top of page

Democratising the United Nations

Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609

Mill Street

Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R

Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of

the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council



Democratising the United Nations

by Prof William Gumede Associate Professor, and former Convener, Political Economy, School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand; and former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg).


Russia’s war with Ukraine – and global responses to it – is not only remaking the post-Cold War world, but has shown that many existing global institutions, particularly the United Nations (UN) have lost their credibility, relevance, and authority. Unless something is done about reforming the UN into a more credible organisation, the global rule of law will collapse. This article explores the central weaknesses of the UN and the reform processes aimed at restoring its credibility. It concludes that the UN should be democratised in such a way that a few countries – or regional blocks – do not dominate the organisations decision-making or are not enabled to manipulate or block action.


Russia’s war with Ukraine – and globally responses to it, is not only remaking the post-Cold War world, has shown that many global institutions established to keep peace between countries, have become redundant.

The UN was established in 1945 following the end of the Second World War, by 51 countries to maintain international peace and security. The United Nations, spectacular absent in the invasion by Russia, joined by Belarus, of Ukraine, have been spectacularly absent in most of the recent violent conflicts between countries. This underscores the fact that the global organisation established after the Second World War to prevent conflict between countries appear to have lost its credibility, relevance and authority.

It has been left to individual country leaders, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) and the G20 to desperately try to end the hostilities. The UN was also absent in the descent into chaos last year of Afghanistan when the Taliban took over, and the government and citizens fled the country en masse. The UN has also been largely silent in the face of China’s ongoing threats against Taiwan, which the Chinese dragon views as part of it – which Taiwan rejects, and not a sovereign country.

Unless something is done about reforming the UN into a more credible organisation, the global rule of law will collapse. The decline of the UN raised the spectre of more copy-cat incidents of aggression by powerful countries against more vulnerable one, making the world even more unstable, violent and chaotic. Without a credible UN, the world will increasingly be divided between countries that have nuclear military versus those who do not have. Many countries, having seen how Russia used its military power to dominate the US, EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), will desperately try to acquire or shore up nuclear military abilities.

Clearly, the UN in its current form is not fit for purpose to address current and future global challenges. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: “The credibility and effectiveness of global institutions is being questioned. The reason for this is that there has been no change in these institutions despite the passage of time. These institutions reflect the mindset and realities of the world 75 years ago” (Mehta 2020).

Even France, a permanent member of the UN Security Council has conceded that the UN Security Council has reached its sell by date. French President Emmanuel Macron said recently UN Security Council “no longer produces useful solutions today” (French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs 2021). The UN, and other global institutions, laws and rules will have to be collectively democratized or abolished and new more relevant, consensual ones created, or the world plunge into more Russia-Ukraine like conflicts and eventually a global nuclear Third World War.

New multipolar world

Many of the global multilateral organisations that anchored the post-Cold World War consensus, whether the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Trade Organisations (WTO) have also lost their credibility. The post-Cold War Western-led global order, assumptions and consensus are in profound crisis of credibility.

The US-led global hegemony wilted in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 global financial crises, unilateral military interventions in developing countries, without seeking global consensus and the often manipulation of multilateral organisations for self-interest, rather than for the greater good of the world.

Furthermore, during the 2007/2008 global financial crisis some of the neoliberal economic thinking that underpinned the US post-Cold War ideology hegemony lost its lustre, when, in order to save economies, companies and livelihoods, Western countries used decidedly un-neoliberal tools, such as state investment in private businesses.

Since the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the communist alliance led by the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR); the US-European Union-led Western alliance has dominated global political, economic power, institutions and ideology. This has now come to an end.

The world has now changed into a multipolar one, away from the domination of the US-led global order which has held sway in the post-Cold World War era, into one where power will become more evenly spread across regions and countries across the globe.

The world has seen the economic, political and ideas’ rise of emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia and Turkey and others, which have resulted in a multipolar global order, which has challenged the US-EU-led Western dominated global order. It is very likely that instead of one or two powers, dominating the world, we are likely going to see a world where there is not one single as in the case of the US in the post-Cold World War or two competing, as was with the US and the USSR during the Cold War, but multiple power poles.

The US shambolic withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, when the Taliban took over, and the government and citizens fled the country en masse, most probably was the symbol of loss of its global hegemony. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in the decline of the US-EU post-Cold World war hegemony and had tried prior to the launch of his invasion of Ukraine, to refashion the old USSR alliance, against the US-European dominated world, but this time, with Russia, with old allies of the USSR and new emerging powers. As part of the strategy to reintegrate the old USSR, Putin in 2015, for reintegrated some of the former economies of the Soviet Union into a regional trade bloc between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia, called the Eurasian Economic Union.

Developing countries are increasingly clubbing together as a group in international fora. African countries are collaborating with each other or with others as a group more. Africa now account for more then a quarter of the total membership of the UN. There have been several initiatives by developing countries to build alternative global institutions. In 2003, India, Brazil and South Africa established an alliance, IBSA, which promised to align the globe’s largest developing country democracies, across continents to trade with each other, to oppose the dominance by industrial countries of global trade, rules, ideas and institutions, and share development experiences.

IBSA was established after India, Brazil and South Africa had been invited at the time as observers to the 2003 G8 summit of industrial countries in France, and left feeling their own fates and that of the developing world are being decided by a small group of unrepresentative developed countries.

Following the 2003 G8 summit, India, Brazil and South Africa strongly felt they must formally club together, to push for a bigger say in global governance for developing countries, to diversify their trade away from industrial countries and to share their unique lessons of the twin pursuit of development and democracy amidst multicultural societies, with deep poverty and inequalities.

In 2009, BRICS was established in 2009 by China, Russia, India and Brazil, with South Africa joining in 2010. For its members, the BRICS partnership offers geopolitical allies for these countries to press for the restructuring of the global trade, economic and political architecture to give Africa and developing countries a fairer say – and therefore better able to compete - in relation to their Western counterparts.

The potential protective wall of BRICS membership may provide individual members the policy space to make independent development, trade and political policy decisions – which may not otherwise be the case, yet so crucial for the sustainable economic development of individual. The BRICS partnership also offers participating countries the space to resolve disputes, whether trade, political or diplomatic constructively. The new multipolar world demands a new kind of the UN or a different organisation entirely.

