Search

A report by the Inclusive Society Institute and the In Transformation Initiative Copyright © 2020 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town South Africa 8000 235-515 NPO In Transformation Initiative PO Box 11071 Silver Lakes, 0054 South Africa All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or the In Transformation Initiative or those of their respective Board or Council members. Author: Daryl Swanepoel Language editor: Olivia Main Content Introduction Assessing the status quo Why is SAPS crime intelligence not yielding adequate results? Assessment Way forward References Introduction The Inclusive Society Institute and In Transformation Institute (ISI & ITI) have registered their serious concern with the high levels of crime in South Africa, the fact that a vast majority of the arrests do not result in court action, and the poor prosecution rates through the judicial system. They identified, as a serious concern, their impression that crime intelligence has broken down in the country and that it had become dysfunctional. The institutes’ intuition was confirmed by the riots and looting, triggered by former President Jacob Zuma’s incarceration at Estcourt Prison for contempt of court charges, which, in mid-July 2021, ran wild in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. This resulted in more than 300 deaths, over R20 billion worth of infrastructure damage, and the loss of thousands of jobs (Aljazeera, 2021), setting back South Africa’s economic recovery from already strained levels as it battles to recover from the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. “The state’s inability to foresee or forestall this frightening and destructive series of events that occurred on such a mammoth scale was a monumental failure [of the State Security Council (SSA) and Crime Intelligence] that defies explanation” (Araie, 2021). The breakdown was confirmed by South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa, who confirmed that “the government had failed to meet the riots and violence with an adequate response, and [that] intelligence had failed them on the ground” (BusinessTech, 2021). With this as background, the ISI and ITI held a workshop with experts from the security research fraternity to assess the state of crime intelligence in South Africa; and to consider interventions needed to restore effectiveness in South Africa’s crime intelligence capabilities. The workshop considered whether the ISI and ITI’s intuition with regard to a breakdown in crime intelligence was indeed justified, the problems that were being experienced in the field, and what initiatives the institute could consider in assisting and giving advice and direction to improve the situation (Swanepoel, 2021; Meyer, 2021). Assessing the status quo There are two components to Crime Intelligence (CI), namely, operations and intelligence information management. The strategic objective is to: prevent, combat and investigate crime. evaluate, analyse and collate data. submit intelligence to the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC); and institute counter-intelligence measures within the South African Police Services (SAPS). In addition, they often work on police corruption, and they support international cooperation in the field of crime intelligence (Newham, 2021). In terms of the availability of financial resources to carry out its mandate, the police budget has over the last decade (2011/12 to 2019/20), increased by 81 per cent, rising from R53,5 billion to R96,8 billion. And although CI forms only a small component of that budget (R4 billion), its proportional share has, over the same period, risen at a much higher rate (113 per cent) (Newham, 2021). In terms of personnel, there are around 8,300 people working in the division. They are allocated across the country, mostly at station and provincial level, as well as a strong component at the national level (Newham, 2021). This would indicate that, given the budget and capacity, potentially, there should be substantial intelligence gathered. But analyses of the SAPS annual reports show an alarming decline in performance. An assessment of network operations – which normally lasts between three to six months, and which is aimed at organised crime or criminal networks – shows a drop from 49,019 such operations in 2011/12 to a mere 859 in 2015/2016. It dropped even further to 311 in 2018/2019, whilst recovering slightly to around 700 last year in 2019/2020. Since 2016/17, CI has repeatedly changed their annual performance indicators so that it is not possible to obtain a clear understanding of performance trends since then. This in itself is of concern, as are the types of indicators used. They are output indicators, so it is not possible to assess the impact of the resources and work undertaken (Newham, 2021). This points to a serious problem, as the work of crime intelligence, regardless of the performance indicators they choose to use, is supposed to guide policing in terms of visible and proactive policing, such as by identifying emerging trends, patterns, geographical hotspots and modus operandi. In addition, it is meant to aid reactive policing, like detective work, by providing insights as to how criminal networks operate to store, transport and distribute stolen and illicit goods or services, how money is laundered and where particular criminal suspects might be found (Newham, 2021). In terms of proactive reports, about 4,500 were generated at national level in 2019/2020, most of which were operationalised, that is, contributing to some kind of policing operation. At provincial level there were around 14,000 such proactive reports of which some 11,000 were operationalised. And at cluster level there were 44,476 of which almost 39,554 were operationalised. In terms of reactive reports, 253,538 were generated in 2019/2020 of which 195,727 were operationalised (Newham, 2021). The SAPS annual reports provide no additional information about what these statistics mean but given the deterioration in the police’s ability to reduce organised and violent crime, raises the question as to what value society is deriving from these reports. Certainly, there has been no improvement in the crime and public safety situation in the country. For example, last year, just under 20 per cent of the reported murder cases were solved – a drop of 38 per cent since 2011/12 and just under 17% of aggravated robberies were solved – a drop of 24 per cent since 2011/12. And over the same period murder increased by 37 per cent, and aggravated robberies increased by 43 per cent (Newham, 2021). Why is SAPS crime intelligence not yielding adequate results? Firstly, it is not only Crime Intelligence that is not performing well. Overall, most SAPS policing functions have deteriorated since 2012. The key reason was identified already in the National Development Plan, which spoke of a “serial crises of top management in the police”. Essentially, too many people were appointed to the top ranks of General or Brigadier for political rather than policing reasons. A former senior manager, who investigated the phenomena, suggested four categories of people that constitute CI, namely: those who were appointed for political reasons primarily to act in the interests of the dominant faction of the governing party the ANC. those whom they appoint to support their interests and control in CI (they could be family members, friends or those in their networks). professional operatives that have gone rogue or just lost interest; and a minority of highly motivated professionals who were trying to move the organisation to one in which their position became the dominant position in CI. (Newham, 2021) The difficulties with regard to the political interference started with the appointment of Richard Mdluli as SAPS National Head of Crime Intelligence by Jacob Zuma two months after he was sworn in as President in 2009. Mdluli himself was responsible for well over 200 appointments, many reportedly including family, friends and loyalists. Despite his history in the apartheid Security Branch, he expressed his loyalty to former President Zuma allegedly by playing a role in providing the so-called ‘spy tapes’ that were used to illegally withdraw corruption charges against Zuma, enabling him to rise to the presidency. In addition to interference in the work of SAPS Crime Intelligence, Zuma made a number of appointments to the State Security Agency (SSA) also with the view of supporting his control of the ANC and the country. To understand the extent of the deterioration, the Mufamadi Committee of Inquiry into the State Security Agency, was appointed at the beginning of the Ramaphosa Presidency in 2018. This committee found: That there had been a serious politicisation and factionalising of the intelligence community over the past decade or more. These factions were largely based on factions within the ruling party, resulting in an almost complete disregard for the Constitution, policy, legislation and other prescripts. It turned what should be a civilian intelligence community into a private resource to serve the political and personal interests of particular individuals. A doctrinal shift away from the prescripts of the Constitution, the White Paper on Intelligence, and from the ‘human security’ philosophy, towards a much narrower, ‘state security’ orientation. That the cumulative effect was the deliberate re-purposing of the SSA. Excessive secrecy stifled effective accountability. Abuse of resources. Involvement of Ministers in operational matters. (Anon., 2021) Based on the findings, the committee recommended: That a comprehensive review of the architecture of the South African security community (community-wide architecture) and legislation be done, which should include a review of intelligence coordination and the NICOC. That the mandates of the intelligence departments, including crime intelligence, be refined, and that clearer and more focused definitions of mandates be developed. That the national intelligence training and education capacity for the intelligence community be reviewed. That South Africa’s intelligence doctrine, policies and prescripts, which should be oriented towards the Constitution, and based on the revised White Paper, be confirmed. That options for and consequences of repealing the Security Services Special Account Act No. 81 of 1969, and the Secret Services Act, No. 56 of 1978, be explored. (Anon., 2021) Disappointingly, implementation of the recommendations has not progressed. A further confusing dynamic developed around the question as to who heads CI. Indeed, the situation remains confusing, to the point that it is unclear, given the ongoing legal proceedings in which Peter Jacobs, who was appointed shortly after Cyril Ramphosa’s rise to the presidency to ‘fix’ this division, has successfully halted the irregular disciplinary proceedings against him that resulted in his re-deployment to another component in the SAPS. To outsiders it is unclear as to who is actually currently in charge of CI, nor who will be permanently appointed as the head of SAPS Crime Intelligence. All of which creates accountability issues (Anon., 2021). Moreover, since the political dimensions within the intelligence community seem to run deep, it has become a complicated chess game, with serious consequences as a result. There are worrying suggestions that elements from outside the police may well be able to activate and deactivate elements of the intelligence community (Anon., 2021). The leadership instability at CI is aptly demonstrated in the graphic below, which was published in the Daily Maverick on 13 July 2021 (Dolley, 2021). The central question is why people would want to disable or manipulate crime intelligence, which has been going on for some time? It is suggested that one purpose of making crime intelligence dysfunctional would be to undermine any attempt or likelihood of having successful investigations into high level corruption committed by senior politicians and officials in the state and their partners in the private sector. These have been clearly exposed by the Zondo Commission, but further evidence is required if successful prosecutions are to follow. The second reason could be certain factions are motivated by attempts to gain control of the substantial resources, as alluded to earlier in this report, including for purposes of channelling monies from the Secret Service Account in Crime Intelligence for example, for political purposes. A third reason could be to hollow out CI’s ability to predict, report or investigate political machinations and instigations behind, for example, the looting and unrest experiences in mid-July (Marais, 2021). Apropos the intelligence failure of the looting and unrest: Whether it be attributable to the factional politics within the ruling party or not, whether it is simply the socio-economic needs that led to the opportunistic exploitation of the situation, or whether there was an element of organised crime involvement in the looting and vandalism, CI had a responsibility to know a lot more, and to analyse with much more clarity, than they did. As such, it was a spectacular failure, and no amount of blame-seeking can excuse it (Marais, 2021). The failure also has to do with mandate interpretation of the various intelligence agencies and the propensity of people from the various agencies not wanting to work in multi-structure teams. The SSA would have been engaged, given the strong political motivation behind the unrest, and as well as CI, given the criminal motivation. Until the intelligence structures find a way to efficiently coordinate amongst themselves, crime intelligence will remain weak and dysfunctional. They need to find a way to form joint teams to work together, and to jointly investigate specific threats, in order to mitigate risk (Marais, 2021). Assessment An analysis of the panel discussion leads the institutes to conclude that: Financial and other resources appear not to be the inhibiting factor for the delivery of the timeous, accurate and effective intelligence information required to combat crime and civil unrest threats in the country. Actually, when considering the resources versus output, as has been illustrated in this report, performance of the period prior to 2011/12, CI should, in theory, be able to perform at higher levels than then. Fixing the crime intelligence dysfunctionality lies in matters other than finances. One area of concern is what appears to be the widescale appointment of political associates, and nepotism. Not only has this neutralised operational efficacy, but it has also led to a force that lacks the requisite skills capacity to perform optimally. There appears not to be a cohesive and strategic understanding at the executive level as how to fix the current dysfunction within the intelligence community. The spat between the police and intelligence ministers as to the timely provision of intelligence related to the July unrest is a prime example. In fact, the whole political dynamic within the intelligence community remains problematic, and the provision of timely and efficient intelligence will continue to deteriorate until such time that political leadership is given at the highest level. The two-year timelapse in implementing the recommendations of the Mufamadi Committee’s report is, for example, indefensible, since failure to act has proved to hold a serious real national security threat for the country. The broader intelligence community, and CI in particular, is in dire need of reform. Key changes need to be made to ensure an increase in the functionality of the intelligence community. The National Security Advisor to the President, which post is currently vacant, could play a key role in driving such reform[1]. This position should be filled on an urgent basis with a person who he fully trusts and who has the ability to work over the boundaries of current factions and departments. In similar vein, the National Security Council’s role needs to be properly defined and its relevance as a key instrument in the crime intelligence arsenal settled. There seems to be inadequate accountability, even at ministerial level. The squabbling within and between agencies and their inability to have timeously assessed the situation in the wake of former President Zuma’s incarceration, and to have advised the president, accordingly, is a manifestation thereof. In the main the problem is not technical, it is political (Anon., 2021). The underperformance and dysfunctionality within the intelligence services raises a number of questions that need answering: To what extent do the findings of the Mufamadi Committee of Inquiry into the SSA remain relevant, with particular emphasis on those findings related to CI and its nexus with the SSA? To what extent has the politicisation of CI undermined its capabilities and effectiveness, how deep has the contamination been and what steps are being taken to remedy the situation? In tandem, such an analysis should include an assessment as to the skills set of the unit and the extent to which the qualification requirements of CI were circumvented through the politicisation; and what should be done to remedy the situation. Linked to the aforementioned, to what extent is the doctrine, policies and prescripts of the various intelligence agencies aligned to the Constitution, and where not, what amendments are needed to bring them in line? Likewise, is the skills set and capabilities within CI sufficient for the task at hand; and are there indeed intelligence capacity shortages? Are the mandates of the various intelligence agencies still fit for purpose, what cooperation mechanisms are in place, to what extent does information sharing between CI and the SSA take place, and how effective is such information sharing? And once again, how should this be remedied? In the context of a top-heavy organisational structure, the organigram of CI needs to be assessed. The South African Police Service has around 200 Generals and 600 Brigadiers. The proliferation of chiefs leads to unnecessary duplication of functions and resultant turf battles. To what extent are the internal mêlées impacting the CI and the ability of SAPS operational components to process and act on intelligence received? Way forward The deep-rooted factional divisions within the crime intelligence environment and its politicisation, probably rules out any meaningful prospect of finding internal solutions and remedies to overcome the current dysfunctionality within CI; and to establish in its place a professionalised, capable, efficient, constitutionally inspired, human-orientated service. Such solutions and remedies will have to emanate from an external intervention, which presents its own challenges. Given the security setting within which CI is located, and which by its very nature is wrapped in a veil of secrecy, it will be difficult for external advocates to, without sufficient executive mandate, penetrate the CI establishment. To this end, it is recommended that an independent review panel, comprised of security and intelligence experts from both within and outside of the public service, similar to the then Ministerial Defence Review Committee, be established by the President. Said panel should be mandated to seek answers and solutions to the questions posed in this report, together with others identified whilst engaging the broader security establishment during the process of developing the panel’s mandate. It will assess the continued relevance of the now three-year-old High-Level Review Panel on the State Security Agency report, whether progress has been made with its implementation and broader questions as identified during the dialogue. In order to take the discussion forward, and to give further content to the recommendations contained in this report, the Inclusive Society Institute and In Transformation Institute will co-host a second, more broadly representative dialogue, which will have as its objective a deeper and more nuanced analysis of the status quo, from which: The parameters and rules can be established within which the intelligence services of the country need to confine itself in order to be conducive to the behaviour expected within a constitutional and democratic state. A draft comprehensive mandate for the proposed review panel can be expounded. The process of reviewing the composition, structure and mandate of the intelligence establishment in South Africa can be defined. Recommendations for the structuring and composition of the review panel can be developed; and A proposed mandate for the review panel can be fleshed out. The sobering events sparked by the recent imprisonment of former President Zuma has served as a timely reminder of the crucial role that the intelligence services of a nation play. It illustrated the devastating impact that a broken and dysfunctional intelligence service can have on the economy and general well-being of the nation. We live in a fragile society. Time is of the essence. The necessary thing to do, is act now. References Aljazeera. 2021. South Africa unrest death toll jumps to more than 300. [Online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/22/south-africa-unrest-death-toll-jumps-to-more-than-300 [accessed: 2 August 2021]. Anon. 2021. An independent consultant with extensive experience in policy and advocacy on policing, community safety and post-conflict reconstruction that participated in the Inclusive Society Institute / In Transformation Institute dialogue called to assess crime intelligence in South Africa, which was held on 19 July 2021. Araie, F. 2021. Intelligence failure on co-ordinated insurrection will cost South Africa billions. [Online] Available at: https://mg.co.za/opinion/2021-07-13-intelligence-failure-on-co-ordinated-insurrection-will-cost-south-africa-billions/ [accessed: 2 August 2021]. BusinessTech. 2021. Government moves to stop ‘next phase’ of insurrection in South Africa: report. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/506884/government-moves-to-stop-next-phase-of-insurrection-in-south-africa-report/ [accessed: 2 August 2021]. Dolley, C. 2021. Zuma’s legacy: The build-up to breaking down Crime Intelligence. [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-13-zumas-legacy-the-build-up-to-breaking-down-crime-intelligence/ [accessed: 13 July 2021]. Marais, N. 2021. Panellist at the Inclusive Society Institute / In Transformation Institute dialogue called to assess crime intelligence in South Africa held on 19 July 2021. Nel Marais is the founder of Thabiti, a specialised risk consultancy in South Africa. Meyer, R. 2021. Convenor of the Inclusive Society Institute / In Transformation Institute dialogue called to assess crime intelligence in South Africa held on 19 July 2021. Roelf Meyer is a Director at In Transformation and a member of the Inclusive Society Institute’s Advisory Council. Newham, G. 2021. Panellist at the Inclusive Society Institute / In Transformation Institute dialogue called to assess crime intelligence in South Africa held on 19 July 2021. Gareth Newham is the Head of the Justice and Violence Prevention Programme at the Institute for Security Studies. Swanepoel, D.W. 2021. Panellist at the Inclusive Society Institute dialogue called to assess crime intelligence in South Africa held on 19 July 2021. Daryl Swanepoel is the Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute [1] Subsequent to the drafting of this report, Dr Sydney Mufamadi was appointed on 5 August 2021 as the National Security Advisor. [2] The proposed panel’s mandate will be broader than that of the panel announced by President Ramaphosa on 5 August 2021, who were appointed to focus on a thorough and critical review of the preparedness and the shortcomings in its response to the recent lootings and riots in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng Provinces. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2021 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town South Africa 8000 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members or Members. Author: Daryl Swanepoel Content Introduction US-Africa relations US-China relations The US-China-Africa nexus Conclusions References - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Introduction When President Joe Biden assumed office in January 2021, analysts attempted to predict how the relationship between the United States of America (US) and Africa would unfold under his administration. The relationship needed some healing given the decline in rapport between the two sides under the previous Trump administration, where the US’s “relations with the continent flitted between perfunctory and hostile” (Thomas, 2021). The US foreign relations decline under the previous administration, was not restricted to Africa. Across the globe this held true. It was, however, especially severe between the US and China, where it turned into a direct trade-war confrontation between them (BBC, 2020). All the while, the US has suggested that China’s growing influence in Africa poses a growing threat (Associated Press, 2021), leaving African leaders with the quandary: How to respond to the US-China nexus as it plays out on the African continent? Analyses directly after the Biden administration’s assumption of office was that, broadly speaking, there would be a normalisation of diplomatic relations between the US, China and Africa. In this regard, general consensus was that the Biden administration would build on and deepen the pre-Trump initiatives as they relate to Africa, and that they would take a keener interest in Africa. Similarly, the contestation with China would remain, especially as it relates to trade and human rights; but the narrative will be more civil and competitive as opposed to the combative approach taken by the previous administration. To date there have been mixed signals. Whilst the Biden administration has “reaffirmed the desire for collaboration and cooperation with China in areas that serve American interests, in sharp contrast to the ‘all-encompassing decoupling’ policy toward China in the final year of the Trump administration” (Cheng, 2021), US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, as late as May 2021, accused China of acting more aggressively (BBC, 2021), and some analysts are now suggesting that the US is even opening up new fronts in the trade war with China (Miller, 2021). What to expect going forward? Questions remain: How is US policy on Africa shaping up? And likewise, how is their approach to China being moulded? How should African countries, who wish to retain good relationships with both sides, respond to the dynamics as they play out on the African continent and how should they position themselves to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes? This paper, in an attempt to find answers to the questions posed, summarises the dialogue on the theme of this paper. The dialogue between a range of academics and policy analysts, drawn from both the United States and Africa, took place in late June 2021. US-Africa relations Through the lens of African analysts In a sense, the jury is still out as to what the Biden administration is going to do with regard to its foreign policy towards Africa. It is fair to say that despite the commitments made during the presidential campaign and what has happened subsequently, Africa remains anxious as to what the Biden policies will hold for the continent. It is also fair to say that following the benign disinterest of the previous administration, African leaders are keen to understand what the new approach to Africa will hold (Grobler, 2021). Obviously, following the lows of the Trump era, a unique opportunity presents itself for the United States to improve the relationship visibly and concretely between the US and Africa. The negative dispersions of the previous US president towards Africa, the fact that he did not visit the continent and his failure to support the former Nigerian Finance Minister for the post of Secretary General of the World Trade Organisation, are all examples that served to strain US-Africa relations. The Biden administration can correct and rectify this (DIRCO, 2021; Grobler, 2021). Echoing this is the assertion that at this time in 2017, four years lay ahead under a Trump administration, which saw US-Africa relations reach its lowest ebb. There is a definite sense that the US could have done more during those years. However, what we are now going through is a normalisation of relations between the two sides (Weseka, 2021). The South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) seem to agree. It is of the view that the inauguration of President Biden has not only set the stage for a reset of the South Africa-United States (US) bilateral relationship, but also for a fresh approach by the US in its relationship with the African continent. They say that President Biden has since his inauguration taken decisive steps to move the US away from the nationalist, confrontationist and unilateralist “America First” policies of the Trump Administration. It has sent strong signals that Africa will be accorded greater priority in US foreign policy (DIRCO, 2021). So, in a sense, there has been a quiet return to normality, and business as usual – the period under the previous administration was an anomaly. It is now a continuation and a return to the policies under the Obama and Bush administrations. The continent has generally appreciated these efforts (Weseka, 2021). It remains to be seen as to whether there will be concrete US economic interest, strongly focussing on trade and investment with the continent, or whether it will be business as usual. Six, seven months into the new administration, there are some green shoots. The fact that Biden has appointed a few very experienced officials that know Africa, such as Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield as the US representative to the United Nations, bodes well for US-Africa relations. Moreover, a well-regarded University of the Witwatersrand academic and US analyst said that Thomas-Greenfield worked with China on joint projects on the ground when she was stationed on the continent. Hopefully, she will serve as an advocate for Africa and possibly for a more sensible US policy towards China. And Mary Catherine Phee – an old hand as it relates to Africa – who has been nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, engenders hope, in that they would be strong advocates for a more strategic relationship with Africa (Grobler, 2021; Weseka, 2021). The fact that a number of Nigerian-Americans have also now been appointed to senior positions in the Biden administration bodes well for a fresh approach, as does the codification of Juneteenth as a public holiday in the US, as this will bring new insights into the political discourse (Weseka, 2021). There have been many statements on Africa: President Biden’s virtual address to the African Union (AU) Summit, positive decisions on US’s re-joining of the World Health Organisation and COVAX, all of which were well received and welcomed by Africa (Grobler, 2021; Weseka, 2021). What Africa would now want to see is a US that is pursuing a calculated high level dialogue strategy and to develop a clear comprehensive bi-partisan long-term vision for its US-Africa policy (Grobler, 2021). DIRCO also views Biden’s address to the 34th Summit of the African Union on 4 February 2021 as an indication of the US’s willingness to re-engage with the Continent. In his address, for example, Biden made it clear that the United States stands ready to be a partner of Africa in solidarity, support and mutual respect (DIRCO, 2021). The department also points to discussions between the leaders of South Africa and the United States, where President Biden, once again, expressed the need to engage on matters such as the strengthening of US-South Africa and US-Africa relations, as well as the importance of international solidarity to overcome the Covid-19 pandemic (DIRCO, 2021). The recent indication of support from the Biden Administration for the TRIPS Waiver initiative that is being championed by South Africa and India at the WTO is a further indication of a changed posture towards Africa, especially given the Administration’s willingness to now alter its stance, as it was initially opposed to the request for a temporary waiver (DIRCO, 2021). Although details of the Biden Administration’s Africa policy will only become clearer over time, the Chair of the US House of Representative’s Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights, Congresswoman Karen Bass, has underlined three key issues: (a) US support for the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), (b) the undertaking by the Biden administration to extend AGOA beyond 2025, and (c) the proposed convening of a US-Africa Summit (DIRCO, 2021). This will help immensely with the challenges confronting the continent, including issues such as industrialisation, infrastructure and human resource development (Grobler, 2021). In terms of this proposed strategy, Africa would hope for the US to constructively support the AU Agenda 2063, which is a commendable attempt by African leaders to get Africa to speak with one voice (Sonjica, 2021). The Biden administration inherits important mechanisms and initiatives, such as the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR), Prosper Africa, which aims to link US and African business in terms of trade and investment, and AGOA, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (which expires in 2025), which was established to encourage and support trade between the US and Africa (Grobler, 2021). DIRCO concurs. They argue that a common understanding and alignment is developing between the US and Africa pertaining to trade and investment, and indeed other areas such as the environment, science and technology, education, the fight against climate change and cybercrime, and public health. In this regard, an important recent development has been the US’s joining of other countries in offering support to help South Africa strengthen its capacity for the local manufacturing of vaccines (DIRCO, 2021). These matters are going to be key elements for the Biden administration, who will now have to chart a new way forward. They may have to go beyond AGOA, and also rethink their strategy for US-Africa relations, which will have to be much broader and much more strategic (Grobler, 2021). For the US to be regarded as a valued partner, it will be important for it to consult African countries on the continent’s developmental needs when designing its Africa policy, particularly in the current context of the US-China strategic competition for political influence and economic dominance, and the current status quo, where China is significantly investing in the African continent through its bilateral partnerships and through the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (DIRCO, 2021). Early evidence would suggest that there is hope that the US will move in such a direction (Grobler, 2021). Through the lens of American analysts There has been a shift in US-Africa relations, away from the fairly combative approach taken by the Trump administration (Sheehy, 2021). In the interim national security strategy, for example, when referring to Africa, the previous administration’s paradigms have been taken out and replaced with the bi-partisan themes as ensconced during the Bush and Clinton administrations (Snyder, 2021). It says that the US will continue to build partnerships in Africa, invest in civil society and strengthen long-standing political, economic, and cultural connections. It will partner with dynamic and fast-growing African economies, provide assistance to countries suffering from poor governance, economic distress, health, and food insecurity, especially as exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. The US, it says, will work to bring an end to the continent’s deadliest conflicts and prevent the onset of new ones, while strengthening their commitment to development, health, security, environmental sustainability, democratic progress, and the rule of law. It will help African nations combat the threats posed by climate change and violent extremism and support their economic and political independence in the face of undue foreign influence (Snyder, 2021). Indeed, continuity, even expansion, of the policies of US agencies for development should be expected. For many years, the US has done a lot to help Africa in improving its health environment, and to empower women. This has saved many lives and should be appreciated. Now development agencies have submitted higher budget requests, so there will most probably be more resources available for these activities in Africa (Sheehy, 2021). Also, programmes, such as Prosper Africa (Sheehy, 2021) – which aims to double two-way trade and investment between the US and Africa, attract capital and create millions of jobs (Snyder, 2021) – is expected to continue, although they most probably need more meat on the bones (Sheehy, 2021). One can expect the deployment of resources made available by the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to increase, since it has doubled its capacity and can therefore do more lending. The DFC has strong bi-partisan support, which is bound to see it become more engaged in Africa with support for investment by the US, and even other foreign companies (Sheehy, 2021). There are clear indications that the US wants to get more involved with the combatting of climate change in Africa, which is a positive development given the severity of its impact on the continent. But at the same time, one of the critical issues facing the Biden administration is with respect to green issues. In this regard there are suggestions that the DFC should not support fossil fuel activity and thus some trimming of the DFC’s energy finance activities in Africa should be expected (Sheehy, 2021). The DFC has, for example, approved more than USD2 billion in environmental and energy projects in Africa, including a natural gas pipeline in Egypt, marine conservation in Kenya, and natural gas extraction in the Capo del Gado region of Mozambique (Snyder, 2021). An assessment will need to be made as to how such withdrawal will impact African economies; to which end, Africans will need to have their voices heard as to how they feel about it (Sheehy, 2021). Another area that will require Africans to lobby the US, is the extension of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which expires in 2025. Whilst there are contrary views, there are a number of policymakers and analysts that have a sense that it should be extended, and even go beyond the current provisions. Their view is that the US should be very careful about taking away unilateral trade benefits from the poorest economies, and poorest countries. In fact, AGOA should be built on, they suggest, by, for example, extending the benefits to duty free and quota free access to US markets for agricultural products from Africa, such as peanuts, nuts and even cotton. Consideration as to AGOA’s future will require careful thought and deliberation, especially in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has had a devastating effect on African economies (Sheehy, 2021). Truth be told, however, is that the Biden administration is battling somewhat with figuring out its trade policy with Africa. Whilst the Trump administration preferred a bilateral approach, such as that which he sought with Kenya, this seems to have paused as the Biden administration figures it out. On this point, there has been some discussion at the US State Department about creating deal teams at US embassies across Africa to push the US’s commercial interests (Sheehy, 2021). To this end, the US will undoubtedly be grappling with how to take advantage of the recently implemented African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the largest free trade area to be established since the founding of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and in which Africa intends to integrate its fragmented markets into a single market home to 1,2 billion people. By eliminating restrictions on the free movement of goods, capital and people, it will create an attractive opportunity for US companies to sell and invest in a combined consumer and business base of USD6,7 trillion by 2030. This is not a market that the US will ignore (Snyder, 2021). Fortunate for US-Africa policy and relations, is that there are a number of strong pro-Africa appointees to the Biden administration. The USAID Director, Samantha Power, is, for example, quite powerful and well-regarded in Washington (Sheehy, 2021). She will henceforth also have an expanded role since she will also sit on the National Security Council. Power’s diplomatic career includes significant African experience and she has worked as a journalist reporting from a number of African countries including Rwanda, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The nomination of Power could very well see a revitalisation of USAID’s mandate in Africa following repeated cuts to the organisation’s budget under President Donald Trump (Thomas, 2021). Similarly, Linda Thomas-Greenfield has been appointed as Ambassador to the United Nations. She has previously served as Ambassador to Liberia, and as the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs since 2013. And whilst the Assistant Secretary for Africa, Molly Phee, has a stronger Middle East background, it is known that she has strong links with Thomas-Greenfield (Snyder, 2021). Equally important are the pro-Africanists in Congress and the Senate. The Chairman of the House Committee for Foreign Affairs, Gregory Meeks, has called for a new Africa policy, which he has made his top priority. His Africa subcommittee chair, Karen Bass, has long been a supporter of Africa. And in the Senate, Senator Chris Coons did not hesitate in answering the call to travel to Ethiopia to mediate the recent and currently ongoing Tigray conflict (Snyder, 2021). These allies will be powerful voices to convey the African message. African diplomats should liaise regularly with these US counterparts, with a unique opportunity existing at the United Nations, as all African countries have diplomatic missions there (Snyder, 2021). Another channel that the Biden administration will undoubtedly tap into in order to advance US-Africa relations, is the extensive African diaspora in the United States. As of 2015, there were 2,1 million African immigrants living in the US. One can envisage them partnering with the International Career Advancement Programme and the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation (Snyder, 2021). But having pro-African appointees and allies does not mean that the US will be uncritical towards Africa. The Biden administration will definitely continue to promote a rules-based democratic and human rights world order (Sheehy, 2021). For Africa, the goal would be to advance democracy and governance, peace and security, trade and investment, and development (Snyder, 2021). On this matter, truthfully, it needs to be recognised that much of Africa is struggling, in that a number of African countries are not moving in the right direction. There is a real sense in the US that it has not been tremendously successful in realising democracy, human rights and good governance across Africa. Thought needs to be given as to how the US could be more successful on that front (Sheehy, 2021). Where there is inequality and poverty, democracy will suffer. One has often heard African leaders despair: Don’t tell me about democracy when my people are hungry (Sonjica, 2021). One tactic which may be expected, is for the US to be more supportive of civil society organisations that promote democracy and human rights (Sheehy, 2021). The Biden administration will also place great emphasis on combatting corruption in Africa. There is, for example, growing interest in promoting transparency in the fight against corruption. In January 2021, the administration deployed the Magnitsky Act, by freezing the assets and placing travel restrictions on several Ugandan government officials and businesspersons, who were considered to have undermined free and fair elections in that country (Sheehy, 2021). Then too, there is a security deficit in Africa. The US would want to coordinate more closely with the African Union, as they do, for example, with Europe. However, up until now that pull from Africa has not been there. This is an area worth considering given that both sides would benefit from such cooperation (Snyder, 2021). US-China relations Through the lens of African analysts It was predicted that China would remain a political football in terms of US domestic politics. Americans expect President Biden, and indeed all their politicians, to be tough on China. It would therefore not be realistic to expect the Biden administration to change US-China policy dramatically. And this has now become evident. They are, more or less, pursuing the policy of the previous administration (Grobler, 2021). The first post-Trump US-China engagement did not start on a good footing. Their first engagement in Alaska was confrontational. It seems the Chinese side was taken aback, and surprised by this. They had hoped that a more constructive approach, based on mutual respect, would have been adopted. That did not happen and the Chinese delegation, determined to safeguard its legitimate interests, promptly retaliated in a comprehensive and hard-hitting manner (Grobler, 2021). The sense in China is that the US should realize that they do not represent the world and that they are no longer the undisputed global leader. And since they also anticipate to soon become the largest economy on earth, it is, in their view, only right for them to be approached with the necessary respect, in good faith and integrity. That said, China does not see itself as being in a long-term ideological struggle with the US. To the contrary, they have repeatedly stated that they are ready to engage the US on the basis of mutual respect and on the basis of good faith (Grobler, 2021). But, in their view, this is not the case. President Biden laments the stiff competition with China, inferring that its ambition is to be the leading, wealthiest and most powerful country in the world. It seems, given President Biden’s retort that this would not happen on his watch, that the US’s view is that it is not noble for China to overtake the US (Grobler, 2021). This notion is affirmed by the US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, who says that, whilst it is not the US’s purpose to contain China, or to hold it back, or to keep it down, it is necessary for them to ensure that China upholds the US-led rules-based order, to which China is, according to him, posing a challenge (Grobler, 2021). Needless to say, this does not sit well with China. In their view, they are a strong multilateral country, committed to multilateralism under the banner of the United Nations. Their commitment, China argues, is to multilateralism and not to the US-led rules-based order that represents a minority of the world’s people. The US’s approach, China senses, is unfortunately motivated by a sort of Cold War mentality (Grobler, 2021). China is uncomfortable with the Biden administration’s push for a strong democratic alliance against them. The notion that the Western nations must present a more united front against China is not acceptable to them. China objects to bloc politics and small cliques targeting a certain country and playing up the ‘China threat’ narrative. They find solace in the fact that these nations are not unanimous on the issue. Countries such as France and Germany take the view that they need to continue to consult and cooperate with China, by working together on issues where they can agree, but also understanding that they will need to constructively oppose those issues that they cannot agree on (Grobler, 2021). It is also unfortunate, some posit, that the US administration’s approach is exacerbated by the US Senate’s continued churning out of sanctions against China, since this is leading to a tit-for-tat as China responds with its own measures to combat the perceived onslaught (Grobler, 2021). It is held that any measures aimed at containing China’s economic or diplomatic progress is destined to fail. Many argue that it is counter-productive and not in the interest of global economic growth and development, for the two major world powers to be on a destructive path. Many countries from across Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa want to continue with a constructive engagement, relationship and economic cooperation with China. Whilst there may be obvious differences, for example developments in Hong Kong, evidence seems to suggest that the international community, in the interest of economic cooperation and peace, is eager to pursue the route of dialogue and cooperation as opposed to confrontation (Grobler, 2021). And the potential for such cooperation does not exclude the US. There are many areas that are ripe for enhanced collaboration as well as harnessing their economic competitiveness in a manner that advances the interests of humanity (Grobler, 2021). Yet, despite the current uncomfortable disposition between the US and China, hope remains that cool heads will prevail, and that as the dust settles, and as the US starts to engage China on multinational issues such as climate change and global economics, so too, good sense will prevail. That officials will again start talking to each other and that the bilateral mechanisms that fell by the wayside under the Trump administration will eventually be reactivated. As one analyst puts it: The US and China will never be beer buddies, but there is ample reason for the two sides to work together on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs and in the interest of global security and development (Grobler, 2021). Through the lens of American analysts The US position on China is informed by its interpretation of the historical developments within China. According to them, China, over the period 1949-1989, that is up until the events of Tiananmen Square, broadly speaking, sought to redefine its national identity, industrialise, and secure the Communist Party of China (CCP) as the legitimate governing regime capable of filling the political, ideological and security vacuum left by the overthrowing of the Kuomintang (KMT), which thrust the country into turmoil (Stone, 2021). After 1989, China made a strategic shift in which it committed itself to comply with international norms. President Deng Xiaoping was of the view that the country should hide its capabilities, rise peacefully and conform with international norms (Stone, 2021). Then, in 2013, the US argue, there was a divergence from Deng’s policy, when President Xi Jinping assumed office. China would, under President Xi, no longer hide its capabilities from the international community, it would advance nationalism, restore its prestige and rise (Stone, 2021). All the while, the US, together with its allies, were building a liberal international order, which would consist of international institutions, with rules that would guide relations among nation states and contend with non-state actors. These institutions include, amongst others, the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank. In their view the rules of these institutions were necessary to enhance predictability. States should follow these rules in that they offer outlets to conflict, and enforce principles of conduct. The US, together with its partners, accepted liberal democracy as a necessary dispensation to ensure a uniform liberal order. They work in tandem to ensure the spread of democracy around the world, promotion of capitalism and to integrate all states into this world order (Stone, 2021). China’s military and economic rise, in the US’s view, challenge this international order, since the Chinese system is not compatible with the liberal order that America has embraced. The two systems of governance, and their respective national ambitions, both equipped with significant economic and military might, pretend a return to a type of Cold War once had between the Soviet Union and United States. Whether this is desirable, or inevitable, remains to be seen (Stone, 2021). Against this background, the Biden administration are now also contending with a China that aims to reform the status quo in favour of their own interests, by replacing the US as the hegemon in the immediate sphere of China, that is East Asia and South-East Asia. The US also charge China of attempting to change the nature of the debate with regard to the liberal international order, because liberal values do not, the US protests, reinforce the Chinese priorities, both at home and abroad. State repression, mass detention, border conflicts with India, aggressive actions against Taiwan, cyber espionage, alignment with autocratic regimes – such as Iran, Russia, North Korea, Pakistan – a domestic social credit system, an