At the Threshold: Recalibrating the EU-Africa Partnership in a Changing Global Order

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EU-Africa Consultative Meeting 2026

Cape Town, South Africa: 27-29 March 2026

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This report documents the proceedings, discussions, and key insights from the

EU–Africa Consultative Meeting 2026,

held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 27 to 29 March 2026.

The meeting was hosted by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), in partnership with the Africa Think-tank Dialogue, the Foundation Max van der Stoel, the Olof Palme Internationella Centre, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES).

The views, analyses, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report reflect the contributions of participating individuals and organisations and do not necessarily represent the official positions of the host institutions or partner organisations. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the information contained herein, no responsibility is accepted for any errors, omissions, or misinterpretations.

This report is intended solely for informational and knowledge-sharing purposes. It does not constitute policy advice, legal opinion, or formal institutional endorsement. Readers are encouraged to consult original sources and to exercise their own judgement when interpreting the material.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the organisers, except for brief quotations used for review, scholarly, or educational purposes, provided that appropriate acknowledgement is given.

This report synthesises the content of dialogue transcripts and related inputs under the full intellectual direction and editorial control of the authors. Artificial intelligence tools were utilised in a supportive capacity to assist in the structuring, synthesis, and language refinement of these materials. All substantive analysis, interpretations, and conclusions remain those of the authors, who bear full responsibility for the content.

MAY 2026

CONTENTS

At a glance
Executive Summary
Setting the Context, Uwe Optenhögel
Reasserting Agency and the Politics of Partnership, Supra Mahumapelo
Europe under Scrutiny and the Credibility of Partnership, Udo Bullmann
From Partnership to System: Structural Misalignment in a Changing Global Order, Daryl Swanepoel
Session 1: Trade, advancing more balanced trade relations, workers’ rights and support for a rules-based order
Session 2: Investing in green industrialisation: aligning EU financial and technical instruments, including global gateway, with African priorities
Session 3: Migration and human mobility - improving understanding and coordination on migration
Session 4: Geopolitical dynamics vs. sovereignty / reforming international financial instruments, the global debt architecture, and tax justice
Session 5: Peace and security - shaping a new international security architecture, including UN Security Council reform and a renewed commitment to the UN Charter
Cross-cutting discussion and reflections
Conclusion and way forward
Annexure A: List of participants

Cover image: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID:2200922582

1. AT A GLANCE

The EU-Africa partnership stands at a moment of recalibration.

It remains both necessary and valued, but its credibility is increasingly defined by outcomes rather than intent.

Across the consultation, five core insights emerged: The partnership is well-articulated, but unevenly delivered; structural imbalances persist, particularly in trade, finance and value chains; alignment with African priorities remains incomplete, despite expanded engagement; global economic and governance systems constrain development outcomes, beyond the scope of partnership alone; and the future of the partnership will depend on credibility, balance and sustained trust.

Taken together, these insights point towards a clear direction of travel: From dialogue to delivery, from participation to transformation; and from operating within the system to shaping it.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report captures the key insights emerging from the EU-Africa consultation, which brought together policymakers, practitioners and experts to reflect on the evolving nature of the partnership in a rapidly changing global context.

Across the discussions, a consistent message emerged: the EU-Africa partnership remains both necessary and valued, but it is entering a phase where its credibility will increasingly be judged by its ability to deliver tangible, balanced and context-responsive outcomes.

The consultation was structured around five thematic areas: trade, green industrialisation, migration, global financial architecture and peace and security, each of which highlighted both progress and persistent structural challenges.

In the area of trade, participants emphasised that while access has improved, the underlying structure of trade relations remains uneven. The continued concentration of African exports in primary commodities, coupled with limited participation in higher-value segments of global value chains, points to the need for a more deliberate focus on industrialisation and value addition and therefore, a more balanced trade relationship, it was argued, must be measured not only in terms of volume, but in terms of developmental impact.

The discussions on green industrialisation reinforced this perspective, with participants agreeing that the global transition to low-carbon economies presents a significant opportunity for Africa, particularly given its resource base, but at the same time there was a realisation that this opportunity depended on aligning the European financial and technical instruments, including the Global Gateway, with Africa’s own priorities. This will require moving beyond project-based engagement towards more integrated strategies that support African infrastructure, industrial capacity and long-term economic transformation.

Migration and human mobility were identified as areas where perception and policy are often misaligned and participants stressed the importance of recognising the complexity of migration dynamics, the predominance of intra-African mobility, and the need for more coherent and coordinated approaches. Improving understanding was seen by them as a prerequisite for developing frameworks that are both effective and humane.

The discussion on the global financial architecture introduced a more systemic dimension to the dialogue. Constraints on development were linked not only to domestic conditions, but also to the structure of the international financial systems, including those dealing with debt sustainability, access to finance and global tax arrangements. Reform of these systems, are essential for expanding policy space and for enabling long-term development.

In the domain of peace and security, participants highlighted growing concerns with regard to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the existing global governance structures, which they said, required the reforming of the United Nations system, including the Security Council. This included a need for a renewed commitment to the principles of the UN Charter, which was identified as being central to maintaining a credible and functional international security architecture.

Beyond these thematic areas, a set of cross-cutting insights were identified, the first and central concern was the question of alignment. Across domains, there remains a gap between the design of frameworks and the realities they are intended to address. Bridging this gap requires a more deliberate effort to ensure that instruments, policies and priorities are mutually reinforcing.

Second, the distinction between commitment and delivery was repeatedly highlighted. While the partnership is underpinned by a strong architecture of agreements, its effectiveness will increasingly depend on its ability to produce measurable outcomes.

Third, the issue of balance, economic, institutional and political, runs through all aspects of the relationship. A partnership that is not experienced as fair risks losing legitimacy over time.

Fourth, the importance of agency and coordination within Africa itself was emphasised, with the ability to articulate and pursue coherent priorities being identified as essential to shaping the direction and impact of the continent’s external engagement.

Finally, trust was identified as both a condition and an outcome of effective partnership, in that it is built through consistency, transparency and delivery, and it remains essential to sustained cooperation across sensitive policy areas.

Taken together, these insights point towards a partnership that must evolve in both form and function, where in the immediate term, it requires the strengthening of alignment, improving coordination and focusing more sharply on implementation. Over the longer term, it calls for engagement with the structural features of the global system that continues to shape development outcomes, including financial and governance architectures.

The EU-Africa partnership is thus positioned at a critical juncture.

It has the institutional foundation and political relevance to act as a platform for both practical cooperation and systemic engagement. However, its future effectiveness will depend on its ability to adapt to changing realities, to deliver on its commitments, and to reflect a shared understanding of what constitutes a balanced and forward-looking partnership.

3. SETTING THE CONTEXT

UWE OPTENHÖGEL

VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN PROGRESSIVE

STUDIES (FEPS), ON A PARTNERSHIP UNDER PRESSURE

In his opening remarks, Uwe Optenhögel situated the consultation to take place over the two days within both its institutional and global context, by drawing attention to the evolving nature of the EU-Africa engagement and the broader environment within which that engagement is now unfolding.

He underscored the significance of bringing together two established platforms, the African Think Tank Dialogue, that is being convened by the Inclusive Society Institute, and the FEPS EU-Africa Progressive Network. The consultation forms part of a deliberate effort to deepen structured exchange between the two continents and in this regard, he framed it not as a once-off engagement, but as part of a broader process of sustained dialogue.

At the same time, his remarks located the discussion within a shifting global landscape, which points to a world increasingly characterised by insecurity, polarisation and the resurgence of big-power politics, and a corresponding erosion in adherence to the rules-based international order. This context elevates the importance of dialogue between Africa and Europe, not only as partners, but as neighbouring regions having to navigate a shared uncertainty.

