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On Tuesday, 29 July 2025.  Mr Daryl Swanepoel, our CEO and Mrs Berenice Marks were honoured to be invited by the Western Cape First Nations Collective Trust to attend the opening of the First Nations Heritage Centre at Riverlands, Observatory.   The opening featured an exhibition “Ancient Legacies and Modern Identities” which is a celebration of the heritage and culture of South Africa’s Foundational Peoples.   Distinguished speaker included Queen Katrina Esau, Head of the Royal House of Nǁnǂe, Mr Petrus Vaalbooi, Traditional Leader of the Kalahari Boesmans as well Chief !Garu Zenzile Khoisan, Chairman of the Western Cape First Nations Collective.   A significant highlight of the occasion was the handover of the Heritage Centre by the Developer, Mr Jody Aufrichtig to the Western Cape First Nations Collective Trust which will be the custodian of the centre and its surrounding heritage features.   On the following day Wednesday, 30 July, Mr Swanepoel and Mrs Marks met with Chief !Garu Zenzile Khoisan and Mr. Charles Quint to discuss an upcoming exhibition of the First Nations at The Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, in Jinhua, Zhejiang, China and other synergies for future cooperation.  The meeting was highly productive, and we look forward to collaborating on the China exhibition project as well as future initiatives.

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to live up to its promise of “Taking the Constitution to the People”  through its far-reaching civic education workshops, conducted at various schools and tertiary institutions across the Gauteng and North West provinces. This initiative forms part of the Institute’s ongoing commitment to strengthen South Africa’s democracy by fostering a deeper understanding of the Constitution among the country’s youth. At the forefront of this effort is the Provincial Schools Project Coordinator, Patrick Motsepe, whose dedication and hands-on approach ensure the success of each workshop. His role is not merely administrative, he actively engages with learners, tailoring the sessions to be both informative and relatable, thus delivering on one of the Institute’s core mandates. On Friday, 25 July, his work reached another milestone when a total of 167 Grade 11 learners from the Academy for Christian Education in Brits, North West Province, attended a dynamic and interactive workshop. The session was specifically designed to equip young people, particularly those approaching voting age, with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa’s foundational legal document, the Constitution. The content of the workshop is carefully aligned with the Life Orientation and History curricula, ensuring that it supports and enhances what learners are already studying in the classroom. Topics such as values, social cohesion, human rights, and civic duties were unpacked in a manner that connected directly with the learners’ everyday experiences. By framing these constitutional principles in real-world contexts, the programme succeeded in bridging the gap between theory and practical application. According to feedback from the school, the presentation left a powerful impression. Mrs Mariska Kruger, Head of the Life Orientation Department, described it as “exactly what the doctor ordered”  — a timely, relevant, and engaging addition to the learners’ education. Her endorsement underscores the importance of this kind of civic engagement in shaping informed, responsible citizens. Workshops like this one do more than simply teach facts about the Constitution; they encourage critical thinking, promote active citizenship, and inspire young South Africans to see themselves as participants in the democratic process rather than passive observers. The sessions also provide a safe space for learners to ask questions, challenge assumptions, and explore how constitutional values apply in their own communities. Looking ahead, the Institute is committed to expanding the reach of the programme, with plans to roll out similar workshops to a growing number of schools and tertiary institutions in both Gauteng and the North West. Each event moves the Institute closer to its goal of ensuring that the principles enshrined in the Constitution are not confined to textbooks or courtrooms, but are truly understood, valued, and lived by the people. Through sustained efforts like these, the Inclusive Society Institute reaffirms its belief that democracy thrives when citizens, especially the youth, are informed, engaged, and empowered.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) has expanded its “Taking the Constitution to the People: Know Your Rights and Responsibilities”  programme to the North West Province, with the first leg of workshops taking place in the Brits District. On 25 July 2025, Patrick Motsepe, ISI Schools Project Coordinator, conducted the workshop at Eagles College in Brits, where 45 enthusiastic Grade 11 learners took part. The workshop is designed to empower young people with a solid understanding of the history of the Republic of South Africa, how the Constitution was crafted and structured, and how it continues to shape the daily lives of citizens. Learners were taken through key aspects of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, the separation of powers, and the importance of active citizenship. The programme also emphasises that with rights come responsibilities and obligations, fostering a sense of accountability and civic duty among learners. The initiative reflects ISI’s commitment to strengthening democracy by instilling constitutional values in the younger generation. Through interactive discussions and practical examples, learners are encouraged to view themselves not only as beneficiaries of the Constitution but also as active participants in building a just and inclusive society. The North West Province will continue to benefit from these workshops in the coming months, as ISI rolls out further engagements in schools across the region. By reaching young people at grassroots level, the Institute hopes to nurture a generation that is well-informed, responsible, and committed to upholding the principles of South Africa’s democracy.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), Mr. Daryl Swanepoel, participated in the United Nations 4 TH  International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), held in Seville, Spain, from 30 June to 3 July 2025.   Representing the ISI and the broader Global South Perspectives Network, Mr. Swanepoel actively engaged in high-level discussions focused on reforming global financial systems to better serve developing nations.   A central theme of the Institute’s participation was the urgent need for fairer climate finance. Mr. Swanepoel championed ISI’s proposals for greater financial support to help developing countries adapt to the escalating impacts of climate change, advocating for solutions grounded in equity and global responsibility [Click here for the ISI paper] .   The Institute also expressed strong support for ongoing UN-led efforts to reform the global tax system. In particular, it emphasised the importance of ensuring developing nations receive fair compensation through mechanisms to more effectively tax the ultra-wealthy and multinational corporations.   Beyond financial issues, Mr. Swanepoel took the opportunity to promote broader UN reforms, calling for an enhanced role for middle-power nations in global governance. As part of the Global South Perspectives Network delegation, he advocated for a more inclusive and representative multilateral order.   The Inclusive Society Institute remains committed to shaping global policy frameworks that reflect the needs and aspirations of the developing world.

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to make significant inroads into secondary schools across the Gauteng Province, actively engaging learners in meaningful discussions and promoting the democratic values that underpin South Africa’s governance. As part of its flagship “Taking the Constitution to the People”  initiative, the Institute recently conducted a workshop that left a lasting impression on both learners and educators. On Wednesday, 23 July 2025, seventy-six learners from Curro Academy in Soshanguve participated in this dynamic civic education programme, facilitated by the Institute’s Gauteng Schools Coordinator, Mr. Patrick Motsepe. With his characteristic passion and deep knowledge, Mr. Motsepe guided the learners through a thought-provoking exploration of South Africa’s democratic Constitution — its origins, structure, and the vital rights and responsibilities enshrined in Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights. Far from being a purely theoretical exercise, the workshop offered a rich, interactive learning experience. Learners were taken on a comprehensive journey tracing the Constitution’s creation — from the negotiations that shaped its drafting to the principles that underpinned its final form. Discussions highlighted the Founding Provisions, which define South Africa’s core values, and examined how these translate into the freedoms and protections that citizens enjoy today. A central theme running through the session was the notion of responsible citizenship . Learners were encouraged to see themselves not only as beneficiaries of constitutional rights, but also as active custodians of those rights. The workshop challenged them to think critically about their role in building an inclusive, equitable, and just society — one that lives up to the spirit and letter of the Constitution. The impact of the session was evident in the lively engagement of the learners, who participated enthusiastically in discussions and posed thoughtful questions. For many, the workshop provided clarity on how constitutional principles connect directly to everyday life and community issues. The Inclusive Society Institute’s dedication to this initiative is ongoing. This event in Soshanguve forms part of a broader strategy to bring constitutional literacy to every corner of Gauteng. Similar workshops will continue to be rolled out across the province’s districts, ensuring that more young people are equipped with the knowledge and values necessary to be informed, engaged, and civically minded citizens. By embedding constitutional education into the school environment, the Institute is investing in a generation that will not only safeguard South Africa’s democratic achievements but will also drive the nation forward in the spirit of inclusivity, justice, and active participation.

The Inclusive Society Institute, in partnership with Daily Maverick, officially launched its Constitutional Insights by Albie Sachs  webinar series on 23 July 2025. This series builds on an earlier four-part podcast with former Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs, which reflected on the ideals, promises, and unfinished work of South Africa’s constitutional democracy. The webinars are designed to extend these reflections into live, interactive conversations with leading thinkers and practitioners, with a view to making constitutional debates more accessible to the public. The first conversation brought together respected analyst and commentator William Gumede  and renowned constitutional law scholar Prof. Pierre de Vos . Their discussion centred on one of the most fundamental and contested questions in South Africa today: What does it mean to be South African? The dialogue explored issues of identity, belonging, and citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa , reflecting on how the Constitution envisioned a united people while recognising deep diversity. Gumede and de Vos spoke to the challenges of building a shared national identity in the face of persistent inequality, lingering racial divisions, and generational differences in how democracy is experienced. They noted that belonging is not just about legal citizenship but also about whether people feel included, respected, and represented within society’s political and cultural frameworks. The speakers emphasised that the Constitution provides a foundation for shared identity through its values of dignity, equality, and freedom, but that these values must be actively lived and defended. They pointed out that the younger generation, in particular, is redefining what it means to be South African, often questioning traditional narratives of nationhood and seeking new forms of inclusion that go beyond symbolic unity. Audience engagement highlighted strong interest in how citizenship and identity intersect with everyday lived experiences — from language and education to economic opportunity and participation in political processes. This underscored the need for continuous dialogue about belonging and citizenship, not only in academic or legal spaces but within communities and among ordinary South Africans. This inaugural webinar set the tone for the rest of the series by posing difficult but essential questions about the meaning of democracy and inclusivity. The three upcoming episodes will continue this work by tackling critical themes: The role of state institutions in defending democracy The transformative power of mother tongue education What it will take to create an inclusive electoral system Through these conversations, the Constitutional Insights  series aims to spark broader public reflection on the enduring relevance of the Constitution and how it can guide South Africa toward a more inclusive and just future.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) proudly participated in the T20 South Africa Midterm Conference , held on 19 and 20 June 2025. Hosted by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) , the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) , and the Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation (IPATC) , the event brought together a rich tapestry of global thought leaders, researchers, and policymakers to review progress and deepen collaboration ahead of the upcoming G20 Leaders’ Summit . The Midterm Conference marked a crucial milestone in the Think20 (T20) process, offering a timely opportunity to evaluate the work being undertaken by the five thematic Task Forces . These include pressing areas such as sustainable development, multilateral reform, digital transformation, and inclusive economic growth. The gathering enabled cross-regional engagement and strategic policy refinement to ensure that recommendations remain responsive to emerging global dynamics. Beyond its formal agenda, the conference provided a platform for building solidarity across disciplines, geographies, and sectors . It created a collaborative environment where diverse perspectives converged  around shared global challenges—from climate action and social justice to economic resilience and innovation. On 20 June, the focus shifted to the broader purpose of the Think20 , the G20’s official ideas bank , which convenes global think tanks and research centers. In the face of uneven economic recovery , rising inequality , and escalating geopolitical tensions, the T20’s role in crafting evidence-based, forward-looking policy recommendations has become more vital than ever. The conference reaffirmed the value of inclusive and informed dialogue in shaping a coordinated global response to today’s complex challenges. The Inclusive Society Institute’s participation reflects its ongoing commitment to advancing inclusive, evidence-based policymaking  that bridges the divide between government, business, and civil society—both at home and abroad.

Occasional Paper 8/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. J U L Y 2 0 2 5   Dr Samantha Williams PhD (Environmental and Geographical Science), University of Cape Town, 2013     Abstract   Small-scale fishing (SSF) in South Africa has long been a cornerstone of coastal livelihoods, identities and cultures. Despite its historical and socio-economic significance, SSF continues to face persistent challenges related to resource access, governance and socio-economic vulnerability. This paper provides an overview of the status of SSF in South Africa within the broader framework of the Blue Economy, emphasising sustainable ocean-based livelihoods and equitable resource use by drawing on a review of relevant academic and policy literature. It describes the evolution of policy reforms aimed at improving SSF governance and identifies gaps between policy intent and local realities, crucial for South Africa’s new blue/oceans economy agenda ambitions.   The paper examines how socio-economic and ecological challenges affect SSF, with particular attention given to the structural inequalities that continue to marginalise small-scale fishers despite national and international frameworks promoting inclusive ocean governance.   In conclusion, this research proposes pathways for advancing SSF within the Blue Economy paradigm, focusing on sustainable governance and equitable resource distribution. This approach highlights the importance of enhancing SSF's livelihoods through capacity building, long-term policy support and the adoption of equitable and just principles within governance structures and processes. These conditions are essential for fostering a sustainable and inclusive ocean economy in South Africa, ensuring that small-scale fisheries contribute to shaping an equitable ocean future.   Introduction   On a global scale, small-scale fisheries (SSF) are recognised as fundamental to food security, nutrition, livelihoods and cultural identity, particularly in developing regions (Cheungpagdee & Jentoft, 2019). A recent study, quantifying the value and contribution of small-scale fisheries (SSF), indicates that globally, the livelihood of 1 in every 12 people, nearly half of them women, depends on SSF for their livelihoods (Basurto et al., 2025). These figures underscore the sector’s significance as a source of food and income, for instance, and especially for vulnerable populations in coastal and inland communities.   Various studies have highlighted the contribution of SSF in combating hunger and malnutrition with catch from small-scale fisheries supporting human nutrition in two key ways: first, through the direct consumption of seafood and second, through income earned from fisheries that are used to purchase nutritious food (Viana et al., 2023; Smith & Basurto, 2019). When seafood is sold within communities or at local markets, it is often more affordable than other animal protein sources, such as beef or chicken, making it a vital and affordable source of nutrients for communities with limited access to broader food markets.   This, for example, in Africa, supports the food security of over 200 million people (March & Failler, 2022).  In Asia, similar contributions are noted where small-scale fisheries support the livelihoods of around 46 million people. Women make up 40 per cent of those engaged in the sector, which accounts for nearly half of the region's total fish catch, with an estimated landed value of USD 53.3 billion (FAO, 2025).   Beyond their nutritional and economic value, SSFs are deeply embedded in the cultural fabric of many societies. Fishing is not merely an occupation but a way of life that shapes community identities and social relations (Delgado-Ramírez et al., 2022; Fabinyi & Barkley, 2022). In South Africa, as in many coastal regions worldwide, SSFs support diverse livelihood strategies and are integral to the social and cultural identity of many coastal communities (Solomon, 2023; Williams, 2023).   While small-scale fishing livelihoods are characterised by their diversity, flexibility and dynamism (Fabinyi & Barkley, 2022), it is accepted that there is no universal definition of what constitutes small-scale fisheries. Various definitions consistently highlight that small-scale fisheries vary widely across regions, cultures, and policy contexts, reflecting differences in gear types, vessel sizes, target species, socio-economic role and the organisation of labour (Smith & Basurto, 2019). The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries [1] explicitly recognise this diversity and the absence of a single definition, instead describes SSF as encompassing a wide range of activities along the value chain, undertaken by men and women in both inland and marine environments (FAO, 2015).  Many studies note that national and scientific definitions often emphasise technological dimensions, such as boat length or engine power. Therefore, small-scale fisheries are best understood as a heterogeneous and context-dependent sector embedded in complex socio-ecological systems and shaped by local realities (Smith & Basurto, 2019).  This connection to place and tradition is a defining feature of SSF, distinguishing it from large-scale industrial fisheries.   Despite the significant contribution that SSF makes to the livelihoods of millions, many SSF-dependent communities still face significant socio-economic challenges and remain vulnerable to poverty, resource access constraints, limited participation in governance, insecure tenure rights, and exposure to environmental and market shocks (Cheungpagdee & Jentoft, 2019; Sowman et al., 2014). Climate change poses risks to SSF through the altered distribution of harvested resources, habitat degradation and increased frequency of extreme weather events (Villasante et al., 2022; Galappaththi et al., 2021). These impacts threaten both the ecological sustainability of these fisheries systems and the socio-economic well-being of SSF communities.  Their vulnerability is further exacerbated by their historical marginalisation in policy and governance frameworks (Cheungpagdee & Jentoft, 2019).   Various national and international policy instruments have aimed to address the challenges faced in small-scale fisheries. The FAO's Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries, along with the inclusion of SSF in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), underscore the importance of equitable access to resources, social protection, and capacity building. In particular, the FAO’s SSF Guidelines were developed to support the visibility, recognition and enhancement of the role of SSF and to contribute to global and national efforts to eradicate hunger and poverty (FAO, 2015). It, therefore, provides guidance that States and stakeholders can consider for the development and implementation of participatory policies, strategies and legal frameworks to enhance responsible and sustainable SSFs.   In this regard, when considering the role and integration of SSFs into the blue economy and ocean governance frameworks, it is essential to ensure that SSFs are not overlooked in the pursuit of economic growth. The Blue Economy has rapidly become a key feature in ocean governance discourse and is hailed as a strategic approach that presents both opportunities and challenges for Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF) (Yousef, 2024). Fisheries form one part of the Blue Economy agenda, which encompasses a broad spectrum of ocean-based economic activities. These include aquaculture, maritime transport, coastal tourism, renewable energy, marine biotechnology and ecosystem services. Within this framework, fisheries, when managed sustainably and equitably, can contribute to economic growth, improved livelihoods and the sustainable use of marine resources.   The following section provides an overview of small-scale fisheries in South Africa, examining their socio-economic significance as a foundation for community livelihoods, identities and cultures. It is also essential to discuss the persistent challenges related to resource access and governance, as the sector has historically been marginalised. Acknowledging these issues is crucial to ensure that small-scale fisheries are not overlooked and that their contributions and livelihoods are fully recognised and supported in Blue Economy frameworks and plans.  It is critically important to explore the role of SSF within the oceans economy framework and how it can enhance and strengthen the sector.    The role and relevance of SSFs in South Africa   Given South Africa’s colonial and later apartheid history, it is not surprising that natural resource use, distribution and access rights are contested issues that the country still grapples with. As in the case of land, so too does the fisheries sector bear examples of this complex nature.  Historically, the small-scale fisheries sector has been neglected in fisheries discourses, policies and management (Auld & Feris, 2022; Sowman, 2011; Hara & Raakjaer, 2009). This is the case as the country's marine resources and activities were dominated by a few large-scale, white-owned enterprises during the country's apartheid era. Access to resources for most of the country’s population and coastal fisher communities was predominantly gained through employment in the commercial fishing sector or by obtaining access through recreational or resource-use permits (Sowman & Cardoso, 2010; van Sittert, 2003).   Despite these restrictions, however, many individuals and communities have been engaged in subsistence and small-scale fishing activities for decades (van Sittert, 2003; Clark et al., 2002). These activities, although labour-intensive, do not require significant financial investments or extensive operations. Typically, small-scale fishers harvest fisheries resources for household consumption and limited sale to local markets (Fabinyi & Barclay, 2022). With South Africa's democratisation and the development of new legislation, small-scale fishers were recognised as part of a formal sector for the first time. Recognition of these individuals and communities was the first step in a long process of transformation that is continuing.   