absence of legal rights, inhibiting freedom of movement internally in China, are all, in the US’s view, antithetical of liberal ideals that are meant to manifest freedom of speech, justice, pluralism, and economic and security cooperation. Collectively, China’s military, economical, and political influence, and contrasting foreign and domestic priorities, the US contend, challenge the very nature of the liberal international order (Stone, 2021). The US charge China of pursuing an integration doctrine, aimed at filling the vacuum left by the US since 2001 as a result of its campaign to combat international terrorism around the world, particular in the Middle East. Nation states can achieve such integration through three different means: compliance, coercion, conflict. This period, the US fears, is one of coercion, which could potentially lead to conflict (Stone, 2021). The aforementioned, sketches the relationship that the Biden administration needs to manage. In doing so, the US and its international partners actively pursue a dual policy of compensation and cooperation aimed at sustaining the liberal international order (Stone, 2021). This it will do by: Firstly, cooperating on issues of mutual concern, such as climate change, cyber security, and nuclear proliferation; and Secondly, reaffirming the rules of the road, and insisting that access to international institutions and their benefits are given only to those that meet the prescribed standards of conduct, which at minimum prohibits genocide, nuclear proliferation, military aggression (unless in self-defence), and oppression in domestic affairs (Stone, 2021). The Biden administration’s China policy is designed within the context of Americans being more concerned with domestic issues that are affecting their daily lives in the now. Moreover, the liberal international order, has, in the wake of the Cold War, borne out the good, bad and ugly results, that is the limitations of foreign interventions, open borders and disparity in collective security. The US and others sold to the world the idea that they would guard against these evils, and that capitalism would reduce inequality, yet it persists. In their wake, it has left a cry for nationalism (Stone, 2021). Therefore, a third objective of the Biden administration is to, within the US, restore faith in the efficacy of the American model. Its focus is on investment in infrastructure and education, and a redefinition of ‘open system’ to include respect for borders and trade with dignity, and the raising of liveable standards to meet the cost of living (Stone, 2021). This forms the foundation of the US’s trade confrontation with China. The US-China-Africa nexus Through the lens of African analysts Even though China considers itself a friend and partner of Africa, the current post-Covid era requires a less emotional and a more critical action-based approach and strategy. This practical and results-orientated policy approach has been institutionalised within the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which has embedded a close policy-based working relationship between the two sides. Indeed, it is expected that when FOCAC convenes in Senegal later this year, the relationship will most probably be taken to higher levels. It is not foreseen that this bond is about to change any time soon (Grobler, 2021). Africa does not share the perspective that doing business with China is to its detriment. At the same time, it wants to continue building its relationship with the US. It wants to work with China and the US without having to take sides and again be caught up in a new Cold War situation. As such, Africa, in its own pragmatic interest, would like to see a process unfolding that would lead to the normalisation of relations between China and the US. Such a situation would be in the interest of Africa, but also for a stable world order, development and security (Grobler, 2021). In fact, at the recent G7 meeting in the United Kingdom, President Ramaphosa, with reference to China, the US and Africa, made the constructive comment during the media conference, to the effect that Africa welcomes those who come on good terms and that the continent does not want to see the one pushing the other out (Grobler, 2021). But one must also expect different approaches. For the US-Africa relations it is normal to anticipate change and continuity; whereas this would not be so in China-Africa relations. This is because of the different political systems that are at play. In the US, administrations frequently change after regular elections, where leadership priorities and policies are bound to vary. This it not so under the Chinese system which by its very nature ensures greater continuity. Hence, China-Africa relations are likely to display greater continuity than would be the case with US-Africa relations (Weseka, 2021). Another point of distinction is the fact that Africa looks to the US and China for cooperation in different fields. For the US it would be for issues such as democracy, human rights, governance, etcetera. Much of this flows from their British and French colonial roots and its entrenched traditions, which civil society and political entities, whilst there could be some variances here and there, have embraced (Weseka, 2021). This also holds true for issues of media and culture. African television viewers tend to watch CNN and/or BBC; very few watch CGTN. Same with newspapers. It is the New York Times, Washington Post, etcetera, not so much the People’s Daily. Many Africans grew up on Hollywood movies. Thus, in the fields of politics and culture, Africans are persuaded to go the American way (Weseka, 2021). When it comes to the economy, the story changes quite dramatically. China overtook the US in 2009 to be Africa’s largest trading partner. This is aptly illustrated in the ICT and tech industries, where despite the Trump administration’s attempts to dissuade African countries away from Chinese 5G telecoms, African countries chose and are committed to Chinese-built telecom infrastructure and fibre optics. Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE, dominate the telecom infrastructure in Africa (Weseka, 2021). As a side note, there is a real fear that the US-China tensions have the potential to impact the achievement of its economic and development targets, especially as this relates to investment in the communications and digital sectors, such as the roll-out of 5G technologies. In this regard, the US targeting of the Chinese telecommunications company, Huawei, which is accused by the US of violating IP protections, could hamper South Africa and Africa’s effective engagement with – and leveraging of – the benefits of the 4th Industrial Revolution, which it is relying on to propel their economies forward and to lessen the widening equality gap (DIRCO, 2021). This sentiment is exacerbated by many in the West who push the narrative that African countries ought to be cautious with regard to the conditions that are attached to Chinese investment, and the toxicity and so-called debt traps that, according to them, comes with their funding (Weseka, 2021). But African countries have not been dissuaded. They continue to look to China for such assistance, countering that the West cautions against Chinese funding, but is not forthcoming with the finance needed to build the roads, ports, and other economic infrastructure (Weseka, 2021). To navigate the dual relationship, Africa will have to contemplate a more considered and coherent framework for its international approach. This will be necessary for it to maximise the opportunities presented by the US, China and others. It needs to be optimally positioned to exploit to its own and mutual benefit, the increasing number of opportunities being made available by the US and China, and indeed others as well. In developing concrete specific objectives, it would have to pursue its own homegrown solutions, ideally developed in concert with both China and the US (and others), who should ideally also align their policies with that of the AU’s Agenda 2063. The launch of the African Continental Free Trade Area could, for example, serve as a powerful catalyst for trade and investment opportunities (DIRCO, 2021; Grobler, 2021). In so doing, Africa will have to encourage both sides to engage in dialogue with a view of resolving the impasse. This will be necessary to effectively address Africa’s socio-economic deficits and for ensuring sustainable growth, development, and the eradication of poverty. The support of reliable international partners is required – in this case both the US and China (DIRCO, 2021). Both countries are considered strategic partners, and hence, both can play an important role in supporting the achievement of Africa’s domestic imperatives. Consequently, both countries should be encouraged to resolve their differences through dialogue (DIRCO, 2021). Mutual cooperation would not only have benefits for both of them, but indeed for the international community. And although US-China interests may diverge in many areas, there is scope for cooperation between the two countries, particularly in areas where their interests coincide. This includes the multilateral arena of climate change, and where the promotion of peace, security and development are concerned, issues that are also crucially important for Africans (DIRCO, 2021), to which end, it may be the opportune time to start triangular consultation and cooperation between Africa, the US and China (Grobler, 2021). Through the lens of American analysts In the early days of the Biden administration, Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken made it clear that African countries would not be forced to choose between China or the US. There was a broad realisation that the Trump style of demanding that countries work with the US against China could not be followed. Such an approach is not popular with African leaders (Sheehy, 2021), who do not want to take sides, as was the case during the Cold War (Stone, 2021). They want the freedom to choose their own international cooperation partners. Also, given the depth and width of Chinese involvement and investment in Africa, it would not be a realistic path to pursue (Sheehy, 2021). Nonetheless, the US will, in large measure, continue with US-China policies as inherited from the previous administration. As to the nexus in Africa, demand will be replaced with an element of persuasion, for example, with regard to information technology, where Chinese enterprises such as TEL are deeply engrained. Another approach could be a shift from diplomatic pressure to the offering of subsidies to countries that opt for Western technology – this approach was discussed at the G7 summit in the United Kingdom in June 2021. It is argued that from an African perspective this should be embraced, in that it presents to them a broader range of options. This, it is reasoned, is also in the interest of African development (Sheeny, 2021). Stepping up US-Africa relations as a countering to China-Africa relations, the US accepts is no easy feat. There is a strong realisation that they are far behind China in Africa (Sheehy, 2021; Snyder, 2021) and that personal relationships matter. If one simply considers the sheer number of personal and diplomatic visits between the heads of states of Africa and China, China is putting the US foreign policy to shame. Then US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Tibor Nagy, commented in an op-ed that the US is being outcompeted in Africa. It is hoped and anticipated that the Biden administration will invest in building personal relationships across the African continent (Sheehy, 2021). To counter, whilst President Biden has already addressed the 34th African Union Summit via video-conferencing in February 2021 (Grobler, 2021), it is anticipated that, at some point, he will visit the continent in person. During 2021 there will also be another US-Africa Leaders’ Summit. It is also expected that senior US government officials will increase their visits to the continent. They will undoubtedly use these opportunities to build and strengthen personal relationships between US and African leaders (Snyder, 2021). The US has also fallen behind China in trade with Africa. As previously mentioned, China overtook the US in 2009 to become Africa’s largest trading partner (Weseka, 2021). Bilateral trade between the US and Africa during the period 2017-2018 rose from USD55 billion to USD61 billion, dwarfed by China whose bilateral trade with Africa rose from USD155 billion to USD185 billion over the same period. The US will deploy various strategies, including those cited in this article, to play catch-up. This it believes it can do, if focussed, as trade is something that the US does well (Snyder, 2021). It should also be recognised that China has taken a march forward with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Snyder, 2021). Research conducted on the BRI in various places, shows that political acceptance levels for Chinese investments are high. But how those resources are spent, allocated, implemented, will stress-test socio-political relationships. This will happen in Africa too (Stone, 2021). Nevertheless, through this initiative, China has made a considerable contribution to infrastructure development, also in Africa. The US, on the other hand, does not do infrastructure investment well, neither does it have a history of participating therein (Snyder, 2021). To counter and carve for itself its niche position, the Biden administration could very well continue with the previous administrations’ provision of technical assistance to African governments. For example, in the field of fiscal governance and the countering of debt trap diplomacy, the US government could assist African finance ministries and budget officials, to give them the tools to better assess potential loans. Frankly, some African loans are good, but many are not, and don’t make sense. The capacity needs to be developed in order to determine whether the loan makes economic sense, what the environmental implications are, what the employment implications are, and whether they employ local folk or provide opportunities for expat employment. In so doing, the US could play an important role in Africa’s development, which role, they anticipate, should be well received by African leaders (Sheehy, 2021). So, who is best positioned to compete in Africa? Is it China or the US? Actually, it will be Africa. They will be able to benefit from both US and Chinese opportunities, which offerings, in essence complement each other (Stone, 2021). But China’s goal in Africa, caution the Americans, is to integrate. It is not benevolent or malevolent, its agnostic to Africa’s situation lest disruptions occur that will harm China’s reputation. This is why China’s largest push into Africa is not economic or political, but symbolic. A public relations campaign that is fed by economic inducements (Stone, 2021). Conclusion As alluded to in the introductory part of this paper, in the days following President Biden’s assent to office, analysts attempted to predict what the US’s policy would be towards Africa, and China, and how these dynamics would play out on the African continent. There seemed, at the time, to be a general consensus that the US would take a keener interest in Africa, and, although it would in large measure continue with the previous administration’s China policy, the tone would shift from combative to being competitive. Since then, there have been mixed signals as it relates to US-Chinese foreign policy. On the one hand, the Biden administration has reaffirmed the desire to collaborate and cooperate with China in areas that serve American interests, in sharp contrast to the Trump era of an all-encompassing decoupling policy towards China. However, on the other hand, it is accusing China of acting more aggressively, especially as it relates to the abuse of human rights. Some analysts are even suggesting that the US is opening up new fronts in the trade war with China and mobilising a concerted international opposition to China’s alleged disregard for the US-led rules-based democratic and human rights order. However, predictions, as they relate to US-Africa foreign policy, on the other hand, seem to be, in large measure, playing out as expected. There is a definite sense that the US’s policy toward Africa is normalising from the Trump-era interruption. Indeed, continuity of Bush and Obama administration policies, and even an expansion of US development agencies activity in Africa, could comfortably be anticipated. This expectation is given further impetus with the range of pro-African appointees in the new Biden administration. That said, Africa should not expect a free pass as the US will remain critical where African countries and leaders do not follow the rules-based democratic and human rights world order. Then too, it was predicted that in terms of US domestic policy, China would remain a political football. This also appears to hold true. China, of course, had hoped for a more constructive approach based on mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs. This did not happen. Thus, on the global stage the relationship between the US and China remains strained, which unfortunately spills over to Africa (Sonjica, 2021), leaving it in a quandary: How do they respond to these dynamics? In an effort to ease the discomfort, the Biden administration has, to their credit, sought to calm the waters. They have made it clear that they do not expect African leaders to take sides between them and China. There is a realisation that the Trump-era style of demanding that African countries work with the US against China was not popular with African leaders and could not be followed. Also, the US’s approach towards Africa’s China relationship is shifting from combative to persuasive. It is recognised that during the last four to five years under Trump, China leapfrogged the US in Africa in terms of infrastructure, technology, and financing, posing a formidable challenge for Biden to overcome. Much of the future African economic development is going to be built on Chinese investment. China has also surpassed the US as the largest trading partner of Africa (Gumede, 2021). That said, the US and China, in their African strategies, seem to, in many respects, be focussing on different priorities. For the Chinese it is infrastructure and technology. Whereas for the US alternative opportunities exist in the provision of technical assistance and the promotion of rules-based democracy and human rights through the strengthening of civil society and the media (Gumede, 2021). Areas of competition between the two global giants will be in the field of renewable energy, trade and financing, with development financing being the key issue (Gumede, 2021). As for the way forward in terms of rebuilding US-Africa relations: Africa should strongly lobby their American counterparts, with, given the range of pro-African appointees to the new US administration, unique opportunities being presented for securing face-time and warm body engagements with them (Gumede, 2021). Crucially, Africa needs to learn to speak with one voice (Sonjica, 2021). To take advantage of the opportunities Africans need to get better organised in the US to engage the policymakers in a more coordinated way, with a clear strategy aimed at taking advantage of identified key priorities, which could include, amongst others, the extension and further expansion of AGOA, technical assistance with regard to matters of governance, security issues, and the advancement of democracy and human rights (Gumede, 2021). Africans must accept that there is always going to be an element of competition between the US and China (Snyder, 2021). The US will follow a rules-based approach to international relations as it had before, whereas China will continue to promote its mutually beneficial approach to trade and investment and to expand its influence through its Belt and Road Initiative. African countries need to figure out, from an African point of view, and by defending its own interests, how to position themselves between these two approaches for maximum benefit (Gumede, 2021). They need to come up with a plan that appreciates the uniqueness of these two powers (Sonjica, 2021). Moreover, in order to navigate the not-by-choice tricky dynamics imposed on them, Africa should seek a mechanism for triangular engagement between themselves, the US and China. Enticing former African leaders that excelled in multilateralism to help facilitate this notion may be advisable (Weseka, 2021). Who knows, such a continental solution may even serve to alter the global discourse for the good. References Associated Press. 2021. China's Africa Outreach Poses Growing Threat, US General Warns. [Online] Available at: https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/chinas-africa-outreach-poses-growing-threat-us-general-warns [accessed: 28 June 2021]. BBC. 2021. US-China relations: Blinken accuses China of acting more aggressively. [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56967211 [accessed: 28 June 2021]. BBC. 2020. A quick guide to the US-China trade war. [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-45899310 [accessed: 28 June 2021]. Cheng, L. 2021. Biden’s China strategy: Coalition-driven competition or Cold War-style confrontation? [Online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/bidens-china-strategy-coalition-driven-competition-or-cold-war-style-confrontation/ [accessed: 28 June 2021]. Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). 2021. Written response to questions posed to the department pursuant to the issues raised during the Inclusive Society Institute’s dialogue on “Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden Administration and its nexus with China”, which was hosted on 22 June 2021. Grobler, G. 2021. Contribution as an expert-panellist in the Inclusive Society Institute’s dialogue on “Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden Administration and its nexus with China”, which was hosted on 22 June 2021 via Zoom. Ambassador Gert Grobler is a former senior South Africa diplomat and currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Zheijiang Normal University. Gumede, W. 2021. Moderator of the Inclusive Society Institute’s dialogue on “Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden Administration and its nexus with China”, which was hosted on 22 June 2021 via Zoom. Professor Gumede is the Executive Chairperson of Democracy Works and Associate Professor at the School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand. Miller, C. 2021. Biden Opens Sneaky New Front in Trade War Against China. [Online] Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/22/biden-semiconductors-south-korea-china-trade-war/ [accessed: 28 June 2021]. Sheehy, T. 2021. Contribution as an expert-panellist in the Inclusive Society Institute’s dialogue on “Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden Administration and its nexus with China”, which was hosted on 22 June 2021 via Zoom. Professor Tom Sheehy is the Principal, Quinella Global, and former staff director of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Snyder, C. 2021. Contribution as an expert-panellist in the Inclusive Society Institute’s dialogue on “Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden Administration and its nexus with China”, which was hosted on 22 June 2021 via Zoom. Professor Charlie Snyder is Professor of African Studies at the Institute for World Politics, and a former National Intelligence Officer for Africa. Sonjica, B. 2021. Participant in the Inclusive Society Institute’s dialogue on “Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden Administration and its nexus with China”, which was hosted on 22 June 2021 via Zoom. Ms Sonjica is a former South African Cabinet Minister and currently the Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute’s Advisory Council. Stone, J. 2021. Contribution as an expert-panellist in the Inclusive Society Institute’s dialogue on “Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden Administration and its nexus with China”, which was hosted on 22 June 2021 via Zoom. Dr Joshua Stone is, inter alia, a former Professor of International Instruction, Beijing, China—DePaul University, and a former Congressional Aide to Congresswoman Barbara Lee. Thomas, D. 2021a. Biden bids to reverse US-Africa decline. [Online] Available at: https://african.business/2021/01/trade-investment/biden-bids-to-reverse-us-africa-decline/ [accessed: 28 June 2021]. Thomas, D. 2021b. Samantha Power to head USAID in boost to Africa projects. [Online] Available at: https://african.business/2021/01/trade-investment/samantha-power-to-head-usaid-in-boost-to-africa-projects/ [accessed: 30 June 2021]. Weseka, B. 2021. Contribution as an expert-panellist in the Inclusive Society Institute’s dialogue on “Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden Administration and its nexus with China”, which was hosted on 22 June 2021 via Zoom. Dr Bob Weseka is the Coordinator of the African Centre for the Study of the US, University of the Witwatersrand. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Daryl Swanepoel, at the invitation of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, travelled to Germany from 14 – 18 October 2019, with a delegation led by ANC Treasurer General, Paul Mashatile. The visit presented an ideal opportunity for the introduction of the institute to the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the German Social Democratic Party (SDP). Both the FES and SDP were of the view that the politically aligned foundations of Germany played an important role in supporting and promoting multiparty democracy, the development of public policy and the engagement of civil society in the political discourse of the country. The idea of setting up such an institute in South Africa that would promote progressive, social and national democratic values was to be welcomed. To advance the aim of creating a progressive and just world, international cooperation between likeminded organisations was important. To this end, the FES, SDP and ISI agreed to further explore avenues and means of cooperation. Visit to Willie Brandt House, headquarters of the German Social Democratic Party. Konstantin Woinoff, SDP International Secretary (second from left) Visit to Friederich Ebert Stiftung. Dr. Ernst Kerbusch, representing the International Division at FES (third from left)

