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The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) hosted its annual lecture on 8 December 2022. The event was hosted in hybrid format, with the in-person presentation being made at the conference facilities of Deloitte in Cape Town with other guests joining via Zoom. The keynote speaker was Professor Jørgen Elklit, who spoke on the topic on ‘Election systems and democracy as tools, to promote social cohesion’. Professor Elklit Professor Jørgen Elklit is a professor of political science at Aarhus University in Denmark, where he attained his doctoral degree. His research and teaching have focused on political parties, Danish national and local politics, elections, electoral systems, electoral administration, the German minority in Denmark, and democratisation and democracy support to countries in transition. Professor Elklit has since 1990 also been active as an advisor on democratisation and elections, electoral systems, and electoral administration in a number of countries, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, China (village elections), Kenya, Tanzania, Lesotho, Jordan and his native Denmark. Professor Elklit was an international member of the South African Independent Electoral Commission in 1994 and of the country’s Electoral Task Team 2022-3 and was Secretary to the Independent Review Commission in Kenya 2008. He has also had research fellowships abroad and been a visiting professor at the University of Cape Town. He has written and/or edited or co-edited more than 20 books and has a number of articles in professional journals as well as book chapters on his list of publications.

Nondumiso Sithole, advisory council member at the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), attended the opening of a new conference facility that hosted by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation (FES). The launching of the new facility held on the 6th of December 2022, at 34 Bompas Road, Dunkeld West. The FES hosted conference not only challenged its attendees to engage in meaningful conversations on critical matters around issues of social impact such as directly challenging patriarchy but genuinely analysing and exploring the new feminist politics, finding ways to address the issues of intersectional inequalities of race, class, gender and sexuality but generally the progression towards a renewal of progressive projects globally. The event also took the opportunity to pay honor, tribute and remembrance to a legend and pioneer of the late former Commissioner to the United Kingdom Lindiwe Mabuza. Ms. Mabuza was not only an activist and politician but wore many impressive hats, academic, poet and cultural activist. Ms. Mabuza was a feminist icon in her own right and was a trailblazer in advocating for fighting for women’s right through the use creative arts and her passion in education.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) participated in the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability’s roundtable on Efforts for Greater Global Resilience Through More Inclusive and Effective Multilateralism. The roundtable was held on 23 November 2022. The objective of the roundtable was to see input from African think tanks, universities and civil society on the global discussion aimed at strengthening multilateralism. The focus was on the conceptualisation of a Global Resilience Council that would create a platform for broader and more effective inclusion of civil society and the academia in the UN policy and programme agenda. Panellists included: Cilene Victor, leader Research Group Humanization, Methodist University, Sao Paulo, Brazil Yoriko Yakusawa, Vice President FOGGS. She is currently a member of the roster of mediation experts for the Inter-American Development Bank Independent Investigation and Consultation Mechanism, and is a part-time lecturer at the Meiji Gakuin University in Yokohama. She also works as an independent journalist and consultant based in Costa Rica. Harris Gleckman, Board Member, FOGGS. He is currently Senior Fellow at the Center for Governance and Sustainability, UMass-Boston and Director of Benchmark Environmental Consulting. Georgios Kostakos, the Executive Director, FOGGS.

Occasional Paper 9/2022 Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. OCTOBER 2022 by Robert Mopp & Daryl Swanepoel Picture source: apdconnaissances.com Abstract This report traces the development journey of the ‘welfare state’ since it was first conceptualised by Thomas More in 1516. It explores the constant deepening and broader reach towards what is today considered the modern welfare state, characterised as a pragmatic compromise between capitalism and socialism. It emphasises equality, justice and redistribution solidarity. The focus then shifts to its development in the South African context and the report concludes that the state should be regarded as containing considerable features of a welfare state, but that it is not yet a full-fledged one. It exhibits features of an intermediate and residual welfare state, which still requires further development in line with evolving economic capacity. It is also proposed that it may perhaps more aptly be described as a modern social-democratic state to avoid the less positive connotations often associated with the term ‘welfare’ in the South African setting. Introduction After the events of World War II, the welfare state came to occupy a central space in discussions and endeavours to improve the quality of people’s lives. However, central as it may have been, it is easier today to describe the functions of such a state rather than defining it. Most of the literature on the subject identifies the “modern” welfare state as European in design, scope and methodology. At present, there is almost no typology provided for states in the developing world, particularly in Africa. The literature, with its attendant terminology and paradigms, focuses solely on the state as it manifests itself in Europe, a modern reality that makes it challenging to use this prism in reference to a South African welfare state. In its current form, the welfare state is not homogenous, as it projects a variety of shapes. Its genesis is intrinsically linked to the rise of industrialisation and its attendant contradictions, risks and deprivations. Developed to mitigate these risks and provide security for workers initially, it was soon extended to the larger population. As such, the notion of the “well-being” of citizens is paramount within the framework of their civil and social rights. In the text that follows, the genesis of the welfare state will be traced to explore what constitutes this form of state and its typologies. Its intellectual foundations will be uplifted, so that its form becomes more discernible, especially within the context of the respective roles of state and market and the interplay that occurs in this process. The post-1970s crisis period and the changes it wrought will be teased out. Next, the South African welfare regime will be discussed in the context of whether the country identifies as a welfare state within the specificities of its challenges. The question will be asked: Does South Africa conform to the notion of a welfare state, and if it does, what kind of typology applies? Issues around the specificity of a welfare state in a country like South Africa, with its history of segregation and accompanied discrimination and deprivation of the majority, as well as the need for a welfare state – accompanied by high growth rates that will absorb large numbers of workers – to ensure the future cohesion, stability and well-being of South Africa’s citizens and society, will be discussed. Welfare State Genesis The term ‘welfare state’ can be traced back to the idea of a guaranteed basic income, with which it was first associated. A guaranteed income is first mentioned in the 1516 novel by English social philosopher, Thomas More, with its inspirational title of Utopia. Another step in the direction of the welfare state was the “poor law”, introduced in England in 1834, as a system of relief for workers and the poor. Next, classical political economist and philosopher, John Stuart Mill, advocated for a minimum income for all adult men for their subsistence, in his 1848 textbook, Principles of Political Economy. By 1850 most industrialising countries had introduced some updated version of the poor law, allied with labour protection measures in 1883; health insurance in 1883; an industrial accident scheme in 1884; and an old-age insurance scheme in 1889 (Van Kersbergen, 2016). With the rise of industrialisation, these ideas vis-à-vis social welfare languished until they reappeared in Germany in the 1880s under the “conservative” chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. Even though he was fiercely anti-socialist and against workers’ struggles, Bismarck introduced the first form of mandatory social security to protect workers – including the establishment of health funds – building on the measures introduced by the Prussian state in the 1840s. The motivations of Bismarck were deemed to promote a healthy workforce for the smooth functioning of the economy and to “stave off calls for more radical socialist alternatives” (ILO, 2009). It contained a combination of economic and political considerations that “gave the Germans a comprehensive system of income security based on social insurance principles” (ILO, 2009). And then, under the “New Deal” rubric in 1935, then American President Ted Roosevelt introduced the Social Security Act, which combined “economic security” with “social insurance”. Further developments towards the modern welfare state came in 1942 when the Beveridge’s Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services, underpinned by the economics of Milton Keynes, was released. Keynes 1936 treatise, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, revolutionised economic theory and policy, and is seen as providing the intellectual foundation for the Keynesian “welfare state” or welfare capitalism. The report established the first unified social security system globally, which gained it recognition as the first major social welfare framework of the modern welfare state. Beveridge subsequently defined welfare policy as a struggle against five evils: poverty, disease, ignorance, poor housing conditions and unemployment (ills of Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness). Keynes was in agreement with the proposals contained in the Beveridge report citing, however, concerns as to the affordability of the scheme. In 1945, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which introduced social and economic rights as the cornerstone of social policy. Article 22 recognises that “everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security”. By 1960, every developed nation had a core of welfare state institutions in place. Most theorists reference the industrialisation process as pivotal to the development of the social welfare system to ensure the well-being of citizens to lead a fulfilled life. Rawls’s theory of justice and the social contract and Sen’s “capability” theory expanded on the social welfare notion. Solidarity, equality and providing equal opportunities – irrespective of socio-economic background – are other important attributes of the welfare state. A robust role was also accorded the state, namely, to be more interventionist with regards to the market, as well as a high level of trust between social classes, especially between business and labour. Citizens in Scandinavian countries are prime examples of this high level of trust in their governments and top the World Happiness Report. Sadly, in South Africa the opposite is the case, and this results in weak social cohesion. The Welfare State and Social Democracy Social democracy is most often associated with the Scandinavian countries, where it is regarded as a “pragmatic compromise between capitalism and socialism” (Jackson, 2013). Behind this association are the Swedish pioneers of the welfare state – economists such as Knut Wicksell and Gustav Cassel, who studied in Germany under Gustav von Schmoller of the German Historical School. Von Schmoller was a scholar famous for the methodological debate (Methodenstreit) with Carl Menger, a pioneer of the neoclassical school. This was followed by adherents of the Stockholm School of Economics, like Gunnar Myrdal, Bertil Ohlin, Dag Hammarskjöld et al, who shared the vision of the counter-cyclical views of Keynes and the welfare policies designed by Myrdal and Gustav Möller (Carlson, 2016). On a governmental level, the Swedish welfare state model was developed by Social Democratic states from 1933 onwards, spearheaded by the People’s Home (Folkhemmet) concept founded by the leader of the Social Democrats, Per Albin Hansson, in 1928. Hansson used the following words to describe the People’s Home: “A home is founded upon community and affinity. The good home is not aware of any privileged or underprivileged, any pets or stepchildren” (Carlson, 2016). Two more key components of the Swedish model are the labour market model, which was established through the Saltsjöbaden Agreement signed in 1938 by the Swedish Trade Union Confederation and the Swedish Employers’ Confederation, and the Rehn-Meidner model (two Swedish labour economists), which sought to increase structural change through the “solidarity wage policy”. Today, social democracy is a global phenomenon. With its emphasis on equality, justice and redistribution solidarity, the system is – somewhat ironical considering equality and solidarity emanate from the values of socialism – opposed to the inequality created by the free market system (laissez-faire capitalism). Furthermore, when it was conceived in the 20th century, the system proposed the maintenance of full employment, echoing Keynes. Keynes, however, doubted that democracy would continue to survive if it does not counter the problems of mass unemployment and the “arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth”, associated with the weakness of the market (capitalist) system (Keynes, 1936). Yet, Keynes believed in the capitalist system, despite its shortcomings, seeing as “capitalism offers the best safeguard of individual freedom, choice, and entrepreneurial initiative” (Keynes, 1936). He saw an active role for government to solve the problems of society and was a proponent of moderate redistribution to help secure full employment. In support of the economist, Skidelsky stated in 2010 that Keynes emphasised sound economics, rather than political ideology and insisted that the state has a duty to supplement and regulate market forces. Keynes’s views were in contrast to the neoclassical school’s belief that market economics have an automatic tendency to full employment equilibrium, are efficient, and generally functioned well (Stiglitz, 2017). This school further believed that markets are more efficient than governments in allocating capital; state spending and taxes should be kept as low as possible; and budgets should be balanced (Skidelsky, 2020). The “Great Financial Crisis” of 2008, together with the economic downturn occasioned by the Covid-19 pandemic, are evidence that that is not always the case, however. In reality, left to its own devices, capitalism has been characterised by outbreaks of instability and rising inequality since the 1980s, associated with the onset of neoliberalism; unfettered free market forces; globalisation; and service economy supplanting manufacturing globally, leading to de-industrialisation in many developing countries, including South Africa. All of which led to increasing dominance of finance capital at the expense of the real economy. What Exactly is the Welfare State? Despite its widespread usage, the welfare state has no simple, single definition. It is heterogeneous and must be seen in its specific context, historical evolvement and political set-up. According to David Garland, the term “welfare state” is misleading. It is not about welfare or welfare for the poor, Garland says. Instead, the term refers to social insurance, social rights, social provision and the social regulation of economic action. Maurizio Ferrera defines it thus: “The welfare state is a set of public interventions related to the modernisation process, which provide protection in the form of assistance, insurance and social security, introducing, amongst others, specific social rights in the case of specific events as well as specific duties of financial contribution” (Antoni, 2018). The welfare state can be thought of as a “device for optimal risk sharing” and acting as an “insurance at birth against unknowable future outcomes, it helps relieve poverty” (Barr, 2018). As risks get shared, Barr proposes, economic growth can flourish. The safety nets that are provided make people more prepared to embark on ventures, as the landing will be softer. There are some real lessons here for South Africa and our challenges on the entrepreneurship front. Using the Swedish social democracy as the quintessential social democratic welfare state exemplar, Goran Therborn noted that such a welfare state displays the following features: full employment; a prosperous open economy that is competitive on world markets; a generous welfare state; and an egalitarian society which, by 1980, had the lowest rates of income and gender inequality in the world. Furthermore, the welfare state is closely associated with the notions of nation-building and common citizenship. It is infused with a spirit of collectivism and solidarity that has the support of both ends of the political spectrum. It also stresses the obligations by governments to ensure the welfare of citizens. This implies a divergence from the ideologies of laissez-faire and economic liberalism. A further component of the definition of the welfare state, which is a key lesson for South Africa’s overdue efforts in reaching an accord, is a social accord between business and labour that ensures stability in the workplace and society. Critiques of the Welfare State A shortcoming of the definition of the welfare state in its current form is that it has little room for the gender dimension. The original Beveridge report and welfare regimes have been criticised for their neglect on this front. Titmuss and Andersen have been criticised on this ground too, albeit less severely. The critique against Beveridge, in particular, was his assumption that men are the main breadwinners, while women attend to household tasks for which they aren’t paid, when the reality was that women increasingly entered the labour market over the ensuing decades. Andersen’s decommodification index was also criticised on methodological grounds. Andersen subsequently responded to these critiques, including the lack of involvement of the global South. He noted the different historical contexts of the North and South and the different development trajectories. Further critiques of the welfare state come from the right of the political spectrum, citing negative elements of the system relating to paternalism and the stigmatising and disciplining of claimants. This includes the claim of “idleness” on the part of recipients and that a culture of “entitlement” will set in, resulting in a dependency on the state. The evidence shows this is not the case. The Scandinavian social democratic states have the highest levels of employment, despite their extensive welfare measures in place. Proof that these benefits are not a disincentive to seek employment. Elsewhere, the jury is still out in this regard, as evidence differs from region to region and country to country. A key paradox and ongoing criticism at the heart of the welfare state that continues to be debated is that it “created a conflict between the priority given to maximising economic growth by boosting profitability and investment and the priority given to maximising democratic legitimation by expanding welfare programmes” (Gamble, 2016). As a result, the affordability and competitiveness of social welfare regimes has taken centre stage since the 1970s “oil crisis”, a point of contention that has been reinforced since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, despite the positive evidence in Scandinavian countries. In a welfare state, politicians are under pressure to lower taxes for individuals and companies. This engineers an irresistible shift to a regime of low taxes, which gradually eliminates progressivity in the tax system by moving towards flat rates. In a few instances, like in the USA and the UK, some taxes such as inheritance taxes are eliminated in totality. This results, in many instances, in a residual welfare state due to the state losing the capacity to fund anything else. Another criticism is that there has been a retreat from the original insurance principle proposed by Beveridge. Welfare is increasingly being funded from general taxation, which means welfare benefits are no longer regarded as something that has to be earned by recipients who make payment contributions. Instead, it’s regarded as a right, resulting in an entitlement culture within which the contribution principle has been lost. Types of Welfare States and its Intellectual Paradigms Despite the many references to it in the public discourse as singular, the welfare state paradigm is diverse and heterogeneous. In 1950, the British theorising pioneer, Richard Titmuss who’s work surprisingly took place in the context of the Conservative Party’s dominance, advocated for a shift from universal