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The Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, represented the Inclusive Society Institute at the T20 High-Level Policy Dialogue  that was held at the CSIR International Convention Centre over the period 29 – 30 April 2025.   This high-level event will brought together leading African think tanks, academics, policymakers, and international experts to discuss and develop Africa-centric policy recommendations.    Key topics include: Multilateralism, International Trade, and Investment Democracy, Governance, and Economic Development Social Cohesion, Inclusive Development, and Employment Climate Change Responses and Sustainability Digital Transformation Debt and External Development Finance Peace and Security To read the concept note, please click below:

3.4.10   Italy's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.10.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Italy, freedom of assembly and association is constitutionally protected under Article 17 and Article 18 of the Italian Constitution. These rights allow citizens to gather peacefully and form associations without government interference, as long as the activities do not violate public safety or morals. Italy is also bound by the European Convention on Human Rights, which further guarantees these freedoms.   In practice, freedom of assembly is generally respected in Italy, and public demonstrations are a common way for citizens to express dissent or demand political and social change. However, protests are occasionally met with restrictions or intervention by law enforcement, especially in cases where demonstrations are seen as a threat to public order. The use of excessive force by police during protests has been reported, particularly during protests against economic austerity, labour rights, and environmental issues.   Freedom of association is also respected in Italy, with a vibrant civil society made up of political parties, trade unions, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, organisations working on sensitive issues, such as immigration and anti-corruption, sometimes face pressure from political groups or state authorities.   In summary, while Italy upholds strong legal protections for freedom of assembly and association, there are occasional challenges in the practical application of these rights, particularly around law enforcement responses to public demonstrations.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Italy, the right to a fair trial and due process is guaranteed by the Constitution and reinforced by the country's membership in international human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Italy’s judicial system operates under principles of impartiality, the presumption of innocence, and the right to a defence, as outlined in Article 111 of the Constitution.   While these rights are protected in law, the Italian justice system faces significant challenges in practice. One of the main concerns is the length of judicial proceedings, which are often subject to delays. Italy has repeatedly been criticised by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for its prolonged pretrial detention periods and the excessive duration of both civil and criminal cases, which undermine the principle of a timely trial.   Corruption and political influence in certain high-profile cases also raise concerns about the full impartiality of the judiciary. Despite these issues, Italy has made efforts to reform its judicial system, particularly through measures aimed at reducing case backlogs and improving the efficiency of court proceedings.   In conclusion, while Italy upholds the right to a fair trial and due process, the country's legal system continues to face structural challenges that affect its ability to provide timely justice for all citizens.   Score: 3/5  – “Judicial independence is inconsistent. Some cases, especially political ones, may experience government interference. Arbitrary detention or extended pretrial detention is reported, but not widespread.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. •                Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Njus.it . 2023. Italy convicted for a violation of the right to a fair trial for having enacted a law that conditioned the outcome of the proceedings in which a public entity was a party . [Online] Available at: https://www.njus.it/news/1046/italy-convicted-for-a-violation-of-the-right-to-a-fair-trial-for-having-enacted-a-law-that-conditioned-the-outcome-of-the-proceedings-in-which-a-public-entity-was-a-party/ [Accessed: 18 September 2024]. SR Defenders. 2024. Italy: Alleged due process violations and other worrying developments related to the trial of HRDs in Trapani and the regulation of civilian search and rescue – joint communication . [Online] Available at: https://srdefenders.org/italy-alleged-due-process-violations-and-other-worrying-developments-related-to-the-trial-of-hrds-in-trapani-and-the-regulation-of-civilian-search-and-rescue-joint-communication/ [Accessed: 18 September 2024].    3.4.10.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Italy is a well-established democracy, with political participation and democratic governance guaranteed under the Constitution. The country operates a parliamentary system, with free and fair elections held regularly for both the national Parliament and local governments. The President of the Republic serves as the head of state, while the Prime Minister leads the government. Elections are generally considered to be transparent, and the political system allows for broad participation by various political parties.   Italy has a vibrant civil society and political landscape, featuring a wide range of political parties, from centre-left to right-wing populist groups. In recent years, populist parties such as the Five Star Movement and the League have gained prominence, reflecting broader European trends. While Italy's political system is open, challenges include political fragmentation, which often leads to unstable coalitions and frequent changes in government.   Corruption remains a concern in Italian politics, with several high-profile cases involving politicians and public officials. Transparency International has highlighted the need for reforms to combat corruption and improve the accountability of elected officials. Nonetheless, Italy has strong institutions in place, including an independent judiciary and a free press, both of which play a critical role in maintaining democratic governance and holding political leaders accountable. The International IDEA notes Italy's strong commitment to democratic governance.   In conclusion, Italy’s democratic system allows for widespread political participation, but challenges related to corruption and political instability continue to impact the effectiveness of governance.   Score: 5/5  – “The country guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in government. Political opposition is allowed and respected, and there is a transparent process for democratic governance.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). 2023. Italy Democracy Tracker . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/italy   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Transparency International. 2023. Corruption Perceptions Index 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.4   Freedom from Discrimination   In Italy, freedom from discrimination is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, which states that all citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, regardless of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, or personal and social conditions. Additionally, Italy has enacted a variety of anti-discrimination laws, such as the Law on Racial Discrimination (1993) and the Equal Opportunities Code (2006), which further strengthen protections against discrimination.   Despite these legal frameworks, issues of discrimination persist, particularly against minority groups such as immigrants, Roma, and LGBTQ+ individuals. Reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch highlight continued racial and ethnic discrimination, especially against migrants and refugees, who often face challenges in accessing housing, employment, and social services. The Roma community, in particular, remains marginalised, frequently living in segregated camps with limited access to basic services.   Gender discrimination is another ongoing issue in Italy. While significant progress has been made in advancing women’s rights, including increased female representation in politics, the gender wage gap and underrepresentation of women in senior leadership positions remain problematic. Gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide, is a significant concern, despite legal protections like the Code on Violence Against Women (2013).   Discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals, although illegal, persists, with cases of social exclusion and violence being reported. Italy has made some strides, such as recognising same-sex civil unions in 2016, but full legal equality, particularly in areas like marriage and adoption, has not yet been achieved.   In summary, while Italy has strong legal protections against discrimination, challenges remain in fully realising equality for all citizens, particularly for minority and marginalised groups.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In Italy, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is protected by the Constitution and reinforced by Italy’s ratification of international treaties, such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Torture was formally criminalised in Italy with the passage of a specific law in 2017, following years of pressure from human rights organisations. Prior to this, Italy faced criticism for not having a specific criminal provision against torture, despite its international commitments.   Despite these legal protections, concerns about the treatment of detainees, especially in police custody, remain. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented cases of excessive use of force by law enforcement during arrests and detentions. Italy has also faced scrutiny over the treatment of migrants and refugees in detention centres, where overcrowding and poor living conditions have been reported.   Italy's handling of protests has also been a focal point for human rights concerns. Instances of police brutality during protests, such as the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa, remain infamous for the excessive use of force by law enforcement. Although Italy has made strides in addressing these issues through legal reforms, the enforcement of these laws and accountability for violations continue to be areas of concern.   In conclusion, while Italy has made significant progress in addressing torture and inhuman treatment through legislation, challenges in the consistent enforcement of these protections remain, particularly concerning the treatment of detainees and migrants.   Score: 3/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Council of Europe. 2022. European Committee for the Prevention of Torture: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Italy, human rights defenders operate within a generally safe legal framework that guarantees freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. However, those working on sensitive issues, such as migrants’ rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption efforts, face various challenges. While the Italian Constitution and international commitments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, protect the activities of human rights defenders, concerns remain about state responses to activism, especially when protests or campaigns challenge state policies or corporate interests.   Italy has mechanisms in place to protect human rights defenders, but the enforcement of these protections can be inconsistent, particularly when defenders challenge powerful political or economic interests. Advocacy groups continue to call for stronger legal safeguards and better enforcement to ensure that defenders can carry out their work without fear of retaliation.   Score: 4/5  – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2024. Italy: Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy.  [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.7   Freedom of Expression   In Italy, Freedom of Expression is guaranteed under Article 21 of the Italian Constitution, which protects the right to freely express opinions through speech, writing, and other forms of communication. Italy is also bound by international human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, that uphold this fundamental freedom. The country has a vibrant media landscape, with a wide range of political and social commentary available in newspapers, television, and online platforms.   However, concerns persist regarding media ownership and political influence. Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders have pointed out that media pluralism in Italy is often undermined by the concentration of media ownership in the hands of a few powerful families and political interests. Former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's control over much of the media through his family’s ownership of the Mediaset group has been cited as a long-standing issue. This has led to concerns about the independence of media outlets and the potential for censorship or self-censorship.   Additionally, defamation laws in Italy have been used to target journalists and critics. Criminal defamation charges can result in prison sentences, and although reforms have been discussed, the laws continue to pose a threat to Freedom of Expression. Journalists, particularly those investigating organised crime, corruption, or political misconduct, have faced harassment, legal challenges, and, in some cases, physical threats.   Italy’s blasphemy laws, though rarely enforced, also remain a concern for Freedom of Expression. These laws have been criticised by international human rights organisations for limiting speech related to religious criticism.   In conclusion, while Italy provides strong constitutional protections for Freedom of Expression, challenges such as media concentration, defamation laws, and political influence continue to affect the full realisation of this right.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in Italy . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/italy [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   In Italy, freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally protected under Article 19 of the Italian Constitution, which guarantees the right of individuals to freely practice their religion or belief. The state upholds a secular approach, allowing citizens to practice any religion or none at all. Italy is also a signatory to international human rights agreements such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which further supports religious freedom.   The majority of Italians identify as Roman Catholic, and the Catholic Church historically has had a significant influence on Italian society and politics. However, the state is officially secular, and there is no official religion. Italy recognises other religions through agreements known as intese, which provide certain legal rights and privileges to recognised religious groups. These include Protestant, Jewish, Islamic, and other religious communities.   Despite these legal protections, challenges remain, particularly for minority religious groups. Islam is the second-largest religion in Italy, but Muslim communities have faced difficulties in gaining formal recognition and securing permits to build mosques. There have been incidents of Islamophobia, and some political figures have called for stricter controls on Islamic practices. Additionally, there have been cases of anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim incidents, reflecting broader societal prejudices.   Religious discrimination in the workplace and public sphere continues to be a concern for some minority faith communities. However, Italy's legal framework provides avenues for addressing such discrimination, with protections against religious intolerance.   In summary, while freedom of religion or belief is largely respected in Italy, challenges remain, particularly for minority religions, in securing equal treatment and combating societal prejudices.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Italy: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. Globally, Government Restrictions on Religion Reached Peak Levels in 2021, While Social Hostilities Went Down . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2024/03/PR_2024.3.5_religious-restrictions_REPORT.pdf [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. International Religious Freedom Report: Italy.  [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/italy/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.10.9   Right to Privacy   Italy has strong privacy protections under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), as part of its commitment to European Union standards. However, concerns persist regarding government surveillance, particularly in the context of anti-terrorism measures. Italy has enacted laws, such as the 2015 Anti-Terrorism Decree, which allow for extended data retention and the blocking of websites suspected of terrorism-related activities. These measures, while aimed at combating terrorism, have sparked criticism due to the potential for overreach and insufficient judicial oversight.   Civil liberties groups and the Italian Data Protection Authority have raised alarms about provisions that allow law enforcement to remotely access private communications and metadata without adequate checks and balances. For example, data retention periods for internet traffic metadata have been extended to 24 months, raising concerns about compliance with European Court of Justice rulings that limit such practices.   In addition, Italy's involvement in intelligence sharing, both within the EU and with other nations, has raised privacy concerns. The use of intrusive surveillance tools, such as remote hacking software (Trojans), further complicates the balance between security and privacy, with critics arguing that such tools threaten fundamental rights under both Italian law and international human rights frameworks.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   European Digital Rights (EDRi). 2015. Italy: Anti-terrorism decree to strengthen government surveillance . [Online] Available at: https://edri.org/our-work/italy-anti-terrorism-decree-strengthen-government-surveillance/ [Accessed: 17 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Privacy International. 2017. The Right to Privacy in Italy: Privacy International Submission to Human Rights Committee . [Online] Available at: https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/HRC_italy119_0.pdf  [Accessed: 17 October 2024].     3.4.10.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   Italy has comprehensive legal protections in place for the right to life and security. However, there are persistent concerns about police violence, particularly toward migrants and minority groups. Amnesty International has reported cases of excessive force by law enforcement, particularly in migrant detention centres and during public protests. These instances include the use of electric shocks, beatings, and other forms of physical abuse during the fingerprinting of migrants.   Further, the conditions in detention centres have been criticised as punitive and falling below international standards, with detainees often experiencing worse conditions than in prisons. These facilities are highly restrictive, lack adequate health and safety provisions, and severely limit the autonomy of detainees.   The lack of accountability remains a significant issue, with very few officers facing disciplinary action for their actions, which raises concerns about the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms to address police violence.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or political views). Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2016. Hotspot Italy: How EU’s flagship approach leads to violations of refugee and migrant rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/hotspot-italy-how-eus-flagship-approach-leads-to-violations-of-refugee-and-migrant-rights/ [Accessed: 17 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2019. Italy: Refugees and migrants’ rights under attack: Amnesty International submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review, 34th Session of the UPR Working Group, November 2019 . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur30/0237/2019/en/ [Accessed: 17 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2024. Italy: Abuse of migration-related detention in punitive conditions deprives people of liberty and dignity . [Online] Available at: https://www.tolerance.ca/ArticleExt.aspx?ID=559316&L=en [Accessed: 17 October 2024].    3.4.10.11   Overall Score for Italy – 3.7/5   While Italy has a robust legal framework for protecting human rights, there are notable areas of concern, particularly in terms of law enforcement accountability, discrimination, and access to justice. The country shows commitment to human rights protection but faces challenges in fully enforcing its legal frameworks, particularly for marginalised groups.     3.4.11   Japan's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.11.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Japan guarantees freedom of assembly and association under its Constitution, and in practice, peaceful protests are generally allowed. Civil society organisations can operate with minimal interference.   However, certain demonstrations, particularly those concerning politically sensitive issues, such as the US military bases in Okinawa, have faced significant restrictions and heavy policing. These measures, though relatively rare in Japan, underscore the challenges faced by civil society groups when addressing politically contentious topics.   Furthermore, the construction of a new US military base in Henoko has been met with widespread protest, with the Japanese and US governments largely disregarding the opposition expressed by Okinawans. This heavy presence of military facilities and the ensuing protests have raised ongoing concerns about the freedom of peaceful assembly in Okinawa.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections are inconsistent or weak. Protests are often subject to heavy policing or restrictions. Civil society groups face bureaucratic hurdles or occasional harassment.”   References:   IMADR. 2015. Human Rights Violations in Okinawa, Japan . [Online] Available at: https://imadr.org/humanrights-violations-okinawa-japan-hrc30-2015-joint-ws/ [Accessed: 17 October 2024]. IMADR. 2016. Freedom of peaceful assembly in Okinawa, Japan . [Online] Available at: https://imadr.org/freedomofpeacefulassembly-okinawa-japan-hrc32-2016-os/ [Accessed: 17 October 2024].    3.4.11.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   Japan’s legal system guarantees a fair trial and due process under the Constitution, but there are significant concerns regarding the treatment of detainees, particularly in pretrial detention, and the use of confessions obtained under duress.   The practice of "hostage justice" in Japan involves detaining suspects for extended periods under the daiyo kangoku or substitute prison system, during which detainees have very limited access to legal representation. Amnesty International has highlighted the harsh conditions faced by detainees, including beatings, sleep deprivation, and the prohibition of lawyers during interrogations. These methods are often used to extract confessions, which are then heavily relied upon in criminal proceedings.   Human Rights Watch has also reported that the Japanese criminal justice system frequently relies on prolonged pretrial detention and coercive interrogation practices to extract confessions. In many cases, suspects are rearrested multiple times on different charges related to the same incident to circumvent the legal 23-day detention limit, pressuring them to confess.   Both organisations have called for significant reforms to bring Japan's criminal justice system in line with international standards, including the right to legal representation during interrogations and an end to coercive methods of obtaining confessions.   Score: 2/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair. Legal representation may be limited for many individuals.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2012. Japan: End abusive detention system after murder conviction quashed . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/pre015452012en.pdf [Accessed: 17 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. Japan: ‘Hostage Justice’ System Violates Rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/japan [Accessed: 17 October 2024].    3.4.11.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Japan holds free and fair elections with generally high voter turnout, and political opposition is permitted.   The Global State of Democracy Report from International IDEA highlights that Japan scores in the mid-range for political participation compared to other countries, with issues such as gender equality and inclusive suffrage still lagging behind other top-performing nations. The report also notes that although Japan performs well in general democratic metrics like representation, rights, and rule of law, its youth engagement remains limited, partly due to political disillusionment and the dominance of established parties like the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed but faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   International IDEA. 2024. The Global State of Democracy Report: Japan . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/japan [Accessed: 17 October 2024].    3.4.11.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Japan does not have comprehensive legal protections against discrimination. Minority groups, including ethnic Koreans, the Ainu indigenous people, and LGBTQ+ individuals, continue to face discrimination.   Amnesty International highlights that societal discrimination remains a significant barrier to achieving equality. For example, despite the passage of laws meant to protect LGBTQ+ rights, such as legislation passed in 2023 to create a “plan” to safeguard against unjust discrimination, these measures often lack clear definitions or enforcement mechanisms, leaving vulnerable communities without sufficient legal recourse.   Human Rights Watch reports that Japan does not have laws prohibiting racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination, or discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. Human Rights Watch also notes that Japan’s 2023 law on sexual orientation and gender identity, aiming to "promote understanding" and prevent "unfair discrimination", falls short of comprehensive non-discrimination legislation.   Score: 2/5  – “Discrimination is prevalent, and legal protections are either weak or non-existent. Marginalised groups face systemic inequality, and the state does little to address these disparities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Japan: Human Rights in 2023 Overview . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/japan/report-japan/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Japan.  [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/japan [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.11.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Japan is a signatory to the Convention against Torture (CAT), and while legal measures are in place to prevent torture, serious concerns persist about the treatment of detainees, particularly death row inmates. Both Amnesty International and the United Nations Committee Against Torture have raised issues with Japan's practice of prolonged solitary confinement, which is considered a form of cruel and inhumane treatment. Death row prisoners are frequently kept in strict isolation for years, with limited access to medical care, which has been linked to the deterioration of their mental health.   Reports highlight that prisoners are only notified of their execution mere hours beforehand, further exacerbating psychological stress. Amnesty International has criticised Japan for failing to provide necessary mental health care to those with psychological disorders on death row, arguing that the conditions in these facilities violate Japan's obligations under international law.   The United Nations Committee Against Torture has similarly noted Japan’s failure to adequately address these issues, particularly regarding the harsh conditions faced by death row inmates. The Committee has urged Japan to reform its detention practices to meet international standards, emphasising the need for better medical care and the abolition of prolonged solitary confinement.   These concerns suggest that while Japan has taken steps to align with the CAT, more comprehensive reforms are required to ensure humane treatment of detainees.   Score: 3/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2009. Hanging by a Thread: Mental Health and the Death Penalty in Japan.  [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa22/005/2009/en/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. United Nations Committee Against Torture. 2013. Committee Against Torture Examines Report of Japan . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2013/05/committee-against-torture-examines-report-japan [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.11.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Human rights defenders in Japan generally operate in a free environment, but there are notable concerns regarding how activists involved in politically sensitive issues are treated. For instance, activists protesting against US military bases in Okinawa, such as Hiroji Yamashiro, have faced arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention. Yamashiro, who led peaceful protests, was detained for five months and was reportedly pressured to confess, highlighting issues of arbitrary detention and suppression of peaceful activism in Japan.   Additionally, the UN Human Rights Committee has raised concerns about restrictive laws in Japan that limit press freedom and the right to protest. The Committee specifically noted the excessive use of force during protests and surveillance of demonstrators, especially during protests in Okinawa. This indicates that, while Japan offers constitutional protections for Freedom of Expression and assembly, these rights are sometimes undermined, particularly in cases involving protests against state policies.   Score: 4/5  – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Civicus Monitor. 2023. UN body raises concerns about laws restricting press freedom and stifling protests while foreign journalists in Japan face threats . [Online] Available at: https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/un-body-raises-concerns-about-laws-restricting-press-freedom-and-stifling-protests-while-foreign-journalists-japan-face-threats/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. IMADR. 2017. Japan’s arbitrary arrests and detention of Okinawan human rights defender . [Online] Available at: https://imadr.org/japan-arbitrary-arrests-detention-okinawan-humanrights-defender-hrc35-2017-joint-os/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.11.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression is guaranteed by Japan’s Constitution, but concerns exist over media independence and government influence. Reporters Without Borders has documented cases of self-censorship among journalists, particularly in relation to criticism of the government or coverage of sensitive issues like the Fukushima disaster. There are also concerns about the use of defamation laws to limit criticism of public officials.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections exist but are weak. Some journalists and activists face censorship or legal repercussions for their work. Independent media faces bureaucratic or financial challenges.”   References:   Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Japan: RSF.  [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/japan [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.11.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Japan guarantees freedom of religion, and individuals are generally free to practice their faith without interference. However, certain minority religious groups face social stigma. The Pew Research Center notes that Japan has low restrictions on religious practices.   Additionally, Jehovah’s Witnesses have experienced challenges, including a rise in hate crimes and societal discrimination. This has included incidents of physical attacks, harassment, and damage to property, highlighting the ongoing social stigma against the group.   Score: 4/5   – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Bitter Winter. 2023. Hate Crimes Epidemic Against the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Japan: Who Is Responsible?  [Online] Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/hate-crimes-epidemic-against-the-jehovahs-witnesses-in-japan-who-is-responsible/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. Restrictions on Religious Freedom Around the World . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2024/03/PR_2024.3.5_religious-restrictions_REPORT.pdf  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.11.9   Right to Privacy   Japan has legal protections for privacy under the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI), which regulates the handling of personal data. However, concerns have been raised about government surveillance, especially in the context of national security. Recent developments, such as amendments allowing for broader surveillance powers, have sparked debate about the balance between privacy and security. Civil liberties organisations have criticised the government's increasing ability to monitor online communications without sufficient oversight, raising fears of potential abuse under anti-terrorism laws.   The 2013 State Secrecy Law further allows the government to classify information as secret, limiting transparency around its surveillance practices. While Japan does not have the same level of surveillance as some other nations, the growing use of surveillance technologies and the absence of robust oversight mechanisms are significant concerns.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom on the Net 2023: Japan . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/japan/freedom-net/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.11.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   Japan’s legal system provides protections for the right to life, but there are significant concerns about police brutality and the treatment of detainees, especially those on death row. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented instances of excessive force used by law enforcement during detentions, as well as the harsh conditions faced by death row inmates. In particular, detainees on death row are often held in prolonged solitary confinement, with little to no advance notice of their execution date, leaving them in constant fear of execution.   Amnesty International has highlighted cases where prisoners live under severe psychological distress, as they are informed of their execution only hours before it takes place. In some cases, prisoners may not be notified at all, exacerbating concerns about the treatment of these individuals. Additionally, reports indicate that some detainees experience ill-treatment, including the use of force during interrogations, which in some cases leads to coerced confessions.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or political views). Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Hanging by a thread: Mental health and the death penalty in Japan. [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA22/005/2009/en/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Japan. [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/japan  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.11.11   Overall Score for Japan – 3.1/5   Japan has a robust legal framework for human rights protection but faces challenges in fully enforcing these protections, particularly regarding privacy, discrimination, and access to justice. The country continues to face scrutiny over its treatment of marginalised communities and detainees, its use of the death penalty and lack of clear anti-discrimination laws.   3.4.12   Mexico's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.12.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Mexico provides constitutional protections for the rights to peaceful assembly and association. However, these rights are often inconsistently enforced, particularly in situations involving protests related to government corruption, organised crime, or human rights abuses. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented numerous cases where security forces used excessive force against protesters, including instances of arbitrary arrests and violence. These abuses are most common during demonstrations that challenge state or federal authorities.   Activists and journalists in Mexico face significant risks, often encountering harassment and violence, especially when reporting on or protesting issues related to human rights violations or organised crime. Mexico remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for human rights defenders and journalists, with very little accountability for perpetrators. Investigations into attacks are often insufficient, and the justice system has failed to adequately protect those targeted.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of assembly and association are restricted. Protests and demonstrations are often banned or dispersed violently. Civil society organisations are heavily regulated, and activists face repression.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/report-mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Mexico, the right to a fair trial and due process is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 14 and Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution, which protect individuals from arbitrary detention and ensure legal rights during criminal proceedings. Mexico is also a party to several international human rights treaties, including the American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both of which reinforce these guarantees.   Despite these legal protections, Mexico faces significant challenges in upholding the right to a fair trial. One of the major concerns is the widespread issue of pretrial detention, or "prisión preventiva", which often sees individuals held for extended periods before their cases go to trial. Many detainees are held without formal charges, and some are denied prompt access to legal representation, violating due process rights. The pretrial detention system disproportionately affects marginalised and low-income individuals, exacerbating inequalities in the criminal justice system.   Corruption within the judiciary and law enforcement also undermines the right to a fair trial. Reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International highlight that police often rely on coerced confessions obtained through torture, which are later used in court. This practice violates the fundamental principles of due process and undermines the integrity of the legal system.   Furthermore, the National Code of Criminal Procedures (CNPP), which was introduced to reform Mexico’s justice system and transition from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial one, has had mixed success. While it has led to some improvements, such as greater transparency in legal proceedings, the system continues to face challenges in ensuring timely trials, addressing judicial inefficiency, and curbing impunity.   In summary, although Mexico has a legal framework that guarantees the right to a fair trial and due process, systemic issues such as prolonged pretrial detention, coerced confessions, and judicial inefficiency continue to undermine these rights.   Score: 2/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair. Legal representation may be limited for many individuals.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Mexico holds regular elections and allows for political opposition, with electoral processes generally being respected. However, significant concerns exist regarding corruption, vote-buying, and political violence, especially at the local level. Transparency International highlights that corruption remains pervasive, undermining public trust in elections and democratic institutions. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Mexico low in terms of public sector transparency, particularly in handling political processes and governance.   Violence targeting political candidates and activists is a grave issue. In the 2024 election cycle alone, Mexico witnessed the highest number of political assassinations in its modern history, with 63 political figures killed between June 2023 and June 2024.   This violence, often linked to organised crime, poses a serious threat to electoral integrity, particularly in regions controlled by criminal groups. The risks extend beyond candidates, as journalists and human rights defenders also face frequent threats and violence.   Score: 3/5  – “Elections occur, but there are significant constraints, such as voter suppression, lack of transparency, or barriers to political opposition.”   References:     Stratfor. 2024. Mexico: 2024 Election Brought the Most Political Killings in Mexico's Modern History . [Online] Available at: https://library.stratfor.com/situation-report/mexico-2024-election-brought-most-political-killings-mexicos-modern-history [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Transparency International. 2023. Corruption Perceptions Index 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/mex [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Wilson Center. 2024. Political Violence in Mexico’s 2024 Elections . [Online] Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/political-violence-mexicos-2024-elections-organized-crime-involvement  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.4   Freedom from Discrimination   In Mexico, freedom from discrimination is legally protected under Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution, which prohibits discrimination based on ethnic origin, gender, age, disabilities, social conditions, health conditions, religion, opinions, sexual preferences, marital status, or any other characteristic that violates human dignity. Mexico is also a party to several international treaties aimed at eliminating discrimination, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).   Despite these legal protections, discrimination remains a significant issue in Mexico. Indigenous communities, women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and Afro-Mexicans continue to face systemic and institutional discrimination in various sectors, including employment, education, and healthcare. Indigenous peoples, in particular, experience higher rates of poverty, lower access to healthcare, and limited political representation. While the Mexican government has made efforts to promote Indigenous rights, many communities remain marginalised.   Gender discrimination is another pressing issue. Although Mexico has laws in place to promote gender equality, such as the General Law on Women's Access to a Life Free of Violence and the Federal Labour Law, gender-based violence remains pervasive. Femicide and violence against women are particularly high, with limited enforcement of legal protections. Women also face discrimination in the workplace, where the gender pay gap and limited career advancement opportunities are widespread.   Discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community is also prevalent, despite legal progress in recognising same-sex marriages in some states and providing gender identity protections. LGBTQ+ individuals frequently face violence, harassment, and exclusion, particularly in rural areas where conservative social attitudes remain strong.   In summary, while Mexico has a robust legal framework to protect against discrimination, significant challenges remain in fully realising equality for Indigenous peoples, women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and other marginalised groups.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In Mexico, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is protected under Article 22 of the Mexican Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Mexico is also a signatory to international treaties such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), which further commits the country to prevent, investigate, and punish acts of torture.   Despite these legal protections, torture and ill-treatment, particularly by law enforcement and military personnel, remain widespread issues. Reports from organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch highlight systemic problems within Mexico's justice and law enforcement systems, where torture is often used to extract confessions. This is particularly prevalent in cases involving organised crime and drug trafficking, where coerced confessions are frequently used in prosecutions, leading to serious concerns about the integrity of the legal system.   Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) has also documented numerous cases of torture, particularly in police custody. Methods of torture reported include beatings, electric shocks, and asphyxiation. Victims are often held incommunicado, without access to legal representation, exacerbating their vulnerability to abuse.   Efforts to combat torture have been made, including the passage of the General Law on Torture in 2017, which aimed to address impunity and improve investigations into torture allegations. However, implementation of this law has been slow, and accountability for those who commit acts of torture remains limited. Human rights organisations continue to call for stronger enforcement mechanisms and greater protection for victims.   In summary, while Mexico has legal frameworks in place to protect individuals from torture and inhuman treatment, these practices remain a significant problem, particularly in the context of law enforcement and organised crime investigations.   Score: 2/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are reported frequently, and legal protections are weak or rarely enforced. Law enforcement and security forces often act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Mexico, human rights defenders face significant challenges, despite legal protections. Human rights defenders (HRDs) work to promote and protect the rights of marginalised communities, including Indigenous peoples, environmental activists, journalists, and those advocating for women’s rights. However, they frequently encounter threats, harassment, and violence, particularly in regions affected by organised crime and corruption.   According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, HRDs in Mexico are often subject to intimidation, surveillance, and physical attacks, with many cases going unpunished. Journalists and activists who expose corruption or challenge powerful economic and political interests are especially vulnerable. Mexico remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists, with many killed or disappearing while investigating organised crime, government corruption, or human rights abuses.   Environmental and land rights defenders also face substantial risks. Activists working to protect Indigenous territories from large-scale infrastructure or mining projects are frequently targeted. Global Witness has documented numerous cases where environmental defenders have been threatened, attacked, or killed for opposing projects that threaten their communities and land.   Despite the Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists, which was established in 2012 to provide protection for those at risk, its effectiveness has been questioned due to inadequate funding, poor implementation, and the ongoing impunity for perpetrators of violence against HRDs. Human rights organisations continue to call for more robust protections and greater accountability for those who threaten or harm human rights defenders in Mexico.   Score: 2/5  – “Human rights defenders are frequently persecuted, harassed, or jailed for their work. Legal protections are minimal, and the state often seeks to suppress their activities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2023. Mex ico: Land, Territory, and Environmental Defenders Criminalized for Exercising Their Right to Protest . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/09/mexico-land-defenders-criminalized-right-to-protest/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Global Witness. 2022. Annual Report on Land and Environmental Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.globalwitness.org [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.7   Freedom of Expression   In Mexico, Freedom of Expression is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 6 and Article 7 of the Mexican Constitution, which protect the right to free speech and freedom of the press. Mexico is also bound by international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, that reinforce these protections.   Despite these legal safeguards, Mexico remains one of the most dangerous countries for journalists and those exercising their right to free expression, particularly when reporting on sensitive topics like corruption, drug trafficking, and organised crime. Human rights organisations such as Reporters Without Borders and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly raised concerns about the high levels of violence and impunity faced by journalists. Many journalists are subject to threats, harassment, and, in the worst cases, assassination, with little accountability for those responsible. Mexico has consistently ranked among the most dangerous countries for journalists due to these risks.   The Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists was established in 2012 to offer protective measures for those at risk. However, its implementation has been inconsistent, and many defenders and journalists continue to face violence. In some cases, state and local officials are implicated in attacks against journalists, further complicating efforts to safeguard Freedom of Expression.   In addition to physical violence, legal harassment is also used to silence critics. Defamation lawsuits and legal threats are often employed by powerful actors to intimidate journalists and human rights defenders. While defamation was decriminalised at the federal level in 2007, it remains a criminal offence in several Mexican states, continuing to pose a threat to free expression.   In summary, while Mexico has a legal framework that protects Freedom of Expression, the environment for journalists and activists remains hostile due to violence, impunity, and legal intimidation.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of Expression is heavily restricted. The press and media are frequently censored, and individuals face legal consequences or violence for expressing dissent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Mexico: Press Freedom Report . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   In Mexico, freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally protected under Article 24 of the Mexican Constitution, which ensures that all individuals are free to practice the religion of their choice or none at all. The state is secular, as established by the Constitution and reinforced by the Law on Religious Associations and Public Worship of 1992. This law guarantees the separation of church and state and prohibits religious discrimination.   Mexico is a religiously diverse country, with the majority of the population identifying as Roman Catholic, though other faiths such as Protestantism, Evangelical Christianity, and Islamism are also present. Despite legal protections, minority religious groups sometimes face social discrimination and challenges in securing equal treatment in public services, education, and political representation.   While freedom of religion is generally respected, reports from organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have highlighted occasional tensions, particularly in Indigenous communities. In some Indigenous regions, local customs and practices can clash with religious freedoms, leading to tensions between converts to non-traditional religions and the broader community. This has led to cases where individuals are pressured or even expelled from their communities for practicing a different faith.   Discrimination based on religious beliefs also persists in some rural areas, especially among Indigenous communities where religious minorities may face social exclusion. Evangelicals and other non-Catholic groups have reported forced displacement in areas where Catholicism dominates the local culture. In one case, evangelical families in Chiapas were forced to leave their homes for not participating in local religious festivals. In summary, Mexico provides robust legal protections for religious freedom, but societal challenges, particularly in rural areas and Indigenous communities, still pose barriers to the full realisation of this right.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections exist but are inconsistently enforced. Religious minorities may face discrimination, and the state may impose limitations on religious practices.” References:   ACN International. 2023. Mexico Report 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://acninternational.org/religiousfreedomreport/reports/country/2023/mexico   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. International Religious Freedom Report: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.9   Right to Privacy   In Mexico, the right to privacy is constitutionally protected under Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution, which guarantees the inviolability of private communications and the protection of personal data. Mexico is also subject to the Federal Law on the Protection of Personal Data Held by Private Parties (LFPDPPP), which provides comprehensive regulations on how personal data should be collected, processed, and stored by private entities. The law establishes the rights of individuals to access, rectify, cancel, and oppose the processing of their personal data (known as ARCO rights).   Additionally, the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information, and Personal Data Protection (INAI) is responsible for overseeing the protection of personal data and ensuring compliance with data privacy laws. The INAI plays a crucial role in enforcing regulations and responding to complaints related to data breaches or unlawful data processing.   However, concerns about privacy rights have arisen due to the government's use of surveillance technology, particularly in the context of national security. Reports by Amnesty International and Citizen Lab have revealed that the Mexican government has used spyware, such as the controversial Pegasus software, to monitor journalists, human rights defenders, and political opponents. These revelations have raised significant concerns about state overreach and the potential abuse of surveillance powers.   In summary, while Mexico has a strong legal framework for protecting privacy, issues related to government surveillance and data protection remain areas of concern, especially regarding the use of invasive technologies against activists and journalists.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.12.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   Mexico’s right to life and security of person is enshrined in its legal framework, but ongoing violence and systemic issues remain significant concerns. Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented high rates of violence and impunity in Mexico, especially related to organised crime and abuses by security forces. Military and police forces have been involved in numerous incidents of extrajudicial executions, and excessive use of force is a recurring issue, particularly during public security operations.   One of the most alarming aspects is the persistent use of excessive force by military personnel and the National Guard, with cases of unlawful killings and impunity for these actions. For example, in 2023, five young men were allegedly killed by soldiers in Nuevo Laredo, an incident that sparked widespread criticism and led to an investigation by the National Human Rights Commission.   Enforced disappearances are another grave issue. Thousands of people go missing each year, often involving collusion between criminal organisations and state actors. Families searching for disappeared loved ones face extreme risks, including threats, violence, and even murder. The Mexican government's responses have been criticised as inadequate, with only minimal progress in solving these cases.   Score: 2/5  – “The right to life is not consistently protected. Arbitrary killings, state violence, or widespread abuses by security forces are common, and accountability mechanisms are weak.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Mexico: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/mexico/report-mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/mexico [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/mexico/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.12.11   Overall Score for Mexico – 2.4/5   Mexico has a solid legal framework for protecting human rights, but systemic issues like impunity, violence, and corruption hinder the effective enforcement of these rights. Marginalised communities, including women and Indigenous peoples, are disproportionately affected by these challenges.     3.4.13   Russia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.13.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Russia, the right to freedom of assembly and association is heavily restricted despite constitutional protections. Over the past decade, authorities have passed repressive legislation that severely limits public demonstrations, particularly those critical of the government. Under current laws, spontaneous protests are prohibited, and any public assembly requires prior authorisation from the state. The police regularly use excessive force to disperse unauthorised protests, and demonstrators, particularly those opposing government policies, often face arrest and prosecution.   During 2023, anti-war protests related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine saw mass detentions, with over 15,000 individuals arrested in the first month alone. Protesters in ethnic minority regions, like Dagestan, were particularly affected, facing harsh crackdowns and criminal charges. Laws criminalising repeated participation in unauthorised protests further curtail freedom of assembly, with penalties that can include several years in prison.   Freedom of association is also under threat, with civil society organisations, particularly human rights groups, being targeted under "foreign agent" and "undesirable organisation" laws. These laws allow authorities to shut down organisations critical of the government, restrict their activities, and prosecute individuals affiliated with them. In 2023, several prominent human rights organisations were dissolved, including the Moscow Helsinki Group and Memorial, under these repressive measures.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of assembly and association are restricted. Protests and demonstrations are often banned or dispersed violently. Civil society organisations are heavily regulated, and activists face repression.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Russia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/eastern-europe-and-central-asia/russia/report-russia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Russia, the right to a fair trial and due process, while formally enshrined in the Constitution, is routinely compromised. Amnesty International has reported systemic bias within the judiciary, particularly in cases involving political dissidents and human rights defenders. These cases often see a lack of impartiality, with courts favouring the prosecution, and confessions obtained under torture or ill-treatment being admitted as evidence. This undermines both the fairness of the trials and the integrity of the judicial process.   Additionally, Human Rights Watch has highlighted the frequent use of politically motivated charges to silence opposition figures and activists. For example, trials are often closed to the public, and defence lawyers representing opposition figures face intimidation, harassment, and in some cases, arrest. The case of Alexei Navalny and his legal team, many of whom were detained on charges related to extremism, exemplifies this trend.   The situation worsened after Russia’s 2022 withdrawal from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which effectively closed a critical avenue for Russian citizens seeking redress for human rights violations. This move further diminished access to fair trials and due process, leaving citizens without recourse to independent international justice mechanisms.   Score: 2/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair. Legal representation may be limited for many individuals.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/eastern-europe-and-central-asia/russia/report-russia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Political participation and democratic governance in Russia are severely restricted despite constitutional guarantees. Over the years, the government has enacted laws and policies that undermine genuine political competition, hinder the formation of opposition movements, and limit the public’s ability to participate freely in the political process. Key opposition figures, such as Alexei Navalny, have been repeatedly targeted with politically motivated charges, arrests, and restrictions that prevent them from running for office or engaging in public life.   Elections in Russia are widely criticised for not meeting international standards of fairness and transparency. Independent political parties face significant obstacles, with authorities often rejecting their registration or preventing them from fielding candidates. Electoral fraud, including ballot-stuffing and manipulation of results, has been reported in various elections, contributing to an environment where political power remains concentrated in the hands of President Vladimir Putin and his United Russia party.   Furthermore, the media landscape in Russia is largely controlled by the state or pro-government actors, severely limiting the diversity of political opinions. This lack of media freedom compounds the difficulties for opposition groups and civil society organisations to reach the public and effectively participate in the democratic process. International observers and civil rights groups have expressed concern about the lack of democratic governance in Russia, citing the government’s efforts to suppress dissent and control political discourse.   Amendments to the Constitution in 2020, which allow President Putin to potentially remain in power until 2036, have further entrenched authoritarian governance. These changes were passed through a referendum marred by irregularities, including pressure on voters and a lack of independent oversight, undermining the legitimacy of the political system.   Score: 2/5  – “Elections are either heavily manipulated or restricted to one-party rule. Political opposition is limited or banned, and democratic processes are consistently undermined by the state.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/russian-federation/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.4   Freedom from Discrimination   In Russia, freedom from discrimination remains a significant challenge, with various groups, including ethnic minorities, LGBTQ+ individuals, and migrants, facing systemic inequalities. The government has been criticised for promoting xenophobia, especially in relation to migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Police regularly subject these groups to racial profiling, arbitrary detentions, and ill-treatment. Reports from Human Rights Watch highlight how police conduct ID checks and raids in areas where non-Slavic individuals are concentrated, often resulting in prolonged detentions under inhumane conditions.   LGBTQ+ individuals face severe discrimination as well. In 2023, the Russian government intensified its crackdown on LGBTQ+ rights, banning any public expression or promotion of LGBTQ+ identities, labelling the LGBTQ+ movement as extremist, and implementing laws that prohibit gender-affirming surgeries and the recognition of gender identity in legal documents. These legal developments have led to increased social stigma and violence against LGBTQ+ people, and the state’s stance has been condemned by numerous human rights organisations.   Ethnic minorities and Indigenous populations in Russia also experience discrimination, particularly in regions with significant non-Russian ethnic groups, such as the North Caucasus. These communities often lack access to social services and face restrictions on their cultural and political rights, exacerbating their marginalisation.   Score: 2/5  – “Discrimination is prevalent, and legal protections are either weak or non-existent. Marginalised groups face systemic inequality, and the state does little to address these disparities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2024. The State of the World's Human Rights: April 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/7200/2024/en/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In Russia, the right to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is constitutionally guaranteed, but the practice remains widespread and largely unpunished. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented systemic abuses, particularly in detention centres and prisons. These include beatings, electric shocks, and waterboarding, with many victims reporting degrading and inhuman treatment during their detainment. Detainees, especially those involved in political protests or opposition movements, are particularly vulnerable to such treatment, with law enforcement officers often using excessive force to extract confessions or intimidate critics of the government.   Torture is also prevalent in cases involving individuals accused of extremism or terrorism, where police frequently use severe methods of interrogation. Although Russia has ratified international agreements against torture, such as the UN Convention Against Torture, the lack of accountability for state actors means that perpetrators are rarely prosecuted, contributing to a culture of impunity. The government’s increasing repression of civil society, particularly in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, has only exacerbated the risks of torture and ill-treatment, as demonstrated by numerous reports of abuse targeting anti-war protesters.   Score: 2/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are reported frequently, and legal protections are weak or rarely enforced. Law enforcement and security forces often act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Russia. [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/eastern-europe-and-central-asia/russia/report-russia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2022. Russia: Brutal Arrests and Torture, Ill-Treatment of Anti-War Protesters. [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/09/russia-brutal-arrests-and-torture-ill-treatment-anti-war-protesters  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Russia, human rights defenders face increasing levels of harassment, intimidation, and legal persecution. Despite their crucial role in advocating for fundamental rights, the state has systematically targeted these individuals under repressive laws. The “foreign agents” and “undesirable organisations” laws, first enacted in 2012 and later expanded, allow authorities to label NGOs and individuals critical of the government as foreign agents, exposing them to criminal charges, administrative fines, and public stigmatisation.   Human rights defenders, such as those working on anti-corruption initiatives or defending environmental and Indigenous rights, have faced numerous attacks and legal harassment. For example, Ilya Shumanov, a prominent human rights defender, has been criminally charged under the “foreign agents” law for failing to label his work on social media accordingly, leading to administrative penalties and possible imprisonment. Such cases demonstrate how these laws are used to silence critical voices and restrict civic space in Russia.   The situation has deteriorated significantly since 2022, with the government further expanding its crackdown on civil society amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. Human rights defenders working on politically sensitive issues, including opposition to the war, are particularly vulnerable, facing criminal charges, threats, and physical violence with impunity.   Score: 2/5  – “Human rights defenders are frequently persecuted, harassed, or jailed for their work. Legal protections are minimal, and the state often seeks to suppress their activities.”   References:   Amnesty International. Russia: Unfair Game: Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Russia Intensifies. [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur46/0950/2019/en/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. OMCT. 2024. Opening of Criminal Proceedings Against Human Rights Defender Ilya Shumanov.  [Online] Available at: https://www.omct.org/en/resources/urgent-interventions/russia-opening-of-criminal-proceedings-against-human-rights-defender-ilya-shumanov [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.7   Freedom of Expression   In Russia, Freedom of Expression is constitutionally protected, but these protections have been significantly eroded in practice, especially under President Vladimir Putin’s regime. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented a marked increase in restrictions on freedom of speech, particularly concerning dissent against the government and criticism of Russia’s military actions. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, authorities introduced even more repressive laws, criminalising the dissemination of "false information" about the Russian military. These laws have been used to target critics of the government, with many opposition figures and activists facing harsh prison sentences.   The Russian government also employs extensive media censorship, effectively silencing independent journalism. Many media outlets that were critical of the government have been forced to shut down, and those still operating face constant pressure and threats. Journalists who attempt to report on politically sensitive topics, such as corruption or human rights abuses, are subject to harassment, legal charges, or even physical violence. The government’s control over major news outlets further limits the scope of public discourse, fostering an environment where self-censorship is prevalent among journalists.   Additionally, the Russian government has employed digital censorship and surveillance, blocking numerous websites and social media platforms that host critical content. The authorities also use advanced surveillance technologies to monitor online communications, particularly among activists and dissidents, contributing to an atmosphere of fear and repression for those who dare to speak out.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of Expression is heavily restricted. The press and media are frequently censored, and individuals face legal consequences or violence for expressing dissent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Russia: Dark Times for Human Rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur46/6651/2023/en/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief in Russia is constitutionally guaranteed; however, in practice, the government has increasingly imposed restrictions, particularly on religious minorities. The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations remains a primary instrument through which the state controls religious activities, often discriminating against groups that are not part of the Russian Orthodox Church, which enjoys privileged status. Various religious groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, have been targeted for alleged “extremism”, despite their peaceful beliefs. The Russian government banned Jehovah's Witnesses in 2017, designating them as an extremist organisation, a decision that has been widely condemned by international human rights bodies.   Authorities have increased their use of anti-extremism laws to limit religious freedom, often applying these laws to criminalise religious practices and beliefs. Muslims, particularly those adhering to non-state-sanctioned interpretations of Islam, have also faced heightened scrutiny, arrests, and criminal charges. Followers of certain Islamic sects, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, are often prosecuted under terrorism laws, even when there is no evidence of violent intent or actions. This has led to a climate of fear among religious minorities, who face continuous harassment and surveillance by law enforcement agencies.   In addition to legal harassment, state actions include the monitoring and raiding of religious institutions. Religious literature deemed to be "extremist" is frequently banned, and individuals found in possession of such materials can face serious penalties. The government’s alignment with the Russian Orthodox Church extends beyond favouritism, creating an environment where any perceived deviation from the state-approved religious narrative is met with severe repression. This undermines the fundamental principles of religious freedom, contributing to an atmosphere of intolerance and discrimination.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of religion is restricted, with certain religious groups facing persecution or being banned. State religion or dominant faith is heavily privileged.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Early release for Jehovah's Witness reverted . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/urgent-actions/early-release-jehovahs-witness-reverted [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.9   Right to Privacy   In Russia, the right to privacy is constitutionally protected, but the government has increasingly violated this right through widespread surveillance and data collection practices. Several laws have been enacted to enable mass surveillance, particularly targeting political activists, opposition figures, and journalists. The System for Operative Search Measures (SORM) allows security agencies to intercept telephone and internet communications without adequate judicial oversight. This system has significantly increased the government’s ability to collect data on individuals, thereby infringing on the right to privacy.   The Yarovaya Law, passed in 2016, further undermines privacy protections by obligating telecommunications providers to store users' data for up to six months and granting authorities access to that data without requiring strong legal justification. This law, along with others, has facilitated mass data collection and heightened concerns about online privacy for Russian citizens (BBC News, 2019). These surveillance measures are often used to monitor and intimidate those critical of the government, including journalists and human rights defenders, further eroding personal privacy.   The Russian government also employs censorship and surveillance techniques to control the digital sphere. The Sovereign Internet Law, passed in 2019, grants authorities the power to isolate Russia from the global internet and block access to information deemed inappropriate or harmful by the state. This law significantly impacts both online privacy and Freedom of Expression, as users' activities on the internet are subject to increased state scrutiny.   Score: 2/5  – “Privacy rights are weak or frequently violated. Government surveillance and intrusion into personal data are widespread, and there is little accountability for breaches.” References:   BBC News. 2019. Russia internet: Law introducing new controls comes into force . [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50259597 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Russia: Freedom on the Net 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/russia/freedom-net/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/russia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   In Russia, the right to life and security of person is enshrined in the Constitution, but in practice, this right is frequently undermined, particularly for political opponents, activists, and vulnerable groups. Extrajudicial killings, torture, and the use of excessive force by law enforcement and security agencies have been documented, raising serious concerns about the state's commitment to upholding this right.   Political dissidents, journalists, and human rights defenders have frequently been targeted with violence, with some cases resulting in murder. The killing of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in 2015 is one of the most notable examples of the dangers faced by those who criticise the government. Investigations into such murders are often opaque, with allegations of state involvement or, at the very least, state complicity failing to adequately prosecute the perpetrators.   Torture and ill-treatment in detention centres remain widespread, especially in cases involving individuals accused of political crimes or extremism. Human rights groups have reported numerous instances of detainees being subjected to physical abuse, including beatings and electric shocks, to extract confessions. These abuses often occur with impunity, as the judicial system rarely holds law enforcement officials accountable for their actions.   In addition to these concerns, the Russian government’s military actions, both domestically in the North Caucasus and abroad, particularly in Ukraine, have resulted in large-scale violations of the right to life. Civilians have been killed or injured in military operations, with reports of indiscriminate attacks and the use of prohibited weapons. The invasion of Ukraine in 2022, for example, has led to widespread civilian casualties, with human rights organisations documenting targeted attacks on civilian infrastructure in violation of international humanitarian law.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no effective protection for the right to life. State violence, extrajudicial killings, or systematic abuses are rampant, and there is no accountability for perpetrators.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2024. Ukraine/Russia: Justice for Ukraine means accountability for all crimes committed by Russia since 2014 . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/02/with-russias-full-scale-invasion-two-years-ago-an-act-of-aggression-that-is-a-crime-under-international-law-the-tragically-familiar-human-rights-catastrophe-extended-acros/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. BBC News. 2019. Boris Nemtsov murder: Five Chechens jailed for 2015 killing . [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40592248 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2024: Russia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/russian-federation [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.13.11   Overall Score for Russia – 1.9/5   While Russia has a legal framework for human rights, systemic violations, political repression, and widespread government abuses hinder the effective protection and enforcement of these rights. 3.4.14   Saudi Arabia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.14.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Saudi Arabia, the right to freedom of assembly and association is severely restricted. The government does not permit public protests, and those participating in unauthorised gatherings risk arrest, imprisonment, or harsher penalties under the country’s broad anti-terrorism laws. Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are required to obtain a government licence to operate, and the authorities closely monitor and regulate their activities. Independent unions and civil society organisations that advocate for human rights or political reform face heavy restrictions, often leading to harassment, shutdowns, and the arrest of activists.   Additionally, the government exerts tight control over political associations, prohibiting the formation of political parties. Any form of public dissent is quickly suppressed, and those advocating for reforms or greater freedoms face serious reprisals. International human rights organisations have repeatedly criticised Saudi Arabia for its failure to respect basic rights related to assembly and association, which stifles civil society and political participation. Score: 1/5  – “There are no meaningful legal protections for freedom of assembly and association. Protests are banned, civil society organisations are disbanded or state-controlled, and activists are routinely imprisoned or persecuted.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Saudi Arabia, the right to a fair trial and due process is frequently compromised. The judiciary operates under the control of the king and is deeply influenced by Islamic law (Sharia), which leaves little room for the protection of rights typically associated with a fair trial in international human rights standards. Defendants, particularly in political and security-related cases, often face prolonged pretrial detention, lack access to legal representation, and are subjected to trials that do not meet basic procedural safeguards.   The criminal justice system frequently uses confessions as the primary form of evidence, often extracted under duress or torture. Trials are held in secrecy, especially those involving political dissidents or activists, and defendants are denied access to proper defence. Furthermore, the Public Prosecution, directly under the Ministry of Interior, exerts significant control over legal proceedings, limiting judicial independence.   Appeals and reviews of sentences are rare, and the death penalty is regularly applied in cases where fair trial standards are not met. This situation disproportionately affects foreign workers and individuals from marginalised communities, who often lack adequate legal resources and protection.   Score: 1/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair. Legal representation may be limited for many individuals.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, and political participation is extremely limited. The king holds ultimate authority, controlling both executive and legislative functions, with no national elections for key political positions. The Consultative (Shura) Council is appointed by the king and serves only an advisory role, lacking any legislative power. While municipal elections occur, they have minimal impact as elected officials hold limited authority, and the majority of council members are appointed.   Political parties are banned, and the formation of any political organisations is prohibited. Civil society participation in governance is tightly restricted, with the government exercising strict oversight over nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). NGOs face significant hurdles, including the need for government licensing and constant scrutiny, making it difficult for independent voices to influence policy or governance.   Public criticism of the ruling family, government policies, or the monarchy is met with severe reprisals, including imprisonment and intimidation. There is little tolerance for dissent, and activists and critics face significant restrictions, including travel bans and detention without trial. Furthermore, the political system lacks transparency, with no avenues for ordinary citizens to participate meaningfully in governance (Amnesty International, 2022).   Women’s participation in politics remains minimal, despite reforms allowing them to vote and run for office in limited municipal elections. Although women were allowed to participate in the 2015 municipal elections for the first time, their political influence remains marginal due to the overall restrictions on governance and political activity (Global Gender Gap Report, 2023).   Score: 1/5  – “There are no free or fair elections. The state is ruled by an authoritarian regime, and any political opposition is systematically crushed. Democratic governance is non-existent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Global Gender Gap Report. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Women’s Political Participation . [Online] Available at: https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia.  [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.4   Freedom from Discrimination   In Saudi Arabia, discrimination remains deeply entrenched in law and practice, particularly against women, religious minorities, and migrant workers. The legal system is heavily influenced by conservative interpretations of Islamic law (Sharia), which formalises gender-based discrimination. Women face significant legal restrictions, including the male guardianship system, which requires women to obtain permission from male relatives to marry, travel, or access certain government services. Despite recent reforms allowing women to drive and travel without male permission, these changes are limited, and women’s rights continue to be curtailed in many aspects of life.   Religious discrimination is also prevalent, particularly against the Shia Muslim minority, who face systemic marginalisation in employment, education, and religious practice. Shia Muslims are often excluded from senior positions in government and the military, and their religious practices are frequently restricted or monitored by the state. Non-Muslims are prohibited from openly practising their religion, and public displays of non-Islamic religious symbols or ceremonies are strictly forbidden.   Migrant workers, who make up a significant portion of the workforce, are also subject to widespread discrimination under the kafala (sponsorship) system. This system ties a migrant worker’s legal status to their employer, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, and forced labour. Despite efforts to reform the kafala system, migrant workers continue to face harsh working conditions, lack of legal protection, and barriers to accessing justice.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no legal protections against discrimination, and the state actively promotes or tolerates discriminatory practices. Marginalised groups are heavily oppressed and face severe inequality.”    References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In Saudi Arabia, the right to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is routinely violated, particularly in cases involving political dissidents, human rights activists, and individuals accused of terrorism-related offences. Detainees are frequently subjected to physical abuse, including beatings, electric shocks, and prolonged solitary confinement. Confessions extracted under torture are regularly used as primary evidence in trials, undermining the integrity of the judicial process.   The lack of independent oversight of detention facilities and limited access to legal representation for detainees exacerbate the problem. Political prisoners and those accused of state security crimes are particularly vulnerable to abuse. In many instances, detainees are held incommunicado for extended periods, during which they are denied medical care and legal counsel, increasing their susceptibility to torture and other forms of inhuman treatment.   International bodies, such as the United Nations Committee Against Torture, have raised concerns about Saudi Arabia’s continued failure to comply with international human rights standards, including those under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Despite these international obligations, Saudi Arabia has taken limited steps to address the widespread use of torture within its security apparatus. Moreover, human rights organisations have repeatedly called on Saudi Arabia to enact reforms that would ensure detainees' rights are protected and that allegations of torture are thoroughly investigated (MENA Rights Group, 2023; UN Committee Against Torture, 2021).   Score: 1/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are widespread and systematically used by the state. There are no legal protections, and security forces routinely act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent.  [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2016. UN Committee Against Torture to Review Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/26/un-committee-against-torture-review-saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. MENA Rights Group. 2023. The Saudi Human Rights Commission: A Whitewashing Tool of the Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://menarights.org/en/documents/saudi-human-rights-commission-whitewashing-tool-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Human rights defenders in Saudi Arabia face severe repression, harassment, and imprisonment for their activities. The government imposes strict laws that criminalise peaceful activism, particularly in areas related to political reform, women’s rights, and free speech. Many prominent human rights defenders have been arrested under broad anti-terrorism and cybercrime laws, which the authorities use to target those who criticise the government or call for reforms.   The Law on Combating Terrorism Crimes and its Financing has been frequently used to suppress human rights defenders, with vague definitions of terrorism enabling the authorities to detain activists on charges that are often politically motivated. Many are subjected to unfair trials, prolonged detention without trial, and, in some cases, torture or ill-treatment while in custody. The Saudi government has also been criticised for using travel bans, asset freezes, and threats against family members to silence human rights defenders, both domestically and internationally.   International human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have repeatedly condemned Saudi Arabia’s treatment of human rights defenders. Despite some reforms in recent years, the kingdom continues to operate with little tolerance for dissent, and the risks for those advocating for human rights remain extremely high. Calls from the international community for Saudi Arabia to respect its obligations under international human rights law have largely gone unheeded, and the environment for human rights defenders remains perilous.   Score: 1/5  – “Human rights defenders are systematically targeted by the state. They face imprisonment, torture, or worse, and there are no legal protections for their work.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. MENA Rights Group. 2020. Saudi Human Rights Commission: A Whitewashing Tool for the Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://menarights.org/en/documents/saudi-human-rights-commission-whitewashing-tool-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in Saudi Arabia is severely restricted. The government exercises tight control over the media and the internet, and public criticism of the government, royal family, or religion is heavily censored. The country’s laws, including the Anti-Cyber Crime Law and Counter-Terrorism Law, are frequently used to prosecute individuals for peaceful expression, particularly those who criticise the authorities, advocate for reform, or express dissenting views online. Journalists, bloggers, and activists are regularly targeted for their work, with many facing imprisonment, fines, or travel bans.   Social media platforms are closely monitored by authorities, and users who post content deemed politically sensitive or critical of the government face prosecution. The case of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was murdered in 2018 after criticising the Saudi government, highlighted the risks faced by those who challenge the state’s narrative. Freedom of the press is virtually non-existent, with media outlets heavily censored and subject to government control.   Although some reforms have been introduced in recent years, such as loosening restrictions on women’s participation in public life, the broader landscape of free expression remains tightly controlled. International organisations continue to call on Saudi Arabia to respect Freedom of Expression and cease the repression of those exercising their right to speak out.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no meaningful protections for Freedom of Expression. The state controls the media, and dissenting voices are silenced through imprisonment or violence.”   References:   Amnesty International, 2023. Human Rights in Saudi Arabia .  [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/saudi-arabia/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Freedom of the Press Index . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Saudi Arabia imposes strict limitations on freedom of religion or belief, with the government enforcing a rigid interpretation of Sunni Islam. Public practice of any religion other than Islam is prohibited, and non-Muslim religious activities are restricted to private spaces. The government does not recognise the right to change one’s religion or belief, and apostasy is punishable by death under Islamic law (Sharia). Religious minorities, particularly Shia Muslims, face systematic discrimination, including restrictions on their religious practices and exclusion from senior government positions.   Religious police, known as the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), continue to monitor and enforce strict religious observance, despite reforms in recent years that have reduced their power. Shia Muslims in particular face restrictions on building mosques and holding public religious ceremonies, while non-Muslims are forbidden from displaying religious symbols or openly practising their faith.   International human rights organisations have repeatedly criticised Saudi Arabia for its severe restrictions on religious freedom, calling on the government to allow greater tolerance of religious diversity. Despite these calls, Saudi Arabia continues to maintain strict controls over religious expression and limits the freedoms of religious minorities and non-Muslims.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no freedom of religion or belief. The state enforces a particular belief system, and those who dissent face imprisonment, violence, or severe discrimination.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2023. 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/saudi-arabia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.9   Right to Privacy   The right to privacy is significantly curtailed in Saudi Arabia, where the government engages in widespread surveillance of its citizens and residents. The authorities routinely monitor internet activities, social media platforms, and private communications. Under the Anti-Cyber Crime Law, individuals can be prosecuted for content shared in private communications if it is deemed critical of the government, religious authorities, or public morality. The government has implemented advanced surveillance technologies to monitor and track individuals’ online activities, contributing to a climate of self-censorship.   Saudi Arabia’s Counter-Terrorism Law is also used to justify invasive surveillance practices. This law enables authorities to intercept communications and search individuals' homes without court orders in cases related to national security. Furthermore, women's privacy is particularly restricted under the guardianship system, which grants male relatives control over certain aspects of women’s lives, such as travel and access to personal documents, limiting their autonomy and privacy.   The government’s use of spyware to track dissidents has been widely reported, with allegations that the Saudi authorities have used tools like the Pegasus software to monitor and target activists and critics of the regime both inside and outside the country. This widespread breach of privacy extends beyond national borders, raising significant concerns about the Saudi government's reach in surveilling its citizens and critics globally.   Score: 2/5  – “Privacy rights are weak or frequently violated. Government surveillance and intrusion into personal data are widespread, and there is little accountability for breaches.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. BBC News. 2021. NSO spyware used to target activists, says report.  [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-57891506 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.14.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   In Saudi Arabia, the right to life and security of person is frequently undermined by state practices, particularly in relation to the use of the death penalty, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killings. The country maintains one of the highest execution rates in the world, with the death penalty applied for a wide range of offences, including drug-related crimes and acts considered to be against the state, such as political dissent or terrorism. Trials leading to capital punishment are often criticised for not meeting international standards of fairness, with confessions sometimes extracted under torture.   Arbitrary detention is another concern, particularly for political activists, human rights defenders, and those accused of terrorism. Individuals are often held without charge for extended periods, denied access to legal representation, and subjected to ill-treatment while in custody. Many detainees report being tortured or otherwise mistreated, and in some cases, these abuses have resulted in death.   Security forces in Saudi Arabia, including the Ministry of Interior, have been implicated in numerous cases of abuse, particularly in suppressing political dissent or protests. International human rights organisations have raised concerns about the lack of accountability for these abuses, with security personnel rarely facing prosecution for violations of human rights.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no effective protection for the right to life. State violence, extrajudicial killings, or systematic abuses are rampant, and there is no accountability for perpetrators.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Saudi Arabia: Eliminating Dissent . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/MDE2369362023ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/saudi-arabia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reprieve. 2022. Saudi Arabia and the death penalty: Everything you need to know about the rise in executions under Mohammed bin Salman . [Online] Available at: https://reprieve.org/us/2023/01/31/saudi-arabia-and-the-death-penalty-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-rise-in-executions-under-mohammed-bin-salman/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.14.11   Overall Score for Saudi Arabia – 1.1/5   Saudi Arabia's overall score reflects its significant shortcomings in upholding fundamental human rights. Despite some recent reforms, the country continues to impose severe restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, while maintaining a justice system that lacks transparency and fairness. Systemic discrimination, the use of torture, and the persecution of human rights defenders remain pervasive. The low score highlights the ongoing repression and absence of meaningful legal protections for individuals, particularly in areas concerning civil and political rights. Substantial reforms are necessary to address these critical human rights issues.