It was against this backdrop that Optenhögel introduced a central question that would come to shape the deliberations of the consultation:

“Is the partnership between Europe and Africa managing to keep pace with the world as it is changing or is it still anchored in previous assumptions that no longer hold?”

This framing brought into focus the need to reflect not only on specific policy areas, but on the adequacy of the partnership itself, specifically in relation to trade, industrialisation and migration, which he noted, should not be viewed as isolated themes, but as interconnected dimensions of a broader relationship that must be capable of responding to the evolving global dynamics.

He further acknowledged that while the EU-Africa partnership is grounded in shared interests and values, it is equally characterised by areas of divergence and the purpose of the dialogue, in this context, was therefore not aimed at eliminating difference, but to engage it constructively. It is through this process that the partnership can remain relevant and responsive.

In this sense, the opening intervention did not seek to prescribe outcomes, but to establish the parameters of the discussion, thereby anchoring it in a changing global reality, and posing the question of whether existing frameworks remain fit for purpose.

4. REASSERTING AGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF

PARTNERSHIP

SUPRA MAHUMAPELO

CHAIRPERSON OF THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS AND COOPERATION, PARLIAMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

Supra Mahumapelo’s intervention shifted the centre of gravity of the discussion. Where the opening framing had located the EU-Africa partnership within a changing global context, his contribution brought the focus firmly onto Africa itself, its agency, its internal coherence and its expectations of the partnership.

At its core, his intervention was not about cooperation in the abstract. It was about control over trajectory.

Implicit in his remarks was a recognition that the language of partnership has, over time, often run ahead of its practical expression. Africa has participated in numerous frameworks, strategies and joint declarations with external partners, including the European Union. Yet the question he surfaced, without overstating it, was whether these engagements have sufficiently shifted Africa’s structural position in the global economy, or whether they have, in effect, managed it.

This is a subtle, but important distinction.

Because if the partnership is to be judged not by its intentions, but by its outcomes, then the metric cannot be the number of initiatives launched or dialogues convened. It must be whether Africa’s position within global value chains, production systems and governance structures is materially changing.

It is in this context that Mahumapelo’s emphasis on Agenda 2063 becomes particularly significant. By foregrounding the African Union’s long-term development framework, he effectively re-centred the conversation: the EU-Africa partnership should not define Africa’s trajectory; it should align with one that is already defined.

This reframing introduces a quiet, but consequential shift in power dynamics. It suggests that engagement must move from externally shaped cooperation towards internally anchored negotiation. In practical terms, this raises a more demanding standard for partnership, one in which Africa engages not as a collection of needs, but as a bearer of a strategic project.

However, his intervention did not locate the challenge solely outside the continent.

A second, equally important thread was the question of internal coherence. The effectiveness of any external partnership, he implied, is contingent on Africa’s own ability to coordinate, to articulate common positions, and to act with a degree of strategic unity. Without this, even well-intentioned partnerships risk becoming fragmented, negotiated bilaterally, implemented unevenly, and ultimately shaped more by external leverage than by continental priorities.

This introduces a dual responsibility.

On the one hand, external partners must be willing to engage Africa on the basis of its stated priorities. On the other, Africa must ensure that those priorities are consistently defined, defended and operationalised across its own institutional architecture.

It is within this interplay that the issue of implementation emerges as a central concern.

Mahumapelo’s remarks pointed, directly and indirectly, to a persistent gap between commitment and delivery. The EU-Africa partnership is not short of frameworks. It is not short of dialogue. What remains less certain is the extent to which these translate into outcomes that are visible at the level of economies, industries and communities.

This gap is not merely administrative. It is political.

Because over time, the accumulation of commitments without corresponding delivery begins to erode confidence, not only among policymakers, but among citizens. And once the partnership is no longer experienced as meaningful, its legitimacy becomes increasingly fragile.

This connects directly to his emphasis on a people-centred partnership.

Here again, the point was not rhetorical. A partnership that does not register in the lived experience of citizens risks becoming an elite construct, sustained in policy forums, but detached from societal realities. The test, therefore, is not whether cooperation is well-designed, but whether it is felt.

Economic transformation sits at the heart of this test.

Mahumapelo’s focus on industrialisation, job creation and value addition speaks to a long-standing structural challenge: Africa’s continued position at the lower end of global production systems. Partnerships that do not actively support movement up the value chain risk entrenching this position, even as they expand trade and investment flows.

This is where the partnership becomes most exposed.

Because it is precisely in the domain of economic structure that the difference between cooperation and transformation becomes most visible. And it is here that expectations are highest, and patience increasingly limited.

Taken together, his intervention can be read as a call for recalibration, not in rhetoric, but in orientation.

A partnership that is:

anchored in Africa’s own strategic vision
reinforced by internal continental coherence
measured by implementation, not declaration
and judged by its developmental impact

Anything less, the implication is, risks perpetuating a gap between what the partnership claims to be and what it delivers.

And in a global environment where alternatives are expanding and alignments are becoming more fluid, that gap may prove increasingly difficult to sustain.

5. EUROPE UNDER SCRUTINY AND THE CREDIBILITY

OF PARTNERSHIP

UDO BULLMANN

MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, S&D GROUP: CHAIR,

DELEGATION FOR RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT

Udo Bullmann’s intervention brought a distinctly European political lens to the discussion, engaging directly with the question that had begun to take shape over the course of the consultation: not only what the EU-Africa partnership aspires to be, but how it is experienced in practice.

His remarks reflected an awareness, implicit, but unmistakable, that the credibility of the European Union as a partner cannot be taken for granted. It must be continually reinforced through consistency, delivery and alignment between stated values and actual conduct.

At the centre of his intervention was the idea that the EU-Africa relationship must be understood within a broader transformation of the global order. Europe, he suggested, is itself navigating a period of internal and external recalibration, economically, politically and strategically, which has implications not only for how it engages the world, but for how it is perceived by its partners.

In this context, the notion of a values-based partnership between the two sides featured prominently. The European Union has long positioned itself as a normative actor, where it has advanced principles such as multilateralism, human rights and rules-based cooperation, but the strength of this positioning does not depend on its articulation, it depends on its application; and the underlying tension is evident.

Where principles are applied inconsistently, or appear to yield to geopolitical expediency, the normative foundation of the partnership begins to weaken, and in a global environment already marked by fragmentation and selective adherence to international norms, this inconsistency carries amplified consequences.

Bullmann’s intervention, read in this light, pointed towards a central challenge for Europe: how to sustain a values-based approach in a world where power politics is reasserting itself, without allowing those values to become either rhetorical or selectively applied.

This challenge is not abstract. It manifests concretely in the domains that define the partnership.

In trade, the question arises as to whether regulatory frameworks and market access arrangements genuinely support industrialisation and value addition in Africa, or whether they reproduce existing asymmetries under the guise of openness. In climate policy, the issue is whether commitments to a just transition are matched by financing structures that distribute risk equitably. In global governance, it is whether Europe’s support for reform extends to shifts in representation and voice that reflect contemporary realities.

Across these domains, the same underlying test applies: does the partnership operate in a manner that is experienced as fair?

Bullmann’s remarks also engaged, directly and indirectly, with the importance of multilateralism. In a context where global institutions are under strain, the EU continues to position itself as a defender of cooperative, rules-based frameworks, but the effectiveness of this position depends on whether those frameworks are perceived as inclusive and responsive, particularly by actors in the Global South.

