Search

Occasional Paper 9/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. N O V E M B E R 2 0 2 4 The Inclusive Society Institute would like to thank JoAnn Kamuf Ward , who is the Deputy Commissioner, Policy & External Affairs at the New York City Commission on Human Rights, for reviewing this paper.  AH Gaum  (Advocate of the High Court) & M du Plessis  (Attorney of the High Court) Abstract   The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) plays a pivotal role in South Africa’s human rights framework, and its current approach reflects the country’s historical and social context. The Commission's use of ‘soft powers’ – which allow for a less adversarial process, encouraging cooperation, transparency, and voluntary compliance – aligns with the country’s justice reconciliation and restoration mechanisms. However, while the SAHRC has a constitutional mandate to promote and protect human rights, its findings and recommendations are not binding and require judicial endorsement to be enforceable.   In contrast, the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR), which operates under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), provides more robust enforcement powers. This study examined the differences in legal frameworks and jurisdictional powers between the SAHRC and NYCCHR in order to consider how enforcement of human rights in South Africa can be strengthened. It highlighted their capacities, limitations, and the effectiveness of their enforcement actions.   The study found that their approaches and effectiveness differ significantly due to their distinct mandates and enforcement powers. The NYCCHR’s focus on discrimination and its ability to issue binding orders that can be enforced through judicial support makes it a robust enforcer of anti-discrimination laws. The SAHRC’s broader mandate to address all human rights issues, coupled with its non-binding recommendations and reliance on separate legal proceedings, potentially dilutes its effectiveness as an immediate enforcer of rights. Establishing a tribunal, clarifying and expanding legal powers, enhancing collaboration with judicial bodies, and increasing resources and capacity could be the answer to ensuring the SAHRC remains effective and relevant in the current climate.    1. Introduction   1.1. Background   Human rights commissions are instrumental in promoting and protecting human rights. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR) are two such bodies operating under different legal frameworks and jurisdictional powers. This study seeks to compare the enforcement mechanisms of the SAHRC and the NYCCHR, highlighting their capacities, limitations, and the effectiveness of their enforcement actions.   1.2. Problem Statement   While the SAHRC has a constitutional mandate to promote and protect human rights in South Africa, its ability to enforce its findings is limited. Recent court cases, such as the Agro Data judgment, have demonstrated that the SAHRC’s recommendations are not binding and require judicial endorsement to be enforceable. In contrast, the NYCCHR operates under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), which provides more robust enforcement powers. This study aims to examine these differences and consider how enforcement of human rights can be strengthened.   1.3. Objectives   The primary objectives of this study are to:   Analyse the enforcement mechanisms employed by the SAHRC and NYCCHR. Compare the legal frameworks and enforcement capabilities of both institutions. Identify the limitations of the NYCCHR and SAHRC’s current enforcement powers.    2. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)   2.1. Constitutional and Legislative Framework   The SAHRC is established under Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution (South African Government, 1996), which outlines its role in promoting and protecting human rights. As a Chapter 9 institution, the SAHRC is mandated to function independently and impartially to support constitutional democracy in South Africa.   The powers, functions, and responsibilities of the SAHRC are defined in the South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013 (South African Government, 2013). This Act grants the SAHRC authority to investigate human rights violations, issue subpoenas, and make recommendations in cases of human rights violations. The specific powers include:   a)  Monitoring and Investigating:  The SAHRC is authorised to monitor human rights compliance and investigate alleged violations. This includes conducting research, requesting information, and inspecting places such as prisons to ensure adherence to human rights standards.   b)  Issuing Subpoenas:  One of the critical powers of the SAHRC is the ability to issue subpoenas to compel individuals or entities to provide testimony or documents necessary for investigations. Although the word “subpoena” is not used in the SAHRC Act to describe this power, section 15(2)c of the Act in effect creates subpoena powers. Section 15(2)c describes how, in pursuance of an investigation, the SAHRC may “ require any person by notice in writing under the hand of a commissioner addressed and delivered by a member of staff or a sheriff in relation to an investigation to appear before it at a time and place specified in such notice and to produce to it all articles or documents in the possession or custody or under the control of any such person and which may be necessary in connection with that investigation ”.   This power is crucial for gathering evidence and ensuring thorough investigations into human rights abuses. However, the exercise of this power has faced challenges, as will be discussed in light of legal interpretations and judicial guidance.   c)  Making Recommendations:  Following investigations, the SAHRC can make findings and issue recommendations to address human rights violations. These recommendations can be directed at individuals, organisations, or government bodies and may suggest policy changes, restitution, or other remedial actions. However, these recommendations are not binding, which limits their enforceability.   d)  Public Awareness and Advocacy:  The SAHRC has a vital role in educating the public about human rights. It runs awareness campaigns, provides training, and collaborates with civil society organisations to promote a culture of human rights in South Africa.   e)  Reporting:  The SAHRC is obliged to report annually to Parliament on the state of human rights in the country and on the measures taken to address violations. These reports are critical for informing legislative and policy interventions. istockphoto.com: 499739446     2.2. Limitations of the SAHRC's Powers   Non-Binding Nature of Recommendations   One of the most significant limitations of the SAHRC is that its findings and recommendations do not have binding legal force, as established in cases such as South African Human Rights Commission v Agro Data CC  (2022) and AfriForum v South African Human Rights Commission  (2023).   In the Agro Data judgment, the High Court explicitly stated that the SAHRC’s recommendations are advisory in nature and that any enforceable relief for parties seeking redress from the SAHRC would necessitate a separate court application to issue binding orders. This requirement diminishes the immediacy and impact of the SAHRC’s role in enforcing human rights. Shortly prior to the completion of this study, the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court in the Agro Data matter (Supreme Court of Appeal, 2024).   In the AfriForum judgment, the High Court ruled that the SAHRC does not have the power to make definitive determinations on whether hate speech has occurred under section 10 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA). Instead, the SAHRC can only form an opinion about whether there is sufficient merit to bring proceedings in a competent court, such as the Equality Court. This opinion merely informs whether the SAHRC should support a complainant in pursuing a legal case; it does not serve as a binding or final judgment on the matter. This ruling reinforces the view that the SAHRC’s role is primarily investigative and advisory rather than judicial or determinative.   Reliance on Judicial Processes   To obtain binding legal relief to address human rights violations, the SAHRC cannot rely on its recommendations and must initiate litigation, effectively presenting the case de novo  (whether it has already investigated and issued recommendations or not). This sees the SAHRC stepping out of the role of an independent arbiter of human rights and into that of a party to litigation, entering the court room with its own predetermined views of the matter and handing over the role of independent arbiter to the court. In matters where the Commission has already investigated and potentially made findings and recommendations, this process involves re-arguing the facts and legal issues in court, which can lead to delays and increase the cost of securing compliance with its findings. This reliance on judicial processes was highlighted in both the AfriForum (2023) and Agro Data (2022) cases.   Subpoena Power Limitations   The SAHRC’s use of its authority to compel individuals to provide evidence has been overly cautious, as its consistent practice has been to seek consultation or permission from the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) before issuing these legal orders. According to the interpretation of the relevant sections of the South African Human Rights Commission Act, such consultation is only necessary in cases where the testimony or documents could lead to self-incrimination, which might affect ongoing or potential criminal proceedings (South African Government, 2014).   This requirement is designed to safeguard the rights of individuals who may be under criminal investigation, ensuring that any compelled testimony does not unintentionally lead to self-incrimination. Additionally, it preserves the integrity of ongoing or future investigations conducted by the NPA that might overlap with those of the SAHRC. By requiring consultation in these specific cases, both institutions can coordinate their actions and maintain awareness of each other's investigative activities, thereby avoiding conflicts and ensuring that justice processes are not compromised.   The SAHRC has interpreted “self-incrimination” broadly to include statements that could show that a person has violated a human right, whether such violation would be truly criminal in nature or not, and has thus sought the permission of the NPA to proceed with subpoenas in numerous matters where doing so was not required.   By misapplying this provision and seeking approval even in situations where there is no risk of self-incrimination, the SAHRC has unnecessarily limited its investigative powers, reducing its efficiency and effectiveness in enforcing human rights protections. A correct understanding and application of these legal provisions are essential for the SAHRC to maximise its authority and impact in its human rights investigations.   Resource Constraints   Resource limitations further restrict the SAHRC’s ability to fulfil its mandate effectively. Inadequate funding and staffing can hamper the Commission’s capacity to conduct in-depth investigations, run educational programmes, and monitor compliance across the country.   2.3. Recommendations for Strengthening the SAHRC’s Powers   Establishing a Tribunal   The creation of a tribunal within the SAHRC could provide a mechanism for issuing binding orders, reducing the reliance on the judicial system to enforce recommendations. This tribunal could operate similarly to the NYCCHR’s Law Enforcement Bureau (NYC Human Rights, N.d.), issuing enforceable orders that parties must comply with or challenge through appeal rather than de novo court proceedings. Establishing such a tribunal would not only require amendments to the SAHRC Act but also a careful consideration of how to balance these binding powers with the SAHRC's existing approach focused on reconciliation and dialogue. By clearly delineating the tribunal's role, the Commission can avoid undermining its soft powers, ensuring that the tribunal handles only cases where legal enforcement is essential.   Clarifying and Expanding Legal Powers   To enhance its investigative capabilities, legislative amendments are needed to clarify the scope of the SAHRC’s subpoena powers and remove unnecessary limitations. This would prevent the SAHRC from being overly cautious and enable it to utilise its full investigative potential. Empowering the SAHRC to issue binding orders directly could be another area for legislative development. However, introducing such powers must be approached cautiously to avoid diminishing the Commission’s role in fostering open dialogue and voluntary compliance. This could be achieved by making these binding powers an option rather than a standard response, reserved for cases where serious violations occur, and where reconciliation efforts have failed.   Enhancing Collaboration with Judicial Bodies     Developing protocols for better collaboration between the SAHRC and the judiciary could streamline the enforcement process. Establishing procedures for expedited judicial review of SAHRC recommendations would ensure more timely enforcement of human rights protections. This would enable the SAHRC to focus on its core functions of advocacy and education while having the support of the judiciary to enforce compliance when necessary. Such collaboration could also involve shared training initiatives to ensure that both the SAHRC and the judiciary have a common understanding of human rights issues and the best practices for addressing them.    Increasing Resources and Capacity    To fulfil its mandate effectively, the SAHRC requires adequate funding and resources. Enhanced financial support would enable the Commission to conduct more comprehensive investigations, expand public education efforts, and develop specialised units to address complex human rights issues. By increasing its capacity, the SAHRC can not only improve its investigative capabilities but also its role in public education and advocacy, further embedding a culture of human rights in South Africa.   Conclusion   The SAHRC plays a pivotal role in South Africa’s human rights framework, and its current approach, characterised by non-binding recommendations and a focus on dialogue, reflects the country’s historical and social context. South Africa's emphasis on reconciliation and restorative justice as mechanisms for addressing both past and present injustices aligns with the Commission's use of ‘soft powers’. These powers allow for a less adversarial process, encouraging cooperation, transparency, and voluntary compliance. This approach can make parties feel more comfortable engaging openly without the immediate threat of legal consequences, which might otherwise cause defensiveness or reluctance to participate. The SAHRC's role in shining a light on human rights issues, raising public awareness, and fostering societal change through dialogue and education is integral to South Africa's unique journey towards reconciliation and social cohesion.   However, there is an argument to be made for expanding the SAHRC’s enforcement capabilities to include more binding powers, especially in cases where voluntary compliance is insufficient to address serious human rights violations. Enhancing the Commission’s legal framework by establishing a tribunal could provide a means of issuing binding orders while preserving the Commission's existing soft powers. The tribunal could function separately, handling cases where legal enforcement is necessary, thereby allowing the SAHRC to maintain its advisory and reconciliatory role in other situations.   This dual approach, similar to the model used by the Ontario Human Rights Commission and Tribunal (OHRC, N.d.), could prevent undermining the SAHRC’s soft powers. Without a clear separation, there is a risk that stakeholders may default to seeking binding resolutions, thereby diminishing the Commission’s ability to use its conciliatory approach effectively. A specialised tribunal within the SAHRC would enable the Commission to leverage the benefits of both soft and hard powers, providing a comprehensive toolkit for addressing human rights violations in South Africa. Such a balanced approach would ensure that the SAHRC can continue to foster a culture of human rights through dialogue and education while having the capability to enforce compliance where necessary, thus remaining a relevant and effective institution in promoting and protecting human rights.   3. The New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR)   3.1. Introduction   The NYCCHR operates under the authority of the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), which is codified in Title 8 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (NYC Human Rights, 2003). The NYCHRL was established to address and prevent discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations within New York City. The law provides a comprehensive set of protections against discrimination based on characteristics such as race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and other protected classes.   One of the NYCCHR's primary roles is to enforce the NYCHRL, which specifically addresses discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, and other areas. Protected characteristics under the law include race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and more. The NYCCHR's authority is outlined in the New York City Administrative Code, Title 8, which empowers the Commission to investigate complaints, conduct hearings, issue fines, and enforce compliance with the law.   A critical component of the NYCCHR's enforcement mechanism is its Law Enforcement Bureau (LEB), which plays a central role in investigating allegations of discrimination. When a complaint is filed, the LEB conducts a thorough investigation to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that discrimination occurred. If such a determination is made, the case is then referred to the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH), an independent city agency that conducts administrative hearings. OATH's involvement is mandatory for cases where probable cause is established, ensuring that the hearings are conducted impartially and separately from the NYCCHR's investigative and prosecutorial arms. The NYCHRL enforces the law, and courts are also a forum where complaints can be filed alleging violations of the Human Rights Law.  istockphoto.com: 1248523239     3.2. Administrative Hearings and the Role of OATH   The NYCCHR relies on OATH to conduct formal hearings. OATH functions independently of the NYCCHR, handling cases not only from the NYCCHR but also from other city agencies. When the LEB finds probable cause of a human rights violation within the NYCCHR, the case is automatically referred to OATH for trial, where an administrative law judge presides over the proceedings. The judge's role is to issue a report and recommendation based on the evidence presented. This recommendation is then reviewed by the NYCCHR’s Office of the Chairperson (OC), which makes the final decision. This process allows for a comprehensive and fair hearing, with the OC having the authority to accept, modify, or reject the judge's recommendations.   OATH's role in the NYCCHR's enforcement framework underscores the separation of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions within the Commission's operations. This separation helps maintain the impartiality and fairness of the hearing process. While the NYCCHR is not required to use OATH for every type of complaint, its use is mandated for cases proceeding to formal hearings following a probable cause finding by the LEB. This reliance on OATH for formal hearings ensures that the Commission's actions are legally sound, and that due process is respected.   However, many cases settle and do not go to a hearing. The Commission resolved 40% of cases in FY24 through settlement. In such cases, the parties and the Commission enter into a conciliation agreement, which is an enforceable Commission order. Some cases are also resolved through a private settlement agreement, with a notice of withdrawal filed at the Commission. Finally, cases resolved through the Commission’s Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution are also included in these totals.   3.3. Specific Enforcement Actions and Powers   The NYCCHR has the power and authority to enforce its order without a final decision from the office of the Chairperson. These include imposing fines, mandating policy changes, requiring training, and taking corrective actions to address discrimination.   Issuing Binding Orders   The NYCCHR has the ability to issue binding orders following investigations. These orders can mandate policy changes, compulsory training, payment of damages to victims, and the imposition of civil penalties. These orders are considered to have immediate legal effect, and respondents are required to comply without needing additional judicial endorsement, even though such endorsement is necessary at times, as discussed hereunder.   The Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Estelle Stamm v E & E Bagels, Inc.  (2016) case exemplifies how the NYCCHR enforces its powers under the NYCHRL. In this case, Estelle Stamm, who has disabilities that require her to use a service dog, was denied service at Empire City Bagels. She filed a complaint with the NYCCHR's Law Enforcement Bureau, which, after investigating the claim and issuing a Probable Cause Determination, referred the matter to OATH for adjudication.   When the respondent failed to participate in the proceedings, the administrative law judge conducted a damages inquest, leading to a finding of discrimination. The judge recommended $7,000 in compensatory damages to Ms. Stamm for emotional distress and an additional $7,000 civil penalty against the respondent, along with mandatory anti-discrimination training for the employees. The NYCCHR adopted these recommendations, and further increased the compensatory damages and civil penalty to $15,000 each, demonstrating its ability to enforce compliance with its findings effectively.   This case displays the NYCCHR's enforcement capabilities, allowing it to not only make determinations but also impose binding penalties and corrective actions directly.   Issuing Fines and Penalties   As displayed above, the NYCCHR is empowered to impose civil penalties for violations of the NYCHRL. These fines can be substantial, with the Commission authorised to impose penalties of up to $125,000 per discriminatory act. For violations deemed wilful, wanton, or malicious, fines can reach up to $250,000 per act (NYC Human Rights, 2003). These penalties serve both punitive and deterrent purposes, underscoring the importance of compliance with human rights standards.   Corrective Actions and Remedies   Beyond imposing fines, the NYCCHR can require respondents to take corrective actions, such as adopting anti-discrimination policies, undergoing training, and ensuring public accommodations are accessible. The Commission can also mandate restorative justice processes to address and repair harm caused by discriminatory practices. These remedies aim to address the root causes of discrimination and foster a more inclusive environment.   Public Education and Outreach   The NYCCHR is also engaged in public education and outreach initiatives to raise awareness of human rights issues and ensure compliance with the NYCHRL. The Commission organises training sessions, workshops, and public campaigns to educate the community about their rights and responsibilities under the law. These efforts are designed to prevent discrimination by promoting a culture of respect and understanding throughout New York City.   