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The Inclusive Society Institute has embarked on an extensive economic research project, which will culminate in a comprehensive ‘Blueprint for rejuvenating South Africa’s economy’. The methodology includes a series of dialogues with various sectoral stakeholders and policymakers. These dialogues each have two parts to them: Gaining an understanding from the particular sectors perspective as to what the country needs to correct policy wise What new initiatives / policies should be introduced to shift the economy onto a higher growth trajectory. This dialogue with the energy sector was held on Tuesday, 8 February 2022. Some key points raised included, amongst others: Questions were raised with regard to understanding what’s best in terms of the public good, that is private sector versus public sector dynamics. It relates to the revenues that can be used for the broader societal upliftment. The lag time between project announcement versus delivery was bemoaned. For example, lengthy, complex and slow regulatory approval, appointments, planning approval, etcetera. In addition, tenders should be geared towards South African entities. How will the switch to electrical motor vehicles fit into the greater picture of supplying sufficient electrical power? Several inhibitors were raised: Cost of labour The need to shift perspective Central planning missing in the sector New opportunity levers need to be rapidly identified Infrastructure deficiencies means we lose out on opportunities. Liquid fuels: Refineries closing, other need major overhauls There seems to be a disjuncture between planning and implementation Skilled worker shortages – a mismatch between the education curriculum and real economy needs. Model also needs to be overhauled to allow for on the job learning. Questions were raised with regard to NERSA’s functionality A full report on the deliberations will be released in due course.

On the 14th of April 2021, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) hosted a panel discussion on the re-invigoration of South Africa’s economy. The discussion forms part of the institute’s broader economic research into new pathways for economic growth in South Africa. The research seeks to both identify areas where the local economy is out of sync with the globally accepted economic architecture for middle-income developing nations, and to ‘think outside of the box’ in an attempt to develop new solutions capable of placing South Africa onto a higher GDP growth trajectory. The key speakers at the event were Ms Marie Marie-Nelly, Country Director, Africa, the World Bank and Mr Wolfgang Fengler, its Lead Economist for Southern Africa. They were joined by Dr Arthur Minsat, Head of the Unit for Africa and Middle East, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The panel comprised Theo Vorster, an economist and CEO of Galileo Capital (the institutes economic research group convenor); Prof Tania Ajam, who is associated with the School of Public Leadership at the University of Stellenbosch (SPL) and a member of the President’s Economic Advisory Council; Prof Zweli Ndevu, the Head of SPL and Deputy Chairperson of the ISI; and Ms Joan Fubbs, a director of the Centre for the Education in Economics and Finance (CEEF). The themes discussed included: What do the multilateral funding institutions consider the most appropriate economic structure, policies and environmental conditions needed in middle-income emerging economies and why? In terms of the aforementioned architecture, from a World Bank perspective, where is South Africa performing well, and where is it falling short? What are the corrective measures that need to be taken to reverse the current depressed economic conditions in South Africa? In terms of the aforementioned architecture, from an OECD perspective, where is South Africa performing well, and where is it falling short? What are the corrective measures that need to be taken to reverse the current depressed economic conditions in South Africa?

The Ministerial Advisory Committee on the electoral system held its first consultative meeting with stakeholders on the 30th of March 2021. The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) was invited to present their proposal as contained in its report “Proposed Electoral Model for South Africa”. The institute was represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, and the convenor of the expert panel established by the ISI to develop the proposals. The essence of the ISI’s proposal are: A 400 -national assembly, 300 of which are elected via 66 Multi-Member Constituencies (MMC) and 100 elected via a compensatory proportional representation list. MMCs are based on the boundaries of the current municipal district and metropolitan council, with a number of MMCs in each metropolitan area based on sub-council/sub-regional lines. Party and independent candidates are able to participate for between 3 and 7 seats per MMC. This ensures multi-party representivity across the whole country, and greater accountability to the voters in that representative are accountable to electorate in particular MMCs. The voting system is simple to understand and implement, with only one ballot paper for the national election and one paper for the provincial election. The full proposal is available HERE After considering the range of proposals made at the consultative forum, the institute is of the firm belief that it model is best suited for the current South African realities, and that the main tenets thereof will find its way into the new Electoral Act.

The Inclusive Society Institute, through its CEO, attended the Copenhagen Democracy Summit 2021, which was held on a hybrid basis in Copenhagen and virtually from 10 – 11 May 2021. The Copenhagen Democracy Summit is hosted annually by the Alliance for Democracy Foundation, who has as its objective is dedicated to the advancement of democracy across the globe. The prominent topics that came under discussion included the protection of democracy and the rule of law, protecting democracy from authoritarianism, defending democracy as a core value and investment in democracy tech. In a presentation of the Democracy Perception Index 2021, it was noted that the single biggest threat to democracy is economic inequality. Other key points made during the dialogue was that values should drive foreign policy, and that the rule of law leads to prosperity. The positives and real dangers of social media to elections and democracy was covered extensively during the second day of the summit. Keynote speakers included, amongst others, Anders Rasmussen, former Prime Minister of Denmark and Secretary General of NATO, Zuzana Čaputová, President of Slovakia, Jeppe Kofod, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Adam Schiff, Member of US Congress, as well a number of other former presidents, parliamentarians and democracy experts and commentators from around the world.

The Inclusive Society Institute has embarked on an extensive economic research project, which will culminate in a comprehensive ‘Blueprint for rejuvenating South Africa’s economy’. The methodology includes a series of dialogues with various sectoral stakeholders and policymakers. These dialogues each have two parts to them: (i) Gaining an understanding from the particular sectors perspective as to what the country needs to correct policy wise, and (ii) what new initiatives / policies should be introduced to shift the economy onto a higher growth trajectory. This dialogue formed the 1st part of the manufacturing sector engagement. The main challenges from the various manufacturing sectors can be grouped into: ​IDEOLOGY AND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDUSTRY, UNIONS AND GOVERNMENT: The ideology of the governing party’s National Democratic Revolution seen as antithetical to entrepeneurship e.g attenuation of property rights, mutual lack of trust between private sector and government. Bureaucrats don’t understand business and vice versa, Cadre deployment has destroyed institutional capability at all levels. Govt puts in place first world standards for a third world country. The question was raised: Should entrepreneurs look to govt to solve the problem or should government to step aside and the entrepreneurs solving the problem? On the other hand, business and government are seen to be inter-dependent. A clear and commonly accepted vision for the country is lacking. ​LABOUR LAW: skewed towards big business and labour (formal sector), not small or rural business or informal sector. Minimum wages prohibitive in the rural area, and cost and difficulties in discipline and dismissing non-performing workers. Trade unions demanding double digit increases (will sacrifice jobs for increases). Perceptions that an expensive but low productivity and low skills labour force undermines growth. Impact of BEE – smaller business can’t work with government directly but through a third party which typically adds no value but adds to costs. There are different views on what localisation is and how it should be implemented. ​QUALITY AND PRICE OF UTILITIES/INFRASTRUCTURE/SECURITY: Dysfunctional municipalities, Eskom’s loadshedding, lack of public transport creates reliance on taxis, roads, planning office slow in transferring land ownership, state vet challenges. These force entrepreneurs to invest in water and solar energy systems which increase costs of doing business. We need to get the municipalities right. LOVE HOWICK is an organisation taking over the municipality’s role but at cost to the sponsoring businesses. Costs of security of assets and staff, farmers murdered and increased cost of security. ​RED TAPE: “Make it easy for business to do business”. Costs of compliance with the various plans required by government and accreditation are high and require dedicated staff and resources which would be more profitably applied elsewhere. E.g. Sugar tax process. The business gets a phone call the day before and SARS arrives at the door and they have to explain how the tax works. No scheduling or prior meeting. It disrupted the audit with Woolworths. ​SKILLS AND EDUCATION: It is important to improve basic education as well as science, technology, engineering and mathematics skills development. FOREIGN SKILLS and a positive attitude to immigrants is critical as well as fixing Home Affairs, improving the efficiency of renewal IDs and passports. Business people need it to travel to see customers, suppliers etc. CULTURE OF ETHICS, WORK ETHIC, PRIDE IN COUNTRY, especially the youth ​FINANCIAL SECTOR: invests in malls/consumption (e.g. luxury cars) but not industry/manufacturing. ​TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON GRANTS, a culture of dependency and an economy which cannot support it. ​INSUFFICIENT EXPORT ORIENTATION: Need export incentives and provide import protection for infant industries until they are able stand on their own. ​NEED RUTHLESS POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, NOT JUST DIAGNOSTICS AND PLANNING: The NDP is a good plan but remains largely unimplemented.