While recognition of this sector was a positive step forward, little information was available about fishers and how they are organised, what and where they harvested, the nature of their communities and their livelihoods. In broad terms, this recognition confirmed that there was a significant level of poverty in fishing communities and that transformation in the industry was urgently required (Sunde & Isaacs, 2008). More specifically, it highlighted the need to accommodate small scale fishers in new policy developments. In September 1993, a 'Fishing Forum' was established, comprising various stakeholders such as the trade unions, large companies, various government departments, all tasked with managing fisheries resources. It was agreed that immediate steps were needed to address the poverty crisis in coastal fishing communities, and the new government promised "the upliftment of impoverished coastal communities through improved access to marine resources" (ANC 1994, p. 104).   The post-apartheid period was, therefore, marked by a series of commissions, interim resource rights allocation measures and processes, policy development, protests and legal actions that all collectively shaped the trajectory of the small-scale fisheries sector (Williams, 2023; Sowman, 2011). Sowman (2011) notes that the promulgation of the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) of 1998 (RSA, 1998) gave recognition to subsistence fishers as a legal category of fishers and demonstrated the new government's commitment to redress for marginalised fishers and their communities.   However, the MLRA's restrictive definition of 'subsistence' resulted in the exclusion of a significant number of traditional and small-scale fishers from the new fisheries policy framework, leaving many without formal recognition or access to the resources they had historically depended on (Auld &Feris, 2022). A pivotal moment in the policy process occurred in 2005, when fishers, their communities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academics approached the Equality Court to challenge the exclusion of small-scale fishers from access to fishing rights (Sowman & Sunde, 2021). This action resulted in the 2007 court ruling that required the (n) Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) to allocate interim rights to excluded fishers and to develop a dedicated policy for small-scale fisheries.   After extensive consultation and negotiation, the Policy for the Small-Scale Fisheries Sector in South Africa was gazetted in June 2012, followed by the promulgation of regulations and amendments to the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) in March 2016 (DAFF 2012). The Small-Scale Fisheries Policy (SSFP) explicitly recognises the unique character and needs of small-scale fishers, defines access rights and aims to facilitate their effective participation in resource management. Central to the policy is a commitment to a human-rights-based approach, emphasising food security, poverty alleviation, the recognition of customary practices and equitable access to marine resources (DAFF 2012). South Africa has approximately 147 small-scale fishing communities, with around 28,338 fisher households and 29,233 subsistence fishers (Issacs et al, 2022).   The Blue Economy concept   The Blue Economy has rapidly emerged as a dominant discourse in global and national discussions about value creation in ocean spaces, emphasising the sustainable use of marine resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods and ecosystem health. Ocean governance, which encompasses the frameworks, policies and institutions that regulate human interactions with the ocean, has become central to this agenda. As the world’s oceans have witnessed a proliferation of anthropogenic pressures, they can no longer be viewed as inexhaustible resources.   In response to the mounting challenges posed by these pressures, the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG 14: Life Below Water) establishes a global mandate for the conservation and sustainable management of the world’s oceans, seas and marine resources. It, therefore, explicitly recognises the ocean's role in future economic, social and ecological development.    Gunter Pauli is credited with coining the term ‘Blue Economy’ in 1994. In his book entitled “ The Blue Economy: 10 Years, 100 Innovations, 100 Million Jobs ”, the economist outlines a blue economy paradigm which seeks to balance economic development with ocean and environmental sustainability (Pauli, 1994). In this model, it is emphasised that the Blue Economy, as an economic model, involves the sustainable use of coastal and marine resources, aiming to stimulate economic growth, support livelihoods and maintain the health and integrity of ocean ecosystems. This approach encompasses all commercial activities associated with ocean and coastal environments, including fisheries, aquaculture, maritime transport and engineering, renewable energy, marine biotechnology and coastal tourism. By integrating economic development with environmental stewardship, these activities aim to strike a balance between value creation and long-term ecological sustainability, as well as social benefits.   The concept of the Blue Economy gained traction following its introduction at the United Nations (UN) Rio+20 conference held in 2012 (Lee et al., 2020). During the preparatory phase for Rio+20, many coastal nations expressed concerns about the relevance and applicability of the Green Economy framework to their specific contexts (UN, 2014). As a result, strong advocacy emerged for the adoption of a "Blue Economy" approach that would more directly address the priorities and realities of ocean-dependent countries, especially Small Island Developing States (SIDS), leading to increased visibility and integration into global policy discussions.   Various definitions and interpretations of the Blue Economy are cited in the growing body of literature (see Das, 2023; Smith-Godfrey, 2016; Voyer et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2020; Picken, 2023). The concept has also given rise to related terms such as Blue Justice, which emphasises social equity and fair access for marginalised coastal communities (Reis-Filho et al., 2024; Arias-Schreiber et al., 2022); Blue Growth, which focuses on the sustainable expansion of ocean-based industries (Eikeset et al., 2018); Blue communities, a concept that draws on the multi-dimensional concept of well-being to foreground social, cultural and environmental factors alongside economic growth and Blue Sustainability, which stresses the long-term health of marine environments alongside economic and social objectives. Given the increasing recognition of the Blue Economy’s importance for sustainable development in coastal nations, these interconnected frameworks are likely to continue expanding and shape ocean governance and policy in different countries and contexts (Voyer et al., 2018).    The Blue/ Oceans Economy in South Africa   Like many other coastal nations, South Africa was also motivated by the economic and social benefits of the Blue Economy and its potential impact on the country's economic, social and developmental needs (Sowman & Sunde, 2024; Loureiro et al., 2022).  With a coastline that stretches nearly 2800 kilometres (the second largest on the African continent), the country is strategically positioned along one of the world’s key maritime shipping corridors. It, therefore, plays a vital role in global marine transportation. Its rich coastal environment is influenced by the convergence of three oceans, which are central to South Africa's economy. With approximately 30% of the population residing within 60 km of the coast and over 90% of all trade involving a maritime element, South Africa has been described as a 'maritime economy' (Struwig et al 2023; Walker, 2018).   Given the country’s maritime nature and developing plans for its ocean economy, the South African government approved the adoption of the Malaysian Big Fast Results (BFR) methodology in 2014 to accelerate economic development across various sectors, including the ocean economy. This initiative, known locally as Operation Phakisa-Oceans Economy ( Phakisa  means hurry in Sesotho, one of South Africa’s 12 official languages), was launched to fast-track the implementation of key objectives outlined in the country’s 2030 National Development Plan (NDP), particularly the eradication of poverty, unemployment, and inequality (Stuwig et al., 2024; Vreÿ, 2019). In his speech to introduce Phakisa, former South African president Jacob Zuma noted that the starting point for this process was “ that South Africa is surrounded by a vast ocean and yet we have not fully taken advantage of the immense potential of this untapped resource. The oceans have the potential to contribute up to 177 billion rand to the Gross Domestic Product and create just over one million jobs by 2033. To further explore this potential, we brought together teams from government, labour, business, academia and other sectors to work together in experimental laboratories to explore all possibilities and further unlock the potential of our country's vast coastline ” (Presidential speech, 2014). From Phakisa’s introduction, it was also outlined that six priority areas and two cross-cutting themes were identified for South Africa’s ocean economy. These included marine transport and manufacturing, offshore oil and gas exploration, fishing and aquaculture, marine protection services and ocean governance, small harbour development, coastal and marine tourism, skills and capacity building, and research, as well as technology and innovation (OEMP, n.d.).    Since its launch and introduction, the implementation of Operation Phakisa-Oceans Economy has yielded mixed and modest economic results and impacts (OEMP, n.d) that also demonstrate variations across the six priority areas. A comprehensive economic analysis undertaken on behalf of the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (DFFE) was conducted in 2021 and estimated that Operation Phakisa-Oceans Economy had the potential to contribute between ZAR129 to ZAR177 billion to South Africa’s GDP by 2033 (compared to ZAR54 billion in 2010) and create between 800 000 and 1 million jobs (compared to 316 000 in 2010) (OEMP, nd). Further forecasts to 2035 suggest that the ocean economy will contribute approximately 4.5% to South Africa's GDP (around ZAR 166.6 billion) and support about 608,253 jobs, representing 2.9% of total employment (Zimmerman, 2021 quoted in OEMP, n.d).   The priority areas highlighted above comprise various subsectors, each with its own targeted and projected gains from the value creation process in South Africa’s ocean spaces. The scope of this research paper does not allow for a detailed examination of all these sectors and subsectors. Instead, this forthcoming section aims to expand on the fisheries sector (with particular reference to SSF) and how these features within South Africa's ocean economy framework [2] . Efforts to expand on South Africa's plans to grow its ocean economy have resulted in a relatively new Oceans Economy Master Plan (OEMP), whose broad vision aims “ to sustainably unlock the socio-economic potential of the Oceans Economy so that South Africa is globally recognised as a fully-fledged maritime nation by 2035”.   The OEMP presents a comprehensive sub-sector plan for fisheries and acknowledges that the industry (which consists of industrial, commercial, subsistence, recreational or artisanal activities) is highly complex.  Regarding the role of SSF, the OEMP describes this sector as recently recognised in law, where basic gear and small boats are used to earn a living and many coastal communities have fished South Africa's waters for generations. Fishing is, therefore, deeply rooted in their culture and heritage. It further highlights that these fishers are granted rights through fishing cooperatives, and about 95% of their diverse catch, ranging from mussels and finfish to seaweed and abalone, is consumed locally (OEMP, n.d).   Challenges identified for the sector and those specifically relevant to SSF are also outlined in the OEMP. Key issues include the overexploitation of marine resources and the impacts of climate change, both of which threaten the sustainability and ecological integrity of these ecosystems, as well as the livelihoods that depend on them. For small-scale fisheries, the situation is further compounded by limited access to essential resources, such as vessels and equipment, as well as access to technology.  The absence of storage and processing facilities, poor infrastructure and high operational costs further hinder their ability to operate effectively. Environmental threats from offshore oil, gas and other mining activities add to the pressures faced by fishing communities.    Discussion   Advancing sustainable small-scale fisheries in the Ocean’s economy of South Africa The question of whether the Blue Economy can offer sustainable livelihoods for small-scale fisheries (SSF) and ensure ecological sustainability in South Africa is complex and multifaceted. Many challenges faced by SSF communities, such as continued marginalisation, limited access to resources and vulnerability to environmental and economic pressures, are longstanding and also acknowledged in sector-specific ocean economy frameworks.   Critiques in South African academic literature highlight that while the Blue Economy promises economic growth and sustainable oceans, its implementation and associated processes may exacerbate the precarious conditions of SSF communities (Sowman & Sunde, 2024; Bond, 2019). For example, Operation Phakisa’s focus on rapid economic development and industrial ocean sectors raised concerns and sparked resistance from SSF communities, NGOs and activists, among others. Widespread media attention and academic critiques have emphasised that Phakisa’s strong economic growth focus has sidelined social and environmental concerns. For example, Bond (2019) argues that the initiative, especially under the Zuma administration, was overhyped and failed to deliver meaningful benefits to communities that also faced exclusion from marine spaces due to industrial developments promoted by Phakisa.  Moreover, the framing of the ocean primarily as a site for capital accumulation conflicts with the cultural and livelihood values of communities, who experienced dispossession and exclusion from fully benefiting from coastal and marine resources.   Local resistance movements, such as the "Oceans Not Oil" coalition, emerged, uniting small-scale fishers, indigenous groups, scientists, and environmental NGOs in opposition to offshore oil and gas activities promoted by Phakisa, demanding a shift toward ocean-centred, socially just and ecologically sustainable policies (Solomon, 2023). Protests led and organised by the coalition opposed a seismic survey aimed at exploring petroleum beneath the ecologically sensitive Pondoland region on the Wild Coast of South Africa. This survey was to be conducted by BG International, a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, in collaboration with Shell Exploration and Production SA and the local consortium Impact Africa Limited. The protests sparked widespread mobilisation among civil society groups both across Africa and internationally (Healy 2022 quoted in Solomon 2023). Following two court interdicts, one of which was successfully revoked, Shell's reconnaissance permit, along with all its subsequent renewals, was revoked, and the company was ordered to pay legal costs. Solomon (2023) further notes that what many protesters were attempting to make visible was not only the public accountability of Shell and Impact Africa but, more specifically, a meaningful reconnection of the marine environment with paradigms of relation and critical care. In South Africa, the sea holds sacred significance for many, regarded as a source of ancestral power, a place for spiritual grounding and healing and therefore deeply embedded in the cultural practices of local communities (Sibeko 2020, quoted in Solomon 2023). A key tension lies in balancing economic expansion with social equity and environmental protection, all of which are core pillars of the Blue Economy. South Africa's SSF policy, for instance, legally recognises small-scale fishers and their communities, aiming to promote equitable access and co-management as part of its overarching objectives. This, therefore, aligns with the Blue Economy principles of sustainability and inclusion (WWF, 2018; DFFE, 2012). However, there have been delays and slow, uneven implementation of policies, which present challenges that will impact and leave many SSF communities vulnerable to exclusion from Blue Economy initiatives (Sowman & Sunde, 2024). This marginalisation is what Bennette et al. (2021) describe in their literature review, which identifies ten injustices that can result from an unjust ocean economy: (1) dispossession, displacement, and ocean grabbing; (2) environmental justice concerns arising from pollution and waste; (3) environmental degradation and the reduction of ecosystem services; (4) undermining the livelihoods of small-scale fishers; (5) restricting access to marine resources essential for food security and well-being; (6) inequitable distribution of economic benefits; (7) social and cultural impacts; (8) marginalisation of women; (9) abuses of human and Indigenous rights; and (10) exclusion from decision-making and governance processes. These interconnected injustices underscore the complex social and environmental challenges that blue economy initiatives can pose, particularly to coastal communities such as small-scale fishers. Effectively advancing small-scale fisheries (SSF) within South Africa's Blue Economy requires a multidimensional approach that addresses and promotes socio-economic empowerment while ensuring ecological sustainability. Building on this foundation, four key pathways are identified here as essential for strengthening small-scale fisheries (SSFs) and ensuring their effective integration into the broader ocean economy. Firstly, securing equitable access to marine resources is foundational. The South African Small-Scale Fisheries Policy (2012) establishes community-based rights allocation, moving away from individual rights toward collective resource management. However, challenges remain in the effective implementation and allocation of these rights, which include bureaucratic delays. Scholarship on promoting sustainable and effective co-management regimes advocates that empowering local communities has demonstrated success in balancing resource sustainability with livelihood security (Pomeroy & Rivera-Guieb, 2006; Gelcich et al., 2019). It is, therefore, imperative to build and support these models by strengthening cooperative governance structures, improve capacity building and ensuring that SSF communities have meaningful participation in decision-making processes.  The contribution and inclusion of SSF community perspectives are paramount.   Secondly, improving economic opportunities through value chain development and infrastructure investment is vital. A recent 36% increase in key fish species to SSFs by South Africa’s DFFE (2025) provides a crucial resource base, but maximising benefits from these allocations requires better access to processing facilities, markets and finance. These remain ongoing challenges for the sector, and therefore, it necessitates support for cooperative entities that can help convert resource access into tangible socio-economic gains (Sowman & Sunde, 2021). Thirdly, addressing environmental sustainability and climate resilience is essential, considering the vulnerability of SSFs to ecosystem degradation and climate change. Blue Economy initiatives often focus on industrial sectors, such as offshore energy and aquaculture, which can spatially and ecologically compete with Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF). Examples of these concerns have been discussed above; hence, integrating SSF concerns into marine protected area (MPA) planning and ecosystem-based management approaches can reduce conflicts and promote biodiversity conservation alongside livelihoods (Sowman & Sunde, 2021). Furthermore, building adaptive capacity through community empowerment, monitoring and diversification of fishing practices can support Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF) resilience to climate variability (Barange et al., 2018).   Finally, strengthening policy coherence and multi-level governance is vital. The fragmentation of governance approaches and the slow pace of policy implementation have hindered the progress of SSF in South Africa. Aligning national policies with regional and local governance frameworks and fostering collaboration among government departments, civil society, traditional and local authorities, communities as well as other relevant stakeholders can create an enabling environment for SSF development (Phiri et al., 2025). Internationally, integrated ocean governance frameworks that embed social justice and human rights principles, such as the FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries (FAO, 2015), offer valuable guidance for achieving ocean economy goals. Embedding these principles into South Africa's Oceans Economy landscape is essential not only for the resilience of small-scale fisheries but also for realising a just, inclusive and sustainable ocean economy.   Conclusion   Small-scale fisheries (SSF) in South Africa have evolved amidst a complex history of marginalisation, policy reform and shifting ocean governance priorities. Its enduring importance for food security, livelihoods and cultural identity is now being re-examined in light of Blue Economy strategies that promise both opportunities and may present challenges for coastal communities. Within this context, this paper considered the integration of SSF into national ocean economy frameworks and highlighted persistent gaps between policy ambitions and the realities faced by small-scale fishers.   The paper’s contribution lies in its examination of how structural inequalities, historical marginalisation and evolving governance frameworks continue to shape the experiences of small-scale fishing communities. It emphasises the value of participatory governance and community-oriented pathways for fostering sustainable livelihoods. By foregrounding the needs and values of SSF communities, the research contributes to advancing the discourse on equitable and sustainable ocean governance in South Africa. Looking forward, the contribution proposes that meaningful progress for SSF within the Blue Economy will require sustained policy support, capacity building and the adoption of just and equitable governance principles. 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(2019). ‘Operation Phakisa: reflections upon an ambitious maritime-led government initiative’, Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies, 47(2), 85-103. https://doi.org/10.5787/47-2-1285     Walker, T. (2018). ‘Securing a sustainable oceans economy, South Africa’s approach’, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), June 2018.   Williams, S. (2023). Surviving the tides: A study of small-scale fisheries and community livelihoods in selected coastal towns of the Western Cape, South Africa. In R. Donaldson (Ed.), Socio-Spatial Small Town Dynamics in South Africa (pp. 107–133). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37142-4_5   WWF. (2018). Principles for a sustainable blue economy. WWF International. https://ocean.panda.org   Yousef, M. (2024). Blue Economy: A Review of Concepts, Definitions, Benefits, and Risks. American Academic & Scholarly Research Journal, Vol 14:4 (16-27). [1] FAO- The Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (SSF Guidelines)  Available at: https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/edfffbfc-81e5-4208-a36f-334ff81ac10f/content   [2]  While the term blue/ oceans economy has been used interchangeably in this work, it is also commonly used in other scholarly literature. However, Sowman and Sunde (2024) argue that South Africa's gradual shift from referring to the "blue economy" to the "ocean economy" suggests a growing emphasis on economic growth while downplaying broader goals related to sustainability and social justice. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On the evening of Friday, 11 July 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute, in collaboration with the South African Chinese Economic and Trade Association (SACETA), hosted an exclusive launch dinner at the offices of the Bank of China in Johannesburg.   The event brought together prominent representatives from the Chinese business community, policymakers and other stakeholders to discuss the importance of foreign investment in South Africa.   The primary purpose of the dinner was to officially launch a comprehensive research initiative into investor sentiment toward South Africa, led by the Inclusive Society Institute.   The research will be conducted in three phases:   Phase one  focuses on gauging investor sentiment from China and the broader East Asian region. Phase two  will explore the perceptions and sentiments of investors from Europe and the West. Phase three  will provide a global overview of international investor sentiment toward South Africa.   The insights gained from this study will inform the development of investor-friendly foreign direct investment (FDI) policies aimed at attracting more investment into South Africa. Ultimately, the goal is to stimulate economic growth and job creation.   Speakers at the event included Mr. Zhang Chaoyang, chairperson of the South African China Economic and Trade Association and chairman of the Bank of China; Mr. Daryl Swanepoel, chief executive officer of the Inclusive Society Institute; His Excellency Ambassador Wu Peng, representing the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in South Africa; and the Honourable Dr. David Masondo, deputy minister of finance in South Africa.   The programme was directed by Ms. Jenny Wu, an advisory council member of the Inclusive Society Institute.   Through this event, the Inclusive Society Institute has taken an important step in strengthening economic cooperation between South Africa and international investment partners, starting with China.