Post-Cold War multilateral global institutions seen as marginalising developing countries

The post-Cold War multilateral global institutions have in the past been dominated by the US-EU often for purely self-interest, rather than for the global good – which has undermined their authority, effectiveness and credibility among the majorities of countries in the world. This has fostered a global climate where it appears dominant countries can get away with breaking global political, economic, legal, market and trade rules for self-interests – while developing countries cannot.

Developing countries have less say within global institutions – which set the rules of the global market, whether the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Trade Organisations (WTO). Some scholars have referred to the phenomenon as global apartheid: industrial powers had more power than developing countries, particularly African countries (Bond 2004).

For example, since the Second World War, the US has always chosen the president of the World Bank “using the appointment as a vehicle to advance American economic interests, power and development priorities around the globe” (Zumbrun 2019). Europeans have traditionally selected the head of the International Monetary Fund.

The World Bank is owned by 189 member countries. The members elect a board of executive directors. However, industrial countries have in the main larger voting shares than developing countries and have more power in decision-making. The US has the largest voting share at around 16%. This is above the 15% share threshold which gives a country veto power on key decisions – the US is the only country with veto power at the World Bank.

Many developing countries were critical of the US favourite, Jim Yong Kim, for World Bank president in 2012 (Zumbrun 2019). Following Kim’s early retirement in 2019, three years before his term ended, divisions sharpened between industrial and developing countries over who should replace him.

Industrial countries often punish other countries or multilateral organisations if these adopt policies which go against the domestic policies of industrial countries. Developing countries do not have the global power to react similarly. In 2017, the administration of US President Donald Trump, withdrew the US membership of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (Beauchamp 2017; John 2017).

UNESCO in 2011 had admitted the Palestinian territories to the organisation as an independent member state called Palestine. In the UNESCO decision to admit Palestine, 104 countries voted in favour of allowing Palestine, while 14 opposed it, with 52 states abstaining. A US law stipulated that US funding will be cut from an organisation recognising an independent Palestine.

Global development institutions have been criticised for being biased towards Western countries at the expense of African and developing countries, which have little say in the control, policies and ideas of these institutions.

In the current global economic system, developing economies do not have the policy independence to use monetary and fiscal policies to stimulate their own economies – lest they face a market, investor and Western media backlash. Many unilateral monetary policies adopted by industrial countries to deal with their domestic crises often destabilise African and developing countries.

Global capital markets are also against many African and developing countries. So unfavourable is the current global political, financial architecture and cultural systems that policies, decisions and events which are triggered in industrial countries, over which developing countries have little say, often undermines well-being of developing countries.

When in financial crisis, western countries often come up with unilateral monetary policies which are destabilising African and developing countries. For example, these governments, often manipulate the value of their currencies to improve their export competitiveness. Again, African and developing countries do not have the same power to come up with unilateral monetary policies to protect their economies, strengthen their currencies and boost employment, they will face backlash from Western governments, global financial institutions and markets (Panitchpakdi 2011).

In fact, when in financial crisis, African and developing countries are often force-fed economic, political and trade policies – from global financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, which are often astonishingly inappropriate, in return for funding by these multilateral organisations.

If African and developing countries do not follow the prescripts they are often punished by the markets, withdrawal of investment by the private sector, diplomatic isolation and negative global media reporting.

Western countries often come up with unilateral monetary policies which are destabilising African and developing countries. For example, these governments, often manipulate the value of their currencies to improve their export competitiveness.

Following the past global financial crisis, the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and the Japanese central bank introduced quantitative easing in 2015. However, these quantitative easing policies eroded the competitiveness of emerging market economies (Rajan 2014; Sablik 2019; Powell 2018). The former Reserve Bank of India Governor Raghuram Rajan (2014) has rightly warned that the US Federal Reserve’s monetary policy was causing spillovers in emerging markets, with seesawing capital flows, volatility and the destabilizing of financial markets.

Global trade rules and laws are stacked against African and developing countries. High tariff and non-tariff barriers in industrial countries block African countries from exporting value-added products which create more jobs and more wealth to more people, to industrial countries (Africa Progress Panel 2012). African free trade agreements with Western countries, such as the Partnership Agreements with the European Union and the African Growth and Opportunity Act with the US are mostly disadvantaging African and developing countries.

If African and developing countries object to global rules stacked against them, they are often threatened with retaliation, whether blocking their products withdrawal of trade or development aid sanctions or the political isolation of specific countries (Gumede 2012). African and developing countries have few recourses for trade, economic and political disputes with developed countries - they are marginalized in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Africa Progress Panel 2012).

How the world should respond to global crises, reform of international organisations, laws and rules and appointments of heads of UN agencies and multilateral institutions now increasingly divide the world into Western countries versus developing countries.

Increasingly, developing countries have tried to circumvent global multilateral organisations or establish alternative global institutions to the existing ones, where they can. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping have established a series of alternative global institutions rivalling existing ones, like the BRICS Development Bank (Gumede 2012).

Appointments of UN general secretaries and heads of agencies

The Security Council members have also dominated the election of UN General Secretaries – which means that general secretaries increasingly are often not get wider legitimacy among countries. The 5 permanent members have often forced their own choices of UN general secretaries.

As the world’s get more uncertain, dangerous and complex, UN heads forced on other countries by the Security Council’s 5 permanent members, have recently often been bland figures, almost invisible who lack global country support beyond. In the past UN general secretaries were larger than life figures, with global personal or country authority, credibility and reputations, many who could through their own personal appeal persuade country leaders.

The five permanent members also dominates the appointments of heads of UN agencies, such as UNESCO, UNDP and the World Health Organisation. And at times when non-permanent members prevail in the appointments of heads of UN agencies, these appointees are often undermined by permanent members, as it has been the case with WHO head Tedros Tedros Ghebreyesus, whose appointment was largely engineered by non-permanent members.

A case in point was the appointment of the head of the World Health Organisation in 2017 and his reappointment in 2022 (Africa Progress Panel 2012).

Developing countries successfully pushed for the appointment of Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, who was endorsed by the African Union, as the World Health Organisation Director-General in 2017. His criticisms of Western countries for hoarding Covid-19 vaccines during the pandemic caused outraged among Western countries.