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, joined a South African delegation led by ANC Treasurer General, Paul Mashatile, who visited Germany during the week of 14 – 18 October 2019. In the course of the week, they met with several prominent leaders of the German Social Democratic Party (SDP), civil society and government. The objective of the visit was to build solidarity amongst the progressive social democratic forces in Germany. The ANC has a longstanding sister-party relationship with the SDP which dates back to long before South Africa’s democracy, which dawned in 1994. The delegation participated in wide-ranging series of meetings, which included, inter alia, engagements with Michelle Müntefering, Minister of State in the German Federal Foreign Office, Thomas Oppermann, Vice President of the German Federal Parliament, Dr Nils Schmid, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the German Federal Parliament and Christoph Matschie, a member of the same committee. The delegation also met with MP’s Dagmar Freitag and Ulla Schmidt. The delegation also paid a visit to Willie Brandt House, the headquarters of the SDP. There they met with, amongst others, Konstantin Woinoff, the International Secretary of the party, Klaus Tovar, Director of the Party School and Andreas Schlotmann, SDP Treasurer General’s Office. The recurring theme of the week’s discussion was that the international progressive and social democratic forces needed to strengthen their cooperation through focused activities aimed at advancing the programme of social justice and equality. Michelle Müntefering, for example, argued that dialogue and better coordination was important to bolster progressive values internationally, including within the multi-lateral institutions such as the United Nations. There were a number of global tasks that required urgent attention. One such task was to break down the current tendency of dividing communities and the building of walls between groups in society. This could be done by fostering the multiracialism belief of the progressive forces at a global level. To achieve this, channels of communication between progressive governments and parties needed to be strengthened, and mechanisms needed to be designed to involve broader society. Meeting with Michelle Muntefering, Minister of State, German Federal Foreign Office Meeting with Thomas Opperman MP (third from left), Vice President of the German Federal Parliament Meeting with German SDP MP’s Dagmar Freitag (left, second from front) and Ulla Schmidt (front left)

