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Occasional paper 1/2020 Copyright © 2020 Inclusive Society Institute 50 Long Street Cape Town South Africa 8000 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members or Members. by Prof David Luka Mosoma Chairperson of the CRL Rights Commission Abstract Like many other drastic events in our country’s 26-year-old democracy, the COVID-19 lockdown has uncovered the deep social divisions in our society. Different classes, races and cultures are differently affected by the crisis, facing vastly different challenges. Indeed, social cohesion remains one of the most fundamental policy challenges facing South Africa since the dawn of our democracy. This paper contextualises the work of the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (or “the CRL Rights Commission”) against the backdrop of our nation’s pursuit of social cohesion. It firstly suggests that no effort aimed at creating a truly cohesive society will succeed if it disregards the enormous challenges facing the South African nation. These include gender-based violence, women and children abuse, home lessness, unemployment, and economic exclusion. Moreover, social cohesion initiatives must be responsive to the needs of those on the receiving end of the seemingly endless string of human dignity violations perpetrated of late. Anything less will merely serve to perpetuate a cosmetic social cohesion, which is empty and meaningless to most. Secondly, the contribution advances the notion of ubuntu as a vehicle to achieve a social cohesion paradigm that is meaningful to all. Finally, it calls on all South Africans to reflect on, and start breaking free from, their decades-long social “lockdown” from their compatriots. Over the years, various scholars and policymakers have expressed the view that social cohesion is arguably one of the most fundamental policy challenges facing South Africa since the dawn of democracy. Like other drastic events in the past 26 years, the current battle against COVID-19 has again exposed the deep lines of social division in the country, with different classes, races and cultures being differently affected by the crisis. Ironically, South Africans marked Freedom Day 2020 in lockdown, each confined to their own space, their own thoughts, and their own problems. But apart from the fact that we are normally physically free to move as we wish, haven’t we perhaps been a socially locked-down nation all along, with each class, race and culture keeping to themselves? And, more importantly, is it truly possible for our society to achieve a state of true social cohesion, or are we still trying to define what this means as we struggle through our diverse interpretations of the concept? Among the many authors who have attempted to capture the essence of social cohesion over the years was influential sociologist Emile Durkheim, whose writings have informed the thinking of scholars, development agencies, government institutions, policymakers, and ordinary people. According to Durkheim, social cohesion can be summed up as “as the interdependence between the members of the society, shared loyalties and solidarity. Aspects often mentioned in describing social cohesion are the strength of social relations, shared values and communities of interpretation, feelings of a common identity and a sense of belonging to the same community, trust amongst societal members as well as the extent of inequality and disparities (Berger-Schmidt, 2000:2-3)” This he conceptualised not as a cosmetic idea, but in response to the challenges that society of the late 18th to early 19th century faced. At the time, Durkheim was searching for solutions to the deep divisions and discrimination that had been caused by economic deprivation, social and class exclusions, migration, cultural conflicts, and industrialisation. In a profound way, his call for interdependence among members of a community, glued together by a willingness to work together to foster social and economic equilibrium to help them survive and succeed, is as relevant today. In South Africa’s case, the pursuit of social cohesion should be aimed at unifying society across its diverse backgrounds through the creation of a shared vision and a common economic development agenda. This should result in social justice based on a sustainable economic distribution model that brings value to every citizen. This is also why the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 emphasises the need for a more prominent role for social cohesion in the national policy framework (RSA, 2012). However, unless we, as a nation, embrace a mutually acceptable and practical understanding of what social cohesion is, and collectively implement substantial, measurable programmes that respond to our socio-economic realities, its attainment will remain a pipedream. In the context of South Africa, no programme or intervention will bring about true social cohesion if it ignores the facts. These include the impact of the various forms of gender-based violence perpetrated in our country, the abuse and killing of women and children, general inequalities, spatial disadvantages, homelessness, unemployment, unequal job opportunities and unequal pay, the demeaning cycle of poverty, economic deprivations, and exclusions. In addition, no effort aimed at achieving social cohesion will succeed if it chooses to ignore the serious violations of human dignity our nation continues to witness. Instances of racial, religious, and cultural intolerance and prejudice seem to be escalating, with some among our communities shamelessly refusing to accept that the Constitution endows all of us with equality in all its forms. Those on the receiving end of this abuse cannot be blamed for seeming less interested in a cosmetic concept of social cohesion. Their lived realities call for a meaningful experience of social cohesion – a social equilibrium that substantially empowers them in ways that will prevent them from being social outcasts in their own country. Such a meaningful form of social cohesion should be propelled by an unwavering resolve to address the aforementioned challenges being justly guided by the principle that all human beings are born free, equal in dignity and rights, which dignity is inherent, inalienable and independent of any state or system. Therefore, this equality in dignity should under no circumstances be denied, harmed, or devalued by anyone, whether governments, systems, individuals, communities, or socio-economic conditions. Our actions and interactions should be firmly grounded in justice-based values that lead to genuine transformation in our communities. Importantly also, everyone must be unambiguously committed not to be party to any attempt to enforce a social cohesion paradigm of “unequals,” as that may be no more than injustice by another name. Notwithstanding its various challenges, our country is endowed with the positive value of ubuntu, which offers enormous potential to help realise a social cohesion paradigm that is meaningful to all. Fundamentally, ubuntu encompasses what social cohesion is truly about – a deep bond among human beings based on a sense of belonging and connectedness that acknowledges that an individual’s humanity can only be actualised in relationship to others. Practising ubuntu in South Africa has to empower all of us to embrace, respect and uphold our compatriots’ dignity, as my humanity is inextricably linked to yours, and yours to mine. If I dehumanise another, I de humanise myself, because, though we are different, we belong together and, so, we can live together (Phasha & Condy, 2016). This is the kind of social cohesion that ac knowledges our diversity as the glue that binds us rather than walls that divide us. It is for this reason that the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (or “the CRL Rights Commission” for short) was established. The commission finds its mandate in the Constitution as well as the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act 19 of 2002. Its task is to help create a truly united South African nation whose cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity is a source of strength that contributes to a common and indivisible bond of loyalty to the country and its people. It is against this context that the CRL Rights Commission has been collaborating with other state agencies to protect the rights of communities, thereby giving actual, real-life, meaningful content to the concept of social cohesion. In implementing its programmes, the commission seeks to contribute to socio-economic development, the restoration of human dignity and the creation of national unity among cultural, religious, and linguistic communities on the basis of equality, non-dis crimination and free association. The CRL Rights Commission continues to run campaigns, initiate engagements, and conduct research in an effort to promote dialogue and mutual understanding among our communities, and thereby help advance the dis course on social cohesion. Navigating our way out of a few months’ COVID-19 lockdown will be difficult but can be done. The tougher challenge is to cast off the shackles of our decades-long socially locked-down existence as South Africans; to move from superficial to significant social cohesion, which will make us stronger in the face of disasters. This is the challenge the CRL Rights Commission invites each and every South African to tackle as we move forward. Prof David Mosoma addressing an Inclusive Society Institute Social Cohesion Dialogue in Pretoria, February 2020. References Berger-Schmitt, R. 2000. Social Cohesion as an Aspect of the Quality of Societies: Concept and Measurement. Mannheim: Centre for Survey Research and Methodology. Phasha, & Condy, .2016. Inclusive Education: An African Perspective. Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd Republic of South Africa (RSA). 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108, 1996. Pretoria: Government Printers Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2002. Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, Act 19 of 2002. Pretoria: Government Printers Republic of Republic (RSA). 2012. National Development Plan 2030. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/Executive%20Summary-NDP%202030%20-%20Our%20future%20-%20make%20it%20work.pdf [accessed: 29 May 2020]. Contextualising note from the CRL Rights Commission by Renier Schoeman CRL Rights Commission, and Chairperson: Committee for Corporate Linkages and International Liaison This occasional paper followed a social cohesion dialogue hosted by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) in Pretoria earlier this year. The paper is important not only because of its immediate relevance to South African society, but also in light of the fact that social cohesion has been selected as a major theme of the CRL Rights Commission’s new term of office. As such, the paper sums up the commission’s agenda for the months and years ahead. Therefore, the CRL Rights Commission will be circulating it widely and strategically, both nationally and internationally, advocating for a socially cohesive society and the benefits the South African nation stands to derive from it. This will be done in key national and sectoral structures such as Parliament, academia, business, think tanks, etc., on a wide and representative level. Internationally, the CRL Rights Commission will also share the views expressed in this paper with countries and organisations aligned with South Africa, as well as with appropriate non-governmental organisations with international linkages. Working in partnership with the ISI will no doubt add considerably to the commission’s impact and will support efforts to advance social cohesion in both a local and global context. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 2/2023 Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. MARCH 2023 by Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPAHons, ND: C.Admin The current energy crisis raging in South Africa is the number one challenge for the country, negatively affecting all aspects of life. It is having a severe impact on the economy, which the economy can least afford in an environment of low growth and structural high unemployment. It has led to some workers having to work short-time and some firms to close down, resulting in job-losses. Market analysts have flagged the energy crisis as one of the major factors denting South Africa’s economic prospects with the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) calculating that load-shedding slashed 2.3 percentage points off the growth rate in Q3 2022. The National Energy Crisis Committee (NECOM) January 2023 update affirmed the ongoing shortfall in electricity as government’s single most important priority. After years of state capture, corruption and the inefficiency of ANC-appointed people, government is under rising pressure to resolve the power crisis, that is Eskom’s failure to meet the country’s power needs. Various sectors of the economy, including tourism, mining, agriculture and manufacturing, amongst others, have warned that they have already been under severe strain and that the more frequent and lengthy electricity loadshedding is a tipping point which will not only constrain growth, but is likely to see declines in revenue and profits. This should raise a red flag in terms of projected tax revenues for the country, with a concomitant weakening in the state’s ability to deliver services. To this end, President Ramaphosa has been consulting various stakeholders on the crisis and is expected to soon announce measures to counter the calamity. The cancelling of his trip to the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos in January to deal with the matter suggests the seriousness of the issue is acknowledged at the highest level of decision-making. This acknowledgement has been reiterated by the ANC’s Secretary General, Fikile Mbalula, who told reporters on the side-lines of the first day of the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting in late January that: “Load-shedding started in 2008, and we [the ANC] have been grappling with it for a long time now. The ANC does take responsibility. We [the ANC] cannot deal with loadshedding by running away and cutting corners as if we are not in power”. What further bedevils the government’s efforts in combatting the energy crisis is the differences between ministers Gordhan and Mantashe. Opposition has emerged within ANC ranks against the 55th Conference resolution to move the oversight of Eskom from the Department of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) to the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), aligning antagonists of the move with that of many of the analysts in the media, some civil society entities and opposition parties. The President needs to crack the whip in order to ensure unity within the ANC, yet he has not. Could it be that minister Mantashe has emerged stronger from the December conference and that he is viewed as one of the key allies that ensured the victory for the Ramaphosa aligned slate? Minister Mantashe prevailed as ANC Chairperson in a three-horse race. Load-shedding, which can be traced to as far back as 2008 and coinciding with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), is likely to impact negatively on ANC performance in the 2024 general election – both internal and external surveys suggest a swing away from the ANC to opposition parties and independent candidates. It is quite conceivable that voter support for the ANC could fall to below 50% for the first time in 2024. This is likely what has spurred the ANC to propose to government that it consider dealing with the crisis through emergency state of disaster regulations. Both in order to get a grip on the problem in order to stabilise electoral support and to respond to a number of civil action actions have been launched against government to deal with the energy crisis. ANC energy summit (ES), 25 January 2023 – University of Johannesburg Speaking at an ANC energy summit (ES) on 25 January 2023, Minister Gwede Mantashe outlined his four-pronged plan to bring an end to SA’s current energy crisis. The four solutions he is proposing are to bring energy from ship-mounted gas-fired power plants online, importing electricity from neighbouring countries, speeding up plans to increase the operational efficiency of Eskom’s fleet of power stations, and addressing the skills shortage at Eskom. He is of the view that these four interventions will take the country out of the energy emergency within a period of six to twelve months. He suggests that government could procure about 1,200MW of power from Turkish company Karpowership under such an emergency solution. The contracts could perhaps be reduced to 10 years - from 20 years - to make it more palatable to those opposing the move. Minister Mantashe was critical of the plan announced by the Eskom board and executives to bring about 6,000MW back online over the next 24 months by improving the energy availability factor (EAF) of the coal-fired fleet. Mpho Makwana, Eskom’s chair, told journalists on 22 January 2023 that they had a generation recovery plan to improve the EAF — a measure of the amount of energy being generated against the total installed generation capacity of Eskom’s entire fleet — from the current 58% to the targeted 70%. Minister Mantashe was unconvinced with the sufficiency of ESKOM’s plan, which proposes to improve the EAF to 60% by the end of March, then to 65% by March 2024 and 70% a year later. Numerous analysts and commentators have urged government to speed up action to deal with the energy crisis, with the requisite urgency, which until now has been lacking. This was echoed at the ANC energy summit. Minister Mantashe reiterated the need for urgency and accelerated action at the summit: “I listened to the board of Eskom saying it will work to improve the EAF to 70% by end-2024. My argument is that this does not reflect [the] urgency [to solve] the crisis”, he said. According to the minister, if Eskom directed sufficient resources and skills towards the service and maintenance of its power stations, it could “accelerate the process of coming out of load-shedding”. Public enterprises minister Pravin Gordhan supported minister Mantashe’s view that Eskom’s recovery plan could (should) be sped up. If all the “supporting mechanisms” that Eskom and the government were putting in place through structures such as the national energy crisis committee “come together in the next five to 10 days”, the two-year recovery plan could be shortened, he said. National Energy Crisis Committee (NECOM) progress report, 21 January 2023 The National Energy Crisis Committee (NECOM) six-month progress update on implementation of the Energy Action Plan (EAP) comes in the wake of load shedding being escalated to stage 6 in the period under review. This was due to a high number of breakdowns across Eskom’s generation fleet. The declining Energy Availability Factor (EAF) of Eskom’s fleet reflects the cumulative impact of historical underinvestment in maintenance and assets, exacerbated by flaws in the design of new power stations (Medupi and Kusile) in the last decade. To respond to the severe impact of load shedding on households, small businesses and the economy as a whole, President Ramaphosa announced a range of measures in July 2022 to improve the performance of existing power stations and to add new generation capacity as quickly as possible. The EAP was developed through extensive consultation and endorsed by energy experts as providing the best and fastest path towards energy security. NECOM was subsequently established to coordinate government’s response and ensure swift implementation of the plan. In mid-January, President Ramaphosa convened NECOM to accelerate government’s efforts to reduce load shedding. The president also engaged with a wide range of stakeholders, including political parties, labour unions, business associations, community groups, interfaith leaders, traditional leaders, premiers and mayors to ensure a collective response to this national challenge. The progress update outlined important steps that have been taken to follow through on the earlier commitments announced by the President. These include: Schedule 2 of the Electricity Regulation Act was been amended to remove the licensing requirement for generation projects, which will significantly accelerate private investment. Since the licensing threshold was first raised to 100 MW, the pipeline of private sector projects has grown to more than 100 projects with over 9000 MW of capacity. The first of these large-scale projects are expected to connect to the grid by the end of this year. NECOM instructed departments to cut red tape and streamline regulatory processes for energy projects, including reducing the timeframe for environmental authorisations to 57 days from the previous more than 100 days; reducing the registration process from four months to three weeks; and ensuring that grid connection approvals are provided within six months. Project agreements for 19 projects from Bid Window 5 and six projects from Bid Window 6 of the renewable energy programme, representing 2800 MW of new capacity. These projects will soon proceed to the construction phase. A new ministerial determination has been published for 14771 MW of new generation capacity from wind, solar and battery storage to accelerate further bid windows. An additional 300 MW has been imported through the Southern African Power Pool, and negotiations are underway to secure a potential 1000 MW from neighbouring countries starting this year. Eskom has developed and launched a programme to purchase power from companies with available generation capacity through a standard offer. The first contracts are expected to be signed in the first quarter of 2023. A team of independent experts has been established to work closely with Eskom to diagnose the problems at poorly performing power stations and take action to improve plant performance. While the power system remains constrained in the short term, these measures will soon reduce the frequency and severity of load shedding as new capacity is brought online. At the release of the 21 January 2023 NECOM progress report, President Ramaphosa said: “South Africans are right to demand immediate action to address the devastating impact of load shedding on our lives and on the economy. The EAP provides a clear way out of this crisis. We do not need any new plans – we are focusing on implementing this plan fully, and effectively, to achieve energy security for all South Africans.” The President has also instructed law enforcement agencies to ramp up efforts to protect electricity infrastructure and to combat the rampant corruption that is sabotaging recovery within the energy generation sector. A special meeting of the National Security Council was to be convened in the last week of January to receive a report on operations underway to disrupt criminal syndicates and address theft and sabotage at several power stations. Risk Factors The pathway our of the energy crisis is confronted with a number of material risks, such as: Vacancies at the very top of Eskom’s organisational structure, including the CEO, COO and a number of other senior managers. These vacancies need to be filled urgently, and with capable individuals with proven skills and management expertise. The restructuring of Eskom must be dealt with decisively, as indecisiveness will pose serious challenges to bringing about an improved business model Disagreement between the two key ministries - SOE and DME - as to the direction to be taken to emerge from the crisis. As Head of State the President needs to step in and resolve this post-haste. Eskom has an unsustainable debt burden exceeding 400 billion rand. Innovative ways needs to be found to lessen Eskom’s debt and to improve the utility’s balance sheet and capacity to raise capital in the markets. This may include the state taking over some of the debt. The inability to finance Eskom’s capital build programme impedes the creation of new generation capacity. Conceptual opposition to private sector supply and/or public private partnerships needs to be addressed, and bureaucratic stumbling blocks removed. Affordability of energy for the majority of households. There is little scope for large tariff increases, lest stability in society is to be put at risk. Social unrest is already starting to pop-up across society. The already high cost of energy is negative impacting households and economic activity. With less disposable income households are struggling to service debt, and are spending less. This poses a serious macro-economic threat. Lack of trust. Government’s tardy track record in dealing with the energy crisis, and its failures, has created widespread doubt that the crisis will be turned around in the stated timeframes. This is having a material impact on the business and investment confidence needed to underpin economic growth. Dissent with regard to moving Eskom from SOE to DME oversight as per the ANC 55th Conference resolution. There has been strong opposition to this, first by players outside of the ANC and the media, and lately within the ranks of the ANC, including backers the president. The internal political squabbling has the potential to slow, even derail, progress. Measures to ameliorate and obviate the energy crisis Eskom has an installed capacity of 46000 MW. However, it has been reported that Eskom can only guarantee between 24000 – 26000 MW Energy Availability Factor (EAF) out of the 46000 MW installed capacity. The country needs between 4000 - 6000 MW of additional EAF to mitigate loadshedding immediately, whilst dealing with medium to long-term engineering solutions to fix plant performance and stabilize the grid. It is estimated that one stage of loadshedding costs the economy about R1 billion a day with many small businesses collapsing. Six power stations have been identified for particular focus over the coming months through a comprehensive Generation Recovery Plan. Cabinet has decided that the immediate focus must be on the following initiatives and actions that will urgently contribute to the reduction and ultimately elimination of loadshedding in the next 6 to 12 or at most 18 months. These initiatives in the include: Improving the EAF through maintenance of existing power stations Procurement of emergency or short-term power Purchase of electricity from neighbouring countries Improving skills capacity at Eskom Conclusion There is general agreement amongst public policymakers that a national state of disaster must be declared and that the president leads a nation-wide, societal and inter-governmental effort to end the loadshedding and stabilise the energy supply. The ANC National Conference, and their Lekgotla, have resolved that, in both the country’s interest and their own survival, a decisive national energy crisis action plan be urgently rolled out. This will be better enabled with the declaration of the national state of disaster. Such will enable better focus and mobilization of all government structures, resources and society. It is expected that, drawing from the Covid-19 experience, the president will constitute a national command structure that will include cabinet ministers, premiers of provinces, mayors, organized labour, business and other critical sectors of society. To date government has not communicated sufficiently or timeously. This lack of communication has created uncertainty in the public mind and has, to the detriment of social and economic stability, heightened the trust deficit between the government and the public. They need to up their game. The president must be the leader and principal communicator of the government action plan to resolve the energy crisis. The public will not be satisfied by anything less. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 1/2023 Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2023 by Dr Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies Abstract “The Constitution belongs to all of us, not just the ruling party, or one section of South Africa. We all wrote this collectively with our blood, some with their lives, with our tears and with our sweat. We claim it as ours, it enshrines the rights that make us live as South Africans, and we will protect it because it belongs to us” (Ramaphosa, 2012). Introduction South Africa faces an existential crisis. Our extensive national failings demand that significant intervention and change are required to save and restore the democratic edifice. At its core, South Africa is at an inflection point. It is not sufficient to only isolate and prosecute suspected parties. The crises cannot be resolved by negative action. Instead of another commission or inquisition, the citizenry must be broadly central in rethinking and then co-creating a new socio-political order. The citizenry, as those whose interests are directly affected by the condition of the state, must actively reimagine the way the state functions. They must consolidate a comprehensive approach to the state that places positive, transformative action first. Everybody with an interest in the country must contribute to substantial renewal. In so doing, the citizens will be discharging their Constitutional duty and contribute to the fulfilment of the Constitutional goals of transformation and a people-driven state. We should adhere to former Chief Justice Chaskalson directive, that “the Constitution calls for positive action to confront the apartheid legacy of poverty and disempowerment and build a truly non-racial society committed to social justice” (Chaskalson, 2012). The Inclusive Society Institute (Institute), through this position paper, offers a brief assessment of the structure and purpose of the state. After critically looking at its orientation, the paper proposes that the best path towards a socially just South Africa is through a transformative, people-driven state. A state that through co-operative democracy pursues the national interest. In pursuit of these goals, the Institute proposes that a process be undertaken whereby civil society unites in order to reimagine its relationship with the government and itself and whereby it reactivates its role in the state. The state should serve the national pursuit The structure of a state is not arbitrary, nor is it pre-determined. When South Africa, through its leaders and citizens, decided on a Constitutional democratic structure, it was a product of a multitude of factors. Both external and domestic influences determined the resultant political-economic order. As was the case in the early 1990s, so it remains that decision-makers draw from global standards and influences when determining the pathways and modalities of the state. While it is useful and expedient to draw from global examples, the contemporary international crisis of democracy, detailed broadly by Freedom House (Abramowitz, 2018), the increasing sovereign crises, as well as a general move towards multipolarity (Shapiro, 2021) compel states to pursue their individually articulated national interests. Today, due to international polycrises, democracies can only be strong and serve their people when they are first organized by and give expression to internal demands and cultures. Instead of deriving its legitimacy from the contemporary perception which sees democracy as the sole legitimate form of political organization – a panacea propelled by status quo global powers - a democracy’s authority is instead always derived from and must be representative of the citizenry. Democracy is therefore not an end or a product, as remains erroneously implied about South Africa. Instead of achieving democracy in 1994, South Africa attained the ability to be democratic. Democracy is a way of doing things. Simply, it is a process whereby the expression of power is exercised in the establishment and execution of power. It is from the Constitution, the foundational text and lodestar of the nation, that the form and intelligence of the state are to be determined. Following the South African people’s long struggle against authoritative and repressive state power, the final Constitution of 1996 establishes that the people shall govern. In abolishing the former system of Parliamentary supremacy (rule by law), the enactment of Constitutional supremacy (rule of law) effectively dislodged power from the hands and whims of a ruling party. Instead, it directs all subjects of the state to be guided by the expression of principles and values. The concepts and ideas of the Constitution form the bedrock of South Africa’s national culture. While governmental structure and policy orientation may and do change, the Constitution as grundnorm is the “foundational principle from which the validity of all norms can be drawn” (Oxford, 2022). Instead of witlessly replacing one dominant theory (apartheid) for the next (liberal democracy), it is from the popular transcendence of the differentiated power of the Apartheid system that the democratic order gains its operational and fundamental legitimacy. It follows that for any political action to be legitimate, it must accord to the Constitution’s aspirational and transformative goals. A critical assessment of the government’s policy choices and achievements should first be read in this regard. The question must be: does the policy or action advance social justice for all? It is too often neglected that it is not only government that must pursue the Constitution’s aspirational ends. The citizenry too is charged, in the spirit and deed of republicanism (South Africa is a republic after all) to participate in democratic action. While much is (rightly) made of government’s failures, the republic is doomed when the citizenry fails to go beyond merely being rights seekers. Voting is the fundamental popular action that conveys representative authority. It is a pillar upon which the national order rests. If an electorate majority confers political legitimacy, then the 54.13 % who did not vote in 2021 municipal elections, effectively invalidated the South African political order. This decided political expression (seemingly unbelievable following the long-pursued quest fulfilled in 1994) symbolizes the crisis of legitimacy, which if not urgently addressed portends to unravel the South African project. Not only does this failure suggest that the ruling party is no longer the popular force it once was. But, if power is not claimed through ‘the will of the people’, it will be challenged through alternative, destructive ways. Such a challenge will fundamentally change the basis and thus the entire scope of the national political order. A fatal strike to the heart of South Africa as we know it. Herein lies the vital task for the nation. It is of cardinal importance that the citizenry debates and resolves the question of the national structure. The debate on state practice, the role of government and the role of the citizenry. For the South African state to be legitimate, the citizenry and government must co-operate in constituting the state. The transformative purpose of the state The preamble to the Constitution serves an important role. It describes the national purpose. It sets the scene, offering a national starting point. It then articulates the national goal. Serving as the foundation to the Constitution, the preamble provides primary guidance to the state. The first words of the preamble undertake a significant role. “We, the people of South Africa”, serves to permanently end the previous dominant political theory and the practice of division (Republic of South Africa, 1996). This phrase creates and then instructs the character of the nation, as per the national motto, ! ke e: /xarra //ke (diverse people unite). While the state continued with the democratic handover in 1994, the nation was birthed, as one. Following the formation of a single citizenry, as “we”, South Africans are enjoined to consider and “recognise the injustices of our past”. The declaration of “we” struck a fatal strike to the edifice of apartheid South Africa. It transcended this period and commenced a new era. The momentousness of this strike does not mean dwelling in the past. These two initial markers, the communal ‘we’ and the location of the present in relation to the past, originate the design of the national goal. From before where there was injustice, South Africans of all shades and preferences must together create justice. From before where there was differentiation, we must create unity, peace and shared prosperity. The bulwark of the new South African nation, its ethos, is transformation. For any political, social and economic action to be legitimate, it must give expression to transformation. To “heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights” (Ibid). Significantly, since differentiation is denied through the creation of ‘we’, any interpretation suggesting that transformation refers to the advancement of one racial or ethnic group above another is invalid. This is a lazy perception. Instead, in liberating all South Africans from the over-reach of repressive state power, transformation, is first, the freedom and duty of all to “improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person” (Ibid). What does it mean for the state to have transformation as its purpose? In sum, it gives the people and its representative government a mandate to transform. During its time in administration, the African National Congress (ANC) has presented itself as a transformative force. The ANC government, through its various policies and strategies, has undertaken to implement what it calls a Batho Pele (people first) approach. This guiding principle was introduced by the Mandela administration in the White Paper on Transforming the Public Service Delivery. According to the White Paper, Batho Pele seeks to align the orientation of the government to that of the Constitutional Principles. “Access to decent public services”, said Mandela in the foreword to the Act, “is no longer a privilege to be enjoyed by a few; it is now the rightful expectation of all citizens, especially those previously disadvantaged” (DPSA, 1997). The progressive goal of giving effect to people-centred transformation, is both strategic and gives expression to Constitutional principles. While these policy ideas are laudable and correct, their execution has fallen well short. The reasons are manifold and diverse. The failures and corruption of the ANC are well documented and have slowly been receiving prosecutorial attention. This is particularly the case following the revelations emerging from the Zondo commission into allegations of State Capture which showed how policy and administration tools were susceptible to nefarious political influence. The role of politicians and political influencers has become a feature of and a threat to South African democracy. The exploitation of state resources by connected individuals has taken place against the interest of the people. The failures of the state are not only the fault of the influencers and implementers. Beyond the crisis of corrupt officials in pursuit of national control, the very structure of the state has become too centralized around politicians. Inordinate centralization has facilitated the pursuit of narrow interests. The government’s statist approach has built a dependency on an overburdened state. Furthermore, and of particular interest to scholars and analysts, the distinction between a genuinely people-centred state that offers free basic services and one which dominates society has not been established. While its strategic ends are people-centred, its strategic means and ways are statist. It is of significant concern that the public programmes and the business of the state have become dominated by individuals and government departments that undermine constitutional values and avoid responsibility and consequences. This pathology was gravely exemplified by the Zuma administration. The excessive regulation under the COVID-19 induced Disaster Management Act signifies a high-water mark for state interference. Exiting the era of the pandemic and resolving the accusations emerging from the Zondo Commission offers a strategic opportunity for a true reform process that leads through Constitutional principles. According to a law expert writing for the Daily Maverick under the nom de plume Professor Balthazar, there is a tangible threat of authoritarian statism seizing this strategic opportunity and ushering in a second and more rapacious chapter of state capture. “Either enough people of goodwill defend our constitutional model, however imperfect it has proved, or the alternative will be an authoritarian populism that make the Zuma years feel like a Sunday picnic. Constitutions do not survive because of majestic promises contained in the text. They survive because people fight for their continuation in the manner millions fought to defeat the racist authoritarianism that preceded 1994” (Balthazar, 2022). Balthazar confirms that South Africans are all Constitutionally charged to transcend the divisive era and to ensure that we do not again become dominated by an authoritarian state. Uniting in this goal and speaking with one voice should be every South African’s primary goal. This is the act of transformation. At this moment of inflection, it is worth recalling how the political project of the 1990s supplanted the Apartheid state. Transformation is a process that must be put into action. President Mandela was a master influencer. He understood the power of persuasion. He led the country to adopt and express the values and ideas of the Constitution. Through his presidency, Mandela enacted the principles and values of the Constitution. He gave expression to and therefore embodied the transformation of the oppressive old into the inclusive new. In doing so, his leadership inspired ordinary South Africans to do the same. To become active citizens and embody the transformed state through their everyday actions (Kotzé, 2021). To confront our contemporary crises, we cannot wait idly for another generation of leadership. Instead, we can all take from the approach of Mandela (and others) and embody the Constitutional values. South Africa: A transformative and people-driven political order When considering the points raised above, it emerges that South Africa’s political order should be transformative. It should be people-driven. Former Chief Justice Langa reminds us that active, popular transformation lies at the heart of the new Constitutional order (Langa, 2006: 1). Transformation does not only equate to what has been achieved regarding race and representation. Transformative Constitutionalism is an ongoing process. “A way of looking at the world that creates a space in which dialogue and contestation are truly possible, in which new ways of being are constantly explored and created, accepted and rejected” (Ibid, 354). Transformation can therefore be seen as the movement from one normative system to the next. To exemplify this understanding, Langa points to the epilogue of the interim Constitution of 1993 as providing the basis for transformation. “Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful coexistence and development opportunities for all South Africans” (RSA, 1993). The bridge provides an arrangement for transformation. It is only through the personal commitment of the citizenry to cross the bridge, that it has utility. Put differently, the bridge represents the classic social contract between the state and the citizenry. And between the citizenry itself. Symbolically these “represent binding structures that are formative…the social contract forms a constitutional submission of citizens to a central authority”, the Constitution (Kotzé, 2021). Both structures require commitment and personal action of the citizenry. “The signing of the contract and the crossing of the bridge represent the commencement, though not the achievement, of transformation. The act of democracy entirely depends on the democratic practice being shared. Deliberation requires two or more active agents. It is incumbent upon individuals to take stock of policy, to shape and build the nation. In returning to the post amble, we see that it forms a call to action. ‘The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past’” (Ibid). The Constitution was greatly influenced “by both the public input as well as the deep involvement of civil society in the negotiation process” (Jagwanth, 2003). Speaking and standing up against the former regime provided the normative basis for civil society in democracy. It was through their acceptance of people from other races as equals, the explicit denial of the divisive apartheid system, that the people of South Africa claimed their citizenship. It is a truism that power and independence are never given, it is always claimed through its enaction. Whereas the admission of equality was the condition for a unitary state, the performance of transformative Constitutionalism is the requirement for a thriving democracy. It is therefore that unlike under apartheid where civil society existed in opposition to the state, today this relationship cannot only be an antagonistic or negative one. Through the founding of Constitutional democracy where people claimed their power, today civil society must collaborate with government. It must do so constructively and independently. Civil society does not only have a central role in the execution of Chapter Nine institutions, such as the Human Rights Commission. It has a direct responsibility to ensure the delivery of constitutional goals (Ibid, 13). The citizenry is central to transformative democracy. To suggest that the citizenry is the state is not an exaggeration. The Greek root origin of the word city (today in political terms, the state) and citizen is the same. Citizenship, therefore, means that one belongs to that geographically inscribed political community. As the city belongs to the citizen, the citizen also belongs to the city. Both have the duty to serve the other. In the South African Constitutional context, statism must be transformed into citizen-led democracy. This does not expropriate duty and responsibility of the government. Instead, it supplements and thus supports the work of the government. The contemporarily popular perception that the people must oppose the activities of government is misplaced. The best way to prove its invalidity is to build partnership and reciprocity. The Constitution, much like the Freedom Charter, stresses the significance of public participation in the practice of governance and statehood. A just government would not only have to be based on the will of the people, but the citizenry would also have to be consulted and co-operated with actively. Claiming our place in this co-operation is one of the first steps towards the national solution. Today, throughout its social and pollical realm, there is a growing chorus claiming the need for people to take back South African democracy. Theirs is a call to take inspiration from the period leading up to 1994. For citizen-led initiatives to restore the state, they should embody the deliberative political force of preceding years. Former Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas, at a recent Defend our Democracy conference, invoked the work of Amartya Sen. He suggested that co-operative democracy (again) be adopted as South Africa’s guiding principle (Jonas, 2022). Co-operative democracy which departs from the consolidation of state control by a governing party sees government administered Batho Pele being supplanted by broader participation. Not only practiced by government officials, but by all citizens. It resolves the tension between a statist and a people-driven state. Sen, in The Idea of Justice (2009), describes a co-operative democracy as one that is defined by public reasoning and government by discussion. He suggests that it is through sharing and discussing our realities and ambitions that we build the edifice of a just society (Sen, 2009). South Africans have an advantage. We have a deliberative recent history and a Constitution that mandates government to work closely with the people. This is the principle of subsidiarity, interpreted from section 156(4) of the Constitution. The principle requires maximum efficiency in the application of government. “The argument is that lower levels of government are closer to the citizen and can therefore make more intelligent decisions on what citizens want” (De Visser, 2010). Subsidiarity is about making efficiency the norm. As such, it is innately about the relation between government and the people. Constitutionally, the government is mandated to devolve power (decentralize) when there is a demand from the people and when such devolution will afford more efficient results. This is an important distinction to make. There must be an active demand, whereby through their interaction with the government, the people take up their civic responsibility as co-creators of the state. The COVID-19 pandemic has been a major driver of civic action in communities. According to Siphelele Chirwa (2020), civil society had become less influential in the last three decades leading up to the pandemic. COVID-19 has removed the veil of unemployment and poverty in South Africa. As a consequence, “civil society is being called on more, we need to collaborate and connect … (During COVID-19) the work happening on the ground in South Africa has been driven by nongovernmental organizations, the challenge remains in working together with the government” (Chirwa, 2020). Both the recognition of and involvement with organizations such as Gift of the Givers has hugely increased during the pandemic. The South African media landscape has become awash with praise for Gift of the Givers and other such civil organisations working to provide social support. An interesting phenomenon emerged where many members of the public have suggested that Gift of the Givers would perform the roles of government better than the government itself (Seale, 2020). The confidence and increased involvement of civic organisations provide an interesting lesson of how government can be restructured and improved. The colossal response to COVID-19 has activated a broad swathe of society to see and act against the immediacy of the hugely