Proactive Investigations and Testing   In addition to responding to complaints, the NYCCHR conducts proactive investigations and testing to identify and address discriminatory practices. These efforts are particularly directed at areas such as housing and employment, where discrimination may be less apparent. Through testing, the NYCCHR can gather evidence of discriminatory practices that might otherwise go unnoticed.    Enforcement through Courts   While the NYCCHR's orders are binding, the Commission may still need to seek court enforcement if a respondent fails to comply. Likewise, respondents have the right and have seen fit to apply to courts to have orders of the NYCCHR overturned or varied.   The NYCCHR can petition the New York State Supreme Court to confirm and enforce its orders. This judicial enforcement mechanism ensures that the NYCCHR’s decisions are respected, with non-compliance potentially leading to court-mandated penalties, including contempt charges. For example, in Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Desir v Walter and Empire State Realty Management, Inc. (2020), the NYCCHR successfully sought court intervention to enforce its orders and ensure compliance​.   An important aspect of judicial enforcement of decisions of the NYCCHR through the New York State Supreme Court is that the express purpose of such cases is not to try the matter de novo  in the court, but rather for the court to consider the decision of the NYCCHR as though the latter were a court itself, whose judgment was now on appeal or review. This allows for the appeal court to more expeditiously dispose of such matters and improve access to justice.   In the case of Automatic Meter Reading Corp. v New York City  (2019), the New York State Supreme Court upheld the decision of the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR), which had found the employer liable for sexual harassment leading to constructive discharge.   The NYCCHR initially ruled that the complainant was subjected to a hostile work environment and was effectively forced to resign due to ongoing harassment. The administrative law judge at OATH found that the employer's actions were severe enough to constitute constructive discharge. When the employer appealed this decision, the Supreme Court supported the NYCCHR’s findings, including the award of $200,000 for emotional distress damages. The court's affirmation highlights the enforceability and judicial support for NYCCHR decisions.   Of course, individuals are also free to go directly to the courts, they are not required to file with the NYCCHR. However, anyone who contacts the NYCCHR and alleges a violation, must be responded to, as the Commission is a "file as of right agency".   3.4. Limitations and Challenges   Jurisdictional Scope   The NYCCHR’s jurisdiction is confined to addressing human rights violations arising from discrimination within the boundaries of New York City. While the Commission has extensive authority within the city, it cannot address general human rights violations that do not involve discrimination, nor can it address issues outside New York City. This contrasts with bodies like the South African Human Rights Commission, which can address a broader range of human rights issues beyond discrimination​.    Resource Constraints   The NYCCHR, like many governmental agencies, faces resource constraints that can affect its ability to manage a high volume of cases. Limited budgets may impact staffing, investigative capabilities, and the scale of public education and outreach efforts. These constraints necessitate prioritising cases, which can limit the Commission’s responsiveness to all complaints.   Dependence on Judicial Enforcement   Despite the binding nature of its orders, the NYCCHR may still need judicial support to enforce compliance. This results in its orders not being binding in exactly the same way a court’s orders would be, in that a person cannot be held in contempt and thus criminally liable simply for not complying with the order of the NYCCHR – the order would first need to be upheld by the New York State Supreme Court for this to happen. While judicial recourse reinforces the legal standing of the Commission's decisions, it can also lead to delays and complicate enforcement when respondents challenge orders in court. Nevertheless, the matter is not tried de novo  when it is brought for judicial enforcement, and this approach still brings the decisions of the NYCCHR very close to a court’s in respect of enforceability.   3.5. Strengths of the NYCCHR’s Enforcement Model   Robust Legal Framework   The NYCCHR’s authority under the NYCHRL provides a strong legal foundation for its enforcement actions. The power to issue binding orders, conduct thorough investigations, and impose significant penalties makes the NYCCHR a formidable force in protecting human rights within New York City.   Integrated Enforcement Mechanism   The combination of the Law Enforcement Bureau and the administrative hearing process through OATH ensures that the NYCCHR’s enforcement actions are both comprehensive and procedurally sound. This integrated approach allows the Commission to handle cases effectively from investigation through to final order, with mechanisms in place to ensure compliance.   Flexibility and Adaptability   The NYCCHR's proactive stance, including its ability to conduct testing and engage in public education, demonstrates its adaptability in addressing emerging human rights issues. This flexibility allows the Commission to respond to both individual complaints and broader patterns of discrimination, making it a comprehensive enforcer of human rights.    Conclusion   The NYCCHR is an important and effective institution equipped with significant powers to enforce the New York City Human Rights Law. Its ability to issue binding orders, conduct comprehensive investigations, and seek judicial enforcement, when necessary, makes the NYCCHR an effective guardian of human rights in New York City. Despite jurisdictional and resource limitations, the Commission’s integrated enforcement model, supported by a strong legal framework, ensures that it can effectively address discrimination and uphold the rights of all New Yorkers. By leveraging its powers and collaborating with other legal entities, the NYCCHR continues to play a vital role in promoting and protecting human rights.    4. Comparative Analysis of Enforcement Mechanisms and Recommendations: NYCCHR vs SAHRC   4.1. Jurisdiction and Scope of Mandate   A key difference between the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR) and the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) lies in the scope and nature of their mandates. The NYCCHR operates under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), which exclusively addresses human rights violations that stem from discriminatory practices. The NYCCHR focuses on issues like employment, housing, and public accommodations but intervenes only when discrimination based on protected characteristics, such as race, gender, or sexual orientation, is involved. This focused mandate restricts the NYCCHR from addressing broader human rights issues that do not involve discrimination​.   In contrast, the SAHRC’s mandate is far broader. The SAHRC is tasked with promoting, protecting, and monitoring all human rights, not just those related to discrimination or those that were violated as a result of discrimination. This allows the SAHRC to address a wide range of human rights issues, including socio-economic rights such as access to healthcare, water, education, and housing, irrespective of whether discrimination is involved. This broader jurisdiction reflects the SAHRC's constitutional role in supporting democracy by upholding the full spectrum of human rights​.   4.2. Enforcement Mechanisms and the Binding Nature of Orders   The enforcement powers of the NYCCHR and SAHRC differ significantly in terms of immediacy and binding authority. The NYCCHR has the power to issue binding orders following its investigations into discrimination complaints. These orders can compel policy changes, require training, award damages, and impose civil penalties. While respondents have the right to challenge these orders, they are generally expected to comply, and the NYCCHR can seek enforcement through the New York State Supreme Court. The court’s role is to confirm these orders, treating the NYCCHR’s findings with the same weight as a lower court decision, thus reinforcing their binding nature​.   The SAHRC, on the other hand, faces more limitations. Although it can issue recommendations after investigations, these recommendations are not binding. The SAHRC does not seek court approval to "convert" its recommendations into enforceable orders. Instead, its recommendations are considered advisory, with no inherent legal force. If the SAHRC seeks to address human rights violations through legal avenues, it must initiate separate legal proceedings, effectively treating the matter as a new case. This separation of the investigative and judicial processes dilutes the impact of the SAHRC's investigations and recommendations, as they do not directly lead to enforceable outcomes​. If the Commission seeks enforceable outcomes, it is required to follow an entirely different legal path within its mandate – in other words, to litigate, regardless of whether it has made recommendations or not.   4.3. Use of Subpoena Powers and Compelling Evidence   Both the NYCCHR and the SAHRC have the authority to compel the production of evidence, but their approaches and the practical application of these powers differ.   NYCCHR   The NYCCHR’s Law Enforcement Bureau (LEB) actively uses its power to issue subpoenas, which compels individuals and entities to provide testimony or documents necessary for investigations into discrimination. This authority is crucial for the NYCCHR to conduct thorough investigations and support its enforcement actions, ensuring that it can gather all relevant evidence to substantiate claims of discrimination​.   SAHRC   The SAHRC is similarly empowered to compel evidence, but its use of this power has been overly cautious. The SAHRC has often sought permission or consultation from the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) before issuing subpoenas, based on a broad interpretation of the need to avoid self-incrimination conflicts with criminal investigations. The SAHRC’s practice has been to apply this cautious approach broadly, rather than reserving it for rare cases where there is a clear risk of self-incrimination, thereby reducing the efficiency and impact of its investigations​.   4.4. Judicial Interaction and Legal Proceedings   The interaction with the judicial system is another area where the NYCCHR and SAHRC differ notably.   NYCCHR   Where the complainant has not gone directly to the Courts, the NYCCHR’s need for judicial involvement typically arises when a respondent challenges an order or when enforcement is necessary. The New York State Supreme Court reviews NYCCHR’s decisions to ensure compliance but does not retry cases. This appellate-like review process supports the NYCCHR’s authority by treating its findings as legally significant and reinforcing the binding nature of its orders. This approach reduces delays and enhances the credibility of the NYCCHR’s enforcement actions​.   SAHRC   For the SAHRC, the judicial process is more distinct and detached from its investigative functions. When the SAHRC identifies a human rights violation that requires legal intervention, it must choose whether to utilise mediation, investigation (with findings and recommendations) or litigation to address the matter. If the SAHRC decides to investigate and makes recommendations that are then not complied with, there are a number of options open to it, including the use of political pressure by approaching relevant government authorities or even Parliament for assistance. However, the only way to truly bring binding relief would be to approach the court, not for an order confirming the recommendations of the Commission necessarily, but rather to argue the case de novo  and ask the court for relief based on the law and facts, essentially restarting the process. This separate legal proceeding treats the matter independently of the SAHRC's investigative findings, undermining the direct impact of its recommendations.   The NYCCHR’s ability to issue binding orders and enforce them through a streamlined judicial review process makes it a potent enforcer of anti-discrimination laws. This direct enforcement mechanism offers immediate legal consequences for non-compliance, which can deter discriminatory practices effectively. However, the SAHRC's approach, characterised by its reliance on issuing advisory recommendations and pursuing separate legal action, if necessary, should not simply be seen as a weakness or a lack of authority.   The SAHRC's softer approach, which relies on persuasion, influence, and public awareness, aligns with South Africa's broader historical context of reconciliation and restorative justice. This model allows the SAHRC to engage with parties in a less adversarial manner, encouraging dialogue and voluntary compliance. The non-binding nature of its recommendations can foster an environment where individuals and organisations feel more comfortable participating in the process without the immediate fear of legal repercussions. This openness can lead to greater transparency, a willingness to acknowledge issues, and cooperative efforts to rectify human rights violations. By shining a light on issues and raising public awareness, the SAHRC plays a crucial role in shaping societal attitudes and behaviours, which can lead to long-term cultural and policy changes. The above also fits neatly into South Africa’s constitutional system, which provides numerous avenues through which to enforce human rights, including specialised courts and tribunals such as the Equality Court, Children’s Court and Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, and numerous ombudsman services at national, provincial and local level.   While the SAHRC’s current model prioritises these softer, reconciliatory methods and has a place in the South African legal system, practical experience has demonstrated that this approach has not been very effective – for example, individuals and government departments often simply ignore the findings and recommendations of the SAHRC. And although the aforementioned challenge may speak more to the overall constitutional and human rights landscape in South Africa, than to specific weaknesses in the SAHRC’s strategical and operational model, there is still room to consider complementing its toolkit with additional enforcement options. Introducing mechanisms such as a specialised tribunal within the SAHRC, which could issue binding orders in specific cases, would provide a balance between soft power and more robust enforcement. This would allow the Commission to maintain its emphasis on reconciliation and education while having the capacity to ensure compliance when voluntary measures fail.   4.5. Structural and Resource Challenges   Both the NYCCHR and SAHRC face structural and resource constraints, but these challenges are framed by their differing mandates.   NYCCHR   Operating within the boundaries of New York City and focusing exclusively on discrimination cases allows the NYCCHR to channel its resources more effectively. However, the high demand for its services in a densely populated city poses challenges. Despite these challenges, the NYCCHR's focused mandate and structured use of its Law Enforcement Bureau enable it to respond effectively to discrimination complaints​.   SAHRC   The SAHRC’s broader mandate covers all human rights across South Africa, which presents a more significant, or at least, a very different kind of challenge. The SAHRC’s ability to conduct comprehensive investigations, monitor compliance, and engage in public education is often hampered by limited funding and staffing. These constraints necessitate collaboration with other institutions and reliance on civil society to extend its reach. The breadth of its mandate, while necessary for addressing the full spectrum of human rights, strains the SAHRC’s capacity to enforce these rights effectively​.   In addition to the above, from a broader human rights perspective, South Africa arguably has a harsher human rights landscape than the USA, both at national and more localised levels. While the USA has significant human rights challenges of its own, one must accept that the levels of poverty, unemployment, lack of state resources, and inequality in South Africa far outweigh those in the USA. This fact alone has a significant influence on the effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) in South Africa to address human rights challenges as compared to nations like the USA.    5. Conclusion   The NYCCHR and SAHRC play crucial roles in protecting human rights within their jurisdictions, but their approaches and effectiveness differ significantly due to their distinct mandates and enforcement powers. The NYCCHR’s focus on discrimination and its ability to issue binding orders that can be enforced through judicial support makes it a robust enforcer of anti-discrimination laws. The SAHRC’s broader mandate to address all human rights issues, coupled with its non-binding recommendations and reliance on separate legal proceedings, potentially dilutes its effectiveness as an immediate enforcer of rights, while nevertheless not denying the SAHRC the ability to work for change and, as suggested in this paper, to find additional ways to enforce its mandate.    References   AfriForum v South African Human Rights Commission (14370/2019; 31328/2019), ZAGPJHC 807; 2023 (6) SA 188 (GJ). 2023. [Online] Available at: https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2023/807.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Automatic Meter Reading Corp. v New York City, No. 162211/2015, 63 Misc. 3d 1211(A), 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 50464(U), 2019 WL 1475080. 2019. [Online] Available at: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ny-supreme-court/1989750.html [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Desir v Walter and Empire State Realty Management, Inc., Complaint No. M-H-S-17-11067, OATH Index No. 1253/19. 2020. [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/decisions-and-orders/Desir_D&O_SIGNED_Redacted.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Estelle Stamm v. E & E Bagels, Inc., Complaint No. M-P-D-12-1026467, OATH Index No. 803/14. 2016. [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/decisions-and-orders/Commission%20on%20Human%20Rights%20ex%20rel%20%20Stamm%20v%20%20EE%20Bagels%20--%20Decision%20and%20Order.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   NYC Human Rights. N.d. Enforcement . [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/site/cchr/enforcement/enforcement.page [accessed: 25 August 2024]   NYC Human Rights. N.d. Rules of Practice. [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/site/cchr/law/title-47-index.page [accessed: 25 August 2024]   NYC Human Rights. 2003. New York City Administrative Code, Title 8: Civil Rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/Title-8-Text-of-the-Law.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC). N.d. Litigation and inquiry strategy . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/about-commission/litigation-and-inquiry-strategy [accessed: 25 August 2024]   South African Government. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 [accessed 25 August 2024]   South African Government. 2013. South African Human Rights Commission Act, Act No.40 of 2013, Government Gazette , 583(37)   South African Human Rights Commission v Agro Data CC (1448/2021), ZAMPMBHC 58. 2022. [Online] Available at: https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAMPMBHC/2022/58.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Supreme Court of Appeal. 2024. South African Human Rights Commission v Agro Data CC & Another (Afriforum, Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Commission for Gender Equality intervening as Amici Curiae) (39/2023) ZASCA 121 . [Online] Available at: https://www.supremecourtofappeal.org.za/index.php/component/jdownloads/summary/94-judgements-2024/4300-south-african-human-rights-commission-v-agro-data-cc-another-afriforum-centre-for-applied-legal-studies-and-commission-for-gender-equality-intervening-as-amici-curiae-39-2023-2024-zasca-121-15-august-2024 [accessed: 25 August 2024]        - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

