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- an Inclusive Society Institute and Daily Maverick collaborative project "As we approach the 2024 national elections in South Africa, participatory democracy becomes even more crucial in our endeavour to establish a fair and all-encompassing society. These elections serve as a significant opportunity for us, as conscientious citizens and leaders, to actively engage in shaping the future of our nation. Participatory democracy plays a vital role as a fundamental pillar in our pursuit of creating a just and inclusive society. It goes beyond the traditional concept of representative democracy, where elected officials make decisions on behalf of the people. Instead, participatory democracy emphasises the active involvement and direct engagement of citizens in the decision-making processes that shape their lives." (Daily Maverick)

Occasional Paper 7/2023

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, attended the inaugural lecture of the Maxeke – Robinson Irish Studies Chair, which is located at the University of the Western Cape (UWC). The lecture was delivered by the Tánaiste, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Micheál Martin, at an event hosted at the UWC’s Greatmore Humanities Hub in Woodstock, Cape Town, on Monday, 17 July 2023. In his lecture, the Minister recalled the collaboration during the days of Apartheid between the people of Ireland and those that worked for liberation in South Africa. He spoke of the similarities in their shared struggles and the current-day challenges to keep the peace. Reconciliation in Ireland, as in South Africa, has not yet been fully achieved, requiring renewed efforts, to ensure its ultimate fulfilment. He said that reconciliation is not an event, but a process that needed ongoing attention over a period of time. The lecture was followed by a reception to open the Good Friday Agreement Exhibition at UWC’s Greatmore Humanities Hub.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is part of the Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform Network, which gathers international affairs, sustainability and communication experts from Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the Middle East. The network is a collaborative initiative by the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), based in Brussels, Belgium, and the research group Humanitarian Journalism and Media Interventions (HumanizaCom) of the Methodist University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. The CEO of the ISI is a member of the core group, who again met on 30 June 2023. The Network is currently undertaking research into perspectives on the main non-military threats and other risks such as such as economic, social, environmental, technological, and health crises. They are also working on reform proposals for the United Nations (UN) and the future of multilateralism.

Over the weekend of 30 June – 2 July 2023, the Inclusive Society Institute co-hosted the inaugural Youth Leadership Camp. The camp was co-hosted by the Athlone Development Action Collective and sought to bring together a broad collective of participating high-school learners from across the municipality. With more than twenty schools present through their learners and educators, the camp was able to introduce a diverse group and facilitate conversations that developed into friendships. The diversity of the group lent to a stimulating atmosphere and spirit of collective civic action. While the camp was a resounding success, it remains a pity that none of the former model-C schools or so-called white schools accepted the invitation to partake in a camp that had nation building as a premise. The campers arrived on a rainy Friday to a warm reception, ice breakers and team building exercises. It took only minutes for the youngsters to settle in; it was immediately impressive to witness their willingness to learn and develop new skills. After a discussion on the values and functioning of democracy, the conversation turned to building community across the racial and cultural divides. The educators, one for every two schools present, closed the first evening when given the opportunity to reflect on how things have changed into the democratic era. It was impressive to witness the youngsters’ admiration and respect for those who came before them. The youth offer great promise in this troubled country of ours. The Saturday was packed with learning, activity and fun. After a workshop on leadership and another on active citizenship, the group moved outside for team and confidence building activities. After dinner it was movie time, with film maker Nadine Cloete screening her celebrated documentary, Action Kommandant. The inspirational story of political activist Ashley Kriel who was gunned down by Apartheid police. Sunday would be the last day. It started off with the group taking a stroll along the beautiful mountain slopes above Llandudno. Overjoyed, the youngsters did not need reminders to take photos. After breakfast, it was time the Constitutional training programme, developed and presented by the Institute. Together with the previous two days’ discussions, the programme was well received and engaged with. Altogether, the camp was a significant step in fostering an inclusive society marked by active citizenship. The Institute looks forward to initiating future, collaborative events that help build the nation.

The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung hosted a Living Room Conversation on the 28th of June 2023, at their conference centre in Dunkeld, Johannesburg. The event was co-hosted in association with the Institute for Global Dialogue and UNISA. The theme of the conversation was “How solid id our common ground?” and focussed on the building of progressive internationalism and its fractured realities. Progressives in South Africa and Germany appear to be drifting apart. Whether it's the recent pandemic, the war in Ukraine, or the climate and energy crisis - ideas and expectations about mutual responsibilities and responses appear to differ. Multiple crises are deepening global inequalities and threatening peace and our very existence. They are exacerbated by the rise of authoritarianism, imperialism, geopolitical shifts, and a looming block confrontation. Progressives on both sides largely agree that the multiple crises are too important to be left to the government alone and that the political moment calls for multilateral responses and progressive internationalism. Is there enough common ground for that? Do we truly understand each other's interests and perspectives? What are the pillars of a shared progressive agenda? The speakers were: Martin Schulz - President FES, former President of the EU Parliament, former president of the Social Democratic Party of Germany; Alvin Botes - Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation; Lebogang Mulaisi – Presidential Climate Commission; former Head of Policy, COSATU; and Sithembile Mbete – Lecturer, International Relations and Political Science, University of Pretoria The conversation was moderated by Yolokazi Mfuto - Civil Society Liaison Officer at the Pan-African Parliament; FHAS alumni.

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, participated in the roundtable discussion on Building the Centre, which was organised by the In Transformation Initiative. The dialogue was held at the Winston Hotel in Rosebank, Johannesburg on the 27th of June 2023. The discussions, including key inputs by an array of high-level speakers, were led by Mr Roelf Meyer and Prof Nick Binedell, focussed on the: Current political, economic, and social environment in South Africa; and Critical challenges: education, mining and crime & justice. In Transformation spelt out the purpose of the discussion as the following: South Africa is experiencing various challenges at all three levels of government due to the incapacity to deliver services as required by a functional state. This situation is demonstrated by line departments being unable to execute government policy (to the extent that more and more functions are located in the Presidency); failed state-owned enterprises across board; unserviceable local authorities; extraordinary high levels of crime. Locally, these issues result in poor economic growth, unemployment and neglect of the poor and insufficient socio-economic transformation. At international level, South Africa lags behind peers on the continent and further afield. It seems impossible for a single political party to correct the situation, although the intent might be there. Also, a single platform or vision between civil society, private sector and government does not exist. In order to give rise to our Constitutional aspirations and imperatives it is suggested that dialogue be stimulated to advance ideas on how the situation can be turned around for the benefit of all South Africans; by means of leadership and execution. Urgent measures need to be taken to increase the capacity of the state, to expedite economic growth through investment and to achieve real economic transformation.

The Istanbul Security Forum’s panel titled “Türkiye as a Stabilising Power in an Age of Turmoil” focused on Türkiye’s efforts aim at contributing to the regional and global stability. Experts evaluated Türkiye's role in the reforming of the international system in an era of uncertainties. Moderator: Prof. Birol Akgün, Chairman, Turkish Maarif Foundation Panelists: Daryl Swanepoel, CEO, Inclusive Society Institute (40:07) İpek Tekdemir, Political Advisor, European Parliament Dr. Valeria Giannotta, Coordinator, CeSPI Türkiye Observation Centre Assoc. Prof. Şuay Nilhan Açıkalın, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University