This introduces a further layer of complexity, because defending multilateralism is not only about preserving existing institutions; it is about ensuring that those institutions evolve in ways that sustain their legitimacy. Without such evolution, defence risks becoming preservation of form, rather than function.

At a more practical level, his intervention pointed to the need for delivery and implementation. The EU-Africa partnership is underpinned by a dense architecture of strategies, financing instruments and political commitments, and therefore, the challenge lies not in the absence of frameworks, but in ensuring that these frameworks translate into outcomes that are visible, measurable, and sustained.

Here again, credibility is at stake.

Because in the absence of delivery, even well-articulated partnerships begin to lose traction. Expectations, once raised, can become sources of frustration if not met. And in a global environment where alternative partnerships and alignments are increasingly available, the cost of unmet expectations rises.

Taken together, Bullmann’s intervention can be read as an engagement with the credibility question from a European vantage point.

It suggests that the future of the EU-Africa partnership will depend not only on the willingness to engage, but on the capacity to align:

values with practice
commitments with delivery
and principles with consistency

This is a demanding standard. But it is also, increasingly, a necessary one.

Because in a partnership shaped by history, tested by present realities, and situated within a rapidly changing global order, credibility is not a given. It is constructed, continuously, and often under scrutiny.

It is within this tension between principle and practice that the discussion began to move beyond the partnership itself, and towards the structure of the global system within which it operates.

6. FROM PARTNERSHIP TO SYSTEM: STRUCTURAL

MISALIGNMENT IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER

DARYL SWANEPOEL

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE INCLUSIVE SOCIETY INSTITUTE

The discussion shifted from the functioning of the EU-Africa partnership to the structure of the global system within which that partnership operates.

At its core was a simple, but far-reaching proposition: the challenges confronting the EU-Africa relationship are not primarily the result of weak cooperation, but of structural misalignment between global rules and contemporary realities.

This distinction is important.

Because if the problem is understood as one of partnership design, the response will be to refine frameworks, strengthen dialogue, and improve coordination. But if the problem lies in the architecture of the system itself, then incremental adjustments will be insufficient. What is required is a more fundamental reconsideration of how value, risk, and voice are distributed in the global order.

This misalignment manifests across multiple domains, but it follows a consistent pattern, in that rules that were designed under one set of historical conditions are being applied in a world that has moved beyond them.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the global economic system, where for decades, developing economies, particularly those in Africa, have been integrated into global markets to serve primarily as suppliers of raw materials. While this model has enabled participation, it has not facilitated transformation. Consequently, the movement up the value chain has remained constrained, not only due to domestic limitations, but also as a result of the global trade structure and production systems themselves.

The implication is that participation does not automatically translate into development. Moreover, it is being exacerbated by the architecture of international taxation, where current frameworks have led to a significant extraction of value from developing economies through profit shifting, regulatory arbitrage and jurisdictional competition. In such a system, economic activity may occur in one jurisdiction, while taxable profits are recorded in another. The result is a systematic erosion of fiscal capacity in countries that are least able to absorb it.

This is not a marginal inefficiency. It is a structural constraint.

Because without adequate domestic resource mobilisation, development becomes dependent on external financing, financing that is itself shaped by conditions that introduce further vulnerability.

This dynamic becomes particularly pronounced in the context of climate finance.

Africa contributes a negligible share of global emissions, yet the continent faces a disproportionate exposure to climate risk. At the same time, it holds many of the critical resources required for the global energy transition, but the prevailing model of climate finance remains heavily reliant on debt-based instruments, often denominated in foreign currency, which creates a compounding effect.

Exchange-rate volatility, driven by global financial conditions, rather than domestic policy choices, increases the real cost of repayment over time and so what may begin as concessional financing can, over the lifecycle of a project, due to factors such as currency volatility, become a significant fiscal burden. In effect, countries are required to assume long-term financial risk in order to participate in a transition for which they bear limited historical responsibility.

This raises a fundamental question: whose transition is being financed, and on whose terms?

The pattern extends beyond economic structures into the realm of global governance.

It was acknowledged and argued that institutions such as the United Nations Security Council continue to play a central role in maintaining international peace and security, but there are serious concerns about its composition which continues to reflect a distribution of power of bygone years that are misaligned with the current geopolitical realities. This creates what may be described as a legitimacy gap, being a growing distance between the authority these institutions claim and the representativeness that they embody.

Efforts at reform remain, for the most part, constrained by political realities. In the case of the veto, for example, abolition remains unlikely. The more plausible pathway lies in regulation as to how the veto is to be exercised, introducing mechanisms that enhance transparency, constrain use in cases of mass atrocity, for example, and subject decisions to broader scrutiny.

Whilst this does not resolve the imbalance entirely, it is a pragmatic recognition of the notion that if power cannot be removed, it must be disciplined.

Underlying these institutional dynamics is a broader concern regarding the state of international law and the effectiveness of which depends not only on its formal existence, but also on its consistent application. Increasingly, however, there is a perception, particularly within parts of the Global South, that adherence to legal norms is selective and contingent on power and interest, rather than on principle. Whether universally accepted or not, this perception has real consequences. Because once rules are seen to apply unevenly, they begin to lose their binding character.

They become, instead, instruments of convenience. And at that point, the system does not collapse suddenly, it fragments. Compliance becomes conditional. Cooperation becomes transactional. And the space for shared norms begins to narrow.

Taken together, these dynamics point to a broader conclusion. The challenge is not the absence of rules, nor the absence of partnership. It is the misalignment between rules, power, and lived reality. And it is within this misalignment that the EU-Africa partnership must now operate.

This has direct implications for how partnership itself is understood.

If the underlying system continues to distribute value, risk and voice unevenly, then even well-intentioned partnerships will struggle to produce equitable outcomes. The issue, therefore, is not simply how Europe and Africa engage one another, but how they position themselves within, and potentially reshape, the system that frames that engagement.

This introduces a more demanding conception of partnership. One that moves from engagement within the system, to engagement about the system .

Because ultimately, the sustainability of the EU-Africa partnership will depend not only on its internal coherence, but on its ability to respond to, and where necessary challenge, the structural conditions that shape it.

In this sense, the question is no longer whether the partnership is functioning. It is whether it is fit for purpose in a world where the system itself is in transition.

7. SESSION 1:

TRADE, ADVANCING MORE BALANCED TRADE RELATIONS,

WORKERS’ RIGHTS AND SUPPORT FOR A RULES-BASED ORDER

The first thematic session engaged directly with one of the most enduring and sensitive dimensions of the EU-Africa relationship: the structure of trade and the extent to which it reflects, or falls short of, the notion of partnership.

At its core, the discussion was not about trade in aggregate terms. It was about balance.

Because while trade volumes between Africa and Europe have grown over time, the question raised repeatedly was whether the composition and conditions of that trade are evolving in a manner that supports mutual benefit or whether they continue to reflect underlying asymmetries.

This distinction framed much of the exchange.

Africa’s participation in global trade remains, in large measure, concentrated in the export of primary commodities, while higher-value manufactured goods continue to flow in the opposite direction. This pattern is not new, but its persistence raises a more fundamental question: can a trade relationship be considered balanced if its structural characteristics remain largely unchanged?

The issue, therefore, is not access alone.

Market access, in formal terms, has improved over time, and the EU–Africa partnership has created multiple frameworks through which trade can expand. But as several contributions underscored, access does not automatically translate into equitable outcomes. A system can be open, and yet produce results that are uneven in their developmental impact.

It is in this context that the notion of advancing more balanced trade relations takes on practical meaning.