This report has been enabled through the generous support of Telkom Copyright © 2024   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   November 2024   Author: Georgi Dragolov and Klaus Boehnke Constructor University, Bremen, Germany Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Table of Contents   Table of Contents List of Tables List of Figures Executive Summary 1. Introduction 2. Measuring social cohesion 2.1 Data 2.2 Analytical approach 3. Level and trend of social cohesion 3.1 Social cohesion in South Africa 3.2 Social cohesion in the nine provinces 4. Structural influences on social cohesion 4.1 Data and method 4.2 Results 5. Individual experiences of social cohesion 5.1 Data and method 5.2 Four classes of experience 5.3 Socio-demographics of the four classes 6. Social cohesion and subjective well-being 6.1 Provinces 6.2 Individuals 7. Discussion and conclusion References                                 Appendices Appendix A: Indicators of cohesion across time Appendix B: Dimensions of cohesion in the provinces over time Appendix C: Correlations of social cohesion on the province level Appendix D: Latent class analyses                                 Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:1440750455             List of Tables   Table 2.1 Sample sizes of Khayabus – Waves 1 Table 2.2 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 1, “Social relations” Table 2.3 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 2 “Connectedness” Table 2.4 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 3 “Focus on the common good” Table 3.1 Social cohesion and its dimensions in South Africa across time Table 3.2 The overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time Table 4.1 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table 5.1 Social cohesion and its dimensions in the four classes Table 5.2 Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents Table 6.1 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Table 6.2 Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents Table 0.1 Indicators of Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” across time Table 0.2 Indicators of Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” across time Table 0.3 Indicators of Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” across time Table 0.4 Indicators of Dimension 2.1 “Identification” across time Table 0.5 Indicators of Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” across time Table 0.6 Indicators of Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” across time Table 0.7 Indicators of Dimension 3.2 “Solidarity and helpfulness” across time Table 0.8 Indicators of Dimensions 3.2 “Respect for social rules” across time Table 0.9 Indicators of Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation” across time Table 0.10 Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” in the provinces across time Table 0.11 Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” in the provinces across time Table 0.12 Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” in the provinces across time Table 0.13 Dimension 2.1 “Identification” in the provinces across time Table 0.14 Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” in the provinces across time Table 0.15 Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” in the provinces across time Table 0.16 Dimension 3.1 “Solidarity and helpfulness” in the provinces across time Table 0.17 Dimension 3.2 “Respect for social rules” in the provinces across time Table 0.18 Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation“ in the provinces across time Table 0.19 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table 0.20 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Table 0.21 Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Table 0.22 Relative class sizes for LCA solutions   List of Figures   Figure 1.1 Constitutive elements of social cohesion (Leininger et al., 2021) Figure 1.2 Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar Figure 2.1 Provinces of South Africa Figure 3.1 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces (2023) Figure 3.2 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time Figure 5.1 Average scores of dimensions in the four classes Executive Summary   This report provides a comprehensive assessment of social cohesion in South Africa, focusing on its development over the past three years. The study uses data from the Khayabus Survey conducted by Ipsos South Africa. Following the conceptualization developed by the authors and their colleagues for Bertelsmann Stiftung, the study assesses social cohesion in three domains: social relations, connectedness, and focus on the common good. Each of these domains encompasses three dimensions of cohesiveness, namely the intactness of social networks , general trust in people , and acceptance of diversity  for the domain ‘social relations,’ identification with one’s place of residence , trust in institutions , and perception of fairness  for the ‘connectedness’ domain, and solidarity and helpfulness , respect for social rules , and civic participation  for the domain ‘focus on the common good.’   The Bertelsmann concept of defining a country’s social cohesion level allows scores between 0 (no cohesion) and 100 (maximal social cohesion). Which score to evaluate as a sufficiently high score of social cohesion is a normative, not to say political decision. It has become customary to designate scores above 60 as speaking for a high level of social cohesion. Scores between 40 and 60 are designated as moderate, below 40 as low and below 20 as very low. Scores above 80 speak for a very high level of social cohesion, which has, however, not been reported for any country or other type of geopolitical entity yet.   The overall social cohesion index in South Africa is moderately high , neither specifically high nor low, but has seen a stable decline  in the past three years. The highest scores for a single dimension were found for identification, followed by solidarity and helpfulness and social networks. The lowest scores were found for 'Perception of Fairness' and 'Respect for Social Rules.'   The study reveals that the most significant decline  occurred in the cohesion dimension,  respect for social rules . Other weakened dimensions include trust in institutions and perception of fairness. The level of solidarity and helpfulness remained stable, whereas civic participation and general trust in people have become slightly stronger.   The current level of cohesion in South Africa, 51.7 , is almost identical to that found in Germany  in 2023, where the index score was 52. As for the South African Provinces, social cohesion was found lowest in KwaZulu Natal (46.1), second lowest in Free State (49.4), and third lowest in Gauteng (50.5) in 2023.   Focusing on the relationship between the level of social cohesion in nine provinces and the characteristics of the provinces reveals surprising facts. The study shows that social cohesion in the South African provinces is negatively correlated with GDP and assets, i.e., higher assets resulting in lower social cohesion. This is mirrored by the finding that poverty positively correlates with social cohesion, with more poor people living in areas with higher social cohesion. The percentage of people living in rural areas is a good predictor of social cohesion, whereas city dwellers report lower levels of subjectively experienced social cohesion. High levels of language fractionalization correlate positively  with social cohesion, and social cohesion tends to be lower when the median age is higher. In contrast, social cohesion elsewhere in the world is higher in countries with a high median age. Language and religious fractionalization results for South Africa also deviate from what had been reported for, e.g., Asia.   The study also found that social cohesion is perceived as lower  among intense Internet   users . These findings contradict the findings of the Bremen Social Cohesion Radar, which suggested that Internet use fosters social cohesion. Cohesion is high where many Whites and Coloureds live and low where many Indians and Blacks live. As one would expect, low percentages of singles in a geopolitical entity and high numbers of married people are related to high social cohesion.   Finally, the study also presents the results of a grouping procedure called latent class analysis (LCA), which isolates subgroups of South Africans who experience different deficits in social cohesion in their immediate life context. The results show that identification with the country of South Africa is not a variable that differentiates the classes: All South Africans are highly identified with their country.   LCAs identify four classes of South Africans: Class 1 (Critics), which is characterized by low tolerance levels and little respect for social rules; Class 2 (Integrated Sceptics), which is characterized by well-knit social networks, high levels of general trust and tolerance; Class 3 (Middle South Africa), which is characterized by an exceptionally high level of loyalty to the country and below-average acceptance of otherness, and Class 4 (Cohesive Communities), which is characterized by a strongly felt social cohesion in their typically rural life context .   Ultimately, the report examines the relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being among South Africans. The data support the OECD countries' finding that high levels of social cohesion are related to well-being. Results show that higher levels of social cohesion in a geopolitical entity lead to a more pos itive outlook on life , with optimism and subjective well-being being considerably higher in provinces with high levels of social cohesion.   The study also examines subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents. The results show that in Class 4, the Cohesive Communities, families are seen as better off than a year ago, children have a bright future ahead, and life satisfaction has improved. Furthermore, the study found that the higher the social cohesion in a geopolitical entity, the more positive people's outlook on life is. Findings suggest that higher levels of social cohesion in a geopolitical entity will likely lead to increased life satisfaction  and overall well-being. Exactly that finding underscores the necessity of political action to improve South Africa’s level of social cohesion. Whereas conceptual academic work on social cohesion sometimes claims that too high a level of social cohesion can cement the societal status quo and prevent progress, all empirical studies  have shown that high levels of cohesion foster peaceful coexistence of various societal groups in respect, dignity, trust, and cooperation. Cohesion translates the social and economic structures (performance and output of the economy, living conditions) into quality of life (happiness, life satisfaction) directly experienced by individual members of society. In case, cohesion is neglected, one can expect societal polarization and political instability.   1. Introduction   Since the French Revolution with its famous motto ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité,’ discourse on the cohesion of geopolitical entities (countries/provinces/neighbourhoods) has seen waves of greater and lesser intensity, but one thing is clear: A healthy social entity needs fraternité or, in modern terminol­ogy, ‘social cohesion’ among its members. Social cohesion stands for the ability of societies to stick together or, as Leininger and colleagues put it, “the glue that holds society together” (Leininger et al., 2021: 2).   In recent years, when social cohesion has been discussed in South Africa, it has been with an increasingly critical undertone. The sentiment that the self-declared Rainbow Nation (Tutu, Mandela) is drifting apart rather than growing together has become stronger. However, research – mainly empirical – on social cohesion in South Africa is scarce. Our search for any available scholarly literature within the past 10 years yielded seven publications, two of which are reviews of a book by Ballantine et al. (2017) included in the count. The book by Ballantine and colleagues is a collection of essays by local academics and public figures about issues related to, amongst others, inequality, xenophobia, safety, gender-based abuse, political leadership, law, education, identity, sport, arts, and South Africa’s position in the world. A paper by Abrahams (2016) tracks the evolution of social cohesion over twenty years in South African politics, criticizing the instrumentalization of cohesion as a social policy concept exclusively towards a form of nation-building that seeks to solidify the hegemony of the ruling party.   A brief report by the South African Institute of International Affairs (2021) reviews the status quo and progress in religion, nationality, race and ethnicity, and LGBTQ+ rights. The report offers recommendations for improving the situation in these spheres and promotes the role of young people in fostering social cohesion. A paper by Burns and colleagues from the South African Labour and Development Research Unit emphasizes the importance of social cohesion as a social policy concept, also referring to studies conducted by the authors of the present report, critically reviews existing concepts of social cohesion proposed in the academic and policy discourse, and formulates a definition for its assessment in the South African society based on theoretical considerations: “Social Cohesion is the extent to which people are co-operative, within and across group boundaries, without coercion or purely self-interested motivation” (Burns et al., 2018, p. 10). Interestingly, Burns et al. (2018) identify the overlap between social cohesion and ubuntu, arguing that the two have become synonymous regarding nation-building and efforts to close South African society's cultural and racial divides.   To our knowledge, two existing empirical studies have defined and measured social cohesion in South Africa. Langer et al. (2017) define social cohesion in an African context as the interplay of three salient aspects: perceived inequalities, trust (interpersonal and institutional), and identity (national vs ethnic). Their measurement draws on data from 19 countries, including South Africa, from Round 3 (2005 – 2006), Round 4 (2008 – 2009), and Round 5 (2011 – 2013) of the Afrobarometer survey. For each aspect of a country, the authors calculate the proportion of respondents who provide those answers to the selected survey items that point to a stronger expression of cohesion. The resulting proportions for each aspect are then averaged by taking their arithmetic mean into a social cohesion index. According to the findings, overall cohesion in South Africa and its three aspects have recorded only minor ups or downs in the period studied. The level of identification was found to range from 0.612 (2005 – 2006) to 0.700 (2011 – 2013) and can be considered moderately high. The perception of equality was found in the range from 0.328 (2008 – 2009) to 0.469 (2011 – 2013) and can be qualified as low to moderately low. Trust was found in the range from 0.239 (2011 – 2013) to 0.293 (2005 – 2006) can be qualified as low.   From a comparative perspective, South Africa emerged in the middle of the country ranking on the overall level of cohesion and the perceived level of equality, in the lower half of the ranking on trust, and among the top countries on identification.   The second available empirical study (Leininger et al., 2021) similarly compares African countries. According to its authors, “cohesion is characterised by a set of attitudes and behavioural manifestations that includes trust, an inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good” (Leininger et al., 2021, p. 3). These three attributes unfold into two elements, encompassing horizontal or vertical relations among citizens and the state (see Figure 1.1): social trust and institutional trust, group identity and national identity, intergroup cooperation, and state-society cooperation. Leininger and colleagues operationalize their concept with items from the Afrobarometer, covering a varying set of African societies depending on the data availability for the particular element of cohesion: 17 to 18 in Round 3 (2005 – 2006), 20 in Round 4 (2008 – 2009), 28 to 34 in Round 5 (2011 – 2013), 32 to 36 in Round 6 (2014 – 2015). Their methodological approach measures the three attributes on a scale from 0 (low) to 1 (high). South Africa achieved scores in the range from 0.44 (2015) to 0.51 (2011) on trust, 0.3 (2015) to 0.43 (2006) on cooperation, and 0.42 (2015) to 0.74 (2011) on identity. These scores point to a downward trend in cohesion in South Africa for each attribute. In comparing African countries, South Africa ranked in the middle on trust, in the lower half on cooperation, and among the top countries on identity (except for the last year of observation, 2015). The work by Leininger et al. (2021), however, does not produce an overall index of cohesion, does not offer insights for more recent years since 2015, and does not venture into exploring the determinants of the country scores on the cohesion attributes or outcomes of cohesion.   Figure 1.1  Constitutive elements of social cohesion (Leininger et al., 2021)     The present report attempts to close the gap in the existing research on South Africa. It aims to provide an all-around theoretically founded and methodologically sound empirical assessment of social cohesion in South African society. In particular, our study attempts to:   measure the current degree of social cohesion in South Africa and its nine constituent provinces; track how cohesion has developed in the period from 2021 to 2023; identify structural characteristics from the thematic fields of economic situation, inequality and poverty, demography, diversity, and modernization that promote or hinder social cohesion; explore which social groups experience a high or low level of cohesion; investigate how social cohesion, i.e., the quality of society, relates to citizens’ well-being, i.e., quality of life.   To achieve these aims, we apply the measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar, which was informed by a comprehensive literature review (Schiefer & van der Noll, 2017) and the input of experts on the topic. It defines cohesion as the “quality of social cooperation and togetherness of a collective, defined in geopolitical terms, which is expressed in the attitudes and behaviours of its members. A cohesive society is characterized by resilient social relations, a positive emotional connectedness between its members and the community, and a pronounced focus on the common good” (Dragolov et al., 2016: 6). These three domains unfold into three dimensions. The domain ‘Social relations’ measures the strength and resilience of individuals’ social ties (Dimension 1.1 – Social networks), the degree to which people trust others (Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people), and the extent to which people accept individuals of different background, lifestyle, and values as equal members of society  (Dimension 1.3 – Acceptance of diversity). The domain ‘Connectedness’ measures the strength of individuals’ identification with the geopolitical entity (Dimension 2.1 – Identification), the degree to which individuals trust the entity’s institutions (Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions), and individuals’ perception that they are treated fairly and that material resources are fairly distributed (Dimension 2.3 – Perception of fairness). The domain ‘Focus on the common good’ captures the extent to which people feel and demonstrate responsibility for weak others (Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness), people’s willingness to abide by the rules of society (Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules), and their participation in society and political life (Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation). Figure 1.2 depicts the measurement concept.   Figure 1.2  Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar    Source: Dragolov et al. (2016) A comparison of the Social Cohesion Radar to the approaches of Langer et al. (2017) and Leininger et al. (2021) shows that the three concepts overlap in several regards. First, social cohesion is a quantifiable quality of collectives, not individuals. Second, they all cover horizontal and vertical ties. Third, they all suggest that social cohesion should be assessed via a perception-based index, not based on objective socio-demographic indicators. Next, there is a considerable conceptual overlap in the emphasis on specific dimensions (aspects) of social cohesion. As already mentioned above, Langer et al. suggest including the extent of perceived inequalities (‘Perception of fairness’ in the SCR), the societal level of trust (‘Trust in people’ in the SCR), and the strength of people’s adherence to their national identity (‘Identification’ in the SCR). Leininger and colleagues also mention trust and identity, whereas their dimension of cooperation is called ‘Solidarity and helpfulness’ in the SCR.   The main difference between the three approaches lies in their conceptual scope. Whereas the SCR comprehensively describes the components necessary for a full-fledged assessment of the level of social cohesion in a given society, the two concepts based on the Afrobarometer remain somewhat piecemeal. In addition, one of the main advantages of the SCR approach is its leanness, a necessity also underscored by Leininger et al. (2021). On the one hand, the concept covers the essential components of social cohesion. At the same time, it leaves room for a systematic exploration of determinants (e.g., state of the economy, socio-economic exclusion) and outcomes (e.g., population well-being). For a critical review of the advantages and disadvantages of measurement concepts of cohesion that have been applied in empirical research, we refer readers to Delhey, Dragolov, and Boehnke (2023).   On a final note, the SCR has been utilized to assess social cohesion in 34 Western (EU and OECD) countries (Dragolov et al., 2016), 22 Asian countries (Delhey & Boehnke, 2018), the 16 federal states of Germany (Dragolov et al., 2016), 79 spatial planning regions of Germany (Arant et al., 2017; Boehnke et al., 2024), 78 neighbourhoods of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen (Arant et al., 2016), the 32 federal entities of Mexico (Boehnke et al., 2019), and the seven regions of Kyrgyzstan (Larsen & Boehnke, 2016). 2. Measuring social cohesion   This section details the data and methodological approach employed for measuring social cohesion in South Africa.   2.1 Data   The current report offers empirical evidence from analyses performed on data from the Khayabus Survey. The data were collected by Ipsos South Africa and provided by the Inclusive Society Institute. The Khayabus Survey is a population-representative survey on various topics related to society and politics in South Africa. The survey initially included the sections Socio-Political Trends (SPT), Government Performance Barometer (GPB), and Party Image (PI). A fourth section, GovDemPol, was added in 2021. It has been fielded annually in at least two waves since 2019 among respondents aged 15 and above.   The analyses performed for this report draw on Waves 1 of the Khayabus survey, typically conducted from late May/early June to mid-July. Because the core set of indicators needed for assessing social cohesion along the Bertelsmann concept is part of the GovDemPol section, our analyses can only start with 2021. Data on three items crucial for the measurement concept, each belonging to the SPT section, had to be taken from the 2020 Khayabus, as they were not included in the 2021 survey. The most recent survey data available to us refer to the year 2023. Our report concentrates on survey respondents aged 18 and above, as several of the needed items were not included in the questionnaire for under-aged South Africans. The overall samples in the employed data encompass 3758 respondents in 2020, 3402 respondents in 2021, 3459 respondents in 2022, and 3519 respondents in 2023.   Table 2.1.1  Sample sizes of Khayabus – Waves 1     Table 2.1 offers detailed information on sample sizes achieved in Waves 1 of the Khayabus surveys from 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023. The table provides a breakdown of the samples by province, as the present report also aims to measure social cohesion in the nine constituent provinces of South Africa. We refer readers unfamiliar with the nine provinces' geographic location and administrative borders to Figure 2.1. It is important to note that population sizes vary widely between the mostly urban Gauteng province, where well over a quarter of South Africa's adult population lives, and the mostly desert Northern Cape province, which encompasses less than 3%. The uneven distribution of the South African population across the provinces is reflected in the achieved sample sizes for the provinces, as evident from Table 2.1. The low sample sizes for the least populated provinces, e.g., Northern Cape, with only 64 respondents in 2023, do not necessarily reduce the representativity of the data concerning core socio-demographic characteristics of their population. We address this issue by calibrating the survey data with the population weights provided by Ipsos South Africa. Smaller sample sizes do, however, involve a larger standard error for sample statistics like percentages and means. In practical terms, this means that the precision of the measurements for Gauteng ( NGP,2023  = 1168) is about four times higher than that for Northern Cape ( NNC,2023  = 64) at the same variability in the data. Caution is, therefore, required when interpreting such statistics as estimates of the ‘true’ situation or opinion in the population of provinces for which low sample sizes are available.   Figure 2.1.1  Provinces of South Africa Source: Apraku et al. (2018)   In addition to the above-addressed statistical issues, population sizes, and population density are closely related: In the Gauteng province, more than 800 people live per square kilometer, whereas in the Northern Cape province, the density figure is below 4 per square kilometer (Statistics South Africa, 2024a). Considering these stark differences is essential when evaluating our findings on levels and trends of social cohesion in South Africa.   