Navigating China-Africa cooperation under the global development and security initiatives within a globally constrained geopolitical environment Occasional Paper 6/2023 Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. MAY 2023 by Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPAHons, ND: Co. Admin Until recently the world was getting used to the idea of the world being an interconnected village. The Cold War was becoming a distant memory. The East-West divide, not so much an ideological constraint, but more of a geographical consideration. It was fast becoming a global village. Then came Covid (2019). Then came the Russia-Ukraine war (2022). In the blink of an eye, the old divisions were being re-established. This essay explores how China-Africa development and security cooperation needs to adapt in this new emerging multipolar world. Make no mistake, great strides have been made towards interconnecting the global architecture so as to focus on the greater coordination of development and security to the benefit of all mankind, as opposed to the benefit of individual nations, often skewed in favour of the developed world. The role of multilateralism in achieving such coordination should not be underestimated. Neither should initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative. The Global Development Initiative The Global Development Initiative (GDI) was put forward to the United Nations by China’s President, Xi Jinping, in September 2021. In addressing the General Assembly, he raised the initiative in his speech titled “Bolstering Confidence and Jointly Overcoming Difficulties to Build a Better World”. It is intended to support the seventeen 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations, which goals envisage a “global development partnership” to promote a “stronger, greener and healthier” world (UN, N.d.). Since then, 32 practical measures for cooperation have been identified and more than one hundred countries and international organisations have indicated their support therefore, 68 of which have joined the Group of Friends of the GDI at the UN (UN, N.d.). The GDI upholds the following core principles: Remaining committed to: development as a priority; a people-centred approach; benefits for all to leave no country and no one behind; innovation-driven development; harmony between humans and nature; and results-orientated actions. (UN, N.d.) Furthermore, the GDI aims to promote international cooperation in eight priority areas: poverty alleviation; food security; pandemic response and vaccines; financing for development; climate change and green development; industrialisation; digital economy; and connectivity in the digital era. (UN, N.d.) Going forward the GDI will function under the principles of: Remaining committed to development as a priority, and focusing on the implementation of the United Nation’s 2030 Agenda; Remaining committed to results-orientated actions and a project-led approach in promoting policy dialogue, experience sharing, capacity building, and practical cooperation; Encouraging extensive participation, with the UN as an important partner for cooperation and the Group of Friends of the GDI as the main driver; Increasing efforts to pool resources, encourage donor participation in cooperative projects and to better leverage the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund and the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund; Strengthening comprehensive GDI cooperation across all 17 SDGs in order to ensure the timely achievement of the 2030 Agenda; and Focussing on addressing the pressing key issues of poverty alleviation, food and energy security, as well as overcoming the disruption to industrial and supply chains. (UN, N.d.) In a nutshell, the GDI provides renewed impetus to the implementation of the UN’s “2030 Agenda by revitalising the global development partnership, mobilising international development resources, deepening development cooperation, bridging the North-South gap, and aiming for stronger, greener and healthier global development” (UN, N.d.). The Global Security Initiative The Global Security Initiative (GSI) was also proposed by China’s President, Xi Jinping. It calls on countries to adjust to the changing international environment “in the spirit of solidarity”. It proposes that the complex and intertwined security challenges ought to be addressed with a “win-win mindset” (MOFA, 2023). The GSI aims to: eliminate the root causes of international conflicts; improve global security governance; encourage joint international efforts to bring more stability and certainty to a volatile and changing era; and promote durable peace and development in the world. (MOFA, 2023) The six core principles, interlinked and mutually reinforcing, under which the GSI is to operate include: Remaining committed to the ideal of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security; Remaining committed to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; Remaining committed to abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; Remaining committed to taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously; Remaining committed to peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation; and Remaining committed to maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains. (MOFA, 2023) The GSI priorities of cooperation include: Actively participating in the formulation of a New Agenda for Peace, as well as the other initiatives put forward on the UN’s “Our Common Agenda”; Helping to coordinate the healthier interaction among major countries in order to build peaceful coexistence, overall stability, and balanced development; Upholding the consensus that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”; Seeing to the full implementation of the resolution “Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security”, which was adopted by the 76th session of the UN General Assembly; Encouraging the political settlement of international and regional disputes; Supporting and improving the ASEAN-centred regional security cooperation mechanism and architecture; Supporting the implementation of the five-point proposal on realising peace and stability in the Middle East; Supporting African efforts aimed at resolving regional conflicts, to fight terrorism, to safeguard maritime security, and to encourage the international community to provide financial and technical support to these African-led operations; Supporting Latin American and Caribbean countries in actively fulfilling the commitments in the “Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace”, and supporting the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in upholding regional peace and security; Attending to the special situation and legitimate concerns of Pacific Island countries in regard to climate change, natural disasters, and public health, and supporting their efforts aimed at implementing the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent; Strengthening the maritime dialogue and practical cooperation to combat maritime differences, and work together to tackle transnational crimes at sea; Strengthening the UN’s role as the central coordinator in the global fight against terrorism; Deepening international cooperation in the field of information security; Strengthening biosecurity risk management; Strengthening international security governance on artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies; Strengthening international cooperation with regard to outer space and safeguarding the international order in outer space regulated by international law; Supporting the World Health Organization in its efforts aimed at global public health, and coordinate and mobilise global resources to jointly respond to global infectious diseases; Safeguard global food and energy security; Seeing to the effective implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime; and Supporting the cooperation among countries in addressing climate change. (MOFA, 2023) The GSI proposes a number of platforms and mechanisms to carry out the hefty objectives. These include engaging in wide-ranging discussions within all organs of the UN, leveraging the roles of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS cooperation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, and other relevant mechanisms, and holding of high-level conferences on global security (MOFA, 2023). It also undertakes to support international peace and security fora, such as the China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, the Middle East Security Forum, the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, and the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum (Lianyungang). And, with a view to “improving the governance capacity in the domain of non-traditional security”, it suggests the building of more international platforms and mechanisms for exchange and cooperation on addressing security challenges in such areas as counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, biosecurity and emerging technologies (MOFA, 2023). What has changed? Covid-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war has happened, and the world has changed in two major respects. Firstly, global supply chains have been disrupted, and secondly, a multipolar world has started to re-emerge. The Covid-19 pandemic, for one, brought about considerable supply chain challenges across the globe. This was due to the stopping of raw materials and finished goods flow, which in turn disrupted manufacturing (Harapko, 2021). The seamless flow of goods and services was interrupted because of the lockdown measures adopted by countries as a health strategy to mitigate the impact of the pandemic’s spread amongst their citizens. This resulted in production stoppages and restrictions to the movement of people and goods. Moreover, border closures, logistical constraints, as well as the slowdown of trade and business activities constrained the smooth functioning of the global supply chains (PWC, N.d.). Manufacturers found it difficult to distribute their products, and there were serious inventory build-ups resulting in an increased cost of storage. And producers of especially perishable finished goods experienced wastages. Due to the restrictions, the cost of distribution was also increased, affecting the profitability of manufacturers, and increasing the cost of living (PWC, N.d.). A further contributor to the increased cost of living has been the soaring sea freight rates, which, for example, in 2021 registered increases in excess of 300 per cent. This was caused by a series of complex factors, such as shifting air freight to shipping containers, which created container shortages, congestions in ports, holding back of ships because they could not be received in ports due to lockdowns, and rerouting, all of which impacted operational costs (UNICEF Supply Division, 2021). As a result of the pandemic’s disruption, enterprises plan to be more resilient in future with customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders, and they are reviewing their strategies with regard to their supply chain architecture. In order to prepare for future disruptions, renewed consideration is being given to what should be “done locally, regionally and globally, including warehouses and manufacturing sites” (Harapko, 2021). Similarly, the Russia-Ukraine war has disrupted global supply chains and increased the cost of living. To cite just one example: Europe has been heavily reliant on gas imports from Russia. Due to the disruption of gas flows caused both operationally and as a result of economic sanctions, energy inflation soared. And since energy inflation is a significant contributor to food inflation, food prices in 2023, for instance, rose by 14,1 per cent (Arce, Koester & Nickle, 2023). The graphs below show the dramatic impact of the war on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and HICP food inflation with sub-components: Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations. Latest observation: January 2023. Another example is the disruption in wheat exports caused by the Russia-Ukraine war. This, for instance, has a devasting effect on food prices in Africa. Because Africa imports a large portion of its food from Russia and Ukraine, it has resulted in the prices of wheat going up by as much as 60 per cent. The president of the African Development Bank suggested that the continent could lose up to 11 billion USD worth of food due to the conflict (Tasamba, 2022). Consequently, China and Africa have not escaped these developments. The Covid-19 pandemic has materially impacted the Chinese economy. Following the outbreak in 2019, China’s GDP fell sharply. In the first quarter of 2020, for example, it fell by 6,8 per cent. Demand fell by between 2 and 4 per cent, its GDP fell by 0,2 per cent and imports fell by an alarming 6 per cent. The outbreak of the pandemic disrupted production, business, and households’ standards of living. It harmed the industry, led to many business closures, and made it difficult for them to manage credit, staff, and expenses (Habibi, Habibi & Mohammadi, 2022). And then the extended lockdown further hampered China’s economic goals. 2022 predictions were obliterated. Retail sales of consumer goods dropped by 11,1 per cent from the previous year. Year-on-year production fell by 2,9 per cent, manufacturing decreased by 4,6 per cent and the sale of motor vehicles dropped by a whopping 31,6 per cent (Chin, 2022). And, of course, China is also feeling the global cost of living crisis resulting from the war, the imposed sanctions on Russia, and the more inward-looking United States. They have not escaped the rising oil prices, and the disruption to international financial transactions, and they are a target in the United States’ localisation drive. Apropos Africa, the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General, Ahunna Eziakonwa, has pointed out that Russia’s war in Ukraine “has disrupted Africa’s promising recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic”. It has raided food and fuel prices, disrupted trade of goods and services, tightened the fiscal space, constrained green transitions, and reduced the flow of development finance within the continent (Sen, 2022). The exporting of products such as grain, fertilizer and crude oil has been disrupted. 2019 wheat imports have increased by 68 per cent to 47 million tons since 2007. Kenya, in 2021 for example, imported 30% of its wheat from Russia and Ukraine. This has resulted in unprecedented levels of inflation and food scarcity. And the cost of food is around 42 per cent higher than it was from 2014 to 2016 (The Borgen Project, 2023). And, of course, Africa has not yet fully recovered from the damage caused to its economies by the Covid-19 pandemic. The continent has not only been set back by the loss of economic activity during the period of Covid-19, but exponentially so through the loss of GDP growth that would have been had, had Covid-19 not emerged. A double whammy, so to speak. This is especially harmful in a high population growth environment, which Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, is. China-Africa cooperation within the changed environment China-Africa cooperation has contributed immensely to the economic and human upliftment of Africa. China is Africa’s largest trade partner and source of foreign direct investment (FDI). The investment has had a significant impact on the continent’s infrastructure development and economic growth. It has offered development loans to nations, such as resource-rich Angola; invests in agriculture; and it has assisted in the development of special trade and a number of economic zones in several states, for example in Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zambia, amongst others (Albert, 2017). And China’s need for oil and other mineral resources, and the market it presents for selling its products, has driven its investment in Africa (Albert, 2017). In 2016 already, Angola emerged as China’s third-largest supplier of oil. Other countries supplying oil to China include the Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. China rose to become Africa’s largest trade partner since 2009 (Albert, 2017). Its share in Sub-Saharan Africa trade increased from 4 per cent in 2001 to 25,6 per cent in 2020 (Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 2021). China’s “going out” policy has resulted in it diversifying its business interests in Africa. It is invested across a wide spectrum ranging from mining to energy, to telecommunications and agriculture – tobacco, rubber, sugar, and sisal plantations, amongst others. And it has through a mixture of public and private funds financed the construction of roads, railways, ports, airports, hospitals, schools, and stadiums (Albert, 2017). The graphs below indicate the extent of China’s FDI in and loans to African countries. Source: Jones, Ndofor & Li, 2022 The bulk of Chinese humanitarian aid in Africa in 2020 and 2021 was overwhelmingly in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The aid comprised the provision of medical supplies, vaccines, and medical teams. Prior to this, the majority of Chinese humanitarian aid was also health-related (making up 74 per cent of activities and 76 per cent of funding) and included the deployment of medical personnel, construction of infrastructure such as hospitals, and contribution of medical supplies, equipment, and drugs. The remaining aid was more or less evenly split between emergency food aid and disaster relief. China’s African humanitarian spend has been concentrated in Angola, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda. These countries accounted for 51 per cent of humanitarian spending from 2000-2017. The vast majority of Chinese humanitarian aid – 89 per cent – tends to be of a bilateral nature, but in recent years it has been increasingly contributing to African multilateral organisations. Some examples are cited in the table below: Source: Lucas, 2022 China is also increasingly helping Africa to establish a more secure, conflict-free continent. At the opening ceremony of the Eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) last November 2021, President Xi said that peace and security play an important role and that China would undertake ten peace and security projects for Africa. He said that China would continue to deliver military assistance to the African Union, and that it would support African countries to independently maintain regional security and fight terrorism. It was also announced that it would conduct joint exercises and on-site training between themselves and African peacekeeping troops and cooperation on small arms and light weapons control (Zhou, 2022). China’s contribution to peace and security in Africa is characterised by: Using diplomatic means to push for the resolution of some conflicts such as that in Darfur, but in a manner that does not compromise the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries; It is becoming a major supplier of conventional arms to African countries; It is increasing the number of troops toward UN peacekeeping missions, which has seen a twenty-fold increase since 2000, with the majority based in Africa; and It intends to involve itself in post-conflict reconstruction through its economic engagement. (Saferworld, N.d.) Practical examples include the provision of strong support for the strengthening of Africa's own peacekeeping capacity by providing aid and support to Africa to enhance its independent peacekeeping capability. Since 2018 it has delivered at least “100 million USD to the African Union (AU) in military assistance grants to support building up the African Standby Force (ASF) and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC)”. Furthermore, it has established a Peace and Security Cooperation Fund. It has undertaken 50 security aid projects, and it has provided equipment, supplies, training, and other forms of support for Africa’s efforts at maintaining peace and stability. It also regularly has close high-level exchanges with its African counterparts, carries out military technology exchange and cooperation, and assists in the building of academies, hospitals, and other facilities in Africa. It also assigns military experts to advise on the strengthening of national defence, military development, and the reinforcement of Africa’s own peacekeeping capacity (Lin & Zhou, 2022). China played a mediation role in Darfur, Sudan in 2007, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda in 2008, South Sudan since 2013, and Djibouti in 2017. Military and police cooperation, counter-terrorism, and law enforcement are also listed as strategic priorities in the Dakar China/Africa Action Plan 2022-2024. Between 2003 and 2017, China was engaged in mediating 15 conflict situations globally, including seven in Africa. It is currently actively involved in crisis management in Sudan and South Sudan (Ryder, 2022). The destruction of the mutually beneficial cooperative nature of the China-Africa development model must not become a casualty of the emerging multipolar global order. Both China and Africa must guard against this. African countries, the author predicts, will come under increasing pressure to choose sides. They must not. The Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is already viewed with a measure of scepticism by some of those outside of the arrangement. Amongst others, China is often criticised as having a habit of offering huge amounts of low-interest loans to countries that they know will most probably not have the means to pay them back. They accuse China of “debt trap diplomacy” (Shattuck, 2018). FOCAC should not be swayed. Rather, instead of retreating, FOCAC should strengthen its resolve for multilateralism. In this regard two proposals are ventured: • FOCAC should establish a strategic think-tank within its structures to contemplate the changing diplomatic environment, and to mitigate the new economic challenges that are bound to arise from the actions of more inward-looking superpowers. And the work of FOCAC needs to be aligned with the Global Development and Global Security Initiatives. The think-tank needs to be properly resourced and organised to enable it to adequately prepare research and analyses to underpin the policymakers within FOCAC. To this end, a proper inclusive coordination mechanism – balanced with China and African input – needs to be designed that will ensure adequate research outcomes across all the strategic focus areas of the initiatives on an ongoing and sustainable basis. This will require workstreams aligned with the GDI and GSI objectives. And since the priority areas of the GDI (and GSI) are closely aligned with many of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including in the areas of poverty eradication, food security, health, climate action, the planet, industrialisation, innovation and means of implementation, the workstreams’ programmes ought to be synchronised with the SDGs (Chatterjee, 2023). The China-Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF) could seamlessly be morphed into such a structure, tasked to undertake such work. • Africa should advance an argument in favour of triangular engagement between itself, China, and the West. Competition between the United States and China is not going to go away, and Africa is increasingly going to be confronted with demand choices. But for Africa, it should not be about what the decision holds for the United States, or for China, but what is in the best interest of Africa. A sound relationship with China, and a sound relationship with the West, is what is in the best interest of Africa. Therefore, creating a mechanism for the three parties to engage in developmental and security issues in Africa could be a useful tool to guide and assist continental leaders in harnessing the most out of their diplomatic and inter-governmental efforts. This will be no easy feat given the heightened tension of late between the United States and China. Political observers told CNBC that the relations are on a dangerous path, with no trust on either side. They said that Beijing regarded the United States as its primary adversary and believes that the United States “is intent on closing off the path of China” (Bala, 2023). That said, the more rational thinkers do see the need for improved relationships between the two superpowers. For instance, US Treasury Secretary, Janet Yellen, recently said that the US and China “can and need to find a way to live together” despite the strained relations (Hussein, 2023). Finding that way will require mechanisms of dialogue between the two sides, and as Africans ponder their relations between the two, the need for three-way engagement seems evident. It may be, given the current tensions, that direct triangulation may not immediately be possible, and that parallel dialogue might be more feasible. Whatever the mechanism, the need is urgent. The initiation of the triangular discussion could take the form of a high-level roundtable between academics, geopolitical analysts and experts tasked with exploring options for convergence, cooperation, and co-existence. The neutrality of the convening authority will be key. New global trade and investment thinking Both the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war have been a wake-up call with regard to global supply chain thinking and have highlighted a need for new international trade and investment architecture. Firstly, it shone a light on Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing and, secondly, it brought into question the efficacy of global value chains (GVCs) and the outsourcing of manufacturing to external jurisdictions. Modern manufacturing across the globe widely uses Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing processes, which is the “production model in which items are created to meet demand, not created in surplus or in advance of need. Organisations adopt the JIT approach to increase efficiency, reduce costs and speed up product delivery. To achieve these goals, however, they must eliminate the types of waste typically associated with manufacturing, such as overproduction, unnecessary wait times and excessive inventory – only then can they implement an effective JIT strategy” (Sheldon, 2022). The vulnerabilities and deficiencies of the lean, just-in-time global supply chain model have been exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic. The geopolitics, labour shortages, and pandemic-related shutdowns, led to supply chain bottlenecks, increased costs and disruptions. The imbalances with supply versus demand made the JIT strategies somewhat obsolete and resulted in increased costs, and rising inflation (Kimberling, 2022). The tumultuous events associated with Covid-19 challenged the merits of paring JIT, as industries were left vulnerable when the pandemic hampered factory operations and sowed chaos in global shipping. Economies around the world were bedevilled by shortages of a vast range of products (Goodman & Chokshi, 2021). The Russia-Ukraine war had a similar impact on JIT manufacturing. Fourty-two per cent of Ukraine’s exports were, for example, semi-finished manufactured products, which when stopped or delayed as a result of the war, had a negative knock-on effect on production processes down the line in other jurisdictions (Goodman & Chokshi, 2021). In response, organisations are now trying different strategies like onshoring or reshoring vendors and vertically integrated supply chains. Several leading organisations are planning to build operations closer to the markets they serve, arguing that locating suppliers closer to assembly and manufacturing locations could assuage product shortages (Hamilton, 2023). Similarly, Global Value Chains (GVCs) were disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic and are still being disrupted by the Russia-Ukraine war. A GVC is where the different stages of the production of a product are located across a number of jurisdictions. Enterprises structure their processes through outsourcing and offshoring the production stages across different jurisdictions in order to optimise productivity and production costs (OECD, N.d. (a)). It is about maximising benefit derived from, for example, different government incentives, tariffs and subsidies, availability of skills and labour costs, and manufacturing cost structures, which differ from country to country. To cite the OECD example: “A smartphone assembled in China might include graphic design elements from the United States, computer code from France, silicone chips from Singapore, and precious metals from Bolivia. Throughout this process, all countries involved retain some value and benefit from the export of the final product” (OECD, N.d.(b)). It goes without saying though that in order for the GVCs to function effectively, all jurisdictions across the chain need to be stable, predictable and open for business. Covid-19 disrupted this. “The persistent uncertainty related to the shift of the epicentre of the pandemic from region to region, and the parallel instability affecting production costs”, made it impossible for enterprises to restart their business on a global scale. This led to many having to decrease or stall their production activities. Yet, simultaneously, there was an increase in demand for a range of critical products that could not be met (Fortunato, 2020). The Russia-Ukraine war is having a similar negative impact on GVCs. According to Dun and Bradstreet data, at least 374,000 businesses worldwide rely on Russian suppliers, and at least 241,000 businesses across the world rely on Ukrainian suppliers (FF, N.d.). The war has interrupted the logistics supply chain and by extension made any GVC dependent on these two countries unworkable. The trade sanctions imposed on Russia and those that circumvent the sanctions, the disruption of shipping and air routes, are impeding the flow of goods and creating product shortages. Catastrophic food shortages around the world as a result of the war – Ukraine is a global supplier of wheat – raise the real possibility of famine in vulnerable societies across the globe (Stackpole, 2022). At the same time, the movement of electronics, raw materials, and parts supplies out of China and other countries has seriously hampered GVCs (Stackpole, 2022). They now need to find innovative ways to recalibrate alternative ways to ensure a complete GVC. What does this mean for global trade and investment? Apropos trade, it means that individual countries (and/or regions) will have to re-evaluate their dependence on imports. They will have to plan their economies in such a way that they can be more self-reliant, lest they are held hostage by future pandemics and natural catastrophes. This does not necessarily dictate that countries need again to become inward-looking, albeit that in many instances local manufacturing will be more beneficial, for example, where it could aid job creation in high-unemployment economies. But then it needs to be balanced with competitiveness. What it may entail is that supply chains need to be adapted to ensure sufficient stock reserves in individual markets and not only in the country of production. It may also entail new thinking in terms of the domain of manufacturing. Where markets – individual countries or regions – warrant it, the sight of manufacturing should shift to those individual countries and/or regions. African trade ministers have been calling for such for a long time. And with the launch and implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – the world’s largest free trade area which brings together 55 African countries, organised in eight regional economic communities – this has become an imperative for African economic planners. It creates a single market comprised of 1,3 billion people with a combined GDP of around 3,4 trillion USD (AfCFTA, N.d.). The objective of the AfCFTA is to, amongst others, remove trade barriers and advance Intra-Africa trade. It aims to promote “trade in value-added production across all service sectors of the African Economy” and to foster industrialisation, job creation, investment, and competitiveness (AfCFTA, N.d.) In terms of Chinese investment into Africa, the changing focus from export trade to manufacturing investment needs to be accelerated, which, in any event, fits well with the objectives of the Global Development Initiative. Conclusion As a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, the world has changed. A new multipolar world is emerging, which is counter-productive to what is envisaged within the Global Development and Global Security Initiatives. This negative trajectory must be countered in the interest of economic and human development. The cooperation between Africa and China, through fora such as FOCAC, have had immense positive spin-offs for development and stability on the African continent. Africa and China must guard against their cooperation becoming a casualty of the emerging new order. To this end, it needs to adapt and deepen its reach through new strategic thinking and triangular engagement between themselves and the West. If the ideals of the Global Development and Security Development Initiatives are to be advanced, it will require a departure from posturing diplomacy to engaged diplomacy. No easy achievement within the constrained global geopolitical setting. 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[Online] Available at: https://sdgs.un.org/partnerships/global-development-initiative-building-2030-sdgs-stronger-greener-and-healthier-global#:~:text=The%20Global%20Development%20Initiative%20aims,greener%20and%20healthier%20global%20development. [accessed: 15 May 2023] Zhou, P. 2022. Ambassador Zhou Pingjian: China to continue backing peace efforts in Africa. [Online] Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202207/t20220728_10729497.html#:~:text=China%20will%20undertake%2010%20peace,and%20African%20peacekeeping%20troops%20and [accessed: 8 May 2023] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. 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The Embassy of Denmark in partnership with the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) and the Southern Africa Trust had a seminar on Inequality in Southern Africa. This seminar also served as the Launch of the ISI’s Youth and Gender Inequality Report. The seminar was held at the Royal Danish Residence in Pretoria on Wednesday, 31 May 2023. It was well attended by the Ambassador of Denmark and other high-ranking officials from the Embassy as well as invitees from the World Bank, UNICEF, and other CSOs. Mr Vusi Khanyile, Chairperson of the ISI, introduced the ISI at the seminar. The presentation for the ISI on the Youth and Gender Inequality Report was done by Dr Nicole Daniels and Dr Beth Vale, who were part of the ISI’s research team, was well received. Presentations: Southern Africa Trust - Reflections on poverty & inequality post Covid Multi-dimensional inequality in South Africa Report links: Understanding youth inequality Understanding gender inequality

