes goes against this principle. The second aspect relates to the problem of independent candidates’ votes being discarded in provinces due to them not being aggregated, which could distort general proportionality in a particular region. To overcome this, the Institute puts forward two possible remedies: Remedy 1 In the event of the SC not accepting our recommendation to aggregate the votes of independent candidates across the whole country, then it is recommended that independent candidates be restricted to participating in only one region, as is the case for party-nominated candidates. But in addition, that the division of National Assembly seats in the regions and national compensatory seats be done on a more equitable 300/100 split, that is 300 seats allocated to independent candidates and parties competing in the regions and 100 seats to parties competing for seats on a compensatory list. This will move the electoral system closer to the ideal of achieving proportionality, in general. It will also improve equality in the handling of independent candidate votes on the one hand, and party candidates on the other. Whilst this remedy does not result in full equality, it substantially improves the position from that proposed in the SC’s version of the bill. We are of the opinion that the improvement should be sufficient to satisfy the notion of proportionality, in general, as the availability of 25 per cent compensatory seats is generally considered sufficient to ensure a reasonable level of proportionality, despite deviations from proportionality in the multi-member constituencies in South African under the current dispensation in the provinces. However, a greater level of equity is achieved in remedy 2 below. Remedy 2 As a remedy it is recommended that the division of National Assembly seats in regional seats and national compensatory seats be removed from the bill and that the allocation of all seats in the National Assembly be done on an equal basis between independent candidates and political parties, along the same lines as that for provincial legislatures. Whilst the total number of seats is calculated for the single national constituency, the IEC will still distribute elected representatives in accordance with provincial-to-national and national-to-national party lists as is the current position. Then the only difference between the way in which the allocation of seats are made between parties and independent candidates are that the excess votes – that is more votes than needed to be elected – are discarded. This, the Institute believes justifiable, in that an independent candidate can by definition be no more than one person. The Institute cannot refrain from pointing out that political parties also have excess votes, that is, votes beyond the number of votes exactly required to obtain the number of seats they are allocated, and that is never seen as a particular problem under any electoral system. Should an independent candidate be of the view that the excess votes cast for him- or herself should not be discarded, or is of the belief that he or she has broad public appeal that will result in many more votes than required to be elected, then there is a remedy: He or she needs to take a personal decision as to whether he or she wishes to be an independent candidate or part of a broader movement. Should it be the latter, he or she retains the right to form a party in order to benefit from any excess votes. Three ballot papers: 6(1) of Schedule 1A In the Institute’s view, the introduction of three ballot papers for the national and provincial elections, as it relates to the question of equality, creates a number of problems: The effect is that parties are being compensated for the share of votes “lost” to independent candidates when the PR (compensatory) element is calculated. For reasons already explained, and as pointed to in the Institute’s legal opinion, this undermines the constitutional requirement for equality in treatment between independent candidates and political parties. One can speculate about the problems for voters – a voter voting for an independent at the regional ballot and the DA for the compensatory ballot is one thing. But another voter will maybe vote ANC on the regional ballot and EFF on the compensatory – it will be very confusing for many voters and for the IEC staff. This will further compromise the achievement of overall proportionality. The remedy is to maintain the two-ballot system for national and provincial elections. This becomes feasible given the proposed equality of treatment proposals above, since there is no change from previous elections in the manner seats are calculated. The Institute is also of the view that the voting system needs to be simple for the voter to understand and for the IEC to execute. Conclusion The ISI wishes to thank the SC for the opportunity to make this submission. It is our humble submission, however, that what is trying to be achieved is to amend a system that is not amendable. What is required is a completely new system. To this end we once again propose an urgent electoral reform dialogue between the public policymakers and civil society to, given the tight timeframes running up to the 2024 general election, chart a practical way forward that satisfies both the broader public sentiment and the practical considerations for delivering an on-time, free and fair election in 2024. Sincerely yours, DW SWANEPOEL CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER ________________________________________________________________________ PO Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, South Africa, 8010 Spaces ▪ 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square, Cape Town, South Africa, 8001 Tel: +27 (0) 21 201 1589, Email: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za, Website: www.inclusivesociety.org.za, 235-515 NPO PBO 930069173 VP Khanyile (Chairperson), Z Ndevu (Deputy Chairperson), K Millard, K Khoza, S Muller, D Swanepoel (CEO)

15 September 2022 Hon. MS Chabane MP Chairperson: Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs Parliament of South Africa CAPE TOWN By email: electoralact1@parliament.gov.za For attention: Mr E Mathonsi Dear Hon. Chabane, SUBMISSION ON ELECTORAL AMENDMENT BILL [B1-2022] Thank you for the opportunity to make this submission in response to your email dated 2 September 2022 in which you have called for public submissions and comments on the aforementioned Bill. Our submission is made in two parts, the first being the Inclusive Society Institute’s (ISI) overall assessment of the Bill under consideration, and in the second, we make specific comments on the provisions highlighted in your 2 September 2022 call. Part 1: General comments The Institute is of the view that a golden opportunity was missed, namely that Parliament should, in our opinion, have been more responsive to the broader public’s insistence on wider electoral reform, that would offer a greater degree of accountability and representivity than the current system does. To this end, the ISI again attaches (as Annexure A) our electoral proposals for consideration. We do so in light of the overwhelming view by civil society that the current proposals are neither responsive to the will of the people, nor constitutional, and not workable. To this end, the ISI would, in the event of a further extension being granted by the Constitutional Court, support the withdrawal of the current Bill in favour of introducing legislation that responds more adequately to public opinion and the 2020 Constitutional Court judgement, as represented by the vast majority of civil society organisations engaged with electoral reform. It does so against the backdrop of most, if not all, submissions made in response to the Portfolio Committee’s (PC) call for comment; and the majority view of the Ministerial Advisory Committee (MAC). We are also aware of the correspondence addressed to the PC by the Chairperson of the MAC, cautioning against the feasibility of the existing Bill under consideration. The Institute is also cognisant of the Independent Electoral Commission’s (IEC) anxiety with regard to having sufficient time to properly prepare for the 2024 general election, and that a constituency-based election requiring the establishment of a Demarcation Board would not allow for sufficient time to prepare for the elections. However, it may be possible, as a transitional arrangement, to introduce a Multi-Member Constituency (MMC) system that is based on the already demarcated District and Metropolitan boundaries already in place. In such instance, the ISI is of the view, that there will be sufficient time for the IEC to prepare for the 2024 election. At the very least, should the aforementioned proposal not be feasible, a legally-binding commitment to broader electoral reform in time for the 2029 general election needs to be made. That is, what the ISI has termed a two-step approach: Firstly, the passage of the existing Bill before the PC in preparation for the 2024 general election, and secondly, the introduction of broader electoral reform in time for the 2029 general election. This, of course, with the proviso that the current bill before Parliament is able to pass constitutional muster. It is the ISI’s considered opinion that the current bill is fatally flawed, the main contention being that it, amongst others, goes against the first founding principle of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, namely that our democratic dispensation requires equality in the advancement of human rights and freedoms. In the legislation before the National Assembly, parties and independent candidates are not treated equally. This is because independent candidates are juxtaposed against political parties, and not candidates representing political parties. To achieve an outcome which is proportional, in general, under the proposed system, is not possible. We attach hereto, as Annexure B, our own legal opinion, as it relates to specific clauses, for your consideration. Part 2: Specific comments in response to the PC’s 2 September 2022 call In this part, the ISI highlights some of its concerns that emanates from the legal opinion contained in Annexure B. The PC is urged to take note of the various other nuances contained in the opinion. Amendment to 31A The Institute would like to acknowledge the constructive proposed changes to section 31A, as well as the other positive proposals by the PC, not least those related to Schedule 1A. Even though we must again express our concerns regarding the distance between independent candidates and the electorate resulting from the system being proposed by the PC - due to the large regional electoral battlefields – which is in in contrast to the ISI’s MMC-based system that will result in greater accountability and representivity due to the elected representative being closer to the voters, and therefore more responsive to them, given the constitutional need for equality, the idea of permitting independent candidates to be nominated in as many regions as they like, is supported. That said, the proposal, read with the provision in Schedule 1A that independent candidates contesting in more than one region cannot aggregate their vote, results in independent candidates not being treated equally to parties, and is thus, in our view, unconstitutional. It does not allow for an independent candidate that may have sufficient national support to reach the quota, but not so in in particular region, to gain a seat in Parliament, whilst, a small political party with an equal distribution of votes, could be elected via the compensatory list. The remedy, the Institute suggests, lies in allowing for independent candidate votes across the country to be aggregated and by removing the division of National Assembly seats in regional seats and national compensatory seats. Thus, we suggest that section 7(2)(c) in the PC’s proposed amendments be changed accordingly and in line with the Institute’s comment below on the amendment to Schedule 1A. The Institute would also wish to ask the PC whether they have given sufficient consideration to the practicalities with regard to the ballot papers. Already, given the large number of political parties that contest elections, South Africa has unwieldly ballot papers. Add to this the additional independent candidates, which could quite easily far exceed 50 nationally, the length of ballot paper will undoubtedly be extremely daunting to most voters. Amendment to 31B(3)(a) Once again, the principle of equality is breached, in that independent candidates will require in excess of 10,000 supporting signatures, whilst a party, at its formation, only requires 1,000 signatures, should it contest a national election, and less, when contesting provincial or municipal elections. Cognisance needs also to be taken of section 19(3)(b) of the Constitution, which posits that any additional limitations on an adult citizen to stand for public office is not permissible, suffice for it being justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. The ISI’s legal opinion suggests that the support requirement for contesting elections imposes a significant limitation on adult citizens’ rights under section 19(3)(b). The remedy, the Institute believes, is to either remove it in its entirety; or replace it by a requirement identical to that placed on political parties in section 15(3)(a) of the Electoral Commission Act, read with regulation 3 of the Regulations for the Registration