2.2 Analytical approach   Below, we elaborate on the methodological approach for assessing social cohesion. We begin with the strategy for selecting Khayabus survey questions, also referred to here as items or indicators, to measure the nine dimensions of social cohesion in line with the Bertelsmann concept. We then turn to the approach for computing scores for the nine dimensions and the overall social cohesion index.   Item selection was conducted using a multi-step procedure. First, members of the research team – independent of each other – identified potential items for measuring the nine cohesion dimensions from the Khayabus questionnaire according to face validity. Members of the research team then jointly prepared a pool of items according to face validity. In the third step, items from the pool were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis for each dimension. Factor analysis is a statistical sorting procedure that analyses the matrix of item intercorrelations to separate items with a highly similar response pattern from items with a different response pattern and then sort them into distinct subgroups. The various subgroups of items (called factors) allow us to assess whether or not the items were selected appropriately according to their face validity as per the different dimensions of social cohesion. An important selection criterion is factor loading, which reflects how strongly an item is correlated with the other items sorted into the given factor. Item loadings should typically exceed .40 to be seen as sufficiently high. Items exhibiting sufficiently high factor loadings were retained. In the final step, we assessed the internal consistency of the scales formed by the selected items to measure a pertinent dimension. Cronbach’s α consistency coefficients should reach .90 for an excellent scale, .80 for a very good scale, .70 for a satisfactory scale, and minimally .30, or, in case of short scales, at least .10 times the number of items in the scale.   Several data preparation steps had to be taken before performing factor analyses. Where needed, the response options of the items were reverse coded so that a higher numerical value stands for a more vital expression of the pertinent aspect of cohesion. The response options of all items were rescaled to range from 0 (weakest expression of cohesion) to 100 (strongest expression of cohesion). If present, missing values on an item were substituted with the sample mean as the missingness rate was very low. Tables 2.2 to 2.4 document the selected items' factor loadings and the internal consistencies of the scales these items form for measuring the nine dimensions of social cohesion.   Table 2.2.1  Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 1, “Social relations”   Table 2.2.2  Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 2 “Connectedness”       Table 2.2.3  Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 3 “Focus on the common good”   Readers will note that not all dimensions of social cohesion were measured equally well. This had several reasons. To begin with, the questionnaire offered a limited choice of indicators for some dimensions. This is why not all dimensions could be measured with at least three items. This pertained to Dimension 2.1 (Identification) and Dimension 3.1 (Solidarity and helpfulness), for which only two items could be included. Moreover, for Dimension 2.1, an item from the 2020 Khayabus had to be included, even with two items, to assess citizens’ identification with South Africa in 2021. Second, not all scales exhibit a high degree of homogeneity (level of intercorrelation) of the included items. This is particularly true for Dimension 2.1 and Dimension 3.3 (Civic participation).   After sorting items via factor analyses, the nine dimension scores were computed by calculating the arithmetic mean of the items determined to belong to a given factor. The overall cohesion index was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the nine dimension scores. Dimension and index scores for the provinces and South Africa were calculated by aggregating the individual-level data to the respective level via the population-weighted arithmetic mean. Scores for the dimensions and the overall index range from 0 (very low cohesion) to 100 (very high cohesion), where scores from 0 to 19.99 can be interpreted as pointing to a very low level of cohesion, 20 to 39.99 – low, 40 to 59.99 – medium, 60 to 79.99 – high, and 80 to 100 – very high.    3.      Level and trend of social cohesion   In this section, we report findings on the level and trend of social cohesion in South Africa and its nine constituent provinces from 2021 to 2023.   3.1 Social cohesion in South Africa   Table 3.1 documents the annual level and trend of social cohesion in South Africa since 2021. We first present the findings for 2023, the most recent year for which data are available, and then proceed to the changes observed over time.   Level in 2023   In 2023, the overall social cohesion index for South Africa was 51.7, slightly above the theoretical midpoint of the measurement scale of 50. As such, the strength of social cohesion in South Africa can be qualified as moderate—neither high nor low. What is behind this result? A look at the single dimensions reveals the strong and weak spots of cohesion in South Africa that jointly produce its moderate overall level.   Table 3.1.1  Social cohesion and its dimensions in South Africa across time     Dimension 1.1, ‘Social networks,’ scored 58.8 in 2023. The intactness of citizens’ social networks is currently the third strongest dimension in South Africa. The strength of this dimension can be qualified as moderate, but it should be noted that the result is very close to the lower bound of the interval of high scores (60). To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: About 52 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “I entertain friends from different population groups at home or another place,” 25 % disagreed, and 20 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.1 of the Appendix).   Dimension 1.2, ‘Trust in people,’ can also be found in 2023 in the upper half of the measurement scale, with a score of 54.1. The level of trust that South Africans place in others qualifies, thereby, as moderate. To exemplify the finding with one indicator for this dimension: 19 % of the respondents trust people in their community completely, 62 % only somewhat or not very much, and 18 % not at all (see Table A.2).   Dimension 1.3, ‘Acceptance of diversity,’ achieved 2023 a score of 46.8. The numeric result qualifies the tolerance level in South African society still as moderate. However, it should be noted that it falls within the lower half of the measurement scale, unlike the previous two dimensions from the Domain ‘Social relations.’ To exemplify with one indicator for ‘Acceptance of diversity’: 14 % of the respondents trust coloured South Africans completely, 58 % only somewhat or not very much, and 26 % not at all (see Table A.3).   Dimension 2.1, ‘Identification,’ scored 71.2, the highest among all dimensions in 2023. Identification is the most pronounced aspect of social cohesion in South Africa and the only dimension that can be qualified as high. This is manifested, for example, in the responses to the statement “I am proud to be South African”: 70 % agreed, 17 % disagreed, and 11 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.4).   Dimension 2.2, ‘Trust in institutions,’ achieved in 2023 a score of 46.6. Just like ‘Acceptance of diversity’, the extent of trust citizens have in the country's institutions can be considered moderate. However, it falls within the lower half of the measurement scale. To exemplify with one indicator: 46 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “Elections are free and fair,” 33 % disagreed, and 17 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.5).   Dimension 2.3, ‘Perception of fairness,’ scored in 2023 at 40.5. It is the second weakest aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people perceive the distribution of material resources as fair can be qualified as moderate. However, it should be noted that the result is very close to the upper bound of the interval of low scores (40). To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 27 % of the respondents stated the government is doing very well or fairly well at narrowing the income gap between races, whereas 68 % stated the government is handling this issue not very well or not at all well (see Table A.6).   Dimension 3.1, ‘Solidarity and helpfulness,’ achieved in 2023 a score of 59.1. With this result, it is the second most vital aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people help the weak members of society can be qualified as moderate, but it should be noted that it is very close to the lower bound of the interval of high scores (60). To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 58 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “I actively look for ways in which I can support people who are less fortunate than I am”, 21 % disagreed, and 20 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.7).   Dimension 3.2, ‘Respect for social rules,’ achieved in 2023 a score of 33. This is the weakest aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people perceive that rules are observed is low. To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 21 % of the respondents stated that the government is doing very well or fairly well at reducing the crime rate, whereas 78 % stated not very well or not at all well (see Table A.8). Dimension 3.3, ‘Civic participation,’ scored at 55.5 in 2023. Just like ‘Trust in people’, the involvement of citizens in society and political life can be qualified as moderate. One indicator for this dimension: 47 % of the respondents agreed with “I actively work for the welfare of my community”, 31 % disagreed, and 20 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.9).   The results for the dimensions form a nuanced profile of cohesion. None of the three domains of social cohesion (‘Social relations,’ ‘Connectedness,’ and ‘Focus on the common good’) exhibits only deficits or strengths for all dimensions. Interestingly, the three top-scoring dimensions (‘Identification,’ ‘Solidarity and helpfulness,’ and ‘Social networks’) stand out as strong to moderately strong anchors of their respective domains. However, two domains are imbalanced: ‘Connectedness’ by the moderately low ‘Perception of fairness’ and ‘Focus on the common good’ by the low ‘Respect for social rules.’ If one should point out the glue that holds South African society together, this would undoubtedly be citizens’ strong identification with the country, their solidarity with their weaker fellow citizens, and the functioning of their social networks. On the other hand, what could destabilize South African society is the perceived lack of respect for rules and the perceived lack of distributional fairness.   Is the level and profile of cohesion in South Africa unique? A comparison to Germany (Boehnke, Dragolov, Arant & Unzicker, 2024) reveals that the current level of cohesion in South Africa is almost identical to that found for Germany in 2023, where the index score was 52. Nevertheless, despite the similar overall levels, the two countries have distinct patterns of strengths and weaknesses in the single dimensions. In 2023, the strongest dimension in Germany was ‘Acceptance of Diversity’ (69), followed by ‘Respect for Social Rules’ (67), whereas the weakest dimensions were ‘Solidarity and helpfulness’ (34) and ‘Perception of Fairness’ (35). Extending the scope to the comparison of social cohesion in 34 EU and OECD member states (Dragolov et al., 2016), we find considerable similarities in the pattern of strengths and weakness between South Africa and Israel. The society of Israel exhibits similarly strong identification, moderate solidarity, social networks, and trust in people, as well as pronounced deficits in the perception of fairness and respect for social rules. No country among the 22 Asian studied (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018) exhibits this profile.   Trend over time   Although the overall social cohesion index in South Africa emerges as moderate, with scores in the upper half of the measurement scale, it has been on a stable decline (see Table 3.1). Over the past three years, it declined from 53.5 in 2021 to 52.4 in 2022 and 51.7 in 2023, thereby losing 1.8 points.   The downward trend is evident for most of the dimensions. The steepest decline was observed for ‘Respect for social rules.’ In 2021, this dimension still ranked as moderate with a borderline score of 40.3 but lost 7.3 points over time to qualify in 2023 as low. Other dimensions of cohesion that have weakened from 2021 to 2023 are, in this order, ‘Trust in institutions’ (-4.1 points), ‘Perception of fairness’ (-2.9 points), ‘Social networks’ (-2.4 points), ‘Identification (-2.1 points), and ‘Acceptance of diversity’ (-0.3 points). Besides ‘Respect for social rules,’ social networks are the only dimension that has experienced a downgrade from a previously higher to a lower category. In 2021, ‘Identification’ was not the sole dimension that ranked as high, but also ‘Social networks’ with a score of 61.3. In contrast, ‘Solidarity and helpfulness’ has remained strikingly stable, whereas ‘Civic participation’ (+1.0 points) and ‘Trust in people’ (+1.6 points) have become slightly stronger. We refer readers to Tables A.1 to A.9 of the Appendix for changes over time in the responses to the indicators of the respective dimensions.   Is the trend of cohesion in South Africa unique? In this regard, we can only compare to Germany (Boehnke et al., 2024). Despite their identical overall levels of social cohesion in 2023, South Africa and Germany do not have the same starting positions. While the decline in the overall index for South Africa amounts to only 1.8 points, the one observed for Germany within the same three-year period is alerting: The strength of social cohesion declined from a stable value of 61 in 2017 and 2020 by 10 points in 2023. Cohesion in Germany slid from a high down to a moderate level. Moreover, between 2020 and 2023, every dimension of cohesion in Germany weakened considerably. The steepest declines were observed for ‘Solidarity and helpfulness’ (-14 points), ‘Acceptance of diversity’ (-13 points), ‘Identification’ (-11 points), and ‘Social networks’ (-10 points).   3.2 Social cohesion in the nine provinces   Level in 2023   Zooming into the provinces, we find some variation across these administrative units. Figure 3.1 maps the strength of the overall social cohesion index in the nine provinces. Table 3.2 documents the annual level and trend over the three years examined here. In 2023, social cohesion was found lowest in KwaZulu Natal (46.1), second lowest in Free State (49.4), and third lowest in Gauteng (50.5). Social cohesion was slightly above the country average of 51.7 in all other provinces. Limpopo (58.3) emerged as a province with a level of social cohesion considerably above the country average. However, it should be noted that all provinces rank in the interval of the measurement scale, referring to a moderate level of cohesion.   Tables A.10 to A.18 of Appendix A document the provinces' performance on the single dimensions of cohesion. Interestingly, the leader Limpopo achieved only middle positions on the dimensions ‘Social networks’, ‘Trust in people’, and ‘Acceptance of diversity’ but consistently ranked highest or second highest on all other dimensions of cohesion. In contrast, KwaZulu-Natal ranked consistently lowest or second lowest on all nine dimensions.   Figure 3.2.1  Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces (2023)   Note : The map applies the colour scheme displayed above to visualize the strength of social cohesion in 2023 across the nine provinces.    Table 3.2.1  The overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time     Trend over time   As evident from Table 3.2, social cohesion has declined from 2021 to 2023 in six of the provinces, most noticeably in Gauteng (-3.6 points), Free State (-4.2), and KwaZulu-Natal (-5.1 points). These three provinces ranked last in social cohesion in 2023. Cohesion has remained, by and large, stable only in the Western Cape (-0.8 points). In contrast, social cohesion has improved in the Eastern Cape (+3.8 points), Limpopo (+1.5 points), and North West (+1.4 points). Figure 3.2 depicts these developments in the overall cohesion index across the provinces.   Figure 3.2.2  Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time   Note : The figure shows the scores of the nine provinces on the overall index of social cohesion in 2021, 2022, and 2023. As to the trend in the single dimensions, Tables A.10 to A.18 reveal that ‘Trust in people’ and ‘Civic participation’ are the only dimensions that improvements for almost all provinces can characterize. ‘Trust in people’ has weakened only in Limpopo (-4.4 points) and more pronouncedly in Northern Cape (-11.6 points). ‘Civic participation’ has declined only in KwaZulu-Natal (-5.9 points) and Northern Cape (-10.4 points). The picture is reversed for the dimensions of ‘Trust in institutions’, ‘Perception of fairness,’ and ‘Respect for social rules,’ in which almost all provinces experienced declines. ‘Trust in institutions’ has increased only in Western Cape (+3.3 points), ‘Perception of fairness’ – only in Western Cape (+3.2 points) and Limpopo (+6.0 points), and ‘Respect for social rules’ – only in Western Cape (+3.4 points). Interestingly, although ‘Identification’ emerged as the glue that holds the South African society together, all provinces but three experienced declines in identification from -3.0 points (Gauteng) to -10.3 points (Mpumalanga). Identification has improved only Limpopo (+6.3 points), Eastern Cape (+8.2 points), and North West (+8.5 points).   In the subsequent section, we investigate which structural characteristics of the provinces may be at play in promoting or hindering social cohesion.   4. Structural influences on social cohesion   This section aims to find evidence on structural determinants of social cohesion. For this purpose, we explore the relationship between the level of social cohesion in the nine provinces and selected characteristics of the provinces from the following thematic fields: economic situation, inequality and poverty, demography, diversity, and modernization. The focus on these aspects is not arbitrary: Our studies on Western and Asian societies as well as the federal states and spatial planning regions of Germany demonstrated empirically that aspects from these thematic fields act as determinants rather than outcomes of social cohesion (Dragolov et al., 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Arant, Dragolov & Boehnke, 2017; Boehnke, Dragolov, Arant & Unzicker, 2024).   4.1 Data and method   To touch on the economic situation in the provinces, we use data on the gross domestic product per capita [1]  in Rand (Statistics South Africa, 2024a), Human Development Index (Global Data Lab, 2024), and unemployment rates – official and expanded (Statistics South Africa, 2023b). We measure poverty using one subjective indicator – the share of households in a province who perceive themselves as poor (Statistics South Africa, 2024c), and objective indicators concerning three definitions of the poverty line [2]  – the share of the population below the food poverty line, the lower-bound poverty line, and the upper-bound poverty line (own calculations based on CRA, 2023). We employ the Gini index of income inequality and the P90/P10 ratio (own calculations based on CRA, 2023) to measure inequality [3] . We draw on data from Census 2022 (Statistics South Africa, 2023a) for the remaining thematic fields. In particular, as to demographics, we consider population density, the share of urban and rural population, the share of singles and married citizens, and the population's median age. To tap into diversity, we use the share of Blacks, Whites, Coloured, Indian/Asian, and Other races; the share of immigrants; as well as ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization [4]  (own calculations based on Statistics South Africa, 2023a). To touch on modernization, we use the share of citizens with completed primary, secondary, and post-secondary education, the share of citizens owning a computer and a cell phone, and the share of the population without access to the internet.   All indicators refer to 2021 or 2022, preceding the most recent measurement of social cohesion from 2023. The intentional time lag—earlier measurement of the structural characteristics of the provinces and later measurement of social cohesion—introduces a certain degree of temporal order in the analyses. It cannot prove the existence of a causal relationship, but it can increase the plausibility of attributing causality.   Each of the above-listed structural characteristics of the provinces was subjected to a correlation test with the level of social cohesion. Two variables are correlated when changes in one are (closely) followed by changes in the other. A correlation can be positive (the more of Variable A , the more of Variable B ) or negative (the more of Variable A , the less of Variable B ). The strength of the association is reflected in the correlation coefficient, which can range from 0 (no correlation) to ±1 (perfect correlation). Typically, a correlation of size below |.10| is very weak and not worth interpreting, between |.10| and |.30| – weak, between |.30| and |.50| – moderate, and above |.50| – strong.   A considerable obstacle arises from the sample size for the correlations on the level of provinces. Of course, the overall sample size in each survey wave is large and has sufficient statistical power. Power (in mathematical-statistical theory) means that a given sample is large enough to corroborate a particular effect as likely ‘true’ about the population from which the sample was drawn – South Africa in this case. On the level of provinces, however, showing that a specific correlation is sizable enough to conclude that it is significant (i.e., likely true in the nine provinces) is problematic due to the number of provinces – only nine, unlike the number of surveyed individuals – over three thousand in each year. This may be surprising at first glance because more people have been surveyed in the provinces, with a minimum of 64 in Northern Cape and a maximum of 1168 in Gauteng in 2023. However, social cohesion is not a characteristic of individuals but of geopolitical entities, and the latter, we only have nine—the provinces—in South Africa.   The low number of cases (provinces) means that only extremely high correlations can reach statistical significance. Mathematically, significance is a function of sample size (the higher, the more likely it is for a particular coefficient to be significant) and data variability (the higher the variance of the included data, the less likely it is that a specific coefficient is significant). Given these constraints, we disregard the significance of the correlation coefficients in our reporting and interpretation, focusing instead on the tendency in the data. Thus, we follow the appeal of a respectable number of scientific community members to ditch p -values (Wasserstein, Schirm & Lazar, 2019). The results from additionally performed bivariate biserial Pearson correlations, for which the province-level characteristics were disaggregated to the individual-level data set for 2023 ( N  = 3519), show that only 6 of altogether 31 associations may not be considered significant (see Table A.19 of Appendix C). This finding supports our decision to focus on tendencies instead of discarding associations because they do not meet a criterion for statistical significance.   