The National Health Insurance (NHI) Bill was introduced to Parliament on 8 August 2019, with a subsequent call for public comment, which expired on 29 November 2019. With the deadline now past, the Inclusive Society Institute deemed it appropriate to host a roundtable dialogue with the critical organisations representing the workers, business and health sector fraternity. The objective of the exercise was to determine the areas of agreement, areas of disagreement, and where such disagreement existed, to seek pathways to reach consensus. Since all the participating organisations had already submitted their comments to parliament, the outcome of these deliberations form a holistic representation as to what can be expected in the parliamentary processes to follow. Participants in the roundtable included representatives form COSATU, BUSA, the ANC NEC subcommittee on Education and Health, government, private hospitals and medical aids, independent practitioner organisations, health accreditation services, the pharmaceutical and medical equipment supply industry, and the South African National Blood Service. The combined input of these participants, the institute is of the opinion, will fairly represent the views and issues to be raised in the public hearing processes to be scheduled by the parliamentary portfolio committee on health. As a general departure point, it can safely be expected that general support will be given to the goals and objectives of the NHI Bill, that is the financing of universal coverage of affordable and accessible quality health care. There was general recognition that the current healthcare system is defective, with inefficiencies in both a public and private sector; and that the introduction of legislation to address the problems was therefore to be welcomed. There was general consensus that the private sector needed to be crowded in, not pushed out, that government and the private sector needed to work together by combining their respective expertise in order to improve the overall healthcare system of the country, and that, in rolling out the NHI, communication between all role-players needed to be improved to ensure an inclusive consultation process. The main contentious issues that were identified and that required further deliberation during the public hearing process, included the role of medical schemes, the role of provinces, capabilities of the State to manage the NHI fund, and the accompanying governance structures, and how private hospitals will link into the public system. Concerns were also expressed as to the schemes financial sustainability, especially given the constrained economic environment the country finds itself in. It is section 33 of the Bill which will require the most urgent and comprehensive consultations, with delegates being of the opinion that compromise was required to avoid confrontation. It would, in their opinion, have severe consequences for not only the private medical aids, but so too the whole of the private healthcare system, the loss of cross-subsidisation benefitting the public healthcare system, and negative impact on investment sentiment. The rationality of its insertion was questioned, especially considering its radical departure from the 2018 policies. As presented, section 33, delegates suspected, could also give rise to questions of constitutionality. A comprehensive report on the roundtable is scheduled for publication towards the end of January 2020.