of Political Parties (GNR.13 of 7 January 2004, as amended), namely that an independent candidate should only be required to submit a list of supporting voter signatures once and in the same number as that applied to parties. Furthermore, the number of signatures should not be that high that it could be viewed as a scheme to eliminate independent candidates from participating. Thus, the current signature required for parties to register, should not be significantly adjusted. Allocation system as provided for in Schedule 1A In that independent candidates can only compete for half the available seats in parliament, that is 200 seats, and political parties may compete for the same 200 regional seats and a further 200 compensatory seats, it means a mathematical improbability that the constitutional requirement for the election outcome to result in general proportionality can be achieved. As per the ISI’s legal opinion, “while viewed separately, it can probably be argued that the manner of allocating seats to independent candidates and political parties respectively in the Bill will not fall foul of section 19(3)(b) of the Constitution, the differentiation between the two categories raises constitutional concerns…the differentiation between types of candidates in how seats are allocated will quite likely fall foul of section 9 of the Constitution” and the in general proportionality provision. An aggravating factor is the fact that the Bill does not adopt a similar approach in the allocation of seats in provincial legislatures. For those seats, the different types of candidates are treated the same in the allocation calculation. That raises serious doubts as to the justifiability of the differentiation in allocating seats in the National Assembly. To this end the Institute offers two possible remedies: But first, there are two aspects to consider. In the first instance, in addition to Froneman’s assertion that the system should not fail the proportionality test, Judge Jafta, in the same Constitutional Court ruling, noted that it was not only about disenfranchising citizens, but it cannot be that some people’s voices “count more than others in our representative democracy”. He states that the rationale goes beyond disenfranchisement, but also to the distortion of equality in political voice, that is the voters’. Therefore, the Institute’s conclusion is that a vote for an independent candidate must be of equal value to that of a party, at least insofar as it will not distort proportionality, in general. The discarding of non-aggregated votes goes against this principle. The second aspect relates to the problem of independent candidates’ votes being discarded in provinces due to them not being aggregated, which could distort general proportionality in a particular region. To overcome this, the Institute puts forward two possible remedies: Remedy 1 In the event of the PC not accepting our recommendation to aggregate the votes of independent candidates across the whole country, then it is recommended that independent candidates be restricted to participating in only one region, as is the case for party-nominated candidates. But in addition, that the division of National Assembly seats in the regions and national compensatory seats be done on a more equitable 300/100 split, that is 300 seats allocated to independent candidates and parties competing in the regions and 100 seats to parties competing for seats on a compensatory list. This will move the electoral system closer to the ideal of achieving proportionality, in general. It will also improve equality in the handling of independent candidate votes on the one hand, and party candidates on the other. Whilst this remedy does not result in full equality, it substantially improves the position from that proposed in the PC’s version of the Bill. We are of the opinion that the improvement should be sufficient to satisfy the notion of proportionality, in general, as the availability of 25 per cent compensatory seats is generally considered sufficient to ensure a reasonable level of proportionality, despite deviations from proportionality in the multi-member constituencies in South African under the current dispensation in the provinces. However, a greater level of equity is achieved in remedy 2 below. Remedy 2 As a remedy it is recommended that the division of National Assembly seats in regional seats and national compensatory seats be removed from the Bill and that the allocation of all seats in the National Assembly be done on an equal basis between independent candidates and political parties, along the same lines as that for provincial legislatures. Whilst the total number of seats is calculated for the single national constituency, the IEC will still distribute elected representatives in accordance with provincial-to-national and national-to-national party lists as is the current position. Then the only difference between the way in which the allocation of seats are made between parties and independent candidates are that the excess votes – that is more votes than needed to be elected – are discarded. This, the Institute believes justifiable, in that an independent candidate can by definition be no more than one person. The Institute cannot refrain from pointing out that political parties also have excess votes, that is, votes beyond the number of votes exactly required to obtain the number of seats they are allocated, and that is never seen as a particular problem under any electoral system. Should an independent candidate be of the view that the excess votes cast for him- or herself should not be discarded, or is of the belief that he or she has broad public appeal that will result in many more votes than required to be elected, then there is a remedy: He or she needs to take a personal decision as to whether he or she wishes to be an independent candidate or part of a broader movement. Should it be the latter, he or she retains the right to form a party in order to benefit from any excess votes. Three ballot papers: 6(a) and 6(b) of Schedule 1A In the Institute’s view, the introduction of three ballot papers for the national and provincial elections, as it relates to the question of equality, creates a number of problems: The effect is that parties are being compensated for the share of votes “lost” to independent candidates when the PR (compensatory) element is calculated. For reasons already explained, and as pointed to in the Institute’s legal opinion, this undermines the constitutional requirement for equality in treatment between independent candidates and political parties. One can speculate about the problems for voters – a voter voting for an independent at the regional ballot and the DA for the compensatory ballot is one thing. But another voter will maybe vote ANC on the regional ballot and EFF on the compensatory – it will be very confusing for many voters and for the IEC staff. This will further compromise the achievement of overall proportionality. The remedy is to maintain the two-ballot system for national and provincial elections. This becomes feasible given the proposed equality of treatment proposals above, since there is no change from previous elections in the manner seats are calculated. The Institute is also of the view that the voting system needs to be simple for the voter to understand and for the IEC to execute. Conclusion The ISI wishes to thank the PC for the opportunity to make this submission. It is our humble submission, however, that what is trying to be achieved is to amend a system that is not amendable. What is required is a completely new system. To this end we propose an urgent electoral reform dialogue between the public policymakers and civil society to, given the tight timeframes running up to the 2024 general election, chart a practical way forward that satisfies both the broader public sentiment and the practical considerations for delivering an on-time, free and fair election in 2024. Sincerely yours, DW SWANEPOEL CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER ________________________________________________________________________ PO Box 12609, Mill Street, Cape Town, South Africa, 8010 Spaces ▪ 1006 One Thibault, 1 Thibault Square, Cape Town, South Africa, 8001 Tel: +27 (0) 21 201 1589, Email: admin@inclusivesociety.org.za, Website: www.inclusivesociety.org.za, 235-515 NPO PBO 930069173 VP Khanyile (Chairperson), Z Ndevu (Deputy Chairperson), K Millard, K Khoza, S Muller, D Swanepoel (CEO)

Occasional Paper 10/2023 Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. DECEMBER 2023 by Prof William Gumede Former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; former Senior Associate Member and Oppenheimer Fellow, St Antony’s College, Oxford University; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg). Introduction Special economic zones (SEZs) can still play a critical role in developing new industries, beneficiating raw materials, and diversifying South Africa’s exports. That is, if they are linked to the overall national development strategy, done in full partnership with business, and freed from the public sector’s governance problems – such as incompetence, corruption, and inefficiency – which have stymied SEZs up to now. SEZs, which are also termed export processing zones, free trade zones and free ports, are geographically demarcated areas which governments dedicate to specific industrial development by giving fiscal incentives, regulatory exemptions, and public infrastructure support (Aggarwal, 2008; Asian Development Bank, 2007; Cirera & Lakshman, 2014; Farole & Akinci, 2011; Fruman & Zeng, 2015). It is a key policy tool many high-growth economies in Asia have used to build manufacturing, export capacity, and lift economic growth (IFC, 2016; ILO, 1988; Ishida, 2009; Jayanthakumaran, 2003). The South African government has adopted as a policy objective the establishment of regional industrial zones – Special Economic Zones and Industrial Parks (IPs) – and corridors (Gumede, 2022a; Gumede, 2022b). The SEZs and IPs are recognised amongst the tools that are catalytic economic drivers in regional economy ecosystems. They drive continuous attraction, promotion and retention of direct domestic and foreign investment to achieve transformative industrialisation and sustainable economic growth in South Africa, especially in underperforming regions (Jayanthakumaran, 2003; Johansson & Nilsson, 1997; Cirera & Lakshman, 2014; Litwack & Qian, 1998; Rhee et al, 1990; Rodrik, 2004; Zeng, 2017; UNCTAD, 2019; UN ESCAP, 2019; UNIDO, 2015). The first industrial SEZ was established in 1959 in Shannon, Ireland. The country established the Shannon Free Airport Development Company, a development agency, to establish an industrial free zone, to generate alternative sources of traffic, business and tourism at the Shannon airport and adjacent area. Investors were given special tax concessions, simplified custom operations, and cheap investment attractions. The area was transformed into an air training base, maintenance and repair centre, and a tourist attraction. Global impact of SEZs According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), by 2007, SEZs accounted for US$851 billion-worth of exports – which is around 41% of global exports – and for 68 million direct jobs created (ILO, 1988). Clustering infrastructure, industries, and public goods in one specific region, means that a country can leverage scale to build a critical mass of related, complementary, and synergetic value chain components that need similar skills, technologies, and market links. This forms an ecosystem that boosts economic development, attracts investment, and fosters an environment for innovation. Companies share resources, costs, and infrastructure. The overriding idea is to concentrate limited public funds, resources, and infrastructure on developing or establishing new industries with the help of private sector investment, skills, and technology. Importantly, as Douglas Zhihua Zeng (2017) argues, SEZs “should only be used to address market failures or binding constraints that cannot be addressed through other options. If the constraints can be addressed through countrywide reforms, sector-wide incentives, or universal approaches, then zones might not be necessary”. If successful, SEZs could provide positive spillovers to the rest of the economy. These spillovers can be direct or indirect. The direct impacts are rising economic growth, new manufacturing industries, and beneficiation (Jayanthakumaran, 2003; Johansson & Nilsson, 1997; Cirera & Lakshman, 2014; Litwack & Qian, 1998; Rhee et al, 1990; Rodrik, 2004; Zeng, 2017; UNCTAD, 2019; UN ESCAP, 2019; UNIDO, 2015). It boosts employment, increases local and foreign exchange income. It brings new technology, innovation and skills, and diversifies the economy. It increases the productivity, efficiency and competitiveness of local companies, the productivity of local labour, and the income of local citizens. Figure 1: The growth of SEZs around the world since 1975 (UNCTAD, 2019 SEZs Report) Why do countries establish SEZs SEZs are established because governments lack the skills, resources, and capacity to introduce nationwide reforms to establish conducive environments for investment attraction, industrial upgrading, and infrastructure development. Furthermore, as Douglas Zhihua Zeng argues, governments also established SEZs because they lack the capacity to tackle vested interests, capture, and political opposition to country