3.4.6  France's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.6.1  Freedom of Assembly and Association   In France, freedom of assembly and association are protected under both domestic law and international agreements.   While freedom of assembly is generally respected, there have been notable instances where state responses to protests have raised concerns. France has a long tradition of public demonstrations, often on issues related to labour rights, social justice, and political reform. However, in recent years, large-scale protests, such as the Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) movement, have seen heavy-handed responses from law enforcement. Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have criticised the use of excessive force, such as tear gas and rubber bullets, by French police during protests.   Additionally, France’s legal framework allows the government to impose certain restrictions on assemblies in the interest of public safety or national security. For example, during periods of heightened security threats, such as after the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, the French government invoked a state of emergency that restricted certain civil liberties, including the right to assemble.   Freedom of association is also guaranteed in France, allowing citizens to form unions, political parties, and civil society organisations freely. However, in recent years, some civil society organisations, particularly those working on issues related to immigration and human rights, have reported increased scrutiny and pressure from the government.   In summary, while France provides strong legal protections for freedom of assembly and association, recent protests and government responses have highlighted tensions between maintaining public order and fully respecting these rights.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: France . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.2  Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In France, the right to a fair trial and due process is protected, but the judicial system faces challenges that affect the timely and equal administration of justice. While legal frameworks ensure the presumption of innocence, access to a defence, and impartial courts, delays in legal proceedings and pretrial detention are ongoing concerns.   Particularly for marginalised communities, access to justice can be hindered by long judicial processes and the uneven availability of legal assistance. France's high-profile counterterrorism laws have also raised concerns about the potential erosion of due process, with critics pointing to cases of prolonged detentions without formal charges under emergency laws.   Despite these challenges, France's judiciary is largely independent and functions well in most cases, but reforms have been called for to improve efficiency and better safeguard procedural rights.   Score: 4/5  – “Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.3  Political Participation and Democratic Governance   France is a well-established democracy with a political system based on the Fifth Republic, which features a strong executive and regular, free elections at local, regional, and national levels. Citizens participate actively in politics through voting, and elections are generally regarded as free and fair, overseen by independent electoral authorities.   Political participation in France is robust, with multiple political parties representing a wide range of ideologies. However, recent years have seen increasing voter apathy, particularly among younger citizens, and growing disenchantment with traditional political parties. This has contributed to the rise of populist movements, including the far-right National Rally (formerly Front National) and the emergence of outsider political figures like President Emmanuel Macron.   While the democratic system functions effectively, concerns remain about political polarisation, the underrepresentation of marginalised groups, and the impact of economic inequality on political engagement. Civil society organisations continue to play an active role in shaping public discourse and holding the government accountable.   Score: 5/5  – “The country guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in government. Political opposition is allowed and respected, and there is a transparent process for democratic governance.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: France . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.4  Freedom from Discrimination   In France, freedom from discrimination is protected by both constitutional provisions and specific anti-discrimination laws, including the Loi sur la discrimination (Law on Discrimination). These laws prohibit discrimination based on race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and other characteristics. France is also a signatory to various international human rights treaties that reinforce these protections.   Despite these legal frameworks, discrimination remains a concern, particularly against minority groups such as immigrants, Muslims, Roma communities, and people of African descent. There have been documented cases of racial profiling by law enforcement, which disproportionately affects young men from these communities. Additionally, Islamophobia has been a growing issue, with the controversial bans on religious symbols, such as headscarves in public schools, drawing criticism from human rights groups for disproportionately targeting Muslim women.   Gender inequality is another persistent issue in France, despite progress in women’s rights. The gender wage gap, underrepresentation of women in leadership positions, and ongoing concerns about gender-based violence continue to be areas where further action is needed.   In summary, while France has comprehensive anti-discrimination laws, societal challenges remain, particularly in addressing racial and religious discrimination, as well as gender inequality.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: France . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.5  Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In France, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is protected under domestic law and international commitments. The Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights prohibit torture and degrading treatment, and France is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT). Despite these legal protections, concerns remain about the treatment of detainees, particularly in police custody and prisons.   Reports from human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have highlighted cases of police brutality, particularly during protests and in low-income neighbourhoods. Instances of excessive force used by law enforcement, including the mistreatment of protestors and the use of dangerous crowd control tactics, have been documented. These incidents have raised concerns about the state's commitment to upholding the prohibition of inhuman treatment. In the prison system, overcrowding and poor conditions are longstanding issues, contributing to concerns about the humane treatment of inmates. Human rights groups have criticised the government for inadequate living conditions, lack of access to healthcare, and occasional instances of violence within prisons.   The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) highlighted overcrowded prisons and a lack of psychiatric beds, which exacerbate the situation. Additionally, the UN Torture Rapporteur requested that France address its obligations, particularly around security operations.   While France has a strong legal framework against torture, challenges in enforcement, particularly within law enforcement and the prison system, persist and have drawn international criticism.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist and are generally enforced, though there may be occasional reports of abuse by law enforcement. Violators are usually held accountable.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Council of Europe. 2023. Anti-Torture Committee Criticizes France for Prison Overcrowding and Poor Conditions . [Online] Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/france-anti-torture-committee-deplores-conditions-of-detention-prison-overcrowding-and-lack-of-psychiatric-beds [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2024. UN Torture Rapporteur Requests France’s Action on Security Operations . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/06/ahead-major-security-trade-fair-paris-un-torture-rapporteur-requests-france  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.6.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In France, human rights defenders are generally able to operate within a robust legal framework that protects freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. However, human rights defenders, particularly those advocating for minority rights, migrants, and environmental protection, face growing challenges. Human rights organisations such as Front Line Defenders and Amnesty International have raised concerns about the harassment and intimidation of activists, especially those involved in protests against state policies and corporate activities.   Environmental activists, for instance, have been increasingly targeted during protests against infrastructure projects, where reports of excessive police force and legal harassment have been noted. Similarly, human rights defenders advocating for migrants’ rights have faced difficulties, including legal threats and police monitoring, particularly when assisting undocumented migrants.   France has a National Human Rights Commission and legal mechanisms designed to support the protection of human rights defenders. However, gaps in implementation remain, especially in cases where the defenders’ activities conflict with state interests, such as protests or migrant advocacy.   Despite these challenges, civil society in France remains active, and human rights defenders continue to play a crucial role in advocating for social justice, environmental protection, and the rights of marginalised groups.   Score: 4/5  – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2024. France: Protection of Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in France is protected under Article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) and is reinforced by the French Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. These legal frameworks guarantee the right to freely express opinions, ideas, and information. France is also home to a vibrant media landscape and active civil society, contributing to robust freedom of speech protections.   However, there have been increasing concerns about restrictions on this freedom, particularly in the context of national security, terrorism, and hate speech laws. In recent years, laws aimed at countering terrorism and hate speech have led to heightened surveillance and the potential restriction of free expression. The Global Security Law, passed in 2021, sparked significant controversy, as it was seen as limiting the ability of journalists and citizens to document police activities, leading to protests and criticism from both national and international human rights groups.   Additionally, while France has strong hate speech laws, there is a delicate balance between combating discrimination and protecting free speech. Laws criminalising hate speech, Holocaust denial, and incitement to violence are in place, but critics argue that these laws can sometimes be used to suppress legitimate expressions of dissent, particularly on sensitive issues like religion or national identity.   The country also faces challenges concerning online censorship and misinformation, as social media platforms are increasingly being held accountable for content shared on their platforms under European and domestic laws. This has raised debates about the balance between maintaining free expression and controlling harmful or false information.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in France . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief in France is protected under the French Constitution and is further reinforced by international agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 1 of the Constitution guarantees the principle of laïcité (secularism), which ensures the separation of religion and state, and protects the freedom of individuals to practice their religion or not.   While the state maintains neutrality in religious matters, France has faced challenges in balancing secularism with religious expression, particularly in relation to Islamic practices. Laws such as the 2004 ban on wearing religious symbols, including the Islamic headscarf, in public schools and the 2010 ban on face coverings in public spaces have drawn criticism from human rights organisations. Critics argue that these laws disproportionately affect Muslim women and infringe on their right to religious freedom.   Religious minorities, including Muslims, Jews, and Christians, generally practice their faith freely in France, though incidents of discrimination and hate crimes based on religion persist. Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attacks, in particular, have been noted by groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, despite efforts by the government to combat hate crimes.   In summary, while France's legal framework strongly protects freedom of religion or belief, tensions around the application of secularism and the treatment of religious minorities continue to raise concerns.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections exist but are inconsistently enforced. Religious minorities may face discrimination, and the state may impose limitations on religious practices.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2024. France: Hijab Bans Ahead of Olympic and Paralympic Games Spark Concerns . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/france-hijab-bans-olympic-and-paralympic/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: France.  [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/france/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. Restrictions on Religious Freedom Around the World . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2024/03/PR_2024.3.5_religious-restrictions_REPORT.pdf  [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. 3.4.6.9   Right to Privacy   France has robust privacy laws, particularly through the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). However, concerns remain about state surveillance.   In France, the right to privacy is protected under domestic law and international agreements, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life. Domestically, the Data Protection Act (1978) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which applies across the European Union, provide robust protections for personal data, ensuring that individuals have control over how their data is collected, used, and stored.   Despite these strong legal frameworks, concerns about state surveillance and the collection of personal data have grown in recent years. The passage of anti-terrorism laws following the 2015 Paris attacks expanded the government’s surveillance powers, allowing law enforcement to monitor communications, search homes without a warrant, and impose house arrests without judicial oversight. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have raised concerns about these measures, arguing that they infringe on the right to privacy and could be abused to suppress dissent.   The National Commission on Informatics and Liberty (CNIL), France's data protection authority, plays an important role in ensuring compliance with privacy laws, particularly regarding the handling of personal data by companies and public authorities. In recent years, CNIL has imposed significant fines on major tech companies for violations of data protection laws.   In summary, while France has comprehensive legal protections for privacy, concerns remain regarding the balance between national security measures and individual privacy rights, particularly in the context of increased state surveillance.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. European Data Protection Board (EDPB). 2023. Annual Report 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2024-04/edpb_annual_report_2023_en.pdf [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. La Quadrature du Net. 2024. Eprivacy . [Online] Available at: https://eprivacy.laquadrature.net/en/ [Accessed: 15 September 2024].    3.4.6.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   In France, the right to life and security of person is constitutionally protected, and the country is a signatory to various international human rights treaties, including the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These frameworks safeguard the right to life, security, and the protection of individuals from arbitrary violence or harm.   Despite these legal protections, France faces significant challenges, particularly related to policing and security. Instances of police violence, especially during protests and in low-income neighbourhoods, have raised concerns. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented cases where the use of force by law enforcement has led to deaths or serious injuries. The 2016 protests against labour reforms and the more recent Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) movement saw widespread allegations of police brutality, prompting calls for greater accountability and reform in policing practices.   In addition to law enforcement concerns, the French government has implemented strict anti-terrorism measures in recent years, which, while aimed at protecting public safety, have raised human rights concerns. The state of emergency declared after the 2015 Paris attacks allowed authorities to impose measures that critics argue infringed on civil liberties, including increased surveillance and restrictions on movement.   Gender-based violence also remains a serious issue in France. The country has made efforts to combat violence against women, but high rates of domestic violence, including femicide, have led to ongoing debates about the effectiveness of these measures.   In summary, while France’s legal framework strongly supports the right to life and personal security, concerns about police violence, state surveillance, and gender-based violence highlight the need for continued reforms and stronger protections for vulnerable populations.   Score: 3/5  – "The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or sexual orientation). Law enforcement often operates with impunity."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. France: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: France . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/france [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.6.11   Overall score for France – 3.8/5   France's overall score reflects a country with strong legal protections for human rights, particularly in areas such as political participation, fair trials, and Freedom of Expression. However, issues such as police violence during protests, racial discrimination, and limitations on religious freedom highlight challenges in enforcement, particularly for marginalised groups like Muslims and migrants. While France upholds a robust legal framework for civil liberties, gaps remain in ensuring equal treatment and protection for all citizens, especially in relation to law enforcement accountability and anti-discrimination efforts.   3.4.7   Germany's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.7.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Citizens have the right to organise and participate in demonstrations and protests without prior notification, though this right can be subject to restrictions in cases where public safety or order is at risk. Assemblies under the open sky may be subject to conditions or bans, especially if they pose a threat to public security.   Germany is known for its robust protections for peaceful assembly, and protests are a common form of political and social expression. However, there are limits to these freedoms, particularly when it comes to extremist groups. For instance, associations that seek to undermine democratic principles, such as those with neo-Nazi or other extremist ideologies, can be banned under Article 9 of the Grundgesetz. The government has taken steps to restrict the activities of groups it deems a threat to public safety, such as those promoting hate speech or violence.   In practice, most public demonstrations in Germany occur peacefully, though there have been occasional clashes with law enforcement, particularly during protests related to far-right or far-left movements. The Federal Constitutional Court ensures that restrictions on assembly and association adhere to the principle of proportionality, balancing individual freedoms with the need for public security.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   German courts operate with a high degree of independence, free from government or political interference. Judges are appointed based on merit and are subject to strict legal guidelines, ensuring their impartiality. The Federal Constitutional Court serves as a guardian of the constitution, upholding the rule of law and ensuring that fair trial principles are adhered to in all cases.   The German legal system guarantees several key elements of due process, including the presumption of innocence, the right to legal representation, and the right to appeal decisions. The Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozessordnung) outlines the rights of defendants, including the right to be informed of charges, to present evidence, and to confront witnesses.   Germany provides legal aid to individuals who cannot afford legal representation, ensuring that financial limitations do not hinder access to justice. This is particularly important in maintaining the fairness of the judicial process for economically disadvantaged groups.   While Germany generally adheres to high standards of fairness in legal proceedings, there have been occasional criticisms, particularly regarding the length of time it can take to resolve cases. Overcrowded courts and a backlog of cases sometimes result in delays, which can prolong pretrial detention in certain circumstances. Nonetheless, the right to a prompt and fair trial remains a cornerstone of the German justice system, with courts working to mitigate these challenges.   Score: 4/5 –  “Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles.”   References:   Council of Europe. 2021. Reforms to address unreasonable legal delays . [Online] Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/impact-convention-human-rights/-/reforms-to-address-unreasonable-legal-delays [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Germany holds regular, free, and fair elections at both federal and state levels. The Bundestag, the federal parliament, is elected every four years through a mixed-member proportional representation system. Citizens over the age of 18 have the right to vote, and voter turnout is typically high, reflecting strong political engagement. The political landscape is dominated by several major parties, including the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and Alliance 90/The Greens, ensuring a competitive and pluralistic political environment.   Civil society in Germany is strong, with a vibrant network of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), advocacy groups, and trade unions actively participating in political discourse. Citizens can engage in political life through protests, petitions, and referenda at the state level, providing multiple avenues for influencing government decisions.   Although Germany has a robust democratic framework, some challenges remain. Political participation by certain minority groups, such as immigrants and people with lower socio-economic status, is often lower than the national average. There are also growing concerns about the rise of far-right political movements, which have gained representation in local and national parliaments, challenging the country's democratic values.   Score: 5/5  – “The country guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in government. Political opposition is allowed and respected, and there is a transparent process for democratic governance.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination is a core principle protected under Article 3 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination on grounds such as race, gender, disability, religion, or political opinion. Germany has also implemented several legal frameworks, including the General Equal Treatment Act (AGG), to combat discrimination and ensure equal treatment in areas like employment, education, and access to services.   The AGG, passed in 2006, is a key piece of anti-discrimination legislation in Germany. It prohibits discrimination in various fields, including employment, housing, and access to goods and services, on the basis of race, ethnic origin, gender, religion, disability, age, or sexual orientation. The AGG provides individuals with legal recourse if they experience discrimination, including the right to file complaints or seek compensation.   Despite strong legal protections, certain minority groups in Germany still face discrimination. Immigrants, particularly those of Turkish or Arab descent, as well as asylum seekers and refugees, are often subject to xenophobia and unequal treatment in employment and housing.   Germany has also faced criticism for its treatment of the Roma and Sinti communities, who continue to face significant barriers to accessing housing, employment, and education. Although the government has taken steps to address these issues, including public awareness campaigns and social integration programmes, discrimination against these groups remains a challenge.   While Germany has made significant progress in gender equality, including closing the gender pay gap and promoting women in leadership positions, challenges remain. Women, particularly those from immigrant backgrounds, continue to face unequal treatment in the workplace. Furthermore, while Germany legalised same-sex marriage in 2017, LGBTQ+ individuals still report discrimination in both public and private life. Hate crimes targeting LGBTQ+ people have also been on the rise, highlighting the ongoing challenges in ensuring full equality.   Overall, while Germany has a strong legal framework to combat discrimination, the practical application of these protections continues to face obstacles, particularly for minority and vulnerable groups.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections against discrimination exist but may be inconsistently enforced. Discrimination is not widespread, though certain marginalised groups may face barriers.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Germany: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/germany/report-germany/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Germany is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT) and its domestic legal framework, particularly the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. Article 1 of the Basic Law emphasises the inviolability of human dignity, providing a strong constitutional foundation against torture and mistreatment. Furthermore, Article 104 prohibits any physical or mental mistreatment of persons in detention.   The Criminal Code stipulates penalties for public officials who commit acts of torture or inhuman treatment, and German courts have taken action to prosecute such offences. Law enforcement agencies are generally held accountable, with oversight mechanisms such as the Federal Agency for the Prevention of Torture monitoring detention facilities and prisons to ensure compliance with anti-torture regulations.   Although Germany has comprehensive legal protections, there have been concerns regarding the treatment of asylum seekers and migrants, particularly in detention centres. Human rights organisations have reported occasional instances of excessive use of force by law enforcement, though these are generally investigated, and responsible individuals are held to account. Germany’s efforts to accommodate large numbers of refugees since 2015 have tested the system, leading to scrutiny of conditions in some reception centres, but no widespread patterns of abuse have been documented.   While cases of police brutality are rare, some instances of excessive force, particularly during protests, have raised concerns. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have highlighted isolated incidents where police officers used disproportionate force, though such cases are usually followed by investigations. Germany's judicial system provides a framework for holding law enforcement accountable when abuses occur.   In summary, while Germany has strong legal frameworks to prevent torture and inhuman treatment, continued vigilance and monitoring are necessary, particularly concerning vulnerable groups like asylum seekers and detainees. The country generally upholds its commitment to international human rights standards, with effective oversight mechanisms in place.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist and are generally enforced, though there may be occasional reports of abuse by law enforcement. Violators are usually held accountable.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Germany: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/germany/report-germany/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 2022. Germany: 2022 National Preventive Mechanism Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/spt-opcat/npm/German-2022.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Human rights defenders in Germany operate in a largely free and open environment, with the ability to advocate for human rights issues, including those related to migrants, LGBTQ+ rights, and environmental activism. They have access to legal recourse when their rights are violated, and civil society organisations play an active role in ensuring that human rights defenders are able to conduct their work without fear of reprisal, although threats and attacks are not unheard of. Law enforcement agencies are generally responsive in investigating and prosecuting those who threaten or attack human rights defenders. Civil society organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, operate freely in the country, providing support to human rights defenders through advocacy, legal assistance, and public awareness campaigns. These organisations also play a critical role in holding the government accountable when failures occur in protecting human rights defenders.   Some environmental human rights defenders have reported increased intimidation tactics by law enforcement, such as use of force during protests, prosecution and exorbitant fines, preventative detention, and even raids on their homes. Such measures have raised concerns about the erosion of civil liberties and the chilling effect on public protest, especially regarding climate change activism, which is seen as challenging the state’s economic policies related to coal mining and other industries.   In summary, while Germany offers a supportive environment for human rights defenders, challenges persist, particularly from far-right groups. Continued vigilance is needed to ensure that human rights defenders can carry out their important work without facing threats or intimidation.   Score: 4/5  – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. DW. 2023. Germany: Viral video prompts debate on police brutality . [Online] Available at: https://p.dw.com/p/4Qa2F [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. Germany Prosecutes Environmental Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/28/germany-prosecutes-environmental-defenders [Accessed: 19 October 2024].     3.4.7.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression is a fundamental right in Germany, enshrined in Article 5 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). This article guarantees every individual the right to freely express and disseminate their opinions in speech, writing, and images, as well as the right to receive information. However, this right is not absolute, and certain limitations are placed on speech that incites hatred, denies the Holocaust, or glorifies Nazism.   Germany has a robust and free press, with journalists generally able to operate without government interference. The country ranks high on global press freedom indices, and its legal framework protects media organisations from undue restrictions. Public and private media co-exist, and the Federal Constitutional Court has played a crucial role in safeguarding the media’s role as a watchdog over the government.   Despite the strong protections, there are legal restrictions on certain types of expression. Germany has strict laws against hate speech, Holocaust denial, and the use of Nazi symbols. The Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) criminalises incitement to hatred, which can result in significant penalties. Additionally, Section 130 of the code specifically prohibits speech that incites violence or hatred against minorities. These restrictions are rooted in Germany’s post-World War II commitment to preventing the spread of fascist ideologies and protecting public order.   In recent years, Germany has implemented stricter laws governing online content. The Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), passed in 2017, requires social media companies to remove illegal content, including hate speech and defamation, within 24 hours or face substantial fines. While aimed at curbing online abuse, the law has raised concerns among free speech advocates about over-censorship and its impact on legitimate speech.   In conclusion, while Germany offers a strong legal framework for Freedom of Expression, the state maintains certain restrictions to prevent hate speech and protect public order, reflecting its unique historical context.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., hate speech or national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in Germany . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/germany [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.7.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Article 4 of the Basic Law ensures that everyone has the right to freely practice their religion, and religious communities have the right to self-governance. Germany recognises several religious communities, including Christianity (Catholic and Protestant churches), Judaism, Islamism, Buddhism, and other faiths. These communities are allowed to operate schools, run charities, and engage in various social activities under their religious identities.   Germany maintains a formal separation between church and state. However, certain religious groups, such as the Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church, enjoy a special status and are allowed to collect a "church tax" from their members through the state’s tax system. Religious instruction is also available in public schools, although it is optional, and students may choose to take ethics classes instead.   While religious freedom is broadly respected, certain minority groups, especially Muslims, face social discrimination and challenges in fully exercising their religious rights. For instance, the construction of mosques and the wearing of religious symbols, such as the hijab, have sparked public debates. There have been instances where local governments placed restrictions on mosque construction or public displays of religious dress, raising concerns about Islamophobia and the treatment of Muslim communities.   The German government has taken steps to address religious discrimination and support religious communities. Laws are in place to prosecute hate crimes based on religion, and efforts to promote interfaith dialogue are ongoing. However, some religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Jews, report that more needs to be done to ensure they are treated equally in public life.   Score: 4/ 5 – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. International Religious Freedom Report: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/germany/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.9   Right to Privacy   The right to privacy in Germany is strongly protected under Article 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which guarantees personal rights, including the protection of personal data. In addition to the constitution, Germany is also subject to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which sets out stringent standards for the processing of personal data across the European Union.   While Germany generally upholds strong privacy protections, concerns have been raised about state surveillance, particularly under the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), which has been accused of overreach in its monitoring activities. In 2020, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court ruled that parts of the BND law were unconstitutional, stating that surveillance of foreign nationals outside Germany violated fundamental privacy rights. This ruling has since prompted reforms to limit the scope of surveillance by state authorities.   Despite strong protections, Germany faces challenges in balancing security concerns with privacy rights. Anti-terrorism measures, such as the retention of telecommunications data under the Data Retention Act, have sparked debates about whether such measures violate individual privacy rights. The act has been the subject of legal challenges, with critics arguing that it infringes on citizens' rights to privacy.   In conclusion, Germany has established a solid legal framework to protect privacy, but concerns about state surveillance and the balance between privacy and security continue to be debated.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/germany/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   In Germany, the right to life and security of person is enshrined in Article 2 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which guarantees the right to life and physical integrity. The state is obligated to protect these rights through its legal system and public security measures. Germany adheres to strict human rights protections, and its legal framework aligns with international human rights treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights.   While the German police are generally effective and held to high professional standards, there have been occasional concerns about police conduct, particularly regarding excessive use of force. This has been highlighted in recent debates about police tactics during protests and public demonstrations. Nonetheless, Germany has strong mechanisms for holding law enforcement accountable, with independent oversight bodies that investigate allegations of misconduct.   In recent years, Germany has faced security challenges related to international terrorism and domestic extremism. The government has introduced a range of counterterrorism measures to protect public safety, including increased surveillance, tighter border controls, and expanded law enforcement capabilities. However, these measures have sparked debates about the balance between security and individual rights. Germany remains committed to upholding human rights even as it addresses security concerns.   Germany continues to face challenges in addressing gender-based violence and domestic abuse. Although legal protections are in place, including laws against domestic violence and support services for victims, gender-based violence remains a serious issue. Reports of domestic violence surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, prompting the government to implement additional support measures for victims.   Despite these challenges, Germany maintains a strong commitment to protecting life and personal security, with a legal framework that aligns with its obligations under both domestic law and international human rights standards.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, and violence is generally low, though certain groups (e.g., minorities or marginalised communities) may face occasional threats. Law enforcement generally follows legal protocols but may overstep in some cases.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Germany: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/germany/report-germany/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Germany . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/germany [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.7.11   Overall Score for Germany: 4.1/5   Germany shows a strong commitment to human rights, with robust legal frameworks that protect freedoms such as expression, assembly, and privacy. While the country generally upholds these rights, challenges remain, particularly in addressing rising far-right extremism, incidents of police overreach during protests, and ongoing issues related to gender-based violence. Despite these concerns, Germany's well-functioning judiciary, accountable law enforcement, and active civil society contribute to its high human rights standards.    3.4.8   India's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.8.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Citizens have the right to gather and protest peacefully, but this is often subject to prior permission from authorities, particularly in urban areas. The requirement to obtain permission, often in the form of a permit, has sometimes been criticised for leading to the suppression of protests, particularly those that challenge the government. Over the years, there have been notable instances where peaceful assemblies have been met with police force, particularly during politically sensitive events, such as protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the farmers' protests of 2020–2021.   India’s constitution also guarantees the right to form associations and unions, with trade unions being a particularly prominent example. However, restrictions can be imposed on groups considered a threat to public order or national security.   In practice, both freedoms have faced challenges. Protests are sometimes met with excessive police force or detentions, and there are concerns about laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) being used to suppress dissent and limit freedom of association, particularly for groups advocating for minority or marginalised communities. While freedom of assembly is generally respected, large-scale protests, particularly those critical of government policies, often face significant resistance from state authorities.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections are inconsistent or weak. Protests are often subject to heavy policing or restrictions. Civil society groups face bureaucratic hurdles or occasional harassment.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. India: Freedom of Assembly Under Threat . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: India . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024].     3.4.8.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process in India is constitutionally protected in India, to ensure equality before the law, protection from arbitrary arrest, the right to legal representation, and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. India’s legal framework aims to uphold judicial independence and safeguard the rights of accused individuals.   However, despite these constitutional protections, the Indian legal system faces significant challenges. Delays in judicial proceedings and overcrowded courts result in prolonged pretrial detentions, with many individuals waiting years for their cases to be heard. The application of laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and sedition laws has raised concerns about the suppression of dissent and the extended detention of political activists without trial, undermining the principles of a speedy and fair trial. While legal aid is available through government programmes, many economically disadvantaged and marginalised individuals face barriers in accessing competent legal representation. In practice, India struggles to fully realise the right to a fair trial due to these systemic issues, despite the presence of strong legal safeguards in the constitution and judicial system.   Score: 3/5  – “Judicial independence is inconsistent. Some cases, especially political ones, may experience government interference. Arbitrary detention or extended pretrial detention is reported but not widespread.”   References:   Constitution of India. Articles 14, 19, 20, 21, and 22 . [Online] Available at: https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: India . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Political participation and democratic governance in India are robust, with the country being the largest democracy in the world. The Constitution of India ensures that citizens have the right to vote in regular, free, and fair elections, with the Election Commission of India overseeing the process. India holds national, state, and local elections that allow for broad public participation.   Political power is distributed across multiple levels of government, and political parties, including both national and regional entities, play a vital role in shaping India's diverse political landscape. Major political parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Indian National Congress (INC) dominate national politics, while various regional parties hold significant influence at the state level.   Challenges to democratic governance include rising concerns about electoral integrity, political corruption, and the increasing influence of money and media on elections. Additionally, the curbing of dissent and the use of laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) to suppress political opposition have raised concerns about the erosion of democratic norms. Despite these issues, India remains a functioning democracy with active political participation and a well-established electoral process.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed but faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: India . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International IDEA. 2023. India . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-overview?country=103 [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.8.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination in India is guaranteed under Article 15 of the Constitution of India, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. Article 17 further abolishes untouchability, which historically affected lower-caste communities, particularly Dalits. Despite these legal protections, discrimination based on caste, religion, gender, and ethnicity remains prevalent in many parts of society.   While outlawed, caste-based discrimination continues to affect social and economic opportunities, particularly for Dalits and other historically marginalised groups. Despite affirmative action policies, such as reservations in education and government jobs, caste violence and social exclusion are still reported, especially in rural areas.   India's diverse religious landscape includes Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, and others. Tensions between religious communities occasionally result in violence, with Muslims and Christians sometimes facing discrimination and hate crimes.   Despite legal frameworks promoting gender equality, women in India face significant challenges, including gender-based violence, wage gaps, and underrepresentation in political and economic spheres. Gender-based violence, including domestic violence and sexual assault, remains pervasive, although laws such as the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act and Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act offer some protection.   While India decriminalised homosexuality in 2018, LGBTQ+ individuals still face significant social stigma and discrimination. Legal recognition of same-sex relationships and rights to marriage, adoption, and inheritance remain areas of ongoing advocacy.   In conclusion, while India’s legal framework prohibits discrimination, deep-rooted societal prejudices and systemic inequalities continue to challenge the full realisation of freedom from discrimination.   Score: 2/5  – “Discrimination is prevalent, and legal protections are either weak or non-existent. Marginalised groups face systemic inequality, and the state does little to address these disparities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in India . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india/report-india/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Freedom from torture and inhuman treatment in India is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. India is also a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), though it has yet to ratify the convention, raising concerns about the adequacy of legal protections against torture. Domestic laws, such as the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, prohibit physical harm and custodial violence. However, incidents of torture and ill-treatment, particularly in police custody, continue to be reported.   Reports of custodial deaths, police brutality, and inhuman treatment by law enforcement agencies are ongoing issues in India. Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented numerous cases where individuals in police custody have been subjected to physical abuse, often to extract confessions or as a means of punishment. Despite laws in place, accountability for such abuses remains weak, and convictions of police officers involved in custodial violence are rare.   The Indian judiciary has played an important role in addressing custodial torture. The Supreme Court of India has passed several judgements reinforcing the rights of detainees, including the need for medical examinations and legal representation for those in custody. Despite these efforts, implementation at the ground level remains inconsistent.   While India’s constitution and judiciary provide safeguards against torture, the prevalence of custodial violence and the lack of a robust legal framework continue to undermine these protections.   Score: 2/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are reported frequently, and legal protections are weak or rarely enforced. Law enforcement and security forces often act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in India . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india/report-india/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Protection of human rights defenders in India remains a significant concern, despite constitutional guarantees of Freedom of Expression and association. Human rights defenders in the country often face intimidation, harassment, legal challenges, and even physical violence, particularly when advocating for the rights of marginalised communities, such as Dalits, indigenous peoples, and religious minorities. The situation is especially dire for those raising issues related to environmental rights, land disputes, or criticising government policies.   Human rights defenders, particularly those working on environmental and land rights issues, face significant risks. The assassination of activists like Gauri Lankesh and attacks on those opposing large infrastructure projects or mining activities highlight the dangers faced by those challenging powerful interests. In many cases, perpetrators of violence against human rights defenders enjoy impunity, as investigations are slow and prosecutions rare.   India has also seen an increasing crackdown on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) critical of the government. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) has been used to restrict the funding of NGOs, particularly those advocating for human rights. Amnesty International, for example, was forced to halt operations in India in 2020 after its bank accounts were frozen, allegedly due to FCRA violations.   Despite these challenges, India has an active civil society, with numerous organisations continuing to fight for the protection of human rights defenders. However, ongoing state repression, misuse of legal frameworks, and lack of accountability for violence against activists remain serious obstacles.   Score: 2/5  – “Human rights defenders are frequently persecuted, harassed, or jailed for their work. Legal protections are minimal, and the state often seeks to suppress their activities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2020. Protect Our Human Rights Work in India . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/petition/protect-our-human-rights-work-in-india/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2023. India: Human Rights Defenders Under Threat . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in India is protected by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, allowing citizens to freely express opinions. However, Article 19(2) permits restrictions based on national security, public order, and other factors. In practice, laws such as Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (sedition law) and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) have been used to target dissenters, journalists, and activists, limiting their ability to criticise the government.   Media freedom in India is under pressure, with frequent reports of harassment and intimidation of journalists, and the country ranked poorly in the 2023 World Press Freedom Index. Furthermore, the Information Technology Rules, 2021 regulate online content and have raised concerns about censorship, especially on social media platforms.   Despite legal protections, these restrictions have created a challenging environment for free speech in India.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of Expression is heavily restricted. The press and media are frequently censored, and individuals face legal consequences or violence for expressing dissent.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: India . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. World Press Freedom Index 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief in India is constitutionally protected under Article 25 of the Constitution of India, which grants all citizens the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate their religion. India is home to a diverse range of religious groups, including Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, and others, with the state maintaining a secular stance. However, this freedom is subject to reasonable restrictions on the grounds of public order, morality, and health.   In practice, there have been concerns about rising religious intolerance and violence, particularly against religious minorities. In recent years, incidents of communal violence, mob lynchings, and hate crimes against Muslims, Christians, and Dalits have raised serious concerns about the protection of religious freedoms. Additionally, the rise of Hindu nationalist sentiment has led to increased pressure on minority religious communities, with laws such as anti-conversion laws being enacted in several states. These laws, aimed at preventing forced religious conversions, have often been criticised for targeting Christian and Muslim communities.   The government's handling of religious issues has also come under scrutiny, with critics alleging that it has not done enough to curb religious violence or protect vulnerable groups. International human rights organisations have raised concerns about growing restrictions on religious freedoms, calling for stronger measures to protect the rights of all religious communities in India.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of religion is restricted, with certain religious groups facing persecution or being banned. The state either privileges a dominant religion or, in secular states, imposes restrictions on all religious practices.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in India . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india/report-india/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2021. Religion in India: Tolerance and Segregation . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/06/29/religion-in-india-tolerance-and-segregation/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.9   Right to Privacy   The right to privacy in India was explicitly recognised as a fundamental right by the Supreme Court in its landmark Puttaswamy v. Union of India ruling in 2017. This right is derived from Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The judgement strengthened protections for individual privacy, particularly in the context of data protection, surveillance, and bodily autonomy.   India does not yet have comprehensive legislation specifically governing privacy, though the Information Technology Act of 2000 and associated rules offer some protections concerning digital privacy and cybersecurity. These provisions mandate companies to safeguard user data, especially sensitive personal information. However, concerns remain regarding the adequacy of these protections in the face of increasing government surveillance and data collection.   The government's use of surveillance technology, such as the Aadhaar biometric identification system, has sparked debates about privacy infringements. Critics argue that without strong legal safeguards, there is potential for misuse, as Aadhaar links personal data to a centralised database. Moreover, the lack of a robust data protection law raises concerns about data breaches and the unauthorised use of personal information.   In conclusion, while the recognition of the right to privacy marks a positive step forward, challenges remain in terms of practical implementation and the protection of individual privacy in the digital age.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations.”     References:   Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Supreme Court of India. 2017. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs Union of India . [Online] Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/127517806/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person in India is constitutionally protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. However, in practice, challenges remain in ensuring these protections for all citizens.   India faces high levels of violence, including crimes such as murder, sexual assault, and gender-based violence. One of the most pressing concerns is the issue of gender-based violence, particularly violence against women.   Additionally, communal violence and mob lynchings, often targeting religious minorities, have raised serious concerns about the state’s ability to protect its citizens. Security forces, including the police, have also been implicated in extrajudicial killings, particularly in conflict regions like Jammu and Kashmir, where state security measures have been accused of overreach.   In terms of state action, law enforcement agencies have been criticised for their use of excessive force during protests and detentions. Allegations of police brutality, custodial deaths, and the use of unlawful force highlight gaps in ensuring the right to life and security of person for detainees and protesters.   In summary, while legal protections for the right to life exist, India continues to face significant challenges in addressing violence, ensuring law enforcement accountability, and protecting vulnerable populations.   Score: 2/5  – “The right to life is not consistently protected. Arbitrary killings, state violence, or widespread abuses by security forces are common, and accountability mechanisms are weak.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. India: Violence and Security . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: India . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/india  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.8.11   Overall Score for India: 2.5/5   While India democratic governance and political participation, significant challenges persist in areas such as freedom from discrimination, torture, and protection of human rights defenders. Legal safeguards exist but are often inconsistently enforced, leading to systemic inequalities and state overreach in several sectors. 3.4.9   Indonesia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.9.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Indonesia, freedom of assembly and association is guaranteed under the Constitution and various international human rights treaties to which Indonesia is a party, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These legal frameworks ensure citizens' rights to peacefully assemble and form associations, including trade unions, political parties, and civil society organisations.   Despite these protections, the reality of exercising these rights is often challenging. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have reported frequent government restrictions on assemblies, particularly those that are critical of the government or related to sensitive political issues. Protests are often met with heavy-handed responses by the police, who have been criticised for using excessive force to disperse crowds, detaining protestors, and imposing arbitrary restrictions on gatherings. Protests related to labour rights, Indigenous land rights, and political dissent are particularly vulnerable to repression.   In addition to assembly rights, the right to form associations is also restricted in certain areas. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that advocate for human rights or environmental protections frequently face scrutiny, and in some cases, their activities are hindered by bureaucratic red tape or allegations of subversive activities. Labour unions, while legally permitted, have also encountered barriers, including intimidation and harassment of union leaders.   While Indonesia has strong legal provisions for these freedoms, in practice, the state's control over political expression and assembly remains a concern, particularly when it comes to activism critical of government policies.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections are inconsistent or weak. Protests are often subject to heavy policing or restrictions. Civil society groups face bureaucratic hurdles or occasional harassment.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report.  [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Indonesia, the right to a fair trial and due process is enshrined in the Constitution and protected under national law. Indonesia is also a party to international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees these rights. However, there are significant gaps in how these rights are implemented in practice.   Indonesia’s judicial system is often criticised for being inefficient and subject to corruption. Defendants from marginalised communities, particularly those from low-income or rural areas, often face difficulties in accessing legal representation. The country's public defender system is under-resourced, and legal aid is limited, which undermines the ability of defendants to receive a fair trial.   Additionally, concerns have been raised about pretrial detention, with individuals often held for long periods without formal charges. Reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented cases where detainees have been denied access to legal counsel or faced coercion, including forced confessions during interrogations. Furthermore, the   Human Rights Monitor   highlights how trials are frequently undermined by the influence of powerful political and military actors, exacerbating systemic weaknesses.   The independence of the judiciary is another issue, as political pressure and corruption can influence court decisions. High-profile cases, particularly those involving political dissent, terrorism, or blasphemy, have raised questions about judicial impartiality.   In summary, while Indonesia has a legal framework that guarantees the right to a fair trial and due process, in practice, these rights are often compromised due to systemic inefficiencies, corruption, and uneven access to justice.   Score: 3/5  – “Judicial independence is inconsistent. Some cases, especially political ones, experience government interference. Arbitrary detention or extended pretrial detention is reported but not widespread.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Monitor. 2023. US Govt Releases New Report on Human Rights Situation in Indonesia in 2022 . [Online] Available at: https://humanrightsmonitor.org/news/us-govt-releases-new-report-on-human-rights-situation-in-indonesia-in-2022/ [Accessed: 15 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   In Indonesia, political participation and democratic governance are characterised by both progress and challenges. Since the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia has transitioned into a democratic system, holding regular multiparty elections. These elections, generally considered free and fair, are key to the country’s political participation. The Constitution guarantees the right to vote, and political parties are active at both the local and national levels, with the People’s Consultative Assembly and the House of Representatives playing central roles in governance.   However, political participation is often constrained by systemic corruption and political patronage. Transparency International and Freedom House have raised concerns about the influence of money in politics, where candidates and parties with financial backing often have disproportionate sway. Additionally, while democratic mechanisms are in place, political freedoms have been restricted in certain contexts, particularly when dissent challenges the ruling government or security interests. Indonesia has a vibrant civil society, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an essential role in advocating for democratic reforms. However, there have been instances where activists and political opposition figures have faced harassment, intimidation, and legal action, particularly in regions such as West Papua, where separatist movements and protests have been met with state crackdowns.   Despite being one of the most populous democracies in the world, Indonesia's political landscape remains fraught with challenges, including voter disenfranchisement in remote areas and underrepresentation of women and marginalised groups in politics. Political participation in Indonesia is evolving, but concerns about corruption, authoritarian tendencies, and the protection of political freedoms remain.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2024  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Transparency International. 2023. Corruption Perceptions Index 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/ind  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.4   Freedom from Discrimination   In Indonesia, freedom from discrimination is legally guaranteed under the Constitution and further reinforced by laws such as the Human Rights Law (1999) and the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination Law (2008).   Despite these legal frameworks, discrimination remains a significant issue in practice. Religious minorities, such as Christians, Ahmadiyya Muslims, and Shia Muslims, often face social and legal discrimination. Reports of violence against religious minorities, including the destruction of places of worship and harassment, are not uncommon, and local governments have been criticised for failing to protect these groups. Blasphemy laws, which have been used to target individuals for perceived insults to Islam, are another source of concern, leading to the persecution of minority groups and activists.   Gender discrimination is also prevalent, despite the legal protections in place. Women face challenges in accessing equal employment opportunities, and there are high rates of gender-based violence. Indonesia has made progress in addressing some of these issues, but enforcement of anti-discrimination laws remains inconsistent.   Indigenous peoples and members of the LGBTQ+ community also face marginalisation. Indigenous communities often struggle to defend their land rights against large-scale developments, while the LGBTQ+ population encounters societal stigma and legal barriers, with no specific legal protections in place for sexual orientation or gender identity.   While Indonesia’s legal framework provides some protections against discrimination, significant gaps remain in enforcement, and marginalised groups continue to face systemic challenges.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   In Indonesia, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is legally protected under the Constitution and international conventions, such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), to which Indonesia is a party. Despite these formal commitments, reports of torture and ill-treatment, particularly by law enforcement and security forces, remain a significant concern.   Human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have documented numerous cases of police and military personnel using excessive force, particularly during interrogations and in detention centres. Torture is frequently reported in efforts to extract confessions from suspects, especially in cases involving political dissent or terrorism. Additionally, the conditions in many Indonesian prisons and detention facilities are described as inhumane, with overcrowding, poor sanitation, and inadequate access to healthcare being common issues.   Indonesia’s security forces, particularly in regions like West Papua, have been repeatedly accused of using torture and inhuman treatment against Indigenous populations and political activists. While the government has established some mechanisms, such as the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), to address these issues, accountability remains weak, and perpetrators are rarely brought to justice.   Efforts to reform the police and military have been ongoing, but the lack of effective oversight and accountability continues to undermine the country’s progress in eradicating torture and ill-treatment.   Score: 3/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Komnas HAM. 2022. Annual Report on Human Rights in Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.komnasham.go.id/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.9.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Indonesia, human rights defenders face considerable challenges, despite the country’s constitutional protections for Freedom of Expression and association. Those who advocate for the rights of marginalised communities, Indigenous people, environmental protection, or political dissent are particularly vulnerable to intimidation, harassment, and violence. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have raised concerns about the increasing risks faced by defenders, particularly those operating in sensitive areas like West Papua or those challenging government policies or corporate interests.   Environmental activists and land rights defenders are frequently targeted, especially those opposing large-scale infrastructure projects, logging, or mining activities. Many of these defenders face threats from private actors, including corporations, as well as state-backed security forces. In regions like West Papua, defenders advocating for political self-determination or the rights of Indigenous groups are at heightened risk of arbitrary detention, violence, and even extrajudicial killings.   Human rights defenders working on LGBTQ+ issues, women's rights, and migrant rights also report facing significant threats, including legal harassment, social stigma, and physical violence. Despite the existence of mechanisms such as the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), defenders often lack adequate protection, and perpetrators of violence against them are rarely held accountable.   In summary, while Indonesia has made strides in promoting human rights, the protection of human rights defenders remains a serious concern, with widespread impunity for violations and ongoing risks for those challenging powerful state and corporate interests.   Score: 3/5  – “Human rights defenders face some harassment or legal challenges, particularly when criticising the government. Protections are weak or inconsistently applied.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2024. Indonesia: Human Rights Defenders at Risk . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.7   Freedom of Expression   In Indonesia, Freedom of Expression is constitutionally guaranteed, but in practice, it is subject to significant limitations. Article 28 of the Constitution grants citizens the right to express their opinions, but various laws, including the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law, have been used to criminalise speech, especially online. Human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have raised concerns about the misuse of these laws to suppress criticism of the government, political figures, and state policies.   The ITE Law has been widely criticised for its vague definitions of defamation, which have led to prosecutions of journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens for their posts on social media. The law has been used to silence dissent, particularly in cases involving political corruption, environmental issues, or criticisms of powerful figures.   Journalists in Indonesia operate in a difficult environment, with reports of intimidation, harassment, and violence, particularly when covering sensitive issues such as human rights abuses in West Papua. In addition, media outlets that report on politically sensitive topics may face pressure from both the government and corporate interests, leading to self-censorship.   Freedom of Expression is further restricted through blasphemy laws, which are frequently used to target individuals accused of offending religious sensitivities. These laws have led to convictions and jail sentences for those deemed to have insulted religion, disproportionately affecting religious minorities and activists advocating for secularism.   In summary, while Freedom of Expression is legally protected in Indonesia, the government continues to use broad laws to restrict this right, targeting activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens, particularly in politically sensitive or religious contexts.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections exist but are weak. Some journalists and activists face censorship or legal repercussions for their work. Independent media faces bureaucratic or financial challenges.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in Indonesia 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/indonesia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.9.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   In Indonesia, freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally protected under Article 29 of the Constitution, which guarantees that all citizens are free to worship according to their own religion or belief. However, the practical application of this right is limited by both societal norms and government regulations, especially for religious minorities. The government officially recognises only six religions—Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism—creating a restrictive environment for those practicing other beliefs or non-religious groups.   Indonesia’s Blasphemy Law has been a significant tool for curbing religious freedom, often used to prosecute individuals for expressing beliefs that are seen as deviating from mainstream interpretations. The most high-profile case in recent years involved the former governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), who was convicted of blasphemy in 2017 for comments perceived to insult Islam. Human rights groups, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have criticised the blasphemy law for fostering intolerance and disproportionately affecting religious minorities, such as Christians, Ahmadis, and Shia Muslims.   Religious intolerance in Indonesia is exacerbated by both social and institutional pressures. In some regions, religious minorities face restrictions on building places of worship, and there have been reports of violence and intimidation against those attempting to practice their faith. For instance, Ahmadiyya and Shia communities have faced harassment, and local governments in certain areas have issued regulations that restrict their religious activities.   In summary, while Indonesia's constitution guarantees freedom of religion, the reality for many religious minorities is fraught with legal and societal challenges. The blasphemy law and other restrictive measures continue to limit religious freedom, especially for non-mainstream faiths and belief systems.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections exist but are inconsistently enforced. Religious minorities may face discrimination, and the state may impose limitations on religious practices.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. 5 facts about Muslims and Christians in Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/03/28/5-facts-about-muslims-and-christians-in-indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 September 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. International Religious Freedom Report: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.9   Right to Privacy   In Indonesia, the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but aspects of it are protected under other laws and regulations. The Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law and the Law on State Intelligence provide some legal framework around the use of personal data and surveillance, though these laws have raised concerns among human rights groups about state overreach.   The ITE Law, while initially designed to regulate online information and protect individuals from defamation and cybercrimes, has often been criticised for being vague, especially regarding privacy protections. The law has been used to criminalise online expression, and it permits broad surveillance of online activities, raising concerns about privacy violations.   Additionally, the Personal Data Protection Bill, which was passed in 2022, represents an important step toward formalising privacy protections, setting out rules for the collection, processing, and storage of personal data. This law aims to strengthen data protection, aligning with international standards, but its implementation remains uncertain, and enforcement mechanisms have yet to be fully developed.   Despite these legal frameworks, there are ongoing concerns about government surveillance and data collection practices. Reports of state monitoring of communications, particularly in politically sensitive regions such as West Papua, have raised concerns about the state's commitment to upholding privacy rights. Activists and human rights defenders have been particularly vulnerable to these surveillance practices.   In summary, while Indonesia has made progress in legislating privacy protections, particularly with the new data protection law, concerns remain about the state’s ability to balance security measures with respect for individual privacy rights.   Score: 2/5  – “Privacy rights are weak or frequently violated. Government surveillance and intrusion into personal data are widespread, and there is little accountability for breaches.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2024. A web of surveillance . [Online] Available at: https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2024/05/a-web-of-surveillance/ [Accessed: 19 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   In Indonesia, the right to life and security of person is protected under the Constitution and various international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Indonesia is a party. Despite these legal frameworks, the country faces ongoing challenges in fully protecting these rights, particularly in the areas of police violence, extrajudicial killings, and human rights abuses in conflict regions like West Papua.   Reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented numerous cases of police brutality and excessive use of force, particularly during protests, in detention centres, and in the context of anti-drug operations. Extrajudicial killings have been reported, especially in conflict-prone areas like West Papua, where the military and police are accused of committing human rights violations against Indigenous populations and political activists. These incidents raise serious concerns about the state's capacity to protect the right to life.   Another major issue is the death penalty, which remains in force in Indonesia, primarily for drug-related offenses. The use of the death penalty has drawn international criticism, particularly because of concerns about fair trial standards and reports of torture used to extract confessions from suspects. The Indonesian government has maintained its stance on capital punishment despite growing calls for its abolition or at least a moratorium.   Gender-based violence is another critical area affecting the right to life and security of person in Indonesia. Rates of domestic violence and femicide are high, with many victims facing barriers to accessing justice. Laws aimed at protecting women and children from violence are often inadequately enforced, leaving vulnerable groups at risk.   In summary, while Indonesia has legal protections for the right to life and security of person, significant challenges remain, particularly in relation to police violence, the use of the death penalty, and gender-based violence.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or political views). Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Indonesia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/indonesia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/indonesia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.9.11   Overall score for Indonesia: 3/5   Indonesia demonstrates a mixed record in its protection and enforcement of civil and political rights. The country has signed numerous international treaties and upholds a constitutional framework to protect these rights, but significant gaps remain in enforcement. While there are legal protections for rights such as Freedom of Expression and assembly, these are often undermined by restrictions, heavy policing, and inconsistent application, especially for minority groups. There are also concerns regarding the judiciary's independence and issues surrounding access to justice.   In areas such as freedom from discrimination and the protection of human rights defenders, Indonesia continues to face challenges, with harassment and limited legal recourse reported for marginalised communities and activists. Despite these shortcomings, efforts are being made to address human rights violations, though progress remains slow.