The Inclusive Society Institute was invited to attend the Third Session of the European-African Progressive Network on 8 July 2025. The session took place under the theme: “Navigating peace, human rights and democratic concerns in the EU-Africa partnership”. This initiative of progressive European organisations sought to gain perspective from various African partners, including think tanks, on their views as pertaining Europe’s engagements with the continent. The Institute, represented by Dr Klaus Kotzé, impressed upon the forum that their consideration of the views of the various continental stakeholders is laudable. When asked about how best Europe can engage with the continent, Kotzé made two suggestions. First, for Europe to engage constructively, it must distinguish between its values and interests. There can be no constructive engagement when Europe behaves as both a player and a referee in international relations. Furthermore, it is imperative that African states, and the African Union as a whole, are not made to choose between global forces. Instead, African players, as should be the case for all states, should be respected for the pursuit of their own interests. A fruitful partnership will flow out of respect and support for reciprocal interests.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   July 2025 Author: Daryl Swanepoel CONTENTS FOREWORD 1 INTRODUCTION 2 BACKGROUND: CLIMATE CHANGE, EMISSIONS INEQUITY AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD'S MARGINAL ROLE 2.1 The origins and drivers of climate change 2.2 What needs to be done 2.3 Emissions responsibility: Who polluted most? 2.4 Africa's marginal role and major vulnerability 3 THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS 3.1 Historical emissions and climate liability 3.2 Moral responsibility beyond legal liability 3.3 Ethics of intergenerational and global justice 3.4 The failure of existing finance mechanisms 3.5 Climate justice is global justice 4 CLIMATE ACTION REQUIRES RESOURCES: A PRACTICAL IMPERATIVE 4.1 The high cost of climate solutions 4.2 Fiscal constraints in developing economies 4.3 The role of developing countries in global climate solutions 4.4 The costs of inaction are even higher 4.5 A moral and strategic imperative combined 5 COP29 PLEDGE: A STEP FORWARD WITH STRUCTURAL FLAWS 5.1 The composition of the pledge: Loans over grants 5.2 The flawed logic of burden-shifting 5.3 Case in point: The South African JETP experience 5.4 The danger of repackaged finance 5.5 A partial victory in need of structural correction 6 THE HIDDEN DANGERS OF CURRENT CLIMATE FINANCE STRUCTURES 6.1 South African case study: Currency volatility and escalating costs 6.1.1 Example 1: 10-year loan with capital redemption at maturity date 6.1.2 Example 2: 10-year loan: capital & interest redemption in 10 equal instalments 6.2 The solution: Denominate climate loans in local currency 6.2.1 Structural risk transfer: A hidden injustice 6.2.2 Fiscal sovereignty and planning certainty 6.2.3 A debt trap in the making 6.2.4 A modest reform with profound impact 6.3 Integration into the broader argument 6.4 Tied climate finance: Technology conditionality 7 RECOMMENDATIONS 8 CONCLUSION REFERENCES ANNEXURE A Cover phote: istock.com - Stock photo ID:2172817661 FOREWORD   The global climate crisis exposes deep historical and structural inequalities between the developed and developing worlds. Although the latter, particularly Africa, contributes the least to greenhouse gas emissions, it is disproportionately vulnerable to climate-related shocks. This paper builds a two-pronged argument: first, that the "polluter pays" principle demands that developed nations shoulder the primary responsibility for funding climate mitigation and adaptation efforts in the Global South through targeted grants; and second, that even if developing countries are to contribute to climate solutions, they must be adequately resourced through fair, predictable and accessible financial mechanisms. These arguments are substantiated through ethical reasoning, historical emissions data and a critique of the current climate finance architecture. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations aimed at reimagining a just climate finance framework grounded in global justice and intergenerational equity. 1 INTRODUCTION   Climate change is the defining existential challenge of our time, but it is neither a neutral nor evenly distributed threat, since it exposes and often exacerbates the structural inequalities entrenched in the global economic and political order. While the entire planet faces the dangers of a warming world, it is the countries least responsible for causing the crisis that suffer its worst effects. This asymmetry between causation and consequence sits at the heart of the climate justice debate and it demands a transformative rethinking of global climate finance.   The current climate finance paradigm is built on a system that does not adequately differentiate between historical emitters and vulnerable nations. It fails to reflect the core principle that those who caused the problem must shoulder the primary responsibility for solving it. For over two centuries, the industrialised countries of the Global North have built immense wealth through carbon-intensive development, externalising environmental costs to the atmosphere and, increasingly, to the Global South. Meanwhile, the developing world, especially in Africa, South Asia, and small island states, has contributed the least to global emissions, yet faces the most devastating consequences, including droughts, floods, food insecurity and displacement.   At the centre of the contemporary climate discourse lies a pivotal question: how should climate action be financed, by whom and under what terms? The answers to these questions are not merely technical or economic, they are deeply moral and ethical. They shape the prospects for global solidarity, for sustainable development and for climate stability. A failure to answer them justly risks not only climate failure, but also geopolitical fragmentation, humanitarian crises and a collapse of trust between North and South.   This policy brief argues that climate finance must be rooted in justice, accountability and pragmatic solidarity. It must shift decisively from a paradigm dominated by loans and conditionalities to one centred on grants, equity, and risk-sharing. Developed countries must lead by acknowledging their historic responsibilities and fulfilling their pledges, not through unfair, even unethical burden-shifting mechanisms that exacerbate debt, but through meaningful financial transfers that enable vulnerable countries to act. At the same time, climate finance structures must be reformed to ensure accessibility, predictability and respect for national sovereignty.   Furthermore, climate finance is not merely a matter of reparations or compensation; it is also a matter of enlightened self-interest. Global decarbonisation, biodiversity preservation and climate resilience cannot succeed without the full participation of developing countries. That participation, however, depends on whether they are equipped with the financial tools, policy space and technological support needed to engage effectively. Without it, the world risks locking in a cycle of inaction and deepening injustice.   This brief advances a dual argument. First, that the "polluter pays" principle must be operationalised into real financial commitments from the Global North, primarily through non-repayable grants. Second, that climate finance must be restructured to eliminate mechanisms that entrench dependency, such as foreign-currency denominated loans or tied aid. Through historical data, ethical analysis and a focused case study, this document seeks to make a compelling case for a just, equitable and functional climate finance regime, one that recognises climate justice as an indivisible part of global justice.   2 BACKGROUND: CLIMATE CHANGE, EMISSIONS INEQUITY AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD'S MARGINAL ROLE    2.1 The origins and drivers of climate change   Scientific consensus confirms that climate change is driven by human activities, especially the burning of fossil fuels, industrial processes and deforestation (IPCC, 2021). These activities release greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄) and nitrous oxide (N₂O), which trap heat in the Earth's atmosphere and disturb the planet's energy balance (NASA, 2023). Since the Industrial Revolution, global atmospheric CO₂ levels have increased from 280 ppm to over 420 ppm today (NOAA, 2023).   2.2 What needs to be done   The IPCC (2021) recommends limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, requiring global net-zero emissions by mid-century. This involves deep decarbonisation, the protection of carbon sinks and major adaptation investments. The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) outlines these goals but relies heavily on equitable climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for success.   2.3 Emissions responsibility: Who polluted most?   Cumulative emissions, rather than annual emissions, offer the fairest gauge of historical responsibility. The United States, EU and other industrialised countries account for over 70% of total historic emissions (Our World in Data, 2023). Africa, by contrast, contributes less than 4% despite comprising 18% of the global population (IEA, 2022). 2.4 Africa's marginal role and major vulnerability   Despite minimal emissions, Africa faces disproportionate climate threats: droughts, floods, sea-level rise and reduced agricultural yields. It stands to lose up to 15% of its GDP by 2030 due to climate impacts (AfDB, 2021). Yet African nations often lack the fiscal space and access to finance necessary to mitigate or adapt effectively (Oxfam, 2023).   3 THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS   At the heart of the climate finance debate lies a simple and powerful principle, yet from which those in power, shy away: Those who caused the damage must pay to repair it. Also known in environmental law as the polluter pays principle , it is a doctrine that is both a matter of historical accountability and ethical justice. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) explicitly endorses this principle, affirming that parties should act “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC, 1992).   3.1 Historical emissions and climate liability   The developed world’s industrialisation, spanning more than two centuries, was powered by coal, oil and gas, with no regard for the environmental consequences. The data is unambiguous: the United States, European Union, Russia, Japan and other high-income countries are together responsible for over 70% of cumulative CO₂   emissions since 1850 (Our World in Data, 2023). These emissions have built the wealth, infrastructure and technological dominance of the Global North.   In contrast, Africa contributes less than 4% of global emissions (IEA, 2022). Countries like Malawi, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have per capita emissions thousands of times lower than developed countries, yet they face the harshest impacts: desertification, failed crops, floods and rising sea levels. This asymmetry in contribution versus consequence forms the foundation of the ethical argument for reparative climate finance. 3.2 Moral responsibility beyond legal liability   The moral obligation of the Global North is not simply about numbers, it is about justice, fairness and restoring dignity. Climate change is not a random act of nature. It is the consequence of identifiable behaviours by specific actors in specific places over time. While developing countries are not without emissions today, their historical contribution is negligible and their capacity to mitigate or adapt is vastly limited.   Just as nations are expected to pay reparations for war, colonisation or human rights abuses, there is now a growing consensus that climate reparations are not merely charity, but a form of accountability (Caney, 2010; Gardiner, 2011). By failing to act on this responsibility, injustice is perpetuated and the burden of climate solutions placed disproportionately on those least responsible and least able to pay.   3.3 Ethics of intergenerational and global justice   Climate change also raises critical questions of intergenerational justice. Developed countries enjoyed centuries of carbon-intensive growth without constraint. Now, just as developing nations begin to grow, they are being asked to limit their emissions, often at great developmental cost. Without appropriate financial and technological support, this demand becomes morally untenable. Moreover, climate change is a collective problem, but responsibility for its origins is not collective. To treat all countries the same, regardless of historical role or current capacity, is to ignore the essence of fairness. As philosopher Henry Shue (1999) argued, fairness in burden-sharing must reflect both the ability to pay and the causation of harm.   3.4 The failure of existing finance mechanisms   Current climate finance mechanisms fail to reflect this principle. As of 2022, over 70% of climate finance to developing countries came in the form of loans, often on concessional terms, but loans nonetheless (Oxfam, 2022). This means that countries who have polluted the least must go into debt to protect themselves from a crisis they did not cause. This inversion of justice is not only inefficient, it is morally indefensible.   Grants are not a gift; they are reparative instruments that recognise historical responsibility. Climate finance, if it is to be ethical and just, must shift from a paradigm of risk-sharing to one of liability and redress. 3.5 Climate justice is global justice   The polluter pays principle must therefore underpin every aspect of the global climate regime, from the structuring of finance to the governance of institutions. It is not enough to commit volumes of funding. The form, fairness and function of that funding must reflect the reality that the climate crisis is rooted in inequality.   To ignore this foundational truth is to compound the injustice. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu once stated, “climate change is a deeply moral issue” (Democracy Now, 2014). Without addressing its root causes, historical emissions and economic imbalance, the world will not only fail to solve the climate crisis but will deepen the very inequalities it seeks to overcome. 4 CLIMATE ACTION REQUIRES RESOURCES: A PRACTICAL IMPERATIVE   While the moral argument for climate finance rests on historical responsibility, there is also a pressing pragmatic imperative for a massive and well-structured mobilisation of resources to the developing world. Put another way, climate action cannot happen without climate financing, particularly in the Global South, where the bulk of climate vulnerability exists but where capital, technology, and fiscal space remain limited.   4.1 The high cost of climate solutions   Mitigating and adapting to climate change entails significant costs. According to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP, 2022), adaptation alone in developing countries will require up to US$340 billion per year by 2030, while the estimated annual cost of mitigation across all developing nations exceeds US$600 billion. These figures do not account for losses and damages resulting from extreme weather events, that are projected to rise sharply with increased global warming.   Despite these needs, current levels of climate finance remain woefully inadequate. In 2020, developed countries collectively mobilised only US$83.3 billion, falling short of the US$100 billion annual pledge made under the Paris Agreement (OECD, 2021). Even more concerning is the disproportionate allocation of these funds - over 70% are disbursed as loans rather than grants (Oxfam, 2023) and a significant share is skewed toward mitigation rather than adaptation, despite the latter being more urgent in low-income, high-risk countries.   4.2 Fiscal constraints in developing economies   Most developing countries, particularly in Africa, face high levels of debt, narrow tax bases and competing developmental priorities. COVID-19 further strained public finances, with many governments forced to divert funds away from climate commitments toward immediate health and economic recovery needs (World Bank, 2023). Without substantial external support, the idea that these countries can fund ambitious climate programmes on their own is both unrealistic and unjust.   For example, in 2022, debt service in sub-Saharan Africa averaged over 15% of government revenues, leaving little room for investment in clean energy, climate-resilient infrastructure or disaster preparedness (AfDB, 2022). Climate action is not merely a matter of political will, it is a matter of financial capability, therefore, demanding climate ambition without supplying the resources is akin to demanding that a drowning man swim harder while denying him a lifebuoy.   4.3 The role of developing countries in global climate solutions   Ironically, many of the most effective and affordable climate solutions lie in the Global South. Africa hosts vast forests that act as carbon sinks, abundant solar and wind potential and untapped blue carbon ecosystems along its coasts (IEA, 2022). Likewise, many countries in Asia and Latin America offer low-cost pathways to decarbonisation if early investment is provided in renewable energy, clean transportation and sustainable agriculture.   In this sense, climate finance is not only a matter of justice but also of strategic efficiency. Every dollar invested in clean energy or climate resilience in a developing country often yields a higher carbon abatement return than the same dollar spent in an advanced economy (CPI, 2022). Yet without upfront finance, these opportunities are lost and the world’s ability to meet its 1.5°C target is severely jeopardised.   4.4 The costs of inaction are even higher   Inaction is not a neutral option, it carries costs that are exponentially higher. The World Bank (2021) estimates that climate change could push over 130 million people into poverty by 2030 without urgent adaptation and mitigation measures. Food insecurity, forced migration and social unrest are likely to intensify, particularly in fragile and conflict-prone states. The costs of dealing with such crises after the fact, through emergency relief, humanitarian aid or peacekeeping, far exceed the costs of preventive climate investment.   From a global economic standpoint, the Climate Policy Initiative (2022) has shown that every US$1 spent on climate resilience yields at least US$4 in avoided losses. This return on investment makes climate finance one of the most cost-effective public policy tools available.   4.5 A moral and strategic imperative combined   Thus, even setting aside the ethical arguments for reparative justice, there is a strong rational case for developed countries to urgently scale up climate finance to the developing world. Doing so is not just the right thing, it is the smart thing. It enables the world to decarbonise quickly and cheaply, averts humanitarian crises and reduces the geopolitical instability that inevitably follows environmental collapse.   In short, climate action in the developing world is a global public good. It must be treated as such in international policy and finance architecture. To continue under-resourcing the Global South not only entrenches injustice, it imperils the climate goals of the entire planet.   5 COP29 PLEDGE: A STEP FORWARD WITH STRUCTURAL FLAWS   The 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29) in Azerbaijan marked an important moment in global climate diplomacy. For the first time, developed countries formally committed to mobilising US$300 billion per annum over the next decade to assist developing nations with their climate mitigation and adaptation programmes (UNFCCC, 2024). This represents a tripling of the previous US$100 billion pledge made at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, which itself had consistently failed to be met in full (OECD, 2021). While the scale of ambition has grown, the structure and quality of the finance remain deeply problematic, raising serious concerns about both equity and effectiveness.   5.1 The composition of the pledge: Loans over grants   Of the US$300 billion annual commitment made at COP29, only 18% (US$54 billion) is to be provided in the form of non-repayable grants. The overwhelming majority, 67% (US$201 billion), is structured as concessional or soft loans, primarily disbursed through multilateral development banks (MDBs), bilateral financial institutions and climate-focused lending mechanisms. A further 15% (US$45 billion) is earmarked for risk guarantees and blended finance instruments, designed to de-risk private sector participation in climate-related investments (CPI, 2024).   While these mechanisms can mobilise additional funding, they often come with trade-offs, especially for low-income and climate-vulnerable countries. The heavy emphasis on repayable instruments, particularly in foreign currencies, undermines the very purpose of climate finance as a tool for supporting sustainable development. Loans, even on concessional terms, increase sovereign debt and restrict fiscal policy space in countries already struggling with high debt burdens (AfDB, 2022; UNCTAD, 2023).   5.2 The flawed logic of burden-shifting   The structural flaw lies not merely in the dominance of loans, but in the underlying philosophy that continues to guide international climate finance: that the Global South should assume partial financial responsibility for fixing a crisis it did not create. This approach ignores the historical responsibility of developed nations and effectively shifts the cost of climate adaptation onto the victims of environmental harm.   Moreover, while concessional loans are often touted as favourable, the conditionalities attached to them, such as fiscal discipline, regulatory reforms or the use of donor-country technologies, can limit policy autonomy and inflate implementation costs (World Bank, 2020). In essence, climate finance becomes a tool not of empowerment, but of control.   5.3 Case in point: The South African JETP experience   South Africa’s experience with the 'Just Energy Transition Partnership' (JETP), which was first announced at COP26 and then subsequently expanded at COP27, COP28 and COP29 is a good illustration of both the potential and the pitfalls of this model. Of the initial US$8.5 billion pledged, only a small fraction came as grants. The remainder consisted of concessional loans tied to the procurement of renewable energy technologies from donor nations, some of which were not the most cost-effective or suited to South Africa’s grid infrastructure (German Embassy, 2022; Meridian Economics, 2023).   The arrangement raised concerns domestically over sovereignty, debt sustainability and developmental alignment, since it highlighted the risk of adopting a cookie-cutter financial model without accommodating local economic realities.   5.4 The danger of repackaged finance   Another critical flaw in the COP29 pledge is that it includes a significant proportion of repackaged or relabelled finance. For instance, many donor countries count existing development aid or export credit as part of their climate finance contributions, thus blurring the lines between new and additional funding (Oxfam, 2023), which practice not only inflates reported figures, but also diverts resources from other pressing development needs, creating a zero-sum game for developing countries.   