Balance, as it emerged in the discussion, is not about symmetry in volume. It is about fairness in opportunity, and the ability of both sides to derive sustainable developmental benefit from the relationship. For Africa, this implies the capacity to move beyond raw material exports and participate more meaningfully in value-added production; and for Europe, it raises the question of how its trade frameworks and regulatory regimes enable, or constrain, that shift.

A recurring theme in this regard was the role of standards and compliance requirements, where on the one hand, such standards are integral to modern trade, in that they ensure quality, safety and environmental integrity. On the other, they can function as barriers where the capacity to meet them is uneven. For economies in the process of industrialisation, increasingly complex regulatory requirements may limit entry into higher-value segments of the market, even where formal access exists.

This creates a structural tension.

A trade regime that promotes openness, but imposes conditions that are difficult to meet, risks reinforcing existing patterns, rather than transforming them. The result is not exclusion in principle, but constraint in practice.

Closely linked to this was the question of value addition.

Participants emphasised that more balanced trade relations cannot be achieved without a shift in the structure of production. The beneficiation of resources, local processing, and the development of manufacturing capacity are not peripheral concerns; they are central to rebalancing the relationship.

Without this shift, trade risks remaining extractive in character, even where it is framed as cooperative, but at the same time it was recognised that the responsibility for achieving this balance does not lie on one side alone. While external frameworks matter, internal capacity, coordination and policy coherence within African economies are equally critical, where, for example, the ability to articulate common positions, leverage continental initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area and building regional value chains, all form part of this equation.

Balance, therefore, is co-produced.

It emerges from the interaction between external opportunity and internal capability.

A second, and equally important, dimension of the session centred on workers’ rights.

Here, the discussion moved beyond macroeconomic structures to the conditions under which trade is experienced at the level of labour. The question was not only how trade is structured, but how its benefits and costs are distributed within societies.

For Europe, labour standards form a core component of its trade identity, reflecting a long-standing commitment to social protection and decent work. For Africa, the issue is more complex. While the protection of workers’ rights is widely recognised as essential, there is also an acute awareness of the need to generate employment at scale, often under conditions of structural constraint.

This introduces a delicate balance.

The promotion of labour standards must not become a mechanism that inadvertently restricts participation in trade. At the same time, the absence of such standards risks entrenching forms of work that are insecure, informal or exploitative.

The discussion did not present these as mutually exclusive objectives, instead it was portrayed as being interconnected ones.

A more balanced trade relationship, it was suggested, must also be a more socially grounded one, in which economic exchange is aligned with the principles of decent work, fair wages and human dignity; and as such, the challenge lies in ensuring that these principles are applied in a manner that is both credible and context-sensitive.

This brings into focus the third element of the session: support for a rules-based order.

In a global environment increasingly characterised by fragmentation and selective adherence to international norms, the reaffirmation of a rules-based trading system remains a shared point of reference between Africa and Europe. However, as the discussion made clear, the legitimacy of that system depends not only on its existence, but on how it is experienced.

Rules, in themselves, are not neutral, in that they reflect historical processes, institutional power and negotiated outcomes that may not always align with contemporary realities and where rules are perceived to operate unevenly, or to favour some actors over others, their legitimacy begins to erode.

This concern was evident in the way participants engaged with the global trading system more broadly, because whilst support for multilateralism remains strong, it is accompanied by a growing expectation that the system must evolve. It was argued that a rules-based order that does not adapt, will risk becoming detached from the realities it seeks to govern.

In the context of EU-Africa trade, this translates into a need for consistency and fairness, that is consistency, in the application of rules and standards, and fairness, in the outcomes those rules produce.

Without these, support for the system becomes increasingly difficult to sustain, particularly among actors who experience its constraints more acutely than its benefits.

Taken together, the session revealed a convergence around a central proposition: that trade, if it is to underpin a credible partnership, must be both economically and socially balanced, and embedded within a rules-based system that is experienced as legitimate.

This is a demanding standard.

It requires that trade frameworks do more than facilitate exchange, they must, in fact, enable development. They must protect dignity. And they must operate within a system of rules that commands confidence across different contexts and levels of development.

The discussion did not suggest that this standard has been fully achieved, But it did make clear that it is increasingly the benchmark against which the EU-Africa trade relationship will be judged.

8. SESSION 2:

INVESTING IN GREEN INDUSTRIALISATION: ALIGNING EU

FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL INSTRUMENTS, INCLUDING

GLOBAL GATEWAY, WITH AFRICAN PRIORITIES

The second thematic session shifted the discussion from the structure of trade to the question of investment, and more specifically, to the role of finance and technical cooperation in enabling a green industrial transition in Africa.

At its core, the session engaged with a dual imperative.

On the one hand, the global transition towards low-carbon economies is accelerating, reshaping production systems, energy models and investment flows. On the other, African economies remain engaged in a broader process of industrialisation, one that is not yet complete, and which must now unfold under the additional constraint of climate transition.

The intersection of these two dynamics defines the challenge.

Green industrialisation, as it emerged in the discussion, is not simply about decarbonisation. It is about ensuring that the transition to a low-carbon economy does not bypass Africa’s developmental needs, but rather becomes a vehicle through which those needs are advanced.

This introduces a fundamental question: can the global energy transition be aligned with Africa’s industrialisation trajectory or does it risk imposing a new set of constraints on it?

The session did not treat this as a theoretical concern. It engaged it through the lens of investment.

The European Union, through a range of financial and technical instruments, including the Global Gateway initiative, has positioned itself as a key partner in supporting infrastructure development, energy transition and connectivity across Africa. These instruments carry significant potential. They offer access to capital, technology and expertise at a scale that is difficult to mobilise domestically.

But the discussion made clear that the effectiveness of these instruments depends not only on their scale, but on their alignment.

Alignment, in this context, emerged as the central organising concept of the session.

Alignment between European priorities and African strategies. Alignment between climate objectives and development needs. And alignment between the design of financial instruments and the realities of implementation on the ground. Without such alignment, even well-resourced initiatives risk underperformance.

A recurring theme in this regard was the relationship between green transition and industrialisation.

Africa holds a significant share of the world’s critical minerals, resources that are essential for renewable energy technologies, battery storage and broader decarbonisation processes; and this therefore positions the continent as a key actor in the global energy transition. However, as participants noted, there is a risk that Africa’s role remains confined to that of a supplier of raw materials, replicating patterns already evident in traditional trade.

The alternative, and the objective articulated in the session, is to embed these resources within domestic and regional value chains.

Green industrialisation, in this sense, is not only about producing clean energy. It is about building industries around that energy, processing resources locally and capturing greater value within African economies.

This is where investment becomes decisive.

Because moving from extraction to value addition requires not only policy intent, but infrastructure, technology and capital. It requires energy systems that are reliable and affordable, transport networks that support production and industrial ecosystems that can absorb and scale new activities.

The European Union’s Global Gateway Initiative was discussed within this broader framework.

The initiative’s ambition to mobilise substantial investment in sustainable infrastructure was recognised as a significant opportunity, but, at the same time, the importance of guarding against such investments not only being directed towards large-scale projects was critical. They ought also to be integrated into a coherent developmental strategy.

This raises practical considerations, such as how projects are selected, whose priorities shape investment decisions, and how are local stakeholders, including governments, industries and communities and involved in the design and implementation of these initiatives.

These questions point to a broader issue: the distinction between investment in Africa and investment with Africa. The former can proceed at scale, but may risk misalignment. The latter requires deeper engagement, but is more likely to produce outcomes that are sustainable and locally embedded.

A further dimension of the discussion centred on the structure of finance itself.