Tedros waged a fierce campaign to get poorer countries a fair share of Covid-19 vaccines. Support for or against Tedros became a proxy battle between Western and developing countries. Developing countries came to his support and he was re-elected unopposed in 2022. At his re-election has head of the WHO in August 2022 Tedros (2022) said: “The global community cannot properly address the mountain of health emergencies and challenges we face, including the Covid-19 crisis and emerging pandemic threats, ‘in a divided world’”.

Inequality between countries in global affairs and law

Developing countries are also unequal in international law. For a case in point, the US, China and key industrial countries have not signed up to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and their leaders and citizens are not subject to its jurisdictions.

Industrial countries’ security, intelligence and police forces often operate across the borders in African and developing countries, something which developing and African countries cannot do.

US-led coalitions, for example, have frequently used their power in the UN to push through invasions in developing countries’ regimes perceived to be anti-Western – in Iraq, Libya and elsewhere – under the disguise of defending human rights. Ironically, these countries support equally evil regimes in other developing countries as long as they are pro-Western. Such decisions, many developing countries say, are often based purely on protecting industrial countries’ commercial interests.

Developed countries have increasingly manipulated global political, economic institutions and laws for purely self-interest, rather than for the global good. This has fostered a global climate where it appears dominant developed countries, can get away with breaking global political, economic, legal and trade rules for self-interests, at the expense of developing countries.

Developing countries appear to have less power in global relations then industrial countries, especially former colonial powers. The voices of developing countries often appear to have less weight than those of industrial countries, although new emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil, with large economies are increasingly pushing back.

Former South African President Nelson Mandela was also critical of Western nations abusing their domination of global and multilateral organizations for their own selfish ends, rather than for the global good. In his farewell speech to South Africa’s parliament, Mandela said: “We see how the powerful countries, all of them so-called democracies, manipulate multilateral bodies to the great disadvantage and suffering of the poorer developing nations.”

The French economist Jean Dresch in 1948 described the economic, political and trade relations between African colonies and colonial powers at independence as: “In essence, it consists of taking money out of a country its export products and selling imported products to the native population which has received money for the exports. It is a very elementary circle in which the market, in so far as is possible, is in the hands of the mother country, and the colony is condemned to produce only raw goods without manufacturing them at home” (Dresch 1948). Very little appears to have changed, since Dresch’s description of the power relations between former colonies – whether in Africa, Latin America or Asia, and former colonial powers, the industrial countries.

Global racism

Racism against black or darker skin people in industrial countries, global multilateral institutions and multinational companies are systemic – undermining the much-vaunted idea of globalisation, the tighter integration of countries resulting from increased global financial, trade and services flows, widespread penetration of new technologies and advances in transport.

Global racism against black and darker skinned prevent them from freedom of movement across borders, specially from African and developing countries to industrial countries, whether for work, trade or living. Blacks and darker skinned people are more likely to be stopped at customs entry to industrial countries.

The Council of Europe’s Commission Against Racism and Intolerance in its 2022 annual report said: “Racism in policing (in the European Union countries) continued to be an issue in a number of countries, including in the context of enforcing pandemic-related restrictions. The ECRI report refers in particular to racial profiling in stop-and-search activities, the use of racist language and excessive use of force against individuals, which not only targeted individual victims, but stigmatised communities as a whole. Victims of such practices have often felt insufficiently supported by the authorities”.

The idea of globalisation makes no sense when dark skinned people cannot move freely from developing to industrial countries; and products, especially value-added ones that foster wealth, jobs and economic growth, from predominantly dark skin developing countries face higher tariff barriers in industrial countries.

“Critics of the way globalisation is organised refer to people as the ignored side of globalisation … (T)he freedom of movement of people has not enjoyed any easing of conditions” (COE 2012: 18).

During the Covid-19 pandemic, many industrial countries were accused of putting stricter entry conditions for entry into their countries on citizens from black and darker skin countries. During the Covid-19 Omicron variant restrictions in late 2021, the Canadian government was accused of racism after only restricting entry from African countries, while many European countries had higher Omicron loads, but their citizens did not the face the same travel restrictions into Canada.

The UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Trade Organisations (WTO) set the rules for the global politics, economy and trade. All of these global institutions are dominated by Western countries. These global institutions have been criticised for being biased towards Western countries at the expense of African and developing countries, which have little say in the control, policies and ideas of these institutions.

Western countries and global agencies often appear to act with more urgency in disasters, human rights violations and environmental neglect when the victims are white around the world. Global interventions often appear to take place only when Western business interests and citizens’ lives are threatened in African and developing countries.

The organisational cultures of multilateral organisations, such as the Western-dominated International Monetary Fund, World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Trade Organisation and the United Nations, have often also exhibited unconscious bias towards developing countries, in their decision-making, lending practices and appointments.

The World Bank’s shareholding is dominated by the US (23.66%), Japan (5.87%), Germany (5,36%), France (5,04%) and the United Kingdom (5,04%). A 2009 report by the US Government Accountability Project (GAP) reported that only four black Americans held professional positions out of more than 1,000 U.S. nationals. This figure represents a significant proportional decline even from the abysmal levels reported thirty years ago” (GAP 2009; Chiles 2012). The World Bank’s own internal survey during that time showed that SubSaharan Africa, Caribbean and black American staff do not appear to have the same opportunities to advance than others (GAP 2009; Chiles 2012). Africa accounted for over 50% of the World Bank’s development assistance, but only 2.5% of the professional staff in the development economics section – responsible for ideas on poverty alleviation were African (Chiles 2012).

The decline of the UN

UN in its current form have lost its credibility, relevance and authority. The UN has in many cases failed to maintain global peace, security and intervene timely in humanitarian crises. In more recent times it “failed to effectively respond to international crises such as the genocide in Rwanda, the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, the second Iraq War, the Syrian civil war, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and mass atrocities in the Sudanese region of Darfur and Myanmar’s Rakhine State” (Friedman 2022).

In 2020, the then President of the UN General Assembly, Volkan Bozkir said “competing interests among its members and frequent use of the veto have limited the Council’s effectiveness”, and that even in the most urgent humanitarian crises, the organisation has “failed to provide a timely and adequate response” (UN 2020).