Besides significance, the number of provinces is critically low for performing Pearson correlations. As a parametric test, the Pearson correlation involves assumptions that cannot be fulfilled with the data on the level of provinces. We, therefore, resort to Spearman correlations as a non-parametric, assumption-free alternative. A Spearman correlation is, in essence, a Pearson correlation performed on ranked data. The significant distinction between the two approaches is that a Pearson correlation considers the exact distances among the observations on each variable. In contrast, a Spearman correlation considers only whether there are differences, disregarding their size. For example, in 2022, the wealthiest province per capita GDP was Gauteng, with 96,252 Rand, and the poorest was Eastern Cape, with 54,805 Rand. The Pearson correlation will be influenced by the numeric difference of 41,447 Rand between the two provinces, whereas the Spearman correlation will only consider which province has the higher value.   One implication is that the Spearman method is not sensitive to outliers in the data – observations (provinces) with an extremely large or extremely low value on a characteristic of interest. Given the critically low sample size of nine provinces, the Spearman method is advantageous compared to a Pearson correlation which may be quickly and heavily biased by an outlier. Because in all our previous studies on cohesion, the data allowed us to apply the Pearson correlation method, we performed Pearson correlations for the present report. Interested readers can find those in Table A.19 of Appendix C. In a few instances, we observe great discrepancies – mostly in size but also in direction. As discussed at length above, to stay on the safe side, we report and interpret the findings from the Spearman correlation tests.   On a final note, we performed both bivariate correlations and partial correlations for GDP, because both in our 34-country OECD study (Dragolov et al., 2016) and our study of 22 Asian countries (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018), GDP was highly positively related to social cohesion: The more prosperous a society, the more cohesive it is. Partialing GDP out of a relationship removes the influence of GDP on both variables involved. This makes it possible to speak of associations between a given structural characteristic of the provinces and social cohesion, independent of their economic prosperity. In the section below, we report and interpret the partial correlations.   4.2 Results   Table 4.1 documents the relationships between the structural characteristics of the nine provinces and social cohesion per thematic field. The empirical findings for South Africa present several surprises concerning what has been previously found for Western and Asian societies.   Economic situation   The bivariate correlation between per capita GDP (in a province) and social cohesion (in the same province) was found at ρ = -.38. The relationship is negative and moderate in size. It informs that social cohesion tends to be lower in more economically affluent provinces. This result is striking as it goes against the positive association between GDP and cohesion that was consistently found in all our previous studies on Western and Asian societies.   The correlation between the Human Development Index and cohesion emerged positive and weak in size (ρ = .25). People-centered economic progress (Gross National Income coupled with mean years of schooling and life expectancy) appears conducive to social cohesion.   Both measures of unemployment – the official and expanded unemployment rates – exhibited negative, though only weak, associations with social cohesion (ρ = -.15 and ρ = -.21, respectively). Provinces in which more unemployed people reside tend to have weaker social cohesion.   Poverty and inequality   The evidence presents mixed findings on poverty. Whereas the subjective indicator exhibited a moderately negative correlation with social cohesion (ρ = -.40), the three objective indicators were found to correlate positively and moderately in the range from ρ = .37 to ρ = .40. Social cohesion tends to be lower in provinces where more households perceive themselves as poor. However, it tends to be higher in provinces where more people objectively fall below the poverty lines. Though at first glance puzzling, the results for objective poverty can be explained with the social welfare programs targeted at supporting poor citizens.   The correlations of the social cohesion index with both measures of income inequality were found to be consistently negative. Social cohesion tends to be lower in provinces with larger inequality in income. Interestingly, the correlation with the Gini index is much weaker (ρ = -.19) than that with the P90/P10 ratio (ρ = -.52). The Gini index considers the entire income distribution. In contrast, the P90/P10 ratio contrasts the income at the top of the distribution (90th percentile) to the income at the bottom (10th percentile). The latter focuses on inequality, which is more visible and more accessible for ordinary citizens to perceive. The top-to-bottom income ratio is 38 in the Free State and 11 in the Northern Cape. These values inform that the top earners' income is 38 times higher than that of poor citizens in the Free State; in Northern Cape – ‘only’ 11 times higher. Vast discrepancies in income tend to be detrimental to social cohesion.   Table 4.2.1  Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces     Demography   Population density exhibited a weak negative relationship with social cohesion (ρ = -.27). Social cohesion tends to be lower in more densely populated provinces. This finding corresponds with the associations of the cohesion index with the shares of urban (ρ = -.26) and rural population (ρ = .26). Though the relationships are only weak in size, they indicate that social cohesion tends to be lower in more urbanized provinces and, in contrast, higher in provinces with a larger share of rural population.   Marital status was found to correlate strongly with social cohesion. Social cohesion tends to be lower in provinces with a large share of singles (ρ = -.69) and higher in provinces with a larger share of married citizens (ρ = .55). This finding suggests that families contribute strongly to cohesion in the South African society.   We found a moderately negative association (ρ = -.36) with median age. Social cohesion tends to be lower where the population’s median age is higher. The association was reversed in Asia: Social cohesion was higher in Asian countries with a higher median age.   Diversity   The composition of the provinces’ population regarding race, migration background, language, and religion seems to be weekly to moderately related to social cohesion. Provinces with larger shares of Blacks (ρ = -.12) and Indians/Asians (ρ = -.15) tend to have weaker social cohesion. In contrast, cohesion tends to be higher in provinces with larger shares of Whites (ρ = .27), Coloured (ρ = .42), and other races (ρ = .19). Provinces with more immigrants were also found to have stronger levels of cohesion (ρ = .50).   The fractionalization measures offer findings that generally follow the tendencies mentioned above. Ethnic (racial) fractionalization exhibited a positive, though only weak, correlation with social cohesion (ρ = .12). The relationship with linguistic fractionalization emerged as positive and moderate (ρ = .41), whereas that with religious fractionalization was found to be weak and negative (ρ = -.14). Racial and linguistic diversity in the provinces seem to contribute to social cohesion, whereas religious diversity appears to harm it.   Modernization   The evidence is puzzling concerning educational attainment. Whereas the share of citizens with completed primary education exhibited a positive and moderate correlation with social cohesion (ρ = .34), the shares of citizens with completed secondary education exhibited a negative and very strong correlation (ρ = -.76) – in fact, the strongest of all associations explored. The correlation with the share of citizens with completed post-school education also emerged negative, though at the border of being negligible (ρ = -.10). Provinces with better and more highly educated citizens tend to have lower levels of cohesion. A possible explanation for these surprising results could be the economy of the country which does not deliver jobs up to the expectations of the better educated citizens.   Access to modern information and communication technology (computers, cell phones, and the internet) weakens social cohesion. The social cohesion index correlation is weakly negative with the share of computer owners (ρ = -.22) and cell phone owners (ρ = -.20) and strongly positive with the share of the population without access to the internet (ρ = .61).   What brings social cohesion in the South African provinces forward is people-centered economic progress, rural population, marriages, racial and linguistic diversity, and immigration. As hazards to social cohesion emerged: unemployment, felt poverty, income inequality, high population density and urbanization, single life, older population, religious diversity, and the penetration of modern information and communication technology.   5. Individual experiences of social cohesion   The previous sections of this report examined the levels and trends of social cohesion in South Africa and its provinces. Correlational analyses on the level of the provinces offered insights into potential structural characteristics that determine the local level of cohesion. In this section, we go down to the level of individual respondents to explore which population groups are at risk of experiencing low cohesion in South Africa.   5.1 Data and method   There are several methodological approaches for identifying groups at risk of experiencing low cohesion, each involving different assumptions. One possibility is to perform separate analyses relating the individual scores on the overall cohesion index and its nine dimensions to the respondents' relevant socio-demographic and economic characteristics. This approach will likely lead to many difficult results to systematize. In order to reduce the complexity without a significant loss of information, we prefer to identify classes (distinct groups) of respondents based on the pattern of their scores on the nine dimensions of social cohesion. The resulting classes are characterized by similarities within and dissimilarities across the classes concerning the experience of the nine aspects of cohesion by the respondents who belong to them. In a second step, we relate class membership to socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. In simpler terms, we investigate how the experience of social cohesion is related to individual characteristics. An example could be rich and poor citizens experiencing different levels of social cohesion.   To classify respondents into groups with distinct experiences of cohesion, we employ the Latent Class Analysis statistical procedure. To cite from the abstract of a recent overview paper (Weller et al., 2020): “Latent class analysis (LCA) is a statistical procedure used to identify qualitatively different subgroups within populations who often share certain outward characteristics. The assumption underlying LCA is that membership in unobserved groups (or classes) can be explained by patterns of scores across survey questions, assessment indicators, or scales.” We take respondents’ scores on the nine dimensions of social cohesion in 2023 as the basis for the LCAs performed here.   LCAs are typically undertaken sequentially. The statistical procedure is programmed so to come up with different numbers of groups, usually starting with two distinct groups (classes) and continuing until several groups (classes) are distinguished that offer plausible pathways of interpretation: Who are the people grouped into Class 1, Class 2, …, Class k ? It is customary to summarize interpretations by labelling the different classes in a way that best characterizes their response patterns. Next to interpretability, specific indices of goodness-of-fit aid the decision of how many groups are most plausible to extract from the available data (Weller et al., 2020). These include the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the (sample-size-adjusted) Bayesian Information Criterion ( BIC , saBIC ), which do not have pre-defined thresholds but inform comparisons of solutions: The solution with the lower AIC  and ( sa ) BIC  would be deemed better. Goodness-of-fit indices with pre-defined thresholds include the Entropy coefficient H  and the Average Probability of Class Membership ( APCM ): Each should be greater than .90 for excellent fit or .80 for acceptable fit. Table A.21 of Appendix D documents the goodness-of-fit indices of six different LCA solutions. Table A.22 of Appendix D shows the population-weighted relative sizes of the classes in the total sample ( N  = 3519) from the various LCA solutions.   Based on the resulting goodness-of-fit indices of the LCA models we specified and considering the classes' interpretability, we selected the LCA model producing four classes.   5.2 Four classes of experience   Table 5.1 provides an overview of respondents’ average scores on the nine dimensions of cohesion, which served as the basis for the LCA and the overall index of social cohesion within each class. Class 1 encompasses 16.7 % of the respondents. It is characterized by low cohesion with an average score of 32.9 out of 100 points. Classes 2 and 3 encompass 32.8 % and 29.8 % of the respondents, respectively. Both exhibit moderate social cohesion with an average score of 51.0 in Class 2 and 51.6 in Class 3. Class 4, encompassing 20.7 % of the respondents, exhibits a high level of social cohesion with an average score on the overall index of 68.3 points.   Table 5.2.1  Social cohesion and its dimensions in the four classes     A closer look at the average scores on the nine dimensions reveals the class differences (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). Likely due to the large sample sizes of the four classes, a series of Scheffe pairwise comparisons from one-way analyses of variance for each of the dimensions informs of significant differences (p ≤ 0.05) among all classes on all dimensions except for: Dimension 1.2 ‘Trust in people’ for Class 2 (M = 69.3) vs Class 4 (M = 71.1), Dimension 3.1 ‘Solidarity and helpfulness’ for Class 2 (M =60.4) vs Class 3 (M = 59.7), and Dimension 3.3 ‘Civic participation’ for Class 2 (M = 54.8) vs Class 3 (M = 54.5).   Respondents within Class 1 (low cohesion) exhibit only a high level of identification (62.4). The strength of their social networks (43.8), their solidarity with weak others (41.5), and their involvement in civic life (42.8) are moderate, yet tending toward weak. Members of Class 1 place low trust in others (25.4) and in institutions (27.2) and have a low perception of fairness (21.9). Their tolerance for diversity is very low (16.5). These respondents also have a very low perception that social rules are respected (14.4). Class 1 can be described as ‘Critics’.    Figure 5.2.1  Average scores of dimensions in the four classes   Note : The figure visualizes the average scores of the social cohesion dimensions in each of the four classes of respondents.   Members of Class 2 (moderate cohesion) exhibit a mixed pattern. They are well-networked socially (61), place high trust in others (69.3), and have high levels of tolerance for diversity (63.0), identification (67.4), and solidarity with weak others (60.4). However, the trust they place in institutions is low (35.6), and they perceive low levels of fairness (27.4) and respect for rules (20.1). Their involvement in civic life is moderate (54.8). Class 2 can be described as ‘Integrated sceptics.’   Members of Class 3 (moderate cohesion) rate most social cohesion aspects on the middle level. The strength of their social networks (57) and solidarity with others (59.7) are moderate to high. Moderate are the levels of trust they place in institutions (54.9), perceived fairness (49.3), and civic participation (54.5). These respondents place moderate to low trust in others (41.5) and have a moderate to low perception that rules are observed (40.1). Their tolerance for diversity is, however, low (33.0). Their identification with the country is the second highest (74.3) among all four classes. If these were findings on the US society, we would label this class ‘Middle America,’ with strong loyalty to the country and below-average acceptance of otherness. Class 3 can be described as ‘Middle South Africa.’   Members of Class 4 express high levels (60 to 80 points) of social cohesion in all aspects, but ‘Respect for social rules’ has a moderate expression, though tending towards a high one (58.3). It should be noted that the strength of identification with the country tends to be very high (79.8). Class 4 can be described as ‘cohesive communities’.   Across all four classes, Dimension 2.1, ‘Identification,’ was found to be consistently high. In contrast, the deficits in Dimension 3.2, ‘Respect for social rules,’ emerged yet again as an antithesis to citizens’ loyalty to the country.   5.3 Socio-demographics of the four classes   In this section, we explore which individual characteristics are typical for the four classes with distinct experiences of social cohesion. We do so using the following socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics: biological sex (male, female), age group (18 to 24, 25 to 44, 45 to 64, 65 years and above), race (White, Black, Indian/Asian, Other), primary language (English, Afrikaans, Indigenous), marital status (single, married or living as married, widowed or divorced), community size (rural or village, town or city, metropolitan area), education (post-secondary, secondary, lower or none), employment status (employed, not in workforce, unemployed), and income class [5]  (low, lower-middle, upper-middle, high, missing). Data on these characteristics stem from Wave 1 of Khayabus 2023.   The four classes were characterized in the framework of separate chi-square tests of independence between respondents’ class membership and the respective individual characteristics of interest. Table 5.2 documents the population-weighted relative frequencies (%) of the socio-demographic and socio-economic categories in the total sample and each of the four classes and the respective result from the chi-square test of independence and Cramer’s V coefficient of effect size. Due to the large sample size, all tests but one emerged as statistically significant, whereas effect sizes were consistently small. We, therefore, focus on the tendencies in the data.   Class 1, the Critics, is characterized by an overproportional representation of men (51.9 %), speakers of indigenous languages (76.5 %), dwellers in metropolitan areas (54.9 %), persons with completed secondary education (58.4 %), unemployed (38.3 %), and persons who have refused to report their household income (46.1 %). In addition, the shares of respondents from the age group 18-24 years (21.2 %), Blacks (80.1 %), singles (62.7 %), and members of the high-income class (14.9 %) tend to be slightly larger than in the total population.   Class 2, the Integrated skeptics, is characterized by an overproportional representation of respondents from the age groups 25-44 years (54.1 %) and 65+ years (4.7 %), non-Black races (Whites – 13.6 %, Indian/Asian – 3.6 %, Other – 9.7 %), speakers of English (13 %) and Afrikaans (18.1 %), widowed or divorced (10.6 %), respondents who have completed post-secondary education (18.4 %), respondents who are not in the workforce (19.8 %), and members of the high-income class (15.2 %). In addition, the shares of women (53.6 %) and members of the upper-middle income class (15.2 %) tend to be slightly larger than in the total population.   Class 3, Middle South Africa, is characterized by an overproportional representation of women (55.1 %), Blacks (81.8 %), singles (63.6 %), dwellers in towns or cities (26 %), and members of the lower-middle income class (14.3 %). In addition, the shares of respondents from the age group 18-24 years (21.6 %), speakers of indigenous languages (75.4 %), dwellers in rural areas or villages (30.5 %), respondents with lower than secondary or no formal education (33.4 %), unemployed (37 %), but also members of the upper-middle income class (16.8 %) tend to be somewhat larger than in the total population.    Table 5.3.1  Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents     Class 4, the Cohesive Communities, is characterized by an overproportional representation of respondents from the age group 45-64 years (28 %), married or living together as married (32.9 %), dwellers in rural areas or villages (33.2 %), respondents with lower than secondary or no formal education (34.4 %), employed (47.8 %), and members of the low-income class (19.2 %) but also of the upper-middle income class (17.8 %). In addition, the shares of respondents from the age group 18-24 years (21.6 %), Blacks (79.8 %), and respondents not in the workforce (20.6 %) tend to be larger than in the total population. 6.      Social cohesion and subjective well-being   In the present section, we inspect the data to determine whether they support the consistent finding from our previous studies on the topic that high levels of social cohesion are related to greater (subjective) well-being. We employ the following five items from the Khayabus survey as proxies of well-being:   Think of the way your family lives, would you say that your family is… better off than a year ago / about the same / worse off than a year ago? And how do you think your family’s lives will be in a year’s time? Do you think your family will be… better off than today / about the same / worse off than today? Please think about your children or the children of family or friends. What do you think the future holds for these children? Do you think that… they have a bright future ahead of them / they have a bleak future ahead of them? And your satisfaction with life? Has it… improved/staying the same/worse compared to a few months ago? On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate whether you (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) agree or (5) strongly agree with the following statement: I am seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so.   We perform analyses both on the level of provinces and of individuals.   6.1 Provinces   We aggregate the individual responses to the five items to measure well-being on the level of provinces. For each province, we take the respective share of the positive response option to each of the four items with categorically scaled answers (better off, bright future, improved) and the arithmetic mean of the individual responses to the Likert-scale item tapping on emigration.   We apply the same methodological approach as in Section 4, which explored associations between several structural characteristics of the provinces and the index of social cohesion. Table A.20 of Appendix C documents the biserial bivariate correlations on the individual level and the bivariate and partial Pearson correlations on the level of provinces. As in Section 4, we report and interpret the results from the Spearman correlations partialled for GDP (see Table 6.1).   