mediatized situation. Considering the Constitutional principle of efficiency and subsidiarity, these claims carry the significant potential to catalyse the structure of the state. Thereby empowering civic organisations beyond the existing reach and scope of governmental policy. ANC elder, Mac Maharaj, recently added his voice to the chorus calling for closer cooperation between government and civil society. In an opinion piece from 20 November 2022, Maharaj suggested: “it is common cause that local government is the coal face for the delivery of services…is this not the place where we should be initiating and implementing measures, where participatory democracy should be rooted?” (Maharaj, 2022). It is exactly in giving expression to subsidiarity, that government can better perform and for society to receive just service. “Our legislation provides for establishing ward committees. Despite our desire to create a people-centred and participatory democracy, little has been done to make ward councillors engage in the ward committees in ways that involve the communities…This again is an area relating to the building of our democracy that cannot be left solely to the elected councillors. Civil society needs to carve out a role as an active partner, making our democracy participatory” (Ibid). The task of carving out its role is an important observation. As witnessed with the distinction between people-centred and people-driven democracy, the citizenry cannot wait to be handed participatory access and recognition. Nor can it expect constructive and strategic outcomes when it does not first consolidate a comprehensive position in its relationship with the state. We can draw inspiration from the struggle against apartheid as an active embodiment of real power. The unified voice expressed towards a singular outcome did not only crush the apartheid regime. It represented the purpose and structure of South Africa’s future democracy. A new deliberative moment Breaking and building a state is a deliberative act. When through giving its voice to the anti-apartheid movement, by naming and shaming its injustice, and when claiming unity through reconciliation, the popular movement incorporated and embodied the principles and therefore the edifice of the new state. Constitutional democracy was legitimized and realized through a robust democratic process. A process where different groups, pursuing their respective ends recognized each other in committed deliberation and negotiation. At the time, people like Desmond Tutu showed the way. He advocated for koinonia, a fellowship between different groups. He implored the engagement between diverse people, thereby denying the strategic principle of apartheid. Through koinonia, it was possible to manifest a united voice without losing individual distinctiveness. According to Salazar (2002), South Africa presents a remarkable example of a democracy that “both magnified and predated European colonialism, a democracy that has broken that mold without a revolution and its usual sequels…It also offers the striking case of a democracy won at the negotiating table and also won every day in public deliberation” (Salazar, 2002). In being birthed through robust consultation, the process to renew South Africa must return to the Constitution as a process and artefact. In the manner of the Tutus and Mandelas, the people again must speak and act the nation. The present moment in South Africa resembles the latter days of the apartheid state in several ways. The governing party has several factions pursuing differing strategies. It has lost its authority and the ability to maintain order. Increasingly there is a chorus of voices calling for change, for a new way. Unlike before, where the defeat of apartheid and the ushering in democracy was the widely held goal, today such a broadly agreed destination is absent. Instead of advocating for systemic change, the calls today are for the competent and just execution of the state. As referred to at the beginning of this piece, the global democratic crisis exists in that it lacks the arguments (and proponents) for itself. Democracies, including South Africa, have become lame; presumptive of an inevitable future. This arrogance has resulted in democrats assuming a negative approach, rebuking others while not bolstering their own foundations. Instead of chastising others, democrats must consolidate arguments and processes for effective democratic discharge. South Africans (and the global community) can take from the democratic moment in the mid-1990s. The citizenry must seize the national moment to engage and to deliberate on the processes needed to resolve the crises. The form and conduct of the process is important. It must be open, inclusive and robust. Instead of any group or political affiliation dominating, it should be guided by the Constitutional principles. Accordingly, such a process will avoid capture and take place through mutual recognition. Whereas some may be quick to deride deliberation, tautologically referred to as mere rhetoric, the act of deliberation sees citizens claiming and expressing their political power. Through deliberation and civil acts, common ground is found, and leaders emerge. The reference to Gift of the Givers and its acclaimed founder, Imtiaz Sooliman, serves as an excellent example. It is from leaders that deliberately recognise the needs of the people that a national voice emerges. Conclusion: Towards a new national accord If the strategic ways of democracy is deliberation, what should we seek to achieve through it in 2023? For co-operative democracy to embody transformative constitutionalism, we need to do what South Africans cohered to do in the early 1990s. We need to establish a new national chorus. While civil organisations have different approaches to their interests, they need to agree on and then sing from the same proverbial hymn sheet. South Africans need to come together to agree upon the details of this score. In the early 1990s disparate groups with the goal of ending Apartheid and crafting a better society came together in different formats. While we can take inspiration from the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, civil society organizations should look to unite, to again form a patriotic front. In a conference in October 1991, a broad array of organisations signed the Patriotic Front Declaration. The Declaration set out what the delegates from different formations agreed on the socio-political conditions to be. Through setting out a consolidated national comprehension, they were able to articulate and then dedicate themselves to a course of action with specific outcomes. While the substance and approach of the new declaration will be different, much in the manner of process, structure and organization can be drawn from the Patriotic Front Declaration. Neither the potential value of such a process nor its mobilizing force should be underestimated. Today there exists a national yearning for such a united front. The concluding paragraph of the Patriotic Front Declaration serves as a fitting starting point for civil society today. It calls “upon our people wherever they are to join and engage in this process emanating from our Conference to create a nation that will be at peace with itself” (United Nations Centre against Apartheid, 1991). To realise the transformative goals of the Constitution, civil society organizations must come together to discuss and agree on the process, content and direction of a new national declaration. To give effect to the people-driven state, civil society should undertake a thorough and democratic process to agree upon and then speak with one voice. References Abramowitz, M. 2018. Democracy in Crisis. [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis [accessed: 1 December 2022] Balthazar, 2022. Authoritarian statism is a real danger to our entire system. [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-10-04-authoritarian-statism-is-a-real-danger-to-our-entire-system/ [accessed: 19 October 2022] Chaskalson, A. 2012. Without fear, favour or prejudice: The Courts, the Constitution and Transformation. Former Chief Justice Speech at the ‘Challenges facing Administrative Justice Conference’, University of Cape Town, 26 January. Chirwa, S. 2020. “The rise of civil society in South Africa”. Mail & Guardian, 31 May. [Online] Available at: https://mg.co.za/coronavirus-essentials/2020-05-31-the-rise-of-civil-society-in-south-africa/ [accessed: 19 October 2022] Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA). 1997. White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery. [Online] Available at: https://www.dpsa.gov.za/dpsa2g/documents/acts®ulations/frameworks/white-papers/transform.pdf [accessed: 5 October 2022] De Visser, J. 2010. Institutional Subsidiarity in the South African Constitution. Stellenbosch Law Review, 90. Jagwanth, S. 2003. Democracy, Civil Society and the South African Constitution: some challenges. Management of Social Transformations, Discussion Paper 65. Jonas, M. 2022. Mcebisi Jonas: Standing up to defend our democracy is the only option. [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/citypress/voices/standing-up-to-defend-our-democracy-is-the-only-option-20220702 [accessed: 1 October 2022] Kotzé, K. 2021. 25 years of the South African Constitution: Reflections and Realisations. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, The Midpoint paper series no. 6/2021. [Online] Available at: https://www.kas.de/documents/261596/0/The+Midpoint_6_2021_Kotz%C3%A9+%282021%29+25+years+of+the+South+African+Constitution+-+Reflections+and+Realisations.pdf/5499af37-ee4b-503a-ba48-7df94202e21c?version=1.0&t=1631103664304 [accessed: 1 November 2022] Langa, P. 2006. Transformative Constitutionalism. Stellenbosch Law Review, 17(3): 351 – 360. Maharaj, M. 2022. What we must do to set our country compass right. [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/citypress/voices/mac-maharaj-what-we-must-do-to-set-our-country-compass-right-20221118 [accessed: 1 December 2022] Oxford Reference, 2022. Grundnorm. [Online] Available at: https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095910371 [accessed: 1 December 2022] Ramaphosa, C. 2012. Conversation on the Constitution. Nelson Mandela Foundation. [Online] Available at: https://www.nelsonmandela.org/news/entry/conversation-on-the-constitution [accessed: 5 December 2022] Republic of South Africa (RSA). 1993. Interim South African Constitution. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-act-200-1993 [accessed: 18 October 2022] Republic of South Africa (RSA). 1996. South African Constitution. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 [accessed: 5 October 2022] Salazar, P-J. 2002. An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: London. Seale, W. 2020. Government ministers could learn from Gift of the Givers’ Dr Imtiaz Sooliman. [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/columnists/guestcolumn/opinion-government-ministers-could-learn-from-gift-of-the-givers-dr-imtiaz-sooliman-20200817 [accessed: 5 November 2022] Sen, A. 2021. The Idea of Justice. Harvard University Press: Cambridge. Shapiro, J. 2021. The Arrival of Multipolarity and its impact on US-Russia relations. [Online] Available at: https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-arrival-of-multipolarity-and-its-impact/ [accessed: 5 December 2022] United Nations Centre against Apartheid, 1991. Patriotic / United Front Declaration. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 11/2022 Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. NOVEMBER 2022 by Dr Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies Abstract When the African National Congress meets for its National Elective Conference in December, it will have to resolve significant concerns beyond the election of a new leadership. In what could be a watershed event for a party facing existential challenges, the decisions on and details of its conference resolutions will prove to be fundamental to its future. Whereas it has previously committed to internal and operational renewal, the detail and direction of such renewal may prove to be critical to both the party and the country’s future. This article pursues understanding of what renewal has meant for the ruling party and what renewal should mean if it is to achieve its goal of building a capable, ethical and developmental state. It argues that it is critical for the next leadership to pursue an agenda that advances a people-driven state. True renewal would, therefore, be underscored by a positive power structure that enables all people to be actively involved in the development of the state. The building of a devolved, cooperative democracy and thus a departure from the statist, centralized power structure would signal a return to the consultative, collaborative approach the party employed with great fortitude and success when it first came to power. Introduction The African National Congress (ANC) will convene its 55th National Elective Conference (NEC) in December 2022. The NEC is the party’s highest decision-making body. At each NEC the party dissolves its leadership structures and through a broadly democratic process elects new representatives to reflect on the approach and achievements of the preceding administration. The conference then designs the party’s path forward. At its 54th NEC, the ANC resolved to address the various concerns facing the party, its role in the government and the state at large. Chief among its resolutions was that the party must be renewed. In its 2022 policy conference documents, captured in a special edition of Umrabulo, the party recognises that the shift from being a liberation movement to being in government has given rise to problems associated with the capacity and functionality of the state. These problems are associated with the self-enrichment by opportunists and the over-centralisation of social and economic control by the state, respectively. The policy conference documents call on the party to resolve its inward-looking, overly centralised focus (ANC, 2022). As redress, the policy documents advance the need for broad party renewal; for stricter vetting processes; that the ANC deal with its internal issues and that it repositions itself as an effective and trusted leader in society. For it to renew and deal with its concerns, it would be incumbent on the leadership to determine the required processes, structures and intended outcomes – determining what a renewed party and state would look like. And what role the party, state and citizenry would play. At the 54th NEC and again at the recent National Policy Conference (NPC), the party has resolved to urgently build a capable, ethical and developmental state. This can be read as its interpretation of renewal. With this target in mind, the appropriate and pragmatic policy is required to comprehensively catalyse the roles of the party, state and citizenry. Due to the sizeable task at hand, as well as the existing limitations, policy must create an enabling environment that stimulates active participation by all stakeholders. The ruling party, in its commitment to renew itself, must embrace pragmatism and through a comprehensive approach guide a social compact that will bring all hands on deck. By virtue of the ANC’s influence on the state and society at large, this article intends to contribute to the debate by discussing concerns and pathways toward renewal. Through assessing the ANC’s approach and strategy, the article seeks to draw causal perceptions and recommendations that will further the constitutional goals in general and the development of a capable and renewed state in particular. In order to plot and pursue these ends, we commence with a short discussion on the composition and function of the state. South Africa’s developmental state model The developmental state refers in general to significant state-led macro-economic planning and policy. The term was conceptualised by Chalmers Johnson, who defined the developmental state as one where the state shapes and drives economic development for the social wellbeing of the people. The role of the state is to “single-mindedly mobilise society to achieve industrial modernisation” (Gumede, 2009: 4). The developmental state has become a term synonymous with East Asian states such as Japan and South Korea, states that share a “major preoccupation to ensure sustained economic growth and development on the back of high rates of accumulation, industrialisation and structural change” (UNCTAD, 2007: 60). While East Asian nations have been synonymous with the developmental model, these states also traditionally have an overly authoritarian approach, a modality that is employed more as a matter of culture and practice than one which is universally most appropriate for development. Instead of necessarily being those that centralise political power, developmental states are those that guide and enable stakeholders to take up responsibility in, and share amongst themselves, the distributive ends of development. Developmental states are thus those that create and enable development. In successful developmental states, the state functions as an entrepreneurial agent that crowds in private investment and “rally business, labour and other social partners behind its efforts” (Gumede, 2009). Instead of following a defined course, successful developmental states select their pathways according to that which would ensure the goal of social economic improvement for the society at large. The ends of the developmental state, as socio-economic development of the citizenry, are more defined than its ways. The distinction between statist (centralised) and people-driven (distributed) developmental paths is a foremost strategic determination to be made by all countries undertaking such a path. In South Africa, due to incapacity, historical disparity and insufficient resources, together with a constitutional mandate for meaningful citizen participation, a statist approach is inappropriate and insufficient. While the public policies of the democratic government have and must continue to advance the ends of socio-economic justice, the case for an East Asian-type developmental state runs contrary to the democratic principles of the state, as well as those of the ANC. While some may suggest that ANC policy, as well as strategy and tactics, documents assert state-centric interventions, these documents must be read in response to local realities, as well as in recognising the various recent failures. Instead of serving the interests of the public, the state service has drifted to advance narrow personal and party-political ends. Nepotism and cronyism have been witnessed in far too many state institutions, doubtlessly brought to light by the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector (Zondo Commission). The findings of the Commission do not only point to gross irregularities, such as the landing of a private jet belonging to the Gupta family at Waterfkloof Air Force, or to corrupt proceedings, such as siphoning off millions of rands at the Vrede Dairy Farm, in a projects-for-friends arrangement managed by senior government officials (News24, 2018). The exploitation of state resources by leaders and their acolytes is revealed to have been nothing less than procedural, a pathway of propping up the interests of individuals at the cost of the people. The Zondo Commission reports play a key role in discerning this reality. It effectively illustrates a number of examples, such as how the State Security Agency was central to state capture. Under President Zuma, the Agency was instrumentalised to serve him and not the people of the country. Covert and irregular operations such as ‘Mayibuye’ saw millions of rands allegedly being siphoned from the Agency to Zuma. It represents “a collection of operations designed to counter threats to state authority. In practice, they and others sought to shield Zuma from a growing chorus of criticism of his misrule. The commission found that the project destabilised opposition parties and benefit the Zuma faction in the ruling African National Congress” (Duncan, 2022). Throughout the other volumes of the Zondo Commission reports, the picture emerges clearly of a state service that was procedurally weakened so as to advance personal interests. The breakdown of Transnet, where Gupta allies were appointed to strategic positions, and the sustained damage brought by chairperson Dudu Myeni to the national carrier are but two examples. The politicization of state infrastructure extends well beyond those implicated in the Zondo reports. The appropriation of state resources by a politicized civil service is indicative of a national situation where the distinction between ANC and state has been obstructed and has become systematically blurred. It has emerged that the party is in charge of the civil service, too often serving itself and not empowering the people. The Zondo Commission reports have definitively shown that a statist developmental state does not and cannot work in present South Africa. So, which path should South Africa then follow? According to Gumede, “a successful developmental state involves getting the nature and relationship between different social institutions right, and managing conflicts within and between these, whether through social pacts or through national consensus” (Gumede, 2009). Gumede goes on to say that there are essential conditions for a successful developmental state. These include having a developmental vision, an efficient bureaucracy, an efficient coordinating centre to manage development and an integrated long-term developmental plan. It is compelling to note that each of these factors have been front-and-centre to the present administration. It has stressed the need for a capable state, it has bolstered the presidency as a coordinating centre, and it has the National Development Plan 2030 as its long-term vision. While these factors lie within the ambit of the government, Gumede mentions one more important condition which does not: “a developmental partnership between government, business, labour and civil society” (Gumede, 2009). It is through this partnership that the developmental state (in a democracy) achieves the appropriate relations between social partners. It is key to ascertain a national consensus that places the citizenry centrally, both in delivery and service execution. Accordingly, a South African developmental state cannot copy the authoritarian, undemocratic models applied in East Asia. Instead, a local developmental state must do the opposite. It must, through being people-driven, deepen democracy. Herein, it is imperative that the state must successfully persuade the citizenry, not only to buy into, but also to help create such a model. The example of China is useful. While the Chinese state is extremely hierarchical and rigid, it has a clear mandate for both the people and the government. The people must both buy into and help shape the party’s direction – the party being the expression and will of the people. This, while the government must, according to policy and practice, unceasingly open up and reform. “In most successful developmental states, the state and the private sector work out a constructive partnership, which involves trade-offs both ways, but with the ultimate goal of radically transforming the economy: lifting economic growth levels, reducing unemployment and poverty and making the country competitive vis-à-vis its competitors … at the heart of such social pacts must be an appearance of not only the burden of suffering, but also the benefits of economic growth, being equitably distributed across society” (Gumede, 2009). From these observations it becomes clear that a South African developmental state should not only empower the citizenry and be entrepreneurial, but it should also be people-driven. ANC policy and orientation Appropriate policy is that which deals best with the strategic environment that an entity finds itself in. In the case of the ANC, it is guided by several core documents, declarations, principles and values. The Freedom Charter of 1955 functions as such a document. It presents a set of core principles and is characterised by its founding statement, “the people shall govern” (SACA, 1955). It lays the foundation for the kind of state that should be sought. The Freedom Charter sets out a hugely ambitious and transformative programme whereby people working in democratic concert, achieve self-actualisation. The Freedom Charter served as South Africa’s lodestar to dispel the subjugation of colonialism and apartheid. As a united declaration of an undivided, sovereign people, the Freedom Charter informed the drafting of the new South African Constitution, finalised in 1996. In its preamble, the Constitution gives expression to the principles and goals of the Freedom Charter. Its preamble does not only declare, “we, the people of South Africa … believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity”, thereby overcoming separation or apartheid. The Constitution also takes forward the conviction that the people shall govern. It empowers and charges all people to actively participate in building a transformed country. Collaboratively, “we” must “heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and human rights … and build a united and democratic South Africa” (RSA, 1996). Herein, the Constitution, much like the Freedom Charter, lays great significance on the participation of the citizenry in the practice of governance and statehood. A just government would not only have to be based on the will of the people, but the citizenry would also have to be consulted and cooperated with actively. To legitimately lead South Africa, the ruling party, in abiding by the constitutional principles and goals, would have to be people-centred in its orientation, while its administration would have to function in collaboration with the people, or be people-driven. People-centred state Through its various policy programmes, the ANC government has undertaken a people-centred approach. Its foundational Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) stressed that “no political democracy can survive and flourish if the mass of our people remain in poverty, without land, without tangible prospects for a better life. Attacking poverty and deprivation must therefore be the first priority of a democratic government” (RSA, 1994). To ensure a people-centred policy framework, the ANC government introduced the 1997 White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery. The White Paper sought to align the work of government to the constitutional principles under the guiding concept of Batho Pele (people first) (DPSA, 1997). Batho Pele and the RDP, while noble in their orientation, centred power inwards in the administration. It placed the country on the path to delivery dependency. The government placed a huge burden on itself to counteract the racialised delivery programme of the former regime. The White Paper sought to guide a government that did not have governing experience, never mind the capacity to overcome the biased system it inherited. The White Paper, in seeking to drive transformation, produced policy tools that would be government-driven and therefore susceptible to political influence. The party’s policy formulation meant that the maxim of “the people shall govern” became suffixed by: “through political representation”. Whereas Batho Pele comprised noble foundational principles, such as that service delivery should be guided by “value for money”, the party deployees often had too much sway in decision-making. In his foreword to the White Paper, former President Mandela stressed that: Batho Pele should entail “the relentless search for increased efficiency and the reduction of wastage within the Public Service” (DPSA,1997). Instead of formulating policy where the state works with the people, policy increasingly became cloistered under ANC control. While this approach started as cultivating a culture of service in the ANC-led government, centralising the force of power inward led to perverse personal aggrandisement. Instead of ensuring value for money, a culture developed where the politically connected overextended the power they held – serving the self vis-à-vis serving the people of the state. Not unique to South Africa, the power that the incumbent ANC afforded its deployees created cults of personality. The egalitarian people-first principle would be moot from the start when those charged with enactment were first serving themselves, as noted in the NPC discussion documents, mentioned above. The result: the people were first no more. The ideals of transformation became subverted in the distorted discharge of the state. Service had been rerouted from a progressive approach to one that served the connected and state employees, first. In 2020, government had spent more money paying its 1.3 million public servants than it did the 18 million South Africans receiving social grants (Mahlaka, 2022). The well-documented failures of service delivery illustrate the failure of translating principles into the corresponding action. While corruption, practiced in the name of Batho Pele, is central to the state failures, it is not the only problem. The statist, government-driven path has not achieved development and transformation. Instead, it has built a dependency on an overburdened state that has become increasingly corrupt and incapable. The distinction between a state that cares, one that offers free basic services, and an overly redistributive, welfare state has not been established in South Africa. The translation of pursuable strategies by leadership, for adoption by the public, is sorely needed. The present South African social welfare (dependency) policy is worth noting. In addition to its social grants programme, the number of informal settlement dwellers has been growing unabated since 2000. Among other welfare proposals, the NPC discussion documents suggest: “Since the dawn of democracy in 1994, about 4.8 million houses have been delivered in South Africa, providing safe shelter to over 25% of South Africa’s households ... Approximately 2.8 million households in South Africa do not have access to improved sanitation services. The ANC has resolved to eradicate the bucket system in order to improve sanitation services. By December 2020, a total of 41 290 out of 52 249 bucket sanitation systems were eradicated. Furthermore, a total of 14 235 rural households were served to eradicate sanitation backlogs” (ANC, 2022:100). The numerous social protection programmes supporting deserving households are valid and pursue the principles of both the national Constitution and ANC conference resolutions. However, given the limitations and failures of the state, South Africa cannot develop only through redistribution. There are real restraints to South Africa’s welfare state, not least the lack of resources. People-driven state The report of the 54th National Conference states that “the ANC’s approach to state power is informed by the Freedom Charter and the principle that ‘The People Shall Govern’” (ANC, 2017). The report continues to explain that the “attainment of power by the ANC is a means to fulfil the will of the people and ensure a better life for all” (ANC, 2017). This articulation continues the path of dependency of ANC power as the expression of people power. It assumes the same centralist (or statist) position as previous NEC reports. But this position is not the only one expressed by the party. In recent years, also at policy and elective conferences, the ANC has articulated new approaches for itself and the state. In 2012, the National Planning Commission, which sits in the Presidency, released the National Development Plan (NDP). The NDP was formulated to form a long-term perspective for South Africa. It offers a comprehensive plan to execute the mandate of the Constitution: to build a transformed state whereby poverty and inequality is eliminated. The NDP, therefore, presents an impression of and a path to state renewal. While it carries the official support of the ANC, as supported by NEC resolutions, its reformist approach to distributed, or people-driven, power has been widely rebuffed by ANC leaders, not least when it did not receive formal approval and endorsement at the National Policy Conference, in 2012 (Mogotsi, 2013). While there are various reasons to explain this disparity, the most important, according to this analysis, is the NDP’s push to reorganise power relations in South Africa towards being more people-driven. Principally, to devolve control away from the national government and create a developmental state where, through the active involvement of the citizenry, truly the people shall govern. The NDP stresses that “South Africa can realise its goals by drawing on the energies of its people … To accelerate progress, deepen democracy and build a more inclusive society, South Africa must translate political emancipation into economic wellbeing for all. It is up to all South Africans to fix the future, starting today” (NPC, 2012). In shifting focus to the extended capacity and capability of the citizenry (people-driven), it moves it away from the government (people-centred). The NDP is therefore not simply a plan for government, but a plan for the people of South Africa. It defines renewal and presents a whole-of-society approach. This is evident from the six interlinked priorities that are set out in the NDP: “Uniting all South Africans around a common programme to achieve prosperity and equity; Promoting active citizenry to strengthen development, democracy and accountability; Bringing about faster economic growth; higher investment and greater labour absorption; Focusing on key capabilities of people and the state; Building a capable and developmental state; Encouraging strong leadership throughout society to work together to solve problems” (NPC, 2012). The citizenry is clearly the decisive agent in each priority area. The plan indirectly acknowledges the limitations of government and strategically shifts power to a people-driven state. It provokes a whole-of-society approach, where each citizen is called upon to collaboratively build the renewed state. “Its success will depend on all South Africans taking responsibility for the plan, led by the President and Cabinet” (NPC, 2012). The NDP continues to make the bold statement that “an unintended outcome of government action has been to reduce the incentive for citizens to be direct participants in their development. To prevent this practice from being entrenched, the state must actively support and incentivise citizen engagement … Active citizenry and social activism is necessary for democracy and development to flourish. The state cannot merely act on behalf of the people – it has to act with the people, working together with other institutions to provide opportunities for the advancement of communities” (NPC, 2012). Government power centralisation and its failure to appropriately facilitate public involvement is a theme that arises in various areas of state affairs. As an example, the Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Bill was introduced in Parliament in 2011 and signed into law on 23 December 2015. The South African Veterinary Association approached the Constitutional Court, submitting that Parliament had failed in its constitutional duty to facilitate public participation in the law-making process. In its judgement, the Constitutional Court declared the Act unconstitutional. It held that Parliament did not undertake meaningful public consultation (Constitutional Court, 2018). This failure of an arm of the state is not a unique example. It instead points to a recurring theme that requires broader recourse. A further example of excessive statism is seen in the control exercised by the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy. For years the Department resisted cooperative ventures and was reluctant to raise the embedded generation threshold. While the Department has since acquiesced to greater people-driven measures, the research group Meridian Economics shows that the current energy crisis could have been significantly averted had the Department not prevented the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer programme from being rolled out. The programme’s additional capacity “would have allowed Eskom to eliminate 96.5% of load shedding in 2021” (Comrie, 2022). Towards the 55th National Elective Conference The African National Congress held its NPC on 29-31 July 2022. In his foreword to the compendium of policy documents, ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa proposes that the “Discussion Documents outline the ANC’s strategic approach to policies and how it shapes and impacts our transformation agenda” (ANC, 2022: 3). The NPC and its policy discussion papers prepare the party for its December 2022 elective conference. It sets a path for the party’s next administration. The NPC and discussion documents do two things. They reflect on the decisions emerging from the 2017 elective conference, which gave the current administration its mandate. They then guide the party towards achieving its goals, while considering the strategic environment within which the party finds itself. The NPC and policy conference functions as a crucial transitional mechanism in guiding the party through successive administrations, seeking to enable adjustments that improve upon previous decisions, while maintaining momentum. As the ruling party, it is imperative both for the party and for the state, that the party undertakes a critical assessment of the path towards its goals, based on its strategic environment. The 2022 NPC took place in “the year of unity and renewal to defend and advance South Africa’s democratic gains” (ANC, 2022). This theme is meant to provoke reflection on the resolutions taken at the 54th National Conference, in 2017 – to guide the policy considerations, so as to advance its resolutions. The theme champions the first resolution of the 54th National Conference: organisational renewal. In order for the party to arrest its decline and renew, it “has to continually review its organisational state and capacities, and its relationship with the people and society” (ANC, 2017: 11). The report undertakes to recognise and address its shortcomings, which it describes as “a loss of confidence in the ANC because of social distance, corruption, nepotism, arrogance, elitism, factionalism, manipulating organisational processes, abusing state power, putting self-interest above the people” (ANC 2017: 13). It is only through a singular, renewed spirit that is awake to the realities of the land, that the party can continue to play a defining role in South Africa’s future. This theme presents a snapshot of the organisation’s larger condition. The party faces a decline in support that could lead to it losing an outright majority for the first time since 1994. The 54th National Conference report suggests that “organisational renewal therefore is an absolute and urgent priority, and we may go as far as to say, to the survival of our great movement” (ANC, 2017: 14). The report thereby charges the next administration with the priority of formulating approaches and policies that will give effect to organisational renewal. According to its president, the party must change its ways; “to counter these negative aspects, we have to intensify our efforts with the renewal process and revitalisation of ANC structures” (ANC, 2022: 3). The renewed function should restructure the party, away from the self-serving cronyism that it has become associated with. It must be reorientated towards serving the country at large. In Ramaphosa’s words: “Our focus has to be the improvement of the quality of lives of people, rather than an often narrow, internal party focus” (ANC, 2022: 4). In perceiving and directing both the NPC and the Elective Conference, the President, who is also seen as a forerunner for another term in the top job, paints a clear picture of the party’s strategic position and the approach needed to first retain electoral support and to govern effectively. It is only an ethical and capable state that can administer and deliver the services required to retain popular trust. Recommendation: Towards ethical renewal To ensure electoral trust and a further mandate to govern, the ANC needs to truly commit to ethical renewal. At the NPC, Ramaphosa – among other leaders, such as Minister of Co-operative Government and Traditional Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, herself a contender for the ANC’s top position – condemned the collapse of the ANC, not on ideological differences, but on the failures of ANC members. “There are not divisions about policies or ideology”, said the President, instead party issues are “driven by the competition for positions, the contestation of structures and the pursuit of access to public resources … These divisions manifest themselves in patronage, gatekeeping, vote buying and manipulation of organisations processes … We can see how our divisions have weakened governance in many areas, undermined public institutions and hampered the maintenance of infrastructure and the provision of services … This situation has contributed to declining levels of voter participation in elections and diminishing support for the ANC” (Ndaba & Sadike, 2012). Ramaphosa submits that the ANC’s failure is due to internal weakness. He charges that without shedding the yoke of corruption and greed, the party will lose power and its mandate to rule. This strategic assessment follows his extraordinary letter to ANC members on 23 August 2020 where he accused the ANC of being “accused number 1”. “Leadership positions are seen by some as the most direct route to, in the first instance, employment and, in the second instance, to influence in the award of tenders and the distribution of other government resources. The people see how organisational principles and structures are corrupted for personal gain … Our lack of discipline and failure to deal with the issues in our movement have eroded our organisational ethos and standing … we must have the political courage and the honesty to acknowledge that ANC leaders, public representatives and members have on numerous occasions been implicated in such forms of corruption” (Ramaphosa, 2020). While renewal has been widely pledged, details thereof have remained scarce. In concluding his letter, Ramaphosa distinguishes two sets of measures that “demonstrate clear political will”, are “unflinching in restoring the values, ethics and standing of our organisation”, and will help “win back people’s trust”. These, says Ramaphosa, are not his own views, but rather, it is the mandate received by the 54th National Conference. It represents an approach to critically providing meaning and operation to a renewed organisation. The first set deals with ANC members. It describes the measures to be undertaken to “implement without delay the resolutions of our 54th National Conference in dealing with corruption” (Ramaphosa, 2020). It is only by punishing offenders, by acting and being seen as acting to restore discipline, that the party can become ethical and have any chance of truly renewing itself. Recommendation: Towards a people-driven, capable state The second set enumerated in his letter pivots toward greater cooperative democracy. Ramaphosa calls for the mobilisation of “a ‘whole-of-society’ response against corruption and ANC members must support progressive organisations in their stand against corruption” (Ramaphosa, 2020). Rallying for such an approach performs an important leadership role. It determines upon aspirational concepts, describing the capable state to be one that is distributed and people-driven. It gives meaning to the complex set of concepts, while detailing what a preferable path will look like. Furthermore, it delineates signification and responsibility. This distinguishment, the engagement of civil society in the process of restoring faith and building a capable state, is itself an act of renewal. Cooperative democracy is an important concept that should be enumerated in the South African context. It refers to a state where government acts in consultation with the citizenry. According to former Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas, the various aspects of renewal should be subject to democratic public reasoning. He suggests that South Africa adopts cooperative democracy “as a guiding principle” (Jonas, 2022). Cooperative democracy departs from the ANC practice of consolidating state control, regardless of capacity and capability. It resolves the tension between a statist and a people-driven state. To retain power, the party must lead and not dominate the state. This entails a capacitating or consultative role for the party. An illuminating example of such a change of course is the President’s comment during the State of the Nation Address: “We all know that government does not create jobs. Business creates jobs” (Ramaphosa, 2022). This comment, an act of conceptual and strategic direction, reverberated throughout the country. An act of renewal, it presented a watershed moment that closed a period where the state was seen to have the core developmental responsibility. This comment, recognising its limitations, initiates a new chapter, where development necessitates cooperation between all who have an interest in the state. It should not be seen as reneging or giving up power. Instead, as is illustrated by the decision to permit up to 100MW of private power generation, it shows a state that enables itself when it enables others. The consultative process should again be used to deliver renewal and unity. Deliberation and engagement are required for true cooperative democracy. These are not only historical principles of the ANC but have also been its traditional strengths. When it first came into power, it employed a consultative and collaborative approach with such skill, it strategically outplayed its political opponents. True renewal would, therefore, be underscored by an enabling power. Inclusion can yet again be used to the advantage of the party. “To be effective”, says Ramaphosa, a capable state underwritten by a comprehensive social compact “needs to include every South African and every part of our society. No one must be left behind” (Ramaphosa, 2022). Conclusion The ANC faces considerable challenges on its path to renewal. The various NPC and strategic documents show that the party is alive to the reality that goals are determined by the strategic environment, and not vice versa. The NDP is instructive. It states that: “A plan is only as credible as its delivery mechanism is viable. There is a real risk that South Africa’s developmental agenda could fail because the state is incapable of implementing it … a capable state does not materialise by decree, nor can it be legislated or waved into existence by declarations. It has to be built, brick by brick, institution by institution, and sustained and rejuvenated over time. It requires leadership” (NPC, 2012). This paper concludes by pointing to the fact that the ANC has resolved to renew and that its leadership has started to articulate what such renewal would entail. It is critical that the future leadership invigorates the renewal process. That it not only maintains its focus on capacitating an ethical, people-driven state, but that it must also actively design and implement the measures that are needed to establish it. To do so, the party must actively advance meaningful and real consultation, and cooperative democracy. References African National Congress (ANC). 2017. 54th National Conference: Report and Resolutions. [Online] Available at: https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/73640_54th_national_conference_report.pdf [accessed: 5 October 2022] African National Congress (ANC). 2022. Umrabulo: Policy Conference 2022: Special Edition. Comrie, S. 2022. The Collapse of old king coal part two, Daily Maverick, 10 October. 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Economic development in Africa: Reclaiming policy space. Domestic resource mobilisation in developmental states. Report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. New York and Geneva, 26 September. [accessed: 7 October 2022] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