industrialisation reforms, and then implement it on a smaller, more protected and ring-fenced scale, through SEZs. If a country lacks effective state capacity, public services, and infrastructure such as power, water and transport, SEZs – located in a smaller geographical area – could offer an opportunity to use the limited state capacity, public services and infrastructure to potentially great impact, which could catalyse other parts of the economy. However, if investments can be attracted, industrialisation fostered and technology, knowledge and skills acquired through normal policy avenues, incentives, and state-business partnerships, SEZs are not necessary. SEZs must only be established if constraints such as government corruption, incompetency and red tape cannot be addressed speedily in the broader economy, and SEZs then are established as smaller protective zones where these governance failures are absent. A critical part of the success of SEZs is that they need to be part of the overall national industrial strategy of a country – they must be exempt from the inefficiencies, corruption and mismanagement normally associated with developing country governments and must respond to real market demands (Warr, 1989; Watson, 2001; White, 2011; Wolman, 2014; Zeng, 2017). Some of the purposes of SEZs are to create new industries that do not exist at the time, beneficiate raw materials and so create new value-add industries, attract foreign investment when it is difficult to do so under normal circumstances, and to develop an export economy. SEZs can also be specifically established to transfer new technology, knowledge, and skills that the country lacks, but are critical to industrialisation. The SEZ is almost an incubator, where experimenting, manufacturing, innovation, and learning can happen behind protective barriers – and the final product then exported to global markets. SEZs have been crucial in skills, technology and knowledge transfer and industrial upgrading from basic to value added industries in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Dubai created a successful Dubai Internet City SEZ, which attracted the world’s largest technology companies, such as Microsoft, Oracle, and IBM. Dubai also created universities as special economic zones, bringing in foreign universities, teachers, and technology to accelerate skills transfer, technology upgrading and innovation (Khaleej Times, 2019). Africa, Morocco, and Nigeria set up SEZs to penetrate the European Union market (Bräutigam & Tang, 2010; Farole, 2011; Fruman & Zeng 2015). Rwanda set up SEZs to manufacture new products for exports. Within three years, 3% of Rwanda’s workforce were employed in its new SEZ. Mauritius set up SEZs to produce processed sugar for export. Such was the Mauritian success, that when the sugar industry was at its peak, the country dominated 50% of the EU market for processed brown sugar (Bräutigam & Tang, 2010; Serlet, 2022). The SEZs must be a zone of competent management, corruption-free, devoid of public sector red tape, and effectively integrated within local and global markets. SEZs must have a specific industrialisation purpose and must not become a collection of subsidised warehouses that create jobs artificially at great cost, as has been the case in many failed SEZs in Africa and South Africa. Many researchers worry that SEZs may only develop certain parts of a country, creating “enclaves”, and the impact will not be transferred to the wider economy. The rise of SEZs Taiwan in 1966, Singapore in 1969, and South Korea in 1970 were amongst the first to create SEZs (Asian Development Bank, 2007). Both Singapore and South Korea established SEZs to use their cheap and available labour, to foster labour-intensive, export manufacturing industries and attract foreign investment – based on giving investors incentives for setting up these industries (Lall, 2000). Singapore established SEZs to build a transhipment trade hub, removing goods and service taxes on products. By the 1970s Singapore created specialised SEZs, particularly to build the petroleum refinery-related industry (Koh, 2006). Singapore has established more than 400 companies trading in petroleum and related products since it established its first SEZ in 1969. For another, the creation of the petroleum refinery-related industry has spurred associated and related petroleum business, including professional services, research and development, and marketing and sales. After the Asian financial crisis, these East Asian states changed the focus of their SEZs, as economic circumstances changed, to industrial upgrading, productivity increases and innovation (UNCTAD, 2019; UN ESCAP, 2019; UNIDO, 2015). They moved their SEZs from low-skilled, low-cost labour to value added activities and technology – these economies now had developed high-skilled workforces, for high-skilled labour. For example, these countries introduced technology, biotechnology, science, and software SEZs. China successfully used SEZs as zones of experimenting to develop the market system, while building new industries the country did not have and learning new technologies it lacked. China launched its “Open Door” reforms in 1978 to introduce market reforms in selected regions, in what former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping called “crossing the river by touching the stones” (Shen & Xu, 2011; Sklair, 1991). The Chinese SEZs were zones where the usual government red tape, corruption and ideology were set aside, focusing on securing foreign investment by giving incentives, attracting new technology and knowledge. The Chinese SEZs built new industries, created new jobs and new export industries (Shen & Xu, 2011; Sklair, 1991). It fostered positive spillovers to the economy – new knowledge, new technology, and new management techniques were transferred to other parts of the economy, which lifted economic growth, development, and the country’s competitiveness (Shen & Xu, 2011; Sklair, 1991). It is estimated that SEZs have contributed to 22% of China’s GDP, 41% of the country’s foreign direct investment, and 60% of its exports. China’s technology commercialisation rate is around 10%. However, in SEZs the technology commercialisation rate is around 60%. SEZs in Africa There are an estimated 237 SEZs in Africa, found in 38 countries (Farole, 2011; Fruman & Zeng, 2015). Mauritius introduced Africa’s most successful SEZs. In 1970, the country established its first SEZ to manufacture textiles and garments, food and beverages, and batteries for export. In the Mauritius export processing zone, companies are free to locate anywhere on the island. Mauritius’ 1970 Export Processing Act broke from the typical post-colonial African import substitution strategy to one of an export-led industrialisation strategy. Mauritius was more successful than many African countries in that it focused on export-led growth, and the SEZ was part of its export-led industrialisation strategy, not a standalone policy like in many African countries where SEZs have had pedestrian results (Bräutigam & Tang, 2010). Mauritius allowed duty-free imports of inputs meant to be used to make products for export. The country gave tax holidays to exporters. Exporters were given reduced rates on power, water and building materials – charging rates similar to international competitors. Domestic companies who were exporters received credit from banks at lower interest rates. The Mauritian government was careful to push labour-intensive production, to soak low-skilled unemployment. Cheaper credit was calibrated in such a way that companies did not shirk labour-intensive for capital-intensive production, because of the cheaper capital available. Mauritius’ priority was to get manufacturing going in the country – whether it was foreign owned or not – transferring knowledge, technology, and skills, and so, fostering positive spillovers to the rest of the economy. Mauritius placed no restrictions on foreign ownership of manufacturing companies – unlike many countries in post-colonial Africa. The country has been governed more pragmatically than almost all African countries, by spending more attention on building and maintaining reliable infrastructure. Mauritius, governed for most of its postcolonial history by coalitions, has been Africa’s most stable country – it has managed its public finances prudently and is amongst the least corrupt – which is an immediate attraction for investors (Gumede, 2022a). The country also prioritised making its public service competent. The SEZs were governed competently, honestly, and pragmatically. By 1988, employment in Mauritius’ SEZs was 85% of total manufacturing employment and 31% of total country employment. By the late 1980s, value add produced in SEZs made up 12% of GDP. More recently, Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria were successful in processing cocoa through SEZs, by partnering with Western companies to co-produce chocolate, the value-add of cocoa, for export, rather than exporting raw, unprocessed cocoa (Gumede, 2022a; Gumede, 2022b). The value-add chocolate creates more jobs, and earns more money, than the raw commodity cocoa. Morocco and Nigeria have also recently established successful SEZs in partnership with foreign investors to penetrate the European Union market. Rwanda has successfully established SEZs in partnership with industrial country companies to manufacture new products for exports. SEZs in South Africa: The Tshwane Automotive SEZ The ANC government has adopted the policy of SEZs as one of its pillar strategies to lift growth, boost investment, and increase job creation (Majola, 2023). The South African SEZ programme started with the Industrial Development Zone policy review in 2007 by the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition (the dtic). The SEZ Act stipulates that SEZs should have a feasibility study and business case. Most of South Africa’s SEZs are state operated. There are 11 designated SEZs, with nine fully operational. They have attracted 167 operational investors, with total private investment of R21,9 billion, and created almost 20 000 operational jobs. The SEZs include Saldanha Bay in the Western Cape, Dube Trade Port and Richards Bay in KwaZulu-Natal, East London and Coega in the Eastern Cape, Maluti-A-Phofung in the Free State, Musina Makhado in Limpopo, and Tshwane Automotive in Gauteng. The Tshwane Automotive SEZ launched in South Africa in 2019 appears to offer the prospect of being a model SEZ. It secured and was driven by a private sector anchor, Ford Motor Company. The company invested over R15 billion to produce the next generation of Ford Rangers. Ford, the national and provincial governments, and the City of Tshwane are co-governing the SEZ in a public-private partnership. Ford is represented on the management board of the entity, which includes representatives of the dtic, Gauteng Department of Economic Development, and the City of Tshwane. Staff from the Eastern Cape SEZ, Coega, were deployed to assist in the establishment of the Tshwane Automotive SEZ. This is one of the rare occasions where all spheres of government are involved in a governing partnership with the private sector. The Tshwane Automotive SEZ was co-designed from the start with Ford and has been given clean audits since its inception. The government has spent R2 billion on the project, with material inputs for the production aimed at 45%. The SEZ will, in cooperation with Transnet, develop a rail-to-port corridor for vehicle and components exports – which will include Tshwane and Gqeberha, in the Eastern Cape – the completion of which is a critical component that will determine the success of the SEZ. Figure 2: Special Economic Zones in South Africa Critical success factors for SEZs Before a country establishes SEZs it must put together a national industrialisation, economic growth, or long-term development plan (Aggarwal, 2008; IFC, 2016; ILO, 1988; Ishida, 2009; Jayanthakumaran, 2003). Such a plan must be based on an analysis of the state of the country’s economy, its development needs, and its human capital. There must be an assessment of the comparative advantages – the resources – the country has, what it can do with domestic resources, capital, and skills, and what will need to be built with outside help. Related to this, there must be a comprehensive analysis of the country’s comparative position in the global economy, trade, and supply chains. A central pillar of any country’s industrialisation, growth and long-term development strategy is how to build local production capacity (Aggarwal, 2008; IFC, 2016; ILO, 1988; Ishida, 2009; Jayanthakumaran, 2003). Establishing SEZs, for example, could be a mechanism to build local production capacity through attracting foreign investors to the SEZs and then getting them to upgrade local production capacity, by partnering, transferring technology, skills and knowledge, and sourcing inputs from local firms. There must be clear reasons for the establishment of SEZs, including how they fit into the national industrialisation, development, or long-term country economic growth plan (Gumede, 2022a; Gumede, 2022b). For example, if the intention is to attract foreign direct investment – which the country cannot do through traditional methods – the objective of attracting investment through the SEZs must be integrated into the country’s economic growth plan. There must be a business case for SEZs (Zeng, 2017), meaning there needs to be a global demand and a