3.4.2 Australia’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.2.1 Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Australia, freedom of assembly and association are fundamental rights protected by both the Constitution and various laws. While Australia does not have a formal bill of rights, these freedoms are recognised under common law and protected through legislation at both federal and state levels. For instance, the Fair Work Act 2009 protects the right to freedom of association in the context of union membership and collective bargaining.   Australians generally enjoy the right to peaceful assembly, including the right to protest. Laws across states and territories regulate the conditions for public assemblies, often requiring permits for large gatherings. However, certain limitations exist, particularly concerning public safety, national security, and public order. In some instances, law enforcement's response to protests has raised concerns, especially in cases involving indigenous land rights, environmental activism, and refugee advocacy.   There have also been debates about laws like the Anti-Discrimination Act in Queensland and other states, which criminalise incitement to discrimination and racial hatred but can potentially limit certain forms of protest and speech. Additionally, anti-terrorism laws have led to heightened scrutiny of some groups, raising concerns about freedom of association in particular circumstances.   Despite these limitations, Australia’s legal system broadly supports freedom of assembly and association, allowing civil society, trade unions, and other groups to operate freely.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.2.2 Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Australia, the right to a fair trial and due process is protected by both domestic laws and international commitments. While Australia does not have a constitutional bill of rights, principles of due process are embedded in the legal system through common law, statutes, and international agreements, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Australia is a signatory. These principles ensure that individuals are entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court, the presumption of innocence, and access to legal representation.   While the legal system generally upholds due process, certain areas raise concerns. Australia’s use of mandatory detention for asylum seekers has been widely criticised by human rights organisations for violating due process rights, as detainees often face long periods of detention without judicial review. Additionally, anti-terrorism laws allow for the detention of individuals without charge for extended periods, raising concerns about the potential erosion of fair trial protections.   In conclusion, while Australia has a strong legal framework supporting the right to a fair trial and due process, issues such as access to legal representation and the treatment of asylum seekers and terrorism suspects remain contentious.   Score: 4/5  – "Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.3 Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Political participation and democratic governance in Australia are supported by a robust system based on constitutional principles and democratic institutions. Australia operates as a federal parliamentary democracy, with a constitutional monarchy. The political system is grounded in regular, free, and fair elections, with mandatory voting ensuring high voter turnout. Citizens are encouraged to engage in the political process, and elections are held at federal, state, and local levels.   Australia's preferential voting system ensures that elected representatives reflect a broader spectrum of the electorate. Political parties, including the dominant Liberal and Labor parties, as well as smaller parties like the Greens and independents, participate actively in the political process. The independent Australian Electoral Commission oversees elections to ensure transparency and fairness.   Despite strong democratic institutions, challenges remain, particularly regarding the influence of money in politics and the representation of minority and Indigenous communities. The role of political donations and the influence of corporate interests on policymaking have been subjects of public concern. Additionally, while Indigenous Australians have the right to vote, they remain underrepresented in political institutions, and ongoing debates about constitutional recognition and treaty-making reflect broader issues of governance and inclusion.   In conclusion, while Australia’s democratic governance is well-established and generally strong, ongoing debates about political representation, the role of money in politics, and the participation of minority groups continue to shape the country’s political landscape.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.2.4 Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination in Australia is protected by a strong legal framework that includes both constitutional provisions and comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation.   Australia has made significant progress in addressing racial discrimination, but challenges persist, particularly for Indigenous Australians and migrant communities. Indigenous Australians face systemic disadvantages in areas like health, education, and employment, and they are disproportionately affected by the criminal justice system. The Uluru Statement from the Heart and ongoing debates about Indigenous constitutional recognition highlight the need for deeper structural reforms.   Australia has been at the forefront of promoting gender equality, with strong protections under the Sex Discrimination Act. However, gender-based violence, wage inequality, and underrepresentation in leadership positions remain significant issues. Movements like #MeToo and ongoing campaigns for gender equality in the workplace have brought attention to the need for further reforms.   LGBTQ+ rights have advanced significantly in recent years, with the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2017 marking a significant milestone. Despite these gains, LGBTQ+ individuals continue to experience discrimination in certain areas, particularly in healthcare and employment, and there are ongoing debates around religious exemptions that allow discrimination against LGBTQ+ people in some settings.   In summary, while Australia has comprehensive anti-discrimination laws in place, enforcement remains uneven, and certain communities continue to face systemic discrimination, particularly Indigenous Australians and marginalised groups.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.5 Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Freedom from torture and inhuman treatment in Australia is protected under both domestic and international law. The Criminal Code Act 1995 criminalises acts of torture, and Australia is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), which prohibits torture in all circumstances. Additionally, the Australian Human Rights Commission plays a role in overseeing and investigating complaints of mistreatment and upholding these protections.   Despite these strong legal frameworks, concerns remain regarding the treatment of certain populations, particularly asylum seekers and Indigenous Australians. Australia’s offshore detention of asylum seekers on islands like Nauru and Manus Island has been heavily criticised by human rights organisations for involving inhuman and degrading treatment. Reports of poor living conditions, inadequate medical care, and prolonged detention without clear legal resolution have raised serious concerns about the country’s compliance with international human rights obligations.   Indigenous Australians have also reported instances of excessive force and mistreatment, particularly in the criminal justice system. The high rates of incarceration of Indigenous people, alongside documented instances of abuse and mistreatment in custody, underscore the ongoing challenges in ensuring freedom from torture and inhuman treatment for all individuals in Australia.   .While Australia has a solid legal framework, issues related to the treatment of asylum seekers and Indigenous Australians highlight the need for ongoing vigilance and reform.   Score: 3/5  – "Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Australia, human rights defenders are generally able to operate in a supportive legal environment, with constitutional protections for free speech, assembly, and association. However, they sometimes face challenges, particularly when addressing issues related to Indigenous rights, environmental protection, and refugee advocacy. Defenders working on Indigenous issues often encounter resistance, including harassment or legal challenges, when advocating for land rights or addressing the treatment of Indigenous communities in the criminal justice system.   Environmental activists have faced increasing scrutiny, particularly those protesting against large-scale infrastructure or mining projects. In some instances, environmental defenders have been subjected to legal action or intimidation by corporations and government authorities, particularly under laws designed to limit civil disobedience.   Human rights defenders advocating for refugees, especially those working to highlight the conditions in offshore detention centres, also face challenges. There have been reports of intimidation and restrictions on access to these facilities, limiting the ability of defenders to expose human rights abuses.   Despite these challenges, Australia’s legal system provides avenues for defenders to seek protection and address violations, and civil society remains strong. However, defenders in certain sectors continue to face obstacles, especially when advocating against powerful interests or government policies.   Score: 3/5  – "Human rights defenders face some harassment or legal challenges, particularly when criticising the government. Protections are weak or inconsistently applied."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.2.7       Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in Australia is largely protected by the Constitution, common law, and various federal and state laws. While the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee free speech, the High Court of Australia has interpreted an implied right to political communication, ensuring the protection of speech related to political and public matters. Additionally, Australia is a signatory to international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which safeguards Freedom of Expression.   Despite these protections, there are limitations on free expression, particularly in areas concerning hate speech, defamation, and national security. Australia's defamation laws are among the strictest in the world, with media organisations frequently facing lawsuits for publishing critical or investigative pieces. Although recent reforms have aimed to balance freedom of the press and the protection of individual reputations, concerns remain about the impact of defamation laws on free speech.   Laws against hate speech, such as the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, prohibit speech that incites racial hatred or vilifies groups based on race, ethnicity, or religion. While these laws aim to protect vulnerable groups from harm, they have raised debates about the balance between preventing hate speech and safeguarding free expression.   In the context of national security, legislation such as the Espionage and Foreign Interference Act has broadened the scope of government control over information, raising concerns about the potential suppression of investigative journalism and whistleblowing on sensitive political matters. Journalists and human rights groups have expressed concerns that these laws could be used to limit press freedom and restrict access to information in the public interest.   Score: 4/5  – "Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics. The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.2.8 Freedom of Religion or Belief   Australia guarantees freedom of religion, with minimal restrictions on religious practice. Religious communities, including minority groups, generally operate freely, and there are few cases of government interference. Pew Research Center (2024) has classified Australia as having low government restrictions on religious practices.   Freedom of religion or belief in Australia is protected by both domestic law and international treaties. While the Australian Constitution does not explicitly guarantee religious freedom, Section 116 prevents the government from making laws that establish any religion, impose religious observance, or prohibit the free exercise of religion. Australia is also a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which reinforces protections for freedom of religion or belief.   Australia is home to a diverse range of religious communities, including Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Judaism, as well as a significant portion of the population identifying as non-religious. Religious groups generally operate freely without government interference, and religious tolerance is a key feature of the country’s social fabric.   However, some challenges remain. Religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Jews, have reported incidents of discrimination, hate speech, and occasional hate crimes. These incidents are often isolated, but they raise concerns about religious intolerance. In response, the government has taken steps to strengthen laws against hate crimes and religious discrimination, particularly through anti-discrimination legislation at the federal and state levels.   In summary, while Australia provides strong protections for freedom of religion or belief, ongoing challenges related to discrimination and balancing religious rights with other human rights continue to be discussed.   Score: 5/5  – "The country guarantees complete freedom of religion or belief, allowing all individuals to practice their faith or choose no faith without fear of persecution. Religious communities operate freely and equally."   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. Globally, Government Restrictions on Religion Reached Peak Levels in 2021, While Social Hostilities Went Down . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2024/03/PR_2024.3.5_religious-restrictions_REPORT.pdf [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/australia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.9 Right to Privacy   The right to privacy in Australia is protected under various laws, although the Constitution does not explicitly mention privacy rights. Australia has developed a robust framework for privacy protection, primarily through the Privacy Act 1988, which governs how personal information is collected, used, and disclosed by both government and private entities. This law is administered by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), which ensures compliance with the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs).   The Privacy Act includes provisions to protect individuals’ data, such as the right to access and correct personal information held by organisations and the right to be informed about how personal data is used. It also covers protections for sensitive information, such as health data and financial records. However, Australia’s privacy protections are not as comprehensive as the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), leading to debates about the need for stronger laws, particularly in the digital age.   Concerns have been raised about government surveillance, particularly with laws like the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, which allows law enforcement agencies to access communications data under certain circumstances. Australia’s metadata retention laws have also faced criticism for enabling the government to collect and store vast amounts of telecommunications data without adequate oversight, raising fears about privacy violations.   In summary, while Australia has solid privacy protections through legislation like the Privacy Act, concerns persist regarding government surveillance and the adequacy of privacy safeguards in the digital era.   Score: 3/5  – "Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations."   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/australia/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.10 Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person in Australia is protected by various legal frameworks and institutions. While the Australian Constitution does not explicitly guarantee the right to life, Australia’s commitment to this right is grounded in common law principles and international human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Australia is a party.   Australia generally enjoys high levels of personal security, but challenges exist, particularly in relation to certain groups. Indigenous Australians face disproportionately high rates of violence, including higher levels of death in custody, and the issue of police accountability remains an area of concern. Despite legal protections, reports of excessive use of force by police, particularly during interactions with Indigenous people and those with mental health issues, have raised concerns about the adequacy of safeguards for the right to security.   Australia also faces challenges related to gender-based violence. The country has high rates of domestic violence, with women and children being particularly vulnerable. Efforts have been made to address this through national initiatives, such as the National Plan to Reduce Violence against Women and their Children. However, violence against women, including intimate partner violence, remains a significant issue affecting the right to life and personal security for many Australians.   While Australia provides strong legal protections against threats to life and security, issues like police violence, Indigenous rights, and gender-based violence require ongoing attention to ensure that these rights are fully realised for all citizens.   Score: 3/5  – "The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse. Law enforcement often operates with impunity."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Australia: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-east-asia-and-the-pacific/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/australia [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Australia . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/australia/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.2.11 Overall Score for Australia: 3.6/5   Australia’s overall score reflects a country with strong legal frameworks in place for protecting civil and political rights but with noticeable gaps in enforcement for marginalised groups, particularly Indigenous Australians. While the country upholds free elections, freedom of assembly, expression, and religion, issues such as police brutality, discrimination, and limitations on privacy rights remain concerning. Australia's robust judicial system is offset by challenges in accessibility, especially for vulnerable populations. These combined factors demonstrate that while Australia performs well in several areas, significant improvements are still needed in enforcement and equality across different sectors of society.   3.4.3 Brazil’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.3.1 Freedom of Assembly and Association   In Brazil, freedom of assembly and association is enshrined in the Constitution of 1988, which guarantees citizens the right to assemble peacefully and form associations without interference. Article 5 of the Constitution explicitly protects these rights, ensuring that individuals and groups can gather and organise for political, social, or labour purposes without prior authorisation, provided the assembly is peaceful and does not conflict with other constitutional principles.   However, in practice, these rights are sometimes restricted. Law enforcement agencies have been criticised for using excessive force during protests, particularly in large cities. Human rights organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented cases of police violence against protesters, especially during demonstrations related to issues such as political corruption, social inequality, and environmental concerns. There have also been reports of arbitrary arrests and intimidation of protestors.   Additionally, while trade unions and other associations are legally recognised, Brazil has seen efforts to restrict the activities of labour unions, especially under recent administrations. Strikes and protests organised by trade unions and other civil society groups often face governmental resistance, including legal challenges that limit their effectiveness.   Despite these challenges, civil society in Brazil remains vibrant, with numerous social movements advocating for the rights of marginalised groups, environmental protection, and political reforms. Nevertheless, ongoing concerns about police violence and legal restrictions on protests underscore the tension between constitutional guarantees and the reality on the ground.   Score: 3/5  – “Legal protections are inconsistent or weak. Protests are often subject to heavy policing or restrictions. Civil society groups face bureaucratic hurdles or occasional harassment.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/brazil/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.3.2 Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process in Brazil is protected under the Constitution of 1988, particularly in Article 5, which guarantees equality before the law, the right to legal defence, and the presumption of innocence. These principles are reinforced by Brazil's ratification of international human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.   However, the Brazilian judicial system faces significant challenges that undermine these rights. One of the key issues is the lengthy delays in the judicial process. Brazil’s court system is often overwhelmed, leading to extensive case backlogs and prolonged pretrial detention. Many individuals, particularly those from marginalised communities, spend long periods in detention awaiting trial, which has raised concerns about violations of the right to a timely and fair trial.   Moreover, access to quality legal representation is unequal, with wealthier defendants having better legal resources while low-income individuals often rely on an underfunded and overburdened public defender system. Human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have highlighted cases of abuse in the judicial process, such as arbitrary arrests, coerced confessions, and instances of torture, particularly within the prison system.   Efforts at reform have been slow, but there have been initiatives aimed at improving the efficiency of the courts and ensuring better legal protections for defendants. Despite these reforms, the judicial system's inefficiencies, coupled with social and economic inequality, continue to pose significant barriers to fully realising the right to a fair trial and due process in Brazil.   Score: 2/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/brazil/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.3.3 Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Brazil is a federal republic with a democratic system of governance, and political participation is constitutionally guaranteed under the Constitution of 1988. Citizens have the right to vote, and voting is compulsory for those aged 18 to 70. Elections at the federal, state, and municipal levels are held regularly, and Brazil has a history of peaceful transfers of power through free and fair elections, overseen by the Superior Electoral Court.   The political landscape in Brazil is diverse, with multiple political parties, though it is often dominated by two major blocs: the Workers' Party (PT) and more conservative parties like the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB) and Liberal Party (PL). While elections are generally seen as free and fair, the political environment has been marked by high levels of polarisation, especially during recent elections.   Corruption remains a significant issue, affecting public trust in political institutions. High-profile corruption scandals, such as the Operation Car Wash investigation, exposed widespread graft involving top politicians and business leaders, which led to several prosecutions but also deepened political divisions. Efforts to address corruption through reforms have been slow, although anti-corruption measures are in place and regularly updated.   Social inequality also plays a role in limiting political participation. While formal rights to vote and run for office are guaranteed, the influence of wealth on political campaigns and the underrepresentation of marginalised groups, such as Indigenous communities, women, and Afro-Brazilians, in decision-making positions remains a challenge.   Despite these issues, Brazil maintains a strong tradition of civil society engagement, with NGOs, social movements, and advocacy groups actively participating in the political process, particularly around issues like environmental protection, Indigenous rights, and social justice.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Transparency International. 2023. Corruption Perceptions Index: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2023/index/bra [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.3.4 Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination is guaranteed in Brazil under Article 5 of the Constitution of 1988, which prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, age, religion, and other personal characteristics. Brazil is also a party to various international human rights treaties, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).   Despite these legal protections, discrimination remains a significant issue in Brazil. Racial discrimination is deeply entrenched, particularly against Afro-Brazilians and Indigenous populations, who face social and economic disparities, including limited access to quality education, healthcare, and employment opportunities. Afro-Brazilians are also disproportionately affected by police violence and face higher rates of incarceration.   Gender-based discrimination is another major concern. While Brazil has made progress in promoting gender equality, women continue to experience wage gaps, underrepresentation in leadership positions, and high rates of violence. The country has some of the highest rates of femicide in the world, despite the introduction of laws like the Maria da Penha Law aimed at combating domestic violence.   LGBTQ+ individuals also face discrimination and violence, despite recent advances in legal protections, such as the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2013. Transgender individuals, in particular, are frequently targets of violence, and Brazil has one of the highest rates of violence against the LGBTQ+ community globally.   Indigenous populations are similarly marginalised, facing discrimination, land rights violations, and inadequate protection from government policies that often favour large agribusinesses and infrastructure projects. Indigenous communities have been vocal in their resistance to encroachments on their lands, but they face significant threats, including violence and political exclusion.   Efforts to address these issues are ongoing, with advocacy from civil society groups and international pressure, but systemic discrimination persists across various sectors of society. Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/brazil/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/brazil/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.3.5 Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is guaranteed under Brazil’s Constitution of 1988, and the country is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT). Despite these legal safeguards, there are significant concerns about the use of torture, particularly by law enforcement and within the prison system.   Police brutality and the use of excessive force are widespread in Brazil, particularly in low-income, predominantly Afro-Brazilian communities. Human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented numerous cases of torture and ill-treatment, often during arrests or interrogations. Torture is frequently used to extract confessions or to intimidate and punish detainees. The victims are often individuals from vulnerable or marginalised communities, including prisoners and young men from poor urban areas.   Brazil’s prison system is notorious for its overcrowding, violence, and lack of adequate medical care, which exacerbates the risk of inhuman treatment. Many prisons are severely overcrowded, with detainees living in unsanitary conditions, and instances of violence between inmates are common. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and local organisations have repeatedly raised concerns about the conditions in these facilities, which have been described as amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment.   Despite legal frameworks aimed at preventing torture, accountability remains inconsistent. Law enforcement officials accused of torture or excessive force are rarely prosecuted, and impunity for such acts is a significant issue. Although some reforms have been introduced, including the establishment of torture prevention mechanisms, these measures are often under-resourced and ineffective in practice.   In conclusion, while Brazil has strong legal protections against torture, systemic issues such as police violence, impunity, and inhumane conditions in prisons continue to undermine the country’s ability to fully realise freedom from torture and inhuman treatment.   Score: 2/5   – "Torture and inhuman treatment are reported frequently, and legal protections are weak or rarely enforced. Law enforcement and security forces often act with impunity."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/brazil/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 2022. Situation of Human Rights in Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Brazil2021-en.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Organization of American States (OAS). 2022. Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2022: Chapter V – Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2022/Chapters/11-IA2022_Cap_5_BR_EN.pdf [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. United Nations Committee Against Torture. 2023. UN Committee Against Torture publishes findings on Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, and Slovakia . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/05/un-committee-against-torture-publishes-findings-brazil-colombia-ethiopia   [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.3.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Human rights defenders in Brazil, particularly those working on environmental and indigenous rights, face significant threats. Amnesty International has documented ongoing violence against activists, especially those opposing illegal deforestation and land seizures in the Amazon. These defenders often receive death threats, and there have been numerous cases of assassination, with little accountability from the state.   Furthermore, Human Rights Watch reports that environmental defenders and indigenous leaders continue to be threatened and killed at alarming rates, particularly in rural areas where illegal logging and land seizures are rampant. The Brazilian government's failure to adequately protect these defenders exacerbates the issue, with perpetrators often escaping justice due to weak law enforcement.   Further corroborating these claims, Global Witness identified Brazil as one of the most dangerous countries for environmental defenders, particularly those standing up against deforestation in the Amazon. The organisation reported several high-profile cases of violence against indigenous activists and environmental defenders, with many victims receiving little protection from the state [1] .   Score: 2/5  – “Human rights defenders are frequently persecuted, harassed, or jailed for their work. Legal protections are minimal, and the state often seeks to suppress their activities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Indigenous peoples’ rights still remain at risk . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr19/7258/2023/en/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Global Witness. 2023. Defending Tomorrow: The climate crisis and threats against land and environmental defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/defending-tomorrow/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.3.7 Freedom of Expression   While Brazil guarantees Freedom of Expression by law, journalists often face harassment, violence, and legal challenges. In the 2024 RSF Press Freedom Index, Brazil’s score slightly improved from 58.67 to 58.59, yet its global ranking fell from 82nd to 92nd due to ongoing threats to journalists, particularly those covering corruption, organised crime, and deforestation.   Under President Lula’s government, relations with the media have improved, but structural issues like concentrated media ownership and violence against journalists persist. Reporters working in rural areas are especially vulnerable to physical attacks and threats.   Additionally, Human Rights Watch reports increasing threats and violence against journalists investigating sensitive political issues, with frequent cases of online harassment and attacks on social media platforms.   Score: 2/5  – "Freedom of Expression is heavily restricted. The press and media are frequently censored, and individuals face legal consequences or violence for expressing dissent."   References:   Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2024. Press Freedom Index . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/brazil [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.3.8 Freedom of Religion or Belief   Brazil guarantees freedom of religion, and religious communities generally operate freely. However, Afro-Brazilian religions such as Candomblé and Umbanda continue to face violence and discrimination, particularly from evangelical groups.   While government restrictions on religion are low, according to Pew Research Center (2024), social hostilities based on religion remain a significant issue for minority religious communities.   Score: 3/5  – "Legal protections exist but are inconsistently enforced. Religious minorities may face discrimination, and the state may impose limitations on religious practices." References:   Pew Research Center. 2024. Religious Restrictions Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2024/03/05/religious-restrictions/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.3.9 Right to Privacy   Brazil’s General Data Protection Law (LGPD) establishes a legal framework for personal privacy and data security. While the LGPD has been praised for providing solid protections, significant concerns persist regarding government surveillance, particularly in the context of organised crime and anti-corruption investigations. Human Rights Watch (2022) has documented instances where Brazilian authorities employed invasive surveillance techniques, often without adequate judicial oversight, leading to violations of citizens' privacy rights.   Further concerns arise from the expansion of surveillance technologies. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) reported that Brazil's government has continued to expand its surveillance infrastructure, often without appropriate legal oversight. This includes monitoring individuals’ online activities, which raises concerns about the state infringing on civil liberties and personal privacy.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent.”   References:   Electronic Frontier Foundation. 2021. Brazil’s Fake News Bill: Perils and Flaws of Expanding Existent Data Retention Obligations . [Online] Available at: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/11/brazils-fake-news-bill-perils-and-flaws-expanding-existent-data-retention [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2022. Children’s Rights Violations in Brazil: Governments’ Surveillance . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/05/25/how-dare-they-peep-my-private-life/childrens-rights-violations-governments  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.3.10 Right to Life and Security of Person   Brazil continues to face alarmingly high levels of violent crime and police brutality, particularly affecting marginalised communities. Human Rights Watch (2023) reported over 6,145 police killings in 2021, with most victims being Afro-Brazilians from low-income areas.   The disproportionate use of lethal force by police, especially in favelas, continues to raise significant human rights concerns. Amnesty International has also highlighted the lack of accountability for such killings, with law enforcement often acting with impunity, making it one of the most pressing human rights issues in Brazil.   Score: 2/5  – “The right to life is not consistently protected. Arbitrary killings, state violence, or widespread abuses by security forces are common, and accountability mechanisms are weak.”   References: Amnesty International. 2023. Brazil: Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Still Remain at Risk . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr19/7258/2023/en/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report: Brazil . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/brazil  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.3.11 Overall score for Brazil: 2.6/5   Brazil’s overall score reflects a nation with a strong legal framework for the protection of civil and political rights but significant challenges in enforcing these protections. Systemic issues, such as police violence, discrimination against marginalised groups, and threats to Freedom of Expression, indicate a gap between legal commitments and actual practice. While Brazil upholds international and regional human rights standards, further efforts are needed to address these ongoing enforcement challenges across the country.   3.4.4 Canada’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.4.1 Freedom of Assembly and Association   Canada’s Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects freedom of assembly and association. Peaceful protests and demonstrations are generally allowed, and civil society organisations operate freely without fear of retribution. However, there are some restrictions, particularly concerning Indigenous land disputes and environmental protests, where police intervention has been heavy at times.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny."   References:   Amnesty International. 2022. Ca nada: Pipeline construction on Indigenous territory endangers land defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/10/canada-pipeline-indigenous-territory-endangers-land-defenders/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.2 Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   Canada's justice system, while independent and generally accessible, still faces challenges, especially for Indigenous and low-income individuals. Human Rights Watch reports that systemic discrimination and delays in court processes create barriers for these groups.   Additionally, the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice highlights that many Canadians cannot afford legal representation, which results in a growing number of self-represented litigants. This lack of representation affects the overall effectiveness of the justice system, leading to unresolved disputes with significant social and economic costs.   Score: 4/5  – "Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles." References:   Canadian Forum on Civil Justice. 2012-2018. The Cost of Justice: Weighing the Costs of Fair & Effective Resolution to Legal Problems . [Online] Available at: https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/2012CanLIIDocs233#!fragment/zoupio-_Toc2Page1-Page10/BQCwhgziBcwMYgK4DsDWszIQewE4BUBTADwBdoAvbRABwEtsBaAfX2zgCYAFMAc0ICMjHvwEAGAJQAaZNlKEIARUSFcAT2gByTVIiEwuBMtUbtu-YZABlPKQBCGgEoBRADLOAagEEAcgGFnKVIwACNoUnYJCSA [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/canada  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.3 Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Canada guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in the democratic process. Political opposition operates without interference, and the electoral system is transparent and well-managed. However, challenges persist concerning political representation for Indigenous and marginalised communities, despite strong overall voter participation and engagement. According to International IDEA’s Democracy Tracker, Canada continues to maintain a high standard of democratic governance, though some inequalities remain in political representation.   Score: 5/5  – "The country guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in government. Political opposition is allowed and respected, and there is a transparent process for democratic governance."   References:   International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). 2023. Canada Democracy Tracker . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.4.4 Freedom from Discrimination   Canada has strong anti-discrimination laws in place, with the Canadian Human Rights Act and provincial legislation offering protections against discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, and other characteristics.   However, according to Human Rights Watch   and Amnesty International, Indigenous communities, Black Canadians, and LGBTQIA+ individuals still face systemic discrimination, particularly in areas like employment, housing, and interactions with law enforcement.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections against discrimination exist but may be inconsistently enforced. Discrimination is not widespread, though certain marginalised groups may face barriers."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Canada: Addressing Systemic Discrimination . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/canada/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. Discrimination in Canada: Ongoing Challenges . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.5 Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Canada has robust legal protections against torture, in line with the Convention against Torture (CAT), to which it is a signatory. However, issues related to police use of excessive force, particularly towards racial minorities and Indigenous peoples, have been highlighted in recent years. Amnesty International reports incidents of excessive force during arrests and protests, often with limited accountability for police officers involved in such abuses. Amnesty International  and Human Rights Watch highlight these issues, particularly during arrests and protests, where accountability for law enforcement misconduct remains inconsistent. The lack of comprehensive accountability measures for officers involved in these incidents, combined with reports of disproportionate policing in marginalised communities, points to ongoing challenges in fully enforcing these protections.   The United Nations Committee Against Torture's 2018 Concluding Observations on Canada raised concerns about the disproportionate use of force by law enforcement, especially toward racial minorities and Indigenous populations. The report emphasised the need for Canada to enhance accountability mechanisms for police misconduct. The Committee also acknowledged Canada's positive steps in establishing independent investigative bodies, like the Independent Investigations Office and Bureau des Enquêtes Indépendantes, but it encouraged further measures to address systemic issues.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections exist and are generally enforced, though there may be occasional reports of abuse by law enforcement. Violators are usually held accountable."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Canada: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/canada/report-canada/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. United Nations Committee Against Torture. 2018. Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Canada . [Online] Available at: https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsglSZMQd1BoEakgym8DLljp%2FtVZwAcP32UhceoEv6s9EFDnHa%2FfIXxFR9KNVY4qkr3X7%2FaP5eVqCmw6nDLJyD3dA5iGzIWJ0XfsLEbi0yIvz   [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Canada generally protects human rights defenders, allowing them to operate freely and without fear of persecution. However, Amnesty International   reports occasional harassment and pressure, particularly for Indigenous and environmental activists who challenge major development projects, such as pipelines. While the legal framework supports human rights defenders, the enforcement of protections can be inconsistent, especially in rural areas.   Human Rights Watch highlights that these activists, especially those opposing natural resource projects, often face harassment, legal actions, and disproportionate use of force by law enforcement. The Canadian government has made efforts to protect rights defenders, but ongoing concerns about police actions during protests and the targeting of activists remain.   Score: 4/5  – "Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Canada: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/canada/report-canada/   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2024. World Report 2024: Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.7 Freedom of Expression   Canada has comprehensive legal protections for Freedom of Expression under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The press operates freely, and dissenting views are tolerated. However, there have been occasional concerns raised about government surveillance and hate speech legislation that could limit free expression in some contexts.   Reporters Without Borders (2024) ranks Canada highly on its Press Freedom Index, though Indigenous and community media sometimes face financial and bureaucratic challenges.   Score: 4/5  – "Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure."   References:   Reporters Without Borders. 2024. Canada: Press Freedom Index . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.8 Freedom of Religion or Belief   Canada guarantees freedom of religion under its Charter of Rights and Freedoms, allowing individuals to practice their faith freely. While there are no significant legal restrictions, social discrimination against minority religious groups, such as Muslims and Sikhs, persists.   The Pew Research Center (2024) notes that while government restrictions are minimal, there have been instances of social hostility towards certain religious minorities, particularly in the wake of terrorist attacks abroad.   Score: 4/5  – "Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Canada: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/canada/report-canada/   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Pew Research Center. 2024. Religious Restrictions Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2024/03/05/religious-restrictions/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.9 Right to Privacy   Canada has a solid legal framework to protect privacy rights, particularly under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). However, there are concerns about potential overreach in government surveillance, particularly in relation to national security measures. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (2023) has raised issues around public perception regarding the balance between privacy and security. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) has raised concerns regarding federal political parties' handling of personal data, arguing that privacy laws should apply to them.   The CCLA and other organisations are urging political parties to commit to transparency and accountability in their data collection and usage, which currently operates in a legal grey area. This issue highlights gaps in privacy protections in Canada, particularly in the context of political processes.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective."   References:   Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA). 2023. CCLA Joins Other Organizations to Urge Federal Political Parties to Accept that Privacy Laws Apply to Them . [Online] Available at: https://ccla.org/privacy/ccla-joins-other-organizations-to-urge-federal-political-parties-to-accept-that-privacy-laws-apply-to-them/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). 2024. Security, Surveillance, and Government Overreach: United States Set the Path for Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/06/security-surveillance-and-government-overreach-united-states-set-path-canada [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. 2023. Canadians’ Views on Privacy . [Online] Available at: https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/research/explore-privacy-research/2023/por_ca_2022-23/  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.4.10 Right to Life and Security of Person   Canada generally ensures the right to life and personal security, with relatively low levels of violence compared to other countries.   However, Human Rights Watch   highlighted concerns regarding the use of force by police, particularly in interactions with Indigenous and racial minority communities.   Amnesty International has raised concerns about the violation of the right to life and security of Indigenous people in Canada during police raids on protest encampments in Alberta. The use of force and the lack of accountability for police actions have endangered the safety of protesters, particularly those advocating for land and environmental rights.   Score: 4/5  – "Legal protections exist, and violence is generally low, though certain groups (e.g., minorities or marginalised communities) may face occasional threats. Law enforcement generally follows legal protocols but may overstep in some cases."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Police Raids on Protest Encampments in Alberta . [Online] Available at: https://amnesty.ca/human-rights-news/police-raids-protest-encampments-alberta/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Amnesty International. 2023. Canada: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/canada/report-canada/   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/canada  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.4.11 Canada’s overall score: 4.1/5   Canada’s strong legal framework for human rights is reflected in its overall score. The country maintains robust protections for civil liberties, including Freedom of Expression, freedom of religion, and democratic governance. However, ongoing issues with systemic discrimination, particularly for Indigenous and racial minority communities, highlight areas where improvement is needed.  Canada also faces challenges in addressing police violence and excessive force, especially in interactions with vulnerable populations. Nonetheless, the country remains a global leader in human rights protection with room for continued progress. 3.4.5 China's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.5.1 Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association are severely restricted in China, where the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tightly controls political and social activities. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China guarantees these rights in theory, but in practice, they are heavily curtailed by strict regulations, surveillance, and crackdowns on dissent.   Peaceful assembly, including protests and demonstrations, is rarely tolerated, particularly if it is critical of the government or touches on sensitive topics like human rights, ethnic autonomy, or corruption. Large-scale protests, such as those in Hong Kong in 2019, were met with a forceful government response, including mass arrests, police brutality, and new laws like the National Security Law that further restrict freedoms. On the mainland, protests are often dispersed quickly, and organisers are subject to imprisonment under vague charges such as "subverting state power" or "inciting separatism."   Freedom of association is equally restricted. Independent trade unions, political parties, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are not allowed to operate freely. All social organisations must be registered with the government, and unregistered groups are considered illegal. The Overseas NGO Law (2017) has further limited the operations of international organisations by requiring them to be registered and supervised by state authorities, effectively reducing their ability to engage in advocacy or human rights work.   China's repression of assembly and association is supported by mass surveillance and digital censorship, with authorities closely monitoring online discussions and swiftly shutting down any attempts to organise protests or critical social movements. This pervasive system of control significantly undermines civil society and individual rights in the country.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no meaningful legal protections for freedom of assembly and association. Protests are banned, civil society organisations are disbanded or state-controlled, and activists are routinely imprisoned or persecuted.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.2 Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process in China faces significant challenges despite legal provisions that theoretically guarantee these rights. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China and the Criminal Procedure Law outline the right to legal representation, public trials, and the presumption of innocence. However, in practice, these guarantees are frequently undermined by the judiciary’s lack of independence, as it operates under the influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).   Judicial decisions, particularly in cases involving political dissidents, human rights activists, or those charged under state security laws, are often seen as predetermined. Defendants accused of crimes such as "subversion of state power" are frequently denied adequate legal representation, and trials are often closed to the public. For example, many high-profile political cases are marked by secretive proceedings, with lawyers barred from accessing their clients or presenting a proper defence.   Pretrial detention is another area of concern, with detainees often held for long periods without trial. Reports of forced confessions obtained through torture, despite being prohibited under Chinese law, are common. Political prisoners and those detained under anti-terrorism or national security charges frequently face arbitrary detention, and their rights are often violated in the process.   China's broad security laws, including the National Security Law and Counterterrorism Law, grant sweeping powers to authorities, allowing for the detention and prosecution of individuals without adherence to standard legal procedures. The lack of judicial oversight, combined with the opaque nature of many trials, particularly those involving sensitive political matters, undermines the right to a fair trial and due process in the country.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no meaningful judicial independence. Courts are tools of the state, used to silence opposition. Arbitrary detention is routine, and fair trials are virtually non-existent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report. [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China. [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China. [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.5.3 Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Political participation and democratic governance in China are tightly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which maintains a monopoly on political power. While China is nominally a "people's republic", it does not have a system of open, multiparty elections as seen in democratic countries. The CCP controls all levels of government, from local administrations to national leadership, with no legal avenue for other political parties to challenge its rule.   Elections do take place in China, but they are tightly managed by the state. For example, elections for local People’s Congresses occur, but candidates must either be CCP-approved or independent candidates vetted through a restrictive system. These elections offer little genuine political choice, and the higher echelons of government, including the National People’s Congress, are composed overwhelmingly of CCP members. This legislative body functions largely as a rubber-stamp parliament, with limited real influence over state policies.   Political dissent is not tolerated, and efforts to promote democratic reforms or challenge the CCP’s authority are met with swift suppression. Activists and advocates for greater political openness are frequently arrested or silenced. High-profile pro-democracy movements, such as those seen in Hong Kong, have faced crackdowns, with leaders imprisoned or forced into exile. The implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong in 2020 further eroded the region’s limited autonomy and political freedoms.   Additionally, China's system lacks transparency, with decision-making concentrated within the CCP’s elite circles. Public participation in governance is minimal, and there are no independent media or civil society organisations that can freely challenge government decisions or hold officials accountable.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no free or fair elections. The state is ruled by an authoritarian regime, and any political opposition is systematically crushed. Democratic governance is non-existent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.4 Freedom from Discrimination   China's legal framework theoretically guarantees freedom from discrimination, with the Constitution of the People's Republic of China affirming equality for all citizens regardless of ethnicity, gender, or religion. Additionally, the Labour Law and other legislation prohibit discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, or gender in employment and public life. However, in practice, significant challenges remain in ensuring freedom from discrimination, especially for ethnic minorities, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals.   Ethnic minorities, particularly Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other non-Han Chinese groups, face systemic discrimination and repression. The Chinese government has been widely criticised for its policies toward Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, where reports from human rights organisations have documented mass detentions, forced labour, and re-education camps. The Chinese state tightly controls religious practices and cultural expression among minority groups, often framing these restrictions as measures to prevent extremism or maintain national unity.   Although China has laws against gender discrimination in employment, women continue to face barriers in the workplace, including unequal pay and discriminatory hiring practices. Many women report being asked about their marital status or plans for children during job interviews. Furthermore, despite laws promoting gender equality, cases of workplace sexual harassment and gender-based violence are underreported, and enforcement of protections is weak.   While homosexuality is not illegal in China, there are no comprehensive legal protections for LGBTQ+ individuals. LGBTQ+ advocacy is heavily restricted, and public discourse on LGBTQ+ issues is often censored. Same-sex marriage remains illegal, and social discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals is widespread, with many facing stigma, family pressure, and workplace discrimination.   Although China has made some legislative efforts to combat discrimination, the gap between law and practice remains significant, especially for marginalised groups. Ongoing surveillance, censorship, and suppression of advocacy efforts make it difficult for civil society organisations to address these issues effectively. Score: 1/5  – “There are no legal protections against discrimination, and the state actively promotes or tolerates discriminatory practices. Marginalised groups are heavily oppressed and face severe inequality.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China. [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.5 Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   China is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), and the country's Constitution and Criminal Procedure Law officially prohibit the use of torture. However, in practice, the use of torture and inhuman treatment remains a serious issue, especially in the context of political repression and law enforcement.   Reports from human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International frequently document the use of torture in Chinese detention facilities, particularly against political dissidents, human rights activists, and ethnic minorities. Common methods of torture include beatings, sleep deprivation, and the denial of medical treatment. These practices are often used to extract forced confessions, which are then presented in court as evidence despite China’s official legal prohibitions on such evidence.   The situation in Xinjiang, where Uyghur Muslims and other Turkic minorities have been detained in "re-education" camps, has drawn international condemnation. Numerous reports have surfaced of detainees being subjected to physical abuse, forced sterilisation, and psychological torture. The Chinese government refers to these camps as vocational training centres aimed at combating extremism, but mounting evidence points to widespread human rights abuses, including torture and inhuman treatment.   Human rights defenders, lawyers, and activists detained under national security laws are particularly vulnerable to torture. Notable cases include those of human rights lawyers detained during the 2015 "709 crackdown", many of whom reported severe physical and mental abuse while in custody. Activists who criticise the government or advocate for greater political freedoms are often targeted and subjected to inhumane treatment during long pretrial detentions.   Despite legal frameworks prohibiting torture, there is little accountability for perpetrators. Judicial oversight is weak, and state authorities rarely investigate allegations of torture. Those who report such abuses often face retaliation, making it difficult to hold officials accountable for their actions.   Score: 1/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are widespread and systematically used by the state. There are no legal protections, and security forces routinely act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. United Nations. 2022. Chin a responsible for ‘serious human rights violations’ in Xinjiang province: UN human rights report . [Online] Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1125932 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.5.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In China, human rights defenders operate in a highly repressive environment where their activities are severely restricted, and they often face persecution. While international human rights norms call for the protection of human rights defenders, in China, the government views activism, particularly on sensitive issues like democracy, Freedom of Expression, and ethnic minority rights, as a threat to state stability. This leads to frequent crackdowns on individuals and groups advocating for human rights.   Human rights defenders, including lawyers, journalists, and activists, are regularly subjected to harassment, surveillance, and arbitrary detention. The 709 crackdown in 2015 is a notable example, during which hundreds of human rights lawyers and activists were detained or arrested. Many were tortured, held incommunicado, or subjected to forced disappearances. Those involved in defending political prisoners or advocating for Freedom of Expression face continuous state repression.   China’s laws, particularly the National Security Law and Criminal Law, are frequently used to charge human rights defenders with crimes such as "subverting state power" or "picking quarrels and provoking trouble". These vaguely defined crimes allow authorities to target anyone engaged in activism or critical speech, making it extremely difficult for human rights defenders to carry out their work without fear of arrest.   Chinese authorities employ extensive surveillance measures to monitor the activities of human rights defenders. Activists and their families are often placed under house arrest, and their communications are heavily monitored. International human rights organisations have condemned the Chinese government for using these surveillance tactics to intimidate defenders and prevent them from engaging with global human rights networks.   In some cases, the Chinese government exerts pressure on human rights defenders by targeting their families. Family members of detained activists often face harassment, social isolation, and restrictions on movement, creating further difficulties for human rights defenders to continue their advocacy.   Despite international condemnation, the Chinese government has shown little willingness to protect human rights defenders or reform laws that allow their persecution. Many defenders remain imprisoned or under constant threat of arrest, limiting the capacity for civil society to flourish in China.   Score: 1/5  – “Human rights defenders are systematically targeted by the state. They face imprisonment, torture, or worse, and there are no legal protections for their work.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Defenders Under Threat . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2022. China: Situation of Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.7 Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in China is heavily restricted, with the Chinese government exerting tight control over media, the internet, and public discourse. Although the Constitution of the People's Republic of China guarantees freedom of speech, in practice, these rights are severely limited by laws that criminalise dissent, criticism of the government, and the sharing of politically sensitive information.   China’s state-run media landscape is tightly controlled by the government, with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ensuring that all media aligns with its policies and narratives. Independent journalism is virtually non-existent, and media outlets are frequently censored or shut down if they publish content critical of the state. International media are also subject to restrictions, with foreign journalists facing intimidation, surveillance, and expulsions.   The Chinese government maintains one of the most comprehensive internet censorship systems in the world, often referred to as the "Great Firewall". Websites, social media platforms, and search engines that allow the free flow of information—such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter—are blocked in China. Domestic platforms like WeChat and Weibo are heavily monitored, with content relating to sensitive topics such as human rights, democracy, or criticism of the CCP swiftly removed. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) plays a central role in regulating online content and censoring any material deemed harmful to state interests.   In addition to censorship, China employs widespread digital surveillance to monitor its citizens' online activities. Individuals who express dissenting views or share politically sensitive content face severe consequences, including arrest, imprisonment, and even forced disappearances. Human rights defenders, journalists, and activists are particularly vulnerable, with many being detained for “subverting state power” or “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”.   Laws such as the National Security Law and Cybersecurity Law give the state broad powers to suppress Freedom of Expression in the name of national security. These laws are frequently used to justify the detention of individuals who criticise the government or advocate for reforms.   China’s repression of Freedom of Expression extends beyond its borders, with increasing efforts to control the narratives around its policies, such as in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan, by pressuring international media and corporations to comply with its censorship standards.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no meaningful protections for Freedom of Expression. The state controls the media, and dissenting voices are silenced through imprisonment or violence.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Freedom of Expression Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. China: Media Freedom and Censorship . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/country/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.8 Freedom of Religion or Belief   In China, freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 36 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which states that citizens "enjoy freedom of religious belief". However, in practice, the Chinese government tightly controls religious practices, and religious freedoms are severely restricted, particularly for groups that are not sanctioned by the state.   State Control of Religion: The Chinese government officially recognises five religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islamism, Catholicism, and Protestantism. All religious groups must register with the state and operate under government-supervised bodies, such as the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association and the Three-Self Patriotic Movement for Protestant churches. Religious groups that operate outside state-sanctioned structures are considered illegal and are often subject to persecution. The government's Regulations on Religious Affairs, revised in 2018, further restrict religious activities, particularly those deemed to be foreign influences or linked to separatist movements.   Persecution of Religious Minorities: Religious minorities, particularly Uyghur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, and underground Christian churches, face severe repression. In Xinjiang, over a million Uyghur Muslims have reportedly been detained in so-called "re-education" camps, where they are subjected to forced indoctrination, restrictions on religious practices, and in some cases, physical abuse. Tibetan Buddhists face restrictions on their religious activities, including the veneration of the Dalai Lama, which is banned by the government. Unregistered or "house" churches, both Catholic and Protestant, are frequently raided by authorities, with congregants facing harassment, detention, and forced closures.   Crackdown on Falun Gong: Falun Gong, a spiritual movement combining meditation and qigong, has been the target of a brutal crackdown since 1999, when the government banned the practice. Falun Gong practitioners have been arrested, imprisoned, and reportedly subjected to forced labour and torture. There have also been allegations of organ harvesting from imprisoned Falun Gong practitioners, which has been condemned by international human rights organisations.   Increased Restrictions: In recent years, the Chinese government has tightened its control over religious practices, increasing surveillance and repression under the guise of maintaining social stability. The state has promoted “Sinicisation” of religion, which seeks to align religious practices with Chinese socialist values and reduce the influence of foreign religious doctrines. This has led to the removal of religious symbols, such as crosses from churches, and the imposition of state-approved religious doctrine.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no freedom of religion or belief. The state enforces a particular belief system, whether religious or secular, and those who practice or promote any dissenting views face imprisonment, violence, or severe discrimination.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in China . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: China . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.9 Right to Privacy   The right to privacy in China is highly restricted, with the state maintaining extensive control over personal data, communications, and digital activities. While Article 40 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China guarantees the privacy of correspondence, this protection is limited in practice, particularly in the digital realm. The Chinese government’s extensive surveillance infrastructure and legal frameworks allow for broad monitoring and control over citizens’ private information.   China operates one of the most sophisticated and widespread surveillance systems in the world. The state monitors communications through technologies such as facial recognition, AI-based surveillance, and social credit systems, which collect vast amounts of personal data. The Cybersecurity Law of 2017 and the Personal Information Protection Law of 2021 provide legal backing for the collection of personal data under the guise of protecting national security and public safety. However, these laws are also used to justify state overreach into the private lives of citizens. Major tech companies are required to cooperate with the government, sharing data upon request and ensuring that platforms align with government censorship and surveillance policies.   The Chinese government exercises significant control over the internet, and the Great Firewall blocks access to many international websites, such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter. Domestic platforms like WeChat and Weibo are tightly monitored, with any content deemed politically sensitive swiftly removed. User data on these platforms is regularly accessed by the state, and online activity is closely tracked, limiting online privacy and free expression.   Specific groups, including human rights defenders, ethnic minorities, and political dissidents, are subjected to heightened levels of surveillance. The situation in Xinjiang, where Uyghur Muslims are under constant surveillance, is a notable example. Uyghurs are monitored through high-tech systems that track their movements, communications, and religious practices. Reports indicate that the Chinese government uses facial recognition technology and biometric data to enforce this surveillance regime, raising grave concerns about privacy violations.   China's legal and technological framework for monitoring personal privacy has drawn criticism from international human rights organisations, which argue that these practices undermine fundamental privacy rights and grant the state unparalleled control over its citizens.   Score: 1/5  – “There are no meaningful privacy protections. The government monitors individuals heavily, and there is no legal recourse for violations of privacy.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in China . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Skadden. 2021. China’s New Data Security and Personal Information Protection Laws: A Compliance Perspective . [Online] Available at: https://www.skadden.com/Insights/Publications/2021/11/Chinas-New-Data-Security-and-Personal-Information-Protection-Laws [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.10 Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person is theoretically protected under Article 37 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, which prohibits unlawful deprivation of life and personal liberty. However, in practice, significant concerns arise due to state actions, particularly in the areas of extrajudicial detentions, forced disappearances, and the treatment of ethnic minorities.   China's extensive use of arbitrary detention, particularly through the Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location (RSDL) system, allows the government to hold individuals for extended periods without formal charges. Political dissidents, human rights defenders, and ethnic minorities are often detained under this system, which has been associated with reports of torture and abuse. There are also concerns about the lack of transparency in police actions, with some individuals disappearing for long periods before any legal proceedings occur.   The situation in Xinjiang has been particularly alarming, with reports from international organisations detailing mass detentions, forced sterilisation, and abuses against the Uyghur Muslim population. Human rights groups have described the conditions in the region as amounting to crimes against humanity, with the Chinese government tightly controlling life and personal security in Xinjiang under the guise of countering extremism. Reports of forced labour and severe restrictions on religious and cultural practices further highlight the precarious state of personal security for Uyghur and other ethnic minorities.   China remains the world’s leading executioner, although precise numbers are difficult to verify due to state secrecy surrounding death penalty cases. The death penalty is often imposed for a wide range of offences, including non-violent crimes such as drug trafficking, raising concerns about the proportionality of the punishment. International human rights organisations have called for greater transparency in China's use of capital punishment and urged the government to reform its judicial practices.   Despite legislative progress, including the Anti-Domestic Violence Law of 2016, gender-based violence remains a significant issue in China. Many victims of domestic violence face barriers in accessing justice, and there is limited state protection or enforcement against such abuses. Cultural stigma, weak enforcement of the law, and inadequate support services further exacerbate the issue, leaving many women vulnerable to continued violence.   While China's legal framework includes provisions for the protection of life and security, in practice, the state’s extensive control mechanisms and weak accountability systems create a climate where personal security is frequently undermined.   Score: 1/5  – “There is no effective protection for the right to life. State violence, extrajudicial killings, or systematic abuses are rampant, and there is no accountability for perpetrators.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. China: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: China . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/china [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. United Nations. 2022. China responsible for ‘serious human rights violations’ in Xinjiang province: UN human rights report . [Online] Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1125932 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.5.11 Overall Score for China: 1/5   China's legal framework provides nominal protections for civil and political rights, but in practice, these rights are routinely violated. State surveillance, political repression, and systemic abuses, particularly against ethnic minorities like the Uyghurs, severely undermine human rights in the country.      - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [1]   Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=85 [Accessed: 3 July 2024].

3.4.15   South Africa's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.15.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   In South Africa, freedom of assembly and association is constitutionally protected, and the country has a vibrant history of public protest and civil society activism. The Constitution of South Africa (1996) guarantees the right to peacefully assemble, demonstrate, picket, and petition. These rights are generally respected, and protests are a common form of expression for addressing grievances related to social justice, economic inequality, and political matters.   However, there are occasional challenges in the practical application of these rights. The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 governs public protests, requiring organisers to notify authorities in advance, which sometimes leads to restrictions or bureaucratic hurdles. In certain cases, law enforcement authorities have been criticised for using excessive force to disperse protests, particularly in marginalised communities. The Marikana Massacre in 2012, where 34 miners were killed by police during a strike, remains a stark example of the tensions between the right to protest and state responses.   The African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF) has called for reforms in crowd management, advocating for better training of Public Order Police (POP) units to ensure protests are handled in line with international human rights standards. APCOF's submission on national policing standards highlights the need for proportionality and the protection of protesters' rights to peaceful assembly.   Freedom of association is also constitutionally protected, and South Africa has a strong civil society sector. Trade unions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and political parties operate freely and play significant roles in shaping the country’s political and social landscape. However, there have been reports of intimidation and violence against activists, particularly those involved in environmental, land rights, and anti-corruption movements, highlighting ongoing challenges in ensuring full protection for these freedoms.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF). 2024. Submission on the proposed revised national policing standards for Municipal Police Services on Crowd Management During Gatherings and Demonstrations . [Online] Available at: https://apcof.org/wp-content/uploads/apcof-submission-on-national-policing-standards-for-mps-on-crowd-management-.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Amnesty International. 2022. South Africa: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/southern-africa/south-africa/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-africa [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   South Africa's judiciary is independent and generally upholds the right to a fair trial, but the judicial system faces serious delays and backlogs. Access to legal representation is constitutionally guaranteed, but in practice, legal aid is underfunded, affecting low-income and rural citizens. Human Rights Watch has raised concerns about pretrial detention, particularly in cases involving political activists or marginalised communities.   One significant issue is the prolonged pretrial detention caused by delays in the judicial system, largely attributed to case backlogs and understaffing. This is particularly problematic for individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds, who often rely on an overburdened legal aid system. Additionally, overcrowding in detention facilities exacerbates these challenges, with many accused individuals held for extended periods before their cases are heard.   Score: 4/5  – “Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Motloung, M.P. 2015. The Impact of Delayed Trials on the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://uir.unisa.ac.za/handle/10500/19103 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   South Africa is a constitutional democracy with strong formal protections for political participation and democratic governance, rooted in its post-apartheid Constitution of 1996. The country holds regular, multiparty elections at national, provincial, and local levels, which are overseen by the independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC). These elections are generally regarded as free and fair, although concerns about voter apathy and declining turnout, particularly among younger citizens, have been raised in recent years.   The political system in South Africa is characterised by a vibrant civil society, which plays a crucial role in shaping policy and holding the government accountable. However, challenges such as political corruption, poor service delivery, and internal divisions within the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), have eroded public trust in democratic institutions. The Zondo Commission into state capture has shed light on systemic corruption, which has undermined good governance and exacerbated public frustration with political leadership.   Despite these challenges, the South African political landscape remains diverse. Opposition parties, such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), actively participate in the political process, although the ANC retains dominance at both the national and provincial levels. Grassroots activism and protests also play a significant role in political participation, with citizens frequently using protests as a means to express dissatisfaction with governance, particularly around issues like unemployment, inequality, and corruption.   Efforts to strengthen democratic governance in South Africa include calls for electoral reform to make the system more inclusive and responsive. The judiciary continues to serve as a crucial check on executive power, with rulings that reinforce constitutional norms and uphold democratic principles. However, continued vigilance is needed to address ongoing issues of corruption, inequality, and political disengagement to ensure the long-term stability and inclusivity of South Africa's democracy. Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International IDEA. 2023. South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-overview?country=207   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Zondo Commission. 2022. State Capture Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.statecaputurereport.org.za [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination is a foundational principle enshrined in South Africa’s Constitution of 1996, particularly under Section 9, known as the Equality Clause, which explicitly prohibits discrimination on various grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth. The government has introduced a range of legislative measures, such as the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA), to enforce this constitutional right and promote equality.   However, despite these legal protections, South Africa continues to struggle with deep-seated inequality and discrimination. The legacy of apartheid’s racial segregation policies still manifests in socio-economic disparities, particularly affecting black South Africans, who remain disproportionately affected by poverty, unemployment, and limited access to quality education and healthcare. Gender-based violence is another pervasive issue, with South Africa having some of the highest rates of violence against women in the world, despite significant legal protections for women’s rights.   Discrimination against the LGBTQ+ community, though formally illegal, remains an issue in practice, with reports of violence and hate crimes against LGBTQ+ individuals, particularly in rural areas. Efforts to improve LGBTQ+ rights, such as the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2006, are landmark achievements, but societal attitudes remain a barrier to full equality.   The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) plays a key role in addressing discrimination complaints, and civil society organisations continue to advocate for greater enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. Despite these efforts, the intersection of race, gender, and socio-economic status means that many South Africans, particularly those in vulnerable communities, still face significant discrimination in their daily lives.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/southern-africa/south-africa/ [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2024: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-africa [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.15.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   South Africa is a signatory to international treaties such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), and the right to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment is enshrined in Section 12 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996). Despite this legal framework, reports of police brutality, abuse in detention, and ill-treatment of detainees remain significant concerns.   Law enforcement and correctional officers have been implicated in cases of excessive force and torture, particularly during interrogations and protests. Although the Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act (2013) criminalises torture, accountability remains inconsistent, with few officers prosecuted for human rights violations. Incidents of inhuman treatment have been documented in South Africa’s overcrowded prisons, where detainees often face substandard living conditions, exacerbating concerns about their treatment.   Score: 3/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/southern-africa/south-africa/report-south-africa/   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Prison Insider. 2023. South Africa: Prisons in 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.prison-insider.com/en/articles/south-africa-prisons-in-2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In South Africa, human rights defenders (HRDs) operate in a challenging environment, where, despite constitutional protections, they face intimidation, harassment, and violence. The Constitution of South Africa enshrines the right to Freedom of Expression, assembly, and association, but HRDs, particularly those advocating for land rights, environmental protection, and anti-corruption measures, frequently encounter threats from both state and non-state actors.   HRDs advocating against corruption and government misconduct, especially at the municipal level, often face intimidation and, in extreme cases, assassination attempts. Community leaders and environmental activists, particularly those challenging large corporate interests or engaging in protests around land rights, have been targeted. The murder of environmental activist Fikile Ntshangase in 2020, who was opposing mining activities, highlights the risks faced by HRDs in South Africa.   Score: 3/5  – “Human rights defenders face some harassment or legal challenges, particularly when criticising the government. Protections are weak or inconsistently applied.” References:   Centre for Environmental Rights (CER). 2020. The Killing of Somkhele Environmental Activist Fikile Ntshangase: A Joint Statement . [Online] Available at: https://cer.org.za/news/the-killing-of-somkhele-environmental-activist-fikile-ntshangase-a-joint-statement [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2024. South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/south-africa [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.15.7   Freedom of Expression   South Africa’s Constitution guarantees Freedom of Expression, and the country has a vibrant media landscape. However, there have been instances of government attempts to stifle criticism, particularly involving whistleblowers and investigative journalists.   One of the key concerns is the Protection of State Information Bill (often referred to as the Secrecy Bill), which has been criticised for potentially limiting investigative journalism by making it easier for the government to classify information as state secrets. Although the Bill has not been fully enacted, it has raised concerns about the potential impact on the media’s ability to report on corruption and governance issues.   Journalists and human rights defenders sometimes face threats, harassment, and even violence, particularly when covering sensitive topics like corruption, land reform, or government mismanagement. While South Africa has not seen widespread media repression, cases of intimidation against investigative journalists, especially those probing corruption, have been reported.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., political corruption). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International Federation of Journalists (IFJ). 2010. South Africa’s Secrecy Bill is a “threat” to Free Expression, says FAJ . [Online] Available at: https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/africa/article/south-africas-secrecy-bill-is-a-threat-to-free-expression-says-faj.html [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/south-africa [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.15.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally guaranteed in South Africa under Section 15 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996), which ensures that everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, and opinion. South Africa is a religiously diverse country, with Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, and traditional African religions all practiced openly, alongside atheism and other non-religious beliefs. The country’s legal framework promotes religious tolerance and prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. Despite the strong legal protections, challenges persist, particularly in relation to religious minorities. Incidents of religious intolerance, though relatively rare, have been reported. For example, members of the Hindu and Muslim communities have occasionally faced social discrimination and localised conflicts over religious practices. Additionally, while public schools are required to accommodate religious diversity, there have been cases where students from minority religions have faced difficulties in observing religious practices, such as wearing religious attire.   South Africa’s broad legal protections ensure a relatively high level of religious freedom compared to many other countries in the region. However, ongoing efforts are needed to maintain religious harmony and ensure that religious minorities are fully protected against any form of discrimination or prejudice.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/south-africa/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.9   Right to Privacy   South Africa has strong legal protections for privacy, particularly through the Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA). However, despite these legal protections, privacy concerns have been raised in relation to the government's surveillance capabilities. The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act (RICA) enables state agencies to intercept communications under certain conditions, raising concerns about potential overreach and lack of judicial oversight.   While South Africa’s legal framework provides robust protections for privacy, ongoing efforts are needed to strengthen oversight mechanisms, particularly concerning state surveillance and data privacy breaches in both the public and private sectors.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-africa/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life is constitutionally protected in South Africa under Section 11 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996). The state is obligated to ensure the protection of this right through effective policing, justice systems, and protection measures. Despite this legal protection, South Africa faces significant challenges related to high levels of violent crime, police brutality, and threats to personal security.   South Africa has one of the highest rates of violent crime in the world, including murder, assault, and gender-based violence. The government has implemented various strategies to address these issues, including the National Development Plan (NDP) and the establishment of specialised police units such as the Family Violence, Child Protection, and Sexual Offences (FCS) units. However, violent crime, particularly in low-income communities, remains a pressing issue that disproportionately affects vulnerable groups.   Gender-based violence (GBV) is particularly pervasive, with the country often referred to as having an epidemic of violence against women. Despite legislative frameworks like the Domestic Violence Act and the Sexual Offences Act, enforcement remains inconsistent, and many victims face barriers to accessing justice. Civil society organisations, including Amnesty International and Sonke Gender Justice, have consistently called for more effective implementation of these laws and greater accountability for perpetrators of GBV.   In addition to violent crime, police brutality and extrajudicial killings also undermine the right to life and security of person. Reports of excessive use of force by law enforcement officers, especially during protests or in police custody, have raised serious concerns.   The state’s ability to protect the right to life is further hampered by resource constraints within the police and justice systems, along with widespread corruption. Despite legal and institutional frameworks to protect life and security, practical challenges continue to undermine the full realisation of these rights in South Africa.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or socioeconomic status). Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2022. South Africa: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/southern-africa/south-africa/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-africa [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Sonke Gender Justice. 2023. Sonke Gender Justice and the Bushbuckridge Civil Society Forum Calls on Religious Leaders to Partake in Combating Gender-Based Violence and Femicide in Communities . [Online] Available at: https://genderjustice.org.za/news-item/sonke-gender-justice-and-the-bushbuckridge-civil-society-forum-calls-on-religious-leaders-to-partake-in-combating-gender-based-violence-and-femicide-in-communities/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-africa/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.15.11   Overall Score for South Africa – 3.6/5   South Africa has a robust legal framework for human rights protection but faces challenges in enforcement, particularly in areas such as police misconduct and social inequality. The country’s constitution provides strong legal protections, but more work is needed to ensure these rights are consistently upheld for all citizens.     3.4.16   South Korea's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.16.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association are protected under South Korea’s Constitution of 1987, which guarantees citizens the right to peaceful assembly and the formation of associations. In practice, these rights are generally upheld, with a vibrant civil society and regular public demonstrations on various political, social, and economic issues. Protests are common in South Korea, and the government usually respects the right to assemble, though there are some restrictions.   South Korean law requires organisers to notify authorities in advance of any public assembly. While this notification system is not overly burdensome, the police sometimes impose restrictions on protests based on concerns for public order or national security.   Freedom of association is generally respected, and civil society organisations, trade unions, and political groups operate without significant interference. South Korea’s National Security Act also imposes limitations on freedom of association by restricting the activities of groups perceived to support North Korea, leading to criticism from human rights organisations for potentially curbing legitimate political dissent.   Despite these challenges, South Korea has made significant progress in advancing the protection of these rights since the country’s transition to democracy in the late 1980s. Ongoing advocacy by civil society groups has contributed to a more open environment for political expression and activism, though concerns remain about the treatment of labour unions and political protesters.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process is protected under South Korea’s Constitution of 1987, which ensures the independence of the judiciary and the right of individuals to be treated equally before the law. The Criminal Procedure Act and Civil Procedure Act provide the framework for legal processes, guaranteeing rights such as the presumption of innocence, the right to legal representation, and the right to a public trial.   South Korea’s judicial system is generally seen as impartial and independent, with a well-established legal framework that upholds due process rights. However, concerns have been raised about the judicial system’s susceptibility to political pressure in high-profile cases, particularly those involving powerful business conglomerates (chaebols) or government officials. While high-ranking individuals have been prosecuted for corruption, such as former presidents and chaebol leaders, there have been instances where the judicial system has been perceived as lenient towards these figures.   Pretrial detention practices have also attracted criticism. Although legal safeguards exist, there have been reports of lengthy pretrial detentions and insufficient access to legal counsel in some cases. Additionally, the practice of solitary confinement for detainees under investigation has been highlighted as a concern by human rights organisations, with some suggesting that this treatment may amount to inhumane treatment in certain circumstances.   Despite these challenges, South Korea’s judiciary remains generally respected for its independence and ability to provide fair trials, particularly in civil and criminal cases not involving sensitive political or national security issues. Continued judicial reforms and oversight are essential to ensuring that these rights are consistently upheld.   Score: 4/5  – "Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   South Korea is a vibrant constitutional democracy, with strong legal protections for political participation and democratic governance enshrined in its Constitution of 1987. The country holds regular, free, and fair elections at the national, regional, and local levels, overseen by the National Election Commission. Citizens are generally able to engage in the political process without significant restrictions, and voter turnout tends to be high in both presidential and legislative elections, reflecting a strong civic engagement.   The political landscape in South Korea is characterised by active political parties, civil society organisations, and a free press that plays a key role in shaping public discourse. The major political parties, such as the conservative People Power Party (PPP) and the progressive Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), dominate national politics. Political competition is generally robust, although political polarisation has become more pronounced in recent years.   Corruption and undue influence by powerful business conglomerates, known as chaebols, remain ongoing concerns for South Korea’s democratic governance. Scandals involving high-level officials, including former presidents, have led to public disillusionment with political elites. The Candlelight Protests of 2016-2017, which resulted in the impeachment and removal of President Park Geun-hye, highlighted the strength of South Korea’s civil society and its capacity to hold the government accountable through peaceful means.   Despite the overall strength of its democracy, South Korea faces certain limitations regarding political participation, particularly for marginalised groups such as migrants, North Korean defectors, and women. Women remain underrepresented in politics, although recent efforts have been made to address gender disparities in political representation. Additionally, the National Security Act, a Cold War-era law, continues to place restrictions on political expression and association, particularly in cases related to North Korea, which has drawn criticism from human rights groups for its potential to curb political dissent.   Overall, South Korea’s political system is stable and inclusive, with a high level of public trust in democratic institutions. However, ongoing efforts are needed to address corruption, political polarisation, and the inclusion of underrepresented groups in the political process to ensure the continued strength of South Korea’s democratic governance.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International IDEA. 2023. South Korea: Country Overview . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/republic-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.4   Freedom from Discrimination   South Korea’s Constitution of 1987 guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination on various grounds, including gender, religion, social status, and political opinion. However, the country lacks comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that would explicitly protect individuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or other marginalised statuses. Despite legal protections in place, various forms of discrimination persist in society, particularly concerning gender, LGBTQ+ rights, and migrants.   Gender inequality remains a significant issue in South Korea. Although legal protections for women exist, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, gender-based discrimination in the workplace, politics, and other public spheres is still prevalent. South Korea ranks low among OECD countries in terms of gender equality, with a substantial gender pay gap and underrepresentation of women in leadership positions. Women also face societal pressures related to traditional gender roles, which often result in unequal treatment in professional and private spheres.   The rights of the LGBTQ+ community in South Korea are limited, as same-sex marriage is not legally recognised, and anti-discrimination protections based on sexual orientation or gender identity remain absent. The military, under the Military Criminal Act, still criminalises consensual same-sex activity between soldiers, further contributing to societal stigma. Despite this, the LGBTQ+ community has grown more visible in recent years, with the Seoul Queer Culture Festival becoming a notable event, though it often faces pushback from conservative groups.   Migrant workers and North Korean defectors are other groups that experience systemic discrimination. Migrant workers, particularly those from Southeast Asia, often face exploitation, poor working conditions, and limited legal protections. While there have been improvements in the legal framework protecting foreign workers, enforcement remains inconsistent. North Korean defectors, though offered resettlement assistance, often struggle with societal discrimination, isolation, and economic marginalisation.   Efforts to pass a comprehensive anti-discrimination law have been stalled in the National Assembly due to political resistance, particularly from conservative lawmakers and religious groups. Human rights organisations, both domestic and international, have consistently called for stronger legal protections against discrimination in South Korea, but progress remains slow.   Score: 3/5   – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/south-korea/report-korea-republic-of/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. OECD. 2024. OECD Employment Outlook 2024 - Country Notes: Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-employment-outlook-2024-country-notes_d6c84475-en/korea_636e4c7a-en.html [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   South Korea is a signatory to key international human rights treaties, such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), and its Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman treatment. Domestic laws, including the Criminal Procedure Act, also provide legal protections against torture and outline the rights of individuals in detention. Despite these protections, concerns remain about the treatment of detainees, particularly during police interrogations and in the country’s correctional facilities.   In South Korea’s prisons and detention centres, overcrowding and substandard conditions have been raised as concerns. Human rights groups have reported on poor living conditions, inadequate healthcare, and a lack of mental health support for inmates. While torture is not widespread, there have been isolated incidents of physical and psychological abuse in detention centres, particularly against vulnerable groups such as foreign detainees and LGBTQ+ individuals.   South Korea’s government has taken steps to address these issues, including reforms aimed at improving the transparency of police practices and establishing independent oversight mechanisms. The National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) plays a crucial role in monitoring human rights abuses and advocating for better treatment of detainees, but it has called on government to address inhumane conditions in prisons. Further efforts are needed to ensure full compliance with international standards and to address the lingering issues of mistreatment in detention settings.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist and are generally enforced, though there may be occasional reports of abuse by law enforcement. Violators are usually held accountable.” References:   Amnesty International. 2023. South Korea: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK). 2023. The National Human Rights Commission of Korea Calls for Action on Inhumane Prison Overcrowding . [Online] Available at: https://www.humanrights.go.kr/eng/board/read?boardManagementNo=7003&boardNo=7610127&menuLevel=2&menuNo=114 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   South Korea is a democracy that offers legal protections for civil liberties, including the rights of human rights defenders (HRDs). The Constitution of South Korea guarantees freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, allowing HRDs to operate openly in most cases. However, human rights defenders—particularly those advocating on sensitive issues such as labour rights, LGBTQ+ rights, and North Korea-related activism—face challenges ranging from legal constraints to harassment.   One of the primary concerns regarding HRDs in South Korea relates to the enforcement of the National Security Act (NSA), which has been criticised for restricting Freedom of Expression and association, particularly when it comes to political dissent involving North Korea. Activists who are perceived as sympathising with or defending North Korean interests may face charges under this law, even when their work is focused on peacebuilding or human rights advocacy. This has led to self-censorship among some HRDs working on issues related to inter-Korean relations.   Despite these challenges, South Korea’s legal framework offers some protections for HRDs, and civil society remains vibrant and active. However, ongoing efforts are needed to address the legal and social barriers that limit the ability of HRDs to carry out their work freely and safely.   Score: 4/5   – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. South Korea: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2023. South Korea: HRD Situation Overview . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression is constitutionally guaranteed in South Korea under Article 21 of the Constitution of 1987. The country generally enjoys a vibrant media landscape, with diverse opinions represented in print, broadcast, and online media. South Korea’s press is regarded as relatively free compared to other countries in the region, but there are still notable challenges to full Freedom of Expression, particularly in relation to political and security issues.   One significant restriction on Freedom of Expression comes from the National Security Act (NSA). Enacted during the Cold War, the NSA criminalises expressions deemed to sympathise with or promote North Korea. Human rights organisations have criticised this law for being overly broad and suppressing legitimate political speech, as well as stifling academic debate and activism related to inter-Korean relations. Activists and scholars have faced prosecution under the NSA for comments or publications perceived to be supportive of North Korea, which has contributed to self-censorship on sensitive political matters.   South Korea also faces challenges related to online Freedom of Expression. The government regulates online content through the Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC), which monitors and censors online speech deemed harmful or inappropriate. While these regulations are intended to protect against cyberbullying, defamation, and the spread of false information, critics argue that they can be used to silence dissenting voices or restrict critical political commentary.   Journalists in South Korea have generally been able to operate without fear of reprisal, although there have been reports of government pressure on media outlets. Investigative journalists covering issues such as political corruption, corporate misconduct, or sensitive national security matters have occasionally faced intimidation, lawsuits, or denial of access to information. Although the media is diverse and private ownership allows for a variety of viewpoints, media outlets with critical views of the government sometimes report subtle forms of pressure or interference.   Public protests and demonstrations also play a significant role in South Korea's expressive culture, with the right to assemble constitutionally protected. However, there have been instances where police used excessive force to disperse protests or limit participation in politically sensitive gatherings.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom Index: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally guaranteed in South Korea under Article 20 of the Constitution of 1987, which protects individuals' rights to religious freedom and prohibits any discrimination based on religion. South Korea is religiously diverse, with Christianity (both Protestantism and Catholicism), Buddhism, and other traditional religions being widely practiced, alongside a growing population of people who identify as non-religious.   In practice, South Korea generally respects the right to religious freedom, and people are free to practice or not practice a religion of their choice without interference from the state. The government does not officially endorse any religion, and there are no significant legal restrictions on religious practice or worship. Religious organisations, including churches, temples, and mosques, operate freely, and religious leaders often play a prominent role in social and political life.   Despite these constitutional protections, some challenges remain, particularly regarding religious minorities. The Muslim population, though small, has reported occasional social discrimination and difficulties in obtaining permission to build mosques. Tensions between religious and non-religious groups, as well as between different religious communities, sometimes flare up, especially in the context of public debates on moral or social issues such as LGBTQ+ rights or secularism in public schools.   Another significant issue is conscientious objection to mandatory military service. South Korea has a strict policy of compulsory military service for men, and until recently, there was no provision for conscientious objectors, many of whom are Jehovah’s Witnesses. These individuals faced imprisonment for refusing to serve on religious grounds. However, a landmark ruling by the Constitutional Court in 2018 recognised the right to conscientious objection and required the government to provide alternative service for those who refuse military service on religious or moral grounds. Despite this progress, the alternative service system has faced criticism for being punitive and excessively long.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2022. South Korea: Drop charges against first conscientious objector to refuse alternative service . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/08/south-korea-conscientious-objector-military-service-hye-min-kim/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.9   Right to Privacy   The right to privacy is protected under South Korea’s Constitution and further reinforced by several laws, including the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) of 2011, which is one of the most comprehensive data privacy laws in the world. The law regulates the collection, storage, and use of personal data by both public and private entities, requiring consent for the use of such data and setting penalties for violations.   Despite these legal safeguards, concerns about government surveillance and data privacy breaches have persisted in South Korea. The National Security Act allows for significant state surveillance, particularly in cases related to national security and issues concerning North Korea. Critics argue that this has led to the overreach of surveillance measures and a potential infringement on the privacy rights of individuals, especially those involved in political activism or sensitive discussions regarding North Korea.   South Korea’s government also monitors internet activity extensively. The Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC) is responsible for regulating online content, including monitoring and censoring content that is deemed to be harmful or illegal. This has raised concerns among civil liberties groups about the balance between national security and personal privacy.   In recent years, the misuse of personal information in the private sector has also gained attention. High-profile data breaches involving companies like Naver and Kakao have underscored the need for stricter enforcement of data protection laws. The South Korean government has responded by enhancing regulations on cybersecurity and increasing penalties for data breaches, but challenges remain as companies and public institutions face growing cyber threats.   South Korea has made efforts to bolster data privacy rights, particularly with the establishment of the Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC), an independent agency tasked with enforcing PIPA and protecting personal data. Despite these advancements, ongoing concerns about government surveillance and the misuse of personal information highlight the need for continued vigilance in balancing security and privacy rights.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-korea/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person is protected under South Korea’s Constitution and further reinforced by legal measures aimed at protecting individuals from violence and ensuring public safety. South Korea generally enjoys a low crime rate, and the government has robust law enforcement and public safety mechanisms in place. However, specific challenges remain in areas such as domestic violence, gender-based violence, and concerns related to the use of force by law enforcement.   One of the most pressing issues related to the right to life in South Korea is the prevalence of gender-based violence. Despite legal protections such as the Act on the Prevention of Domestic Violence and the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Crimes of Domestic Violence, reports of domestic abuse and violence against women remain significant. Civil society organisations, including women’s rights groups, have called for more effective enforcement of these laws and better support systems for victims. Additionally, South Korea's #MeToo movement has highlighted systemic issues related to sexual harassment and violence, particularly in the workplace and public institutions.   Police use of force is generally well-regulated, but there have been concerns about excessive use of force during protests and in handling public demonstrations. While such incidents are rare, human rights groups have reported cases where law enforcement officers used unnecessary or excessive force, raising concerns about accountability. The government has made efforts to address these concerns through police reforms and better training on the use of non-violent tactics.   Suicide remains another major public health issue, with South Korea having one of the highest suicide rates among OECD countries. Mental health services and suicide prevention measures have been expanded in recent years, but societal stigma surrounding mental health persists, making it difficult for individuals to seek help. The government has implemented national suicide prevention plans aimed at addressing the root causes of suicide, including poverty, mental illness, and social isolation.   Capital punishment remains a sensitive topic in South Korea. Although the country has not carried out any executions since 1997, it retains the death penalty, and there are still individuals on death row. The debate around abolishing the death penalty continues, with human rights organisations advocating for its full abolition in line with global human rights standards.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, and violence is generally low, though certain groups (e.g., activists or protestors) may face occasional threats. Law enforcement generally follows legal protocols but may overstep in some cases.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. South Korea: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/south-korea [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Korea JoongAng Daily. 2023. Suicide among young Koreans is systemic problem, experts say . [Online] Available at: https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/13/national/kcampus/korea-suicide-moonbin/20230713174115739.html [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-korea/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.16.11   Overall Score for South Korea: 3.9/5   In conclusion, South Korea upholds a strong legal framework for human rights, but challenges remain. Restrictions on political dissent under the National Security Act, limitations on Freedom of Expression, and discrimination against women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and migrant workers persist. Despite reforms in areas like military service and privacy, concerns about police conduct and protection of vulnerable groups continue. Further reforms are needed to strengthen human rights protections.   3.4.17   Turkey's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.17.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association are constitutionally protected in Turkey, but in practice, these rights face significant restrictions, especially under President Erdoğan. The government frequently limits protests, restricts civil society organisations, and stifles dissent through legal and administrative measures.   Large protests, such as Gezi Park (2013) and university protests (2021), were met with excessive police force, mass arrests, and vague charges like "terrorism". The situation worsened after the 2016 coup attempt, with a two-year state of emergency leading to further curtailment of these rights, and many restrictions remain in place.   Civil society organisations, particularly those working on human rights, women’s rights, LGBTQ+ issues, and press freedom, face legal obstacles, harassment, and government control. Despite these challenges, grassroots movements continue to push for reforms, though the climate for assembly and association remains highly restricted.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of assembly and association are restricted. Protests and demonstrations are often banned or dispersed violently. Civil society organisations are heavily regulated, and activists face repression.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Turkey: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process is enshrined in Turkey’s Constitution and guaranteed under both domestic laws and international human rights treaties to which Turkey is a party, such as the European Convention on Human Rights. However, in practice, these rights have been significantly undermined, particularly in the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup attempt, which led to widespread purges and crackdowns on dissent.   Turkey’s judiciary has faced increasing politicisation in recent years, raising concerns about its independence. The dismissal of thousands of judges and prosecutors following the 2016 coup attempt, and the appointment of government-aligned officials, have contributed to a judiciary that is often seen as biased, particularly in politically sensitive cases. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has raised concerns about the lack of judicial independence in Turkey and the erosion of fair trial rights, especially for political opponents, journalists, and human rights defenders.   Prolonged pretrial detention is another issue undermining due process in Turkey. Individuals accused of terrorism, often under vague or broad charges, can be held for extended periods before trial. This practice disproportionately affects political activists, journalists, and civil society members. Many of these cases are brought under the country’s expansive anti-terrorism laws, which have been criticised for being used to stifle dissent rather than address legitimate security concerns.   The use of emergency decrees during the post-coup state of emergency (2016–2018) further weakened fair trial standards, allowing the government to bypass normal legal procedures. Although the state of emergency has officially ended, many of the restrictive measures introduced during this period remain in place, continuing to impact the justice system.   While Turkey does provide access to legal representation, lawyers defending individuals in politically charged cases often face harassment, intimidation, and legal action themselves. This creates a climate of fear among legal professionals, further undermining the right to a fair defence.   Score: 2/5  – “The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair. Legal representation may be limited for many individuals.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. MEDEL. 2023. Statement of the Platform for an Independent Judiciary in Turkey on the Erosion of Rule of Law in Türkiye . [Online] Available at: https://medelnet.eu/statement-of-the-platform-for-an-independent-judiciary-in-turkey-on-the-erosion-of-rule-of-law-in-turkiye/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. The Law Society. 2023. Widespread Mistreatment of Lawyers in Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/contact-or-visit-us/press-office/press-releases/widespread-mistreatment-of-lawyers-in-turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Turkey is a republic with a multiparty political system, but political participation and democratic governance have been increasingly restricted under the administration of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While elections are held regularly, concerns about the fairness and integrity of the electoral process have grown in recent years. Turkey’s political environment is marked by the dominance of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and allegations of government interference in the judiciary, media, and opposition parties.   Turkey’s Electoral Law guarantees citizens the right to vote and participate in elections, and voter turnout is generally high. However, opposition parties and independent observers have raised concerns about electoral fairness. The 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections, for example, were criticised for media bias in favour of the ruling party, unequal access to campaign resources, and reports of voter intimidation, particularly in Kurdish regions.   Freedom of political expression is significantly curtailed, with opposition parties, activists, and media outlets frequently targeted under Turkey’s broad anti-terrorism laws. Members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) have been especially affected, with many party leaders and parliamentarians arrested or removed from office on charges of terrorism. This has severely limited political representation for the Kurdish minority and other opposition groups.   Civil society and grassroots political participation are also heavily restricted. Following the 2016 coup attempt, the Turkish government imposed a state of emergency that lasted two years, during which time many civil society organisations were shut down, and political dissent was suppressed. Although the state of emergency has officially ended, many restrictive measures remain in place, limiting the ability of civil society to engage in political activism.   The role of the judiciary in democratic governance has also come under question, with widespread reports of political influence over judicial appointments and rulings. This has weakened the system of checks and balances and raised concerns about the erosion of democratic governance in Turkey.   While Turkey remains a functioning democracy in terms of holding elections, the political space for meaningful opposition and participation has significantly narrowed, raising concerns about the country’s democratic backsliding.   Score: 3/5  – “Elections occur, but there are significant constraints, such as voter suppression, lack of transparency, or barriers to political opposition. Democratic processes are undermined by the ruling party.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Turkey’s Constitution guarantees equality before the law regardless of language, race, gender, political opinion, or religion, but discrimination remains widespread, particularly against women, minorities, LGBTQ+ individuals, and refugees.   Women face systemic discrimination, especially in the workforce, with a persistent pay gap and underrepresentation in leadership. Gender-based violence is a serious issue, and the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention has weakened protections for women.   The Kurdish minority faces repression, particularly regarding cultural rights, and other religious minorities also encounter societal discrimination and limited access to services. LGBTQ+ individuals lack legal protection, and same-sex relationships are not recognised. Activists and events face increasing government crackdowns, leaving LGBTQ+ individuals vulnerable to harassment and violence.   Refugees, especially Syrians, face discrimination, with limited access to employment, healthcare, and education, exacerbated by rising social tensions and political scapegoating.   Score: 2/5  – “Discrimination is prevalent, and legal protections are either weak or non-existent. Marginalised groups face systemic inequality, and the state does little to address these disparities.”    References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/turkiye/report-turkiye/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Turkey, a signatory to international treaties like the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), prohibits torture under its Constitution. However, reports of torture and ill-treatment, especially in detention and police custody, remain a major concern. Human rights organisations have raised alarms over widespread abuses following the 2016 coup attempt, when emergency powers led to mass arrests and detainees faced beatings, threats, and solitary confinement, often without access to legal representation or medical care.   Overcrowded prisons and poor conditions further exacerbate these issues, particularly for political prisoners and dissidents. Police brutality during protests, especially against pro-democracy, Kurdish, and LGBTQ+ activists, is also a serious issue. Despite torture being illegal, accountability for perpetrators remains rare, and victims face barriers to justice.   