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NOVEMBER 2022 by Robert Mopp & Daryl Swanepoel Contractionary fiscal consolidation vs Expansionary fiscal stimulus in the context of SA's budget Implications for growth, employment and debt Picture source: superforex.com Abstract This essay will first look at austerity as the policy that gained currency in the post-2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), particularly in the United Kingdom (UK), Greece, etc. The counter policy of fiscal stimulation has a much longer genesis that can be traced to the Great Depression era. In the stimulus versus austerity debate, there are also shades and overlap between the two approaches. Both have pros and cons and should be viewed against the background of South Africa’s current fiscal and economic situation. South Africa’s fiscal space has shrunk due to low growth, but there has been an improved revenue intake from higher commodity prices, resulting in a much improved main budget deficit for the 2022/2023 fiscal year, compared with the national budget presented in February. The main budget deficit narrowed to R42.7 billion in August, from R129.5 billion in July. This has provided additional space in the upcoming Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) in October – giving Treasury additional wiggle room. This essay advocates for a more gradual decrease of the budget deficit, as opposed to the current plan of higher levels of cuts. This should be in conjunction with structural changes to the economy to spur higher and faster growth, with infrastructure spending kick-starting the process. Introduction Joseph Schumpeter reminded us in 1934 that "public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of society; the budget is the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies, the truest reflection of the distribution of power and influence”. It is where the governing party shows its prowess and resolve to grow the economy sustainably and improve the quality of people’s lives. Former President Mbeki further elaborated on this profound observation in his 2006 SONA address, when he said that “the spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare, is written in its fiscal history”. Professor Ben Clift (2018) asserts that austerity remains the central economic policy debate of our age; it goes to the nub of the issue under consideration. Over the last few years, this has become the case for South Africa too. He continues by asking how far governments should contain public spending, given increasing fiscal deficits and debt levels. Clift further asks, what should be accorded the highest priority: “reducing national debt to secure economic credibility or using fiscal and other policy levers to bolster economic growth”? This summarises the tension at the heart of the budget, namely contractionary “fiscal consolidation” versus an “expansionary fiscal policy”. These posers are pertinent to South Africa, in light of the upcoming budget statement by the minister of finance and “austerity by stealth”, which many say has been integral to the budget over the last period. This stance should be viewed against the current worsening global economic climate – after the two years of Covid-19 restrictions and initial recovery experienced in 2022 – of high inflation (high prices); high food and energy prices (accelerated by the conflict in Ukraine); glitches in the global supply chain mechanisms; de-globalisation and rising economic nationalism and the retreat into regional economic and political blocs; rising protectionism and trade barriers; deflation; stagflation and hysteresis (which increases long-term unemployment). It should also be seen against the increasing decoupling of the USA from Russia and China, ushering in a new “cold war” – seemingly at an end with the dissolution of the USSR, finding expression in Francis Fukuyama’s now famous axiom, “the end of history”. This maxim noted that the liberal-democratic system has triumphed, with no rival paradigm to challenge it. Predictions are that these challenging economic issues are not transitory, but will be medium to long term in nature. Currently, the world faces an unprecedented “cost of living crisis”. Fiscal Consolidation (Austerity) versus Fiscal Expansion Austerity is often couched in the understated and misleading term of “expansionary fiscal contraction”, which will ostensibly lead to increased growth levels, resulting in more jobs being created and the attendant positive outcomes. Austerity opponents state emphatically that this is not the case, based on empirical evidence dating to the 1930s (Germany then) and post-2008 Global Financial Crisis, in the European Union (EU). This debate also references the notion of Keynesian “countercyclical” economic measures, especially in crisis periods. Genesis of the Austerity Idea The austerity doctrine has a long genesis, dating back to philosophers and the classical economists. It can be traced to David Hume and Adam Smith in the 17th century, with John Locke, the antecedent. Blyth notes that the sentence, “the state: can’t live with it, can’t live without it, don’t want to pay for it” defines the liberal dilemma as the basis for austerity politics. Locke wanted to limit the attitude and ability of the state to increase debts at will. At that time, this was mainly directed at kings who arbitrarily taxed subjects for their vanity projects and to wage wars. Hume went further with his assertion that public debt can destroy a nation; again, to be seen within the context of monarchs with their unbridled power. In the modern era, there are checks and balances in place to counter this type of arbitrary exercise of power. He believed that the problem of public debt is unsolvable and potentially limitless; he also believed that debt can be passed on from generation to generation. According to Blyth, Adam Smith deduced that the free-market system would not survive if a country was not prepared to make certain sacrifices. Smith, as a notable abstemious person, had a very high opinion of “saving as an actuator” (Blyth, 2013). For Smith, a cardinal problem is that states are not savers, individuals are. These three theorists approached cost (debt) from a moral perspective – to them, saving is a virtue and spending is a vice. Later theorists associated with the neoclassical economic paradigm associate Smith with assigning a minimalist role to the state, the so-called “night watchman” role referred to in his 1776 classic, Wealth of Nations. According to Reisman (1998), Adam Smith “was not a single-minded advocate of a laissez-faire market in which the minimal state had no more than a protective function. Rather, he was a pragmatic social thinker who in each case selected the tool that was the best suited to his meta-objective of rapid economic growth”. Thomas Malthus, another classical economist, argued in favour of the need to maintain aggregate demand and to support key sectors of the economy. He greatly influenced Keynes. Malthus is referenced by Keynes as the “grandfather of his theory of effective demand” (Skidelsky, 2003). In 1930, Keynes warned the establishment of a rising disaster, if they continued on the path of an unbridled free-market, gold-standard orthodoxy and fiscal and monetary policy austerity. As it turned out, shrinking markets and balanced budgets exacerbated the unemployment problem, which remained obstinately high, leading to the 1929 stock market crash and the “Great Depression”, and, ultimately, war amongst nations in Europe. This scenario came to bear once more in 2008 with the Global Financial Crisis. Austerity Definition Professor Mark Blyth defines austerity as a “form of voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, and public spending to restore competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state’s budget, debts, and deficits”. Its adherents believe that it will inspire “business confidence”, since the government will either be “crowding out” the market for investment by amassing available capital through the issuance of debt, or adding to the nation’s already considerable debt, which they regard as too large and unsustainable in the long term. For Blyth, the goal of the exercise goes beyond a mere reduction of the fiscal deficit or public expenditure; it also aims to enhance competitiveness. Barry Ritholtz describes austerity as “the desire to slash government spending and cut deficits during a time of economic weakness or recession” (Andor, 2018). Professor Joseph Stiglitz, former World Bank Chief Economist and one of the critics of fiscal consolidation, compares austerity with an obsession with balanced budgets and a fixation on fiscal deficits. Stiglitz makes it clear that the main problem with the approach is that it makes cuts in expenditures (especially social spending) a policy priority when public revenues fall at a time of an economic downturn (what we are experiencing currently). Austerity measures refer to procyclical interventions during an economic downturn or recession, as opposed to fiscal stimulus measures that stress countercyclical measures. Treasury View and Neoclassical Economics The policy of fiscal consolidation, small government and balanced budgets is associated with the neoclassical economic framework. The neoclassical school posits that market economics have an automatic tendency to full employment equilibrium, are efficient and generally function well (Stiglitz, 2014). This school further believes that markets are more efficient than governments in allocating capital; state spending and taxes should be kept as low as possible; and budgets should be balanced (Skidelsky, 2020). Left to its own devices, the market would not provide the above, as we witnessed with the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and with the downturn occasioned by the Covid-19 pandemic. New Consensus Macroeconomics, which replaced the New Keynesian synthesis as a dominant framework in central bank and finance minister circles, has a long history and many labels, according to Blanchard (2009). Perhaps the earliest popular term to describe its essential character, is the “Treasury View” – a term attributed to Keynes when he was employed here. Keynes was critical of Churchill’s defence of austerity in the beginning stages of the Great Depression. Two major features define the Treasury View: reduce the public debt, and the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP at all times. Padayachee describes the Treasury View as predicated on “fiscal restraint/conservatism, low budget deficits, holding down expenditures and public debt, tightly controlling and directing the public purse and sound money”. It became synonymous with the Washington Consensus. The argument is that such austerity will not adversely affect the economy, but rather that the opposite will happen, as government cuts will be met by increased private-sector spending. Increasing the budget deficit will, in this view, “crowd out” more productive private investment and should be strongly discouraged. The neoclassical doctrine of “expansionary austerity”, of cutting public expenditure and reducing budgets, is largely associated with the work of Alberto Alesina, a Harvard economist. Alesina used statistical techniques that supposedly identified all large fiscal policy changes in advanced countries between 1970 and 2007, and claimed to find evidence that spending cuts, in particular, were often “associated with economic expansions rather than recessions”. The reason advanced is that spending cuts create confidence (business), and that the positive effects of this increase in confidence trump the direct negative effects of reduced spending and exclude the possibility of any revived inflationary pressures. Inflation is currently at record highs, globally. However, the evidence does not bear this out under all circumstances and conditions. The 2013 Economic Report of the President, produced by the US President’s Council of Economic Advisers, notes that where states have pursued the economics of austerity, the result has been continually declining growth. In contrast, the US, Australia, etc., experienced positive economic growth. Similarly, the social democratic welfare states with the biggest levels of fiscal stimulus experienced the least loss of jobs and economic contraction during the Covid-19 pandemic, with accompanying massive global economic downturn. Reinhart-Rogoff Controversy In 2010, two well-known Harvard economists, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, claimed in their now infamous paper, Growth in a Time of Debt, that 90% debt is a critical threshold; that once debt reaches more than about 90% of GDP, the risks of a large negative impact on long-term growth become highly significant. George Osborne, the then British Chancellor of the Exchequer, and many other finance ministers in the developed world, seized upon this conclusion to justify spending cuts and sharply lowering government debt. Three economists, Herndon, Ash and Pollin, from Amherst-Massachusetts, in a critique, replicated the Reinhart and Rogoff analysis and discovered a crucial spreadsheet error. When corrected, they came to the conclusion that growth rates in fact averaged 2.2%, not -0.1%, over the same period for the same group of countries. In their conclusion, they said: “In particular, it has established that policymakers cannot defend austerity measures on the grounds that public debt levels greater than 90% of GDP will consistently produce sharp declines in economic growth.” According to Professor Eric Widmaier (2013), in mistakenly characterising the historical relationship between rising debt and falling growth, Reinhart and Rogoff inadvertently omitted strong performers like Canada, New Zealand and Australia from their calculations. Widmaier continues by saying that more important, however, than their spreadsheet errors, was their “lack of theoretical insight, as they failed to recognise that the relationship is best seen as one of reverse causality: rising debt does not cause falling growth, so much as falling growth causes rising debt”. Subsequently, in 2013, Reinhart and Rogoff stated, “Our consistent advice has been to avoid withdrawing fiscal stimulus too quickly, a position identical to that of most mainstream economists. Given the likelihood of continued weak consumption growth in the US and Europe, rapid withdrawal of stimulus could easily tilt the economy back into recession.” Despite their erroneous calculations and subsequent partial volte-face, the Reinhart and Rogoff paper remains highly influential in the United States and Europe, and even in developing countries in the Global South. New Deal’s State-Led Approach In contradistinction to the fiscal consolidation approach, is an expansionary fiscal approach, undergirded by an effective, capable state. The New Deal, under former President Roosevelt, is regarded as a highly successful state-led economic development to counter the Great Depression travails. Roosevelt took America off the gold standard, devalued the dollar and targeted growth and development (Rauchway, 2015). He further targeted what was seen as the biggest challenge at that time, namely “deflation” (decrease in the general price level of goods and services) and secured a sustainable economic recovery. President Roosevelt was advised by Keynes – some budget items were cut, but overall spending was up. Massive public works programmes were created during this time. When asked if he intended to balance the budget, he responded thus: “It depends entirely on how you define the term, ‘balance the budget’ … We will balance the budget as far as the ordinary running expenses of the government go. But fighting the Depression required borrowing, to put people back to work and keep human beings from starving in this emergency. As desirable as a balanced budget might be, the needs of recovery come first” (Rauchway, 2015). By all accounts, the measures taken with the New Deal were a resounding success; growth was high, about 9% on average (Rauchway, 2015). Most scholarly accounts will concur with Keynes’s observation that “the extent, variety and spread of the recovery is outstanding in economic history” (Rauchway, 2015). Stimulus or Expansionary Fiscal Spending Evidence and results from the Great Depression and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis demonstrate that for fiscal stimulus, the “most effective way of cutting deficits is to resist recession and to combine deficit reduction with rapid economic growth” (Sen, 2015). Furthermore, Roosevelt’s words that, “as desirable as a balanced budget might be, the needs of recovery come first” (Rauchway, 2015) also apply in the context of expansion versus contraction. From the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s the public debt to GDP ratio was considerably larger in Britain than it has been at any time since the 2008 financial crisis, with high growth rates. Britain was also establishing its welfare state at the time, developing a foothold for the welfare state in Europe, and then globally. According to Sen, Britain’s debt to GDP ratio in 1948 was more than 200%, more than double what it has been over the last two decades. Keynes is credited with advocating for countercyclical fiscal measures to counter unemployment and low growth, rather than the procyclical approach followed in South Africa. Keynes famously said that the “boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the Treasury” (Skidelsky, 2003). In his General Theory in 1936, he suggests that cutting public expenditure is a problem, rather than a solution. Keynes introduced the notion that “demand is important as a determinant of economic activity, and that expanding rather than cutting public expenditure may do a much better job of expanding employment and activity in an economy with unused capacity and idle labour”. Many have misinterpreted Keynes’s point, saying he advocated reckless spending. However, Keynes was mindful of the context of spending, but within the broader framework of the macro economy. It was about the collective will of all stakeholders to deal with the challenges. Austerity does not assist the recovery process, as cutting public expenditure “adds to the inadequacy of private incomes and market demands” (Sen, 2015), leading to higher levels of joblessness. Most of the stimulus packages to counter the 2008 Global Financial Crisis were replaced by austerity packages in most of the developed countries. Sen said a “hybrid policy of somewhat weakened fiscal austerity with monetary expansion” then came into play, with mixed responses. South Africa’s Disquieting Political Economy South Africa has its own unique socio-economic challenges, characterised by high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality. We are regarded as one of the most unequal societies in the world. World Bank data that has measured the Gini coefficients of 146 countries since 2010, indicate that South Africa had the worst score, of 63. Unemployment stood at 34.9% in Q2: 2022, according to Stats SA. The aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis saw South Africa lose about one million jobs, only replenished on the eve of the outbreak of the devastating Covid-19 pandemic. A bigger number was subsequently lost in 2020, mainly recovered in 2021. In 2012, South Africa adopted the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030, which sets out a long-term vision for the country on how it intends to bring about fundamental socio-economic transformation. The aim of the NDP is to attain an ever-improving standard of living for all South Africans, through higher economic growth and the reduction of poverty and inequality. The NDP set a number of ambitious targets that have by and large not been met by the actual outcomes (NPC, 2020). Given the devastation wrought by the Covid-19 pandemic – due to the lockdown of economies allowing no or reduced production, trading and consumption – South Africa’s economy shrunk by 7% in 2020. This is the worst performance since 1920, according to statistics. Then the world was battered by the “Great Flu” pandemic and the aftermath of the First World War. It would be an understatement that the 2021 budget was awaited keenly by everyone in South Africa. The expectation was that there would be economic improvements, and that this would raise our hopes for the future. But the entrenched fault lines in our political economy have only been aggravated by the economic, social and psychological ravages inflicted by the Covid-19 pandemic. It should be noted that our economy was already performing poorly prior to the onset of Covid-19, with many challenges on the fiscal, monetary, labour, productivity, indebtedness front, plus low growth. Covid-19 has simply highlighted fault lines that can no longer be hidden or wished away. We have suffered low nominal growth –1.2% annually over a five-year period, 2013-2018. By comparison, we averaged growth of 4,7% in the 2005-2008 period. The number of unemployed persons increased by 132 000 to 8,0 million in Q2: 2022. The total number of persons employed is now 15,6 million. The official unemployment rate was 33,9%, and 44,1% for the expanded definition. The economy shrunk by 0.7% in Q2, denoting weaker economic activity, less spending power and weaker confidence overall. The NDP set a target of reducing unemployment from 25.4% in 2010 to 14% by 2020 and 6.0% by 2030. Achieving these goals would have entailed the creation of 2.2 million jobs between 2010 and 2015, at an annual average of 436 000, on the back of an average GDP growth rate of about 4.6% per annum. Between 2015 and 2020, the average rate of job creation should have risen to 505 000 per annum, creating an additional 2.5 million jobs. Instead, the small business sector, so critical for job creation and sustaining livelihoods in most economies, dropped from 64% in 2008 to 55% in 2015 (NPC, 2020). The South African economy’s small business composition is one of the lowest in Africa and globally. And yet, the NPC 2020 review report makes the truly astonishing claim that “the NDP does not prioritise informality”. This is linked to our inability to turn townships into areas of thriving economic activity. This is the case in many countries, especially at local level where the focus is on enhancing growth and creating jobs. On the poverty and inequality front, while poverty rates dropped significantly in the 2000s, this has tapered off since 2011, with some indicators degenerating (NPC, 2020). The percentage of the population designated as poor in terms of the South African Multidimensional Poverty Index headcount was 17.9% in 2001, dropping to 7% in 2016 (Stats SA, 2018). According to World Bank data, 19.5% of South Africans were trying to survive on the equivalent of USD1.90 per day in 2018 (PPP adjusted), representing a reduction from the equivalent figure of 36,6% in 1996. The NPC (2020) states that the “persistence of deep poverty is most likely due to slow job creation, rising food prices, and rapid increases in utility costs that have outpaced income growth”. Fiscal Direction of Budget and Consequences Let us now determine the “spirit” of our fiscal direction, as outlined in the 2021 budget. Most economists have characterised the budget as “austerity by stealth”, due to the cutbacks in funding on health, education and social assistance (in real terms). The then Finance Minister, Mboweni, proposed reducing the deficit from 14% in 2020/2021 to 6.3% in 2023/2024 in order to stabilise debt at 88.9% by 2023/2024. This will primarily be achieved by cutting R265 billion spending over the three-year MTEF, with hopefully higher income proceeds for an upturn in the economy. The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC, 2021) says that the tabled budget implies a real reduction in per capita non-interest spending of around 14% over the next three years. The FFC, in its March 2021 supplementary note, states that the consolidated expenditure on emergency medical services will be R7.2 billion in 2021 (R8.2 billion in the 2019 fiscal year). The estimate for 2023 is R8.1 billion – i.e., below its nominal level in 2019. Expenditure on central hospitals will grow at 1.3% per annum between 2019 and 2023 – below the average inflation rate of around 4%. The cutting of funds contradicts the idea of using the health crisis to strengthen the health infrastructure as we transition to the National Health Insurance (NHI). Consolidated expenditure on basic education will increase by less than 2% per annum between 2019 and 2023, below the average rate of consumer price inflation over theperiod. This will result in fewer teachers, meaning larger class numbers, especially in township schools. Funding for students at tertiary level has also been cut, resulting in the absence of many deserving students from disadvantaged backgrounds. The sober tones of the FFC should give us pause for reflection. The FFC notes that the “budget 2021 is the first time since the adoption of the Constitution in which a budget tabled by the executive hasunambiguously proposed a substantial reduction in the real value of allocations to public services that undergird these socio-economic rights” (FFC, 2021). Infrastructure Spent to Spur Economic Growth According to the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC, 2020), government has been issuing bonds worth about R80 billion a month for current spending needs. Since the additional funding is already committed, there is very little room for bulk investments. Investment flows have lagged the targets set by President Ramaphosa, despite the diligent efforts to attract such. However, government notes that the market has the capacity and the appetite to invest in long-term infrastructure projects via public-private partnerships, provided they are bankable. The private sector is prepared to do this without government having to commit initial kick-start funding. But it would want a “clear regulatory framework, transparency, zero political interference and a clear project pipeline” (PEAC, 2020). These infrastructure projects – in water, electricity and the build environment – would then create spin-offs for ancillary industries. The PEAC also envisages green projects to be prioritised. Yet, FirstRand Chair, Roger Jardine, in the group’s 2021 annual report, has been extremely critical about the “painfully slow” pace of government’s proposed infrastructure programme. Jardine says that over two years ago President Cyril Ramaphosa pledged an infrastructure programme that was “the flywheel for economic growth and large-scale job creation”. He says Ramaphosa “has regularly acknowledged the crucial importance of South Africa’s “infrastructure programme as a key driver of his economic recovery strategy. Yet, it is hard to identify one government-led infrastructure project of any significance that has actually been executed. Progress, in other words, has been to date, glacial. The pace does not correlate to the stated ‘extraordinary’ nature of the measures required. Extraordinary suggests urgency, immediate action and focus.” Despite the general negative sentiment, Jardine denotes “some promising developments, particularly in the energy space”. Jardine notes a disconnect between President Ramaphosa’s plea and the lack of delivery. Jardine says that the primary reason “is the historical unwillingness to crowd in the private sector”. This refers to the lack of close, cooperative ties between government and the private sector since the post-1994 period. This historic mistrust has not sufficiently receded as hoped in that initial euphoric period. PEAC on South Africa’s Fiscal Trajectory The Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC, 2020) states that GDP has declined over the last few years, mainly due to “declining Total Factor Production” and that “fiscal policy had been unsustainable” prior to the onset of Covid-19. They express misgivings about our procyclical fiscal stance, as debt levels have been on the rise. In the same breath, the PEAC notes that austerity is essentially anti-growth. The PEAC aligns itself with Professor Burger’s view, which proposes a “more gradual and realistic fiscal adjustment path”, as Treasury’s ambitious plan is neither economically nor politically feasible in a low growth, high interest rate environment. For Burger (2020), higher growth rates are imperative, coupled by a more gradual rise in the primary surplus by 2016/2017. To achieve this more gradual, realistic, less procyclical scenario, it needs to be “accompanied by visible structural change in order to be time consistent and credible, including wage bill reduction and fundamental restructuring of SOEs” (PEAC, 2020). This more feasible trajectory must not only contain unnecessary perks and expenditure, engender savings by eliminating wasteful and inefficient expenditure, but it must also grow incomes via growth enhancing reforms that will result in more jobs being created. The PEAC notes that whilst the “imperative for fiscal consolidation is therefore compelling, it must also be balanced by the need to support post-Covid recovery and for a buoyant tax base”. SA’s Debt, is it Too Onerous? There is a general prevailing narrative that South Africa’s debt ratio to GDP is too high. It currently stands at 70.1% (IMF, 2022), which, by international standards and the average of South Africa’s debt level, is not onerous. The other plus in the case of South Africa, is that most of our debt is rand-denominated (local currency); about 90%, “shielding government from some volatility in debt costs due to fluctuations in the exchange rate” (Treasury, 2020). The world average is 97% – advanced economies, 120%; emerging markets, 66%; upper income, higher than 66%; Asia, 73%; and Latin America, 72% (IMF, 2022). Japan is a staggering 256% and has suffered from deflation for more than a decade. The interest rate on our debt is high, at 8-9%. By comparison, developing countries’ average debt cost on external borrowing is three times higher than that of developed countries. In the low interest environment of the last decade, developed countries borrowed at an interest cost of an average of 1% (Spiegel & Schwank, 2022). The problem is that there is no belief from financial entities that government will stick to its promises to lower the debt through fiscal consolidation, higher taxes or efficiencies in spending. Treasury has committed itself to a budget surplus by the 2023/2024 budget – which is odd, given the current depressed global economic environment. This move is intended to send a signal to the “market” and financial institutions that Treasury is committed to a “fiscal consolidation path” and to instil confidence. On the expenditure front, we should be mindful that spending should be in areas that will spur economic growth and not go into consumer spending, especially on luxury goods. Consumption is already high as a share of GDP in South Africa. It means that households are consuming more than their income, as statistics clearly show, signifying high levels of debt. Indeed, debt levels are very high in South Africa – too high for too many. Private consumption as a substitute for government spending to invoke higher levels of growth will not add substantially to the economy. In fact, it is likely to make the economy less productive in the future, not more productive (Baker, 2012). Dean Baker notes that “high levels of private consumption are associated with a negative savings rate”. The savings rate (not in a mechanistic manner) is important for the domestic investment rate. The Covid-19 crisis has showed that many more things are possible with commitment. Conclusion South Africa’s economy has not been robust for some time, with debt on an upward trajectory, dampening growth prospects. Our debt is not onerous by international standards, and it is overwhelmingly rand-denominated. At the same time, social ills are in abundance in our society, and some fiscal easing is necessary to tackle the cost-of-living crisis with its accompanying high prices of goods, especially food and energy. Our growth rate is low and that must urgently improve. Economic policies and choices need to be firm and consistent to ensure that there is confidence in them. The appropriate policy mixes, contextual to our situation, should be implemented so that our economic turnaround can occur in the short term and be sustainable. This paper argues for less severe budget cuts within a more gradual, realistic, less procyclical framework and a more longer-term fiscal recalibration path – as endorsed by the President’s own economic advisory council – than the current Treasury one, which is too ambitious in its outlook. Given the current dismal global economic scenario (likely to continue into the medium term), Treasury’s fiscal consolidation plan is not regarded as economically and politically attainable in a low-growth, high interest rate, higher inflation environment. A more realistic fiscal approach should then result in a more gradual rise in the primary surplus in the years ahead, rather than a short, sharp shock approach, which will dump the economy into a recession, with all its negative attributes. There are enough areas to cut in government spending with the amount of waste and inefficiencies prevalent. These views should be articulated in the Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) on 26 October, as a much-improved main budget deficit for the 2022/2023 fiscal year is forecast, compared with the national budget projections in February. The tax take shot past the February budget outlook by R162 billion, narrowing the main budget deficit to R42.7 billion in August, from R129.5 billion in July Zwane, 2022). Fiscal consolidation has “costs” attached to it, like a reduction in government personnel, less funds for services and infrastructure maintenance. “Rigidly sticking to fiscal orthodoxies in a crisis is not always wise, as much as it needs to be balanced with boldness” (Financial Times, 2022). We have seen how Europe has put price caps on energy prices and introduced windfall taxes for the oil companies, given the astronomical profits generated over the last period due to its high prices. Shell’s profits more than doubled for the third quarter of 2022, to a whopping USD9.5 billion, compared to 2021 alone. Shell’s chief executive Ben van Beurden, for example, urged governments to tax energy companies via a windfall tax to ‘protect the poorest’ in society (Euronews). Stiglitz (2022) states that windfall profit taxes are necessary in “controlling key prices – such as those for electricity and food – and encouraging government interventions where necessary”. The mining industry in South Africa has generated 85% of the windfall profits generated over the last year. However, and crucially important, this expanded fiscal space generated by less severe budget cuts, combined with the windfall profits, should be spent on economic infrastructure development and job-enhancing projects and programmes and not on consumption. Economic infrastructure development will undoubtedly lead to higher economic growth and a bigger market, with an accompanying increase in tax revenues and more social and political stability; a win-win situation in South Africa. Wasteful expenditure and unnecessary perks should be ruthlessly erased from budgets; SOEs should be radically restructured and better governed, underpinned by the necessary structural reforms of our economy. It was noted by the PEAC that the market has both the appetite and capacity to invest in infrastructure programmes. More importantly, the private sector is prepared to do this without government even committing the initial kick-start funding; this is a big plus. There has been positive development in the energy sector with the opening up of the various bid windows of the renewable energy independent power producer’s procurement programme (REIPPPP) and with other components of the national energy programme. The twin reforms of austerity related to consumption spending and debt expansion to accommodate economic infrastructure development will enable both growth and future tax revenue enlargement capable of servicing the newly acquired debt. In the immortal words of Joan Robinson, “when it is forbidden to admit error there can be no progress”. We must disabuse ourselves of the notion that incantations will deliver the magical silver bullet; that is the height of idealism. The economy needs lubrication, as well as dealing with the debt that has grown exponentially. In an ideal world, we should be implementing Keynes famous dictum that the “boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity at the Treasury”; it remains as true now as then. Unfortunately, the world is imperfect. Forging an agenda of shared objectives between the government, labour, business and civil society will be critical in advancing a growth and development agenda for the country. The structural deficiencies in the South African economy have to be addressed simultaneously. Our low growth rate of the last period, likely to be less than 2% for 2022 (Treasury, 2020; IMF, 2022), should be urgently boosted. The budget and its implications require a thorough discussion of the appropriate policy options for the country’s future. Spend on economic infrastructure development Source: Treasury projection: http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2021/review/FullBR.pdf (grey line); illustrative alternative debt model : Inclusive Society Institute (red line) Annotation Austerity or “fiscal consolidation” can be defined as “a form of voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices and public spending to restore competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state’s budget, debts and deficits”, which will “inspire ‘business confidence’”. Blyth considers it very dangerous, because it was the failed “classical” response to the Great Depression, 180 degrees in opposition to the Keynesian prescriptions, and also exactly what Germany has been prescribing today for Greece, with predictably disastrous results (Blyth, 2013). Barry Ritholtz describes austerity as “the desire to slash government spending and cut deficits during a time of economic weakness or recession”. Prof Alberto Alesina, a Harvard economist, was positive about the effects of austerity of fiscal consolidation. His perspectives were based on a study of large fiscal policy changes in advanced countries between 1970 and 2007. Alesina claimed to find evidence that spending cuts, in particular, were often “associated with economic expansions rather than recessions”. The reason advanced is that spending cuts create confidence (business), and that the positive effects of this increase in confidence trump the direct negative effects of reduced spending and exclude the possibility of any revived inflationary pressures. Classical economics refers to the English school of economic thought that originated during the late 18th century with Scottish economist, Adam Smith, and that reached maturity in the works of David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. The theories of the classical school, which dominated economic thinking in Great Britain until about 1870, focused on economic growth and economic freedom, stressing laissez-faire ideas and free competition. Many of the fundamental concepts and principles of classical economics were set forth in Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2022). Most consider Smith the progenitor of classical economic theory. However, Spanish scholastics and French physiocrats made earlier contributions. Other notable contributors to classical economics include David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, Karl Marx, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, John Stuart Mill, Jean-Baptiste Say, and Eugen Böhm von Bawerk (Young, 2022). The Classical economists believed in free market efficiency, given a series of assumptions known as the First Welfare Theorem. The conditions of this theorem are that there is perfect information in the market, zero transaction costs, a large number of buyers and sellers, no externalities, and all transactions are voluntary. According to the classical school of thought, free markets functioned better than regulated markets as long as the conditions of the First Welfare Theorem held. (Econ488.blogs) Deflation is when the overall price level decreases so that the inflation rate becomes negative. It is the opposite of the often-encountered inflation. A reduction in money supply or credit availability is the reason for deflation, in most cases. Reduced investment spending by government or individuals may also lead to this situation. Deflation leads to a problem of increased unemployment due to slack in demand. Central banks aim to keep the overall price level stable by avoiding situations of severe deflation/inflation. They may infuse a higher money supply into the economy to counterbalance the deflationary impact. In most cases, a depression occurs when the supply of goods is more than that of money (The Economic Times). Hysteresis is from the Greek term “hysteros”, meaning "a coming short, a deficiency”. The term “hysteresis”, coined by Sir James Alfred Ewing, a Scottish physicist and engineer (1855-1935), refers to systems, organisms and fields that have memory. In other words, the consequences of an input are experienced with a certain lag time, or delay. In economics, hysteresis arises when a single disturbance affects the course of the economy. An example of hysteresis in economics is the delayed effects of unemployment. As unemployment increases, more people adjust to a lower standard of living. As they become accustomed to the lower standard of living, people may not be as determined to achieve the previously desired higher living standard. In addition, as more people become unemployed, it becomes more socially acceptable to be or remain unemployed. After the labour market returns to normal, some unemployed people may be disinterested in returning to the work force (Kenton, 2021). New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) draws heavily on the so-called new Keynesian economics in its macro-modelling and replaced it after the collapse of the Grand Neoclassical Synthesis in the 1970s. The New Keynesian paradigm, which arose in the 1980s, provided sound microfoundations along with the concurrent development of the real business cycle approach, which promoted the explicit optimisation behaviour aspect. Those developments, along with macroeconomic features that the previous paradigm lacked (such as the long-run vertical Phillips curve), resulted in the NCM. The Taylor Rule became the most common way to model monetary policy. Monetary policy as interest rate policy became one of the hallmarks of the New Consensus (prof Philip Arestis). Stagflation is an economic cycle characterised by slow growth and a high unemployment rate accompanied by inflation. Economic policymakers find this combination particularly difficult to handle, as attempting to correct one of the factors can exacerbate the other. Once thought by economists to be impossible, stagflation has occurred repeatedly in the developed world since the 1970s oil crisis (Investopedia, 2022). Stimulus refers to action by the government to encourage private sector economic activity by engaging in targeted, expansionary monetary or fiscal policy based on the ideas of Keynesian economics. The term economic stimulus is based on an analogy of the biological process of stimulus and response, with the intention of using government policy as a stimulus to elicit a response from the private sector economy. Economic stimulus is commonly employed during times of recession. Policy tools often used to implement economic stimulus include lowering interest rates, increasing government spending, and quantitative easing, to name a few (Investopedia, 2021). References Andor, L. 2018. Austerity: From Outrage to Progressive Alternatives [Online] Available at: https://socialeurope.eu/austerity-outrage-progressive-alternatives [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Baker, D. 2012. Attacking the Treasury View, Again [Online] Available at: https://cepr.net/report/attacking-the-treasury-view-again/ [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Blanchard, O. 2009. The State of Macro [Online] Available at: https://www.nber.org/papers/w14259 [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Blyth, M. 2013. Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. New York: Oxford University Press. Burger, P. 2020. South Africa’s debt: Has the budget overpromised? [Online] Available at: https://www.cde.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CDE-Viewpoints_SAs-Debt_Burger.pdf [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Clift, B. 2018. The IMF’s Reconstruction of Economic Orthodoxy since the Crash [Online] Available at: https://economicsociology.org/2018/06/29/the-imfs-reconstruction-of-economic-orthodoxy-since-the-crash/ [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2022. Classical economics [Online] Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/classical-economics [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC). 2021. Supplementary Comment on Budget 2021 and the Bill of Rights [Online] Available at: https://cisp.cachefly.net/assets/articles/attachments/84822_ffc_supplementary_comment_on_2021_budget.pdf [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Financial Times. 2022. The big British economic gamble[Online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/70d8d42d-d6ad-4fa1-bb59-a8106c7c309b [accessed: 27 October 2022]. GovInfo. 2013. 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[accessed: 27 October 2022]. Jardine, R. 2021. FirstRand 2022 Annual Integrated Report [Online] Available at: https://www.firstrand.co.za/media/investors/annual-reporting/firstrand-annual-integrated-report-2021.pdf [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Kenton, W. 2021. What Is Hysteresis? [Online] Available at: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hysteresis.asp [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Krugman, P. 2015. The austerity delusion [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austerity-delusion [accessed: 27 October 2022]. National Planning Commission (NPC). 2020. Economic Progress Towards the National Development Plan’s Vision 2030 [Online] Available at: https://www.nationalplanningcommission.org.za/assets/Documents/Review%20of%20Economic%20Progress%20NPC%20Dec%202020.pdf [accessed: 27 October 2022]. National Treasury (Treasury). 2020. Budget Review 2020 [Online] Available at: http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2020/review/fullbr.pdf [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Peden, G. 1996. The Treasury View in the interwar Period: An Example of Political Economy? [Online] Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324113673_The_Treasury_View_in_the_interwar_Period_An_Example_of_Political_Economy [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC). 2020. Briefing Notes on Key Policy Questions for SA’s Economic Recovery [Online] Available at: https://www.scribd.com/document/479901686/Briefing-notes-on-key-political-questions-for-SA-s-economic-recovery [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Presidential Economic Advisory Council (PEAC). 2021. Briefing Note for President Ramaphosa on Current Economic Policy Priorities [Online] Available at: https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/sites/default/files/Briefing%20Note%20for%20President%20Ramaphosa%20on%20Current%20Economic%20Policy%20Priorities%20Jan%202021_1.pdf [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Rauchway, E. 2015. The Money Makers: How Roosevelt and Keynes Ended the Depression, Defeated Fascism, and Secured a Prosperous Peace. New York: Basic Books. Reinhart, C. & Rogoff, K. 2010. Growth in a Time of Debt [Online] Available at: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w15639/w15639.pdf [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Reisman, D. 1998. Adam Smith on Market and State, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154(2): 357-357. Sachs, M. 2021. Fiscal Dimensions of South Africa’s Crisis [Online] Available at: https://www.wits.ac.za/media/wits-university/faculties-and-schools/commerce-law-and-management/research-entities/scis/documents/Sachs-2021-Fiscal%20dimensions%20Working%20Paper%2015.pdf [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Sen, A. 2015. The Economic Consequences of Austerity[Online] Available at: https://www.newstatesman.com/long-reads/2015/06/amartya-sen-economic-consequences-austerity [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Sibeko, B. 2019. The Cost of Austerity: Lessons for South Africa [Online] Available at: https://iej.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/The-cost-austerity-lessons-for-South-Africa-IEJ-30-10-2019.pdf [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Skidelsky, R. 2003. John Maynard Keynes: 1883-1946: Economist, Philosopher, Statesman. Great Britain: Penguin. Skidelsky, R. 2010. Keynes and Social Democracy Today [Online] Available at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/keynes-and-social-democracy-today?barrier=accesspaylog [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Skidelsky, R. 2015. The Failure of Austerity [Online] Available at: http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/SPERIPaper23-the-failure-of-austerity.pdf [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Skidelsky, R. 2020. Keynes: The Second Coming? PANOECONOMICUS, 68(2):159-165. South African Reserve Bank, 6 October 2022 press statement. South Africa is Doing Well. Spiegel, S. & Schwank, O. 2022. Bridging the ‘great finance divide’ in developing countries [Online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2022/06/08/bridging-the-great-finance-divide-in-developing-countries/ [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2018. Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in South Africa [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/wp-content/themes/umkhanyakude/documents/South_Africa_Poverty_and_Inequality_Assessment_Report_2018.pdf [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Stiglitz, J. 2014. Europe’s Austerity Disaster [Online] Available at: https://socialeurope.eu/europes-austerity-disaster [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Stiglitz, J. 2017. The Welfare State in the 21st Century [Online] Available at: https://policydialogue.org/files/publications/The_Welfare_State_in_the_Twenty-First_Century.pdf [Accessed: 27 October 2022]. Widmaier, W. 2013. Deficit hysteria debunked: in the long run, Keynes was right [Online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/deficit-hysteria-debunked-in-the-long-run-keynes-was-right-14465 [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Young, J. 2022. Classical Economics [Online] Available at: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/classicaleconomics.asp [accessed: 27 October 2022]. Zwane, T. 2022. [Online] SA doing well, as Reserve Bank hails fiscal position. Available at: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/economy/2022-10-04-sa-doing-well-says-reserve-bank-as-it-hails-fiscal-position/ [accessed: 27 October 2022]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

30 November 2022 - 2 December 2022, Wellington The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) attended the 2022 Conference and Workshop: Centre for Good Governance in Africa, the School of Social Innovation at Hugenote - Co-created Community-based Partnership Local Governance and Service Delivery in South Africa Analysis, Action and Activism. It was held at the Andrew Murray Centre for Spirituality, Wellington South Africa. The workshop took place from 30 November to the 2 December 2023. The workshop was hosted by CiviNovus NPC. The ISI was represented by Dr Motsomai Molefe, Dr Klaus Kotze, Mr Edwin McQueen and Mrs Berenice Marks. Drs Molefe and Kotze presented their papers, Ubuntu and the role of local government, and Realising the constitutional goals: a transformed and people driven state respectively at the conference. The workshop was well attended by political parties, civil society, academia, and well know South African dignitaries. The theme was Community based local governance, analysis, action and activism.

Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. Author: Melanie Lue Editor: Daryl Swanepoel SEPTEMBER 2022 Content Background Introduction Panel Discussion What drives xenophobia in South Africa? What research tells us? A statistical overview of migration in South Africa – Implications for migration management and addressing xenophobia Reframing interventions: Towards a plan beyond the National Action Plan on Racism and Xenophobia Does immigration policy and laws fuel xenophobia? Aligning policy and legislation to ensure consistency in action Discussion Way Forward Annexure A: Dr Steven Gordon’s full presentation Annexure B: Mr Diego Iturralde’s full presentation Annexure C: Prof Loren Landau’s full presentation References Cover page picture source: istockphoto.com | FourOaks Background On the 17 August 2022 the Inclusive Society Institute (Institute) hosted a roundtable discussion titled ‘Developing an Effective Response to Addressing Xenophobia in South Africa’. The roundtable is the first engagement in a two-part series of discussions. The second engagement is planned at a strategic level with senior government stakeholders and policy makers. The motivation for the roundtable stems from concerns of growing levels of intolerance to migrants and the increasing number of xenophobic attacks. This coupled with anomalies in government’s response to issues of migration have called into question South Africa’s commitment to domestic, regional, and international trade and human rights commitments. Recognising xenophobia threatens the foundation of South Africa’s constitutional values of equality and human dignity; and poses a real threat to the country’s developmental agenda; the Institute decided to host the roundtable to bring together experts and civil society stakeholders to investigate challenges and opportunities to effectively respond to xenophobia in South Africa. The following issues were discussed: What drives xenophobia in South Africa? - What the research tells us? A Statistical overview of migration in South Africa - Implications for migration management and addressing xenophobia. Reframing interventions: Towards a plan beyond the National Action Plan on Racism and Xenophobia. Does immigration policy and laws fuel xenophobia? Addressing the lack of consistency in government responses to dealing with xenophobia? How to align policy and legislation to ensure consistency in action. The roundtable took place in person in Cape Town at the Inclusive Society Institute’s offices and via online streaming. Introduction The discussion is timely given increasing xenophobic outbreaks, and growing lack of trust by South Africans according to recent polls. Invitations were extended to relevant government departments. Panel Discussion What drives xenophobia in South Africa? What research tells us? Dr Steven Gordon of the Human Sciences Research Council presented key findings from the last decade of public opinion research focusing on the drivers/factors informing xenophobia and discussed the implications of this research. Xenophobia is defined in the National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, xenophobia and Related Intolerance (NAP) as an attitudinal orientation/ hostility towards international migrants. Xenophobia manifests in different ways - the most visible being violence; and further that it disproportionately affects the poor and the working class impacting those who specifically work in the informal economy and live in the townships. The growing level of populism and exploitation of the immigration issue by politicians and community leaders, and the impact of the coronavirus epidemic which has negatively affected millions and resulted in the largest economic recession in over a century, have fuelled tensions. Key findings from research conducted examining public opinion since 2003 included: It is wrong to classify South Africa as a purely xenophobic society. Only a third of the adult population harbour extremely negative views of international migrants. Posing the question - Would you welcome to South Africa all immigrants, some immigrants or no immigrants? – Results from surveys fluctuated. Researchers examining these spikes found these could be contributed to specific events e.g., a spike in pro-immigrant sentiment in 2008 could be attributed to post rioting media and community pushing back against xenophobic attitudes. Spikes in 2015 coincided with anti-xenophobia media campaigns following widespread violence in eThekwini and Johannesburg in the beginning of that year. Addressing why people have negative views of international migrants, researchers found that 60 percent in a given survey round believed that international migrants were responsible for socio-economic problems. A small minority, saw international migrant’s economic and social contribution positively There is a deep misunderstanding about the actual number of people who are foreign born living in South Africa. Half the adult population think there are between 17- 40 million international migrants in the country. There are in fact only around 4 million of which it is estimated that only half are illegal migrants and the remained legal. This misconception is driven by scapegoating rumours. A key question therefore is where do people get their information about international migrants? Primary sources included the broadcast media, television and most importantly radio. Over the last few years social media has become more important as a source of information. It is therefore important to understand how the broadcast media is reporting on international migration and the extent to which it is challenging myths and stereotypes. The general population is divided on the issue of refugees. A substantial proportion of the population do reject refugees living and working in South African at all. Participation in anti-immigrant violence is increasing. The survey asked people if they have partaken in violence against immigrants. In 2015, only about five to six percent of the adult population were willing to indicate that they had taken part in this type of violence; 13 percent indicated that they had not taken part but might do so; 80 percent said that they had not done it and would never do it. However, over the years a greater share of the adult population has shown a willingness to admit to engaging in xenophobic violence. The reasons advanced for participation in this form of violence included blaming migrants for violence. These were driven by ignorance, misinformation and emotional factors with jealousy being the most important emotional factor listed. Myths about the impact of international migrants on society further perpetuates explanations for anti-immigrant violence. A substantial share of the population called for the expulsion of immigrants when asked what can be done to stop violence against foreigners living in the country. Other solutions put forward focussed on social factors, education, community dialogue, changing the way people viewed the world. Recommendations noted included: The need to address this attitudinal problem through effective communication and education campaigns. A large segment of the population, about a third, have extremely strong and negative views of international migrants fuelled by false stereotypes. There is a need for special communication strategies to shift opinions and attitudes. The importance of encouraging greater integration of international migrants into communities which will help dispel some of the negative and false stereotypes about foreign nationals. That government should consider comprehensive immigrant integration strategies which would help immigrants integrate into local communities. Clearing the backlog and reducing some of the obstacles that refugees and asylum seekers have in accessing documentation – which is a main blockage to successful integration. Challenges noted included: The restrictionism and oppositional view to international migrants by the Department of Home Affairs. The growing politics of anti-migrant sentiment. Dr Steven Gordon’s full presentation is attached as Annexure A A Statistical overview of migration in South Africa - Implications for migration management and addressing xenophobia Mr Diego Iturralde from the Demography and Population Statistics at Statistics South Africa presented empirical research data debunking myths which have fuelled xenophobic sentiment. The size of the foreign-born population: In the three preceding population censuses there has been a gradual progression from 1996 to 2001 from about 830,000 to just over 1 million immigrants; the 2001 to 2011 censuses showed a significant increase to 2.18, indicating 2.2 million foreign born persons in South Africa. This represents 4.2 percent of the population. The data therefore debunks the common perception that there is a large number of foreign nationals in the country as claimed recently by the Minister of Home Affairs, Minister Motsoaledi, who stated there are 13 million irregular migrants in South Africa. Mid-year populations estimate for 2022 indicated that 3.98 million persons are foreign born. This is supported by other indicators such as spikes in deaths or births, consumption of services or size of vat. This dispels the myth that there are millions and millions of undocumented migrants in South Africa. The term ‘foreign’ includes not only migrants but people who have moved to South Africa and have become South Africans over time; people with work permits and study permits; documented migrants; unaccompanied minors; and asylum seekers or refugees. In terms of where foreign nationals come from the top countries on the continent were Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho and Malawi. One of the biggest contributors to anti-immigrant sentiment comes from misinformation and the irresponsible diffusion of information by people in positions of leadership. This is accompanied by the failure to make use of official statistics for decision making, planning and policy development. Challenges with undercounting of the migrant population would be similar to that of the non-migrant population. Furthermore, it would not be on the scale as proposed by certain groups. The 2022 survey seeks to address the issue of undercounting through the Post Enumeration Survey. Furthermore, other data is considered i.e., population estimates which use a demographic model considering birth, deaths and net international migration. Allegations that that migrants are ‘stealing jobs’ are inaccurate: Migrants have a long-standing employment record in South Africa and have been found to contribute to the economy as indicated in the World Bank study which found that for every employed migrant he/ she creates jobs for two South Africans. On the question that migrants are stealing jobs in specific sectors of the economy. Research indicates that migrants work primarily in the informal sector. Using the ILO decent work framework - immigrants scored worst in eight of the 11 categories. The work migrants do is in fact primarily in the informal sector and is mostly considered as not decent work. The informal sector is dominated by males, people aged 15 to 44 and it occurs, mostly, in non-metros. This debunks another perception that informality is most prevalent in metros but in fact is highest in the Eastern Cape at 66.3 percent; Free State at 71.8, KZN at 65.5 and even Mpumalanga and Limpopo at 62.7 and 64 percent respectively. The proportion of persons involved in the informal sector increased from 11.6 to 12.3 percent from 2012 to 2017; the census indicated there that it’s at 13.05 percent; in restaurants, bars and canteens and shebeens this increased from 8.5 to 10.6 percent – which is less than claims of 40, 50, 60 percent. Given the very small increment over time it is unlikely to change dramatically in 2022. Therefore, claims that certain sectors are overwhelmed by foreign nationals cannot be supported. It would be improper, and there’s no evidence to suggest that all social ills are due to the existence of migrants. South Africa is a signatory to the Global Compact for migration and the Global Compact on refugees. Both are best practice guides on migration and refugee management for state parties. These two documents provide South Africa with a guideline on how it should approach migration and refugee management in South Africa. The establishment of the National Migration and Urbanisation Forum in August of 2021 is an important initiative to assist policy makers. This forum meets every three months with the intention of elevating discussions around migration and urbanisation with the view to inform policy. One of the outputs is to produce a migration profile report which is a government owned resource with migration data, which countries around the world are producing. A national migration data hub be housed at Statistics South Africa. Post-Covid, South Africa is on the road to recovery which should be inclusive of migrants and using all the resources and the contributions that migrants bring to the table. Responding to questions it was noted that: Administrative data is unfortunately unreliable. The Department of Home Affairs was only able to account for about 2 million of the 3.6 million foreign born persons. The Department of Home Affairs is only able to account for people who enter the country and who approach the department. What some countries do in order to plan for services, is to encourage migrants to register on a database which is firewalled from the security cluster, so that their identity and their whereabouts can be protected. The biggest challenge therefore is to get government departments to produce administrative statistics and to disaggregate these by migrant status and, secondly, to share it with Statistics SA. An example of misinformation is the claim a few years ago that there were about 1 million undocumented learners in public schools - however about 900,000 of these learners were actually South Africans who, for a variety of reasons, did not have an ID book. The citizen survey conducted by HSRC found that about four percent of the adult public claimed not to have a 13 digit ID document. This could indicate as a rough estimate the proportion of the adult population, who did not have ID documentation. Xenophobic attitudes not only hurt the foreigners in South Africa. Many investors are choosing to go and invest elsewhere in the region affecting South Africa’s GDP, inflation and other economic indicators. South Africa has signed the Pan-African Free Trade Agreement and plays a big role in the African Union. Xenophobia and this increasing animosity towards international migrants are hurting South Africa’s standing on the continent and preventing plans for regional integration which has economic and social benefits for South Africa. Mr Diego Iturralde’s full presentation is attached as Annexure B Reframing interventions: Towards a plan beyond the National Action Plan on Racism and Xenophobia Prof Loren Landau of the African Centre for Migration & Society, University of Witwatersrand presentation drew from work done on the Xenowatch project which has been tracking data on xenophobia, and other work with migrant rights groups. Addressing attitudes and tackling the issue of scapegoating / xenophobic mobilisation is necessary but there we need to reframe interventions about how we think about security and accountable governance. Anti-immigrant attitudes are ‘pretty strong’ among the population at large and particularly among the poorer population. To this point, a 2021 IPSOS survey commissioned by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI, 2022) found that only 31,23 percent of South Africans said that they trusted or somewhat trusted immigrants from Africa. Similarly, only 32,29 percent said that they trusted or somewhat trusted immigrants from outside of Africa. But that xenophobic violence doesn’t take place everywhere but in specific areas. So, while it’s useful to do public education and try to change and reframe attitudes - this not the proximate cause of the violence. If we want to change South African attitudes across the board, this is a multi-generational long-term project. But if we look at the people getting involved in xenophobic violence or mobilisation it is not about information or people not knowing about the rights of immigrants. The most important factor in the outbreak of xenophobic violence is that it occurs where there is contested authority. Examples cited included: In 2008, it occurred during the breakdown of the ANC and its structures at the local level as they became fragmented over debates over Mbeki’s response to HIV and, then Zuma’s rise in power. People tried to take advantage of a weaker fragmented system and establish themselves as political authorities in specific areas - ‘township governance’. Another example is in Robertson and the conflicts between labour brokers which are not being regulated by the police, party structures, the church, religious institutions or NGOs. Where there are stable institutions that can do conflict resolution and where the police respond quickly – xenophobic attacks don’t happen. The attitudes might remain, the ignorance, the dislike of immigrants but what we are not seeing is that overt violence. The need to reframe interventions by: Placing this issue on the agenda - to go beyond this outrage of xenophobia and think about how do we address people like the Dudula’s? Addressing the question - how do we address the community-based organisations that are leading the xenophobic violence? These groups do use a human rights language – promising to deliver to poor South Africans human rights, welfare, security – ironically they are fighting for social justice. We need to recognise that their claims, not the accusations against immigrants. Their concerns are about justice being denied, increasing inequality, inflation, violence and economic insecurity. Understanding that immigration is not really the issue that we should be debating here because that’s not what is underlying the continued inequalities and injustices that South Africans are facing. We need to address the issue of xenophobia and xenophobic violence and re-centre this discussion. We need to move the discussion away from migrant rights and what should be done for migrants because South Africans are not interested in having that discussion. The more we focus on this the more we fuel the Dudula’s and the other organisations whose interests is that South Africans should come first. In conclusion, it was noted that it is necessary to reframe this discussion about what is good for South Africa and South Africans (regional trade is important), but we need to be talking about what is going to make South Africans safer and townships (the places where the violence is happening) more governable, more sustainable and more secure. The question is not about immigration at all but, gangster government - the way vigilantes have taken over the law. Myth busting must continue by not allowing certain types of accusations to go unchallenged, but we need to reframe these discussions about what is important to the South Africans who are getting involved in these organisations. To try to hear their pain and to try to address those issues and reframe them in ways that people can redirect their attention to the source of their challenges - which is the failure of government to provide security, jobs, development and to give people hope for a better life. Prof Landau’s full presentation is attached at Annexure C Does immigration policy and laws fuel xenophobia? Unless we work assiduously so that all of God's children, our brothers and sisters, members of our one human family, all will enjoy basic human rights, the right to a fulfilled life, the right of movement, of work, the freedom to be fully human, with a humanity measured by nothing less than the humanity of Jesus Christ Himself, then we are on the road inexorably to self-destruction, we are not far from global suicide; and yet it could be so different. (Archbishop Desmond Tutu) Ms Sharon Ekambaram of Lawyers for Human Rights, Refugee & Migrant Rights Programme addressed the issue of government’s response to xenophobia. There is a need to refocus the discussion on xenophobia in the context of inequality, the slow pace of transformation, and the crisis in democracy and governance. Issues identified included: The endemic nature of corruption and its impact on governance (including the Department of Home Affairs). The need to acknowledge the impact of the geopolitics of Apartheid. The current way in which South Africa is managing the movement of people of African descent is reminiscent of apartheid pass laws. The need to rethink how we are managing migration - the criminalisation of migration has actually fuelled and given legitimacy to Operation Dudula and its vigilantism. The impact of populism on policy developments. Citing examples of the Refugee Bill, Gauteng Development Bill, Johannesburg Informal Traders Bill, and the ANC’s new policy document on migration which speaks about withdrawing from the 1951 Convention and presents migration as a threat to national security. The growing use of national security language when discussing migration. The language of national security speaks to the difficulty of determining appropriate balances between security and privacy (citing Prof Duncan). The police have strayed from their post-1994 mandate and become alienated from the community - this is evident in the role of the security system in society and indicates a movement to a climate of heightened repression. The non-existence of Chapter 9 institutions in ensuring accountability. The failure to acknowledge the impact of the climate crisis citing examples of floods in KZN and in Mozambique – and the impact of climate change on displacement of populations. The need for disaggregated data is crucial for a better understanding of the internal and international movement of people and central to evidenced based policy making. The growth of narrow national chauvinism which is resulting in the othering and hatred for anyone who is not South African, is of grave concern. Aligning policy and legislation to ensure consistency in action. Ms Franzman from the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ)- the focal agency for the NAP, addressed the work being done on the National Action Plan The DOJ has been implementing a number of actions over the past few years since the Cabinet’s approval of NAP’s five year programme of action. The implementation of the NAP is closely aligned with the government’s medium strategic framework particularly under the Priority Six which is the Social Cohesion Programme led by the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture. The DOJ has commissioned a baseline study (conducted by the HSRC) to determine levels of racism, anti-foreigner sentiment, homophobia, racial incidents, interracial relations and perceptions of national identity. The service directory for victims of discrimination has been developed and is currently a soft copy. An integrated government strategy on public education in respect of anti-discrimination to support NAP has also been developed. The DOJ continues to roll out social mobilisation dialogues to address xenophobia working in partnership with government and other stakeholders. Funding remains an issue, especially for non-government role-players to implement. A funding model has been developed to address this. The DOJ is also part of the United Nations Protection Working Group which is a structure comprising of a number of stakeholders from government, civil society, United Nations agencies, and Chapter Nine institutions led by United Nations High Commission for Refugees. The DOJ is co-chairing a specific group dealing with incidents of xenophobic threats and violent attacks. Threats are referred to DevComm (part of the JCPS Cluster) but there is not as yet a fully operational rapid response mechanism. The setting up of the rapid response mechanism is underway with the United Nations Office on the High Commission for Human Rights. South Africa has reiterated its support for the Global Compact on migration at the International Migration and Refugee Forum (May 2022). The development of a framework for a virtual repository on data collection of disaggregated statistical data in support of the NAP is in progress. The coordinating structure for the National Action Plan was set up in March. The top level of the structure is headed by the Minister of Justice, and it comprises of eight departments including South African Police Service, Home Affairs, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs and others. The next level structure, which is like an implementation structure is to be set up in this quarter. The implementation structure for National Action Plan is envisaged to be a multi-sectorial structure with a number of specific task teams with representation from civil society- some have been identified already to look at issues of research, data collection, public education et cetera. This structure will strengthen alignment across government. The inclusion of more stakeholders, such researchers and academics that come on board to support it, will assist in strengthening and guiding evidence-based interventions. The National Action Plan is close to the end of its first five year plan and needs to be revised. This is an opportunity to gather key government departments together in terms of their specific mandates and engage with research and data. The DOJ will be going back to Cabinet to brief Cabinet on the findings of the baseline study. This provides an opportunity to brief the ministerial structure of the National Action Plan the next time it is convened on findings and research. This could assist in intensifying and strengthening support for the National Action Plan. The DOJ continues work with civil society partners to support implementation for the NAP. Discussion The following additional inputs were made: Governance Challenges: The importance of recognising how fragile and vulnerable South Africa is from a governance perspective. Research conducted by HSRC has found a substantial decline in public trust in key institutions, the police, national government, parliament, and local government. The lowest level of national trust was reached in 2017 during the exit of Jacob Zuma with a brief improvement under Ramaphosa, but in the last two years there has been a further decline across many key institutions. Issues of immigration cannot be sealed off from the wider climate of a very fragile status quo. Limitations of the NAP The National Action Plan has always been constrained in what it can do and assigning the lead to Arts and Culture, for example, has shifted many of the interventions into this realm of attitudes, culture and understanding and away from issues of governance, criminal accountability, urban planning et cetera. that are really at the root of inequality. So, there’s a limit in what the National Action Plan can do in terms of addressing what is at the root of the anger, but also what is the proximate causes of the violence. Securing commitment to actions required buy-in from different departments is a challenge. The artificial compartmentalisation between departments, and the limited view of social cohesion which tend to be relegated to symbols and attitudes, is a challenge. A multi-faceted approach is required given the multiple factors contribute to xenophobia. Clear leadership is needed in the different sectors. Crisis in Policing APCOF explained the research they have been involved in which tried to understand the way in which South African Police Service (SAPS) is structurally enabled and functionally performing in terms of detection, prevention and responses to xenophobic violence and related hate crimes. Key findings of the research included: There are structural limitations both in terms of the legal framework but particularly the policy framework under which SAPS is operating as well as in terms of attitudinal issues. There’s no drilling down of the equality framework to the operational level where there are some discriminatory practices in terms of the policing of foreign nationals. APCOF found that this is manifesting as a dual phenomenon of over policing and under policing. Foreign nationals are being specifically targeted for policing and law enforcement and seen as soft targets. This is driven by attitudinal issues and corruption. There is a lack of training and preparedness at an operational station level. The police are not well trained and do not understand immigration, refugee laws and issues related thereto. The failure of early warning systems and the failure of crime intelligence were also noted. Lack of knowledge about immigration policies and the kind of struggles that migrants face in obtaining documents and asylum permits and implications of police action for example removing immigrants away documents. The absence of a policy by SAPS on issues around non-nationals, migration and xenophobia; systemic and endemic levels of corruption when it comes to migration and non-nationals; and the failure of SAPS to implement original recommendations of more than a decade ago to address xenophobia. There is a significant breakdown in trust in the police. Recent research by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime which found extortion rackets prevalent in Khayelitsha and the extent to which the police were completely unaware. There is a serious crisis of the policing system including the roles that, for example, the Civilian Secretariat and IPID should be playing. Poor performance is evident for example in despite a 66 percent increase in the budget of the police since 2012 to 2020, their ability to solve murders dropped by 38 percent, assault and armed robberies dropped by 24 percent. Both those crime categories have gone up massively and there has been a huge growth of organised crime. So, the system is actually deteriorating and continues to deteriorate because the internal accountability mechanisms are dysfunctional - people don’t get held accountable for not doing what they’re doing. Whatever is on paper doesn’t exist in terms of the daily practices of policing on the streets of South Africa. We do not need more police officers - if we want to improve public safety, we have to re-orientate the entire organisation and what it does starting with its leadership cohort. This recommendation he noted goes as far back as the 2012 from the National Development Plan. There are 174 generals at the moment who are fighting with each other, some of them are involved with organised crime, some in corruption, some with deep roots and loyalties to the former president, and some are just waiting to retire. These factors are contributing to the decline and deterioration in all these systems - resourcing, planning strategies, accountability and incentives. South Africa has not had a permanent head of crime intelligence since the end of 2019. The top six people were removed, and more localised intelligence officials are not getting much direction from the top. SAPS, the single biggest law enforcement capability in the country needs urgent attention. There is work going on to fix the National Prosecuting Authority, the Hawks and Special Investigations Unit, but the single organisation that can play a role of providing some kind of security at a local level is deteriorating and continues to deteriorate and is now part of the threat to national security. The police are not underpaid in accordance with the public sector. In fact, they get paid more than other public servants on the same grades and they also get better benefits and so forth. So, the issue is not salaries. Bad cops don’t improve their behaviour because they get paid more. Policing approaches are not evidence based, are not evaluated but driven by political considerations to be seen to be doing something, to be visible to the community, to be seen to be responding to community concerns. What is needed is a complete re-orientation of the organisation itself and what it uses its resources for. The serious crisis within the police and law enforcement is crosscutting, it’s not just the xenophobia against foreign nationals, but gender-based violence, how protests are managed, and police heavy handedness, corruption and crime and extortion. Reasons for poor trust in the police are very inefficient and unable to provide a secure and safe environment and secondly, that the police are not fair and impartial in their provision of justice, often treating people in a brutal and exploitative manner. The issue of vigilantism and alarming findings that 43 percent of the adult population agrees it’s sometimes okay to take the law into your own hands and about 63 percent believe that communities should organise themselves to defend themselves against criminals, is disconcerting. Such support for vigilantism is not concentrated primarily amongst the poorer working class but is found across the socio-economic divide in South Africa. Holding government accountable? Concern was expressed at the failure of Chapter Nine Institutions to hold government accountable. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) indicated it continues to do advocacy work on countering xenophobia for example in in schools and communities, and has provided training to various institution and departments including the SAPS and Home Affairs. Furthermore, in line with its mandate it has conducted investigations into xenophobia and made recommendations. Way Forward Given the above contributions and discussion, the Inclusive Society Institute recommends government take the following steps: The DOJ ensure the National Action Plan Ministerial Structure and Cabinet is briefed on: Research findings and data The disjuncture in government responses, policy and compliance with international commitments (at national, provincial and municipal levels). The need to comply with best practice guides in terms of migration and refugee management (as signatory to the Global Compact for migration and the Global Compact on refugees). That Government commit to an evidence based policy development approach across all spheres of government and: Put in place measures to monitor compliance. Ensure research and data collected by structures such as the National Migration and Urbanisation Forum is effectively disseminated across government departments and spheres of government to inform policy making. That DOJ motivate for the urgent establishment of the implementation structure for the National Action Plan and: Strengthen participation of research institutions, academia and civils society in the implementation structure and subcommittee working groups. Urgently activate the Early Warning and Response Capacity and ensure this capacity adopt holistic approach (not being purely security centric) as noted above. That the DOJ urgently commence the review of the National Action Plan and ensure the review address the limitations including: The efficacy of Arts and Culture as lead department. Extension of the current focus of National Action Plan as cited above (including contested authority, issues of governance, town planning etc.). Adopting an evidenced based approach relying on accurate research and empirical data. Address both prevention and response in strategies. The review and strengthening of SAPS and law enforcement training and policies in line with international best practice. The SAHRC investigate Government’s failure to implement previous findings and recommendations on xenophobia, and non-compliance with key international conventions. Annexure A Dr Steven Gordon’s full presentation Annexure B Mr Diego Iturralde’s full presentation Annexure C Prof Loren Landau’s full presentation References Edwards L, Netshikulwe A, &Freeman L (2021) Policing and non-nationals - Community Police Forums and xenophobic violence in South Africa. APCOF Report. [Online] Available: https://apcof.org/wp-content/uploads/policing-and-non-nationals-community-police-forums-and-xenophobic-violence-in-south-africa.pdf [accessed: 6 September 2022] Edwards L & Freeman L. Policing and non-nationals - Analysis of police prevention, detection and investigation of xenophobic violence in South Africa. APCOF Report. [Online] Available: https://apcof.org/wp-content/uploads/policing-and-non-nationals-report.pdf [accessed: 6 September 2022] Freeman L, October L & Edwards L. 2022. Policing and non-nationals - External police oversight, accountability and xenophobic violence in South Africa. APCOF Report. [Online] Available: https://apcof.org/wp-content/uploads/policing-and-non-nationals-external-police-oversight-accountability-and-xenophobic-violence-in-south-africa-.pdf [accessed: 6 September 2022] Gordon SL. 2020. Understanding xenophobic hate crime in South Africa. J Public Affairs. Vol 20 (3). [Online] Available: https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2076 [accessed: 6 September 2022] Gordon SL. 2020. Understanding the attitude –behaviour relationship: a quantitative analysis of public participation in anti-immigrant violence in South Africa. South African Journal of Psychology Vol.50 (1): 103-114 . [Online] Available: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0081246319831626 [accessed: 6 September 2022] Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2022. Measuring Social Cohesion in South Africa. [Online] Available: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XpvT5k1Bg0hQMa9v5Ayr-bPMqLPnT2sG/view [accessed: 6 September 2022] Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 2021. SAPS Resourcing and Performance, 2012-2020. [Online] Available: https://issafrica.org/crimehub/analysis/fact-sheets/saps-resourcing-and-performance-2012-2020 [accessed: 6 September 2022] Misago JP & Landau LB. 2022. Running Them Out of Time: Xenophobia, Violence, and Co-Authoring Spatiotemporal Exclusion in South Africa. Geopolitics. [Online] Available: DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2022.2078707 [accessed: 6 September 2022] Misago JP, Bule K & Mlilo S (December 2021) Xenophobic Violence in South Africa - An Analysis of Trends, Causal Factors and Responses. A Xenowatch Quinquennial Report. [Online] Available: http://www.xenowatch.ac.za/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Xenowatch-Report_Final_Dec_2021_.pdf [accessed: 6 September 2022] Roberts B & Gordon S. 2022. South Africans Have Low Trust In Their Police. Here’s Why. Human Sciences Research Council. [Online] Available: https://hsrc.ac.za/news/capable-and-ethical-state/south-africans-have-low-trust-in-their-police-heres-why/ [accessed: 6 September 2022] Republic of South Africa. 2019. National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (NAP)2019. [Online] Available: https://www.justice.gov.za/nap/docs/NAP-20190313.pdf [accessed: 6 September 2022] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) did a presentation to a high-level Danish Delegation, on Thursday, 09 March at 6 Spin Street. The delegation included the Speaker of the Danish Parliament, Mr Søren Gade, the Ambassador to Denmark in South Africa, HE Mr Tobias Elling Rehfeld amongst others. Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, Chairperson, of the Institute’s Advisory Council, opened the meeting with an introduction of the Institute. Mr Daryl Swanepoel, the Institute’s CEO, did a presentation on, The People’s State of the Nation. The presentation was based on, a) the gloomy predictions for 2023 from the Ipsos Global Advisor, b) what worries the world in February 2023 with the focus on SA issues, c) Social cohesion in South Africa from the GoveDemPol, May 2022 highlighting governments performance on nation building d) political leaders and parties and trust in parties from the latest political poll results and e) providing context. Mr Dave Strugnell, CEO at Percept, representing our research team did a presentation on the Understanding Youth Inequality report. His presentation focused on South Africa being widely regarded as the most unequal country on earth, where the top 20% of the population earned over 68% of income while the bottom 40% earned just 7% of income by January 2020. He discussed, the country’s inequality being multidimensional, transcending income and wealth to include matters of land, capital and access to quality public services, which illustrated that multidimensional inequality also intersects with gender, race and geography in ways that entrench historical fault lines. There was a robust discussion during the Q & A session.

Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. 21 FEBRUARY 2023 Prof Geo Quinot Department of Public Law, Stellenbosch University In 2008, government, via the South African National Roads Agency SOC Ltd (“SANRAL”), embarked on the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project (“GFIP”). In essence, the project involved declaring several roads in Gauteng as toll roads in terms of The South African National Roads Agency Limited and National Roads Act 7 of 1998 (“the SANRAL Act”). Tolling is done via an e-tolling system that involves gantries logging the passage of vehicles and issuing a bill to the registered vehicle owner (or another registered party) for payment of fees. Tolling started in December 2013. Following years of controversy, litigation and large-scale non-payment of toll fees by road users, the Minister of Finance announced in his medium-term budget policy statement in 2022 that SANRAL’s GFIP debt will be transferred to national and provincial government (in a 70:30 split) and that the province will take over maintenance of the roads. The Gauteng provincial government subsequently announced that e-tolling under the GFIP will be terminated. Gauteng Premier Panyaza Lesufi furthermore suggested that motorists that paid e-toll bills will be refunded. Consultant seeks an analysis of the legal implications of a decision to write off outstanding e-tolling bills. LEGISLATIVE SCHEME The power to levy a toll on the use of any national road is vested in SANRAL by section 27 of the SANRAL Act. In terms of that section, SANRAL may, with the approval of the Minister of Transport (“the Minister”), declare any section of a national road to be a toll road. Once so declared, the Act empowers SANRAL to levy and collect toll for the use of the road. The amount of the toll is determined by the Minister by means of a notice in the Government Gazette. The declaration of a toll road and the determination of a toll levy create an obligation in terms of section 27(5) of the SANRAL Act on all users to pay such toll. A failure to do so is an offence under the Act, punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine as well as a civil fine payable to SANRAL. The operative decisions are thus the declaration of a toll road and the determination of the amount of toll payable. Once these decisions have been taken, liability will be imposed by operation of law based on a person’s use of the toll road. SANRAL may, in terms of the Act, grant exemption from the payment of tolls or suspend the payment of tolls, either to specific users or generally. The SANRAL Act determines that a declaration of a toll road, the determination of the amount of toll payable, an exemption or suspension will only become effective 14 days after the relevant notice was published in the Gazette. The Act explicitly states that the toll, as determined by the Minister, will be payable from a date and time determined by the Minister, which may not be earlier than 14 days after the publication of the relevant notice in the Gazette. In respect of the GFIP, the original notices declaring the relevant road network as toll roads were published in Government Gazette 30912 on 28 March 2008 and in Government Gazette 31273 of 28 July 2008. Various sets of regulations have been issued under the SANRAL Act to govern aspects of the implementation of the GFIP. These include the e-Road Regulations, 2016 that create the conditions for levying toll fees electronically. Notably, regulation 6(2) of the e-Road Regulations determines that “[u]nless payment is made … such registered user shall remain liable for the payment of all tolls in relation to the use of an e-road”. Successive notices have been issued under the SANRAL Act determining the amount of toll to be paid and the conditions of payment. The most recent of these notices, published in Government Gazette 45902 of 11 February 2022, set the applicable toll amounts with effect from 1 March 2022. From the above legislative scheme, it follows that a legislative liability is placed on users of roads forming part of the GFIP, which liability arises at the time of use of the relevant road. This liability does not only constitute a civil debt towards SANRAL, but a failure to discharge the liability automatically gives rise to criminal liability under the SANRAL Act.   EXCUSE OF NON-PAYMENT The legislative scheme does not provide for e-toll liability to be waived once incurred. In terms of the scheme, an individual can only discharge their liability by either paying the toll or by nominating another person as the actual road user and thereby transferring the liability to such nominated person. In Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that the legality principle in South African constitutional law dictates that “the legislature and executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle that they may exercise no power and perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law.” When this principle is applied in the current context, it follows that SANRAL does not have the power to excuse non-payment of e-toll fees once incurred. Nor does any other organ of state have such power. A further problem with the contemplated excuse of non-payment of e-toll fees is that once the amount of toll to be paid under the GFIP had been determined, the Minister would be functus officio regarding that decision. This means that once the Minister took the decision to impose a particular amount of toll for use of the relevant roads for a specific period and published that decision as required under the SANRAL Act, the Minister’s decision was final, and the Minister retained no power to alter that decision in the absence of specific authorisation to do so. As noted above, the legislative scheme does not contain any authorisation for the Minister (or any other actor) to change the amount of toll retrospectively once it had been set and imposed. Any attempt to subsequently amend the amount payable (including to zero) retrospectively would fall foul of the functus officio doctrine. This does not suggest that the Minister cannot change the amount of toll payable prospectively. The Minister is explicitly authorised to do so, but subject to strict timelines that limit any retrospective effect. The fact that the Minister’s determination of the amount of toll payable is final, is underscored by the explicit rules regarding the date of effectiveness of such determination in the legislative scheme. As noted above, both the declaration of a road as a toll road and the determination of the amount of toll payable for use of that road, which in combination would create the liability to pay toll, are subject to specific timelines regarding operation. The legislative scheme determines that such decisions may not take effect earlier than 14 days after the prescribed notice of such decision is published. It follows that any attempt to determine the liability for use of the road retrospectively would be unlawful as it would amount to an attempt to determine the amount of toll payable with effect earlier than 14 days after publication of the decision. On the same reasoning, a decision to withdraw the declaration of a road as a toll road (under section 27(1) of the SANRAL Act), as is currently anticipated in respect of the GFIP, would not retrospectively affect the liability for the prior use of the relevant road while it was a toll road. The analysis above shows that a decision to excuse outstanding toll fees would be unlawful. It should be noted that the same reasoning applies to a decision to excuse paid fees and reimburse same. In terms of the current legislative scheme, the dismantling of the GFIP can only operate prospectively. Such dismantling cannot alter the existing legal position in respect of tolls that are due. The transfer of the SANRAL debt relating to the GFIP to national and provincial government would also not impact on the outstanding tolls. SANRAL’s GFIP debt and outstanding tolls are distinct liabilities. Even though they were linked (SANRAL partly levied tolls in order to pay its GFIP debt), the payment of one does not automatically lead to the payment of the other. The two liabilities also arose from distinct bases – SANRAL’s debt arose from its contractual arrangements to finance the GFIP while the outstanding tolls arose statutorily from road use. It follows that government’s take-over of SANRAL’s debt does not extinguish road users’ toll liability. While an active decision to excuse toll fees would be unlawful, the same may not be true for a passive excuse of fees. That is, it may be possible for SANRAL (or another public entity) to “excuse” toll fees by simply not enforcing the liability. It is notable that the SANRAL Act authorises SANRAL to enforce payment of toll fees, but does not oblige SANRAL to do so. Section 30(1) states that SANRAL “may institute legal proceedings to recover toll moneys owing to it” (emphasis added). This clearly indicates that SANRAL is empowered, but not obliged, to enforce payment by means of legal proceedings. SANRAL would thus not be breaching a legal duty under the SANRAL Act by simply not enforcing e-toll liabilities that have already vested. An approach by SANRAL that amounts to simply adopting a supine attitude towards outstanding toll fees would arguably not be reviewable. While an omission, such as a failure on SANRAL’s part to enforce payment of tolls, may amount to an administrative action under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”), it would only be reviewable if such omission breached a duty to act. Section 6 of PAJA determines that a failure to take action would be reviewable if the administrator had a duty to act and failed to do so, either within the stipulated timeframe or, in the absence of such prescribed timeframe, a reasonable time. As the Supreme Court of Appeal noted in Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Trend Finance (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 117 (SCA), the section does not apply when an administrator “has a right, but no duty, to do [something]”. In the present matter, SANRAL arguably falls exactly in this position. It has a right to enforce payment, but not a duty to do so. Accordingly, a mere omission on SANRAL’s part to enforce payment would not merit a review. The position may be different if SANRAL took an explicit decision not to enforce payment. Such a scenario would not amount to an omission on the part of SANRAL, but rather a deliberate positive action. Such an action would be subject to review under PAJA, including on the basis of reasonableness. In such a review, serious questions can be asked about how reasonable it would be for SANRAL to decide to forgo outstanding tolls while it actively enforced payment of identical tolls before. That is, the reasonableness of effectively waiving tolls for some users while it enforced payment against others could be questioned. A final point to note relates to the criminal liability attached to non-payment of tolls, as set out above. No action by SANRAL (or any other actor) can retrospectively change such criminal liability. Section 27(5) of the SANRAL Act states that “any person liable for toll who … refuses or fails to pay the amount of toll that is due … is guilty of an offence” (emphasis added). It is evident that the criminal liability arises when a person refuses or fails to pay a toll that is due. This liability cannot be retrospectively extinguished by SANRAL. The liability could be formally pardoned by way of the presidential pardon powers or by way of a specific statutory scheme, but not by simple administrative action such as a decision by SANRAL (or another executive or administrative functionary) to “excuse” payment of tolls. The criminal liability would continue to exist even after SANRAL has formally abandoned the GFIP. END - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On Wednesday, 15 February, the Inclusive Society Institute attended the Pioneer the Possible symposium at the invitation of the Swedish Embassy. Borne out of the need for creative solutions to address local and international poly-crises, the host of the day, Ambassador Håkan Juholt, stressed that it could no longer be business as usual. Instead of attempting to tackle isolated events in silos, it is the task of all stakeholders to collaborate in building a more sustainable world. Complex issues would require innovative approaches that not only see obstacles but through working together find creative solutions. As such, it is not about seeing the impossible, but collaborating to pioneer the possible. The first session showed how several companies were successful in building sustainable industries fit for the future. The country manager of mega Swedish textiles company H&M, Caroline Nelson, mentioned several initiatives whereby the company is finding creative solutions to the hitherto unsustainable business model of quick fashion. South Africa, she said, faces an excellent opportunity to rebuild its collapsed textiles industry, catapulting re-generative approaches for a collapsed industry. Instead of merely going back to previous approaches, industry leaders must upskill and invest in South African businesses to build a more sustainable model. According to Nelson, the “possibility to pioneer in South Africa is much easier”. We have the spirit and resilience required to create thriving, sustainable industries. We just have to work together and get things done. In the second session, moderated by the Inclusive Society Institute’s CEO, Daryl Swanepoel, the discussion focused on how a sustainable, circular economy can be pioneered. Dr Roelof Botha spoke about how the introduction of a Basic Income Grant would advance the socio-economic condition of millions of South Africans. His comments follow the extensive work undertaken for the Institute on the feasibility of a Basic Income Grant. Pointing to the success of the Brazilian Bolso Familia programme that not only uplifted millions of people, but also stimulated economic growth, Dr Botha suggested that such a conditional grant programme would offer enormous benefit to South Africa’s indigent and well as to the national economy at large. His analysis is captured in an Institute report that will be released soon. Further sessions focussed on several key national issues. Delegates representing youth and civil society groups agreed that the nation lacks trust in the political status quo. They echoed the call for broader inclusion in formal political structures and the need for civil society to organise and mobilise. Trust was again central when representatives from media and academic institutions agreed that open, critical and creative conversations are required by a broad cross-section of society. After a busy and productive day, stakeholders agreed that a new politics was required in South Africa. One based on trust, cooperation, and mutual benefit. It was agreed that civil society organisations, the media and academia should do more to work with and bring together the private and public sectors in developing South African solutions for South African problems.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, represented the Institute at the seminar on creating stable coalitions that was hosted by the Danish Embassy on 13 February 2023. The event was held at the historic 6 Spin Street in Cape Town. The event served as a public feedback session on the recent political party study tour to Denmark on coalition governance and relevance for South Africa. This was followed by a spirited panel discussion and dialogue on how to strengthen coalition governance in South Africa and how to make coalitions more stable. The seminar was opened by HE Danish Ambassador Mr. Tobias Rehfeld moderated by Professor Richard Calland. The panel was comprised of the party representatives that undertook the tour, which included the UDM, Good, FF+, ANC, Action SA, IFP and One South Africa Movement. Mr Swanepoel, in his contribution, highlighted the Irish approach to coalition formation, which was based on trust and generosity. He said that trust amongst parties was non-existent, and in creating workable coalitions, parties would have to move away from transactional agreements based on relative strength to one that acknowledges coalition partners to be equal. The failure of South African parties to grasp these two concepts will result in unstable coalitions. This ought therefore to be at the forefront of their thinking in the run-up to the next election, which will undoubtedly see a number of coalition governments having to be formed.

ISI CEO, Daryl Swanepoel, met with the High Commissioner of Singapore, Zainal Arif Mantaha on 10 February 2023 at the offices of the ISI in Cape Town. They discussed a range of public policy issues, notably social inclusion from which SA can draw valuable lessons.

ISI CEO, Daryl Swanepoel, met with former Deputy President Baleka Mbete, Chairperson of NaLHISA on 10 February 2023 at the ISI offices in Cape Town. The ISI is excited to partner with NaLHISA to tell the authentic and proud story of SA's liberation.

Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. Author: Olivia Main Editor: Daryl Swanepoel FEBRUARY 2023 Content 1. Setting the scene 2. Annual Lecture presented by Jørgen Elklit, professor emeritus, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University 3. Q&A session with Jørgen Elklit, professor emeritus, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University 1. Setting the scene The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) hosted its Annual Lecture in Cape Town on 8 December 2022. Jørgen Elklit, professor emeritus at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, in Denmark, was invited to lecture on the topic “Democracy and Electoral Systems as Tools to Promote Social Cohesion”. In early 2022, the ISI published a report in which it made proposals concerning electoral reform, in light of the Constitutional Court judgement declaring the current Electoral Act unconstitutional. The Institute appointed an expert panel, including Professor Elklit, to undertake the work and mandated the panel to design an electoral model that will meaningfully give effect to the judgement, respect the boundaries set out in the Constitution, retain proportionality as a basis for representation in that it best promotes inclusivity, and which enhances representativity, accountability and transparency. Professor Elklit is an expert on global electoral systems. Since 1990, he has been active as an advisor on democratisation and elections, electoral systems and electoral administration in a number of countries across the globe. Elklit was also an international member of the South African Independent Electoral Commission in 1994 and of the country’s Electoral Task Team 2002-2003 (aka the van Zyl Slabbert Commission), and was Secretary to the Independent Review Commission in Kenya in 2008. Professor Elklit’s lecture focussed on how we can strengthen democracy and social cohesion through an improved electoral system. Elklit opined that this must be done within the framework of South Africa as a diverse population with various backgrounds. The understanding that the mere holding of elections entitles a country to be called a democracy is an electoral fallacy. Elections must also be fair, inclusive and integrous in order to gain voters’ trust in the election process and the outcome of such. In a single seat constituency model – in other words, a winner-takes-all majority election system – you could conceivably have many provinces represented wall to wall by one political party, which, in South Africa, would most likely be the ANC. Even though the system would result in general proportionality, those members would only come from the compensatory proportional list, which may or may not draw from members of a particular province. This does not promote inclusivity of the diversity in the country or do much for geographic representation. It's a problematic approach to adopt in a country such as South Africa. Therefore, in order to achieve a true democracy and social cohesion, we need to adopt a system that not only results in general proportionality, as is the constitutional requirement, but also where representatives are drawn from the many different communities across the country – in other words, a multi-member constituency model. We also need to ensure that all eligible voters are included in the elections, by adopting a system such as automatic voter registration. 2. Annual Lecture presented by Jørgen Elklit, professor emeritus, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University This lecture on “Democracy and Electoral Systems as Tools to Promote Social Cohesion” is an opportunity to engage in a much-needed conversation about matters of the utmost concern for all who want to see South Africa prosper, develop, and eventually become the country we want it to be – the country so many dreamt of during the Struggle, but also after 1994. Democracy is a fluid concept, defined and interpreted differently by different people at different times and in different situations. But there are at least three elements that are necessary for a democracy to develop and consolidate: free and regular elections of good quality, the full complement of political rights for the citizens and, above all, the rule of law, which is often the weak link in emerging democracies. Elections must come at regular intervals, and between elections citizens must be able to try to influence public policy through other instruments such as interest associations, social movements and civil society organisations, local groupings, and so forth. Only then can we see the development of a complex system of institutions, rules and patterns of incentives and disincentives which makes it evident that democracy has become “the only game in town”. Not too many decades ago, some politicians – and even some political scientists – claimed that if a country conducted elections for its leadership, then it was a democracy, as its leadership was elected by the people, the demos – even if the elections were only of poor quality. It was, however, not difficult to challenge that view – especially based on the way elections were conducted in Latin America during that period, but also elsewhere, such as the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and in many countries in Africa. The understanding that the mere holding of elections entitled a country to be called a democracy was pejoratively termed the electoral – or electoralist – fallacy. People then started to look for other, more comprehensive definitions of democracy. The inclusion of the entire adult population in elections was obviously not to be left out, on the contrary, but what else should go into the definition? Robert Dahl, a leading US political scientist, gave us an important list of seven minimal conditions that must be present before we can talk of a country being a modern political democracy. Dahl required that elections should not only be fairly conducted, but they must also be seen so by the electorate, as that makes it natural for all – losers as well as winners – to trust the outcome of the elections and to perceive the elections as being of integrity. The first prerequisite for having elections of integrity is to have a trustworthy electoral commission. South Africa can take pride in having had one of the best electoral commissions on the continent – partly because of a competent staff component; partly because commissioners have only rarely brought their private party political inclinations with them to the office. This is not always so in other countries – in Africa or elsewhere – and one can only express the hope that politicians will honour the need for competent and trustworthy electoral commissioners considered to be men and women of integrity. And the electoral staff, at all levels, must have the same qualities, so that voters can rest assured that electoral results are honest and reliable – and not big lies as some US voters and politicians still claim, against all evidence, that the 2020 elections were. The second prerequisite for high quality elections to pay attention to, is that all eligible voters must be on the electoral register. Going beyond Dahl speaking about the importance of having the right to vote, experience shows that some voters also need help to get into a position where they can actually use their voting right. Elections can be considered a kind of conversation among the citizens of the country, where it is discussed and decided who shall form the political leadership during the next term – a conversation that is important for the emergence of social cohesion. If some citizens cannot participate in that conversation, the political leadership will have less legitimacy. In South Africa, at least 30% of the eligible voters are not on the electoral register, despite the various efforts by the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC). Think of it: 30% of the eligible voters cannot participate in the elections. That is more than just a pity, it’s a disgrace! The IEC will probably say that they have done all they can to get all voters on board, and that they cannot force people to register. That is obviously true, but a registration rate of about only 70% is still not good enough for a country that claims to be a democracy. The situation has not improved over recent years – despite many registration campaigns – so it is high time to realise that the only solution is to shift to automatic voter registration. Automatic voter registration means that the state takes steps to ensure automatic registration of all eligible voters. It is done in different ways in different countries, but it is normally done by linking voter registration to the national ID or to the social security system. Automatic voter registration is not compulsory voting, which one should avoid at all costs. Voters are still free to vote or not to vote – as they should be – but automatic registration means that the entire adult citizenry can go and vote, even if they only decide to do so on election day. They don’t need to have registered beforehand, and they can react to what is happening during the election campaign and go and express their opinion if they wish. The third prerequisite for qualitatively good elections might challenge some. But my experiences with many countries have been convincing enough to show that it is much better for a country – any country – to use a proportional representation electoral system than to rely on some kind of majority system. The basic difference between proportional representation (or PR) elections and majority elections is that losers in PR elections don’t lose everything. A losing party will still have at least some seats in the Assembly, and those who voted for that party will still feel included in the political process, as some of the elected representatives sit in Parliament because the voters wanted that to be the case and therefore voted for them. It’s easy to understand that this is particularly the case when a country is characterised by a number of social and political cleavages, due to racial and ethnic differences, religious antagonisms, national identities or class, to mention only the most obvious ones. This was also the conclusion of a high-powered international commission under the chairmanship of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan a few years ago. With majority elections, politicians have too much at stake, as the winner takes it all, and the loser loses everything. That’s why we see candidates in majority elections fighting so hard to avoid losing – and behaving so unpleasantly, as did Donald Trump in the US, or some voters in Kenya in 2008 or in Lesotho in 1998, even if they nevertheless don’t win. This consideration is also highly relevant in this country, and that is exactly why the ANC National Executive Commission during the negotiations in the early 1990s eventually decided to go for proportional representation. The formula used for calculating each party’s share of the National Assembly seats is fine and the same can be said about South Africa having no formal electoral threshold. These two features – in combination with the size of the National Assembly – combine to make the National Assembly the most proportional parliament in the world, as measured by the very reliable and useful index developed by the Irishman Michael Gallagher. This implies that any discussion about what is meant by the expression “in general proportional representation” in the Constitution is strange, as it is obvious that the National Assembly is more proportional than what we see in other PR systems. This also implies that the current PR electoral system can be changed, at least somewhat, without any risk of violating the Constitution. Some change of the current electoral system is, however, seriously needed – not because the system is poor, but because South Africa has changed since 1994. The system, in other words the closed-list system, with 200 seats allocated in the nine provinces and 200 seats used as compensatory seats to reach full proportionality, was probably what was best in 1994, at the system’s inception. But the political development since then has made many call for a system that makes it easier – some would even say possible – to hold parliamentarians more to account than is now the case. I agree with those who feel that way. I had the honour of serving, as the only non-South African, on the van Zyl Slabbert Commission in 2002-2003. Our task was to develop an electoral system that was still compatible with the Constitution, of course, but that also introduced some element of accountability. Our majority proposal suggested a number of multi-member constituencies – all in all 60-some such constituencies, with from three to seven parliamentarians elected in each of them, also by a PR system, so that local voters would be represented in proportion to the local strength of their parties. That would allow the current 200+200 system to be changed to a 300+100 system, with 300 seats allocated to the new and smaller MMCs, while 100 compensatory seats should definitely be enough to ensure that “in general proportional representation” could still be easily achieved. Such small constituencies would allow a much closer relationship between represented and representatives than is now the case – or to put it differently: increase the level of accountability, especially when preferential voting would eventually be introduced. We did not propose preferential voting from day one, but we suggested a change from closed to open lists at some later point in time, above all, to allow a strong element of accountability to enter into the relationship between voters and representatives. Our majority proposal had many qualities, but it was probably never considered seriously by the Cabinet, and therefore South Africa still uses the electoral system implemented in 1994. We all know that the system does not allow independent candidates and that the Constitutional Court (CC) eventually had to consider the constitutionality of this fact – when the Constitution entitles all adult South Africans to stand for election to public office if they so wish, which is also one of Dahl’s seven conditions for a political democracy. There has always been this incompatibility between the Constitution and the Electoral Act, so the CC judgement in June 2020 did not surprise me. It actually pleased me. What has surprised me, however, is that the National Assembly has been so slow to act. And it has now even been necessary to apply for a further extension of the time frame for finalising the Electoral Amendment Bill, as more public consultations are suddenly needed. Will Parliament have completed the job in February 2023, or will it take even longer? Various groups, civil society organisations, and even individuals have both studied the options and also presented a number of ways in which independent candidates could stand for election and thus comply with the views of the Constitutional Court. The proposal presented in early 2022 by the Inclusive Society Institute is well worth considering, as it creates space for independent candidates, but not really at the expense of the established political parties. The only real change from the current system is that the number of lower-tier constituencies – which are now the nine provinces – will change to 66 smaller multi-member constituencies (MMCs), following already existing administrative borders. These smaller MMCs will each elect a modest number of Members of the National Assembly, and that will bring with it a much closer rapport between voters and representatives elected in the local areas. This will eventually increase the level of accountability and can also be expected to increase the level of social cohesion, as voters in an MMC have something in common: the opportunity to elect their MPs, who might engage with the local voters and their various associations in defending the area’s interest in the National Assembly and within their respective parties. And this will happen even if an independent candidate is not among those elected in the MMC. The ISI proposal would certainly be a good starting point for the work of the Electoral Reform Consultative Panel, which has now been suggested by the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). And by the way: Experience from other countries tells us that very few independent candidates will eventually be elected. It’s good, and constitutionally required, that independent candidates can have a try, but there is no reason to fear that many of them will be elected. It is in my opinion more important – but not because of constitutionality issues – to also use this opportunity to discuss the large number of political parties in South Africa. At the national level we saw 48 parties participating in the 2019 elections – and as many as 34, almost 75%, did not make it into the Assembly, despite there being no formal threshold. I, therefore, was very pleased when I saw that one of the changes proposed by the National Council of Provinces to the electoral Amendment Bill was to require that parties not already presented in Parliament or the Provincial Legislatures, must also submit a substantial number of seconding signatures in order to be allowed ballot paper access. The requirement is suggested to be 20% of the relevant quota at the previous election, which is exactly the same requirement as suggested for independent candidates. This is a constructive solution to the problem with the first versions of the drafted Bill, namely that it would be much more difficult for independent candidates to get on the ballot paper than it would for new and formerly unrepresented political parties – who could even hope for access to the pool of compensatory seats. So, suddenly both problems – (1) the differential treatment of independent candidates and new parties, and (2) the mushrooming of new parties with virtually no chance of getting elected – have found a common solution! This constructive and welcome addition to the current electoral system does not violate the right to associate freely, which is so important in a democracy. But it makes it clear that access to the ballot paper does not come almost automatically to any small association or publicly known personality who can collect as little as the 1,000 signatures required for registration of a party. Parties allowed on the ballot paper must of course be able to prove that they deserve this honour, and it is completely legitimate in a democracy to require parties to do so. Parties that were elected in the previous election – and are still represented in Parliament – can be allowed to participate in the elections without further ado and have their performance as parliamentarians evaluated by their constituents, as that is how parties are being held to account. The newly suggested requirement will definitely reduce the number of parties on the ballot paper considerably – and consequently, make it easier for serious parties to make it into the National Assembly. It makes sense to see both the requirements for ballot paper access and for winning a seat in the National Assembly as important gatekeeping tools. Some kind of gatekeeping is necessary at Parliament’s gate to restrict entrance to those trusted by a reasonable number of voters. All to avoid votes being scattered over so many parties that none of them make it into Parliament. One can even argue that the NCOP proposal is too kind to the previously unrepresented parties, but I will not go into that debate here. I shall only in passing mention that in my own country, in Denmark, the similar requirement for new and currently unrepresented parties is to provide as many seconding signatures as is the equivalent of a full electoral quota at the latest election, not only a modest 20%! It has, however, surprised me that I have not seen or heard any public debate about this constructive suggestion that will definitively decrease the number of parties on the next ballot paper considerably – something that many South Africans will certainly see as a fine step forward, as I also do. Social cohesion is about social integration and inclusion, in local communities and in society at large. I’m strongly convinced that the issues I have addressed in relation to the electoral system and the Electoral Amendment Bill will all have a positive bearing on social cohesion both locally and in the South African society as a whole. My seven take-aways cannot be very surprising: Democracy is much more than elections, but as good quality elections is a necessary part of it. It is okay to pay special attention to elections. Democracy becomes stronger and more consolidated, the higher the quality and the more integrity the electoral process has. In South Africa, the competence and the integrity of the IEC has proven important since the first IEC. It is of the utmost importance that the perception of the IEC as competent and politically unbiased is not allowed to change. Automatic voter registration must be introduced as a matter of urgency. The ISI proposal for a new South African electoral system can be a good starting point for the work of the Electoral Reform Consultative Panel, which has been proposed. The number of signatures required for a national party to get on the ballot paper has been suggested to be the same as the requirement for independent candidates. That is a very welcome improvement to South Africa’s electoral system – it might even be a good idea to set the requirement for political parties somewhat higher than for independent candidates. My suggestions will all increase social cohesion, both in local settings – the MMCs – and in society at large, by reducing exclusion and by reducing the costs of taking responsibility for the attainment of goals agreed upon. 3. Q&A session with Jørgen Elklit, professor emeritus, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University Q. The automatic voter registration will obviously bring down the costs for the IEC, because it's just a data merging between Home Affairs and the IEC. But at the same time, it would also most probably lead to a lower voter turnout, in the sense that, at the moment voter turnout is registered on 70%. Whereas, with the new system it would be registered on 100%. The problem in South Africa is with the young voters that are not coming on board. How do we motivate the young people to start talking and to exercise their democratic right? A. Although the automatic voter registration would lead to a decrease in the official voting turnout number, I don’t think this matters, because the present voter turnout figure is artificial. The IEC says that the participation rate is about 70%, but on which participants are they basing this on? If it’s 70% of the elligible voters, then the current turnout in South Africa is actually only about 50%. But the IEC is always very proud of claiming that it is about 70%. What really matters is that the entire eligible population can easily exercise the right to vote without having to register or being registered some time ago, so I don't buy that argument at all. In reference to the question about the young voters – bearing in mind that some female voters are also underrepresented in the current situation – the issue with young voters voting less than others and registering less than others is not only a South African problem, it is seen all over the world and it is, in particular, seen among underprivileged young voters of different kinds. They have to be motivated and one can do different things in order to get them to register, but it is a complicated issue and I think the main reason is that the parliamentarians are not delivering on their promises. If parliamentarians made society function better, so that not only young voters but all of us could see that it made sense to go to the polls and vote – because that would influence what happened in our local society, in our village, in our country – then it would be easier to motivate young voters to go and vote. It's something which cannot be remedied very easily, as one would have to change the entire political culture and deliver in a different way. Q. I want to follow on from the previous question. The issue about automatic voter registration is that it’s great in a country where the systems work well, but when you have a Home Affairs that is struggling to ensure the integrity of its data, then what you’ll have going forward is a well functioning electoral system that is in doubt. And so, we are actually going to go backwards. In my opinion, there's a prerequisite to automatic voter registration, given our context. What is your comment on that? A. Yes, the more serious problem is, of course, how can one introduce automatic voter registration when Home Affairs is functioning, or rather, not functioning the way it is? Therefore, I understand completely that it is not something that could be immediately implemented or even set up long before the next election. Rather, it requires that structures be put in place that can handle it. It would not necessarily have to be Home Affairs, it could be some other body, but it would have to be capacitated and funded to do so. It could even be something the IEC could take on. It would require legislation and decisions of a very complicated nature. I understand that. But the current situation, where more than a quarter of the population is not able to vote is, from a democratic point of view, a serious problem, and one that has to be dealt with, in my opinion. It will be complicated to salvage, but as I was just saying, it is what should be done because it cannot continue as it is. Q. How do we deal with the issue of fraud and having ”dead” people coming into the electronic voting with automatic voter registration? A. The way the automatic voter registration would function to avoid fraud within the system, is that when a person dies, they are deleted automatically from the register. And therefore, also from the voter register. So, a person cannot come with a claim, for example, for their deceased grandmother, because she would have already been deleted from the voter register automatically. And on the other end of the spectrum, when a person turns 18, they will automatically be registered as a voter. I think if one could get an organisation to prepare the framework for this system, and it works, it would probably solve the problem of fraudulent voters. That's one of the advantages. I understand that it's difficult to get to that point, because it’s expensive. But in my experience in Denmark, I have never heard of a person succeeding in using a deceased person’s voter ID, and that’s simply because they are no longer on the register. I'm not saying that fraud cannot happen. I’ll be honest with you, the only way it can happen is that sometimes a person’s voter card gets stolen. The system automatically sends out a voter ID card by mail with all your information on it, which you take with you when you go to the voting station. In theory, a person may be able to go and vote for another person using their stolen voter ID, but as I understand, it's very rare. Q. I agree that it’s ridiculous to have such a long ballot paper. How do we effectively reduce the number of parties on the ballot paper, and guard against the counterattack that says this would be an assault on our democracy because people/parties are being suppressed? A. I think the suggestion in the NCOP's changes to the Amendment Bill is a good one. If a political party not only has to register but also collect a certain number of signatures to support its being on the ballot paper, this will result in a natural screening of parties on the ballot paper, because some of the weaker parties that do not have the appropriate structures in place will not be able to deliver the number of signatures required. I think one can easily argue that if a so-called political party trying to get into Parliament cannot even organise the collection of a certain number of seconding signatures, then why should it go to Parliament? It will not have the capacity, as we have seen in recent elections, to get enough votes to be elected. The outcome of the current situation is that you have ballot papers as long as my arm, which confuses voters and some voters might decide not to go and vote because they can’t find a party to vote for. So, by reducing that number considerably, those problems would be solved. I'm not saying that new parties shouldn’t be allowed to stand for election, but rather, if they can organise the collection of the allotted number of signatures in time and get approved by the IEC, which could be the controlling organisation, then they might also be able to run a good election campaign, get out to the people and get the votes so that they would be represented. If they cannot organise the collection of signatures, then they would probably also not be able to get elected, and then there's no need to have them on the ballot paper. So, I think it’s a set of regulations that would be very helpful, not only for the IEC, but also for all voters, who could more easily find solid, substantial parties on the ballot paper to vote for. I think that's a good way forward and I think one could even be less kind to the new and unrepresented parties, because there's no need to have them on the ballot paper if there’s no chance that they will get elected. If they have the support of the people, they will get the numbers they need to get into Parliament. Q. In relation to the creation of a space for independent candidates. We are currently emerging from a very fragmented environment. I think we've been working hard for quite a long period of time on uniting as a country, so that we act as a collective in dealing with the national challenges. Especially at the national level, the very purpose of creating space for people to represent the interests of this society as individuals is to encourage unity and cohesion of South Africans, to act together in dealing with the country’s problems. What is your comment on this? A. I think it's interesting because we talk about creating space for independent candidates a lot, but at the same time, many of us feel that we need the political parties as lightposts in developing the political policy proposals we need going forward, with candidates and all the functions of political parties. And that under normal circumstances it should be enough to have the political parties to organise the political space. The problem is that sometimes individuals come forward who have strong opinions, people who could make a difference in Parliament with their views, but it happens very rarely. The idea is that, if such people do come forward, they can be tested by the voters, and if they can convince the voters in sufficient numbers of their abilities to influence the political debate in the country in a positive way, then they should be allowed to be tested, at least. I think that's the idea of the formulation in the Constitution of South Africa, and in the constitution of many countries, that if a person believes that they have something to offer in political life, there should be a possibility for testing whether the voters would trust that person. But as I said, it happens extremely rarely that people come forward who have convinced the voters that they have something to offer that is over and above what comes from the political parties. And that is why I said in my presentation that it is extremely rare that independent candidates are elected. Something which has surprised me in relation to South Africa, is that the debate about independent candidates has been so intense from some corners. For one thing, there is the constitutionality problem, and for the other, what will happen in actual practice? Have we come across people who we would like to see as independents in Parliament? That can hopefully be tested in the next election, but my guess is that it would be very difficult. It has only happened on one occasion in Denmark, and I know that the Danish political system is very different from the South African system, but on one occasion an independent candidate was elected. It was a comedian who was very popular at the time. He was not your ordinary political comedian; he was just your normal comedian who decided to give it a try. After a couple of elections, I think in the third, he got elected as an independent. And it so happened that he became the person in the middle numbers who commanded the majority in Parliament, because on one side there was the socialist bloc and on the other the bourgeoisie bloc, and then there was Mr Haugaard in between. What he realised was that to hold that position as a relatively ordinary person was extremely complicated. He hated his life in Parliament for that period. I suppose he needed the money, so he stayed for the full term. But then he decided never again, because it was too demanding in all ways for him. And I think we see the same happening in many other countries. So, I think the option must be there, commanded by the Constitutional Court and the Constitution, but there's no reason to think that it's a big issue. The political parties are the building blocks of modern political society and should be so, in my opinion. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Mr Daryl Swanepoel, met with the Ambassador of the European Union, HE Sandra Kramer, in Pretoria on Wednesday, 1 February 2023. The purpose of the visit was to set in motion processes to establish relationships between the ISI and likeminded think tanks and institutions in the EU and to discuss policy issues across a wide front of topics. This included agriculture, green energy and international relations, amongst others. The ISI and the Embassy are committed to maintaining and strengthening their relationship, and to promote solidarity between the European and South African societies.