market for the products manufactured in the SEZs. SEZs must be embedded in the comparative advantage of the country. They cannot be established based on political, ideological, and interest-group considerations. It is crucial that SEZs form part of a country’s national long-term development or industrialisation plan, rather than operating as standalone job creation exercises. Once the business case for SEZs has been made, there must be an assessment of the implications of establishing them for existing businesses, institutions, and policies. After this, SEZ laws, policies, and supporting and governing institutions will have to be created. Well-thought out, pragmatic and credible laws, regulations, and institutional frameworks are crucial to govern SEZs. Governments must implement these consistently, honestly, and competently to foster investor, market, and society confidence that SEZs are not simply going to be another avenue for corruption, self-enrichment, and failure (Gumede 2022a; Gumede 2022b). The business environment must be conducive, efficient, and friendly. The costs of doing business – registration, logistics and customs – should be conducive to companies setting up. The public infrastructure – power, rail, and water – for SEZs must be working, reliable, and cost effective. Poor, unreliable or lack of infrastructure is a significant factor increasing the costs of doing business, global pricing competitiveness of products manufactured and of labour utilisation. Sound infrastructure is a vital competitive advantage for investors to set up shop in an SEZ – without it, it makes no sense. SEZs must also be linked to the supply chains of local industry (Jayanthakumaran, 2003; Johansson & Nilsson, 1997; Cirera & Lakshman, 2014; Litwack & Qian, 1998; Rhee et al, 1990; Rodrik, 2004; Zeng, 2017; UNCTAD, 2019; UN ESCAP, 2019; UNIDO, 2015). Local firms must provide the inputs, material, and services to the companies in the SEZs. If local firms do not have the capacity to do so, it will be crucial for governments to also provide them with assistance, incentives, and rebates to enable them to link into the supply chains of the SEZ firms. Doing this considerably maximises the positive spillover effect of SEZs. South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, for example, provide tax rebates, technical assistance, and infrastructure subsidies for local companies to their SEZs, to foster backwards linkages between SEZ companies and local ones. In addition, there must be a clear strategy of how local firms will be linked to the supply chains of the global firms in the SEZs (UNCTAD, 2019; UN ESCAP, 2019; UNIDO, 2015). Many global firms buy more than half of their inputs from other firms and outsource their manufacturing to other smaller firms. In such cases they only retain design, marketing, and research and development functions. It is important that, as part of the industrialisation strategy, a country encourages global firms attracted to the SEZs to source their inputs locally. And if local companies do not have the capacity to produce inputs for global companies, the SEZ strategy must outline how the capacity of local firms could be built up with the support of foreign investors. This would usually involve incentives being given to foreign players to build the capacity of local suppliers through transferring skills, technology, and providing financial support, where necessary. Governments must actively intervene to overcome market failures in the value chains linking local suppliers to that of international investors (Jayanthakumaran, 2003). For example, local suppliers may not know about the opportunities available to produce inputs for international companies. At the same time, the international companies may not know of the existence of local companies with the capacity to provide inputs for their products. In some cases, the inputs of local companies may be of too poor a standard or too costly for global firms. Government SEZ policy must then provide tools to help local firms to produce quality inputs at affordable prices for global investors. Also, in many cases developing country hosts of SEZs employ predominantly unskilled citizens because educational institutions are weak, ineffective, and under-resourced. The SEZs can be a catalyst to establish new training institutions, research, and development centres, and to upgrade existing ones. There must be clear monitoring, evaluation, and assessment mechanisms to ensure that SEZs are on track to meet their stated objectives (Gumede 2022a; Gumede 2022b). There must be benchmarking of SEZs against comparable successful ones elsewhere, and mechanisms need to be in place to intervene if they are in danger of veering off course. Those managing SEZs must be held accountable for delivering on the stated objectives of the entities. China, for example, in 1996 issued an official administrative decree for the compulsory regular evaluation of SEZ performance: SEZs that are poorly managed, not meeting their development targets, and growing too slowly lose their SEZ status. Chinese SEZs are evaluated based on several performance indicators, including knowledge creation and technological innovation – which are measured based on how much the education level of employees has been uplifted – R&D expenditure, the number of R&D institutions and technology innovation incubators established. Another performance indicator is the level of industrial upgrading and how structural optimisation capabilities have been boosted, which are measured by the number of new high-tech companies created, the number of services firms established, the number of intellectual property registrations, and the number of listed companies attracted to the SEZ. The SEZ performance in China is also measured based on how local companies developed in the SEZs penetrate international markets and fare in global competition, by the ratio of their employees who have received education abroad, and the number of intellectual property registrations lodged abroad (Asian Development Bank, 2007). The Chinese SEZ performance is also measured in relation to companies’ sustainable development capacity increases, by way of looking at the number of employees with master’s and doctoral degrees, the increases in taxable revenues, the growth rate of the companies, and the amount of new investment undertaken. SEZs could be fully government or business owned or could be public-private arrangements. In developing countries, the SEZs that have been fully government owned have mostly failed – as all the governance failures of the public sector, such as corruption, incompetence and red tape are also repeated in the SEZs, making them unviable. Public-private arrangements, in which the private sector co-govern and co-manage, have generally been the most successful. An effective, competent, and pragmatic management structure is crucial in managing an SEZ, and sound operational management skills are vital to its success. Many SEZs in African countries and in South Africa fail from the same lack of implementation and execution management capacity found in their public sectors – especially if the same incompetent public sector managers are operating the SEZs. It is also important that the SEZs’ good infrastructure development is from time to time transplanted to the wider region in which they are situated. This means that the infrastructure built for the SEZs must be part of an integrated public infrastructure development programme, whereby the SEZs’ public infrastructure investment would be the anchor of broader infrastructure expansion. Another point is that SEZs are often giant industrial structures that could damage the environment significantly. Therefore, the construction and management of SEZs must be done in such a way that it protects the environment, which many first generation SEZs neglected. Many are now trying to clawback environmental destruction in the wake of mass industrialisation that took place without taking the environment into account. It is very important that SEZ investors be required to report on environmental, sustainability and governance (ESG) performance. Many of the first generation SEZs’ construction also rarely consulted with local communities, civil society, and interest groups. It is essential that new SEZs do not repeat this mistake. If a site chosen to construct the SEZ involves uprooting local communities, acquiring their land and property, the process must be done in consultation with them, fairly and compassionately. Consultations of local communities, civil groups and interest groups are also essential in identifying the local comparative advantages and to link the SEZ investor activities with local input, material, and services – and so, crucial to maximising the positive spillover effect of the SEZs. Why SEZs have failed in many African countries Some SEZs in African countries have failed for the same reasons that development has failed in these countries (Farole, 2011; Fruman & Zeng, 2015). These reasons include SEZs not being integrated as part of a national growth, industrialisation, or long-term development strategy. SEZs are often set up for ad hoc policy objectives, such as only job creation or only attracting foreign investment. In Africa, only Mauritius, Rwanda, and Morocco made SEZs part of their national development strategies. In many African countries, SEZs are often set up for ideological, patronage, and corrupt reasons – and without making a business case. In many cases African governments established SEZs without having anchor private sector investors, with the exception of Mauritius, who was successful with its SEZs in developing a processed sugar export industry because the government partnered with European processing companies. African SEZs have not prioritised linking industries to global value chains (Jayanthakumaran, 2003). They also have not prioritised using SEZs to develop new industries for export. Neither have African countries used SEZs to add value to the primary commodities they export, or to upgrade their countries’ skills, industrial and technology bases. Projects are often not decided based on a business case, but rather on which company gives the largest kickback. A case in point, the CEO of South Africa’s Dube Port SEZ was suspended because of alleged corruption. Many African and South African SEZs are not internationally competitive – and are economically non-viable. To add insult to injury, the public sector governance failures – such as incompetence, corruption, and inefficiency – that often undermine development, delivery and efficiency in South Africa and African countries, are often replicated in SEZs. These problems have stymied SEZs and continue to do so. The legal, regulatory, and institutional structures of SEZs are often lacking or poorly defined – open to different interpretations or not consistently implemented. Furthermore, in some cases, although national governments decree SEZs, they in many instances do not give them the financial, infrastructure or political support they need. New governments, whether national or provincial, often withdraw support for SEZs established by their predecessors. Furthermore, SEZs in African countries often take a long time to put legal, regulatory, and institutional structures in place – and sometimes even longer to operationalise. Incentives are regularly either uncompetitive or overgenerous, undermining local industry outside the SEZs. Business procedures are slowed down by red tape, and special customs and tax are incoherently applied. Governments often do not have an adequate understanding of the requirements of businesses they want to invest in the SEZs. Many African and South African SEZs start without any anchor business investor, which means that the state is the anchor or biggest investor. In South Africa, the most successful SEZ is the Tshwane SEZ, which started with an anchor investor, the Ford company. Public infrastructure in African and South African SEZs is often as bad as in other parts of South Africa, with the supply of power, water, rail, roads, ports, and internet frequently not consistent. This makes it unproductive for investors to set up in SEZs – as the cost of infrastructure is a determining factor. In South Africa, and in many African countries, the governance management structures of SEZs are in many instances run solely by the state – and the corruption, incompetence, and mismanagement that is found there is oftentimes replicated in the SEZs. One of the reasons for the success of the Tshwane SEZ has been the partnership between the government and the private sector, where both co-govern the management structure. Many African and South African SEZs are not linked to their domestic economies, but operate largely as enclaves, disconnected from the national economy and local businesses (Litwack & Qian, 1998). Investors in SEZs are also insufficiently linked to local suppliers. And there are for the most part no special efforts to strengthen the capacity of local suppliers who may not have the capacity to deliver inputs to foreign companies in the SEZs. For another, SEZs also often do not integrate primary, secondary, and tertiary industries into the investor supply chain. Unlike in China, Singapore, or Taiwan, African and South African SEZs regularly do not integrate the boosting of research and development into the industrial value chains of companies in the SEZs (Zeng, 2017). The technical learning, knowledge transfer, and industrial