#6/26 The next UN Secretary-General and the future of the International Order

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Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 8 June 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.

JUNE 2026

Rapporteur: Klaus Kotzé

CONTENTS

1 Introduction: Leadership at a moment of institutional strain

2 The field

3 A process of power, not principle

4 What the role demands

5 Independence is necessary, but structurally difficult

6 Gender representation

7 Civil society and its influence

8 What the Secretary-General inherits

9 Reflection

Cover photo: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID:516365784

1 INTRODUCTION: LEADERSHIP AT A MOMENT OF

INSTITUTIONAL STRAIN

The June 2026 edition of the Open Consultation Mondays discussed what on the surface appears administrative: who will lead the United Nations when António Guterres's term concludes? Richard Gowan, a UN analyst with the International Crisis Group and an expert in the field led the conversation and provided excellent context and insight. The session quickly revealed that the selection of a Secretary-General would never simply a matter of candidates and timelines. Instead, it presented an uncomfortable reflection of the state of the international system itself.

The discussion largely agreed that the UN is operating under genuine strain. While it is not collapsing the current strain is damaging the organisation’s credibility, particularly in the area of peace and security. Its financing is structurally precarious. Its internal culture, by several accounts, is demoralised. Into this context arrives the task of electing the next UN Secretary General.

2 THE FIELD

Mr Gowan opened with an account of where the race currently stands. Five candidates have formally been declared. He was direct about the field's shape. Two candidacies face significant headwinds. Macky Sall has not managed to consolidate the African Union support that might have been expected to follow his profile. Michelle Bachelet’s bid appears to be contending with organised opposition from right-wing Americans. This is a reality that, in the context of Security Council politics, is not easily overcome.

Two names stood out as genuinely credible. Gowan considered Rafael Grossi, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as a frontrunner. His trajectory is, in part, tied to the outcome of Middle East diplomacy that remains unresolved. Rebeca Grynspan, who heads UNCTAD, was described as having performed well in the April hearings. She appeared measured, competent and capable of articulating what the institution needs. Maria Fernanda Espinosa entered the race late and her path to the top appears harder to read.

There was also acknowledgment of a familiar feature of these processes: the possibility that someone not currently in view ends up at the centre of things. Compromise candidates have a habit of appearing when the more visible options stall. The discussion did not dismiss this.

3 A PROCESS OF POWER, NOT PRINCIPLE

The UN Security Council is expected to commence straw polls in July. A final decision is anticipated between October and December. While that is the formal timeline, it is still very unclear what will happen.

Discussion participants were frank on the topic. They agreed that the P5 and particularly the relationship between Washington and Beijing will shape the outcome in ways that the formal process does not fully account for. These kind of negotiations usually happen behind-the-scenes. The concern raised was not simply that this is untransparent, but that the signal it sends compounds an already existing problem. If the UN leadership selection is determined by great power interest rather than by the fitness that the role requires, then the institution will suffer credibility before the new Secretary-General has even begun.

Then there is the risk of deadlock. When the P5 cannot agree, the process tends not to produce the best available candidate, but only the least objectionable one. Participants agreed that this would be a poor basis on which to determine a role that will require considerable strength of character and independence of judgement.

US financial leverage was also directly addressed. The United States remains one of the largest contributors to the UN budget. This ends up putting significant strain on the decisions. How leverage is used, and in whose interest decisions are made.

4 WHAT THE ROLE DEMANDS

The conversation moved beyond the candidates themselves and on to the question of what is required of the position. There was broad agreement that whoever takes the role inherits an unusually difficult brief. There is a crisis of legitimacy, geopolitical fragmentation, and serious institutional and financial pressure.

Participants were specific about the qualities they considered essential. The next Secretary-General must be capable of mediation in contexts where the parties have limited interest in being mediated. They must be an effective manager of a Secretariat that is struggling with morale. Furthermore, the new SG must be willing to delegate, to build teams and to empower employees. This is not an abstract wish-list, but a frank assessment of what the institution currently lacks.

There was also a pointed concern about what risks being lost in the current discourse. Peace and security, understandably in the present climate, dominate the conversation. But participants noted that this preference means that development and human rights are being marginalised. The latter has barely been present in the public discussion of what the next Secretary-General should prioritise. These omissions matter. They speak to a narrowing of what the UN is expected to be doing.