In concluding his week-long outreach programme to the Netherlands and France, the Chief Executive officer of the ISI, Daryl Swanepoel, signalled that the institute was to work with a number of organisations in the two countries to advance its values of democracy, good governance and inclusive public policy. The ISI met with a range of organisations in The Hague and Amsterdam and Paris. Netherlands In this leg of the visit the institute reached out to likeminded social democratic foundations, curators of social history archives and the former Dutch anti-apartheid activists. Significant synergies were discovered in the policy work of the ISI and that of the various organisations that were approached. The Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, the Max van der Stoel Foundation and the Wiardi Beckman Foundation all share the ISI’s objective not only to strengthen democracy in a citizen-centred manner, but also to create a greater sense of inclusion in public policy. The ISI also agreed to work with the International Institute of Social History (ISH), which is based in Amsterdam. The ISH hosts extensive archival material on the anti-apartheid movement of the Netherlands (and other countries). It was agreed that access would be given to the ISI to link this material to the liberation archives portal of the ISI. Further areas of cooperation in archiving historic material of the broader liberation struggle will be explored. The CEO of the ISI also met with the African Studies Centre based at the University of Leiden. Here too, an enormous amount of synergy existed that could be tapped into. It was agreed that joint public policy research projects could be explored, and mechanisms would be developed to link the extensive library and archives of the African Studies Centre to the ISI’s ‘Liberation Archives’ portal. A discussion was also held with Bart Luirink, Kier Schuringa and Jan-Bart Gewald, prominent former anti-apartheid activists. There exists a sense that the linkages between the former Dutch anti-apartheid movement activists and South Africa has weakened over years, and that a concerted efforts was needed to revive and strengthen this South African conduit into Dutch society. This is a project that the ISI will take to heart. France In Paris the ISI met with both the Fondation Jean-Jaures, which is aligned with the Socialist Party of France, and the Institut Montaigne, a prominent independent public policy think tank. Given France’s heightened interest under President Emmanuel Macron in African public and developmental policy, there was an ardent interest to explore joint projects that the ISI could undertake with these foundations. Initial areas of interest included topics such as gender-based violence, gaining a deeper understanding of inequality in order to pursue greater inclusivity in the economy, and climate change. The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, seen here with the Head of Knowledge and Innovation at the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, Wouter Dol. The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, handing over the ANC publication “Unity in Diversity: A 100 years of ANC leadership” to Prof. Jan-Bart Gewald, Director of the African Studies Centre, University of Leiden The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, with Klara Boonstra, CEO of the Wiardi Beckman Foundation