to selective social services, which stands in direct opposition to the “universalism” principle of the Scandinavian welfare system. Titmuss’s classification encapsulates the terminology of residual, meritocratic-occupational and institutional-redistributive (Antoni, 2018). It makes strong provision for market forces, whilst incorporating principles of “equality and the fulfilment of social needs with state services being generous” (Antoni, 2018). Danish sociologist Gosta Esping-Andersen’s influential “worlds of welfare” typology depiction “emerged as somewhat of a master-frame for comparative inquiries” (Svallfors, 2012). In it, he stressed the importance of the relationships between the state, family and markets as key distinguishing factors with which to explain the differing welfare systems. For Esping-Andersen, the “sum total of social welfare depends on the way in which the inputs of state, market and family are combined” and generate welfare outcomes. In addition, the welfare state creates social stability by “tempering the inegalitarian consequences of the market” and creating “de-commodified spheres in which allocation was based on citizen rights” (Esping-Andersen, 1990). With regards to interconnectivity, Andersen argued that the manner in which the social programmes and labour market regimes are connected results in different welfare regimes with different development and operational functioning. According to the Dane, the Swedish model is “universal”, as the basic social security system is based upon income up to a certain level (Carlson, 2016), although this “universal” tag has been questioned, especially by the those in the developing world, who wonder whether it applies as widely as its name suggests. Furthermore, Andersen said that the Swedish social-democratic model is based on the idea of “decommodification” or the notion that people should not be obliged to sell their labour in order to survive. The irony is that Sweden has one of the highest employment rates globally. Andersen’s original 1990 typology was critiqued in the main for its narrow Western European focus and generalisation, without due consideration for countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa. His models were also accused of misspecification. Andersen broadly differentiates between three types of welfare capitalism in the 1970s and 1980s, namely: The social democratic or industrial achievement model, with its highly regulated labour markets and a large ”de-commodified” sphere of public provision (in essence, the models found in the Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark); The liberal or residual welfare model of limited welfare provision and “flexible labour markets” (as seen in the Anglo-Saxon countries of the USA, UK, Canada and Australia); The intermediate continental European “social market” tradition/conservative-corporate regime of welfare rights based on secure private sector employment (as seen in continental European countries including Germany and France and elsewhere including Japan). And a fourth category was subsequently added. Known as the Mediterranean or familist model, it is characterised by the rudimentary character of the welfare programmes, weakness of state institutions, the prominent role of the family as a social buffer and a highly fragmented system of social protection. Yet it offers very generous social protection benefits such as old-age pensions (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal). (The different development trajectory of most Asian countries should be noted. The emphasis in Asia was on economic growth, with well-being a derivative/by-product of their phenomenal growth. In South Africa, we have a strong emphasis on redistribution, starting with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994; some Left critics say that this has faded. This was largely a result of South Africa’s unfortunate political and socio-economic history. Our growth rate was relatively good in the decade prior to 2008, when an average of around 5% was registered. Subsequently, our growth rate has been anaemic.) The social welfare models are further identified and distinguished by the “instruments used; the access rules; the financing methods adopted; and the organisational structures” (Antoni, 2018, Carlson, 2016; Hemerijck, 2020; Noyoo, 2017). The various models and different systems essentially differ on the basis of the “size and composition of public spending; the institutional aspects; the types of services provided; and the funding mechanisms” (Antoni, 2018; Barr, 2018; Carlson, 2016; Gamble, 2016; Hemerijck, 2020). These welfare state models differ substantially in their expenditure. According to various theorists, what matters most for social outcomes – such as social protection and inequality – is the social purposes on which money is spent; how the programmes are organised, taxed and financed; and how transfer/service-orientated they are. The Welfare State Post the 1970s Crisis After the 1970s oil crisis, calamity became the prevailing narrative with reference to the welfare state. Before then, the welfare state’s high point, with almost universal appeal in the developed world, was embodied by the “belle epoque” period of high capitalism, which stretched from 1945 to 1973. The period post 1973, however, was characterised by stagflation (high inflation and low growth, eerily reminiscent of the current period) and heralded the nadir of Keynesian economics, together with the rise of Friedman’s monetarism and the ascent of neoliberalism in the wake of Thatcher, Reagan and Kohl gaining political office. It further witnessed the rise of globalisation and the increasing offshoring of production, which impacted significantly on the welfare state. Social protections came to be in the firing line with a shift to the right and renewed focus on the unfettered power of markets, a self-regulating economy, and a minimalist state. These right-wing critics argued that if their advice is not followed, investment and jobs will be lost. Increasingly, the welfare system was prised open for the private sector, whereas this was previously taboo. The first area that was penetrated was kindergartens in countries like Sweden, although there was strong resistance. On the flip side, in the USA, the world witnessed how Trump could not dismantle Obamacare, even amongst Republican supporters. Despite the shift to the right, it was the social democratic welfare states like Sweden, Norway, et al that showed the most resilience following the 2008 Great Financial Crisis. Their economies slowed down the least and they lost the least number of jobs. The same pattern was seen during the Covid-19 pandemic. In contrast, the Mediterranean states such as Greece and Italy, with their more segmented welfare states (i.e., regulating access to benefits based on membership in occupational or social groups, rather than based on needs or rights) weathered the storm less successfully (Hemerijck, 2020). A key issue that arose after the economic slowdown/crisis of the 1970s, was the rising costs associated with expanding welfare programmes. The shift now was towards cost containment and recalibration of the original expansive model, a movement that was taken a few steps further with the introduction of austerity measures (cutting costs by government) post-2008. Britain, under the Tories, was a prime example of the new direction, which was illustrated even more starkly with the subsequent Greek sovereign debt crisis in the aftermath of 2008. South Africa has not remained immune to cost-cutting, with the introduction of “austerity by stealth” over the last few years. After Covid, another major shift towards the policy of social investment, especially in the European Union (EU), occurred. The policy emphasised investment in people, with measures designed to enhance people’s skills and capacities. The focus was on granting them support towards their full participation in social life. There was a strong link to employability – aligned to the knowledge economy. Synergies between education, employment, gender equity, and social participation were underscored with the objective of the creation of a virtuous cycle of well-being. In relation to these outcomes, Hemerijck said that the national welfare states’ ability to foster institutional capabilities are imperative for an “effective, more service-intensive, social investment European welfare state”. In the present era, a factor that’s impacting the functioning of the welfare state, is how the nature of work has changed due to the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). As a result of the 4IR, higher levels of automation, with its associated drop in employment, together with the rise of other technological advances like robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things, 3D printing, genetic engineering, quantum computing, blockchain technology have become common place. The coinciding shift to the service industry has led to rising levels of precarity amongst the workforces – a development that places additional pressure on the welfare system as workers struggle to adjust to the high cost of living. South Africa’s Welfare South Africa suffers from a deep malaise characterised by high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality. Our economic problems are structural and deep-seated and require extensive and thorough surgery. No quick fixes would do. Globally we top the list on all of these metrics. Our Gini coefficient is the highest according to the World Bank, with Stats SA’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) for Q2: 2022 telling us that a mere 648 000 jobs were gained between the first quarter of 2022 and the second quarter of 2022. The number of unemployed persons increased by 132 000 to 8 million out of a total potential workforce of 23,6 million. The official unemployment rate was 33,9%– and 44,1% for the expanded definition. Further bad news is that the economy shrunk by 0.7% in Q2, denoting weaker economic activity, less spending power and weaker confidence overall. This is against the background of the rising food and energy prices; higher interest rates, which dampens economic activity and demand; and the deep, unprecedented cost of living being experienced globally. Even though the democratic state elected in 1994 inherited an extensive welfare policy, it was still skewed in favour of the previously advantaged. The emphasis of the new government was to bring about parity in social disbursements and lessen inequalities. The social policy and welfare regime that followed occurred within the macro context of transforming South African society to grow the economy for all, achieve social justice, overcome the social divisions of the past, and forge a united nation. Social policies and laws were comprehensively overhauled, based on a rights-based approach to social welfare. This was in line with the progressive South African Constitution and strong focus on socio-economic rights, enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Formal racial discrimination in access to services no longer exists and a nationally integrated single welfare system has been created, incorporating all South Africans. Many innovations in social development have been introduced, albeit in stages, and not in an encompassing, universal manner as in the case of the Swedish social-democratic model. A key consideration has been the affordability of the social welfare model in South Africa, which has not been assisted by our weak economic performance, allied to serious political problems like “state capture”, especially since 2008. The social assistance programmes established since 1994 are extensive and have a reach of more than 18 million people every month in the form of grants, old-age pensions, Covid-grants, public employment generating schemes, and the “social wage”. About 10.3 million people have signed up for the R350 special Covid grant (Ramaphosa, 2022). Although these efforts are admirable, it should be viewed against the unequal distribution of income in South Africa. The welfare bill now represents about 50% of all government spending of R1.1 trillion, of which roughly a quarter is distributed in cash (Kantor, 2022). Higher levels of economic growth are required to provide a larger tax base and ensure education and training deliver better qualified entrants to the labour market, based on the social investment policy found in the EU. The table below shows the various instruments and policies that encompass the social welfare regime in South Africa, how extensive it is and how it has grown over the years. The post-apartheid welfare regime Source: National Planning Commission, 2011 Is South Africa a Welfare State? There is a considerable amount of debate about whether South Africa is a welfare state or not. And if it is, to what extent? Founder and Director of the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at the University of Cape Town, Prof Alan Hirsch, provides an excellent precis of the democratic government’s economic philosophy, saying the following: “The ANC government had followed a consistent economic philosophy with, at its centre, a social democratic approach to social reform. It is the state’s job to underwrite the improvement in the quality of life of the poor and reduce inequalities, but with a firmly entrenched fear of the risks of personal dependency on the state and of the emergence of entitlement attitudes” (Hirsch, 2005). The following definition of the welfare state by political scientist Maurizio Ferrera, seems apt for South Africa: “The welfare state is a set of public interventions related to the modernisation process, which provide protection in the form of assistance, insurance and social security, introducing, amongst others, specific social rights in the case of specific events as well as specific duties of financial contribution” (Antoni, 2018). According to Prof Robert Van Niekerk, Professor of Public Governance and Social Policy at the University of Witwatersrand – with its universal primary education, statutory social insurance and nascent moves towards national health insurance – does possess many of the characteristics of a social democratic welfare state. Sithole, Patel et al, concur with this view, albeit with various caveats. Van Niekerk also states that the goals of African Claims and the Freedom Charter of 1955 could only be achieved with a democratic, interventionist state that could redistribute wealth and resources. This would entail recalibrating the power and resource dynamics between the white minority and the black majority that commenced with the advent of democracy in 1994. This has shades of the Beveridge programme, introduced under Attlee’s Labour government redistributive programme in post-war Britain. Others pose the problem in the form of a question. Former President General of the ANC, Dr AB Xuma, in the 1943 African Claims document, stressed the equality of treatment for the whole population; a bill of social rights; state medical services; and compulsory education, as well as extension of progressive labour legislation to all racial groups. This was the forerunner of the Freedom Charter of 1955, which demanded income maintenance; universal education; rights to housing; and medical care be provided by the state. In 2012, the then President Jacob Zuma said that “we are building a developmental and not a welfare state. The social grants will be linked to economic activity and community development to enable short-term beneficiaries to become self-supporting in the long run” (Zuma, 2012). Another statement reads, “Whilst acting effectively to promote growth, efficiency and productivity, the developmental state must be equally effective in addressing the social conditions of the masses of our people and realising economic progress for the poor” (ANC, 2007). The concepts of a welfare state versus a developmental state are not divergent, but there is one important difference, with the developmental state’s focus more on economic growth with social welfare as a corollary (this is similar to the rise of the “Asian Tigers” post WWII). Prof Ndangwa Noyoo of the Department of Social Development at the University of Cape Town stated in 2012 that “South Africa is not a welfare state even though it pursues strong state-led social policy programmes to counter the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality”. Burger (2008) refers to a welfare system in South Africa. In contrast, Sithole takes to task the “myth” that South Africa is the biggest welfare state in the world based on the number of social grants recipients as vis-à-vis the taxpayers, which yield the unacceptably high dependency ratio. He says, whilst the dependency ratio is unsustainable in his view, South Africa is certainly not the biggest welfare state in the world. According to Sithole, the South African welfare system is residualist, which implies minimal state intervention in the daily lives of people. Furthermore, because not all citizens have access to services, only those who qualify in terms of the means test get services. The welfare state benefits therefore apply only to those who can prove that they are unable to meet their own welfare needs. The Minister of Finance, Enoch Godongwana, in February 2022, said that South Africa is fast becoming a welfare state. He told the National Assembly that 46% of its citizens are receiving social grants, which is inimical to economic growth. According to Godongwana, it is the nature of Treasury to generally put the brakes on spending. A Roadmap to Developing a Social Welfare State in South Africa A comprehensive social welfare state requires a capable government – one which can look after its citizens from cradle to grave and provide equal opportunities to all, as well as guidance to the market, while being an active participant in a competitive and growing economy (Weir, 2022; Wills, 2022). Although South Africa is still a long way off from being classified as a comprehensive social welfare state, the ANC-led government has made some strides in that direction. One such stride is South Africa’s guiding principles post-1994, which are rooted in the ruling ANC’s vision to create a social and national democratic developmental state. It reads: The ANC therefore seeks to build democracy with social content, underpinned by a capable developmental state. Informed by our own concrete conditions and experiences, this will, in some respects, reflect elements of the best traditions of social democracy, which include: a system which places the needs of the poor and social issues such as healthcare, education and a social safety net at the top of the national agenda; intense role of the state in economic life; pursuit of full employment; quest for equality; strong partnership with the trade union movement; and promotion of international solidarity (ANC, 2022). Another step forward is the protection of individual rights as enshrined in the South African Constitution, which also contains South Africans’ socio-economic rights, legislating the rights of people to certain basic needs required for a human being to lead a dignified life (Khoza, 2007). This is an important foundation for the country’s most vulnerable and poor to stand on. The government further instituted a targeted approach in developing a social safety net. The majority of its social support programmes are premised on an income threshold before an individual can qualify as a recipient. These include monthly financial support payments for children, disabled individuals and the elderly, as well as government’s Reconstruction and Development housing programme (GroundUp, 2022; LFA, 2022). Limited financial support is also available through the Unemployment Insurance Fund to support, amongst others, retrenched workers and mothers needing maternity leave (SARS, 2022). In 2018, government further agreed to fully subsidise tertiary education for students from poor and working-class households (Gov, 2022a). A few years later, the state stepped in as the Covid-19 pandemic knocked people’s income, by introducing a Social Relief of Distress (SDR) grant of R350 for qualifying individuals (Gov, 2022b). Looking to the future, the National Treasury has earmarked R3,3 trillion over the medium term to support vulnerable and low-income households. The Social Wage represents 60% of government spending over the next three years, with the largest share allotted to basic education, social protection and health services. In the 2022/23 financial year alone, the state supports an estimated 18,6 million grant recipients with an allocated budget of R364,4 billion, equivalent to 3,9% of the country’s GDP (Crotty, 2022). The financial assistance through the country’s extensive grant system equates to nearly 17% of the state’s total yearly expenditure (NT, 2022a; NT, 2022b). This is expected to increase as further social programmes are being considered. A universal health care system is amongst the new programmes being considered for implementation. The National Health Insurance (NHI) is a health financing system with the aim to provide affordable health services to all South Africans, regardless of their socio-economic backgrounds (Gov, 2022c). The state intends to create a single fund that will buy medical services on behalf of the population. Citizens will then be able to access the required treatments at accredited health facilities, which include private institutions. The NHI is scheduled to be operational from 2026. Government is further giving consideration to