While the government has introduced reforms to improve detention conditions and train law enforcement, these efforts have been insufficient, and abuses persist, undermining Turkey’s commitment to eradicating torture.   Score: 2/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are reported frequently, and legal protections are weak or rarely enforced. Law enforcement and security forces often act with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Turkey: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). 2022. The CPT and Türkiye . [Online] Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Human rights defenders in Turkey face significant risks despite constitutional protections for Freedom of Expression, assembly, and association. Over the past decade, especially after the 2016 coup attempt, the government has intensified its crackdown on civil society, using anti-terrorism laws and vague charges to silence defenders, journalists, and activists critical of state policies.   These laws have been used to accuse defenders of links to terrorism, particularly those advocating for Kurds, women, and LGBTQ+ rights. High-profile cases include the persecution of the Ankara Bar Association and the imprisonment of Osman Kavala. Human rights defenders face legal obstacles, arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention, and unfair trials. The Law on Associations has further restricted civil society, allowing the dissolution of NGOs on security grounds. Lawyers representing defenders also face harassment.   Women’s rights and LGBTQ+ activists have seen growing repression, especially after Turkey's withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. LGBTQ+ events have been banned, and activists face threats, smear campaigns, and criminal charges. Defenders are also subject to state surveillance, travel bans, and intimidation, forcing many to flee or work in secrecy.   Reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International highlight the misuse of anti-terrorism laws to suppress defenders, yet the government has shown little willingness to address these abuses, continuing to target human rights advocates.   Score: 2/5  – “Human rights defenders are frequently persecuted, harassed, or jailed for their work. Legal protections are minimal, and the state often seeks to suppress their activities.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2023. Turkey: Overview of the Situation for Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2020. Turkey: Criminal Case for Opposing Homophobic Speech . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/01/turkey-criminal-case-opposing-homophobic-speech [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT). 2023. Turkey: The Instrumentalization of the Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Its Impact on Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.omct.org/en/resources/reports/turkey-the-instrumentalization-of-the-counter-terrorism-legislation-and-policies-and-their-impact-on-hrds [Accessed: 14 September 2024].    3.4.17.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in Turkey is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution of Turkey, which ensures individuals the right to express and disseminate their thoughts and opinions. However, in practice, this right has been severely curtailed, especially in recent years. Under the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, there has been an intensified crackdown on dissenting voices, including journalists, academics, opposition politicians, and activists, with Freedom of Expression increasingly undermined by legal and extralegal measures.   Turkey has one of the most restrictive environments for media freedom in the world. Numerous media outlets critical of the government have been shut down, particularly following the 2016 coup attempt, and many journalists have been imprisoned under charges of terrorism or insulting the president. According to Reporters Without Borders, Turkey remains one of the top jailers of journalists globally. Media outlets that remain in operation face heavy government pressure, including threats of fines, license revocations, and other sanctions. Many prominent media organisations are now controlled by pro-government business interests, limiting the diversity of views in mainstream news.   Turkey’s broad anti-terrorism laws have been widely used to suppress Freedom of Expression. Critics of the government, including journalists and social media users, are frequently charged with supporting terrorism or inciting violence, even for peaceful criticism of state policies. Individuals who speak out on sensitive issues such as the Kurdish question, the Armenian genocide, or military operations in Syria often face criminal prosecution. This has created a chilling effect, where many journalists and activists resort to self-censorship to avoid legal repercussions.   Social media platforms have become a critical space for dissent in Turkey, given the restrictions on traditional media. However, the government has taken steps to curtail online expression as well. In 2020, Turkey passed a new social media law requiring platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to appoint local representatives and store user data within Turkey. The law gives authorities greater control over content removal and user information, raising concerns about privacy and state surveillance. Numerous social media users have been arrested or prosecuted for their posts, particularly those critical of government policies.   Academic freedom has also been under attack in Turkey, particularly for those critical of the government or military actions. After the 2016 coup attempt, thousands of academics were dismissed from their positions, with many also facing criminal charges. Universities have been pressured to align with government policies, and student activists are frequently targeted during protests. Similarly, artists, filmmakers, and writers who produce work critical of the government often face censorship, fines, or even imprisonment.   International human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have consistently condemned Turkey’s assault on Freedom of Expression. Although the Turkish government occasionally signals reforms, substantial changes to restore Freedom of Expression remain elusive.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of Expression is heavily restricted. The press and media are frequently censored, and individuals face legal consequences or violence for expressing dissent.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2022. Türkiye’s “disinformation law” tightens government control and curtails Freedom of Expression . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/EUR4461432022ENGLISH.pdf [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Turkey: Press Freedom Index . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief is constitutionally guaranteed in Turkey, but in practice, significant restrictions affect religious minorities. While Sunni Islam is the dominant religion, minority groups such as Christians, Jews, Alevis, and non-Sunni Muslims face various challenges. Alevis, for example, are denied official recognition of their places of worship, resulting in disparities in funding and state support. Similarly, Christian denominations often struggle with legal and bureaucratic hurdles, particularly when reclaiming property or maintaining religious institutions.   The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which regulates Sunni religious institutions, does not support other religious groups, reinforcing the marginalisation of these communities. The state also exercises significant control over religious education and institutions, often citing secularism as a basis for its involvement. However, under President Erdoğan, there has been a shift toward greater government influence over religious affairs, leading to concerns about the erosion of secularism and the increased promotion of Sunni Islam.   Despite constitutional protections, the unequal treatment of religious minorities continues to undermine Turkey’s commitment to religious freedom.   Score: 2/5  – “Freedom of religion is restricted, with certain religious groups facing persecution or being banned. State religion or dominant faith is heavily privileged.”   References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report 2022 . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.9   Right to Privacy   The right to privacy is constitutionally protected in Turkey, but government surveillance and data monitoring practices raise significant concerns. Under the Law on the State Intelligence Services and other security-related laws, the government has broad powers to intercept communications, monitor online activity, and gather personal data, often with minimal judicial oversight. The expansion of digital surveillance, particularly following the 2016 coup attempt, has heightened concerns over the government's ability to infringe on personal privacy under the guise of national security.   Social media platforms are also subject to strict regulations. A 2020 law mandates that major platforms store user data in Turkey and comply with government requests for content removal and data access, raising fears about the erosion of online privacy. Human rights organisations have criticised these measures for facilitating state overreach and weakening protections for free expression.   While legal frameworks exist for protecting personal data, including the Law on the Protection of Personal Data (2016), enforcement remains weak, and state surveillance practices continue to undermine privacy rights.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognized, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations.”    References:   Freedom House. 2023. Freedom in the World 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. DW. 2020. Turkey: New law tightens hold on social media . [Online] Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-tightens-control-on-social-media-with-new-law/a-54360493 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. JURIST. 2020. Analysing the Effects of Turkey’s Social Media Regulation Bill . [Online] Available at: https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/09/akshita-tiwary-turkey-social-media-bill/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person is protected under Turkey’s Constitution and international human rights agreements to which the country is a party. However, Turkey faces persistent challenges in ensuring these rights, particularly due to high levels of violence, state security operations, and police brutality.   Turkey has been criticised for excessive use of force by law enforcement, especially during protests and in Kurdish regions. Security forces have been implicated in extrajudicial killings and torture, particularly in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt and during counter-terrorism operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Reports from human rights groups document instances where detainees and protestors were subjected to harsh treatment, with little accountability for perpetrators.   Gender-based violence is another major issue in Turkey, with high rates of femicide and domestic abuse. Despite legal protections like the Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence Against Women, enforcement remains inconsistent. The government’s 2021 withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, an international treaty aimed at preventing violence against women, further exacerbated concerns about the state’s commitment to addressing this issue.   Additionally, Turkey's handling of refugees and migrants, especially in border regions, has raised human rights concerns. There are reports of ill-treatment and, in some cases, unlawful returns of refugees to conflict zones, violating international law.   Score: 2/5  – “The right to life is not consistently protected. Arbitrary killings, state violence, or widespread abuses by security forces are common, and accountability mechanisms are weak.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Turkey: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Turkey . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Turkey: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2022 . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/turkey [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.17.11   Overall Score for Turkey – 2.2/5   Turkey faces significant challenges in protecting civil and political rights, particularly in areas like judicial independence, freedom of assembly, and the treatment of political dissidents and minorities. While there are legal protections in place, their inconsistent enforcement and frequent violations raise serious concerns. 3.4.18   United Kingdom's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.18.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association are protected in the United Kingdom (UK) under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, integrated through the Human Rights act 1998. Citizens generally have the right to protest, join trade unions, and form associations. However, these rights are not absolute and may be restricted to maintain public order, national security, or prevent disorder.   Recent legislation, such as the Police, Crime, Sentencing, and Courts Act 2022, grants the police more power to limit protests based on factors like noise or disruption. This has raised concerns among human rights organisations about curbing the right to peaceful protest. Freedom of association, particularly for trade unions, is well established but faces restrictions, especially around strike action, as highlighted in the Trade Union Act 2016.   Criticism has mounted due to the heavy policing of movements like Black Lives Matter and Extinction Rebellion, with claims that government measures could restrict civil liberties.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. United Kingdom: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. The Independent. 2021. Extinction Rebellion and BLM protests: Robert Buckland defends new police powers . [Online] Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/extinction-rebellion-blm-robert-buckland-police-b1814392.html [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process is a fundamental principle of the UK’s legal system, protected under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which is incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998. The UK legal framework ensures individuals are entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal. The principle of due process is upheld through the right to legal representation, the presumption of innocence, and the right to appeal.   Despite the strong legal protections, certain areas remain concerning. The UK's legal aid system, which is critical for ensuring access to justice for those who cannot afford representation, has faced significant cuts in recent years. This has limited access to adequate legal support, particularly for low-income individuals, raising concerns about inequality in legal representation.   In addition, there are concerns regarding the use of terrorism laws and extended pretrial detention periods for individuals suspected of terrorism-related offences. Critics argue that these measures can undermine fair trial standards, particularly regarding the right to a prompt and public hearing.   The judicial system in the UK remains highly regarded for its independence and fairness. However, issues such as delays in court proceedings and limited access to legal representation continue to pose challenges for ensuring full compliance with the right to a fair trial and due process.   Score: 4/5  – “Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Legal Aid Agency. 2022. Legal Aid Report 2022 . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/legal-aid-agency-annual-report-and-accounts-2021-to-2022 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].     3.4.18.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   The UK is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy, where citizens enjoy the right to participate in free and fair elections. The political system is underpinned by democratic institutions, with the Parliament comprising the House of Commons and the House of Lords. General elections are held at least every five years, and voter turnout is generally high, reflecting robust citizen engagement in the political process.   Political participation is open to all citizens, and the UK maintains a multiparty system, with the Conservative Party and the Labour Party being the dominant political forces. Smaller parties, such as the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party (SNP), also play significant roles, particularly in devolved regions such as Scotland and Wales, which have their own parliaments or assemblies.   Challenges to democratic governance have emerged, including concerns over voter disenfranchisement and new regulations like voter ID requirements, which critics argue could marginalise vulnerable groups. There are also ongoing debates about the representation of minority groups in Parliament and the wider political landscape.   The UK's devolution system, which grants legislative power to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, ensures that regional governments can govern according to the specific needs of their populations. However, tensions around devolved powers, particularly regarding Scotland's independence movement, remain an important issue in British politics.   Score: 5/5  – “The country guarantees free and fair elections, and all individuals have the right to participate in government. Political opposition is allowed and respected, and there is a transparent process for democratic governance.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International IDEA. 2023. United Kingdom Democracy Tracker . [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/country/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination is protected under several laws in the UK, most notably the Equality Act 2010, which consolidates previous anti-discrimination laws and ensures protection based on characteristics such as race, gender, age, disability, religion, and sexual orientation. The UK’s legal framework is among the most comprehensive in the world, with specific provisions to prevent discrimination in employment, education, housing, and public services.   However, despite these legal protections, discrimination remains a persistent issue in practice. Racial and ethnic discrimination continues to affect minority communities, particularly Black, Asian, and other minority ethnic groups. Studies show disparities in employment opportunities, educational outcomes, and interactions with the criminal justice system. The Windrush scandal further highlighted systemic racism within immigration enforcement, where British citizens of Caribbean descent were wrongly detained or deported.   Gender-based discrimination is also prevalent, with women facing challenges in pay equity, representation in leadership roles, and ongoing issues with gender-based violence. While laws like the Equal Pay Act aim to address gender inequality, progress has been slow, particularly in sectors like finance and technology. The gender pay gap remains a significant issue, despite legal requirements for companies to publish pay gap data.   Discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals has improved significantly following the legalisation of same-sex marriage and the implementation of anti-discrimination protections. However, hate crimes targeting LGBTQ+ people, particularly transgender individuals, remain a concern, with many reporting harassment and violence.   Disability discrimination continues to pose challenges, particularly in terms of accessibility to services and employment opportunities. While the Equality Act 2010 mandates reasonable adjustments for disabled individuals, implementation remains inconsistent, and many disabled people face barriers to full participation in society.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections against discrimination exist but may be inconsistently enforced. Discrimination is not widespread, though certain marginalized groups may face barriers.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United Kingdom.  [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is protected under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), incorporated into UK law through the Human Rights Act 1998. The UK is also a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), which reinforces the absolute prohibition of torture in all circumstances.   In practice, the UK generally upholds these protections. However, concerns have been raised in relation to the treatment of individuals in immigration detention centres, prisons, and during counter-terrorism operations. Human rights organisations have criticised conditions in detention centres, particularly for asylum seekers and immigrants, where reports of inhumane treatment, poor living conditions, and inadequate healthcare have emerged.   In the context of policing, the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) has been involved in reviewing cases of excessive force or misconduct by officers, although such cases are relatively rare. Still, issues of police violence during protests, including the use of force against protestors, have occasionally been raised by civil rights groups.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist and are generally enforced, though there may be occasional reports of abuse by law enforcement. Violators are usually held accountable.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. United Kingdom: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   The UK provides a generally safe environment for human rights defenders compared to many other countries, with strong legal protections in place. Human rights defenders, including activists, journalists, and civil society organisations, are free to operate and advocate for various causes, benefiting from the country's respect for Freedom of Expression and association. Laws such as the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010 provide a legal framework that supports the work of human rights defenders.   However, there are growing concerns about certain trends that may negatively impact the work of human rights defenders. Recent legislation, such as the Police, Crime, Sentencing, and Courts Act 2022, has raised concerns among activists and civil society groups about potential limitations on the right to protest, which could restrict the activities of human rights defenders advocating for social justice, environmental issues, and other causes. Critics argue that the increased police powers to limit protests could create a chilling effect on peaceful demonstrations, which are a key tool for human rights defenders to raise awareness and push for reforms. In addition, organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have expressed concerns over the UK government's increasing scrutiny of non-governmental organisations, particularly those addressing issues like migration and the treatment of asylum seekers. There have been reports of NGOs and human rights defenders facing legal and bureaucratic obstacles in carrying out their work, especially when challenging government policies.   Despite these challenges, the UK remains a largely supportive environment for human rights defenders, with a robust civil society and numerous avenues for legal recourse in cases of harassment or threats. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) also plays a key role in safeguarding the rights of activists and organisations.   Score: 4/5  – Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in the United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.7   Freedom of Expression   The UK generally upholds this right, allowing for a free press and open public discourse. However, there are concerns regarding certain legal and political developments that may limit free expression. For example, the Public Order Act 1986 contains provisions that criminalise speech that incites hatred on grounds of race, religion, or sexual orientation, which some critics argue can lead to the over-policing of speech. Additionally, the Defamation Act 2013 was introduced to balance protection of reputation with free speech, reducing the ability to bring frivolous defamation claims.   Social media has also become a focal point for debates about free speech, with the rise of online harassment and hate speech leading to calls for tighter regulation. The UK’s Online Safety Bill, which seeks to impose new regulations on online platforms to prevent harmful content, has been controversial. Critics argue that while it aims to curb harmful online content, it could also stifle legitimate free expression, particularly in cases where definitions of harm are vague.   There are also concerns over restrictions on protests and demonstrations. The Police, Crime, Sentencing, and Courts Act 2022 has been criticised for expanding police powers to limit protests based on noise or disruption, which human rights organisations argue could suppress peaceful assembly and freedom of speech.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in the United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/united-kingdom/report-united-kingdom/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   The UK provides robust legal protections for individuals to practice their religion or belief freely, or to choose not to practice any religion at all. This right includes the freedom to manifest beliefs in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. The Equality Act 2010 further protects individuals from discrimination based on religion or belief in areas such as employment, education, and public services.   The UK is a religiously diverse country, with Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Judaism, and other religions practiced openly. While the Church of England is the state religion, the UK maintains a largely secular public space. Religious freedom is broadly respected, and individuals are allowed to express their beliefs freely, provided they do not infringe on the rights of others or public order.   Despite these protections, some challenges remain. Religious minorities, such as Muslims and Jews, face ongoing issues of discrimination and hate crimes. Islamophobia and antisemitism have been persistent problems, with reports of harassment, vandalism, and violence against places of worship (particularly after October 7th, 2023). The UK government has introduced policies and strategies to combat hate crimes, such as the Hate Crime Action Plan, which seeks to provide stronger legal recourse and protections for religious communities.   The intersection of religious freedom and other rights has occasionally been contentious. For example, debates over religious attire in schools or workplaces, such as the wearing of hijabs or Sikh turbans, have highlighted tensions between individual rights and institutional policies. However, UK law generally favours accommodating religious practices unless there are strong reasons not to, such as health and safety concerns.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Human Rights in the United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/western-central-and-south-eastern-europe/united-kingdom/report-united-kingdom/   [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. UK Government. 2019. Hate Crime Action Plan . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hate-crime-action-plan-2016 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.18.9   Right to Privacy   The UK has robust data protection laws, particularly through the Data Protection Act 2018, which implements the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This framework ensures that individuals have control over their personal data and imposes strict obligations on organisations to handle personal information responsibly. Individuals also have the right to access their data, correct inaccuracies, and request its deletion.   Despite these protections, concerns have arisen about the government’s use of surveillance powers, particularly under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (often referred to as the "Snooper's Charter"). This law grants wide-ranging powers to security and intelligence agencies to intercept communications and collect bulk data. While the government argues these measures are necessary for national security, critics and human rights groups argue that they infringe upon privacy rights and lack sufficient oversight.   Furthermore, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) allows authorities to carry out surveillance and access personal communications in certain circumstances. These laws have sparked debate about the balance between security and privacy, with human rights organisations like Privacy International raising concerns over state overreach.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections for privacy exist, but some government surveillance or data collection occurs, particularly in national security matters. Personal data protections are mostly effective.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Liberty. 2023. Legal challenge to the Investigatory Powers Act . [Online] Available at: https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/legal-challenge-investigatory-powers-act/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Privacy International. 2023. Key highlights of our results 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/5294/key-highlights-our-results-2023 [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person is a fundamental right protected in the UK under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), incorporated into domestic law through the Human Rights Act 1998. This right imposes both negative and positive obligations on the state. The state must refrain from taking life, except in strictly necessary circumstances like self-defence, and must also take proactive measures to protect individuals' lives, particularly those who are vulnerable.   While the UK generally upholds this right, there are areas of concern, particularly regarding police use of force, custodial deaths, and the protection of vulnerable individuals, such as victims of domestic violence and refugees.   Custodial   deaths also raise significant concerns, particularly the conditions in prisons and immigration detention centres. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Freedom House, have highlighted issues of overcrowding, poor mental health care, and violence within the UK’s prison system. Vulnerable detainees, including those with mental health conditions, often face inadequate protection, leading to tragic outcomes.   Domestic violence remains a major challenge to the right to life and security of person. Despite the legal framework, including the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, domestic abuse victims often face barriers to protection, and the number of domestic homicides remains high. Organisations like Refuge and Women's Aid continue to advocate for stronger enforcement of existing laws and better support for victims.   There are also concerns regarding the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, particularly those held in immigration detention. Reports from groups such as Human Rights Watch have raised alarm about conditions in detention centres and the government's duty to protect the right to life of these individuals.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, and violence is generally low, though certain groups (e.g., minorities or marginalised communities) may face occasional threats. Law enforcement generally follows legal protocols but may overstep in some cases.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. United Kingdom: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-kingdom/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United Kingdom . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-kingdom [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.18.11   Overall Score for the UK: 4.1/5   The UK has a robust legal framework for human rights protection but faces challenges in enforcement and compliance, particularly in areas such as Freedom of Expression and police accountability.

3.4.19   United States' Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.19.1   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association in the United States (US) is protected by the First Amendment, which guarantees the right to peaceful assembly and the formation of groups, including unions and political organisations. These rights are fundamental to democratic participation, allowing citizens to protest, advocate for causes, and organise collectively. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) further protects the right to form unions and engage in collective bargaining.   While these rights are strongly upheld, there are limitations. Governments may impose time, place, and manner restrictions to maintain public order, but these must not target the content of the assembly. Recent protests, such as the Black Lives Matter demonstrations, have exposed concerns about police handling of peaceful assemblies, with law enforcement criticised for excessive force. Similarly, challenges to unionisation, particularly in states with "right-to-work" laws, highlight ongoing obstacles to fully exercising freedom of association.   According to Freedom House, the US maintains a high degree of freedom for assembly and association, but the increasing use of aggressive tactics by police at protests and restrictions on union activities present notable challenges to fully exercising these rights.   Score: 4/5  – “Legal protections exist, but with some restrictions (e.g., permits required for large gatherings). Civil society organisations operate mostly freely, though there may be occasional government scrutiny.”   References:   American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 2023. Freedom of Assembly and Protest Rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.2   Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   The right to a fair trial and due process in the United States is protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution, which guarantee that no individual shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law". The Sixth Amendment further guarantees specific trial rights, including the right to a speedy and public trial, the right to legal representation, and the right to confront witnesses.   The US judicial system is built on principles of fairness and impartiality, and trials are overseen by independent courts. However, concerns exist around racial and economic disparities within the system. Marginalised groups, including Black and Latino individuals, are more likely to face harsher sentencing and experience systemic bias throughout the trial process. The high cost of legal representation also means that low-income individuals often rely on public defenders, who may be overworked and underfunded, raising concerns about the quality of defence in some cases.   Although the right to a fair trial is firmly established, issues such as prolonged pretrial detention, unequal access to legal resources, and racial disparities continue to affect the justice system. Additionally, concerns about due process have arisen in cases related to national security, where the rights of detainees at facilities like Guantanamo Bay have been questioned.   In summary, while the US legal system provides significant protections for fair trials and due process, ongoing challenges remain related to racial inequality and legal representation.   Score: 4/5  – “Judicial independence is largely upheld, but there may be occasional political influence in sensitive cases. Legal representation is accessible, though certain marginalised groups may face hurdles.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.3   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   The US holds regular, free, and fair elections, with a robust system that allows political opposition.   Citizens have the right to vote, form political parties, and run for office, with elections overseen by independent electoral bodies. Political participation is further strengthened by robust civil society and advocacy groups that influence public policy and hold government accountable.   However, voter suppression, gerrymandering, and barriers to political participation for certain groups, including racial minorities and low-income individuals, persist. Human Rights Watch has raised concerns about these issues, particularly during the 2020 elections.   While the US prides itself on its democratic values, there are challenges related to voter access and participation. Laws like the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were designed to eliminate racial discrimination in voting, but recent restrictions on voting, including stringent voter ID laws and reductions in early voting periods, have raised concerns about disenfranchisement. These measures have disproportionately affected minority groups, leading to debates over voter suppression. Additionally, low voter turnout in certain elections, particularly midterms and local elections, has been a recurring concern.   In summary, while the US maintains a strong democratic framework with widespread political participation, challenges related to voter access, political polarisation, and the influence of money in politics continue to affect its democratic processes.   Score: 4/5  – “Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations.” References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.4   Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination in the United States is protected by a combination of constitutional amendments, civil rights legislation, and court rulings.   Despite these legal protections, discrimination persists in various forms. Racial discrimination remains a significant issue, especially for Black and Latino communities. Disparities in policing, sentencing, and access to education and healthcare are well-documented.   Gender-based discrimination is another key challenge. While progress has been made through laws like the Equal Pay Act, women—particularly women of colour—continue to face wage gaps, workplace discrimination, and barriers to reproductive rights.   LGBTQ+ individuals have also seen legal victories, such as the 2015 Supreme Court ruling legalising same-sex marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges), but they still face discrimination in areas like employment, healthcare, and housing. Protections vary widely by state, with some states offering more comprehensive safeguards than others.   In conclusion, while the US has strong anti-discrimination laws in place, enforcement and equality of outcomes remain inconsistent, particularly for racial minorities, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals.   Score: 3/5  – “Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups, though the state does take some action to address these issues.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 2023. Laws Enforced by EEOC . [Online] Available at: https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/laws-enforced-eeoc [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.5   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Freedom from torture and inhuman treatment in the United States is protected under both domestic law and international treaties to which the US is a party. The Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment", and this forms the basis for protection against torture in the criminal justice system. Additionally, the US is a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT).   Despite these legal protections, the US has faced criticism for violations, particularly in the context of law enforcement, prison conditions, and national security. The use of torture in counterterrorism operations after 9/11, including practices such as waterboarding, has drawn international condemnation. The release of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on CIA torture practices further revealed the extent of inhuman treatment used during interrogations. Although the US government has since banned such practices, concerns about accountability for these actions persist.   In the domestic context, reports of inhuman treatment within the US prison system are common. Overcrowded facilities, solitary confinement, and abusive conditions have been criticised by human rights organisations. The use of excessive force by law enforcement, particularly against racial minorities, has also been highlighted as a serious issue, with incidents of police brutality raising concerns about state-sanctioned violence.   In summary, while US law prohibits torture and inhuman treatment, significant concerns remain, particularly in relation to past actions in the context of counterterrorism, as well as ongoing issues in the criminal justice system.   Score: 3/5  – “Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. United States: Human Rights Issues . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.6   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In the United States, human rights defenders operate within a legal framework that supports robust civic participation, protected by the First Amendment, which guarantees freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. These protections enable human rights defenders to advocate for social justice, challenge government policies, and hold corporations accountable. Civil society organisations, advocacy groups, and journalists play key roles in these efforts.   However, human rights defenders, particularly those working on issues like racial justice, police accountability, and environmental protection, face significant challenges. Harassment, surveillance, and arrests, especially during movements like Black Lives Matter, have raised concerns about law enforcement's treatment of activists. Environmental and Indigenous rights defenders opposing infrastructure projects also face legal threats and violent opposition, often from corporate interests, with tactics like Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) used to silence them.   While the US legal system and civil society offer recourse for these defenders, ongoing issues such as police violence, state surveillance, and corporate influence continue to pose risks.   Score: 4/5  – “Human rights defenders generally operate freely, but there may be occasional instances of harassment or government pressure. Legal protections exist, though they may not always be fully enforced.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.7   Freedom of Expression   Freedom of Expression in the United States is strongly protected under the First Amendment of the US Constitution, which guarantees individuals the right to free speech, including the freedom to express opinions, protest, and engage in political discourse.   However, certain limitations to free expression exist, including restrictions on speech that incites violence, threats, and defamation. Laws related to hate speech, while controversial, also come into play, though the US has historically upheld a broad interpretation of what constitutes protected speech, often allowing even highly offensive speech under the banner of free expression.   Recent challenges to Freedom of Expression include concerns about the role of social media platforms, where the debate around misinformation, disinformation, and content moderation has intensified. The private ownership of these platforms means that they have significant control over what content is allowed, leading to debates over whether restrictions on social media violate free speech principles.   Overall, while the US continues to offer some of the strongest protections for free expression in the world, the rise of digital platforms, political polarisation, and the spread of hate speech and misinformation present ongoing challenges.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of Expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics (e.g., national security). The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Reporters Without Borders. 2023. Press Freedom in the United States . [Online] Available at: https://rsf.org/en/united-states   [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.8   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief in the United States is strongly protected under the First Amendment of the US Constitution, which guarantees the right to freely practice any religion or no religion at all.   In practice, the US has a diverse religious landscape, with protections extending to people of all faiths, including Christianity, Islamism, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and other religions, as well as atheists. Religious freedom cases often arise in contexts such as education, healthcare, and employment.   Recent concerns about religious freedom have emerged, particularly surrounding issues like the travel ban targeting Muslim-majority countries and debates over religious exemptions in laws related to healthcare and civil rights protections. Religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Sikhs, have reported instances of discrimination and hate crimes, raising concerns about the protection of their rights in practice.   In summary, while the US provides robust legal protections for freedom of religion or belief, challenges remain, particularly for religious minorities facing discrimination or exclusion.   Score: 4/5  – “Freedom of religion or belief is largely protected, though there may be some legal or social restrictions (e.g., certain public expressions of faith). Minority religious communities may face occasional challenges.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].   3.4.19.9   Right to Privacy   The US has privacy protections in place, particularly with regard to personal data and digital privacy. However, concerns remain about state surveillance, especially following the revelations from Edward Snowden on the National Security Agency’s mass surveillance programmes. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Human Rights Watch have raised issues about the extent of data collection and government surveillance without adequate oversight.   In recent years, concerns about digital privacy have grown. Laws such as the Patriot Act have expanded government surveillance capabilities, allowing the collection of personal data in the name of national security. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the widespread use of technologies like facial recognition and data mining have raised concerns about government overreach and the erosion of individual privacy. The Edward Snowden revelations in 2013 brought attention to the scale of government surveillance, sparking debates on privacy versus security.   In summary, privacy in the US is protected through various legal mechanisms, though the rapid evolution of technology and surveillance capabilities presents ongoing challenges to fully safeguarding this right.   Score: 3/5  – “Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent. Individuals have limited recourse for violations.”   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.10   Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person in the United States is protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution, which guarantee that no one shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law".   However, significant challenges remain in fully realising these protections, particularly with respect to police violence, gun violence, and systemic inequality. Police brutality, especially against Black and Latino individuals, has been a longstanding issue, leading to nationwide protests, particularly after high-profile cases such as the killing of George Floyd in 2020. Excessive use of force by law enforcement has raised questions about state accountability and the need for reform in policing practices.   Gun violence is another major concern. The US has one of the highest rates of gun-related deaths among developed countries, including both homicides and suicides.   In terms of state protection of individuals, disparities in access to healthcare and safety services contribute to unequal protection of the right to life, with marginalised communities often being disproportionately affected by violence and neglect.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse (e.g., due to race, gender, or political views). Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. United States of America: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/north-america/united-states-of-america/report-united-states-of-america/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: United States . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: United States . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/united-states [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.19.11   Overall Score: 3.6/5   While the US has strong legal protections for fundamental rights such as Freedom of Expression, political participation, and fair trials, persistent issues remain. These include racial and economic disparities, police violence, and concerns about privacy and government surveillance. The US continues to face challenges in ensuring equal protection under the law for all citizens, particularly for marginalised communities.                           4 TABULATED SCORES Table 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association by Country    Table 12: Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   Table 13: Political Participation and Democratic Governance  Table 14: Freedom from Discrimination   Table 15: Freedom from Torture and Inhumane Treatment   Table 16: Protection of Human Rights Defenders Table 17: Freedom of Expression   Table 18: Freedom of Religion or Belief   Table 19: Right to Privacy   Table 20: Right to Life and Security of Person   Table 21: Overall Score   5 CONCLUSION   The Human Rights Barometer for G20 nations reveals a complex landscape of progress and challenges in the protection of fundamental human rights across the world’s major economies. While many G20 nations have enshrined legal frameworks that protect rights such as Freedom of Expression, assembly, and the right to a fair trial, significant gaps remain in the enforcement and realisation of these rights. Key issues include widespread gender-based violence, police brutality, corruption, and restrictions on civil liberties. Vulnerable groups, including migrants, minorities, and human rights defenders, are often disproportionately affected by these challenges.   Many countries in the G20 continue to grapple with systemic discrimination, inequalities in access to justice, and impunity for state actors. The ongoing prevalence of torture, arbitrary detention, and surveillance without adequate oversight raises concerns about the erosion of personal freedoms. In countries with authoritarian tendencies or populist leadership, political participation and freedom of the press face additional threats, with journalists, activists, and opposition figures frequently targeted.   However, the Barometer also highlights positive trends. Countries with strong civil societies and independent judiciaries tend to demonstrate better human rights outcomes, providing examples of how robust democratic institutions and respect for rule of law can support human dignity. Many G20 nations have also adopted progressive policies on LGBTQ+ rights, gender equality, and religious freedoms, reflecting a growing global commitment to inclusivity and tolerance.   The Barometer highlights the importance of continued vigilance, reform, and international cooperation in addressing human rights violations within the G20. It is clear that while progress has been made, sustained efforts are required to ensure that human rights are fully protected and realised for all.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), represented by its Chief Executive, Daryl Swanepoel and the Center for China & Globalization (CCG), represented by their Director for External Relations, John Zhao and Senior Fellow, Philip Xie, met at the CCG’s Head Office in Beijing, China, on Tuesday, 8 April 2025 to explore potential area for cooperation.   Both the CCG and ISI are seized with dialogue and research aimed at bringing about a fairer and more lust multilateral order. And both organisations are studying BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative. Similarly both organisations focus on Global South development in the fields of the economy, research and innovation and human development (including skills and talent development).   The two sides agreed that the overlap in work, conflation of areas of interest and influence within their various spheres warranted closer cooperation. It was decided to further explore how their relationship and cooperation could be deepened and actioned.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   April 2025   Author: Inclusive Society Institute Research Unit CONTENTS   1. SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Defining the Scope 1.3 Academic Sources and Legal Frameworks 1.4 Justification for the Scope 1.5 Human Rights Barometer for G20 Members: Selecting Key Indicators 1.5.1 Selection Criteria 1.5.2 Key Indicators  1.5.3 G20 Members  2       CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS AMONG G20 MEMBERS   2.1    Introduction        2.2    Common Protections Among G20 Members    2.3    G20 Members’ Laws and Policies   2.3.1  Argentina   2.3.2  Australia    2.3.3  Brazil  2.3.4  Canada      2.3.5  China         2.3.6  European Union  2.3.7  France       2.3.8  Germany    2.3.9  India  2.3.10 Indonesia   2.3.11     Italy   2.3.12 Japan         2.3.13  Mexico       2.3.14 Russia        2.3.15 Saudi Arabia       2.3.16 South Africa        2.3.17 South Korea        2.3.18 Turkey (Türkiye)  2.3.19 United Kingdom  2.3.20 United States      3 THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS BAROMETER   3.1 Overview of the Human Rights Barometer        3.2 Methodology for Measuring Compliance 3.3 Rights Matrices   3.4    Enforcement of Civil and Political Rights Protections: Applying the Barometer 3.4.1  Argentina's Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.2  Australia’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.3  Brazil’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis       3.4.4  Canada’s Human Rights Barometer Analysis    3.4.5  China's Human Rights Barometer Analysis       3.4.6  France's Human Rights Barometer Analysis     3.4.7  Germany's Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.8  India's Human Rights Barometer Analysis         3.4.9  Indonesia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.10  Italy's Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.11     Japan's Human Rights Barometer Analysis       3.4.12   Mexico's Human Rights Barometer Analysis     3.4.13 Russia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis      3.4.14    Saudi Arabia's Human Rights Barometer Analysis     3.4.15  South Africa's Human Rights Barometer Analysis      3.4.16   South Korea's Human Rights Barometer Analysis      3.4.17   Turkey's Human Rights Barometer Analysis     3.4.18   United Kingdom's Human Rights Barometer Analysis  3.4.19   United States' Human Rights Barometer Analysis      4       TABULATED SCORES  5       CONCLUSION    TABLES   Table 1: Freedom of Assembly and Association Matrix       Table 2: Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Matrix  Table 3: Political Participation and Democratic Governance Matrix       Table 4: Freedom from Discrimination Matrix   Table 5: Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Matrix  Table 6: Protection of Human Rights Defenders Matrix       Table 7: Freedom of Expression Matrix   Table 8: Freedom of Religion or Belief Matrix   Table 9: Right to Privacy Matrix      Table 10: Right to Life and Security of Person Matrix  Table 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association by Country      Table 12: Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process  Table 13: Political Participation and Democratic Governance      Table 14: Freedom from Discrimination  Table 15: Freedom from Torture and Inhumane Treatment  Table 16: Protection of Human Rights Defenders       Table 17: Freedom of Expression   Table 18: Freedom of Religion or Belief   Table 19: Right to Privacy      Table 20: Right to Life and Security of Person  Table 21: Overall Score           Cover phote: istock.com - Stock photo ID:1795102165 1. SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY   1.1 Introduction   This research brief explores the development of a human rights barometer to assess and compare the civil and political rights compliance of G20 members. Drawing from international law and academic sources, the barometer will establish a baseline for evaluating these members' commitment to fundamental human rights principles. This research brief will outline the civil and political rights laws and policies of each G20 member in order to create a legal and policy baseline, from which the human rights barometer will be drawn. Thereafter, the brief will consider the latest available data outlining levels of respect for civil and political rights by G20 members and measure this data against the barometer.   1.2 Defining the Scope   Civil and political rights are foundational to democratic societies and are protected under international law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as well as numerous domestic human rights laws. These rights ensure individuals' freedom to participate in public life, express opinions, and receive fair treatment by the state. For this brief, the following civil and political rights are within the scope:   Freedom of Expression Recognised in Article 19 of the UDHR and ICCPR, this right includes the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media, ensuring individuals can communicate without censorship or fear of retaliation. Freedom of Assembly and Association Defined in Articles 20 and 21 of the UDHR and ICCPR, this encompasses the right to peaceful assembly and to form associations or join groups, allowing people to organise for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Under Articles 10 and 11 of the UDHR and Articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR, this right involves the protection against arbitrary detention and the guarantee of a fair and public trial by an independent judiciary, ensuring justice and legal representation. Political Participation and Democratic Governance Recognised in Article 21 of the UDHR and ICCPR, this includes the right to take part in the government, vote in free and fair elections, and access political representation, underpinning democratic governance. Freedom from Discrimination Defined in Article 2 of the UDHR and Article 26 of the ICCPR, this encompasses equal protection under the law without discrimination based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other characteristics. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Recognised in Article 5 of the UDHR and Article 7 of the ICCPR, this right prohibits torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, ensuring the dignity of individuals is respected. Protection of Human Rights Defenders Although not explicitly defined in a single article of the UDHR or ICCPR, this right is supported by various international norms, including the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. It ensures individuals and groups can advocate for human rights without fear of persecution or retaliation. Freedom of Religion or Belief Protected under Article 18 of the UDHR and ICCPR, this right ensures individuals have the freedom to adopt, change, or practice a religion or belief of their choice, free from coercion or discrimination. Right to Privacy Recognised in Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR, this right protects individuals from arbitrary interference with their privacy, family, home, or correspondence and guarantees the right to be free from unwarranted surveillance. Right to Life and Security of Person Defined in Article 3 of the UDHR and Article 6 of the ICCPR, this right includes protection against arbitrary deprivation of life and ensures the security and protection of individuals from violence, abuse, and harm.   1.3 Academic Sources and Legal Frameworks   The rights outlined above are derived from established international legal frameworks and academic research on human rights. Notable sources include:   United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC): Publishes reports on the status of civil and political rights globally. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch: Non-governmental organisations that document violations and promote human rights advocacy. Academic Journals: Articles from journals like the Human Rights Law Review and International Journal of Constitutional Law explore the application and interpretation of these rights in various contexts.    1.4 Justification for the Scope   Civil and political rights form the bedrock of personal freedoms and democratic governance. They are enshrined in international law and widely recognised by G20 members. By focusing on these rights, the barometer aims to evaluate the extent to which these members uphold their international obligations and create a meaningful baseline for assessing human rights compliance.   1.5 Human Rights Barometer for G20 Members: Selecting Key Indicators   To create a human rights barometer that effectively measures civil and political rights compliance in G20 members, selecting key indicators is crucial.   1.5.1 Selection Criteria   To ensure the indicators are useful and reliable, they should meet these criteria:   Relevance: Indicators should reflect significant aspects of civil and political rights. Measurable: They must be quantifiable or assessable through data. Reliable: Sources must be reputable to ensure accuracy and consistency.   1.5.2 Key Indicators   The following indicators are used in this brief for evaluating civil and political rights in G20 members:   Freedom of Expression   Indicator: Press freedom index, censorship laws, and incidents of journalists being harassed, detained, or killed.   Sources:  Reports from organisations like Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House, as well as government records on media-related prosecutions.   Freedom of Assembly and Association   Indicator:  Laws regulating public gatherings, requirements for permits for peaceful protests, and cases of police violence during demonstrations.   Sources:  Legal databases, government records on protest-related arrests, and reports from NGOs monitoring public assembly.    Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   Indicator:  Judicial independence index, time to trial, and reports on arbitrary detention or political imprisonment.   Sources:  Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports, as well as government statistics on judicial proceedings.   Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Indicator:  Election transparency, voter turnout, and representation of women and minorities in political offices.   Sources:  Election observation reports from organisations like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), along with government statistics on electoral processes and representation. Freedom from Discrimination Indicator:  Anti-discrimination laws, reported incidents of hate crimes, and data on social inequalities.   Sources:  Reports from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), national anti-discrimination bodies, and NGOs monitoring social discrimination.   Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   Indicator:  Legal prohibitions against torture, documented incidents of abuse, and mechanisms for holding violators accountable.   Sources:  Reports from organisations like Amnesty International and the UN Committee Against Torture, as well as official records from national human rights bodies.   Protection of Human Rights Defenders   Indicator:  Legal protections for human rights defenders, instances of harassment or persecution, and the existence of laws that safeguard activists.   Sources:  Reports from Front Line Defenders, Human Rights Watch, and government data on the treatment of civil society actors.   Freedom of Religion or Belief   Indicator:  Legal protections for religious freedom, incidents of religious persecution or discrimination, and the state’s treatment of religious minorities.   Sources:  Reports from NGOs like Open Doors and the Pew Research Center, as well as government records on religious freedom violations.    Right to Privacy Indicator:  Laws regulating government surveillance, data protection laws, and incidents of privacy violations by state actors.   Sources:  Reports from international privacy organisations, UN privacy experts, and national data protection bodies.   Right to Life and Security of Person   Indicator:  Legal protections against violence, state-sanctioned killings, and reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces.   Sources:  Reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and government data on incidents of violence or arbitrary killings.    1.5.3 G20 Members   The following is a list of G20 members and a short description of their legal systems:   Argentina : A federal republic with a bicameral legislature consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. Executive power is vested in the President. Australia : A federal representative democracy and a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral Parliament consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Brazil : A Federative Republic with a bicameral Parliament consisting of a Chamber of Deputies and a Federal Senate. Canada : A federation with a bicameral Parliament, consisting of the House of Commons and the Senate, and a constitutional monarchy. China : The world's largest legislative body with a unicameral National People's Congress. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds significant power. European Union : The European Parliament is the lawmaking body of the European Union, with 705 Members elected by direct universal suffrage. France : A bicameral Parliament consisting of the Senate and the National Assembly. The Senate has 348 members, and the National Assembly has 577 members. Germany : A bicameral parliamentary system with the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The Bundestag is the main legislative body. India : A parliamentary system with a bicameral Parliament consisting of the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) and the Lok Sabha (House of the People). Indonesia : A bicameral Parliament with the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) comprising the House of Representatives and the Council of Representatives of the Regions. Italy : A bicameral Parliament with the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic. Both houses are elected every five years. Japan : A constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. The National Diet consists of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. Mexico : A federal republic with a bicameral Congress of the Union consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Russia : A bicameral Federal Assembly consisting of the State Duma and the Federation Council. Saudi Arabia : A monarchy with a Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura) that advises the King. The council has 150 members appointed by the King. South Africa : A bicameral Parliament consisting of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. South Korea : A single-chamber National Assembly responsible for reflecting the views of the Korean people, pursuing their interests, and scrutinising government actions. Türkiye : A constitutional republic with a Presidential system. The Grand National Assembly has 600 seats. United Kingdom : A constitutional monarchy with a bicameral Parliament comprising the House of Lords and the House of Commons. United States : A federal republic with a bicameral Congress consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate.   2. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS AMONG G20 MEMBERS   2.1 Introduction   This section of the brief introduces the common civil and political rights protections that exist among G20 members and outlines how these protections vary between members. To evaluate each member's commitment to human rights, the barometer examines legal frameworks and policies governing these rights. This introduction provides an overview of the most common civil and political rights protections, offering a foundation for subsequent analysis of individual G20 members' laws and policies.     2.2 Common Protections Among G20 Members   Among the G20 members, certain protections for civil and political rights are widely recognised, typically based on international agreements like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Common protections include:   Freedom of Expression: The right to express opinions and share information without fear of censorship or retaliation. Freedom of Assembly and Association: The right to peacefully assemble and form groups for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Protections ensuring judicial independence and fair legal processes. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: The right to participate in political processes and hold public office. Freedom from Discrimination: Legal frameworks preventing discrimination based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other characteristics. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Laws prohibiting torture and inhuman treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Protections for human rights activists, journalists, and civil society advocates.   2.3 G20 Members’ Laws and Policies     In this section, the brief will delve into each G20 member's laws and policies individually to explore their compliance with these common protections. The analysis will cover domestic legislation, international agreements, and other regulatory frameworks that influence civil and political rights. 2.3.1 Argentina   Argentina is a signatory to various international and regional human rights instruments that protect civil and political rights. The following list includes the international and regional agreements to which Argentina subscribes:   International Instruments   Argentina has ratified core international human rights treaties [1] , including:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Additionally, Argentina has ratified various optional protocols, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT, indicating its commitment to human rights monitoring and protection.   Regional Instruments   Argentina is a member of the Inter-American System of Human Rights, overseen by the Organization of American States (OAS). As part of this system, Argentina subscribes to the American Convention on Human Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are key mechanisms for monitoring and promoting human rights in the Americas.   Domestic Protections in Argentina   Argentina's domestic laws offer protections for civil and political rights. The Argentine Constitution contains provisions that align with international human rights standards, including:   Freedom of Expression: Protected under constitutional law, allowing for the free exchange of ideas and opinions. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Guaranteed by the constitution, permitting citizens to assemble peacefully and form associations for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Enshrined in the constitution, ensuring judicial independence and protection from arbitrary detention. Freedom from Discrimination: Constitutional provisions prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other characteristics, ensuring equal protection under the law. Argentina also has additional domestic laws that reinforce these constitutional protections. For instance, the Anti-Discrimination Law prohibits discrimination based on various grounds, and the Right to Information Law promotes transparency and freedom of information. These domestic protections, along with Argentina's international commitments, reflect the country's efforts to uphold civil and political rights. Civil and Political Rights Protections in Argentina   Argentina offers the following protections for civil and political rights, derived from its constitution, domestic laws, and international commitments:   Freedom of Expression: Individuals can freely express their opinions and share information without fear of censorship or retaliation. Freedom of Assembly and Association: People are allowed to assemble peacefully and form associations for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Ensures judicial independence, fair trials, and protection against arbitrary detention. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: Guarantees the right to vote, participate in elections, and hold public office. Freedom from Discrimination: Protection against discrimination based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other characteristics, ensuring equal treatment. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Prohibits torture, cruel, or degrading treatment, ensuring humane treatment of individuals. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Ensures the safety and freedom of activists, journalists, and civil society advocates. Access to Information: Promotes transparency and allows individuals to access public information.   2.3.2 Australia   Australia subscribes to a range of international and regional instruments that protect civil and political rights, along with domestic protections outlined in its constitution and other laws.   International Instruments   Australia has ratified many core international human rights treaties [2] , demonstrating a commitment to international standards. These include:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Reduction of Statelessness.   Optional protocols are also ratified, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT.   Regional Instruments Australia is part of the Asia-Pacific region and does not have a regional human rights convention like other continents. However, it actively participates in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and supports the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).   Domestic Protections   Australia's constitution does not explicitly list all civil and political rights but contains some key protections, including:   Freedom of Political Communication: Implied in the constitution. Anti-Discrimination Laws: Addressed through various acts, including the Racial Discrimination Act, the Sex Discrimination Act, and the Disability Discrimination Act. Judicial Independence: Ensured through the separation of powers in the constitution.   Additional protections in Australia include:   Freedom of Expression: While not directly stated in the constitution, it is protected through legal frameworks and court rulings. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Laws permit peaceful assembly and the formation of associations. Right to a Fair Trial: Protections against arbitrary detention and for judicial independence. Freedom from Discrimination: Laws that prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other grounds. Civil and Political Rights Protections in Australia   Freedom of Expression: Australians can express opinions and share information without fear of censorship or retaliation. This freedom is generally implied within the legal framework and court rulings. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Australians have the right to assemble peacefully and form associations for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Legal frameworks ensure judicial independence, protect against arbitrary detention, and guarantee fair legal processes. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: Australians have the right to vote, participate in elections, and hold public office. Freedom from Discrimination: Legal provisions ensure equal protection under the law and prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other grounds. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Australian laws prohibit torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Legal frameworks provide safety and freedom for activists and journalists. Access to Information: Australians have the right to access public information, promoting transparency. These protections are derived from a combination of domestic laws and international commitments.  2.3.3 Brazil   Brazil is a signatory to various international and regional human rights instruments that protect civil and political rights. It also has domestic protections in its constitution and other laws.   International Instruments Brazil has ratified key international human rights treaties [3] , demonstrating a commitment to international standards. These include:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)   Brazil has also ratified optional protocols, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT, indicating a commitment to monitoring human rights and ensuring compliance.   Regional Instruments   Brazil is part of the Inter-American System for Human Rights, subscribing to the American Convention on Human Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.   Domestic Protections in Brazil   Brazil's constitution, adopted in 1988, is known for its comprehensive human rights provisions. It enshrines key protections for civil and political rights, including:   Freedom of Expression: Individuals have the right to express opinions without fear of censorship. Freedom of Assembly and Association: The right to assemble peacefully and form associations for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Judicial independence and protection against arbitrary detention. Freedom from Discrimination: Laws prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or other characteristics. Brazil's domestic laws reinforce these constitutional protections. For example, the Anti-Discrimination Law and other legislation focus on anti-racism and gender equality. Brazil's legal system also supports freedom of information and other civil liberties. Civil and Political Rights Protections in Brazil   The following is a list of civil and political rights protections in Brazil, derived from its constitution and international commitments:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Political Participation and Democratic Governance Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information These protections provide a basis for evaluating Brazil's compliance with civil and political rights. 2.3.4 Canada   Canada is a G20 member that upholds various civil and political rights through a combination of international and regional commitments and domestic legislation.   International Instruments   Canada has ratified key international human rights treaties [4] , including:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Canada has also ratified several optional protocols, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT.   Regional Instruments Canada is part of the Inter-American System for Human Rights under the Organization of American States (OAS), subscribing to the American Convention on Human Rights and other instruments. Domestic Protections in Canada Canada's domestic protections for civil and political rights are derived from its constitution and other laws. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a part of the Canadian Constitution, guarantees fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to a fair trial. Additionally, Canada has anti-discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other characteristics. Canada's legal system also supports human rights through judicial independence, promoting transparency, and protecting human rights defenders. Other laws, like the Anti-Discrimination Act and the Right to Information Law, reinforce these constitutional protections. Civil and Political Rights Protections in Canada The following is a list of the common protections for civil and political rights in Canada, derived from its constitution, domestic laws, and international commitments: Freedom of Expression: Canadians have the right to express opinions and share information without fear of censorship. Freedom of Assembly and Association: The right to assemble and form associations for political, social, or cultural purposes. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Ensures judicial independence and protection from arbitrary detention. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: The right to vote, participate in elections, and hold public office. Freedom from Discrimination: Prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other characteristics. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Canadian laws prohibit torture and degrading treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Ensures the safety and freedom of activists, journalists, and civil society advocates. Access to Information: The right to access public information, promoting transparency.    2.3.5 China   China has ratified or joined numerous international human rights instruments, including six core UN conventions. Among these instruments are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). China has also participated in the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council and served as a member of the council several times.   On the regional level, China does not belong to a specific regional human rights system. However, it actively engages in global human rights governance, participates in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and has a consistent record of ratifying international human rights instruments.   China's domestic laws and policies are designed to comply with these international human rights instruments, ensuring that legislation and policies are consistent with these conventions. The white paper on the practice of the Communist Party of China regarding human rights outlines China's approach to respecting, protecting, and promoting human rights.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in China   Below is a list of the civil and political rights protections in China, derived from its international commitments and domestic laws:   Freedom of Expression: Individuals can express their opinions, although within certain constraints. Freedom of Assembly and Association: While this right is protected in China’s constitution, China has specific regulations that control public gatherings and associations. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Legal frameworks support judicial independence and protect against arbitrary detention. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: Political processes are regulated, with limited multiparty participation. Freedom from Discrimination: Laws prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other characteristics. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Laws prohibit torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Human rights defenders are subject to specific regulations and oversight. 2.3.6 European Union   International Instruments   The European Union (EU) is unique in its comprehensive incorporation of international human rights standards into its legislative framework. It adheres to a wide range of international treaties and has its mechanisms to ensure compliance:   European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Regional Instruments   The EU's framework is robust, with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) playing critical roles in overseeing and enforcing human rights standards across member states.   Domestic Protections   The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees numerous civil and political rights across its member states, including dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights, and justice. The EU actively promotes these rights both within its borders and in its external relations.   Civil and Political Rights in the European Union   Freedom of Expression and Assembly: Broadly protected across member states, though variations exist in the application depending on national laws. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Strongly enforced, with mechanisms in place to ensure fair trials and legal accountability. Freedom from Discrimination: The EU has stringent anti-discrimination laws covering race, gender, religion, disability, and more. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: The EU is known for its strong stance on protecting human rights advocates both within and outside its borders.    2.3.7 France   France has committed to protecting civil and political rights through international human rights instruments, domestic legislation, and regional mechanisms.   International Instruments   France has ratified several key international human rights treaties [5] , demonstrating its commitment to global human rights standards. These include:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) France has also ratified various optional protocols, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT.   Regional Instruments   France is part of the European human rights system, subscribing to regional agreements like the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and supporting bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights. These regional mechanisms offer additional protection for human rights in Europe.   Domestic Protections in France   France's domestic legislation includes various protections for civil and political rights. The French Constitution ensures fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Additional domestic laws focus on anti-discrimination, protection against torture, and support for refugees and migrants.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in France   The following protections for civil and political rights are found in France:   Freedom of Expression: Protected under French law, with certain restrictions regarding incitement to violence or hate speech. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Legal frameworks regulate public gatherings and associations, with some restrictions for security reasons. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Judicial independence and protections against arbitrary detention. Freedom from Discrimination: Laws that prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or other characteristics. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Legal provisions against torture and cruel or degrading treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Legal mechanisms exist to support activists and journalists, though there are instances of police brutality during protests. Access to Information: Right to access public information, promoting transparency.    2.3.8 Germany   Germany has ratified various international human rights treaties and has a comprehensive domestic legal framework protecting civil and political rights.   International Instruments   Germany has ratified many key international human rights treaties [6] , demonstrating its commitment to global human rights standards. These include:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Germany has also ratified various optional protocols, such as the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the CAT.   Regional Instruments   Germany is part of the European human rights system and subscribes to regional agreements like the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is a key regional body overseeing compliance with these instruments.   Domestic Protections in Germany   Germany's constitution, the Basic Law, guarantees various civil and political rights, such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Additional domestic laws address anti-discrimination, judicial independence, and other human rights protections.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in Germany   The following protections for civil and political rights are found in Germany:   Freedom of Expression: Protected under German law, with some limitations regarding incitement to violence or hate speech. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Legal frameworks support public gatherings and forming associations. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Judicial independence and protection from arbitrary detention. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: The right to vote, participate in elections, and hold public office. Freedom from Discrimination: Laws that prohibit discrimination based on various grounds. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Protections against torture and cruel or degrading treatment. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Legal frameworks support the work of activists and journalists. Access to Information: The right to access public information, promoting transparency. 2.3.9 India   India has signed several international and regional instruments that protect civil and political rights. Here is an overview of these instruments and domestic protections in India.   International Instruments India has ratified a number of key international human rights treaties [7] , including:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). However, India has not ratified all optional protocols, including the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (CAT).   Regional Instruments   India does not belong to a specific regional human rights system, but it participates in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).   Domestic Protections in India   India's constitution provides fundamental rights and protections for civil and political rights, such as freedom of expression, assembly, association, and the right to a fair trial and due process. Additional domestic laws focus on anti-discrimination, judicial independence, and protection against torture.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in India   India provides various civil and political rights protections, derived from international treaties and domestic legislation, including: Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information   2.3.10 Indonesia   International Instruments   Indonesia has committed to several key international human rights instruments [8] , which reflect its engagement with global human rights standards:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Regional Instruments   As part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia is a signatory to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, which aims to enhance regional cooperation on human rights issues.   Domestic Protections   Indonesia’s Constitution guarantees numerous civil and political rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to a fair trial. Additionally, Indonesia has national laws that support these constitutional protections:   Human Rights Law: Enshrines broad protections for civil and political rights. Anti-Discrimination Law: Addresses various forms of discrimination and promotes equality. Information and Electronic Transactions Law: Regulates digital communication, aiming to balance freedom of expression with protections against online harm. Civil and Political Rights in Indonesia   The protections for civil and political rights in Indonesia include:   Freedom of Expression: Legally protected, though subject to limitations concerning public order and morality. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Guaranteed but requires government notification and can be subject to restrictions based on security and public order. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Ensured through the judiciary, though challenges in consistency and enforcement remain. Freedom from Discrimination: Supported by legislation, although implementation varies across regions. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Prohibited under law, with ongoing efforts to strengthen enforcement mechanisms. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Increasingly recognised, though activists often face challenges. Access to Information: Supported by laws that promote transparency and public participation in governance. 2.3.11 Italy   International Instruments   Italy is party to several international treaties [9] that uphold civil and political rights, such as:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Optional Protocol to CEDAW Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Optional Protocol to CRPD Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) Italy has also accepted the individual complaints procedures of the ICCPR, CAT, CEDAW, CRPD, CRC, CERD, and CPED, allowing individuals to submit complaints about human rights violations.   Regional Instruments   Italy is part of the European human rights system, subscribing to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Social Charter. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) oversees these conventions' implementation.   Domestic Protections   The Italian Constitution provides for various civil and political rights, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Italy's domestic laws reinforce these protections, covering areas like anti-discrimination, judicial independence, and transparency.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in Italy   Italy's protections for civil and political rights include:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information 2.3.12 Japan   International Instruments   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Optional Protocol to the ICCPR Optional Protocol to the CEDAW Optional Protocol to the CRC Optional Protocol to the CRPD Regional Instruments   Japan does not belong to a specific regional human rights system but actively participates in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and supports the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).   Domestic Protections   Japan's constitution guarantees civil and political rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Domestic laws further reinforce protections against discrimination and torture.   Civil and Political Rights Protections Japan's protections for civil and political rights include:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information 2.3.13 Mexico   International Instruments   Mexico has ratified international treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention against Torture (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).   Regional Instruments   Mexico is part of the Inter-American System for Human Rights, subscribing to the American Convention on Human Rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights monitor and enforce these regional conventions.   Domestic Protections   Mexico's constitution includes guarantees for civil and political rights like freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Additional domestic laws provide protections against discrimination, torture, and arbitrary detention.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in Mexico   Mexico's protections for civil and political rights include:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information   2.3.14 Russia   International Instruments   Russia is a signatory to several international human rights instruments, including:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention against Torture (CAT) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol Regional Instruments   Russia is part of the European human rights system and has signed the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Social Charter.   Civil and Political Rights in Russia   Protections for civil and political rights in Russia are covered through a combination of international and regional instruments and domestic legislation:   Freedom of Expression: Russian citizens have the right to freely express their opinions, although this is subject to certain limitations. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Regulations allow for peaceful assembly and association, with certain restrictions. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Judicial independence and protection against arbitrary detention, though often criticised for political bias. Political Participation and Democratic Governance: The right to vote, participate in elections, and hold public office, although restrictions exist. Freedom from Discrimination: Anti-discrimination laws exist but with varying effectiveness in enforcement. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Legal protections against torture and degrading treatment, although concerns remain. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Activists and journalists face increasing restrictions and scrutiny. Access to Information: Access to information is constrained by governmental control over media. 2.3.15 Saudi Arabia   International Instruments   Saudi Arabia has committed to various international human rights frameworks, though its adherence and the breadth of its commitments have been subjects of significant international scrutiny: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Regional Instruments   As a member of the Arab League, Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which was ratified in 2008. This Charter reaffirms the principles contained in universally recognised human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights, but has been criticised for not fully meeting international norms, particularly regarding women's rights and the rights of children.   Domestic Protections   Saudi Arabia's legal framework includes provisions that theoretically protect various civil and political rights. However, the application and enforcement of these provisions often fall short of international standards. Key issues include restrictions on freedom of expression, association, assembly, particularly for activists and human rights defenders and consistent use of the death penalty. Recent years have seen some reforms, such as improvements in women's rights, notably the right to drive and a reduction in the male guardianship system, although these changes have not fully dismantled systemic gender discrimination. Civil and Political Rights in Saudi Arabia   Freedom of Expression and Assembly: Severely restricted, with the government frequently targeting activists and critics under the guise of security and cybercrime laws. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Often compromised by the use of special courts and anti-terrorism laws that lack transparency and procedural fairness. Freedom from Discrimination: Despite some progress, significant challenges persist, especially concerning gender equality and the rights of foreign workers. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Human rights defenders face arrest, detention, and harassment, often without due process. 2.3.16 South Africa   International Instruments   South Africa is committed to international human rights standards, demonstrated by its ratification of several key treaties:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Convention against Torture (CAT) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Regional Instruments   As a participant in the African human rights framework, South Africa subscribes to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol).   Domestic Protections   The South African Constitution is celebrated for its broad protections of human rights, including:   Bill of Rights: Enshrines freedoms such as expression, assembly, association, and the right to a fair trial. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act: Tackles discrimination and promotes equality. Protection of Personal Information Act: Safeguards personal information and enhances the right to privacy. Civil and Political Rights in South Africa   Key protections include:   Freedom of Expression: Strongly protected under the Constitution. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Guaranteed and actively upheld. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Central to the judicial system, with independent courts. Freedom from Discrimination: Extensive laws to prevent discrimination on any grounds. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Explicitly prohibited and enforced by law. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Generally supported, though challenges exist in practice. Access to Information: Robust legislation facilitating transparency and accountability. 2.3.17 South Korea   International Instruments   South Korea has ratified international treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention against Torture (CAT), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).   Regional Instruments   South Korea does not belong to a specific regional human rights system but participates in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).   Domestic Protections   South Korea's constitution guarantees various civil and political rights, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Its domestic laws reinforce protections against discrimination, torture, and arbitrary detention.   Civil and Political Rights Protections in South Korea   South Korea's protections for civil and political rights include:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Access to Information    2.3.18 Turkey (Türkiye)   International Instruments   Turkey has ratified key international conventions, reflecting its commitment to uphold human rights:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Convention against Torture (CAT) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Regional Instruments   As part of the European human rights regime, Turkey subscribes to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Social Charter.   Domestic Protections   Turkey’s constitutional and legal framework provides for civil and political rights:   Constitution of Turkey: Incorporates fundamental rights and freedoms, including detailed articles on freedom of expression and the press. Law on Meetings and Demonstrations: Governs public gatherings, aiming to balance security and freedom of assembly. Anti-Discrimination and Equality Board: Established to enforce laws against discrimination. Civil and Political Rights in Turkey   Prominent protections include:   Freedom of Expression: Constitutionally protected, though subject to significant legal restrictions. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Allowed with regulatory requirements. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Affirmed in the legal system, with ongoing concerns about judicial independence. Freedom from Discrimination: Legislation in place, with varying effectiveness in enforcement. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Prohibited by law, with ongoing international scrutiny. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Legally recognised yet facing operational challenges. Access to Information: Legal provisions exist, promoting government transparency to an extent. 2.3.19 United Kingdom   International Instruments   The United Kingdom (UK) has ratified several key international human rights instruments, highlighting its commitment to upholding global human rights standards. These treaties include:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Convention Against Torture (CAT) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Regional Instruments   As a member of the Council of Europe, the UK is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Domestic Protections   The UK integrates international commitments into its domestic legal framework, primarily through the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the ECHR. Additionally, various statutes and common law provide protections against discrimination, ensure due process, and uphold other fundamental rights.   Civil and Political Rights in the United Kingdom   The protections for civil and political rights in the UK include:   Freedom of Expression: Robustly protected, subject to certain legal restrictions regarding hate speech and national security. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Well-established rights, with police needing to be notified of public assemblies. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: Fundamental rights under the UK legal system, emphasising fair legal procedures and access to justice. Freedom from Discrimination: Comprehensive laws that cover various grounds including race, gender, and disability. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Strongly prohibited under both domestic law and international obligations. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: Generally upheld, with legal protections in place to support their activities. Access to Information: Enshrined in the Freedom of Information Act, providing public access to data held by public authorities. 2.3.20 United States   International Instruments   The United States (US) has ratified key international human rights treaties, reflecting its commitment to uphold these standards, including:   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Compared to other nations, however, the US has ratified relatively few treaties related to civil and political rights. The US has notably not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Furthermore, although less relevant to this barometer, which focuses on civil and political rights, the US has not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).   Regional Instruments   The United States participates in the Inter-American System for Human Rights but has not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, which limits its commitments under this regional framework.   Domestic Protections   The US Constitution provides robust protections for civil and political rights, with the First Amendment guaranteeing freedom of speech and assembly, among other rights. The Fourteenth Amendment ensures due process and equal protection under the law. Federal statutes like various iterations of the Civil Rights Act protect against discrimination on several bases including race, colour, religion, sex, or national origin.   Civil and Political Rights in the United States   Key protections include:   Freedom of Expression and Speech: Broadly protected under the First Amendment, with no specific laws criminalising hate speech, recognising a high threshold for limiting speech to cases of imminent lawless action. Freedom of Assembly and Association: Strongly protected, allowing individuals to gather and organise freely. Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process: A cornerstone of the American legal system, ensuring fairness and legal equity. Freedom from Discrimination: Supported by extensive legislation that prohibits discrimination across various contexts. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Outright prohibited under US law and international treaties the US has ratified. Protection of Human Rights Defenders: While generally supported, human rights defenders in the US can face challenges such as surveillance, legal actions intended to curb activism, and in some cases, harassment or violence, which may hinder their ability to operate freely. Access to Information: Facilitated by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which promotes transparency and accountability in government. These protections, while extensive, are subject to ongoing legal and social challenges that test the boundaries and effectiveness of civil and political rights in the US. 3 THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS BAROMETER   3.1 Overview of the Human Rights Barometer   The Human Rights Barometer is a tool designed to evaluate the compliance of G20 members with civil and political rights standards, focusing on both legal frameworks and the realities of enforcement. This document introduces and applies the Barometer using a set of rights matrices, each tailored to specific human rights categories. These matrices reflect both the legal protections in place for each right and the actual enforcement and lived experiences of individuals within these states.   The Barometer covers a broad spectrum of rights that are foundational to the protection of civil and political freedoms, including:   Freedom of Expression Freedom of Assembly and Association Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Political Participation and Democratic Governance Freedom from Discrimination Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Protection of Human Rights Defenders Freedom of Religion or Belief Right to Privacy Right to Life and Security of Person   While this document introduces the Barometer and demonstrates its use, it does not provide a comprehensive study of all G20 members. Instead, it provides an illustrative application, using external reports and available data to offer an overview of each country’s compliance with key human rights. For a complete and fully accurate application of the Barometer, each G20 member would require a dedicated, in-depth study focusing on the specific rights evaluated by the tool.   3.2 Methodology for Measuring Compliance   The Barometer evaluates each country’s performance in respect of the selected human rights categories through matrices that combine legal standards (de jure protections) with actual enforcement and compliance (de facto realities). The matrices provide a five-point scale for each category, reflecting both the presence of legal protections and the extent to which these protections are enforced in practice. This approach ensures a nuanced understanding of each country’s human rights landscape, considering not just what is written into law but how effectively those laws are applied and respected.     3.3 Rights Matrices   Each rights category is assessed using a matrix that outlines clear criteria for scoring. Below are the matrices used to determine a member’s protection of civil and political rights according to the barometer.   Table 1: Freedom of Assembly and Association Matrix Table 2: Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process Matrix Table 3: Political Participation and Democratic Governance Matrix Table 4: Freedom from Discrimination Matrix Table 5: Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment Matrix Table 6: Protection of Human Rights Defenders Matrix Table 7: Freedom of Expression Matrix Table 8: Freedom of Religion or Belief Matrix Table 9: Right to Privacy Matrix Table 10: Right to Life and Security of Person Mat rix 3.4 Enforcement of Civil and Political Rights Protections: Applying the Barometer   Having explored the domestic, regional, and international legal frameworks that underpin civil and political rights in each G20 country, the next step in the Barometer’s application is to assess the enforcement of these protections. This section will provide an overview of how each country implements and upholds these rights in practice, using the 10 matrices developed earlier. These matrices cover a broad range of rights, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association, the right to a fair trial, protection from discrimination, and more.   In assessing the enforcement of these rights, the analysis will draw on reports from credible sources such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, UN bodies, and other authoritative organisations. While this overview is not an exhaustive analysis of each country’s human rights performance, it provides a snapshot of how well legal protections translate into real-world outcomes. The Barometer, as applied here, serves as a framework for understanding compliance with civil and political rights and highlights areas where countries perform well, as well as those where significant challenges remain.   3.4.1 Argentina's Human Rights Barometer Analysis   3.4.1.1 Freedom of Assembly and Association   Freedom of assembly and association are constitutionally guaranteed in Argentina under Article 14 of the Constitution, which protects the right to meet peacefully and to form associations for lawful purposes. These rights are fundamental to Argentina's democratic system and have been central to its civil society, particularly in the aftermath of the country’s military dictatorship.   Despite these protections, there are concerns regarding the state’s handling of protests, particularly in cases involving police violence against demonstrators. Law enforcement responses to social protests, often related to economic conditions or human rights issues, have sometimes involved the use of excessive force, raising concerns about violations of the right to peaceful assembly. Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented instances of police brutality in controlling protests, particularly in lower-income areas.   Trade unions and political parties operate freely, with strong legal protections for labour organisations. However, union leaders and activists have occasionally faced threats and violence, particularly when advocating for workers’ rights in conflict with business interests. These incidents highlight ongoing challenges in fully protecting the right to association in practice.   Score: 3/5  – "Legal protections are inconsistent or weak. Protests are often subject to heavy policing or restrictions. Civil society groups face bureaucratic hurdles or occasional harassment."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/ [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024 : Argentina. [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2024 [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023 : Argentina. [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina [Accessed: 19 October 2024].    3.4.1.2 Right to a Fair Trial and Due Process   In Argentina, the right to a fair trial and due process is protected under both national and international legal frameworks. The Constitution of Argentina guarantees due process rights in Articles 18 and 75, which include the presumption of innocence, the right to a defence, and the prohibition of arbitrary detention. Argentina is also a signatory to the American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which further affirm these protections.   Despite these legal safeguards, there are persistent concerns about the effectiveness of Argentina’s judicial system. Issues such as long delays in court proceedings, pretrial detention without timely access to justice, and corruption within the judiciary remain significant problems. Many detainees, particularly those from marginalised communities, face extended periods in pretrial detention due to case backlogs and an underfunded judicial system.   Although judicial reforms have been introduced to address these issues, challenges remain in ensuring timely access to fair trials, especially for those who cannot afford private legal representation. Corruption, political influence, and inefficiencies in the system continue to undermine the right to due process for many individuals.   Score: 2/5  – "The judiciary is compromised by political or executive influence. Arbitrary detention is frequent, and trials are often delayed or unfair."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Annual Report 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. United Nations Human Rights Committee. 2016. Concluding Observations on Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FARG%2FCO%2F5&Lang=en  [Accessed: 14 September 2024].   3.4.1.3 Political Participation and Democratic Governance   Argentina is a federal, representative democracy with regular, multiparty elections at all levels. Elections are generally free and fair, with high voter turnout due to mandatory voting laws. The political landscape has traditionally been dominated by the Justicialist Party (Peronists) and the Radical Civic Union, though polarisation has increased in recent years, particularly over economic and corruption issues.   Corruption is a significant problem, undermining public trust in government institutions. High-profile corruption cases and political influence over the judiciary have slowed reforms, and political clientelism, especially in poorer areas, affects the fairness of elections. Despite these challenges, Argentina has a strong civil society and an independent media that play crucial roles in democratic accountability, although journalists covering sensitive issues occasionally face harassment.   Score: 4/5  – "Elections are generally free and fair, though there may be some political interference. Political opposition is allowed, but it faces certain challenges or limitations."   References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2024  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). 2022. Electoral Integrity in Argentina. [Online] Available at: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/country?country=11&database_theme=293   [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Transparency International. 2023. Argentina Corruption Perceptions Index . [Online] Available at: https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.4 Freedom from Discrimination   Freedom from discrimination in Argentina is protected under the Constitution of Argentina and reinforced by various national laws and international treaties.   Argentina is a global leader in gender and LGBTQ+ rights. It was the first country in Latin America to legalise same-sex marriage in 2010 and is known for its progressive Gender Identity Law (2012), which allows individuals to change their gender on legal documents without needing medical procedures. Despite these legal advances, women and LGBTQ+ individuals continue to face discrimination in practice, particularly in employment and healthcare, including access to abortion. Gender-based violence remains a critical issue, with high rates of femicide.   Indigenous groups, particularly in rural areas, often face economic and social exclusion. Discrimination against Afro-Argentine and immigrant communities, especially migrants from neighbouring countries, is also reported, manifesting in limited access to public services and employment opportunities. The state has introduced laws to address these issues, but enforcement remains inconsistent, and these communities continue to face marginalisation.   Argentina has strong legal protections for people with disabilities, including the Comprehensive Protection Law for people with disabilities. However, in practice, people with disabilities often encounter barriers in accessing education, employment, and healthcare, and there are frequent reports of inadequate infrastructure and services.   In summary, while Argentina has made significant strides in establishing legal protections against discrimination, challenges persist, particularly for women, LGBTQ+ individuals, indigenous groups, and people with disabilities.   Score: 3/5  – "Anti-discrimination laws exist but are weakly enforced or selectively applied. Significant disparities exist for certain minority groups."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. BBC. 2023. Abortion may be legal in Argentina but women still face major obstacles . [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-64784660  [Accessed: 14 September 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.5 Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment   While torture is prohibited by law in Argentina, reports of police brutality and inhuman treatment persist.   There have been ongoing concerns about police violence and mistreatment of detainees, particularly in prisons and detention centres. Human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented cases of excessive use of force, torture, and ill-treatment by law enforcement officials, particularly against vulnerable populations, including migrants and those in poorer communities. These reports often highlight instances of torture used to extract confessions or punish individuals during detention.   In the aftermath of Argentina’s military dictatorship, the country has worked to address past human rights abuses, including widespread torture. Argentina has held numerous trials for individuals involved in state-sponsored torture during the dictatorship, reflecting its commitment to holding perpetrators accountable. However, current-day allegations of police brutality and ill-treatment continue to be areas of concern.   While Argentina has made significant strides in addressing historical torture and strengthening legal protections, the ongoing use of excessive force by law enforcement highlights the need for continued oversight and reforms to ensure full protection against torture and inhuman treatment.   Score: 3/5  – "Torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited by law but reports of abuse by law enforcement or security forces are not uncommon. Accountability for violators is inconsistent."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. United Nations. 2022. Convention Against Torture: Argentina's Review . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/cat  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.6 Protection of Human Rights Defenders   In Argentina, human rights defenders play a critical role in advocating for social justice, democracy, and accountability, often in the face of significant risks. While Argentina's Constitution and international human rights treaties guarantee protections for human rights defenders, in practice, defenders frequently face threats, harassment, and even violence, particularly when addressing sensitive issues like corruption, indigenous rights, and environmental protection.   Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented cases where human rights defenders, particularly those from indigenous and rural communities, have been targeted by both state and non-state actors. Environmental defenders opposing large-scale projects like mining and deforestation are especially vulnerable, facing intimidation and legal challenges from powerful corporate interests.   Despite these threats, Argentina’s civil society remains strong, with human rights defenders continuing to advocate for marginalised communities and hold the government accountable for human rights violations. However, ongoing challenges in ensuring the safety of defenders, particularly in remote areas, highlight the need for stronger legal and institutional mechanisms to protect them.   Score: 3/5  – "Human rights defenders face some harassment or legal challenges, particularly when criticising the government. Protections are weak or inconsistently applied." References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Front Line Defenders. 2023. Argentina: Protection of Human Rights Defenders . [Online] Available at: https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/location/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.7 Freedom of Expression   Freedom of expression in Argentina is protected by Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees individuals the right to express their ideas and opinions freely.   Despite these legal protections, challenges persist in practice. Media outlets and journalists face pressures when reporting on sensitive topics such as corruption, government mismanagement, and human rights violations. Journalists, particularly those working in investigative journalism, have reported harassment and threats when covering politically sensitive stories.   In conclusion, while Argentina has strong legal frameworks protecting freedom of expression, the reality for journalists and civil society actors sometimes involves navigating threats, government pressure, and legal challenges.   Score: 4/5  – "Freedom of expression is generally protected, though some restrictions apply, particularly on sensitive topics. The press operates freely, but there may be occasional government pressure."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2024  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.8 Freedom of Religion or Belief   Freedom of religion or belief in Argentina is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution, which ensures the right to freely practice any religion. Argentina has a rich religious diversity, with Roman Catholicism historically being the dominant religion, though the state formally separated from the Catholic Church in 1994. The Constitution also prohibits any form of religious discrimination, and Argentina is a signatory to international treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), further solidifying protections for religious freedom.   Argentina has made significant strides in promoting religious tolerance. Various religious communities, including Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, and indigenous spiritual practices, coexist in relative harmony. The country also has one of the largest Jewish communities in Latin America.   However, despite these protections, religious minorities occasionally face social discrimination. There have been reports of antisemitism and instances of intolerance toward other religious groups, such as evangelical Christians and Muslims, though these incidents are relatively rare. The government generally promotes religious pluralism and engages in dialogue with various faith communities to address these issues.   Overall, Argentina’s legal framework strongly supports freedom of religion or belief, although vigilance is needed to address occasional incidents of discrimination and ensure the continued protection of all religious communities. Score: 5/5  – "The country guarantees complete freedom of religion or belief, allowing all individuals to practice their faith or choose no faith without fear of persecution. Religious communities operate freely and equally."   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2024  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. International Religious Freedom Report: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.9 Right to Privacy   The right to privacy in Argentina is protected under Article 19 of the Constitution, which guarantees personal autonomy and the protection of private life. This article establishes that private actions that do not harm others are outside the scope of public authority, forming the basis for privacy protections in the country. Argentina has also implemented the Personal Data Protection Law (Law 25.326), which regulates the collection, storage, and use of personal data, drawing inspiration from international data protection frameworks like the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).   The National Directorate for the Protection of Personal Data is responsible for overseeing the enforcement of this law, ensuring that individuals' data is handled responsibly, and protecting their right to privacy. This law includes provisions for the protection of sensitive data, the right to access and rectify personal information, and the requirement for informed consent before personal data is collected.   However, concerns remain about government surveillance, particularly regarding law enforcement’s access to personal data in the name of national security. There are also criticisms of the effectiveness of the country's data protection system, with reports of weak enforcement and delays in updating regulations to address new technological challenges.   Score: 3/5  – "Privacy rights are legally recognised, but government surveillance is more common, and protections for personal data are inconsistent." References:   Freedom House. 2024. Freedom in the World 2024: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/argentina/freedom-world/2024  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.10 Right to Life and Security of Person   The right to life and security of person is guaranteed in Argentina under Article 18 of the Constitution, which prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life and ensures protection from violence and harm. Argentina is also a signatory to international human rights agreements, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, both of which enshrine the right to life and personal security.   Despite strong legal protections, Argentina faces significant challenges in ensuring the right to life and security of its citizens, particularly due to high levels of violent crime, police brutality, and gender-based violence. Crime rates, especially in urban areas, remain a concern, with high incidences of homicides and violent assaults. Organised crime and drug-related violence have also increased, particularly in cities like Rosario, further undermining security.   Gender-based violence, particularly femicide, remains a critical issue in Argentina. Despite the introduction of laws like the Comprehensive Law on Violence Against Women, enforcement is inconsistent, and many women continue to face violence and abuse. Argentina has one of the highest femicide rates in Latin America, sparking widespread protests and campaigns like "Ni Una Menos" to demand better protections and justice for victims.   Police violence and excessive use of force, particularly during protests or in marginalised communities, have been reported by human rights organisations. There are concerns about impunity for police officers involved in unlawful killings, as well as inadequate accountability mechanisms to address such violations.   In conclusion, while Argentina has robust legal frameworks for the protection of life and security, persistent issues with crime, gender-based violence, and police brutality undermine the full realisation of these rights for many individuals.   Score: 3/5  – “The right to life is legally recognised, but certain populations face systemic violence or abuse. Law enforcement often operates with impunity.”   References:   Amnesty International. 2023. Argentina: Human Rights Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. Human Rights Watch. 2023. World Report 2023: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/argentina  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. US Department of State. 2022. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Argentina . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/argentina/  [Accessed: 19 October 2024]. 3.4.1.11 Argentina’s overall score – 3.3/5   Argentina demonstrates a mixed performance in terms of civil and political rights protections. The country has made significant strides in areas such as political participation and democratic governance, as well as freedom of religion, with strong legal frameworks in place. However, there are still notable challenges in enforcing these rights, particularly concerning issues of police brutality, and freedom from torture. While there are comprehensive anti-discrimination laws, enforcement remains uneven, particularly in rural areas and among vulnerable groups. Additionally, despite the legalisation of abortion, barriers persist in accessing these rights for many women.      - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - [1]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=7&Lang=EN  [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [2]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=9  [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [3]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=24   [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [4]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=31  [Accessed: 3 July 2024].   [5]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=62 [Accessed: 3 July 2024].   [6]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=66  [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [7]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=79 [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [8]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=80 [Accessed: 3 July 2024]. [9]  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). N.d. Treaty body database . [Online] Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=85 [Accessed: 3 July 2024].