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) was invited to participate in the 12th meeting of the China Africa Think Tanks Forum )CATTF), which was held from 30 to 31 May 2023 in the Chinese City of Jinhua. The CATTF is an important sub-forums of the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Founded in 2011, The CATTF was founded in 2011 and has become a major platform for academics and experts to promote multilateral cooperation, as well as to produce ideas for developing countries around the globe. The forum was attended by more than 200 scholars and experts from China and Africa, including, amongst many others, Mr Lui Yuxi, Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs; Pierre Gomez, Minister of Higher Education, Research and Technology, Republic of the Gambia; and Kgalema Motlanthe, former President of the Republic of South Africa. The 12th meeting of the forum focussed on four thematic areas: Centennial journey of China-Africa striving in unity for rejuvenation: retrospect and prospect The principles of sincerity, real results, amity and good faith and pursuing the greater good and shared interests usher in a new era of China-Africa cooperation China-Africa relations under the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) Toward common prosperity: Africa’s 2063 vision and Chinese modernization The ISI’s Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, moderated the GDI/GSI/GCI session, where he also spoke on the highlights of a paper developed by the ISI on “Navigating China-Africa Cooperation under the Global Development and Security Initiatives within a globally constrained geopolitical environment” Click here for access to the occasional paper

On the 23rd and 24th of May, Dr Klaus Kotzé represented the Inclusive Society Institute at the Masterclass on Coalition Governance. The event was hosted by the Hugenote School of Social Innovation in collaboration with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. The event was well attended by a variety of South Africa’s political parties who actively and discursively contributed to making the event a success. In the whole, the attendees agreed on the need for clarity and workable structures for coalition governance. Professor Erwin Schwella, Dean of the School of Social Innovation, facilitated the programme and explained that the attendant sessions would serve as a test case for the future Masterclasses that would be rolled out to party and governance officials. In an open and participative space, Professor Schwella sought the inputs from the various party officials and leaders present. It clearly emerged that political parties agreed that coalitions have been fraught with structural contention and contests for positions, as opposed to negotiations towards policy balance and societal advance. In the last session of the programme, the Inclusive Society Institute presented its Coalition Training Assignment which will be included in future Masterclasses. The aim of the assignment is to challenge the participant to grapple with the likely 2024 election result whereby the ANC will maintain either an outright majority or would only require the support of one or two minor parties. It is the Institute’s goal to ready South Africans at large and the various parties for a future where multi-party coalition prevails. The Institute believes that, above all, trust, respect and generosity should steer the relations between political parties in serving the people of South Africa.