The mistrust in the UN, has caused many countries not to cooperate with UN-led attempts to mobilise international cooperation in global crises, such as wars, the health pandemics and disasters. During the Covid-19 pandemic the UN Security Council was spectacularly absent in providing leadership. The Covid-19 pandemic has “laid bare the United Nations Security Council’s incapability to produce quick solutions to contain the spread of the virus. The UNSC held very few meetings even as the pandemic was spreading death and destruction” (Mehta 2020). A dispute between the US and China which lasted three months after the global outbreak of Covid-19, delayed a resolution proposed by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres calling for greater international collaboration to combat the disease, support for poorer countries and requesting countries in wars to call ceasefires to prioritise combating the disease (Mehta 2020).

The UN released a report, “Our Common Agenda”, on the future of multilateralism in September 2021. The “Our Common Agenda” report highlighted the failures by countries to cooperate under the UN banner to tackle global crises. The report points out the failure of countries to coordinate efforts to combat the Covid-19 pandemic.

Following the UN “Our Common Agenda” report, the UN Secretariate was tasked to develop policy responses to the criticisms of the failings of the organisation. A global gathering, called a Summit for the Future is planned for September 2023, when the recommendations from the “Our Common Agenda” will be discussed and a “New Agenda for Peace” for global peace and security agreed on (Gowan 2022). Alongside the planned Summit for the Future, the UN has also appointed a “High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism convened by Ellen Sirleaf Johnson, the former Liberian President and Stefan Löfven, the former Swedish Prime Minister to come up with proposals for a change in global governance structures (Gowan 2022).

The perception that the UN is biased against developing countries have led many developing countries to unite behind calls to reform the organization. For another, many developing countries on principle vote against or abstain on issues in UN pushed by industrial countries. The last couple of years developing have increasingly formed blocs opposing industrial countries – turning the UN into “a us (developing countries) versus them (industrial countries). This has further undermined the authority, focus and workings of the UN.

Nevertheless, the rising developing country calls for reform of the UN has up to now being ignored by industrial countries. For another, the collapse in credibility of the UN has given countries such as Russia and China the opportunity to act unilaterally. The decline of the UN raised the spectre of more copy-cat Russian-like incidents of aggression by powerful countries against more vulnerable, making the world even more unstable. Unless something is done about reforming the UN, the rule of law at global level will collapse.

For another, unless the UN and other multilateral organisations are made more representative, inclusive and equal, countries who feel excluded may form alternative global organisations. Many developing countries are increasingly turning their back on the UN – because they have no voice.

During the first few weeks of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Russia as a permanent member of the Council blocked UN action, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (2022) called for new more democratic global institutions. Zelensky proposed a new “union of responsible countries” to replace the UN. Such a new UN would intervene within 24 hours of a country experiencing an attack by another country, natural disaster, or health crisis, saying “a union of responsible countries that have the strength and consciousness to stop conflicts immediately.”

And many other countries are reluctant to contribute to UN activities, such as peacekeeping. On the ground, because of the perceived bias of the UN, many UN peacekeeping forces have often been – been wrongly attacked in Africa by locals.

UN Security Council – central shortcomings

The central weakness of the UN is the Security Council which is limited to 5 permanent members - China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, with outsize powers. The five have veto power on key UN decisions. The UN Security Council is it is, is simply not relevant to the changing world anymore. The only substantial reform of the UN Security Council was introduced since the establishment of the UN in 1945 was in 1965, when the number of elected, non-permanent seats, but without the veto, was increased from six to ten. The UN Charter was amended to make this possible.

There have been two broad reforms focuses, one to expand the UN Security Council beyond the five permanent members and the other to reform the Council’s processes, meeting procedures and administration, called the working methods (Kugel 2009; Swart 2013; Lehman 2013). In 1992, an Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council was established to spearhead reforms. The group’s workings were on the basis of consensus. However, the reform group collapsed because of disagreements (Lehman 2013; Swart 2013).

By 2005, a number of different developing country groups had emerged split along the lines of the type of reforms they wanted. The Africa Group and the Group of Four (G4), consisting of Japan, Germany, Brazil and India called for the expansion of permanent seats. Another country grouping, the Uniting for Consensus group, formed by countries including Italy, South Korea and Argentina, limited their proposals to only an extension of non-permanent seats.

Because of the impasse, the UN members in 2008 proposed to conduct what is called intergovernmental negotiations at the General Assembly of the UN. In such negotiations decisions can be resolve by a two-third majority of the General Assembly. However, by 2013, of eight rounds of negotiations, the process collapsed. It has not moved since.

Jerry Matjila (2020), South Africa’s UN representative blamed the UN’s failure to maintain global peace and security as “largely due to its current outdated configuration”, which makes it impossible for it to make decisions, make decisions in the self-interest of permanent members and leading to non-permanent members rejecting what appears to be biased decisions by the five permanent members.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: “The credibility and effectiveness of global institutions is being questioned. The reason for this is that there has been no change in these institutions despite the passage of time. These institutions reflect the mindset and realities of the world 75 years ago” (Gupta 2020).

The five permanent members have often abused their power for their own national interests, rather than in the common interests of humankind. The UN’s credibility was destroyed by those 5 permanent members abuse of the organisation for selfish interests, forcing other countries to turn their back on the organisation as a place where they have voice.

These include, the invasion of Iraq, with questionable reasons, with many countries outside the 5 permanent members opposing it, and the invasion of Libya, which were also opposed by many countries, have undermined the UN. The Security Council members have also dominated the election of UN General Secretaries – which means that general secretaries often did not get wider legitimacy among countries. Appointments as heads of UN organisations such as UNESCO, UNDP and UNCTAD are often also heavily influenced by the permanent 5.

The veto power of the 5 permanent members is particularly anachronistic. The legitimacy of five countries having a veto over decisions at the UN Security Council has been bitterly questioned (UN 2020). Critics of the veto have been rightly said it was often arbitrarily used, or used to protect the five countries’ self-interest, rather than the interest of humankind broadly, and that it has undermined the functioning, effectiveness and legitimacy of the UN.

The 5 permanent members have often forced their own choices of UN general secretaries. As the world’s get more uncertain, dangerous and complex, UN heads forced on other countries by the Security Council’s 5 permanent members, have recently often been bland figures, almost invisible who lack global country support beyond. In the past UN general secretaries were larger than life figures, with global personal or country authority, credibility and reputations, many who could through their own personal appeal persuade country leaders.

Challenges of reforming the UN administration

Some countries have also rightly called for an overhaul in the way that UN conducts its business, its processes and meeting formats, called its working methods (Nadin 2014).