Table 6.1.1  Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces     The share of respondents evaluating their family’s life as better off today than a year ago correlated strongly and positively with the level of social cohesion in respondents’ province (ρ = .60). The same was found for the share of respondents evaluating their life satisfaction as improved in comparison to a few months ago (ρ = .59). Further, in more cohesive provinces, there are larger shares of respondents believing that their family’s lives will be better off than today in a year (ρ = .67) and that their children will have a bright future ahead (ρ = .68). The share of respondents who consider emigrating to another country was found lower in the more cohesive provinces (ρ = -.43).   The provinces' results indicate that social cohesion is conducive to a positive life evaluation, higher life satisfaction, and greater optimism. They are entirely in line with our findings from other continents: The higher the level of social cohesion in a geopolitical entity, the more positive people’s outlook on life (see Dragolov et al., 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Arant et al., 2017; Boehnke et al., 2024).   6.2 Individuals   To investigate the association between social cohesion and subjective well-being on the individual level, we relate the individual responses to the well-being items to respondents’ membership in the four distinct classes of experiencing social cohesion. As most of the items on well-being are of categorical measurement quality, we apply the approach from Section 5 to describe the four classes based on respondents’ socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Table 6.2 documents the results. Unlike the very weak relationships found in Section 5, the individual experience of social cohesion exhibits somewhat stronger, though still weak, associations with four of the indicators of subjective well-being.    Table 6.2.1  Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents     The evidence presents a clear picture. The greatest share of respondents who evaluate their family’s life as better off than a year ago was found in Class 4, Cohesive Communities (29.5 %). The second largest share was found in Class 3, Middle South Africa (22.3 %). The lowest shares were found in Class 2, Integrated skeptics (13.3 %), and Class 1, Critics (12.7 %). The largest shares of respondents evaluating their family’s life as worse off than a year ago were found in Class 1 (43.8 %) and Class 2 (43 %).   Moving on to the two indicators of optimism, we find similar evidence. The largest share of respondents believed their family’s life would be better off than today in a year was found again in Class 4 (44 %). Class 3 appears somewhat reserved, given that most believed life would be about the same (43.2 %). Again, in Class 1 (43.6 %) and Class 2 (39.8 %), we find the largest shares of respondents believe their family’s life will be worse off than today. Optimism regarding children’s future was found highest in Class 4: 62.3 % believe children would have a bright future ahead of them. Pessimism prevails in the other classes, even in Class 3 (53.8 %), but yet again, we find the largest shares of respondents believe children would have a bleak future ahead of them in Class 1 (77 %) and Class 2 (69.2 %).   The above-described pattern holds for life satisfaction, too. The largest share of respondents evaluating their life satisfaction as improved was found in Class 4 (35.7 %), followed by Class 3 (20.8 %). The majority in both classes, though, report no change in life satisfaction: 50.8 % in Class 3 and 44.9 % in Class 4. Life satisfaction has worsened for the majority in Class 1 (50.4 %) and Class 2 (45.8 %). Finally, the association between the experience of social cohesion and emigration is unclear or instead reversed. An overwhelming majority in each class (over 70 %) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “I am seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so.” Interestingly, the disagreement rate is highest in Class 1 (81.6 %). Class 2 has the relatively highest rate of agreement with the statement (10.5 %), followed by Class 3 (9 %) and Class 4 (8.1 %), whereas only 7.4 % of Class 1 consider emigrating. High social cohesion does not suffice to discourage people from emigrating. The relationship is, however, very weak in terms of effect size.    7. Discussion and conclusion   We deliberately keep the discussion of our results relatively brief and mostly leave the conclusions to the political bodies working with the study results. South Africa has debated social cohesion ever since the end of the apartheid regime, especially in light of the Rainbow Nation concept. However, only two empirical studies have assessed South Africa's social cohesion during all these years. According to that research, South Africa scores middle on overall cohesion, lower on trust, and high on identification with the country .   The current study assesses social cohesion in South Africa, tracks its development, identifies structural factors that promote or impede it, explores social groups with high or low subjectively perceived cohesion, and examines its relationship to citizens' well-being. The Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar  has been used as a model to quantify societal cohesiveness in many countries, including now South Africa. South Africa's social cohesion in 2023 (51.7 of 100 possible points) is similar to Germany's (52), although with different strengths and shortcomings in specific aspects.   The 2020–2023 Khayabus surveys provided by IPSOS South Africa also allowed us to examine cohesiveness in the nine South African provinces. Results demonstrated that social cohesion was predominantly determined by intact social networks, trust in institutions, perceived fairness, and respect for social rules fostering the common good. KwaZulu Natal  had the lowest social cohesion  (46.1), followed by Free State (49.4) and Gauteng (50.5). Limpopo (58.3) had greater social cohesion than the rest of the country.   As for trends across the 2020s, one can clearly state that South Africa's social cohesion is decreasing . However, the downward trend’s 'speed' is not devastating. A similar downward trend was also found for Germany between 2020 and 2022. The COVID pandemic is often seen as one of the reasons for dwindling social cohesion. In South Africa, high levels of identification with the country seem to be the decisive glue of society. Political attention must, however, be paid to the perception of fairness and respect for social rules , as those can spark turmoil. Trust in institutions and acceptance of diversity also need to be strengthened.   When one looks at people’s subjective experience with social cohesion, our study points to the core driver of deteriorating social cohesion: the urban-rural split . Cohesion is considerably higher in rurally dominated South Africa, while metropolitan areas are hotbeds of an intra-societal split.   Finally, several surprising results must be highlighted again. Previous studies elsewhere have always yielded that geopolitical entities that enjoy higher levels of per capita GDP also exhibit higher social cohesion, Scandinavia being the most prominent example. Findings for Asian countries corroborate that result. In South Africa, poorer regions of the country exhibit higher levels of cohesion. The study furthermore found conflicting results on South African poverty and inequality. Social cohesion is lower in provinces where more households view themselves as poor but higher in those where more people objectively live in poverty. A negative link with median age (the younger people are in an area, the higher social cohesion) and a positive correlation with ethnic and linguistic fractionalization were also discovered, which appear counterintuitive at first glance.   However, what emerges from the South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI) study as it did for essentially all other studies that set out to measure the effects of social cohesion on people’s well-being? Social cohesion is ‘good’ for people, or in more technical terms, the higher people perceive social cohesion to be, the more positive their subjective well-being .   There are certainly also shortcomings to the study presented here—as there probably are to all empirical studies: The assessment of the level of social cohesion had to be based on very few questions from the Khayabus studies. Before the SASCI can be fielded as a regular endeavour in providing data for the further development of South Africa’s social cohesion, it may, after all, be advisable to conduct one more extensive representative study devoted exclusively to the topic of social cohesion and its economic (pre-)conditions  as has been the case in Germany with the series of Bertelsmann studies. References   Abrahams, C. (2016). Twenty years of social cohesion and nation-building in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 42 (1), 95–107. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43900558   Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8 , 155–194. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024471506938   Apraku, A., Moyo, P., & Akpan, W. (2018). Coping with climate change in Africa: an analysis of local interpretations in Eastern Cape, SA. Development Southern Africa, 36(3), 295–308. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2018.1482199   Arant, R., Dragolov, G., & Boehnke, K. (2017). Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2017 . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Arant, R., Larsen, M., & Boehnke, K. (2016). Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Bremen . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Ballantine, C., Chapman, M., Erwin, K., & Maré, G. (Eds.) (2017). Living together, living apart? Social cohesion in a future South Africa . University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press. http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=496   Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.). (2018). What holds Asian societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann-Stiftung.   Boehnke, K., Berrueto, A., Dragolov, G., & Ocampo Villegas, P. (2019). Are value preferences and social cohesion interconnected? The case of Mexico. Acta de Investigación, 9 (2). http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fpsi.20074719e.2019.2.262   Boehnke, K., Dragolov, G., Arant, R., & Unzicker, K. (2024). Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2023. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Burns, J., Hull, G., Lefko-Everett K., & Njozela, L. (2018). Defining social cohesion  (SALDRU Working Paper 216). Cape Town: SALDRU, UCT.   Center for Risk Analysis. (2023). Assets and Incomes. November 2023. Johannesburg: Center for Risk Analysis.   Delhey, J. & Boehnke, K. (2018). Conceptualizing social cohesion in Asia, In Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.), What holds Asian societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar  (pp. 29-48). Gütersloh: Bertelsmann-Stiftung.   Delhey, J., Dragolov, G. & Boehnke, K. (2023). Social Cohesion in International Comparison: A Review of Key Measures and Findings. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 75 , 95-120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-023-00891-6   Dragolov, G., Ignácz, Z. S., Lorenz, J., Delhey, J., Boehnke, K., & Unzicker, K. (2016). Social cohesion in the Western world. What holds societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar . Springer International. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32464-7   Global Data Lab (2024). Subnational HDI (v8.0) . Retrieved on September 24, 2024 from https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/table/shdi/ZAF/   Langer, A., Stewart, F., Smedts, K., & Demarest, L. (2017). Conceptualising and measuring social cohe-sion in Africa: Towards a perceptions-based index. Social Indicators Research, 131 , 321-343. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1250-4   Larsen, M. M., & Boehnke, K. (2016). Measuring Social Cohesion in the Kyrgyz Republic. Social Cohesion Index . University of Central Asia's Institute of Public Policy and Administration Working Paper No. 36, Bishkek.   Leininger, J., Burchi, F., Fiedler, C., Mross, K., Nowack, D., von Schiller, A., Sommer, C., Strupat, C., & Ziaja, S. (2021). Social cohesion: A new definition and a proposal for its measurement in Africa (Discussion Paper 31/2021). Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). https://doi.org/10.23661/dp31.2021.v1.1   OECD (2021). Old-age income inequality. In Pensions at a Glance 2021: OECD and G20 Indicators . OECD Publishing, Paris. doi: https://doi.org/10.1787/d1a5a309-en   Schiefer, D. & van der Noll, J. (2017). The essentials of social cohesion: A literature review. Social Indicators Research, 132 (2), 579-603. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1314-5   Statistics South Africa (2023a). Census 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2023b). Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Quarter 4: 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2024a). Estimation of regional gross domestic product for South Africa: Experimental estimates. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2024b). Population Estimates. Pretoria: Stats SA   Statistics South Africa (2024c). Subjective poverty in South Africa. Findings from the General Household Surveys 2019 and 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Wasserstein, R. L., Schirm, A. L., & Lazar, N. A. (2019). Moving to a World Beyond “ p  < 0.05.”  The American Statistician, 73 (sup1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2019.1583913   Weller, B. E., Bowen, N. K., & Faubert, S. J. (2020). Latent Class Analysis: A guide to best practice. Journal of Black Psychology, 46 (4), 287-311. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095798420930932   [1]     In line with the customary practice in economic research and our previous studies, we transform the raw values by taking their natural logarithm ( ln ). [2]     Individuals below the food poverty line cannot afford enough food to obtain the minimum daily energy requirement for adequate health. Individuals below the lower-bound poverty line are unable to afford both adequate food and non-food items and have to sacrifice food for essential non-food items. Individuals below the upper-bound poverty line can afford adequate food and essential non-food items. In 2022, the food poverty line was at 663 Rand, the lower-bound poverty line at 945 Rand, and the upper-bound poverty line at 1417 Rand, according to the report of the Center for Risk Analysis (CRA, 2023). [3]     The Gini index measures income inequality in the population as a whole. It ranges from 0 (perfect equality among all individuals) to 1 (perfect inequality, where one individual has all income). The P90/P10 ratio contrasts the income at the 90th percentile of the income distribution to the income at its 10th percentile (OECD, 2021). [4]     Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals are not from the same group (ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.; Alesina et al., 2003). The corresponding indices for ethnic/linguistic/religious fractionalization range from 0 (all individuals are from the same ethnic group/speak the same language/are from the same religious group) to 1 (each individual belongs to a separate ethnic/linguistic/religious group). [5]     Income classes were derived from the reported total household income. The latter was equivalized concerning household size using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Respondents with equivalized household income lower than 60 % of the median belong to the low-income class, from 60 % to 100 % - to the lower-middle income class, from 100 % to 200 % - to the upper-middle income class, greater than 200 % - to the high-income class. Respondents with a missing value on household income are treated as a separate group due to the large share of non-response (41.5 %).   Appendices   Appendix A: Indicators of cohesion across time   This Appendix documents the population-weighted relative frequencies of the response categories of the indicators used to calculate the social cohesion scores in this report. The reported values pertain to the respective percentage distributions in the total sample for each year of data collection.   Table 0.1  Indicators of Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” across time      Table 0.2  Indicators of Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” across time     Table 0.3  Indicators of Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” across time     Table 0.4  Indicators of Dimension 2.1 “Identification” across time     Table 0.5  Indicators of Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” across time     Table 0.6  Indicators of Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” across time      Table 0.7  Indicators of Dimension 3.2 “Solidarity and helpfulness” across time     Table 0.8  Indicators of Dimensions 3.2 “Respect for social rules” across time      Table 0.9  Indicators of Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation” across time     Appendix B: Dimensions of cohesion in the provinces over time   This Appendix contains results on the level and change over time in the nine single dimensions of social cohesion across the provinces of South Africa.   Tables A.10 to A.18 reveal that Gauteng is the province with the weakest level of social cohesion in Domain 1, “Social Relations.” Gauteng ranks last on Dimensions 1.1, ‘Social Networks,’ 1.2, ‘Trust in People,’ and 1.3, ‘Acceptance of Diversity.’ KwaZulu Natal ranks last on five of the remaining six dimensions. Only for Dimension 3.3, ‘Civic Participation,’ Northern Cape ranks last, likely because of lacking infrastructure in this least densely populated province.   Domain “Social Relations”   Table 0.10  Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” in the provinces across time      Table 0.11  Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” in the provinces across time   Table 0.12 Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” in the provinces across time      Domain “Connectedness”   Table 0.13  Dimension 2.1 “Identification” in the provinces across time     Table 0.14 Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” in the provinces across time     Table 0.15  Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” in the provinces across time Domain “Focus on the Common Good”   Table 0.16  Dimension 3.1 “Solidarity and helpfulness” in the provinces across time     Table 0.17  Dimension 3.2 “Respect for social rules” in the provinces across time     Table 0.18  Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation“ in the provinces across time Appendix C: Correlations of social cohesion on the province level   Table 0.19  Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces     Table 0.20  Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces     Appendix D: Latent class analyses   This Appendix documents goodness-of-fit indices for the various LCA models specified.   Table 0.21  Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions      Table 0.22  Relative class sizes for LCA solutions       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 10/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. D E C E M B E R 2 0 2 4 Lars Gumede BCom (Actuarial Science) Picture: istockphoto.com , Stock photo ID: 1483013789 Abstract   At its core the Artificial Intelligence (AI) revolution represents a period of exponentially increasing technological advancement. However, the future of AI is a human question more than a technological one – of how we deal with its rapid transformation of society. Companies are rushing to integrate AI into their systems to capitalize on its potential for greater efficiency, accuracy and cost-effectiveness. But there is also potentially a dark side to AI. For low- and middle-income countries, it will either mean economic salvation or continued stagnation. Large corporations will be forced to follow global corporate trends – automating as many jobs as possible and investing in reskilling the remaining workforce. Other companies may give up competing globally, compensated by government to artificially keep job numbers up.   Of course, the AI revolution also represents the opportunity to solve pressing issues: climate change, world hunger, the fight for resources. Global trends indicate a net loss to jobs in the short term, but long term, new industries will create more jobs and grow the world economy. For South Africa, the opportunity exists for radical growth. If proper investment is made in digital infrastructure, AI hubs and innovation, education and reskilling and in using AI to boost its strategic opportunities, there is no limit to the success we may see. If, on the other hand, we neglect our responsibility to build, learn and ensure that the country thrives, South Africa will see increased strife in the form of unemployment, crime, economic stagnation and inequality. Introduction   The Artificial Intelligence (AI) revolution will have more significant consequences than the Industrial Revolution and Internet Age. The potential of this revolution is unquantifiable even for the best experts and researchers in the field. Artificial Intelligence and the hunt for Digital Superintelligence will spark exponential technological development culminating in the ‘technological singularity’ – the point at which technology is advancing at such a fast rate that the human mind can no longer comprehend.   Before that though, there will be wide-ranging effects on the world economy, social cohesion and our systems of organizing ourselves. As new breakthroughs occur every day, it becomes increasingly essential to understand AI and its potential for upheaval, as it creates the potential for salvation or damnation for companies, countries, individuals and organizations alike.   It is no surprise then that companies are rushing to integrate AI into their systems to capitalize on the power of AI to increasingly accomplish human tasks with much greater efficiency, accuracy and cost-effectiveness. These integrations are projected to automate 43% of all job tasks by 2027, according to the World Economic Forum’s Future of Jobs Report  (2023). Corresponding to 83 million jobs eliminated in easily automated areas such as data entry, bookkeeping and other repetitive administrative roles (WEF, 2023).   Governments are rushing to put together regulations to deal with potential societal upheaval as well as implement AI systems into their own organizations to increase efficiency. Civil society organizations and think-tanks are contemplating social safety nets such as Universal Basic Income to compensate for lost jobs.   Jobs that are not lost can expect to be radically transformed as integrations with AI transform every job into a management role overseeing an AI tool that automates mundane, repetitive and programmable tasks.   There also exists the potential for entirely new jobs in entirely new industries. These opportunities require adaptive and informed citizens in order to smoothly move into this new world. Sixty-nine million jobs are expected to be created due to new technologies by 2027 – below the number of jobs lost. Resulting in a net loss to jobs of 2% globally by 2027 (WEF, 2023).   This will have impacts on social cohesion and necessitates countries establishing comprehensive social safety nets, warns Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2024). Of course, such governmental measures are tall asks, particularly for developing nations. This will generally worsen global inequality between countries and within countries as the benefits of technological development most often go to capital owners and highly skilled labour (Moll, Rachel & Restrepo, 2022).   