Occasional Paper 5/2023 Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. MAY 2023 by Gustavo de Carvalho & Daryl Swanepoel Introduction - heightened geopolitical risk Geopolitical risk is characterised by its omnipresence, but there have been few, if any occasions than the events of 2022, when such a variety of overlapping shocks have transpired to create a bewildering sense of near-universal anxiety. Abstract This paper critically examines Türkiye's growing engagement with Africa over the past two decades, focusing on its potential to contribute to the region's peace, security, and economic development. It seeks to determine whether Türkiye's approach offers a genuine alternative to traditional global powers with historical colonial ties. It also assesses the connection between its peace and security initiatives and sustainable economic growth. The analysis highlights the multifaceted nature of Türkiye's involvement, spanning diplomacy, development cooperation, military engagement, and trade and investment. Through qualitative analysis of case studies, including its summit and educational diplomacy, and the flagship project in Somalia, the paper sheds light on the opportunities and challenges posed by Türkiye's unique approach in Africa. It concludes with recommendations for Ankara's future engagement, emphasising the need to carefully consider the continent's fragility context and potential implications on regional stability. Introduction Over the past two decades, Türkiye's engagement with African countries has grown considerably, indicating its intent to bolster its regional presence and contribute to peace, security, and economic development. As a rising global power, Türkiye claims to offer an alternative perspective on cooperation, differentiating itself from traditional global powers with historical colonial ties. This burgeoning relationship could reshape the continent's geopolitical landscape, fostering a more balanced and inclusive approach to regional development. However, it is essential to critically assess the extent to which Ankara's engagement represents a genuine alternative. The deepening connection between Türkiye and Africa is exemplified by the increase in embassies, from 12 in 2002 to 44 by 2022 (Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.), and President Erdoğan’s 27 visits to African countries since 2003 – more than any other non-African leader (Mitchell, 2021). Rapid growth in trade between Türkiye and Africa, from a volume of 5.5 billion USD in 2003 to around 25 billion USD, underscores the country’s diverse relationships with Africa’s fastest-growing economies, with investments spanning infrastructure development, mining, and energy sectors (Orakçı, 2022). Turkish cooperation assistance and conflict engagement, particularly in Somalia, demonstrate the inextricable link between its peace and security initiatives and economic interests. This multifaceted approach reflects a broader strategy to strengthen Türkiye's presence in the continent while promoting regional stability and development. Türkiye's engagement in Africa brings opportunities and risks for addressing fragility and promoting regional development. To achieve this, it must consider the continent's fragility context, including weak state capacity, poor governance, political instability, and insecurity (Hoeffler, 2019). This paper aims to critically evaluate Türkiye's role in Africa's peace and security landscape and assess the prospects for future engagement. It explores whether Türkiye's approach offers an alternative to "old colonial" strategies and its potential moderating role in Africa compared to other global powers. Additionally, it will examine the connection between the country's peace and security initiatives and sustainable economic growth, along with the tools employed to achieve these goals. This paper uses qualitative analysis to offer a comprehension of Türkiye's involvement in Africa and its possible influence on the region's stability and development. Overcoming Fragility and Enhancing Agency: the Role of Emerging Powers in Africa Africa, home to some of the world's fastest-growing economies, has the potential to become a significant global force economically and politically. However, African nations face challenges such as a youth bulge, rapid urbanisation, natural resource management, poverty, exclusion, and socio-economic divisions (African Development Bank, 2019). African countries experiencing fragility must reconsider their governance, institutional capabilities and develop strategies to boost their resilience. The African Development Bank identifies six factors to tackle fragility: robust leadership and governance, social inclusion and equity, economic opportunities and job creation, access to essential services, environmental sustainability, and regional cooperation (African Development Bank, 2019). These elements can foster inclusive economic growth, alleviate poverty and inequality, enhance human development, and prevent conflict. Global powers, including China, the United States, and others, are increasingly interested in Africa, intending to expand their influence. Addressing fragility challenges requires collaboration, as these issues are too complex for any single actor to handle alone (African Development Bank, 2019). Partnerships between African nations and external powers can catalyse development and resilience building. Traditional global powers like Europe and the United States have engaged with Africa for decades through development assistance and economic partnerships. However, maintaining these narratives presents challenges. The US has shifted its strategy to counter the rising influence of China and Russia, prioritising strategic alliances and investments over development aid. China focuses on infrastructure, resource extraction, and trade in Africa, while Russia's involvement centres on arms sales, military cooperation, and energy agreements. African nations have increasingly acknowledged the necessity of a strategic and cohesive approach towards external actors as the global scenario increasingly becomes multipolar, especially through the African Union (AU). Emerging powers in Africa offer opportunities for resilience and stability but require a nuanced, long-term strategy. High-level visits from Germany, Russia, France, and the US to 13 African states since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 illustrate the competition for Africa's hearts and minds (de Carvalho and Rubidge, 2022). The increased attention from global powers could benefit Africa, but it also presents challenges regarding the continent's ability to negotiate its position in the international landscape and maintain its agency. One such challenge is the risk of Africa being perceived merely as a theatre for global power competition, where it is utilised as a proxy in geopolitical rivalries. The escalating global competition in Africa presents challenges and opportunities for Türkiye as it expands its engagement on the continent. In the following sections, the analysis will consider Ankara’s potential to emerge as a moderating power, bridging the gap between the Global South and Global North. Türkiye's distinct approach could contribute to a more balanced and collaborative environment, fostering partnerships that respect African agency and address the complexities of Africa's relationship with the wider international community. Case Study 1: Summit Diplomacy and Impact on Turkish African Policies Africa's economic potential, natural resources, and a young population have attracted the attention of emerging countries seeking access to untapped markets (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). As a result, international summits have been relevant for establishing institutional structures for Africa's relations with other countries and discovering areas of mutual interest (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). The Türkiye-Africa summits have played a crucial role in fostering Türkiye's engagement with African nations by creating institutional frameworks, exploring opportunities, and enhancing mutual understanding (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). Three summits have been held thus far: Istanbul (2008), Malabo (2014), and Istanbul again (in 2021, despite COVID-19 restrictions). They have facilitated increased economic cooperation and investment between Türkiye and African countries, with trade volume growing significantly since the first Summit. The Türkiye-Africa Partnership mechanism was established as a direct outcome of these summits. These gatherings have provided a platform for African countries to showcase their potential and attract investment from Turkish firms. It creates a framework for cooperation in several areas. It serves as a critical entry point for signing agreements and memoranda of understanding between Türkiye and various African countries, further formalising relations and opening the space for Turkish engagement in the continent (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). Trade Value in USD Billions. Source: http://wits.worldbank.org/| Map developed by the author on Tableau The map above shows that Türkiye’s presence in Africa has become increasingly significant in recent years, largely a result of the summits and mechanisms developed thereafter. Now, as one of the top trading partners on the continent, Turkey is competing with countries like Brazil, Russia, Thailand, Japan, and Korea for access to Africa's markets and resources. The last Summit in 2021, was co-organised with the AU, showcasing the increasing importance of continental and regional organisations in shaping Africa's engagement with global powers. Collaborations between the AU, RECs, and emerging powers like Türkiye has the potential to create a more inclusive platform for African nations, allowing them to address global challenges more effectively. During the Summit, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu stated that the Summit aimed to "win with Africa and to walk together to the future” (“Africa – Turkey,” 2022). Such statements showcase Türkiye’s intentions not only to expand its presence in the continent but also to promote its image as a responsible global actor committed to South-South cooperation (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). The Summits have also been a space for further collaboration in areas of common interest in global governance. President Erdoğan's call for UN reform, emphasising his belief that "the world is bigger than five," highlights the need for a more inclusive and representative global governance system (Erdoğan, 2017). The alignment of views between Türkiye and African nations on issues such as UN Security Council reform highlights their shared understanding of the evolving role of global powers in Africa. This strategic convergence has opened opportunities for cooperation between emerging powers and African countries, challenging existing norms and influencing global decision-making. The discussions in these summits have played a significant role in expanding Türkiye and Africa's claims for a more equitable international order. While the summits have positively impacted Türkiye-Africa relations, the ambitious goals outlined in the Istanbul and Malabo Declarations have not consistently been fully implemented (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). This highlights the need for ongoing dialogue and concerted efforts to ensure that commitments are upheld, and that the partnership continues to evolve in a mutually beneficial manner. Indeed, the summits' success should be assessed concerning economic indicators and the context of political, social, and cultural exchanges between Türkiye and African nations. Establishing sustainable partnerships requires addressing various sectors' infrastructure development, regional security, and capacity-building challenges (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). Türkiye’s historical engagements in Africa Analysing Türkiye’s historical engagements in Africa is essential for understanding the cultural and historical ties that form the foundation of its current involvement in the continent. These ties offer context for the present-day dynamics and motivations behind Türkiye’s approach to African nations. Türkiye’s historical engagement with Africa can be divided into three periods, as described by Özkan (2008). The first period of relations between Turks and Africa spanned several centuries until the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. During this time, the Ottoman State maintained substantial connections with the continent. Some African countries were entirely or partially under Ottoman rule, such as Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Niger and Chad (Özkan, 2010). In the northern Sub-Sahara region, the Ottomans were part of the balance of powers system, forging friendships and alliances with the Kanem Bornu Empire, which still exists in today’s Northern Nigeria, Niger, and Chad (Özkan, 2010). These cultural and historical ties continue to influence Türkiye’s engagements in the continent, providing a foundation for its contemporary approach. From 1923 to 1998, the second period saw Türkiye-Africa relations at their lowest point, almost non-existent due to Türkiye’s focus on domestic issues and its orientation towards the West during the Cold War (Donelli, 2021). During this time, Türkiye’s relations with Africa were limited to a few countries, such as Egypt and Sudan (Özkan, 2010). The third period, which began in 1998 with the launch of Türkiye’s first “Africa Opening Action Plan”, marked a revival of Ankara’s interest in Africa. This period represents a significant shift in Türkiye’s engagement with Africa. It will be the focus of the following section, as it is most relevant to the objectives of this article. Ankara’s Foreign Policy Diversification and Africa Despite the deep historical, cultural, and religious ties between Türkiye and the African continent during the Ottoman Empire, it was only in the late 1990s that Türkiye’s connection to Africa began to develop (Turhan, 2021). The collapse of the Soviet Union significantly impacted Türkiye’s foreign policy, prompting diversification and creating a more independent approach, no longer constrained by the bipolar world order. This systemic change coincided with diversifying societal and political sources influencing Turkish foreign policymaking. New uncertainties and threats emerged, leading to a renewed debate on Türkiye’s international role due to ethnic conflicts and instability in neighbouring regions. These changing geopolitical conditions resulted in differing perspectives on Türkiye’s international role (Özkan and Akgün, 2010). Some advocated focusing on traditional Western allies and closer ties with Europe. In contrast, others called for diversifying foreign relations and developing stronger connections with countries in the Middle East, Eurasia, the Balkans, and Africa. Domestic factors within Türkiye, such as the rise of religious and nationalistic groups, also contributed to the diversification process and encouraged the development of ties outside Europe (Özkan and Akgün, 2010). These groups urged governments to adopt a more independent stance from Western institutions, emphasising the importance of domestic factors in shaping Türkiye’s foreign policy during that period. This change in policy orientation can be viewed as a reassembly of its previous legacy under a different name, with Türkiye utilising its historical, cultural, and religious connections with Africa to shape its foreign policy towards the continent (Turhan, 2021). This shift is a broader trend towards a more proactive and assertive Turkish foreign approach. It aims to increase Türkiye’s influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood, including new regions like Africa. Turhan (2021) highlighted the considerable impact of Turkish leaders, including Davutoğlu and Erdoğan, on shaping Türkiye's foreign policy towards Africa by prioritising cultural and historical connections with former Ottoman territories. Turkish Development Cooperation Tools in Africa Türkiye has been trying to develop its own approach to South-South cooperation based on its experiences from working with Balkans and Central Asia countries. Until recently, Türkiye's donor contributions were not significant in the past due to poor coordination and modest funding, but it is becoming more apparent now. Türkiye's approach to South-South cooperation aims to increase its visibility and engagement in African development projects, which has successfully achieved economic, political, and social gains in the region (Özkan, 2018). The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), an essential instrument for executing Türkiye’s strategy, has notably extended its reach into the country’s areas of interest in Africa. Türkiye’s engagements predominantly focus on its immediate vicinity. As a result, it is no surprise that the country’s most substantial contributions in Africa are allocated to Somalia and Sudan, both of which rank among the top 10 recipients of ODA from Türkiye (“Turkish Development Assistance Reports - TİKA,” n.d.). African nations constitute most of Türkiye’s contributions to Least Developed Countries (LDCs), with countries like Somalia, Sudan, Niger, Djibouti, Chad, and Guinea ranking among the top beneficiaries (“Turkish Development Assistance Reports - TİKA,” n.d.). Türkiye’s development assistance prioritises education and education policy, exceeding other sectors such as administrative and civil infrastructure, health, water, and sanitation (“Turkish Development Assistance Reports - TİKA,” n.d.). As an OECD member, Türkiye’s engagements align with those of other donor countries, setting it apart from emerging powers like Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. TIKA serves a critical function by facilitating Turkish government projects and directly engaging with Turkish NGOs. In 2019, Türkiye allocated 8.6 billion USD to official development assistance (ODA), with 90% of its support targeting humanitarian and food aid (OECD, 2021). It is worth noting that only a small portion of Türkiye’s aid constitutes programmable aid, subject to multi-year planning at country and regional levels. Most of Türkiye’s assistance is developed case-by-case, frequently through project-specific initiatives and humanitarian responses. Among OECD members, Türkiye has one of the lowest rates of programmable aid per ODA, with approximately 7.3% of its support allocated to country programmes, compared to the OECD average of 47.7% (OECD, 2021). Case Study 2: Türkiye's Educational Diplomacy in Africa Beyond its humanitarian support, education is critical to Türkiye's foreign policy in Africa. It is pivotal in fostering long-term cultural exchange and strengthening social, political, and economic ties with African states. In 2020, the education sector received the highest multi-sector funding from the Turkish ODA, with 220.5 million USD provided (OECD, 2021). Source: Graph downloaded from OECD Development Co-operation Profile (2021) Türkiye's educational diplomacy in Africa involves scholarships, exchange programs, and establishing Turkish schools and universities. These efforts enhance Türkiye's soft power and address challenges such as language barriers, cultural differences, and resource limitations (Enwere, 2014). Turkish universities have become more popular among African students due to scholarships managed by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBITAK) (Gunn, 2020). These scholarships have facilitated academic and cultural exchange between the regions. A prime example of the significance of education in Türkiye's foreign policy was the Gülen movement. As an Islamic transnational religious and social organisation, it shaped Türkiye's engagement with Africa between 2003 and 2014. The Movement played a crucial role in formulating and implementing Türkiye's public diplomacy, primarily through establishing numerous schools throughout the continent and reinforcing cooperation in the education sector. The Gülen movement was once an ally of Erdoğan and his AKP party; however, their relationship deteriorated post-2013. Subsequently, Türkiye accused the Movement of masterminding the unsuccessful coup attempt in July 2016 (Bishku, 2019). Since, Turkish authorities implemented measures to shut down schools and businesses associated with the Movement and sought the extradition of its members from other countries to Türkiye. After the attempted military coup of 2016, Türkiye established the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF) to reclaim its own domain in international education, which was controlled mainly by the Gülen movement (Akgün and Özkan, 2020). The TMF now operates nearly 150 schools and 20 dormitories across 25 African countries (Özkan and Orakçı, 2022). The TMF has become a significant element of Turkish soft power in foreign policy, promoting Turkish education abroad through its initiatives (Akgün and Özkan, 2020). Military Engagement in Africa: Asymmetric Wars and the Rise of Drone Diplomacy Understanding Türkiye's role as an alternative partner in Africa requires a closer look at its military engagements. Türkiye interacts with African nations using diverse tactics, encompassing high-level diplomatic visits, military training schemes for African troops in Türkiye or Africa led by Turkish personnel, collaborative military exercises, and involvement in peacekeeping operations under international organisations like the United Nations (Yaşar, 2022). Many African states are keen to take advantage of Türkiye’s experience in counterinsurgency, the modernisation of its security sectors, and the developments in its defence industry (Yaşar, 2022). This experience allows Türkiye to draw on its background while achieving objectives through proxy warfare, supporting local actors, and minimising risks and costs associated with direct military intervention. In response to Marshall Haftar's 2019 offensive threatening