In a social cohesion roundtable meeting on the role and place of the Afrikaans-speaking community in South Africa, held on Tuesday, 11 February 2020 at the Taj Hotel in Cape Town, it was agreed that the Inclusive Society Institute will implement a sustainable programme to keep social cohesion high on the agenda. This would include the design of an action plan aimed at marshalling the decisions taken in the programme onto the country’s policy-making agenda. The roundtable was attended by a good cross-section of Afrikaans speakers drawn from business, government, the NGO sector, community representatives and academia. The keynote speakers included the Treasurer General of the African National Congress, Mr Paul Mashatile, who elaborated on the ruling parties philosophy, policy and history aimed at building a non-racial South Africa; and Dr Ruben Richards, Chairman of the Ruben Richards Foundation, who are actively involved in community upliftment projects and the creation of sustainable communities. The discussion was facilitated by Roelf Meyer, a key architect in the drafting of the South African Constitution. Areas, amongst others, that need fleshing out include: Developing a political culture of tolerance, with particular emphasis on ensuring that the narrative is conducive to reconciliation. Reversing the inter-community trust deficit that has systematically developed post the Mandela-reconciliation era. Guarding against stereotyping individuals on the basis of their community affiliation. Developing activities that give greater inter-community exposure. Designing public policies that crowd in the talents, skills, expertise and goodwill within the minority communities so as to enable their practical contribution towards building the South African economy and society. This dialogue forms part of the Inclusive Society Institute’s broader programme aimed at fostering an inclusive progressive society Sue van der Merwe, Chairperson, Inclusive Society Institute Paul Mashatile, Treasurer General, African National Congress Daryl Swanepoel, CEO, Inclusive Society Institute Ruben Richards, Chairperson, Ruben Richards Foundation Roelf Meyer, Director, In Transformation Initiative

In a social cohesion roundtable meeting on the role and place of the Afrikaans-speaking community in South Africa, held on Tuesday, 18 February 2020 at the Capital Menlyn on Maine Hotel in Pretoria, the Inclusive Society Institute reconfirmed its commitment to implement a sustainable programme to keep social cohesion high on the agenda. As agreed at the Cape Town roundtable the previous week, this would include the design of an action plan aimed at marshalling the decisions taken in the programme onto the country’s policy-making agenda. This roundtable, as at the Cape Town roundtable, was attended by a good cross-section of Afrikaans speakers drawn from business, government, the NGO sector, community representatives and academia. The keynote speakers included the Treasurer General of the African National Congress, Mr Paul Mashatile, who elaborated on the ruling parties philosophy, policy and history aimed at building a non-racial South Africa; and the well-known economist, Theo Vorster, CEO of Galileo Capital, did a presentation on the economic context of South Africa. The discussion was facilitated by Roelf Meyer, a key architect in the drafting of the South African Constitution. The discussion revealed more or less the same concerns that were raised at the Cape Town meeting, albeit that there was a greater discussion on the economy and its potential contribution to fostering social cohesion. Concerns included: Developing a political culture of tolerance, with particular emphasis on ensuring that the narrative is conducive to reconciliation. Reversing the inter-community trust deficit that has systematically developed post the Mandela-reconciliation era. Guarding against stereotyping individuals on the basis of their community affiliation. Developing activities that give greater inter-community exposure. Designing public policies that crowd in the talents, skills, expertise and goodwill within the minority communities so as to enable their practical contribution towards building the South African economy and society. The need for more inter-community dialogue. The overriding message of the evening was ‘to get the economy right’. A growing economy would enable the government to deliver better services, create new jobs and economic opportunities that would expand the business base. Such an expansion would give natural momentum to the Black Economic Empowerment programmes of government. This dialogue forms part of the Inclusive Society Institute’s broader programme aimed at fostering an inclusive progressive society. Paul Mashatile, Treasurer General, ANC Keith Khoza, Board Member, Inclusive Society Institute Theo Vorster, CEO, Galileo Capital Daryl Swanepoel, CEO, Inclusive Society Institute Roelf Meyer, Director, In Transformation Initiative

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is currently involved in an extensive research programme seeking alternative pathways to universal access and affordable healthcare in South Africa. It recently released a report on its NHI roundtable dialogue, which brought together the diverse range of healthcare stakeholders to interrogate the draft legislation which is now before the National Assembly’s Portfolio Committee on Health. One of the report’s recommendations is that the portfolio committee consider alternative international examples of universal healthcare models, the German healthcare system being one such model. In line with the aforementioned recommendation, the ISI, in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, hosted a seminar on Wednesday afternoon, 19 February 2020, at the Taj Hotel in Cape Town. The seminar was attended by delegates from the healthcare industry, academics, Members of Parliament serving on the National Assembly’s Portfolio Committee for Health and Dr. Gwen Ramakgopa, a representative of the ANC’s National Executive Committee for Education and Health. The ranking Member of Parliament was Dr. Sibongiseni Dhlomo, Chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Health. The key presenters included Germany’s former Minister of Health, Hon. Ulla Schmidt, who currently serves as a Member of the Bundestag, and Mr. Franz Knieps, who serves on the board of German Health Insurance BKK. Hon. Schmidt was Europe’s longest serving Minister of Health and oversee the implementation of the national health insurance system of Germany. Mr. Knieps, a former German Director General of Health, also made an extensive technical presentation during the seminar. ​The German healthcare system is based on solidarity, where the rich subsidise the poor, and the healthy the sick. It has a universal healthcare system where all citizens are compelled to have health insurance. All citizens belong to the national insurance scheme, but they may opt out if they take out private health insurance. The State funds the premiums of the unemployed and for certain categories of social beneficiaries. Whilst the proposed South African model suggests a single fund, in order to promote competition, there exists a number of funds in Germany. Standards are assured through an independent and autonomous healthcare standards authority. Another key feature of the German system is that healthcare specialists, providers and patients accept joint responsibility for the various funds’ governance.

Following the seminar on the NHI: Lessons from the German healthcare system, a technical meeting was held at the offices of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) to further interrogate the areas of compatibility of the German system within the South African environment. The objective of the meeting was to clarify issues raised in the previous seminar on the topic, to discuss its applicability within the current economic constraints, to consider aspects that could be incorporated into the legislation currently under discussion, and to assist the ISI research team in the drafting of its written report to policymakers. The meeting was attended by the ISI’s research team, which is being led by Dr. Shivani Ranchod, invited academics, Dr. Gwen Ramakgopa representing the ANC’s NEC sub-committee on Education and Health, and Mr. Franz Knieps, an expert on the German healthcare system and a board member of German Health Insurance BKK.

The Inclusive Society Institute, in conjunction with NCOP MP Mohammad Dangor, hosted visiting MPs from the German Bundestag for lunch in Parliament on Friday, 21 February 2020. Hon. Ulla Schmidt and Dagmar Freitag, both members of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, were joined by the ANC Chief Whip, Hon. Pemmy Majodina MP. Also in attendance was Ms Sue van der Merwe and Daryl Swanepoel, Chairperson and CEO of the Inclusive Society Foundation, as well as Ms Londiwe Mntambo, who represented the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Matthias Hansen, Consul General of Germany, also attended. Points of discussion were wide-ranging. The conversation included coalition politics, parliamentary ethics and conventions, as well as the political programmes of both South Africa and Germany. Given the shared social democratic ideology, much of the discussion also included the furtherance of the global dialogue on the advancing of the progressive agenda internationally. Photo: (from left) Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer, Inclusive Society Institute Sue van der Merwe, Chairperson, Inclusive Society Institute Pemmy Majodina, MP, SA Parliament Ulla Schmidt, Member, German Bundestag Londiwe Mntambo, Project Manager, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Mohammed Dangor, MP, SA Parliament Dagmar Freitag, Member, German Bundestag Matthias Hansen, Consul General, German Consulate General in Cape Town

Government has announced their intention to introduce a National Health Insurance Scheme for South Africa. The Minister of Health has published a bill in this regard, which is currently being discussed at the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Health. The introduction of the bill has met with mixed reaction, inter alia, trade unions who have expressed their support, and medical aid schemes and private hospitals raising concerns regarding the financial viability of the scheme. The bill has been published without an accompanying financing paper. The institute has commissioned research to inform a way forward that is cognisant of the shortcomings of the current system, both public and private, and the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed reforms. In questioning the way forward, it will be useful to conceptualize an inter-connected set of reforms – enabling thinking about a series of policy choices and the sequencing of the implementation of the various choices. In its research, the institute wishes to develop a framework against which reform pathway choices can be assessed by also providing a technical costing model which can be used to contextualize the fiscal implementation of alternatives. This research is currently ongoing. In December 2019 the institute hosted a highly successful roundtable on the NHI, in which organisations drawn from across the health sector, government, labour and business participated. One important aspect that was raised on a number of occasions during the discussion, was the concern that the bill would not pass constitutional muster. A further desktop study identified a number of constitutional arguments that were raised by various stakeholders in this regard. In order to test and assess the validity of the constitutional arguments being raised, a roundtable dialogue (via video-conferencing) was held on Tuesday, 19 May 2020 with representatives from the legal and academic fraternity. In the course of the discussion it became quite clear that the constitutional questions associated with the NHI Bill are complex and needful of intensive interrogation. The institute intends to obtain formal legal opinions to accurately inform its research and advocacy work with regard to the legislation.