Furthermore, the complexity of accessing these funds remains a major barrier, since countries must navigate bureaucratic application processes, competing eligibility criteria and technical reporting requirements, which favour wealthier and more administratively capable nations (UNEP, 2022). This gatekeeping through bureaucracy perpetuates inequality within the developing world itself, resulting in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) being left behind.   5.5 A partial victory in need of structural correction   While the COP29 commitment is laudable in scale, it is deeply flawed in structure. A just climate finance system cannot rest on debt-heavy instruments, currency risk exposure and donor-driven procurement models. For climate finance to be truly effective, it must be:   Predictable, to support long-term planning; Accessible, to all developing countries regardless of administrative capacity; Transparent, in accounting and disbursement; and Most importantly, equitable, recognising historical emissions and present vulnerabilities.  Unless these structural flaws are corrected, COP29 may be remembered not as a breakthrough, but as a missed opportunity to recalibrate the global climate finance architecture toward fairness and functionality.   6 THE HIDDEN DANGERS OF CURRENT CLIMATE FINANCE STRUCTURES     6.1 South African case study: Currency volatility and escalating costs    6.1.1 Example 1: 10-year loan with capital redemption at maturity date   A prime illustration of the risks of foreign currency-denominated climate loans is South Africa's experience following the $8.5 billion climate finance pledge made at COP26 in 2021 (German Embassy, 2022). Though these were concessional loans, the requirement to repay in euros exposed South Africa to severe exchange rate risk.   To illustrate, consider a hypothetical €100 million loan issued on 1 January 2015, at 3% annual interest, with capital repayment due on 31 December 2024. The euro-to-rand exchange rate was R13.98 in 2015 but rose to R19.52 by 2024 ( Investing.com , 2025).   Table 1: Euro vs Rand exchange rates from 2015 to the end of 2024   Year €:ZAR Year €:ZAR 2015 13.98 2020 15.70 2016 16.80 2021 17.79 2017 14.38 2022 17.96 2018 14.86 2023 18.10 2019 16.48 2024 20.19 Source: Investing.com   Annual interest payments fluctuated, starting at R41,94 million and ending at over R58 million. Total interested repaid over the ten-year period would equate to R498.72 million The capital repayment alone amounted to R2,019 billion at the 2024 exchange rate. Total repayment (interest + capital) over 10 years reached R2,517 billion – 38,52% more than if the loan had been denominated in South African rand, because :   Were the loan to have been denominated in South African rand the repayments would have been as follows:   Annual interest payments would remain the same for entire period, namely R41.94 million per annum. Total interested repaid over the ten-year period would equate to R419,4 million. The capital repayment alone amounted would have been fixed at R1,398 billion. Total repayment (interest + capital) over 10 years reached R1,817 billion   The detailed data underpinning the above numbers is contained in Annexure A, but the high-level calculations are set out hereunder:   To calculate the percentage difference between two values, specifically, how much more R2,517,720,000 is compared to R1,817,400,000,  the following formula is used:    Applying the numbers:   Final Answer:   Approximately 38.52% more is paid when repaying R2.52 billion (when loan is denominated in Euro) versus R1.82 billion. when the loan is denominated in South African rand).   The glaring difference between the two funding models is illustrated in the figure below:   Figure 1:  Data – Investing.com ; Graphic - Author   Even with a relatively stable currency like the rand when compared to many other developing countries, the cost escalation is stark. Of course, for countries with more volatile currencies, the financial impact can be crippling.   Some economists argue that it is better to denominate the loans in local currency and then to compensate the funders for the currency exchange losses, the interest rate can be increased. However, calculations done in this study have shown that were the interest rate to be increased by 50% (i.e. 4,5%) then the premium will still amount to 16%. And were the interest rate to be doubled to 6%, it would no longer constitute a soft loan, but a normal commercial loan.    6.1.2 Example 2: 10-year loan: capital & interest redemption in 10 equal instalments   An alternative illustration based on the same loan over the same period and at the same rate of interest, but where both interest and capital is repaid in ten equal annual instalments, revealed an equally unfavourable outcome.   To recap, we assume a €100 million loan (denominated in Euro), 3% interest rate in 10 equal instalments. The mathematical formula will thus be:     Where :   A = annual payment (equal instalment) P = loan principal (€100 million) r = annual interest rate (3% or 0.03) n = number of periods (10 years)    Thus :      Results :   Payment each year: €11,719,751 Total interest over the period in €17,197,510 Total repayment interest and capital: €117,197,510       Conversion to South African rand at prevailing exchange rates as indicated in Table 1   Year Instalment €:ZAR rate ZAR value 2015 11,719,751 13.98 163,607,724 2016 11,719,751 16.80 196,891,817 2017 11,719,751 14.38 168,530,019 2018 11,719,751 14.86 174,155,500 2019 11,719,751 16.48 193,141,496 2020 11,719,751 15.70 184,000,091 2021 11,719,751 17.79 208,494,370 2022 11,719,751 17.96 210,486,728 2023 11,719,751 18.10 212,127,493 2024 11,719,751 20.19 236,621,773 Total in ZAR 1,948, 057,011 Total  @ 3% and no currency fluctuation (13.98) 1638421189 Premium in ZAR 309,635,822 Premium % 18,89% Under any of the scenarios highlighted above , the rich countries remain rich, the poorer countries get poorer.    6.2 The solution: Denominate climate loans in local currency   One of the most pressing yet overlooked reforms in climate finance is the need to denominate concessional loans in the local currencies of recipient countries. The current system, because the financiers are primarily developed world nations and/or developed world dominated multilateral institutions, predominantly issues climate loans in hard currencies like the US dollar, euro or yen, exposing developing nations to exchange rate volatility that can drastically inflate their repayment obligations, undermine budgetary planning, driving them deeper into debt. This structure is not only economically inefficient, it must also be said, ethically indefensible (Oxfam, 2023; UNCTAD, 2023).   6.2.1 Structural risk transfer: A hidden injustice   By denominating loans in foreign currencies, donor countries and institutions externalise the financial risk onto recipients, so a country may, for example, enter into a concessional loan agreement with seemingly favourable terms, such as a 1–3% interest rate, only to find that depreciation of their local currency increases their repayment burden by 30 - 40% or more over the life of the loan (UNCTAD, 2023). This is not a theoretical risk; it is a well-documented and recurring reality in many African, Asian and Latin American economies (World Bank, 2023).   This kind of risk transfer is neither fair nor sustainable. It effectively punishes countries for global market volatility over which they have no control. Developed countries have the institutional and financial capacity to absorb this risk; developing countries do not. If the Global South must borrow to survive the climate crisis, the very least the Global North can do is absorb the currency risk (Caney, 2010; UNEP, 2021) . 6.2.2 Fiscal sovereignty and planning certainty   Local currency loans would give developing countries the ability to anchor their debt servicing within their own fiscal and monetary frameworks, where repayments would be tied to revenue streams collected in the same currency, allowing finance ministries to project their debt-to-GDP ratios, plan multi-year expenditure frameworks and manage national budgets without the destabilising uncertainty of fluctuating exchange rates (UNCTAD, 2023).   Contrast this with the status quo, where exchange rate shocks force governments to either increase taxation, reduce social spending or incur new debt to meet old obligations, thus perpetuating cycles of austerity and dependency (Oxfam, 2023; World Bank, 2023). Currency-denominated climate finance is not only fairer; it is smarter macroeconomic policy (AfDB, 2021). 6.2.3 A debt trap in the making   The existing model is quietly but effectively sowing the seeds of a new debt crisis. Countries already constrained by shrinking fiscal space are being pushed to assume obligations whose real costs cannot be forecast at the time of signing. This is not just risky, it is reckless (UNCTAD, 2023). It creates a scenario where the more a country complies with global climate expectations, the more it suffers financial strain.   It is inconceivable that such a system could be tolerated in trade or defence agreements. Why then should it be acceptable in the most existential issue of our time? Climate finance that leaves the recipient worse off than before is not development, it is extraction by another name (Caney, 2010; Stone, 2011).   6.2.4 A modest reform with profound impact   Adopting local currency denomination is neither radical nor unfeasible. In fact, the tools already exist. Currency risk can be mitigated through international financial instruments such as:  Global reserve buffers or guarantees from institutions like the IMF, GCF or World Bank. Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as stabilising mechanisms (IMF, 2022). Regional pooling of risk across multilateral development banks. Hedging instruments subsidised by climate funds (UNCTAD, 2023).   The cost of implementing such mechanisms is a fraction of the cost of issuing full grants, and yet the benefit in terms of stability, dignity and ownership for the Global South is transformative.   6.3 Integration into the broader argument   This case study highlights a fundamental injustice in the current climate finance architecture. Developed countries, whose emissions caused the crisis, not only offer loans instead of grants, but they also impose the financial risk of currency fluctuation on the very countries least equipped to manage it.   This is not climate justice, it is climate exploitation.   If the global community is serious about achieving an equitable climate future, then developed nations must not only increase the volume of finance, but fundamentally change its structure. Issuing climate finance in local currency is not an act of generosity, it is the bare minimum for a fair and just global compact.   6.4 Tied climate finance: Technology conditionality   Tied climate finance refers to financial arrangements in which climate-related loans or grants are contingent upon the recipient country purchasing specific goods, services or technologies, usually from the donor country. This practice, while often rationalised under the banner of ensuring “quality control” or “technical support,” represents a covert form of economic conditionality that erodes the developmental sovereignty of recipient nations. It also distorts local markets, drives up project costs and stifles domestic innovation.   At its core, technology conditionality undermines the principles of equity and partnership that should characterise climate finance. Instead of empowering developing countries to chart their own low-carbon development trajectories based on national contexts, needs and comparative advantages, it locks them into supply chains and technological ecosystems designed and controlled by the Global North. This compromises the autonomy of climate policy and perpetuates dependency rather than resilience.   The World Bank (2020) found that technology-tied procurement inflated renewable energy project costs in sub-Saharan Africa by up to 30%, a staggering figure in regions where every dollar must stretch across vast developmental needs. In many cases, donor-imposed technologies are not optimised for local climatic, infrastructural or maintenance conditions, leading to implementation inefficiencies, cost overruns, and operational failures. Furthermore, this undermines local industrial development by crowding out domestic firms and local entrepreneurs who might otherwise contribute to innovation, employment and sustainable development.   South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) again illustrates this risk. Reports by Meridian Economics (2023) and others have highlighted that large portions of JETP-linked funds were structured in such a way that procurement of renewable technology was effectively steered toward suppliers in donor countries. Not only did this create concerns over cost and compatibility with South Africa’s energy grid, but it also limited the potential for localisation, skills development and domestic industrial participation in the transition.   Technology conditionalities also contradict the broader objectives of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, which call for technology transfer  and capacity building , not technology imposition . A conditional approach benefits the commercial and geopolitical interests of donors at the expense of climate justice and genuine partnership. By prioritising their own exports and strategic influence, donor nations risk undermining both the effectiveness and legitimacy of climate finance, so to remedy this, there must be a clear de-linking of finance from technology procurement. Recipient countries must be granted full autonomy to select, adapt, and develop technologies that are appropriate to their national circumstances and development strategies. This includes the right to engage local firms, adopt indigenous solutions and build technological capacity through open, competitive and transparent procurement processes.   Moreover, international climate finance should actively promote technology co-development and/or technology transfer, where donor funding supports collaborative innovation with local stakeholders, ensuring that knowledge, intellectual property and production capabilities are shared. This would foster self-reliance, enhance climate resilience and stimulate sustainable growth in developing economies.   Finally, conditionality-free financing would also better align with Sustainable Development Goal 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), which calls for inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and innovation in the Global South. By removing technology restrictions, climate finance could become a catalyst for endogenous growth, rather than a channel for perpetuating economic hierarchies. 7 RECOMMENDATIONS   To advance a climate finance system that is truly equitable, will require the urgent introduction of structural reforms that both acknowledges the historical responsibility for the current climate crisis and that creates a sustainable path forward for developing nations.   First and foremost, the proportion of climate finance allocated as grants must be significantly increased. A minimum threshold of 50% in grants should be adopted to reflect the principle that those who polluted the most must shoulder the financial burden of fixing the problem. Loans, particularly those requiring repayment in foreign currency, should not dominate climate assistance in contexts where vulnerability and debt exposure are already high.   Equally critical is the denomination of climate loans in local currencies, because by shifting this financial risk to the creditor, typically a developed country or multilateral financial institution, recipient countries are empowered to engage in long-term budgetary planning. This shift will promote debt sustainability and instead of perpetuating the financial dependency of the developing world on the developed world, it will serve to promote a spirit of partnership between the developed and developing world.   Furthermore, it is imperative that loan conditionalities be overhauled, especially the tied financing arrangements that mandate the use of donor-country technology or consultants not only inflate project costs but also stifle local innovation and industrial development. Climate finance must serve the developmental interests of recipient countries, not the commercial interests of donors.   Access to global climate finance should also be streamlined and made more accessible, especially for countries with weaker institutional capacity. This includes simplifying application procedures, reducing bureaucratic hurdles and providing technical assistance where necessary.   Importantly, developed nations must accept that currency volatility risk is a cost of justice and one they must bear. Absorbing this risk as part of international development cooperation is far less expensive than providing full grant funding, yet it significantly relieves fiscal pressure on developing nations.   Finally, the upcoming UN Finance for Development Summit presents a unique opportunity to institutionalise these reforms in a new global compact. This summit should serve as the turning point where the world commits to a just and inclusive climate finance architecture, one that is not merely adequate in volume but fair in design.   8 CONCLUSION   The climate crisis is not merely an environmental emergency. It is a profound test of our global moral compass and at its core lies a question of justice, namely whether those who caused the damage will bear the cost of repair or will the burden be shifted onto those least responsible and least equipped to cope? The current climate finance architecture, unfortunately, perpetuates the very injustices it claims to address. It continues to treat finance as a privilege rather than a right, exposes vulnerable nations to debt traps through foreign-denominated loans and undermines sovereignty through tied aid and conditionalities that prioritise donor interests over developmental needs.   The current architecture is structurally flawed, since it prioritises volume over equity, complexity over accessibility and debt over dignity. This has resulted in a model where climate finance acts less as a tool for empowerment and more as a mechanism of dependency, reinforcing the same global asymmetries that contributed to the crisis in the first place. As such, the demand for reform is not a call for charity, but a call for accountability. The global South does not seek favours, but fairness. It does not demand handouts, but a restoration of balance in the climate compact.   A just climate finance system must embody four essential principles: historical responsibility, equitable burden-sharing, fiscal sovereignty and developmental autonomy. This means scaling up grant-based finance, denominating loans in local currencies to reduce risk, eliminating technology conditionalities and ensuring access for all, regardless of institutional capacity. These are not radical ideas, they are the minimum ethical and functional requirements for a global climate finance regime that seeks to be just and effective.   The time for rhetorical commitments is over. What is needed now is political courage and institutional innovation. The upcoming UN Finance for Development Summit must seize this opportunity to pivot toward a finance framework that is not only adequate in volume but just in design and implementation. Anything less would amount to betrayal, not just of the developing world, but of future generations everywhere.   In sum, the way forward is clear: finance must be fair, risk must be shared, sovereignty must be respected and justice must be done. Only then can the world hope to meet the climate challenge with unity, resolve and moral clarity. REFERENCES   African Development Bank (AfDB). 2021. Climate Change and Green Growth . Abidjan: African Development Bank.   African Development Bank (AfDB). 2022. African Economic Outlook 2022: Supporting Climate Resilience and a Just Energy Transition in Africa . Abidjan: African Development Bank.   Caney, S. 2010. 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D. 2011. Should Trees Have Standing? United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2023. A New Financial Architecture for Climate Action . Geneva: United Nations.   United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2021. State of the Climate in Africa 2020 . Nairobi: UNEP.   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change . [Online] Available at: https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf [accessed: 10 June 2025].   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2015. The Paris Agreement . [Online] Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/parisagreement_publication.pdf [accessed: 10 June 2025].   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2024. COP29 UN Climate Conference Agrees to Triple Finance to Developing Countries, Protecting Lives and Livelihoods . [Online] Available at: https://unfccc.int/news/cop29-un-climate-conference-agrees-to-triple-finance-to-developing-countries-protecting-lives-and [accessed: 10 June 2025].   World Bank. 2020. Evaluation of Climate Project Procurement . Washington, DC: World Bank.   World Bank. 2021. Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2021: Reversals of Fortune . Washington, DC: World Bank.   World Bank. 2023. Debt and Development in a Changing World . Washington, DC: World Bank.    ANNEXURE A   Data supporting the calculations as set out in paragraph 6.1. South African case study: Currency volatility and escalating costs     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Mr. Daryl Swanepoel, attended the International Conference on Cohesive Societies, organised by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University and held in Singapore from 24 to 26 June 2025.   Under the theme "Cohesive Societies, Resilient Futures,"  the conference aimed to champion this global endeavour in order to inspire hope, foster inclusion and build momentum towards establishing harmonious and resilient multicultural societies.   The conference brought together more than 1,100 policymakers, academics and leaders from diverse civic and religious organisations representing more than 50 countries. This diverse gathering created a valuable platform for the exchange of ideas and best practices on strengthening social cohesion and intercultural understanding.   The conference was officially opened by the President of the Republic of Singapore, Tharman Shanmugaratnam , who, in his opening address, emphasized the importance of mutual respect, trust, and collaboration as the foundation for building cohesive and resilient societies. The Sultan of Perak and Deputy Yang di-Pertuan Agong, His Royal Highness Sultan Nazrin Muizzuddin Shah , also delivered a keynote address.   Mr. Swanepoel participated in various plenary sessions and workshops focusing on countering polarisation, promoting interfaith dialogue and building more inclusive communities. Some of the themes, among many, were:   Unpacking multiculturalism Navigating uncertainty Presentation of the Southeast Asian Social Cohesion Radar Forging societal resilience   In his contributions, he highlighted the vital role of institutions such as the Inclusive Society Institute in creating spaces for open dialogue and fostering trust between diverse communities.   Attending this conference provided valuable insights and international perspectives that will strengthen the work of the Institute, particularly in its mission to help build a more cohesive and just South African society.