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Mr Daryl Swanepoel, met with the High Commissioner of Singapore, HE Zainal Arif Mantaha, in Pretoria on Wednesday, 1 February 2023. The purpose of the visit was to set in motion processes to establish relationships between the ISI and likeminded think tanks and institutions in Singapore. There are lessons to be drawn from the Singapore experience, which has many similarities to South Africa. They too had to emerge from a colonial past, are a diverse nation that had to grapple with social inclusion, and they needed to progress from abject poverty, which they successfully did by transforming themselves into the economic giant they are today. The ISI and the High Commission are committed to maintaining and strengthening their relationship, and to promote solidarity between the societies of Singapore and South Africa.

Articles Click on the article title below to read: State-driven developmental state vs people-driven developmental state Lumko Mtimde Social advancement and change through public college education funding Dr Connie September Democratising the United nations Prof William Gumede Ports regulation in South Africa: An equitable tax rate approach Mahesh Fakir & Prof Mihalis Chasomeris Xenophobia in South Africa: The politics of naming, national contract, and the invention of the foreign other Dr William Jethro Mpofu

Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2023 State-driven developmental state vs people-driven developmental state by Lumko Mtimde BSc (UWC), Postgrad Diploma in Telecommunications and Information Policy (UNISA) Abstract The State must create an enabling environment, a roadmap for redress – as required by the Constitution of 1996 – and addressing problems such as high levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality linked, in part, to the history of apartheid. Whereas these challenges are central for redress by a People’s Government, communities are similarly key to the solutions in their own development, accordingly, community development must be people-driven and -centred. It is notable that one of the 6th Administration’s priorities is the building of a capable, ethical and developmental state. The assumption in the implementation of this priority is that it is only possible if key to it, is active citizenry. The paper offers an analysis of the ANC Policy Conference draft discussion documents and policy proposals. It looks at scenarios of development and empirical evidence for such scenarios, where possible, and it acknowledges that for things to take a new turn in the field of policy analysis and scenario planning, much critical thinking and proper implementation must take priority. The paper reviews the literature concerning the definitions of a developmental state, a welfare state, the bottom-up approach to development, the nature of a state-driven development in light of safeguarding citizens, and building digital infrastructure at every corner of the country to facilitate inclusivity and enhance a people-driven democracy. A revolution is multi-layered like an onion, hence there is always a struggle within the struggle. Accordingly, the paper argues that a development state is a process of building the country; the endgame is a welfare state. Keywords: ANC, RDP, Development State, Welfare State, Development Communication, Public Participation. People Driven, Digital Infrastructure, Data Revolution, Social Grants. Introduction What I refer to as the People’s Declaration, the Freedom Charter (1955), a statement of core principles of the South African Congress Alliance – which consisted of the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies: the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People's Congress – that is characterised by its opening demand, "The People Shall Govern!", lays a foundation for us to understand the kind of state we should have in the post-apartheid South Africa. In its preamble, the Freedom Charter states: We, the People of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people; that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality; that our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities; that only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief; And therefore, we, the people of South Africa, black and white together – equals, countrymen and brothers – adopt this Freedom Charter. And we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing neither strength nor courage, until the democratic changes here set out have been won (ANC, 1955). The Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994), echoing the dreams of a truly democratic society, states: No political democracy can survive and flourish if the mass of our people remain in poverty, without land, without tangible prospects for a better life. Attacking poverty and deprivation must therefore be the first priority of a democratic government. (RSA, 1994) Accordingly, the above quotations, therefore, affirm the central place and role of the State in democracy and sustainable development. Sections 24 through 29 of the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution (RSA, 1996) recognise the socio-economic rights of citizens, including the right to social security. The National Development Plan (NDP) offers a long-term vision of South Africa. The NDP aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. According to the plan, South Africa can realise these goals by drawing on the energies of its people, growing an inclusive economy, building capabilities, enhancing the capacity of the state, and promoting leadership and partnerships throughout society (NPC, 2012). The NDP proposes that by 2030, South Africa should have a comprehensive system of social protection that includes social security grants, mandatory retirement savings, risk benefits (such as unemployment, death and disability benefits) and voluntary retirement savings. Part of our approach to social protection is through a social wage, which includes no-fee schools, free basic services and subsidised public transport. In addition to creating more jobs in the private sector, a significant broadening of public employment programmes will also help to ensure that fewer households live below a determined income level (NPC, 2012: Chapter 11). It is acceptable that South Africa needs to build a state that is capable of playing a developmental and transformative role (NPC, 2012: Chapter 13). The Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) in its Central Committee in 2005 noted that in South Africa, the concept of the “developmental state” refers to a state-driven development, in contrast to a free-market approach. It noted that the model of the developmental state originated with a U.S. Asian studies scholar named Chalmers Johnson. For him, the critical element of the developmental state was not its economic policy, but its ability to mobilise the nation around economic development within the capitalist system. In effect, these states endorsed a revolutionary project – although, in his view, “What distinguishes these revolutionaries from those in the Leninist states is the insight that the market is a better mechanism for achieving their objectives than central planning” (Johnson, 1999:53). On the 2nd of July 2022, representatives of civil society, faith-based and community organisations, academia, and media from all over the country met and made the following pledge: Inequality, poverty, joblessness, and violence, which we inherited from apartheid, have been made worse by a decade of state capture, corruption, and maladministration by the government. We envisage a new economic model that is inclusive and leaves no one behind, that meets people’s basic needs and is characterised by values of empathy, solidarity, and social and climate justice.(Defend Our Democracy Campaign, 2022) Other than the inequalities inherited by the South African democracy in 1994 – whose redress is enshrined in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, in the Preamble – various other South African reports present a very worrying picture of the state of affairs in the country. The South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), in its report to Parliament, stated that about 60% of applicants for the R350-a-month Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant are young, and approximately 5% of all SRD grant applicants hold tertiary qualifications. Statistics South Africa’s (Stats SA) Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) for the first quarter of 2022, states that the unemployment rate was 64% for those aged 15-24 and 42% for those aged 25-34 years, whilst the national rate stands at 35% (Stats SA, 2022). Prof Ingrid Woolard (Stellenbosch) argues and concludes that excluding the Covid-19 Social Relief of Distress grant, more than 18.3 million social grants are paid out each month, including 13.6 million for children and 3.7 million old-age pensions, totalling R193 billion, or 3.1% of the GDP (Woolard, 2022). The ANC Policy Conference 2022 Discussion Documents (ANC, 2022) notes, the “provision of social grants reduces poverty and contributes to the reduction of income inequality in the country, and empirical evidence shows that the Child Support Grant (CSG), for example, contributes to improved school attendance, educational attainment and access to food. The Department of Social Development pays social grants to qualifying South Africans through the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). Social grants reach more than 18 million people at a cost of R180 billion a year. The provision of social grants continued during nationwide lockdown with minimal disruptions” (ANC, 2022:97). When scholars analyse the specific material conditions in our country – whether appropriately using Marx’s methods and tools of analysis – we must grapple with understanding the scientific material conditions and resolution of Africa’s problems with a view to changing Africa for the better, qualitatively, not quantitatively. I submit that Marxism is not just about the economy; we must also be able to use its tools of analysis to understand the specific contexts and the consequences it spells out for inaction. This is a seminal point that Gramsci contributes to enrich the theoretical and practical potency of Marxism as a complex tool of analysis. Besides the objective economic and political variables, the Italian revolutionary introduced the equally important subjective variables in any revolution. Gramsci’s hegemony and counter hegemony perspective places an emphasis on these subjective variables, including culture as a weapon, education, religion, consciousness, media, etc. If these domains that affect individuals and institutions are not equally contested, the revolution will be seriously jeopardised. Against the above background, it is imperative to understand and appreciate that the concept of a developmental state imagines the State in the driving seat managing the process of socio-economically building a country, driven by the goal of realising a welfare state. Literature review and framework Barrientos (2010) in an article that links social protection to new perspectives on poverty and vulnerability, identifies and discusses key issues in the emergence of social assistance programmes in developing countries, and assesses their potential contribution to addressing poverty and vulnerability in the South. Barrientos, in the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), reports that societies all over the world recognise in the last decade that social protection has emerged as a policy framework employed to address poverty and vulnerability in the developing countries. According to the Center for Theory of Change (N.d.), theory of change is essentially a comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. It is focused in particular on mapping out or “filling in” what has been described as the “missing middle” between what a programme or change initiative does (its activities or interventions) and how these lead to the achievement of the desired goals. It begins by first identifying the desired long-term goals and then works backwards from these to identify all the conditions (outcomes) that must be in place (and how these relate to one another causally) to secure the desired goals. It’s important to appreciate a theory of change model, as it captures all the essential elements needed to achieve long-term goals, all things being equal (Weiss, 1995). “To be successful, the theory of change model should communicate what’s required from participants to reach business goals, and the desired goals must be expressed in terms of measurable success-indicators. A theory of change model requires the active involvement from stakeholders and those involved in it should constantly test assumptions that can be measured in the pursuit of the desired goals” (WalkMe, 2018). In the context of a history like that of South Africa, where our democracy emerges with the baggage of concerningly high levels of inequality, we should – in line with the NDP envisaged plan and vision – ensure to enlist a multipronged strategy and tactics to achieve the social outcome where no individual lives below the defined minimum social floor. As part of ensuring the upliftment of all individuals to be above the threshold of extreme poverty, we must begin by objectively evaluating our immediate situation, the challenges, opportunities and so on. The NDP Vision 2030 could serve as a good reference point as we imagine the future and goals we are trying to achieve as country. Having our vision for a better life for all, as the ANC puts it, we need to make a social impact that can deliver it. The NDP has prioritised social protection as a critical intervention to improve the quality of life of South Africans by eradicating poverty, reducing inequalities and addressing unemployment (NPC, 2020). In this light, the South African government, as part of a social wage package, approved a National Municipal Indigent Policy in 2005, which is intended to guide the national initiative to improve the lives of indigents and to improve access to free basic services. The policy recognises the need for intergovernmental cooperation in the process of dealing with indigents, but places a specific emphasis on the municipal sphere, recognising the important role local government has in effectively addressing the needs of indigent households (DPLG, 2012). The indigents are defined as lacking the necessities of life to survive, like water, electricity, food, clothing, sanitation, etc. According to Stats SA’s recently released report of its Non-financial census of municipalities, the number of indigent households across the country’s 278 municipalities registered 3,56 million in 2016, the highest number on record since figures were first published by Stats SA in 2004 (Stats SA, 2020). South Africa provide social grants – the applications for which are administered by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) – that strengthen and support the safety net, to improve standards of living and redistribute wealth in order to create a more equitable society. The social protection approach adopted by the South African government: has a number of sub-programme elements that reduce the cost of living for the poorest households. These are a combination of social assistance grants, minimum wages (through waged work in private or public sector) and the social wage (education, health care, free basic services, Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) houses, transport subsidies, school feeding schemes, etc). All these elements make a significant impact on poverty and inequality and reduce the cost of living for the poorest households, especially the 17 million who receive social cash grants. (NPC, 2020) A developmental state must provide social protection as an important intervention by providing income support to low-income citizens and a lifeline for the unemployed, poorest and most vulnerable households, as demonstrated during the Covid-19 crisis, as well as during recurring global economic and financial crises. What is a developmental state? There is no consensus on the definition of a developmental state. One will find, however, many useful definitions of it in the literature. There is no doubt that the many and different definitions will draw and reflect the various ideological orientations that undergird it. Developmental state has become a “generic term to describe governments that try to actively ‘intervene’ in economic processes and direct the course of development rather than relying only on market forces” (Stubbs, 2009:5). Jeremy Seekings (2015:1) observes that “enthusiasm for the idea of a 'developmental state' emerged in South Africa in the early 1990s, re-surfaced in the mid-2000s, and re-emerged yet again after 2007”. The enthusiasm to embrace a state-centric development path was animated by the desire toward “shifting the economy onto a more inclusive and faster growth path” (ibid.). Consider also Kaname Akamatsu’s (1962) argument that it is impossible to study the economic growth of the developing countries in modern times without considering the mutual interactions between the developing economies and the developed countries. This approach to conceptualising the role and position of a developmental state finds corroboration among many scholars’ views, whose argument for state intervention in the economy takes advantage of the fact that there is access to the economic conditions, performances and weaknesses of developed countries. The challenge and responsibility of developing states is how to position one’s country, in light of the global economic trends, threats and opportunities, to advance national and public interests. As much as there is a promising case for a developmental state, one often is pressed to consider which route is more preferable in social and economic development: Is it one that is state-driven (developmental state) or a citizens-driven developmental state? Accordingly, a case is made in this paper for a citizens-driven developmental state. In 1994, South Africa produced a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which was referred to as the end of one process of subjugation and oppression and the beginning of another political era of freedom and development for all. The RDP included an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework that emerged out of many months of consultation within the ANC, its alliance partners (the South African Communist Party (SACP), COSATU, South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), etc.) and other mass organisations in the broad civil society. We have seen what a state-driven developmental state can look like. Measures taken to protect state officials, for example, whilst very important, must occur in equal measure to protect citizens and avoid the lawlessness, increasing crime and criminality, thus also safeguarding the citizens. Another case that requires urgent attention and intervention relates to the appointments in key public entities – like the National Health Insurance (NHI), the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), etc. – wherein citizens nominate their proposed leaders to govern the entities and through the people’s representatives in Parliament, the appointments are made, and the Executive Authority effects the appointment. This approach seems a unique South African tried-and-tested working model. In terms of which, then the Boards appoint the required Executive Management like Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) without interference from the Executive Authority. The above approach does still equally give the political parties (including the ruling party), the right to nominate and subject their nominated candidate to the above people/citizens-friendly approach. Other preferred examples of citizens-driven elements include the post-1994 safety and security approach to policing. It urges us to move away from apartheid military kinds of policing towards the kind of policing that is humane, and one where there is collaboration with communities via the concept of Community Policing Forums. This people-driven agenda towards policing, for example, is not top-down, but rather it is bottom-up, where the citizens play a crucial role in directing the fight against crime and building safe and peaceful societies. There are many other examples of a citizen-driven developmental state, but the main argument in this paper is for a bottom-up approach to development, which takes the views of the citizens and their broader participation seriously, in conceptualising and realising a developmental state. What is a welfare state? To begin our discussion of a welfare state, we note that it has several defining features. Firstly, a welfare state is one that plays a central role in the extension of the socio-economic conditions of its citizens. It does so, guided by its commitment to “the principles of equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions of a good life. Social Security, federally mandated unemployment insurance programmes, and welfare payments to people unable to work are all examples of the welfare state” (Kenton, 2022). The state has a duty to extend the safety net to secure all its citizens. According to Assar Lindbeck (2003), it can do so in terms of two types of government spending arrangements: (i) cash benefits to households (transfer, including mandatory income insurance) and (ii) subsidies or direct government provision of human services (such as childcare, pre-schooling, education, healthcare, and old-age care). Lindbeck (2003) further argues that by definition, the welfare state may also include price regulation (such as rent control and agricultural price support), housing policies, regulation of the work environment, job security legislation, and environmental policies. In this paper, a case is therefore made for a welfare state system, where the state undertakes to protect the health and well-being of its citizens, especially those in financial or social need, by means of grants, pensions, and other benefits. This case is supported by the perceived weakness in this country of the socio-economic elements of a robust society, where it has a functional state, many firms that afford widespread employment of the working population, functional and stable family units, and the generally robust market. In South Africa, with its history of inequality, many of the weakness of these elements necessitate the welfare. In fact, the role of a state that delivers to the welfare of its citizens is enshrined in the Constitutional Act of 1996 (Bill of Rights) in South Africa. The literature indicates that the term ‘welfare state’ first emerged in the UK during World War II (Kenton, 2002). The foundations for the modern welfare state in the UK were laid by the Beveridge Report of 1942. Proposals such as the establishment of a National Health Service and the National Insurance Scheme were implemented by the Labour administration in 1948. Singapore: an example of a welfare state Yunmin Nam (2020) examined the diverse pathways of welfare development in the East Asian region. Nam argues that the existing regime’s approaches characterise East Asian welfare states as possessing low levels of government intervention and investment in social welfare. “However, democratisation in the 1980s changed the socio-economic structures of East Asian countries – leading them to rethink their welfare commitments. The late 1990s financial crisis and globalisation also accelerated the reorganisation of their welfare systems.” Soo Ann Lee and Jiwei Qian (2017) in their paper discussed the major social policies in Singapore that have been designed to accommodate the political rationale and economic growth strategies. They conclude: Singapore has made outstanding achievements in social development with a relatively small government social expenditure … The welfare institutions in the Singaporean welfare state, as an East Asian ‘productivist’ welfare regime, are designed to support economic growth. Furthermore, this study discusses the policy responses in Singapore to the recent developments of economic and social conditions as an example of the evolution of welfare states. (Lee & Qian, 2017) John Goodman (2015) noted that “about 90% of Singapore households are homeowners – the highest rate of homeownership in the world. In healthcare, Singapore started an extensive system of ‘Medisave Accounts’ in 1984 – the very year that Richard Rahn and I proposed ‘Medical IRAs’ for America in the Wall Street Journal. Today, 7 percentage points of Singapore’s 36% required savings rate is for healthcare and is deposited in a separate Medisave account for each employee. Individuals are also automatically enrolled in catastrophic health insurance, although they can opt out. When a Medisave account balance reaches about $34,100 (an amount equal to a little less than half of the median family income) any excess funds are rolled over into another account and may be used for non-healthcare purposes” (Goodman, 2015). The social welfare policy interventions by the state in Singapore are in the best interest of citizens and therefore yield an economic growth that best serves the national interests. South African social welfare policy is also worth noting. In addition to its social grants programme, the number of informal settlement dwellers has been growing on an average of 9 million since 2000. This long passage shares some of the advances that have been made by the South African aspirant welfare state: Since the dawn of democracy in 1994, about 4.8 million houses have been delivered in South Africa providing safe shelter to over 25% of South Africa’s households. Globally 1 billion people live in slums in 161 countries. More than 30% of the urban population live in slums and informal settlements. Approximately 2.8 million households in South Africa do not have access to improved sanitation services. The ANC has resolved to eradicate the bucket system in order to improve sanitation services. By December 2020, a total of 41 290 out of 52 249 bucket sanitation systems were eradicated. Furthermore, a total of 14 235 rural households were served to eradicate sanitation backlogs. The DWS has developed the Water and Sanitation Master Plan, which provides a 10-year roadmap for eradicating the bucket system, providing adequate sanitation, innovative solutions and generating economic opportunities. The DWS provides the Water Services Infrastructure Grant (WSIG), which is used to assist municipalities to procure intermediate water supply to ensure the provision of service infrastructure (e.g. spring protection, drilling, testing and equipping of boreholes). Through this grant, 802 projects were funded for construction nationally, with 142 of these projects completed. (ANC, 2022:100). What do we mean by inclusivity? The RDP process, explained above, was a unique, inclusive, people-driven policymaking attempt in South Africa. South Africa needs to continue with this citizen-driven approach as it brews ownership of challenges and solutions by the people – which approach is key to a robust democracy. An important aspect of a robust democracy is that of inclusivity. Susanne Ricee (2017) defines inclusivity in this fashion: the idea that all types of people, for whatever differences, must be included as much as possible in work and other institutions and must be assimilated. It means that whatever benefits afforded to others must be afforded to everyone, and if possible, if ever they are disadvantaged, society must address that deficiency to ensure equality. Promoting inclusivity is easier in theory than in practice, for biases abound against the marginalised, minorities, women, and people of different genders and mental and physical disabilities. They have been victims of the patriarchal society, majority, the powerful, and the dominant classes throughout history. (Ricee, 2017) The idea of inclusivity involves a society that equally recognises all human beings. It is one that extends opportunities for survival and thriving to all. It identifies those that are weak, marginal, oppressed, women, minorities, disabled, and seeks to create conditions that fully accommodate them. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, in its preamble, commits South Africa to lay the foundation for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; to improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person. Therefore, inclusivity is embraced by the Constitution of South Africa and is a commitment to economic development and equality through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. Inclusivity deepens democracy. What does the ANC Policy Conference Discussion Documents propose? On the 20th of May 2022, the ANC published the Policy Discussion Documents as part of preparations for the National Policy Conference, towards the ANC December 2022 Congress (Elective Conference). These discussion documents outline the ANC’s strategic approach to policies and how it shapes and impacts our transformation agenda. ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa states that the new policy frameworks must be underpinned by a comprehensive social compact underpinned by a capable and ethical state, for us to succeed in our undertakings (ANC, 2022:3). The ANC acknowledge that the political and other generations of rights – including social, economic, gender and environmental rights – enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic, derive their origin from the demands of the 1955 Freedom Charter. The ideals of the Freedom Charter are therefore embedded in the country’s Constitution (ANC, 2022:6). The ANC Discussion Document Chapter 6 dealing with Social Transformation notes that “in addition to the social grants, the DSD portfolio provided an additional social relief package, consisting of the following: Covid-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) of R350 per month to adults aged 18-59 with no income from May 2020 to April 2021 Caregiver Social Relief of Distress (CSRD) Child Support Grant (CSG) Top up of existing grants – The Old-Age Grant, Disability Grant, Care Dependency Grant and Foster Child Grant were each topped up by R250 per month in May to October 2020 inclusive. The CSG was topped up by R300 per child in May 2020 only. The introduction and roll-out of a new Special COVID-19 R350 grant for those between 18 and 59 reached 6 million new individuals who have not had access to a grant, in a very short space of time. The top-ups on existing grants have provided a cushion to the most vulnerable individuals. Social grants overall proved to be the most effective mechanism available to government to cushion millions of the most vulnerable individuals and households from the dire socioeconomic impact of Covid-19. The Social Development portfolio is also introducing and strengthening policies that are aimed at reducing high levels of poverty, inequality, vulnerability and social ills. These policies include: The Green Paper on Comprehensive Social Security – it seeks to integrate social grants, mandatory social security contributions and voluntary contributions into a coherent system that ensures that all South Africans are included. The Maternal Support Policy – it seeks to integrate the relevant systems from key departments such as DHA, DoH, DBE (ECD and Education), DSD, Employment and Labour, and SASSA. The linkage of pregnant women to comprehensive social protection packages would further contribute to the ongoing development of synergistic linkages between services provided by the DSD. The Policy on linking children grants beneficiaries to government services will integrate social welfare services, education, and health within the cash transfer system. Draft Policy (Basic Income Grant) Proposal on Income Support to 18-59 Year Olds will expand the safety net to this additional vulnerable group, whilst also ensuring improved targeting of government services that will assist in empowering social grant beneficiaries. The Fundraising Amendment Bill seeks to consolidate the various Relief Funds into one National Social Development and Relief Fund that will enable the Fund to be more proactive and developmental in disaster mitigation.” (ANC, 2022:99). This paper, in the next section, “Analysis of the ANC propositions”, looks at what the ANC proposes, an analysis thereof, and the outline of my argument. The ANC proposals are consistent with its caring mandate and mission to promote a better life for all. Given the historical background of South Africa, the social welfare benefits are critical in transforming the economy. The document, under “Organisational Renewal: Progress and Challenges” (ANC, 2022: Chapter 2), refers to a challenge of existential crisis. Accordingly, “Renewal, re-engineering and regeneration therefore has to focus on the vital matters of the renewal of the values and integrity of the Movement, identifying and developing cadres who would be loyal to those values and the strengthening of our common vision for South Africa and the achievement of our organisational mission” (ANC, 2022:27). The document goes further, stating that “despite these existential challenges, there is ironically agreement about the mission, character, and tasks of the ANC in the current period. This consensus is contained in Strategy and Tactics (1997/2017), which articulates the central mission of the ANC as the liberation of Africans in particular and black people in general from socioeconomic bondage, by resolving the fault lines created by apartheid colonialism and patriarchy, and the creation of a National Democratic Society” (ANC, 2022:28). The draft document proposes, “A diverse and inclusive capacitated collective of public representatives, at each sphere of government, with a collective minimum skillset, which enables them to govern a modern state, at that level, has become an imperative. At present we use the exact same electoral process in the ANC to elect our internal leadership collectives and to elect ANC public representatives, from the same pool, members in good standing. The result being that we mostly duplicate the internally elected leadership as public representatives. An almost mirror image. These processes are further exacerbated when factional wars are raging in the movement. This is very restrictive and limiting on the ANC” (ANC, 2022:34). The ANC in Chapter 6, Social Transformation, proposes that “the comprehensive strategy for and the coordination and monitoring of the protection of vulnerable groups led by the Department of Social Development must be resourced to enable effective protection of children, the elderly, people with disability, and people with Albinism across relevant departments and spheres of government” (ANC, 2022:95). On social protection, the document proposes that “child-headed households including street (homeless) children must be prioritised in social protection policy, in EPWP opportunities. The child support grant should be extended from the age of 18 to 21 for beneficiaries that are still studying in order to eliminate the advent of vulnerability” (ANC, 2022:96). On housing subsidisation, the ANC proposes that “the sale of subsidised houses by beneficiaries should be prevented and beneficiaries who no longer need the house must be assisted to return the house to the State for compensation or allocation of an alternative opportunity in another area. The rental of subsidised houses to non-beneficiaries must be discouraged especially in the face of growing need. Accelerate the issuing of title deeds and registration of subsidy houses in favour of the ‘family’ rather than the individual beneficiaries” (ANC, 2022:97). The discussion documents noted again that the report of the 54th National Conference states, “The ANC’s approach to state power is informed by the Freedom Charter and the principle that ‘The People Shall Govern’. The attainment of power by the ANC is a means to fulfil the will of the people and ensure a better life for all”. Analysis of the ANC propositions The ANC discussion documents reaffirm what the ANC 54th Conference resolved on, which is to build a democratic and capable developmental state, with the agility and resolve to drive and implement the programme of social transformation and the creation of a National Democratic Society (ANC, 2022:31). With regard to the Theory of Change, the ANC need to acknowledge that the renewal is not going to succeed if it overemphasises (which is necessary) internal organisational dynamics. It needs to equally focus on building a new cadre system and capacity at all levels (locally and nationally) to radically improve on its capacity to deliver services to the people, and to focus on the objective of change, which is delivering on its organisational mission to better the lives of the citizens. The ANC as it recalibrates – digitising its membership systems, empowering each member to actively and equally participate in its activities through using automation and new technology platforms – needs to understand that empowering its members will also require creating an enabling environment for a citizens-driven democracy and development. Whilst the discussion documents propose a diverse and capacitated public service, the same efforts should be spent on capacitating all citizens, in particular the youth, so they are empowered to actively participate in governance. Digital skilling should be mainstreamed at schools, TVETs and universities, and society readied to effectively use new technological platforms and improve efficiencies. The ANC recommends the adoption of adaptable, flexible and transparent government policies needed for a capable developmental state, with a bias towards policies which benefit the marginalised, poor and unemployed, and directed at narrowing inequality (ANC, 2022:31). Digitisation will go a long way to improve efficiencies and enable the ANC to achieve these recommendations. In line with the digitisation interventions, the ANC proposes the modernisation of SASSA’s national administration to be more effective and efficient in line with government’s overall objectives for the public service, whilst maintaining seamless integration with provinces to ensure that there is adequate support, decision-making, and to ensure accountability through the organisation. “The use of pay points also needs to be phased out to support financial integration of communities by the use of a more modern payment system” (ANC, 2022:97). The National Infrastructure Plan 2050 (NIP 2050), published by the Minister of Public Works and Infrastructure in March 2022, is very welcome. The goal of the National Infrastructure Plan 2050 (NIP 2050) is to create a foundation for achieving the NDP’s vision of inclusive growth. This phase of the NIP 2050 focuses on four critical network sectors that provide a platform: energy, freight transport, water and digital infrastructure. The Plan notes that there has been good performance in digital infrastructure rollout over the past decade; by 2019, 93% of the population was covered with 4G/LTE, up from 53% in 2015. Over 85% of the population live within 10 km of a fibre access point. This coverage bodes well for NIP 2050 efforts to improve digital access for low-income communities. The NDP envisages a seamless information infrastructure that is universally available and accessible, at a cost and quality at least equal to South Africa’s peers and competitors. Whilst South Africa is far off the NDP’s goals from 2021, the 2030 goals must remain in place. There is evidence of sufficient capacity to deliver on these objectives if they are implemented through private-public cooperation. To achieve the vision for digital infrastructure, the NIP 2050 says that: High-speed broadband will be universally accessible. Regulation will enable competitive and universally accessible broadband public sector capacity will be strong and able to drive the required policy agenda. Partnerships will be strong and there should be centres of digital excellence promoting a growing knowledge base of delivery and innovation. The information and communications technology (ICT) skills base will be broad, robust and ready for the future. Government services and buildings will be digitally enabled. Private sector participation in achieving universal broadband access will be prevalent. The NIP 2050 further notes that the digital SIPs will be deepened and augmented and 3-year priority actions to 2023/4 are outlined. For example, digital migration and spectrum auctions will take place in 2021/2, in that sequence; that the policy for rapid deployment of electronic communications networks and facilities will be finalised in 2021/2; that arrangements will be made to enable private participation in public interest digital delivery projects from 2022/3; that 80% of public buildings will be digitally enabled by 2024/5; that high-speed broadband will be accessible in every community by 2024/5; that there will be consideration of free basic data for low-income users; that government services be digitised; that a data centre strategy will be finalised in 2021/2; and that a satellite communications strategy will be finalised in 2021/2 for implementation beginning by 2022/3. If the ANC government was to deliver on its commitment to the NIP 2050, ensuring each and every corner of South Africa is connected with access to high-speed broadband and internet, the digital skills rollout throughout the country will enable a people-driven and citizens-driven development state. Citizens in villages, townships and everywhere else in South Africa should have access to stating their development needs, shaping policy, and participating in the implementation thereof. The rollout of this NIP 2050 is a priority to improve where things are going in the country, as it will contribute to the creation of a knowledgeable and informed society. The Economic Recovery and Reconstruction Plan (ERRP) also asserts that the infrastructure rollout is a key driver to the recovery and will facilitate inclusivity. The ANC in Chapter 3, Digital Communications and the Battle of Ideas, notes the NDP 2030 highlights that “access to information via print, broadcasting and the internet are vital for building an informed citizenry. It also contributes to education and economic development” (ANC, 2022:54). High-speed broadband rollout, investment in digital infrastructure, building a digitally skilled workforce, enhancing digital transformation, creation of an effective competition, promotion of universal service and access, improved government communications, support for community and small commercial media, will contribute to a citizens-driven developmental and welfare state. For the District Development Model (DDM) to succeed, the citizen participation must be guided by the very concept of the Freedom Charter, “The People Shall Govern”. Most notably, the ANC Discussion Documents stated that “the economic challenges have been worsened by a recent series of negative economic shocks including the Covid-19 pandemic, violence and looting in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, massive flooding and damage in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape and fraught geopolitics, including the conflict between Russia and Ukraine” (ANC, 2022:141). These developments coupled with some reported failures in respect of service delivery, as expressed in several Presidential Imbizos and Auditor-General of SA (AGSA) reports, are contributing to citizens’ impatience, and present the potential for instability and social strife. The ANC needs to adopt policy interventions that will fast-track the redress of these challenges and bring hope, to bring trust to the public. Further, the ANC needs to decisively deal with corruption, criminality, end loadshedding, fix embattled state-owned entities (SoEs), recover the economy, reduce unemployment, and rebuild a people-driven state. The ANC Discussion Documents also note and recommend that “to further consolidate and advance the progress made in implementing the Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan (ERRP), the ANC must play a leading role in deepening the processes of social compacting around economic policy interventions for long-term and sustainable growth and job creation. Such a process of social compacting should build on the foundation established among social partners in the development and implementation of the ERRP. Further, the process should be more explicit about the trade-offs, timeframes, contributions, and sacrifices to be made by specific constituencies towards rebuilding the economy. Mechanisms to ensure accountability for non-delivery on the commitments made must be established” (ANC, 2022:143). International best practices Internationally, as seen above in terms of the East Asian and Scandinavian countries, a people-driven development and welfare state cares for its citizens, people take care of the social net. Partnership with the private sector is value adding, but citizens must be the main actors. “The idea that the state should play a leading role in economic development was central to early development economics” (Chang, 1999:182-199). China is one of the countries in the world with a large population. It is developing and its drive to develop seems to be an incentive for it to be a developmental state model. Its economy is state guided, or a socialist market economy as it defines it. The other interesting model is that of Denmark and Japan, but I will not expand on these cases given limitations of space in this paper. What further thoughts need to go to the ANC proposals and recommendations? The ANC needs to strengthen civil society participation, create dialogues that cover all stakeholders, ensure active community participation in local economic development forums, build capacity of public officials orientated towards partnerships, and create an enabling environment that promotes meaningful public participatory processes and a balance of less talk and more action in regard to implementation. The political will must be open to new ideas and have the ability to listen, not just tell, and try to understand where people’s input is coming from. Leadership should have the ability to put themselves in the position of the people and keep their calm. South Africa must avoid tilting towards a state-driven developmental state, as that will not work and will lead to more instability. The state must not erode the people’s power. For example, a people-driven developmental state must promote both rural and urban sustainable human settlements and turn rural areas into hubs of agricultural production – with villages developed to compete favourably with commercial farmers. Different scholars have different takes on defining and understanding a developmental state and Gumede (2010), in his paper, refers to the Mkandawire (2001b) argument, that developmental states are “social constructs” by different role-players in a particular society. Conclusion The above picture painted in this paper of continued poverty, inequality and unemployment, confirms that the situation regarding the poor and vulnerable households in South Africa requires state intervention. In addition, with the population of about 64 million, the number of dependants exceeds the number of social grant beneficiaries by a considerable margin. Therefore, grant money will continue to make a contribution to the challenges of poverty and inequality, forming an integral part of the support of households, beyond just the beneficiary. Whereas some argue that a social security grant system targeting about 19 million people is not sustainable, similarly, others argue that the absence of such an intervention is not sustainable. South Africa must prioritise deployment of digital infrastructure – in addition to the other infrastructure requirements such as roads, electricity, sports and recreational facilities, etc. – digital skills, and access to high-speed broadband throughout the country, in order to create a meaningful environment for public participation, efficiency, improved access to public services and operation of digital platforms, thus enhancing a people-driven developmental state. The state power is critical and imperative to drive change and the state role in changing society for the better is fundamental, but by itself, state power is not sufficient. There is similarly a need to populate people’s power, through mass participation and involvement. Appreciating both in a citizens-driven developmental state concept, I must admit that people’s power on its own, without state power, is equally insufficient – they must be complimentary and work together in a democracy. The Basic Income Grant (BIG), or Universal Basic Income Grant (UBIG), must be ventilated, robustly discussed, as discussions are raised to extract South Africans from the perceived mentality of dependence and entitlement to a people’s culture of self-sufficiency. The welfarist approach must be interrogated, having regard for its good and bad, for all to see so that resolutions, plans, programmes and actions of the ANC and government become developmental, promote self-reliance, self-sufficiency, and not dependency, but caring, and respond to citizen’s reality and needs. workable approach must bring to life the aspirations of the people enshrined in the 1955 Freedom Charter and the 1962 SACP Road to South African Freedom (SAHO, 1962). Social spending must be classified and understood to support production and productivity. A development state is a process of building the country and the economy, the endgame is a welfare state. A development state is not an end in itself, but a transition to a welfare state, a caring state serving the interest of the people. References African National Congress (ANC). 