5 INDEPENDENCE IS NECESSARY, BUT

STRUCTURALLY DIFFICULT

Participants plainly stated the need for institutional independence. Whoever takes the position must be capable of resisting political pressure. This is particularly the case from the major powers and is not a novel expectation. Yet, it has rarely been this important, while also structurally being difficult to achieve.

The tension is obvious. Any feasible candidate must also be able to secure P5 support. The very process through which independence is to be guaranteed also requires the explicit support from the powers from which independence is needed. Participants agreed this is a serious challenge for which there is no easy resolution.

Participants agreed to the frustration with the Security Council's structure, with the veto system, and with the reluctance of member states to challenge an architecture they privately find inadequate. That reluctance is not irrational. States depend on the cooperation of major powers across many domains. But cumulatively the system can only reform slowly, if at all. This places considerable faith in the character of individuals to compensate for its structural deficits.

6 GENDER REPRESENTATION 

The next SG has long been expected to be a female. Whether this selection will produce such a result was a thread throughout the entire discussion. Various sectors, influencers and civil society at large has been lobbying for a female SG for some time. They have had some effect on how the process has been framed publicly. The two strongest females, Grynspan and Espinosa, are serious figures, not symbolic ones.

But participants were honest about the gap between expectation and political reality. With the P5 likely to determine the final result, their support for a female candidate is not assured. History suggests that formal criteria and stated commitments do not always determine what happens in the Security Council chamber. Progress in this area has consistently moved slower than what appears the case from public discourse. The discussion participants appeared to agree that the matter is not concluded. A remaining tension exists and the conversation remains open and unresolved.

7 CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS INFLUENCE 

The role of civil society in this process was considered with some caution. Participants acknowledged that advocacy, particularly around gender representation, has shaped public discourse in meaningful ways. The hearings have been more open than previous times. This is a considerable change.

However, it was noted that shaping discourse and determining outcomes were different in totality. On the structural questions such as Security Council reform, the veto, and the redistribution of institutional influence, civil society's capacity to move the needle remained limited. This was stated directly and honestly, without being defeatist.

Perhaps the more interesting observation was that civil society played an active role in keeping topics alive and in the public discourse. By keeping the development agenda visible, by sustaining the human rights conversation, by voicing the concerns of the Global South when formal processes sideline them, advocacy networks alter the conditions within which decisions are made. This is of real consequence. While it is a different kind of influence, it is influence nonetheless.

8 WHAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL INHERITS

The discussion about the next Secretary-General should also consider the place, the environment in which they will operate in. Participants agreed that this is a world dominated by ongoing conflicts, particularly that of the Middle East. These tensions continue to test the institution's capacity and its credibility. Economic instability, both in the developing and developed world, is increasingly generating pressures that existing multilateral mechanisms are not well-designed to address. The risks of food and energy crises, in regions where resilience is already stretched, add further weight to an already heavy institutional load.

When discussing financing the participants again focused on the structural vulnerability that the UN has carried for some time. This now feels more exposed. The heavy reliance on US and Chinese contributions introduces political conditions into what should be straightforward operational funding. Irregular payments under political machinations generate instability at the institutional level that compounds the difficulties of everything else. There was cautious discussion of whether the moment might create space for middle powers to play a more significant role. These states could increase their influence if they step up financially. Whether that appetite exists, and whether it can be organised into something coherent, however remains uncertain.

9 REFLECTION

While the session engaged in serious deliberation, it did not produce any easy conclusions. It did produce a clear-eyed account of an institution that remains necessary, but also in poor health.  It cast light on a selection process that continues to reflect the same distribution of power that has shaped, and constrained, the UN from its very founding.

These were not new observations, per se. But at present, they carry significant weight. More than ever, there is a gap between what the institution is supposed to do and what it is able to do.

The next Secretary-General may not be able to resolve this structural problem. But leadership now matters tremendously. It matters for how the institution carries itself, for the confidence of the people who work within it, and for whether member states continue to invest and sustain it. This is of particular interest for the Global South who have most consistently borne the cost of the system's inconsistencies.

What the June Consultation session made clear is that the coming months are not simply a procedural exercise in selecting a chief executive. These next months will be a test of whether the international community can, in a moment of genuine strain, make a choice that reflects something more than the interests of its most powerful members. This is a high bar, and from the discussion one that will be difficult to clear. History suggests that this will be difficult test for the world. Nevertheless, participants agreed, that the bar must be set, and that in setting it and making it heard and seen the world over would in itself be part of what this conversation is for.

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This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network

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