reshaping the current SDR grant into a basic income grant (BIG) (Osborne, 2022). Whether this will be targeted, like other social grants, or universal, is yet to be determined. The affordability of a BIG will most likely be the determining factor in the extent of such a programme. Supporters of a BIG argue that the financial assistance granted to the poor will be spent on consumer goods, which, in turn, would boost economic activity and therefore growth. Critics, on the other hand, believe the South African government simply cannot afford such a measure at the moment. Despite these progressive steps towards creating a social welfare state, the movement forward remains limited. If models, like the Nordic social welfare state, are used as a benchmark, the South African government still has gaps to fill. These models are generally characterised by universal programmes for sufficient, amongst others, parental support, medical and old-age assistance, and education subsidies (NC-op, 2022). They further seek to provide effective childcare support to parents, as this has proven to increase a country’s labour force participation rate – especially amongst women (Enevoldsen et al, 2020). Maximising a country’s labour force participation through supportive policies is key, as the more people that are employed, the bigger the pool that can contribute to the country’s welfare fund to continue delivering the required social services (Greve, 2007). Another point to be addressed, is ensuring the state provides quality education to develop the required skills for future economic performance (Davids, 2020). South Africa’s education system has repeatedly delivered poor learner results, by international standards. Furthermore, governments of countries considered to be social welfare states operate with near-zero incidents of corruption (Davids, 2020). While these governments still oversee some state-owned entities (SOEs), especially those producing a net social welfare benefit, they’re considered to be value creating and competitive organisations, as opposed to companies burdening taxpayers. These states also enjoy a deep trust between social partners (government, business, labour and civil society) that all who live and function within the country’s borders are working toward the same goal, while contributing their share of funds to the country’s welfare (Karkov, 2012). In this regard, the current South African government has a mammoth task ahead. It requires rooting out state looters, establishing limited, but successful, SOEs and restoring trust between its social partners. It should be noted that reaching a consensus about the structure of a national social welfare policy framework is going to be vital for the state to move forward with its stated ideal. Fiscally speaking, underpinning the successful development of any welfare state, is economic performance. Without growth outpacing the birth rate, South Africa won’t be able to garner the fiscal ability to support the required welfare programmes. Government’s duty in achieving this is to create ripe market conditions for the private sector to flourish. If business succeeds, it will expand, and with that comes increased employment and more tax revenue to fund welfare programmes. High taxes and a relatively large tax base are also characteristics shared by some successful welfare states (Greve, 2007). The state should, however, continue to keep a close eye on market operations, as failures could occur where mandates or regulations may be required to guard against it. These should be implemented with caution as to not stifle companies’ performance. As part of the roadmap to developing a social welfare state in South Africa, the programmes accompanying a social welfare state must be implemented in stages as and when the economy allows for it. It’s a parallel process where the expansion of the economy allows for more funds to implement another welfare net. In turn, these programmes may up labour participation and increase productivity further, boosting growth, and making yet more money available to support and provide services to the poor. It’s vital to not over-extend the fiscus with social welfare programmes, i.e., implementing too many plans at once without sufficient funds available to support them. Further attention must be given to the strategy, through which certain programmes are prioritised in the order they must be launched as the economy moves towards a desired growth rate. In order to achieve the greatest positive impact given the available financial input, implementing plans must be prioritised in a staged process. The democratic dispensation has taken meaningful steps towards developing a social welfare state in South Africa since 1994. The existing programmes are a lifeline for millions living in poverty. Plans are afoot to expand these programmes, while adding new ones to provide further support. The country’s fiscal constraints to support the necessary measures may, however, prove a difficult hurdle to overcome should government fail to address its own shortcomings. First and foremost, it’s the state’s responsibility to fulfil its role effectively, as befitting an ideal welfare state, before other partners will follow suit. Without this cooperation, the economy may never gain traction, leaving the idea of South Africa operating as a comprehensive social welfare state to revolutionary literature. Source: Inclusive Society Institute Conclusion The welfare state has undergone various changes, especially with the entry of the private sector into key areas of the social welfare system that were previously off-limits. The sentiment was that there should not be profit-taking from social aspects like education, health and so on. The concept has also been under scrutiny and attack due to the rising costs associated with its expansion and the onset of the mid-1970s economic crisis. And even though Piketty (2019) summarised the universal achievement of the welfare system in Western Europe as “the best social-security system in the world together with the least unequal, social market economic system in the world”, the aging population in those countries, which decreases the number of people in the labour force, plus the increase in health care costs in particular, has added to the negative sentiment. Recent world events have swung the pendulum once more, however. Post the 2008 Great Financial Crisis and in 2020/21, with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, the welfare state has shown its true worth, helping millions when they couldn’t help themselves. John Stuart Mill and John Maynard Keynes wisely prophesied that humankind can increasingly look forward to a horizon of growing leisure: “The reorientation of life away from the merely useful toward the beautiful and the true”. Or, as according to Skidelsky: “The good life undergirded by a high degree of happiness” (Skidelsky, 2020). It pays to be mindful, however, that Keynes also said in 1936 that if democracies fail to tackle mass unemployment and inequality, people would turn to dictatorship. It happened then, and it is starting to happen now. In South Africa, we do not have the luxury of starting with the contention that welfare services must be affordable, before embarking upon its provision. Poverty and inequality are way too high and must be mitigated and reduced. The key issue is that more jobs must be urgently created, and a social accord reached between the key social partners. Swanepoel agrees that the tax base needs to be increased, so that the state has sufficient resources to implement welfare programmes and to spend on other societal priorities. He further notes that in Sweden, more than 70% of working-age citizens contribute towards the tax base, whereas the comparative figure for South Africa is around 11%, which is way too low (Swanepoel, 2022). A well-functioning state machinery, allied to an expansive welfare state will enhance overall well-being in society, as well as social cohesion, thus lessening our growing list of social problems. The riots and looting in July 2021, in mainly KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, are signs of what might happen if people go hungry in large numbers and have no jobs. Such circumstances – and the withdrawal of the special Covid-19 grant prior to July 2021 – impact negatively on their dignity and sense of self-worth, all of which were contributing factors in creating a climate conducive to chaos and destruction that was exploited by unscrupulous elements. It is the contention of this paper that the South African state be regarded as containing considerable or extensive features of a welfare state, but not of a fully-fledged one, à la the social democratic welfare state. Given the negative connotations associated with the term “welfare”, maybe “social democratic state” should suffice. It exhibits features of the intermediate and residual welfare state, as expounded by Esping-Andersen, but not in the neat fashion of those models. The social welfare regime is undergirded by a strong anti-poverty focus, as shown in the public expenditure figures. The other key drawback is that the South African state is weak and flailing, with many commentators preferring the word “failing”. This is a key consideration in the ability of the state to deliver on its commitments to citizens. The Bureau of Market Research’s (BMR) June 2022 Happiness Index shows that South Africans are now less happy than before, and confidence is at an all-time low. This is in marked contrast to the Scandinavian welfare states, which register consistently as the happiest nations on earth, according to Gallup’s annual World Happiness Report. We are most certainly wedged between Scylla and Charybdis in South Africa currently. The interplay between the state and market must produce the well-being of citizens, allied to sustaining employment and promoting growth. By being timid, rather than bold and innovative, we are not going to slay the beasts of unemployment, poverty, inequality and other social ills. Annotation The capability approach is a theoretical framework that entails two normative claims: first, the claim that the freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance and, second, that well-being should be understood in terms of people’s capabilities and functioning. Capabilities are the doings and beings that people can achieve if they so choose – their opportunity to do or be such things as being well-nourished, getting married, being educated, and travelling; functioning are capabilities that have been realised. Capabilities have also been referred to as real or substantive freedoms as they denote the freedoms that have been cleared of any potential obstacles, in contrast to mere formal rights and freedoms (Robeyns & Morten, 2021). Dani Rodrik, an economist at Harvard University, who's devoted his career to the interplay between globalisation and economic development, has documented a trend called "premature deindustrialisation". With such a trend, countries start to lose their manufacturing jobs without getting rich first. Developing countries have moved away from manufacturing and ventured into services long before their more developed counterparts did, and at fractions of the income per capita. This led to a phenomenon wherein the growth of an economy's manufacturing sector begins to slow down prematurely in its path towards development. Some economies might even witness a premature movement of resources to the services sector, thus leading to underdevelopment of the manufacturing sector. Premature deindustrialisation – i.e., a decline in the share of manufacturing in the economy and typically a shift towards services – is regarded in literature (especially a‐la‐Kaldor) as being likely to have negative effects on economic growth. Joseph Stiglitz defines globalisation as the process of economic integration of countries through the increasing flow of goods, services, capital and labour. This process is not new and has started at the end of the 19th century with the 1st wave of globalisation. Economic "globalisation" is therefore a historical process, the result of human innovation and technological progress. It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through the movement of goods, services and capital across borders. The term sometimes also refers to the movement of people (labour) and knowledge (technology) across international borders. There are also broader cultural, political and environmental dimensions of globalisation (IMF, 2008). According to British economist, Prof Alan S. Blinder, Keynesian economics is a theory of total spending in the economy – called aggregate demand – and its effects on output and inflation. The man behind the theory, John Maynard Keynes, spearheaded a revolution in economic thinking that overturned the then-prevailing idea that free markets would automatically provide full employment. That is, that everyone who wanted a job would have one as long as workers were flexible in their wage demands. The main plank of Keynes’s theory is the assertion that aggregate demand – measured as the sum of spending by households, businesses and the government – is the most important driving force in an economy. Keynes further asserted that free markets have no self-balancing mechanisms that lead to full employment. Keynesian economists justify government intervention through public policies that aim to achieve full employment and price stability (Jahan, Mahmud & Papageorgiou, 2014). With the General Theory, as it became known, Keynes sought to develop a theory that could explain the determination of aggregate output and, as a consequence, employment. He posited that the determining factor is aggregate demand. Amongst the revolutionary concepts initiated by Keynes was the idea of a demand-determined equilibrium wherein unemployment is possible; the ineffectiveness of price flexibility to cure unemployment; a unique theory of money based on "liquidity preference"; the introduction of radical uncertainty and expectations; the marginal efficiency of investment schedule breaking Say's Law (and thus reversing the savings-investment causation); the possibility of using government fiscal; and monetary policy to help eliminate recessions and control economic booms. Indeed, with this book, he almost single-handedly constructed the fundamental relationships and ideas behind what became known as "macroeconomics" (Phelps, 1990). Neoliberalism is a thorough reinvention of the classical liberal tradition expanded to encompass the whole of human existence as a political animal and a knowing being. In this tradition, the market stands as the ultimate arbiter of truth. The pinnacle of achievement is to become an entrepreneur of the plastic self. In addition, there is no such thing as society and freedom is recoded to mean anything the market allows. Neoliberals privilege the strong state as opposed to the conventional wisdom that they are for a minimalist state under all conditions. All attempts to demote the state to night-watchman (Adam Smith) status end up augmenting the power and size of the state with respect to the market. It is generally conceded to have been initially stabilised by the members of the Mont Pelerin Society, a group founded in 1947 and that is still in existence today. Over the last four decades, the group has expanded to encompass a vast thought-collective ranging from high-profile economists like Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman to politicians like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan; from the Murdoch media empire to Astroturf movements like the Tea Party (Mirowski, 2014). In 1601, England experienced a severe economic depression with large-scale unemployment and widespread famine. The Poor Laws were proclaimed as a system of poverty relief in England and Wales (VCU, 2011). The Original Position is a central feature of John Rawls’s social contract account of justice, “justice as fairness,” set forth in A Theory of Justice (TJ). The Original Position is designed to be a fair and impartial point of view that is to be adopted in our reasoning about fundamental principles of justice. In taking up this point of view, we are to imagine ourselves in the position of free and equal persons who jointly agree upon and commit themselves to principles of social and political justice (Robeyns & Morten, 2021). The Rehn-Meidner Model was named after two trade union economists, Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, and launched in 1951. The basic idea was that all industries, irrespective of their profitability, pay the same wages for similar work. Less efficient companies would then eventually go out of business; efficient companies would make huge profits and expand; and the government would through its labour exchanges transfer workers from the former to the latter. Social Policy is concerned with the ways societies across the world meet human needs for security, education, work, health and well-being. Social Policy addresses how states and societies respond to global challenges of social, demographic and economic change, and of poverty, migration and globalisation (Platt, 2022). Social Rights are human rights and have all of the latter’s characteristics. Social Rights are moral, legal or societal rules and an understanding of what is necessary to fulfil people’s social needs and to promote social inclusion and social solidarity. Social Rights are concerned with how people live and work together and the basic necessities of life. They are based on the ideas of equality and guaranteed access to essential social and economic goods, services and opportunities (Council of Europe, 2022). Socio-Economic Rights are those rights that give people access to certain basic needs necessary for human beings to lead a dignified life. The South African Constitution of 1996 includes social security as one of the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution reads: “Everyone has the right to have access to social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social security.” This was codified in the ground-breaking Grootboom case and the decision that, “the measures instituted must consider the plight and conditions of people in desperate circumstances and those who are living in conditions of poverty (SAHRC, 2001). The Social Wage reduces the cost of living and is a measure of how much better off individuals are with the provision of publicly funded welfare services (education, health, social housing and so on) than they would be without these 'in kind' benefits (i.e., if they had to pay the full cost of these services) (SPII, 2018). The Stockholm School, or Stockholmsskolan, is a school of economic thought that refers to a loosely organised group of Swedish economists that worked together, in Stockholm, Sweden, primarily in the 1930s. Due to translation issues (they published primarily in Swedish), their recognition internationally was initially limited to the extent that they received no credit for theories they developed. 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Closing Remarks to the 53rd National Conference of the ANC by President Jacob Zuma [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/53rd-national-conference-closing-remarks-by-president-jacob-zuma/ [Accessed: 21 October 2022] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Daryl Swanepoel, met with a delegation from the US State Department in Cape Town on Friday, 18 November 2022. The team visited South Africa in an effort to solidify and strengthen the Biden administration’s strategic outlook to help set a stronger foundation for the bilateral partnership between South Africa and the United States. The US team comprised the Principal Deputy Director of the Bureau of Strategic Planning, Matan Chorev, and the Senior Advisor for Africa, Cecily Brewer. The aim was help shape and sharpen the US’s approach to key broader multilateral foreign policy priorities. A wide range of issues were raised during the meeting, key amongst which included the role of multilateral fora and their role and operation in Africa. Swanepoel also raised the need for triangular engagement between Africa, the West and the East as they converge on the African continent. He also urged the US to continue to strengthen economic cooperation. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was a key instrument, which, he urged the US to, amidst rumors that is was to be renewed excluding South Africa, to renew with South Africa being retained as a beneficiary. Both sides agreed that the engagement was very useful, and that dialogue channels be maintained and expanded.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) presented its findings related to the Institute’s research on the feasibility of a Basic Income Grant (BIG)( to the Deputy Minister of Finance, on Wednesday, 17 November 2022. The presentation was made by Dr Roelof Botha, the Institute’s lead researcher on the project. The findings of the Institute confirm that the introduction of a targeted Basic Income Grant is indeed feasible and in fact, will marginally grow Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The proposed grant will be made to all unemployed South African citizens. The research modelling includes both the BIG costing and the potential financing mechanism. The ISI will release its report in January 2023, whereafter it will embark on a promotion campaign aimed at securing the introduction of this overdue social intervention, which is aimed at securing a greater degree of social justice and cohesion.