The Inclusive Society Institute has embarked on an extensive economic research project, which will culminate in a comprehensive ‘Blueprint for rejuvenating South Africa’s economy’. The methodology includes a series of dialogues with various sectoral stakeholders and policymakers. These dialogues each have two parts to them: (i) Gaining an understanding from the particular sectors perspective as to what the country needs to correct policy wise, and (ii) what new initiatives / policies should be introduced to shift the economy onto a higher growth trajectory. This dialogue formed the 2nd part of the manufacturing sector engagement. A number of initiatives were proposed, amongst others: The primary steel manufacturing needed to be more competitive, either through the improvement of the existing and/or the introduction of new investors with more efficient technology. Old and inefficient technology should not be protected via protective duties. As regards the steel industry, where protective duties are currently in place, whilst the local producer seemingly has an inability to provide sufficient product, proposals for a USA-type exemption system was proposed. Similarly, the current basket-price mechanism has to be revisited. On protection mechanisms: One cannot protect the primary producer, without protecting the downstream industries. A number of examples for the removal of red-tape and the labour law overhaul were made. Revitalise the previous rural industrial development parks, also considering the past-incentivisation mechanisms. Greater efforts on stimulating demand, with special emphasis on creating markets beyond the local. Local markets are too small. Products need to be geared to be internationally viable.

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, attended the Progressive Governance Summit which was held from 9 to 11 June 2021. Keynote speakers at the opening session included Olaf Scholz, Vice Chancellor and Federal Minister of Finance of Germany and Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada. Scholz spoke about the tasks for progressive governments to fend off authoritarian regimes. He said that the biggest tasks for progressives was to create hope by letting every citizen know that he/she has a future in the country. This would counter populist rhetoric. Trudeau’s message concurred. He said the role of progressive governments were to reassure, support and empower its citizens. A wide range of topics were discussed over the three days, including, amongst others: Successful governing in an Age of Complexity: Humble as the New Vision The New World of Work after the Pandemic: Who are Winners and Losers? Tomorrow’s Tech Economy: Pathways to Carbon-free Innovation Landscapes Resisting the Far-Right: Progressive Narratives that Restore Trust in Democracy Europe’s Sovereignty Post-Pandemic: Entering an Era of Deglobalization? From Building Back Better to the European Green Deal: Advancing the Climate Agenda Strategies for a World without Right-Wing Populism and Nationalism Placing Politics above Economics: How Covid has led to a Public Finance Paradigm Shift Europe in the 2020s: Reinvigorating the Spirit of Reform People Power: A message to the G& The Struggle for Democracy: How to Turn Back the Authoritarian Tide Building a New Era of Multilateralism Germany after Merkel Campaigning during and after the Covid-19 Pandemic New Economic Paradigms After the Crisis: Centre-Left Comeback or Another Conservative Decade Empowering the Politically Abandoned: Addressing Inequalities in the 2020s Visions for Europe’s (Digital) Future Stronger Together! Background Discussion on European Solidarity between National Parliamentarians from EU Member States Mayors as Progressive Motors Progressive Majorities: Best-Practices Politics on Keeping out the Centre-Right Intergenerational Justice and Social Mobility Post-Covid

Analysts have attempted previews on how the relationship between the US and Africa will unfold under a Biden administration. Given the prominent role of China in Africa, it is also important to understand US – China relationship expectation, and how African countries ought to position themselves within this contestation. Broadly speaking, analysts have suggested that there will be a normalisation of diplomatic relations between the US, China and Africa. In this regard: The Biden administration will build on and deepen the pre-Trump initiatives as they relate to Africa. They will take a more keen interest in Africa. The contestation with China will remain, especially as it relates to trade, democracy and human rights; but the narrative will be more civil and competitive as opposed to combative. Is this so? To date we have seen mixed signals. What to expect going forward? To answer these questions the Inclusive Society Institute held a dialogue on Tuesday, 22 June 2021, with foreign policy experts from the US and South Africa. It aimed to answer the following questions: Expected US policy on Africa Expected US policy on China How should African countries, who wish to retain good relationships with both sides, position themselves to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. Participants included: Prof William Gumede, Executive Chairperson, Democracy Works and Associate Professor at the School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, who moderated the discussion. Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute Ambassador Gert Grobler, former South African diplomat and currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Zheijiang Normal University, China. Dr Bob Weseka, Coordinator: African Centre for the Study of the US, University of the Witwatersrand Prof Tom Sheehy, Principal, Quinella Global, former staff director of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Charlie Snyder, Institute for World Politics, former National Intelligence Officer for Africa Dr Joshua Stone, inter alia, former Professor of International Instruction, Beijing, China—DePaul University, and former Congressional Aide to Congresswomen Barbara Lee.

Inequality in South Africa remains stubbornly high. High-level evidence suggests that twenty-seven years into the new democratic dispensation white citizens remain, on average, three times wealthier than their black compatriots. Inequality within the black community has also deepened. The ISI is of the opinion that this knowledge on its own does not help fully understand the transformational gains made in South Africa, nor does it properly explain the reasons behind the lingering high inequality, which understanding is necessary for the development of policy interventions capable of addressing the problem. In order to find answers, the institute will be conducting a nuanced and more in-depth analysis of data which will culminate in an ‘Inequality, poverty and socio-demographic change in South Africa 27 years after the end of apartheid: an action- and policy-oriented analysis’ report. To this end the Inclusive Society Institute, in collaboration with the Swedish Institute for Future Studies, held a technical workshop on 1 July 2021, to consider: Systemic approaches to understanding inequality and the implications for its measurement; What the best inequality measurement instruments and lenses are for South Africa? This entailed a critical discussion of conventional inequality measures and the consideration of alternatives; and Data shortcomings and alternative data sources for testing and evaluating inequality within society. A high-level panel of experts participated in the dialogue, including: Dr Ellen Ehmke, Senior Expert Inequality, Global Issues; Robert Bosch Stiftung, Germany Professor Jan Jonsson, Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University Professor Carina Mood, also from the Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University Professor Gustaf Arrhenius, Director of the Swedish Institute for Future Studies Dr Anja Roux, lead researcher on inequality for the Inclusive Society Institute and her team. The Inclusive Society Institute’s inequality research is being supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, who’s South African representative, Sebastian Sperling, and his Johannesburg team, also attended.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) hosted an exploratory discussion on Monday, 19 July 2021, as to what interventions were needed to address the perceived breakdown of crime intelligence in South Africa. Experts have for some time now been warning about such a breakdown, the manifestation of which was confirmed through the looting riots of last week that took the country and its security establishment by surprise. In the panel discussion between security experts, who were jointly hosted by the ISI and the In Transformation Initiative, panellists concluded that the riots pointed to a spectacular breakdown in crime intelligence. They were however of the opinion that this was to be expected given the dysfunctionality within the crime intelligence community which had become evident to the crime research community for some time now. The objective of the dialogue, moderated by Mr Roelf Meyer, was to make an assessment as to the of state of play of crime intelligence in South Africa, and to consider the type of interventions that were required to ensure well-functioning crime intelligence in the country. The dialogue served as a scoping exercise for potential research to be undertaken by the ISI and the In Transformation Initiative.