While significant funding is being mobilised for climate-related investments, much of this finance remains debt-based. For economies already facing fiscal constraints, this raises concerns about sustainability, the cost of borrowing, currency volatility and repayment risks that all shape the feasibility of such long-term investment.

This introduces a tension within the green transition, in that countries are expected to undertake long-term structural changes, often involving high upfront costs, while relying on financial instruments that may not be aligned with these time horizons. Where financing conditions are short-term or risk-sensitive, they may undermine the very investments they seek to support.

Participants therefore pointed to the need for a more diversified financing approach, that should include the greater use of concessional finance, grant-based support for adaptation and mechanisms that share risk more equitably between partners. Moreover, it should also include consideration of granting finance in local currency, because this can mitigate exposure to external shocks.

These are not technical adjustments alone.

They speak to the broader question of how the transition is structured, and who bears its costs.

Closely linked to this was the role of technical cooperation and capacity building.

Finance, while essential, is not sufficient on its own, since the ability to design, implement and maintain complex infrastructure and industrial systems, depend on skills, institutional capacity and knowledge transfer. The session emphasised that technical instruments must therefore be aligned not only with projects, but with long-term capacity development, because without this, investments risk remaining externally driven, with limited domestic spillover.

The issue of coordination also emerged as a critical factor, because Africa is not a single market in practice, even as it moves towards greater integration through initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area. Therefore, the alignment of external investment with continental and regional priorities requires a degree of coordination that extends across national and institutional boundaries.

For the European Union, this implies engaging not only at the bilateral level, but also with continental frameworks and institutions, and for African partners, it requires articulating priorities with sufficient clarity and coherence to guide external engagement.

Alignment, once again, is co-produced.

It depends on both the willingness of external partners to adapt, and the capacity of African actors to define and coordinate their developmental trajectory.

Taken together, the session underscored that green industrialisation represents both an opportunity and a risk.

An opportunity to reposition African economies within a rapidly changing global system, to build new industries, and to capture value within emerging sectors.

A risk that, without careful alignment, finds the transition reproducing existing patterns, with Africa supplying inputs into global value chains without fully participating in their higher-value segments.

The role of the EU-Africa partnership, in this context, is therefore pivotal.

Its financial and technical instruments have the potential to shape the trajectory of this transition. But that potential will be realised only if those instruments are aligned with African priorities that are structured in a manner that supports long-term development, and implemented in partnership, rather than in parallel.

The discussion did not suggest that this alignment is absent. But it did make clear that it cannot be assumed.

It must be actively constructed, continuously assessed, and, where necessary, recalibrated. Because in the context of green industrialisation, the question is not only whether investment flows. It is whether those flows translate into transformation.

9. SESSION 3:

MIGRATION AND HUMAN MOBILITY - IMPROVING

UNDERSTANDING AND COORDINATION ON MIGRATION

The third thematic session turned to one of the most politically sensitive and often contested dimensions of the EU-Africa relationship: migration and human mobility.

From the outset, the discussion signalled a need to move beyond entrenched narratives.

Migration, as participants observed, is frequently framed through the lens of crisis, particularly within European political discourse, but, in empirical terms, mobility between Africa and Europe is only one component of a much broader and more complex set of migration dynamics, the majority of which occur within the African continent itself.

This gap between perception and reality emerged as a central concern.

Because where migration is primarily understood as a problem to be contained, rather than a phenomenon to be managed, policy responses tend to become reactive, fragmented and often misaligned with underlying drivers.

Improving understanding, therefore, was not treated as an abstract objective. It was seen as a precondition for effective coordination.

Participants emphasised that migration is not a singular process, but a spectrum of movements, encompassing labour mobility, education, displacement, family reunification and informal cross-border flows. Each of these carries different motivations, time horizons and policy implications.

A failure to distinguish between them risks producing responses that are overly generalised and insufficiently targeted.

This complexity is further compounded by the asymmetry in how migration is experienced across regions.

For many African countries, migration is as much an internal and regional phenomenon as it is an international one, because it is also linked to urbanisation, economic opportunity, environmental pressures and demographic change; for Europe, migration is often framed in terms of external arrivals, border management and domestic political pressures.

These differing vantage points shape priorities. And where priorities diverge, coordination becomes more difficult.

The session therefore placed considerable emphasis on the need for a more shared understanding of migration as a structural and long-term feature of global and regional systems, rather than a temporary disruption.

This shift in perspective has practical implications.

It suggests that policy responses should move from short-term containment towards longer-term management, grounded in cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination, which then also implies a need to recognise the positive dimensions of mobility, including its contribution to economic activity, skills development and social exchange.

Migration, in this sense, is not only a challenge. It is also a resource.

However, the ability to harness this potential depends on the existence of frameworks that are coherent, predictable and mutually understood.

It is here that the issue of coordination becomes central.

The EU-Africa relationship is underpinned by a range of migration-related dialogues, agreements and initiatives, but these frameworks often operate in parallel to each other, rather than in concert, which can lead to overlaps, gaps and inconsistencies in the implementation of the agreed objectives. Coordination, therefore, is not simply about increasing engagement, instead it is about aligning existing mechanisms in a way that enhances coherence.

This includes coordination across institutions, between different levels of governance, and across policy domains, because migration does not operate in isolation. It intersects with labour markets, education systems, development strategies and, increasingly, climate dynamics and therefore effective coordination requires that these linkages are recognised and integrated into policy design.

A further dimension of the discussion concerned trust.

Migration governance is highly sensitive to perceptions of fairness and reciprocity, for if one side perceives that its concerns are not adequately reflected or that commitments are unevenly implemented, trust can erode. This has direct implications for cooperation, because migration management depends, to a significant extent, on sustained engagement between partners and without a baseline of trust, even well-designed frameworks can struggle to gain traction.

Participants therefore highlighted the importance of dialogue that is not only continuous, but candid; and it should therefore be a space in which differences can be articulated without undermining the broader partnership.

In this regard, the session echoed a broader theme present throughout the consultation: that partnership does not require uniformity of position, but it does require a willingness to engage difference constructively.

The human dimension of migration also featured prominently.

Beyond policy frameworks and institutional coordination, migration is experienced at the level of individuals and communities, since it involves decisions taken under conditions of uncertainty, shaped by aspirations, constraints, and, in some cases, necessity. These dimensions risk getting overlooked when approaching migration through a purely technocratic lens.

There is a need for policies that are attentive to human realities, including the protection of rights, the reduction of vulnerability and the creation of pathways that are safe and regulated, amongst others. This becomes particularly relevant in the context of irregular migration, where the absence of legal pathways can drive individuals towards more precarious routes, with significant human and social costs. As such, improving coordination, in this context, also means improving pathways for regular migration.

Ensuring that mobility can occur within frameworks that are predictable, transparent and humane.

At the same time, the session recognised the constraints under which migration policy is developed.

Domestic political considerations, public sentiment and institutional capacities all shape what is feasible, which adds a layer of complexity to EU-Africa coordination, as policies must be navigated within different political and societal contexts.

This does not negate the need for cooperation, but it does underscore the importance of realism in how coordination is pursued.

Taken together, the session advanced a more nuanced understanding of migration within the EU-Africa partnership, since it suggested that improving coordination is not primarily a technical exercise, but a relational one and it depends on a shared understanding of migration as a structural phenomenon; alignment between policy frameworks and lived realities; coherence across institutions and policy domains; and a foundation of trust that allows for sustained engagement

The discussion did not seek to resolve all tensions inherent in migration governance, but it did move the conversation away from simplified narratives, and towards a more grounded appreciation of complexity.