Article 30 of the UN Charter (1945) says that the Security Council must adopt rules of procedure, or operating procedures of its administration. The Security Council adopted a Provisional Rules of Procedure (S/96) in 1946. The rules of procedures have remained provisional since. Security Council permanent members have been unenthusiastic about making the changes, beyond the most superficial. The rules of procedure remain untransparent, lack participation and accountability. How decisions on sanctions are made, where peacekeeping forces should be deployed and how to hold decision-makers accountable are veiled in secrecy.

In 2005, the UN World Summit Outcome Document proposed the Council way of operating should become more accountable. It recommended the Council improve its working methods, by becoming more transparent and inclusive in its decision-making processes. However, the permanent five members of the Security Council have consistently blocked proposals to make the working methods, procedures and decisions of the Council accountable.

Some non-permanent members have been wanting reform of the Council to simultaneously address the composition of the Council and the working methods of the organ. Others have tried to separate the working methods reforms from these of calls to change the composition of the Council. In 2005, five countries, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland, formed a group, called S-5 to mobilise for reform of the working methods of the Council. The S-5 group stayed clear from proposing Council composition reforms. The S-5 group stayed within the confines of proposing reforms that will be passed by a simple majority in the UN General Assembly (Lehmann 2013).

In 2012, the S-5 proposed a draft resolution (A/66/L.42/Rev.2) calling for administrative transparency, inclusiveness and accountability in the workings of the Security Council. It called for greater inclusion of non-permanent members in decision-making on peace-building initiatives, in preparing, monitoring and ending mission mandates. The S-5 group called for the Security Council to provide information about its activities, decisions and planned actions, including holding monthly briefings to UN members about these.

The S-5 resolution called for the permanent members not only to be transparent in the use of the veto, but to limit the use of the veto. They proposed the permanent members must explain why a veto is used. The group suggested the veto not be used to block UN action against mass atrocities. The S-5 proposals also called for greater participation, inclusion and transparency in the appointment of the General Secretary of the UN. The appointment of the UN General Secretary has been dominated by the 5 permanent members. The S-5 group also called for greater participation in the workings in and for the end of domination by permanent members of subsidiary bodies of the UN.

The S-5 group proposed a change in the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, away from the current one where the permanent members can override General Assembly resolutions or ignore them. They argued or greater accountability of the Security Council to the General Assembly.

The permanent members rejected the reform proposals from the S-5 group, insisting only they, permanent members, can decide on the appropriate reforms of the working methods of the Council. The permanent members put sufficient pressure on the UN administration to make obligatory for the S-5 group proposals to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, something not easy to achieve.

The 5-permanent members, despite their political differences, were united in their opposition to the proposed transparency, accountability and inclusivity reforms. At the time Russia and China were pitted against the US, France and the UK over the Security Council’s handling of the Syrian civil war. The opposition by the five permanent members were particularly riling for many non-permanent members, as latter put pressure, inducements and even coerced poor developing countries to support them (Lehmann 2013). China was accused of pressuring African countries in which it had large investments, loans and projects to not support the reforms to the working methods of the Council proposed by the S-5 group (Lehmann 2013).

Furthermore, the “Uniting for Consensus Group” at the last-minute after initially supporting the S-5 proposals, withdrew their support before the vote was to take place. This lobby, “Uniting for Consensus Group”, and nicknamed the “Coffee Club”, was founded by Italy, Mexico, Egypt and Pakistan in 1995, have since been joined by others including Argentina, Spain and Canada. They did so because the G4 group of countries, Brazil, Japan, Germany and India, referred to as the G4, which competes over UN reform direction with the Uniting for Consensus Group, had supported the S-5 proposals.

Following the opposition by the 5 permanent members and the Uniting for Consensus Group, the S-5 withdrew their UN working methods reform resolution. For another, they also withdrew it for tactical reasons, to prevent a precedent be set, at the insistence of the permanent members, that critical reforms, such as the working methods reform, would need a two-third majority vote in the General Assembly (Lehmann 2013). By 2012 the S-5 group’s attempts to reform the working methods of the UN had collapsed.

“The failure of the S-5 was first and foremost a show of force on the part of a P5 (permanent members) determined to maintain their control over the representation of member states interests and the reform agenda at the UN” (Lehmann 2013: 3).

Following the failure of the S-5 reform proposals, 27 small and mid-size members of the UN in 2013 launched a fresh effort to reform the UN Security Council’s internal workings and its relationship with the broader UN membership, calling themselves Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT).

The group included Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland and Chile. The ACT group stated their objectives as: “[T]he UN Security Council (UNSC), in its present composition, shall work in a more transparent, efficient, inclusive, coherent, legitimate and accountable way, both within its own structure, but also in relationship with the wider membership” (ACT 2013). It argued that a Security Council that is accountable was “more legitimate, coherent and efficient” (ACT 2013).

The ACT stayed clear of proposing reforms on democratising the Security Council. The ACT included some of the reform proposals of the S-5 group – four of the S-5 members were ACT members. The ACT repeated the S-5 group proposal that the Security Council should not used their veto when a decision is mass human rights abuses. In 2015, ACT proposed a Code of Conduct to guide Security Council action against genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes “which calls upon all members of the Council (permanent and elected) to not vote against any credible draft resolution intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities” (ACT 2013). The group asked for more due process when the Council decides on sanctions against errant countries.

The group called for more fairer allocation of penholdership – the role of initiating and negotiating Council draft resolutions, which has been in the past heavily skewed towards allies of the permanent members. Furthermore, it called for more inclusive and transparent process for the distribution of the Chairs of the Council’s subsidiary bodies. They also want troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping operations to participate in Council decisions when and where to send peacekeepers.

The ACT group also wants more transparency in the relationship between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The ACT group proposed more open meetings of the Council, regular briefings and wider consultation before resolutions are prepared, by the Council to the Assembly. The ACT group want more meetings between the UN Security Council and civil society organisations.

The UN reform debate so far

In 2009, the UN established the Intergovernmental Negotiations Framework (IGN) to look at Security Council reforms. The discussions within the forum are considered “informal”, and therefore the UN General Assembly rule of procedure do not apply. Many countries have called for the “urgent need for transparency and application of general assembly’s rules of procedure to the intergovernmental negotiations” (Naidu 2020).