The Inclusive Society Institute has embarked on an extensive economic research project, which will culminate in a comprehensive ‘Blueprint for rejuvenating South Africa’s economy’. The methodology includes a series of dialogues with various sectoral stakeholders and policymakers. These dialogues each have two parts to them: (i) Gaining an understanding from the particular sectors perspective as to what the country needs to correct policy wise, and (ii) what new initiatives / policies should be introduced to shift the economy onto a higher growth trajectory. The dialogue with the FDI community was held in collaboration with the Southern African-German Chamber of Commerce on 24 and 25 August 2021. A sampling of points made during the discussion included, amongst others: Efforts to attract investment should be directed towards areas where South Africa has a competitive advantage. Investment won’t flow to non-competitive sectors and thus such efforts would be fruitless. South Africa should set itself up as a geo-political alternative to other jurisdictions in order to replace manufacturing capacity when such capacity is disrupted. The Covid-19 pandemic has proved the need therefore. South Africa will have to be far more adventurous and expansive in providing electricity generation capacity. It will have to, for example, take into account the transforming automotive industry that is moving away from fossil fuels. Investment is about risk and reward. If government wants manufacturers of large machinery to invest, it will have to assist in creating markets for such reward via the government spend. Do less, achieve more. The country needs to rather focus on a smaller number of deliverables. It is better to get three or four crucial policy areas right, than to spread the efforts across a broad spectrum of areas without the means or capacity to implement them. Stay real. Focus on projects that are achievable within the country’s limitation. Don’t venture with unachievable grand scheme projects which serves only to defocus energy that could rather be used to implement realisable projects in line with the country’s level of development. Fix the trust deficit between government and business. This will require attitudinal changes from both government and business. A new social contract is needed. FDI investment takes a long-term view. Investors therefore need policy certainty. The fluidity of the South African policy regime does not instil confidence. Less regulation. The South African authorities should not strive to outdo the developed world in terms of regulation. The fact that developing countries are less regulated is in fact a competitive advantage that investors take into consideration. The labour force is not sufficiently skilled for the economy, which requires a significant overhaul of the education system and curriculum. A full report on the deliberations will be released in due course.

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, participated in a Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) hosted interactive session on Global Experiences of Social Democracy: “What does Social Democracy have to offer today?” The engagement formed part of the FES’s Fort Hare Autumn School Leadership Programme. ​ The Fort Hare Autumn School Leadership Programme (FHAS) is a political and civic education programme that seeks to create a new ethical leadership culture. The programme includes 25 students, from different institutions based in the Eastern Cape; Rhodes University, Nelson Mandela University, Walter Sisulu University as well as the University of Fort Hare. ​ The discussion focussed on the programmatic and electoral journey of the Social Democratic Parties in Europe and Germany in particular; and how they interpret the fundamental values of today? And more broadly: What does Social Democracy have to offer today? ​ Key discussants at the session included Christian Krell, Prof at the University of Bonn, Member of SPD Committee on Fundamental Values of Social Democracy, and Josefine Rückert, International Secretary of JuSos (Young Socialists, Germany). The discussion was facilitated by Sebastian Sperling, the country representative of FES in South Africa.

The Inclusive Society Institute has embarked on an extensive economic research project, which will culminate in a comprehensive ‘Blueprint for rejuvenating South Africa’s economy’. The methodology includes a series of dialogues with various sectoral stakeholders and policymakers. These dialogues each have two parts to them: (i) Gaining an understanding from the particular sectors perspective as to what the country needs to correct policy wise, and (ii) what new initiatives / policies should be introduced to shift the economy onto a higher growth trajectory. This dialogue, held in Johannesburg, aimed at channelling the thoughts of the SMME sector into the research. A range of concerns were raised, amongst others: The regulatory burden that is impacting the ability of enterprises to focus on their primary production activities. The inefficiency of government bureaucracy which impedes the enterprises ability to execute projects and to develop & grow. The rigid labour laws; and unbridled and uncompetitive competition with foreign nationals. Limitations to funding. A need to redesign the curriculum of the education system, since there is a disconnect connect between the education outputs and the skills requirements within the real economy. A number of proposed solutions were put forward, which proposals will be captured in the report that will emanate from this discussion, and which will be fed into the broader research project.

Eng/ქარ On 14 October 2021, H.E. Mr. Beka Dvali, Ambassador of Georgia to South Africa hosted Mr. Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer of Inclusive Society Institute of South Africa. Mr. Roger Latchman, Honorary Consul of Georgia in Johannesburg and Mr. Teimuraz Kereselidze, the Counsellor at the Embassy of Georgia in South Africa also participated in the meeting. During the meeting, Georgian Ambassador had the honour of getting acquainted with the experience of the above organization in the process of strengthening inclusive society in South Africa. The participants of the meeting also exchanged views about the opportunities of developing bilateral partnerships between Georgia and South Africa in various spheres, including between various Think Tanks, research and educational institutions. 14 ოქტომბერს, სამხრეთ აფრიკის რესპუბლიკაში საქართველოს ელჩმა ბექა დვალმა უმასპინძლა სამხრეთ აფრიკული ორგანიზაციის „ინკლუზიური საზოგადოების ინსტიტუტის“ წარმომადგენელს ბატონ დარილ სვანეპულს. შეხვედრაში, ასევე, მონაწილეობა მიიღეს იოჰანესბურგში საქართველოს საპატიო კონსულმა როჯერ ლაჩმანმა და საქართველოს საელჩოს მრჩეველმა თეიმურაზ კერესელიძემ. შეხვედრისას, საქართველოს ელჩს შესაძლებლობა მიეცა გასცნობოდა ხსენებული სამხრეთ აფრიკული ორგანიზაციის გამოცდილებას სამხრეთ აფრიკაში ინკლუზიური საზოგადოების გაძლიერების პროცესში. ასევე, განხორციელდა მოსაზრებების ურთიერთგაცვლა საქართველოს და სამხრეთ აფრიკას შორის სხვადასხვა სფეროში, მათ შორის, ანალიტიკურ-კვლევით ორგანიზაციებს შორის კავშირების განვითარების შესაძლებლობებთან დაკავშირებით.

Measuring the "Pulse of the People" This presentaion is available for bona fide research on request. Kindly contact us on info@inclusivesociety.org.za with your detailed request.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) hosted a High-level Dialogue on the Establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa on 19 October 2021. The dialogue was a response to the proposal by President Cyril Ramaphosa to establish a National Anti-Corruption Council (NACC). The ISI and the Anti-Corruption Centre for Education and Research (ACCERUS) of Stellenbosch University, through its School of Public Leadership, has entered a partnership to research the realities of international and African Advisory Councils against corruption and to produce a report which will be handed to the public policymakers as a contribution to policy development in this regard. This dialogue aimed to give direction to the research to be undertaken by the ISI and the School for Public Leadership. The dialogue noted that corruption is antithetical to sustainable development, aggravating income inequality, reducing domestic and foreign investment and significantly lowering the quality of public sector services. Addressing corruption will support a more inclusive recovery from the Covid19 pandemic. The dialogue was moderated by Professor Bonang Mohale, President of Business Unity South Africa, Chancellor of the University of the Free State, and Chairperson of the Bidvest Group. Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer of ISI, and Roger Latchman, Convenor of the ISI’s research into corruption, also spoke at the event.