In doing so, it reinforced a central insight: that migration, if approached through understanding and coordination, rather than fragmentation and reaction, can be managed in a way that supports both stability and opportunity within the EU-Africa relationship.

10. SESSION 4

GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS VS. SOVEREIGNTY / REFORMING

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, THE GLOBAL DEBT

ARCHITECTURE, AND TAX JUSTICE

The fourth substantive session shifted the focus of the consultation from sectoral cooperation to the structure of the global system within which that cooperation takes place.

At its core, the discussion engaged with a more fundamental proposition, being that many of the challenges confronting the EU-Africa partnership are not solely the result of gaps in policy or implementation, but because they are rooted in deeper structural dynamics within the global political and economic order.

This reframing is significant, because it suggests that even well-designed partnerships may struggle to deliver transformative outcomes if they operate within systems that are themselves misaligned with contemporary realities - this is particularly true as it relates to the realities of developing economies.

The point of departure was the relationship between geopolitical dynamics and sovereignty, where participants reflected on a global environment that is increasingly being characterised by contestation, shifting alignments and the reassertion of power politics. The space for smaller and/or less economically dominant actors to exercise meaningful sovereignty in such a context, becomes more constrained, not necessarily through formal mechanisms, but through structural pressures.

These pressures manifest most clearly in the economic domain, where sovereignty, in formal terms, remains intact, but in practical terms, the policy space is often shaped by external conditions, including access to finance, exposure to global markets, and dependence and reliance on international institutions.

This introduces a distinction between formal sovereignty and operational sovereignty. The former is recognised in principle. The latter is experienced in practice. It is within this gap that much of the session’s discussion was situated. A central area of focus was the architecture of international finance.

Participants pointed to the way in which existing financial systems, including the role of international financial institutions and global capital markets, shape the options available to developing economies. Access to financing, the terms on which it is provided, and the conditions attached to it, all influence domestic policy choices.

The issue is not simply availability, but structure, where financing is predominantly debt-based, and where borrowing costs are influenced by factors beyond domestic control, such as global interest rates, risk perceptions and currency volatility, the ability of countries to pursue long-term development strategies becomes constrained.

This is particularly evident in the context of sovereign debt, where the growing burden of debt across many African economies, and the challenges associated with restructuring and relief was highlighted. It was argued that the existing mechanisms for debt resolution is fragmented, slow, and often insufficiently responsive to the scale and urgency of the problem.

This creates a situation in which countries may find themselves caught between competing imperatives, which on the one hand is the need to service debt and maintain macroeconomic stability, and on the other, the need to invest in development, infrastructure and social services. Where these imperatives are not aligned, policy space narrows.

This brings into focus the question of reform.

Participants did not suggest that the current system is without merit, but there was a clear sense that it is no longer fully fit for purpose in a changing global economy. It was said that the distribution of voice, the responsiveness of institutions and the design of financial instruments were all areas that required reconsideration.

This extends beyond debt to the broader functioning and governance of the international financial institutions.

The governance structures of these institutions, often reflecting historical configurations of power, were seen as increasingly misaligned with contemporary economic realities; and whilst reforms have been initiated in some areas, the pace and depth of change were viewed as limited relative to the scale of the challenges faced.

This raises a question as to how legitimate these governance structures are, given that institutions derive their authority not only from their formal mandates, but also from the extent to which they are perceived as being representative, responsive and fair. Where this perception weakens, so too does their ability to function effectively.

Closely linked to the issue of debt was the question of the global tax architecture.

Here, the discussion turned to the ways in which value is created and captured within the global economy, with current tax frameworks, that were shaped by principles developed in an earlier era of economic organisation, now being seen as increasingly ill-suited to a world characterised by digitalisation, financialization and complex multinational structures.

Participants highlighted the extent to which profit shifting, regulatory arbitrage and jurisdictional competition enable the relocation of taxable income away from the jurisdictions in which economic activity occurs, which for developing economies, represents not merely a technical inefficiency, but indeed, a significant loss of fiscal capacity, due to revenue that could be used to fund development being missed out on, because it is being captured elsewhere.

This has direct implications for sovereignty, given that the cornerstone of state functionality is fiscal capacity, and without it, the ability to design and implement policy, invest in public goods and respond to societal needs becomes constrained.

The call for tax justice, therefore, was not framed in abstract moral terms, but instead it was grounded in the practical realities of development and economics.

The alignment of taxation collection more closely with real economic activity, the enhancement of transparency and the need to ensure more inclusive participation in the governance of tax systems, were all identified as necessary steps towards a more equitable framework.

A further dimension of the discussion concerned the interplay between external reform and internal agency, because whilst much of the focus was on global systems, there was also a recognition that African countries and institutions have a role to play in shaping outcomes, which includes the strengthening of coordination, articulating common positions and engaging more strategically in global negotiations.

Sovereignty, in this sense, is not only constrained externally. It is also exercised internally. The effectiveness of that exercise depends on the degree of coherence and alignment within the continent itself.

Taken together, the session advanced a more systemic understanding of the challenges facing the EU-Africa partnership.

It suggested that progress in areas such as trade, investment and development cannot be fully realised without addressing the broader structures within which these operate.

This does not imply that partnership is irrelevant. On the contrary, it underscores its importance. Because partnerships such as that between the EU and Africa provide a platform through which these structural issues can be engaged, negotiated, and, where possible, reformed.

But it also introduces a more demanding expectation. That the partnership must not only function within the existing system, but contribute to its evolution.

The discussion did not present a single pathway for achieving this, but it did clarify the direction of travel: Towards a global economic and financial architecture that is more responsive to contemporary realities, more inclusive in its governance, and more aligned with the developmental needs of those it seeks to serve.

11. SESSION 5

PEACE AND SECURITY - SHAPING A NEW INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, INCLUDING UN SECURITY COUNCIL

REFORM AND A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO THE UN CHARTER

The fifth thematic session extended the discussion into the domain of peace, security and global governance, when it engaged directly with the institutions and principles that underpin the international security order.

At its core, the session was anchored in a growing recognition that the existing architecture of global security is under increasing strain, which strain is not only operational, but also structural. Operationally, it is reflected in the difficulty of responding effectively to contemporary conflicts, and structural it raises questions about the continued alignment between institutional design and present-day geopolitical realities.

The United Nations system, and the Security Council in particular, featured prominently in this discussion.

For decades, the Security Council has occupied a central position in the maintenance of international peace and security. But its composition and functioning remain rooted in a historical moment that no longer reflects the distribution of power, nor the diversity of actors, in today’s global system.

This creates what participants implicitly and explicitly identified as a legitimacy gap. On the one hand, the Council retains formal authority, but on the other, its representativeness, responsiveness and perceived fairness are increasingly contested, which creates a gap that has practical consequences.

Where legitimacy is questioned, the capacity of institutions to act decisively and to command broad-based support is diminished, which becomes particularly evident in situations where divisions among major powers limit the ability of the Council to respond to crises in a timely and coherent manner.

The issue of reform, therefore, is not an abstract or aspirational objective, instead it is a necessary condition for maintaining the relevance and effectiveness of the international security system.

Participants engaged with a range of reform considerations, which included, amongst others, the question of representation, particularly the underrepresentation of Africa within the Security Council, as well as broader concerns regarding the inclusivity of decision-making processes. The argument advanced was not only that representation should be more equitable, but that it should also reflect the realities of the current global dynamics.

Closely linked to this was the issue of the veto held by the permanent members of the Security Council, recognised as both a foundational feature of the current system and a significant constraint on its functioning. While its complete removal was politically unlikely, there was a need for greater restraint, transparency and accountability in its use, and particularly in situations involving large-scale humanitarian crises.