Some countries have accused the permanent members of deliberately stalling turning the consolidated text of the “informal” Intergovernmental Negotiations Framework into formal negotiations, which will apply the General Assembly’s rules of procedure (Naidu 2020).

At a UN Assembly debate in 2020 on Security Council reforms, Assembly President Volkan Bozkir, from Turkey, said reform is “an unavoidable imperative, both challenging and essential” (UN 2020). Bozkir warned: “This process can and should be an opportunity to correct the problems of structure and functioning of the Council. It should not create new privileges” (UN 2020). UN Security Council reform to bring in it more equitable representation has been on the UN General Assembly programme since 1979, with very little progress. Ronaldo Costa Filho, Brazil’s representative at the UN Assembly said inclusive representation at the Council is a precondition for restoring the legitimacy of the organisation (UN 2020).

Recent reform proposals argue for the expansion of the 15-Member Council beyond the five permanent seats held by the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China and France and the remaining non-permanent membership. The proposals all push for greater regional representation and greater participation in the Council affairs to increase the legitimacy of the Council. Changing the Council’s composition and substantial decisions need a two-thirds majority member of member states in the UN’s General Assembly.

Most of the UN reform debate has focused on reforming the Security Council, specifically to reduce the dominance of the 5 permanent members. There are essentially three broad overarching reform proposals or lobbies. Some countries, such as Brazil, Japan, Germany and India, referred to as the G4, have proposed enlarging the Council (Nadin 2014), by including at least six new permanent members, which would include Brazil, Japan, Germany, India, two African countries and introducing additional three elected seats on the Council.

Another proposal is creating “new permanent seats in each region, leaving it to the members of each regional group to decide which member states should sit in those seats, and for how long” (Nadin 2014). This lobby, “Uniting for Consensus Group”, and nicknamed the “Coffee Club”, proposed a 26 member Council, with 9 permanent seats among regions, and the remainder of the seats would be held for two-year terms, with the option to get re-elected for another term (UN 2020).

The Uniting for Consensus Group was founded by Italy, Mexico, Egypt and Pakistan in 1995, have since been joined by others including Argentina, Spain and Canada. The Uniting for Consensus group reject an increase in the number of permanent seats in the UN Security Council, but argue for the increase in non-permanent seats. They believed that increasing permanent seats will increase the power inequality – but just adding more countries that will have access to Council power. The group now has 50 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

African countries as a group, have proposed two permanent seats and two additional elected seats for Africa on the Council (Nadin 2014; UN 2020). All the different proposals for reform include Africa in one form or the other on a transformed Council. African countries cobbled together their common position under the ambit of the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. At the 2020 UN Assembly debate, the Chinese representative said: “Reform must focus on equality between big and small States, strong and weak, rich and poor” (UN 2020).

South Africa has advocated for a 26-seat Council with an increase in permanent and non-permanent seats and giving representations to all five regions of Africa in some form on the Council (Matjila 2020). The US supports “modest” expansion of the Council “as long as it does not diminish the effectiveness of the Council or impact veto power” (UN 2020).

There has been compromise reform proposals suggested by individuals outside the formal UN reform negotiations process. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein (2022) the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and former Jordan ambassador to the UN have proposed that a super-majority in the UN General Assembly should override any veto of a permanent member. Such a super-majority of member countries could be based on three-quarters or seven-eights of the membership vote.

Former Colombian Finance Minister José Antonio Ocampo and former Turkish Economy Minister Kemal Derviş have similarly proposed a majority veto be introduced, they called it a “a large double majority—representing, for example, at least two-thirds of member countries and two-thirds of the world’s population—to override a veto.” Clearly, given that permanent members appear resolutely opposed to relinquish their veto, such majority vote proposals to override the veto of permanent members should be considered.

UN reform opposition, and lack of consensus

Currently, any change to the UN Charters – which involves reform of the composition of the UN Security Council needs a two-thirds majority and supported by all permanent members of the UN Security Council. A veto from any of the five permanent members of the Council stops any decision to be taken by the Council.

In the past, China has used its veto power to stop efforts to discuss criticisms of its role in Tibet, Hong Kong or Taiwan (Mehta 2020). China for example used its veto power to block sanctions against Pakistan-based militant Jaish-e-Mohammed Masood Azhar, who have been accused of terrorism, for over a decade, until it budged in 2019 (Mehta 2020).

Some developing country analysts have accused China of “using a variety of excuses to delay the intergovernmental negotiations process, which has been going on for over 10 years” (Mehta 2020). The intergovernmental negotiations process refers to country discussions at the UN on reforming the Security Council. India has accused China of dragging its feet on reform, because it did not want India to become a permanent member of the Council (Mehta 2020; Gupta 2020).

China “supports reasonable and necessary reform” of the Council. The Chinese dragon does not want to abolish the Council or the idea of permanent membership, neither the veto. However, China wants to increase the representation of developing countries on the Security Council (CGTN 2022).

“At present, the makeup of the Security Council is out of balance between the North and the South, and reform should correct the over-representation of developed countries, earnestly improve the representation of developing countries, correct the historical injustice suffered by Africa, and give more opportunities to small and medium-sized countries that come from Asia, Africa, Latin America and Arab countries and small island countries to serve in the Council and play their important role” (Zhang 2021).

Russia has also used its veto power to block UN action against it (UN 2022). In February 2022, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that have would have demanded the country stop its invasion of Ukraine and withdraw its troops (UN 2022).

Some countries, such as Pakistan and Colombia, oppose Security Council expansion. In the UN Assembly 2020 debate, the Pakistan representative said since the 5 current permanent members cannot agree on policies, adding additional ones will increases decision paralysis. Columbia’s represent said that expanding the Council will not automatically increase transparency of the structure.

There have been a number of proposals not to eliminate, but to the limit the veto. Mexico for example have argued for limiting, rather than eliminating the veto that permanent members have (UN 2020). Mexico and France have proposed to retain, but to restrict the instances in which the veto could be used. Mexico and France argue proposed that the veto be restricted in the cases where the UN must urgently intervene when mass atrocities are committed – to prevent paralysing inaction.

The UK does not support the elimination of the veto but advocate its responsible use. UK representatives in the UK emphasise that the “UK has not used its veto since 1989 and will never use it on any credible draft resolution to prevent or end a mass atrocity” (Allen 2020).