Inclusive Society Institute has embarked on an extensive economic research project, which will culminate in a comprehensive ‘Blueprint for rejuvenating South Africa’s economy’. The methodology includes a series of dialogues with various sectoral stakeholders and policymakers. These dialogues each have two parts to them: Gaining an understanding from the particular sectors perspective as to what the country needs to correct policy wise What new initiatives / policies should be introduced to shift the economy onto a higher growth trajectory. The dialogue with the construction community was held on 19 October 2021. A sampling of points made during the discussion included, amongst others: Do we have a construction industry? The construction sector has contracted over successive quarters, especially as a result of the pandemic. The sector is under severe strain and confidence is low. So little is happening but so many depend on the sector for survival. Infrastructure constraints in respect of water and electricity, too little land for development, losing skills and inadequate skills development processes. Fibre and affordable broadband internet access. Inadequate maintenance of infrastructure beyond project completion and sustainable employment. These constraints are recognised but not addressed. Municipalities need to function to create a conducive environment for infrastructure development. Planning approvals take too long – processes that should take 6 months takes 4 years. Water use licences process also stifle development. Municipalities seldom plan beyond 3-5 years. Political interference in the execution, corruption and mismanagement of resources. Town planning is non-existent, buildings appear haphazardly on vacant land without consideration of complementary infrastructure. Government to employ competent and experienced personnel. Long lead time to implementation of infrastructure projects and inadequate scale: Government has announced infrastructure programmes but little visible evidence. Long lead time to implementation. There is poor planning and uncoordinated implementation. Shouldn’t work in silos to build a construction section. Example of a development – private sector proceeds with the bonded section, but the budgets and the planning not aligned. Schools, police stations not built, solid waste infrastructure. Instead of stimulating growth it becomes a dormitory suburb. Plans go one way (NDP), but reality goes another, widening backlogs. Municipalities don’t have accurate estimates for their populations and in and outflows of people and businesses. Town planning is non-existent, buildings appear on vacant land without consideration of complementary infrastructure. Budgeting not integrated with planning: IDPs, SDFs not quantified, because not costed, and can’t monitor. Densification is a policy objective, but it is more expensive and may not be financially affordable. Government is not a good payer which may undermine project feasibility. Supply Chain Management: Poor budget execution including SCM and supplier selection – government can’t determine a reasonable cost of infrastructure to avoid inflated tenders being awarded, or under-estimates of the true cost resulting in budget over-runs. Results in increase in performance bonds because of uncertainty about whether private sector can deliver on spec and budget. Abuse of panels on SCM, and only panellists can bid which causes corruption and frustration. Lack of transparency in tender adjudication. Guatrans is more transparent. Disqualification of bidders appears to be arbitrary and vague. Time to adjudicate tenders is too long – frequent extensions. Ratio of bids awarded as to those requested is low which wastes private sector time. Subcontractors need to be paid within 30 days, but the main contractor isn’t paid on time. 30% transformation spend. While transformation is imperative, it is often misinterpreted – it should be where feasible for subcontracting 30% and not applied across the board, holistically in the supply chain, not just between main and subcontractors. Ideology: Government sees private sector as funders not as partners in development. Government doesn’t consult the construction industry and contractors in infrastructure planning and design. Government doesn’t appreciate that it cannot create sustainable jobs it can only create an environment. Government has been attracted to social grants rather than infrastructure investment. Lack of trust of the private sector. Limited involvement of local communities: Builder’s mafia” – how can local communities be involved to ensure skills transfer. Government isn’t geared towards smaller businesses. Recommendations: Infrastructure development can catalyse growth and reduce poverty but need to re-industrialise the industry. Instead of importing, materials in the supply chain can be developed locally e.g. valves. The design codes need to be put in place, not only for local content development but for maintenance. Need early contractor consultation as part of holistic development and a single planning vision. Need to fast track PPPs. Now these have come to a halt. Skills: Government needs to understand contracting and specifying outputs and attract competent personnel, and train them using competence based assessment and apprenticeship programmes. Not just technical but social skills and ethics. There needs to be more accountability and incentives for accountability. There needs to be a process review not a policy review. There is a proliferation of policies but little follow through and follow up to the industry. SCM: Emulate Gautrans in being transparent about the bidding process, giving feedback to the bidders. SCM bids should be clear to avoid interpretation. Get the professionals who specified these bids to be more involved in adjudication. Address interpretation of 30% BEE spend requirement – should there be feasibility studies for this? Need combined public sector/municipality-private teams can stimulate green infrastructure. International partnerships need to considered and attract foreign investment. Good practices must be interpreted in the light of our context and constitution. A full report on the deliberations will be released in due course.

On Friday evening, 22 October 2021, the Deputy Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Professor Zweli Ndevu, and its CEO, Daryl Swanepoel, met with the Minster in the Presidency, Hon, Mondli Gungubele. The objective of the meeting was to introduce the work of the institute to the Presidency and to discuss the various research projects related to urgent national issues that the ISI is currently busy with. This included, amongst others, studies into the National Health Insurance, inequality, the Basic Income Grant (BIG), crime intelligence, anti-corruption, the economy and social cohesion. The ISI shared with the Minister its desire to constructively participate as a co-builder in the national dialogue and was encouraged by both the Minister’s commitment and openness to engage the broader public policy community, and the sense of urgency and pragmatism with which the Presidency is seeking solutions to the burning socio-economic issues confronting the nation. Both sides were of the view that resolutions to the issues required the broad support of government, business, labour, and civil society and that all should work in concert within a social contract that was pragmatic, and whilst aspirational, should work within the confines of the current status quo and rules based global realities. The two sides have committed themselves to maintaining open channels of communication.