The 2025 ACUNS (Academic Council on the United Nations System) Workshop, held from 23–25 June in Nairobi, Kenya, convened leading global scholars, policy practitioners and civil society actors under the theme Environmental Multilateralism and Human Development . The workshop provided a critical platform to explore the nexus of climate governance, sustainable development and social justice in a multilateral context.   Among the notable participants was Dr Samantha Williams, representing the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), who contributed significantly to the workshop’s discourse through a well-received presentation titled Advancing Small-Scale Fisheries in South Africa: Pathways to Sustainability and Equity within the Blue Economy Framework . Her participation underscored the Institute’s commitment to inclusive and sustainable development, particularly within the marine and coastal sectors that are vital to vulnerable communities in South Africa and beyond.   Dr Williams' presentation formed part of a broader dialogue on how environmental multilateralism can be reframed to include historically marginalised communities, such as small-scale fishers. Her work focused on the South African context, where nearly 30,000 subsistence fishers across 147 coastal communities depend on marine resources for their livelihoods. She highlighted the crucial socio-economic and cultural roles that small-scale fisheries (SSFs) play, noting that they contribute 40% of the global fish catch and support over 500 million people worldwide.   One of the key messages in her presentation was the urgent need to address the marginalisation of small-scale fishers within South Africa’s growing Blue Economy agenda. Dr Williams traced the policy evolution from post-apartheid reforms to the landmark 2012 Small-Scale Fisheries Policy, and the subsequent Oceans Economy Master Plan (OEMP) under Operation Phakisa. She argued that despite legal recognition, many SSF communities continue to face exclusion, inadequate infrastructure and environmental threats, particularly from offshore mining and seismic exploration.   For full report click here For the presentation click here

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to make significant strides in advancing constitutional literacy and democratic values among secondary school learners in Gauteng Province. On Monday, 23 June 2025, learners from Hercules High School in Pretoria participated in the “Taking the Constitution to the People”  workshop, facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s Gauteng Schools Coordinator. This dynamic workshop was designed to deepen learners’ understanding and appreciation of South Africa’s democratic Constitution, exploring its history, structure, and the fundamental rights and responsibilities enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights. Through an interactive and thought-provoking session, students were guided through the development of the Constitution, the principles that informed its creation, and the critical role it continues to play in shaping governance and society. The session also explored the Founding Provisions, highlighting the core values and freedoms that underpin the Republic of South Africa. A key focus of the workshop was on responsible citizenship, encouraging learners to reflect on their role in upholding the Constitution and contributing to a society that is inclusive, just, and equitable. The learners actively engaged with the content, asking insightful questions and sharing perspectives that demonstrated a growing sense of civic awareness and empowerment. The Inclusive Society Institute’s efforts in Gauteng are part of a broader, ongoing initiative. Similar workshops will be rolled out across various districts, ensuring that more learners are reached and empowered through this important constitutional education programme. By fostering informed and engaged young citizens, the Institute aims to help safeguard the democratic principles on which South Africa was built and to inspire the next generation of civic-minded leaders.

The Inclusive Society Institute is making strides in promoting constitutional literacy and democratic engagement across South Africa, with a strong presence in both the Gauteng and North West Provinces. Through its civic education initiative, “Taking the Constitution to the People”, the Institute has been delivering impactful workshops to Grade 11 and 12 learners, focusing on the imperatives and core principles of the South African Constitution. These workshops are part of a broader mission to empower young people with the knowledge and understanding necessary to become active, informed, and responsible citizens. On Monday, 23 June 2025, the Institute conducted one of these workshops at Daspoort Secondary School in Pretoria. The session was facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s dedicated Schools Project Coordinator for both Gauteng and North West Provinces. His depth of experience and engaging presentation style created an environment that was both educational and inspiring for the learners. The workshop content was carefully curated to align with the learners’ academic curriculum while also broadening their civic knowledge. Topics included the Preamble to the Constitution, which sets out the vision and values of the Republic; the Founding Provisions, which establish the democratic foundations of the state; the Bill of Rights, which articulates the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed to all citizens; and the Chapter 9 Institutions, which serve to protect and strengthen constitutional democracy. Learners responded with great enthusiasm, actively engaging in discussions and asking probing questions. Topics raised included the nature and functioning of democracy, the responsibilities of political parties in governance, and how ordinary citizens can hold public institutions accountable. The learners' curiosity and thoughtfulness were clear indicators of the effectiveness of the workshop in stimulating critical thinking and civic awareness. In addition to delivering constitutional content, the workshop aimed to foster a sense of ownership and responsibility among the youth regarding the democratic processes that shape their country. By emphasizing the role of each individual in sustaining democracy, whether through voting, community involvement, or civic activism, the session encouraged learners to view themselves as key contributors to the nation’s future. This workshop at Daspoort Secondary School is one of many being conducted across districts in Gauteng and the North West, with plans to expand to additional provinces in the near future. The Inclusive Society Institute is firmly committed to building a generation of learners who are not only knowledgeable about their constitutional rights but are also empowered to defend and exercise them in their everyday lives. Through this growing outreach programme, the Institute seeks to nurture a culture of constitutionalism, where democratic values are understood, respected, and lived out by all citizens—starting with the youth in our schools. The journey toward a more inclusive, equitable, and participatory democracy begins with education—and the Inclusive Society Institute is proud to be leading the way.

Occasional Paper 7/2025 This paper is published jointly by the  Inclusive Society Institute and School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University   PO Box 610 Bellville, 7550 South Africa    Copyright © 2025   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute and the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University.    D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University.   JUNE 2025 by Nicola Jo Bergsteedt (BA Drama; BA Hons Journ; MA Journ; PGDip Futures Studies) & Daryl Swanepoel Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University (ND Co Admin; BPAHons; MPA) This is the third in a series of three occasional papers on managing social cohesion in diverse communities. They explore the mechanisms that Singapore, Finland and the United Arab Emirates have deployed in forging socially cohesive societies within their very different environments.  The three papers will ultimately be integrated into a comprehensive synthesis report with the objective of providing a menu of tools for South African policymakers to contemplate for purposes of strengthening their efforts within the South African context. Abstract   The GovDem Survey of the Inclusive Society Institute has revealed that social cohesion in South Africa has not made sufficient progress post-Apartheid. In fact, the level of cohesion has declined of late, reversing the early gains made at the onset of the democratic order ushered in in 1994. This is worrying given the need for cohesion to underpin peace and security, and economic growth in a country, both of which are at worryingly levels in South Africa.   This occasional paper has as its objective the development of a menu of policy interventions aimed at advancing social cohesion, that the policymakers in South Africa may wish to ponder. The paper forms part of a broader study that explores the practices in other diverse communities, notably Singapore, Finland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This paper discusses proposals informed by the UAE case study, notably the Ministry of Tolerance & Co-Existence and the Happiness Programme. It discusses the findings thereof, and advances recommendations for South African policymakers to consider. 1. Introduction   In analysing its extensive 2023 GovDem Survey , the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), an independent public policy research institute, concluded that thirty years into the new South African dispensation, social cohesion had not advanced to optimal levels. In fact, trends were worrying. Context   In 1994 South Africa transitioned from Apartheid South Africa, in which the minority white community controlled all political power, to a new democratic dispensation in which universal suffrage ensured that all South African, regardless of race, shared political power in the country. Hopes were high that a rainbow nation could be forged from the divisions of the past (Austin, 2021). South Africa is celebrating its 30 years of democracy during 2024. In the poll, less than half (48%) of the respondents were of the view that a united nation could be forged out of all the population groups in the country. 31 percent believed it possible. 18 percent did not express a view one way or the other. This sentiment held true across all the major race groups in the country. Only 46 percent of whites believed it feasible, 48% of blacks believed it so, and for Indians and coloureds it was 44 percent and 50 percent respectively (ISI, 2023).   Even more disquieting is the finding that only 39 percent of South Africans believed reconciliation in South Africa is moving in the right direction. This held true across all the race groups, where similar trends existed.   In its definition of social cohesion, the Inclusive Society Institute includes dimensions wider than just race. It also considers religious tolerance, and attitudes towards immigrants, amongst other criteria, as contributors towards social cohesion. The Institute’s recently released South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI), is built on three pillars: demographic integration, extent of connectivity to the country, and sense of community (ISI, 2024). These pillars respond to the three dimensions of social cohesion as argued by Langer et al. (2017), namely inequality, trust and identity. Figure 1: Social Cohesion Triangle (Langer et al., 2017) High levels of inequality, Langer et al. argue, threatens social cohesion in society, in that it erodes relationships, which, in turn, could cause conflict. When trust is missing between members of society, the ability for individuals to collaborate to build the nation is weakened. And a national identity, in contrast to group or ethnic identity, may cause aggressive behaviour amongst members of society to the detriment of stable coexistence.   In South African society, trust amongst the various groups is worryingly high. For example:   In the same GovDem Survey, only 40 percent of White South Africans completely or somewhat trusted their Black compatriots, and similarly only 41 percent Black South Africans completely or somewhat trusted their White compatriots.   Only 48 percent of South Africans completely or somewhat trusted people from a different religion to their own. Only 43 percent of South Africans completely or somewhat trusted people from different nationalities. Similar trends existed across all the major race groups. Of particular concern was the finding that 68 percent of South Africans did not trust immigrants from other African countries. So too, some 66 percent did not trust immigrants from overseas. And likewise, similar trends were registered across all the race groups. (ISI, 2023)   These disappointingly low levels of trust suggest that, as a nation, in terms of demographic integration, South Africa has a long way to go in consolidating social cohesion in the country.   That said, the ISI survey finds that South Africans are slowly starting to forge a nation. Already, 46 percent of South Africans - with similar trends across all race groups - are in favour of associating with compatriots across racial lines, as opposed to only 31 percent who do not like associating with people from different population groups. And already, 52 percent of South Africans – with a similar trend across all race groups – are socialising (entertaining) with compatriots from across racial lines.   Likewise, some 49 percent of South Africans – with similar trends from across all race groups - do attend the church/shul/mosque/religious services of their fellow South Africans.   And 69% of respondents indicated that they wanted a united South Africa.   In considering the second pillar of the ISI’s SASCI, the extent of connectivity to the country, the findings of the survey were equally disappointing. Nine percent of the respondents indicated that they were seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so. Of particular concern was the number of high-income earners and those with tertiary education. Eleven percent of the high-income earners and those with tertiary qualifications were considering emigration. South Africa is experiencing a critical skills shortage across almost all sectors (Business Tech, 2023). For the country to lose more skills and taxpayers would be quite tragic for the country.   The minority communities are the most vulnerable. Fifteen percent and 14 percent of Whites and Indians respectively were considering emigration, as opposed to 8 percent of Black South Africans.   There were two main reasons driving the sentiment:   ·                A lack of confidence in the ability of the economy to deliver jobs for themselves and their family, and a sense that South Africa was failing. Twenty-five percent of respondents cited work opportunities as the reason for them contemplating emigration, and only 23 percent were confident that their children will be able to become part of the South African labour market and that they will find a good job. ·                A sense that South Africa was failing. Twenty one percent of respondents were of the view that the country was failing. Once again, apart from the Coloured community, it was the minority communities – particularly the Indian community – that were most vulnerable. Twenty-three percent of Whites and 41 percent of Indians cited South Africa’s failure as a state as the reason for them considering emigration.   In considering the third pillar of the ISI’s SASCI, namely a sense of community, a far healthier picture emerged. Seventy-five percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that it important to get involved in the community in which they lived, 47 percent agreed or strongly agreed that it was important to actively work for the welfare of their community, and 58 percent said that they actively looked for ways in which they could support people that were less fortunate than themselves. Similar trends were registered across all the race groups.   The survey was however silent as to the extent to which the individual race groups involvement extended across demographic lines. 1.1 About the survey   The aforementioned data is drawn from the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey, which forms part of IPSOS’ Khayabus Survey, the methodology of which is illustrated in the diagrams contained in Figure 2 below   Figure 2: The IPSOS Khayabus (ISI, 2023)   Against this backdrop one must ask: Is enough being done to promote, nurture and ensure social cohesion in South African society? The country’s National Development Plan (NDP) after all recognises that the strategy set out therein needs to be underpinned by social cohesion (NPC, N.d.).   The NDP argues that “leaders throughout society have to balance the power they hold with responsibility, including…promoting social cohesion”, and that it is necessary to broaden social cohesion and unity while redressing the inequities of the past. “South Africa’s own history and the experiences of other countries”, it says, “show that unity and social cohesion are necessary to meet social and economic objectives”. It also argues that social cohesion in society is necessary to narrow the inequality divide (NPC, N.d.).   The NDP is correct, because in socially cohesive societies, where there is a general absence of underlying social conflict, people work together as one towards the well-being of all in society. It works against exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its people the opportunity of upward mobility (SFRI, N.d.). It enables people to be engaged in “a common enterprise”, wherein they can face shared challenges as members of the same community (Maxwell, in SFRI. N.d.). It allows society to share equitably in its prosperity, because cohesive societies are politically stable, thereby allowing them to focus on economic growth (Bris, 2014).   It is therefore encouraging that the National Planning Commission recently proposed the establishment of a Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Council with the objective of developing and monitoring strategies for the promotion of tolerance and the embracing of diversity …for the emergence of a shared South Africa identity and pride” (NPC, 2023).   Some progress has been made in setting up the structures and mechanisms to advance the goal of social cohesion in South Africa.   The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (CRL Rights Commission) has been established in terms of Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution. The primary objectives of the CRL Commission is “(a) to promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities; (b) to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance and national unity among cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and free association; and (c) to recommend the establishment or recognition, in accordance with national legislation, of a cultural or other council or councils for a community or communities in South Africa” (RSA, 1996).   Since its establishment the CRL Commission has tackled several topics that impede social cohesion. The full list of reports contained on the CRL Commission’s official website include: The commercialisation of religion and the abuse of people’s belief systems. Challenges that lead to deaths and injuries at initiation schools in South Africa; The reuse  of graves by local governments: Seeking a solution to the violation of cultural and religious rights of communities through the reuse of graves by local governments; Ukuthwala (the abduction that involves kidnapping a girl or a young woman by a man and his friends or peers to compel the girl or young woman's family to endorse marriage negotiations). The use of official languages by organs of state. Violations of religious rights by members/congregants of church missions; and Civil unrest in Phoenix that allegedly resulted in racially motivated deaths. (CRL Commission, N.d.)   Scrutinisation of the annual and other reports will suggest that the bulk of the Commission’s work has been limited and reactive in nature. No wonder given that the Commission’s annual budget in the 2021/22 financial year amounted to a mere R46,4 million rand (CRL Commission, N.d.). Given the extent of the work needed to tackle the social cohesion deficit, the commission has not been adequately resourced to properly carry out their work.   So too, the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture (DSAC), is mandated to lead nation building and social cohesion through social transformation, but the unit tasked to carry out this mandate is inadequately resourced. The DSAC social cohesion programme includes activities such as the celebration of national days, advocacy platforms on social cohesion, and community conversations (DSAC, N.d.). The unit tasked with carrying out the social cohesion mandate comprises four members of staff (Anon., 2023) and the annual budget for 2024/5 amounts to mere R59,8 million (Treasury, 2024).   On paper it suggests that the government is committed to securing social cohesion in South Africa. It forms an integral part of the NDP, a constitutionally committed commission has been established to promote and protect the rights of the country’s diverse communities, and DSAC has established programmes aimed at promoting social cohesion in South Africa. The lived reality tells a different story: activities are few and limited in nature, the programmes are wholly under-resourced and as evidenced in the ISI’s GovDem Survey, the level of social cohesion is disappointingly low.   