This reflects a broader tension within the system, that is the tension between the need to accommodate major powers, and the need to ensure that collective action is not indefinitely blocked in the face of urgent challenges.

Beyond institutional reform, a strong emphasis was placed on the normative foundations of the international order, specifically the United Nations Charter, which remains the central reference point for principles such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-use of force and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Nonetheless, the strength of these principles depends not only on their formal status, but also on their consistent application.

In a global environment where adherence to international norms is increasingly selective, the credibility of the rules-based order becomes more fragile, and therefore, the need for a renewed commitment to the UN Charter was framed as not being a symbolic gesture, but, indeed, a practical necessity. Moreover, it requires that states, regardless of power, operate within the bounds of agreed principles, and that deviations from these principles are not normalised or justified through expediency. This commitment, it was argued, was is particularly important within a context where the line between stability and fragmentation is becoming less clear.

The session also engaged with the evolving nature of conflict and security, where contemporary security challenges are becoming increasingly complex - they often span national borders and involve a combination of state and non-state actors. Accordingly, issues such as regional instability, transnational threats and the intersection between security and development require responses that are both coordinated and context-sensitive, and this has implications for how the security architecture is to be conceived.

A system that is overly centralised and/or rigid, may struggle to respond effectively to diverse and rapidly changing conditions, and this has led to a growing recognition of the need for regional organisations to play a role in peace and security.

In the African context, institutions such as the African Union and the continent’s sub-regional bodies, have developed capacities in areas such as mediation, peacekeeping and conflict prevention. Moreover, these organisations bring both contextual knowledge and proximity that can enhance the effectiveness of interventions aimed at stabilising conflict.

Participants therefore reflected on the need to better integrate regional and global mechanisms, not to replace the United Nations system, but to complement it. In so doing, different levels of governance can operate in a more coordinated and mutually reinforcing manner. This pointed towards a more layered understanding of security architecture as being one that recognises that legitimacy and effectiveness are strengthened when institutions reflect both global authority and regional relevance.

Taken together, the session underscored that the future of international peace and security will depend on the ability to adapt existing frameworks to contemporary realities, which will involve enhancing representation and inclusivity, addressing constraints within decision-making mechanisms, reaffirming commitment to foundational principles and strengthening coordination between global and regional actors. These are not incremental adjustments, they speak to the need for a recalibration of the system itself.

At the same time, the discussion remained grounded in pragmatism, in that it recognised that the reform of international institutions, particularly those embedded in the post-war settlement, is inherently complex and politically sensitive. This meant that progress is likely to be gradual, and shaped by negotiation and compromise, but, as the session made clear, even if protracted, the cost of inaction may be greater.

A system that does not evolve risks becoming increasingly disconnected from the realities it seeks to govern, and in the domain of peace and security, such a disconnect carries profound consequences.

The EU-Africa partnership, within this context, was implicitly positioned as a platform through which these issues can be engaged.

Not only in terms of cooperation on specific security challenges, but as a space for advancing dialogue on the future of the international system itself.

12. CROSS-CUTTING DISCUSSION AND REFLECTIONS

The discussion session that followed the thematic inputs introduced a different dynamic into the consultation.

Where the earlier sessions had set out structured perspectives across distinct domains, the discussions brought these strands into interaction. In doing so, they did not simply reinforce the themes already identified. Rather, they exposed points of convergence, areas of tension, and, perhaps most importantly, the underlying questions that cut across the EU-Africa partnership as a whole.

A first and recurring thread was the question of alignment.

Across trade, green industrialisation, migration, financial architecture, and security, participants returned, in different ways, to a common concern: that the frameworks through which the partnership operates do not always align fully with the realities they are intended to address.

In the economic domain, this misalignment is visible in the persistence of structural trade patterns and the constraints on industrial upgrading. In the context of green transition, it emerges in the gap between climate ambitions and the financing structures available to support them; in migration, it is reflected in the divergence between perception and lived reality; and in global governance, it appears in the disconnect between institutional design and contemporary distributions of power and vulnerability.

These are not isolated issues.

They point to a broader pattern in which systems, frameworks, and instruments, many of them developed under different historical conditions, are being applied in a context that has materially changed.

The implication, as reflected in the discussion, is that incremental adjustment may no longer be sufficient.

A second cross-cutting theme was the distinction between formal commitment and practical outcome.

The EU-Africa partnership is underpinned by an extensive architecture of agreements, strategies and joint declarations. It can therefore not be said that there is a shortage of frameworks, nor stated intent, but, as several participants observed, the translation of these commitments into tangible outcomes remains uneven.

This gap between commitment and delivery was not attributed to a single cause, instead, it was understood to be as the result of multiple interacting factors, such as institutional complexity, coordination challenges, capacity constraints, and, at times, differing priorities between partners.

What emerged, however, was a shared recognition that the credibility of the partnership increasingly depends on its ability to demonstrate impact at the level of economies, societies and communities.

Without this, the risk is not only inefficiency, but erosion of confidence.

A third theme concerned the question of balance.

This was most explicit in the discussion on trade, but it extended into other domains.

Balance, as it emerged in the discussions, is not about parity in a narrow sense. It is about the extent to which the partnership produces outcomes that are experienced as fair, and that support the developmental trajectories of both sides.

In economic terms, this relates to value addition, industrialisation and the distribution of benefits across value chains, which in the context of finance, speaks to the allocation of risk and the sustainability of debt; in migration, it touches on reciprocity and the management of mobility in ways that are humane and predictable; and in global governance, it is reflected in representation, voice, and the equitable application of rules.

Across these domains, the same underlying question recurs: does the partnership operate in a manner that is experienced as balanced?

Closely linked to this was the issue of agency.

Participants consistently emphasised that the effectiveness of the partnership is contingent not only on the actions of external actors, but on the capacity of African institutions and states to articulate, coordinate and pursue their own priorities.

This includes aligning external engagement with continental frameworks such as Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area, as well as strengthening internal coherence across policy domains and levels of governance.

Agency, in this sense, is both a precondition and an outcome. It shapes how the partnership is engaged, which is, in turn, is shaped by the structures within which that engagement takes place.

The discussions also brought into sharper focus the role of trust, which operates across multiple levels, such as between institutions, between states and between policymakers and the constituencies they represent. It is built through consistency, transparency and delivery, and it is eroded where commitments are not met, where rules are applied unevenly, or where outcomes are perceived as misaligned with stated objectives.

In a partnership as historically layered and politically complex as that between the EU and Africa, trust cannot be assumed, instead, it must be continually reinforced; and this is particularly important in areas such as migration and finance, where policy decisions have direct and often immediate implications for individuals and communities.

A further insight that emerged from the discussions was the interconnectedness of the thematic areas, in that trade, investment, migration, finance and security are often treated as distinct policy domains. But, in practice, they are deeply interlinked.

Constraints in one area can have cascading effects in others. To illustrate one can cite limited industrial capacity that affects trade outcomes, and which in turn shapes employment and migration dynamics; financial constraints that influence the ability to invest in green transition, which has implications for both economic development; and social stability, and weaknesses in global governance structures, that affect the management of both economic and security challenges.

This interconnectedness suggests that isolated interventions are unlikely to be sufficient and what is required therefore, is a more integrated approach, one that recognises the systemic nature of the challenges being addressed.

Taken together, the discussions point towards a recalibration of how the EU-Africa partnership is understood, that is to say, not as a collection of sectoral engagements, but as a relationship situated within a broader and evolving global system.

Within this system, the partnership is both shaped by, and has the potential to shape, the rules, norms and structures that govern interaction.