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, visited the Institute for African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, from 9 – 10 April 2025. He was accompanied by Ms Jenny Wu, a member of the Institute’s Advisory Council. The IAS was represented by their Deputy Director, Prof Xu Wei, Prof Yang Kai, Deputy Director International, and Prof Zhang Qiaowen, Academic Deputy Director.   During the visit the two sides met to discuss and deepen cooperation between the two Institute’s. Among others, they agreed to joint projects related to the programme of the Think-tank 20, which is being hosted in South Africa during 2025. Among the projects agreed was a G20 policy brief development process and the hosting of a T20 Academic Seminar in Cape Town during the second half of 2025.   CEO Daryl Swanepoel, also delivered a guest lecture in his capacity as Distinguished Visiting Professor on Thursday, 10 April 2025. The lecture was titled “ The G20: A Comprehensive Overview & Expectations of South Africa’s Presidency 2025 ” .   Follow the link below to access the guest lecture presentation:

Occasional Paper 4/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. A P R I L 2 0 2 5   Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPAHons, ND: Co. Admin Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University      Abstract   This Economic Brief analyses the country's precarious economic situation, that is characterised by significant domestic challenges and global trade disruptions. Business confidence has been negatively impacted by the historic withdrawal of the National Budget due to the controversy over the Value-Added Tax increases which, although now agreed, has triggered government instability and legal disputes. Deteriorating relations with the United States threatens South African exports and have raised uncertainties regarding South Africa's ongoing participation in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which will seriously impact particularly the automotive and agricultural sectors. Amidst declining business and consumer confidence, economic growth remains stubbornly low. Persistent levels of high unemployment, particular among the youth, inequality and poverty, exacerbate the crisis, and risks social stability. While inflation is projected to moderate, the deep-seated structural weaknesses hinder recovery efforts. The brief emphasises the urgent need for comprehensive reforms to restore confidence, enhance competitiveness, and address systemic issues vital for sustainable growth.   1. Introduction   For the first time in the history of South Africa the National Budget as presented to Parliament by the Minister of Finance had to be withdrawn due to the controversy over a proposed Value-Added-Tax increase. Whilst the budget was subsequently re-introduced and approved, members within the National Executive voted against the budget proposals. Moreover, the budget is being procedurally challenged in the courts.   The aforementioned dynamics does not bode well for business and consumer confidence.   The budget has also been presented against the backdrop of geo-political turmoil. The United States administration initiated global trade war has put the global economy into turmoil. South Africa has not escaped the impact thereof. In fact, the country’s relationship with the United States has been deteriorating at a rapid pace, which has resulted in billions of dollars of aid being withdrawn.   Moreover, South Africa’s continued inclusion in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), an agreement that provides eligible sub-Saharan African countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for over 1,800 products, in addition to the thousands more than 5,000 products eligible for duty-free access under the Generalized System of Preferences programme (Office of the US Trade Representative, N.d.) is uncertain. The author, with the benefit of having had extensive discussions with senior public policymakers within the US, is of the view that unless the relationship between the two countries are rapidly restored, South Africa’s graduation out of AGOA is almost certain. South Africa’s automotive and agricultural sectors will, under such circumstances, be particularly hard hit.   These dramatic turn of events happen within a slow-growth economic environment, with low business and consumer confidence and economic infrastructure backlogs that are inhibiting the further expansion of the economy. Without expanding the economy the high employment rate cannot be addressed. The social stability of the nation is at risk.   This paper assesses the current state of the South African economy, and the prospects for its recovery and growth. It further considers the implications of the 2025 national budget and the emerging ‘global trade wars’ thereon.   This paper is the result of the combined insights of a number of reputable economists and financial analysts that participated in a webinar workshop and additional interviews in the first part of April 2025. The insights have been synergised by the author. The views expressed during the webinar and interviews have informed the content of the paper, but cannot be ascribed to any one of them. The interpretation of the content is that of the author.   The experts consulted include:   Dr Adel Bosch, Senior Economist, Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) Dr Miriam Altman, Strategist, Economist and Social Activist, Altman Advisory Prof William Gumede, Associate Professor, School of Governance, Witwatersrand University Mr Theo Vorster, CEO and Co-founder, Galileo Capital Mr Isaac Matshego, Senior Economist, Nedbank Dr Roelof Botha, Economic Advisor to the Optimum Investment Group Ms Lara Hodes, Economist, Investec   The webinar workshop and interviews were structured in such a way as to address the following five issues:   A prognosis of the current state of the economy The impact of the 2025/2026 national budget proposals thereon The likelihood of meeting the 1,9% GDP growth target Further interventions needed to spur meaningful GDP growth Should US impose tariffs on and graduate South Africa out of AGOA, how serious will the impact be on the South African economy?   In addition to the content generated through the workshop and interviews, some desktop research was done where further expansion, clarity or verification was needed. The main points of the paper is summed up in the text-box below:     The South African National Budget was withdrawn for the first time due to controversy over a proposed Value-Added-Tax increase, highlighting governance issues. After its re-introduction, the budget faced opposition from some within the National Executive, leading to further procedural challenges in court. This has highlighted fractures within the ruling coalition which has further negatively impacted  business confidence. Business and consumer confidence are under duress, which is detrimental to economic growth and recovery. The global trade war initiated by the U.S. has created a tumultuous international economic environment that negatively impacts South Africa. South Africa’s relationship with the U.S. is rapidly deteriorating, resulting in the withdrawal of billions of dollars in aid and support. There is uncertainty regarding South Africa's continued inclusion in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), critical for duty-free access to the U.S. market. Loss of AGOA status could severely impact South Africa’s key sectors, particularly automotive and agriculture. The economy recorded a meagre GDP growth rate of 0.6% in 2024, falling significantly short of the necessary levels for job creation and poverty reduction. Whilst the budget has assumed a 1.9% GDP growth, it is unlikely to be achieved given the structural impediments and global trade turmoil. It is likely to be in the 1% to 1.5% range, making unlikely that the budgeted revenue projections will be achieved. Key indicators highlight low business confidence, with indices hovering around 45 points, indicating a lack of optimism among investors. Consumer confidence continues to decline, reflecting growing scepticism about the economy's recovery and health. The high level of unemployment, currently 33.2%, poses substantial risks to economic stability, especially with youth unemployment at 45.5%. The integration of large segments of the population into the workforce is critical to boosting household consumption and ensuring social stability. South Africa faces chronic poverty and inequality, with some of the highest disparities globally, exacerbating social tensions. Inflation is projected to be around 4.5% in 2025, suggesting moderating prices, though challenges to purchasing power remain. The global “tariff war” could result in upward pressure beyond the 4.5% mark. Overall, the South African economy's fragile recovery is threatened by deep-rooted structural weaknesses, necessitating urgent policy reforms to enhance competitiveness and reduce red tape.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author    2. Macroeconomic overview   The South African economy’s recovery is fragile. It remains clouded as growth remains subdued and continues to stagnate. The economy recorded a meagre 0.6% GDP growth rate in 2024. This is way below the threshold necessary to generate significant job creation and to reduce poverty. The growth continues to be slow in spite of the relatively favourable global economic environment during the past years, which would suggests deep-rooted structural weaknesses within the domestic economy.   Key indicators further highlight the severity of the economic malaise:   Business confidence continue to be low. Indices hover around a worrying 45 index points.  (the neutral threshold is 50 points). This is especially troubling given that the low confidence has been sustained below the 50 point mark for at least five years (Trading Economics, N.d.(1)). The below 50 points threshold figure reflects the widespread pessimism and a lack of forward-looking investment sentiment among businesses. For outsiders to invest in the country, the economy will need to be more competitive, for which the ease of doing business will have to be addressed. To this end the levels of red tape will need to be reduced considerably.     Consumer confidence has similarly declined, further illustrating the erosion of public faith in the ability of the economy to mend. Consumer confidence in South Africa decreased to -20 points in the first quarter of 2025 from -6 points in the fourth quarter of 2024 (Trading Economics, N.d.(2)).   This erosion of confidence perpetuates economic underperformance, since businesses delay investment and expansion, while households reduce discretionary spending.   The stubbornly high unemployment rate (32.1%) as at the end of the third quarter of 2024, and especially that of the youth (45.5%) (Stats SA, 2025), undermines South Africa's long-term growth prospects. The failure to integrate large segments of the population into productive employment limits household consumption and contributes to social instability.   Compounding these issues are chronic poverty and high levels of inequality, which are among the highest globally.   Inflation, is expected to be in the region of 4.5% in 2025 (SARB, 2025 (1)), thus showing signs of moderation, but challenges remain. A stable inflation environment is critical for consumer purchasing power. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has limited room to further cut interest rates given the inflationary pressures and the need to maintain financial market stability. Thus, the current monetary policy landscape offers little space for expansionary measures to stimulate demand. Alternative view on the cutting of interest rates   The current real lending rate in South Africa is 7.8%, whilst some argue that it should not be above 5%. The lowering of interest rates are important given that the average real prime rate in our major trading partners is a third of what it is in South Africa. The cost of capital in this country, it is argued, is too high.   It is said that the household debt costs as percentage of household disposable income at the beginning of 2022 was 6.7%, compared with the current 9.1%. If it had stayed at 6.7 the interest rates would not have increased by much, but then consumers would have over the three-year period been able to spend R200 billion more in the economy. This would have provided R50 billion more to play with in the budget and the VAT rate increase would not have been on the table. It is argued that the Reserve Bank is overly concerned with inflation, which approach provides an obstacle to growth in this economy, which is impacting the country’s fiscal stability.   High interest rates do not only refer to the supply side, but also the demand side, which is closely related to the type of investment we seek as a country. Investments in bonds, shares and deposits provide relatively high rates of return. Investors find it more attractive to invest in these instruments that a relatively risk-free, as opposed to investment into plant and machinery which carries much higher risk.   The down side of this is that South Africa seeks investment into real production, since this can boost both exports and jobs.   Also to be considered is the inflationary impact of the punitive US tariff regime on global inflation and the real possibility of a US and global recession, which JP Morgan suggest is a 60% probability (Siddarth, 2025).   The above inflation salary increase for the public service (that is 5.5% against the 4,5% anticipated inflation) (Moloi, 2025) will place further upward pressure on inflation and reduce the revenue available for public services and infrastructure.   The electricity supply, whilst relatively stable over the last few months, continues to plague the economy. The threat of loadshedding remains, and is putting the brake on expansion in manufacturing and other high-energy use sectors. The disruption in the supply of electricity negatively impacts productivity and dampens investor sentiment.  The unpredictable nature of the electricity supply has also led to many companies having to incur additional costs by investing in alternative energy solutions, which reduces the overall competitiveness of the South African business environment and discourages both domestic and foreign investment.   The energy crisis is contributing to a broad sense of societal discontentment in the economy's ability to deliver. The power outages hinder educational institutions, medical facilities and small businesses. It is disrupting their daily operations and is exacerbating inequality between communities that have varying access to alternative energy solutions.   The growing disparities need to be addressed urgently. Government can do so through the introduction of targeted interventions, which could include, for example, subsidies for off-grid solutions and the prioritisation of energy reforms.   The national budget presumes a 1.9% GDP growth for the fiscal year (Treasury, 2025). Given the external shocks triggered by the US tariff war, the impact thereof on global inflation and the upward pressure on local inflation resulting from the VAT increase, together with the underperformance of actual 2024 GDP growth against projected GDP growth (as can be seen from the graph below), and a reduction in consumer spending, it is highly unlikely that the 1.9% target will be realised. It would mean a trebling of GDP growth from 2024 levels, and there is little evidence to suggest that the economic structural deficiencies will be dramatically corrected in the short term. A target of around 1.5% is more realistic, and may even be optimistic.   On the back of expected higher inflation and lower than budgeted GDP growth, it is likely that the revenue targets set in the budget will not be achieved.   In terms of gross fixed capital formation, the National Development Plan envisages increasing it from 17 percent to 30 percent by 2030 (Parliament, 2025). However, when one considers current investor confidence and that the average in emerging markets is around 25%, it seems a little over optimistic.   Fragile Economic Recovery:  South Africa's economy is struggling, with only a 0.6% GDP growth rate in 2024, insufficient for significant job creation and poverty reduction, indicating deep-rooted structural weaknesses. Low Business and Consumer Confidence:  Business confidence remains low at around 45 index points, causing delayed investments and expansions, while consumer confidence is also declining, further reducing discretionary spending. High Unemployment and Inequality:  The unemployment rate stands at 33.2%, with youth unemployment at 45.5%, contributing to social instability and limiting household consumption amidst chronic poverty and inequality. Inflation and Monetary Policy Constraints:  Inflation is expected to moderate at about 4.5% in 2025, but the South African Reserve Bank has limited capacity to cut interest rates, complicating efforts to stimulate demand in a challenging economic environment. Energy Crisis Impact : Persistent electricity supply issues, including the threat of loadshedding, are stifling economic expansion and contributing to societal discontent, necessitating urgent government interventions for targeted energy reforms and support for off-grid solutions.   Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author   3. Fiscal framework and revenue composition   Government revenue is far too heavily dependent on a narrowing and shrinking tax base, which places the South Africa's fiscal framework under considerable strain.   Individual income taxes is the largest contributor to government income. It is followed by value-added tax (VAT), corporate taxes, fuel levies and customs duties. This structure exposes government to significant risks during periods of economic downturn, more so when unemployment rises and real incomes decline.   Since South Africa's tax base is so small, the over-reliance on individual taxpayers is particularly problematic. With only around 7.9 million taxpayers out of a population of over 60 million, of which 1 million pay 60% of all income tax, and 28 million welfare recipients, there is a serious risk to fiscal sustainability (Business Tech, 2025 (1)).   The regressive nature of VAT further exacerbates the already high levels of inequality, since it disproportionately affects low-income households who spend most of their income on consumption.   The decision to increase VAT by 0.5% - that is from 15% to 15.5% - will undoubtedly have an impact on consumer spending, as well as on inflation. Economists predict the increase could depress GDP growth by up to 0.1% annually and raise inflation by 0.25%. Given the fragile state of consumer confidence, any tax increase could further erode household disposable income and reduce overall demand.     Case study: Potential to reach the budgeted tax target   One of the economists consulted referred to research that he had previously undertaken.   In 2018, VAT was increased from 14% to 15%.  The total VAT that was projected by National Treasury at that time was R348.1 billion. The proposal itself was expected to raise an additional R22.9 billion. But the actual collection, that is the number released by National Treasury about two years later after the first revisions, was R324.8 billion, R23.3 billion below what National Treasury had forecasted.   But that does not tell the full story, because when one examines the breakdown, refunds were estimated at just under R200 billion, but it came in at R229, that is R29 billion more than expected.   This was due to the impact of State Capture. Under the previous Commissioner, the South African Revenue Services (SARS) was weak, there was corruption within the SARS system, and because of the widescale corruption, there was no public buy-in. People were disillusioned, so found ways to cheat the system.   Now that corrective action has been taken at SARS, which Commissioner Edward Kieswetter has to a large extent transformed back into its former efficient state, it is believed that the VAT revenue shouldn’t be far off of the VAT projected should the GDP growth be achieved.   That said, as discussed previously, the likelihood of a GDP growth being achieved is questionable.   Because what also needs to be noted is that most of South Africa’s economic growth over the last decade has been from consumer spending. Unless other areas of the economy and other sectors of the economy can stimulated, household consumption is expected to drive economic growth in the immediate period. It is important to note that consumer spending last year most probably prevented South Africa from going into recession. And the two-pot pension reform, increased household spending towards the end of the year, which further helped.   In the context of consumer driven growth, to raise value added tax, even if  only by 0.5%, will dampen consumer confidence and undermine the consumer spending growth. It is likely to drag down economic growth. In a VAT increase scenario, businesses are likely to pass on the cost to consumers. That, in turn, will drive up inflation. This means that any rise in VAT, even if it's only 0.5%, is unlikely to bring the revenue as envisaged by the Treasury, as it would depress other parts of the economy.   Customs duties, while a smaller component of total revenue, play a significant role in regional economic relations. South Africa collected approximately R160 billion in 2023/4 in customs duties of which it retained only around R80 billion (approximately 50%). The balance was distributed to neighbouring countries through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (SARS, 2024).   Even though only 10% of imports incur duties, these revenues form a crucial fiscal pillar for SACU member countries such as Lesotho, Eswatini, Namibia, and Botswana. Transfers to these countries of around 50%, a figure that vastly surpasses their proportional share of the duty-bearing imports. South Africa 97.4% to the pool (SARS, 2024).This raises questions with regard to the equity and sustainability of the current revenue-sharing arrangements.   The current structure of SACU revenue distribution not only strains South Africa's budget but also creates a dependency syndrome among member countries, where in some cases, these transfers often make up more than 50% of their revenue. It also serves as a disincentive for the diversification of their economies.   Consideration should be given to the re-evaluation of the SACU formula. The new arrangements should balance actual trade values and development needs in order to foster a more equitable regional partnership.     Over-reliance on a Narrow Tax Base : South Africa's government revenue is heavily dependent on individual income taxes from a small taxpayer base, which poses risks to fiscal sustainability and equity. Impact of VAT Increase:  A proposed 0.5% increase in value-added tax (VAT) may negatively affect consumer spending and inflation, potentially dampening economic growth and undermining consumer confidence. Role of Consumer Spending:  Consumer spending has been the main driver of South Africa's economic growth over the past decade, and any tax hikes could reduce household disposable income and overall demand. Customs Duties and SACU Dynamics:  Customs duties contribute significantly to South Africa's revenue but much of this is redistributed to neighbouring countries through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), raising questions about equity and sustainability. Need for SACU Reform:  The revenue-sharing arrangements under SACU strain South Africa's budget and create dependency among member countries, highlighting the need for a re-evaluation of the distribution formula to foster regional equity and diversification.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author    4. Public expenditure and debt dynamics   South Africa's commitment to social support - which includes welfare grants, health and education - is reflected in its public spending. This commitment, however, brings pressure to bear on the national budget. Education receives over R500 billion annually, aimed at improving school infrastructure, teacher remuneration and the provision of other educational resources. But, despite the significant investment, the outcomes remain uneven. The high levels of disparity between urban and rural schools persist.   Social services, such as grants for the elderly, children, and disabled, receives R431 billion annually. These programmes are essential in mitigating poverty and inequality, but cognisance needs also to be taken of its growing share of the budget. As such, they limit fiscal space for other essential functions like infrastructure investment and innovation.   Perhaps most worrying is the rising cost of debt servicing.   As debt-to-GDP levels increase, more of the budget is being absorbed by interest payments that reduce the funds available for development. The fiscal crowding out is becoming a pressing issue, because it is constraining the government's ability to adequately invest in long-term growth drivers, such as economic infrastructure.   The South African government's gross loan debt is projected to reach nearly 75% of GDP in the coming fiscal years (Trading Economics, N.d.(3)), which some consider high. The reality is that South Africa does not has a super-high debt-to-GDP ratio, it just does not have the growth trajectory to support the payments, which is the problem.     Debt per se is not problematic, it what the debt is used for that matters. Investment into economic infrastructure will serve as a stimulus to generate growth and future revenue to service the debt. Unfortunately, the performance in public infrastructure spending is poor. Creating opportunity through the reform of Public Private Partnership (PPP) regulations – which government has started doing - can serve to overcome poor spending performance. An approach similar to the lifting of the embedded electricity generation restrictions enabling the private sector to invest, is another example.   But as confidence in the country's fiscal sustainability declines, borrowing costs may very well increase, further worsening the ability to service the debt burden. This dynamic creates a vicious cycle that can only be broken by sustained fiscal consolidation and/or economic growth.   To mitigate long-term risks, South Africa's approach to public spending needs to be more strategic. Treasury will need to conduct comprehensive spending reviews in order to evaluate efficiency, to eliminate duplication and to improve the outcomes of its spending.   Investments in digital governance and fiscal transparency could enhance accountability and improve budget implementation. So too, a switch to performance-based contracts and incentives to attract the private sector into managing some public services will introduce efficiencies with concomitant savings.   Currently Treasury is making cuts to education and health personnel, which is not sensible for long-range growth and capacity, since this will negatively impact the skills and capacity needed ten years down the line.   Public Spending and Budget Pressure : South Africa allocates significant funds to social support, including education and welfare grants, but this creates pressure on the national budget and limits fiscal capacity for other essential functions. Education Investment vs. Outcomes:  Although over R500 billion is spent annually on education to enhance infrastructure and resources, disparities between urban and rural schools persist, indicating uneven outcomes. Growing Debt Servicing Costs:  Rising debt-to-GDP levels, projected to approach 75%, result in a larger portion of the budget being consumed by interest payments, which hinders investment in growth-oriented infrastructure. Need for Strategic Spending:  South Africa must adopt a more strategic approach to public spending, including spending reviews to improve efficiency, eliminate duplication, and enhance outcomes, while investing in digital governance and fiscal transparency. Impact of Budget Cuts:  Current cuts to education and health personnel by Treasury may adversely affect long-term growth prospects and the development of essential skills and capacity needed for future economic stability.   Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author 5. Infrastructure investment and economic revitalisation   Infrastructure investment serves as a major catalyst for economic recovery. It is therefore assuring that the 2025–2026 budget has allocated more than R1 trillion for the development and revitalisation of the country's energy and transport infrastructure (Magubane, 2025), since these investments will address key supply-side constraints, facilitate trade, and attract foreign direct investment (FDI).   However, for this to materialise, the existing implementation gap will have to be addressed, since projects are often held up in the planning stage as a result of bureaucratic inefficiency, the lack of project preparation, and insufficient feasibility assessments. Realising the benefits of infrastructure spending will require urgent improvements in project management capacity, procurement efficiency, and intergovernmental coordination.   Structural reforms have begun to create space for greater private sector participation, particularly through public-private partnerships (PPPs). These frameworks aim to de-risk infrastructure projects and leverage private capital in order to supplement public investment. Successful examples in the energy sector serve as a model that can be replicated and expanded to other sectors such as transportation, logistics, and housing.   Government should be the flywheel that crowds in capital. It should accept that it hasn’t got all the capital and it can’t do everything, but it can be the flywheel. It can allow infrastructure projects or supply chains or the regulatory environment to act as the stimulant to expand capital investment beyond its own sources.   The infrastructure backlogs in municipalities also needs to be urgently addressed. Inadequate water, sanitation and road infrastructure, serves as a barrier to development and hinders productivity and the communities' quality of life. Municipalities often lack technical expertise and financial management capacity, leading to underspending and inefficient use of grants. National government must play a proactive role in capacity-building and oversight.   In addition to conventional infrastructure, digital infrastructure is emerging as a key enabler of economic growth and development. Through the expansion of broadband access, particularly in underserved rural areas, new opportunities in education, healthcare and e-commerce can be unlocked. Government should, therefore, prioritise digital inclusion as a strategic component of its long-term infrastructure planning.   Special attention will also have to be given to reviving the manufacturing sector, which has all but collapsed. In the late 1980’s manufacturing contributed 25% to South Africa’s GDP. It now stands at around 9%. Contraposed to this, Malaysia also stood at 25% in the late 1980’s, but manufacturing now contributes around 30% to their GDP.   In this regard, more attention needs to be given to the beneficiation of minerals and other raw materials.   Infrastructure Investment Significance:  The 2025–2026 budget allocates over R1 trillion for energy and transport infrastructure, which is crucial for economic recovery, addressing supply-side constraints, facilitating trade, and attracting foreign direct investment. Implementation Challenges:  To realise the benefits of infrastructure spending, the existing implementation gap must be closed, requiring improvements in project management, procurement efficiency, and intergovernmental coordination. Private Sector Participation:  Structural reforms are fostering greater private sector involvement through public-private partnerships (PPPs), which can de-risk projects and enhance public investment in various sectors. Municipal Infrastructure Backlogs : Urgent action is needed to address inadequate municipal infrastructure, such as water and sanitation, which hampers development and quality of life. The national government should assist municipalities with capacity-building and oversight. Digital Infrastructure Expansion:  Prioritising digital infrastructure, especially broadband access in rural areas, is essential for economic growth and can unlock new opportunities in education and healthcare. Digital inclusion should be a key focus in long-term infrastructure planning.   Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author     6. The investment climate and private sector dynamics   Due to policy uncertainty, infrastructure constraints, and the private sectors limited confidence in the government's ability to deliver the required reforms that will enable economic growth, current investment levels remain weak.   Investors are hesitant to commit capital when returns on safer instruments, such as government bonds, offer risk-free and guaranteed yields of 6% or more. This crowding out effect is particularly significant for sectors like manufacturing and agriculture, where risk-adjusted returns are less certain.   For the private sector to flourish, it requires less red tape, and a clearer and more supportive regulatory environment. Delays in licensing, opaque decision-making processes and shifting policy signals deter investment. To address these challenges a streamlined regulatory regime, improved transparency, and a commitment to policy continuity is needed.   There are also concerns about South Africa's potential growth rate. A decade ago, potential growth was estimated at around 3.5%, but this figure has likely declined due to institutional decay and lost capacity. Rebuilding institutional effectiveness—particularly at the municipal and provincial levels—is essential for restoring investor confidence.   Foreign direct investment has also been impacted by perceptions of corruption, weak enforcement of contracts, and limited investor protections. South Africa must strengthen the rule of law, improve dispute resolution mechanisms, and instil confidence amongst investors so that they believe that they will have recourse to fair treatment.   To reinvigorate local investment, the government should support small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs), which are critical to job creation. It should take steps to improve access to finance, to simplifying tax compliance, and to tailor support programmes that will empower entrepreneurs and stimulate grassroots economic activity.   Impacting each of these interventions are the real and perceived anti-growth policies. The recently promulgated Expropriation Act being one example, where the ambiguity as to what constitutes ‘’property” and under what circumstance expropriation without compensation may occur lead antagonists to suggest that property rights are under threat. What is needed as a minimum is clearer definition; which definition should be defined collaboratively between the state, the private sector, civil society, and professionals in order to ensure that all sectors of the economy are in sync and sing from the same hymn sheet.   Such clarity will also reduce the potential for misunderstanding such as that of the current US administration who have embarked on punitive measures against South Africa based on what some infer to be a false narrative (Mbembe & Gilmore, 2025). The reality is, however, that differences in interpretation do exist.   Investment Hesitation:  Current investment levels in South Africa are weak due to policy uncertainty, infrastructure issues, and low confidence in the government's reform capabilities, leading investors to favour safer, guaranteed returns like those from government bonds. Regulatory Challenges : A clearer, more supportive regulatory environment is necessary for the private sector to thrive, as delays, opaque decision-making, and shifting policies deter investment. Streamlining regulations and improving transparency are critical steps. Concerns About Growth:  South Africa's potential growth rate has declined from an estimated 3.5% due to institutional decay. Rebuilding effective institutions, especially at municipal and provincial levels, is essential for restoring investor confidence. Foreign Investment Issues:  Perceptions of corruption, weak contract enforcement, and limited investor protections are hindering foreign direct investment. Strengthening the rule of law and improving dispute resolution mechanisms are needed to rebuild investor trust. Support for SMEs and Clarity on Expropriation:  Government support for small and medium enterprises (SMMEs) is vital for job creation. Additionally, clearer definitions around property rights and expropriation are necessary to prevent misunderstandings that may lead to international tensions and miscommunications.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author     7. Trade and international relations   South Africa's external trade environment is under pressure due to the emergence of global protectionist tendencies and shifting international trade alliances. The unilaterally imposed punitive tariffs of the United States call into question the feasibility of continuing exports to them at current levels, which can have a significant impact on the economy, given that the US accounts for 8% of South African exports (Mohamed & Moloi, 2025). Source: Stanlib in Daily Investor (15 April 2025)   Exporters will have to find new markets for their products as South African products and produce in the US will become expensive and uncompetitive. This is however not a short term solution as one market cannot be shut down today, and a new market opened tomorrow. It will take time to develop. In the interim manufacturers need to survive in the short term; the possibility of some not, is real.   Automotive exports could be particularly hard hit, posing a direct threat to this vital manufacturing sector. The auto industry supports thousands of jobs and is a major contributor to export earnings. The 25% tariff that has been imposed could be devastating for local producers, especially for small and medium enterprises that lack the capital to absorb such shocks.   Negotiations with key trade partners like the United States must be prioritised to preserve favourable terms under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).  Potentially, up to 200,000 jobs (125,000 in automotive industry alone) (Libera, 2025) may be threatened. AGOA in 2024 accounted for about 46% of total exports to the US (Business Tech, 2025 (2)), and somewhere between 3% - 4% of total exports. Although this may appear to be a small exposure, it does have an impact downstream, because a lot of the exposure is concentrated in certain sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing – particularly motor vehicles and component parts.   One economist pointed out that many manufacturers of component parts are not large enterprises and thus do not have the balance sheet to support shocks of this magnitude. Some concessions need to be considered.   At the same time, diversification of trade partners—especially within Africa and Asia—can reduce dependence on any single market. The strategic planning in this regard should assume South Africa’s graduation out of AGOA, especially given the fractious  relationship between US and South Africa.   Regional trade also needs reform. SACU revenue sharing, as noted, is skewed and lacks transparency. South Africa effectively subsidises the budgets of its neighbours, with little reciprocal benefit. These arrangements must be re-evaluated to ensure long-term fiscal fairness and regional economic stability.   The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) presents a unique opportunity to expand intra-African trade. However, success will depend on harmonising standards, improving logistics and investing in cross-border systems and infrastructure. In order for South Africa to position itself as a regional trade hub, it should play a leadership role in operationalising AfCFTA.   Global Trade Pressures:  South Africa's trade is facing challenges due to rising global protectionism, particularly with the imposition of US tariffs, which threaten the viability of exports to the US, accounting for 8% of South African exports. Need for Market Diversification:  Exporters must find new markets as US tariffs make South African products less competitive; however, this is a long-term process and short-term survival for manufacturers is critical. Impact on Automotive Industry:  The automotive sector, a significant contributor to jobs and export earnings, is especially vulnerable to the 25% tariff imposed by the US, which could adversely affect small and medium enterprises. Importance of Trade Negotiations:  Prioritising negotiations with key partners like the US is crucial to maintaining favorable trade terms under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and preventing potential job losses of up to 200,000. Regional Trade Reform and AfCFTA:  South Africa needs to reform regional trade arrangements for fairness and stability while seizing the opportunity presented by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to enhance intra-African trade through improved logistics and standards.     Summary generated by Grammarly AI, verified and amended by author     8. Social Considerations: Welfare, consumption and human capital   Social grants support millions of South Africans and serve as an important consumption driver. However, this model is not sustainable in the long term. With only a small proportion of the population paying income tax, the balance between support and dependency must be carefully managed.   Consumer spending has historically driven economic growth, but this trend is weakening due to wages that have been stagnating and persisting inflationary pressures. The recent introduction of the two-pot pension system, which allows partial early withdrawals, offers short-term liquidity but may undermine long-term savings.   Investing in human capital is paramount. The educational outcomes we now have in the public schooling system are quite unsatisfactory. According to one of the world’s leading development economists and specialist on education reform, Professor Lant Pritchett, South Africa is the single biggest learning underperformer relative to GDP per capita among low and middle income countries. In short, we get extremely poor education outcomes despite our high levels of public expenditure (Schirmer, 2023).     Education must be re-imagined and vocational training must be aligned with market needs. Programmes that promote entrepreneurship, digital literacy, and technical skills that can empower citizens to contribute productively to the economy, must be rolled-out.   Healthcare is another key pillar of human development. The proposed National Health Insurance (NHI) aims to provide universal access but faces funding, infrastructure, and administrative hurdles. A phased, consultative approach is necessary to ensure that healthcare reforms are inclusive and fiscally sustainable.   9. Institutional capacity, integrity and governance   Poor governance and corruption have been a recurring themes in South Africa's economic stagnation. State capture has significantly eroded institutional integrity, and has affected everything from procurement processes to service delivery. Rebuilding trust requires transparent governance, accountability, and a capable public sector.   That is, however, only part of the story. The reality is that we have been in as low growth economy for decades – we have an institutional problem, and constraints.   The first part of the constraint has the infrastructure SOEs, Transnet, Eskom, the water boards, etcetera, which are in disarray. Their roles in lifting growth by investing and driving infrastructure are not that strong anymore. And the breakdown of infrastructure has also driven up inflation, prices, the cost of living and the cost of doing business; and it has eroded savings. It has a deterring effect, or at least threatens to deter future investment. The Reserve Bank, for example, has warned that a breakdown in infrastructure is threatening the stability of South Africa's financial system also (SARB, 2024 (2)).   Municipal governments, which are key to local economic development, suffer from under-capacity and corruption. Reforms in municipal finance, procurement and service delivery will be crucial to achieving inclusive growth.   Improving the ease of doing business must remain a top priority. Urgent attention needs to be given to measures such as digitising licensing processes, reducing red tape, and clarifying land rights, all of which can unlock significant investment.   Civil society and the media are important watchdogs that enhance and ensure accountability. These institutions must be strengthened so as to ensure the protection of the freedom of expression and similarly, civic engagement must be encouraged, as both are vital components of a resilient democracy and economy.     10. Strategic recommendations and conclusion   South Africa's economic revival requires a multifaceted approach:   Accelerate infrastructure implementation: Shovel-ready projects need to be expedited and public project management capacity must be improved. Reform revenue sharing: Revise SACU arrangements for equitable fiscal contributions and reduced dependency. Promote private investment: Lower barriers to entry, improve investor protection, streamline regulatory approvals and reduce the levels of red tape. Target key sectors: Provide targeted incentives to revive agriculture, manufacturing, energy, and construction. Rebuild institutions: Focus on governance, transparency, and public sector training at all levels of government. Diversify trade and exports: Strengthen regional and Asian trade ties to reduce vulnerability to Western protectionism. Support SMEs: Simplify tax compliance and provide financial support to small businesses and start-ups. Foster innovation and skills: Increase investment in R&D, higher education and vocational training. Strengthen civic institutions: Empower watchdog organisations and ensure freedom of the press and civil participation.     Conclusion   South Africa stands at a crossroads. The choices made in the next few years will determine whether the country continues on a path of stagnation or begins a journey toward inclusive and sustainable growth.   The building blocks exist: a diversified economy, a young population, and robust institutions that, though weakened, can be rebuilt and restored.   But for it to be achieved, action must be decisive and coordinated. By implementing bold reforms, investing in infrastructure and human capital, and by fostering a culture of accountability, South Africa can reclaim its position as a dynamic emerging market and a leader on the African continent.     References   Business Tech. 2025 (1). South Africa has 7.9 million taxpayers funding 28 million grant recipients. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/budget-speech/816563/south-africa-has-7-9-million-taxpayers-funding-28-million-grant-recipients/ [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Business Tech. 2025 (2). R70 billion disaster for South Africa. 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[Online] Available at: https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/statements/monetary-policy-statements/2025/march#:~:text=The%20overall%20result%20of%20these,the%20better%20fuel%2Dprice%20projections. [accessed: 15 April 2025]   South African Reserve Bank (SARB). 2025 (2). Reserve Bank warns poor infrastructure is a major threat to SA's financial system.  [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/reserve-bank-warns-that-poor-infrastructure-is-a-major-threat-to-sas-financial-system-20241129  [accessed: 15 April 2025]   South African Revenue Services (SARS). 2024. Media release: Joint media statement National Treasury and South African Revenue Service on the release of the 17th annual edition of Tax Statistics. [Online} Available at: https://www.sars.gov.za/latest-news/media-release-joint-media-statement-national-treasury-and-south-african-revenue-service-on-the-release-of-the-17th-annual-edition-of-tax-statistics/#:~:text=In%20the%202023/24%20fiscal,9%20billion%20(R32. [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025. Statistics South Africa on official unemployment rate in third quarter of 2024. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/statistics-south-africa-official-unemployment-rate-third-quarter-2024-12-nov#:~:text=The%20official%20unemployment%20rate%20was,persons%20to%208%2C0%20million [accessed 15 April 2025]   Trading Economics. N.d.(1) South Africa Business Confidence. [Online] Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/business-confidence [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Trading Economics. N.d.(2). South Africa Consumer Confidence. [Online] Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/consumer-confidence [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Trading Economics. N.d.(3). South Africa Government Debt-to-GDP. [Online] Available at: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/government-debt-to-gdp#:~:text=In%20the%20long%2Dterm%2C%20the,according%20to%20our%20econometric%20models. [accessed: 15 April 2025]   Treasury.2025. 2025 Budget. Budget Review. [Online] Available: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20Budget/2025/review/FullBR.pdf [accessed: 15 April 20125] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The inclusive Society Institute, represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, attended the Civil Society Policy Forum 2025 on Wednesday, 23 April 2025. The meeting was held at the Headquarters of the International Monetary Fund in Washington and Online. The focus of the meeting was on hidden debt and how to tackle grand corruption in debt management in order to safeguard financing for development.   Debt is essential for the economy. But what happens when it is captured, mismanaged, acquired improperly, or hidden? Amid increasing democratic backlash, greater transparency and accountability in debt are urgently needed. The session also explored lessons from Mozambique to shape FfD4 discussions on preventing debt capture and safeguarding economic sustainability and future generations’ welfare. Speakers included:  Daniela Patino Pineros, Lead Public Resources, Transparency International (moderator) Aslak Jangård Orre, Senior Researcher Chr. Michelsen Institute Kjetil Abildsnes, Senior Policy Officer - Debt Justice, Eurodad Sally Torbert, Policy Manager, International Budget Partnership Alessandro Gullo, Assistant General Counsel, IMF

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is fulfilling its commitment to bringing the Constitution closer to the people by conducting impactful workshops at secondary schools across Gauteng Province. These sessions are led by ISI’s Schools Coordinator, Mr. Patrick Motsepe, who is working diligently to advance one of the Institute’s core mandates. On Wednesday, 23 April 2025, Grade 11 learners at Acudeo College in Kirkney had the opportunity to participate in one such transformative workshop. The session offered learners a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of South Africa’s constitutional framework, a cornerstone of the country’s democratic order. The workshop content is thoughtfully aligned with the Life Orientation and History curricula, addressing essential themes such as values in education and social cohesion. By engaging with these critical topics, the workshops aim to instill a lasting appreciation for the Constitution—an enduring symbol of the nation’s democratic principles and collective identity. In addition to constitutional education, the sessions also explore South Africa’s national symbols, including the flag and the national anthem, thereby fostering a stronger sense of pride and connection to the country's heritage. The timing of this particular workshop was especially meaningful, as it coincided with the commemoration of 31 years of South African democracy. Held during Freedom Month, with Freedom Day on 27 April marking the anniversary of the country’s first democratic elections in 1994, this year’s theme— “United in Resilience for the Defence of our Freedom and Democracy” —resonated strongly with the purpose of the initiative. ISI remains committed to educating young South Africans about these foundational elements of the nation's history and civic life, with additional workshops scheduled for roll-out across numerous high schools in Gauteng in the months ahead. Mr. Rampete, Head of the Life Orientation Department at Acudeo College, expressed his appreciation for the initiative, stating: “These workshops should also be extended to NGOs, CBOs, NPOs, faith-based organisations, and other civic entities. I would like to invite Mr. Motsepe to return and present the workshop to our Grade 12 learners as well.” The Inclusive Society Institute welcomed this feedback and is currently considering the request.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   April 2025   Author: Prof Jan van Heerden Editor: Daryl Sw anepoel   Table of Contents             Introduction      Models used      The core principles of the CGE models used in the simulations           The baseline forecast           The policy forecasts Macro-economic interventions      1. Alternative debt-reduction roadmap      2. Youth solidarity tax      3. Limited public salary bill increases Conclusion Bibliography             List of Figures             Figure 1 The baseline and policy forecasts Figure 2 Debt to GDP ratio (policy simulation) Figure 3 Increase in public sector debt above the baseline Figure 4 Government Deficits (policy simulation) Figure 5 Investment Expenditure and Imports (deviations from the baseline) Figure 6 GDP and its components (cont.) (deviations from the baseline) Figure 7 Industry survivors (relative to the baseline) Figure 8 Short run industry losers Figure 9 Real GDP % deviation from the baseline Figure 10 Change in the income tax rate on rich households Figure 11 Annual deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components (% change) Figure 12 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in main GDP expenditure components Figure 13 Cumulative % change from the baseline in Industry output Figure 14 Deviation from the baseline in household consumption by income group Figure 15 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components levels (revenue not recycled) Figure 16 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components (revenue recycled) Figure 17 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the Supply Side components of GDP, as well as real wages and the CPI. Introduction   The report below is a summary of a more technical modelling report of three macroeconomic simulations done for the Inclusive Society Institute in 2024. The three macroeconomic interventions are listed in the textbox at below.    Macro-economic interventions   Alternative debt-reduction roadmap – increase debt to GDP to 100 percent over the next five years followed by a systematic reduction. Proviso: increased debt ringfenced purely for economic infrastructure development, NO consumption spending.   Youth solidarity tax: Increase personal tax by one percent for all taxpayers earning R600,001+ per annum. In the form of a transitional tax for five years only. Ringfenced for youth enterprise development to be administered by the Solidarity Fund. See if this can be funded by delaying inflationary bracket adjustments over the next two or three years.   Limit the public salary bill increases to inflation   Models used   The study was done using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. The Department of Economics at the University of Pretoria has various CGE models, with the same core set of equations, but with different extensions, depending on the tasks at hand. We have used three different models for the simulations: (i) The national model was used for the first macroeconomic intervention where the debt-to-GDP ratio was increased temporarily; (ii) An older version of the provincial TERM model was used for the remaining two macroeconomic interventions, since the national model does not have income taxes (personal or corporate) integrated into the model, and (iii) the latest version of our provincial TERM model was used for some sectoral interventions, included in the technical report, but not reported on here.     The core principles of the CGE models used in the simulations   A CGE model is basically a system of thousands of equations describing the relationships that exist in the economy. It uses data from Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), namely the Supply and Use tables, which resembles a snapshot of the economy at a specific point in time. The Supply and Use tables show that the economy is in equilibrium, or balanced, in the sense that the supply and demand for every commodity or factor of production is equal at that point in time. So, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) starts with a general equilibrium of all goods, services and factors of production in the economy, and then uses a computer to solve a very large system of equations that describes all the relationships between role players in the economy. We start with equilibrium and then change one or two things in the model, such as a tax rate or spending by the government, or investment by the private sector, and then let the computer calculate the values that will hold in a new equilibrium. A CGE model could be a national model that studies the economy of the country at large, or a multi-regional CGE model which treats each province of South Africa as a separate economy. The regional model not only studies the equilibria of each province, but could also calculate the effects that actions of one province would have on the national economy as well as on all other province.   The equations of the CGE model describe the relationships between all the role-players in the economy, namely the Industries, Households, Investors, Governments and Foreigner buyers, who could be foreign industries, households, investors, or governments, or merely buyers from other provinces in the case of the regional models.   Unlike the Australian CGE model, we have multiple households in our South African models, namely twelve groups distinguished by income: we have the poorest decile split into two ventiles; then the eight next deciles by income, and finally the richest decile also split into two ventiles. The model is therefore very well suited to measure changes in the income distribution or poverty levels. In the older models we had 48 household groups, by income as well as race group.   The basic production function for all industry production is the so-called Leontief function, which means that inputs into the production process are used in fixed proportions: if an industry wants to double output, it has to double all inputs, irrespective of input prices. The Leontief production function is generally accepted by economists world-wide: for example, to produce one car, the factory needs four wheels, one engine, one steering wheel, etc., and to produce ten of those cars, it will need ten times as many wheels, engines, steering wheels, and so forth. Even though we assume that the basic production function has this simple form, industries can choose where  to buy their intermediate inputs from, according to CES [1] demand functions: depending on relative prices and the substitutability of the goods from different sources, industries may decide to source their inputs from the local market, or from abroad, depending on price.   Transportation cost in the model plays a very important role, and is included in the purchaser’s price of a commodity. A buyer would therefore rather source from a nearby industry than from one far away. Distances between the capitals of the nine provinces as well as to the different ports of import and export are used to build a gravity  mechanism, determining where industries would source their inputs from, or which ports of import and export they will use.   The demand for factors of production also follows the CES functional form: an average level of factors grows proportionally with output, according to the Leontief  function, but an industry could substitute labour for capital or vice versa. Labour demand is also modelled using the CES demand functional form: once the industry has decided about the capital-labour ratio it prefers, different occupational groups – we have 11 in the model – are chosen: different wage levels play a strong role, as well as the substitutability of one occupation for another.    Export demand is a very simple function of domestic versus foreign prices of commodities: if South Africa’s price levels increase relative to world prices, which are exogenous in our model, then the demand for South African commodities decrease. Since South Africa is a small open economy, exports play a very significant role in the model.   Household demand follows the LES (Linear Expenditure System) format: households have a subsistence demand for all commodities, which they will buy first, without looking at the price of the goods. Then they will use the money left over in their budgets to buy “luxury” components of the same goods. For example, we have a subsistence demand for petrol to drive to work every day, but when we go on holiday, the demand for petrol becomes a luxury demand. Subsistence demand is not a function of the price of a good – it is a must have - but luxury demand is a function of the disposable incomes of households.   Unlike households, who maximise utility, given their budget constraints, and industries, who minimize costs or maximise profits, given certain quantities to be produced, we do not have a theory of government in the model. We model the government in two possible ways: (i) exogenously, with its behaviour determined by the modeler (from information published by the government itself, such as in the regular medium-term budget information sessions), or (ii) endogenously, and specifically tied to household behaviour. Governments receive direct and indirect tax income, as well as transfers from all the role players in the economy. The indirect taxes could be modelled as GST’s or a VAT system, and we use the latter. Individual households as well as companies pay direct income taxes as well, while we also have production taxes and subsidies in the model. The government could borrow and build up debt over time, which needs to be serviced on an annual basis. In our simulation we keep the annual government budgets balanced: they give grants to all households, but need to raise either indirect or direct taxes to finance the grants, or a combination of the two types of taxes.   The general method of performing dynamic simulations with a CGE model is to start with a baseline forecast of the macroeconomy, without the economic interventions that we try to implement. A second forecast – the policy simulation – is then performed and compared to the baseline. We generally only report the deviations from the baseline that happen as a result of the policy simulations. So, to some extent we always perform two forecasts: one with the current state of affairs, and a second with some external intervention into the economy. We are then interested in the difference between the two forecasts.    The baseline forecast   The task at hand is to compare the results of three simulations, suggested by the Inclusive Society Institute, to a “baseline” forecast. Any economic forecast is difficult, so we try to keep the baseline forecast as simple as possible. We would typically incorporate macroeconomic forecast data from the National Treasury of South Africa and the International Monetary Fund, amongst others. Specifically, we adopt forecasts for the GDP expenditure components, employment and population growth. We do a “vanilla” forecast, which means that we assume the economy would run on a smooth and moderate path, rather than jumping up and down in a zig-zag fashion. For this study we adopted the strategy of gradually bringing the economy to GDP real growth of around 2% in 2026, and keep it at that level throughout the forecast period.   The policy forecasts   The baseline graphs of all the variables are usually quite smooth, especially of the future forecast values of the variables. We then apply “shocks” to the model – suggested by the Inclusive Society Institute -  by changing one or more of the exogenous variables in the model, which will then alter the smooth path of all the model variables to higher or lower levels than in the baseline. In Figure 1 below the blue line depicts the baseline path of some variable from 2023 to 2039. In 2026 some policy measure is implemented which alters the path of the variable to the orange line. We are typically interested in the size of the deviation from the baseline , and not necessarily the absolute values of the baseline and policy variable values.   Figure 1 The baseline and policy forecasts   Macro-economic interventions   1. Alternative debt-reduction roadmap   The first macroeconomic intervention to be modelled was to “increase debt-to-GDP to 100 percent over the next five years followed by a systematic reduction”, with the proviso that “increased debt (would be) ringfenced purely for economic infrastructure development (and) NO consumption spending”.   It might sound like simple tasks to “increase debt-to-GDP ratio” and “build economic infrastructure” but unfortunately neither task is straight forward.   Debt is built up over time when government expenditure exceeds government income from year to year, so, to increase the debt-to-GDP ratio, the government needs to spend more , or receive less  income , given the size of the GDP. To build infrastructure (and not spend on consumption goods) is tricky in our models. The model database has as its core the National Supply and Use Tables, published occasionally [2] by Statistics South Africa. UN-DESA (2018) describes the Supply and Use Tables (SUTs) as follows:   The SUTs describe the whole economy by industry (for example, the motor vehicle industry) and by product (for example, sports goods). The tables show links between components of GVA, industry inputs and outputs, and product supply and use. The SUTs link different institutional sectors of the economy (for example, non-financial corporations) together with details of imports and exports of goods and services, final consumption expenditure of government, household and non-profit institutions serving households (referred to as NPISHs), and capital formation.   The Supply and Use Tables form part of the system of National Accounts, measuring all aspects of the GDP of a country. However, infrastructure   per se  is not part of the measurement of GDP! We therefore cannot simply increase government expenditure on “infrastructure” to increase the government deficit in a particular year, and hence the debt over time. The industries building the infrastructure do  have their activities recorded in the SUTs, such as all the commodities that they buy or sell, and the values thereof, but the value of old or new infrastructure does not form part of GDP. So, how do we respond to the goal of simulating the government increasing their debt and building infrastructure? (And answer questions such as” how much growth will this bring?” and “how many jobs would be created?”).   Simulation Design   The industry most closely linked to the building of infrastructure is the Construction Industry, so one might let the government buy more Construction Goods and Services, increasing the deficit in that way. However, even if the government would buy all the available Construction Goods and Services, it would not increase the deficit enough to reach the 100% goal of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, the government does not actually buy any Construction Goods and Services in the model: of their total expenditure, less than 1% goes to Construction Goods and Services. So, even if they would start buying all available Construction Goods and Services, it would not lead to more or better infrastructure, since they are not directly involved in infrastructure development. Private firms  are hired to build infrastructure, and they do buy significant amounts of Construction Goods and Services, when they increase their investment spending. Even though the government does not buy much Construction Goods or Services, or spend much directly on infrastructure, we could let them subsidize everyone else who does! So, in our simulation we let the government borrow funds (increase their debt) and use the funds to subsidize all investment expenditure. All Investment expenditure in the model takes place according to a fixed recipe: one unit of investment has specific inputs into its production process, and Construction Goods and Services form 64,9% of all domestic inputs into the production of Investment Goods. This means that any R100 spent on Investment in the model would automatically buy R64,90 worth of Construction Goods or Services, and the rest on other inputs such as transport equipment, real estate, business services, etc., which are converted into what we know as infrastructure.   In our view all capital goods in the economy, whether privately or publicly owned, form part of the total economic infrastructure. Capital goods are produced through investment activities and Construction Goods and services form more than half of all investment. So, a subsidy on investment would be the best avenue in our model to improve the general infrastructure in the model.   Simulation Results   Figure 2 shows the results for the debt-to-GDP ratio in our simulation. We could not reach a higher level than 84% of GDP without crashing the model, using a subsidy on all investment activities. CGE models are designed for small shocks to their variables: we typically start with the economy in equilibrium and then apply small changes to one or more variables, and let the computer find a new equilibrium accordingly. We then compare the two equilibria and make conclusions about the differences.  Trying to achieve a debt-to-GDP ratio of 100% is an abnormal type of simulation to try with any CGE model.   Figure 2 Debt to GDP ratio (policy simulation)   To achieve the debt-to-GDP ratios in Figure 2, we needed to apply a subsidy on all investment done by all industries in the model of 30% in 2024, an additional 20% in 2025 and an additional 10% in 2026. To get the debt-to-GDP ratio back to its starting value, we then had to remove the subsidies again from 2027 to 2030. Figure 3 shows the level of extra debt to be generated above the baseline to achieve the said goals, peaking at R639bn in 2027. Figure 3 Increase in public sector debt above the baseline     The government’s debt increases from one year to the next if they spend more than their income, that is, when they incur a budget deficit in a specific year. If they continuously incur deficits, the debt will grow larger and larger.   Figure 4 shows how the government deficit has to increase significantly at the start of the simulation, to achieve the debt-to-GDP ratios in Figure 2, and subsequently decrease again to get back to the baseline levels of debt-to-GDP.   