1955. The Freedom Charter. [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/the-freedom-charter-2/ [accessed: 31 January 2023]. 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Cape Town: CSSR General, UCT. South African History Online (SAHO). 1962. The Road to South African Freedom. [Online] Available at: https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/road-south-african-freedom-1962 [accessed: 31 January 2023]. Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2020. Non-financial census of municipalities for the year ended 30 June 2020. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P9115/P91152020.pdf [accessed: 31 January 2023]. Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2022. Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Quarter 1: 2022. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02111stQuarter2022.pdf [accessed: 1 February 2023]. Stubbs, R. 2009. Whatever happened to the East Asian Developmental State? The Unfolding Debate, The Pacific Review, 22(1):1-22. WalkMe. 2018. How Do You Define Change Management? The Best Approaches. [Online] Available at: https://change.walkme.com/how-to-define-change-management/ [accessed: 31 January 2023]. Weiss, C. 1995. Nothing as Practical as Good Theory: Exploring Theory-Based Evaluation for Comprehensive Community Initiatives for Children and Families. In: New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives. New York: Aspen Institute. Woolard, I. 2022. The role of social grants in economically enabling South African women. In: Women’s Report 2022: Women and Fiscal Policy, Paper 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. 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Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2023 Democratising the United Nations by Prof William Gumede Associate Professor, and former Convener, Political Economy, School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand; and former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg). Abstract Russia’s war with Ukraine – and global responses to it – is not only remaking the post-Cold War world, but has shown that many existing global institutions, particularly the United Nations (UN) have lost their credibility, relevance, and authority. Unless something is done about reforming the UN into a more credible organisation, the global rule of law will collapse. This article explores the central weaknesses of the UN and the reform processes aimed at restoring its credibility. It concludes that the UN should be democratised in such a way that a few countries – or regional blocks – do not dominate the organisations decision-making or are not enabled to manipulate or block action. Introduction Russia’s war with Ukraine – and globally responses to it, is not only remaking the post-Cold War world, has shown that many global institutions established to keep peace between countries, have become redundant. The UN was established in 1945 following the end of the Second World War, by 51 countries to maintain international peace and security. The United Nations, spectacular absent in the invasion by Russia, joined by Belarus, of Ukraine, have been spectacularly absent in most of the recent violent conflicts between countries. This underscores the fact that the global organisation established after the Second World War to prevent conflict between countries appear to have lost its credibility, relevance and authority. It has been left to individual country leaders, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) and the G20 to desperately try to end the hostilities. The UN was also absent in the descent into chaos last year of Afghanistan when the Taliban took over, and the government and citizens fled the country en masse. The UN has also been largely silent in the face of China’s ongoing threats against Taiwan, which the Chinese dragon views as part of it – which Taiwan rejects, and not a sovereign country. Unless something is done about reforming the UN into a more credible organisation, the global rule of law will collapse. The decline of the UN raised the spectre of more copy-cat incidents of aggression by powerful countries against more vulnerable one, making the world even more unstable, violent and chaotic. Without a credible UN, the world will increasingly be divided between countries that have nuclear military versus those who do not have. Many countries, having seen how Russia used its military power to dominate the US, EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), will desperately try to acquire or shore up nuclear military abilities. Clearly, the UN in its current form is not fit for purpose to address current and future global challenges. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: “The credibility and effectiveness of global institutions is being questioned. The reason for this is that there has been no change in these institutions despite the passage of time. These institutions reflect the mindset and realities of the world 75 years ago” (Mehta 2020). Even France, a permanent member of the UN Security Council has conceded that the UN Security Council has reached its sell by date. French President Emmanuel Macron said recently UN Security Council “no longer produces useful solutions today” (French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs 2021). The UN, and other global institutions, laws and rules will have to be collectively democratized or abolished and new more relevant, consensual ones created, or the world plunge into more Russia-Ukraine like conflicts and eventually a global nuclear Third World War. New multipolar world Many of the global multilateral organisations that anchored the post-Cold World War consensus, whether the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Trade Organisations (WTO) have also lost their credibility. The post-Cold War Western-led global order, assumptions and consensus are in profound crisis of credibility. The US-led global hegemony wilted in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 global financial crises, unilateral military interventions in developing countries, without seeking global consensus and the often manipulation of multilateral organisations for self-interest, rather than for the greater good of the world. Furthermore, during the 2007/2008 global financial crisis some of the neoliberal economic thinking that underpinned the US post-Cold War ideology hegemony lost its lustre, when, in order to save economies, companies and livelihoods, Western countries used decidedly un-neoliberal tools, such as state investment in private businesses. Since the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the communist alliance led by the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR); the US-European Union-led Western alliance has dominated global political, economic power, institutions and ideology. This has now come to an end. The world has now changed into a multipolar one, away from the domination of the US-led global order which has held sway in the post-Cold World War era, into one where power will become more evenly spread across regions and countries across the globe. The world has seen the economic, political and ideas’ rise of emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia and Turkey and others, which have resulted in a multipolar global order, which has challenged the US-EU-led Western dominated global order. It is very likely that instead of one or two powers, dominating the world, we are likely going to see a world where there is not one single as in the case of the US in the post-Cold World War or two competing, as was with the US and the USSR during the Cold War, but multiple power poles. The US shambolic withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, when the Taliban took over, and the government and citizens fled the country en masse, most probably was the symbol of loss of its global hegemony. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in the decline of the US-EU post-Cold World war hegemony and had tried prior to the launch of his invasion of Ukraine, to refashion the old USSR alliance, against the US-European dominated world, but this time, with Russia, with old allies of the USSR and new emerging powers. As part of the strategy to reintegrate the old USSR, Putin in 2015, for reintegrated some of the former economies of the Soviet Union into a regional trade bloc between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia, called the Eurasian Economic Union. Developing countries are increasingly clubbing together as a group in international fora. African countries are collaborating with each other or with others as a group more. Africa now account for more then a quarter of the total membership of the UN. There have been several initiatives by developing countries to build alternative global institutions. In 2003, India, Brazil and South Africa established an alliance, IBSA, which promised to align the globe’s largest developing country democracies, across continents to trade with each other, to oppose the dominance by industrial countries of global trade, rules, ideas and institutions, and share development experiences. IBSA was established after India, Brazil and South Africa had been invited at the time as observers to the 2003 G8 summit of industrial countries in France, and left feeling their own fates and that of the developing world are being decided by a small group of unrepresentative developed countries. Following the 2003 G8 summit, India, Brazil and South Africa strongly felt they must formally club together, to push for a bigger say in global governance for developing countries, to diversify their trade away from industrial countries and to share their unique lessons of the twin pursuit of development and democracy amidst multicultural societies, with deep poverty and inequalities. In 2009, BRICS was established in 2009 by China, Russia, India and Brazil, with South Africa joining in 2010. For its members, the BRICS partnership offers geopolitical allies for these countries to press for the restructuring of the global trade, economic and political architecture to give Africa and developing countries a fairer say – and therefore better able to compete - in relation to their Western counterparts. The potential protective wall of BRICS membership may provide individual members the policy space to make independent development, trade and political policy decisions – which may not otherwise be the case, yet so crucial for the sustainable economic development of individual. The BRICS partnership also offers participating countries the space to resolve disputes, whether trade, political or diplomatic constructively. The new multipolar world demands a new kind of the UN or a different organisation entirely. Post-Cold War multilateral global institutions seen as marginalising developing countries The post-Cold War multilateral global institutions have in the past been dominated by the US-EU often for purely self-interest, rather than for the global good – which has undermined their authority, effectiveness and credibility among the majorities of countries in the world. This has fostered a global climate where it appears dominant countries can get away with breaking global political, economic, legal, market and trade rules for self-interests – while developing countries cannot. Developing countries have less say within global institutions – which set the rules of the global market, whether the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Trade Organisations (WTO). Some scholars have referred to the phenomenon as global apartheid: industrial powers had more power than developing countries, particularly African countries (Bond 2004). For example, since the Second World War, the US has always chosen the president of the World Bank “using the appointment as a vehicle to advance American economic interests, power and development priorities around the globe” (Zumbrun 2019). Europeans have traditionally selected the head of the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank is owned by 189 member countries. The members elect a board of executive directors. However, industrial countries have in the main larger voting shares than developing countries and have more power in decision-making. The US has the largest voting share at around 16%. This is above the 15% share threshold which gives a country veto power on key decisions – the US is the only country with veto power at the World Bank. Many developing countries were critical of the US favourite, Jim Yong Kim, for World Bank president in 2012 (Zumbrun 2019). Following Kim’s early retirement in 2019, three years before his term ended, divisions sharpened between industrial and developing countries over who should replace him. Industrial countries often punish other countries or multilateral organisations if these adopt policies which go against the domestic policies of industrial countries. Developing countries do not have the global power to react similarly. In 2017, the administration of US President Donald Trump, withdrew the US membership of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (Beauchamp 2017; John 2017). UNESCO in 2011 had admitted the Palestinian territories to the organisation as an independent member state called Palestine. In the UNESCO decision to admit Palestine, 104 countries voted in favour of allowing Palestine, while 14 opposed it, with 52 states abstaining. A US law stipulated that US funding will be cut from an organisation recognising an independent Palestine. Global development institutions have been criticised for being biased towards Western countries at the expense of African and developing countries, which have little say in the control, policies and ideas of these institutions. In the current global economic system, developing economies do not have the policy independence to use monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate their own economies – lest they face a market, investor and Western media backlash. Many unilateral monetary policies adopted by industrial countries to deal with their domestic crises often destabilise African and developing countries. Global capital markets are also against many African and developing countries. So unfavourable is the current global political, financial architecture and cultural systems that policies, decisions and events which are triggered in industrial countries, over which developing countries have little say, often undermines well-being of developing countries. When in financial crisis, western countries often come up with unilateral monetary policies which are destabilising African and developing countries. For example, these governments, often manipulate the value of their currencies to improve their export competitiveness. Again, African and developing countries do not have the same power to come up with unilateral monetary policies to protect their economies, strengthen their currencies and boost employment, they will face backlash from Western governments, global financial institutions and markets (Panitchpakdi 2011). In fact, when in financial crisis, African and developing countries are often force-fed economic, political and trade policies – from global financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, which are often astonishingly inappropriate, in return for funding by these multilateral organisations. If African and developing countries do not follow the prescripts they are often punished by the markets, withdrawal of investment by the private sector, diplomatic isolation and negative global media reporting. Western countries often come up with unilateral monetary policies which are destabilising African and developing countries. For example, these governments, often manipulate the value of their currencies to improve their export competitiveness. Following the past global financial crisis, the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Japanese central bank introduced quantitative easing in 2015. However, these quantitative easing policies eroded the competitiveness of emerging market economies (Rajan 2014; Sablik 2019; Powell 2018). The former Reserve Bank of India Governor Raghuram Rajan (2014) has rightly warned that the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy was causing spillovers in emerging markets, with seesawing capital flows, volatility and the destabilizing of financial markets. Global trade rules and laws are stacked against African and developing countries. High tariff and non-tariff barriers in industrial countries block African countries from exporting value-added products which create more jobs and more wealth to more people, to industrial countries (Africa Progress Panel 2012). African free trade agreements with Western countries, such as the Partnership Agreements with the European Union and the African Growth and Opportunity Act with the US are mostly disadvantaging African and developing countries. If African and developing countries object to global rules stacked against them, they are often threatened with retaliation, whether blocking their products withdrawal of trade or development aid sanctions or the political isolation of specific countries (Gumede 2012). African and developing countries have few recourses for trade, economic and political disputes with developed countries - they are marginalized in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Africa Progress Panel 2012). How the world should respond to global crises, reform of international organisations, laws and rules and appointments of heads of UN agencies and multilateral institutions now increasingly divide the world into Western countries versus developing countries. Increasingly, developing countries have tried to circumvent global multilateral organisations or establish alternative global institutions to the existing ones, where they can. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping have established a series of alternative global institutions rivalling existing ones, like the BRICS Development Bank (Gumede 2012). Appointments of UN general secretaries and heads of agencies The Security Council members have also dominated the election of UN General Secretaries – which means that general secretaries increasingly are often not get wider legitimacy among countries. The 5 permanent members have often forced their own choices of UN general secretaries. As the world’s get more uncertain, dangerous and complex, UN heads forced on other countries by the Security Council’s 5 permanent members, have recently often been bland figures, almost invisible who lack global country support beyond. In the past UN general secretaries were larger than life figures, with global personal or country authority, credibility and reputations, many who could through their own personal appeal persuade country leaders. The five permanent members also dominates the appointments of heads of UN agencies, such as UNESCO, UNDP and the World Health Organisation. And at times when non-permanent members prevail in the appointments of heads of UN agencies, these appointees are often undermined by permanent members, as it has been the case with WHO head Tedros Tedros Ghebreyesus, whose appointment was largely engineered by non-permanent members. A case in point was the appointment of the head of the World Health Organisation in 2017 and his reappointment in 2022 (Africa Progress Panel 2012). Developing countries successfully pushed for the appointment of Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, who was endorsed by the African Union, as the World Health Organisation Director-General in 2017. His criticisms of Western countries for hoarding Covid-19 vaccines during the pandemic caused outraged among Western countries. Tedros waged a fierce campaign to get poorer countries a fair share of Covid-19 vaccines. Support for or against Tedros became a proxy battle between Western and developing countries. Developing countries came to his support and he was re-elected unopposed in 2022. At his re-election has head of the WHO in August 2022 Tedros (2022) said: “The global community cannot properly address the mountain of health emergencies and challenges we face, including the Covid-19 crisis and emerging pandemic threats, ‘in a divided world’”. Inequality between countries in global affairs and law Developing countries are also unequal in international law. For a case in point, the US, China and key industrial countries have not signed up to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and their leaders and citizens are not subject to its jurisdictions. Industrial countries’ security, intelligence and police forces often operate across the borders in African and developing countries, something which developing and African countries cannot do. US-led coalitions, for example, have frequently used their power in the UN to push through invasions in developing countries’ regimes perceived to be anti-Western – in Iraq, Libya and elsewhere – under the disguise of defending human rights. Ironically, these countries support equally evil regimes in other developing countries as long as they are pro-Western. Such decisions, many developing countries say, are often based purely on protecting industrial countries’ commercial interests. Developed countries have increasingly manipulated global political, economic institutions and laws for purely self-interest, rather than for the global good. This has fostered a global climate where it appears dominant developed countries, can get away with breaking global political, economic, legal and trade rules for self-interests, at the expense of developing countries. Developing countries appear to have less power in global relations then industrial countries, especially former colonial powers. The voices of developing countries often appear to have less weight than those of industrial countries, although new emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil, with large economies are increasingly pushing back. Former South African President Nelson Mandela was also critical of Western nations abusing their domination of global and multilateral organizations for their own selfish ends, rather than for the global good. In his farewell speech to South Africa’s parliament, Mandela said: “We see how the powerful countries, all of them so-called democracies, manipulate multilateral bodies to the great disadvantage and suffering of the poorer developing nations.” The French economist Jean Dresch in 1948 described the economic, political and trade relations between African colonies and colonial powers at independence as: “In essence, it consists of taking money out of a country its export products and selling imported products to the native population which has received money for the exports. It is a very elementary circle in which the market, in so far as is possible, is in the hands of the mother country, and the colony is condemned to produce only raw goods without manufacturing them at home” (Dresch 1948). Very little appears to have changed, since Dresch’s description of the power relations between former colonies – whether in Africa, Latin America or Asia, and former colonial powers, the industrial countries. Global racism Racism against black or darker skin people in industrial countries, global multilateral institutions and multinational companies are systemic – undermining the much-vaunted idea of globalisation, the tighter integration of countries resulting from increased global financial, trade and services flows, widespread penetration of new technologies and advances in transport. Global racism against black and darker skinned prevent them from freedom of movement across borders, specially from African and developing countries to industrial countries, whether for work, trade or living. Blacks and darker skinned people are more likely to be stopped at customs entry to industrial countries. The Council of Europe’s Commission Against Racism and Intolerance in its 2022 annual report said: “Racism in policing (in the European Union countries) continued to be an issue in a number of countries, including in the context of enforcing pandemic-related restrictions. The ECRI report refers in particular to racial profiling in stop-and-search activities, the use of racist language and excessive use of force against individuals, which not only targeted individual victims, but stigmatised communities as a whole. Victims of such practices have often felt insufficiently supported by the authorities”. The idea of globalisation makes no sense when dark skinned people cannot move freely from developing to industrial countries; and products, especially value-added ones that foster wealth, jobs and economic growth, from predominantly dark skin developing countries face higher tariff barriers in industrial countries. “Critics of the way globalisation is organised refer to people as the ignored side of globalisation … (T)he freedom of movement of people has not enjoyed any easing of conditions” (COE 2012: 18). During the Covid-19 pandemic, many industrial countries were accused of putting stricter entry conditions for entry into their countries on citizens from black and darker skin countries. During the Covid-19 Omicron variant restrictions in late 2021, the Canadian government was accused of racism after only restricting entry from African countries, while many European countries had higher Omicron loads, but their citizens did not the face the same travel restrictions into Canada. The UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Trade Organisations (WTO) set the rules for the global politics, economy and trade. All of these global institutions are dominated by Western countries. These global institutions have been criticised for being biased towards Western countries at the expense of African and developing countries, which have little say in the control, policies and ideas of these institutions. Western countries and global agencies often appear to act with more urgency in disasters, human rights violations and environmental neglect when the victims are white around the world. Global interventions often appear to take place only when Western business interests and citizens’ lives are threatened in African and developing countries. The organisational cultures of multilateral organisations, such as the Western-dominated International Monetary Fund, World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Trade Organisation and the United Nations, have often also exhibited unconscious bias towards developing countries, in their decision-making, lending practices and appointments. The World Bank’s shareholding is dominated by the US (23.66%), Japan (5.87%), Germany (5,36%), France (5,04%) and the United Kingdom (5,04%). A 2009 report by the US Government Accountability Project (GAP) reported that “only four black Americans held professional positions out of more than 1,000 U.S. nationals. This figure represents a significant proportional decline even from the abysmal levels reported thirty years ago” (GAP 2009; Chiles 2012). The World Bank’s own internal survey during that time showed that SubSaharan Africa, Caribbean and black American staff do not appear to have the same opportunities to advance than others (GAP 2009; Chiles 2012). Africa accounted for over 50% of the World Bank’s development assistance, but only 2.5% of the professional staff in the development economics section – responsible for ideas on poverty alleviation were African (Chiles 2012). The decline of the UN UN in its current form have lost its credibility, relevance and authority. The UN has in many cases failed to maintain global peace, security and intervene timely in humanitarian crises. In more recent times it “failed to effectively respond to international crises such as the genocide in Rwanda, the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, the second Iraq War, the Syrian civil war, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and mass atrocities in the Sudanese region of Darfur and Myanmar’s Rakhine State” (Friedman 2022). In 2020, the then President of the UN General Assembly, Volkan Bozkir said “competing interests among its members and frequent use of the veto have limited the Council’s effectiveness”, and that even in the most urgent humanitarian crises, the organisation has “failed to provide a timely and adequate response” (UN 2020). The mistrust in the UN, has caused many countries not to cooperate with UN-led attempts to mobilise international cooperation in global crises, such as wars, the health pandemics and disasters. During the Covid-19 pandemic the UN Security Council was spectacularly absent in providing leadership. The Covid-19 pandemic has “laid bare the United Nations Security Council’s incapability to produce quick solutions to contain the spread of the virus. The UNSC held very few meetings even as the pandemic was spreading death and destruction” (Mehta 2020). A dispute between the US and China which lasted three months after the global outbreak of Covid-19, delayed a resolution proposed by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres calling for greater international collaboration to combat the disease, support for poorer countries and requesting countries in wars to call ceasefires to prioritise combating the disease (Mehta 2020). The UN released a report, “Our Common Agenda”, on the future of multilateralism in September 2021. The “Our Common Agenda” report highlighted the failures by countries to cooperate under the UN banner to tackle global crises. The report points out the failure of countries to coordinate efforts to combat the Covid-19 pandemic. Following the UN “Our Common Agenda” report, the UN Secretariate was tasked to develop policy responses to the criticisms of the failings of the organisation. A global gathering, called a Summit for the Future is planned for September 2023, when the recommendations from the “Our Common Agenda” will be discussed and a “New Agenda for Peace” for global peace and security agreed on (Gowan 2022). Alongside the planned Summit for the Future, the UN has also appointed a “High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism convened by Ellen Sirleaf Johnson, the former Liberian President and Stefan Löfven, the former Swedish Prime Minister to come up with proposals for a change in global governance structures (Gowan 2022). The perception that the UN is biased against developing countries have led many developing countries to unite behind calls to reform the organization. For another, many developing countries on principle vote against or abstain on issues in UN pushed by industrial countries. The last couple of years developing have increasingly formed blocs opposing industrial countries – turning the UN into “a us (developing countries) versus them (industrial countries). This has further undermined the authority, focus and workings of the UN. Nevertheless, the rising developing country calls for reform of the UN has up to now being ignored by industrial countries. For another, the collapse in credibility of the UN has given countries such as Russia and China the opportunity to act unilaterally. The decline of the UN raised the spectre of more copy-cat Russian-like incidents of aggression by powerful countries against more vulnerable, making the world even more unstable. Unless something is done about reforming the UN, the rule of law at global level will collapse. For another, unless the UN and other multilateral organisations are made more representative, inclusive and equal, countries who feel excluded may form alternative global organisations. Many developing countries are increasingly turning their back on the UN – because they have no voice. During the first few weeks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Russia as a permanent member of the Council blocked UN action, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (2022) called for new more democratic global institutions. Zelensky proposed a new “union of responsible countries” to replace the UN. Such a new UN would intervene within 24 hours of a country experiencing an attack by another country, natural disaster, or health crisis, saying “a union of responsible countries that have the strength and consciousness to stop conflicts immediately.” And many other countries are reluctant to contribute to UN activities, such as peacekeeping. On the ground, because of the perceived bias of the UN, many UN peacekeeping forces have often been – been wrongly attacked in Africa by locals. UN Security Council – central shortcomings The central weakness of the UN is the Security Council which is limited to 5 permanent members - China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, with outsize powers. The five have veto power on key UN decisions. The UN Security Council is it is, is simply not relevant to the changing world anymore. The only substantial reform of the UN Security Council was introduced since the establishment of the UN in 1945 was in 1965, when the number of elected, non-permanent seats, but without the veto, was increased from six to ten. The UN Charter was amended to make this possible. There have been two broad reforms focuses, one to expand the UN Security Council beyond the five permanent members and the other to reform the Council’s processes, meeting procedures and administration, called the working methods (Kugel 2009; Swart 2013; Lehman 2013). In 1992, an Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council was established to spearhead reforms. The group’s workings were on the basis of consensus. However, the reform group collapsed because of disagreements (Lehman 2013; Swart 2013). By 2005, a number of different developing country groups had emerged split along the lines of the type of reforms they wanted. The Africa Group and the Group of Four (G4), consisting of Japan, Germany, Brazil and India called for the expansion of permanent seats. Another country grouping, the Uniting for Consensus group, formed by countries including Italy, South Korea and Argentina, limited their proposals to only an extension of non-permanent seats. Because of the impasse, the UN members in 2008 proposed to conduct what is called intergovernmental negotiations at the General Assembly of the UN. In such negotiations decisions can be resolve by a two-third majority of the General Assembly. However, by 2013, of eight rounds of negotiations, the process collapsed. It has not moved since. Jerry Matjila (2020), South Africa’s UN representative blamed the UN’s failure to maintain global peace and security as “largely due to its current outdated configuration”, which makes it impossible for it to make decisions, make decisions in the self-interest of permanent members and leading to non-permanent members rejecting what appears to be biased decisions by the five permanent members. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: “The credibility and effectiveness of global institutions is being questioned. The reason for this is that there has been no change in these institutions despite the passage of time. These institutions reflect the mindset and realities of the world 75 years ago” (Gupta 2020). The five permanent members have often abused their power for their own national interests, rather than in the common interests of humankind. The UN’s credibility was destroyed by those 5 permanent members abuse of the organisation for selfish interests, forcing other countries to turn their back on the organisation as a place where they have voice. These include, the invasion of Iraq, with questionable reasons, with many countries outside the 5 permanent members opposing it, and the invasion of Libya, which were also opposed by many countries, have undermined the UN. The Security Council members have also dominated the election of UN General Secretaries – which means that general secretaries often did not get wider legitimacy among countries. Appointments as heads of UN organisations such as UNESCO, UNDP and UNCTAD are often also heavily influenced by the permanent 5. The veto power of the 5 permanent members is particularly anachronistic. The legitimacy of five countries having a veto over decisions at the UN Security Council has been bitterly questioned (UN 2020). Critics of the veto have been rightly said it was often arbitrarily used, or used to protect the five countries’ self-interest, rather than the interest of humankind broadly, and that it has undermined the functioning, effectiveness and legitimacy of the UN. The 5 permanent members have often forced their own choices of UN general secretaries. As the world’s get more uncertain, dangerous and complex, UN heads forced on other countries by the Security Council’s 5 permanent members, have recently often been bland figures, almost invisible who lack global country support beyond. In the past UN general secretaries were larger than life figures, with global personal or country authority, credibility and reputations, many who could through their own personal appeal persuade country leaders. Challenges of reforming the UN administration Some countries have also rightly called for an overhaul in the way that UN conducts its business, its processes and meeting formats, called its working methods (Nadin 2014). Article 30 of the UN Charter (1945) says that the Security Council must adopt rules of procedure, or operating procedures of its administration. The Security Council adopted a Provisional Rules of Procedure (S/96) in 1946. The rules of procedures have remained provisional since. Security Council permanent members have been unenthusiastic about making the changes, beyond the most superficial. The rules of procedure remain untransparent, lack participation and accountability. How decisions on sanctions are made, where peacekeeping forces should be deployed and how to hold decision-makers accountable are veiled in secrecy. In 2005, the UN World Summit Outcome Document proposed the Council way of operating should become more accountable. It recommended the Council improve its working methods, by becoming more transparent and inclusive in its decision-making processes. However, the permanent five members of the Security Council have consistently blocked proposals to make the working methods, procedures and decisions of the Council accountable. Some non-permanent members have been wanting reform of the Council to simultaneously address the composition of the Council and the working methods of the organ. Others have tried to separate the working methods reforms from these of calls to change the composition of the Council. In 2005, five countries, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland, formed a group, called S-5 to mobilise for reform of the working methods of the Council. The S-5 group stayed clear from proposing Council composition reforms. The S-5 group stayed within the confines of proposing reforms that will be passed by a simple majority in the UN General Assembly (Lehmann 2013). In 2012, the S-5 proposed a draft resolution (A/66/L.42/Rev.2) calling for administrative transparency, inclusiveness and accountability in the workings of the Security Council. It called for greater inclusion of non-permanent members in decision-making on peace-building initiatives, in preparing, monitoring and ending mission mandates. The S-5 group called for the Security Council to provide information about its activities, decisions and planned actions, including holding monthly briefings to UN members about these. The S-5 resolution called for the permanent members not only to be transparent in the use of the veto, but to limit the use of the veto. They proposed the permanent members must explain why a veto is used. The group suggested the veto not be used to block UN action against mass atrocities. The S-5 proposals also called for greater participation, inclusion and transparency in the appointment of the General Secretary of the UN. The appointment of the UN General Secretary has been dominated by the 5 permanent members. The S-5 group also called for greater participation in the workings in and for the end of domination by permanent members of subsidiary bodies of the UN. The S-5 group proposed a change in the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, away from the current one where the permanent members can override General Assembly resolutions or ignore them. They argued or greater accountability of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The permanent members rejected the reform proposals from the S-5 group, insisting only they, permanent members, can decide on the appropriate reforms of the working methods of the Council. The permanent members put sufficient pressure on the UN administration to make obligatory for the S-5 group proposals to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, something not easy to achieve. The 5-permanent members, despite their political differences, were united in their opposition to the proposed transparency, accountability and inclusivity reforms. At the time Russia and China were pitted against the US, France and the UK over the Security Council’s handling of the Syrian civil war. The opposition by the five permanent members were particularly riling for many non-permanent members, as latter put pressure, inducements and even coerced poor developing countries to support them (Lehmann 2013). China was accused of pressuring African countries in which it had large investments, loans and projects to not support the reforms to the working methods of the Council proposed by the S-5 group (Lehmann 2013). Furthermore, the “Uniting for Consensus Group” at the last-minute after initially supporting the S-5 proposals, withdrew their support before the vote was to take place. This lobby, “Uniting for Consensus Group”, and nicknamed the “Coffee Club”, was founded by Italy, Mexico, Egypt and Pakistan in 1995, have since been joined by others including Argentina, Spain and Canada. They did so because the G4 group of countries, Brazil, Japan, Germany and India, referred to as the G4, which competes over UN reform direction with the Uniting for Consensus Group, had supported the S-5 proposals. Following the opposition by the 5 permanent members and the Uniting for Consensus Group, the S-5 withdrew their UN working methods reform resolution. For another, they also withdrew it for tactical reasons, to prevent a precedent be set, at the insistence of the permanent members, that critical reforms, such as the working methods reform, would need a two-third majority vote in the General Assembly (Lehmann 2013). By 2012 the S-5 group’s attempts to reform the working methods of the UN had collapsed. “The failure of the S-5 was first and foremost a show of force on the part of a P5 (permanent members) determined to maintain their control over the representation of member states interests and the reform agenda at the UN” (Lehmann 2013: 3). Following the failure of the S-5 reform proposals, 27 small and mid-size members of the UN in 2013 launched a fresh effort to reform the UN Security Council’s internal workings and its relationship with the broader UN membership, calling themselves Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT). The group included Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland and Chile. The ACT group stated their objectives as: “[T]he UN Security Council (UNSC), in its present composition, shall work in a more transparent, efficient, inclusive, coherent, legitimate and accountable way, both within its own structure, but also in relationship with the wider membership” (ACT 2013). It argued that a Security Council that is accountable was “more legitimate, coherent and efficient” (ACT 2013). The ACT stayed clear of proposing reforms on democratising the Security Council. The ACT included some of the reform proposals of the S-5 group – four of the S-5 members were ACT members. The ACT repeated the S-5 group proposal that the Security Council should not used their veto when a decision is mass human rights abuses. In 2015, ACT proposed a Code of Conduct to guide Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes “which calls upon all members of the Council (permanent and elected) to not vote against any credible draft resolution intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities” (ACT 2013). The group asked for more due process when the Council decides on sanctions against errant countries. The group called for more fairer allocation of penholdership – the role of initiating and negotiating Council draft resolutions, which has been in the past heavily skewed towards allies of the permanent members. Furthermore, it called for more inclusive and transparent process for the distribution of the Chairs of the Council’s subsidiary bodies. They also want troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations to participate in Council decisions when and where to send peacekeepers. The ACT group also wants more transparency in the relationship between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The ACT group proposed more open meetings of the Council, regular briefings and wider consultation before resolutions are prepared, by the Council to the Assembly. The ACT group want more meetings between the UN Security Council and civil society organisations. The UN reform debate so far In 2009, the UN established the Intergovernmental Negotiations Framework (IGN) to look at Security Council reforms. The discussions within the forum are considered “informal”, and therefore the UN General Assembly rule of procedure do not apply. Many countries have called for the “urgent need for transparency and application of general assembly’s rules of procedure to the intergovernmental negotiations” (Naidu 2020). Some countries have accused the permanent members of deliberately stalling turning the consolidated text of the “informal” Intergovernmental Negotiations Framework into formal negotiations, which will apply the General Assembly’s rules of procedure (Naidu 2020). At a UN Assembly debate in 2020 on Security Council reforms, Assembly President Volkan Bozkir, from Turkey, said reform is “an unavoidable imperative, both challenging and essential” (UN 2020). Bozkir warned: “This process can and should be an opportunity to correct the problems of structure and functioning of the Council. It should not create new privileges” (UN 2020). UN Security Council reform to bring in it more equitable representation has been on the UN General Assembly programme since 1979, with very little progress. Ronaldo Costa Filho, Brazil’s representative at the UN Assembly said inclusive representation at the Council is a precondition for restoring the legitimacy of the organisation (UN 2020). Recent reform proposals argue for the expansion of the 15-Member Council beyond the five permanent seats held by the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China and France and the remaining non-permanent membership. The proposals all push for greater regional representation and greater participation in the Council affairs to increase the legitimacy of the Council. Changing the Council’s composition and substantial decisions need a two-thirds majority member of member states in the UN’s General Assembly. Most of the UN reform debate has focused on reforming the Security Council, specifically to reduce the dominance of the 5 permanent members. There are essentially three broad overarching reform proposals or lobbies. Some countries, such as Brazil, Japan, Germany and India, referred to as the G4, have proposed enlarging the Council (Nadin 2014), by including at least six new permanent members, which would include Brazil, Japan, Germany, India, two African countries and introducing additional three elected seats on the Council. Another proposal is creating “new permanent seats in each region, leaving it to the members of each regional group to decide which member states should sit in those seats, and for how long” (Nadin 2014). This lobby, “Uniting for Consensus Group”, and nicknamed the “Coffee Club”, proposed a 26 member Council, with 9 permanent seats among regions, and the remainder of the seats would be held for two-year terms, with the option to get re-elected for another term (UN 2020). The Uniting for Consensus Group was founded by Italy, Mexico, Egypt and Pakistan in 1995, have since been joined by others including Argentina, Spain and Canada. The Uniting for Consensus group reject an increase in the number of permanent seats in the UN Security Council, but argue for the increase in non-permanent seats. They believed that increasing permanent seats will increase the power inequality – but just adding more countries that will have access to Council power. The group now has 50 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. African countries as a group, have proposed two permanent seats and two additional elected seats for Africa on the Council (Nadin 2014; UN 2020). All the different proposals for reform include Africa in one form or the other on a transformed Council. African countries cobbled together their common position under the ambit of the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. At the 2020 UN Assembly debate, the Chinese representative said: “Reform must focus on equality between big and small States, strong and weak, rich and poor” (UN 2020). South Africa has advocated for a 26-seat Council with an increase in permanent and non-permanent seats and giving representations to all five regions of Africa in some form on the Council (Matjila 2020). The US supports “modest” expansion of the Council “as long as it does not diminish the effectiveness of the Council or impact veto power” (UN 2020). There has been compromise reform proposals suggested by individuals outside the formal UN reform negotiations process. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein (2022) the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and former Jordan ambassador to the UN have proposed that a super-majority in the UN General Assembly should override any veto of a permanent member. Such a super-majority of member countries could be based on three-quarters or seven-eights of the membership vote. Former Colombian Finance Minister José Antonio Ocampo and former Turkish Economy Minister Kemal Derviş have similarly proposed a majority veto be introduced, they called it a “a large double majority—representing, for example, at least two-thirds of member countries and two-thirds of the world’s population—to override a veto.” Clearly, given that permanent members appear resolutely opposed to relinquish their veto, such majority vote proposals to override the veto of permanent members should be considered. UN reform opposition, and lack of consensus Currently, any change to the UN Charters – which involves reform of the composition of the UN Security Council needs a two-thirds majority and supported by all permanent members of the UN Security Council. A veto from any of the five permanent members of the Council stops any decision to be taken by the Council. In the past, China has used its veto power to stop efforts to discuss criticisms of its role in Tibet, Hong Kong or Taiwan (Mehta 2020). China for example used its veto power to block sanctions against Pakistan-based militant Jaish-e-Mohammed Masood Azhar, who have been accused of terrorism, for over a decade, until it budged in 2019 (Mehta 2020). Some developing country analysts have accused China of “using a variety of excuses to delay the intergovernmental negotiations process, which has been going on for over 10 years” (Mehta 2020). The intergovernmental negotiations process refers to country discussions at the UN on reforming the Security Council. India has accused China of dragging its feet on reform, because it did not want India to become a permanent member of the Council (Mehta 2020; Gupta 2020). China “supports reasonable and necessary reform” of the Council. The Chinese dragon does not want to abolish the Council or the idea of permanent membership, neither the veto. However, China wants to increase the representation of developing countries on the Security Council (CGTN 2022). “At present, the makeup of the Security Council is out of balance between the North and the South, and reform should correct the over-representation of developed countries, earnestly improve the representation of developing countries, correct the historical injustice suffered by Africa, and give more opportunities to small and medium-sized countries that come from Asia, Africa, Latin America and Arab countries and small island countries to serve in the Council and play their important role” (Zhang 2021). Russia has also used its veto power to block UN action against it (UN 2022). In February 2022, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that have would have demanded the country stop its invasion of Ukraine and withdraw its troops (UN 2022). Some countries, such as Pakistan and Colombia, oppose Security Council expansion. In the UN Assembly 2020 debate, the Pakistan representative said since the 5 current permanent members cannot agree on policies, adding additional ones will increases decision paralysis. Columbia’s represent said that expanding the Council will not automatically increase transparency of the structure. There have been a number of proposals not to eliminate, but to the limit the veto. Mexico for example have argued for limiting, rather than eliminating the veto that permanent members have (UN 2020). Mexico and France have proposed to retain, but to restrict the instances in which the veto could be used. Mexico and France argue proposed that the veto be restricted in the cases where the UN must urgently intervene when mass atrocities are committed – to prevent paralysing inaction. The UK does not support the elimination of the veto but advocate its responsible use. UK representatives in the UK emphasise that the “UK has not used its veto since 1989 and will never use it on any credible draft resolution to prevent or end a mass atrocity” (Allen 2020). The US and the UK are not enthusiastic about large-scale reforms of the UN Security Council. The UK supports “modest expansion of the Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories”, which includes the “creation of new permanent seats for India, Germany, Japan and Brazil, as well as permanent African representation on the Council”, to bring “the Security Council’s total membership to somewhere in the mid-twenties” (Roscoe 2021). The US is “open to a modest expansion of the Council in permanent and non-permanent categories as long as it does not diminish the effectiveness of the Council or impact veto power”. The US is opposed to taking away the veto power of permanent members. The US insists that any alteration in the Council structure must be “made by consensus” (UN 2020). Historic feuds between individual countries are often also played out in the debate over UN Security Council reform- and undermines building developing country consensus on reforms. China got Taiwan expelled from the UN and Security Council membership in 1971. China then took Taiwan’s place on the Security Council, after it became vacant (UN 1971). South Korea for example opposes Japan securing a permanent Security Council seat because of Japan’s former colonisation of South Korea. China has consistently opposed Japan’s admission to the UN Security Council (AFP 2005). China has insisted that Japan should not be granted permanent status on the Security Council until it atones for its wartime history (AFP 2005). In 2009, Japan’s public bid for a permanent UN Security Council unleashed two days of violent protests in China (Fincher 2009). Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at the time said: “I think the core issue in the China-Japan relationship is that Japan needs to face up squarely to history,” before China will support its Security Council seat bid (Fincher 2009). India claims China is blocking its ambition to secure a permanent Council because of frosty relations between the two countries (Mehta 2020). In 2020, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed China has stood in India’s way to become a permanent member of the Security Council and into associated UN international fora such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Modi claimed China deliberately tagged India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group to Pakistan’s acceptance, although India, according to Modi having a an “impeccable non-proliferation record”, which he said was not the case for Pakistan (Gupta 2020). Conclusion: A new UN democratisation agenda New global institutions are needed or current ones needed to be remade to be more relevant to the new more complex, uncertain and unpredictable post-Cold War world where the ideologies of the past, old institutions and old ways of looking at the world are increasingly becoming largely irrelevant. If the UN is to be retained, the UN must not only be reformed, it must be democratised to ensure equitably representation, participation and decision-making to ensure the credibility, legitimacy and embrace of the organisation. The UN’s administration must be democratised to “increase transparency and enable greater engagement of the Council members especially small and medium sized countries in the Council’s work” (PRC 2022). In fact, the working methods of the UN must be democratized in such a way to allow all members to have equal participation. The idea of a UN Security Council with permanent members is clearly outdated. Yet, permanent members appear resolutely opposed to relinquish their veto. So far, proposals for reform have been mostly about increasing the numbers of countries on the UN Security Council. Proposals that call for majority votes in the General Assembly – if permanent refuses to let go of their veto power - to override the veto of permanent members should be considered. Ultimately, the idea of a limited number of countries having veto power should also be abolished entirely. The veto is not only unfair, make countries unequal and open to abuse, it has also paralysed the function of the Council. The UN should be democratised in such a way that a few countries – or regional blocs do not dominate the organisation’s decision-making, or able to manipulate or block action. Importantly, democratisation of UN decision-making must be based on every country having equal power. 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Zack Beauchamp (2017) “Here’s what UNESCO is – and why the Trump administration just quit it”, Vox, October 12. https://www.vox.com/world/2017/10/12/16464778/unesco-us-withdrawal-trump Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein (2022) “Reform or Dissolve: Ukraine’s Challenge to the United Nations”, International Peace Institution public, April 14. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sK9BmL54xws&t=1544 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2023 Social advancement and change through public college education funding by Dr Connie September Ph.D. in The Management of Technology and Innovation in Education, Da Vinci Institute. Abstract Policies of the Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector that lend itself towards social advancement have become evident. The aim was to explore the policies, legislation and regulations of the funding realm in the public colleges towards a response with empirical evidence of improved social gains in South Africa. The significant findings of the study revealed the magnitude of youth unemployment prevalent in the country. The results of the study render a single policy intervention ineffective, and therefore a multipronged approach offers better prospects towards a social outcome of employability possibilities for young people. Many countries have dealt with challenges to construct funding formulae. Government policies often tend to increase rather than reduce the divergence between private and social valuations (an external effect which leads to misallocation of resources). Overall, the study concludes that policymakers and stakeholders must optimally combine priorities in order to ascertain the social value of the related areas. Consideration towards activation policies to encourage and help youth find a job is to be based on the “mutual obligations principle” as a form of improved social outcomes, whereby payment of unemployment benefits is combined with job search requirements and compulsory participation in Active Labour Market Programmes. Key words: social gains; policy and legislation; multipronged; mutual obligations. Introduction This paper outlines the policy and legislative prescripts of funding of the public colleges sector in South Africa and their concomitant social outcomes. More broadly, it explores evaluation techniques to gain a full view of the value that those social programmes can have on increased funding for the TVET sector. An increased interest in policies of the TVET sector towards a developmental approach of economic growth and skills development seems evident. The point of entry into legislation on the values and principles, which act as bastions underlying the Constitution, results from the ultimate importance of the law in the inducement of a desired result in the implementation process, according to Maluleke (2000:46). In order to translate policy and legislation, the economy and social relations have to become key drivers for delivery. Success is achieved through assessment and evaluation with a developmental state having the organisational and technical ability to translate broad objectives. A developmental agenda to give effect to increased funding in the TVET sector is firstly displayed within a relationship between expenditure and the social change within the individual student and, more broadly, collectively in societies. Thus, a social return-on-investment not only fosters trust and cooperation, but also enhances the benefits of investment in infrastructure as well as human capital. With a developmental state increasing the financial investment into the TVET sector, realising the social value, the funding is therefore not seen as a bothersome expense, but an investment in societal improvements. A framework for a social return-on-investment has the ability to assess expenditure and become reviewable towards a new funding model that can detail the social outcomes to be achieved. In essence, expenditure must relate to an achievement of a policy outcome as policy outcomes are informed by budget allocations. The developmental role that the state has accorded to the TVET sector – as part of transforming the type of outcome of the sector – appears to have a deliberative policy intent with an inclusive social justice perspective to redefine its traditional relationship with education, as well as within the economy as encapsulated in legislation. This means that any financial increases to the TVET sector must resonate with a responsive outcome towards a social return to such an investment. Background The history of Further Education and Training (FET) colleges in South Africa can be traced back to the technical colleges that supported the apprenticeship system. These were reserved for the white population only and were found in major centres and industries during the apartheid era in South Africa. This culminated in capital intensiveness in high-skill white enclaves alongside low-skilled black labour. By 1994, the college sector remained racially fragmented. It was further characterised by being linked very weakly to the labour market with students not having access to practical training. This further contributed to graduate unemployment within a broader global crisis of youth unemployment (King & Mc Grath, 2002). The decision to place the public technical colleges in the same further education and training stream as senior schools at a provincial government level came with serious challenges for the public college sector. These included the neglect of funding as well as the college provisions in the National Accredited Technical Education Diploma (NATED) programmes. As early as 1993, The Committee of Technikon Principals agreed to reallocate funding from the historically advantaged technikons to the disadvantaged institutions (Moja & Hayward, 2000). A considerable increase in funding for the public colleges saw the budget grow in 2010 from R3.8 billion to R5.45 billion in 2013/14, a 43% increase (DNA Economics, 2015). The South African government’s policy intention of the public funding for the TVET colleges outcome is encapsulated within the National Norms and Standards within the Continuing Education Training Act of 2006. The public colleges migrated in 2009 to the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), with the establishment of a single ministerial portfolio for higher education. Background to Funding Intention Prior to 1994, off-budget financing of educational development programmes was identified and has been uneven in impact and effectiveness (ANC Education Policy, 1994). Inequitable funding formulae and procedures were seen to encourage wasteful or extravagant spending in some quarters, while under-funding critical services for low-income communities and other disadvantaged groups remained a challenge. The legislative obligation – as derived from the Constitution (1996) – provides in Section 26 of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 1 of 1999, that Parliament must appropriate money for each financial year for the requirements of the state. Expenditure management has three administrative levels and intents which include: Policy determination objectives and resource needs Resource allocation to those objectives and needs Assurances that the objectives and needs are carried out efficiently, economically and effectively (Premchand, 1993:22). The national norms and standards for funding technical and vocational education and training colleges, in accordance with section 23 of the CET Act (2006), considered the public TVET Colleges to address the cost-effective services; bring about change in skills development; prepare graduates for labour market employability; as well as contribute towards the growth of the South African economy. Background to Policy Formulation The South African college system has its own unique function, which was preceded by consolidating a fragmented sector; address an unchanged college curriculum; expose learners to practical experience in a work-related environment; as well as address qualitative learning and teaching. The public college policy and legislation had to be an operation tailored to the needs of the country as established (CET Act, 2006). The introduction of the Green Paper (DOE, 1998) saw the state indicating an intention to steer and oversee vocational education and training, and hence the policy change of public colleges was renamed Further Education and Training (FET) colleges. To increase the investment and involvement of employers in training, the Green Paper (1998) called for the introduction of a levy-grant and the introduction of learnerships (a model to extend apprenticeships). These policies were enacted into the Skills Development Act (1998) and the Skills Development Levies Act (1999). A joint policy paper by the Departments of Education (DOE) and Labour (DOL) (2001) ensured the output for vocational education and training culminated in the Human Resources Strategy, which sought to provide a baseline on supply and demand issues. Whilst inequities between historically privileged colleges as well as under-resourced colleges still existed, the South African government introduced a further economic reform, namely the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative in South Africa (ASGISA) in 2006. The introduction of ASGISA can be read as part of a broader shift in emphasis, which was part of the rationale that came from an acceptance that policies have not been working well enough. ASGISA emphasised the increase of skills, the upgrading of FET colleges and introduced a policy called the Joint Initiative for Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) (2006). This prompted the emergence of an increased focus on colleges with more theoretical input and less artisanship; skills training for the workplace; as well as the introduction of the National Certificate Vocational (NCV), which replaced the NATED programmes. South Africa required further revision and additional policy development. This led to The National Skills Development Strategy III (NSDS) (2010) to enhance the integrated national framework. The New Growth Path (NGP) (2011) was released in 2010 as a strategy to reduce unemployment by 10% by 2020. Arising from the White Paper on Post School Education and Training (WPPSET) (2013), a draft Joint Policy Statement on “enhancing the efficacy and efficiency of the National Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) System” (2016) called for an integrated approach to realise the development of intermediary level skills required by the economy which were to be produced by the TVET system. The National Plan for the Post-School Education and Training (NPPSET) (2019-2030) provided a roadmap for the implementation of the policy vision of the White Paper on Post School Education and Training (WPPSET) (2013). These policies came against the backdrop of an increasing hostile labour market and economic environment for the TVET sector. An uptake of learnerships and the placements in employment of graduates of the public colleges were constrained by the lack of employer demand for entrants. The newly established National Planning Department of the South African government in 2009 led to the National Development Plan (2012) being produced. The plan included detailed proposals that the South African government has to achieve by 2030. The TVET colleges are the catalyst within these policies to drive the developmental needs of South Africa, a country which is advancing towards a developmental state. In spite of getting higher growth from an increased expenditure on the TVET colleges, the reduction of unemployment in South Africa has not occurred. According to Statistics South Africa, the South African economy shed 2,2 million jobs in the second quarter of 2020, while in the first quarter of 2021 the unemployment rate increased to 43.2%, as per the expanded definition of unemployment (Stats SA, 2021). Between 1994 and 2012, the average economic growth rate was 3.2% (Bhorat, Cassim & Tseng, 2016), whilst since 2012, the annual growth rate fell from 2.2% to 1.3% in 2015, which Sheppard and Cole (2016) noted was below the estimates of the National Development Plan of more than 5% per annum to 2030 (National Planning Commission, 2011). Aim The aim was to explore the policies and legislation, together with the regulations and related norms and standards, as they all manifest themselves in an integrated way and respond with empirical evidence of improved social gains to the requirements of a developmental state. Objectives The research endeavoured to find the reasons behind the fact that a developmental approach to skills development into the economy, and the reduction of unemployment, had not been realised despite an increase in TVET funding and related policy changes. It also proposed solutions based on the findings and included conclusions reached from the research. In support of the aim, the research objectives were to: Examine the rationale of the South African developmental state which devotes a considerable increase in the public college sector budget allocation. Examine the policy, norms and standards processes established to analyse the demonstration of social gains on government expenditure. Research Question The research question was motivated by the researcher’s real-life observation and experience in fulfilling what is termed in parliament an oversight responsibility of parliamentary committees as per the rules of parliament over DHET, the Minister and their entities. Primary Research Question What is the nature and scope of the public funding of the public college sector and how does it affect the social gains in higher education in South Africa? Secondary Questions In order to address the primary research question, the following secondary questions were posed: What is the rationale behind the South African developmental state devoting a considerable increase in the public college sector budget allocation? What are the policy, norms and standard processes established to analyse the demonstration of social gains on government expenditure? Methodology The researcher undertook a conceptual and theoretical framework of literature review in South Africa. This was done by doing a desktop literature review of scholarly articles; examining books and reports; as well as the financial norms and standards of TVET allocation, legislation and policies of the public college sector in South Africa. The study comprised a qualitative research method employed together with a [1]grounded theory data analysis process and applying an inductive lens to the theory development reasoning. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework The theories of the financial frameworks and norms and standards were found to have a relationship with the dictates of the Constitution (1996). The institutions built; the philosophies adhered to; the prevailing ideas of the time; and the culture of society were all determined by the economic structure of a society according to Karl Marx, in Burke (2000). The research approach took into consideration that education is a societal issue and a socio-economic approach to funding policies might be best. The conceptual framework was developed based on the literature of current studies and theories. The researcher identified and constructed a global view of TVET funding and policies, as well the linked concepts that together provided a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of policies of various countries and international bodies. Major Findings Theoretical and Conceptual Findings Policy papers such as the NDP (2012) and The WPPSET (2013), as well as the Revised Norms and Standards (2021), provide the theoretical intentions of government currently. They outline policy directions to guide the DHET and the institutions for which it is responsible to contribute to building a developmental state with a vibrant democracy and a flourishing economy. In addition, the national policy framework of Department of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME); the list of skills and occupations in high demand; and the presidential district models to effect skills development provided for a practical response to the national skills development objectives and the CET Act (2006). Policies that address unemployment are broadly divided between those that consist of the demand side and those that consist of the supply side. Education is part of the supply side policies that can address and solve occupational immobility and reduce structural unemployment. The political economy of education, which is about demand and supply, has a relationship with employment opportunities and dictates – as with other commodities or services – and the amount produced (Todaro & Smith, 2009). The effective financing of TVET education causes the demand side to have more educated students with prospects of future earnings. The magnitude of the youth employment challenge facing South Africa makes its resolution impossible by a single employment policy. A combination of interventions, or a multipronged approach, is likely to offer the greatest potential for young people to gain decent work opportunities and alleviate youth unemployment. Emergent Themes and Concepts of the Policy and Legislation Policies and proposals for confronting youth unemployment should be guided by the underlying issues that explain why youth employment is so low (National Treasury, 2011). ASGISA identified urgent skilled persons (engineers, artisans, technicians, and planners) and quick and effective solutions, as well as skills for local economic development, as paramount. However, no new funding for new programmes emerged and relatively high economic growth was not experienced. In addition, a continuation of socio-economic decline became prevalent. Employers were unenthusiastic regarding government policies (Mc Grath & Akoojee, 2007). These findings are consistent with the NDP (2020) evaluation plan towards 2030. The themes that emerged spoke of the targets that were set for the TVET sector, which are unlikely to be achieved. The broad visions of the National Development Plan (2012); the New Growth Path (2011); the Industrial Policy Action Plan 2 (2011); and the Human Resource Development Strategy for South Africa 2010-2030 (2009) collectively articulate a TVET college sector that contributes towards inclusive growth. The themes that emerged from the skills supply and demand reports highlighted rising unemployment and low literacy and numeracy skills. They also cited a continuous increase in those not in education, employment or training – referred to as the NEETS – with females bearing the brunt of these challenges. A positive increase in the enrolment of young people in the TVET sector has not produced encouraging information on skills needs in South Africa (ibid). The misalignment and mismatch of funding allocation, and the skills demand and supply, are prohibiting factors towards economic growth in the country. Thus, alignment with trade and investment strategies, together with economic growth, education and training is required. Each year, the sector education training authorities publishes the hard-to-fill vacancies; the skills gaps, the critical skills and sectoral priority occupations and interventions lists as part of their sector skills plan. The findings reveal that, thematically, an outdated curriculum and insufficient exposure to the workplace towards apprenticeship is prevalent within the TVET sector. Employers view the type of skills produced as not addressing the skills required in the labour market. The Revised National Norms and Standards for Funding TVET (2020) revealed the following within its funding formula for the TVET sector: guidance towards the public college sector through an expenditure framework on how funds allocated are structured towards the public college sector in fulfilling its mandate. However, a National Treasury review (2016) shows that funding the public colleges is based on full-time equivalent enrolments. Public colleges receive a proportion of the 80% allocation and the total funds made available for public colleges are allocated according to the province in which they are located. A recurring theme that emerged showed that, due to the absence of effective monitoring and evaluation, a mismatch of policy implementation of the national skills development strategy principles and funding allocation is prevalent. The same phenomenon is prevalent according to the documented analysis about the TVET sector in Africa. It reveals that the TVET systems are also supply driven. The National Evaluation Plan 2020-2025 is a government evaluation agenda consisting of priority evaluations identified by the DPME. One of the guiding principles is the alignment to the key priorities of government which means that evaluations should be guided by the NDP. It is essential to align the evaluation process with planning and budgeting so that plans and policy development are informed by evidence attained from that strategic alignment. The economic documented analysis provides the findings of what constitute problems of plan implementation and plan failure. Government policies often tended to increase rather than reduce the divergence between private and social valuations (an external effect which leads to misallocation of resources). The Philosophy of Karl Marx on Education Marx advocated a philosophy that stated, “education should correspond to the development of society and industry: it should technologically stimulate it as well as socially anticipate scientific assumptions for the future and a much faster development of the society” (Ivković, 1999). Discussion There needs to be an ability to look at what is happening in the sphere of policy as it relates to strategy; policy output; the role of a developmental state; quality and relevance of data and delivering quality. An integrated approach between government departments, the public colleges and other stakeholders enhances a sense of societal ownership of continuous improvement in the TVET system. Policy interventions to address the youth employment challenge need to concentrate on narrowing this gap. The policy review experience reveals the important aspects of the policy process, such as the commitment to make policies clear; a commitment to provide resources to the policy goals; and a commitment to intervene in the areas of inefficiencies and crisis. It is for this reason that the ruling African National Congress party in South Africa resolved in 2007 at its national conference to become a developmental state where the government will become intimately involved in the macro and micro-economic planning in order to grow the economy and reconstruct and develop the country. According to the Green Paper (2012:1), locating the TVET college in a developmental state is an important instrument for the developmental state (strong state intervention) to improve graduate access to socially and economically rewarding jobs; redress racial income equality; secure college-to-work transitions for NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training) and dropouts; as well as develop skills for the poor, vulnerable, historically disadvantaged and marginalised to sustain their livelihoods (HRDCSA, 2014). This model in the South African TVET system is in line with the National Development Plan (2012), the then New Growth Path (2011), the Industrial Policy Action Plan 2 (2011) and the Human Resource Development Strategy 2010-2030 (2009). To achieve this the findings revealed that, to address developmental challenges, an alternate budgeting and funding model must be revised to allow for adequate funding of building capacity. The constitutional and legislative obligations and the role of government is to ensure sustainable economic development, growth and management of the public finances for the greater good of the country. The consistent view espoused by the National Treasury (2011:58) was that the TVET sector must assist to reduce youth unemployment and absorb young people into the formal labour market. The investment in college education should measure the sum of all economic and non-economic net benefits that accrue to society at large, and the students in particular. Economic impact is more easily measured, but it is the social impact that completes the whole return-on-investment (ROI) as studies indicate that social implications in training are most important to understand as they provide a true value of training that is often neglected in TVET research due to difficulty in measuring it (Schueler & Loveder, 2017). The National Treasury holds that high youth unemployment is an inhibiting factor to the country’s social and economic development. Unemployment is not a new problem in South Africa, although its incidence peaked early in the current decade. Part of the explanation for high unemployment in South Africa is that economic growth has not been high enough over the last 30 years. Employment growth between 1994 and 2014 was completely inadequate to reduce unemployment, further raising the level of urgency with which skills development should be treated (Stats SA, 2014). In recognising the economic emphasis placed on the TVET sector, there is a need to consider the social segment that lends itself to the human development factor. The documented economic analysis provides the findings of what constitute problems of plan implementation and plan failure. Government policies often tended to increase rather than reduce the divergence between private and social valuations (external effect which leads to misallocation of resources). A case in point in the least developed countries is that the economic signals and incentives have served to exaggerate the private valuations of the returns to education at the secondary and tertiary levels to a point where the private demand for more years of schooling exceeds the social payoff (ibid). As stated, policy justification must allow for implementation and justification of financial investments in the TVET sector. Todaro and Smith (2009) offer several reasons for plan failure that must be considered: The gap between the theoretical economic benefits of planning and its practical results in most developing countries has been quite large. Plans are often overambitious and try to accomplish too many objectives at once without consideration that some of the objectives are competing or in conflict. Insufficient and unreliable data on which the economic value of a development plan depends lacks quality and reliability of statistical data. The institutional weaknesses of planning processes of most developing countries include the separation of a planning agency from the day-to-day decision making machinery of government. Planners, administrators and political leaders fail to engage in dialogue and internal communication about goals and strategies. The lack of political will with poor plan performance and the wide gap between plan formulation and plan implementation. The above reasons for plan failure as pointed out by Todaro and Smith is testimony of government’s lack in undertaking social valuations of the benefits of financial costs attributed towards the implementation of policies. A contribution can also be made towards continuous assessments of the labour market needs, which in turn can address the changing nature of skills requirements. As part of continuous assessments of skills and labour market needs, communications must occur with major stakeholders of the public colleges on efficient improvements towards preparing students for employability. The financial contribution that the South African government allocates to DHET, which in turn allocates funds to the TVET sector to address an expansion of effective access to deserving students, is in line with its constitutional obligations of ensuring the right to education on an equitable basis. However, the TVET sector cannot be judged on expenditure towards providing access to students only. The special role accorded to the TVET sector, however, must be judged on the basis of whether the sector has achieved its developmental purpose. Todaro and Smith (2009) relate the phenomenon of a gap between theoretical economic benefits of planning and its practical results, which are large. Within the TVET sector, several policies have been introduced. The success hinges on overcoming the mismatch between funding and policy as well as overcoming the gap between theory and practical results. A plan is only as credible as its delivery mechanism. The TVET sector policies are only credible if they can be seen to produce its developmental agenda. Consideration should be given towards what Todaro and Smith (2009) referred to as the role of the state in the development of policymaking. Instead of planning policies unwittingly and so doing contributing to a perpetuation of negative outcomes in their implementation, evaluation must address the following: The objectives of the policies should not compete or conflict with each other. Overcome vagueness in the design on specific policy achievements in its stated objectives. Close the gap between plan formulation and implementation. Recognise the socio-economic value of a development plan to ensure that data remains qualitative and reliable. A developmental state must address institutional weaknesses of separation of planning and day-to-day decision making with political will to close the gap between plan formulation, lack of commitment and plan implementation. A policy is judged in real life if it won sufficient support, proved capable of implementation and succeeded in achieving its objectives to be responsive to society. Almost any education and training policy will come to nil in practice if it does not win the support of two essential constituencies: those who are expected to benefit from it, and those who are expected to implement it. International Comparisons of College Policies and Funding for Social Change Effective policymaking is a challenge that many countries in Africa are facing, suitable to country context (ILO, 2013). Many countries have dealt with challenges to construct funding formulae according to the OECD reviews of VET (Field, Musset & Álvarez-Galván, 2014). A special role has now been accorded to the TVET sector internationally as part of what UNESCO (2015) referred to as being the master key to developmental objectives of alleviating poverty; conserving the environment; and achieving sustainable development and quality of life for all. The literature shows that debates internationally around responses and policy reform for skills development focus on matching transition of economic growth with types of skills or moving towards a higher growth trajectory characterised by an increased investment in higher-level skills as done in the East-Asian transition. The G20 countries discussed the main youth employment challenges and highlighted the role of policies to increase both quantity and quality of jobs for young people (OECD & ILO, 2011). Across the G20 economies, policy action over the recent past has been most concentrated in the areas of boosting demand and job creation; improving transitions to work; maintaining cost-effective Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs); strengthening vocational education and training; and expanding quality apprenticeship and internship programmes (OECD & ILO, 2014). At the G20 meetings, the labour and employment minister’s policy recommendations, that were endorsed, entailed improving active employment policies particularly for young people and vulnerable groups; establishing social protection floors; as well as strengthening the coherence of economic and social policies. The South Korean experience tended to be more sequenced and designed to support the needs of the economy. The Korean government addressed and invested in primary then secondary education, whereafter the government shifted to higher education to address the country’s skills needs. In various countries, the labour market influences the dynamics and policies in vocational education and training, such as reducing unemployment and meeting industry skills too (Keating, Medrich, Volkoff & Perry, 2002). It is evident that different labour markets have distinctive labour market types. The developing economies have different features, such as informal labour markets and reduction in rural employment and urban drifts with China being a growing labour market. It is important therefore to undertake a comparative policy and legislative analysis to reflect on its effectiveness of its stated social objectives, such as the country’s inability to reduce unemployment and address the skills mismatches of labour market demand and supply. The debate on supply and demand arises as it relates to low- and middle-income countries, where the argument for supply is that a government-financed TVET system is a supply-driven system, which may lead to youth being trained in irrelevant skills or under-trained with no employment prospects. The argument for a demand-side system financed and managed mainly by employers exists. TVET financing plays a major role in leveraging the TVET direction, as well as having country-specific objectives and priorities guided by the policy objectives. Korea provided an interesting illustration from the East Asia region of how a country’s TVET financing mechanisms have changed as TVET objectives changed (Lee & Kim, 2016). TVET financing approaches do not operate in isolation of other TVET reforms and therefore governments need to create a conducive policy, regulatory and administrative climate for a financing mechanism to function. Conclusions and Recommendations The theoretical policy purpose of TVET Colleges in South Africa needs to shift and be broadened to include the human capital, human capability and sustainable development approaches. The budget on its own will not achieve a developmental state, but integration of all plans together with mobilising society as the NDP envisioned has those possibilities. The district development model has been introduced to activate the levers for achieving common purpose of legislative and policy mandates of different spheres of government and departments. Evaluating the municipal laws and regulations towards the WPPSET and NDP objectives must be taken into consideration towards a further positive outcome of the TVET sector within the district development model. At the point where high levels of unemployment have settled, stabilisation policies are required and can play a major role in turning the situation around. The ability to effect policy, funding and practices requires systems-thinking of how different role-players in government and other stakeholders in the TVET system interact and impact each other. Systems-thinking in education can take the form of an agreement or legislative introduction of an agreement between government and stakeholders; a framework of cooperation on a common agenda; and a structured operational plan led by government in cooperation with stakeholders. This approach could further encourage government as the key mechanism through which funds are allocated to partner with other funders; civil society; the private sector to take a systems approach in developing a comprehensive costed; and a nationally owned public education system plan that supports the TVET policy. The current policy outcomes are therefore expectant of producing the developmental objectives as set by the various policy decisions. The literature and documented reviews speak of a phenomenon in most developing countries where the government plays a dual role in the TVET sector. The multiple roles of government are that of a policy maker, a regulator and a training provider and, in most instances, it does so in an inefficient way due to the lack of coordination (Todaro & Smith, 2009) as well as facing financing constraints and capacity. A policy justification must be shown in its true meaning of being implementable. Karl Marx referred to a curriculum that should not have an outcome of producing abstract knowledge. The TVET sector, according to Marx, must produce productive and creative citizens. Todaro and Smith (2009) relate the phenomenon of a gap between theoretical economic benefits of planning and its practical results, which are large. The social value of the business community must be obtained through the attainment of skills that match the needs of the world of work. TVET financing as an indicator is largely determined by the rules and regulations whereby financial resources are collected, allocated and managed. Relevance considers the extent to which TVET is responsive to labour market needs and requirements. Ideally, the TVET outcome on the labour market should be measured by the share of TVET graduates who obtained a job after completion of training; the time span between graduation and placement; the ratio between the average wage of TVET graduates; and the average wage of those who did not follow the TVET path. In many G20 countries, activation policies to encourage and help youth find a job are based on the “mutual obligations principle” whereby payment of unemployment benefits is combined with job search requirements and compulsory participation in Active Labour Market Programmes. In the case of internships, they can serve as stepping-stones for career development in more stable occupations, but only if they provide a good learning experience and a gateway to a good-quality job, rather than simply being used by employers for hiring cheap labour to do low-skilled work. In the case of Brazil, for example, the multi-annual programme that the Federal Government has implemented aims to use apprenticeship as a tool to permanently attract youth into the formal labour market. In the United States, a four-year community college job-driven training fund was established, which offer competitive grants to partnerships of community colleges; public and non-profit training entities; industry groups; and employers to launch new training programmes and apprenticeships that prepare participants for in-demand jobs and careers. 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[1]Grounded theory is a qualitative method that allows a researcher to study a particular phenomenon and to discover new theories based on the collection and analysis of real world data. Grounded theory data analysis offers a great contribution in areas in which little research has been done such as a social return-on-investment. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za