A group of civil society organisations that are lobbying for electoral reform met the media on Wednesday, 9 November 2022, to voice their concerns with regard to the current parliamentary processes related to amending the Electoral Act. The Constitutional Court declared the existing act unconstitutional in that it did not provide for independent candidates to participate in national and provincial elections. Civil society is of the view that the amendment bill being processed by parliament is in itself unconstitutional, in that the constitutional principle of equality is not being adhered to. There are two separate sets of rules for independents and parties. The Inclusive Society Institute’s CEO, Daryl Swanepoel, spelt the Institute’s three main concerns out to the media: § Whilst political parties could aggregate their votes from across all nine provinces, independent candidates cannot; § Whilst political parties only require 1000 supporting signatures to gain access to the ballot, independents required 15,000 and more; and § Votes for parties and votes for independents do not carry equal weight.

Daryl Swanepoel, the Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), attended a reception hosted by the Consul General of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ms Tanja Werheit, in honour of a visiting delegation from the Bavarian State Parliament. The reception was held on the evening of 3 November 2022 at the official residence of the Consul General in Cape Town. The Bavarian delegation was led by the President of the Bavarian State Parliament, Hon. Ilse Aigner. The ISI has as one of its objectives the promotion and development of rules-based international cooperation. In this regard it is working with a number of institutions and academics in Germany to advance and strengthen the bi-lateral relationship between South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as to foster a better understanding between the two sides as to the need for reform of the global multilateral organisations.

Statistic South Africa hosted a stakeholder information sharing workshop on Monday, 31 October 2022, on the upcoming Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) 2022/23 which will be in the field from November 2022 to November 2023. The IES is a household-base sample survey that collects information on all acquisitions, consumption, spending, and income earned of households living in South Africa. The Inclusive Society Institute, who participated in the workshop, supports the survey, especially since the last such survey was conducted in 2015. The institute is of the opinion that it is long overdue in that the economic landscape has changed considerably since then and, given the constrained economic environment the country finds itself in, it is now urgent to get a more comprehensive view on issues such as inequality, levels of debt, growth potential, etcetera, all of which could be empirically examined through such updated information.

On 29 October 2022, the Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, attended a reception hosted by the Consul General of Türkiye, HE Mr Sĩnan Yeşĩldağ, which was held to commemorate the 99th foundation anniversary of the Republic of Türkiye. The reception was held at the residence of the Consul General in Constantia, Cape Town. The Inclusive Society Institute wishes the people of Türkiye all the best for a prosperous future. Türkiye has done well in its development trajectory and has a built a solid foundation on which to excel even further. South Africa enjoys a friendly and constructive relationship with Türkiye, with growing economic and people to people ties. The Institute is committed to further strengthening those ties, and to work together with its Turkish associates in strengthening global democracy, human rights and peace and security.

The Istanbul Security Forum (ISF) will be held for the first time in January 2023. It aims address the concept of “security” in regional, global and thematic context, by employing the combined wisdom of experts from Türkiye and across the globe. The Advisory Board of the ISF met on Monday, 24 October 2024, to help chart its path and to plan for the upcoming January 2023 event. The ISI was represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel.

On Tuesday 18 October, the Inclusive Society Institute continued to roll out its new civil education programme at Westerford High School in Newlands, Cape Town. The workshop, titled “Taking the Constitution to the People: Know your Rights and Responsibilities”, is aimed at young adults at the end of their schooling. It seeks to stimulate awareness of Constitutional principles and values. Beyond bringing awareness among the scholars of their rights, the workshop aims to evoke perception about where they can become involved in the civic and public affairs. How they can apply the Constitution in their day-to-day lives and why it is important that they take civic responsibility for their environment, community and the state at large. The session at Westerford High, which was also attended by partners from the OR Tambo School of Leadership, was very well received and plans are already in the pipeline for another session in the new year.

The Inclusive Society Institute participated in the UN Protection Working Group Meeting which was held on 20 October 2022. The meeting was called to discuss the outcomes on the PWG survey and proposals for reforming the PWG, as well as to determine the capacity needs of government, civil society and other stakeholders. The Protection Working Group (PWG) is a UNHCR platform aimed at forging partnerships with civil society organisations across the country and directly supports implementing partners (IPs) to conduct xenophobia related programmes and activities in many areas through a range of approaches. It is the primary platform for civil society engagement on matters related to refugees, an initiative that has engendered concrete partnerships and collaborations between UNHCR and other organisations. With the statistics on immigration grossly overstated in the public domain, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is concerned with the sporadic outbreaks of xenophobic attacks based on the emotional outburst premised on wrong statistical data. Whilst popular speak refers to some 13 million illegal immigrants in the country, recent data from Statistics South Africa and the Human Sciences Research Council suggests only around 2 million illegal immigrants in South Africa. The ISI is working on programmes aimed at better controlling immigration in South Africa, but also to moderate the immigration environment based on South Africa’s obligations under international law and the constitutional embodiment of a culture for human rights.

Occasional Paper 8/2022 Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. OCTOBER 2022 by Prof William Gumede Associate Professor, and former Convener, Political Economy, School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand; former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg). Introduction Russia’s war with Ukraine – and global responses to it – is not only remaking the post-Cold War world but has also shown that many global institutions established to keep the peace between countries have become redundant. In 1945, following the end of the Second World War, the United Nations (UN) was established by 51 countries to maintain international peace and security. However, the UN, together with Belarus, of Ukraine, has been spectacularly absent during the invasion by Russia. In fact, the UN has been strikingly uninvolved in most of the recent violent conflicts between countries. This underscores the fact that the global organisation established after the Second World War to prevent conflict between countries appears to have lost its credibility, relevance, and authority. It has been left to individual country leaders – the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), and the G20 – to desperately try to end the hostilities. The UN was also absent during Afghanistan’s descent into chaos last year, when the Taliban took over and the government and citizens fled the country en masse. In addition, the UN has been largely silent in the face of the ongoing dispute between China and Taiwan, which the Chinese dragon views as part of it (which authority Taiwan rejects) and not a sovereign country. Unless something is done about reforming the UN into a more credible organisation, the global rule of law will collapse. The decline of the UN has raised the spectre of more copy-cat incidents of aggression by powerful countries against more vulnerable ones, making the world even more unstable, violent, and chaotic. Without a credible UN, the world will increasingly be divided between countries that have nuclear military power versus those who do not. Many countries, having seen how Russia used its military power to dominate the US, EU, and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), will desperately try to acquire or shore up nuclear military abilities. Clearly, the UN in its current form is not fit for purpose to address current and future global challenges. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: “The credibility and effectiveness of global institutions is being questioned. The reason for this is that there has been no change in these institutions despite the passage of time. These institutions reflect the mindset and realities of the world 75 years ago” (Mehta, 2020). Even France, a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), has conceded that the UNSC has reached its sell-by date. French President Emmanuel Macron said recently that the UN Security Council “no longer produces useful solutions today” (French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2021). The UN’s, and other global institutions’, laws and rules will have to be collectively democratised or abolished and new more relevant, consensual ones created, or the world will plunge into more Russia–Ukraine-like conflicts and eventually a global nuclear Third World War. New multipolar world Many of the global multilateral organisations that anchored the post-Cold War consensus – the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Finance Corporation (IFC), and World Trade Organization (WTO) – have lost their credibility. The post-Cold War Western-led global order is facing a profound reputation crisis. The US-led global hegemony wilted in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis; unilateral military interventions in developing countries, without seeking global consensus; and the often manipulation of multilateral organisations for self-interest, rather than for the greater good of the world. Furthermore, during the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis some of the neoliberal economic thinking that underpinned the US post-Cold War ideology hegemony lost its lustre when, in order to save economies, companies and livelihoods, Western countries used decidedly un-neoliberal tools, such as state investment in private businesses. Since the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the communist alliance led by the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), the US–European Union-led Western alliance has dominated global political, economic power, institutions, and ideology. This has now come to an end. The world has now changed into a multipolar one – moving away from the domination of the US-led global order, which has held sway in the post-Cold War era, and towards an order where power will become more evenly spread across regions and countries across the globe. The world has seen the economic, political, and ideas rise of emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey, amongst others, resulting in a multipolar global order that has challenged the US–EU-led Western-dominated global order. It is very likely that instead of one or two powers dominating the world – as was the case with the US in the post-Cold War period and the competition between the US and USSR during the Cold War – we will see multiple power poles emerging. The US’ shambolic withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, when the Taliban took over and the government and citizens fled the country, most probably symbolised the loss of its global hegemony. Russian President Vladimir Putin, during the decline of the US–EU post-Cold War hegemony and prior to the launch of his invasion of Ukraine, tried to refashion the old USSR alliance against the US–European-dominated world, but this time between Russia, old allies of the USSR, and new emerging powers. In 2015, as part of his strategy, Putin reintegrated some of the former economies of the Soviet Union into a regional trade bloc between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia, called the Eurasian Economic Union. Developing countries are increasingly clubbing together in international fora. African countries are collaborating with each other or with others as a group more. Africa now accounts for more than a quarter of the total membership of the UN. There have been several initiatives by developing countries to build alternative global institutions. In 2003, India, Brazil and South Africa established an alliance, IBSA, which promised to align the globe’s largest developing country democracies across continents to trade with each other, to oppose the dominance by industrial countries of global trade, rules, ideas, and institutions, and share development experiences. IBSA was established after India, Brazil, and South Africa had been invited, at the time as observers, to the 2003 G8 summit of industrial countries in France. They left feeling that their own fates, and those of the developing world, were being decided by a small group of unrepresentative developed countries. Following the 2003 G8 summit, India, Brazil, and South Africa felt strongly about formally clubbing together to push for a bigger say in global governance for developing countries, to diversify their trade away from industrial countries, and to share their unique lessons of the twin pursuit of development and democracy amidst multicultural societies with extreme poverty and inequalities. BRICS was established in 2009 by China, Russia, India and Brazil, with South Africa joining in 2010. For its members, the BRICS partnership offers geopolitical allies for these countries to press for the restructuring of the global trade, economic, and political architecture, to give Africa and developing countries a fairer say – and therefore a better chance to compete – in relation to their Western counterparts. The potential protective barrier of BRICS membership may provide individual members the policy space to make independent development, trade, and political policy decisions – which may not otherwise be the case, yet is so crucial for the sustainable economic development of individual countries. The BRICS partnership also offers participating countries the space to resolve disputes, whether trade, political, or diplomatic, constructively. The new multipolar world demands a new kind of UN, or a different organisation entirely. Post-Cold War multilateral global institutions seen as marginalising developing countries The post-Cold War multilateral global institutions have in the past been dominated by the US–EU, often for purely self-interest, rather than for the global good – which has undermined their authority, effectiveness, and credibility amongst the majority of countries around the world. This has fostered a global climate where it appears dominant countries can get away with breaking global political, economic, legal, market, and trade rules for self-interest – while developing countries cannot. Developing countries have less say within global institutions that set the rules of the global market, whether that is the UN, World Bank, IMF, IFC, or the WTO. Some scholars have referred to the phenomenon as global apartheid: industrial powers have more power than developing countries, particularly African countries (Bond, 2004). For example, since the Second World War, the US has always chosen the president of the World Bank, “using the appointment as a vehicle to advance American economic interests, power, and development priorities around the globe” (Zumbrun, 2019). Similarly, Europeans have traditionally selected the head of the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank is owned by 189 member countries. The members elect a board of executive directors. However, industrial countries have in the main larger voting shares than developing countries and have more power in decision-making. The US has the largest voting share, at around 16%. This is above the 15% share threshold that gives a country veto power on key decisions – the US is the only country with veto power at the World Bank. Many developing countries were critical of the US favourite, Jim Yong Kim, for World Bank president in 2012 (Zumbrun, 2019). Following Kim’s early retirement in 2019, three years before his term ended, divisions sharpened between industrial and developing countries over who should replace him. Industrial countries often punish other countries or multilateral organisations if these adopt policies that go against the domestic policies of industrial countries. Developing countries do not have the global power to react similarly. In 2017, the administration of then US President Donald Trump withdrew the US membership of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (Beauchamp, 2017; John, 2017). UNESCO, in 2011, had admitted the Palestinian territories to the organisation as an independent member state called Palestine. In the UNESCO decision to admit Palestine, 104 countries voted in favour of allowing Palestine, while 14 opposed it, with 52 states abstaining. A US law stipulated that US funding will be cut from an organisation recognising an independent Palestine. Global development institutions have been criticised for being biased towards Western countries at the expense of African and developing countries, which have little say in the control, policies, and ideas of these institutions. In the current global economic system, developing economies do not have the policy independence to use monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate their own economies – lest they face a market, investor, and Western media backlash. Many unilateral monetary policies adopted by industrial countries to deal with their domestic crises often destabilise African and developing countries. Global capital markets are also against many African and developing countries. So unfavourable is the current global political, financial architecture and cultural systems, that policies, decisions and events which are triggered in industrial countries, over which developing countries have little say, often undermine well-being of developing countries. When in financial crisis, Western countries often come up with unilateral monetary policies that are destabilising for African and developing countries. For example, these governments often manipulate the value of their currencies to improve their export competitiveness. Again, African and developing countries do not have the same power to come up with unilateral monetary policies to protect their economies, strengthen their currencies, and boost employment, so they will face backlash from Western governments, global financial institutions, and markets (Panitchpakdi, 2011). In fact, when in financial crisis, African and developing countries are often force-fed economic, political, and trade policies – from global financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank – that are often astonishingly inappropriate, in return for funding by these multilateral organisations. If African and developing countries do not follow the prescripts, they are often punished by the markets, withdrawal of investment by the private sector, diplomatic isolation, and negative global media reporting. Following the past global financial crisis, the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Japanese Central Bank introduced quantitative easing in 2015. However, these quantitative easing policies eroded the competitiveness of emerging market economies (Rajan, 2014; Sablik, 2019; Powell, 2018). The former Reserve Bank of India, Governor Raghuram Rajan (2014) has rightly warned that the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy was causing spillovers in emerging markets, with seesawing capital flows, volatility, and the destabilising of financial markets. Global trade rules and laws are stacked against African and developing countries. High tariff and non-tariff barriers in industrial countries block African countries from exporting value-added products, which create more jobs and more wealth to more people, to industrial countries (Africa Progress Panel, 2012). African free trade agreements with Western countries, such as the Partnership Agreements with the European Union and the African Growth and Opportunity Act with the US, are mostly disadvantaging African and developing countries. If African and developing countries object to global rules stacked against them, they are often threatened with retaliation, from blocking their products, withdrawal of trade, and development aid sanctions, to the political isolation of specific countries (Gumede, 2012). African and developing countries have few recourses for trade, economic, and political disputes with developed countries – they are marginalised in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Africa Progress Panel, 2012). How the world should respond to global crises, reform of international organisations, laws and rules, and appointments of heads of UN agencies and multilateral institutions now increasingly divides the world into Western countries versus developing countries. Increasingly, developing countries have tried to circumvent global multilateral organisations or establish alternative global institutions to the existing ones, where they can. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping have established a series of alternative global institutions, such as the BRICS Development Bank, rivalling existing ones (Gumede, 2012). Appointments of UN general secretaries and heads of agencies The Security Council members have also dominated the election of UN General Secretaries – which means that general secretaries increasingly are often not getting wider legitimacy amongst countries. The five permanent members (P5) have often forced their own choices of UN general secretaries. As the world gets more uncertain, dangerous, and complex, UN heads forced on other countries by the Security Council’s P5, have recently often been bland figures, almost invisible, who lack global country support. In the past, UN general secretaries were larger-than-life figures – with global personal or country authority, credibility, and reputations – many of whom could through their own personal appeal persuade country leaders. The P5 also dominate the appointments of heads of UN agencies, such as UNESCO, UNDP, and the World Health Organisation. And at times when non-permanent members prevail in the appointments of heads of UN agencies, these appointees are often undermined by permanent members. A case in point was the appointment of the head of the World Health Organisation, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, in 2017, and his reappointment in 2022 (Africa Progress Panel, 2012). Developing countries successfully pushed for the appointment of Tedros, who was endorsed by the African Union, as the World Health Organisation Director General, in 2017. His criticisms of Western countries for hoarding Covid-19 vaccines during the pandemic caused outrage amongst these countries. Tedros waged a fierce campaign to get poorer countries a fair share of Covid-19 vaccines. Support for or against Tedros became a proxy battle between Western and developing countries. Developing countries came to his support and he was re-elected unopposed in 2022. At his re-election as head of the WHO in August 2022, Tedros (2022) said: “The global community cannot properly address the mountain of health emergencies and challenges we face, including the Covid-19 crisis and emerging pandemic threats, ‘in a divided world’”. Inequality between countries in global affairs and law Developing countries are also unequal in international law. For instance, the US, China, and key industrial countries have not signed up to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and their leaders and citizens are not subject to its jurisdictions. Industrial countries’ security, intelligence, and police forces often operate across the borders in African and developing countries, something which developing and African countries cannot do. US-led coalitions, for example, have frequently used their power in the UN to push through invasions in developing countries’ regimes perceived to be anti-Western – in Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere – under the guise of defending human rights. Ironically, these countries support equally evil regimes in other developing countries as long as they are pro-Western. Such decisions, many developing countries say, are often based purely on protecting industrial countries’ commercial interests. Developed countries have increasingly manipulated global political, economic institutions and laws for purely self-interest, rather than for the global good. This has fostered a global climate where it appears dominant developed countries can get away with breaking global political, economic, legal, and trade rules for self-interest, at the expense of developing countries. Developing countries appear to have less power in global relations than industrial countries, especially former colonial powers. The voices of developing countries often appear to have less weight than those of industrial countries, although new emerging powers – such as China, India, and Brazil – with large economies are increasingly pushing back. Former South African President Nelson Mandela was also critical of Western nations abusing their domination of global and multilateral organisations for their own selfish ends, rather than for the global good. In his farewell speech to South Africa’s parliament, Mandela said: “We see how the powerful countries, all of them so-called democracies, manipulate multilateral bodies to the great disadvantage and suffering of the poorer developing nations.” The French economist Jean Dresch in 1948 described the economic, political and trade relations between African colonies and colonial powers at independence as: “In essence, it consists of taking money out of a country its export products and selling imported products to the native population which has received money for the exports. It is a very elementary circle in which the market, in so far as is possible, is in the hands of the mother country, and the colony is condemned to produce only raw goods without manufacturing them at home” (Dresch, 1948). Very little appears to have changed, since Dresch’s description of the power relations between former colonies – whether in Africa, Latin America, or Asia, and former colonial powers, the industrial countries. Global racism Racism against black or darker-skinned people in industrial countries, global multilateral institutions, and multinational companies is systemic. It undermines the much-vaunted idea of globalisation; the tighter integration of countries, resulting from increased global financial, trade, and services flows; widespread penetration of new technologies; and advances in transport. Global racism against black and darker-skinned people prevents them from freedom of movement across borders, specially from African and developing countries to industrial countries, whether for work, trade or living. They are more likely to be stopped at customs entry to industrial countries. The Council of Europe’s Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, in its 2022 annual report, said: “Racism in policing (in the European Union countries) continued to be an issue in a number of countries, including in the context of enforcing pandemic-related restrictions. The ECRI report refers in particular to racial profiling in stop-and-search activities, the use of racist language and excessive use of force against individuals, which not only targeted individual victims, but stigmatised communities as a whole. Victims of such practices have often felt insufficiently supported by the authorities”. The idea of globalisation makes no sense when dark-skinned people cannot move freely from developing to industrial countries; and products, especially value-added ones that foster wealth, jobs and economic growth, from predominantly dark-skinned developing countries, face higher tariff barriers in industrial countries. “Critics of the way globalisation is organised refer to people as the ignored side of globalisation … (T)he freedom of movement of people has not enjoyed any easing of conditions” (COE, 2012: 18). During the Covid-19 pandemic, many industrial countries were accused of placing stricter entry conditions on citizens from black and darker-skinned countries. During the Covid-19 Omicron variant restrictions in late 2021, the Canadian government was accused of racism after only restricting entry from African countries, while many European countries had higher Omicron loads, but their citizens did not face the same travel restrictions into Canada. The UN, World Bank, IMF, IFC, and WTO set the rules for the global politics, economy, and trade. All of these global institutions are dominated by Western countries and have been criticised for being biased against African and developing countries, which have little say in the control, policies, and ideas of these institutions. Western countries and global agencies often appear to act with more urgency in disasters, human rights violations, and environmental neglect when the victims are white. Global interventions often appear to take place only when Western business interests and citizens’ lives are threatened in African and developing countries. The organisational cultures of multilateral organisations, such as the Western-dominated IMF, World Bank, IFC, WTO, and the UN, have often also exhibited unconscious bias towards developing countries in their decision-making, lending practices, and appointments. The World Bank’s shareholding is dominated by the US (23.66%), Japan (5.87%), Germany (5.36%), France (5.04%), and the United Kingdom (5.04%). A 2009 report by the US Government Accountability Project (GAP) reported that “only four black Americans held professional positions out of more than 1,000 US nationals. This figure represents a significant proportional decline even from the abysmal levels reported thirty years ago” (GAP, 2009; Chiles, 2012). The World Bank’s own internal survey during that time showed that Sub-Saharan African, Caribbean, and black American staff do not appear to have the same opportunities to advance as others (GAP, 2009; Chiles, 2012). Africa accounted for over 50% of the World Bank’s development assistance, but only 2.5% of the professional staff in the development economics section responsible for ideas on poverty alleviation were African (Chiles 2012). The decline of the UN The UN in its current form has lost its credibility, relevance, and authority. The UN has in many cases failed to maintain global peace, security, and intervene timeously in humanitarian crises. In more recent times it “failed to effectively respond to international crises such as the genocide in Rwanda, the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, the second Iraq War, the Syrian civil war, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and mass atrocities in the Sudanese region of Darfur and Myanmar’s Rakhine State” (Friedman, 2022). In 2020, the then President of the UN General Assembly, Volkan Bozkir, said “competing interests among its members and frequent use of the veto have limited the Council’s effectiveness”, and that even in the most urgent humanitarian crises, the organisation has “failed to provide a timely and adequate response” (UN, 2020). The mistrust in the UN has caused many countries not to cooperate with UN-led attempts to mobilise international cooperation in global crises, such as wars, the health pandemics, and disasters. During the Covid-19 pandemic the UN Security Council was spectacularly absent in providing leadership. The Covid-19 pandemic has “laid bare the United Nations Security Council’s incapability to produce quick solutions to contain the spread of the virus. The UNSC held very few meetings even as the pandemic was spreading death and destruction” (Mehta, 2020). A dispute between the US and China that lasted for three months after the global outbreak of Covid-19, delayed a resolution proposed by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres calling for greater international collaboration to combat the disease, support for poorer countries, and requesting countries in wars to call ceasefires to prioritise combating the disease (Mehta, 2020). The UN released a report in September 2021, “Our Common Agenda”, on the future of multilateralism. The report highlighted the failure of countries to cooperate under the UN banner to tackle global crises and to coordinate efforts to combat the Covid-19 pandemic. Following the UN “Our Common Agenda” report, the UN Secretariat was tasked with developing policy responses to these criticisms of the organisation’s failures. A global gathering, called a Summit for the Future, is planned for September 2023, when the recommendations from the UN report will be discussed and a “New Agenda for Peace” for global peace and security agreed upon (Gowan, 2022). Alongside the planned Summit for the Future, the UN has also appointed a “High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism” convened by Ellen Sirleaf Johnson, the former Liberian President, and Stefan Löfven, the former Swedish Prime Minister, to come up with proposals for a change in global governance structures (Gowan, 2022). The perception that the UN is biased against developing countries has led many developing countries to unite behind calls to reform the organisation. For another, many developing countries, on principle, vote against or abstain on issues in the UN pushed by industrial countries. In the last couple of years, developing countries have increasingly formed blocs opposing industrial countries – turning the UN into an “us (developing countries) versus them (industrial countries)”. This has further undermined the authority, focus, and workings of the UN. Nevertheless, the rising calls from developing countries for reform of the UN has up to now been ignored by industrial countries. For another, the collapse in credibility of the UN has given countries such as Russia and China the opportunity to act unilaterally. The decline of the UN raised the spectre of more copy-cat Russian-like incidents of aggression by powerful countries against more vulnerable ones, making the world even more unstable. Unless something is done about reforming the UN, the rule of law at global level will collapse. Furthermore, unless the UN and other multilateral organisations are made more representative, inclusive, and equal, countries who feel excluded may form alternative global organisations. Many developing countries are increasingly turning their back on the UN – because they have no voice. During the first few weeks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Russia as a permanent member of the Council blocked UN action, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (2022) called for new, more democratic global institutions. Zelensky proposed a new “union of responsible countries” to replace the UN. Zelensky explained that such a new UN would intervene within twenty-four hours of a country experiencing an attack by another country, a natural disaster, or a health crisis, saying that it would be “a union of responsible countries that have the strength and consciousness to stop conflicts immediately”. And many other countries are reluctant to contribute to UN activities, such as peacekeeping. On the ground, because of the perceived bias of the UN, many UN peacekeeping forces have often been wrongly attacked in Africa by locals. UN Security Council – central shortcomings The central weakness of the UN is the Security Council, which is limited to five permanent members – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – with outsized powers. The five have veto power on key UN decisions. The UN Security Council as it is, is simply not relevant to the changing world anymore. The only substantial reform of the UN Security Council introduced since the establishment of the UN in 1945 was in 1965, when the number of elected, non-permanent seats, but without the veto, was increased from six to ten. The UN Charter was amended to make this possible. There have been two broad reform focuses, one to expand the UN Security Council beyond the P5 and the other to reform the Council’s processes, meeting procedures, and administration – the working methods (Kugel, 2009; Swart, 2013; Lehman, 2013). In 1992, an Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council was established to spearhead reforms. The group’s workings were on the basis of consensus. However, the reform group collapsed because of disagreements (Lehman, 2013; Swart, 2013). By 2005, a number of different developing country groups had emerged split along the lines of the type of reforms they wanted. The Africa Group and the Group of Four (G4), consisting of Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India, called for the expansion of permanent seats. Another country grouping, the Uniting for Consensus group, formed by countries including Italy, South Korea, and Argentina, limited their proposals to only an extension of non-permanent seats. Because of the impasse, the UN members in 2008 proposed to conduct what is called intergovernmental negotiations at the General Assembly of the UN. In such negotiations decisions can be resolved by a two-third majority of the General Assembly. However, by 2013, after eight rounds of negotiations, the process collapsed. It has not moved since. Jerry Matjila (2020), South Africa’s UN representative, blamed the UN’s failure to maintain global peace and security as “largely due to its current outdated configuration”, which makes it impossible for the organisation to make decisions. Instead, decisions are made on the self-interests of permanent members and lead to non-permanent members rejecting what appear to be biased decisions by the P5. These members have often abused their power for their own national interests, rather than in the common interests of humankind. This has destroyed the UN’s credibility, forcing other countries to turn their back on the organisation as a place where they have a voice. These abuses, including the invasion of Iraq, for questionable reasons, with many countries outside the P5 opposing it, and the invasion of Libya, which was also opposed by many countries, have undermined the UN. The Security Council members have also dominated the election of UN General Secretaries – which means that general secretaries often do not get wider legitimacy amongst countries. Appointments of heads of UN organisations such as UNESCO, UNDP, and UNCTAD are often also heavily influenced by the P5. The veto power of the five permanent members is particularly anachronistic. The legitimacy of five countries having a veto over decisions at the UN Security Council has been bitterly questioned (UN, 2020). Critics of the veto have rightly said that it has often been arbitrarily used, or used to protect the five countries’ self-interests, rather than the interests of humankind broadly, and that it has undermined the functioning, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the UN. Challenges of reforming the UN administration Some countries have also rightly called for an overhaul in the way that the UN conducts its business, its processes, and meeting formats, called its working methods (Nadin, 2014). Article 30 of the UN Charter (1945) says that the Security Council must adopt rules of procedure, or operating procedures, for its administration. The Security Council adopted its Provisional Rules of Procedure (S/96) in 1946, which have remained provisional ever since. Security Council permanent members have been unenthusiastic about making the changes, beyond the most superficial. The rules of procedure remain untransparent, and lacking in participation and accountability. How decisions on sanctions are made, where peacekeeping forces should be deployed, and how to hold decision-makers accountable are veiled in secrecy. In 2005, the UN World Summit Outcome document proposed that the Council’s way of operating should become more accountable. It recommended the Council improve its working methods, by becoming more transparent and inclusive in its decision-making processes. However, the permanent five members of the Security Council have consistently blocked proposals to make the working methods, procedures, and decisions of the Council accountable. Some non-permanent members have been wanting reform of the Council to simultaneously address the composition of the Council and the working methods of the organ. Others have tried to separate the working