What to do?   There are many other countries around the world that have/are faced/facing social cohesion challenges.  Three come to mind, each with different mechanisms to nurture and promote social cohesion within their societies. These are Singapore, Finland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is the focus of this paper. The UAE experience may hold lessons for South Africa, the exploration of which is the object of this dissertation. 1.2 Research question and methodology   The departure points of this study, based on the empirical evidence contained in the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey, as highlighted in the introductory chapter, is that:   Social cohesion, of which, in the South African context, nation-building and reconciliation are crucial elements, is not at an acceptable level. South Africans desire a united nation in which the different communities that compose the nation can work together to build a common future. The South African Constitution places a high premium on a non-discriminatory environment underpinned by social cohesion. That all three spheres of government, that is the executive, legislative and judicial spheres, at its heart, recognise and promote the ideals of the Constitution, that is a united and reconciled South Africa culminating in a socially cohesive society. That the current structures, programmes and resources allocated by the authorities have not yet – thirty years since the transition from Apartheid - delivered the desired level of social cohesion in South Africa.   It recognises the importance of social cohesion in any society that wishes for harmony, stability and prosperity. Thus, more needs to be done to promote such.   What that is, is an open question.   In a case study, the United Arab Emirates model for managing diversity and social cohesion is examined. It aims to provide new options for South Africa’s policymakers to contemplate, by identifying a set of practices that do not currently form part of the South African toolset.   2. The United Arab Emirates Case Study   2.1. Introduction   In today's globalised world, countries are confronted with significant challenges in nurturing social cohesion and tolerance among their diverse populations. Due to its extensive expatriate community that comprises more than 200 nationalities, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stands out as a unique model. This paper explores the frameworks and programmes deployed by the UAE in order to promote tolerance and social cohesion through its Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, and the Happiness Programme. And it considers how these insights may inform similar initiatives in South Africa. The need for social cohesion is underscored by the reality that societies are becoming increasingly diverse due to globalisation, migration, and changing demographics. For post-apartheid South Africa, where previous policies enforced racial division and inequality, the quest for a unified and inclusive society is both a challenge and an imperative. 2.2. Historical Context   To appreciate forming the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence in the UAE, it is important to understand the historical context of the country. It comprises seven Emirates:, namely, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al-Quwain, Fujairah, and Ras Al Khaimah. Prior to its unification in 1971, each of the Emirates had distinct identities which were rooted in shared cultures, traditions, religions, and heritage (Salah, 2024).   Since unification the country has development rapidly, and, together with its phenomenal economic growth, it has attracted expatriates from many diverse countries. This has led to its demographic transformation. The influx of various nationalities since the twentieth century, has resulted in the drastically altered social fabric of the nation. Whilst the diversification brought the richness of different cultures, it also raised the questions as how to maintain social harmony (Salah, 2024).   The majority of residents in the UAE now hail from abroad, which has led to the UAE government's recognition of the importance of ensuring that the Emiratis and the expatriates need to coexist peacefully and productively. This recognition has led to the establishment of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence. It was a strategic response to these developments, since the government needed to foster an environment of mutual respect and understanding among the different communities inhabiting the UAE and considered it crucial for social stability. Its creation signified a proactive approach to potential friction arising from cultural and linguistic differences (Salah, 2024).   2.3. The background to the need for promoting tolerance in the UAE   The UAE is a multi-national and multi-cultural society. The Emirati nationals make up just 10% of the population. The vast majority are expatriates, who have relocated to the UAE from various countries in search of opportunity and a better life (Olimat, 2025).   Expatriates number around 9 million and the Emirati only around 2 million. Accordingly, the UAE hosts a vast array of cultures, languages and traditions. This has created a unique demographic landscape that has brought about both opportunities for enrichment and challenges in terms of social cohesion (Salah, 2024).   The UAE government has recognised the importance of promoting tolerance and understanding among its varied population. As a nation, the UAE has shifted its focus toward fostering a harmonious society where individuals from different backgrounds can coexist peacefully. This recognition led to the establishment of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, which focuses on initiatives that foster respect and acceptance among the of myriad cultures present in the nation. This ministry’s initiatives have been designed to address the challenges posed by diversity whilst simultaneously harnessing the potential that such diversity offers (Olimat).   2.4. The Ministry of Tolerance   The Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence was founded in 2016 and is tasked with promoting the values of tolerance, inclusiveness, and social cohesion within the UAE. The ministry's formation testifies to the UAE's commitment to addressing the issues which can emerge in a multicultural society, such as prejudice and discrimination (Olimat, 2025).   The Ministry of Tolerance functions on several principles:   Promotion of Cultural Understanding: The ministry implements programmes aimed at promoting awareness and appreciation of the various cultures that exist within the UAE. Initiatives have been designed to promote and encourage dialogue and understanding between the Emiratis and the expatriates with regard to their traditions, values, and beliefs. Development of Comprehensive Policies: The ministry has formulated a range of policies that support a culture of tolerance in schools, workplaces, and communities Engaging the Community: Community engagement is important for ensuring the success of initiatives aimed at promoting tolerance. The ministry therefore focuses on outreach programmes that involve various stakeholders, including local communities, businesses, schools, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Monitoring and Evaluation: The ministry assesses the impact of its initiatives through surveys and studies that evaluate the levels of tolerance and cohabitation among residents. This data helps in refining and enhancing programs. (Olimat, 2025).   2.4.1. The role, structure and functions of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence   The UAE's Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence is the country's authority which is dedicated to promoting tolerance, coexistence and respect among its diverse communities. Its work extends beyond mere toleration. It also seeks to promote an understanding and appreciation amongst its citizens for the various cultures that make up the nation.   Outreach and community engagement   Central to the ministry's strategy is community outreach. By engaging with the different cultural groups and organisations, the ministry endeavours to bridge the gaps between the various cultures. These engagements comprise activities such as the hosting of cultural events, forums and workshops, which are intended to facilitate dialogue and cultural exchanges.   The initiatives help to demystify the different customs and traditions of the various communities, which allows for a greater appreciation among community members. Moreover, the ministry focuses on providing platforms that are inclusive and wherein individuals can express their cultural identities. This helps to promote a better understanding between the various ethnic and religious groups. The approach reinforces the idea of diversity being a strength as opposed to being a challenge.   Education as a tool for promoting tolerance   Education is the basis on which of the ministry's mission has been developed. By integrating concepts of tolerance and coexistence into school curricula, the ministry inculcates these values in future generations. Educational workshops and training programmes shed light on the importance of intercultural understanding to both students and educators. This is done in collaboration with educational institutions. Through such collaboration, the ministry develops the resources needed to promote awareness about the diverse cultures within the UAE. These educational initiatives are intended to prepare students to thrive in a multicultural environment and to embrace diversity from a young age.   Legislative provisions   In order to achieve its objectives, the ministry operates within a robust legislative environment. The government has developed laws that are aimed at promoting tolerance and respect among its citizens and residents. The laws provide the foundation for the ministry's actions and initiatives.   Apart from the obvious laws establishing the Ministry of Tolerance & Coexistence, specific laws have been decreed to protect everyone in the UAE, via a solid legislative ground for the environment of tolerance, co-existence and acceptance. For example, the “Federal Law by Decree No (34) of 2023 Concerning Combating Discrimination, Hatred and Extremism” aims to fights discrimination against individuals or groups based on religion, caste, doctrine, race, colour or ethnic origin (UAE, 2023).    So too, Article 25 of the UAE’s highest law, the Constitution, states that “All individuals are equal before the law, and there is no discrimination between citizens of the Union on the basis of origin, nationality, religious belief or social status” (UAE, 1971).   Framework of tolerance   The ministry’s has established guidelines and policies to prohibit discrimination based on race, nationality, or religion. Legal provisions create a safeguard for individuals belonging to minority groups, thereby ensuring their rights are protected under the law. Additional regulations also encourage businesses and other organisations to adopt practices that promote inclusiveness. By promoting a culture of respect in workplaces and public spaces, the ministry helps to nurture a society that embraces diversity and fosters understanding among its members.   Organisational structure and resources   The ministry has a well-defined organisational structure in order to facilitate the effective implementation of its initiatives. In follows a multi-faceted approach so that it can address the various aspects of tolerance and coexistence in a comprehensive manner. Departments and their activities   The ministry has various departments. Each department is tasked with a specific responsibility, such as cultural integration, the development of coexistence regulations, and community outreach.   Cultural integration programmes aimed at promoting mutual understanding and appreciation between Emiratis and expatriates are designed to facilitate cultural exchanges. Education initiatives focus on developing programmes and resources aimed at embedding tolerance-related topics into school curricula and community workshops.   Through community engagement, outreach initiatives that actively involve diverse cultural communities in events, discussions, and collaborative projects are developed.   Facilitated workplace dialogues: The goal is to promote a spirit of inclusiveness and cooperation amongst workers from different backgrounds and nationalities within the workplace. The Ministry started rolling out these workshops within the government departments. Now that most government departments have been covered, it is looking to implement similar workshops within the private sector.   Legislative Affairs: This department focuses on ensuring that rules, guidelines, and regulations promote a culture of inclusivity and respect across the nation.(Salah,   2024)   Resources allocated to the ministry stem from both governmental budgets and partnerships with private organisations and non-profits. By collaborating with various stakeholders, the ministry expands its capacity to implement effective programmes that resonate with the community's needs (Salah, 2024).  2.4.2. Successes, challenges and important Initiatives   Since establishing of the ministry, the UAE has seen considerable progress in the furthering of a tolerant and inclusive society. Several initiatives and events have contributed to this achievement (Salah, 2024).   One of the major successes of the ministry is the promotion of national events that celebrate diversity, such as the 'International Day for Tolerance'. These events highlight the importance of tolerance but they also engage various communities in a manner that brings them together to share experiences and learn from each other.   Additionally, the ministry's partnership with organisations and institutions has resulted in numerous programmes aimed at youth, empowering them to take an active role in promoting tolerance among their peers. Workshops emphasising leadership and interfaith dialogue have proven successful in encouraging young people to appreciate diversity, and to respect their fellow citizens (Salah, 2024).   Despite these successes, the complex nature of cultural integration, management of differing viewpoints, misunderstanding, friction, and even hostility, have meant that challenges still remain (Salah, 2024).   The ministry must navigate these challenges with sensitivity, recognising that some individuals may struggle to adapt to a multicultural society. The ministry is also tasked with addressing concerns surrounding cultural appropriation and the respect of traditions while promoting their integration. Striving for an equilibrium between preserving cultural identities and promoting a unified national identity is an ongoing challenge that requires thoughtful consideration (Salah, 2024).   2.4.3. Governance and stakeholder engagement   Governance within the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence emphasises collaboration, transparency and accountability. The ministry operates in partnership with various governmental and non-governmental entities, fostering open lines of communication among stakeholders.   Stakeholder collaboration   Engagement with community representatives, civil society organisations, and international entities is crucial in shaping the ministry's policies and initiatives. Through consultation with stakeholders, the ministry ensures that diverse perspectives are included in its programmes, thereby allowing for more effective solutions. This collaborative governance model also helps build trust between communities and governmental institutions. When various stakeholders feel involved in the decision-making process, they are more likely to support initiatives that aim to bolster social cohesion.   Community resilience and responses to global events   The ministry is not only tasked with promoting tolerance but it is also tasked with responding to challenges brought on by global events, such as economic crises, geopolitical tensions, or humanitarian crises. (Salah, 2024)   During challenging times, the ministry's response has been crucial in reinforcing the values of respect and understanding among communities. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the ministry organised initiatives aimed at countering misinformation and fostering a spirit of cooperation between communities. By emphasising shared experiences, the ministry helped to mitigate divisions and reinforce social bonds (Salah, 2024).   The ministry also actively participates in dialogues related to global issues, such as climate change, migration, and human rights. These interactions not only position the UAE as a responsible global citizen but also demonstrate the country's commitment to fostering a culture of tolerance that transcends geographic boundaries (Salah, 2024).    2.4.4. Future directions   As the UAE continues to evolve and grow, so too does the role of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, which needs to be poised to adapt its strategies to meet changing and emerging challenges and opportunities that arise within the multicultural landscape.   Innovation in engagement   It is envisaged that future initiatives leverage technology in order to reach a broader audience and to engage individuals in innovative ways. Digital platforms can facilitate virtual cultural exchanges, social campaigns, and online educational resources, making it easier for communities to connect and interact. Moreover, the ministry may focus on strengthening its partnerships with private sector organisations and universities to develop more tailored programmes that target specific cultural groups or demographics. By aligning their initiatives with the needs of particular communities, the ministry can foster deeper connections and encourage wider participation.   Fostering Inter-religious dialogue   In an increasingly interconnected global environment, inter-religious dialogue is vital for promoting understanding and respect among diverse faiths. The ministry is likely to expand its efforts in this area by organising interfaith events, building bridges between religious leaders and communities, and creating platforms for dialogue that emphasise common values. By nurturing inter-religious understanding, the ministry can further reinforce its core mission of fostering a harmonious society that embraces diversity. (Salah, 2024)    2.5. The Happiness Programme   Closely aligned with the work of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, is the UAE's Happiness Programme. The programme has as its objective the creation of an environment in which all residents feel valued and included.   The programme recognises that happiness and social well-being are deeply interconnected. A happy society is one where individuals respect and support each other. The programme therefore encourages government departments and entities to think creatively about how they can enhance the lives of individuals in the UAE. Happiness more often than not leads to a better understanding and acceptance of others, which in turn promotes a more tolerant society (Olimat, 2025).   2.5.1. Key aspects of the Happiness Programme   The key aspects of the programme are:   Public interface design: Initiatives have been tailored to enhance user experiences with public services. The government aims to ensure that citizen engagement with government services is positive since it fosters a sense of belonging and good interaction between the state and its citizens.   By working with the private sector, businesses are encouraged to adopt practices that promote workplace happiness. Happy workers positively impact attitudes in communities. Mental Health Awareness: Mental well-being is recognised as a core component of happiness. Programmes addressing mental health stigma and promoting services play a vital role in community health. (Olimat, 2025)   2.5.2. The programmes and initiatives of the Happiness Programme   The programme employs several initiatives which are aimed at enhancing tolerance and happiness in the community. Often overlapping with those of the Ministry of Tolerance and Co-Existence's, they include:   A cultural awareness programme that involves educational activities tailored to facilitate understanding among different cultural groups. Through workshops and events, shared values and common goals are emphasised to break down barriers between communities. For example, cultural exchange workshops allow residents to engage with art, music, cuisine, and customs from different cultures so as to create empathy and understanding amongst them.   Public campaigns that highlight stories of multiculturalism, that reflect the nation’s values, and which encourage unity among residents are regularly implemented. The UAE has implemented national campaigns that promote coexistence: Campaigns reminding residents of the dignity of every individual, respect across communities, and historical situations of cooperation help mitigate prejudice and foster a collective identity.   Engagement with Youth   The youth are engaged through programmes that promote volunteerism, cultural exchange and civic responsibility. This is done so as to instill the principles of tolerance and understanding at a young age. In so doing, future generations that value inclusivity are cultivated. The youth programme includes activities such as community service days, and interschool cultural events. Furthermore, youth councils provide platforms for young people to contribute to the social dialogue.   