On Saturday, 6 June 2020, the Inclusive Society Institute of South Africa (ISI) and The Houde Institute of China entered into a cooperation agreement. The agreement enjoins the two parties to undertake joint research, and to hold academic symposia, seminars and conferences training programmes for future diplomats, scholars and future leaders of international organisations and NGOs. The signing ceremony took place via videoconferencing. The ISI was represented by its Acting Chairperson, Prof Zweli Ndevu and its CEO, Daryl Swanepoel. The Houde Institute was represented by its President, Ms Wang Hongjuan, Liu Yu, Deputy Secretary of The Houde Institute, as well as board members Fu Chengyu, and Ambassador Su Ge. A number of other senior delegates from both sides also attended the ceremony to witness the signing of the agreement, including, amongst others, Dr Miao Ji, Senior Research Fellow of the Houde Institute and Wei Dongze, Secretary General of the South Africa China Economic & trade Association. A number of potential areas for research cooperation were identified, including in the field of renewable energy policy, trade coordination and international cooperation in BRICS, the BRI and FOCAC. The two organisations are planning to meet face-to-face once the COVID-19 travel restrictions have been lifted. At that meeting joint projects and themes will be designed and launched. In the interim the two parties will initiate projects on an ad hoc basis. Read People's Daily Article

Expert panel appointed to contemplate a new electoral system for South Africa In the light of the recent Constitutional Court judgement declaring the current Electoral Act invalid, the Inclusive Society Institute has embarked on a process to design potential new electoral models for South Africa. Whilst not rigid in its thinking, the institute has mandated its research panel to design electoral models that respects the findings of the judgement, the boundaries set out in the Constitution, retains proportionality as a basis for representation and which, given the institutes driving philosophy, promotes inclusivity.​ The institute has appointed an expert panel to undertake the work. They are:

The Inclusive Society Institute’s expert panel looking into electoral reform in South Africa met on 3 August 2020 to further elaborate on the boundaries of the research to be undertaken in the development of a new electoral model for South Africa. ​The necessity to develop a new electoral model has been spurred by the recent Constitutional Court judgement declaring the current electoral model invalid. It has given the legislature two years to introduce new legislation that will enable independent candidates to stand for election in the national and provincial spheres of government. ​At its 3 August meeting the panel decided to extend its work beyond the mere development of a technical model that would accommodate the requirement for independent candidates to stand for election. It would also use this window to come up with proposals as how to address the limitations of the current electoral model. The panel would for example consider systems that improve accountability to the voters by elected representatives, the improvement of oversight over the executive and the promotion of meaningful and inclusive demographic representivity within the legislatures. ​Whilst not discarding an eventuality that may require some form of constitutional amendment, the preferred option of the panel to date, is to restrict its design to fit within the current boundaries of the Constitution and prescripts of the Constitutional Court judgement. That is, the retention of an electoral system that results, in general, in proportional representation, together with mechanisms providing for independent candidates to stand for election at all three spheres of government. ​In its next phase of deliberations, the panel will consider the current applicability of the outcomes contained in the 2003 Van Zyl Slabbert Commission into electoral reform. It will also be receiving presentations on electoral models in other jurisdictions that combine proportionality with the right of independent candidates to stand for election.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is busy developing a new growth centred economic blueprint for South Africa. The project comprises a number of phases, the first of which is to study several economies from historically distressed jurisdictions that have successfully turned themselves into winning nations. In this second panel discussion, the focus was on South Korea. South Korea was one of the poorest nations on earth in the late fifties/early sixties, whereas today it is, globally, the 11th largest economy by GDP. The crux of South Korea’s success story is captured in its ‘Can do’ attitude, a healthy work ethic, and the mobilisation of the nation behind its economic plan. The ‘Can do’ and work ethics, based on the New Village Movement philosophy, is inculcated in the national psyche from primary school days already. Other unique approaches include a higher emphasis on rural development, where the rural GDP per capita outperforms the urban GDP per capita; a high focus on innovation and human development; less reliance on FDI and greater emphasis in internal savings; and a state that works in partnership with business and civil society. Whilst great emphasis is placed on human development and ensuring sufficient societal safety nets, assistance by the state in the development of enterprises is primarily based on performance as opposed to universal handouts. South Korea’s Ambassador to South Africa, Dr Jong-Dae Park, an economist by trade and author of the book Re-inventing Africa’s Development, was the keynote presenter. South African panellists included Prof Tania Ajam from the School of Public Leadership at Stellenbosch University and a member of the President’s Economic Advisory Council, Mr Theo Vorster (the lead panellist), also an economist and CEO of Galileo Capital, and Ms Joan Fubbs, director of the Centre for Education in Economics and Finance and former chairperson of the parliamentary portfolio committee on trade and industry. The programme was directed by Mr Daryl Swanepoel, the ISI’s CEO, who in setting the scene for the discussion, suggested that the depressed state of the South African economy obligated policymakers to take decisive action, and to make the structural reforms necessary to ensure growth in the economy. He argued in favour of developing a blended economy, with less reliance on dogmatic ideology and a greater emphasis on implementing policy that provides solutions to the twin challenges of ensuring economic growth, whilst addressing income inequality (poverty alleviation). The ISI is of the opinion that imaginative, out of the box thinking is now required more than ever. In guiding the institute’s dialogue and policy development, few parameters will be set, but the outcomes are conditioned on two pre-requisites: that the economy be demographically transformed, that is to be made more equal and inclusive, and that it provide sufficient opportunity, safety-nets and cross-subsidiarity to ensure dignity for the poor.

The Inclusive Society Institute has commissioned research aimed at developing an economic blueprint for South Africa that will be capable of catapulting the country out of its current downward trajectory, whilst simultaneously transforming it to address inequality, to mainstream the informal sector and to become more demographically inclusive. The research is being done against the backdrop of the economy remaining stubbornly sluggish. Without factoring in the impact of COVID-19, GDP growth is estimated to be less than one per cent, debt to GDP has risen to over 65 percent, and unemployment stands at a record high of 30 percent (narrow definition), or around 40% (expanded definition). The impact of the COVID-19 measures could see a GDP contraction of between 6 and 7 per cent. Imaginative thinking is required. It is the institutes view that the current neo-liberal economic model is not, on its own and within the South African context, delivering the desired results. Inequality, unemployment, and poverty continues to grow. It believes that the introduction of social democratic developmental programmes could contribute to addressing the lingering backlogs. By blending these policies with the current regime will deliver a mixed economy more capable of achieving fairness and economic justice within an inclusive growth centred economy, more capable of bringing about demographic transformation and the provision of the safety-nets and cross-subsidiarity needed to ensure dignity for the poor. As part of the first phase of the project, a panel discussion was hosted by the institute on Thursday, 20 August 2020, via ZOOM. The objective of the seminar was to examine Germanys post-WW2 economic development, so as to consider whether there are any lessons that South Africa can draw on from the path Germany chose. And to consider the applicability of that path within South African context and the modern global architecture. The keynote presentation was made by Prof Klaus Boehnke, who is associated with the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, Jacobs University. The title of his presentation was “Social Cohesion – a pathway to citizen’s well-being and economic prosperity? The case of Germany and the OECD world.” Social Cohesion played an enormous role in Germany’s Konzertierte Aktion (Concerted Action), the purpose of which was to through the Stability and Growth Act coordinate behaviour between the political authorities responsible for macro-economic stability on the one hand and the trade unions, business and civil society on the other, which aimed at averting macroeconomic disturbances. In recognising social cohesion as the glue that binds society together and the importance thereof for economic justice, stability and growth, the German authorities continue to prioritise efforts in this regard. Other panellists included: Mr Theo Vorster, a well-known economist, TV personality and the Chief Executive Officer at Galileo Capital. He is facilitating the Inclusive Society Institute’s economic project. Professor Tania Ajam, who is associated with the School for Public Leadership at the University of Stellenbosch. She is also a member of the President’s Economic Advisory Council Ms Joan Fubbs, Director of the Centre for Education in Economics and Finance (CEEF). She was also the former longstanding chairperson of the parliamentary portfolio committee for trade and industry. Professor Zweli Ndevu, the institute’s Deputy Chairperson. He is the head of the School for Public Leadership at the University of Stellenbosch. The event was broadcast live via YouTube to invited guests from business, civil society and the ranks post-graduate students. Prof Dr Klaus Boehnke

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) held its annual general meeting on Saturday, 3 October 2020. At the meeting, the institute carried out the normal business of the AGM as prescribed in its constitution. This included the approval of its annual report and financial statements. During the AGM, members of the institute elected its first advisory council, which is made up of individuals who have served with distinction the democratic emancipation and education of the South African people, or who have excelled in the fields of politics, public policy and economic development, or who, by their achievements, guarantee that they will act fully in line with the institute’s objectives. Members of the advisory council are: Professor Firoz Chachalia Professor David Masoma Dr Brigalia Bam Mr Roelf Meyer Ms Sue van der Merwe Ms Byyelwa Sonjica Ms Khanyisile Kewyama Ms Joanmarie Fubbs

Justice Albie Sachs

The Ninth Meeting of the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum took place on 5 and 6 November 2020. The Inclusive Society Institute’s CEO, Daryl Swanepoel, was invited to attend and speak at the event. The opening ceremony on 5 November, moderated by Li Xinfeng, Executive President of the China-Africa Institute, had a range of high-level speakers, including Deng Li, the Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and Joaquim Alberto Chissano, African Chairman of the International Advisory Committee, China-Africa Institute, and former President of Mozambique. Cai Fang, Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Martin Mpana, Head of the Diplomatic Mission to China, and Cameroon’s Ambassador to China also spoke. The opening session was followed by a plenary session called to discuss, both retro- and prospectively, the 20th anniversary of the founding of FOCAC. Four parallel panel discussions took place on the 6th of November. Panel 1 discussed China-Africa Solidarity against the COVID-19 Pandemic and Public Health Security, panel 2 discussed the “Belt and Road” and the construction of the African continental free trade area, panel 3 discussed China-Africa Cooperation on climate change, and panel 4 cooperation on poverty reduction. Mr Swanepoel spoke to the paper he developed on the need for greater coordination between the various geo-political and geo-economic initiative s being carried out simultaneously. He argued that the better coordination between the various initiatives and the streamlining of their programmes would enhance greater efficiency