The US and the UK are not enthusiastic about large-scale reforms of the UN Security Council. The UK supports “modest expansion of the Security Council in both permanent and non-permanent categories”, which includes the “creation of new permanent seats for India, Germany, Japan and Brazil, as well as permanent African representation on the Council”, to bring “the Security Council’s total membership to somewhere in the mid-twenties” (Roscoe 2021).

The US is “open to a modest expansion of the Council in permanent and non-permanent categories as long as it does not diminish the effectiveness of the Council or impact veto power”. The US is opposed to taking away the veto power of permanent members. The US insists that any alteration in the Council structure must be “made by consensus” (UN 2020).

Historic feuds between individual countries are often also played out in the debate over UN Security Council reform- and undermines building developing country consensus on reforms. China got Taiwan expelled from the UN and Security Council membership in 1971. China then took Taiwan’s place on the Security Council, after it became vacant (UN 1971). South Korea for example opposes Japan securing a permanent Security Council seat because of Japan’s former colonisation of South Korea.

China has consistently opposed Japan’s admission to the UN Security Council (AFP 2005). China has insisted that Japan should not be granted permanent status on the Security Council until it atones for its wartime history (AFP 2005). In 2009, Japan’s public bid for a permanent UN Security Council unleashed two days of violent protests in China (Fincher 2009). Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at the time said: “I think the core issue in the China-Japan relationship is that Japan needs to face up squarely to history,” before China will support its Security Council seat bid (Fincher 2009).

India claims China is blocking its ambition to secure a permanent Council because of frosty relations between the two countries (Mehta 2020). In 2020, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed China has stood in India’s way to become a permanent member of the Security Council and into associated UN international fora such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Modi claimed China deliberately tagged India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group to Pakistan’s acceptance, although India, according to Modi having a an “impeccable non-proliferation record”, which he said was not the case for Pakistan (Gupta 2020).

Conclusion: A new UN democratisation agenda

New global institutions are needed or current ones needed to be remade to be more relevant to the new more complex, uncertain and unpredictable post-Cold War world where the ideologies of the past, old institutions and old ways of looking at the world are increasingly becoming largely irrelevant.

If the UN is to be retained, the UN must not only be reformed, it must be democratised to ensure equitably representation, participation and decision-making to ensure the credibility, legitimacy and embrace of the organisation. The UN’s administration must be democratised toincrease transparency and enable greater engagement of the Council members especially small and medium sized countries in the Council’s work” (PRC 2022). In fact, the working methods of the UN must be democratized in such a way to allow all members to have equal participation.

The idea of a UN Security Council with permanent members is clearly outdated. Yet, permanent members appear resolutely opposed to relinquish their veto. So far, proposals for reform have been mostly about increasing the numbers of countries on the UN Security Council. Proposals that call for majority votes in the General Assembly – if permanent refuses to let go of their veto power - to override the veto of permanent members should be considered.

Ultimately, the idea of a limited number of countries having veto power should also be abolished entirely. The veto is not only unfair, make countries unequal and open to abuse, it has also paralysed the function of the Council.

The UN should be democratised in such a way that a few countries – or regional blocs do not dominate the organisation’s decision-making, or able to manipulate or block action. Importantly, democratisation of UN decision-making must be based on every country having equal power.

There is a need for a global alliance of all developing countries – in alliance with progressive industrial countries, who belief in the principle of equality, to press for the democratisation of the UN. The pillars of the democratisation of the UN must include dissolving the feature of the UN Security Council as one with permanent members. It should be either fully dissolved or every country should through a rotation system become a member of the council over time. Finally, the UN reforms must be on the basis that every country must have equal power, that regional blocs should not dominate and that voting should be on vote per country – with each country having equal votes.


ACT (2013) “ACT Fact Sheet”, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN, May.

AFP (2005) “China opposes UNSC enlargement with Japan”, June 3. ttps://

AFP (2022) “Tedros Ghebreyesus, re-elected as WHO chief: Official”, May 24.

Africa Progress Panel (2012) “Jobs, Justice and Equity: Seizing opportunities in times of global change”, Africa Progress Panel Publications, Geneva.

African Union (2005) “The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: ‘The Ezulwini Consensus’ (Report)”, Executive Council, 7th Extraordinary Session (7-8 March), African Union.

Alischa Kugel (2009) “Reform of the Security Council – a new approach?”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, FES Briefing Paper No. 12.

Brookings Institute (2012) “The African Growth and Opportunity Act: Looking back, looking forward”, African Growth Initiative at Brookings, New York.

CGTN (2022) “China calls for increasing developing countries’ voice at UNSC”, February 23.

Chari, Anusha, Karlye Dilts Stedman, and Christian Lundblad (2017) “Taper Tantrums: QE, its Aftermath, and Emerging Market Capital Flows,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 23474, June 2017.

Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (2022) “Annual Report”, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, June 2.

Council of Europe (2012) “Globalisation”, COE, Brussels.

F. Duina (2006) The social construction of free trade: The European Union, NAFTA and MERCOSUR, Princeton University Press.

Government Accountability Project (GAP) “Racial Discrimination at the World Bank”, GAP, June 10.

Gumisai Mutumi (2002) “How to boost trade with Africa – Lower barriers and diversify production”, Africa Recovery, Vol 16 (2), September, p.20

International Council on Human Rights Policy (2010), “Human Rights in the Global Economy, Report from a Colloquium”, ICHRP, Geneva.

International Labour Organisation (2004) “Towards a fair deal for migrant workers in the global economy”, Report VI, International Labour Conference, 92nd Session, Geneva.

J. Ruggie (2006) “Human rights policies and management practices of Fortune Global 500 firms: Results of a survey”, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper No. 28, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Jean Dresch (1948). “Villes congolaises: Études de géographie urbaine et sociale”, La Revue de géographie humaine et d'ethnologie, pp. 3-24

Josh Zumbrun (2019) “The U.S. Has Always Chosen World Bank Presidents—Will It This Time?”, Wall Street Journal, January 8.

K. Ulmer (2004) “Are trade agreements with the EU benefi cial to women in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific?”, Gender and Development, Vol. 12, No. 2, July.

Kemal Derviş and José Antonio Ocampo (2022) “Will Ukraine’s Tragedy Spur UN Security Council Reform?”, Project Syndicate, March 3.