methods reforms from those of calls to change the composition of the Council. In 2005, five countries – Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland – formed a group, the S-5, to mobilise for reform of the working methods of the Council. The S-5 group stayed clear of proposing Council composition reforms, and instead, remained within the confines of proposing reforms that will be passed by a simple majority in the UN General Assembly (Lehmann, 2013). In 2012, the S-5 proposed a draft resolution (A/66/L.42/Rev.2) calling for administrative transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability in the workings of the Security Council. It called for greater inclusion of non-permanent members in decision-making on peace-building initiatives, in preparing, monitoring, and ending mission mandates. The S-5 group called for the Security Council to provide information about its activities, decisions, and planned actions, including holding monthly briefings to UN members about these. The S-5 resolution called for the permanent members not only to be transparent in the use of the veto, but to limit the use of the veto. They proposed the permanent members must explain why a veto is used. The group suggested the veto not be used to block UN action against mass atrocities. The S-5 proposals also called for greater participation, inclusion, and transparency in the appointment of the General Secretary of the UN. The appointment of the UN General Secretary has been dominated by the P5. In addition, the S-5 group called for greater participation in the workings on and for the end of domination by permanent members of subsidiary bodies of the UN. The S-5 group proposed a change in the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, away from the current one, where the permanent members can override General Assembly resolutions or ignore them. They argued for greater accountability of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The permanent members rejected the reform proposals from the S-5 group, insisting only they, the P5, can decide on the appropriate reforms of the working methods of the Council. The permanent members put sufficient pressure on the UN administration to make it obligatory for the S-5 group proposals to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly – something not easy to achieve. The P5, despite their political differences, were united in their opposition to the proposed transparency, accountability, and inclusivity reforms. At the time, Russia and China were pitted against the US, France, and the UK over the Security Council’s handling of the Syrian civil war. The opposition by the five permanent members was particularly riling for many non-permanent members, as they put pressure, inducements, and even coerced poor developing countries to support them (Lehmann, 2013). China was accused of pressuring African countries in which it had large investments, loans, and projects, to not support the reforms of the working methods of the Council proposed by the S-5 group (Lehmann, 2013). Furthermore, the Uniting for Consensus group, after initially supporting the S-5 proposals, withdrew their support at the last minute before the vote was to take place. This lobby – the Uniting for Consensus group, nicknamed the “Coffee Club” – which was founded by Italy, Mexico, Egypt, and Pakistan in 1995, has since been joined by others including Argentina, Spain, and Canada. They did so because the G4 group of countries – Brazil, Japan, Germany, and India – which compete over UN reform direction with the Uniting for Consensus group, had supported the S-5 proposals. Following the opposition by the five permanent members and the Uniting for Consensus group, the S-5 withdrew their UN working methods reform resolution. They also withdrew it for tactical reasons, to prevent a precedent being set that at the insistence of the permanent members, critical reforms, such as the working methods reform, would need a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly (Lehmann, 2013). By 2012 the S-5 group’s attempts to reform the working methods of the UN had collapsed. “The failure of the S-5 was first and foremost a show of force on the part of a P5 determined to maintain their control over the representation of member states’ interests and the reform agenda at the UN” (Lehmann, 2013: 3). In 2013, following the failure of the S-5 reform proposals, 27 small and mid-sized members of the UN launched a fresh effort to reform the UN Security Council’s internal workings and its relationship with the broader UN membership, calling themselves Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT). The group included Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland, and Chile. The ACT group stated their objectives as: “[T]he UN Security Council (UNSC), in its present composition, shall work in a more transparent, efficient, inclusive, coherent, legitimate and accountable way, both within its own structure, but also in relationship with the wider membership” (FDFA, 2014). It argued that a Security Council that is accountable was “more legitimate, coherent and efficient” (FDFA, 2014). The ACT group stayed clear of proposing reforms on democratising the Security Council. The group included some of the reform proposals of the S-5 group – four of the S-5 members were ACT members. The ACT group repeated the S-5 group proposal that the Security Council should not use their veto when a decision involves mass human rights abuses. In 2015, the ACT group proposed a Code of Conduct to guide Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, “which calls upon all members of the Council (permanent and elected) to not vote against any credible draft resolution intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities” (FDFA, 2014). The group asked for more due process when the Council decides on sanctions against errant countries. The group called for fairer allocation of penholdership – the role of initiating and negotiating Council draft resolutions, which has in the past been heavily skewed towards allies of the permanent members. Furthermore, it called for more inclusive and transparent processes for the distribution of the Chairs of the Council’s subsidiary bodies. They also want troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations to participate in Council decisions on when and where to send peacekeepers. The ACT group also wants more transparency in the relationship between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The ACT group proposed more open meetings of the Council, regular briefings, and wider consultation before resolutions are prepared by the Council to the Assembly. The ACT group wants more meetings between the UN Security Council and civil society organisations. The UN reform debate so far In 2009, the UN established the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) framework to look at Security Council reforms. The discussions within the forum are considered “informal”, and therefore the UN General Assembly rules of procedure do not apply. Many countries have called for the “urgent need for transparency and application of General Assembly’s rules of procedure to the intergovernmental negotiations” (Naidu, 2020). Some countries have accused the permanent members of deliberately stalling, turning the consolidated text of the “informal” Intergovernmental Negotiations framework into formal negotiations, which will apply the General Assembly’s rules of procedure (Naidu, 2020). At a UN Assembly debate in 2020 on Security Council reforms, Assembly President Volkan Bozkir, from Turkey, said reform is “an unavoidable imperative, both challenging and essential” (UN, 2020). Bozkir warned: “This process can and should be an opportunity to correct the problems of structure and functioning of the Council. It should not create new privileges” (UN, 2020). UN Security Council reform to bring into it more equitable representation, has been on the UN General Assembly programme since 1979, with very little progress. Ronaldo Costa Filho, Brazil’s representative at the UN Assembly, said inclusive representation at the Council is a precondition for restoring the legitimacy of the organisation (UN, 2020). Recent reform proposals argue for the expansion of the 15-member Council beyond the five permanent seats held by the US, UK, Russia, China, and France and the remaining non-permanent membership. The proposals all push for greater regional representation and greater participation in the Council’s affairs, to increase its legitimacy. Changing the Council’s composition and substantial decisions need a two-thirds majority of member states in the UN’s General Assembly. Most of the UN reform debate has focused on reforming the Security Council, specifically to reduce the dominance of the five permanent members. There are essentially three broad overarching reform proposals or lobbies. Some countries, such as Brazil, Japan, Germany, and India – the G4 – have proposed enlarging the Council (Nadin, 2014) by adding at least six new permanent members, which would include Brazil, Japan, Germany, India, two African countries, and introducing an additional three elected seats on the Council. Another proposal is to create “new permanent seats in each region, leaving it to the members of each regional group to decide which member states should sit in those seats, and for how long” (Nadin, 2014). This lobby, the Uniting for Consensus group, proposed a 26-member Council, with nine permanent seats amongst regions, and the remainder of the seats would be held for two-year terms, with the option to get re-elected for another term (UN, 2020). The Uniting for Consensus group rejects an increase in the number of permanent seats in the UN Security Council but argue for the increase in non-permanent seats. They believe that increasing permanent seats will increase the power inequality, whereas increasing non-permanent seats would mean more countries will have access to Council power. The group’s membership now includes 50 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. African countries as a group, have proposed two permanent seats and two additional elected seats for Africa on the Council (Nadin, 2014; UN, 2020). All the different proposals for reform include Africa in one form or the other on a transformed Council. African countries cobbled together their common position under the ambit of the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. At the 2020 UN Assembly debate, the Chinese representative said: “Reform must focus on equality between big and small States, strong and weak, rich and poor” (UN, 2020). South Africa has advocated for a 26-seat Council with an increase in permanent and non-permanent seats and for giving representation to all five regions of Africa in some form on the Council (Matjila, 2020). The US supports “modest” expansion of the Council “as long as it does not diminish the effectiveness of the Council or impact veto power” (UN, 2020). There have been compromise reform proposals suggested by individuals outside the formal UN reform negotiations process. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein (2022), the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and former Jordan Ambassador to the UN, has proposed that a super-majority in the UN General Assembly should override any veto of a permanent member. Such a super-majority of member countries could be based on three-quarters or seven-eighths of the membership vote. Former Colombian Finance Minister, José Antonio Ocampo and former Turkish Economy Minister, Kemal Derviş have similarly proposed a majority veto be introduced. They called it a “large double majority – representing, for example, at least two-thirds of member countries and two-thirds of the world’s population – to override a veto”. Clearly, given that permanent members appear resolutely opposed to relinquishing their veto, such majority vote proposals to override the veto of permanent members should be considered. UN reform opposition, and lack of consensus Currently, any change to the UN Charter – which involves reform of the composition of the UN Security Council – needs a two-thirds majority and must be supported by all permanent members of the UN Security Council. A veto from any of the five permanent members of the Council stops any decision to be taken by the Council. In the past, China has used its veto power to stop efforts to discuss criticisms of its role in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Mehta, 2020). For example, China used its veto power to block sanctions against Pakistan-based militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed Masood Azhar, which has been accused of terrorism for over a decade, until it budged in 2019 (Mehta 2020). Some developing country analysts have accused China of “using a variety of excuses to delay the intergovernmental negotiations process, which has been going on for over 10 years” (Mehta, 2020). The intergovernmental negotiations process refers to country discussions at the UN on reforming the Security Council. India has accused China of dragging its feet on reform, because it did not want India to become a permanent member of the Council (Mehta, 2020; Gupta, 2020). China “supports reasonable and necessary reform” of the Council. The Chinese dragon does not want to abolish the Council or the idea of permanent membership, neither the veto. However, China wants to increase the representation of developing countries on the Security Council (CGTN, 2022). “At present, the makeup of the Security Council is out of balance between the North and the South, and reform should correct the over-representation of developed countries, earnestly improve the representation of developing countries, correct the historical injustice suffered by Africa, and give more opportunities to small and medium-sized countries that come from Asia, Africa, Latin America and Arab countries and small island countries to serve in the Council and play their important role” (Zhang, 2021). Russia has also used its veto power to block UN action against it (UN, 2022). In February 2022, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have demanded the country stop its invasion of Ukraine and withdraw its troops (UN, 2022). Some countries, such as Pakistan and Colombia, oppose Security Council expansion. In the UN Assembly 2020 debate, the Pakistan representative said since the five current permanent members cannot agree on policies, adding additional ones will increase decision paralysis. Columbia’s representative said that expanding the Council will not automatically increase transparency of the structure. There have been a number of proposals not to eliminate, but to limit the veto. Mexico, for example, has argued for limiting, rather than eliminating the veto that permanent members have (UN, 2020). Mexico and France have proposed to retain, but to restrict the instances in which the veto could be used. They propose that the veto be restricted in cases where the UN must urgently intervene when mass atrocities are committed – to prevent paralysing inaction. The UK does not support the elimination of the veto but advocates its responsible use. UK representatives emphasise that the “UK has not used its veto since 1989 and will never use it on any credible draft resolution to prevent or end a mass atrocity” (Allen, 2020). The US and the UK are not enthusiastic about large-scale reforms of the UN Security Council. The UK supports “modest expansion of the Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories”, which includes the “creation of new permanent seats for India, Germany, Japan, and Brazil, as well as permanent African representation on the Council”, to bring “the Security Council’s total membership to somewhere in the mid-twenties” (Roscoe, 2021). The US is “open to a modest expansion of the Council in permanent and non-permanent categories as long as it does not diminish the effectiveness of the Council or impact veto power”. The US is opposed to taking away the veto power of permanent members. The US insists that any alteration in the Council structure must be “made by consensus” (UN, 2020). Historic feuds between individual countries are often also played out in the debate over UN Security Council reform and undermines building developing country consensus on reforms. China got Taiwan expelled from the UN and Security Council membership in 1971. China then took Taiwan’s place on the Security Council, after it became vacant (UN, 1971). South Korea, for example, opposes Japan securing a permanent Security Council seat because of Japan’s former colonisation of South Korea. China has consistently opposed Japan’s admission to the UN Security Council (AFP, 2005). China has insisted that Japan should not be granted permanent status on the Security Council until it atones for its wartime history (AFP, 2005). In 2009, Japan’s public bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat unleashed two days of violent protests in China (Fincher, 2009). Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, at the time said: “I think the core issue in the China-Japan relationship is that Japan needs to face up squarely to history” before China will support its Security Council seat bid (Fincher, 2009). India claims China is blocking its ambition to secure a permanent Council seat because of frosty relations between the two countries (Mehta, 2020). In 2020, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed China has stood in India’s way to becoming a permanent member of the Security Council and into associated UN international fora such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Modi claimed China deliberately tagged India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group to Pakistan’s acceptance, although India, according to Modi, had an “impeccable non-proliferation record”, which he said was not the case with Pakistan (Gupta, 2020). Conclusion: A new UN democratisation agenda New global institutions are needed, or current ones need to be remade to be more relevant to the new, more complex, uncertain, and unpredictable post-Cold War world, where the ideologies of the past, old institutions, and old ways of looking at the world are increasingly becoming largely irrelevant. If the UN is to be retained, it must not only be reformed, but it must also be democratised to ensure equitable representation, participation, and decision-making to ensure the credibility, legitimacy, and embrace of the organisation. The UN’s administration must be democratised to “increase transparency and enable greater engagement of the Council members, especially with small and medium-sized countries in the Council’s work” (PRC, 2022). In fact, the working methods of the UN must be democratised in such a way to allow all members to have equal participation. The idea of a UN Security Council with permanent members is clearly outdated. Yet, permanent members appear resolutely opposed to relinquish their veto. So far, proposals for reform have been mostly about increasing the number of countries on the UN Security Council. Proposals that call for majority votes in the General Assembly – if permanent members refuse to let go of their veto power – to override the veto of permanent members, should be considered. Ultimately, the idea of a limited number of countries having veto power should also be abolished entirely. The veto is not only unfair, makes countries unequal, and is open to abuse, but it has also paralysed the function of the Council. The UN should be democratised in such a way that a few countries – or regional blocs – do not dominate the organisation’s decision-making or are not enabled to manipulate or block action. Importantly, democratisation of UN decision-making must be based on every country having equal power. 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The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) attended the workshop on reframing migration narratives through hope and value-based narratives in the context of migration. The workshop was conducted, in the context the OHCHR’s broader work on social cohesion in South Africa through the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund Joint Programme on Strengthening Migrant Integration and Social Cohesion through Stakeholders’ Engagement, Socio-Economic Activities and Countering Anti-Migrant Narratives in South Africa. The programme is being implemented in collaboration with the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, the International Organisation for Migration, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and UN Women. The workshop took place at the Cape Town Lodge Hotel on Friday, 14 October 2022.