Tripoli, Türkiye increased its support for Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA) (Yüksel, 2020). This support included providing GNA-aligned forces with conventional combat enablers, irregular components and deploying Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to enhance their defensive capabilities. Türkiye also facilitated the participation of thousands of Syrian opposition fighters in the Libyan Civil War. Türkiye's proxy warfare strategy in Libya is characterised by high centralisation and control (Yüksel, 2020). This tailored approach to commanding proxies in conjunction with Türkiye's military operations allows the country to achieve its objectives while reducing risks and expanding its influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Türkiye's most prominent effort is its increased arms exports to African nations, providing competitively priced military equipment with minimal restrictions. The growing emphasis on military arrangements in Africa, particularly involving drones, armoured vehicles, naval apparatus, and infantry equipment, has directly influenced Turkish defence and aerospace exports. As per a report presented to DW, a German media outlet, Turkish exports to Africa recorded a significant surge, increasing more than five times from 2020 to 2021 and reaching 460 million USD (Hairsine, 2022). The report suggests that due to their comparatively affordable nature, Turkish arms have become an attainable resource for numerous nations grappling with conflict on the continent. Drones have transformed modern warfare by enabling states to project their power while minimising the potential danger to friendly personnel (Lin-Greenberg, 2022). Türkiye's military-industrial complex has experienced significant growth in recent years, especially in developing UAVs. Since the late 2010s, Türkiye has emerged as a leading source of drone technology, with the Bayraktar TB2 becoming a key player in the global market. In Africa, Türkiye's drones first saw action in Libya, providing tactical and operational advantages in asymmetric warfare. As such conflicts become increasingly common on the continent, Turkish drones have become an attractive choice for African nations. However, it is crucial to recognise that drones should not be considered a standalone solution but rather a component of a comprehensive strategic framework that includes defence systems, political initiatives, and diplomatic efforts (Kasapoğlu, 2022). Countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Nigeria have reportedly purchased drones from Türkiye, demonstrating the growing relevance of Turkish UAVs in the African security landscape and highlighting Türkiye's role as an alternative partner in the region. Türkiye's military and defence engagement in Africa, though modest compared to global powers such as Russia, the United States, China, and France, is steadily growing. This heightened involvement may carry significant implications for future interactions between Türkiye and African nations. As Türkiye furthers its presence in Africa, it could foster a diversification of influence within the region, potentially shifting the existing balance of power. Furthermore, the affordability and accessibility of Turkish military equipment might empower African countries to enhance their defence capabilities, ultimately affecting regional security dynamics. However, Türkiye's no-strings-attached approach to governance and human rights in its military engagements raises concerns about potential arms proliferation, which could aggravate existing conflicts or provoke new ones, leading to negative implications for the continent. Case Study 3: Türkiye's Comprehensive Approach to Peacebuilding in Somalia Türkiye's engagement in Africa, with a particular emphasis on Somalia, showcases a blend of humanitarian concerns and long-term strategic interests, reflecting the nation's aspiration to establish a prominent role in regional and global politics. Somalia is a flagship project for Türkiye, transforming the country's approach to African engagement and elevating its status as a complex and multifaceted political actor, thereby influencing its broader African agenda (Özkan and Orakci, 2015). Initially commencing as a humanitarian response to the severe drought that struck Somalia in 2011, Türkiye's involvement has since evolved into a comprehensive policy encompassing political and social dimensions (Sıradağ, 2018). Ankara's engagement is characterised by several critical factors, including timely intervention, risk inclination, the availability of Turkish products and expertise, soft power projection, the lack of historical imperial baggage, and a highly coordinated unilateral approach (Cannon, 2017). Türkiye has played an active role in supporting Somalia's humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. Its approach has focused on concrete actions that can have an immediate impact, such as investments in infrastructure projects like roads, hospitals, and schools (Özkan and Orakci, 2015). These projects aimed to improve access to essential services and create job opportunities for local workers. In line with its focus on education as a tool for increasing its soft power, Türkiye has supported education in Somalia through the establishment of partnerships between Turkish and Somali universities, the provision of scholarships for Somali students to study in Türkiye, and investment in human capital within the country (Sıradağ, 2018). Türkiye has contributed to peacebuilding efforts in Somalia by hosting conferences to bring together various factions to resolve the conflict. Türkiye's peacebuilding in Somalia prioritises establishing a functioning state as crucial for achieving sustainable peace. In 2017, Türkiye opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia, aiming at providing capacity building for Somali soldiers and support for peace support operations in the country (Sıradağ, 2018). Despite these efforts, Türkiye's humanitarian diplomacy in Somalia is not without limitations. Türkiye's approach balances conscience and interest by utilising official, civic, and business channels (Akpınar, 2013). However, the implementation of humanitarian diplomacy encounters challenges due to on-the-ground realities, the interests of other intervening nations, public support, capacity constraints, and the necessity for regional recognition and international collaboration. Expanding Türkiye's Trade and Investment Horizons in Africa Türkiye's diversification strategy has led to a growing reliance on Africa to expand its export markets and sustain economic growth, focusing on sectors such as agriculture, construction, and textiles. Key African trading partners include Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa, chosen for their geographic proximity, cultural similarities, and economic growth rates (Aman et al., 2017; Mohamud and Köksal, 2021). By 2022, Africa became Türkiye's third most significant trade source, surpassed only by Europe and Asia (“Turkey trade balance, exports, imports by region 2020 | WITS Data,” n.d.). Source: http://wits.worldbank.org/, https://www.trademap.org/ | Map developed by the author in R Source: http://wits.worldbank.org/| Graph developed by the author on Tableau This increasing engagement has been supported by Türkiye's improvements in the corruption perception index, rising ODA donations, and the opening of commercial consulates in various African countries (Aman et al., 2017). Türkiye has also signed Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreements with 38 African nations to establish a solid contractual foundation for mutual economic relations (“Turkey | African Development Bank - Building today, a better Africa tomorrow,” n.d.). Türkiye's African investments, which have increased tenfold since 2004 to an estimated $5-$8 billion (Ofodile, 2019), are part of a broader strategy to extend its economic influence and promote sustainable development and South-South cooperation. Turkish contractors have executed over 1,150 projects involving airport and highway construction, renewable energy initiatives, and joint ventures with African enterprises (Ofodile, 2019). Ethiopia remains the top destination for Turkish FDI, receiving over $2.5 billion of the $6 billion allocated to Africa (Ofodile, 2019). In Addition, Egypt is Türkiye's largest bilateral trading partner in Africa. Türkiye’s Unique Approach in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges Türkiye's focus on diversification in its engagement with Africa demonstrates a mutual need for both parties to explore new opportunities and expand their respective economic and political horizons. This shared interest in diversification is driven by a desire to reduce over-reliance on traditional markets and partners, fostering more sustainable and resilient economies. For Türkiye, diversification is essential to maintain its economic growth and extend its influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood. By engaging with Africa, Türkiye can access new markets, resources, and investment opportunities while establishing itself as a significant regional actor. This diversification strategy is crucial for Türkiye, given its current geopolitical challenges and need to reduce its dependence on traditional markets in Europe and the Middle East. For African countries, diversification is equally critical for sustainable economic development. Engaging with partners like Türkiye, which offers different perspectives and approaches compared to traditional powers, allows African nations to broaden their economic base, access new technologies and investments, and foster more balanced relationships. This diversification can contribute to greater resilience in the face of global economic fluctuations and promote a more inclusive development trajectory. As a potential moderating power in Africa, Türkiye can navigate the complexities of regional conflicts and power dynamics while fostering dialogue and cooperation. Its unique position, devoid of historical colonial baggage, may allow it to mediate disputes and promote stability more effectively than traditional powers. Ankara's coordinated effort, exemplified by the Türkiye-Africa summits, state visits, and institutional frameworks, has significantly contributed to the country's growing influence in Africa. These top-down initiatives have facilitated increased economic cooperation, investment, and mutual understanding between Türkiye and African nations. While ambitious goals outlined in summit declarations require ongoing dialogue and commitment, the success of these efforts extends beyond economic indicators to encompass political, social, and cultural exchanges. However, Türkiye faces challenges in balancing its interests, navigating geopolitical rivalries, and adapting its foreign policy apparatus to the growing demands of African engagement. By addressing these challenges, Türkiye can strengthen its position as a key player in Africa's peace, security, and development landscape. Türkiye's involvement in Somalia has emphasised the significance of a coherent multi-sectoral approach to African participation. The Somalia project showcases Türkiye's ability to combine humanitarian concerns with strategic interests, demonstrating the need for a comprehensive policy to address state fragility. This approach encompasses timely intervention, soft power projection, and coordinated efforts, reflecting broader aspirations for promoting stability and development across the continent. Türkiye's development cooperation in Africa reflects its commitment to long-term partnerships and capacity-building, crucial to its broader strategy for the continent. As an OECD member, Türkiye aligns with traditional donors while demonstrating adaptability through case-by-case initiatives. Through prioritising sectors like education and leveraging TIKA's expanded reach, Türkiye establishes itself as a multifaceted and influential actor in Africa, promoting mutual growth and development. Türkiye's military engagements in Africa, while modest compared to traditional powers, contribute to its goal of offering an alternative partnership to the continent. By providing competitively priced military equipment, including drone technology, with minimal restrictions, Türkiye enables African nations to enhance their defence capabilities. This diversification of influence has the potential to shift the balance of power. Still, concerns about arms proliferation and implications for regional security dynamics must be considered as Türkiye expands its presence in Africa. Conclusion and recommendations While the debate continues over whether Türkiye truly offers a genuine alternative to traditional powers in Africa, its emphasis on diversification, cultural connections, and long-term cooperation is undeniably reshaping the dynamics of engagement on the continent. Despite having a smaller reach than other global powers, Türkiye's consistently increasing role in the continent indicates that the country is indeed moving towards becoming an alternative. The future success of this diversification strategy will depend on the ability of both Türkiye and African nations to navigate challenges, seize opportunities, and continue fostering mutually beneficial relationships that contribute to regional stability and development. Ankara's efforts in diplomacy, development cooperation, and military engagements contribute to its growing influence on the continent. Türkiye's experience in Somalia exemplifies its comprehensive, multi-sectoral approach to addressing state fragility, reflecting broader aspirations for promoting stability and development across Africa. However, challenges remain in balancing interests, addressing geopolitical rivalries, and preventing arms proliferation. Türkiye must navigate these complexities while fostering dialogue and cooperation, leveraging its unique position devoid of historical colonial baggage to mediate disputes and promote stability more effectively than traditional powers. The future success of Türkiye's engagement will hinge on its ability to address these challenges and adapt its foreign policy apparatus to the growing demands of engagement in Africa. Türkiye and Africa are expected to deepen their cooperation and further diversify their relationships across multiple sectors. This includes expanding trade, investments, and development assistance, collaborating on shared security interests, and addressing global challenges like climate change and pandemics. To solidify its position as a key player in Africa's peace, security, and development landscape, Türkiye should maintain mutually beneficial relationships promoting regional stability and development. As Türkiye and Africa strengthen their ties, ensuring that the diversification strategy promotes mutual benefits, sustainable development, and long-term partnerships is crucial. This article presents five recommendations for positively enhancing the Turkish presence in Africa. Enhance transparency in military agreements: Türkiye and African countries should collaborate to improve transparency and accountability, ensuring compliance with international norms and human rights standards. In this process, involving AU organs, particularly the Peace and Security Council, can bolster these efforts. By incorporating third-party monitoring mechanisms and engaging regional organisations, the potential negative implications of arms proliferation and increased militarisation can be mitigated, further strengthening the cooperative relationship between Türkiye and African nations. Increase long-term programmatic funding: Türkiye should consider expanding its long-term programmatic financing for African nations, transitioning from a predominantly project-based approach to a more structured, strategic investment in development programmes. This will give African countries greater predictability and resources to address complex, systemic educational, healthcare, and infrastructure challenges. Bolster commitment to development and social responsibility within trade and investment: Türkiye and African nations should emphasise sustainable development, human rights, and social accountability as central pillars of their trade and investment activities. By jointly focusing on environmental conservation, social inclusion, gender equality, and ethical business practices, both parties can create a solid foundation for expanding and deepening their trade and investment relationships. Foster regional integration and cooperation: Türkiye should consider supporting regional integration efforts in Africa, working closely with organisations such as the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs) to promote economic growth, intra-regional trade, and political stability. The country should consider the potential of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as a key avenue for trade and investment in Africa. This could include technical assistance, capacity-building programs, and investment in regional infrastructure projects. Bolster political dialogue and cooperation: African nations should actively work to establish clearer objectives for their engagement with Türkiye. Alongside Türkiye, they ought to continue investing in high-level diplomatic interactions, including Türkiye-Africa summits, state visits, and institutional structures, to nurture mutual understanding and tackle common challenges. Such collaboration can involve addressing global issues like climate change, pandemics, and peace and security and promoting democratic governance, transparency, and adherence to the rule of law. About the authors Gustavo de Carvalho is a public policy analyst and consultant. He is also a Senior Researcher at the African Governance and Diplomacy Programme at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). With more than 15 years of experience in Africa, he previously worked with several international organisations and think tanks, including the University of Johannesburg, the United Nations in Guinea-Bissau, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). Gustavo holds an MSc in African Studies from the University of Oxford and a bachelor’s in international relations from the University of Brasilia. Daryl Swanepoel is the Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, an independent South African Non-Profit public policy research institute. The institute also promotes democracy, human rights, constitutionalism and international cooperation. He is a qualified financial accountant, a former Member of Parliament, and has filled a number of senior party political and private sector posts. He holds a National Diploma in Company Administration from the University of Johannesburg, a Bachelor of Public Administration (Honours) degree honours degree (cum laude) and a master’s degree in public administration from the University of Stellenbosch. In the honours degree, he distinguished himself as the best overall achiever in the degree, as well as the best subject achiever in economic governance, political governance, and research. For the master’s degree, he received an academic achievement bursary. Daryl’s current research focus areas are economics, social cohesion and geopolitics. Concurrently, he is the Vice President of the Institute for Accounting and Commerce, a statutory recognised professional body tasked with licensing financial accountants and tax practitioners in South Africa. He is also an advisor to Tianyuan University, Tianjin, China, and recently joined the Advisory Board of the Istanbul Security Forum. References Africa – Turkey: Istanbul Summit, 2022. . Africa Res Bull: Pol Soc Cul 58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2022.10337.x African Development Bank, 2019. High-Level Panel on Fragile States [WWW Document]. African Development Bank - Building today, a better Africa tomorrow. URL https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/high-level-panel-on-fragile-states (accessed 4.16.23). Akgün, B., Özkan, M., 2020. Turkey’s Entrance to International Education: The Case of Turkish Maarif Foundation. 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URL https://www.tika.gov.tr/en/publication/list/turkish_development_assistance_reports-24 (accessed 4.9.23). Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d. Türkiye-Africa Relations [WWW Document]. URL https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-africa-relations.en.mfa (accessed 4.8.23). Yaşar, N.T., 2022. Unpacking Turkey’s Security Footprint in Africa. Trends and Implications for the EU. SWP Comment 42. Yüksel, E., 2020. Turkey’s approach to proxy war in the Middle East and North Africa. Security and Defence Quarterly. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute launched its Business Circle programme on 11 May 2023 at a business breakfast hosted at the Radisson Blu Hotel in Sandton. Business Circle is the business outreach programme of the Inclusive Society Institute, which has as its objective the inclusion of the business community in the development of socio-economic policy for South Africa. It recognises that the development of socio-economic policy without the inclusion of those directly involved in and impacted thereby is necessary to ensure its credibility and suitability in the real-world economy. Business Circle aims to involve the business community in the Institute’s policy development processes. It will also create a platform for policy dialogue, networking, empowerment, and business trade and promotion. Speakers at the event included the Hon. Faiez Jacobs MP, a senior member of Parliament’s economic cluster, Ms. Jenny Wu, a prominent Johannesburg businesswoman, the Consul General of the People’s Republic of China in Johannesburg, Tang Zhongdong, and the CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Mr. Daryl Swanepoel. The keynote presentation was made by well-known economist, Mr. Keith Lockwood, who dissected the South African economy with projections as to what society can expect going forward. [Click here for the presentation of projections for the South African economy]