Leta Fincher (2009) “China Against Japan Getting a Permanent Seat on UN Security Council”, Voice of America, October 28.

Lydia Swart (2013) “Reform of the Security Council: September 2007 – May 2013”, Center for UN Reform, June.

Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs (2021) “Why France wishes to regulate use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council”, France, July.

Moscow Bureau for Human Rights (2015) “Racism, xenophobia, ethnic discrimination and anti-Semitism in Russia”, June 2005. www.

N. Shah (2006) “Restrictive labour immigration policies in the oil-rich Gulf: Effectiveness and implications for sending Asian countries”, United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, doc. UN/POP/EGM/2006/03, May 5.

Nagaraj Naidu (2020) Letter by India to the President of the UN General Assembly on the Intergovernmental Negotiation Process, Presented by India’s Deputy Permanent Representative to UN, Ambassador Nagaraj Naidu, August.

Nick Chiles (2012) “Report Details Shocking Racism at the World Bank”, Atlanta Black Star, December 3.

Patrick Bond (2004) Against Global Apartheid: South Africa meets the World Bank, IMF and International Finance. Zed Books.

Powell, Jerome H (2018) “Monetary Policy Influences on Global Financial Conditions and International Capital Flows”, Speech at the Eighth High-Level Conference on the International Monetary System sponsored by the International Monetary Fund and the Swiss National Bank, Zurich, Switzerland, May 8.

R. Jureidini (2003) Migrant workers and xenophobia in the Middle East, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva, December.

Raghuram Rajan (2014) “Competitive monetary easing – is it yesterday once more?”, Remarks by Dr Raghuram Rajan, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC., on April 10.

Raghuram Rajan (2014) “Raghuram Rajan calls for more global monetary policy coordination”, Economic Times, May 28.

Richard Gowan (2022) “The Ukraine War and UN Reform”, International Crisis Group, May 6.

Shalmali Guttal (2007) “Globalisation”, Development In Practice, vol. 17 no. 4/5, August, pp. 523-531

Shishir Gupta (2020) “China is biggest stumbling block in India’s UNSC permanent membership”, Hindustan Times, November 19.

Stephen Buranyi (2020) “The WHO v coronavirus: why it can’t handle the pandemic”, The Guardian, April 10.

Supachai Panitchpakdi (2011) Statement to the United Nations General Assembly, 66th Session - Agenda item 17: Macroeconomic policy questions. New York, October 27

Tim Sablik (2019) “Dealing with Monetary Policy Spillovers”, Econ Focus, First Quarter, Richmond Federal Reserve.

UN (1945) Charter of the United Nations and Statue of the International Court of Justice, UN, New York.

UN (1946) Security Council adopted a Provisional Rules of Procedure (S/96), UN, New York.

UN (1971) Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations A/RES/2758 (XXVI), Session 26, Resolution 2758.

UN (2005) World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1), UN, New York.

UN (2012) “Enhancing the accountability, transparency and effectiveness of the Security Council”. Revised Draft, [Prepared by Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland], Sixty-sixth session Agenda item 117, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, United Nations A/66/L.42/Rev.2 General Assembly, May 15.

UN (2015a) “The Working Methods Handbook of the Security Council” (‘Green Book’), UN Security Council.

UN (2015b) “Presidential Statement on the working methods of the Security Council”, Presidential Note S/PRST/2015/19, October 2015.

UN (2017) “Compendium of the Security Council’s Working Methods”, Presidential Note S/2017/507, UN Security Council, August.

United Nations (2003) “Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Russian Federation”, UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, document CERD/C/62/CO/7, March 21.

United Nations (2022) “Russia blocks Security Council action on Ukraine”, UN News, February 26.

United Nations Economic and Social Council (2006) “Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance”, Doudou Diène, January 24. (Addendum: Mission to Japan), E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.2.

United Nations General Assembly (2006) “Global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action”, Report of the Secretary General, doc. A/61/337, 12 September.

Uri Friedman (2022) “How the UN Security Council Can Reinvent Itself”, The Atlantic, July.

Volkan Bozkir (2020) “‘Assembly Presidential Introductory Remarks’, United Nations (2020) “General Assembly: Seventy-Fifth Session – 27th& 28th Meetings [AM & PM]”, November 16, GA/12288.

Volker Lehmann (2013) “Reforming the Working Methods of the UN Security Council: The Next Act”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, August

Volodymyr Zelensky (2022) Ukrainian President Address to the US Congress, May 16.

William Gumede (2005) Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. Penguin Random House.

William Gumede (2006) “Thabo Mbeki et la Renaissance Africaine”, Africultures, 2006/1 n° 66 | pages 61 à 71.

William Gumede (2011a) Can BRICS-South Africa ease the Eurozone Debt Crisis. Eurasia Briefing Paper, October 25, Washington DC.

William Gumede (2011b) “African political unity must be more selective: a blueprint for change”, Briefing Paper, Foreign Policy Centre (FPC), London, May

William Gumede (2012) South Africa in BRICS: Salvation or Ruination? Tafelberg.

William Gumede (2012a) “Sydafrikas medlemskap i BRICS får intern kritik”, Internationella Studier 3, September 2012, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, pp. 32-33.

William Gumede (2012b) Politique Internationale, sommaire du n° 137 LA CHINE EN AFRIQUE N° 137 – Automne.

William Gumede (2012c) “Power and Inequality in Africa”, Working Paper, Open Society Institute Southern Africa, November.

William Gumede (2013) South Africa in BRICS: Salvation or Ruination. Tafelberg.

William Gumede (2014) “The BRICS Alliance – Challenges and Opportunities for South Africa and Africa”, TNI Working Paper, June.

William Gumede (2018) “The International Criminal Court and accountability in Africa”, Firoze Lalji Institute for Africa, London School of Economics and Political Sciences, January 31.

William Gumede (2022) “Russia-Ukraine: Impact on BRICS & Africa”, Occasional Paper, April, Inclusive Society Institute, Cape Town.

Zack Beauchamp (2017) “Here’s what UNESCO is – and why the Trump administration just quit it”, Vox, October 12.

Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein (2022) “Reform or Dissolve: Ukraine’s Challenge to the United Nations”, International Peace Institution public, April 14.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals.

Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589



bottom of page