Occasional Paper 7/2022 Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. OCTOBER 2022 by Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPA Hons, ND: Co. Admin Abstract It is universally recognised that reform is necessary and urgent for the United Nations (UN) to reclaim its initial lustre, and that this cannot be complete without a comprehensive reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Failure to do so would feed into the current narrative of an increasingly irrelevant organisation clinging on to old-world structures and processes, which still reflect the post-1945 unipolar geopolitical and economic landscape. The UNSC is assailed by a number of disquiets about its representativity, efficiency, transparency, and accountability. But this paper argues that it is the use – or rather, misuse – of the veto power of the five permanent member countries that is at the core of credible reform. It finds that, despite all its faults, the UN will remain a relevant force in the fight for global peace, security, and sustainable development, as long as it adapts to the new multipolar world order. Rather than a wholesale overhaul, a more sensible – and probably more realistic – way to tackle reform would be to follow a piecemeal approach, with a focus on inclusive multilateralism and natural justice. Setting the scene The Turkish Consulate held a panel discussion in Cape Town at the Westin Hotel on 30 August 2022 regarding the Türkiye government’s UN reform initiative, which it hosted in South Africa, as it has done and is doing in other countries around the world. This specific campaign is summed up by the catchphrase of President Erdoğan that the “world is bigger than five”. It captures the important notion that global peace, justice, and development should be in the hands of all countries at the UN, not only a few. In fact, the use – or rather misuse – of the power held by each of the five permanent UN Security Council members lies at the heart of the Turkish position on UN reform. Türkiye believes that the aim of the reforms should not be to devise a new global structure but rather to reform the existing UN system, and that this cannot be complete without a comprehensive reform of the Security Council. The Council’s membership needs to be restructured to reflect the modern multicultural global political balance, by adopting a more equitable and just representation of member states. The emergence of new centres of power – mainly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America – heralds the end of the hegemony of the West, and the need for a new international system to rise (Acer, 2022). The Turkish president has proposed a rotating membership system wherein all countries would get a chance to be a member at some point, rather than increasing the number of permanent members. The criteria for membership should be reasonable and achievable, to avoid selectivity, which would wall off the majority of member states from the prospect of a seat on the Security Council (Republic of Türkiye, 2005). Another priority identified by Türkiye, is creating greater efficiency, transparency, and accountability – the Council’s credibility is hanging in the balance. In its current state, the UN’s decision-making and interaction processes around major global disputes happen largely behind closed doors and lead only to stalemates, instead of to unlocking the solutions needed. And when those in the UN who make the rules do not themselves follow them, it brings into question the legitimacy of the organisation as a whole. Striking examples are the dozens of resolutions on Palestine the UN Security Council has made that have come to nought and the UN General Assembly resolutions on Israel, which are mostly not applied (Acer, 2022). In addition, Türkiye points out that the relationship between the Council and other states and with the main UN bodies needs to be improved, with better cooperation and coordination. The General Assembly and ECOSOC need to be remedied and revitalised in the face of new challenges for the true success of the UN’s reform. The UN also needs an efficient Secretariat and Human Rights Council (Republic of Türkiye, 2005). The Turkish government remains committed to the UN as the centre of global governance and remains open to discussing any proposal based on these principles. Türkiye is willing to take any action necessary to reach a solution that is inclusive of the interests of the majority of state members. Türkiye’s adoption of the Action Plan for Opening up to Africa in the late 1990s has also been lauded. This Action Plan assigns greater priority to Africa and boosts economic cooperation. This was followed by Türkiye’s announcement in 2005, that it would be "The Year of Africa". Africa is also mindful, and thankful, that the reign of the Ottoman Empire left Africa unscathed in terms of colonial outreach and subjugation. The relationship is therefore based on a different premise to the relationship between Africa and the former colonial regimes, which still impacts Africa’s legacy and, it could be argued, persists, even within organs such as the UN. Maybe food for thought as the path to a reformed UN is navigated. Introduction Undoubtedly, the world is safer today than at the UN’s founding in 1945, notwithstanding the belligerence in Ukraine, Yemen, Sahel, Ethiopia, and the other hotspots around the globe. The UN that emerged from post-WWII had an aspiration of a world free from conflict, hunger, inequality, etc, where nations can solve problems collectively and for the global common good. And it has achieved some major feats since then. Probably its most notable contribution to world peace was the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a response to the atrocities that occurred during World War II. The UN also deployed the first fully-fledged peacekeeping unit, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), to oversee the end of hostilities in the Suez Crisis, leading to the withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces (Pruitt, 2018). An achievement which is particularly relevant today, is the UN’s landmark Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Although this pact has not stopped nuclear proliferation, it has set a major precedent for international cooperation on the arms control issue. Another pressing current issue the UN should be commended for is its lead in taking on the climate crisis. In the global health arena, the WHO led the fight to eradicate smallpox, and won. UNAIDS still leads in the fight against HIV/AIDS, with the lowest levels of new HIV infections and deaths reported this century. In addition, the UN has been at the centre of combatting a number of emergency health situations – including the 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa, and the recent unprecedented Covid-19 pandemic (Pruitt, 2018). The General Assembly’s Declaration of the Rights of the Child was the first global consensus on the matter of children’s rights. Women’s rights are also built into the United Nations Charter. UN Women continues to champion women’s rights, engendered by the 2014 ground-breaking HeForShe campaign (Pruitt, 2018). And the UN’s agencies take care of approximately 60 million refugees and other vulnerable people across the world (Santamaria, 2020). The UN has also won the Nobel Peace Prize numerous times, with the latest recipient being the World Food Programme (WFP), which has been responding to the urgent need for food supplies during global crises for over 60 years. The WFP assisted over 128 million people in 2021 and provides school meals to more than 15 million children. Each day the WFP has up to 5,600 trucks, 100 planes, and 30 ships on the move, delivering food and other assistance (WFP, 2022). The UN and its other multilateral entities, at its founding, reflected the geopolitical and economic power and influence dynamics of the time. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States found itself transformed from a midlevel global power to the leader of the “free world”, alongside the Soviet Union, which had experienced a similarly unexpected rise to power, while there was a sharp decline in the power and economic influence of the European colonial empires (The National WWII Museum, 2020). The Global South was essentially absent from the UN’s establishment process, as they were undergoing processes of independence. Africa, for example, was almost totally absent, with only Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa present. Today, the UN’s functioning and governance mechanisms still reflect the post-1945 geopolitical and economic landscape. This despite the world undergoing tremendous changes and developments since then. The new reality needs to be reflected in the UN architecture. It is not. Need to transform This august body cannot remain untransformed and largely unaffected by these momentous geopolitical and economic shifts that have occurred over the last 77 years, if it wants to remain relevant, credible, and responsive. If it truly wants to be inclusive, not only in terms of geographic inclusion, which it does by way of membership, but also in terms of geopolitical orientation, influence, and the realpolitik, it will need to adapt and become fit for purpose for the new world order that has emerged since 1945. The spectacular rise of China over the past two decades and the relative decline of the US marks the end of the dominance of the West. A massive 35% of world growth pre-pandemic came from China, with 18% from the US, 9% from India, and 8% from Europe. By 2050, the top five largest global economies are most likely to be China, India, US, Brazil, and Indonesia. To survive this global geopolitical transition, the first step is to accept the new multipolar world order, with the US and China at its centre (WEF, 2018). Democratic South Africa has been a proud member of the UN family for a mere 28 years. While it recognises the importance of being part of the global community, it is not blind to the inherent deficiencies, even a measure of unfairness, that is built into the current architecture, which has been of concern over the years, but which has become more pronounced as time goes by. It is universally recognised that reform is necessary and urgent for the UN to reclaim its initial lustre. The UN is assailed by a number of disquiets about its efficacy, effectiveness, representivity, governance mechanisms, mode of operation and functioning across a number of fronts. Despite its many successes, the UN has also had several failures, largely due to ineffective leadership and a limited range of actions at hand. In some instances, it has been the all-encompassing power imbued upon the permanent members of the Security Council that has stalled operations and nullified resolutions. Simply put, while the UN has the power to pass resolutions, it often lacks the punch to enforce them. As a result, the UN presents with unfair decision-making processes, lack of inclusion of new and emerging global powers, and few accountability mechanisms in place (Gardiner, 2007). Critics of the UN also point to the overly bureaucratic and slow way in which it deals with development issues. Former UN officials have criticised its lack of coherent strategic planning, outdated structure and business practices, and staggering personnel costs. In fact, as the UN has expanded more and more over the years, many of its bodies now have overlapping mandates, and it has become a rather unwieldy organisation (The Guardian, 2015). Analysts have over the years identified a number of problems and obstacles causing the need to improve the UN. This includes, amongst others: In the broader context, it needs to move from a state-centric model of international governance towards a citizen-orientated model. The domination of the Security Council, its exclusive power, self-interest of Council members, and lack of checks and balances The veto power Non-participation of UN members in Security Council decisions Lack of transparency of Security Council meetings Procedures to amend the Charter Financial and political realities. But principally, it is the veto power of the P5 countries that has remained intact, despite numerous attempts at reform over the years, that has seized the minds of those arguing for reform. The Security Council’s veto power is granted solely to its five permanent members – the US, Britain, France, China, and Russia – and allows them to block any substantive resolution, rendering it invalid. The UN is shackled, watching on as these powerhouses decide on matters to suit their own interests, rather than the interests of the international community or those of justified sides. Ostensibly, the P5 hold the whip hand through vetoes and the 10 temporary members of the Security Council are simply window dressing (The Guardian, 2015). Attempts at reform have been further impacted by labyrinthine bureaucratic processes and budget constraints. This is especially evident to us in Africa with reference to peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, etcetera, given our challenging economic levels. The UN’s failure to prevent the mass killing of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, and its slow response to the Sudan genocide are shameful episodes that will haunt the UN for generations (Gardiner, 2007). The UN, despite its best efforts to live up to its Charter and noble aims, suffers from a lack of legitimacy and a crisis of confidence in its abilities to effect the requisite changes. The Charter is asymmetrical in its outlook and functioning. There are also many flashpoints in the world and the UN is often criticised for not doing enough to quell or address such conflicts. In a number of instances, it has not intervened in these conflicts, because it was paralysed by competing self-interest, principally of the P5 nations. Since 1982, the US has used its veto power to block 35 resolutions critical of Israel. Other permanent members have put a stop to 27 resolutions over the same time period. And recently, UN intervention in Syria has been blocked by Russia and China (The Guardian, 2015). Africa’s UN position and ambition Since 1963, members of the African group have been represented in the UN as a region, with the creation of the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), now the African Union. It is Africa’s firm contention that the UN must work more closely with the AU to address and resolve Africa’s myriad challenges. In 2018, for example, over 50% of UNSC meetings, 60% of its outcome documents, and 70% of its resolutions with Chapter VII mandates – that is, action in respect of threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression – concerned African peace and security issues; the majority by far. Currently, there are 12 peacekeeping operations being led by the UN Department of Peace, with six of those in Africa alone – in Western Sahara, Central African Republic, Mali, Congo, Abyei, and South Sudan (UN Peacekeeping, 2022). Yet, no African country is yet a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The 2005 Ezulwini Consensus represents the AU’s unified position regarding UN reform. The main elements relate to UNSC reform; the question of equal representation, in numerical and geographical aspects; the question of effectiveness of UNSC actions, linked to equality and transparency; and the question related to improving working methods through the implementation of new procedures for the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and UNSC. The Sirte declaration at the 5th African Union (AU) Assembly re-affirmed the strong commitment to the Ezulwini declaration. It is acknowledged that there was no agreement on categories of membership, eligibility, number of seats, system of rotation and the so-called veto power (deadlock result) and that further work needs to be done, but there seems to be agreement as to the areas that need to be reformed. There are of course some contentious internal issues, but it is believed that these can be overcome (ISI, 2020). South Africa is committed to the Ezulwini Consensus. What is the essence of the Ezulwini Consensus? In the consensus document, the AU expressed the need for the UN General Assembly to be strengthened. While it should retain its intergovernmental character and remain essentially as a forum for intergovernmental dialogue, measures should be taken to improve its effectiveness, including its ability to ensure that its decisions are implemented (ISI, 2020). Furthermore, the relationship between the General Assembly and UNSC needs to reflect a more balanced distribution of competence (AU, 2005). Once again, keep in mind that in 1945, when the UN was formed, most of Africa lacked representation. And in 1963, when the first UNSC reform took place, the continent was still not properly represented. Now that Africa is fully represented in the UN, it is, however, better placed to influence reforms. The AU’s goal, therefore, is for Africa to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the UNSC, which is considered the principal decision-making organ in matters relating to peace and security (AU, 2005). In the AU’s opinion, Africa should be allocated at least two permanent seats on the UNSC. These appointments should be accompanied with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent members, including the right of veto, should the principle of veto rights be maintained. Although opposed to the principle of a veto, the continent’s leadership argues that, as long as it exists, it should be made available to all permanent members of the UNSC as a matter of common justice. Furthermore, Africa should be allocated a further five non-permanent seats on an expanded UNSC (AU, 2005). The selection of Africa’s representatives on the UNSC should be the AU’s responsibility. Criteria should include continent-wide representation, and the chosen member states’ capacity to represent the continent and to effectively execute its responsibilities within the UNSC (AU, 2005). Although the Ezulwini Consensus stipulates that the AU reserves the right to elect the two permanent members to the UNSC, a number of African states have already pronounced themselves ready to assume such a seat (Anon., 2020). A range of reform initiatives The Ezulwini position is one of a number of other initiatives, whilst different in detail, similar in principle. The G4 proposal The G4 (Germany, India, Brazil, and Japan) believe the UN Security Council structure is out of date. There is an imbalance of influence in the Council that cannot be righted with only non-permanent members joining the UN. Their position is that expansion in both categories is crucial to demonstrating the balance of current global realities. And that it is unacceptable that entire continents, such as Africa, are excluded from permanent seats on the Council (The Economic Times, 2021). The G4 proposal suggests adding six new permanent members to the Security Council (two seats each for Asia and Africa and one seat for the Western European and Others Group and the Latin American and Caribbean Group respectively). They would also like to see four or five non‑permanent members added to the Security Council (one seat each for Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and one or two seats for Africa). They have also proposed several reforms to the working methods, including that new members initially give up the right of veto and that the issue be resolved at a review conference 15 years after the amendment of the Charter kicks in (Federal Foreign Office, 2022). L.69 Group The L.69 Group is a cross-regional grouping of developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific pushing for lasting and comprehensive reform of the UNSC. The L.69 Group is “bound by the firm conviction that expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of UNSC membership is imperative to better reflect contemporary world realities” and achieve a more accountable, representative, transparent, and relevant UNSC (IAS Parliament, 2022). The L.69 Group supports the Ezulwini Consensus, including that the veto should either be abolished or extended to all permanent members. The group proposes adding six new permanent members, two from Africa, two from Asia, one from Latin America and the Caribbean, and one from WEOG. Additionally, L.69 advocated for a rotating non-permanent seat for small island developing states (SIDS) (ISI, 2020). The Arab Group The Arab Group, which is made up of 22 members, supports a real and comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council. The group believes the Council needs to be made more representative, transparent, neutral, and credible. It continues to promote its position of gaining a permanent seat for one of its members and calls for a fairer Arab representation in non-permanent UN Security Council seats. The group points to objective criteria – the Arab population density, and the number of Arab countries in the UN and Arab-related conflicts often found on the Council’s agenda – as compelling factors in this decision (Hatim, 2021). Uniting for Consensus The Uniting for Consensus group of 12 countries, nicknamed the Coffee Club, wants the proposed UNSC non-permanent membership expanded from 10 to 20 members, serving for a two-year term, in addition to the five permanent members. The 20 non-permanent members would be elected as follows: six from Africa; five from Asia; four from Latin America and the Caribbean; three from Western Europe and Other States; and two from Eastern Europe. Each geographical group would decide on arrangements for re-election or rotation of its members, including a fair subregional representation. The group also calls for more transparent, inclusive, and accountable working methods in the Council. For instance, restraint on the use of the veto; improved decision-making and performance processes; greater access to information; adequate consultation and cooperation between the main UN bodies (UN, 2005). Lack of reform holds danger for proliferation There is a concern with regard to no movement, the non-ability of the UN to reform itself. The lack of UN representivity and its inability to solve global issues, and the sense that it is the P5 that drive the process, has resulted in the proliferation of alternative regional and transnational blocs. There are additional expansions in the pipeline. A lack of reform will aid the formation of alternative multilateral fora, which holds the danger that it may well feed into narrow regionalism that has the potential to result in polarisation. We have witnessed the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement, the formation (and now on the cards, proposed expansion) of BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative, etc. We have seen how the BRICS bank and other initiatives have come to augment the Bretton Woods Institutions. The development of these blocs in itself should not be unduly criticised, they are good initiatives and overlap in some ways with the work of the UN. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a forum of 120 countries not aligned with or against any major power bloc, has ceaselessly battled alongside the UN against oppressive foreign occupation and domination to ensure those vulnerable to these attacks have their inalienable right to self-determination and independence preserved (GoI, 2012). BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – is important in bringing together the major emerging economies of the world. Although primarily their focus has been on inter-BRICS financial, trade and economic cooperation, they have become synonymous with defending global governance, economic globalisation, free trade, and climate action. They are also well positioned to stand side by side with the UN in efforts to eradicate hunger and poverty (UN News, 2017). There is also considerable overlap in the goals and strategies of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Many of the UN agencies are in fact involved in the BRI, which is integral to the SDGs as a primary vehicle for sustainable projects, sources of green finance, and poverty alleviation initiatives across Europe, Asia, and Africa (Lewis et al., 2021). However, the fear is that, should these countries continue to feel excluded, overridden and marginalised from the decision-making processes of the UNSC, they could morph into alternative geopolitical multilateral institutions competing against the UN processes. Failure by the UN to reform would feed into the narrative of an increasingly irrelevant organisation clinging on to old-world structures and processes, with a growing sense of disenfranchisement amongst many of its members. This would obviously not bode well for global coordination against worldwide threats, such as, for example, climate change. It is the author’s considered view that inclusive multilateralism and natural justice should be the focus. These are, after all, the noble values enshrined in the UN Charter that inspired the world in 1945. But multilateralism should be built on the principles of equality, inclusiveness, and fairness. And the current UN system, it is argued, is not. Concerns relating to non-reform have lingered for too long Concerns about the effectiveness of the Security Council have festered for decades. In 1993, then Secretary General Kofi Annan, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, called for “radical reform” of the UN system, acknowledging that the United Nations no longer meets the needs of its members. Annan stated: “We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded.” He added, “I believe the time is ripe for a hard look at fundamental policy issues, and at the structural changes that may be needed in order to strengthen them.” Annan criticised the US' pre-emptive strike doctrine, which he called a challenge to the UN's founding principles. But he said the organisation must show it can act effectively when member states have security concerns. The secretary general formed a high-level panel to advise on how the UN could better respond to new threats to security posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (McMahon, 2003). Former UNSG, Ban Ki-moon said at the 70th UN General Assembly, “Reaching our sustainable development goals means organising ourselves better. Let there be no more walls or boxes; no more ministries or agencies working at cross-purposes. Let us move from silos to synergy, supported by data, long-term planning, and a will to do things differently” (Ban, 2015). In the corridors of the UN, they are aware of the problems at the heart of the institution and what needs to change. And they are mindful that there are different modes of reform (far-reaching versus modest). This applies to both structural and working methods reform. The UNSC must be enlarged, ideally with more permanent members possessing a veto. Alternatively, it should do away with the veto entirely and develop mediation and effective decision-making processes. These need to align with the principles of equity, representativeness, efficiency, equality, democracy, and geopolitical and economic realities of the world today. But reform stubbornly stagnates. On 28 June 2022, Loraine Sievers, Director of Security Council Procedure, told the Council that “its outdated working methods needed improvement in order to create a transparent, nimble 15-nation organ capable of tackling contemporary global challenges”. She said that fragmentation within the Council due to geopolitical troubles has placed it under serious scrutiny, exposing the truth about the powers the Council actually holds. Transparency with regards the Council’s proceedings is also an issue, she said. “It is you, the present Council members, who have full control over how to strike this balance between the public and private.” She believes the opacity encircling the workings of the Council has the potential to reduce a sense of trust and legitimacy. But if the Council, in good faith, remains open about its working methods, this could warm up the relationship with the wider membership, nurturing cooperation (UNSC, 2022). Sievers presented wide-ranging proposals that included the use of the veto, the system of drafting resolutions, and reforming the sanctions regime. Yet the Sievers proposals show that the concerns of SG Kofi Annan have not been acted upon since 2003. The question is: Will reforms be enacted now, and if not, what will propel the P5 to act in the wider interest of humanity, rather than in their national (self) interest? The reform priorities We know what is necessary. The UNSC needs to be reformed. It needs to be expanded in a manner that promotes greater regional inclusion. Most of the literature points to this aspect as the most focussed-on element of the reform discussion. Currently, entire regions continue to be excluded – notably Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Caribbean – from the permanent membership category. The 15‑member Council must be expanded beyond the current five permanent seats and its non-permanent membership to include nations from the north and south; big and small states; strong and weak; rich and poor. But it can be argued that as important as regional inclusion is – in that it ensures enriched discussion, more inclusive decision-making, and holistic consultation – the most important, is to tackle P5 veto rights. Often, competing self-interest between P5 members results in paralysis of UN processes, meaning that the endgame is zero action. For years, Russia’s veto power has stymied resolutions against its military terrorising of Ukraine and Syria (Falk, 2022). The UNSC could not even pass a resolution on the all-important topic of Covid-19 because of the United States’ insistence that there be no reference to the WHO. Similarly, when discussing the political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, no substantive discussion was possible due to opposing resolutions by Russia and the US (Roth, 2019). The contention is that the principle of recusal should apply if a veto power is the subject of discussion; it is not the case currently. The principle of recusal says that any party who has a self-interest in, or is biased or prejudiced against, a matter on the table for discussion should voluntarily refrain from participating for the purpose of avoiding a conflict of interest. It cannot be right – it goes against all principles of natural justice – for a P5 country to exercise its veto right on a resolution in which it is the topic of discussion. It cannot be player and referee at the same time. In any judicial system around the world, where there is a conflict of interest, the conflicted party needs to recuse themselves from the discussion and decision. Not so in the UNSC. It is this single issue that is causing the greatest harm to the credibility of the UN, and which is the prime driver of the perceived and real credibility and trust deficit. And an appeal mechanism needs to be found, at least as relates to UNSC decisions that are not supported by the majority in the General Assembly. It could be that UNSC decisions not supported by a motion in the General Assembly, may be reviewed by the General Assembly, or some other body, and amended or sent back by means of a super-majority decision. It could be an alternative mediation mechanism. It could be something else. But history has taught us – and the South African story is a prime example – when a minority continues to inflict its views on the majority without a credible means of mediation, trouble looms. So, it is clear from the decades-old debate, that the UNSC and the P5 veto rights need to be tackled to address the credibility and trust deficit. Further research and consultations are not necessary to figure out what needs to be reformed, nor what the reforms should look like. We all know what needs to be done. The prospects for reform The question arises as to what is feasible given the prevailing power dynamics? The P5 will be reluctant to cede power. Truthfully, they are not about to. So, does it even help to waste time and resources on the topic? It seems that it is the P5 themselves who have to come to the conclusion that it is necessary. There is no other overriding mechanism. We have to appeal to their sense of justice. We need to get them to understand the danger of polarisation and what it holds for world peace and development. Only when the P5 come to this insight, will reform advance. Countries need to heighten their diplomatic efforts in this regard. In light of the above, perhaps rather than a wholesale overhaul, a more sensible – and probably more realistic – way to tackle reform would be to follow a piecemeal approach. Given the current political situation, demands for far-reaching reforms targeting changes to the UN Charter, however well they may sound, are unlikely to provoke solidarity or movement amongst UN member states. But partial measures taken over a period of time, such as reforming the working methods to increase their effectiveness and efficiency, may just be the ticket to change. It is proposed that the P5 be directly engaged about the veto power, with careful consideration of the political will and interests of these member states. The options need to be seen as cost-saving or, at least, cost-neutral. Two main proposals vis-à-vis the veto power stand out. The first is not to eliminate, but to limit the veto. Mexico and France have proposed to retain the veto power, but argue that the veto should be restricted in cases where urgent intervention by the UN is required – for instance, when mass atrocities are committed – to prevent the prevailing paralysing inaction (UN, 2022). The second option is the idea that a super-majority in the UN General Assembly should have the authority to override any veto of a P5 member. This super-majority of member countries could be based on three-quarters or seven-eighths of the membership vote. In a similar vein, former Colombian Finance Minister José Antonio Ocampo and former Turkish Economy Minister Kemal Derviş have proposed “a large double majority – representing, for example, at least two-thirds of member countries and two-thirds of the world’s population – to override a veto” (Friedman, 2022). Considering the resolute reluctance of the P5 to relinquish their veto power, such a proposal may be a tall order. Another angle to use in trying to convince the member states of this piecemeal approach, is to bring their attention to the real threat of increased proliferation of competing regional and international organisations. If the P5 members continue to wield their power in selfish ways, they may end up losing it altogether, as other states withdraw their support. A partial measure – an olive branch, if you will – should be offered to appease aggrieved states, in the form of either modest expansion of the Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories, or a rotational format. The UK supports the “creation of new permanent seats for India, Germany, Japan and Brazil, as well as permanent African representation on the Council”, which would bring total membership into the mid-twenties (ISS, 2022). And may keep the wolves at bay, for us all. Conclusion As difficult and as near impossible as it seems, this should not inhibit our ambition for meaningful change and reform at the UN. Reform is the right thing to do and will assist with peace, security, and sustainable development. And the UN is worth saving. Despite all its faults, the UN remains a relevant force. It has helped ward off hunger, poverty, and violence for hundreds of millions of people. It leads the fight against climate change. Its agencies take care of approximately 60 million refugees and other vulnerable people across the world. UN observers help ensure free and fair elections worldwide. Its peacekeepers have intervened in conflicts where few countries would consider doing so alone. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has ensured the limitation of nuclear weapons. It also remains relevant in terms of providing an enormous range of basic services that people take for granted. And while there are a growing number of alternative platforms where world leaders can engage in multilateral cooperation, there is no entity that can equal the established capacity of the UN and its agencies across the globe (ISI, 2020). It seems we need to find the sweet spot between structures and processes within the UN, where power can be shared fairly for the benefit of all humankind. And we need to find it soon. The geopolitical world is shifting rapidly, and we are faced with ever-increasing global threats, creating enormous uncertainty within the international system. The danger of a major collapse is real. Climate change, specifically, the great equaliser, will not wait for us to come to a consensus on who is more worthy of holding the power. It is our UN. We must persist. The global challenges are too urgent and too great for us to give up. We must make it work. Humanity is relying on us to get it right. References Acer, Y. 2022. 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[accessed: 7 October 2022]. Lewis, D.J., Yang, X., Moise, D. et al. 2021. Dynamic synergies between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, Journal of International Business Policy, 4: 58-79. McMahon, R. 2003. UN: Path To Reform Complicated By Differences On Iraq. [Online] Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/1104564.html [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Pruitt, S. 2018. 10 Memorable Moments in United Nations History. [Online] Available at: https://www.history.com/news/10-memorable-moments-in-united-nations-history [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Republic of Türkiye. 2005. Turkey´s Priorities for the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. [Online] Available at: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-priorities-for-the-60th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly.en.mfa#:~:text=Turkey%20believes%20that%20a%20comprehensive,must%20ensue%20within%20the%20Council [accessed: 7 October 2022]. Roth, R. 2019. 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[Online] Available at: https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1f/k1fncdy0el [accessed: 7 October 2022]. UN News. 2017. 'BRICS' countries well placed to help lead global efforts to tackle hunger – UN agency. [Online] Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/06/559662 [accessed: 7 October 2022]. World Economic Forum (WEF). 2018. 5 facts you need to understand the new global order. [Online] Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/five-facts-you-need-to-understand-the-new-global-order/ [accessed: 7 October 2022]. World Food Programme (WFP). 2022. WFP at a glance. [Online] Available at: https://www.wfp.org/stories/wfp-glance [accessed: 7 October 2022]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) was requested to contribute towards an extensive review of local government being undertaken by City Insights on behalf of the Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs (COGTA). The ISI’s input focused on the model of local government, which reviewed the Policy and Legislative Framework, key focus areas such as demarcation, elections and political participation. The ISI’s recommendations included issues, such as, amongst others: Improved public participation mechanisms Reviewing the Municipal Electoral Act to provide for coalition arrangements and constitutional eventualities The need for assessing the effectiveness of coordination between the three spheres of government Strategies to improve continuity of councillor representation and executive competencies

On Tuesday 20 September 2022 the Inclusive Society Institute hosted another successful Constitutional training workshop. This time at it was the turn of Voortrekker High School, in Wynberg. The workshop titled “Taking the Constitution to the People: Know your Rights and Responsibilities” is aimed at young adults who are either in their final years of school or who have recently completed their schooling. The workshop aims to raise awareness of how young people can apply the Constitution in their day-to-day lives. Though the Constitution seemed distant and inaccessible to the learners of Voortrekker before the session, many reported to have gained considerable insight from the workshop while some suggested that they now felt inspired to contribute to civil activity and others to study law. The next workshop will take place at Westerford High School on 18 October.

On Tuesday, 13 September 2022, the Inclusive Society Institute launched its Constitutional awareness programme at Herzlia High School in Cape Town. The new workshop, appropriately titled “Taking the Constitution to the people: Know your Rights and Responsibilities”, will systematically be rolled out to the youth, primarily at high schools, over the next year. The goal of the workshop is to enable students to gain an understanding of the history of the South African Constitution, how it was created, how it is structured, and how it applies to our day-to-day lives. This practical course is designed to empower citizens with knowledge about the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and guide them on how they can use it in their day-to-day lives.

In response to Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs’ invitation to make a submission on the Electoral Amendment Bill that is currently before Parliament, the ISI forwarded its comments on 16 September 2022. The ISI is promoting a Multi-Member Constituency model, which is diametrically opposed to that contained in the Bill. The Institute is however following a pragmatic approach by proposing a two-step approach to the electoral reform. Step one would entail passing the current legislation before Parliament, which is a minimalistic adjustment providing for the current PR system to continue with a provision for independent candidates to also stand for election to the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures. This should be for the 2024 general election only. The second step, the ISI proposes, should be broader reform in time for the 2029 general election, which should provide for some form of constituency representation. Furthermore, the ISI is of the view that the current Bill before Parliament is not constitutional. It has made proposals to the Portfolio Committee to remedy the clauses deemed not being able to pass constitutional muster. The Institute full submission, legal opinion and electoral proposals can be accessed by following the links below: [Click here for submission] [Click here for legal opinion] [Click here for the ISI’s electoral proposals]