International cooperation   The UAE actively seeks to promote its tolerance initiatives on a global scale. This it does by engaging international organisations and by participating in global dialogues called to address tolerance. It aims to position itself on global platforms as a leader in promoting peace, and cultural understanding and tolerance.   The role of policy and infrastructure   The UAE’s approach to governance significantly contributes to social cohesion. It is of the view that the effectiveness of its infrastructure - from advanced technology in government services to a robust legal system - creates an environment of assurance for residents. Seamless and quality public service experiences nurtures and promotes trust in government - trust which is vital for social stability. The satisfaction with government services is often cited as a major factor in residents’ overall happiness.   Government services and technology   To improve access to all necessary services for residents, the UAE government harnesses technology that promotes transparency and efficiency. The availability of online portals for government services allows residents to conveniently interact with government departments and entities. Processes are more efficient and barriers are removed. Enhanced administrative practices ensure responsiveness to community needs. Rule of law and civic responsibility   The country's firm adherence to the rule of law has a positive impact on the fabric of society. The legal and judicial systems are designed to ensure fairness and equity, which creates a sense of security for residents in that they better understand their rights and responsibilities. When grievances arise, mechanisms for resolution reinforce the norms of civic order and mutual respect. With clear legal frameworks in place, citizens know that conflicts will be resolved efficiently and equitably. This creates confidence in the judicial system. and because residents can expect justice and fairness to prevail when disputes occur, community interactions tend to be civil (Olimat, 2025)   2.5.3. Evaluating Social Cohesion in the UAE   There seems to be a dearth of empirical research measuring social cohesion and the impact of the UAE's tolerance programme's on it. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests a positive trend. In various surveys conducted by government bodies, the perception of safety and acceptance among residents is highlighted. This would indicate that tolerance is indeed part of the cultural fabric of the UAE (Olimat, 2025).   Listening to community members’ experiences provides insights into the successes and challenges of ongoing initiatives. Feedback from citizens indicate increasing levels of cultural exchange, participation in community events, and general acceptance of diversity (Olimat, 2025).   Surveys focusing on perceptions of security and community engagement also suggest an increased sense of belonging among residents. The heightened sense of safety seems crucial, since it encourages individuals to participate fully in social and cultural events. This participation promotes a deeper connection to the UAE as a shared home for all its citizens (Olimat, 2025). 3.     Conclusion and recommendations   The journey toward tolerance and social cohesion is of the highest importance for social stability in both the UAE and South Africa. Drawing lessons from the UAE's model can provide valuable insights into initiatives that could be effectively adapted for a South African context. Therefore, a society founded on mutual respect and understanding needs to be constructed through strategic thinking, collaborative actions, and the development of innovative solutions.   To cultivate a culture of tolerance is not merely a governmental responsibility but a shared societal one that requires participation from all citizens.   In South Africa, embracing diversity as a strength rather than a division is essential for holistic national growth. Building a cohesive society rooted in appreciation and respect will lay the foundation for a brighter future where tolerance reigns, enabling all citizens to feel they have a place in their shared national identity.   The world is grappling with rising intolerance and conflict. So the importance of learning from models of successful integration cannot be overstated. By focusing on building communities where individuals embrace differences while recognising shared humanity, we can create pathways toward a more peaceful and harmonious future for all.   By continuously updating policies, fostering intercultural dialogues, and by encouraging engagement at all levels of society, nations can work collaboratively toward a common goal of tolerance — with the ultimate aim of enriching human experience and promoting a culture of acceptance and understanding across the globe.   The establishment of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, and the introduction of the Happiness Programme, have been significant steps towards nurturing a more tolerant and happy society. One that accepts diversity and promotes social cohesion and harmony. Through sustained community engagement, sound legislation, educational initiatives, and innovative responses to world challenges, the ministry is playing a critical and essential role in fulfilling the UAE's commitment to coexistence and mutual respect.   Whilst the journey toward achieving a fully tolerant and harmonious society is ongoing, the continuous efforts of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence and the Happiness Programme affirm its dedication to ensuring that individuals from all walks of life feel valued and respected.   The UAE is a model to other nations needing to manage their diverse communities and to promote social cohesion. As the complexities of cultural diversity is grappled with around the globe, the principles and practices established by the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence serve as a guide for creating inclusive societies. By nurturing the values of tolerance, coexistence, and harmony, the ministry contributes to the nation's internal social fabric. It also positions itself as a global leader in promoting harmonious relationships among diverse populations.   Through its ongoing commitment to the promotion of tolerance, and by creating understanding and respect amongst the different cultures and communities calling the UAE their home, the country's national identity is enhanced.   3.1. Insights for South Africa   South Africa, has a complex history of division and inequality. It can therefore can benefit from the UAE's experiences of promoting social cohesion, since it remains a central challenge requiring initiatives to promote understanding among its diverse communities. The cultural landscape of South Africa is rich, and leveraging this diversity can create a vibrant nation rooted in mutual respect.   The establishing of a structure for tolerance, coexistence and happiness   South Africa should consider the establishment of a dedicated institution or the expansion of the mandates of the existing constitutional Chapter 9 institutions, for purposes of designing and implementing social cohesion programmes alike to those of the UAE. This will help focus efforts aimed at fostering social cohesion in the country. Similarly, a national body with the authority to coordinate social cohesion, tolerance and harmony initiatives could ensure that the various stakeholders involved in the development and implementation that policies are linked. This will encourage its effective implementation at all levels.   Cultural awareness programmes   Implementing comprehensive educational programmes that encourage cultural exchange can promote respect and tolerance among South African communities. Collaborations between schools, community organisations, business and local governments are crucial in implementing these initiatives. Programmes should emphasise the contributions of various cultural groups to South African history and development, highlighting shared values and experiences. Through interactive workshops, local festivals, and shared storytelling events, communities can build bridges of understanding.   Implementing public campaigns and community engagement   Through the implementation of public campaigns that celebrate diversity and shared values, prejudice is eased and inclusivity promoted. They can highlight success stories of intercultural friendships, shared community projects, and mutual support among different groups. The engagement initiatives should involve the various stakeholders, such as businesses, educational institutions, and civil society, in order to strengthen the reach and effectiveness of the campaigns. Incorporating voices from diverse backgrounds ensures that the public relates to and invests in the changes being made.   The utilisation of technology   By leveraging technology to improve access to government services, trust in public institutions is built. This ultimately contributes to greater civic responsibility among citizens. Similarly, enhanced digital platforms for community engagement enables feedback and connection in real time, thereby allowing residents to effectively articulate their needs and concerns. Online platforms can be used to share best practices, facilitate dialogue, and create virtual spaces for cultural exchange, and for broadening the community’s engagement radius.   Youth Engagement   The targeting of young people with programmes aimed at promoting leadership, service, and community involvement can help engender a culture of tolerance and understanding for future generations. Providing mentorship programmes that connect youth from diverse backgrounds can promote understanding and collaboration. Education plays a central role in shaping perspectives. Schools can implement curricula celebrating diversity while emphasising the importance of understanding, empathy, and civic duty.   References   Bris, A. 2014. Social Cohesion – Why it matters. [Online] Available at: https://www.imd.org/research-knowledge/articles/com-april-2014/ [accessed: 7 February 2024]   BusinessTech, 2023. There’s a critical shortage of these shills going into 2023.  [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.sa/news/lifestyle/653227/theres-a-critical-shortage-of-these-skills-in-south-africa-going-into-2023/ [accessed: 7 February 2023]   CRL Commission. N.d. Annual and Other Reports . [Online] Available at: https://www.crlcommission.org.sa/reports/ [Accessed: 7 February 2024]   Department of Sport, Arts and Culture (DSAC). N.d. Annual Performance Plan 2023/24 . [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.dsac.gov.za/sites/default/files/2023-05/DSAC%20APP%202023-2024.pdf [Accessed: 7 February 2024]   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), 2023. GovDem Poll . Cape Town: Inclusive Society Institute.   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2024. The South Africa Social Cohesion Index: Measuring the well-being of a society . [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/the-south-africa-social-cohesion-index-measuring-the-well-being-of-a-society  [accessed: 11 March 2025]   Langer, A.; Stewart, F., Smedts, K. & Demarest, L. 2017. Social Cohesion Index. [Online] Available at: https://www.socialcohesion.info/concepts/arnim-langer-/-francesstewart-/-kristien-smedts-/-leila-demarest [accessed: 7 February 2024].   National Planning Commission (NPC). N.d. National Development Plan 2030. Our future – make it work. [Oline] Available at: ndp-2030-our-future-make-it-workr.pdf [accessed: 7 February 2024]   Olimat, M. 2025. Interview with Dr Muhammed Olimat, Professor, Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, United Arab Emirates.   Republic of South Africa (RSA). 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 . Pretoria: Government Printer.   Salah, M. 2024. Structured interview with on 20  August 2024 with Ms Mai Salah, Senior Official at the Ministry of Tolerance & Coexistence, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.   Scanlon Foundation Research Institute (SFRI). N.d. What is social cohesion?  [Online] Available at: https://scanloninstitute.org.au/what-social-cohesion [accessed: 7 February 2024]   Treasury. 2024. Vote 37: Sport, Arts and Culture . [Online] Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2024/ene/ENE24-Vote37_ChapterTables.xlsx [accessed: 2 April 2024]   United Arab Emirates (UAE). 1971. The Constitution . [Online] Available at: https://uaecabinet.ae/en/the-constitution [accessed: 19 March 2025]   United Arab Emirates (UAE). 2023. Federal Law by Decree No (34) of 2023 Concerning Combating Discrimination, Hatred and Extremism . Aby Dhabi: Presidential Palace.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This paper is published jointly by the  Inclusiv e Society Institute and School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University                      www.inclusivesociety.org.za             www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/economy/sp

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to make meaningful progress in promoting democratic values within secondary and tertiary institutions across the North West Province. On Thursday, 19 June 2025, learners from Rabboni Christian High School took part in the “Taking the Constitution to the People”  workshop, facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s Gauteng Schools Coordinator. The workshop aimed to deepen the learners’ understanding and appreciation of South Africa’s democratic Constitution, its historical development, structure, and the fundamental rights and responsibilities enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights. Through an engaging and interactive session, participants were guided through the constitution-making process, the principles that shaped its formation, and its critical role in underpinning the country's governance and social cohesion. The workshop also highlighted the Founding Provisions, which articulate the core values of the Republic and the freedoms to which all South Africans are entitled. A key focus of the session was the idea of responsible citizenship. Learners were empowered to see themselves not just as beneficiaries of constitutional rights, but as active participants in safeguarding democratic ideals and contributing to a more inclusive, equitable, and just society. This workshop forms part of a broader and ongoing initiative by the Inclusive Society Institute to strengthen constitutional literacy and democratic engagement. Similar programmes will continue to be rolled out across various districts of the North West Province, targeting both secondary schools and tertiary institutions. Through these efforts, the Institute seeks to nurture a generation of informed, engaged, and civic-minded individuals who will play a vital role in upholding and advancing South Africa’s democratic legacy.

On Thursday, 19 June 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute’s School Project Coordinator in the North West Province, Patrick Motsepe, facilitated an engaging and insightful constitutional education workshop for Grade 11 learners at Lighthouse Academy. The workshop aimed to equip students with a deeper and more practical understanding of South Africa’s supreme legal document—the Constitution. Moving beyond textbook theory, the session explored the Constitution’s historical context, its structure, and key components such as the Preamble and the country’s national symbols, including the National Anthem and the national flag. Carefully aligned with the learners’ Life Orientation and History curricula, the session offered an enriching learning experience that enhanced both content knowledge and critical thinking skills. As the workshop progressed, learners became increasingly engaged—posing thought-provoking questions, offering their own insights, and actively participating in discussions. Motsepe skillfully facilitated the dialogue, creating an inclusive space where each learner felt empowered to express their views. The workshop also focused on fostering a clearer understanding of the rights, limitations of rights, and responsibilities that come with citizenship in a democratic society. By the end of the session, students left with a greater appreciation of the Constitution’s relevance in their daily lives and their roles as active, informed citizens. To conclude, learners completed a survey designed to assess their comprehension of the workshop content and its application, providing valuable feedback for future programming.

The Inclusive Society Institute participated in the Electoral Commission of South Africa’s Symposium on Political Funding, which was held in Durban on 18 and 19 June 2025. The symposium brought together a diverse array of stakeholders, including political parties, researchers, regulators, civil society organisations and representatives of the media, to interrogate and reflect on the current state and future trajectory of party political funding in South Africa.   Representing the Institute was its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, who contributed to the robust discussions on funding transparency, equity and the sustainability of South Africa’s multiparty democracy.   A multi-sectoral engagement on the Future of political funding   The symposium was convened by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and structured over two days, with a series of high-level thematic sessions, which included:   A public session in which the objectives of the symposium were set out, focusing on strengthening transparency, fairness and institutional integrity within the South African political funding regime. A deep dive into the architecture of political funding in South Africa, which featured a keynote address by IEC Deputy CEO Mr George Mahlangu, who offered insights into the Commission’s work in monitoring political finance and enforcing the Political Party Funding Act. A presentation of key findings from new research conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), examining the legal and policy framework regulating political finance in South Africa, as well as public perceptions around compliance and enforcement. A global comparative perspective on political funding, with inputs from international experts exploring best practices and emerging challenges in other electoral democracies. A focused session on cross-jurisdictional research, drawing from comparative experiences around the world to identify policy lessons for South Africa’s regulatory environment.   On the second day, the symposium resumed with a keynote address by the Minister of Finance, who highlighted the critical intersection between public finance management and democratic integrity. Subsequent sessions included:   Reimagining the Purpose, Role and Mandate of Political Funding, which interrogated whether South Africa’s current funding model adequately supports a vibrant and inclusive democratic order. Transparency in Political Funding, featuring new research on the capacity and commitment of key stakeholders, political parties, oversight institutions and civil society, to uphold the principles of openness and accountability. A closing session that examined Transparency in Public and Private Political Funding, addressing the persistent challenges of disclosure, enforcement and public trust, and proposing forward-looking reforms.   The institute’s contribution   Mr Swanepoel’s contribution on day one of the symposium highlighted several pressing concerns around the funding framework. In his remarks, he noted the apparent mismatch between the financial disclosures reported by political parties to the IEC and the scale of expenditure observed during election campaigns.   He cautioned that South Africa had adopted a high-disclosure of private funding of political parties' regime without adequately increasing public funding for political parties, a mismatch that risks undermining the objectives of the Political Party Funding Act, particularly in preventing corruption. Citing research conducted by the Inclusive Society Institute, he pointed out that South Africa spent approximately R20 per eligible voter per year on public funding in 2021, well below international norms for proportional representation systems. While funding has increased since that time, it remains inadequate to support a healthy democratic system.   Swanepoel further warned that if political parties remain underfunded and unable to meet their obligations. They may feel compelled to circumvent the law to secure sufficient campaign resources, thereby weakening the very transparency and integrity the Act seeks to protect.   In response to concerns raised by delegates at the symposium around the revised formula for distributing public funding, now based on a 10% equal share and 90% proportional allocation, he proposed a more inclusive three-tiered approach. This would begin with a small basic allocation to all represented parties to ensure operational viability, followed by the current 10-90 split, because such a model, he argued, would strike a better and more acceptable balance between the need for fairness and electoral performance, while enhancing the sustainability of South Africa’s multi-party democracy.   Conclusion   The ISI welcomed the opportunity to contribute to this important dialogues, since it the Institute was of the view that it helped advance the consolidation of South Africa’s democracy. The Institute remains committed to promoting policy reform that enhances transparency, fairness, and inclusivity within the political landscape.