Occasional Paper 1/2022 Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. FEBRUARY 2022 Author: Dr Marius Oosthuizen BTH, Hons BTH, MSF, M.Phil, Ph.D The state of public integrity in South Africa Overview A paper addressing the current state of public integrity in South Africa, examining the impact of poor public integrity on societal stability, coordination and national decision-making. Defining an ideal-state and approach to enhanced public integrity in South Africa. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Definition of public integrity Public integrity has been defined as: “The consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector” (OECD, 2017). From this definition we see the focus of public integrity as being fairly narrow, and related specifically to the management of affairs in the public sector. Importantly, this definition emphasises the prioritisation of public interest over private interest. As such, the definition which the OECD uses, is centred on the question of whether public affairs are managed in such a way that the prioritisation of public interests predominate in government. Another important aspect of the definition is the manner in which it links public integrity to the role of ethical values, principles and norms, and the manner in which these are upheld. Specifically, this conception of public integrity emphasises the consistent alignment of public affairs in government to ethical foundations, as a test of their integrity. The need for an expanded concept of public integrity While being a useful definition of public integrity in general terms, especially when examining conduct in the public sector, the OECD definition could be argued to not be adequate when assessing public integrity in the South African setting at a national level. For the purposes of this paper, we will refer to the OECD definition as the narrow definition, and contemplate an alternative expanded or multi-dimensional definition. As illustrated by figure 1. below, it follows that the focus of the narrow definition emphasises anti-corruption and the pursuit of governance and accountability in government. The test then, of the level of public integrity in a given national government system, is the level to which it prioritises public interest and does so in accordance with shared ethical values, principles and norms. But for this to be achieved in the South African setting, public integrity must be understood as, governance for the public good in all sectors nationally – including at the interface of the sectors. Figure 1: Narrow definition of public integrity In the context of ordinary state or governmental affairs, the narrow definition seems appropriate. That is to say, any government, acting on behalf of its public, is expected to do so in accordance with the interests of the public and with the public’s ethics, principles and norms, upheld. However, in the specific South African case, this narrow definition is insufficient to navigate the complex reality of the South African situation where public, corporate and social affairs are intertwined and inter-dependant. We will return to this point, but for the time being will consider the operational environment in which public integrity is expressed. Ethics of Functional Silos Various functional silos exist within the public sector, each with their own focus in terms of the public goods or services they aim to deliver. These range, as shown in figure 2. below, from safety and security, environmental management and social cohesion, to matters pertaining to youth, economic access, health, education and increasingly, digital access. This list is not exhaustive but merely demonstrates the range of contexts in which public integrity is contemplated, and more importantly, the range of functional silos, each with its own ethic, in which public integrity must be upheld. This is important to note if we are to contemplate the state and future of public integrity. In democratic South Africa, the functional silos are overseen and managed from a top-down point of view, by the dual processes of procedural democratic (through party-political and participatory policy processes, including the legislature), and day-to-day public management in government by political appointees and bureaucrats. It is in these realms, of politics and governance, that public integrity is expressed or negated. The situation in the private sector is similar in that governance frameworks are constituted by laws and regulations arising from the legislature and government departments, and they are upheld or negated by managers in the ranks of corporate South Africa. However, and crucially, the overall process is an expression of what is first and foremost an underlying foundation of public values and duties – agreed upon by the society. In the South African case, the Constitution is understood to be the reference point for the public values and duties that underpin the political and governance processes, and by extension, the public management or corporate silos and sectors. Figure 2: Ethics of Functional Silos However, to continue the earlier point about South Africa’s complexity: the diversity of cultural, worldview and socio-economic realities of citizens across the South African landscape alongside the interdependence of the public and private spheres, can be argued to make the notion of a homogenous public ethic illusive. Although the constitution is the formal agreed upon framework for the South African nation state, the question remains as to what degree alignment and authentic inculcation of the content thereof has occurred in the society at large, public servants and the institutions that make up the private sector. For instance, are values of individualism in some quarters and notions of collectivism in others, capable of being simply co-accommodated within the constitution’s current human rights framework? Are market-values and their accompanying structures on the one hand, and state-interventionist policies preferred by many ruling elites on the other, easily accommodated side-by-side by the current constitutional aspirations? The answer is of course ‘no’. The contradictions that mark the current South African social, economic and political reality, in terms of diversity but also in terms of relations, remain an unresolved gordian knot. What the constitution does, is to point the way from where the society is to where it wants to be, but it does not describe where it is at present. When we therefore think of public integrity in the South African context, and want to measure and reflect on the standards thereof, we ought to take a broader societal perspective. We need to reflect more deeply about the foundations on which it must be built. When we assess specific cases of public integrity in the governance silos contemplated in figure 2 above, we must also do so in light of the embodied reality of how each silo translates into the lived-realities of everyday citizens. Social location and diversities of ethical imperatives To consider an example that relates to the social dimension of public integrity: One might contemplate the day-to-day reality of a family living in Soweto, the rapidly formalising informal settlement of the apartheid period, then known as the South-Western Township. For the so-called Soweto family, of whom 40-60% of family members are unemployed and increasingly dependant on social grants, the notion of a public good such as free access to electricity is a matter of day-to-day survival and dignity in a modern, developing society. Without free energy provided by the state, it is impossible for such a family to stay warm in winter, to cook food, or have their children study or read books at night. A failure of public integrity then in terms of energy provision by government is a violation of or threat to human dignity at the most basic level. Comparatively, an upper middle class family in an established apartheid-era suburb, who duly pays their rates and taxes, does so to ensure that their up-to-date electricity bill will assure them of energy provision by the state. This will enable them to for instance charge their high-tech devices and stay connected to their offices and schools that increasingly operate online in a post Covid-19 environment. In the first community, state provision of basic services, including energy, is a matter of survival. In the latter, state provision of energy is a matter of progress and comfort. These social differences often play out along racial and group-identity lines in present-day South Africa and means that public integrity as it relates to a particular silo of government translates differently into the ethical imperatives that underpin the public good being provided in different social locations. Therefore, in a situation where the state fails to provide energy security, either due to corruption’s decaying effects on the state’s energy system or a breakdown in state capacity, or due to a failure of overall resources, the families in these communities’ rights are understood to be violated in a very different way. Whereas it is an ethical imperative for the state to provide energy security to both families, in the first case the state is solving for energy poverty to secure citizens’ basic dignity, and in the second it is solving for economic security and leisure to ensure human flourishing. In the first instance, the state has an imperative to provide for the citizens even if they cannot comply with their duty to contribute to the public purse. In the latter, the state must provide for the citizens precisely because they have fulfilled their duty to the public purse. As a result the notion of fairness in relation to state disbursements in each case, must be contextually understood. The ethical foundation of each is different, but both are important to public integrity. When one then overlays the challenges arising from limited resources available to the state, and the present impetus for the transformation of the racial composition of South Africa’s human resource component of the public services and of its socio-economic systems, the matter is complicated further. Simply stated, for the state to deliver services to one party amid resource constraints and so-called transformation imperatives, it must do so by limiting its capacity to deliver services to others. This creates ethical conundrums and competing interests in relation to how public integrity is understood. If the state must act in preferential consideration of one party over another and balance their interests, difficult judgements must be made about what constitutes public integrity. This is complicated further by the interwoven interests of the private sector among and between these same communities contemplated in the example above. Interwoven private and public sector interests in society A historically typical pattern of interests would be that the interests of the suburban citizens are widely served by the private sector due to their formal employment and disposable income levels, while the township citizens are more fundamentally and increasingly dependent on the state. Where interconnected interdependencies do exist, the South African pattern is usually that the private sector, benefiting the suburban citizen, indirectly benefits the township citizen through informal or low-paying jobs and via the tax contributions of the formally employed which contribute a considerable proportion of government revenues. As such, in cases where the state decides to advance the interests of the private sector, it disproportionately benefits the interests of the privileged and only in a secondary manner, the interests of the disadvantaged. The counterpoint is of course that, when the state favours the disadvantaged at the neglect of the private sector, it does so at the material disadvantage of the privileged, given the current composition of the South African political economy. Choices about allocation of state resources between different sectors are in and of themselves choices about public integrity. The implication of the above is that public integrity in South Africa cannot be contemplated in a narrow sense by focusing on public interest as a unitary or