Figure 4 Government Deficits (policy simulation)     The GDP components   The blue line in Figure 5 shows the deviation from the baseline in total Investment expenditure, which is the sum of all investment expenditure by all industries. In the beginning of the graph investment expenditure shoots up to 20% above the baseline, because all investment expenditure is subsidized by the government. It becomes profitable to invest and all role-players therefore respond to the government’s subsidy, and buy investment goods. The graph looks much like the one in Figure 4, because the deficit there was exactly caused by the introduction of a subsidy on investment expenditure in the first place, and then the reverse policy later on. The orange line in Figure 5 shows the deviation in Import expenditures from the baseline. Buying investment goods typically entails a high proportion of Imports (24% of all new investment expenditure is on imports), so we expect that the Imports graph should look similar to the Investment graph.   Figure 5 Investment Expenditure and Imports (deviations from the baseline)   Figure 6 shows the trends in GDP itself, as well as the remaining GDP components, Household Consumption, Government Expenditure and Exports. All the graphs show the deviation from the baseline, in percentage points. For example, the blue line shows that real GDP moves above the baseline and increases to 2,2 percentage points above the baseline in 2027. This is a wonderful result! The government borrows money and subsidize investment expenditure, and then the economy grows 2,2 percent higher than without the government’s intervention. It then decreases and lies below the baseline from 2029 onwards. The baseline portrays what would have happened without the policy intervention. So, the policy intervention of increasing government debt in the short run, is good for real GDP in the short run. However, when we apply the contractionary counter policy in the latter part of the simulation, real GDP would be worse than what it would have been for the last decade of the simulation.   Figure 6 GDP and its components (cont.) (deviations from the baseline)     The orange line shows that Household Consumption starts off very poorly as a result of the policy simulation, and then grows significantly above the baseline for five years, before following real GDP into the negative zone. The first two periods are very significant and poses a dilemma for the policy makers. However, GDP is reacting well to the policy intervention in the short run: it is the massive investment increases that cause the positive results in GDP, while households fare not good at all. The increased demand for investment goods as a result of the subsidy, pushes up the demand for construction goods, which forms half of all the components of investment. Construction goods also forms significant parts of many goods that households buy, such as real estate, transport equipment, all transport services, business and other services. The said goods’ prices increase relative to other goods, with the result that the basket of goods that the typical household buys, becomes more expensive than without the policy intervention. Households move above the baseline when we start to reverse the investment subsidy policy intervention in 2026. However, in the long run household consumption follows the rest of the economy into the red zone.   Exports perform better than in the baseline until 2030, and then also falls below it. The export equation in the model is very simple: export demand increases if South African prices increase at a slower rate than foreign prices (or decrease faster). With investment subsidies all industries benefit, and except for the prices of construction goods and a few other ingredients of a unit of investment, most prices fall, relative to the baseline. South African industries thus become more competitive in the world and therefore export more.    Industry winners and losers   Of the 56 industries in our National Model, only 6 end up above the baseline at the end of the simulation period, as shown in Figure 7. It is clear that the forms of their graphs over time are very similar to the graph of total investment in Figure 5 above, since all of them are closely related to the production of investment goods, or the construction industry itself.   Figure 7 Industry survivors (relative to the baseline) A second series of industry graphs simulates that of Household Consumption in Figure 6, and reading through the industry names reminds one of the goods that we as households buy on a regular basis: Bakery, Dairy and Grain products, Education and Health services and Water.   Figure 8 Short run industry losers     Discussion   Increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio temporarily to allow for infrastructure development shows positive results for all industries directly related to the production of investment goods, such as the Construction industry and other hard-core Manufacturing industries. Exports also perform well in the short to medium term because the industry subsidies make South African firms more competitive than before due to lower costs of production. Unfortunately, Households are paying the price for this policy intervention in the short run because many of the goods in their shopping baskets have become relatively more expensive. In the long run all the GDP components fall below the baseline, while only a handful of the 56 industries produce more per annum than what they would have produced in the baseline.   Productivity improvement   Fortunately, the story does not end here. Investment expenditure forms part of GDP, alongside household expenditure, government expenditure, exports and imports. It is a straight forward result that a subsidy on investment expenditure would lead to increased investment and increased GDP, if the decrease in household consumption does not outweigh the increases in investment.   However, why does GDP dip below the baseline towards the end of the simulation period and not benefit from the better infrastructure? Because we have not simulated the effects of better infrastructure yet! Until now we have only subsidized investment expenditure for three years, and then reversed the subsidy subsequently.   Let’s assume that the new infrastructure would improve total factor productivity in all industries, from 2027 onwards, when the subsidy on investment is completed. Figure 9 shows the percentage deviation from the baseline in real GDP as a result of the initial (three year) subsidy on investment and the subsequent removal of the subsidy. There are two graphs, namely, the original graph of GDP from Figure 6 above, and the resulting GDP (orange line) when we let total factor productivity in all industries improve by a mere 0,3% per annum.   The conclusion could be made that it could be a good policy measure to borrow funds for infrastructure development, because (i) in the short to medium term the investment itself would lead to significant growth in GDP, and (ii) in the longer run the productivity in the economy would improve enough to secure a permanently higher level of growth over time.   Figure 9 Real GDP % deviation from the baseline 2. Youth solidarity tax   The task at hand in this Section was defined as “Youth solidarity tax: Increase personal income tax by one percent for all taxpayers earning R600,001+ per annum. In the form of a transitional tax for five years only. Ringfenced for youth enterprise development to be administered by the Solidarity Fund. See if this can be funded by delaying inflationary bracket adjustments over the next two or three years.”   Simulation Design   “Youth enterprise development” is quite difficult to define in terms of our CGE model. The labour force in the model does not have an age dimension, and we are convinced that the youth is working in all of the industries in the model. What the model does have, is a labour force divided into ten different occupational groups. So, in this simulation we are modelling a one per cent increase in the income tax rate on all “rich” households, and recycling the tax revenue in the form of wage subsidies to three of the ten occupational groups. The three chosen groups are elementary workers , operators  and skilled agricultural workers . In reality, wage subsidies are paid to industries for extra  workers hired, but in the model, they are paid to all the workers in the three said occupational groups. Since the cost of labour comes down, industries would certainly hire more labour in each of the three categories, including new young workers.   Figure 10 Change in the income tax rate on rich households   In this simulation we define “rich” households as everybody in the three top deciles according to labour income received [3] .  Figure 10 shows the change in the income tax rate for the top three deciles of households, above the baseline.   Simulation Results   The simulation results look very good, and could serve as part of a policy recommendation to the government. The GDP Components   All the GDP components benefit from this policy intervention. Government consumption (yellow line) is not allowed to deviate from the baseline because all the new income tax revenue is recycled into wage subsidies, while all other government expenditures remain the same. The graph of Real GDP is hidden behind the Household consumption graph. Exports is the biggest winner, and it stems from the decreased labour cost to firms as result of the wage subsidies to some occupational groups. The CGE model is a neo-classical model, which means that all the savings on labour are given through to the consumers of the goods produced. South African firms become more competitive in the world because they are able to charge lower prices for their goods as a result of the wage subsidies. Lower labour cost implies that more labour will be hired, which increases the purchasing power of households, leading to increased household consumption. Lower cost of production also leads to increased investment, since investment goods are produced using capital and (cheaper) labour, just like all other goods.   Figure 11 Annual deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components (% change)   Figure 11 shows the annual differences between the policy simulation results and the baseline during the five years of higher direct taxes, recycled as wage subsidies. After five years all the GDP expenditure items move back to the baseline. That means that cumulatively over time the five years would result in permanent increases in all the variables above the baseline. This is shown in Figure 12: the expenditure components increase to levels above the baseline during the five years of the policy intervention, and then remain there. Take investment as an example: in Figure 11 we see that investment grows 0,1% faster than in the baseline, for five years. Then it grows at baseline levels again. Five periods of 0,1% growth each adds up to about 0,5% cumulative growth, which is the level portrayed in Figure 12. Figure 12 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in main GDP expenditure components   Industry Winners and Losers   Industries are very dependent on the GDP expenditure components that they are connected with. For example, the Food industry is strongly related to Household expenditure, while the Mining industries are related to Export demand. If all the GDP expenditure components have positive trends as in Figure 12, we could expect all industries to also have similar positive outcomes. This is indeed confirmed by all 30 industry graphs in Figure 13. It is clear that some industries gain much more than others, but in general, this policy intervention does not show any real losers.   Figure 13 Cumulative % change from the baseline in Industry output.     Discussion   This policy intervention looks very promising, with mostly positive results on the macroeconomic as well as industry levels. The increased income taxes would certainly harm some industries that supply consumer goods to the rich group of households who pay extra taxes in the simulation, but their harm should be compared to the benefits of other groups, to determine whether the policy should be implemented or not.   Are these results too good to be true? What is the catch here? If this is such a good policy measure, why does the government not just implement it permanently? Wouldn’t there be a significant cost to the economy if the rich has to pay more income tax?   Figure 14 shows the changes in household consumption for the twelve income groups in the model. The richest 3 deciles (four groups) who pay higher percentages of income tax are depicted by the bottom four lines in the graph. One of the groups (D8) increase their consumption, while V19 stays more or less on the baseline, with D9 and V20 dropping below the baseline in the simulation. The moral of the story is that higher income tax rates do not necessarily mean that household consumption of the taxpayers would decrease. It could, but it does not always happen. In the simulation the wage subsidy causes the cost of production and price levels to decrease, which could lead to an increase in consumption. The poorer groups – V1 to D7 – do not pay more tax, and all consume more as a result of (i) lower price levels of consumption goods and services, and (ii) higher total wage income for three of the occupational groups, due to wage subsidies.   Figure 14 Deviation from the baseline in household consumption by income group     3. Limited public salary bill increases   The requested policy intervention was to “limit the public salary bill increases to inflation”. We briefly report the results here, because most of the explanations of what would happen has been done in Section 3 above. Limiting the public salary bill is contractionary government policy, if they do not spend the savings on other priorities. We could expect similar results to those reported above.   Simulation Design   In the model we have three government “industries”, namely General government, Education and Health and Social Services. It is necessary to think about the government like that because they are employers of factors of production, such as labour and capital, and they produce something, namely “Government Services”. So, in the policy simulation we fix all real wages of the three government industries for seven years, starting in 2024, which means that nominal wage increases are limited to the rate of inflation. Since other industries are not limited in the same fashion, government wages seem to be lower than other wages and the model would let the government employ more labour. We therefore also need to fix the number of workers in government to avoid anomalous results.   Simulation Results   Case 1: Government revenue not recycled   All the macroeconomic results shown in Figure 15  could have been anticipated from what we learned in Section 3 above. Contractionary government policies lead to decreased total demand in the economy, resulting in decreasing price indices. South African goods seem to be cheaper than those of the rest of the world, so that exports increase. Household consumption would be less than in the baseline, because all the workers in the public sector receive lower wages than in the baseline, and therefore have less buying power. In Figure 15 below only exports lie above the baseline, while the other GDP expenditure components look very similar to those in Figure 17 above where the corporate tax rates were increased without recycling the revenue.    Figure 15 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components levels (revenue not recycled)   Industry Winners and Losers   The three government industries would perform better than any other industry, because their labour cost is relatively lower, by design. A handful other industries who are very reliant on exports also perform better than in the baseline, but the majority of all industries lose with the contractionary government policy.   Discussion   Enough was said above about contractionary government policies, so we would rather do something with the savings that the government build up through paying lower nominal wages than in the baseline.   Case 2: Government revenue is recycled   We ran a second simulation where we used all the savings from the government wage bill to subsidize the sale of Construction Services, to all users thereof. This should have similar results to our subsidy on all investment done in Section 1 above, because Construction Services forms about half of all investment goods, and  Figure 16 shows that this is exactly the case. The big winner is Investment that grows to 5% above the baseline towards the end of the simulation period. This is to be expected because all Construction Services are subsidized, so Investors’ cost of production is decreased. Real GDP benefits from the higher levels of Investment also. However, Households are again the worst off. Many people work for the government and they are being paid less than in the baseline, so their purchasing power is decreased. They cause a decrease in total demand for many goods in the economy, which leads to decreasing real wages and price levels, which benefits Exports.   Figure 16 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the main GDP expenditure components (revenue recycled) Figure 17 shows how a subsidy on Construction Services, funded by lower government wages, would distort the supply side of the economy. Investment is growing fast, which leads to the economy becoming capital intensive: the capital stock is growing while employment is decreasing. Even though GDP is higher than the baseline, Households suffer because employment is decreasing, and the employed work force have to face lower real wages.   Figure 17 Cumulative deviation from the baseline in the Supply Side components of GDP, as well as real wages and the CPI.    Discussion   This forth macroeconomic policy intervention should stress two important points from above: (i) decreasing government expenditure through lower real wages would lead to a contraction of the economy with mostly negative results on both the macro- and industry levels, and (ii) the choice of recycling mechanism is a matter of paramount importance.   Conclusion   The three macroeconomic interventions modelled above used three different methods of increasing the government’s spending power, namely (i) increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio (borrowing money), (ii) increasing the personal income tax rates on the rich, (iii) keeping government wages constant in real terms, rather than giving annual increases.   One fact that should be clear after reading the three sets of simulation results, is that increased savings by the government is generally bad for the economy if the government does not spend the savings properly. Keeping the increased revenue in or under the sofa is contractionary economic policy which decreases total economic activity; it is deflationary and mostly inefficient.   One of the three macroeconomic interventions showed very positive results, namely, a wage subsidy on youth labourers. The subsidies on investment and construction services also have positive GDP results, but these two recycling schemes would only benefit households in the longer run, and would therefore be unpopular for the government to implement in the short run, but which will yield positive economic infrastructure development to enable future production expansion and GDP growth.   This report should not be interpreted, read or understood as a fixed set of recommendations, but rather as a catalyst for dialogue on proposed interventions.    Bibliography   UN -DESA. (2018). Handbook on Supply and Use Tables and Input Output-Tables with Extensions and Applications. Available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/SUT_IOT_HB_Final_Cover.pdf   [1]  Constant elasticity of substitution [2]  They are not published on an annual basis, but rather every five or ten years, or so. [3]  One percentage point is very small and if only those above R600 000 were chosen the additional revenue would not get very far in terms of wage subsidies.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 3/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. M A R C H 2 0 2 5 Prof William Gumede Former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; former Senior Associate Member and Oppenheimer Fellow,   St Antony’s College, Oxford University; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg).      Abstract Despite evidence from climate experts that 6% of the world’s coal use must be terminated every year until 2040 to prevent a climate disaster, global coal use continues to rise. The global challenge now lies in securing a just transition from coal. Developed countries – the biggest emmitters – have made funding promises to developing countries that fall far short of what these nations need to transition and adapt, and largely take the form of loans that leave these poorer nations heavily indebted and without any power over how the transition unfolds. In South Africa, about 80% of its power is generated by coal. Mine closure will have a severe impact on millions of already poverty-stricken people. At present, South Africa has no effective plan to mitigate the transition shock on the economy, which could destabilise its financial institutions. So, how can South Africa pursue a just transition from coal that takes into consideration local realities, energy security, development and economic growth, indebtedness, and poverty, unemployment and social stability? The country has well-developed infrastructure, abundant natural resources, and critical minerals, offering opportunities to create a formidable green economy. The way forward is global funding based on grants and investment funding, a focus on technology to clean coal, a massive step-up in developing renewable energy, and a manufacturing, skills and technology revolution. But most importantly, is the need for an industrial policy based on a compact between the state, private sector, and civil society.   Introduction   Following energy shortages generated by the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Middle East conflict, many industrial and emerging powers have either returned to the use of coal for power, whether temporarily, or slowed down on decommissioning of coal plants.   A new December 2024 report from the International Energy Agency (IEA) said global demand for coal is set to hit fresh records every year through at least 2027 (IEA, 2024a). Coal demand in 2024 was about 9% higher than a forecast made a few years ago. The forecast from the IEA sees demand for coal rising to nearly 8.9 billion tons by 2027, about 1% higher than 2024 levels.   While there has been a global rise in the deployment of wind turbines and solar panels, it has not slowed down the use of coal. The IEA states: “Coal is often considered a fuel of the past, but global consumption of it has doubled in the past three decades. At the height of lockdowns related to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, demand declined significantly. Yet the rebound from those lows, underpinned by high gas prices in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, has resulted in record global coal production, consumption, trade and coal-fired power generation in recent years” (IEA, 2024a: 3).   “Separate to the rise in the use of coal due to energy supply shortages because of the Russia-Ukraine war and the Gaza conflict, accelerating demand for electricity around the world could give coal another boost. Our models show global demand for coal plateauing through 2027 even as electricity consumption rises sharply,” Keisuke Sadamori, the IEA’s director of energy markets and security, said in a statement (IEA, 2024b).   Climate researchers have pointed out that 6% of the world’s coal use must be terminated every year until 2040 to prevent a global climate disaster (GEM, 2023).   In 2015, global nations signed the Paris Climate Change Agreement, which outlined a long-term strategy the world must adopt to keep the rise of global temperatures under 1.5C, the temperature limit compared with preindustrial times (AP, 2025; UNFCCC, 2015). The Agreement proposed that all the world’s coal plants should be closed by 2040, unless they have carbon-removal technology.   A key challenge in the energy transition is how to make renewable energy fully replace coal generation, without imperilling energy security, development, and economic growth (Dresselhuys,   2024).   G7 countries battle to reduce coal usage   In April 2024, the Group of Seven (G7) countries pledged to end what they called, euphemistically, “unabated” coal power plants by 2035 (G7, 2024). It published a pledge to “phase out existing unabated coal power generation in our energy systems during the first half of the 2030s” to curb the rise in global greenhouse gas emissions (G7, 2024).   The G7 nations – the UK, US, Canada, France, Italy, Germany and Japan –had for years struggled to reach agreement on phasing out coal. These seven countries are collectively responsible for one-fifth of global greenhouse gas emissions (Fyson et al, 2022).   The G7 left space for members to continue to use coal beyond the deadline if plants are fitted with carbon-capture technology to prevent emissions from entering the atmosphere. Many G7 and European Union member countries have transitioned from coal to natural gas, which “has acted as a lower-carbon ‘bridge fuel’” (Dresselhuys,   2024).   Germany and the UK have nine coal-fired power plants each in the list of the top 30 CO2-polluting thermal power plants in the EU, according to a July 2024 report called “Europe’s Dirty 30” released today by CAN Europe, World Wildlife Fund, the European Environmental Bureau, the Health and Environment Alliance, and Climate Alliance Germany.   Germany uses more coal to generate electricity than any other EU country, while the UK comes third in absolute coal consumption for power after Poland, according to the “Europe’s Dirty 30” report.   Germany, Europe’s largest economy, was set to phase out coal by 2030. The German statistics office Destatis reported that during July and September 2022, more than a third (36.3%) of the electricity fed into the German power grids came from coal-fired power plants, compared with 31.9% in the third quarter of 2021 (Eckert & Sims, 2022).   In October 2023, to avoid winter power shortages and to replace scarce natural gas, after a sudden drop in Russian imports to Germany, the German Cabinet approved putting on-reserve lignite-fired power plants back online from October 2023 until the end of March 2024. Berlin reactivated coal-fired power plants and extended their lifespans.   In its bid to cut planet-warming  emissions  in the region  by 55% by 2030  from 1990 levels, the European Commission in 2022 proposed a 100% reduction in CO2 emissions from new cars by 2035 (Pole, 2022).   That means it would not be possible to sell combustion engine cars from then. However, the German government refused to accept the EU ban on new fossil fuel cars from 2035. The EU has stated ambitions to reduce carbon emissions, including a pledge to become carbon neutral by 2050 (Le Monde, 2022).   In 2023, France extended the life of its two remaining coal plants, located in Cordemais and Saint-Avold, long after they were initially due to shut down ( Cossins-Smith , 2023). Many countries only temporarily shut down coal-fired plants to be brought back online during high energy demands or crises. France brought back its coal plants “as a precaution” to “ensure reliable electricity production” during winter. The French government aims to completely phase out coal power by 2030 ( Cossins-Smith , 2023).   In March 2023, the UK called on its reserve coal capacity to manage increased demand following a colder than expected winter (Ambrose, 2024). The UK had in the past pledged to phase out coal by the end of 2024.   Italy, Austria, and the Netherlands in 2023 started up their coal power stations. Italy’s Energy Minister told the country’s Parliament that the country was committed to stopping electricity generation from coal by the end of 2025 nationwide, except on the island of Sardinia (Reuters, 2024a). Italy will move to gas-fired plants instead. It had initially targeted to abandon coal by 31 December 2025; however, Italy’s updated National Climate Energy Plan was revised to end the use of coal only between 2026 and 2028 (Reuters, 2024a). The country is trying to coordinate coal exits until it has brought on board new gas-fired power plants (Reuters, 2024a).   In 2022, Austria announced it would reopen its Mellach power plant in the southern Styria region of the country, which was closed in 2020, over Russian supply shortages because of the war in Ukraine.   The Austrian decision, taken by a “small crisis Cabinet”, was to convert the gas-fired power plant so that it can produce electricity with coal. The Mellach power plant had been shut down but kept on stand-by for coal use when needed.    Previously the Netherlands had capped coal power to 35% of the country’s power output. In 2022, the Netherlands activated an "early warning" phase of the country’s energy crisis plan when it lifted a cap on production by coal-fired power plants to reduce reliance on Russian gas following the war in Ukraine. 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster pushed Japan to increase coal   Japan is the fourth-largest economy in the world. The 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, when a 9 magnitude earthquake caused explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, pushed Japan to increase the amount of coal and natural gas it used. Japan has increased renewable energy capacity, like solar and wind, however, shortage of land limits the expansion. Before Fukushima, nuclear power provided one-third of Japan’s power.   Coal makes up 32% of Japan’s electricity mix. Gas-fired power stations supply 34% of the country’s power. Nuclear power accounts for 10%. The country pledged that renewable energy would account for more than a third of its power generation by 2030 and it would achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 (Irfan, 2024).   Japan is the world’s eighth-largest greenhouse gas emitter. It imports 98% of its natural gas in the form of liquified natural gas. The country has large gas storage capacity, the world’s largest LNG storage capacity, which allows the country to use natural gas energy during periods of power downturns (EIA, 2024).    Although in 2023 two new coal power stations came on board (Jera, 2023),  Japan’s target is to reduce the share of coal in electric generation from 32% to 19% by 2030. The country’s policies over the past two decades have focused on “clean coal”.   The government not only intends, over time, to get rid of old and inefficient coal power stations, but it is also prioritising developing technologies that reduce emissions from coal. Since 2023, new coal-fired power stations must come with emission reduction measures (EIA, 2024).   It is also working on increasing the efficiency of coal stations through “integrated-gasification combined-cycle infrastructure, carbon capture and sequestration, and fuel blending with ammonia and biomass” (EIA, 2024).    To continue to keep 12 GW of coal-fired power capacity going beyond 2030, the government has proposed “adding 20% or more ammonia to the coal supply or blending 25% or more wood pellets into the coal boilers to help lower CO2 emissions and keep the plants open” (EIA, 2024). The government is offering, for 20 years, a feed-in-tariff (FIT) paying coal-fired power stations for every kilowatt hour generated by wood pellets in a coal boiler (EIA, 2024). To qualify, coal power stations must keep greenhouse gas emissions under specified limits. Trump ascendancy to the US presidency may increase coal use   The US Environmental Protection Agency in early 2024 set new rules requiring coal-fired power plants to either shutdown before 2040 or if they stay in operation, to capture nearly all of their climate pollution. It is likely that under new US Republican President Donald Trump, who says climate change is overhype, coal use is likely to rise. Trump in his presidential election campaign promised to deregulate the energy sector, cut environmental regulations, and drill for shale gas.   Coal makes up 16% of US power generation. The US exported more than $5 billion of coal in 2023, as they shipped out more than 32.5 million metric tons of thermal coal, the second highest since 2017.   In November 2024, Texas and 10 other Republican-led states sued BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard, alleging they conspired to curtail supplies to further “a destructive, politicised environmental agenda” (Reuters, 2024b). Texas and the 10 Republican-led states said the large asset managers violated antitrust law through climate activism that reduced coal production and boosted energy prices.   The complaint was filed in the Federal Court in Tyler, Texas. Texas and the 10 Republican-led states accused the companies of exploiting their market power and involvement in climate advocacy groups to pressure coal companies to slash output and reduce carbon emissions from coal by more than 50% by 2030, driving up consumers’ energy bills (Reuters, 2024b). Republicans have used US antitrust laws since 2021 to fight what they alleged is collusion among investment managers to combat climate change.   The lawsuit cites the defendants' investments in nine coal companies, including combined respective stakes of 34.2% and 30.4% in Arch Resources and Peabody Energy, the largest publicly traded US coal producers (Reuters, 2024b). The lawsuit tries to block the companies from making any shareholder decisions that will reduce coal production. Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, whose office filed the lawsuit, accused the companies of promoting an “illegal weaponisation of the financial industry in service of a destructive, politicised ‘environmental’ agenda” (Reuters, 2024b).   In January 2025, the six biggest banks in the US all quit the global banking industry’s net zero target-setting group, ahead of the inauguration of Donald Trump as US president in anticipation of pushbacks against climate change action from his government (Gayle, 2025). The banks that left the UN-sponsored net zero banking alliance included JP Morgan, Citigroup, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs.   The banking industry’s net zero banking alliance (NZBA) was established by the UN Environment Programme finance initiative but is led by banks. Members commit to align their lending, investment and capital markets initiatives with net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (Unepfi, 2024). In 2022, a number of US Republican states threatened to launch anti-trust legal action against US banks that are members of the NZBA for their commitments to reduce fossil fuels. However, the NZBA group amended the guidelines for action to soften commitments to cut fossil fuels.   In December, the Republican-led judiciary committee of the House of Representatives, the US Congress’s lower house, in a new report attacked what it called “a cartel” of global financial firms and climate activists and civil society organisations of colluding to “impose radical ESG-goals” on US companies (US Congress, 2024).   Countries faced a February 2025 deadline for updated country climate change plans. The outgoing Joe Biden administration in December 2024 proposed a climate change plan for the US in which greenhouse gas emissions will be cut by more than 60% by 2035 (Daly & Borenstein, 2025). On 21 January 2025, US President Donald Trump signed executive orders directing the United States to again withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement (Daly & Borenstein, 2025). Trump also signed a letter to the United Nations stating the US withdrawal from the 2015 Agreement. BRICS country coal consumption steady   Coal has dropped to only 4.4% of Brazil’s energy mix in 2023, with its use falling 5% between 2022 and 2023. Brazil ranks 25th in the world for coal consumption, accounting for about   2.4% of the world’s total consumption, and imports 89% of its coal.   Renewable energy sources account for 49% of Brazil’s energy mix, whereas the global national average for use of renewable energy is 15% (Argus, 2024). Natural gas has averaged around 10% of energy used.   Renewable energy – wind, solar, water, biomass, biodiesel, ethanol, green diesel, carbon capture and storage, sustainable aviation fuel and green hydrogen – is the largest energy component in Brazil’s new energy transition policy, making the country a leader in clean energy production.   Brazilian President Lula da Silva (2024) asked recently: “People respect us, because we can go anywhere and say: 80% of our electricity is renewable and 51% of our total energy matrix is already renewable and we can reach 100%. Who would have thought, 30 years ago, that we’d be talking about biomass, biodiesel, ethanol, that we are going to make the energy transition, that we are going to have wind, solar and green biodiesel?”    China enjoys new coal power construction boom   Fossil fuels now make up under 50% of China’s power generation capacity, whereas a decade ago, fossil fuels made up two-thirds. China’s share of coal power generation is around 60%, with its usage reaching an all-time high in 2024 (Slav, 2024).   Coal-fired power is enjoying a construction boom in China, the world’s biggest emitter may be turning a corner (Harvey & Hawkins, 2024). China constructed more coal-fired power plants in the first half of 2024 than any other country, presenting 90% of the world’s new coal plant construction last year (GEM, 2023).   China has been building the equivalent of two new coal plants per week, more than at any time in the past seven years, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air and the Global Energy Monitor (GEM, 2023). In coal producing areas in northern China, such as Shaanxi, coal employs more than 8% of the workforce (Tridimas, 2024).   China repositioned coal as a source of continuing use following the 2022 drought the country experienced, which reduced the country’s hydroelectricity capacity, causing factory closures, and the war in Ukraine, which caused global energy shortages and price fluctuations. China sees coal as not only a backup for renewables during weather crises or high energy demand, but also as a form of energy security (GEM, 2023).   China’s grid has many inefficiencies – the country struggles to share power across regions during shortages, energy production is itself often inefficient, and it lags behind on storage capacity. However, the country has recently made big strides in building energy storage capacity (Xinhua, 2025). In China, some regions, cities and districts provide subsidies for energy storage power stations (WEF, 2024).   China’s energy strategy is based on the country’s leader Jinping Xi’s speech to the Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2022, when he said the government led by “the principle of building the new before discarding the old” (Harvey & Hawkins, 2024). This means that the Chinese government tries to reduce emissions in a way that will ensure energy security. India vowed to ensure its coal sector remains “vibrant”   Although India in recent times has expanded its renewable energy capacity, the country’s coal fleet is still the second largest in the world after China. More than 70% of India’s electricity needs are met by coal. India grew its renewable energy – wind and solar power – by 25 times in the past decade, to 195 gigawatts.   Peak electricity demand in May 2024 reached 250 gigawatts – and it is expected to rise to 300 gigawatts within two years. The Indian government wants to install 500 gigawatts of wind and solar power by 2030. However, the growth of renewable energy installation slowed after 2016. Between 2022 and 2023 the government only installed less than 15 gigawatts a year. It needs between 50 to 60 gigawatts of new wind and solar power per year to meet future demand. The decline has been due to delivery failures, policy inertia, and supply chain challenges (Arasu, 2024).   On the campaign trail in April 2024 ahead of the elections, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said India had achieved an “historic milestone” by reaching the production of one billion metric tons of coal and lignite. Modi said it was proof of the country’s “commitment to ensuring a vibrant coal sector” (Arasu, 2024).   India is planning to build even more coal plants. In 2023, India’s coal demand rose 10%, the biggest of any country. Coal demand in China in 2023 rose 6%, according to the International Energy Agency, and India’s electricity demand is projected to grow 6% annually.   India also suffers from a shortage of energy storage capacity to allow the country to use available energy more efficiently, with less than 4 gigawatts of power storage (Arasu, 2024). India subsidised fossil fuels to the tune of $350 billion per year, according to the IMF. The country exempted coal mining equipment from customs duty, gave knockdown rates for coal transport on long-distance rail, and provided low interest loans to build coal plants (McFarlane, 2023). South Africa’s coal use   South Africa in 2023 relied on fossil fuels for 83% of its electricity generation. The country’s coal value chain forms a large part of the domestic economy and energy generation infrastructure.   About 80% of South Africa’s power is generated by coal. Its well-developed infrastructure, abundant natural resources such as wind and sun, and critical minerals offer lots of opportunities for the country to create a formidable green economy. South Africa’s coal mining is 160 years old. It directly employs 100 000 people, and its ecosystem and indirect jobs and industries are multiples more.   Five coal-fired power plants and 15 coal mines will likely close by 2030 in South Africa, and another four plants and 23 mines by 2040. This will impact the livelihoods of 2.5 million people, most of them in Mpumalanga.    There are 66 operating coal mines in South Africa, most in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal, owned by 32 private companies, with the five largest companies – Seriti, Sasol, Exxaro, Thungela and Glencore – producing 77% of the country’s coal. Coal mines produced 231 million tons of coal in 2022, which translated into earnings of R28 billion and employment of over 91 000 people. And earnings would have been higher, if not for the crisis at state-owned entity, Transnet, which has resulted in lost export revenues of R22.7 billion in 2022.   Research published in the Journal of the Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy  said the closure of 15 mines by 2030 will withdraw 29.5 million tons a year (mtpa) from South Africa’s coal production, followed by a further 106 mtpa as an additional 23 mines are closed by 2040. This will have an impact on 69 mining communities and 21 municipalities.   “The impact of mine closure on the 2.5 million residents of host communities will be significant, particularly as levels of income, employment, and education are already very low and many municipalities are in financial distress,” according to the Journal of the Southern Africa Institute of Mining and Metallurgy  article authors, Megan J Cole, Mzila Mthenjane and Andrew Van Zyl.   The Journal’s authors say coal mining communities are concentrated in the western part of Mpumalanga and north-western KwaZulu-Natal, where just under 40% live below the poverty line of R19 600 annual household income, and over 39% are unemployed. Mine closures will impact on these poverty-stricken communities; and will reduce the funds for municipalities, businesses and income tax depending on income from mine companies and employees.   Renewable energy investment around the world has produced double the number of jobs compared to fossil fuels. “Many of these communities have experienced mine closures and do not have the skills and opportunities to take advantage of the inevitable transition, let alone the transition to clean energy”.   A recent South African Reserve Bank paper warned that South Africa has no effective plan to mitigate the transition shock on the economy, the drastic cut in coal production and utilisation that the country’s commitments to climate change goals requires (Monnin, Sikhosana & Singh, 2024).   Six industrial sectors are disproportionately exposed to climate change transition risks: the fossil fuel, utilities, energy-intensive, transport, housing and agriculture sectors. Around R980 billion of corporate credit loans of South African banks are tied up in sectors, called “transition-sensitive economic sectors”, which are vulnerable to the global energy transition.   The South African Reserve Bank warned that the transition shock, unless it is mitigated with adequate policies, currently absent, could destabilise South Africa’s financial institutions.   “Losses in some segments of the financial sector, even compensated by gains in others, may affect the system at large and trigger a degree of financial instability,” said the Reserve Bank researchers.   Standard Bank, Africa's biggest lender of assets, has defended its investment in fossil-fuel projects, saying the continent's energy needs have to be balanced with climate concerns (Burkhardt, 2023). Africa accounts for only 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Standard Bank’s exposure to coal mining, oil and gas, and power generation from fossil fuels rose 21% in 2022. The bank’s lending to green-power initiatives rose 84% over the same period. Standard Bank’s lending to coal mining, oil and gas, and power generation from fossil fuels was still five times that of its investment in green power (Burkhardt, 2023).   “It is not possible for Africa and many of the African countries to ignore the shortage of electricity supply,” according to Kenny Fihla, Chief Executive Officer of Standard Bank’s corporate and investment banking unit, said in an interview in 2023 with Bloomberg news agency. “Today's challenges are not going to be resolved overnight and therefore a much more balanced approach is required.” Industrial countries increased fossil-fuel subsidies   Many industrial countries have also increased fossil-fuel subsidies for their domestic companies and households to reduce energy prices (Black, Parry & Vernon-Lin, 2023; IMF, 2023). The OECD (2022) found that total global subsidies for fossil fuels doubled in both 2021 and 2022.   Industrial countries and emerging powers collectively paid out $7 trillion in 2022, for producing coal, oil and natural gas, in the form of subsidies such as tax breaks and price caps (IMF, 2023). The fossil-fuel subsidies increased by $2 trillion over the past two years.   Fossil-fuel subsidies rose during the global increase in energy prices caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the country’s economic reboots following the Covid-19 pandemic. The subsidies were the equivalent of 7.1% of global gross domestic product. China is the biggest subsidiser of fossil fuels, followed by the US, Russia, India, and the EU. Climate change funding needs to be sustainable for recipient developing countries   The UN estimated that combined developing and emerging countries, including Africa, need $2 trillion annually by 2030 to deal with climate change. In 2009, in the New Collective Quantified Goal for climate finance, devised at the Copenhagen Climate Summit, developed countries promised $100 billion annually by 2020 to support developing countries to meet their climate change targets.   At the 2015 Paris Agreement, developed countries extended the commitment to 2025. However, developed countries only met the $100 billion yearly target in 2022. African countries have called on industrialised countries to “scale up climate finance to make up for the shortfall caused by failure to deliver $100 billion per year by 2020 and through 2025”.   If countries like South Africa are to make good on their climate target objectives, annual climate financing commitments from developed countries need to increase more than tenfold to “at least $1.3 trillion (R23.02 trillion)” annually, according to South African Forestry, Fisheries and Environment Minister Dion George, speaking at the National Stakeholder Consultation on South Africa’s negotiating mandate ahead of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) in Baku, Azerbaijan.   At COP29 in 2024, rich countries pledged $300 billion a year for climate finance, however, the funding promises from these nations were criticised by developing and African countries as too little. The climate finance that is available often does not include funding for climate adaptation – dealing with the floods, fires and hurricanes caused by climate change.   “Without a dramatic upscaling of international support, developing country governments may not be able to implement the necessary pace and scale of emissions cuts to keep 1.5°C in reach, nor to put in place adequate adaptation measures to cope with the worsening impacts of climate change” (Fyson, 2022:5).   The G7, for example, has been criticised for the fact that “none of the G7 members are providing sufficient support for decarbonisation measures in developing countries” (Climate Action Tracker, 2021).   However, even where promised climate change funding from developed countries has been given to developing countries, it has been based on the outdated development aid model of developed country loans with conditions, including using advisors, companies and plans from donor countries, which in an overwhelming number of cases are misguided.   Such climate finance allows donors to claim they have contributed, but the donor money is recircled back to the donor countries, with high interest rates, with companies, experts and ideas – with little knowledge of local needs – from donor countries used as part of the conditions.   This is the classic development model, which has caused developing countries so much harm, with little positive impact, and with massive loans to repay, while doing hardly anything for combating climate change. Very little of the funding is fit for purpose.   An Oxfam analysis of developed country funding for climate change concluded that only a small amount of the promised funding has been delivered. And where money was given, it was mostly in the form of punishing loans, with very few grants. Not much has been provided to help developing nations with adapting to climate change. Worse, many developed nations have been dishonest in the way they report their financial contributions, exaggerating the amounts they have given.   Oxfam uncovered that many developed countries are guilty of misleading accounting, reporting funding for climate change to developing countries, when the funding never actually reached the supposed beneficiaries. Rather, the funds were being used to pay donor country consultants, agencies and plans.   Global private companies are reluctant to finance high-risk climate projects in developing countries. Firstly, private investors demand that African governments, or private companies, provide ‘bankable’ projects, often meaning low-risk projects with high or immediate returns. International funding for climate change should prioritise high-risk, low-return climate projects, for which developing countries struggle to secure funding. For another, funding should also prioritise start phase project preparation and development, as many developing countries lack project preparation capacity, resources and funding. South Africa’s climate change funding from developed countries will leave the country indebted, without a sustainable transition     South Africa received $11.6 billion in climate change funding from developed country donors to shift to renewable energy, and to prevent economic decline during the movement away from coal. Sadly, the overwhelming majority of the funds were old-style development aid-type loans, with conditions including the use of consultants, organisations and ideas from donor countries. Grants make up only $676 million of the total.   This means that South Africa will be indebted, while the ‘funding’ is recycled to donor organisations, consultants, and to generate donor-country ideas. Very little of the money is likely to go to South African organisations, expertise or South African-generated ideas, or to local communities. Furthermore, by ‘giving’ donor funding to developing countries, donor governments dictate to developing countries how they should pursue their climate change transitions – often without consideration for the context of these countries.   Yet, developing countries do not have the same power to dictate to developed countries – the major emitters – how they should pursue their climate transitions. Global climate financing from developed countries to developing countries therefore entrenches the existing skewed power inequalities in favour of developed countries.   Of the money, so far, $1.9 billion has been spent, mostly as policy-based loans to the government; the other large proportion has gone to agencies, consultants and organisations from the donor countries. Even funding that ostensibly goes to projects to revive the coal belt province, Mpumalanga, went to consultants, donor development agencies, or to support donor-originated development ideas. A planned green hydrogen hub, skills training and community development similarly went largely to consultants, donor development agencies, and donor country origin ideas.   In 2019, South Africa enacted a carbon tax, which industry has criticised as too onerous. Furthermore, Eskom, the state power utility, has been criticised for passing the cost of the transition to renewables on to customers.   It was revised recently and will come into effect in 2026. A National Treasury policy paper released in November 2024, indicated that the carbon offset allowance for combustion emissions will be increased to 25% in 2026, from 10%. This will be counterbalanced by cutting tax-free allowances from 60% to half in 2026 and by a further 2.5% annually until 2030 (National Treasury, 2024). The amended National Treasury proposal in the policy paper replaced a 3.5c/kW levy on non-renewable power with the carbon tax. The big challenge will be how to prevent Eskom from passing on the cost of the transition to renewables to customers.   Way forward for South Africa   The challenge for South Africa is to secure a just transition from coal. A just transition “is a process aimed at ensuring the benefits of a green economy shift are shared widely, while supporting those who may lose out economically, whether nations, regions, industries, communities, workers or consumers” (Teixeira, 2022).   Global funding for climate change to South Africa must be in the form of grants and concessional financing that can be allocated to create enabling environments for climate change investments. The funding for the just transition must not be in the form of loans, as is currently the case, but rather, it must be based on grant and investment funding.   South African Forestry, Fisheries and Environment Minister Dion George said that by “de-risking investments and creating new asset classes for clean technologies, we can unlock and leverage greater amounts of public and private finance” for climate change.   South Africa must either renegotiate the terms of the $11.6 billion climate change loans it received from developed countries’ donors, or change them to grants, and change the provision that says donor country agencies, staff, ideas and ideologies must be used in the design of South African just transition projects.   Countries have specific timetables to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy, based on their domestic circumstances. South Africa must identify a timetable that takes into account local contexts, one which ensures energy security, development needs, and stability.   “The South African approach to the just transition needs to take local realities into account, and the narrative must support an effective transition that does not undermine energy security and economic growth,” rightly argues the authors from the Journal of the Southern African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy .   South Africa must pursue a triple energy generation strategy: coal, gas and renewables. This can be done by collaborating with African neighbours to apply comparative advantages. Sadly, many of South Africa’s neighbours are politically unstable, with autocratic governing parties and leaders mismanaging their countries, meaning their economies are also unstable, so it will not always be practical to partner with energy producing neighbours to leverage comparative advantages.    Unlike many of the G7 countries, South Africa is struggling with gas resources. Mozambique, with its gas resources, has been run autocratically for years by the liberation movement Frelimo, and the country is facing a civil war. Sasol, the petrochemical giant, for example, has said the company will have to recalculate its carbon emissions target, set in 2021, for a 30% reduction in emissions by 2030, as it may not be achievable due to gas shortages (Faku, 2024).    Given South Africa’s coal bounty, there has to be more focus on technology to clean coal. Japan is a good example of a country that prioritised a policy of producing “clean coal” over the past two decades. South Africa can also fit its coal plants with carbon-capture technology, as many G7 nations have been given the option to do, to prevent emissions from entering the atmosphere.   There are lessons to be learnt from Japan’s “clean coal” strategy (Hakko & Petersen, 2024). Japan has focused on “efficient coal power”, which gets more energy from less coal through advanced technologies and coal plants (IEA, 2020). In 2007, Japan introduced the abatement technology of carbon capture and storage (CCS), which can secure 90% emission reductions. The country also introduced co-firing coal and ammonia, to reduce emissions.   Ultimately, for South Africa, there has to be a massive step-up in the development of renewable energy, wind and solar. Brazil is a great example of how to develop the full spectrum of renewable energy – wind, solar, water, biomass, biodiesel, ethanol, green diesel, carbon capture and storage, sustainable aviation fuel, and green hydrogen.   South Africa needs a manufacturing, skills and technology revolution linked to renewable energy. Green hydrogen is a key source of renewable energy in which the country must invest. Any laws or regulations, ideologies and policies inhibiting the development of renewable energy will have to be abolished.   The South African government must provide substantial incentives to families and business to install solar technology, like Vietnam did to kickstart its renewable energy programme (Govindarajan, Bin Mohideen Batcha & Bin Abdullah, 2023). Consumers who have excess power must be able to channel it back into the power grid and get compensated for it.   Coal power stations that have been decommissioned could also become sites for renewable energy generation and energy storage (Dresselhuys, 2024). Coal power stations can be adapted for renewable energy generation.   “These legacy coal assets offer an opportunity. Instead of abandoning coal-generating sites, many are good candidates for conversion to clean energy hubs where the large tracts of land and existing grid connections can rapidly connect renewable capacity without the need for new transmission infrastructure” (Dresselhuys, 2024).   South Africa will have to establish greater energy storage capacity. Kristen Panerali and Zhang Xun write that the industrial energy storage sector offers promising opportunities (WEF, 2024). “On the one hand, the market potential is vast, with an increasing number of industrial users recognising the importance of energy storage and showing a growing willingness to install storage systems. On the other hand, industrial companies are confronted with high costs of the procurement and deployment of energy storage systems, such as land acquisition, grid connection and financing” (WEF, 2024). In China, different levels of government provide subsidies for energy storage power stations (WEF, 2024). South Africa can learn from this.   To make it all happen, there has to be an effective industrial policy to make the shift from fossil fuels to renewables that involves the state, private sector, and civil society in a compact. Corruption, cadre-deployed state managers overseeing state implementation, and giving tenders to politically connected businesses based on patronage will have to be eliminated.   The just transition policy must be put together by local expertise, entities and groups, and with local ideas, not based on the outdated development aid model where foreign funding comes with foreign companies, foreign expertise and foreign ideas.   Conclusion   The challenge for South Africa is how to pursue a just transition from coal that takes into consideration local realities, which means not undermining the country’s energy security, development and economic growth, not leaving it highly indebted to developed countries, and not multiplying poverty, unemployment and society instability.   Many G7 and emerging powers have specific timetables to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy, based on their domestic circumstances. 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China’s new energy storage capacity exceeds 70 million KW . [Online] Available at: https://www.macaubusiness.com/chinas-new-energy-storage-capacity-exceeds-70-million-kw/ [accessed: 10 March 2025].          - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Deputy Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, and the Institute’s Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, attended a prestigious gala dinner organised by the African Chinese Women’s Association in Johannesburg on Saturday evening, 15 March 2025. The event coincided with International Women’s Day.   The Gala Dinner was held in celebration and appreciation of South Africa’s diversity by showcasing cultural exchanges between South Africa and China in order to help build cohesion in South Africa. The evening featured a number of high level speeches and a concert with musical and dancing performances by local South African and Chinese performers.   Speeches were delivered by the Consul General of China in Johannesburg, Pan Qingjiang ,  who undertook to increase exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and South African women in line with the unprecedented bilateral relations between the two nations. Other speakers included the South African Deputy Minister for Tourism, Hon. Maggie Sotyu, the Counselor at the Embassy of China in South Africa, Liao Xiaoying,  Li Xinzhu, director of South Africa Chinese Community and Police Cooperation Centre, Jenny Wu, chairwoman of the African Chinese Women’s Association, who is also a member of the ISI’s Advisory Council; and the ISI’s Chief Executive Officer. Click here for speech by Ms Jenny Wu   Click here for speech by Daryl Swanepoel

Good evening ladies and gentlemen.   Firstly allow me to thank the organisers of the event for the invitation to be here this evening. I am joined by the Deputy Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute, former Cabinet Minister Buyelwa Sonjica.   The Inclusive Society Institute is committed to the pursuit of a just and equal South Africa that works for all who live in it. A nation built on non-racialism and non-sexism, and in which people from all cultural, religious and social groupings live freely, and build towards the common goal of a united country that rises above the troubles of its past,  and looks towards a brighter, better and more inclusive future.   This evening’s event is a perfect fit with our objective. The invitation says that tonight we appreciate and celebrate the diversity of our community. And we will witness tonight how working together, playing together and socialising together, strengthens our character and make us better and happier people.   As an Institute we recently released our South Africa Social Cohesion Index . At an event in Cape Town the Deputy President of the Republic, HE Paul Mashatile, launched the report. Jenny Wu, your chairwoman was also there. We are proud to have her on our Advisory Council.   The essence of the report pointed to a country that still needs to do a lot to properly reconcile and build our nation.   The index reflects an overall moderately high level of social cohesion. But the overall score of 53.3 index points does not tell the full story. There are areas of serious concern.   Acceptance of diversity in the country has steadily declined from an already low 47.1 index points in 2021 to only 46.8 in 2024; Trust in institutions has declined from 50.1 index points to 47.9; Perceptions of fairness has declined from 42.4 index points to a mere 42.7; and Respect for social rules has declined from 40.3 to an alarming 36.6   What distorts the perception that South Africa is doing ok in terms of social cohesion is that across all demographics identification with the country is very high. In 2021 it was 73.2 index points and in 2024, 72.2. Were this not so, it would be just above/just below the 50 index points level. It is indeed the strong identification with the country that is holding the nation together.   Unfortunately identification alone is not enough. When one domino falls, all dominoes fall. We must work on every dimension that is required for social cohesion.   But let’s recognise the fact that South Africans from all areas of life and all communities are proud to be South African, and love our country. And let’s use that as the foundation to strengthen the weaker areas that need attention. It must and can be done.   That makes an evening such as tonight so important. When we socialise together from all walks of life, we realise we are all human, we all have red blood, we all have moments of happiness and moments of sadness. In essence we all just want a decent life for our families and for those we love.   Thank you Africa Chinese Women’s Association  for this evening. And for the initiative to celebrate our diversity, and to bring communities together just to celebrate and appreciate being South African and being human. You will be surprised how initiatives such as this build and strengthen the nation. Keep it up.   As the Inclusive Society Institute we certainly learn from this. We will be launching our Good Relations Programme  this year, which also aims to do just that.   To the Chinese community of South Africa, thank you for your constructive involvement in the lifeblood of our nation, for the businesses you have set up, for the jobs you have created, for the community work that you do. Know that it is seen, and know that it is appreciated.   Thank programme director.

Honorable Deputy Minister of Tourism of South Africa, Ms. Maggie Sotyu, Honorable Consul General of the Chinese Consulate-General in Johannesburg, Mr. Pan Qingjiang, Honorable Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in South Africa, Ms. Liao Xiaoying, Honorable Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute, Mr. Daryl Swanepoel, Honorable Director of the South Africa Chinese Community and  Police Cooperation Center, Mr. Li Xin Zhu, Distinguished community leaders, esteemed guests, dear friends, Good evening! As we gather here in this vibrant month of March to celebrate International Women’s Day, I would like to extend my highest respect to every woman present. Today is not only a time for women to shine but also an occasion to honor resilience, wisdom, and dedication. On this special day, on behalf of the African Chinese Women Association, I extend my sincere gratitude to the Chinese diplomatic missions, local government officials, community leaders, and friends from all walks of life who have continuously supported us. I also send my heartfelt best wishes to every woman here—may you continue to thrive and inspire! As the 7th Executive Council, we are deeply aware that every step forward for our Association has been made possible by the strong support of the community. Tonight, I would like to express my sincere appreciation: To the Chinese Embassy and Consulates in South Africa, thank you for your continuous guidance and support. The Chinese government and its diplomatic missions have always been our strongest pillar overseas. To Deputy Minister Maggie Sotyu, your steadfast support over the past three years has been invaluable. Your commitment exemplifies responsibility and leadership, affirming the South African government’s recognition of our work and inspiring us to keep moving forward. To our fellow Chinese community organizations, your respect and support have given us the strength to continue our journey. To the esteemed experts and artists from the Chinese Minority Music Academy, thank you for traveling across continents to bring us a magnificent cultural performance. To the generous sponsors, entrepreneurs, and friends who support our events, your kindness and generosity have made it possible for us to shine on this stage. To the members of our Cheongsam team, Hanfu team, dance troupe, and choir, your relentless rehearsals and sacrifices of family time to perfect each performance are truly admirable. To the event planners, program directors, technical teams, and videographers—words cannot fully express our gratitude. It is this spirit of unity and mutual support that has allowed us to create a remarkable chapter for Chinese women in South Africa. This year marks the third year since our 7th Executive Council took office. Staying true to our mission of “uniting Chinese women to promote social integration and development,” we have made significant progress across various fields: Cultural Confidence Every March, we celebrate International Women’s Day, providing a platform for women to shine and express themselves through art and culture, spreading confidence and strength. Social Responsibility With warm hearts, we continue giving back to local communities—visiting nursing homes, supporting underprivileged neighborhoods, and funding over 400 students in disadvantaged communities for six consecutive years. We have helped build schools and sports facilities, bringing hope to those in need. Integration into Mainstream Society As part of the Chinese women’s community, we actively engage with South African society, participating in social science research and African think tank forums to contribute insights for Africa’s development and deepen China-Africa cooperation. Mutual Support On this journey, we remain committed to supporting Chinese women in South Africa, providing assistance to those in difficulty and ensuring that every sister finds a sense of belonging and warmth, even far from home. Educational Support Education is the foundation of social progress. We are committed to promoting educational equity, sponsoring underprivileged university students, and helping them change their destinies through knowledge. Building Harmony We actively support the South African Chinese Police-Civil Cooperation Center and the cause of peaceful reunification of China. We participate in Chinatown cultural events, fostering dialogue and collaboration to enhance the safety and development of the Chinese community. Dear sisters, today’s achievements belong to all the resilient, dedicated, and hardworking women in this room. Looking ahead, we will continue to uphold our mission, embrace new opportunities, and work together to showcase the intelligence and brilliance of Chinese women on a broader stage. We will strive to contribute more to China-Africa friendship and social progress! May today’s celebration inspire us for the future, and may every woman shine brightly in the tides of our time! Wishing you all a wonderful Women’s Day, filled with happiness and prosperity! Thank you!

Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. Author: Percept Actuaries and Consultants Editor: Daryl Swanepoel JANUARY 2023 This research has been enabled through the generous support of the Embassy of Denmark in Pretoria, South Africa Content Executive summary Introduction Defining youth and youth agency The youth unemployment crisis A life course approach to inequality Perinatal Early childhood Adolescence Early adulthood Transitions into post-school education Transition into the labour market The experience trap Young women’s disadvantage in the labour market Financial exclusion Social exclusion Pathway support The young workforce Young people in the informal sector Key interventions to alleviate youth inequality over the life course Perinatal Advance the Maternal Support Grant Schools must implement national policy by supporting pregnant learners and young mothers to stay in school Early childhood Government must invest in the ECD workforce and quality ECD services Adolescence: basic education Implement early warning systems Open access to psychosocial support Adolescence: post-school education Support alternative pathways to a matric qualification Improve TVET education in terms of access and quality Early adulthood: transitions into work and between jobs Employer readiness Matching Social protection The young workforce Enabling environments Public employment Youth citizenship and political participation Executive Summary Policy discourse in South Africa is preoccupied with the country’s vexing ‘triple threat’ of poverty, unemployment and inequality. What remains comparatively muted in these discussions is the reality that many South Africans have the odds stacked against them well before they reach their second birthday. Young people’s vulnerabilities rarely emerge out of a single crisis. More often, they reflect the cumulative effects of multiple events and pressures, which unfold in young people’s homes, institutions and communities, as well as in wider society. This report takes a ‘life course’ approach to youth inequality [1] that focuses on five critical life stages: perinatal, early childhood, adolescence, early adulthood, and the young workforce. Young South Africans (aged 15-34) make up over a third of the country’s total population. They should be the engine of the economy, society, and democracy. But instead, nearly half of these young people are without work, education or training opportunities. While the working-age population is growing, the South African economy has struggled to keep pace. A key driver of youth inequality arises at the intersection of income levels, access to quality early learning programmes, and child outcomes. Children from contexts characterised by poor access to nutrition, inadequate living and infrastructural environments, and a lack of security and social protection have few opportunities for quality early learning and stimulation. They therefore enter school on a significantly uneven footing, vulnerable to worse health and developmental outcomes. Without the right support and intervention, this can impact their success in school, their future economic and social participation, and ultimately contributes to deepening inequality. South Africa’s inequality is intergenerational and cyclical. Despite expanded access to health, education and social security in democratic South Africa, the livelihood prospects of children often remain tied to those of their parents. Two-thirds of Black children live below the poverty line compared to 2% of White children, which illustrates the racial dimension of entrenched inequality. Hence, youth inequality is locked in place by stubborn racial and class inequalities that limit access to quality schooling, propel learner dropout, and obstruct transitions into post-school education and employability. Furthermore, gender discrimination means that women bear the brunt of social reproduction, with many young women forced to participate in unpaid care work. Regardless of their level of qualification, women also earn less than their male counterparts. The knock-on effects of these racial, class and gender inequalities show up profoundly in infant and children’s lives, which is why the recommendations propose a maternal support grant to safeguard perinatal outcomes. By improving mothers’ wellbeing and nutrition, the wellbeing and nutritional status of their children will be positively impacted too. This report draws attention to the important relationship between early influences and later outcomes in young people’s lives, while exploring their life trajectories in social, political, economic and cultural context, as youth are not a homogenous category. The analysis draws on transdisciplinary evidence to show not only how youth inequality accumulates over the life course, but also critical moments where policy and programming might intervene to alleviate inequality and safeguard more just futures for young people. This includes interventions that support pregnant women, invest in early childhood development, reduce school dropout, bolster alternative routes to matriculation and better match young people and employers. Introduction South Africa is widely regarded as the most unequal country on earth.[2] By January 2020, the top 20% of the population earned over 68% of income[3]; while the bottom 40% of the population earned just 7% of income.[4] The country’s inequality is multidimensional,[5] transcending income and wealth to include matters of land, capital, and access to quality public services. This multidimensional inequality also intersects with gender, race, and geography in ways that entrench historical fault lines. The country’s inequality is also viciously circular. It is both characterised, and reproduced, by a reality in which only four out of 10 young people have work.[6] While the working-age population has grown, job creation has not kept pace. This has given way to a backlog of young people without work, whose livelihoods are uncertain and whose opportunities of entering the labour market are narrowing. While there is stark inequality between young people and other generations in the labour market, there is also inequality between youth: young women have less access to employment, earnings and job security than men; and race and income remain tightly bound. Policy discourse in South Africa is preoccupied with the vexing ‘triple threat’ of poverty, unemployment and inequality. What remains comparatively muted in these discussions is the reality that many South Africans have the odds stacked against them, well before they reach their second birthday. This is because the inequality is intergenerational. Notwithstanding expanded access[7] to health, education and social security in democratic South Africa, the livelihood prospects of children often remain tied to those of their parents.[8] Any meaningful shift in the stark, and long-entrenched inequality will demand that we unlock the social and economic mobility of these youth. Defining youth and youth agency ‘Youth’ is a culturally constructed category, with different meanings in different places and times, and often involving contradictions[9]: The United Nations defines ‘youth’ as those aged between 15 and 24 years. In South Africa, youth consist of those aged 15 to 35 years,[10] as defined by South Africa’s National Youth Commission (NYC) Act of 1996. The essence of this categorisation, according to the act, is that because many older youth were disadvantaged by their role in the struggle against apartheid, they needed to be included in youth development initiatives.[11] Today, the extension to 35 years of age continues to speak to the ambiguity and dynamism of youth transitions in the country, where some markers of adulthood – like having stable work or attaining educational qualifications – might be delayed; while others, like parenthood or domestic responsibility may begin in early adolescence. Young men, for example, might be culturally assigned as adults while still remaining economically dependent. In South Africa, most young people in their early twenties have some work experience, and one third of women at this age are mothers. But they also move in and out of employment and education, and many continue to live with their parents, delaying marriage and cohabitation. The fluctuations between, and overlapping of, assumed ‘child’ and ‘adult’ roles is most powerfully symbolised in teenage mothers. South African youth undertake household chores, raise younger siblings, and are sometimes involved in paid labour. Yet, despite their participation in social and economic processes, they remain marginalised from the formal political and economic domain.[12] Dominant understandings of young people in South Africa have often reflected the political context of the time. In the 1980s and 1990s, researchers were preoccupied with young people as political activists.[13] Some positioned youth as irresponsible, irrational and uncontrolled opponents of apartheid, while others saw them as heroes of the liberation struggle. In both cases, ‘youth’ were treated as a homogenous entity, acting as one, with a unified set of motivations. In the early 1990s, a growing body of research sought to muddy constructions of youth as either ‘heroes’ or ‘villains’,[14] surfacing the complex range of motivations and circumstances that attracted young people to political action. Following the democratic transition, the militancy of adolescents who had boycotted against apartheid, stayed away from school, and challenged adult authority was rapidly recast as a liability. Nineties youth attracted labels like ‘the lost generation’ or ‘marginalised youth’ – a generation likely to threaten social stability. In the early years of democracy, the generation of young people who had left school to join the liberation struggle and were now seen to be ‘aimless’, provoked a sense of moral panic.[15] In the latter years of the decade, youth researchers adopted an increasingly policy-oriented focus, producing studies on ‘at-risk’ youth like AIDS orphans and street children. Some have argued that the dominant line of cleavage in post-apartheid South Africa has been that of ‘generation’, and that young people’s lives in particular have been at the heart of post-1994 change.[16] In the ‘new’ South Africa, youth are positioned amidst a range of overlaying tensions, as opportunities and constraints shift. On the one hand, democracy promises increased economic and social mobility for young Black South Africans, allowing them to aspire to possibilities previously denied to their parents. However, these new possibilities have emerged in a context of skyrocketing youth unemployment, a frequently dysfunctional education system, and other stark socio-economic inequalities that often make young people’s high ambitions unattainable. While the new constitution has protected the rights of children, especially in terms of independent access to healthcare,[17] this empowerment does not always translate into young people’s home or community lives. Instead, young people are especially vulnerable to physical, sexual and emotional abuse, and often take on a significant burden of unpaid household labour. To understand the lives of young people growing up in post-apartheid South Africa, one must appreciate both rapid change and oppressive continuity, which create stark ambivalences and contradictions in young people’s lives. [18] Post-apartheid South African policy has described the country’s youth both as the “greatest threat to social stability” and as a “demographic dividend”.[19] The former invokes a “ticking time bomb” of increasingly impatient, disillusioned and economically inactive young people. The latter anticipates the economic potential of a disproportionately large working-age population. Indeed, young people are viewed with both trepidation and tremendous expectation. These binaries have been symptomatic of political discourse for some time,[20] but fail to capture a much more ambiguous reality. By 2012, the South African Reconciliation Barometer[21] was showing that South African youth were optimistic about the future and confident in their ability to shape political decision-making, while at the same time being sceptical of political parties. Their expressions of agency and constraint were complex and varied, which was not reflecting in the dichotomies of policy discourse. Young people are all-too-often described as personifications of their circumstances – as instigators of violent service delivery protest, or as pawns in the political plays of organised labour, politicians and business. Rarely do we hear about young people as dynamic social and cultural agents. There is now a robust and growing body of ethnographic literature on the everyday lives of young people in South Africa, with the earliest antecedent being Burman and Reynolds’[22] volume, ‘Growing up in a Divided Society: The Contexts of Childhood in South Africa’. In the early 1990s, social anthropologists Mamphela Ramphele[23] and Patti Henderson[24] worked with teenagers from New Crossroads township in Cape Town. Both described young people’s everyday mediation of high ambitions and harsh structural constraints. This work has since been furthered by qualitative research on the gulf between youth ambitions and their ad-hoc plan-making in light of limited resources.[25] Acknowledging the “ambiguous agency”[26] of young people – as both vulnerable and virulent – might shift how we think about them, and how we intervene in their lives. The youth unemployment crisis South Africa is in the midst of a much-anticipated ‘demographic transition’: declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy have meant that the ratio of working-age people to dependents is changing, giving rise to a growing, economically productive youth population and associated hopes for an economic boom (see Figure 1). This lower dependency ratio is unlike other upper-, middle-, or high-income countries, and represents an economic opportunity that other wealthier regions don’t have access to. Young South Africans (aged 15-34) make up over a third of South Africa’s total population.[27] They should be the engine of the economy, society, and democracy. But instead, nearly half of young people are without work, education or training opportunities.[28] While the working-age population is growing, the South African economy has struggled to keep pace: according to Quarterly Labour Force Statistics (QLFS), for example, the number of people employed increased by just under 2 million from 2007 to 2019, while the working-age population increased by 6.5 million over the same period.[29] However, in the second quarter of 2022, the expanded unemployment rate (which includes discouraged job seekers) was over 72% for young people aged 15–24, compared to 51% for those aged 25-34 years, while the overall rate stood at around 44% (see Figure 2). This reality doesn’t shore up with the large economic opportunity presented by the lower dependency ratio. Figure 1: Old-age dependency ratio across the globe An analysis of QLFS data between Q1 2017 and Q2 2022 (see Figure 2) shows that this is not a new phenomenon. Rates of youth unemployment have been stubbornly high throughout the five-year period, increasing with the effects of Covid-19 lockdown, before returning to 2017 levels. And indeed, high youth unemployment rates long precede 2017: the earliest estimates of youth unemployment originate from the 1996 National Census, conducted just after the country’s transition to democracy and reported that 53.2% of young people between the ages of 15 and 34 were unemployed.[30] Figure 2: Unemployment rate (expanded) by age group Table 1: Unemployment rate (expanded) by age group Among the working-age population, vulnerability in the labour market seems to decrease with age: youth in the younger age group are most severely affected by unemployment. Because of this, South Africa’s unemployment crisis is often framed as a ‘youth unemployment crisis’. Yet the root of the problem is the scarcity of quality jobs, the structural constraints within the South African economy, and the challenges of industrial change, rather than with young people themselves. Undoubtedly, young people are uniquely affected, and often uniquely vulnerable. Relative to older adults, they have less work experience and financial capital, weaker social networks and are prone to higher levels of informality and in-work poverty. Young people’s vulnerability in the labour market means they are particularly affected by job and earning loss when financial shocks hit. National survey data show that, among those who lost jobs in April 2020 as a result of Covid-19 lockdown, young people were least likely to have recovered those jobs by October 2020.[31] We know that South Africa’s youth unemployment rates are significantly affected by high levels of early school-leaving which translates into low access to post-secondary education, and ultimately higher levels of unemployment.[32] More so, economic wellbeing is often an intergenerational transfer, with a large part of earnings inequality explained by the educational attainment of one’s parents.[33] But ‘youth’ are also not a homogenous group; there are significant inequalities between them. In fact, this report shows that young people’s future chances often begin articulating in early childhood, setting in motion a range of inequities that tend to widen as children move through school and into the workforce. Race, geography and gender, all of which are outside of young people’s control, continue to constrain the possibilities available to them in profound ways. In 2022, 8.8 million young people (15-34 years old) in South Africa were not in employment, education, or training (NEET).[34] The majority of this group are Black, income-poor, without a qualification, and live in households with no employed members.[35] Figure 3: Educational status attained by race Moses, van der Berg, and Rich[36] suggest that there are a few primary routes through which young people from low-income households can achieve social mobility and ultimately access the upper end of the labour market: (1) by attending either moreaffluent schools or better-performing schools in poor communities; (2) by performing well in Grade 12, despite being in a lowerquality school, and acquiring enough resources to gain entry to university; or (3) by entering the labour market at the lower end and progressing upwards. This report will show the immense challenges entailed in all three paths: from undoing historic inequalities in access to quality education, to reaching and passing matric, to gaining university access, to gaining any momentum in the labour market (Figure 4). On their journey towards quality jobs, most of South Africa’s young people have the odds stacked against them, starting as early as their first years of life. Figure 4: Road to South Africa’s youth unemployment rate This report is about how those inequities play out over young people’s life course and what strategies we might take to interrupt them, both to improve their chances of social and economic mobility, and disrupt structural patterns of inequality. A life course approach to inequality This report takes a life course approach to youth inequality.[37] This approach draws attention to the important relationship between early influences and later outcomes in young people’s lives, while also exploring their life trajectories in social, political, economic and cultural context. Young people’s vulnerabilities rarely emerge out of a single crisis. More often, they reflect the cumulative effects of multiple events and pressures, which unfold in young people’s homes, institutions and communities as well as in wider society. What happens to a child at each developmental stage is influenced by what happened at earlier stages, which means that for young people to reach their potential, we need enabling environments across the life course.[38] For the purposes of this report, a life course approach entails four levels of analysis, which have also been used in global studies of youth vulnerabilities[39]: The life course model frames development as a cumulative and continuous process and cautions against approaches to youth programming that would silo risks or particular age groups. It also implies that interventions should be tailored differently for different youth populations, given the unique combinations of risk and protective factors to which they are currently, and have previously been, exposed.[40] To see a life course framing in action, let’s imagine the journey of the average South African child (Box 1). In a recent article[41] by Percept and the Inclusive Society Institute, we called them Nation. Box 1: Nation’s story ​While pregnant, Nation’s mother will almost certainly be able to access antenatal care at her neighbourhood clinic. But she will also have a nearly 3 in 10 chance of experiencing antenatal depression.[42] Once Nation is born, important aspects of their emotional, social, and cognitive development, as well as their future health, will already start to coalesce.[43] The stimulation, nourishment and care Baby Nation receives will lay the foundations for their future learning, school performance, health and wellbeing. This, in turn, will affect their ability to participate meaningfully in social and economic life as a young adult.[44] ​If Nation is lucky, they may be one of the 6 in 10 South African children to benefit from the Child Support Grant in their critical first year of life.[45] This type of support is critical, since, as a toddler, Nation will have a 3 in 5 chance of growing up in poverty, and a 2 in 5 chance of living below the food poverty line.[46] This will reduce their chances of nutritional stunting, which is estimated to affect 27% of the country’s children, with ramifications for their future health, learning and earning prospects.[47] ​When Nation grows up, and becomes more independent, and their mother needs to find, create or return to work, Nation might be among the 32% of children (under age 4) to attend an Early Learning Programme (ELP).[48] These critical early learning services are delivered by a women-led, non-state and largely informal sector, including sole-proprietors, microenterprises and Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs). Since Nation has a less than 30% chance of their fees being subsidised by government,49 early learning will be expensive for their mother. ​By the time Nation turns five, they will have a less than 50% chance of being developmentally ready to start primary education.[50] This setback will make it harder for Nation to stay in, and succeed in school – with knock-on effects for their ability to enter the labour market and build a secure livelihood. This may sound like a deterministic outcome: how can we possibly curb inequality if it has been set in motion from the womb? But, in fact, life course research tells us that intervening at critical points in a young person’s life course can radically alter not only their own trajectory, but also the trajectory of future generations. This report draws on transdisciplinary evidence to show not only how youth inequality accumulates over the life course, but also critical moments where policy and programming might intervene to alleviate inequality and safeguard more just futures for young people. We focus on five critical life stages (see Figure 5), as described below: a. Perinatal (period in-utero) b. Early childhood (birth to 6 years) c. Adolescence/basic education d. Early adulthood/post-school transitions e. The young workforce Figure 5: Critical life stages Perinatal A healthy pregnancy is essential to safeguard the health and wellbeing of children in the critical early stages of their lives. For example, maternal stress, depression and anxiety in pregnancy can lead to lower birth-weight, increased attention and behavioural difficulties and sleep disorders for children.[51] One of the greatest victories of the post-apartheid South African public health system has been its improved access for maternal and child health. Since 1998, Demographic Health Surveys have indicated that over 92% of women access Antenatal Care (ANC) services. But the timing of the first ANC visit, as well as the number of visits, are also important for child outcomes.[52] While availability of antenatal care has improved, pregnant women are still not accessing it early enough: only 67% of women have their first ANC visit before 20 weeks in South Africa.[53,54] Despite the victories of clinic-based maternal and child health services, pregnant women in South Africa remain inordinately vulnerable. Research suggests that pregnant women in South Africa are 45.6% less likely than other women of reproductive age to earn an income.[67] In a Western Cape study, 71% of pregnant women were unemployed, and 83% of those reported no prospects of future employment.[55] The overrepresentation of women in the informal sector[56] means that many pregnant women who do earn an income will not be granted paid maternity leave. Pregnant women’s unemployment and under-employment has significant implications for the health and wellbeing of both women and children, and can deepen pre-existing inequality. Robust research has shown that many life-long patterns of illness and health, as well as emotional and cognitive development, are catalysed in a child’s first years of life, especially during pregnancy.[57] The physiological and neurological capabilities accumulated in these early years influence not only child survival, but also their growth, learning and ability to rise out of poverty.[58] Just over a quarter (27%) of South Africa’s children under five are believed to be nutritionally stunted,[59] making them more likely to drop out of school, struggle to find work, and live in poverty. More recent data suggests significantly more conservative figures among children (aged 50-59 months, or between four and five years old) attending early learning programmes, where moderate and severe stunting was found to be at 5.7%.[60] Growth deficits at a young age have long-term effects on social and cognitive development.[61] Undernutrition, with stunting being one of its more severe consequences, is not only a manifestation of poverty, but also “one of the key mechanisms by which poverty – and its consequences – are transmitted intergenerationally”.[62] Stunting is driven, in part, by mothers’ mental health and nutritional status,[63] and research indicates that pregnant women in poorer communities are experiencing high rates of food insecurity and depression.[64] Nearly four in 10 of the pregnant women surveyed between 2020 and 2021 in the Western Cape reported going to bed hungry in the previous week, while six out of 10 had felt depressed.[65] Currently, there is low uptake of the Child Support Grant (CSG) among caregivers with 0-2-year olds who meet the criteria due to lags in registration. Surveys of more than 5,000 children conducted between 2018 and 2022 in nine food-vulnerable districts in South Africa, show that 44% of children under one year old were not benefitting from a child support grant.[66] As a result, the grant is not as effective as it could be. Early childhood There are about 6.5 million children in South Africa under the age of six; 4 million of them live in the poorest 40% of households.[67] This means that the majority of children are born into contexts that make it difficult for them to realise their potential. These contexts are characterised by poor access to nutrition, inadequate living environments, a lack of security and social protection, and few opportunities for quality early learning and stimulation.[68] Far too many children experience malnutrition and toxic stress. Research shows that across all developmental domains, outcomes were worst among the poorest children, and best among the wealthiest children.[69] This means that children from poor backgrounds enter school on significantly unequal footing, with impacts on their success in school, and their ultimate economic and social participation.[70] The relationship between income levels, access to quality early learning programmes, and child outcomes, is a key driver of South African inequality. To alleviate inequality, we must find ways to reduce this gap before it is widened in later years. Although adults are still more likely than children to live in urban homes, a significant majority (57%) of South Africa’s young children (below the age of six) now live in cities and major metros, and this proportion is increasing.[71] Meanwhile, 3 million children under six still live in rural areas, primarily in the former homelands.[72] Rates of poverty for young children are highest in Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape.[73] Whether urban or rural, children who grow up in poor living conditions – with inadequate water, sanitation or energy – are vulnerable to worse health and developmental outcomes.[74] Poor sanitation, in particular, has strong links to rates of childhood stunting.[75] In 2019, almost a third (29%) of young children live in households without piped water on site.[76] Young children who grow up in poor households are at highest risk of being excluded from early learning and health services because they cannot afford transport to clinics or government offices, or because the fees of early learning programmes are unaffordable. Early Childhood Development (ECD) services – including nutrition, early learning, healthcare and social services – can facilitate children’s development and future chances, increasing primary school enrolment, improving academic performance and reducing school dropout.[77] Although access to early learning programmes has expanded over time, there is still stark inequality in the distribution and quality of programmes, and the level of funding from the government.[78] Deeply entrenched inequality is also illustrated by the fact that two-thirds of Black children live below the poverty line compared to 2% of White children.[79] Currently, only about 1.5% of the country’s GDP is spent on ECD, most of which goes to child support grants. A mere 6.5% of this budget is allocated for early learning, nutrition support and supportive parenting programmes.[80] While early learning in South Africa is a heterogenous and predominantly informal sector, the current institutional framework for supporting Early Learning Programmes (ELP) is geared towards formal and registered providers. This means that the vast majority of ELPs are excluded from any government oversight or support. Of the estimated 70,000 ELPs, only around 16,000 – 20,000 are formally registered.[81] ELP attendance is partly a function of age: children under the age of two are least likely to attend an ELP. But it is also a function of income – Figure 6 shows ELP attendance for children age 3-5 years old by income quintile. Figure 6: Early learning programme attendance for 3-5 year-old children by income quintile Source: Hall, K. et al. 2017. South African Early Childhood Review[82] The ability of parents or caregivers to afford ELP fees will continue to be a driving factor for ELP access – and indeed inequality – without wider and deeper public financing.[83] The first step to giving children an equal start in life is to ensure that all young children have access to quality and comprehensive early childhood development services.[84] If not, these foundational setbacks become more and more difficult to overcome as they move through school and into adult life. Adolescence Access to basic education has improved dramatically in South Africa. By the early 1990s, the country had near-universal enrolment rates at primary school level. Between 1985 and 2007, secondary school enrolment had risen from 51% to 91%.[85] Despite arriving on unequal footing, almost every young person in South Africa starts school. But, from the moment they enter a Grade 1 classroom, most will have the odds of success stacked against them. Only four out of every 10 Grade 1’s reach and pass Grade 12.[86] Rather than being a once-off event, school dropout is a process, propelled by a range of factors in young people’s schools, homes and communities that serve to either push or pull them from school (Figure 7).[87] Figure 7: Predictors of school drop-out The school environment can either be a protective or a risk factor in driving learner dropout. School is a vital space for education. But beyond learning, a quality school environment can also play other important roles in young people’s lives, offering them safety, socialisation, freedom and community. This can deepen young people’s attachment to school and make it less likely that they will drop out. However, many learners continue to feel unsafe, uncomfortable and unstimulated at school. Bullying, absent teachers, irrelevant curricula and poor sanitation are just some of the factors that make learning difficult and often drive learners from school.[88] An obstructive learning environment can contribute to learners’ academic struggles, which are another important predictor of dropout, particularly for those who start to fall behind early on. The early years of school are about building a basic understanding of words and numbers. Without the basic tools to understand what is being taught, further learning cannot take place and it becomes very difficult for learners to progress through the curriculum.[89] Robust research suggests that the South African education system is failing children in these early years.[90] By Grade 4, less than half of the learners who started Grade 1 three years earlier, are on track academically, and many are older than the expectation for their grade. In the poorest schools (quintiles 1 and 2), only one in three of these learners are on track.[91] Grade repetition is the single greatest predictor of school dropout.[92] Over 1 million school learners repeat grades each year.[93] An estimated 20% of learners in Grades 10-12 are three or more years over-age, having repeated grades.[94] In 2018, the cost of repetition to the public schooling system was estimated at R20 billion – 8% of the annual basic education budget.[95] Government progression policy does not allow learners to repeat a grade more than once per ‘phase’, whether Foundation Phase (Grade R-3), Intermediate Phase (Grades 4-6) or Senior Phase (Grades 7-9), or Further Education and Training (Grades 10-12). Instead, learners failing for a second time simply ‘progress’ to the next grade, but often without the academic support they need to succeed.[96] Learners that are struggling academically can feel alienated and inadequate, deepening their sense of disengagement from school.[97] As they fall further behind, some might feel unable to catch up, or that they don’t have the academic ability to complete their schooling. In South Africa, boys are significantly more likely to repeat grades than girls, which is undoubtedly a significant driver of their higher dropout rates.[98] National survey data over the course of 2020–2021 showed that the Covid-19 pandemic had amplified disruptions to education: deepening learning losses, reducing access to school meals, and exacerbating learner disengagement from school.[99] Outside challenges in the learning environment and academic curricula can push young people from school. Young people can also be pulled from school by pressures at home or in their communities. Given that most young people across South Africa attend no-fee-paying schools, it may come as a surprise that many don’t have the financial resources to complete their basic education. Even those enrolled in no-fee-paying schools, or supported by government bursaries, often struggle to make ends meet because of the added costs of education, which include uniforms, learning materials, transport, and stationery.[100] In rural areas in particular, barriers to schooling extend beyond finances: many must travel long distances to the classroom. In his research in the Mpumalanga province, Lawrence Mboweni[101] found that young children aged between seven and 13 years walked a total of 16km each day to and from school. Along these journeys, children face many possible dangers. In KwaZulu-Natal, children have been reported to be crossing a lake with hippos in order to reach school.[102] Many learners undertake household chores and caregiving responsibilities that, in some contexts, can pull them away from their schoolwork. Girls and young women tend to carry a greater burden of caregiving and domestic responsibilities, which can limit time for homework and even keep them from the classroom.[103] In rural areas, girls and young women carry an especially heavy load of household duties, carrying water and fetching firewood.[104] Covid-19 and lockdown also exacerbated burdens for girls: when relatives fell sick or there were younger siblings at home and in need of childcare, girls were more likely to take on caregiving responsibilities than boys.[105] South African public discourse is gripped with moral anxiety over pregnancy among adolescent girls, partly because of its perceived age-inappropriateness, and partly because of the possible impacts on the wellbeing of mothers, families, and children. Notwithstanding the recent dramatic spike in young pregnancy over the Covid-19 lockdown,[73] South Africa’s adolescent fertility rates have been steadily declining over the years, dropping by 27% over the past 50 years.[74] Although adolescent girls are more likely to fall pregnant in South Africa than in other upper middle-income countries, the country’s adolescent fertility rate is well below the sub-Saharan African average.[106] Research[107] tells us that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between pregnancy and school dropout: young women that leave school are at higher risk of falling pregnant, while pregnant youth are also at higher risk of leaving school. In addition to financial pressures, parenting learners carry the responsibility of childcare, which can affect their ability to stay in, and succeed at, school. What is often missing from the story is the role that schools, families, and policymakers play in determining whether a young mother returns to school or not. For many girls and young women, an unintended pregnancy means social stigma and isolation, along with major disruptions to schooling. Without the right type of support, the physical toll of pregnancy, regular antenatal visits, and caring for a newborn often come at the expense of young women’s schooling. Research into the effects of early childbearing on young people’s educational and economic attainment show that delaying childbearing can improve young women’s educational outcomes as well as their chances of employment.[108] In South Africa, young people without a matric year, or an equivalent qualification (Level 4 of National Qualifications Framework), are often cut off from pathways to tertiary education, employment and higher earnings. They not only struggle more than their peers to find work, they also remain unemployed for longer periods of time, and if they do find work, have less stable and lower earning jobs.[109] Figure 8: The Qualifications Hierarchy: Outcomes of the 2008 Matric Cohort Source: Spaull, N. 2016. Important Research Inputs on #FeesMustFall Levels of qualification also affect job security, which also means that in economic downtimes, those with fewer qualifications are disproportionately affected. From 2017 Q1 to 2022 Q1, overall employment decreased 8%.[110] Within that figure, employment among those with tertiary qualifications decreased 4%; matric-educated employment decreased 8%; and those with less than matric saw an employment decrease of 20%. School completion rates in South Africa are both a driver, and a reflection, of South Africa’s inequality. Dropout rates differ significantly by race. Black and Coloured youth are half as likely to complete Grade 12 as their White and Indian counterparts.[111] Young Coloured men appear to be at highest risk of dropping out: one survey showed that 29% of 16-18-year old Coloured men were not in school.[112] But across genders, it is Black youth who are at highest risk of dropout. This is certainly not for want of trying, since young Black learners also tend to stay in school for longer, repeat more grades, and leave school at an older age.[113] Because of the country’s history, race in South Africa is a proxy for other inequalities. Different races have different dropout rates because of how South Africa’s education system, together with its towns and cities, were planned under apartheid. Apartheid spatial planning gave White families privileged access to quality schools and urban infrastructure. These inequities have persisted in the post-apartheid context, such that poor, Black and particularly rural youth are disadvantaged in their access to quality education, which would otherwise improve their access to jobs and advance their social mobility.[114] In the poorest 80% of schools, only 1% of Grade 8 learners will go on to pass matric and be eligible to study maths and science at university (i.e. achieve above 60% for these subjects). In the wealthiest 20% of schools, nearly ten times as many learners will pass Grade 12 with these grades.[115] Early adulthood Transitions into post-school education Young people who leave school with a matric certificate have a labour absorption rate of 31.5% (see Figure 9 below), 13.8% percent higher than for those without one (17.8%). But chances of finding work are improved exponentially by a tertiary qualification, which increases absorption rates by a further 26.8%. Tertiary-educated youth have a labour absorption rate of 58.0%. Figure 9: Absorption rate by education status This is also borne out in the expanded unemployment rate for young people (aged 15–34) by education level (see Figure 10). While having a matric certificate marginally decreases young people’s chances of being unemployed, it is only when this certificate is used as a passport to a tertiary qualification that chances of being employed are exponentially increased. This is partly because the economy of South Africa has shifted to one in which higher levels of skills are increasingly in demand.[116] Figure 10: Unemployment rate (expanded) by education status We know that most young people who drop out of school do so between Grades 10 and 12. Despite having completed compulsory schooling, historically they have had no formal qualification to aid their transition into further training or employment. The proposed General Education Certificate (GEC)[117] is intended to address this problem, giving those who have completed Grade 9 a national certificate. While the Technical and Vocational Education and Training system (TVET) should provide young people with a Grade 9 or GEC qualification opportunities to further their education, very few young people without a matric access these institutions.[118] Among young people without a matric, only 1% have some other school certificate or diploma (from a TVET college for example).[119] Quarterly Labour Force statistics show that as many as three in 10 young people in this category (aged 15-24) are not only unemployed, but are also not enrolled in education or training.[120] TVET enrolment is low, in part because unlike university degrees, TVET qualifications are not perceived to improve young people’s employability.[121] There is further evidence that young people’s aspirations for a university degree, and for a professional career as opposed to a menial job, also contribute to them valuing university education over TVET education.[122] TVET education has therefore often carried with it assumptions of inferiority, which have been exacerbated by difficulties with the quality of teaching and learning at these institutions.[123] Research shows that, rather than acting as an alternative route to a matric-level qualification, TVETs have become ways for young people who already have a matric certificate to bide time, before qualifying for a university degree programme or finding a job.[124] Despite the important impact that a post-school qualification can have on young people’s future, most who start a tertiary level programme do not complete it: only 60% of university undergraduates, for example, complete their degrees within 6 years.[125] TVET students are even less likely to graduate.[126] Notwithstanding increased access to post-school education,[127] only 8% of 15-24-year olds attend a university or college, and even fewer complete their qualifications.[128] Culture shock, poor quality teaching, social exclusion, bullying, along with physical and mental illness can constrain young people in completing their qualifications, particularly if they are from vulnerable or rural homes.[129] In 2016, the Dell Foundation, which offers bursaries to students in two top South African universities, published a report about the types of support that students felt they most needed. 50% said psychosocial and community support made the most difference to their success.[130] Low rates of access to and completion of post-school qualifications contribute to stubborn racial and class inequities in youth employment outcomes.[131] An analysis of QLFS data between Q1 2017 and Q2 2022 shows marked, and continued, inequality in unemployment by race (see Figure 11). This illustrates the stubbornness of apartheid-era racial hierarchies, and reflects broad, historical patterns in educational attainment by race (see Table 2). Figure 11: Unemployment rate (expanded) by race In South Africa, 60% of young people either leave school before matric, or have failed their matric exam, and are left without any kind of recognised educational qualification. And yet, chances of finding work are improved exponentially by a tertiary qualification. Any meaningful shift in South Africa’s stark, and long-entrenched, inequality will demand that we unlock the social and economic mobility of these youth. Table 2: Youth education status by race, 2017 Q1 and 2022 Q2 Transition into the labour market South Africa’s fast-growing labour force presents both a tremendous challenge and an unprecedented opportunity. Over the past five years (Q1 2017 – Q2 2022), South Africa’s working-age population has continued to grow steadily: from 37.1 million in the first quarter of 2017 to 40.0 million in the first quarter of 2022. When they leave school, young people in South Africa enter a world of uncertainty, often unprotected. Many will lose the routine, daily meals, and adult mentorship that the school environment provided. When they turn 18, those who had benefited from a child support grant will stop receiving it, putting added financial pressure on their households.[132] Among those without a matric qualification, there are a variety of different pathways in terms of movement into and out of the labour market. An analysis of five waves of the National Income Dynamics Survey shows that over a 10-year period, two-thirds of young people who had not completed Grade 12 experienced some degree of churn in the labour market, with a smaller proportion remaining consistently in or out of employment and the education system.[133] But even within this group, there is significant inequality. The consequences of not having a matric certificate differ depending on young people’s connectivity to the labour market. Those from poorer households and disadvantaged schools are more likely to be long-term unemployed, which translates into poorer mental health and subjective wellbeing.[134] Between 2008 and 2021, the number of young people who had been looking for work for more than three years tripled.[135] The number who had given up entirely, tripled.[136] Figure 12 shows the composition of the working-age population across its four constituent categories over the period 2017 Q1 – 2022 Q2. Figure 12: Composition of the working-age population Table 3: Composition of the working-age population Over this time, the employed population shrunk from 16.2 million to 15.6 million despite the overall growth in the working-age population, while the other three categories all grew: unemployed from 6.2 to 8.0 million, discouraged job-seekers from 2.3 to 3.6 million, and other not economically active from 12.4 to 13.1 million. This underscores the size of the challenge for South Africa: in a period in which the working-age population has grown by over 8%, the economy was able to accommodate 4% fewer in employment. The rising number of discouraged job-seekers is a pressing concern for South Africa, reflecting not only the financial and psychosocial cost of job-seeking but also deepening chronic unemployment. Research suggests that the longer someone is unemployed, the more difficult it becomes to find work, not only because they become increasingly discouraged, but also because employers view them as riskier hires.[137] South African research[138] suggests that unemployment is also associated with stigma and shame, as well as stress, depression and anxiety, which in turn make it more difficult for people to seek and find work. Over the past five years, the number of young job-seekers (aged 15–34) who have grown discouraged (i.e. had not acted to find work in the previous four weeks) has increased by almost 40%.[139] The experience trap Part of the challenge of the job search is in how to gain, and then signal, experience as an entry-level worker. Qualitative evidence suggests that young people are frequently denied jobs or interviews on the basis of their ‘lack of experience’.[140] A Western Cape survey of middle-class youth showed that those who gained some work experience during high school transitioned more easily into the workplace than those without experience.[141] This is reinforced by national panel data, which shows that school learners and tertiary students who undertook part-time work were more likely to be permanently employed.[142] Indeed, after race and gender, being able to demonstrate some work experience appears to be the most important factor in finding work in South Africa, regardless of whether it is formal or informal, paid or voluntary.[143] But how does one gain experience if experience is often an entry-requirement for work opportunities? Indeed, part of the reason that unemployment is so high for young people is that many struggle to gain first entry into the labour market. The unemployment rate (using the narrow definition) is markedly worse (63.9%) for younger youth (aged 15-24) than older youth (aged 25-34). Some evidence suggests that, by the time they turn 24, 60% will have never had a job before.[144] Long-term unemployment, as well as an extended and unsuccessful job search, can lead to discouragement and depression among young people.[145] In 2019, the South African government relaxed requirements for prior work experience for job openings in the public sector. But the ‘experience trap’ has nevertheless remained a major barrier for young job-seekers. In a context where employers often receive large numbers of applicants, many continue to use level of experience (along with formal qualifications) as a sifting tool. Young women’s disadvantage in the labour market Young women are most likely to be stuck outside of employment,[146] owing in large part to domestic and childcare responsibilities.[147] South Africa has achieved parity in school enrolment, and although girls and women generally outperform boys and men as they move through primary, secondary and tertiary education, they continue to fare worse in the labour market. International research suggests that equity in education does not necessarily translate to workplace equity, often because of the motherhood wage penalty.[148] But women not only have worse wages, they are also less likely to be employed, despite often having higher qualifications. In the second quarter of 2022, 13.2% of women had tertiary qualifications compared to 11.2% of men, and 46.7% had completed secondary education compared to 43.5%. Yet despite being more qualified than men, women fare worse than men in the labour market. Figure 13 shows that young women (aged 15-34) are being absorbed into the workforce at a far lower rate than young men at all qualification levels. This can be partially explained by maternity, domestic and childcare responsibilities forcing women to opt out of the workforce. While their analysis was not particular to youth, Schoer and Leibbrandt[149] show that domestic responsibilities can also keep women from the job search. In the early months of the 2020 Covid-19 lockdown, women accounted for two-thirds of net job losses and have also been slower to recover employment since. This was attributed, in part, to inequities in time spent on childcare.[150] Figure 13: Youth absorption rate by gender and education status While women’s disproportionate caregiving responsibilities may be part of the story, Figure 14 shows that even for young women who opt into the workforce and are actively seeking work, young women with the same qualifications have higher unemployment rates than men, suggesting gender discrimination in the labour market. Gender discrimination in the labour market means that young women’s full economic participation remains untapped, and targeted policy and programmes are needed to redress gender disadvantage. Figure 14: Youth unemployment rate (narrow) by gender and education status This is further confirmed by looking at the proportional difference between male and female absorption and expanded unemployment rates. These statistics are calculated as female divided by male, and emphasise the magnitude of the gaps shown in the previous two graphs. In the first section, “Absorption rate”, the table shows how much less likely women are than men to be absorbed into the workforce. In the second, “Expanded unemployment rate”, it shows how much more likely women are to be unemployed. Overall, the gaps seem to be slowly shrinking over time. However, there is a long way to go. In 2022 Q2, a matric-educated woman is 20.9% less likely to be absorbed into employment than a man with the same education and 10.1% more likely to be unemployed. Table 4: Proportional gender gaps in select employment statistics by education level Financial exclusion In 2019, the Siyakha Youth Assets Study estimated that young South Africans spent an average of R938 a month looking for work[151]: about R558 for transport and an added R380 for internet access, printing, application fees, and agent’s fees.[152] The cost of job-seeking was more than young people’s monthly income (an average of R527), which meant that many could not look for work without becoming indebted. Nearly two-thirds of young people in South Africa relied on family members to help fund the cost of job-seeking.[153] Many have to weigh up the costs of job-seeking with basic necessities.[154] In 2021, a Youth Capital survey of over 2,000 young people across the country suggested that eight in 10 young people were choosing between looking for work and buying food.[155] Apartheid spatial planning exacerbates inequalities in the job search. Because poor youth typically still live either in townships on the outskirts of the cities, or in less economically-developed rural areas, they are often removed from where jobs and industry are located and lack reliable, affordable transport.[156] Ironically, it is then the poorest youth for whom work-seeking is most expensive. Even if these young people find work, the costs of getting to and from work, means that they ultimately make less income. And in fact, there are some jobs that would cost them money to accept.[157] It is perhaps unsurprising then that several studies have found that when households start receiving social grants, there is a positive association with job-seeking among working-age household members.[158] Even before Covid-19 lockdown, almost 90% of young people were using the internet to look for work, with mobile data being among their biggest expenses.[159] But with only 10% of South Africa’s population having internet access at home,[160] the majority of young people are dependent on local hotspots, internet cafés and mobile data. High data costs impact how young people access information on education and work opportunities, producing a digital divide between better-resourced and connected youth, and those with limited connectivity or resources. Given the financial and psychosocial costs of the job search, it is unsurprising that three out of four young people in a 2019 study reported having been looking for work for more than a year.[161] Nearly one in 10 had given up the job search altogether.[162] Social exclusion Most people in South Africa find jobs through friends and family, who either refer them to employers, tell them about work opportunities, offer start-up capital, or lend them money to fund the job search. Employers also often rely on employees to refer people they know and trust when there are job openings. In the early 1990s, researchers found two dairies in Gqeberha and Cape Town that had recruited all their staff from a single Ciskei village, propelled through a chain of referrals.[163] Indeed, a strong body of South African evidence[164] shows the power of social ties and social privilege in determining entry, stability and success in the labour market. This reality means that having social ties to people already in the labour market is critical to gaining entry. But as many as four in 10 young people find themselves on the margins of the labour market, living in homes with no employed members.[165] In the Eastern Cape, the proportion of young people living in homes where no one is employed increases to almost 60%, and in the poorest municipalities in the country, as much as 80%.[166] Because of the interplay between class privilege, social networks and economic power, some researchers[167] have argued that the South African labour market can be split into two camps: a wellconnected group of ‘insiders’, and a second (much larger) group of ‘outsiders’, whose social exclusion locks them out of quality work opportunities. Pathway support The South African labour market experiences a high degree of churn. This has been especially acute over the past few years as a consequence of Covid-19 lockdown. National survey data tracking employment dynamics between February 2020 and March 2021 showed that 23% of participants who had been employed in February were no longer employed the following year, while 30% who had been jobless in February 2020 had found jobs by March 2021.[168] But young people were experiencing this churn well before Covid-19 struck. Many of South Africa’s young workers will cycle through short-term training, jobs or self-employment opportunities, struggling to find a stable foothold in the labour market. Young people who do find jobs often battle to keep them. Instead, they find themselves moving in and out of training, informal work, and short-term positions, unable to translate their experience into stable employment.[169] Although chronically unemployed and transitory unemployed people in South Africa share many of the same characteristics – they tend to be Black, women and younger – transitory-unemployed people are 10 times more numerous than chronically-unemployed people.[170] This reality, coupled with the increase in part-time jobs, means that policy and programming must be designed to support those in transitory employment, bridging them to their next opportunity. The young workforce Like much of the rest of the world, wage labour has been a central economic, social, and political organising force in South Africa: first through colonial and then apartheid capitalist accumulation.[171] Both enforced the employment of Black men on the mines and attached urban residence with formal employment. Over the second half of the 20th century, the South African economy grew exponentially, shifting from agriculture to minerals, and finally to manufacturing.[172] But these structural changes in the economy were also attended with some of the widest unemployment rates in the world and deepening inequality. Since the final decades of apartheid, the economy has become increasingly capital- and skills-intensive,[173] while growth has stalled. Today, the services sector is the key to both growth and employment, while agriculture, mining, and manufacturing have contracted significantly.[174] South African youth face a future without the prospect of industrial waged work and uncertain possibilities for livelihoods in the agricultural sector. Despite skyrocketing unemployment, South African social protection is reserved for those presumed unable to work (children, the elderly, and the disabled), while there is no direct support for the young and unemployed. Structural change towards a service-oriented economy is reflected in young people’s rates of employment in key industries. Among those young people (aged 15-34) who were employed in the second quarter of 2022, 24% were employed in community, social and personal services; 24% in wholesale and retail; and 16% in financial intermediation, insurance, real estate and business services. In other words, the vast majority (about 64%) of young people who are employed, are employed in these service-driven industries. Between Q1 2019 and Q2 2022, the proportions of those employed in mining and manufacturing decreased across the board, but particularly for young people (see Table 5). Table 5: Youth versus overall proportion of employed across industries While some sub-sectors of the service industry are able to absorb low- and medium-skilled workers, the overall absorption capacity of the sector is severely restricted, particularly since most young job-seekers have limited formal qualifications. One diagnosis of the youth unemployment problem is a ‘supply-side problem’. Here it is argued that the primary driver of youth unemployment is that young people do not have the right qualifications, technical or ‘soft’ skills to meet the needs of a changing labour market. This includes the skills demanded by a growing digital economy, as well as the shift to a high-skill, service-oriented sector. As the economy becomes more service sector-oriented and digitisation and automation play a bigger role, some argue that South Africa will need to produce 1.7 million more tertiary graduates to take advantage of the opportunity that an increasingly digitising economy presents, and alleviate job losses.[175] Supply-side solutions work off a deficit model that positions young job-seekers as lacking the capacities that industries and employers need. In doing so, they arguably place the burden of responsibility on young people to equip themselves for work, with little guarantee that the labour market will be able to absorb them or that they will have the support, recognition and resources required to secure a job.[176] The previous section about transitions into the labour market suggests that skills deficits are not the only, or necessarily the primary, barrier to entry for young people. Indeed, young people’s experience of social and financial deficits are as, if not more, pressing. More so, young women may experience gender discrimination in the labour market regardless of their level of their qualification. While we know that more education and training generally equates to higher employment and higher earnings for youth, and demands proper investment, the relationship is not inevitable. There also must be livelihood opportunities to absorb these better-skilled young people. Young people in the informal sector Over the period Q1 2017 – Q2 2022, the proportion of young people employed in the formal sector shrunk by 16%, relative to 6.5% overall (see Table 6). While employment prospects for young people also contracted in agriculture and private households, the informal economy was the only sector in which young people experienced a growth in employment. This is all the more impressive considering the sector was also hardest hit by the Covid-19 pandemic. Among young people, informal employment increased 4% over the period, despite decreasing 23% compared to the formal sector’s 15% in South Africa’s first lockdown. Table 6: Youth versus overall proportion of employed across sectors Literature on youth employment in South Africa often falls into two camps with respect to its approach to the formal economy. For some, shrinking possibilities in the formal sector, both within South Africa and globally, compel us to think differently about work. They argue that ‘the prevalence and persistence of “informal”, “precarious”, and “non-standard” employment in so many sites around the world… requires a profound analytical decentring of waged and salaried employment as a presumed norm or telos, and a consequent reorientation of our empirical research protocols’.[177] Others argue that stimulating formal wage employment is the only way to transform the economy at the scale required to shift livelihood prospects. By looking to expand livelihoods for young people outside the formal wage job, those in the former camp might be accused of valorising ‘precarious work’ and placing the burden on young people themselves to transform their own prospects. Meanwhile, those who view job creation in the formal economy as the only solution to youth unemployment often invoke a false binary between the informal and formal sectors. Here, interventions in the formal economy are perceived as systemic and sustainable, while those in the informal economy are seen piecemeal and individualised; formal work is understood as decent and secure, while informal work is not.[178] Given the lower earnings and poor access to social protection for informal workers, we cannot romanticise the informal economy. But we also cannot ignore it. Nor can we continue to hold rigid dichotomies that fail to capture a much more complex reality. The lines between the formal and informal economies often blur, with connections and overlaps between them. Stereotypes that describe ‘decent, dignified work in the formal economy’ and ‘insecure, exploitative work’ in the informal economy often do not hold. Despite apparent job security, wage-workers in the formal economy can also be exploited, treated as ‘disposable’, and forced to work in unsafe conditions.[179] In South Africa, low-paid wage work has been coupled with colonialism and apartheid,[180] and relatedly forced migration, oppression and abuse.[181] This is part of why some young South Africans report opting for insecure selfemployment as opposed to the indignities of certain forms of wage labour.[182] Descriptions of work outside the boundaries of a formal wage job often rest on what it is not: informal, non-standard, unstable or insecure . This leaves us with far less research or description of what it is, and how we might meaningfully respond to it. In South Africa, young people in the informal economy are often understood in terms of ‘entrepreneurship’, with the assumption that young people’s innate entrepreneurial potential needs only to be unlocked through training and skills.[183] While some see young people in the informal sector as untapped vessels of entrepreneurial potential, others see them as a ‘ticking time bomb’. Outside of formal employment young people are regularly assumed to be lazy, idle and dangerous.[184] With persistently high rates of youth unemployment, post-apartheid South African has been awash with images of ‘waiting youth’,[185] pushed to the margins of society by under-employment and unemployment, and growing increasingly detached from their aspirations for their lives and livelihoods. But rarely are young people just waiting. Instead, research illustrates that young people without jobs are routinely creating new strategies to navigate changing labour markets. In a recent ethnographic study, Hannah Dawson[186] explored social connections among young men working in-and-around a car wash in Zandspruit informal settlement, Johannesburg. Rather than operating in isolation, the car wash business formed part of a web of informal business activity, connected to the taxi industry, informal mechanics and the ‘chesanyama’ (a buy-andbraai informal butchery). The car wash offered young men a place to socialise, pass time, and ‘hustle’ for work. In 2022, a survey conducted by Youth Capital[187] found that neighbourhood hubs, including train stations, schools, clinics and community centres, play a key role in linking young people to opportunity. By becoming visible to potential employers and business partners, young men at the Zandspruit car wash gained leverage in their local economy. Their livelihoods were created and sustained by “making plans with other people”.[188] Those who currently had money or work could support those who didn’t, offering a form of informal insurance that held them from one job to the next.[189] These relational and reciprocal aspects of self-employment are often muted in the literature on entrepreneurship, which has historically centred on individual agency and self-reliance.[190] As it turns out, entrepreneurship is a particularly limiting frame for the work that young people are undertaking outside the formal economy and in the interstices of formal and informal work. This work includes forms of self-employment, side-hustle and opportunism, and enterprises ranging from at-home businesses to sole-proprietors to sophisticated networks of employees. The vast majority of young South Africans will be forced, at some point in their lives, to create their own living through forms of self-employment. But only a small percentage will be able to create businesses that employ others. There is limited crossover between these two types of entrepreneur; not very many microenterprises will develop into Small and Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs). Yet both micro-enterprises and SMEs regularly operate in hostile economic environments with limited capital or networks. Programmes aiming to ‘unlock’ entrepreneurship through business training, financial literacy, access to finance, business plan development, and mentoring are widespread. What is less common are interventions to improve key infrastructure – like electricity, broadband, transport and other infrastructure – that would allow businesses to thrive. Key interventions to alleviate youth inequality over the life course To alleviate youth inequality demands that we attend to vulnerabilities and protective factors throughout the life course. This is particularly pertinent for their economic participation, around which most of the concern about young people’s vulnerability has circulated. Equalising opportunities at birth and in early childhood, for example, sets the foundation to allow for more merit-based systems later on. Similarly, by supporting young people to stay in school and attain formal qualifications, they might gain a firmer foothold in the labour market. If we fail to support young people in their early lives, inequalities only widen as they grow older. But we also cannot afford to fail young adults, who will in turn become the parents of future generations. The recommendations listed below are by no means exhaustive. But they do suggest critical interventions at key moments of the life course that can help alleviate structural inequality and ignite young people’s potential. Perinatal Advance the Maternal Support Grant Research shows that childhood stunting, together with other aspects of children’s physical and mental wellbeing, is driven in part by mothers’ mental health and nutrition during pregnancy.[191] Research suggests that in South Africa’s most disadvantaged communities, pregnant women are experiencing high rates of mental illness and food insecurity.[192] Yet these women will not be able to access any income support from the state until their child is born, and even then, access to the Child Support Grant within the first year of life is low. By extending social protection to caregivers, before they give birth, we can safeguard the health and wellbeing of both mother and child, and take the first steps to disrupting intergenerational poverty. Income support, together with affordable antenatal care, can improve pregnant women’s nutrition and psychological wellbeing, as well as the physical and cognitive functioning of their babies.[71] Research suggests that if stunted children receive extra nutrition and cognitive stimulation, their life-time earnings potential can increase by 25-40%.[72] Schools must implement national policy by supporting pregnant learners and young mothers to stay in school Pregnancy can disrupt young women’s schooling in a range of ways. First, pregnant learners often need to take leave from school for antenatal visits, as well during and after the baby is born. This can disrupt their learning and make it difficult to catch up later. Second, in addition to the physical difficulties of pregnancy, many pregnant learners also suffer shame and bullying in their homes, schools, neighbourhoods and health facilities. The admonishment pregnant learners face both on the journey to school and from their peers can discourage their attendance. Just as judgement and bullying might cause pregnant learners to drop out of school, those who fall pregnant after having dropped out might be discouraged to return, fearing hostility from teachers or classmates. Finally, having a child puts additional responsibilities and financial pressures on parenting learners, which can come at the expense of their schooling if they are not adequately supported.[193] In light of the interplay between pregnancy and dropout, policy and programming must support pregnant learners to stay in school and young mothers to return to school as soon as possible after giving birth. This has been the driving force behind recent (2018) national policy.[194] Indeed, evidence[195] shows that the longer a new mother waits to return to school, the more at-risk she is of dropout. But, even when they want to return to school, attitudes among school staff and classmates often keep young mothers from doing so.[196] But the implementation of new recommendations has varied across schools and provinces with some places completely ignoring policy in favour of expelling pregnant learners.[197] More often, schools have chosen to follow a more outdated government policy[198] that keeps young mothers from school for the first year of their child’s life. Schools remain hostile environments for pregnant women and young mothers, and very few have baby-changing or childcare facilities. Schools can also create other barriers for pregnant learners. In some schools, learners that are more than six months pregnant must submit a doctor’s note indicating whether they are fit to learn; in others, pregnant learners must be accompanied to school by a guardian.[199] At the level of policy and implementation, we must support both expectant and new mothers to stay in school. Pregnancy and early motherhood are critical moments, both in the life course of the pregnant learner themselves, and in the life course of children born to learners, affecting the future chances of both parent and child. Early childhood Government must invest in the ECD workforce and quality ECD services In the critical first 1,000 days of a child’s life, infants and caregivers are expected to receive Early Childhood Development (ECD) services at home, from community health workers, hired as part of clinic-based outreach teams. Community health workers form part of a cadre of about 270,000, mostly Black, women delivering ECD services across the country.[200] These women, who operate largely informally, are all-too-often underpaid, under-resourced and unprotected. The achievement of minimum wage for informal care workers (now R23.19 per hour) has been an essential lever in reducing the gender wage gap at the lower end of South Africa’s wage distribution.[201] As they grow older, children are most likely to receive care through an Early Learning Programme (ELP), but with limited government subsidies, access to these services is dependent on caregivers’ ability to pay fees. Research shows that investing in early childhood accrues benefits over the life course, with returns for schooling, tertiary education, employment prospects, and ultimately national budgets. Some models suggests that the elimination of stunting, alone, could generate an additional R62 billion a year,[202] which would be enough to subsidise a national early learning programme for 0–5-year-olds, while also reducing the funding shortfall at tertiary institutions. If universal access to early learning translated into better basic education outcomes and a fully-literate working-age population, some researchers suggest the country’s GDP would be expected to grow by a quarter.[203] But investing in ECD goes far beyond a return on investment, presenting an opportunity to radically shift intergenerational inequality in South Africa. This is not only because it unlocks the developmental potential of children, but also because it means supporting quality jobs in the community and social services sector, where women are heavily represented. Community, social, and personal services is the only sector that added jobs for young people from 2017 Q1 to 2022 Q2, most of which (over 60%) have been to women. Expanding quality, affordable childcare not only has benefits for young children and young women in the early childhood sector, it also enables more caregivers (usually women) to participate in the labour market. Given that caregiving responsibilities can often delimit young women’s labour participation, this is essential to unlocking their economic potential and alleviating gender inequality in the labour market. Key levers for the government to unlock the multiplier effects of early childhood development: Unlock public financing to pay and skill the ECD workforce through Sector Education and Training Authorities or Public Employment Programmes; and Develop more inclusive regulatory frameworks that allow unregistered sites to access funding and quality support. Adolescence: basic education Implement early warning systems For young people to reap the benefits of basic education, they must be supported to complete their schooling. This starts by developing and supporting thoughtful dropout-prevention programmes. Schools can implement early warning systems[204] for school dropout by tracking signs of learner disengagement, and then delivering the right support at the right time. Research suggests that three indices are critical to identify early signs of disengagement: academic performance, behaviour change, and chronic absenteeism. Academic performance: when learners’ grades begin to drop, it may mean they are falling behind in the curriculum. Without the right support, this can put them at risk of grade repetition, which research shows is a leading predictor of dropout.[205] Behaviour change: disruptive or disengaged behaviour can be an early warning sign, especially if it appears alongside other indicators. Chronic absenteeism: absenteeism usually increases over time. Documenting this can help to trigger support to absent learners before they drop out. Open access to psychosocial support Many children in South Africa are exposed to trauma, violence, loss of family members, hardships at home, inadequate living conditions and limited access to services. This can have both short- and long-term consequences for children’s emotional wellbeing, mental health, academic performance, and ultimate ability to finish school.[206] Evidence from South African longitudinal research shows that adolescents struggling with mental illness are less likely to have completed secondary school or be formally employed, and more likely to report psychological distress.[207] Psychosocial support services for children can include role modelling, mentoring and monitoring from trusted adults and peers. It may also involve individual and group counselling, life-skills training or referral to professional state services. These support interventions are reliant on early warning systems that help trigger the right support at the right time. Adolescence: post-school education Support alternative pathways to a matric qualification Recent research suggests that, at any given time, there are as many as a quarter of a million young people pursuing a matric outside the full-time school system.[208] That equates to a third of the annual matric cohort.[209] This includes young people who are seeking to rewrite their matric exams as well as those who left school before reaching Grade 12. Government must expand and support these alternative routes to a matric qualification, which include the National Senior Certificate, the Senior Certificate and the National Senior Certificate for Adults. As a first principle, this should include easily accessible application information, academic resources, and support services that help young people navigate second-chance matric qualifications. Improve TVET education in terms of access and quality To boost tertiary education rates and equip young people for the labour market, we must increase access to quality Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVETs). Despite a radical expansion in access to tertiary education since democracy,[210] fewer than two in 10 young people who start Grade 1 will be eligible to attend university, let alone afford university fees or have enough support to finish their degrees.[211] Six out of 10 young people will not leave school with a matric certificate and will need to find pathways to further education where this is not a requirement. TVETs can help prepare young people for the labour market through targeted skills training and opportunities for workplace-based learning. When they work well, these colleges can equip young people with knowledge, skills, and professional know-how that improve their employability and open up networks to potential employers. High schools must educate Grade 8 and 9 learners about the learning pathways available, including TVET colleges and courses on offer. The Department of Basic Education’s (DBE) introduction of the General Education Certificate offers hope for a national qualification for Grade 9 graduates, but for this to serve them, the DBE must ensure that this is a meaningful benchmark qualification that is recognised by employers and tertiary institutions. More so, the DBE should work in collaboration with the Department of Higher Education and Training to help bridge learners leaving school in Grade 9 to a post-school environment. TVET colleges should build strong relationships with industry to ensure the relevance of their curricula, facilitate workplace-based training, and improve the industry reputation of TVET qualifications. These post-school approaches are about building young people’s qualifications and skills. But this, on its own, is not enough. Young people’s disadvantage in the labour market needs redress through wrap-around support, receptive employers, social security, and an enabling environment. These are addressed in the recommendations below. Early adulthood: transitions into work and between jobs As young people exit the schooling system, there are few readily accessible or reliable points of information about how to apply for jobs, how to compile a CV, or how to access further education and training opportunities. Instead, young people must often feel their way through the systems with little to no guidance, mentorship or knowledge-sharing in the process.[212] This means that many young people find themselves floundering in the job search, applying with masses of other applicants to jobs that do not match their qualifications or aptitudes, and with little knowledge of how to signal their particular skills to employers. Endless applications and trips to interviews can be time-consuming and extraordinarily costly, with little payoff, leaving many young people feeling discouraged.[213] Employer readiness Relative to the literature focused on building young people’s aptitudes and preparedness for the world of work, there is far less research about employer-driven drivers of youth unemployment in South Africa. This includes employers’ attitudes and practices with respect to hiring young people.[214] Employers can be supported and incentivised to hire young people through interventions like the Employment Tax Incentive and including youth employment as a pillar on the BB-BEE scorecard.[215] Employee hiring practices must shift from exclusionary norms that necessitate prior work experience and unnecessary educational qualifications. Instead, attention needs to be paid to alternative signals of a young person’s capability.[216] Matching Matching support is about building bridges between young people and employers, where there is often an information chasm, with both parties struggling to find the right people at the right time. Recent South African research[217] shows the impact of providing a young job-seeker with a documented assessment of their skills and capabilities, including not only their educational qualifications, but also their soft skills, experience, and learning potential. When job-seekers were able to provide employers with a summary skills report, their chances of finding work improved by up to 17% and their earning potential increased by up to 32%.[218] Matching is not only about making young people visible in the right ways to their first potential employer, it is also about linking them to their next opportunity, given the rate of churn in the South African labour market.[219] SAYouth.mobi offers one route to doing this. Through a zero-rated mobile site, SAYouth.mobi provides young people with workseeking content, from listings of available income-generating opportunities, to interview techniques and CV-building software. Because it is digital, young people can access and apply for work opportunities without incurring transport or printing costs. SAYouth.mobi also helps to directly link young job-seekers to employers seeking talent, combating inefficient work-seeking behaviours. Matching is based on a range of criteria, including socio-economic circumstances (household income and access to a social grant), geography (proximity to opportunity), capabilities (numeracy, literacy, and skills), gender, and disability. Social protection About a third of South Africans benefit from a social grant. The introduction of the Covid-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant over the past few years had added a further 10 million recipients, meaning that, by 2022, close to half of the country is supported by social welfare.[220] The rapid expansion of South African social welfare is informed by a robust body of evidence that shows the impact of social grants on poverty alleviation, labour participation, sustainable economic growth, and social cohesion. Quantitative analysis suggests that the introduction of the SRD has alleviated household poverty and inequality, while stimulating labour market participation. Access to an SRD increased the likelihood of looking for work by 25%.[221] In a 2021 Youth Capital survey of over 2,000 youth, nearly three in 10 young people said they had used grant money to support their job search.[222] Given this effect, the National Treasury is considering proposals to transform the SRD into a job-seekers support grant. However, both the South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) and the Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) have slammed these proposals, arguing that the eligibility requirements currently being tabled for the job-seekers grant would exclude the vast majority of current SRD recipients, by imposing a range of unfounded conditionalities and ignoring non-financial barriers to job-seeking.[223] Welfare policy in both developed and developing countries, including South Africa, remains focused on providing social protection to those physically unable to enter the labour market: children, the elderly, the sick and the disabled. Everyone else is expected to rely on waged work or entrepreneurship, despite limited opportunities for either. The young workforce Enabling environments For young job-seekers, informal workers and entrepreneurs alike, mobile data is increasingly critical. Data-light platforms can help bridge the digital divide by functioning on low-end smartphones, slow and unreliable networks, and requiring very little data to operate.[224] Reliable electricity, telecommunications, and transport infrastructure are equally important for industry to thrive. The Presidency’s Operation Vulindlela, for example, recognises the energy shortfall[225] as a critical inhibitor to employment and growth. A number of additional key strategies have recently been identified by The Presidency to create a more enabling environment for employment.[226] These include enabling private sector employment, and small and medium enterprises, by reducing their regulatory burden, and shifting towards labour-intensive growth sectors. For young people, this will mean investing in the services sector in particular, with special focus on the social economy together with wholesale and retail. Global Business Services (GBS) is another sector showing significant growth potential in an increasingly digitised economy. Creating enabling environments for self-employed young people is particularly important in a South African context. Here, selfemployment represents just 10% of jobs, relative to 30% in most upper- and middle-income countries. Some suggest that by boosting self-employment rates, South Africa might halve its unemployment rate.[227] Public employment NIDS-CRAM survey data showed that between February 2020 and March 2021, young people experienced the largest employment-to-population ratio increase.[228] At this point industry-level data was already suggesting gains in community, social, and personal services (likely attributable to large-scale, youth-targeted public employment programmes), and wholesale and retail trade. Both industries also had a high level of youth intensity of employment. One such youth-targeted public employment programme was the Basic Education Employment Initiative (BEEI), launched in April 2020 as part of The Presidential Employment Stimulus Package, which sought to stimulate work in response to the economic effects of Covid-19. The BEEI is a large-scale public employment programme, ring-fenced particularly for young people (aged 18–35), who are recruited through the SAYouth.mobi platform and placed as education assistants or general school assistants in schools across the country, remunerated at minimum wage. Phase I of the BEEI was executed between 1 December 2020 and 31 March 2021, with the QLFS showing that the sector added some 115,000 jobs in the final quarter of 2020 and the first quarter of 2021. According to the Presidency, 65% of those placed were young women.[229] Recruiting through SAYouth.mobi enabled scale, because of the reach of its online network. It also meant democratised opportunity beyond employers’ social networks. Evidence shows that public employment can offer short-term earnings, a funded entry into the labour market, and valuable work experience for young people that can improve their long-term stability and success in the labour market.[230] But without transferable skills and supported pathways to their next opportunity, it risks being yet another stop-gap as young people trampoline in and out of the labour market. Youth citizenship and political participation Factors beyond the control of youth can cause huge inequality. Youth today must grapple with serious social, political, and environmental problems inherited from their elders. Even though they possess the energy, creativity, and passion to take on the intractable problems they have inherited, they are systematically excluded from policy decisions. Achieving youth equality requires active participation and involvement of youth in decision-making at all levels, starting in the home and extending to the highest levels of government. Yet youth are largely excluded from formal political processes and government policy. Participation equality implies political representation at national, provincial, and municipal level. The Ladder of Citizenship Participation (LCP) holds that representation and participation of all groups in society is key and fundamental to the existence of a vibrant democracy.[231] In other words, a vibrant democracy requires that all social groups have a voice in how they wish to be governed, while institutions tasked with the exercise of this civic duty must provide spaces that allow for full and effective participation. In spite of the growth in the number of political parties, there has been a noticeable decrease in voter turnout in South African elections since 1994. The poor and disjointed participation by the youth in particular is concerning. If the process of participation is skewed and twisted to benefit only a select group, then the electorate’s disenchantment with political processes becomes a threat to democracy. Reasons for voter apathy and political disengagement, particularly by youth, include a lack of political party membership and low levels of political participation, a disinterest in electoral politics, high levels of cynicism about politics and a low level of confidence in the country’s democracy.[232] References [1] A Hardgrove, K Pells, and P Dornan, “Youth Vulnerabilities in Life Course Transitions,” Occasional Paper (UNDP Human Development Report Office, 2014), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a089eeed915d3cfd0004ca/youth-vulnerabilities-in-life-course-transitions.pdf. [2] Based on Gini Coefficient. The Gini is useful but limited, given its exclusive focus on income inequality. Adopting a wider scope that includes access to quality nutrition, health services, housing, education, water, and caring networks within the frame of inequity can offer us a better sense of its real effects on human life and flourishing, while still recognising the centrality of money, especially in circumstances where public services and infrastructure do not function well. [3] IMF, “Six Charts Explain South Africa’s Inequality.” [4] IMF, “Six Charts Explain South Africa’s Inequality.” [5] Inclusive Society Institute. 2021. Trends in multidimensional inequality and socio-demographic change in SA during 27-years of democracy. Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/trends-in-multidimensional-inequality-and-socio-demographic-change-in-sa-during-27years-of-democracy [6] QLFS2022: Q1 [7] Access is not an indicator of the quality of these services, and in fact, access to quality services remains a key driver of South Africa’s inequality. [8] Inclusive Society Institute. 2022. Inequality & Demography; Von Fintel D, Richter L. Intergenerational transfer of health inequalities: exploration of mechanisms in the Birth to Twenty cohort in South Africa. BMJ Glob Health. 2019;4(e001828). [9] D Durham, “Youth and the Social Imagination in Africa: Introduction to Parts 1 and 2,” Anthropology Quarterly 73, no. 3 (2000): 113–20. [10] Stats SA, “Youth Still Find It Difficult to Secure Jobs in South Africa.” [11] Juta and Company Ltd, Electoral Act 73 of 1998. [12] A Honwana and F De Boeck, “Children and Youth in Africa: Agency, Identity and Place,” in Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 2005). [13] J Seekings, “Beyond Heroes and Villains: The Rediscovery of the Ordinary in the Study of Childhood and Adolescence in South Africa,” Social Dynamics 32, no. 1 (2006): 1–20. [14] Seekings; L Ntsebeza, “Youth in Urban African Townships. 