The National Liberation Heritage Institute of South Africa (Nalhisa) hosted the "Dialogue on bridging the gap, crossing the divide: Steps towards a post-Apartheid heritage", to which a number of speakers, including former President Kgalema Motlanthe, were invited to speak at Freedom Park, Pretoria, on 10 May 2023. The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Mr. Daryl Swanepoel, also spoke. In his speech titled ‘Preserving South Africa’s liberation history is important for nation-building’, Mr. Swanepoel pointed out the importance of keeping the inclusive story of South Africa’s transition to democracy alive, in order to inspire citizens towards an inclusive and socially just, cohesive future. He also bemoaned the diversion away from the Mandela era of reconciliation and called for today’s leaders to re-prioritise reconciliation and nation-building. Click here for the speech of Daryl Swanepoel

The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Daryl Swanepoel, participated in the Istanbul Security Forum, which was held in Istanbul, Türkiye from 2 to 3 May 2023. About the Forum Facing challenges that disrupt peace and stability in different parts of the world, international actors are prompted to ponder on ways to navigate their future. Since the traditional understanding of the concept of security has been transformed, the need for building resilience against modern challenges targeting security has also arisen. International actors, ranging from states to international organisations, have come to acknowledge that the concept of security has a multi-layered structure that includes phenomena such as climate and environmental problems, natural disasters, epidemics, economic crises, and cyber threats. Natural disasters and epidemics have marked the significance of joint actions and international cooperation in alleviating human suffering. The prolonged conflicts in recent years, including the Syrian Civil War and the War in Ukraine, also demonstrated the disastrous impact of instabilities on civilians. As civilians continue to withstand the worst of conflicts, which have global reverberations for international security and stability, there has been debate over the role of international organisations in addressing said conflicts. In light of the aforementioned issues, the Presidency’s Directorate of Communications of the Republic of Türkiye is hosting the Istanbul Security Forum (ISF), aiming to generate fruitful discussions over the concept of security with an innovative perspective. The Forum, held for the first time, brought together policymakers, academics, experts, journalists, and representatives of international organizations who discussed the regional and global powers’ approaches to security policies. In panels and roundtables, the participants exchange views on ways to ensure security, and on facing challenges that await collective response. Programme Click here to view the programme ISI participation The ISI CEO participated in the panel discussion titled “Türkiye as a Stabilizing Power in an Age of Turmoil”. His remarks at the panel discussion were based on a paper prepared by the ISI titled “Beyond Colonialism: Türkiye's Unique Approach to Africa”. Click here to view the paper Click here to view the speech

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) attended a roundtable exploring the best models for co-existent between monarchical rule within a democratic system in Southern Africa, the design of social accords for more sustainable state society relations, and the role of the Southern African Development Community and other actors in supporting and facilitating the transitions to democracy in Eswatini or consolidation of democracy in Lesotho. The roundtable was held in hybrid format with the in-person event taking place at The Capital Menlyn Maine, Pretoria. It was hosted by Gateways for Peace – an EU-South Africa Partnership for Peace & Security. It was held on Tuesday, 18 April 2023. The CEO of the ISI represented the Institute. Two policy briefs served as the basis for the discussion: Navigating the crisis in Eswatini: Options for dialogue and transitional justice Promoting Human Security and Peacebuilding in Lesotho.