upgrading is therefore not as effective as it has been in many Chinese, South Korean, or Singaporean SEZs. This means that the positive spillover effects of SEZs are absent or minimised. Many African and South African SEZs have faced opposition because they were constructed on sites where local residents had to be forced off their land, moved out of their homes, and their ancestral and historical sites disturbed. This has led to local communities often being hostile to SEZs in their areas. For example, communities opposed the construction of the Makhado, in Limpopo, and Dube Port, in KwaZulu-Natal, SEZs over allegations that their land rights had been trampled on. It is therefore crucial that land, property, and historically sensitive site disputes with local communities over the location of SEZs are resolved in a participatory manner. More importantly, SEZs must not be located on sites where it involves displacing communities, expropriating their property, and desecrating their historical sites. SEZs: Policy lessons for South Africa There has to be a solid business case for creating an SEZ. However, many of South Africa’s SEZs have been established without a credible business case. In 2001, the government established the Coega Industrial Development Zone in Gqeberha to create an integrated steel producing hub. The steel hub was not based on a business case that looked at global demand over the coming years. Not surprisingly, the government struggled to attract initial anchor business investors. The business case for the Musina Makhado SEZ in Limpopo is also not clear. The Musina Makhado SEZ is supposed to be an energy metallurgical cluster centred around a coal cluster, which consists of 20 interdependent industrial plants, including ferrochrome, ferromanganese, stainless steel, high manganese steel and vanadium steel, thermal, coking, coal washery and lime, and cement plants. The Limpopo provincial government said 11 memorandums of understanding have been signed with the Chinese government for investment of around US$1.1 billion. The government said 70% of what would be produced will be exported to China. But there is a real danger that the Musina Makhado SEZ may not align to global demand, so crucial to the success of any SEZ. In September 2021, China’s President Xi Jinping (Volcovici, Brunnstrom & Nichols, 2021) told the United Nations General Assembly that China will not build any new coal-fired power projects overseas, in support of increasing its green and low-carbon energy footprint in developing countries – which raised questions around building a coal cluster SEZ in Limpopo based on exports to China. The South African government often takes a long time to put legal, regulatory, and institutional structures in place for SEZs – and sometimes even longer to operationalise. When finally in operation, business procedures are slowed down by red tape, and special customs and tax are incoherently applied. In comparison, the Hamriyah Free Zone in Sharjah, in the United Arab Emirates could grant a license to establish a business within 24 hours of submitting all the required documents. The problem is that South African national, provincial or city governments often do not have an adequate understanding of the requirements of businesses they want to invest in the SEZ. The government services provided for SEZs are also frequently not tailored for the investors they want to attract. Then Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies announced the formation of the Musina Makhado SEZ in 2017. However, the project has yet to get off the ground. In March 2021, the Limpopo Economic Development and Tourism Department temporarily stopped the project, saying its environmental impact assessment was “insufficient”. The project was also deemed not to have widely consulted with local communities, traditional authorities, and farmers. Countries face heavy competition for foreign investment, which can go anywhere in the world. This means countries cannot afford to give the same or a lesser value proposition to competitor countries. Despite this, incentives to attract private sector investors in South Africa are often uncompetitive. South Africa’s special economic zone tax incentive was introduced into the Income Tax Act, but it is overly bureaucratic compared to other countries’ SEZ tax incentives – for example, to qualify, the Minister of Trade and Industry and Minister of Finance must approve. Qualified companies can get a reduced corporate tax rate of 15% instead of the current 28% rate (SARS, 2018). Furthermore, companies could get an accelerated depreciation allowance of 10% on cost of any new and unused buildings or improvement owned by the qualifying company (SARS, 2018). Morocco, in comparison, has seven Special Economic Zones, with no corporate taxes for the first five years and significantly reduced rates thereafter (Böhmer, 2011). In Morocco, companies have exemption from building and equipment tax for the first 15 years, and goods entering or leaving the SEZ are not subject to laws on foreign exchange. Companies are also exempted from dividends and share taxes when paid to non-residents and a low tax rate of 7.5% if they are paid to locals. Morocco has built a successful aeronautics industry through attracting global aeronautics players to manufacture for export in the country – with the export industry now accounting for US$2 billion in export revenues. It is critical that SEZ industries are linked to the local enterprises – through market opportunities, access to finance, technology, and training (Rifaoui, 2021). Morocco has focused on building full industry ecosystems in the SEZs, using the SEZs to develop an export manufacturing sector in very specific areas. The country has, importantly, ensured that all the firms in the SEZs are industrially interconnected, linked to local players, and the products linked to global supply chains. In South Africa, Coega, after a slow start, has increasingly fostered linkages with local SMMEs. During the 2015-2020 period, there was a 35% SMME procurement participation rate (Coega, 2020). The Hamriyah Free Zone in Sharjah, in the United Arab Emirates, incorporates fiscal incentives, which include complete exemption from taxes, customs and commercial levies; and financial incentives, which include low rents and subsidised energy (Böhmer, 2011). Many global firms want infrastructure incentives to invest in SEZs (Rodríguez-Pose et al, 2022). South Africa not only generally does not offer generous infrastructure incentives, but the country’s infrastructure – power, rail, and ports – is also deteriorating, which is actually a disincentive to attract investors for local SEZs. The success so far of the Tshwane SEZ is instructive for other SEZs in South Africa. The Tshwane Automotive SEZ launched in 2019 was initiated by government securing a private sector anchor investor first – the Ford Motor Company – rather than government being the anchor investor. The Tshwane SEZ is co-governed in a genuine public-private partnership. Most SEZs in South Africa have been state-led and started without a private sector anchor investor. In the Tshwane SEZ, Ford, the national and provincial governments, and the City of Tshwane have been co-governing the SEZ in a public-private partnership from the start. Ford is represented on the management board of the entity, which includes representatives of the dtic, Gauteng Department of Economic Development, and the City of Tshwane. The SEZ has been given clean audits since its inception, and the government has spent R2 billion on the project. In South Africa, SEZs have not been integrated into a long-term development plan, industrialisation, or growth plan. Such a plan must be based on an analysis of the state of the country’s economy, its development needs, and its human capital. Related to this, there has to be a comprehensive analysis of the country’s comparative position in the global economy, trade, and supply chains. In fact, most of the SEZs in South Africa have been set up for ad hoc policy objectives, either by national or provincial governments, such as only job creation or only attracting foreign investment. Many of South Africa’s SEZs operate largely as enclaves, disconnected from the national economy and local businesses. Investors in SEZs are insufficiently linked to local suppliers. There are often no special efforts to strengthen the capacity of local suppliers who may not have the capacity to deliver inputs to foreign companies in the SEZs. For another, SEZs also often do not integrate primary, secondary, and tertiary industries into the investor supply chain. SEZs have also not been able to effectively upgrade South Africa’s skills, industrial and technology bases. Unlike in China, Singapore, or Taiwan, African SEZs also often do not integrate the boosting of research and development into the industrial value chains of companies in the SEZs. The technical learning, knowledge transfer and industrial upgrading in South African SEZs has therefore not been as effective as it has been in many Chinese, South Korean or Singaporean SEZs. This means that the positive spillover effects of SEZs are absent. The problem for South Africa is that SEZs have not delivered the volume of export manufacturing, value add production or employment as expected. Neva Makgetla writes that national government transfers to SEZs amounted to R1.1 billion in 2020-2021, from R600 million in 2013-2014, and after a peak of R1.7 billion in 2017-2018. However, Makgetla rightly says that these figures excluded provincial transfers, which for example in the Eastern Cape ran up to R500 million a year (Makgetla, 2021). According to the dtic figures, in 2021, Coega accounted for half of the private investment to SEZs, the East London IDZ accounted for 20% and the Dube Trade Port for 10% (dtic, 2021; Makgetla, 2021). Over the 2013 to 2019 period, manufacturing employment dropped by 3.7% and valued added manufacturing only rose 0.7% (Makgetla, 2021). Many of South Africa’s SEZs have frequently faced opposition because they were constructed on sites where local residents were forced off their land; or they were constructed without being sensitive to the environment (Buthelezi, 2022). This has often caused the SEZs to face community, court, and civil society challenges – making it difficult for them to get off the ground. There really needs to be greater consultation and involvement of local communities and environmental safeguards when sites for SEZs are identified. Conclusion The location of SEZs is no longer a comparative advantage, which means that SEZs will have to be internationally competitive. SEZs can only be successful and competitive if they are a well-thought-out part of a national development, growth, and industrial plan. There must be a business case for SEZs, based on the country’s comparative advantages, and they must be internationally and locally competitive. They have to be governed competently, honestly, and according to consistently implemented laws. SEZs have to be closely monitored, benchmarked, and have clear goals. They must be held accountable for their performance, and if they fail, they may have to in some cases be reduced as SEZs. They must also operate in ways that safeguard the environment, use green technology, and uphold human rights. SEZs must resolve Africa’s industrialisation challenges, including the inability since colonialism and apartheid to link African products to global value chains. In addition, Africa has not only struggled to add value to its primary commodities, but has also struggled to build manufacturing, diversify product offerings, and produce export industries. Africa has been unable to secure new technology, knowledge, and skills. The reality is that unless SEZs can help African countries accomplish all these important tasks, there is no business case to establish them. 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The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The eight parties to the Multi-Party Charter invited a wide range of civil society organisations to get input as to what civil society expect from the Charter. This engagement was held on 28 November 2023 at the Birchwood Hotel in Boksburg. The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) attended the meeting in order to gain a deeper understanding as to the objectives and policy approaches of the Charter. It was noted that the individual parties would continue to campaign independently, and that the Charter was in effect a pre-election coalition agreement. The Charter does not have its own set of policies, but have agreed a set of principles around which a government programme should be designed. The ISI will continue to monitor the developments within the Charter.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) participated in the CiviNovis/School for Social Innovation/Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Masterclass on Coalition Governance, which was held at the Dutch Reformed Church Hall in Bellville Cape Town on 7 and 8 November 2023. The ISI was represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel. The workshop entailed the garnering of a deeper understanding of the current state of affairs regarding coalitions in South Africa, case studies and group discussions. It also explored coalitions that count, that is a focus in ethical practices, and resilience through mindful compassion. It also considered future perspectives apropos coalitions in the country.