1945–1992” (Master of the Arts, Durban, University of Natal, 1993); G Straker et al., “Violent Political Contexts and the Emotional Concerns of Township Youth,” Child Development 67, no. 146–54 (2007). [15] Seekings, “Beyond Heroes and Villains: The Rediscovery of the Ordinary in the Study of Childhood and Adolescence in South Africa.” [16] Honwana and De Boeck, “Children and Youth in Africa: Agency, Identity and Place.” [17] R Bray and S Moses, “Children and Participation in South Africa: Exploring the Landscape,” in Perspectives in Education, vol. 29 (University of the Free State, 2011). [18] Bray and Moses. [19] K Lefko-Everett, “Ticking Time Bomb or Demographic Dividend: SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey 2012” (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2012). [20] Seekings, “Beyond Heroes and Villains: The Rediscovery of the Ordinary in the Study of Childhood and Adolescence in South Africa.” [21] Lefko-Everett, “Ticking Time Bomb or Demographic Dividend: SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey 2012.” [22] S Burman and P Reynolds, Growing up in a Divided Society: The Contexts of Childhood in South Africa (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1986). [23] Mampela Ramphele, “Steering by the Stars,” in Youth in Cities: A Cross National Perspective (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002). [24] P Henderson, “Living with Fragility: Children in New Crossroads” (Cape Town, University of Cape Town, 1999). [25] A De Lannoy, “The Stuff That Dreams Are Made of...Narratives on Educational Decision-Making among Adults in Cape Town,” Centre for Social Science Research Working Paper Series (University of Cape Town, 2007); L Swartz, J Harding, and A De Lannoy, “Ikasi Style and the Quiet Violence of Dreams: A Critique of Youth Belonging in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Comparative Education 48, no. 1 (2012): 27–40. [26] L Bordonaro and R Payne, “Ambiguous Agency: Critical Perspectives on Social Interventions with Children and Youth in Africa,” Children’s Geographies 10, no. 4 (2012): 365–72. [27] Statistics South Africa, “Mid-Year Population Estimates,” 2022. [28] M Khuluvhe and E Netshifhefhe, “Fact Sheet on NEETS” (Department of Higher Education and Training, 2022), https://www.dhet.gov.za/Planning%20Monitoring%20and%20Evaluation%20Coordination/Fact%20Sheet%20-NEET%20_%20March%202022.pdf. [29] Inclusive Society Institute, “Inequality and Demography,” 2022, https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/inequality-and-demography. [30] A De Lannoy et al., “Why Is Youth Unemployment So Intractable in South Africa? A Synthesis of Evidence at the Micro-Level,” [31] G Espi, M Leibbrandt, and V Ranchhod, “Age, Employment History and Heterogeneity of COVID Era Employment Outcomes,” Wave 3, NIDS-CRAM, 2021, https://cramsurvey.org/reports/ #wave-3 . [32] De Lannoy et al., “Why Is Youth Unemployment So Intractable in South Africa? A Synthesis of Evidence at the Micro-Level.” [33] N Branson, C Hofmeyr, and D Lam, “Progress through School and the Determinants of School Dropout in South Africa,” Development South Africa 31 (2015): 106–26. Journal of Applied Youth Studies 3 (2020): 115–31. [34] Statistics South Africa, “Quarterly Labour Force Survey 2022 Q2,” 2022, https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0211/P02112ndQuarter2022.pdf. [35] Youth Capital, “Beyond the Cost: What Does It Really Cost Young People to Look for Work?” 2022, https://youthcapital.co.za/beyond-the-cost-research-report/. [36] E Moses, S van der Berg, and K Rich, “A Society Divided: How Unequal Education Limits Social Mobility in South Africa,” Programme to Support Pro-Poor Policy Development (University of Stellenbosch, 2017). [37] A Hardgrove, K Pells, and P Dornan, “Youth Vulnerabilities in Life Course Transitions,” Occasional Paper (UNDP Human Development Report Office, 2014), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a089eeed915d3cfd0004ca/youth-vulnerabilities-in-life-course-transitions.pdf. [38] M Tomlinson et al., “Optimising Child and Adolescent Health and Development through an Integrated Ecological Life Course Approach.,” BMJ 372, no. m4784 (2021). [39] Hardgrove, Pells, and Dornan, “Youth Vulnerabilities in Life Course Transitions”; Tomlinson et al., “Optimising Child and Adolescent Health and Development through an Integrated Ecological Life Course Approach.” [40] Tomlinson et al., “Optimising Child and Adolescent Health and Development through an Integrated Ecological Life Course Approach.” [41] B Vale and D Swanepoel, “The Childhood Catalyst,”Collective Insight: Generation Reset, 2022, https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/special-reports/collective-insight/2022-09-22-free-to-read-collective-insight-september-edition/. [42] S Redinger et al., “First Trimestor Antenatal Depression and Anxiety: Prevalence and Associated Factors in an Urban Population in Soweto, South Africa,” Journal of Developmental Origins of Health and Disease 9, no. 1 (2017): 30–40. [43] National Scientific Council on the Developing Child, The Science of Early Childhood Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). [44] R Martorell, “Improved Nutrition in the First 1000 Days and Adult Human Capital and Health,” American Journal of Human Biology 29, no. e22952 (2017); HK Biesalski, RE Black, and B Koletzko, Hidden Hunger: Malnutrition and the First 1000 Days of Life: Causes, Consequences and Solutions, vol. 115 (Basel: Karger Medical and Scientific Publishers, 2016); SE Cusick and MK Georgieff, “He Role of Nutrition in Brain Development: The Golden Opportunity of the ‘First 1000 Days,’” Journal of Paediatrics 175 (2016). [45] Iilfa Labantwana, “South African ECD Review,” 2019. [46] M Tomlinson, S Kleintjies, and L Lake, “South African Child Gauge: Child and Adolescent Mental Health” (University of Cape Town: Children’s Institute, 2022). [47] NDoH et al., “South Africa Demographic and Health Survey 2016,” 2019, https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR337/FR337.pdf. [48] M Ashley–Cooper, LJ van Niekerk, and E Atmore, “Early Childhood Development in South Africa: Inequality and Opportunity,” in South African Schooling: The Enigma of Inequality (Cham: Springer, 2019). [49] Ibid. [50] Thrive by Five, “Thrive by Five Index,” 2022, https://thrivebyfive.co.za/. [51] T Rochat and S Redinger, “A Life-Course Perspective on the Biological, Psychological and Social Development of Child Mental Health,” South African Child Gauge Part 2 (2022), https://bettercarenetwork.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/child_gauge_2021_final_screen.pdf#page=58. [52] Iilfa Labantwana, “South African ECD Review.” [53] Ndlovu, N, Day, C, Gray, A, Busang, J and Mureithi, L. Chapter 29. South African Health Review. 2020 [54] National Department of Health, “Saving Mothers Annual Report 2017,” 2017. [55] GrowGreat, “Cocare Maternal Support Study,” 2021, https://www.growgreat.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GG-COCARE-REPORT-final-1.pdf. 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It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2023 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. Authors: Daryl Swanepoel Editor: Olivia Main FEBRUARY 2023 Content Chapter 1: Background and introduction of the study Chapter 2: The literature review 2.1 The role of political parties in a democratic dispensation 2.1.1 Why are political parties important for democracy? 2.1.2 What is the role and functions of political parties in a democracy? 2.2 The need for party-political funding 2.3 How political parties are funded 2.4 The imperative to ensure transparency through the regulation of private donations 2.5 The rationale for state funding of political parties 2.5.1 Enabling parties to fulfil their democratic responsibilities 2.5.2 State funding of political parties to combat corruption and as mitigation for anti-corruption measures 2.6 The different forms of state funding for political parties 2.7 The relationship between private donations, disclosure regulations, state funding and the viability of political parties 2.8 The post-1994 history of party-political funding in South Africa 2.9 Conclusion Chapter 3: The legislative review 3.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 3.1.1 Section 19(2) 3.1.2 Section 57(2)(c) 3.1.3 Section 59(1)(a) 3.1.4 Section 236 3.2 Political Party Funding Act, Act 6 of 2018 3.2.1 Direct funding of political parties 3.2.1.1 Prohibited donations 3.2.1.2 Donations from juristic persons 3.2.2 Represented Political Party Fund 3.2.3 Multi-Party Democracy Fund 3.3 Appropriation Bill B7-2022 and Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022–2025 3.3.1 Appropriation Bill B7-2022 3.3.2 Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022–2025 3.4 Conclusion Chapter 4: Research design and methodology 4.1 Research objective 4.2 Research question 4.3 Research design 4.4 Research subjects 4.5 Measurement 4.6 Data collection 4.7 Analysis 4.8 Ethics 4.9 Limitation of the study Chapter 5: Findings 5.1 The public party-funding regime of Germany 5.1.1 Public funding of German political parties 5.1.1.1 Restrictions of private donations to political parties 5.1.1.2 The various forms of public funding that German parties are entitled to 5.1.1.3 Incentives to encourage individuals/corporates to make donations to political parties 5.1.1.4 Indirect public funding 5.1.1.5 Private versus public funding of political parties ratio 5.1.1.6 Quantifiable public funding to support political parties 5.1.2 Funding to party-aligned political foundations 5.1.3 Germany–South Africa Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 5.1.3.1 PPP in relation to direct public funding to political parties 5.1.3.2 PPP in relation to funding to politically aligned foundations 5.1.3.3 PPP in relation to the funding of the German party-political dispensation as a whole 5.1.3.4 Public annual-spend per person on political parties and foundations 5.2 The public party-funding regime of Sweden 5.2.1 Public funding of Swedish political parties 5.2.1.1 Restrictions of donations to political parties 5.2.1.2 The various forms of public funding that Swedish political parties are entitled to 5.2.1.3 Incentives to encourage individuals/corporations to make donations to political parties 5.2.1.4 Indirect public funding 5.2.1.5 Private funding versus public funding of political parties ratio 5.2.1.6 Quantifiable funding to support political parties 5.2.2 Funding to party-aligned political foundations 5.2.2.1 Quantifiable funding to support political foundations 5.2.3 Sweden–South Africa Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 5.2.3.1 PPP in relation to direct public funding to political parties 5.2.3.2 PPP in relation to funding to politically aligned foundations 5.2.3.3 PPP in relation to the funding of the Swedish party-political dispensation as a whole 5.2.3.4 Public annual-spend per person on political parties and foundations 5.3 The public party-funding regime of the Netherlands 5.3.1 Public funding of Swedish political parties 5.3.1.1 Restrictions of donations to political parties 5.3.1.2 The various forms of public funding that the Netherlands political parties are entitled to 5.3.1.3 Incentives to encourage individuals/corporations to make donations to political parties 5.3.1.4 Indirect public funding 5.3.1.5 Private funding versus public funding of political parties ratio 5.3.1.6 Quantifiable funding to support political parties 5.3.2 Public funding to political foundations 5.3.3 The Netherlands–South Africa Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 5.3.3.1 PPP in relation to direct public funding to political parties 5.3.3.2 Public annual-spend per person on political parties and foundations 5.4 The public party-funding regime of South Africa 5.4.1 Public funding of South African political parties 5.4.2 Indirect public funding 5.4.3 Private funding versus public funding of political parties ratio 5.4.4 Quantifiable funding to support political parties 5.4.5 Public annual-spend per person on political parties Chapter 6: Discussion of findings 6.1 Comparative analysis: The amount of public funds allocated to the political parties in selected jurisdictions Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations 7.1 Conclusions 7.2 Recommendations References Cover photo credit: istockphoto.com – Jacques Kloppers Chapter 1: Background and introduction of the study Prior to 2019, donations to political parties in South Africa were unregulated. But in light of the growing scandals flowing from alleged illicit donations to parties, such as money for tenders, civil society began to agitate for private donations to political parties to be more transparent. It was, for example, alleged that the ruling African National Congress was being bankrolled by the now fugitive Gupta family and that the Democratic Alliance was captured by the so-called “white monopoly capital” (M&G, 2017). Donations to political parties, pre- and post-1994, have always been shrouded in secrecy, and therefore “it has never been possible to tell whether political parties act in the best interests of the public, or whether they act in the best interests of those who fill their pockets” (M&G, 2017). This led to the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (Idasa) lodging a legal challenge in 2004, to ensure the introduction of legislation to limit private funding to parties and compel them to make public their sources of funding (M&G, 2017). Against this background, the High Court in Cape Town, in 2017, ruled that legislation needed to be introduced to regulate the funding of political parties (De Wet, 2017). This led to the passage of the Political Party Funding Act (PPFA), Act 6 of 2018 (RSA, 2019a). The Act was subsequently assented to by the President of the Republic and came into effect on 1 April 2019 (The Presidency, 2019). Since the introduction of the legislation, private funding of political parties has, to a large degree, dried up, with many – including the ruling party – finding it difficult to meet their operational obligations. It has, for example, been widely reported in the media that the ruling party is unable to regularly pay its staff their monthly salaries (Moichela, 2022). Parties have directly linked the evaporation of private funding to the disclosure requirements contained in the PPFA. Former ANC Treasurer General, Paul Mashatile, is reported to have said that the Act “is making regular donors reluctant to give” (Letshwiti-Jones, 2022). It is recognised that, in order for political parties to effectively conduct their democratic obligations, they need adequate funding so that they can carry out their core functions, and to fund their election campaigns (Venice Commission, 2020:56). State funding for parties is essential to guarantee parties’ independence from undue influence of private donors and to ensure that they “have the opportunity to compete in accordance with the principle of equal opportunity”. But private contributions are also a form of political participation. Therefore, a balance needs to be achieved between encouraging moderate contributions and limiting unduly large contributions on the one hand, and state funding on the other (Venice Commission, 2020:56). It is evident that the South African parties are struggling to keep afloat. Whether this is due to insufficient funding or because the available funds are not being appropriately applied, is an open question. Whether the balance between private funding and state funding within the highly regulated South African dispensation is adequate, needs to be assessed. This study aims to carry out such an assessment by benchmarking the South African party-political funding regime against a selection of European democracies whose election systems are similarly based on proportional representation. Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands have been chosen, since, as stated, their elections are based on proportional representation. In Germany it is a system of personalised proportional representation, where “each voter has two votes: the first for an individual constituency candidate, and the second for a party-list in a particular state” (Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, N.d.). In Sweden the number of seats each party receives in the Riksdag is in proportion to the number of votes the party received in the election (Sveriges Riksdag, N.d.), and in the Netherlands citizens vote for a candidate on the candidate list, with parties represented in Parliament in proportion to the total number of votes they received in the election (Tweede Kamer. Der Staten-Generaal, N.d.). The study will attempt to settle the question as to whether our democracy is sufficiently funded. It will do so through the lens of political parties, the primary building blocks of our country’s parliamentary democracy. The theoretical motivation for the public funding for political parties is that it will have a positive impact on the role of money in politics and “ensure that all political forces have access to enough resources to reach the electorate, thereby encouraging pluralism and providing the electorate with a wider choice of politicians and policies” (International IDEA, 2014:22). However, as has been alluded to, the introduction of party-funding regulation in South Africa has led to financial instability within the political party environment. The level of public funding should therefore take into account the impact that high regulation has on party income from private sources. Should practice prove that such public funding be insufficient, the objective of bolstering democracy could very well be undermined. This study therefore aims to evaluate the South African party-funding dispensation against international best practice. It intends to make recommendations to the public-policymakers as to what adjustments are needed, if any, to ensure that sufficiently resourced political parties adequately underpin the country’s democratic dispensation. Chapter 2: The literature review The literature review aims to garner an understanding as to the role of political parties in a democratic dispensation, their need for income and how they are funded, and to understand the interaction between private and state funding of parties. 2.1 The role of political parties in a democratic dispensation Before we delve into the financing aspects of political parties, the review starts by asking two fundamental questions: Why are political parties important for democracy and what is the role of parties in a democratic dispensation? 2.1.1 Why are political parties important for democracy? The influential International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) argue that “political parties are crucial for the functioning of representative democracy”, since they produce a variety of policy options for the electorate to consider and choose from. They also provide the mechanism “through which citizens express diversity of interests and aspirations” (International IDEA, N.d.). Political parties bring people with the same political ideas together, for them to take part in elections collectively, in the hope of getting as many of those of the same ‘thinking’ as possible elected into legislatures, such as Parliament or a municipal council. And similarly, to hold as many posts as possible in the government (Government of the Netherlands, N.d.). In this vein, many prominent scholars have lamented the importance of political parties for democracy. They have said that parties are indispensable, make democracy workable, and provide a mechanism for the public to be represented in the legislatures through electoral competition (Ezrow, 2011). Political parties allow for broader societal participation in the drafting of coherent public policy, serve as an intermediary between members of society and the government, connect them and allow for the interpreted communication between government and society (Ezrow, 2011). Political parties make government accountable for its actions by helping the public identify the executives’ past performances, and by diminishing the power of dominating personalities. The existence of opposition parties also allows for non-performing incumbent governments to be challenged at the poll (Ezrow, 2011). Individuals attempting to challenge incumbent governments tend to be “fragile, fragmented and incoherent, with limited capacity to mobilise, organise and coordinate collective action”. When individuals group themselves into parties, they become more capable of overcoming coordination problems. And they create longer-term time horizons, since parties normally have long-term goals with a broader spectrum of priorities (Ezrow, 2011). They also help politicians solve these coordination problems, since they act in a collective manner and are able to present disciplined goals by keeping politicians in line with the goals of their parties, as opposed to individuals that can opportunistically manoeuvre their message as the wind blows (Ezrow, 2011). “Parties also enable the opposition to stand firm against divide and rules tactics by the incumbent regime”, something that individuals acting on their own accord will find difficult to do. So too, independent politicians may not be able to credibly commit to policies that do not coincide with their own preferences, whereas, by being a member of a party, they are put in a position where they can convincingly commit to policies that they normally would not support in order to win a larger support base (Ezrow, 2011). Furthermore, governments comprise collective leadership capable of carrying out cogent and coordinated policies. This requires likeminded individuals acting in unison. Parties play a role in creating such cohesive leadership through their internal recruitment, nomination and socialisation processes. Unlike individual politicians, parties, because of their diversified process of recruitment, are also able to create ways for individuals of diverse ethnic and economic backgrounds to rise to political power (Ezrow, 2011). And parties are more likely to be in a position to provide valuable training in negotiation, compromise and coalition building; and broader socialisation with regard to democratic practices (Ezrow, 2011). Whilst acknowledging the right of individuals to compete for political office, there seems to be broad consensus that political parties are, given their greater capacity to coordinate and function over a far wider sphere within the democratic machinations, an essential component of a functioning democracy. Ezrow (2011) quotes the authoritative American political scientist, E.E. Schattschneider, who argued that "democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties”. 2.1.2 What is the role and functions of political parties in a democracy? Having, in the aforementioned section, established that political parties are indeed important for democracy to succeed, in this section we examine the role of political parties and the functions they carry out. Although somewhat dated, being written in 1950, it was then argued that political parties consist of individuals that hold common views on important public questions, and who promote their principles in order to gain control of government so that they can put their ideas into operation. These parties generally have three things: organisation, fidelity to certain principles, and they must follow constitutional means to reach their objectives (Singh & Singh, 1950). This remains true today. Similarly, the authors contended that political parties did not exist in Greek times, as citizens participated in the democratic processes in their own capacity. But in modern times, due to the complexity of government and the vast increase in the population, it is not practical for all to be directly involved in the democratic processes. Political parties now act as “brokers of ideas and carriers of government”. Indeed, they are the principal go-betweens in the constitutional process. Parties are the ‘people’ – the apex norm of all democratic constitutions – organising themselves. They therefore act as the organisational vehicle for the people, with the value proposition being that they can be better enabled if properly organised and through the sharing of resources (Kangu, 2001). Kangu affirms the 1950 assertion that political parties are in fact an “association of private citizens formed to promote certain political and economic beliefs … [with the purpose of having] … them adopted as government policy”. Political parties fulfil a range of important functions in a democracy, such as: Drawing together those people who share similar philosophies and ideas. They are vehicles through which those with broadly similar interests can organise and campaign. Since governments are composed of people who belong to political parties, political parties are in reality the way in which political power is exercised. Political parties therefore provide the government and the opposition. Parties select candidates to contest elections. It is therefore parties that provide the nation’s political leadership. Parties provide organisational support for organising and financing election campaigns, for recruitment and training of candidates, and for developing policy, all of which are crucial for the sustainability of the party’s elected members. Through the debating of issues and formulation of policies to be presented to the electorate during elections, parties articulate the shared beliefs, values and philosophies of its members. They then utilise these to determine their attitude to legislation, public policy, and the issues of the day. Parties are often an avenue for community groups to shape the decision-making process. Many civil society organisations, such as trade unions, organised business, advocacy groups, etcetera, have close ties with political parties. They interact with the parties in order to influence the development or implementation of public policy. Parties are one of the main avenues for political debate and discussion in the community. Given that statutory authority vests in the hands of government, parties are ultimately responsible for the structure of the machinery of government, in that, in practice, it is they who can make appointments to the public sector from the ranks of their members and supporters. (AustralianPolitics.com, N.d.) Parties also fulfil important ancillary roles in society that go beyond their own narrow interests. In many societies, including South Africa, they also fulfil the role of educating society on the role of politics and the political processes. For example, they provide political education for their members and broader society. This includes, amongst others, voter education – that is, the activities and processes designed to deliver a free, fair, efficient and cost-effective election, the value of democracy and human rights (Sirivunnabood, N.d.). And they contribute to the legitimisation of the political system, in that their activities help connect citizens and social groupings to the political system. In this, they anchor the political order in the consciousness of the citizens and in social forces (Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011). 2.2 The need for party-political funding Whilst much has been written on the shady influence of money in politics, the fact is that political parties need resources to effectively carry out their constitutional and democratic mandates. Money in politics is not a problem per se; it is whether that money has been ethically secured, legally applied, and fairly distributed amongst the political role-players. Should the nation aspire to a well-functioning and effective representative democracy, it must accept that political parties – lest the country is to slide towards authoritarianism – need to be well-resourced and that money is necessary for inclusive democracy and effective governance, for allowing candidates and parties to reach out to voters and for them to build long-term political organisations (Lee-Jones, 2019). Political parties need appropriate funding in order for them to carry out their core functions, activities and programmes, all of which involve expenses “which should be seen as the necessary and unavoidable costs of democracy”. Parties need to maintain their party organisations, employ staff, campaign in elections, and communicate with the electorate at large (Van Biezen, 2003). Political parties have at least eight spending needs (IEC, N.d.): Developing the political will of people. For this, programmes and actions need to be put in place to inform, empower and mobilise citizens. Shaping public opinion. This would, for example, include the costs attached to carrying out media and advertising campaigns, hosting public outreach programmes such as town hall meetings, etcetera. Inspiring and furthering political education, which will include activities such as voter education, informing the electorate with regard to their constitutional rights and the value of democracy and human rights. Promoting active participation of individuals in political life, for example, the identification and recruitment of young leaders, their training and equipping them for future political leadership roles. But also ‘foot soldiers’ training’ to ensure that the party has sufficient manpower to carry out campaigns, act as party agents during elections, etcetera. Exercising an influence on political trends, which could entail, for example, empirical research; policy and message development; and the carrying out of polls and surveys. Ensuring linkages between the people and organs of state, for example, through the maintenance of constituency offices to service the electorate, and to deal with their complaints. It may be necessary to arrange contact meetings with government and political leadership to engage the electorate on various issues as the need arises. Operational expenses such as staff, travel, administration, office rental, the hosting of meetings, running of programmes and publications. Election campaigns, for example, the hosting of rallies, media advertisement, posters and billboards, pamphlets, town hall meetings, etcetera. Access to sufficient funding for political parties is crucial to the overall vibrancy of an electoral and democratic system. Without funding, political parties would not be able to reach out to the electorate to explain their goals and policies, nor would they be able to maintain mechanisms for them to receive input from the electorate about their views. Similarly, they would not be able to run dynamic election campaigns capable of engaging citizens in the electoral process. Neither would they be able to maintain the democratic dialogue between elections (Ohman, 2014:1). What is therefore being inferred is that parties that lack organisational coherence and institutionalisation, and/or programmatic substance, will fail to perform. Neither will they be able to get much traction amongst the electorate (Cotón, 2008). Needless to say, poor performing political parties are counterproductive to the building of dynamic, responsive and inclusive democratic dispensations. 2.3 How political parties are funded This literature review has revealed that political parties are funded via a range of sources. Apart from passive income in the form of interest or dividends that parties may receive from investments lodged at registered financial institutions, at least six streams of funding have been identified. Direct state funding In many democracies, political parties receive funding via the national fiscus. Direct funding from the state may take on different forms, differing from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Similarly, there may be different streams of direct state funding within the same jurisdiction. In Germany, for example, there is no distinction drawn between campaign funds and political party funds, since campaigning is considered part of the normal duties of a party. Campaign expenditure therefore forms part of the normal operation of a political party and is included in the party's total budget (DW, 2021). Germany’s state funding of political parties is votes-based, with further contribution-based funding dependent on the extent to which they are established in society. Whilst there are preconditions for entitlement and absolute limits set, the basic tenet of the funding is that parties receive an amount for each vote received. Section 18 (3) of the Act on Political Parties states that they are entitled to state funding in the amount of €0.85 per valid vote won at the most recent European, Bundestag and Land parliament elections up to a total of four million votes, and €0.70 for every additional vote thereafter. In other words, the financial rewards given by the state vary depending on electoral success (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012). These amounts may have been adjusted since 2012, the discovery of which will be made during the interviews envisaged by the research. For contributions given by natural persons, the parties receive €0.38 per euro donated per person per year up to a total of €3,300 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012). Similarly, these amounts may have been adjusted since 2012. In other countries a distinction is drawn between regular annual funding of parties and reimbursement for election campaign expenditure. For example, after each federal election or by-election in Australia, the Australian Election Commission distributes money to eligible political parties, candidates and Senate groups to reimburse them for election campaign expenditure (AEC, N.d.). The current election funding rate is AU$ 3.016 for every first preference vote received. An automatic payment in the amount of AU$ 11,029 is made. Further funding of expenditure greater than the automatic payment can be claimed. The amount payable will be calculated as the lesser of the calculated election funding entitlement; or the amount of demonstrated electoral expenditure. The payment will be reduced by the amount that has been paid as an automatic payment (AEC, N.d.). Indirect state funding for parties In addition to the direct state funding to political parties, elected representatives and political groups receive varying degrees of support for their work as parliamentarians. For example, the House of Commons in the United Kingdom reimburse MPs for the costs of running an office, employing staff, and travelling between Parliament and their constituency (UK Parliament, N.d.) In South Africa, Parliament also provides allowances for the setting up of constituency offices. These payments are, however, made directly to the parliamentary party. Further administrative allowances are also made to parties to employ parliamentary support staff and to enable them to effectively perform their parliamentary function. The administrative allowances are distributed in proportion to the seats each party occupies in Parliament (Parliament of the RSA, N.d.). In addition, a feature of European democracies is the state-funded politically aligned foundations. Germany currently has, for example, six political foundations that receive funding from the government. Each foundation is associated to a party that is represented in the federal Parliament (Unmüssig, 2017). These foundations are tasked to, amongst others, promote civic participation, and support young academic talent with scholarships and support the development of democracies abroad. They offer socio-political and democratic education and provide information and policy analysis at home and abroad. Their purpose is to build on the principles of liberal democracy and to solidify the basic principles of societal solidarity, subsidiarity and tolerance (Unmüssig, 2017). Whilst the foundations act autonomously and are legally and financially independent, each foundation is “politically associated and close to a political party”. Their work therefore stimulates and indirectly underpins the work of political parties (Unmüssig, 2017). Membership fees, trade union and other voluntary contributions; and public representative levies Party membership subscriptions are normally not high, but can collectively can make up a material portion of a party’s income. In 2014, for example, membership income for parties in the United Kingdom was 23% for the Green Party, 15% for the Labour Party, 9% for the Liberal Democrat Party, but just 2% for the Conservative Party. In 2015 the Labour Party also introduced a registered supporters’ scheme by which people can pay £3 per annum, which gives them the right to vote in the leadership elections (Brit Politics, N.d.). In South Africa, the ruling African National Congress has uninitiated the Progressive Citizens’ Forum, a debit-order campaign aimed at soliciting regular contributions from its members and supporters (PCF, N.d.). So too, trade unions in the United Kingdom have been linked to the Labour Party since its foundation in 1900. Most charge their members a political levy, which can be used for campaigns, publicity on issues they are concerned with and so on. Some can affiliate to the Labour Party and pay the Labour Party for the number of members that they have. In 2014 this provided twenty-seven percent of Labour’s income (Brit Politics, N.d.). And in some countries, parties levy their public representatives a monthly contribution based on their earnings from their position as a public representative. In South Africa, for example, the ruling African National Congress collects levies from their public representatives. In 2009 they took in about R250,000 from their parliamentarians and cabinet ministers each month. MPs were then levied around R500, while cabinet members paid between R1,500 to R2,000 a month. Councillors are also levied (politicsweb, 2009). The DA public representatives pay around 2% of their salary, while the ID levies 10% per month. The IFP charged MPs R3,300 a month (politicsweb, 2009). Donations Direct donations and sponsorships from corporates and wealthy individuals also remain a feature of modern-day politics, albeit that jurisdictions are insisting on greater regulation to various degrees of late. This will be further explored later in this study. Standard Bank, for example, donated R5 million to political parties in 2009, split amongst political parties based on the IEC’s funding formula, “in terms of which funding is distributed to political parties in proportion to their representation in the National Assembly" (politicsweb, 2009). Commercial investments It is not uncommon for political parties to own companies as investments to augment their income. The SPD of Germany, for example, has a one hundred percent shareholding in German Printing and Publishing mbH (dd.vg, N.d.). Until as recently as 1997 the SDP of Sweden owned the advertising company, Folkreklam and Förenade ARE-Bolagen (Lakomaa, 2019). And in South Africa, the African National Congress set up Chancellor House as an investment vehicle to make the party self-sufficient over time (Jolobe, 2010). Fundraising events Parties also raise funds through hosting dinners, holding raffles, and so on (Brit Politics, N.d.). These events are sometimes organised on a national scale, providing a substantial stream of income. In South Africa, for example, the ruling party, under the auspices of its Progressive Business Forum, regularly hosts presidential gala dinners, business breakfasts and corporate exhibitions on the sidelines of its national conferences (Ticketpro, N.d.). In a similar vein, the UK Labour Party hosts exhibitions at their national conferences (UK Labour Party, N.d.). 2.4 The imperative to ensure transparency through the regulation of private donations It has been established that effective and functioning political parties are crucial for democracy. For them to be so, they need to be adequately resourced. This funding can be either via the fiscus or from private sources. Funding from the fiscus is open and transparent. From private sources, less so but needs to be. Why? Because a lack of information on how much money circulates in and around elections, where resources are coming from and how they are spent, makes it harder for the electorate to make informed decisions (International IDEA, 2019). Donations to political parties, be it direct or indirect, can materially impact, influence and distort both the electoral process and passage of legislation. And it has also proved to be a major motive for grand corruption (GSDRC, 2001; Bodede, 2022). Therefore, society needs to know who are funding the parties so that: The electoral process is fair and equitable. Parties need to be able to compete on an equal footing. Elections can be distorted should some parties be flooded with funds that are illicitly obtained, since it could create unfair advantage for them. In a multi-party election, there is often a spending rat race between the parties, where governing parties are often in a stronger position to solicit donations, thereby placing the opposition in a disadvantaged position (GSDRC, 2001). The passage of legislation can be unduly influenced should donors exercise financial coercion to manoeuvre certain policy and legislative outcomes, which may not be in the interest of the broader public. It may even sway elected representatives to either actively, or through inertia, go against their undertakings to the electorate (GSDRC, 2001). This is because when politicians become overly dependent on donations from a limited group of donors, the danger is that their policy programmes can be co-opted (International IDEA, 2019). It also facilitates corruption and erodes citizen trust in political institutions (International IDEA, 2019). And, as has been demonstrated in the South African context, shady donations to parties, for example cash for tenders, as has been highlighted in the Zondo Commission of Enquiry into Corruption. This led to corruption on a grand scale (Bodede, 2022). According to Webb and Drury (2020), “big political donations are intended to have political influence”. They say that there is a “sliding scale of influence” that is facilitated by such donations: Access: It can ensure the donor gets access to a public representative that ordinary citizens would not normally get. Clientelism: This is the kind of corruption where officeholders are influenced through large donations to decide issues not on the merits of the argument, or the interests and desires of their constituents, but according to the biddings of the donor upon which the officeholder may have become dependent. Quid pro quo: Where politicians make promises in exchange for donations. Pressure: The running of political parties and election campaigns has become very costly. Parties and politicians are accordingly being placed under enormous pressure to keep donors happy, lest they walk away with their support. Big money effectively builds inequality between the haves and the have-nots into the political system. There are at least four arguments in favour of transparency in party finance: The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) considers it paramount for parties to make their funds transparent in order to prevent corruption. The objective of regulations aimed at making party funding more transparent is to, in the first instance, rebuild public trust amongst those that have disengaged from politics due to the marginalisation of the voter through the dominance of money in the political environment. And secondly, to prevent affluent and illicit donors from dominating modern politics. Transparency creates a mechanism through which the adherence to party finance regulation can be monitored. Where parties receive state funding, transparency ensures that parties can be effectively monitored in order to prevent the misuse of public money. It ensures that the electorate can be better informed as to who is supporting which political parties, thereby creating for them a tool to observe whether parties’ special interests may be motivated by external influences. (Tonhäuser & Stavenes, 2020) Thus, it is safe to conclude that the only way that the electorate can hold their public representatives accountable for their actions and make an informed vote in the knowledge that their representatives have not been unduly influenced by donor monies, is for them to know how the parties (and individual public office-bearers) have been financed and by who (Essop, N.d.). In conclusion: Clearly, money is needed to stimulate, maintain and enhance political competition, an essential component of any effective democracy. But if the quantum and source of that money is not transparent, it could pose a serious challenge to the democratic dispensation – should donors, for example, channel their resources to the political elite, essentially negating the ordinary citizens’ ability to influence policies and policymakers through their vote (International IDEA, 2019). 2.5 The rationale for state funding of political parties There are two overarching reasons that motivate for the state to fund political parties. The first being a mechanism to strengthen democracy by ensuring that political parties are empowered to fulfil their constitutional and democratic roles, and that they are able to do so within a system that is fair and equitable. The second is to combat corruption. A consequence of high transparency regulation as to who funds political parties, is a loss of private funding to political parties, as private funders shy away from being publicly exposed. This creates a funding gap, which public funding needs to address. 2.5.1 Enabling parties to fulfil their democratic responsibilities There are three central arguments in favour of the state providing political parties with financial resources for purposes of ensuring that they can effectively carry out their constitutional and democratic mandates. First, as has been repeatedly argued, political parties are critical to democracy. It is implausible to suggest that a functional democracy is possible without effective parties and party organisation. For them to be effective, they must be able to mobilise the electorate, socialise the citizenry, recruit and train future leaders and party workers, research and formulate policy, and fund their operational costs, such as rent, salaries, etcetera. Their mere existence offers support to the democratic process. And the character of the modern state depends directly on the abilities of the parties serving as integrative links between state and society. State funding can contribute to this. Secondly, parties are the vehicles through which the electorate express their political views, and they are the mechanisms through which citizens can become involved in the governing of society. However, there may be vast differences between interest groups and spheres of society – financial and otherwise – that could translate into the powerful having a disproportionate ability to mobilise the electorate behind their narrow cause. The provision of state funding helps safeguard political equality. It also mitigates against the problem of private and corporate funding potentially being channelled to only some parties, since this undermines the principle of equality in the parties’ ability to be responsive apropos their linkages and interactions with the citizenry. Thirdly, the costs of running a political party in a modern democracy is costly and they are competing against far better resourced external think-tanks and interest groups, who exert significant influence. Parties need to compete with them for the public mind. For this they need to develop and present to the public coherent policy proposals on a wide range of issues, which requires highly qualified staff and institutionalised expertise. State funding can help sustain the central role of political parties in the political system by providing funding support to enable them to develop and communicate their messages to the voters. (Pierre, Svåsand & Widfeldt, 2000:1-24) A further strong argument in favour of funding political parties, is that it is necessary to develop strong opposing political parties so that there is capable and healthy competition within the political system. And funding by the state guards mitigates against an incumbent party misusing the programmes and resources of the state to further its own interests (Marfo, Musah & Owiredu-Amankwah, 2021). 2.5.2 State funding of political parties to combat corruption and as mitigation for anti-corruption measures Once again, to fulfil their core functions, political parties need appropriate funding. When there is inadequate funding, political parties are ‘forced’ to adapt various strategies to fund their activities and programmes, which has to pay back in cash or kind. This often leads to “corruption and kickbacks and appointment of incompetent people to hold public positions” (Marfo, Musah & Owiredu-Amankwah, 2021). To minimise the danger of corruption, in particular state capture and influence peddling, best practice suggests that the funding of political parties ought to be regulated. In this regard, article 7(3) of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) requires states to improve transparency in the funding of political parties and public office candidates (UNODC, N.d.). A growing number of countries subsidise political parties through the fiscus, or direct provision of goods and services. This is primarily meant to help the parties perform their functions, but it is generally also considered to decrease the opportunities for corruption, since, having some form of sustainable funding, parties are de-incentivised from succumbing to the interests of private donors in return for donations (UNODC, N.d.). However, a consequence of high disclosure transparency regulations appears to be that corporates and wealthy individuals become more reluctant to give to political parties where there are high disclosure requirements. In South Africa, with the introduction of the PPFA Act in 2019, parties have been crying foul of its unintended consequences, with them receiving fewer private donations. Donors have become apprehensive knowing that their donations would be open for public scrutiny, as it may lead to either reprisal or an impact on their reputation (Pasensie & Clarke, 2021). The fear of reprisal and/or reputational loss is two-directional. On the one hand, as deliberated before, private donations to governing parties could be viewed as influence peddling, whilst donors may also be fearful of disclosing donations to opposition parties, for fear of the government blocking them from tenders (Pasensie & Clarke, 2021). And as discussed in the introduction of this study, it has, in South Africa, had a devastating impact on the parties’ ability to properly fund their operations. It should, therefore, be recognised that the probability is high that elevated transparency rules aimed at combatting corruption, will negatively impact the political parties’ ability to solicit donations from private funders. It is with this in mind that regulators promote state funding as a means to mitigate against the losses parties may incur as a result of high disclosure regimes. But, as illustrated, should the state funding not be set at an appropriate level, it could have the opposite effect of weakening the parties’ operational performance. In determining the appropriate level, governments will have to accept that democracy, and for that matter the fight against corruption, comes at a price and that, accordingly, the fiscus will have to provide the necessary resources. What that appropriate level is, is an open question, and will be for each country to make its own determination. But a 2021 study into money and politics did give some indication. It was found that in countries where high levels of spending had become an equilibrium outcome due to corruption and the influence of special interests, the setting of a spending limit may increase political competition and allow for new entrants into politics. In countries where political elites come disproportionately from more affluent and well-resourced echelons of society, it may also reduce the concentration of political power in the hands of the better off. These effects might have direct and indirect consequences for a country’s policy outcomes and, might I add, the depth of democracy in the medium to long term (Avis, Ferraz, Finan & Varjão, 2021). 2.6 The different forms of state funding for political parties A complementary approach to regulating donations is to give political parties access to public funding. The purpose of providing political parties with public funding is to: Promote pluralism and to stimulate the battle of ideas – that is, providing the electorate with a wider choice of policies – by ensuring that all the “relevant political forces” are sufficiently resourced. By giving all parties access to funds for campaigning, it also serves to equal the playing field by limiting the advantage that contenders with access to significant resources have. The levelling of the playing field will, however, only be achieved if the gap between the rich and the poor is addressed by complementing public funding with spending caps. Providing the extent of state funding is significant enough, it serves to incentivise obeyance to the election rules. This is because political parties will fear losing access to public funding should they not obey the rules. (International IDEA, 2014) The International Democracy and Electoral Assistance Institute (International IDEA, 2014), in their handbook on political finance, identify two types of state funding for political parties: Direct funding, that is, providing money Whilst it may seem fair that all registered political parties should receive state funding, such an approach opens up the danger of the system being abused, where parties with little or no support are formed just to collect the funding. Therefore, in most countries, a threshold is applied for parties to gain access to the state funding. This could, in a proportional representation system, be a minimum share of the vote obtained, or in a constituency system, a minimum number of seats. Different countries also follow different allocation criteria. Here too, whilst it may seem that the most democratic way is to give all parties the same amount – national election campaigns after all could cost as much for a smaller party as for a larger party – such an approach, it could be argued, goes against the will of the people. It could also be argued that it is a waste of taxpayers’ money, in that a lot of money will be distributed to many parties who may not materially alter the shape of party politics in the country. The more common option preferred by most countries is to allocate the state funds in proportion to the votes obtained by the various parties. In some jurisdictions this is done purely proportionally, in others, a percentage is divided equally amongst qualifying parties, with the balance allocated proportionally. Then again, a different form is to match the funding that parties manage to raise out of their own initiatives from donors, with an equal amount from the fiscus. This is, for example, the position in the United States and Germany. But this too is open for criticism, with detractors arguing that it favours parties with strong business links. Thus, whilst the overarching objective remains the same for whichever system is adopted, it is for each country to decide which of the systems is most palatable for their particular circumstances and environment. Indirect funding, that is, providing goods and services Most countries also provide indirect funding to political parties. This too can take on various forms, the most common being the provision of free or subsidised access to the public media for campaign purposes. But there are other examples as well, such as tax relief for parties/candidates and their donors, access to public buildings for campaign events and subsidised postage (International IDEA, 2014). Table 2.1. below captures the rationale and considerations regarding direct public funding as developed by International IDEA. Table 2.1.: The rationale and considerations regarding financial reporting requirements (Source: International IDEA, 2014) In addition to direct and indirect funding, in its broader interpretation, alternative state assistance that can help parties develop and improve their standing in society and within the array of parties, can also include measures other than funding. It can, for example, take the form of: Legislation placing spending caps on election campaigns In many jurisdictions, there are limits as to how much parties and/or candidates are allowed to spend on their election campaigns. The purpose is not to regulate the influence of money, but to reduce the advantages that political parties and candidates with access to large amounts of money have over those that are less resourced. Whilst this does not equate to income for the party and/or candidate, it does help level the playing field so that the different parties/candidates have a more equitable chance of selling their message. It also brings less pressure to bear on party treasurers, since it reduces the overall spending on election campaigns. In the South African context, as has already been highlighted in this study, where parties are finding it difficult to stay afloat, this can play an important role in stabilising the financial fortunes of parties and contribute to their sustainability and longevity (International IDEA, 2014). Funding of politically aligned foundations In many European countries there are political foundations that receive funding from the state. Whilst each foundation is close to, and ideologically aligned with a particular party, they are autonomous and legally independent. In Germany, for example, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation is associated with the Social Democrats (SPD), and Konrad Adenauer Foundation with the Christian Democrats (CDU). In fact, foundations can be formed and funded by the state for each political party that has been elected to the Bundestag for at least a second term (Unmüssig, 2017). They receive their funding from a number of ministries, such as the Federal Foreign Office, and the Federal Ministries of Education and Research and of Economic Cooperation and Development, who set and adopt the level of funding as part of the federal budget negotiations process (Unmüssig, 2017). There are similar arrangements in other European countries such as Austria, the Netherlands, Hungary, Finland, Greece and Spain, amongst others, as well as at the European level (Bértoa & Teruel, N.d.). As previously stated, they do work, amongst others, in the field of civic, democratic and socio-political education, as well as policy analysis and empirical research (Unmüssig, 2017). Whilst they are legally independent, determine their own programmes and are in no way accountable to political parties, they do do their work through the ideological lens of their associated parties. In so doing, individual political parties benefit immensely, since foundations underpin and complement the objectives of the party they are associated with (European Parliament, N.d.). As such, they should be viewed as part and parcel of the political party funding regime, in that their output motivates policy in favour of the particular party they are associated with, and they provide empirical evidence on which parties can develop policy and base their arguments on. In the absence of such foundations, such research and other activities would fall wholly to the political parties themselves. From the aforementioned, it is evident that a determination as to whether the democratic dispensation is adequately funded rests on more than just the financial income of parties, but so too the broader architecture of the particular dispensation. 2.7 The relationship between private donations, disclosure regulations, state funding and the viability of political parties Evidence suggests that many businesses and other clandestine interests support the bigger political parties with a view to influence public policy, and therefore the legitimate calls for greater transparency within the party funding regime. The public have a right to know who is funding the various parties, so that they can assess whether the donations play a role in influencing policy positions. Regulation is needed to prevent policy capture (Terracino & Hamada, 2014). However, as has already been pointed out in this review, an undeniable consequence of greater transparency is that donors become reluctant to donate to political parties. This is due to a fear of being victimised or penalised if their contributions were to be disclosed (Maphunye & Motubatse, 2017). And what the review has simultaneously revealed, is that well-functioning political parties are crucial for representative democracy. Thus, since “public funding is generally tied to stronger rules and controls”, it is argued that where disclosure regulation has been introduced, it needs to be complemented by state funding, lest the lack of sufficient funding becomes counterproductive by rendering the political parties ineffective due to them not being able to financially sustain themselves. In the process of reducing reliance on private funding to support themselves, public funding to political parties becomes necessary to sustain the institutionalisation of political parties in democracies (Terracino & Hamada, 2014). The literature implies, therefore, that there is a direct correlation between the flow of private money to political parties and disclosure regulation. The higher the regulation, the less private money will flow to political parties. The lower the regulation, the higher the prospect of parties receiving private donations. Consequently, a fair deduction would be that where the disclosure regulations of private donations to political parties are low, the necessity for public funding is reduced, whereas when the disclosure requirements are high, the need for public funding is increased. To illustrate: In a 2013 study by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), it was found that political parties in Ghana successfully managed to develop and assert themselves without any public funding. In fact, the study suggests that “Ghana is one of the most competitive and relatively stable democracies with a vibrant party system in sub-Saharan Africa”. Parties are free, without limitation, to raise funds through donations. There are also no requirements for parties to disclose the identities of their donors (Magolowondo, Falguera & Matsimbe, 2013). On the other hand, political parties in Mozambique are required to annually declare their donors and the extent of each donation. In this instance they receive regular contributions from the state for both their overall functioning and for election campaigning. But the study says that the Mozambique case shows that when funds are not disbursed timeously, it has a negative impact on the competitiveness of political parties (Magolowondo, Falguera & Matsimbe, 2013). To further illustrate: Prior to the passing of the Political Parties Funding Act in South Africa, similar to Ghana, there were no funding restrictions on parties, nor any disclosure requirements. But since the inception of the Act, donors have become reluctant to donate (Letshwiti-Jones, 2022) and parties are finding it difficult to keep afloat (Moichela, 2022). Parties are now crying foul. The ruling African National Congress’ Treasurer General has, for example, bemoaned the disclosure requirements, saying that it is causing donors to steer away from contributing to the party. He has called for a greater degree of public funding to fill the gap (Friedman, 2020). The South African experience underscores the argument that the higher the disclosure requirements, the greater the need for public funding, lest the parties are neutered from effectively fulfilling their constitutional and democratic roles. 2.8 The post-1994 history of party-political funding in South Africa When ushering in the new democratic dispensation in 1994, no laws, rules and regulations were in place, nor introduced, to regulate private donations to political parties. Parties were free to solicit donations from any source and of any amount, be it local or international, and in most any form. Of course, whilst laws did not prohibit private donations, the receipt of such donations would still be subject to the normal laws of the country. It did not mean that criminal activity would be condoned. Following a number of funding scandals – which involved parties from across the political spectrum – public and civil society opinion started to form in favour of some form of regulation to be introduced. It came in the wake of allegations of corruption levied against the French arms company Thales, and various ruling party heavyweights, dominating the media headlines. It was alleged that the then Deputy President and later President, Jacob Zuma, received large sums of money as a bribe in exchange for him protecting Thales from investigations into a multi-billion rand deal for supplying weapons to South Africa (Reuters, 2021). In the early 2000’s allegations of corruption started to emerge against leaders of other political parties as well. In 2004, for example, charges were laid against New National Party leaders, who then governed the Western Cape province, for planning permission irregularities in exchange for bribes (M&G, 2004). The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance, also did not escape scrutiny. In 2002 they were accused of corruption after a German businessman, Jürgen Harksen, told an official commission that he paid more than one million rand to the then Democratic Alliance mayor of Cape Town for both his party's and his own benefit (McGreal, 2002). In 2004 the first shots were fired, when the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (Idasa) filed papers in the Western Cape High Court, seeking an order that legislation should be introduced that would compel political parties to disclose the details of all funding they received (M&G, 2017). They failed, but in subsequent court challenges, the Western Cape High Court ruled in favour of a motion brought by “My Vote Counts”, who challenged the constitutionality of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) “insofar as it did not allow for the disclosure of information on private funding to political parties”. Parliament was given eighteen months to “remedy the defect in the PAIA to allow for disclosure of private funding for political parties” (Parliament, 2017). The Political Party Funding Act was introduced into Parliament in 2018. It was subsequently passed by Parliament and assented to by the President on 23 January 2019 (RSA, 2019a). Since the implementation of the Act, it has been a struggle for South African parties to survive financially. Bloomberg, in 2021, already reported that they are “in dire straits”. Most were unable to raise enough money to cover their operational costs (Cele, 2021). In a report released by the Independent Electoral Commission, it was reported that the ruling party, whose monthly wage bill amounted to R18 million, managed to only raise R10,7 million in the three months through to July 2012 (Cele, 2021). They were not alone. Of the country’s other 503 registered parties, it was only the ruling African National Congress, the Official Opposition Democratic Alliance, and ActionSA that received donations exceeding R100,000 (Cele, 2021). While the measure is aimed at curbing corruption, politicians have been complaining that corporates have been deterred from donating (Cele, 2021). The problem is that prior to the enactment of the PPFA, like other political parties, the ANC generated its revenue primarily from private donations. It has been reported that “between 2013 and 2017, the ANC collected R2.6-billion in donations” (Mahlaka, 2021). And as alluded to in the preceding paragraphs, these private donations have all but dried up. The drying up of private donations to the parties is in itself not a bad thing, for all the reasons elaborated on in the previous sections of this review. It is the fact that the public funding to political parties has not been materially adjusted pre- versus post-PPFA. Private funding has been cut off without the compensatory upward adjustment of the allocation to the Represented Political Parties’ Fund (RPPF), that is, the fund managed by the Independent Electoral Commission, out of which the public funding is paid over to the political parties. In Treasury’s Estimates of National Expenditure for the 2019/20 financial year (pre-PPFA), an amount of R157,8 million was allocated to the RPPF (Treasury, 2019:74). This rose marginally to R171,1 million for the 2022/23 financial year (post-PPFA) (Treasury, 2019:xiii), a mere R13,3 million per annum more three years on, amounting to no more than an inflationary adjustment. It seems, however, that some relief has been given in the 2022/23 Estimates of National Expenditure, which indicates an increase of around thirty percent on the previous year, to R342 million. In addition, the defunding has been exacerbated by the fact that funding to political parties by provincial legislatures needed to be cancelled as a consequence of the introduction of the PPFA. Some provinces, such as Gauteng Provincial Legislature, had such arrangements, but the legislation had to be repealed once the PPFA came into operation (Gauteng Provincial Legislature, 2021). 2.9 Conclusion This literature review gives rise to the question: Is South Africa’s democracy properly funded? It seems that whilst great strides have been made in improving the transparency regime, it has not gone hand-in-hand with the necessary concomitant increase in public funding. The improvement on the one hand, and not on the other, amounts to a defunding of the party-political environment, which may very well have damaged the democratic dispensation more than the transparency advancements might suggest. This requires serious and urgent contemplation, to which this study hopes to contribute. Chapter 3: The legislative review It is evident from the literature covered in the preceding Chapter that scholars, democrats, political analysts and experts consistently argue that the provision of public funds to political parties is a necessary part of a free and fair democratic dispensation. This matter has also been settled in South African law, which makes it clear that the provision of public funds to political parties for purposes of executing their constitutional and democratic responsibilities is not open for consideration and/or interpretation. Neither should it be considered a benevolent act of the Executive and/or Treasury. It is compulsory. In this legislative review, the two principal pieces of legislation reviewed are the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the Political Party Funding Act. The review will also examine the public funding afforded to the parties via the Appropriation Bill and the Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022 – 2025. 3.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 3.1.1 Section 19(2) Section 19(2) of the Constitution asserts: “Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for any legislative body established in terms of the Constitution” (RSA, 1996). In this regard the emphasis is placed on the right of every citizen to a fair election. Law Insider defines fair elections to mean: “electoral processes that are conducted in conformity with established rules and regulations, managed by an impartial, non-partisan professional and competent Electoral Management Body (EMB); in an atmosphere characterised by respect for the Rule of Law; guaranteed rights of protection for citizens through the electoral law and constitution and reasonable opportunities for voters to transmit and receive voter information; defined by equitable access to financial and material resources for all political parties and independent candidates in accordance with the national laws; and where there is no violence, intimidation or discrimination based on race, gender, ethnicity, religious or other considerations” (Law Insider, N.d.). In terms of this definition, the delivery of a fair election is therefore considerably more than just the technical delivery of the election. It also envisages an environment in which ideas, policies and programmes are effectively communicated to the electorate, and that sufficient opportunities are created for them and parties to connect and communicate with each other. It also pre-supposes that sufficient finances and resources will be in place for parties to carry out their functions. And that the parties have an equitable access to such financial and material resources. It cannot be, therefore, that some parties, merely as a consequence of their incumbency or policies favoured by the business community and/or the wealthy, are advantaged. Such advantage can come in the form of using the parties’ incumbency to reach out and communicate with the electorate or relying on the favour of private funders. Thus, public funding: To level the playing field and to ensure that all participants in the election have a fair chance at putting their case forward. 3.1.2 Section 57(2)(c) Section 57(2)(c) of the Constitution says: “The rules and orders of the National Assembly must provide for … financial and administrative assistance to each party represented in the Assembly in proportion to its representation, to enable the party and its leader to perform their functions in the Assembly effectively” (RSA, 1996). In this regard, the emphasis is placed on the enabling of parties represented in Parliament to perform their functions. Parliament of South Africa’s Policy on Political Parties Allowances is meant to give effect to section 57(2) of the Constitution. The policy’s objective is to, amongst others, assist parties represented in Parliament to perform their parliamentary duties, and to enable the parties to establish and maintain infrastructure that enables them to serve the interests of their constituents, as well as to service them (Parliament, 2005). The allowances are meant to cover the parties’ expenditure in relation to their parliamentary functioning, and include: Party leader allowances Political party administration allowances, which are based on a determination of staff and other entitlements made by the Secretary to Parliament on an annual basis. Party constituency allowances, which are paid to the parties and not the individual members of Parliament. The Presiding Officers annually determine an amount per member. Parties receive a constituency allowance equal to the annually determined amount multiplied by the number of their representatives in Parliament. 3.1.3 Section 59(1)(a) Section 57(1)(a) of the Constitution states: “The National Assembly must facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes or the Assembly and its committees” (RSA, 1996). To this end, parliamentary and Provincial Legislature portfolios and select committees provide opportunities for public participation in debating the proposed policy or law (ETU, N.d.). Apart from political parties participating in the legislatures through their public representatives, they are principally civil society organisations that encapsulate the interests, views and ideas of a certain group (or groups) within society. They articulate and represent these groups by participating in democratic elections, but they also, as a civil society contestant, sometimes independently and sometimes in collaboration with other civil society organisations, present these interests to formal political representatives and institutions (Mexhuani & Rrahmani, 2017). This is necessary to ensure the timely exchange of information between the legislators, the government and the public about problems and their solutions. And for civil society to take part in the country’s public affairs, to contribute to the development of the government policy- and law-creating procedures and to exert influence on the decision-making that will affect them and broader society (Aitken, 2013:19). Given the constitutional weight afforded to public participation in the legislative and other processes of Parliament, it is fair to deduce that meaningful (as opposed to superficial) contributions are expected from the public (and civil society). The development of their contributions requires from them well-developed, consulted, and empirically researched proposals to present to the Legislatures (and might I add, Executive, who themselves follow similar consultative processes when developing policy and legislation). Well-researched legislation and policy requires accuracy (Aitken, 2013:5), certainty, predictability (Aitken, 2013:7) and detailed analysis as to the likely impact of the legislation/policy, and its ability to achieve the desired regulatory results (Aitken, 2013:6), which requires considerable participatory and transparent policy processes and (Aitken, 2013:7), might I add, research by well-qualified experts. Proper participatory processes comprise the holding of discussions, open dialogue participation, consultations, workshops and seminars, with input from government officials and agencies, parliamentarians, civil society, international advisers, independent experts, the private sector, academics and the public (Aitken, 2013:19). All of which require political parties to have adequate funding or networked collaboration, which collaborators, in turn, will require funding. 3.1.4 Section 236 Section 236 of the Constitution says: “To enhance multi-party democracy, national legislation must provide for the funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable and proportional basis” (RSA, 1996). The legislation envisaged by this section of the Constitution is the Political Party Funding Act, Act 6 of 2018, the details of which is deliberated on in paragraph 3.2 hereunder. 3.2 Political Party Funding Act, Act 6 of 2018 The Political Party Funding Act, Act 6 of 2018 (PPFA), was assented to by the President of the Republic of South Africa on 21 January 2021 (RSA, 2021). With its introduction, the political party funding environment was completely changed. It introduced a new era of transparency in terms of who is funding the political parties. It will also help guard against corruption and the misuse of state resources. All of which needs to be applauded in an open and free democratic society. What was not envisaged was the spectacular collapse of private funding to political parties. This has all but dried up to the extent, as has been discussed, that the official opposition has, for example, had to retrench a significant portion of its staff, and the ruling party has run up huge debts and is not able to regularly pay its staff; indeed, its operations have been hamstrung. The celebration with regard to the ushering in of transparency, now needs to be balanced against the danger to the country of a weakening democratic dispensation due to neutering of the parties’ ability to effectively carry out the work, due to a lack of financial and other resources. What does the Act say? For purposes of this review the focus is on the three areas in the Act that impact party funding, namely, the direct funding to parties and the imposition of prohibitions, the establishment of the Represented Political Party Fund, and the establishment of the Multi-Party Democracy Fund. 3.2.1 Direct funding of political parties 3.2.1.1 Prohibited donations Political parties may no longer receive donations from foreign sources, be they foreign governments and/or agencies, foreign persons or entities. There is one exception, namely that they may accept grants for the purposes of training and skills development, and/or policy development. But this is subject to an annual cap that an entity may contribute, which currently stands at R5 million (RSA, 2021). The parties may also not receive funding from any organ of state or state-owned enterprise, albeit that this was the case prior to the introduction of this legislation as well (RSA, 2021). They may also not receive any donations that they know, ought to have known, or suspect, originated from sources of crime (RSA, 2021). 3.2.1.2 Donations from juristic persons A political party must disclose any donation it receives from a natural or juristic person that exceeds the threshold. The current threshold is R100,000 received from any single entity within a financial year (RSA, 2021). Furthermore, no entity may donate more than R15 million to a political party within a financial year (RSA, 2021). 3.2.2 Represented Political Party Fund Section 2 of the PPFA provides for the establishment of a Represented Political Party Fund (RPPF). Its purpose is to promote multi-party democracy through the provision of public funding to those parties that are represented in Parliament (RSA, 2021). Money is appropriated annually by an Act of Parliament and is distributed to the parties by means of a prescribed formula that, in part, provides for a weighted equitable distribution to parties represented in the national parliament and provincial legislatures. The second part provides for a distribution to the parties represented in the National Assembly and provincial legislatures based on their proportional strength in terms of the numbers of members represented in both the National Assembly and provincial legislatures. Currently, one-third is distributed equitably to all parties that hold seats in the National Assembly or any provincial legislature; and two-thirds is distributed in proportion to seats held by a political party in the National Assembly or provincial legislatures (IEC, N.d.). Section 7 of the PPFA spells out what parties may and may not use the monies received form the RPPF for (RSA, 2021). They may use it for: Activities aimed at developing the political will of the people Shaping public opinion Political education Promoting the active participation of citizens in political life Influencing political trends Ensuring connectivity between the citizenry and organs of state Expenditure aimed at ensuring compliance with the PPFA They may not use it for: Remunerating any person that represents the party in any legislature or municipal council, or who receives remuneration for any appointment or service rendered to the state The financing of or contributing to anything that is in contravention of any code of ethics aimed at binding members of Parliament or members of a provincial legislature Establishing a business of any kind, or to acquire or maintain a financial interest therein, except where it is for the purposes of acquiring property to be used solely by the party and for party political purposes Defraying legal costs that relate to internal political party disputes 3.2.3 Multi-Party Democracy Fund Section 3 of the PPFA provides for the establishment of a Multi-Party Democracy Fund, the proceeds of which are to be distributed to represented political parties for purposes of promoting democracy (RSA, 2021). The fund may receive contributions in any amount from any private source within or outside of the country. It may, however, not receive any money from an organ of state, state-owned enterprise, foreign government or foreign government agency. In addition, interest earned by the fund and irregular donations made to political parties which are recovered, are also distributable to the represented parties (RSA, 2021). Donors making contributions to the Multi-Party Democracy Fund may request the regulator not to disclose their identity (RSA, 2021). The funds are allocated to the parties using the same formula as that of the RPPF. Similarly, the rules in terms of what the monies can and cannot be spent on are the same as those of the RPPF (RSA, 2021). 3.3 Appropriation Bill B7-2022 and Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022–2025 The purpose of this section is to ascertain the degree of public funding given to the political parties in a financial year. It examines the Appropriation Bill B7-2022 and Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022–2025, with specific reference to the amounts allocated to political parties. Direct public funding is channelled to parties through these two avenues only. 3.3.1 Appropriation Bill B7-2022 In the Appropriation Bill B7-2022 (RSA, 2022), there are two allocations that bear reference to the question posed in this study. Firstly, the Bill provides an allocation to Parliament, and secondly, it provides an allocation to the Independent Electoral Commission. It is these two institutions that transfer monies to the political parties. The following allocations were made in the Appropriation Bill: For the purposes of providing support services required by Parliament to fulfil its constitutional functions, and to assist the political parties represented in Parliament with facilities and administrative support, and to service their constituents, Parliament was allocated an amount of R2,212,234,000 (two billion two hundred and twelve million two hundred and thirty-four thousand rand). For purposes of providing institutional support and transfer funds to the Electoral Commission, the Represented Political Parties' Fund and the Border Management Authority, an amount of R2,762,584,000 (two billion seven hundred and sixty-two million five hundred and eighty-four thousand rand) was allocated. Of this, R342,077,000 (three hundred and forty-two million and seventy-seven thousand rand) was allocated to the Representative Political Parties’ Fund. 3.3.2 Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022–2025 Programme 3 of Parliament’s Annual Performance Plan 2022/23 to 2024/25 provides for the transfer in the amount of R518,572,000 (five hundred and eighteen million five hundred and seventy-two thousand rand) during the 2022/23 financial year, the application of which has been spelt out in paragraph 3.1.2. of this review. The actual net amount transferred to parties in the 2022/23 financial year amounted to R511,869,648 (five hundred and eleven million eight hundred and sixty-nine thousand six hundred and forty eight rand) (Parliament, 2022). 3.4 Conclusion Direct public funding in South Africa is allocated to political parties via three avenues: the RPPF, Multi-Party Democracy Fund (of which there has been no distribution to date) and Parliament, the quantum of which is indicated in Table 3.1. below. The number of eligible and soon-to-be eligible voters – that is, citizens over the age of 15 – number around 43,587,000 according to Statista (2022a), whereas the number of registered voters number 26,046,612 (IEC, N.d.). This means than an amount of R19,59 per annum per citizen over 15, or R32,78 per annum per registered voter, is set aside from public funds to support political parties.   Table 3.1.: Transfer of public funds to political parties per citizen over 15 and registered voter *Note: These figures are in relation to the national sphere of government. See study limitation in Chapter 4. Chapter 4: Research design and methodology As already stated, the introduction of the new party-political funding regime seems to have negatively impacted the political parties’ ability to raise funding from private sources. This has made them far more dependent on state funding, which, according to reports, seems not to be adequate, in that parties are not being able to meet their financial obligations. Consequently, they are not empowered to carry out their democratic and constitutionally imposed responsibilities and obligations properly and effectively. The introduction of regulations with regard to the private funding of political parties may have improved transparency, but at the same time it may also very well prove to disable parties from carrying out their functions effectively. In order for parties to effectively represent the constituents in Parliament, they need to have the organisational infrastructure to regularly interact with the electorate, and the capacity to do research, policy development and the marketing of their policy positions. All of which requires money. This is deployed to, for example: Develop the political will of the people Bring the party's influence to bear on the shaping of public opinion Inspire and further political education Promote active participation by individual citizens in political life Exercise an influence on political trends Ensure continuous and vital links between the people and organs of state (IEC, N.d.) 4.1 Research objective The objective of this research is to examine the South African party-funding environment in comparison to a selected group of parties from the European Union. The purpose is to ascertain how the South African political party funding regime compares to these international jurisdictions. The purpose is to provide public policymakers with benchmark information to enable them to consider the appropriateness of the current funding regime and to motivate for adjustments thereto, should it be found that the current model is wanting. 4.2 Research question Primary research question What comprises South Africa’s party-political funding regime and how does it compare with the party-funding regimes of Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands? Secondary research question Compared with the public funding regimes of the other countries of this study, are the South African political parties sufficiently funded to effectively carry out their democratic and constitutional obligations? 4.3 Research design The research takes a pragmatic approach in which both qualitative and quantitative methods were deployed during the course of the research. Qualitative research – “that is, non-numerical examination and interpretation of observations” (Babbie & Mouton, 2017:646) – was, for example, deployed to discover and understand the elements and extent of state funding of the political parties in both the European dispensations chosen for the benchmarking, as well as that of South Africa. Quantitative research – that is, the numerical representation and manipulation (Babbie & Mouton, 2017:646) – was, for example, used to measure the financial variances between the different state funding models and to convert the various financial quanta to equivalent purchasing power parity (PPP) in order to equalise the purchasing power of different currencies, by eliminating the differences in price levels between the foreign countries and South Africa. It was also needed to determine the per capita cost of state funding in each of the jurisdictions. 4.4 Research subjects The research subjects were the political parties of the countries that formed part of this study. The objective was to obtain data as to all the funding streams for funding the activities of the parties, and the extent thereof. The countries were selected using matching selection – that is, by comparing the similarities between the subjects to be selected (Babbie & Mouton, 2017:213). In this study the similarities were the electoral system – proportional representation. Whilst it is also important to consider the bearing of the different socio-economic conditions between that of South Africa and the developed world, the overriding consideration was that the quality of democracy should not be undermined based purely on affordability, since such considerations could potentially undermine the democratic ethos in the country. Costs were, however, as mentioned, converted to equalise the buying power differences between the countries. 4.5 Measurement The study required three measurements. The first was to measure the extent of party funding in each of the jurisdictions. This was to ascertain all the types of funding and the financial extent of that funding in each of the jurisdictions. This called for qualitative data, given the descriptive nature of the data (OSU, N.d.). It was obtained directly from the political parties, foundations and electoral commissions interviewed. The second measurement was to determine what the differences were between the jurisdictions in terms of the various sources of funding. This too was qualitative in nature. The third measurement was to determine the comparative cost per citizen (15+) to fund the parties. This was quantitative in nature, since it required measurable numeric information (OSU, N.d.). There were two dimensions to this measurement: (i) the conversion of the quantum in each jurisdiction in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) in order to ensure that an apples-for-apples comparison between the jurisdictions would be achieved, and (ii) to determine the per capita percentage differentiation between the various jurisdictions. This enabled an interpretation as to the adequacy of the South African funding regime compared with the practices in the benchmarked countries. 4.6 Data collection In-person expert interviews were undertaken in each of the benchmarking countries with the treasurers (or their delegated representatives) of a major political party in the particular country, and/or the electoral commission in the country. The purpose was to get a holistic understanding of the funding regimes in each country. It also served to identify all the elements of funding for parties in the particular country and the quantum thereof. To this end, both the qualitative and quantitative data were secured through open-ended questions, in order to allow for a holistic and comprehensive look at the issues being studied, since open-ended questions allowed for the respondents to provide all options and opinions related to the topic, thereby ensuring more diversity and elaboration than would be possible with a closed-question or forced-choice survey format (Allen, 2017). The questionnaire used in this regard is shown hereunder: 1) Questions to be posed to interviewees a) Are there restrictions of private donations to political parties, and if so: b) What are the laws governing those restrictions? 2) What do the restrictions entail? a) What are the various forms of public funding that parties are entitled to? b) Directly to the party c) Directly to elected representatives d) To the groups within Parliament e) Reimbursement for election expenses f) Any other 3) What is the monetary value of each of the aforementioned funding contributions? 4) How is the funding divided and distributed to the parties and/or elected representatives? 5) Are there any election campaign spending caps, and if so, what? 6) Are there any incentives in place to encourage individuals/corporates to make donations to political parties, such as, for example, tax incentives? 7) Is there any indirect funding in place, such as, for example, free media slots, and if so: a) What are the rules? b) What is the value? c) How is it divided and distributed to the parties? 8) Are there any public funds made available to institutions, foundations, etcetera, which stand independent from the political parties, but which are ideologically aligned with parties, such as the political foundations in Germany and other European countries who stimulate the public policy dialogue, democracy and human rights through the lens of the ideological orientation, and if so: a) What is the rationale behind those contributions? b) How does it work? c) From which government departments and/or institutions are the funds dispersed? d) How are the contributions divided/distributed to the various institutions, foundations, etcetera? e) What is the monetary value of the contributions from each department and/or institution? 9) In terms of private versus public funding of political parties, what is, in your estimation, the ratio between the two? Indicate by marking the correct statement: Note: Private finding includes membership fees and contributions by trade unions. (10) Are there any other factors that you believe should be taken into account? 4.7 Analysis Various multivariate tables were constructed, which comprised a number of independent variables (the different jurisdictions) and a range of dependent variables (the funding streams available in each jurisdiction) (Babbie & Mouton:435). This enabled the researcher to do a comparative analysis on the similarities and differences between the various systems. In some instances, the tables were simultaneously multiple in nature, since they, in addition to the qualitative data mentioned above, also provided for quantitative data – that is, the quantum of the various funding streams available in each jurisdiction. In the final instance, the researcher interpreted the table in terms of: the elements of state funding that are available in each of the benchmarking countries, including those elements that are not available in South Africa, together with an analysis of the amounts provided by the state to fund each of the elements the per capita cost of party funding by the state, based on PPP, for each of the countries whereafter: in that the researcher had been exposed to the implicit and explicit facts related to the various funding regimes (Babbie & Mouton, 2017:641), the researcher was able to make a determination through deduction reasoning as to the adequacy of the South African funding dispensation in comparison to the benchmarked countries the researcher developed recommendations for public policymakers to ponder. 4.8 Ethics Whereas the data, such as the types and quantum of state funding, are available in the public domain, formal ethics clearance was not required. However, since some financial information, especially that which relates to private funding or commercial activities, was confidential, the financial analysis was restricted to public funding only. 4.9 Limitation of the study This study has only examined the public funding of political parties at the national level. It has not ventured into public fund transfers to political parties at the provincial and/or municipal level of government. The assessment therefore relates to public funds transfers to the parties at the national and the national parliamentary levels only. That said, in the comparative analysis, all jurisdictions were treated in similar fashion, resulting in a like-for-like comparison. The author is therefore confident that the conclusions reached will be valid for the purposes of the study, that is, to draw conclusions as to how South Africa’s public funding of political parties compares with those of the other international jurisdictions against which it was assessed. 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