This introduces a more demanding expectation.

That the partnership must operate on two levels simultaneously:

at the level of practical cooperation, delivering outcomes across specific domains
and at the level of systemic engagement, contributing to the evolution of the global order

The discussions did not resolve the tensions inherent in this dual role. But they did clarify them and in doing so, they established a more rigorous lens through which the partnership can be assessed.

A partnership that is:

aligned with contemporary realities
capable of translating commitment into outcome
balanced in its effects
grounded in mutual agency
reinforced by trust
and responsive to the interconnected nature of global challenges

Anything less, the implication is, risks widening the gap between what the partnership aspires to be and what it delivers. And in a global environment marked by increasing fluidity and alternative alignments, that gap may prove increasingly difficult to sustain.

13. CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD

The consultation underscored both the depth of engagement within the EU-Africa partnership and the increasing complexity of the environment in which it operates.

Across the thematic sessions and subsequent discussions, a consistent picture emerged: one of a partnership that is well-articulated at the level of intent, but uneven in its translation into outcomes; one that is supported by a dense architecture of frameworks and instruments, but still grappling with questions of alignment, balance and delivery; and one that is situated within a global system that is itself undergoing significant change.

Taken together, these dynamics point not to a failure of partnership, but to a moment of recalibration.

A first and immediate priority is to strengthen alignment between ambition and implementation.

This requires a more deliberate effort to ensure that financial, technical and regulatory instruments are consistently anchored in African priorities and development trajectories - initiatives such as the Global Gateway therefore carry significant potential, but their impact will depend on the extent to which they are integrated into coherent, locally grounded strategies, rather than operating as parallel or externally driven interventions.

Alignment, in this sense, must move from principle to practice.

Closely linked to this is the need to narrow the gap between commitment and delivery.

The credibility of the partnership will increasingly be judged not by the breadth of its declarations, but by its ability to generate tangible outcomes, which calls for greater coordination across institutions, clearer prioritisation of interventions and more consistent follow-through in implementation.

It also suggests the importance of monitoring not only inputs and outputs, but outcomes and impact.

A second priority lies in advancing a more balanced economic relationship.

This includes supporting the structural transformation of African economies through value addition, industrialisation and the development of regional value chains. Trade and investment frameworks must be assessed not only in terms of access, but in terms of the distribution of benefits they generate.

In parallel, the financing of development and transition requires renewed attention.

Reform of international financial instruments, the global debt architecture and tax frameworks, is not peripheral to the partnership; it is central to its long-term sustainability. Without adequate fiscal space and access to appropriately structured finance, the ability of countries to pursue development strategies, including green industrialisation, will remain constrained.

In this regard, the partnership provides an important platform for engagement on systemic reform.

A third area of focus concerns the management of mobility.

Improving understanding and coordination on migration requires a shift away from reactive and fragmented approaches towards more coherent, long-term frameworks. This includes recognising the diversity of migration dynamics, strengthening dialogue between partners, and supporting pathways that are safe, regulated and responsive to both developmental and societal considerations.

Here, as in other areas, the quality of coordination will be as important as the substance of policy.

A fourth priority relates to the broader architecture of global governance, particularly in the domain of peace and security.

The continued relevance of the international system depends on its ability to adapt to contemporary realities, which means that the reform of the United Nations system, including the Security Council, requires a renewed commitment to the principles of the UN Charter. These are essential components of this process.

The EU-Africa partnership, given its scale and political weight, is well positioned to contribute constructively to these discussions. It can do so through both the adoption of joint positions and through sustained engagement in the various multilateral fora.

Across all these areas, two cross-cutting considerations stand out.

The first is the centrality of agency, and accordingly, for the partnership to be effective, African actors must not only participate, they must actively shape its direction. This will require internal coordination, clarity of priorities and the ability to engage strategically across different levels of governance.

The second is the importance of trust, and to build that trust, consistency, transparency and delivery is essential, in that it is reinforced when commitments are met and when outcomes align with expectations. Conversely, it is eroded when there is a persistent gap between intent and experience.

Strengthening trust, therefore, is not a separate objective. It is an outcome of how the partnership functions across all domains.

Looking ahead, the EU-Africa partnership faces a dual challenge: It must deliver more effectively within the existing frameworks, whilst also contributing to the evolution of the broader systems within which it operates, which requires both pragmatism and ambition. Pragmatism in improving coordination and implementation; and ambition in engaging with the structural reforms necessary to ensure long-term relevance and fairness.

The consultation did not seek to resolve all the complexities inherent in this task. But it did provide a clearer articulation of the direction in which the partnership must move.

Towards a relationship that is more aligned with contemporary realities, more balanced in its outcomes, more effective in its delivery, and more responsive to the interconnected challenges of a changing global order.

Figure 1: Towards a Renewed EU–Africa Partnership

In this, the partnership is not only an instrument of cooperation. It is, increasingly, a test of whether cooperation itself can be reimagined, and made to work, in a world that is no longer what it once was.

14. ANNEXURE A: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

NAME	SURNAME	COMPANY
Rachel	Dubale	Africa-Europe Foundation
Febe	Potgieter-Gqubule	African National Congress
Wesley	Seale	African National Congress
Zine	Barka	Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization
Eddy	Mandikwaza	Centre for Mediation in Africa
Assi	Kimou	Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences
Masindo	Maswanyane	Department of International Relations and Cooperation, South Africa
Anna	Knoll	European Centre for Development Policy Management
Asad	Beg	European External Action Service
Udo	Bullman	European Parliament
Damaris	Uzoma	European Parliament
Beatriz	Abellán	Foundation for European Progressive Studies
Thainá	Leite	Foundation for European Progressive Studies
Uwe	Optenhögel	Foundation for European Progressive Studies
Kathrin	Meissner	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung South Africa Office
Ibrahim	Rage (Mukhtar)	Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
Odile	Bulten	Inclusive Society Institute
Zweli	Ndevu	Inclusive Society Institute
Buyelwa	Sonjica	Inclusive Society Institute
Daryl	Swanepoel	Inclusive Society Institute
Ben	Katoka	Institut du Développement Durable et des Relations Internationales
Mikatekiso	Kubayi	Institute for Global Dialogue
Sanusha	Naidu	Institute for Global Dialogue
Aimée-Noël	Mbiyozo	Institute for Security Studies
Melha	Biel	Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies
Francis	Matambalya	Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre
Trenton	Elsley	Labour Research Service
Robert	Kabage	Mashariki Research and Policy Centre
Tula	Dlamini	Nedbank
Beauty	Ogbologu	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
Efem	Ubi	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
Nkanyiso	Maqeda	Olof Palme International Centre
Supra	Mahumapelo	Parliament of South Africa
Alex	Benkenstein	South African Institute for International Affairs
Hermine	Sam	The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Sameh	Abidi	Tunisian Association of Local Governance
Sizo	Nkala	University of Johannesburg
Christopher	Ogunmodede	World Politics Review
Annefloor	Robijn

This report has been published by

the Foundation for European Progressive Studies and the Inclusive Society Institute

The Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS)

is the European progressive political foundation and think tank of the progressive political family at the EU level. Our mission is to develop innovative research, policy advice, training and debates to inspire and inform progressive politics and policies across Europe

www.feps-europe.eu

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI)

is an independent organisation dedicated to strengthening multi-party democracy, social justice, cohesion, equality, and development in South Africa and globally. Through pragmatic research and collaboration, it supports capable democratic institutions and promotes social and national democratic values.

www.inclusivesociety.org.za

This event is organized with the financial support of the European Parliament.

It does not represent the views of the European Parliament.