one-dimensional item. Nor can it account for the interdependencies in the national system by only focussing on the day-to-day governance and management of the public sector only. In light hereof, as depicted in figure 3 below, a more comprehensive definition of public integrity is needed, that accounts for the multi-level conception of societal relations, and that accounts for the social dynamics in South Africa when considering public integrity. Figure 3: Multi-level perspective of public integrity Public integrity might therefore be defined in as follows: “Nurturing the level of alignment between foundational societal values and norms, through formal institutional arrangements and the constitutional framework in a bi-directional manner. The effective management of societal interests, at social, economic and political level, through and within public institutions. The expression of personal and community values, through sectoral and group ethics, within the laws and regulation created and upheld.” Within such a definition, the role of the public sector in upholding public integrity is crucial, but exists in a dynamic interplay with the role of the private sector and of the citizenry and other social institutions at large. The state of public integrity in South Africa From this point of view, an assessment of public integrity requires an analysis of a range of issues including: The quality of public sector governance and of private sector governance The extent to which the interests of the social partners, government, business, labour and society at large, are served and promoted. The emerging institutional culture evident across the aforementioned dimensions, in terms of governance. How the political process is contributing or undermining the aforementioned and is being itself conducted in relation to ethical considerations. Whether decision-making in governance, policy- and law-making, is taking place in line with shared national interests. Whether the democratic conduct of society, whether in expressing their political views, pursuing their economic interests, or their discontent through the media and forms of public speech, promote the shared national interest. This paper therefore is interested in the question of progress or regress of these multiple factors, bearing in mind the immense scope which they represent. It therefore can merely provide a broad overview of the state of public integrity by reflecting on a range of societal phenomena against the backdrop of the multi-level definition of public integrity outlined above. When public integrity fails: corruption, including sextortion It is widely reported that South Africa is facing endemic corruption. The Analysis of Corruption Trends (ACT) report by Corruption Watch indicates that illicit acts, including the stealing of public monies or incidences of nepotism continued apace in 2021. Thanks in large part to 1964 whistle-blowers in the public and private sectors, the nature and scope of the corruption problem is well known. Corruption Watch observed an annual increase of 12% of acts of corruption in the South African Police Service (SAPS), and disturbingly, complaints of instances where school principals operated outside the regulations of their provincial departments by hiring unqualified teachers and soliciting sexual favours from temporary teachers in exchange for safeguarding their jobs (Pillay, 2021). These two instances, one in the security silo and another in the human development silo, are indicative of the depth of ethical decay that has occurred in South Africa. In the first silo, the ethic of public protection and adherence to the law and rules of society is central to public integrity, but shockingly acts of corruption are being perpetrated by the very individuals tasked with presiding over public compliance. This is starkly demonstrated by the recent case where a police officer is reported to have demanded a bribe from citizens whose family member had been kidnapped (Shange, 2021). Such conduct in the SAPS represents not only illegal and unethical activity in a broad sense but embodies the antithesis of the ethic intended to govern the silo of state activity. Similarly, in the cases of corruption in the health sector where the provision of personal protection equipment and other services were used to siphon monies from the state during the Covid-19 pandemic emergency response (Corruption Watch, 2020), public integrity is eroded at its core. Such a case represents a direct betrayal of the ethic which underpins the governance silo’s existential purpose, of using public resources to promote the health of the public. Such conduct points to a liquidation of the personal ethical substance of many who occupy positions of public service and thereby a departure from the foundations of public integrity. Misuse of public resources for private interests According to Pijoos (2021), the most common forms of corruption are reported to be bribery (28%), procurement irregularities (24%), employment irregularities (11%), abuse of power (9%) and embezzlement of funds (8%). Pijoos also observes that major cities continue to be affected by corruption, with reports to Corruption Watch by whistle-blowers in 2020, rising to as many as 125 from the City of Cape town, 166 from eThekwini, 325 from the City of Tshwane, 354 from Ekurhuleni and 700 reports from Johannesburg. Such occurrences are not limited to the public sector. According to Cala (2021), whistle-blowers allege that “companies are encouraged to corrupt the municipality by billing double the amount for services”. Pijoos (2021) argues that “consequently, the hedges of the country’s democracy are unprotected because politicians and administrators are serving personal, factional and private interests. Not even a global pandemic could make them pause and think about the people they promised to serve.” Corruption Watch has increasingly highlighted the need for the vulnerability of whistle-blowers to be addressed as a matter of urgency. According to Ncala (2021) this is crucial if there is to be any meaningful shift in the efforts to eradicate corruption. To illustrate the point, the recent fleeing from South Africa by whistle-blower Athol Williams, who is said to have been instrumental in the surfacing of illicit acts relating to State Capture. Williams’ case points to the urgency of the problem. In his letter of explanation for leaving South Africa, Williams refers to the assassination of whistle-blower Babita Deokaran, who was gunned down while dropping her daughter off at school, after blowing the whistle on corruption in the Gauteng Provincial Department of Health (Lindeque, 2021). In his public letter, Williams further laments the endemic state of corruption: "We have a very dangerous situation in South Africa where we accept the narrative that only a few bad apples are involved in state capture. The reality is that there are many important and influential people who we revere in society, who we offer awards to, who sit on boards and committees and lead grand initiatives and organisations, who are in fact enabling this capture and benefitting from it. The corrupted web stretches across our society and needs bold action to clear this out. It starts with each of us. Challenge those around you to act with conscience and with courage. Local governance and SOEs governance - Auditor-General of South Africa’s report Amid these challenges, a positive fact that must not be forgotten is that the World Bank in 2021 ranked South Africa's Auditor General as one of only two "fully independent" watchdog entities of their kind in the world. This makes the reporting of the AGSA all the more important as a source of perspective on the state of public integrity (World Bank, 2021). In 2021 the AGSA reported that in the Department of Public Works, to which SOE's such as Transnet, Eskom, SAA and Denel report, irregular expenditure of R25.9 billion was identified. Simultaneously, the AGSA reported that the 257 municipalities incurred an estimated R19 billion in irregular expenditure and over R14 billion in unauthorized expenditure, and another R2 billion in fruitless and wasteful expenditure. High levels of maladministration continue to undermine municipal performance, with News24's "Out of Order Index" estimating an additional 43 municipalities, over and above the 87 already red-flagged by government, being in danger of collapsing. The AGSA found that similar trends are now increasing in South African prisons. The system meant to mete out punitive justice is itself beset with corruption (News24, 2021a). Similar to the SAPS case and the education system and health system above, the dire state of governance in local municipalities strikes at the core of South Africa’s overall capacity to maintain public integrity. Interestingly, much of the maladministration in local government is said to be attributable to low levels of skills among officials and the mismanagement of supply chains and municipal finance (AGSA, 2021). Municipal finance, as a key component of the broader local governance system, has been shown to have been bedevilled by problems associated with the African National Congress' (ANC) policy of 'cadre deployment', but similar challenges have occurred in municipalities run by opposition parties. This points to a deeper systemic and societal origin, as a causal factors to the problem. Crucially, in terms of managing and furthering the interests of the public, the decay of local governance has resulted in an overall weakening of economic prospects for South Africa, not least by increasing the cost of financing in state entities as their risk profiles rise but also through rising administrative costs passed on to the economy, and to the consumer. This is evidenced, for instance, by the recent further downgrade of Transnet by the Moody's ratings agency in November 2021 due to a qualified audit opinion. Daily Maverick's Xolisa Phillips attests to the contestation which occurred between Transnet, Treasury and the AGSA over the audit-findings, where the parties deliberated the issues contributing to the finding as it relates to matters of compliance with the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA). As one of many such contestations between SOEs, Treasury and the AGSA, this denotes a systemic weakness in the governance environment, its framework and the related capacity of the public sector to comply with its own rules. In fact, according to the AGSA, as much as 12% of audited government departments and entities’ “ability to continue as a going concern” is now in doubt, and this includes Eskom which reported a R20.5 billion deficit in 2019-2020. The AGSA put this down to “widespread weaknesses in basic internal controls and little movement towards investing in preventative controls” as well as an overall annual unauthorised expenditure increase from R1.65 billion the previous year to R18.12 billion in 2019-20 (News24, 2021b). Other examples of the siphoning off of public funds include the construction of local social infrastructure, like the sports facilities, such as the incomplete Matatiele sport facilities in the Eastern Cape of which R18.9 million of the project’s budgeted R27 million has been paid, but barely any infrastructure has been erected (Phillip, 2021). All of these cases exemplify a dynamic where, in light of the multi-level definition of public integrity, there is a lack of alignment between citizen values, institutional conduct and the rule of law. Weak proactive monitoring Notwithstanding the AGSA’s independence lauded above, the body itself is confronted with operational difficulties such as the inadequate implementation of the R150 million real-time audits of Covid-19 spending in 2020—2021, due to which the AGSA ran into a budget shortfall of R57 million. Given that the AGSA reported to Parliament’s Standing Committee on the Auditor-General that some of the real-time audit projects were abandoned or redirected and others didn’t achieve the required objectives. The contribution of the AGSA to preventing future corruption remains questionable while its reporting, after the fact, remains crucial (Gerber, 2021). Taken together, the fraying of governance standards coupled with