The National Planning Commission [NPC] held a Consultation Session on the Social Cohesion Framework on Thursday, 23 November 2023. The Inclusive Society Institute was represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel. A presentation was made by Commissioner Abba Omar with regard to the Social Cohesion Framework Document (click here for framework document / click here for presentation), and the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture presented their Revised National Strategy for Social Cohesion and the National Social Compact for Social Cohesion and Nation Building. Included in the NPC’s strategy is the establishment of a Social Cohesion & Reconciliation Committee, which will be multiparty in nature, and a Social Cohesion & Reconciliation Council which will be composed of NPOs, relevant research organisations, Labour, Business, the Office of the Deputy president, key departments and Chapter 9 Institutions.

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) visited Constructor University in Bremen, Germany, on Monday, 20 November 2023, where he met with Professor Klaus Boehnke, an international expert on measuring social cohesion in countries. The ISI and Professor Boehnke intend to work together in the development of a Social Cohesion Radar for South Africa. The Isi is of the view that social cohesion in South Africa is slipping, and that raising awareness and programmes aimed at enhancing reconciliation and nation-building in the country needs more urgent focus and attention than the current experience. Social cohesion is by no means a nice to have. It is an economic imperative. Research indicates that countries with a high level of social cohesion tend to have a higher level of economic growth when compared with countries that experience low social cohesion. Similarly, social stability is promoted through high levels of social cohesion. The six-month project will be launched in January 2024.

The Inclusive Society Institute's study trip to Denmark, 14 - 17 November 2023, was a pivotal endeavour in understanding the Danish labour business compact, aimed at enriching inclusivity efforts in South Africa. The delegation, comprising Zingiswa Losi (COSATU President), Susan Khumalo (Deputy President, SACTWU), Matthew Parks (COSATU Parliamentary Coordinator), Khulekani Noel Mathe (Deputy CEO, BUSA), Jahni de Villiers (Vice Chairperson, Social Policy Dept., BUSA), Michael James Lawrence (Executive Director, NCRF), Daryl Swanepoel (CEO, Inclusive Society Institute) and Nicola Bruns (Coordinator and Researcher, Inclusive Society Institute) engaged in a series of enlightening meetings. Their interactions spanned from a meeting with Ms. Sofie Holme Andersen at Arbejdernes Landsbank to insights from former Finance Minister Mogens Lykketoft, enhancing their understanding of Denmark's social and economic frameworks. Highlights included a session at Danish Industry, organised by Clara Halvorsen, and a deep dive into labour relations with Jesper Nielsen, Head of Department at 3F United Federation of Danish Workers. The trip also featured a culturally enriching visit to the Workers' Museum, offering a glimpse into the history of Denmark's labour movement. These diverse experiences are set to significantly contribute to the Institute's mission of fostering a more inclusive society in South Africa.

On Monday, 30 October 2023, the Inclusive Society Institute briefed a Swedish delegation led by ACCESS Sweden on the state of socio-economic and political affairs in South Africa. The briefing took place at the offices of Deloitte in Cape Town. ACCESS is devoted to building and strengthening the good relations between the peoples of Sweden and South Africa. The delegation visited South Africa for the purposes of carrying out said objective and to learn and inform themselves about the current state of affairs in the country.

Recent polls from various institutes suggest that South Africa is heading for coalition government, possibly at the national level, but certainly at the provincial level of government. To this end, given the long historical experience of coalition governments in Finland, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) hosted a panel discussion via webinar on Coalition Government: Lessons from Finland. Following the opening remarks of HE Anne Lamilla, Ambassador of Finland to South Africa, and a presentation of recent party support polling data by ISI CEO Daryl Swanepoel, three prominent experts on Finnish Coalitions, made presentations, which were followed by lively discussions. Ms Liisa Laakso, from the Nordic Africa Institute, spoke on Multi-Party Government: Sharing power or building a coalition? Ms Virva Viljanen, from Demo Finland, spoke on the legal framework and best practices of coalition government in Finland. And Prof Jenni Karimäki, from the University of Helsinki, spoke on Finnish traditions regarding the building and maintenance of coalition government.

The Inclusive Society Institute hosted a panel discussion aimed at assessing the impact of the Construction Mafia on the South African economy. The event was held on 11 October 2023 at the offices of Deloitte in Midrand, Johannesburg. This follows the high-level Construction Summit hosted by the Institute on 8 August 2023 in Cape Town, which included speakers from both the private and public sectors, including a keynote address by the Deputy Minister of Finance, Hon. David Masondo MP. One area identified during the summit requiring further attention was the problem of the ‘Construction Mafia’. It was decided to delve further into this, thus the panel discussion. Speakers included: Mr Webster Mfebe, Chief Executive Officer of the South African Forum for Civil Engineering Contractors Mr Gareth Newham, Head of the Justice and Violence Prevention Programme, Institute of Security Studies Brig Lucas (NL) Ramangwa, Section Head: Special Operations and Investigations, South African Police Service

The 17th International Winelands Conference took place in Stellenbosch on 16, 17 and 18 October 2023. This year’s theme was: “Re-imagining Public Servant Leadership in a post-capture, post-pandemic governance landscape”. The Inclusive Society Institute attended the conference and was represented by Dr Klaus Kotzé who delivered a working paper titled “Re-imagining governance in South Africa: Putting the Constitution first”. The paper recognises governance shortfalls, while seeking to conceptually investigate where we come from in order to better conceive preferable pathways and modalities for future governance. The paper pursues the ongoing work that the Institute is doing to amplify the centrality of Constitutional principles in governance and civil society. It was therefore opportune to present the paper to an audience of practitioners and experts at a conference focusing on public servant leadership, a key principle espoused by the Constitution and amplified in the paper. The conference was hosted Prof Zweli Ndevu, Director: School of Public Leadership at Stellenbosch University and Deputy Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute. When asked, Prof Ndevu expressed his utmost satisfaction with the proceedings. He highlighted that it was the variety of speakers, representing different sectors, including academia, the public and civil service that contributed to the event’s success. Various delegates mentioned their appreciation for the critical approach of the conference proceedings, which opened space for creative suggestions to South Africa’s urgent crises. In the final plenary, the Prof Mark Swilling suggested that whereas past conferences called for a global rethink on the role of the state, that this process had now begun in full earnest. The Institute will continue playing an active role in pursuing a unified sense of purpose that places the Constitution central to South African governance.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) led an economic delegation to China with the objective of gaining a deeper understanding of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Special Economic Zones regime of China. The delegation attended the Belt and Road CEO Conference that was held on 17 October 2023 at the China National Convention Centre in Beijing. The conference was addressed by a number of high-level speakers including China’s Vice Premier, He Lifeng. The Beijing Declaration of the Belt and Road CEO Conference captured five principles: Adhering to openness and cooperation Deepening connectivity cooperation Adhering to green development Promoting cooperation in the digital economy Adhering to lawful operation and fulfilling…[of enterprises] social responsibility The delegation then travelled to the cities of Xian and Baoji in the Shaanxi province where they inter alia met with the President of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade Shaanxi province, Madame Ma Yuhong. And in Baoji the CCPIT hosted a Business Seminar, which focussed on Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Baoji. They also arranged a tour of a number of industries located within the SEZs..

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute attended a dialogue on South African perceptions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that was hosted by the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD). The dialogue took place at the Sheraton Hotel in Pretoria on 12 October 2023. The dialogue was presented through the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Programme.