In South Africa, a country already dealing with high inequality, unemployment and social tensions, the effects will be even more extreme. Large companies will be forced to take harsh decisions – implementing AI systems and replacing human jobs. Only then will they be able to compete globally against companies operating in highly efficient markets who will act with great haste and ruthlessness.   Government will find itself under increased pressure from the resulting social unrest and may be forced to guarantee jobs – which if implemented well could see incredible innovation and growth. It could also spell total disaster, if government measures to protect jobs clash with the requirements of businesses in order to compete globally.   Of course, the AI revolution also represents opportunities unlike any humanity has seen in its history. The potential exists for a world in which increased productivity and technological advancement allows humanity to solve such pressing issues as climate change, world hunger and the fight for resources.   There exists a huge opportunity to supercharge the economy and create new jobs in new industries. To capitalize on this opportunity, the country must do certain basic things such as invest in digital infrastructure, AI innovation and entrepreneurship, reskilling and education as well as specific strategies to boost national assets and opportunities.   There is also a need for unconventional local-focused strategies such as a national online AI education platform, a national public data repository to allow all to create AI systems targeting South African issues and challenges, and lastly, a national AI venture fund is needed to support South African entrepreneurs and promote AI-based economic growth.   These opportunities will be grasped by forward thinking countries, companies, individuals and organizations. In order to compete, a full understanding of the future of AI and its potential is needed. What is AI – and what is its current state?   Artificial Intelligence (AI) refers to computer systems and related machinery that are able to perform tasks typically associated with human intelligence such as classification, natural language generation and interpretation of text and speech.   The field of study of AI has been around for nearly a century. British scientist Alan Turing, in 1950, developed the ‘Turing Test’ as a way of evaluating whether a machine could think. The latest breakthroughs that have taken the world by storm are in the form of Large Language Models (LLMs), the most well-known being the GPT models of OpenAI (Goldstein & Kirk-Giannini, 2023).   The ‘ChatGPT’ interface by OpenAI provides a user-friendly way to interact with the world’s most advanced AI. The latest models can analyze text, images and video; write working code as well as pass professional tests and exams with flying colours – scoring in the 90th percentile on the SAT (OpenAI, 2024).   LLMs are neural networks that can understand and generate human (natural) language. These models are trained on large quantities of text on the internet such as books, articles and scientific papers. By processing this data, the models are able to produce coherent text relevant to the input it receives (IBM, 2024).   When one puts a question to an LLM, it uses the patterns and knowledge from its training data to generate responses. By analyzing patterns in the language used in its training data, one can converse with it as one would with any real person. These systems are referred to as Generative AI (GenAI) systems as they generate text from some input.   While OpenAI led the charge with its GenAI offerings, today there exists proprietary models from most large technology companies as well as a large ecosystem of open-source models which are just as advanced and available for anybody to use in their own projects.   Developments in AI will continue as models get larger, more powerful processors are developed and more money enters the space. The stated goal of the AI heavyweights such as OpenAI and Meta is to build Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). AGI being a level of AI that surpasses human capabilities, and that could in theory take over all strenuous and arduous tasks.   Of course, there is much debate as to whether the achievement of AGI will bring about utopia or dystopia. As with all things it will likely be somewhere in the middle, as better technology has solved many human problems – conversely, we are still saddled with many problems that we have the technology to fix. The future of the world of AI depends on how we adopt this new technology.    Global Adoption of AI – Its Effect on Employment Private Sector The breakthroughs in AI are rapidly transforming various sectors of society. The availability of custom models, abundance of data and global connectivity mean companies are racing to integrate AI into their systems. According to a McKinsey Global Survey, 65% of respondents say their organization is regularly using AI (Chui et al., 2024).   Automation of Jobs by AI   In Finance, JP Morgan Chase is using AI for fraud detection, risk management and the reviewing of legal documents with their Contract Intelligence (COiN) platform (JP Morgan Chase, 2024).   German giant Siemens is using its AI platform MindSphere to analyze the data from its connected machinery in order to reduce downtime and optimize manufacturing processes (Siemens, 2024). Tesla’s Autopilot system uses AI to control its self-driving cars. Google’s AI optimization tools have reduced the tech giant’s energy consumption by 40% across its data centres by predicting cooling needs.   Mining conglomerate Rio Tinto has been working on AI-driven automation for more than a decade. The company’s Iron Ore business unit operates AutoHaul, a long-distance railway system that is fully autonomous – a world first. The company operates 200 autonomous locomotives on 1700km of railway. By eliminating the need for drivers and the associated costs, the company has significantly improved safety and efficiency. New productivity schemes across its $50 billion portfolio generated $5 billion of additional free cash flow in 2021 (Rio Tinto, 2021).   Swedish fintech company Klarna has introduced an AI customer service agent that handles two-thirds of its customer service chats. The system is “designed to enhance the shopping and payments experience for Klarna’s 150 million consumers worldwide” (Klarna, 2024).   Its system handles the equivalent of 700 full-time customer service agents. The system is more accurate than human agents – with a 25% drop in repeat inquiries and has reduced the average query resolution time from 11 minutes to 2 minutes. It has capabilities that cannot be matched by human agents. It is available 24 hours a day, in 23 markets and can communicate in 35 languages. This AI system brought a $40 million USD profit improvement to the group in 2024 (Klarna, 2024).   This system, which was a result of a joint experiment by Klarna and OpenAI, will likely become the industry standard globally in the coming years. This is significant as the global customer service market is valued at roughly $9 billion and is predicted to reach $82 billion in revenue by 2025 (Forbes, 2024). Moreover, bad customer service is estimated to cost global markets $3.7 trillion annually. The millions employed in the customer service industry will increasingly see themselves being replaced by much cheaper, effective and secure AI systems.   While Klarna is an early adopter of these technologies and it may seem natural for a technology company to be heavily automated, these changes will soon be seen worldwide. The Future of Jobs Report  compiled by the World Economic Forum in 2023 found that by 2027, 43% of all work tasks will be automated – an increase from 34% in 2022. Faster than expected automation is estimated to displace 83 million jobs in the next five years. The jobs most at risk are highly repetitive administrative tasks such as bookkeeping, data entry, accounting and other administrative and secretarial work (WEF, 2023).   More generally, job losses will primarily be low-skilled jobs as a study of Taiwan’s electronics industry found that AI innovations favour high-skilled labour – reducing the share of the workforce who hold college level educational qualifications and lower (Yang, 2022).   A survey of 2000 corporate executives, conducted by Swiss staffing firm Adecco Group, found that 41% of executives polled expect to employ fewer people due to AI. Furthermore, 80% of business executives are actively accelerating their plans to integrate AI systems and deploy new technologies (WEF, 2020).   Globally, AI systems are being tested with great success in performing human tasks. These successful tests will prompt full-scale replacements in the years to come. It is not only blue-collar jobs and highly repetitive tasks that are at risk of replacement. Rapid technological development means that “AI is coming for the jobs that were supposed to be automation-proof”, according to Sarah T. Roberts, associate professor at the University of California in Los Angeles (Verma & De Vynck, 2023).   The IMF estimates that 40% of all jobs are exposed due to AI – meaning the jobs will either be lost or radically transformed, requiring reskilling or repurposing (Georgieva, 2024).   Scientists are increasingly finding that Large Language Models are capable of surprising levels of creative production and could target even the most intellectually demanding jobs. So complex are the largest models that scientists and researchers are studying them like they would strange natural phenomena – experimenting and trying to explain the results (Heaven, 2024). There is thus no way of knowing to what extent AI will replace jobs or even which jobs are safe.   Opportunities for Reskilling   While job losses are inevitable, there are huge opportunities for reskilling workers to be productive in conjunction with advanced AI systems. Where jobs are not lost, they will certainly be transformed and will look quite different than they do now. A study by the Harvard Business Review  found that the average half-life of skills is now less than five years and in the technology industry it is less than three years (Harvard Business Review, 2023).   The figure below, illustrated the extent to which the labour market will be impacted by the AI revolution. Together, 61% of jobs will require reskilling or redeployment by 2027, according to the Future of Jobs Report  of the World Economic Forum (2023).    Upskilling and Reskilling Outlook, 2023-2027, by workforce fraction Figure 1:  Upskilling and reskilling outlook, 2023-2027. Graph adapted from WEF Future of Jobs Report  2023 (WEF, 2023).   Companies are therefore investing more than ever before in internal training and retraining – roughly 1.5% of the total budget among large companies, according to a Boston Consulting Group study (Goel & Kovács-Ondrejkovic, 2023). Investment in reskilling workers for this new world is essential, as the World Economic Forum estimates that over half of the global population requires new skills to stay ahead of technology-driven change. That figure could climb to 90% by 2030 as current skills become increasingly obsolete.   Telecommunications giant AT&T, released in their 2022 ESG summary the fruits of the company’s new Real Time Training Program created to upskill its employees. During the year 2021, almost 2 000 employees received real-time tutorial recommendations, resulting in 4 300 new customers and nearly a $5 million increase in annual revenue. In the program the company “identifies who needs training and when, as well as which training solution is most likely to drive the greatest performance improvement”.   In 2023, pharmaceutical giant Moderna undertook a massive reskilling and modernization program affecting all aspects of its business. Partnering with OpenAI, it has deployed ChatGPT Enterprise to thousands of its employees (OpenAI, 2024).   “We’re looking at every business process—from legal, to research, to manufacturing, to commercial—and thinking about how to redesign them with AI,” said Stephane Bancel, Moderna’s CEO. The company is seeking to bring 15 new mRNA medicines to market in the next five years by supercharging its development cycle. Moderna set out to achieve a “100% adoption and proficiency” of generative AI by all its employees. To do this, the company assembled a dedicated team of experts who created personalized AI learning companions augmented by group research and training exercises.   The company’s internal AI chatbot, mChat, has been adopted by 80% of the company’s workforce and has 2 000 active weekly participants in its AI forum. After months of usage, the average user has 120 conversations with AI per week – boosting knowledge and productivity at all levels.   “If we had to do it the old biopharmaceutical ways, we might need 100 000 people today,” explained Bancel. Utilizing advanced AI systems, a few thousand people can perform like a team of 100 000 (Moderna, 2024). This corporate architecture supercharged by AI allowed Moderna to ready its COVID-19 vaccine for human trials in just 42 days (Pomeroy, 2023).   Projected job creation and displacement, 2023-2027 Figure 2:  Projected job creation and displacement, 2023-2027. Graph adapted from WEF Future of Jobs Report  2023 (WEF, 2023).   In the near future (next five years), there will be job losses of around 83 million. Near-term job creation is expected to total 69 million – created by new technologies and industries, according to a World Economic Forum report (2023). This estimate gives a net loss of 14 million jobs worldwide by 2027 – which corresponds to a global workforce cut of 2% (WEF, 2023). In the long term, by orders of magnitude more jobs are likely to be created by entirely new industries (JP Morgan, 2024). However, long-term estimates are difficult due to the rapid nature of technological advancements and their effects.   The private sector has obviously been faster to adopt new AI systems but worldwide, public sector organizations are also adopting these systems to boost their productivity and efficiency.   Public Sector   Just as companies are racing to integrate AI into their systems, so too are proactive governments and public sector entities. In the public sector, AI is being used on four primary issues (OECD, 2023):   Effectiveness of Policymaking Efficiency of Operations Improved Accountability Responsiveness Public Sector AI Opportunities Figure 3:  Public Sector AI Opportunities – generated by author.   Policymaking   AI enables effective and objective policymaking. Sophisticated systems are able to ingest large volumes of data and produce policy recommendations at great scale, efficiency and at low cost. However, only 30% of countries have adopted AI for policymaking, according to the 2023 OECD Digital Government Index (OECD, 2023).   Use cases include budget management to analyze spending and income data, fraud and corruption prevention, anticipating budget deviations and emergencies and many more.   The largest use case for AI in guiding policymaking is in analyzing large quantities of data to better understand the needs of the population and identify patterns to make more effective decisions. In the Netherlands, an AI system was introduced in Nijmegen municipality to monitor the number of and activities of people in the city centre. Analyzing the traffic, movement and economic data of the city allows policymakers and officials to make better decisions involving city planning, road safety, municipal services as well as entrepreneurial and business support.   “We can now also predict how busy it is in places where there are no sensors,” says Paul Geurts, strategic information adviser at the municipality of Nijmegen. This system boosts economic development by creating better decision-making at the municipal level (Geurts, 2024).   In South Korea, the Disease Control and Prevention Agency developed an AI system to address crises involving emerging infectious diseases. The system analyzes medical, quarantine, spatial and population data to develop strategies and protocols for responses to infectious diseases (Ubaldi & Zapata, 2024).   AI can be used to analyze and predict the environmental effects of current or prospective public projects. In France, AI was used to build a digital simulation of the Paris-Saclay municipality which is used to simulate the management of large projects. Officials are able to predict energy needs, environmental and financial impacts as well as ordinarily unexpected challenges and setbacks (Paris-Saclay, 2023).    Operational Efficiency   Most deployments of AI by the public sector are done in order to improve efficiency of operations and service delivery. This has been done by nearly 70% of countries analyzed by the OECD’s 2023 Digital Government Report  (OECD, 2024).   In Sweden, an AI system was developed by the Companies Registration Office that automatically sorts 60% of its incoming emails. This system reads the emails, understands the content and then forwards it to the appropriate department in the office. Every day the authority receives approximately 500 emails that would ordinarily require multiple dedicated employees to handle. To modernize the authority’s operations, a dedicated AI hub was set up, which birthed this AI email sorter. The team leading this AI initiative is currently working to expand the system, with the final goal of automatically resolving all queries without the involvement of any staff members (Bolagsverket, 2023).   France has developed and deployed a much larger model in its national government. The Interministerial Directorate for Digital Affairs launched an AI system named Albert that helps public service agents better respond to online queries. French Prime Minster Gabriel Attal declared the system will “de-bureaucratize the administration and simplify everyday life” (Attal, 2024).   ‘Albert’ has been deployed in various areas of the French administration. The system manages court hearings, detects forest fires, manages human resources and automates medical reports, to name but a few of its use cases (Cirou, 2024). Another of Albert’s jobs is to answer questions posed to all government departments. For example, French tax agents receive around 16 million queries per year. Albert, with its database, knowledgebase and ability to understand and respond to questions, will automatically satisfy these queries or forward them to the relevant departments (RFI, 2024). The system is even able to ‘pre-instruct’ regional environmental directorates on the 4 000 environmental project proposals they receive each year and has detected nearly 150 000 cases of fraud for local tax authorities.   Additionally, a new AI system called ‘Aristotle’, which focuses on education, will soon be deployed nationally to modernize the French education system. ‘Aristotle’ will be a digital tutor, provide quizzes and assessments as well as convert lecture videos and materials into disability-friendly format (Cirou, 2024).   As illustrated, the potential for AI to improve the efficiency of government operations whilst radically cutting costs is immense.   Public Accountability   Another important use case of AI is in promoting public accountability and transparency of government. AI has been successfully tested by tax and procurement authorities in order to detect fraud, limit corruption and manage risk (OECD, 2024).   In Brazil, the General Controllership of the Union developed an AI system to curb procurement fraud and corruption. The system called the Analyzer of Biddings, Contracts and Notices (ALICE) automatically analyzes data and recommends action related to public procurement. ALICE collects data related to ongoing and past procurement contracts on the various federal Government procurement platforms. The system will analyze a potential contract and its facts and alert auditors and officials to suspicious and unusual cases (Oliveira at al., 2022).   ALICE scrutinized nearly 200 000 purchasing processes in 2023. Investigations based on the alerts of the ALICE system saw the cancellation of purchases worth more than $2.08 billion (R6.7 billion (ZAR)). This advanced system is capable of such sophisticated tasks as identifying the overpricing of products and services, unnecessary contracting and conflicts of interests ( Gov.br , 2024).   Advanced AI systems can play a crucial role in enhancing oversight and accountability in the public sector – providing objective and transparent analysis that can be used to monitor all areas of government spending.   Responsiveness   The final major use case of AI in the public sector relates to responsiveness – specifically improving service delivery by responding to the feedback of the population. Responsiveness to feedback has been found to be directly related to quality of services provided (OECD, 2013).   In Finland, the government created the AuroraAI program to analyze which public services are well-received and well-administered and which are poorly received. The project forms part of the Finnish drive to digitalize all public services. AuroraAI functions as a network connecting citizens to the most relevant services, with the aim of “making everyday life and business easier”, according to (now former) Prime Minister Sanna Marin (European Parliament, 2024).   Around the world governments are utilizing AI to improve the lives of their people. The potential for huge improvements in efficiency, accountability, responsiveness and decision-making exists and is being explored by forward-thinking government entities.    Regulatory Challenges & Development Consequences   The most important impact of the AI revolution will be on the rate of change of technological development. The acceleration of innovation across all fields of science will bring about massive changes to all aspects of our lives and the world.   New systems will boost productivity globally and may herald a new era in which humanity can focus on issues greater than wars and strife. Of course, today there already exists the tools to solve most practical problems, yet problems abound.   It is thus a human question; one of human organization. Many will prosper, namely large asset owners, forward facing companies and countries. Many will no doubt be left behind just as today 700 million people globally live in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2024).   The IMF projects 40% of the world’s jobs are at risk due to AI, some to replacement and others to augmentation (Georgieva, 2024). This will necessitate well-thought-out and put-together social safety nets to support acceptable standards of living. However, there will be entirely new industries created – giving rise to countless jobs.   Personal AI systems will become commonplace, which will cause inequality that goes far beyond socio-economic inequality. Persons who have access to these tools will be able to supercharge their intellect and productivity and those without access will be left behind – creating a wider and wider gap.   In developed economies, the wealthiest asset owners will continue to see the bulk of benefits. While the bottom majority will find themselves increasingly out of work or forced to reskill themselves for AI-related tasks. Globalization saw millions of jobs offshored from developed nations to developing nations; now those developed economies will lose even more jobs to AI (European Parliament, 2023). Jobs in advanced, highly efficient economies are much more exposed to AI than those in developing nations – as they are forced to adopt the latest market and productivity trends (Georgieva, 2024).   