Occasional Paper 6/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. J U N E 2 0 2 5   Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPAHons, ND: Co. Admin   Abstract   As the rivalry between the United States and China intensifies under the Trump administration, the global order is being reshaped in profound and often unpredictable ways. This paper explores how a potential second Trump presidency could escalate this competition and what that means for the rest of the world, particularly Africa.   Drawing from the author’s extensive engagements with US policy experts, think tanks and lawmakers, this position paper offers a forward-looking analysis of how Trump’s likely return to office, with his characteristic emphasis on economic nationalism, strategic decoupling and ideological confrontation, would redefine US-China relations. While much attention is focused on the Indo-Pacific, the paper makes a compelling case that Africa has become a significant, if underacknowledged, theatre in this global rivalry.   Africa finds itself caught in the middle of competing superpowers offering infrastructure, investment and ideological influence, each with strings attached. Whether through trade wars, military posturing or the ideological framing of governance models, the US-China standoff is already shaping African policy choices, development trajectories and diplomatic alignments. The paper uses South Africa as a case study to illustrate how Washington's growing skepticism toward Beijing’s influence could lead to economic, diplomatic and reputational consequences for nations perceived as drifting too close to China.   At its core, the paper argues that African nations must navigate this turbulent period with strategic clarity and assertive diplomacy. Instead of being pulled into a zero-sum competition, countries should leverage the rivalry to diversify partnerships, build institutional resilience and assert a form of updated non-alignment rooted in their own developmental priorities.     1. Introduction: US - China relations as the defining global axis   The global geopolitical landscape is being redrawn by intensifying strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. A prospective second Trump administration, characterised by economic nationalism, ideological confrontation and unilateralism, will define its approach to US - China relations: renewed rigidity and hostility.   While much of the focus centres on the Indo-Pacific, the implications of this rivalry will ripple globally. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, which, while not the core battleground, serves as a critical theatre in which the great-power contest for influence, resources, ideology and markets plays out in consequential ways.   This paper repositions US - China relations as the central lens through which we examine the evolving international system, with Africa presented as an illustrative case study of what smaller and developing states can expect in an era of heightened bipolarity. The objective is not only to project possible scenarios under a second Trump administration, but also to understand how this intensification of global rivalry constrains or enables agency among Global South nations, particularly those like South Africa that play an influential role on their continent.   2. Escalation in US - China relations under a Trump Presidency   2.1 Tariff wars, technology sanctions and economic decoupling   Trump’s first term launched a major economic confrontation with China through a combination of tariffs, export bans and the weaponisation of trade policy. A second term is expected to deepen this decoupling trend.   In 2025, the Biden-Trump transition period has been marked by increasing trade policy uncertainty. Trump-aligned Republicans in Congress have already tabled bills proposing expansion of the 60% blanket tariff on Chinese goods to include categories such as EV batteries, solar panels and rare earth imports and there will be increased scrutiny of US firms sourcing inputs from China through new guidance on "supply chain transparency" (USTR, 2025).   Trade measures:  Trump’s first term launched a major economic confrontation with China through a combination of tariffs, export bans and the weaponisation of trade policy (Bown, 2020; Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020). Now tariffs are flip-flopping, rising as high as 145%, then down again to 30%, temporarily, but the final outcome is still up in the air. Export controls:  Huawei, ZTE and other Chinese tech firms were blacklisted under national security grounds. Campaign rhetoric (2024):  Trump proposed a 10% baseline tariff on all imports and a 60% tariff specifically on Chinese goods (WSJ, 2024; Trump Campaign, 2024).   Likely Implications:   The world may witness a bifurcated economic order, with separate trade and technology ecosystems, forcing countries to choose sides or hedge with complexity. African nations that rely heavily on Chinese capital and technology, such as Ethiopia, Kenya or Zambia, could find themselves caught in the crosshairs of this decoupling. If African manufacturing sectors are integrated into Chinese supply chains, they risk being cut off from US and European markets due to compliance restrictions related to forced labour, technology origin and sanctions.   2.2 Military posturing in the Indo-Pacific   Trump’s “peace through strength” foreign policy led to a bolstered US military presence in Asia and revitalised alliances. The emphasis on containing Chinese military expansionism will likely sharpen further.   The Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia)  was enhanced to counterbalance China’s Indo-Pacific rise (The White House, 2019). Freedom of navigation  operations increased in the South China Sea. Intermediate missile development  resumed after US withdrawal from the INF Treaty.   Likely implications:   Heightened military tensions with the possibility of flashpoints over Taiwan, maritime boundaries and alliances with regional players. The military dynamics will extend diplomatically to Africa as the US scrutinises Chinese military cooperation with African states, including port access in Djibouti and arms trade in southern Africa. African governments that engage militarily or logistically with China may attract US countermeasures.   We have already seen the US Navy in early 2025 resuming joint exercises with the Philippines and expanded rotational deployments in Guam and Darwin, Australia. China’s PLA Navy responded with increased activity around Taiwan and the construction of another artificial island in the South China Sea (DoD, 2025). Trump campaign surrogates have promised to re-enter the INF Treaty only if China agrees to verifiable dismantlement of its medium-range missiles.   2.3 Democracy versus autocracy framing   Trump’s foreign policy often used ideological language to delegitimise China’s global rise, framing it as an existential threat to the liberal order.   Pompeo (2020):  "If we bend the knee now, our children’s children may be at the mercy of the CCP" (Pompeo, 2020). Legislation:  The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act bans imports from Xinjiang linked to forced labour. Human rights reports:  The Trump State Department sharply criticised repression in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang.   Likely implications:   This ideological framing bleeds into foreign aid, partnerships and multilateral diplomacy, especially in Africa where governance models are diverse. Governments seen to be drifting towards China’s governance template, that is centralised authority, party-dominated institutions and limitations on civil society, may find their partnerships with the US becoming strained or withdrawn. Public diplomacy tools will amplify this divide, painting a dichotomy that forces African states into uncomfortable positions.   2.4 Countering China's global expansion   Trump’s team viewed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as “debt trap diplomacy” and advocated alternatives.   Blue Dot Network (2019):  Created to vet infrastructure projects for transparency and sustainability. Prosper Africa:  Meant to scale up US private-sector investment on the continent. PGII (G7):  Though formalised under Biden, Trump-era momentum laid groundwork for infrastructure competition.   Likely implications:   Washington will likely increase pressure on states accepting BRI deals while offering conditional US and Western-backed infrastructure alternatives. For Africa, this means potential access to new finance, but with expectations around transparency, governance reforms and alignment with US-led frameworks like the Build Back Better World agenda or the DFC guidelines. The competition is no longer just about roads and ports; it is about ideological allegiance, digital sovereignty, and strategic dependency.   3. Africa as a strategic testing ground   Africa, rich in natural resources, a rapidly growing population, and critical voting power in international forums, is an increasingly vital arena in the US - China strategic rivalry. While China has deepened its footprint through infrastructure development, concessional lending and digital expansion, a renewed Trump administration would likely see Africa not only as a market, but as a battleground for global influence.   3.1 Pressure to reassess partnerships   A Trump administration is likely to exert strategic pressure on African governments to reduce their dependency on Chinese financing and infrastructure. Washington may leverage bilateral aid, trade access and diplomatic relations to discourage certain forms of Chinese engagement.   Technology and cybersecurity:  The US will oppose the deployment of Huawei and ZTE technologies in African telecoms and surveillance networks, citing risks of espionage. Strategic infrastructure:  Ports, railways and government buildings constructed by Chinese firms may be seen as dual-use facilities, prompting diplomatic concern. Debt diplomacy:  Countries highly indebted to China, such as Angola and Kenya, may be urged to adopt more transparent and multilateral lending frameworks and coerced into aligning with US and Bretton Woods institutions.   Likely outcome:   African states could be forced to reassess relationships not only based on economic benefit, but on the strategic optics and consequences of alignment.   3.2 Competing economic offerings Trump’s economic strategy would likely focus on enhancing US competitiveness in Africa through the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), targeted bilateral trade deals and the mobilisation of private capital.   Reinforced AGOA strategy:  The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) may be restructured to provide preferential access to US markets for countries aligning with US geopolitical interests. Critical minerals engagement:  The US may enter joint ventures with African governments in mining sectors to secure cobalt, lithium and rare earth elements vital to green and defence technologies. Private sector incentives:  US businesses could receive tax benefits and risk insurance to invest in African infrastructure and technology.  While not matching China's scale or speed, these initiatives may appeal to African governments seeking diversification and reduced exposure to Chinese leverage. In March 2025, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) announced a $5 billion investment guarantee facility for American firms investing in African digital infrastructure. The initiative explicitly excludes partnerships involving Huawei or Hikvision technologies (DFC, 2025).   3.3 Ideological influence and civil society tools   In addition to economic levers, the Trump administration would likely amplify ideological messaging through public diplomacy tools.   Civil society support:  US-funded NGOs may be bolstered to promote transparency, democracy and anti-corruption efforts. Narrative framing:  Agencies like USAID and media platforms like Voice of America may cast Chinese influence as undermining good governance. Think-tank engagement:  US institutions may increase collaboration with African academic and policy groups to challenge Beijing’s development model.  These instruments serve not just to compete for hearts and minds, but also to signal to African elites the reputational risks of leaning toward China.   4. Key Congressional and Senatorial role-players and legislative proposals   The US Congress is increasingly active in shaping policy to counter China’s global influence, with several lawmakers taking a leading role in advancing legislation that directly or indirectly impacts Africa.   4.1 Senator Jim Risch (R-ID)   Co-sponsored the Strategic Competition Act , prioritising diplomatic and development expansion to confront China’s influence. Supports increased US diplomatic staffing in African embassies and expanded civil society engagement to counter Chinese investments (U.S. Congress, 2021).   4.2 Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), now Secretary of State   Sponsored the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act , banning imports linked to forced labour in China. It advocates revoking China’s PNTR status, potentially impacting African manufacturing hubs linked to Chinese supply chains, such as Ethiopia (U.S. Department of State, 2020).   4.3 Representative John Moolenaar (R-MI)   Co-founded the Critical Minerals Policy Working Group . Promotes US partnerships in Africa’s mining sector, especially in countries like DRC and Zambia, while discouraging Chinese joint ventures. 4.4 Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) Supports the Outbound Investment Transparency Act , increasing scrutiny of US firms involved in Chinese-linked projects in Africa. 4.5 Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT)   Introduced the Sanctioning Russia Act, a piece of legislation which could impose tariffs on countries that buy sanctioned Russian oil, through which China is directly targeted, African nations with non-aligned foreign policies are nevertheless going to be affected.   In addition to previously mentioned roleplayers, the 2025 Congressional China Strategy Caucus was formally launched, co-chaired by Senator Tom Cotton and Representative Elissa Slotkin. Their proposed “Supply Chain Sovereignty Act” would introduce sanctions on Chinese firms operating in sectors deemed critical to US national security, including medical devices, green tech components, and telecommunications. African nations trading heavily in these sectors may face secondary compliance challenges.   These legislative efforts signify bipartisan momentum in Congress to build a legal framework that will serve to deter deeper African engagement with China. Countries seen are seen as being too closely aligned with Beijing may find themselves penalised economically or diplomatically. 5. Case Study: South Africa in the crosshairs of great- power rivalry   South Africa’s foreign policy, trade orientation and ideological alliances have drawn increasing scrutiny from US policymakers, particularly under a Trump-aligned strategic worldview. As one of the continent’s most politically and economically influential nations and a core BRICS member, South Africa’s trajectory offers an insightful example of how US - China rivalry is reshaping bilateral and regional relations. 5.1 The US - South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025   Introduced in early 2025, this Act mandates the Executive to do a comprehensive review of all diplomatic, military and economic engagements between the United States and South Africa, with provisions that reflect mounting concerns in Washington over Pretoria's growing closeness with both Beijing and Moscow. Specific US concerns include:   Military cooperation:  Reports of joint naval exercises between the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), China’s PLA Navy and Russia’s fleet. Digital sovereignty:  Widespread adoption of Huawei, ZTE and Hikvision technologies in South Africa’s security and telecommunications networks. Ideological alignment:  Continued high-level party-to-party ties between the ANC and the Chinese Communist Party.   Likely US responses:   Suspension or redirection of specific development assistance programmes, particularly in digital infrastructure and defence cooperation. Enhanced scrutiny of dual-use infrastructure projects funded by Chinese entities. Diplomatic signalling to, and subtle coercion of, its regional allies to start distancing themselves from Pretoria’s trajectory.   As of May 2025, the Act has cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Amendments now require a full audit of South African universities’ research partnerships with Chinese state-linked entities. There is increased concern in Washington over reports of joint AI labs co-funded by Huawei and local academic institutions (GAO Report, 2025). 5.2 Reputational and regional implications   The US review of its relationship with South Africa could serve as a warning to other African nations, that they too could follow, thereby reinforcing the risks of overt alignment with China. As South Africa holds prominent roles in continental institutions such as the African Union and SADC, its choices may influence the strategic posture of neighbouring states. Countries that emulate Pretoria’s engagement model may find themselves subject to similar scrutiny, while those that hedge or diversify may be rewarded with deeper Western partnerships. 6. Anticipated impact on China and China - Africa Relations 6.1 Impacts on China   Economic constraints:  US trade and technology restrictions have already begun to limit Chinese export capacity and innovation in high-tech sectors. Semiconductor and rare earth supply chain disruptions could worsen under a renewed Trump presidency. Diplomatic isolation:  Countries such as Australia, Lithuania and Sweden have resisted Chinese pressure, strengthening Western diplomatic coordination. If the US further isolates China in multilateral bodies like the WTO or the UN, its normative influence will shrink. Strategic withdrawal:  Chinese firms increasingly de-risk by delisting from US exchanges and focusing on South - South cooperation or domestic markets. This may reduce Beijing’s presence in contested or high-risk regions, including parts of Africa.   In the first quarter of 2025, China's GDP growth slowed to 4.5% amid tightening US and EU export restrictions on AI chips and advanced semiconductors. The Chinese government announced an acceleration of "dual circulation" policies to reduce reliance on foreign technology. 6.2 Impacts on Africa   Tactical reassessments:  African countries are already re-evaluating the terms of Chinese debt, with loan disbursements from China dropping from $29 billion in 2016 to under $9 billion in 2022 (China Africa Research Initiative, 2023)Strategic. Diversification of funding:  Africa now has access to competing Western initiatives, such as the G7’s PGII and the EU’s €150 billion Global Gateway, offering alternatives to BRI finance with potentially better terms and transparency. Increased scrutiny:  Nations adopting Chinese digital infrastructure (e.g., Kenya, Nigeria) may see reduced eligibility for US aid or face political consequences, which adds pressure on African states to reassess the long-term costs of Chinese technological integration.   According to a World Bank Africa Briefing (2025), concessional finance from China dropped below $7 billion in 2024. By contrast, PGII and Global Gateway disbursements in Africa exceeded $10 billion combined for the first time. Moreover, at least five African countries (Ghana, Senegal, Namibia, Uganda and Rwanda) have launched regulatory reviews of existing BRI agreements due to rising public debt concerns. 7. Strategic Recommendations for African Policymakers   The African experience provides practical lessons for navigating US - China rivalry. Policymakers must proactively shape foreign policy to preserve autonomy while capitalising on opportunities from both East and West. 7.1 Strategic non-alignment as policy doctrine   Africa must revive the spirit of the Non-Aligned Movement and update it for a multipolar 21st century. Rather than neutrality, this entails actively managing relationships with all powers based on developmental needs.   Maintain working ties with both US and Chinese partners. Avoid exclusive alignment with either bloc. Practice competitive diplomacy to extract the best offers.     7.2 Institutional strengthening and resilience   Improve public financial management and debt transparency. Strengthen legal protections around national assets. Enhance policy coordination across ministries to evaluate foreign proposals holistically.   7.3 Continental coordination and multilateralism   Use AU frameworks to issue collective positions on digital governance, foreign investment and debt sustainability. Operationalise AfCFTA to enhance intra-African trade, reducing dependence on external powers. Promote African agency in multilateral reform discussions.     7.4 Monitor legislative risks from the global north   Track new US and EU legislation that could affect African supply chains. Build forecasting units within foreign ministries to anticipate external regulatory shocks. Develop local content requirements and compliance capacity to avoid sudden disqualifications.   New EU legislation in 2025 requires traceability of all critical minerals entering its market. This indirectly affects African exporters who partner with Chinese firms lacking such compliance mechanisms. The African Minerals Transparency Index, developed by UNECA and launched in April 2025, is helping African governments prepare for these evolving standards. 8. Conclusion: Navigating the age of rivalry   The rivalry between the US and China defines the geopolitical epoch and whilst dynamics may have originated in trade and technology, they now affect every global region, especially Africa. As the case of South Africa demonstrates, alignment choices have consequences. The continent must tread a careful path, asserting strategic autonomy, embracing multilateralism and building resilient institutions.   While a renewed Trump administration may intensify the rivalry, the broader arc of global affairs is clear: developing nations must act with vision and conviction if they are to shape their futures rather than be shaped by external powers. Africa’s response to this challenge can serve as a model for the Global South, a model of pragmatic independence, proactive diplomacy and principled engagement.   References   Bown, C.P., 2020. US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart . Peterson Institute for International Economics. [Online] Available at: https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart [Accessed 7 June 2025].   China Africa Research Initiative (CARI), 2023. Chinese Loans to Africa Database . Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. [Online] Available at: https://www.sais-cari.org/data [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Development Finance Corporation (DFC). 2025. DFC Announces $5 Billion Africa Investment Guarantee Facility.  [Online] Available at: https://www.dfc.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). 2025. Guidance on Supply Chain Transparency in Strategic Sectors.  [Online] Available at: https://ustr.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020. Economic Impact of the US-China Phase One Agreement . [Online] Available at: https://ustr.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Pompeo, M., 2020. Communist China and the Free World's Future . Speech at the Nixon Library, 23 July. U.S. Department of State. [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/ [Accessed 7 June 2025].   The White House, 2019. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report . [Online] Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Trump Campaign, 2024. Campaign Rally Transcript, January 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.donaldjtrump.com [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Congress, 2021. Strategic Competition Act of 2021 . [Online] Available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1169 [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). 2025. Annual Indo-Pacific Defense Posture Report. [Online] Available at: https://www.defense.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Department of State, 2020. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2025. Audit of Foreign Research Partnerships at US Academic Institutions.  [Online] Available at: https://www.gao.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (UNECA), 2025. African Minerals Transparency Index Launch Report.  [Online] Available at: https://www.uneca.org   Wall Street Journal, 2024. Trump Proposes Sweeping Tariff Plan . [Online] Available at: https://www.wsj.com [Accessed 7 June 2025].   World Bank, 2025. Africa’s Economic Outlook and Financial Flows Briefing Q1.  [Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org [Accessed 7 June 2025]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za