Occasional Paper 9/2023 Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. OCTOBER 2023 by Prof William Gumede Former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; former Senior Associate Member and Oppenheimer Fellow, St Antony’s College, Oxford University; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg). Introduction The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), a new anchor institution of the trade alliance, will have to re-examine its role, model, and activities, after struggling to expand as rapidly as envisioned, battling to secure more diversified funding and failing to effectively challenge Western-dominated multilateral development financial institutions as intended at its launch. The BRICS New Development Bank, formerly called the BRICS Development Bank, appointed former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff as president of the bank in March this year, to provide fresh leadership to the organisation. Strengthening the capacity of the NDB, refining its role and structure, was at the top of the agenda of the recent BRICS summit in August. The Shanghai-based NDB was established in 2015 with US$10 billion in paid-in share capital from each member of the BRICS trade alliance – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – which was founded in 2009. The idea behind forming the NDB was to challenge the existing Western-dominated global financial institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), in providing lending to developing countries (Woods, 2006). Simultaneously, the BRICS countries also established a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), with a commitment of US$100 billion, to provide “a framework for the provision of support through liquidity and precautionary instruments in response to actual or potential short-term balance of payments pressures” among BRICS members. This was a direct challenge to the IMF. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was also set up by China to counter the Western-dominated global financial institutions. BRICS and other developing countries have criticised global financial institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF, and World Trade Organization (WTO) for excluding them in shareholding, decision-making, representation voting, and ideas. BRICS have called “for the reform of international financial institutions to make them more representative and to reflect the growing weight of BRICS and other developing countries”. The BRICS members aim to reshape global power, to counterbalance the dominance of the US and Western countries and to give the Global South more power in relation to the West in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization and World Bank, and the IMF – which are dominated by Western countries. BRICS also plan to create, and have tried to set up, their own alternative development organisations to rival Western-dominated international financial, trade and political institutions. Trying to forge a development bank for developing countries, rather than just for BRICS countries The New Development Bank is a key part of the BRICS development strategy to challenge Western-dominated global hegemony. Headquartered in Shanghai, the bank has US$50 billion in subscribed capital. However, the bank has been hoping to raise capital from new members. Currently, the bank has eight member countries and only loans to members, despite envisaging at its launch that it would lend to members and non-members. The only new members, outside BRICS, since 2021 are Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and Bangladesh. Uruguay is in the process of being admitted, and the bank is considering applications from 15 other countries that have applied for membership. Rousseff has stated the bank’s ambition to forge a development bank for developing countries – what she calls “a bank made by developing countries for themselves”. A previous developing country effort to create a successful alternative to the World Bank, the Banco del Sur (Bank of the South), failed to do so (Chandrasekhar, 2014). Leslie Maasdorp, the CFO of the bank, said: “The intention has always been to create a global bank anchored in emerging markets.” The bank’s aim is to lend to, without attaching political conditions such as good governance, structural adjustment, or using the staff or businesses of the lender as part of its loans, to distinguish itself from the World Bank, IMF, and Western lenders. Many developing countries have criticised Western lenders for placing onerous conditions on lending requirements to developing countries, such as insisting countries must introduce neoliberal economic policies – including often extreme austerity measures – use Western advisors and companies, and vote in global multilateral institutions in tandem with Western countries (Bond, 2001; Woods, 2006; Green & Kalomeris, 2015). While the bank may say it will not demand political conditions for its loans, the challenge is going to be for the bank to apply financially responsible conditions, to ensure its grants are prudently used, for the purposes intended, and to extract remedies when lending is abused. Development banks provide funding to large development projects deemed too risky for the private sector. Because of this, they need to put stringent performance measures, financial oversight, project feasibility measures, market analysis, and funds audits in place to ensure the funds provided are prudently used, given that the funded project is already high risk (Gumede et al, 2011). Another challenge for the bank is commercial sustainability, particularly since it sources large amounts of its funding from the markets. The one condition the NDB requires for its loans, is that governments must guarantee the loans they give to domestic state development projects – such guarantees help bring down borrowing costs and lends credibility and authority to the bank. Nevertheless, as eminent Indian economist Chandrasekhar (2014: 10) has warned: “Any form of socially concerned lending that does not yield a return adequate to cover costs and deliver at least a nominal profit will be ruled out (by the NDB). There is only so much an institution whose activities are constrained by market realities can do.” Robust social, economic, and environmental impact assessments are fundamental. Green and Kalomeris (2015) perfectly sum up the challenge for the NDB: “On one hand, the bank can be seen as an alternative to the Western-based conditionality of existing institutions. MDB loan conditions are often called excessive or even hypocritical when requirements exceed the actions of the lender at a similar point of development. On the other hand, if it supports projects with controversial environmental, social, or corruption concerns, the NDB is left open to criticism.” Green and Kalomeris (2015) argue the NDB will have to make sure “that conditionality is prudential, rather than political, is a prerequisite”. Finally, it is moot whether the NDB will be more robust in its respect for the environment, dignity of communities, good governance, and human rights in its development projects than traditional Western lenders. Civil society organisations, the media, and human rights activists in BRICS will have to hold the bank accountable. However, with only three of the founding members – Brazil, India, and South Africa – being democracies, and the rest not, and with a number of new members also likely not to be democratic, it is going to be an uphill battle. Nevertheless, it is crucial that civil society organisations, the media, and human rights activists in the developing world hold the bank accountable to uphold sustainability, good governance, and human rights. New members joining the bank The NDB has struggled to expand to large numbers of emerging markets – from its core five founding members. The bank has expressed as a priority its intention to expand its geographic representation, which compares poorly to other development banks. For example, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was launched in 2016, has 106 members, including 45 members outside Asia and 23 European countries. Dilma Rousseff, the president of the NDB, said the bank was reviewing applications for membership – which is open for members of the United Nations – from about 15 countries. Bringing in new members is critical for the bank to diversify its project portfolio, mobilise capital and to de-dollarise. The bank is keen to get new members to increase its capital base, and it wants to increase fundraising in member currencies, to reduce its reliance on the US dollar. The entry in January 2024 of six new BRICS members – Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – in particular the petrodollar countries, who will also become members of the bank, will not only boost the geographic representation of the bank, but may bring in much-needed fresh capital and projects. Saudi Arabia, for example, is the largest economy in the Middle East and is one of 18 countries in the world with a gross domestic product larger than US$1 trillion. The US is the largest, with US$23 trillion, China second, with US$17.5 trillion, and Japan third, with US$4.9 trillion. Currently, Russia is the only large oil producer in BRICS. The fact that large oil producers such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt will be joining BRICS, means the group will dominate the world’s energy supply. The strength of the US dollar is partially based on the currency underpinning oil trade – the so-called petrodollar – and members of OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) settle their accounts in US dollars. Therefore, if the petrodollar BRICS members trade with their own currencies within BRICS, it could substantially accelerate the de-dollarisation of the world. The bank’s shareholder governance structures provides that the five founding members will retain the majority voting power and the senior board and executive positions. The BRICS jointly hold the majority share of 55% of the bank, with each founding member having an equal voting share. The founding agreement stipulates that the NDB leadership will be rotated among the shareholders. The bank tries to make decisions based on consensus. However, there are fears that China, which has provided the most capital so far, will necessarily dominate decision-making in similar ways to how, for example, the US or Europe dominates the World Bank or IMF. Furthermore, a big challenge for the NDB will be whether it can maintain institutional independence from its shareholders – in order to make decisions based on developmental sustainability, rather than on political motivations. Many developing countries’ domestic development banks have failed because decisions to lend are often based on political patronage considerations, rather than on purely developmental, sustainability and growth reasons, leading to unsustainable, poor quality and low development impact projects. Nevertheless, new members may not be happy to take backseats in decision-making and management – and the bank may have to relook its governance statutes to give new members equitable say. The bank, therefore, will have to find a way to include new members in decision-making, voting and representation – if it does not want to run the risk of being accused of also being dominated by the founders in the same way Western countries dominate global financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. Western sanctions against Russia have undermined the NDB’s operations Western sanctions against member Russia because of its war on Ukraine have also undermined the NDB’s operations, its ability to expand more rapidly and to secure more diversified funding. In fact, the bank suspended all its activities in Russia, fearing Western sanctions – Russia holds 19.4% of the bank’s capital. Fitch, the rating agency, downgraded the bank’s debt from AA+ to AA last year, because of Russia’s holdings in the bank, saying that the bank “could face challenges to issue a long-term bond on US capital markets”. In May this year, Fitch changed the bank’s outlook to stable following the bank’s successful issuing of a US$1.2 billion green bond. The impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on the BRICS development bank is forcing a rethink of the role of the bank. BRICS countries now want the bank to play a central role in de-dollarising the global markets. However, the bank is heavily dependent on US capital markets, with the majority of the bank’s capital, around 70%, in US dollars. The bank could not issue a US$1.06 billion Russian bond after it set up a rouble programme in 2019, because of Western sanctions against the country. Sanctions against Russia have also increased the bank’s borrowing costs – particularly US dollar-based transactions. As a case in point, a five-year US$1.5 billion bond issued by the bank in 2021 had a 1.125% coupon; but two years later a similar five-year bond had a 5.125% coupon, making the bank more expensive than other development banks. Because of the increase in the costs of the bank’s lending, it reduced its new lending. The bank only lent US$1 billion loans in 2022 – partially as a result of the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war. The bank’s CFO, Leslie Maasdorp, told Reuters that, because “of the capital market challenges of 2022, and in an endeavour to preserve the bank’s core financial ratios, there was indeed a slowdown”. The bank’s role in de-dollarisation of the global