Occasional Paper 4/2023 Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. APRIL 2023 by Dr Roelof Botha and Daryl Swanepoel Introduction - heightened geopolitical risk Geopolitical risk is characterised by its omnipresence, but there have been few, if any occasions than the events of 2022, when such a variety of overlapping shocks have transpired to create a bewildering sense of near-universal anxiety. No sooner had most countries removed harsh lockdown regulations associated with the Covid pandemic than Russia staged a full-blown military invasion of Ukraine. The invasion started in February 2022 and is the biggest military mobilisation in Europe since World War II. The global repercussions of this war has shifted global concerns away from health issues related to the Covid pandemic and towards intensifying risks in the socio-political, security, environmental and macroeconomic domains. Russia’s subsequent use of energy as a weapon against Western European nations led to food and commodity price shocks that predictably resulted in the worst global price instability in more than four decades (EPRS, 2022). The rapid tightening of monetary policy arguably caused more harm than good, as higher interest rates were never going to be effective to counter one of the other key reasons for the spike in inflation, namely the eight-fold increase between 2019 and 2021 in freight shipping rates (Kaspar, 2022). The latter was caused by the supply-chain disruptions during the Covid-pandemic, especially the random closure of key harbours as part of lockdown regulations. Since 2022, the extraordinary confluence of geopolitical risks has also fuelled a cost-of-living crisis and heightened social unrest in many parts of the world. The World Bank has forecast a global economic slowdown, with median incomes in virtually all emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) being eroded by inflation, currency depreciation and under-investment in human capital and private sector expansion (The World Bank, 2023). Since these gloomy predictions were published in January, however, a number of positive trends have started to emerge that suggest an avoidance of undue economic contraction. These include signs that inflation has peaked in most countries and the imminent recovery of the Chinese economy (Romei, 2022). In addition to various risks whose intensity may eventually start to dissipate, the world is also grappling with climate transition that is not nearly as advanced as it needs to be. Until mid-January 2023, several authoritative research agencies, including the World Bank, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Eurasia Group and a variety of academic institutions, had started to highlight and analyse new unfolding global risk scenarios. In the process, a loose consensus has developed pointing to adverse ripple effects of the war in Ukraine, global monetary tightening and an economic slowdown in China, all of which were expected to weigh on the global economy in 2023. Global growth forecasts were revised downwards and the long-awaited final recovery phase from the Covid pandemic seemed to have been effectively halted (Gourinchas, 2022). The latter half of 2022 witnessed the fall-out of these unfortunate circumstances. Carbon emissions started climbing again as production responded to pent-up demand and Russia’s use of food and energy as part of its military strategy was partly responsible for inflation rising to their highest levels in decades. China’s zero-Covid policy prevented a full reopening of global freight shipping routes, the cost of which had sky-rocketed as a result of supply-side constraints and harbour closures. A cost-of-living crisis soon started unfolding, with Europe and under-developed nations having to bear the brunt of escalating food and energy prices. According to the World Bank, small states are especially vulnerable to such shocks because of their reliance on external trade and financing, limited economic diversification, elevated debt, and susceptibility to natural disasters and climate change (The World Bank, 2023). Identifying the largest risks Table 1 lists the ten largest global risks as identified by the latest Global Risks Perception Survey, published by the World Economic Forum. Table 1: Global risks ranked by severity of impact over the short term Fortunately, two of the three key triggers perceived to lead to higher levels of geopolitical and socio-economic instability have become considerably less potent in a short space of time, as portrayed by the latest Global Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and indications of an imminent reversal of the rising interest rate cycle in most countries (IMF, 2023). An element of optimism over a dilution of geo-economic risks has also emanated from rising asset prices, especially global equity markets and sovereign bonds of some emerging markets, including South Africa. Risks associated with civil unrest and crime As identified by an overview of recent authoritative economic and political research reports, including by the IMF, the US Federal Reserve and the European Union, it has become clear that governments and businesses all over the world are facing a variety of escalating risks, caused, inter alia, by: The turmoil brought about by the war in Ukraine Sanctions against Russia Supply-chain disruptions Unprecedented increases in shipping freight charges China’s long-standing zero-Covid policy Fiscal constraints from falling tax receipts The rise in support for populist policies in some countries Socio-economic inequality and poverty Higher inflation Higher interest rates In its latest update on the global political risk outlook, Verisk Maplecroft points to risks currently being at the highest global level in the last five years. Unsurprisingly, the research company has concluded that, after two years in which the Covid-19 pandemic served as the primary source of global instability, the conflict in Ukraine was the main driver of risk in 2022 (Middleton, 2023). In December 2020, Verisk Maplecroft warned of a new era of civil unrest, projecting that 75 countries would see an increase in civil unrest risk by August 2022. The reality has been far worse, with more than 100 countries witnessing an increase in risk since then (Soltvedt, 2022). According to Verisk Maplecroft’s latest Civil Unrest Index (CUI), the world is facing an unprecedented rise in civil unrest as governments all over the world grapple with the impact of inflation on the price of staple foods and energy. The data, covering seven years, shows that, during the last quarter of 2022, more countries witnessed an increase in risks from civil unrest than at any time since the Index was released. Out of 198 countries, 101 saw an increase in risk, compared with only 42 where the risk decreased. The impact is evident across the globe, with popular discontent over rising living costs emerging on the streets of developed and emerging markets alike (Soltvedt, 2022). The CUI report rates crime as the biggest security issue facing companies in major cities across the world, putting staff, assets and supply chains at risk. Incidents of conflict and terrorism are primarily cited as threatening global security, but crime and civil unrest are more widely distributed threats. Of these, crime represents a significant cost to business, due to the need to protect staff and assets and maintain supply chain integrity (Soltvedt, 2022). Verisk Maplecroft publishes a risk index for 579 urban centres with a population over 1 million on their exposure to a range of threats. The latest index shows that the most dangerous cities overall are distributed widely, with the top 100 including 33 cities from the Americas, 33 from Africa, 19 from Asia, 14 from Middle East/North Africa (MENA), and one from Europe. Unfortunately for South Africa, three of its own cities feature in the high and extreme risk categories, as depicted by the data in table 2. The data suggests that the severity and frequency of protests and labour activism is set to accelerate further during 2023 (Moshiri, 2022). Table 2: Selection of global cities with the highest risks for crime and civil unrest A concise discussion of the key geopolitical risks that feature in several authoritative research studies and surveys follows (in declining order of their probability to lead to an escalation of socio-economic and political instability). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine It is no surprise that the war in Ukraine features prominently in all of the authoritative studies on current geopolitical tensions, as several other risks in the socio-economic and political domains are intrinsically tied to the conflict in Eastern Europe. Towards the end of February 2023, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favour of a resolution calling for an end to the war and demanding that Russia leave Ukrainian territory (UN, 2023). A similar resolution was adopted a year ago, shortly after the invasion began. The extent of global opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is also illustrated by the fact that only one country in the Middle East block of 16 countries voted against the resolution (Syria), whilst only one abstained (Iran). Although Algeria and Tunisia regard themselves as part of the Middle East, they remain geographically part of Africa. The Middle East has a long-standing record of opposition to the US and strong ties to Russia. Unfortunately, Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has also raised the spectre of nuclear warfare. On 31 January, the United States accused Russia of not complying with its obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the only remaining treaty limiting the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. The US State Department said Russia is refusing to facilitate inspections on its territory as required under the treaty. The United States remains committed to restoring compliance with the accord, it said (Hudson & Cho, 2023). The allegations of noncompliance come months after Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons to defend the Ukrainian territory that Russia has illegally annexed. The demise of New START would mark the near-total collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation architecture that the United States and the Soviet Union, and later Russia, built in the 1980s and 1990s (Hudson & Cho, 2023). The Russian Ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Antonov, said in a statement on 1 February that, due to the conflict in Ukraine, it was currently inappropriate to invite the U.S. military to Russia’s strategic facilities. He added that Russia still views the treaty as a useful tool for maintaining stability between the two nuclear powers (Hudson & Cho, 2023). In February, Russian President Vladimir Putin nevertheless signed a bill formally suspending the START treaty. Further escalation of tensions Tensions between the US and Russia over the invasion of Ukraine were heightened again on 24 March when Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that his country would station tactical nuclear arms in Belarus, a move that has predictably evoked fierce criticism from the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Ukraine’s response was to request an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to counter Russia’s “nuclear blackmail”, whilst NATO spokeswoman Oana Lungescu calling the decision dangerous and irresponsible. She also stated that Russia’s reference to NATO’s nuclear sharing is totally misleading, as NATO allies always act with full respect of their international commitments (Gregory, 2023). In addition, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant of arrest in March for Russian President Vladimir Putin for alleged war crimes related to the unlawful deportation of children and unlawful transfer of people from Ukraine to Russia (Borger & Sauer, 2023). President Cyril Ramaphosa's spokesperson, Vincent Magwenya, has refused to speculate on South Africa’s likely position when Putin is expected to visit the country later this year for a Brics Summit, saying that no invitations had yet been sent to the leaders of the other four Brics countries. In a media statement, he did, however, acknowledge the South African government’s respect for international statutes (Gerber, 2023). South Africa is a signatory of the Rome Statute and, therefore, has the responsibility to honour an ICC arrest warrant, if the person against whom it is issued sets foot in South Africa. This was not the case in 2015, when the South African government under Mr Jacob Zuma’s orders refused to detain the former president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, who attended an African Union summit in South Africa. Al-Bashir was subject to two ICC arrest warrants for several counts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The following year, South Africa's Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that the implementation act for the Rome Statute overruled the immunity granted to foreign heads of state, and that Al-Bashir should have been arrested in South Africa (Gerber, 2023). Although concern remains in the United States and Europe over Beijing providing military assistance to the Kremlin, the recent visit to Moscow by Chinese President Xi Jinping served to allay these fears somewhat. During the state visit to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the two leaders pledged friendship and predictably denounced the West. The West has been critical of China, suggesting that it is supporting Russia against Ukraine, but the Chinese leader has said that China had an "impartial position" on the conflict (Reuters, 2023). He also discussed with the Russian President China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis, which plan has been developed by the Chinese authorities as a basis for their mediation to bring a resolve to the Russia-Ukraine conflict (FMPRC, 2023). To some extent, the summit between the Russian and Chinese leaders was upstaged in Kyiv, where Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida made an unannounced visit and met President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. Japan is the world’s 3rd largest economy and is an important Asian ally of the US and Europe. During 2022, geopolitical risk became more pervasive and few countries have been left unscathed by the side-effects of the war in Ukraine, lingering supply-chain constraints due to China’s zero-Covid policies and renewed assertiveness by China towards Taiwan. GDP growth forecasts by the World Bank and the European Union prior to and after the onset of the war in Ukraine confirm a marked slowing down of the post-pandemic economic recovery, especially for EMDEs in the European and Central Asia regions (The World Bank, 2022). Global economic damage The damage wreaked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has spread to all parts of the globe, with advanced and emerging economies alike weakened as a result of: Significant disruptions in trade flows and supply chains Commodity price shocks, especially surging energy prices due to lower energy supplies to Europe Sharp increases in food prices, which exacerbated the spike in global inflation caused by record freight shipping charges. It is estimated that Ukraine and Russia provide at least half of the grains for over 26 countries. Declines in consumer and business confidence A prolonged risk-off sentiment amongst global fund managers, which was reinforced by the sharp increase in US interest rates Equity market weakness, which eroded household wealth/disposable income ratios The macroeconomic impact of the war in Ukraine lends credence to the geopolitical risk (GPR) index, developed by Dario Caldara and Matteo Iacoviello and published by the US Federal Reserve. Since the turn of the century, the following events led to spikes in the GPR index: After the 9/11 terror attacks in the US (2001) During the 2003 Iraq invasion During the 2014 Russia-Ukraine crisis After the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015 During the current war in Ukraine (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2021) Although the war in Ukraine only led to the fourth highest monthly reading of the GPR Index since 1985, it has resulted in the third highest ever annual average reading over the past four decades and the highest in almost two decades. On every occasion that a spike was observed in geopolitical risk, it resulted in a decline in real economic activity, equity market weakness and movements in capital flows away from emerging economies and towards advanced economies (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2021). Global economic disruption, however, pales in comparison to the damage suffered by Ukraine. The country’s economy contracted by around 35% in 2022 and 14 million people are estimated to have been displaced. In addition to the tragic loss of life, the cost of recovery and reconstruction of infrastructure and productive capacity could amount to $350 billion, which is more than 1.5 times the size of Ukraine’s pre-war economy in 2021 (The World Bank, 2022). NATO steps up its involvement One of the reasons for Ukraine’s recent plea to members of NATO to supply the country with tanks is that the area in which the war is mostly being fought is flat and open. Russian forces have dug in deep, which rules out infantry-only attacks, but tanks could be decisive during the next phase of the war. The US and Germany have been cautious about escalating the war, which explains their reticence at providing Ukraine with an offensive weapon like a tank (Cohen, 2023). But they do not want a stalemate to emerge along the existing lines of occupation. What they want, it is now clear, is for Ukraine to win. Consequently, an escalation is firmly on the cards. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has requested 300 tanks, and at the moment, he is likely to get a third of that figure, which does not compare favourably to Russia’s estimated 2 000 battle-ready tanks and several thousand more in storage facilities. Interestingly, US military officials that have been monitoring the war estimate that Russia has already lost more than 1 000 tanks. What Russia clearly lacks, is unquestioned air superiority, and it is sheer madness to drive tanks into a modern battlefield that has no ground cover, without adequate air support (Cohen, 2023). Since the beginning of the year, Ukraine has secured huge pledges of weapons from the West, offering new capabilities - the latest to include rockets from the United States that would nearly double the firing range of Ukrainian forces. Officials in the US have confirmed that a new $2 billion package of military aid will be announced early in February that would for the first time include gliding missiles that can strike targets more than 150 km away - a new weapon designed by Boeing (Stone, 2023). These weapons would put all of the Russian-occupied territory on Ukraine's mainland, as well as parts of the Crimea peninsula seized by Moscow in 2014, within range of Kyiv's forces. In a significant shift, the Pentagon announced at the end of January that it would expedite the delivery of 31 M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine by around September. Originally, the plan was to send the newer M1A2 Abrams tanks, but this would have taken between one and two years to deliver. Following pressure from Ukraine and other NATO countries, it has now been decided to rather send the older M1A1 version, which can be taken from existing US army stocks, subject to the necessary refurbishing. The new arrangement will provide Germany with political cover for a swift provision of Leopard battle tanks to Ukraine. An advantage of the older M1 Abrams tank is that it will be easier for Ukrainian forces to learn to use and maintain as they try to repel the invading Russian forces (Baldor, 2023). According to Tim Cohen, business editor at Daily Maverick, the crucial aspect about the supply of tanks and other sophisticated weapons to Ukraine is the change of attitude in the West (Cohen, 2023). From now on, NATO is effectively at war with Russia and the world needs to face this fact. In mid-March, Polish President Andzej Duda announced that the country would deliver the first four of a batch of Soviet-made MiG-29 fighter jets before the end of March. Poland has a stronger vested interest in an end to the Ukrainian conflict than most other countries, due to an imminent humanitarian crisis flowing from 10 million refugees that have entered Poland over the past 13 months (Statista, 2023). Poland and Slovakia, which has also committed to sending fighter jets to Ukraine, have already called on other countries to follow their lead. In February, Britain said that it would start to train Ukrainian pilots on fighter jets used by NATO countries. Commentators have suggested that the Polish donation was of more symbolic than battlefield value, with a senior Kyiv official calling it a “psychological tipping point” that could encourage other countries to also provide additional aircraft (Chapman et al, 2023). Any doubt over the pervasive negative economic impact of Russian aggression in Ukraine was dispelled by the 25% decline in the value of the S&P 500 Index between the end of 2021 and September 2022 (Simonetti, 2022). Fortunately, however, global equity markets have recovered well since the third quarter of 2022, mainly due to signs that inflation has peaked in most countries and that hawkish monetary policy by the US Federal Reserve may end during the first half of 2023. Tensions between the West and China The conciliatory tone of an address at Davos by Liu He (a Chinese vice premier) stands in somewhat in contrast to President Xi Jinping’s cautioning to the West merely three months earlier that China is willing to use force to reunify Taiwan. The warning was made during his opening address to the Communist Party’s 2022 National Congress in Beijing, where he was appointed for a third term as Party leader after abolishing a two-term limit on the Chinese presidency in 2018 (Gan & McCarthy, 2022). This move will effectively enable him to remain at the helm for an infinite period. Under Xi Jinping, China has taken a more assertive stance towards Taiwan, reaffirming its view that the island is a breakaway province that will eventually be part of the country. This position has put China at odds with the United States and its Western allies, who maintain an approach of strategic ambiguity. Tensions between the US and China escalated in August 2022 with the visit to Taiwan by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. China perceived the visit as a challenge to its sovereignty over the nation and retaliated with a show of force by firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan (Lendon, 2022). Xi Jinping is widely considered one of the most powerful Chinese leaders since Chairman Mao, but local dissent has increased due to his firm-hand approach, especially on the lengthy implementation of extremely harsh lockdown regulations. Millions of China’s citizens have suffered under the regular and tough enforcement of tight lockdown regulations. In November 2022, anger eventually turned into widespread protests, triggered by an apartment fire that killed 10 people and comments on social media suggesting that the lockdown had prevented their escape (The Guardian, 2022). Xi Jinping’s rule has been characterised by restrictions which have seen thousands of critics sanctioned. The Chinese leader has also stepped up the regime’s control over the private sector, including a larger degree of surveillance and censorship, whilst his zero-Covid policy has been criticised for damaging the world’s second-largest economy (BBC News, 2022). Tensions between China and the West also flared up earlier in 2022, shortly after Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, with US President Joe Biden warning Chinese leader Xi Jinping that Beijing could regret siding with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, pointing out the number of American and foreign corporations that left Russia as a consequence of its ruthless behaviour (Al Jazeera, 2022). The Biden administration has been pressuring China and other countries to refrain from supporting Russia, including attempts to counter Western sanctions and providing military assistance. Western democracies, spearheaded by the US and the EU, remain concerned about China’s support to Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. The EU has also taken an increasingly confrontational stance towards what they term China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang where UN reported arbitrary and discriminatory detentions go against international law (UN, 2022), discrimination against EU firms operating in China and the country’s subsidy-led industrial model, which they say flouts the protocols of the World Trade Organisation, which, they say, effectively leads to dumping, a term associated with exporting goods at below cost (WTO, 2023). Middle East tensions remain in place Global geo-political risk also remains omnipresent in the Middle East, with multiple air strikes carried out by the US military in Syria against Iran-aligned groups during March. The retaliatory attacks were carried out at the direction of President Joe Biden, following a drone attack that killed an American contractor and injured five US troops. US officials believe that drone and rocket attacks are being directed by groups affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Over the past two years, US troop shave come under attack by these groups 78 times, which has further strained the relations between Washington and Tehran (The Guardian, 2023). Cyber-warfare aimed at damaging infrastructure Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and tensions surrounding Taiwan have increased the likelihood of major cyber-attacks between states. Given the much higher costs of direct military conflict and the difficulty in identifying perpetrators of cyber-attacks, any military escalation between repressive states like Russia and the West is most likely initially to take the form of cyber-warfare. According to research by the Eurasia Group, a real possibility exists that Kremlin-affiliated hackers will ramp up cyber-attacks on Western firms and governments (Eurasia Group, 2023). This could take the form of attempts to disrupt oil pipelines, American and European satellites and infrastructure, including telecommunications and electricity grids, which would severely disrupt business operations. Further efforts to influence and sabotage global elections also pose a risk. Environmental degradation Concerns over global warming and environmental risks do not feature prominently in a number of recent studies on geopolitical risks in 2023 and beyond, including the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Risk Outlook 2023 (EIU, 2023). In contrast, The Global Risks Perceptions Survey 2023 (GRPS), published by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in January, shows that climate and environmental risks are the core focus of risks perceptions over the next decade. In the ranking of global risks by the GRPS over the short term, environmental concerns represent five of the top-ten identified risks. Over the long term (ten years) this share rises to six out of the ten most severe perceived risks (WEF, 2023). According to a report by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), biodiversity within and between ecosystems is already declining faster than at any other point during human history (IPBES, 2019). Human interventions have negatively impacted a complex and delicately balanced global natural ecosystem, triggering a chain of negative reactions. Given that over half of the world's economic output is estimated to be moderately to highly dependent on nature, the collapse of ecosystems will have far-reaching economic and societal consequences. According to research contained in the GRPS, these include increased occurrence of diseases, a fall in crop yields and nutritional value, growing water stress exacerbating potentially violent conflict, loss of livelihoods dependent on food systems, and ever more dramatic floods, sea-level rises and erosion from the degradation of natural flood protection systems like water meadows and coastal mangroves (WEF, 2023). A report from United Nations (UN) Climate Change published in October 2022 shows some progress in bending the curve of global greenhouse gas emissions downward but underlines that these efforts remain insufficient to limit the global temperature rising to 1.5 degrees Celsius by the end of the century (UNEP, 2022). The fact that only 24 new or updated climate plans were submitted since the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Convention on Climate Change is disappointing. The UN has repeatedly urged the 193 Parties under the Paris Agreement to align government decisions with actions that reflect the level of urgency, the gravity of the threats the world is facing, and the shortness of the time to avoid the devastating consequences of runaway climate change. According to the UN, the downward trend in emissions expected by 2030 shows that nations have made some progress this year, but the world is still nowhere near the scale and pace of emission reductions required to achieve a 1.5 degrees Celsius world. According to the EIU, climate change models point to an increased frequency of extreme weather events. Although these have been fairly sporadic and in different parts of the world, they could start to occur more frequently and for prolonged periods. Recent droughts and heatwaves in Europe, China, India and the US have contributed to rising prices of food. Crop shortages and rising food prices also raise the risk of food insecurity or even famine. Other risks A combination of slow growth, tightening financial conditions, and heavy indebtedness could weaken investment in new productive capacity and infrastructure and potentially trigger corporate defaults. Fiscal stability is being threatened in less creditworthy emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), especially if they are also energy importers. This threat is related to dampened capital market risk appetite, which has led to widespread capital outflows and slowing bond issuance across EMDEs. Socio-economic instability in less developed countries often leads to large-scale involuntary migration, as has been evident in North Africa, the Middle East, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. The rise of social media has provided so-called generation Z with the ability to organise online to affect corporate and public policy, often making life difficult for multinationals and disrupting politics with the click of a button. Members of this generation were born into a world of peak tech­no­log­i­cal inno­va­tion - where infor­ma­tion was imme­di­ate­ly acces­si­ble and social media increas­ing­ly ubiquitous The conflict in Ukraine has brought to the forefront the strategic competition that has been emerging between a Western model and a Chinese-Russia centred zone. The inherent longer-term risk for companies is related to the future manner in which China will engage internationally. References Al Jazeera. 2022. ‘Gigantic mistake’: Biden warned China’s Xi over aiding Russia. 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[Online] Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/dsb_27jan23_e.htm [accessed: 4 April 2023] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) participated in the Kagiso Trust Anti-Corruption High Level Dialogue, which was held at Constitution Hill, Johannesburg. The ISI was represented by Professor Evangelos Mantzaris, who led the Institute’s own research looking into the feasibility and desirability of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa. Five themes were identified during the dialogue: Taking a stand against corruption The implications of State Capture Understanding the causes of corruption Challenges and opportunities to build social accountability Enhancing coordination for social mobilisation to promote access to justice and combat corruption Professor Mantzaris delivered a presentation on the outcomes of the ISI research into the desirability and feasibility of an Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa. Much emphasis was placed on the need to rebuild trust between the organs of state and the public, without which, the fight against corruption would come to naught. Recording of event: Part 1 & Part 2:

Occasional Paper 3/2023 Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. MARCH 2023 by Robert Mopp and Daryl Swanepoel “Then the flag and the palace where sits the government cease to be the symbols of the nation. The nation deserts these brightly lit, empty shells and takes shelter in the country, where it is given life and dynamic power. The living expression of the nation is the moving consciousness of the whole of the people; it is the coherent, enlightened action of men and women” (Fanon, 1963). Introduction This essay begins with some background on the concept of social cohesion and then defines the constitutive elements of the term. Various approaches, by key theorists, to the concept of social cohesion are then outlined – the terms “social cohesion” and “social capital” will be used interchangeably in this context. Some of the key elements of social cohesion relate to trust, social networks, well-being and happiness. With reference to South Africa, the challenges facing the country and that pose a threat to social cohesion will be highlighted and some of the programmes that are in place to facilitate improvement in these areas will be discussed. In the conclusion, our levels of social cohesion will be assessed. In brief, despite a plethora of initiatives to foster social cohesion and many government initiatives, and some progress made, we still have a long way to go on the social cohesion front and in the creation of a stable, vibrant, harmonious and prosperous society. Social cohesion is deemed to be a critical ingredient for people to co-exist meaningfully and in harmony; it is also important for their social progress, well-being, happiness and overall development. Social cohesion is seen as part of the cure for the manifold challenges that South Africa faces such as high levels of unemployment, poverty, inequality, crime, corruption, gender violence, etc. It is also seen as important in restoring trust between, especially, the prosperous and the poor, who are the majority. The country is not well governed and service delivery is abysmal. Confidence in government, political parties and other institutions is low. At the same time, honest and frank social dialogue is required to deal with lingering legacies and the enduring economic marginalisation of the majority. At a broader societal level, our economic growth levels must be much higher to absorb labour and to make people feel that they have worth and restore flagging dignity. This is in addition to some of the other negative features that plague our country. Norton and de Haan (2013) remind us of the positive attributes of social cohesion in achieving a prosperous and happy populace. They state that “social cohesion can stand for the elements of social progress which include human security and solidarity, and can be both constitutive to development, and instrumental to other elements of development, for example the ability of social groups to sustainably improve living standards, or the ability of representative institutions to facilitate economic reforms” (Norton & de Haan, 2013). This is important for turning the fortunes of South Africa around in the period ahead. The Background of Social Cohesion Social cohesion is a core concept in social science and can be traced back to changes that were regarded as undermining the social fabric. Emile Durkheim is credited with being the first modern sociologist to theorise about the concept, in his De la Division du Travail Social (The Division of Labour in Society). Some of the earliest references to social cohesion can be found in the writings of the Arab polyglot, Ibn Khaldun, regarded as the last great scholar of the Islamic Golden Age and one of the founders of sociology, economics and historiography. Khaldun’s concept of assabiyah (group feeling) is loosely translated as social cohesion; the solidarity of small groups (tribes) that have the power to promote broader social integration, through a number of stages. The process of industrialisation and the development of the market economy (capitalism) and the notion of solidarity between individuals in society found different expressions in various theorists. For Marx it was mainly about class conflict, whereas for Durkheim it was about solidarity (Norton & de Haan, 2013). Pre-modern societies were marked by “mechanical solidarity and a strong collective ethos based on relatively homogeneous patterns of life and work” (Norton & de Haan, 2013). In contrast, advanced capitalist societies, with the now complicated division of labour, were characterised by “organic solidarity based on merit, respect for different roles within the labour force, with a need for moral regulation” (Norton & de Haan, 2013). Ferdinand Tönnies surveyed modernity and individualisation by distinguishing between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The former is a group of individuals who are socially connected and act for the sake of the community, whereas the latter is a group of individuals who are living together geographically but are socially more isolated (Schiefer & Van der Noll, 2017). Max Weber was concerned about the development of capitalism in modern society, highlighting the role of religious beliefs (the Protestant ethic of hard work). Weber saw rationality as a binding force in modern society, with the bureaucracy the “embodiment of that rationality” (Norton & de Haan, 2013). Jürgen Habermas highlights the importance of “critical rationality” as a binding force in today’s society that illuminates processes of socialisation. The French theorist Pierre Bourdieu (1986) is regarded as the founder of the term “social capital”, which many use interchangeably with “social cohesion”. This term displays the benefits that accrue to individuals for participation in groups and the necessity to invest in these relations. Whilst many theorists view social capital as a rewarding network of social connections, Bourdieu sees it in terms of the cold realities of social inequality; how people are inserted into the hierarchy of society (Gauntlett, 2011). Putnam (1998) is another important theorist on social capital, with his influential study of civic traditions in Italy. The crux of the study was to “determine the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions” (Norton & de Haan, 2013). Bourdieu and Putnam both emphasise the “role of social networks for the functionality and problem-solving capability of societies” within the social capital framework. Social Cohesion as a Concept There is no single, universally accepted definition of social cohesion (OECD, 2012). Indeed, a purview of the literature on the subject matter reveals that the term “social cohesion” holds numerous definitions. The term is differently appropriated and utilised in many countries across the globe, depending on the context, as there are multiple challenges in countries and different responses are developed to deal with the diversity. A number of theorists propose that the definition of the term “social cohesion” should be broad enough for people to embed a wide variety of ideas which reflect their own concerns and beliefs (Ballard, 2019). Delhey et al (2018) define social cohesion as the quality of social cooperation and togetherness of a collective – defined in geopolitical terms – that is expressed in the attitudes and behaviours of its members. The European Committee for Social Cohesion (2004) defines social cohesion as a set of social processes that help instil in individuals the sense of belonging to the same community and the feeling that they are recognised as members of the community. The French General Planning Commission (Commissariat général du Plan) (Eurofound, 2004) defines social cohesion as the capacity of a society to ensure the welfare of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding polarisation. A cohesive society is a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing these common goals by democratic means. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines a cohesive society as one that “works towards the well-being of all its members”, minimising disparities and avoiding marginalisation, and entails fostering cohesion by building networks of relationships, trust and identity between different groups, fighting discrimination, exclusion and excessive inequalities, and enabling upward social mobility (OECD, 2012). Easterly (2006) sees the lack of social cohesion as based on “the nature and extent of social and economic divisions within society” – divisions such as income, ethnicity, political party, caste, language, etc. – which create societal cleavages. Pierre Bourdieu defines social capital as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Gauntlett, 2011). South Africa’s National Planning Commission (NPC) states that social cohesion seeks to address “the divisive effects of racism, class divisions, social fragmentation, language, spatial exclusion, sexism, unemployment, crime and inequality” (NPC, 2012). The National Development Plan 2030 situates social cohesion at the centre of South Africa’s socio-economic transformation agenda to promote ubuntu, trust, tolerance, social interaction, inclusion and solidarity in communities and society at large. The country’s motto speaks of “unity in diversity” and this concept seeks to harness this energy and its character traits to improve relations between people, irrespective of background, status or colour. It is seen as a constructive process of addressing division and exclusion, which continue to replicate and buttress the racial, ethnic, and other identities of South African society (NPC, 2012). Approaches to Social Cohesion Contemporary approaches to social cohesion put more stress on the “operationalisation and usability” of the concept to policymakers (Schiefer & Van der Noll, 2017). The paradigm of the Canadian Policy Research Networks (CPRN) advances five dimensions for social cohesion: Belonging/isolation (i.e., shared values, collective identities in the social entity) Economic inclusion/exclusion (e.g., in the labour market) Participation and involvement of the society’s members in public affairs Recognition versus rejection of diversity and pluralism The degree of legitimacy of societal institutions. Bernard developed the CPRN’s framework further into three specific fields, namely economic, political or socio-cultural, and the type of social involvement (attitudinal or behavioural). This addition makes it six dimensions. Chan, To and Chan (2006), for example, differentiate between subjective (trust, attitudes, identification) and objective (participation rates, crime rates, etc.) divisions, which apply to both horizontal relations (between members of society) and vertical relationships (between individuals and institutions). Chan, To and Chan went further and proposed four main areas of social cohesion, namely, legitimacy versus illegitimacy (i.e., institutional trust), acceptance versus rejection (i.e., solidarity, and concern for the common good), political participation, and socio-cultural participation. A supplementary distillation results in six distinct magnitudes of social cohesion commonly found: social relations, identification, orientation towards the common good, shared values, quality of life, and equality/inequality. According to Moody and White (2003), four out of the six dimensions reside under the ideational and relational divisions of social cohesion. The ideational dimension comprises cognitive and affective facets such as norms, values and identification; the relational dimension encompasses the relationships and ties between individuals (Moody & White, 2003). The remaining two dimensions, quality of life and equality/inequality, can be incorporated under a third area, labelled the distributive dimension, comprising the relatively equal or unequal distribution of physical, economic, social and cultural resources (Moody & White, 2003). The last dimension is pertinent to South Africa, given the unequal nature of South African society. It is prudent to be mindful that there are different approaches to social cohesion, depending on political ideologies or subject focus. Social democracy views equality and solidarity as essential to social cohesion, whereas from a nationalist view, the shared national history and traditional values are important. Liberal views perceive equality in terms of individual opportunities. The World Bank, for example, addresses social cohesion with a focus on economic development and poverty reduction (Moody & White, 2003). Social Cohesion and Trust Trust is an important element for social cohesion in society and amongst people. Trust towards institutions is equally significant. They have to trust each other and the “belief that they share a moral community” (Chan, To & Chan, 2006) that engenders trust. Trust is deemed crucial for social development and is an essential element of social capital since it “enhances economic exchange, improves the efficiency of public institutions” (Uslaner, 2019). Participation or civic engagement is another positive outcome of high levels of trust that conceivably strengthens democratic processes. “Participation in the public life reflects sense of belonging, solidarity and the readiness for mutual cooperation in the pursuit of common goals” (Schiefer & Van der Noll, 2017). It is important for people to feel attached to a social entity (other people, a group or community). A sense of belonging, together with social interactions, trust and willingness to participate and help others (Chan, To & Chan, 2006). It provides security and self-worth, which enhances the willingness for participation and effective social networking in community and societal affairs. In South Africa, this is expressed through the concept of ubuntu (recognising each other’s humanity), which was expressly referred to in the 1993 Constitution, but not the final 1996 Constitution. It is submitted that ubuntu is impliedly included in the 1996 Constitution by its frequent reference to human dignity. Ubuntu refers to behaving well towards others or acting in ways that benefit the community and encourage trust. Yet, research findings by Afrobarometer (2021), etc., show low levels of trust in public institutions and representatives in South Africa, which undermines social cohesion. This latest Afrobarometer opinion poll has shown that trust in the country’s Parliament stands at 27%, while the trust in the president comes in at a lowly 38%. Trust in the courts of law has dropped to 43%. The Public Protector received a 42% vote of trust, while only 36% trusted the Electoral Commission of South Africa, with trust levels particularly low amongst younger respondents. With a 56% approval rating, the Department of Health recorded the highest level of trust in comparison to other state institutions. In fact, trust as a concept is problematic in South Africa. Findings from the extensive GovDem Poll commissioned by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) in late 2021 showed that South Africans do not sufficiently trust their fellow compatriots. And that the lack of trust runs across most dimensions, be it race, gender, age, education, or income (ISI, 2022). Except for high levels of trust within families, with 87,42% of South Africans trusting other members of their family, disquieting trends endure across all other dimensions. Whilst people have reasonable trust in their neighbours – 62,27% indicated that they either completely or somewhat trusted their neighbours – and whilst they grow to trust people who they have gotten to know, they highly distrust people they do not know. There are also disturbingly high levels of distrust amongst people from different religions – less than half of South Africans (47,1%) indicated that they completely or somewhat trust people from religious groups other than their own – and races, where only around 50% of those South Africans from the minority communities indicated that they completely or somewhat trusted people from the black community. Then again, alarmingly, only 41% of black South Africans completely or somewhat trusted their white compatriots, which deepened to only 39% for their coloured compatriots and 35% for their fellow Indian South Africans. (ISI, 2022). What also emerged in the ISI’s GovDem Poll as an alarming trend, is the extreme lack of trust that South Africans have in foreigners, be they from Africa or other overseas countries. Overall, only 31,23% of South Africans said they completely trusted or somewhat trusted immigrants from African countries and 32,29% of South Africans said they completely trusted or somewhat trusted immigrants from countries other than those in Africa. This is particularly important to take note of, given the sporadic incidents of xenophobia in the country (ISI, 2022). Within the political sphere, the GovDem Poll revealed that the majority of South Africans deeply distrust fellow compatriots who do not belong to the same party as their own. Results drawn from the three largest political parties show that, across all parties, only 43,26% said that they could completely or somewhat trust people who supported the ANC, whilst this dropped to 33,2% for the DA and 32,39% for the EFF (ISI, 2022). This undermines social cohesion, and points to a high level of political and social naïveté, in that in a mature democracy people should be able to associate freely at the personal, workplace, and societal levels without overt hostility towards those who differ. This is particularly unsettling given the country’s past racial divisions, and party support that remains largely divided along racial lines. This needs to be overcome in order to achieve social cohesion and to build a united nation. Well-being and Happiness The well-being and happiness of countries are regarded as extremely important aspects, over and above economic progress, output and prosperity (wealth). There is now much more to consider than simply measuring GDP per capita in determining well-being and satisfaction with life. Two key determinants of well-being are equality and education (a positive relationship). South Africa performs poorly on both fronts. The level and quality of education influence contemporary well-being, and education matters greatly to social cohesion. South Africa does badly on this front as our output is inadequate, despite having one of the highest per capita spends on the continent. But countries can catch up, as the examples of many East Asian nations illustrate. The Happiness Index was developed to show how people evaluate their own lives and express the universal desire for happiness, and how people support each other in times of great need, like at the height of the Covid-19 period or when disaster strikes. South Africans, for example, are overwhelmingly kind and display “ubuntu” in their day-to-day interactions. The Happiness Index was first created by the Global Happiness Council, a group of independent academic happiness specialists, with the first World Happiness Report being published in 2012. The definition of the report originates from the Bhutanese Gross National Happiness Index. In 1972, Bhutan started prioritising happiness over other factors such as wealth, comfort and economic growth. The Happiness Index has since been revised, and the report no longer makes reference to the term. The World Happiness Report now determines the happiness ranking of countries in the fashion of a "happiness ladder”, known as the Cantril Ladder, which asks respondents to think of a ladder, with the best possible life for them being a 10 and the worst possible life being a 0. They are then asked to rate their own current lives on that 0 to 10 scale. This methodology is used in a lot of studies as a simple way to ask people to rate their current satisfaction with life, i.e., happiness. The latest country ranking shows life evaluations (answers to the Cantril ladder question) for each country, averaged over 2019-2021. Over the years, Scandinavian countries have been placed consistently at the top of the ranking, and this report says no different. According to the Ranking of Happiness in the World Happiness Report 2022, Finland ranks first, at 7.8, followed by Denmark and Iceland in second and third place. The United States (US) ranks 16th (6.97), and the United Kingdom (UK) sits just below at 17th (6.94). In sharp contrast, South Africa can be found way down the ranks, at position 91 out of 146, with a score of 5.19 – below the global average happiness ranking of 5.59 (WHR, 2022). South Africa’s Societal Challenges Impacting on Social Cohesion South Africa is characterised by unusually deep inequalities in employment, poverty, income, savings, etc. The narrow definition of unemployment was recorded at 33.9 percent in Q3, 2022. Poverty levels are elevated, and South Africa is the most unequal society in the world, according to the World Bank report, Inequality in Southern Africa. Racial and gender inequalities remain stubbornly embedded. Millions of South Africans cannot live without credit and are falling further behind on their debt repayments, resulting in over-indebtedness. In fact, more than half of South Africa’s credit-active consumers are over-indebted, an April 2022 report by the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) shows. Between 2015 and 2020 the percentage of credit-active consumers with an impaired record fluctuated between 38-48%, according to the report. A whopping 95% of the surveyed low-income individuals engaged in debt financing to afford basic needs such as food, clothing, transport and bills (FSCA, 2022). Over-indebtedness is coupled with high levels of crime, corruption, and alcohol and drug abuse. Additionally, the majority of the population has been excluded from the body politic and mainstream economy for the longest time, despite policies that have been developed, post-1994, to address this iniquity. This has a negative effect on social cohesion efforts in the country. It is generally recognised that these levels, apart from being unacceptable, are unsustainable and pose an existential threat to the long-term stability and functionality of the country. According to the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation’s (IJR) South African Reconciliation Barometer, the legacies of apartheid continue to have an economic and psychological impact on South Africans. The public discourse has become louder, questioning the outcome of the 1990s negotiated settlement. Many are saying that reconciliation has been emphasised at the expense of justice. The IJR Barometer further says that in the absence of memory, a society is likely to repeat previous catastrophes. In the same vein the Barometer states that “South Africans do not have enough of a shared understanding of their history, and the country is replete with ‘silent non-agreements’ underlying conflicts that are not spoken of, so as not to upset the democratic transition” (IJR, 2021). The post-1994 nation-building project designed to create unity and a common nationhood was also seen as instrumental for redistribution of wealth and other benefits, which historically had been denied to the majority. The levels of mistrust and anger are growing simultaneously, with negative consequences for the social cohesion agenda in South Africa. The 2020 ANC Discussion Paper on Social Cohesion, Gender and Nation-Building states that social cohesion can be a critical element of our attempt at uniting the country, deepening our democracy and making it safer for all who live in it. The underlying causes contributing to the less than satisfactory levels of social cohesion have to be urgently addressed to improve the situation in the country. Poverty and Crime In 1917, George Bernard Shaw, the playwright, argued that “the greatest of all evils and worst of crimes is poverty”. Amartya Sen (2007) notes that poverty is a tragedy. Sen further highlights the “calamity of deprivation and penury” and how “lives are battered, happiness stifled, creativity destroyed, and freedoms eradicated by the misfortunes of poverty”. Sen says that poverty is more than the ‘lowness of income’ (primary poverty), it is about the ‘inability to lead a decent, minimally acceptable life’ (secondary poverty). Sen also examines the connection between poverty and crime, of which South Africa is seen as a prime example given the high levels of both indicators. Many theorists have argued that countering poverty is one of the guaranteed ways to decrease crime, enhance social cohesion and prevent social turmoil. Sen mentions that then (2007) Calcutta had the highest level of poverty in India, but the lowest incidence of murder among all Indian cities. How to account for this anomaly, this seeming paradox? For Sen, it demonstrates that “poverty does not inescapably produce violence”. One of the positives of Calcutta is that it has a “long history of being a thoroughly mixed city, where neighbourhoods have not had the feature of ethnic separation”, like many other cities in India (Sen, 2007). There are also other social and cultural features that impact positively in Calcutta, as opposed to the situation in South Africa – many point to the apartheid legacy of divided neighbourhoods, deprivation, and lack of access to equal opportunities. A number of theorists have asserted that inequality, poverty, injustice, and continued suffering can generate intolerance and provoke anger and fury. For example, the banlieues on the outskirts of Paris, where mostly immigrants reside, have high crime rates and there is intermittent violence linked to neglect, marginalisation, and bad treatment by authorities. For Sen this demonstrates that ‘’we do not know enough about the empirical relations and their fragility and robustness to be confident of what the exact causal connections are” (Sen, 2007). Sen concludes that the “tendency to see a universal and immediate link between poverty and violence is hard to sustain”. Sen says that the “economy of poverty involves much more than just economics” (Sen, 2007). Many theorists feel differently with regard to the South African situation. There is something different in the psyche here that results in the high levels of crime and the violent nature of crime. South Africa’s Risk Profile According to the World Economic Forum's Global Risks Report 2022, the five biggest risks facing South Africa are: Prolonged economic stagnation Employment and livelihood crises State collapse Failure (and destruction) of public infrastructure The proliferation of illicit economic activity. (WEF, 2022) South Africa was also identified as one of 31 countries – including Argentina, France, Germany and Mexico – with high risks around the ‘erosion of social cohesion’. The country where most people say that things are heading in the wrong direction is Colombia (89%), followed by South Africa (85%), Peru (81%), Argentina (80%) and Brazil (79%) (Ipsos, 2021). The Aug-Oct 2021 Afrobarometer survey reflects the following findings: Trust in institutional checks and balances on political power is weak. Trust levels in local councils are very low, at 24%. Only 10% of South Africans indicated that they thought that politicians were trustworthy (Ipsos, 2021). Only about one in three citizens (36%) trust the IEC, with trust levels particularly low among younger respondents. Equally concerning is weak trust in the country’s courts of law (43%). Trust in both the ANC (27%) and opposition parties (24%) continues to decline. Trust in the ANC is especially low among younger and more educated respondents. Two-thirds (67%) of South Africans would be willing to give up elections if a non-elected government could provide security, housing and jobs. Nearly half (46%) say they would be “very willing” to do so, with higher levels of support among younger and more educated respondents. Only 35% think their Local Government is doing well. Most South Africans feel unsafe and only 13% had trust in police (Ipsos, 2021). Almost two-thirds (64%) of South Africans say that corruption increased in the past year, including half (49%) who believe it increased “a lot”. Most South Africans believe that GBV is getting worse (Dec 2021); (73%) of South Africans believe that GBV increased “somewhat” or “a lot” over the past year. Citizens point to alcohol and drug abuse and unemployment as primary contributing factors. (Afrobarometer, 2021) Identity in South Africa This is one of the key aspects of social cohesion that South Africa battles with and that is baffling. The question arises as to how we identify as South Africans and identify the factors that constitute the South African nation beyond birth and citizenship (inclusive of naturalisation). English has become the lingua franca (common language) and other languages, with the possible exclusion of Afrikaans, are on the periphery and have not been developed as mediums of instruction in the post-1994 period. South Africans would struggle to answer the following: What are our common dishes, clothing, major sporting codes, cultural artefacts, music genres, etc.? These are issues that we still grapple with, but don’t seem to have answers for, 28 years after our democratic breakthrough. These questions have no easy answers, but government and political parties, civil society formations, the religious sector, etc., are not doing enough to foster an inclusive, albeit diverse South African identity. There is rhetoric from government departments, but programmes are not rolled out on a large enough scale and consistently; it is done piecemeal and ad hoc. Speeches are given on national days, which are largely ignored. It should be noted that government programmes on their own, are insufficient. Rather, an identity is largely formed through life practices and choices – in other words, people choose to be identified in a certain way and it reflects their life choices. Schools, workplaces, religious institutions, sports association, etc., also contribute to identity. The dark side of our identity is that the social fabric is not robust and relatively minor infractions and incidents cause discomfort or outrage. The recent attempts to address lingering discomforts around prejudice and potential racial views, allied to dealing with our divided past, created a huge furore at Fish Hoek High School, for example, and had to be abandoned. There were also the unfortunate incidents at Stellenbosch University and various other such incidents across the spectrum – including many actors from different backgrounds and one political party that features prominently on a regular basis. Efforts to deal with the underlying unease and unhappiness in various institutions and in society have to continue and multiply if we are to create a positive South African identity. Government Programmes to Foster Social Cohesion Government has a variety of interconnecting interventions to encourage social cohesion and unite the country. Values like ubuntu, solidarity and instilling a culture of participation and equality are important to the vision in the Constitution and to realise our motto of “unity in diversity”. Many efforts are underway to make communities safer, but there remains an overwhelming sense of people feeling unsafe in their homes, public spaces and in communities. Healing the wounds of the past focused on redress and forging a united nation through culture, sport, etc., but with mixed results. Our national symbols have been promoted, including the constitutional values, to assist in forging a common national identity. Yet, how united do we feel as South Africans in 2023, after 28 years of democratic rule? To what degree have attitudes been shifted in a positive direction? Have the values enshrined in the Constitution found increasing expression in behavioural change in society at large? A New Value System A new value system would see social cohesion as more than moral ‘regeneration’, or nostalgia for an idealistic past that never was. It would be inspired by the humane values of a caring society. To achieve this, there should be a thorough understanding of the socio-economic environment that today shapes the South African political and socio-economic landscape, which is infused with the forces of individualism and greed that simultaneously suppress the imperatives for solidarity within the community. In South Africa, we have a mindset of taking shortcuts and the easy way out to reach goals. Too often, incentive systems are vastly inflated and distorted and not commensurate with individual contributions to an effort or to society. Excessive displays of wealth are common and serve as the wrong example for young people. These are, unfortunately, the dominant values that permeate mediums like social media and imagery globally by persuasive and powerful influencers and personalities. These must be countered to coincide with values like fairness, justice, respect for the rights of others, and the importance of solidarity and helping the less fortunate in life. The Covid-19 crisis showed us that this is possible. We need to build upon this, and the acts of kindness and solidarity displayed by most people on a daily basis. South Africa is in need of a national dialogue to determine what we understand as “unity in diversity”. A good starting point is to look to the concepts and ideas of the Constitution, which form the bedrock of South Africa's national culture. The first words of the preamble to the Constitution state, "We, the people of South Africa", words that serve to right the wrongs of a long battle against authoritative and repressive state power during apartheid. This phrase is encapsulated in the national motto – ! ke e: /xarra /Ike (diverse people unite) – a call to South Africans of all races, religions and gender identities to create justice, unity, peace and prosperity together (Kotzé, 2023). Therefore, to create a new value system that steers us towards social cohesion, we must adopt democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights to transform our society. We need people-centred transformation. “In liberating all South Africans from the over-reach of repressive state power, transformation, is first, the freedom and duty of all to ‘improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person’” (Kotzé, 2023). Uniting in this goal and speaking with one voice should be every South African’s holy grail. Nelson Mandela embodied these values and inspired others to also become active citizens who live this transformation through their everyday actions. Indeed, to confront our contemporary crises, “we cannot wait idly for another generation of leadership. Instead, we can all take from the approach of Mandela (and others) and embody the Constitutional values” (Kotzé, 2023). It was only through a robust democratic process, one where different groups pursuing their own ends recognised each other in committed deliberation and negotiation, that the anti-apartheid movement was victorious. People like Desmond Tutu, who advocated for koinonia (a fellowship between different groups), have shown us that it is possible to be a united force without losing our individuality. Now, as the governing party has loses its authority and the ability to maintain order, there is an increasing call for change, for a new way. But unlike before, where the goal was to defeat apartheid and usher in democracy, today the call is for the competent and just execution of the state. It is the time of the united citizenry; we must seize the national moment and put our heads together to find solutions to the crises. Importantly, we must engage in open, inclusive and robust ways. The process must be guided by the principles and values in the Constitution, rather than being dominated by any group or political affiliation (Kotzé, 2023). It is through this type of engagement, deliberation and civil action that leaders who recognise the needs of the people will emerge and a national voice will be born. Conclusion As mentioned, South Africa is assailed by manifold challenges that range from high levels of unemployment, poverty, inequality, crime, corruption, low economic growth, etc. We have emerged from a divisive past that has left the country with many psychological scars, and efforts to promote social cohesion. Education, as one of the key components of ensuring social cohesion, continues to deliver negative outcomes. Our inequality levels engender envy, resentment, anger, and are most likely a factor in our violent crime patterns. All these challenges make it difficult to become more cohesive as a nation. The introduction noted that social cohesion is deemed to be a critical ingredient for people to co-exist meaningfully and in harmony, and is important for their social progress, well-being, happiness, and overall development. Social cohesion is needed as part of the cure for the myriad of challenges that South Africa faces. It is also seen as important in restoring trust between, especially, the prosperous and the poor, who are the majority. During the Covid-19 period, the good character traits that make up the essence of human beings shone through. The best qualities – values like ubuntu, assisting those in need and mutual trust – came to the fore, through big and small acts of goodwill, respect and kindness, which helped people to be more resilient in overcoming the odds. This needs to be harnessed. It shows us how we can assist in breaking down artificial barriers and practices of selfish individualism, especially in the suburbs but also in society at large. These acts must be encouraged to continue and multiply. The strength of any nation is its people and there is a recognition that South Africa’s people and their ongoing goodwill and resilience in the face of much adversity shows promising potential, which must be mobilised and channelled for the collective good of the country, so that, together, we can produce higher levels of sustainable growth. More mixed neighbourhoods closer to city centres and places of work must be created as part of growing a more inclusive nationhood. National unity is necessary for the achievement of equality, justice and development. Ethical leadership at all levels of society and in all organisations, together with improved governance and service delivery, is essential to restore faith in the affairs of the country. Trust levels in leadership and institutions must improve urgently to counter cynicism around the political process and to increase civic interest, participation, and accountability by all for the state of affairs in the country. Social cohesion, as difficult as it is to define, is clearly important to create a prosperous, harmonious society. It is even more critical for us, in South Africa, given our history. Our transition was lauded across the globe, but ironically, now is increasingly being doubted for the supposed benefits it failed to deliver – economic prosperity and increased equality, in the main. In conclusion, Norton & de Haan (2013) say that social cohesion enables peaceful contestation, voice, respect for cultural difference and, broadly speaking, builds the freedoms of both individuals and groups (as advocated by Sen’s capability approach). Social cohesion thus also implies the capacity of societies to manage social change peacefully, inclusively, and with a view to enhancing individual and group freedoms. We still have a long way to traverse in rooting and deepening social cohesion in South Africa, but with the necessary willpower it can be achieved. There is an urgent need to have meaningful dialogue on many difficult issues. We have to deal with entrenched challenges like unemployment, poverty, inequality, crime, corruption, ineffective governance, etc. Trust and confidence levels in institutions have to lift to make social bonds stronger. Efforts must be intensified to finalise the social contract that will enable South Africa to achieve higher levels of inclusive growth and employment, and economic development. 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The Historical Roots of Well-Being and Social Cohesion. [Online] Available at: https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/hdr19bpthehistoricalrootsofwell-beingandsocialcohesionfinalpdf.pdf [accessed: 6 March 2023] World Economic Forum (WEF). 2022. Global Risks Report 2022. [Online] Available at: https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-risks-report-2022/ [accessed: 6 March 2023] World Happiness Report (WHR). 2022. World Happiness Report 2022. [Online] Available at: https://worldhappiness.report/ed/2022/happiness-benevolence-and-trust-during-covid-19-and-beyond/ [accessed: 6 March 2023] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za