an incapacity to arrest a general decline in ethics, does not bode well for public integrity in the near future. The task of improving public integrity will extend far beyond the removal of so-called “bad apples” in the bureaucracy of government, and require a national reconstruction effort of the ethical foundations. Extension of basic income grants As part of managing the interests of society, South Africa has now developed an extensive and sophisticated social support system centred on direct cash grants. Government is now considering extending the social security system with the introduction of a basic income grant. Considered the Department of Social Development’s pre-eminent policy proposal, the grant would extend the budget of the department beyond the current R15 billion in unauthorised expenditure incurred during the Covid-19 pandemic (Dayimani, 2021), and form part of a mitigation strategy as government responds to the socio-economic setbacks experienced by citizens during the Covid-19 pandemic. What this means is that even as the state is being weakened by the self-interested abuses of public sector and private sector opportunists, the burden of public interests is shifting increasingly from the shoulders of individuals or corporates to that of the state. An embattled state, both in terms of resources and of integrity, is extending itself to being a de facto caretaker state. Naturally, argued from the point of human rights, of national security and of social stability, this policy posture is attractive and somewhat inevitable. But, considered in the context of the overall weakening of economic capacity, partly due to pre-Covid factors such as a lack of investor confidence and then after the pandemic, partly due to a demand-side shock, the national system is weakened even as its burdens rise. The prospect then of a tenuous public budget management environment, within the context of a shifting political landscape, is that anti-corruption must be prioritised at a time when there is less resources in circulation generally. This brings to the fore deep-seated and unresolved questions of whether the collectivist ethics of direct state care, versus the market ethic of indirect public benefit from the economic advancement of those who primarily benefit from the private sectors, ought to be the organising principle for public disbursements. The statists, will likely argue that more fiscal largess is both politically and morally expedient – an ethical imperative, and that the public risks associated with greater fiscal largess do not outweigh the ethical imperatives for social relief. Their market-minded opponents are likely to argue that fiscal prudence and demand-side stimulus in the core industrial and commercial economy should be prioritised on pragmatic, and from a systemic perspective, on social and long-term political grounds. Crucially, these ethical and policy debates about distribution will proceed against the backdrop of persistent post-colonial and post-apartheid legacy systems and power relations, often undertaken along racial and community lines. Importantly, this latter fact will blur the lines of public integrity between the transformation imperatives cited earlier, and individual rights relating to property, economic freedoms and competition. As controversial as it may be, it will likely mean that questionable acts of nepotism and political interference in economic processes, in the state or private sector, will continue but be shrouded in pseudo-moralistic terms by their protagonists - according to which the ends of economic transformation, justify the means of rule-breaking. Accountability for corruption has broken down To demonstrate this dynamic, according to Corruption Watch the Register for Tender Defaulters, a national register created by The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, is empty – meaning that zero suppliers found guilty of criminal offences from doing business with the government have been listed (Cronje, 2021). This signals a total breakdown in accountability and a symbiosis between self-interest and a decline in public integrity. It is seemingly not a stretch to imagine that the lack of accountability at the coalface is related to the interwoven interests between the public and private sector elites, particularly at the upper levels of the social strata. South Africa’s society might be said to be presided over by a plutocratic elite, who have turned narrow interests into shared interest at the top (of power), in order to secure political and economic privilege. That this is, and has for long been a defining feature of South Africa’s political economy and subsequent relations in terms of distribution. That, if allowed to continue, will create a new form of patronage-based rent-seeking which continues to shape market structures and the resultant accumulation of privilege. From that point of view, the specific instances of mutually-beneficial corruption between private and public sector actors, go beyond personal and organisational governance failures and constitute a societal plague of injustice and ethical depravity. It must therefore be asked: Can the current systems, the mid-level formal institutions that are operative between the level of the Constitutional framework at the top and the coalface of citizen interest at the bottom, be reformed? Sources of reform If so, where in the system is reform likely to emanate from? It seems unlikely that the private sector or public sector, at the apex or corporatist level, will enthusiastically lead a reform agenda that improves public integrity. It also seems obvious then, that current emerging efforts at political realignment that are in embryonic stage, constitute an attempt at forging a new and alternative political economy. The battle for better public integrity is in some ways also a class battle. The key systemic risk for South Africa, is that a combination of unethical justifications, both at the citizens level due to deprivation, and at the organising level in politics, combine to high-jack South Africa’s transformation agenda in favour of a destructive revolutionary cycle of uncoordinated social change. As seen in the phenomena of insurgency and the associated looting spree in KwaZulu-Natal in July 2021, the outcomes of such action would amount to a destructive wake of national insecurity. The impact of poor public integrity on South African society and state In terms of public integrity, South Africa is caught between two tides as depicted in figure 4 below. On the one hand, the declining capacity and effectiveness of the state, due to institutional decay as well as resource constraints, and on the other, a rising tide of structural injustices often lamented as persistent poverty, inequality and unemployment. Figure 4: Navigating between two tides As these tides interact, they bring to the fore competing ethical imperatives that will test the very notion of what is considered public integrity. It seems likely that, should they persist and not be arrested, public integrity’s foundations in relation to the seemingly opposed values or principles of collectivism versus market values will become more acute. So too, the tolerance for the disruptive effects of social change and fairness, either as evolutionary and staged, or as revolutionary and unsettling of old patterns of power and privilege sharpen. The effects of these two foundational ethical divergencies and associated debates in the public discourse, and by extension in the policies and conduct of public and private actors and institutions, cannot be overstated. The result, depending on their outcomes, are extremely divergent future natural milieu, in which public integrity will be understood and practiced. Without speculating about which ethical formulation is more likely to succeed in advancing the public interest, it seems obvious that neither an extreme revolutionary and collectivist ethic, nor a slow-burn combination of evolutionary change and market forces will advance South Africa’s public interest at a pace required for national stability. What consequently emerges is a middle-ethic, which must continue to balance the interests of society in often seemingly contradictory ways. Whether tacit or codified, it suggests that a new set of trade-offs across South African society would be required for a new equilibrium to be sustained in terms of the social contract, given the new economic, political and social reality the nation faces in a post-pandemic South Africa. Does the ethical foundation exist to rebuild public integrity? The above observations of grotesque corruption at shopfloor and government department level, along with the broader systemic view, asks if the ethical foundation exists for a public integrity which is able to manage the landscape of interests at this time? The constitution, with its deeply rooted humanist and rights orientated ethic, places at the centre equality and progressive change as its organising principle. It seems that the constitution is insufficiently expressive of the ethic which would need to underpin a patient moderation of expectations in relation to those same interests. The constitution on its own, is inept at articulating fairness in the current milieu. By patient moderation, one does not mean the patience of the poor as they wait for a better life permitted for them from on high, be it through jobs or grants. Rather, the patient moderation also of business people who might exact greater profits, were they not taking account of the ethical imperatives of a newly democratic but still deeply traumatised society. So too, the patient moderation of a politically active class and new middle class, who now see their gains slowly diminish even as they taste upward mobility for the first time. From the point of view of systems of ethical persuasion, South Africa does not have, perhaps not yet, a virtue ethic of citizen identity that can provide a basis for patient moderation. At the same time, the various constructs of collective identity and national belonging, be it the notion of a Rainbow Nation or unity amid diversity, are increasingly out of step with the national climate, and therefore unable to provide a foundation for an national public ethic. The risk thereof, is that a draconian state imposing rules and ethics in a deontological fashion runs the risk of further alienating an already distrustful population. It may be the case, in light of South Africa’s topological social diversity - itself a function of apartheid spatial planning and discrimination – that a single and centralised national ethical foundation remains elusive for South Africa in the medium term. It may be that a decentralised, pluralistic foundation, made up of community-based networks of citizens’ interest, is the only realistic pursuit in search of a solid foundation on which to build for now. Such a recognition would require a significant shift away from the current emphasis which has assumed mechanism of accountability as ideally centralised. Alongside the AGSA, National Prosecuting Authority and the judicial commissions, the strengthening of local and dispersed systems of accountability might be the most feasible instrument in practically improving public ethics. It may be that the rule of law, first at the coalface of for instance local government oversight committees, are the building blocks of a new public ethic. Similarly, it may be that social cohesion and civil obedience, two sides of the same coin, do not in the short-term stem from the constitutional imperatives. Rather, that they stem from individual and community interests, coordinated by new forms of democratic participation. It may therefore be that the South African social contract, which in 1994-1999 stemmed from a grand national effort through codified instruments of institutionalisation, of which the constitution is an example, must now be complemented by a community-by-community basis. In such an approach, the national public ethic arises from a crescendo of diverse and citizen-driven foundations, as opposed to a singular liberation movement. Harness codes of ethics and pledges for public integrity What the state, government and large institutions in the