economy BRICS economies are seeking to reduce the use of the US dollar in trade. Russia is proposing that the New Development Bank (BRICS Bank) should become a clearing centre for a BRICS common currency. “We are ready to discuss them within the New Development Bank framework that may become a kind of clearing centre. This is not the core business for the bank now but this is [also] not the main obstacle to solve the task,” according to Russia’s Finance Minister, Anton Siluanov. Brazil’s President, Lula da Silva, has also put forward that the BRICS bank become a clearing house for a proposed BRICS common currency. “Why can’t an institution like the BRICS bank have a currency to finance trade relations between Brazil and China, between Brazil and all the other BRICS countries?” Lula asked early in the year during a visit to the BRICS bank’s head office in Shanghai (Bloomberg, 2023a). The bank is planning to increase its lending in local currencies, to reduce its reliance on using the US dollar as the dominant currency of transactions. Using local currencies not only strengthens local markets, but it also shields local borrowers from currency fluctuations. The currencies of many developing countries are not convertible, which causes their economies to suffer disproportionally from currency fluctuations. Two-thirds of the NDB’s loan book was in US dollars; currently only 22% of the bank’s transactions are in local currency. The bank wants to increase it to 30% by 2026, and therefore, will push for local currencies to be used more in trade between BRICS countries. The idea is that BRICS members should be able to use their own currencies to finance projects or do trade in other member countries. Leslie Maasdorp, the CFO of the bank, said the reality was that the US dollar was where the largest pool of liquidity is (Sguazzin, 2023). The bank is aiming to increase the use of local currencies to not only reduce the risks of foreign exchange fluctuations, but also as part of the BRICS trade alliance’s strategy to de-dollarise. Most developing countries use the US dollar to trade, borrow and price the commodities they produce. Their economies are therefore sensitive to changes in US monetary policy, which affects the value of the dollar, as it directly impacts on them. Many BRICS members have dollar-denominated debt, which has increasingly become expensive to service, because the US central bank often raises interest rates to counter downturns in its domestic economy. This then destabilises the economies of developing countries, who predominantly trade in US dollars. In the 18 months up to 26 July 2023, the US Federal Reserve, its central bank, had raised its interest rates up 5.25 percentage points – an aggressive strategy, which has destabilised the economies of many developing countries (Bodea, 2023). It has forced foreign capital flows from developing countries to the US where it would be more attractive for them. This depressed the currencies of many developing countries, who are then forced to copy US interest hikes, also destabilising their domestic economies, causing, for example, recessions of their interest rates, which are already high. In addition, many developing countries export or import commodities that are priced in US dollars. Exchange rate fluctuations therefore impact on their imports and exports. And since many developing countries have their debts in US dollars, this means that servicing debts becomes more expensive if their domestic currencies depreciate against the US dollar. Many developing countries also borrow in US dollars – meaning their borrowing costs will also be more expensive. David Malpass, former President of the World Bank, in April 2023, said that around 60% of lower-income countries are at high risk of debt distress – and thus, are severely impacted by US interest rate hikes. Lending in local currency would reduce foreign exchange fluctuations and risks for BRICS members; and will decrease the negative impacts of US domestic interest rate variations, which cause fluctuations in the US dollar, undermining US dollar-based transactions around the globe. The value of the US dollar has increased in relation to most emerging market currencies since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, after the US central bank increased interest rates to tackle domestic inflation in 2022. This has increased the servicing of US dollar debt for developing countries. Vladimir Kazbekov, the chief operating officer of the NDB, explained how localisation of currencies would work. “A project in South Africa can be financed in the [Chinese currency] renminbi, not with US dollars. This would be done especially with projects that require the importing of parts, which would be cheaper to use local BRICS currencies than using US dollars,” Kazbekov said (Mahlaka, 2023). As part of this new strategy to de-dollarise, the bank will, in 2023, lend in the South African, Brazilian, and Indian currencies – either through currency swaps or debt issuing (Bloomberg, 2023b). Two years ago, the bank made a commitment to provide US$3 billion to finance South Africa’s “Just Transition” from coal to renewable energy. However, South Africa has been unable to provide the projects to finance. In 2019, the bank registered an initiative to sell R10 billion in debt on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The bank issued its first South African debt sale in 2023 when it sold R1.5 billion in bonds. The NDB closed the auction of the rand-denominated bonds on 15 August. The South African bond auction raised R1.5 billion, which will be used to fund development, infrastructure, and industrialisation initiatives in the country. The NDB also plans to fund South Africa’s ailing state-owned entities, but will provide funding to private companies too, it says. The bank is already lending in Chinese currency, the yuan. In fact, more than half of the bank’s lending has been in yuan. Most of the bank’s funding has been from the Chinese market, using the proceeds from issuing yuan-dominated bonds in the Chinese market to fund projects. In May 2023, the bank raised 8.5 billion Chinese yuan (US$1.20 billion) through a so-called Panda bond transaction, with the proceeds being invested as part of the bank’s liquid assets. The Bank of China was the lead underwriter of the bond. Up to 100 percent of the net proceeds from a Panda bond, or yuan-denominated bond – which were first issued in 2005 – may be remitted offshore in yuan and converted into other currencies. The bank is now planning to register to issue bonds in Indian rupees to the tune of US$2.5 billion over five years. Typical new projects funded The NDB’s mandate allows it to “support public or private projects through loans, guarantees, equity participation and other financial instruments”. The bank has an authorised capital of US$100 billion. Since its launch, it has approved 80 projects in all of its member countries, translating into a portfolio of US$30 billion. The projects cover transport, water and sanitation, clean energy, digital infrastructure, social infrastructure, and urban development. The bank aims to channel 40% of its lending to climate-related projects. Since the Russia-Ukraine war, the bank has stopped lending to Russia, for fear of Western sanctions. The largest proportion of the bank’s lending is to South Africa, which makes up more than 18% of the bank’s total loans of US$33 billion. The NDB has announced it would provide Transnet, the South African state-owned logistics company, with a loan facility of US$1 billion by the end of 2023 for the modernisation of the Transnet fleet and locomotives. The NDB has given the loan to Transnet on condition that the South African government stands as guarantee for the full loan. Transnet posted an annual loss of R5.7 billion (US$304 million) for the 2022/2023 financial year. The SOE’s debt has ballooned to R130 billion – it is paying R1 billion a month to service this debt pile (Jacobs, 2023). At this rate, the chances are high that Transnet will default on its debt repayments in the future. If this is the case, the government will have to repay the Transnet NDB loan. The NDB in August 2023 also provided a US$75 million loan to Telkom for the expansion of its telecommunications infrastructure and network. In addition, the NDB has given South Africa’s state-owned Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) a R3.2 billion loan to implement Phase Two of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The project involves the building of the Polihali Dam and Reservoir, which is a 38km water transfer tunnel that combines roads, bridges, and telecommunications networks. The project on completion will provide South Africa with 71 million litres of water per year; it currently produces 24 million litres of water per year. The South African government is providing full guarantees for the project – as per the NDB’s lending conditions. In July 2023, the bank approved a US$57.6 million loan to the Serra municipality in the southeastern state of Espírito Santo in Brazil, to develop its public transport infrastructure. In the same month, the bank approved a US$60.95 million water sanitation infrastructure project for the Water and Sanitation Company of Paraiba, in the Brazilian state of Paraiba. The bank also approved a US$120 million loan to the municipality of Aparecida de Goiânia in the state of Goiás in Brazil, to improve urban mobility and social infrastructure. In March 2023, the bank approved a US$638.12 million loan to the government of the state of Bihar in India to improve rural roads. In December 2022, the bank approved a US$346.72 million loan to the state of Tamil Nadu in India for the Chennai Metro Rail Limited state entity to upgrade rail infrastructure. In July 2022, the bank provided US$79.05 million in funding to the state of Meghalaya in India for its Meghalaya Ecotourism Development project. In July 2023, the bank approved 2.415 million yuan to China’s Hubei Province for the establishment of the Wuhan Smart Logistics Hub in the Wuhan Municipality. In June 2023, the bank approved US$50 million to the Bank of Huzhou Co. to finance a municipal project in the Zhejiang Province, to develop low-carbon, clean energy, and energy efficiency. Within the project, the NDB facilitates the private sector in China to bridge the funding gap for clean energy projects. The bank in October 2022 approved US$200 million funding for the Liaoning Environmentally Sustainable Urban Development Project in the Liaoning Province of China to finance sustainable urban infrastructure in the Anshan and Lingyuan Municipalities. Conclusion The Russia-Ukraine war – and the threat of sanctions against the bank – is one of the reasons for the bank’s increase in lending costs, slowdown in lending, and failure to secure more funding from capital markets. The entry of six new BRICS members, especially the oil producers, offers an incredible opportunity for the bank to extend its geographical reach, secure new capital and increase its operations. For BRICS members, the bank is likely to be a key institution, to push its strategy of de-dollarisation. In 2023, as part of this new strategy to de-dollarise, the bank will lend in the South African, Brazilian, and Indian currencies – either through currency swaps or debt issuing. Lending in each other’s currencies will not only be a tool to de-risk transactions against exchange fluctuations, but it is also likely to increase the de-dollarisation of the global economy – over the long term. Under the new leadership of former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, the bank enters a new era, with a focus on becoming a development bank for developing countries. However, to reach this goalpost, and to challenge Western-dominated global development banks, the NDB will have to expand its geographical footprint, dramatically scale up its lending capacity and transform its governance structure to allow for new members to have a say in decisions. Finally, it is critical that the bank respects the environment, sustainability, the dignity of communities, good governance, and human rights in its development projects, footprint, and partnering. References Africanews. 2023. BRICS bank can help African countries tackle urgent challenges. 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US: Cornell University Press. Xinbo, S. 2021. New Development Bank expands. [Online] Available at: https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-09-10/New-Development-Bank-expands-membership-and-moves-to-new-building-13rbKEetuU0/index.html [accessed: 21 September 2023] Xinhua. 2023. Interview: BRICS bank to increase membership, finance in local currencies, says president. [Online] Available at: https://english.news.cn/20230825/76830e2a98b54d418b54d010caf98131/c.html [accessed: 21 September 2023] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

- an Inclusive Society Institute and Daily Maverick collaborative project Hosted by: Daily Maverick Associate editor Ferial Haffajee. Panellists include: Associate Professor, School of Governance at the University of the Witwatersrand Prof William Gumede and Professor of Law, Stellenbosch University Prof Geo Quinot. On Wednesday, 20 September our panel of experts delved into the intricacies of Social Economic Rights as envisioned by our constitution. During this enlightening session, the panel shared their perspectives on the invaluable insights presented by Justice Albie Sachs, a distinguished former judge of the constitutional court.