private sector can do now, is to nurture the environment for the emergence of a new framework of good citizenship, in its own ranks and also in the public. A rebuilding of public integrity may therefore require a multi-pronged political, corporate and individual effort which places personal and shared integrity at the core of institutional culture-formation. In this vein, a strategic framework for national action on public integrity may be useful, but unlikely to succeed if it does not address the aforementioned societal contradictions. In that regard, a set of social compacting initiatives that surface and mediate interests, may be required within which the pursuit of public integrity can be couched. Such large-scale social change would require that the levers for action and a theory of change be developed. Mechanisms such as new codes of ethics and a pledge for public integrity, developed in an embodied manner from within institutions, may be required. These efforts are unlikely to succeed until and unless high-profile gestures are forthcoming, that set a new standard for the prioritisation of public integrity. Given the long-term developmental character of the challenges at hand, any successful national effort in this regard will have to involve the education system and the impartation of a core curriculum on public ethics and integrity among South African children, youth and adults. In addition, even as civil society becomes increasingly active in combating corruption, their role in expanding the scope and deepening the reach of a process of national reconstruction of public ethics will be crucial. In this vein, entities such as Right2Know, Corruption Watch, Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse (OUTA) and the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation and other foundations, who have more recently been pitted against public and private sector actors, would need to become allies in a new national partnership for public integrity (Mafata, 2021). What is to be done? Implicit in the recommendations of this paper is a theory of change for the improvement of public integrity. The paper's theory of change rests on the multi-level framework for public integrity, which postulates that the constitutional framework is underpinned by the foundational values and norms of society, that these in turn inform public management conduct, which in turn manifests in the formal institutional arrangements of the state and of government as well as in the private sector in a reciprocal manner. Against this backdrop, a reform agenda which prioritizes public integrity must of necessity pay attention to four imperatives: Strengthening the ethical foundation of society by building cultural familiarity with values, ethics and principles of common interest. Aligning and enhancing the codes, frameworks, systems and monitoring of public management to give expression to higher standards, as outlined in an agreed-upon a national ethical foundation. Rectifying the collapse of adherence to the law, regulation and norms of good ethical and governance practices in formal institutions. Pursuing the first three imperatives within the framework of the Constitution and in such a way as to give expression to the Constitution's human rights and equality-orientated conception of society. The four imperatives can be advanced by the development of a national framework for the enhancement of public integrity, including the proposed development of a national curriculum on public ethics, to which citizens and public servants ought to become socialised. Such a curriculum would include pedagogical strategies to familiarize citizens with matters relating to ethical decision making, values-based conduct, the negotiation of public priorities amid the ethical conundrums of resource constraints. Also, the skills required for debating the public interest in search of the common good, the creation of shared interest and the importance of the notion of a shared future for citizens and different communities. The principles of diversity and participation would be crucial to a national effort of this kind, and ought to be geared toward enhancing transparency and accountability in the day-to-day functioning of the democratic governance process and of the economic order. Therefore, the foundational principle of the rule of law, as an expression of a shared commitment to a rules-based national order, should be sacrosanct. Practically, such a curriculum would need to address the skills gap which exists in the systems of public procurement and supply chains, to create the requisite capacity in the public sector to comply with its own rules. It would thereby need to enhance internal and preventative controls in all sectors as a result. Importantly, such a framework and curriculum cannot be created by any singular state organ, government department or segment of society, but must of necessity be the expression of a joint national effort at finding the common values and shared interests that lie at the centre of an envisioned national democratic South Africa. As previously argued, a single and centralised national ethical foundation is likely to remain illusive for South Africa in the medium term, and as such a national dialogical process must be set in motion. As postulated, it may be that a decentralised, pluralistic foundation, made up of community-based networks of citizens’ interest, is the most realistic pursuit in search of a solid foundation on which to build national consensus for now. This would require catalysing an initiative that strengthens local and dispersed systems of accountability for the practical improvement of public ethics. For this reason, the vast array of knowledge networks such as universities, the faith communities and civil society, as well as the formal public and private sector institutions, would need to be orchestrated to participate in a national ethical reconstruction process. Through such an evolutionary process of cultural restoration, a virtue ethic of citizen identity is expected to emerge, and can be codified, which would provide a basis for national ethical coherence in time. In pragmatic terms, it may provide the patient moderation required from citizens for the building of an increasingly fair democratic order. Such an effort, to quote Whistle-blower Williams once more, would require a revolution of "conscience and courage" from societal leaders, who would need to guard against short-term political expedience and self interest in their own ranks. References Auditor General. 2021a. Annual Report to Standing Committee on Auditor General 12 November 2021. Parliamentary Monitoring Group. [Online] Available at: https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/33780/ [accessed: December 2021]. Auditor General. 2021b. Annual Report 2020-2021. [Online] Available at: https://www.agsa.co.za/Reporting/AnnualReport.aspx [accessed: December 2021]. Bello, P. O. 2021. Do people still repose confidence in the police? Assessing the effects of public experience of police corruption in South Africa. African Identities, 19:141-159. Corruption Watch. 2020. In South Africa, Covid-19 has exposed greed and spurred long-needed action against corruption. [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/in-south-africa-covid-19-has-exposed-greed-and-spurred-long-needed-action-against-corruption [accessed: 21 January 2022]. Cronje, J. 2021. ‘Something is wrong’: Zero names in register of companies barred from doing business with govt. [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/something-is-wrong-zero-names-in-register-of-companies-barred-from-doing-business-with-govt-20211103. [accessed: November 2021]. Dayimani, M. 2021. Another dodgy multimillion-rand stadium project surfaces in Eastern Cape. [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/another-dodgy-multimillion-rand-stadium-project-surfaces-in-eastern-cape-auditor-general-to-investigate-20211022 [accessed date: October 2021]. Gerber, 2021. Auditor General in talks with Treasury to recoup R150m spent on auditing Covid-19 corruption. [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/auditor-general-in-talks-with-treasury-to-recoup-r150m-spent-on-auditing-covid-19-corruption-20210305 [accessed: December 2021]. Lindeque, M. 2021. State capture whistle-blower Athol Williams leaves SA over safety concerns. [Online] Available at: https://ewn.co.za/2021/11/08/state-capture-whistleblower-athol-williams-leaves-sa-over-safety-concerns [accessed: November 2011]. News24. 2021. Out of Order Index. [Online] Available at: https://outoforder.news24.com/ [accessed: November 2021]. News24. 2021. 12% of govt, SOEs still not improving says Auditor-General. [Online] Available at: https://www.citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/government/2455135/12-of-govt-soes-still-not-improving-says-auditor-general/ accessed: November 2021]. Mafata, M. 2021. South Africa: Civil Society Calls on the Public to Stand Up and Fight Corruption. [Online] Available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/202111090205.html [accessed: November 2021]. Phillip, X. 2021. South Africa: Moody's Downgrades Transnet After Qualified Audit. [Online] Available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/202111080632.html [accessed: November 2021]. Pillay, K. 2021. Corruption, dodgy Covid-19 procurement deals and sextortion at schools are on the rise: Corruption Watch. [Online] Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/corruption-dodgy-covid-19-procurement-deals-and-sextortion-at-schools-are-on-the-rise-corruption-watch-370e6cfa-5b13-4387-9ba3-b09457c47414 [accessed: November 2021]. Pijoos, I. 2021. Corruption Watch: City of Joburg tops list with most corruption allegations. [Online] Available at: https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south -africa,2021-08-18-corruption-watch-city-of-joburg-tops-list-with-most-corruption-allegations [accessed: November 2021]. Shange, N. 2021. Senior cop in kidnap unit accused of extorting cash from family of victim. [Online] Available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2021-11-22-senior-cop-in-kidnap-unit-accused-of-extorting-cash-from-family-of-victim/ [accessed: 21 January 2022]. Steyn Kotze, J., Bohler-Muller, N., Roberts, B., Pienaar, G., Davids, Y.D. & Mchunu, N. 2021. South Africa's Thuma Mina moment: public opinion and political trust in South Africa's COVID-19 response. Human Sciences Research Council, Policy Brief, July 2021. [Online] Available at: https://repository.hsrc.ac.za/handle/20.500.11910/16281 [accessed: December 2021]. World Bank, 2021. Supreme audit institutions independence index: global synthesis report 2021. [Online] Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36001?show=full. [accessed: December 2021]. Further reading: Bibliography Ferreira, I.W. 2021. Government Corruption in South Africa, Tummala, K.K. (Ed.) Corruption in the Public Sector: An International. Fowkes, J. 2021. A hole where Ely could be: Democracy and trust in South Africa. International Journal of Constitutional Law. [Online] Available at: https://academic.oup.com/icon/article-abstract/19/2/476/6294785 [accessed: December 2021]. Narotam, K. 2021. The impact of transformative constitutionalism in addressing the marginalization of domestic workers in post-apartheid South Africa with specific reference to Mahlangu and another minister of labour and others. [Online] Available at: HeinOnline.org. University of Pretoria:196. https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/pslr15&div=16&id=&page= [accessed: October 2021]. Rapanyane, M. B. 2021. Seizure of State Organs, Corruption and Unaccountability Promotion in South Africa: Case Study of Jacob Zuma Administration. African Journal of Development Studies (Formerly AFFRIKA Journal of Politics, Economics and Society), 11:251-270. Sindane, N. 2021. Why decolonization and not transformative constitutionalism. Pretoria Student Law Review,15(1):236-154. Teagle, A. 2021 South Africa needs a single anti-corruption unit and real-time monitoring. Human Sciences Research Council Review, 19(1):34-37. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. 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