In developing nations, which rely heavily on foreign investment, jobs are not safe either. Just as companies moved their operations to the third world for cheaper labour, they will find even cheaper labour in the form of advanced AI systems. This will have serious consequences for development, as it will reduce foreign investment in these developing nations (Fan & Qiang, 2024).   This leads to the devaluing of their comparative advantages, less access to capital, worse terms of trade and will eventually further widen the gap between rich and poor countries (Boy et al., 2023). This will also have serious consequences geopolitically, as developing nations will have even less of a say in world affairs.   Lack of social cohesion and unrest will be a global phenomenon, which will come as more of a surprise to developed nations whose standards of living may see more abrupt changes. This process (which has begun already) will precipitate the rise of populist political movements, as is happening across Europe today.   In developing nations whose standards of living are low even without AI’s effects, the trends are more predictable. These nations who feel increasingly excluded from the family of developed nations will attempt to form their own trading, diplomatic and support blocks (Gumede, 2023). Groups like BRICS have expanded to 10 member nations (BRICS+) and tensions will continue to rise between the West and the rest.   Without global cooperation, meaningful AI regulation will be near impossible. Like with taxes, corporations will shop around the world for the best regulatory environment rendering any good or bad faith regulations toothless (Wheeler, 2023).   Democracy and democratic values may be perceived as being of diminishing value and utility as one relies more and more on transnational corporations and global social initiatives than one does on one’s own government.   Success in the future of AI depends primarily on:   ·                Digital Infrastructure: An essential foundation for an AI-powered economy. ·                Skills Development & Retraining: Equipping people with the skills of the Future. ·                Local AI Investment: Developing local AI industries, hubs and innovators. ·                Strategic Boosters: Using AI to boost strategic opportunities and assets. ·                AI Safety: Regulation to ensure safe development in national/global interest.   Development Requirements in the World of AI  Figure 4:  Development Requirements (generated by author).    Continental Developments & Outlook   In May 2024, the African Union Commission released its Draft Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy pursuant to the African Union Agenda 2063. The continental strategy aims to guide member states in achieving ‘people-centric’ and ‘development-oriented’ AI implementation.   The strategy’s focus areas are:   Maximizing AI benefits: Improving people’s livelihoods, focus on AI in agriculture, healthcare, education, public service delivery and defense. Minimizing risks: Addressing risks involving inclusion, human rights and dignity. Building capabilities: In infrastructure, AI talent, R&D and innovation. Regional and international cooperation: Developing strategic partnerships. Private/public sector investment: Encouraging massive regional investment.   Underlying the strategy is an adherence to African culture and values (African Union, 2024). The strategy goes further in stating 15 “action areas”, including but not limited to:   Establishment of appropriate regulation and governance systems. Creating an enabling environment for AI startups. Ensuring the availability of high-quality and diverse datasets. Promoting AI skills and talent in schools, colleges, workspaces and among the populus.   The continental AI pioneer Mauritius published its national AI strategy in 2018 – which included countrywide research and a detailed action plan. Included in this plan was the creation of the Mauritius Artificial Intelligence Council (MAIC) – a 10-member panel tasked with facilitating the implementation of various AI projects (MAIS, 2024). This is overseen by the larger Mauritius Emerging Technologies Council (METC), whose goal is to make Mauritius a thriving tech hub.   Among the projects are:   Digital Youth Engagement Program: Partnership with Microsoft to equip 25 000 Mauritians with digital skills. Venture Investing and Funding: the National Resilience Fund as well as various grant programs are providing investment and low-interest working capital loans with flexible payment terms. Development Sandboxes:  The country’s Regulatory Sand Box License lets startups ‘test-drive’ their systems and products in a controlled environment.   Due to these initiatives, Mauritius is set to nearly double tech’s contribution to GDP by 2025, according to a PwC report (Balloun, 2024).   Today, 13 out of Africa’s 54 countries have begun putting together national AI strategies, as the continent recognizes the importance of AI for development and growth. These strategies are essential to confront the challenges facing the continent such as limitations in infrastructure, lack of access to quality data and incohesive regulatory frameworks. As well as capitalize on the potential $1.2 trillion AI contribution to Africa’s GDP (Jaldi, 2024). Proper AI development in Africa could see Africa’s stature rise in the global geopolitical landscape, with Africa becoming less reliant on the Global North and lead to a more balanced power dynamic (Brookings, 2024). On the other hand, failure to become leaders in AI will spell continued lack of influence in global matters.   South Africa Outlook: Risks & Opportunities   The World Bank described AI as being either a blessing or a curse for low- and middle- income countries (Fan et al., 2024). In South Africa, AI will certainly be either a blessing or a curse; economic salvation or continued stagnation.   Large South African corporations who wish to compete globally will be forced to follow global corporate trends – automating as many jobs as possible as well as investing in reskilling the remaining workforce to work in conjunction with AI. Other companies may give up competing globally, compensated in some way by government who wishes to artificially keep job numbers up.   This may be done in business-friendly ways by reviving South African industry and supercharging businesses with AI tools; thus, creating jobs, or it may be done by bloating the government – stretching an already stretched national budget.   The informal economy will be less affected than the formal economy as it is less linked to global markets. With job losses in the formal economy and the reskilling of workers to equip them with modern skills, many will find the technological skills requirements too foreign or cumbersome. There will be a larger split between the formal economy, which aims to compete globally, and an increasingly large informal economy utilizing outdated and inefficient means as it does today.   As economic inequality grows ever larger, social cohesion becomes more difficult and the rule of law may continue to degrade. The gap between the rich and the poor will continue to grow. Increased productivity and wealth will put the top end of the formal economy out of reach of the government as the country becomes increasingly reliant on the private sector for survival. Government operations may at some point abandon economic goals and profit motives completely as on one side the masses of people reliant on the state demand what the state cannot provide and on the other side, slow thinking and anti-market policies will see the state being less competitive.   The welfare state will expand – with a greater percentage of the population depending on grants and jobs that are artificially protected (to the detriment of productivity and efficiency). The current grant program by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) may be expanded into a countrywide Universal Basic Income (UBI) style program.   Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a cash transfer unconditionally given to all citizens at regular intervals (Banerjee et al., 2019). South Africa, as a developing country with a large formal economy, faces unique financial challenges in dealing with an expanding welfare state.   Since 2012, South Africa’s Personal Income Tax (PIT) base has shrunk by roughly 2% (Scott, 2022). Given South Africa’s shrinking tax base, funding an expanded grant program will become increasingly untenable. A World Bank Blog (2023) study found that in developing nations with large informal sectors, funding a UBI grant through income taxes is unfeasible. Such a program would likely be funded by increased consumption taxes – taxes on the purchases of goods and services (Singh, 2023).   Global innovations in technology will make the world less reliant on South African exports and labour. Moreover, poor governance will make it less and less possible for South African companies to export goods competitively. Decreased reliance on South Africa means less investment interest and the economy begins to stagnate.   A large portion of the country will feel disenfranchised and wronged as their standard of living continues to drop. This fuels anti-free market sentiments and prompts a rise in populist anti-establishment and anti-constitutionalist political movements (Gumede, 2024b).   Development Requirements   Conventional Requirements for AI Prosperity   In order for South Africa to thrive in the world of AI, the country must do certain basic things. The four requirements that are common across most national AI strategies are:   Invest in Digital Infrastructure:  Behind every amazing AI system is a vast infrastructure making it all possible. This includes datacenters, large-scale energy generation and specialized hardware. For example, expanding internet and smartphone access as well as supporting the technology industry.   Skills Development & Digital Education:  Large-scale investment is needed in education involving science, technology and specifically AI. This is essential in giving citizens the tools to build the AI systems that can create jobs, growth and technological progress. For example, introducing school and post-school programs that expose people to the latest developments in AI and promote AI participation.   Local AI Industry:  Investment is needed to turn the country into an AI hub that can attract investment, talent and interest in the country. This requires support of entrepreneurs, research laboratories, national educational programs and competitions – anything that promotes engagement in the field of AI. For example, the establishment and support of dedicated AI research institutes.   Strategic Boosters:  AI must be used to boost strategic assets. Public-private sector cooperation is needed to unlock the potential of the country’s resource and human wealth. For example, public-private sector AI research units in every major corporation and state-owned enterprise that deals specifically with AI tools for its area of expertise.   South Africa’s Current AI Strategy   There are two existing government AI initiatives in South Africa. In 2011, the Centre for Artificial Intelligence Research (CAIR) was established by the Department of Science and Innovation (DSI) and is primarily engaged in supporting AI research at South African Universities. In 2022, the AI Institute of South Africa (AIISA) was established by the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies (DCDT) – which is focused on creating applications of AI for the private and public sector.   In 2024, a new discussion document was released at the DCDT’s AI National Government Summit, listing four core priorities for the government regarding AI:   Smart Approach to AI: An AI agenda that benefits all citizens. AI Skills Generation: Invest in education geared towards developing AI skills. Policy Research: Identify ways to mitigate negative impacts of AI. Economic Growth: Promote investment in local AI economy.   The document further describes the country’s 2030 goals, most notably to have 5 000 AI experts, 30% of the country’s workforce trained with basic AI skills, 100 to 300 AI startups and R70 billion in direct investment in AI (DCDTa, 2024).   The four core priorities are more or less shared by most countries developing their own national strategies.   Birthed by the dialogue of the National AI Summit was South Africa’s AI Policy Framework. Released by the DCDT, it is a “first step in developing the National AI Policy” and aims to address national challenges and exploit opportunities across the economy (DCDTb, 2024).   The framework suggests a ‘Futures Triangle’ approach to developing the national AI policy – considering the “Push of the Present”: technological advancement, the “Pull of the Future”: the National Development Plan (NDP), as well as the “Weight of the Past”: the historic inequities in South African society.   The AI policy framework lays out the following strategic pillars for the national AI policy.   Talent Development, Digital Infrastructure, Research & Development Public Sector Implementation, Ethical AI, Data Protection, Security & Transparency Fairness, Human Control & Promotion of Cultural Values   The National AI Policy Framework outlines the key considerations and values that should be foundational to a future national plan or future AI initiatives.   However, there exists a large gap between the country’s goals and its core priorities – namely specific initiatives designed to achieve the goals. These represent significant unaddressed opportunities for the country.   Unaddressed Opportunities & Specific Plans for South Africa   Artificial Intelligence (AI) is being designated a national priority by the world’s largest economies, who are all investing heavily and conventionally in their AI industries. South Africa, with an already stretched budget and existing social-economic and development challenges must embrace unconventional strategies in an attempt to leap-frog up and compete on the world stage. Importantly too, these strategies must be economically feasible and easily implementable.   While the DCDT’s AI National Government Summit discussion document and AI Policy Framework list the country’s core priorities for upcoming national AI policy, there are many opportunities unaddressed by the national dialogue and policy framework that could deliver cost-effective economic growth.   In order to create cost-effective and efficient growth in regard to AI, the country must:   Create shared public datasets and environments for AI development, training and testing. Problem Addressed: Too many problems for government to address Make government data publicly available so that the public can create solutions to the country’s problems. In the National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan 2023 prepared by the National Science and Technology Council in the United States, one strategy that is proposed is the creation of publicly available datasets for AI research and development (NAIRDSP, 2023).   Availability and access to large volumes of relevant data is crucial for AI development. A well-designed public data repository would promote cost-effective AI development by allowing anybody to train and test models as well as build advanced systems that solve unique local challenges. All data collected and stored by government departments should be made publicly available with private/sensitive data being anonymized for privacy and security considerations. Additionally, cloud hardware and computing resources could be made available for the public to train and test the systems on the available data or at the very least point to free, online publicly available tools.   This would allow citizens to build systems to solve problems facing the country from anywhere without cost to the government. For example, by making school performance and resource data (e.g. results, attendance, socio-economic breakdowns, resource availability, location, teacher certifications, etc.) available publicly, AI systems could be built to optimize resource allocation, professional development, policy recommendations and customized learning tools.   This is a cost-effective way to allow the country’s best minds to confront the challenges this country faces and develop solutions tailored to local challenges.   National Public AI Learning Platform Problem Addressed: Lack of skills and literacy in the field of AI As described above in ‘Global Adoption of AI: Public Sector’, the average half-life of skills is less than five years and 61% of all jobs will require reskilling by 2027. It is therefore essential to equip citizens with the skills of the future or make available the tools for citizens to equip themselves.   The most cost-effective way of doing this is by creating a zero-rated (free to access) online AI learning portal with resources created by partnerships with companies and universities. Under Singapore’s 2019 National Artificial Intelligence Strategy, the government is on course to provide AI literacy courses to 100 000 adults and students by 2025 (SNDGO, 2019).   This is an efficient way to skill and reskill citizens for the world of AI and drastically improve AI literacy and understanding of the opportunities that exist as a result of advancements in the field of AI.   National AI Venture Investment Fund   Problem Addressed: Missed Economic Opportunities South Africans have produced innovations that have shaped the world in the fields of medicine, technology, electric vehicles and more. There currently exists the next generation of large SA-born companies. The government – whether under the Public Investment Corporation, Department of Communications and Digital Technologies, or any other branch – must establish a vehicle to invest in South Africa’s burgeoning AI startups.   This will boost the number of AI startups by offering capital, promoting the local AI ecosystem and allowing future spending on future AI-related projects. The countries on the forefront globally in technological development are large-scale investors in startups in their home countries and abroad. Examples include the China Investment Corporation (CIC) supporting Chinese entrepreneurs, Fonds Souverain d'Investissements Stratégiques (FSIS) in France, which is partnered with tech incubator ‘Station F’ to fund French startups, and the Saudi Public Investment Fund involved in venture investing across the world (WIPO, 2020).   The stakes are higher than ever before for South Africa. The country may have the world’s greatest potential but the potential for total disaster exists if the country does not move swiftly, proactively and strategically into the new world. Given South Africa’s unique challenges, the country needs unconventional strategies that can have maximum impact whilst remaining economically feasible.   Conclusion   Fears of dystopia and hopes of utopia are equally unrealistic in regard to AI. We already have the tools of our destruction and salvation, AI is yet another. The future of AI is a human question more than it is a technological question – a question of how we deal with increasingly advanced technologies.   At its core the AI revolution represents a period of exponentially increasing technological advancement. Each stage of human development has brought significant change but overall, the human standard of living has increased, human civilization has expanded, and new worlds and industries have been created.   The automobile revolution created millions of jobs and displaced countless, too. The Ford Model T must certainly have been devastating to the last horse trader in Detroit, but today a world without automobiles is impossible to imagine.   Global trends indicate that there will be a net loss to jobs in the short term as a result of AI but that in the longer term, new industries will create more jobs than are lost and grow the world economy.   Companies, countries, organizations and individuals who are proactive and adaptive in this changing world will see their fortunes thrive and others who are not, will see their fortunes wither. Countries around the world are making great gains in efficiency, transparency and service delivery by utilizing AI. Companies too, are increasing the efficiency of their operations by experimenting with automated AI systems.   For developing nations like South Africa, the opportunity exists for radical growth. If proper investment is made in educating and reskilling people for the world of AI, the country’s enormous potential could be unleashed. If the people of South Africa actively participate in the task of finding the right path and the government endeavors to create the conditions for people to thrive, there is no limit to the success we may see.   If, on the other hand, we neglect our responsibility to build, learn and ensure that the country thrives, South Africa could easily be left behind. The country must invest in digital infrastructure, support AI hubs and innovation, invest in education and reskilling for the future and use AI to boost its strategic opportunities.   In addition to the conventional strategies, there is also a need for unconventional local-focused strategies. These include a national online AI education platform, a national public data repository to allow all to create AI systems targeting South African issues and challenges, and lastly, a national AI venture fund is needed to support South African entrepreneurs and promote AI-based economic growth.   The right choices could see the country become a world superpower with an economy supercharged by AI and related advanced technologies. The wrong choices will bring about increased strife in the form of unemployment, crime, economic stagnation, inequality, etc.   In understanding what the future of humanity’s relationship with technology is, one should consider this: a century ago the idea of being able to instantaneously see and speak to somebody across the world was beyond comprehension. Today, if one forgets one’s phone at home, it feels as if one is missing a limb. If the internet is down, one might as well be in Antarctica. Not only is technology advancing at an increasing rate, but we are also becoming technology. We are merging with machines – in so doing, creating a new type of human. With advancements in the way we interact with technology it will soon become difficult to determine where machines begin and humans end. Humanity is being supercharged by machines.   Imagine now if one does not participate in this societal shift. The gap between those who embrace AI and those who do not will grow exponentially until the differences in capabilities within our species are greater than the difference between us and our closest relatives: Chimpanzees and Bonobos.   The AI revolution represents a shift too significant to ignore or sleep-walk into. Failure to adapt and develop will have severe consequences regarding development, social-economic inequality, social cohesion, human rights and democratic ideals. Fortunately, the future is in our hands. It will neither be utopia nor dystopia; it will be what we make it.   References   African Union. 2024. Draft Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy . [Online] Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/44004-doc-EN-_Continental_AI_Strategy_July_2024.pdf   Attal, G. 2024. Use of AI to Serve French Citizens. Office of Prime Minister, France. [Online] Available at:   https://www.uspa24.com/bericht-24391/pm-g-attal-s-speech-amid-states-reform-over-de-bureaucratizing.html   Balloun, C. 2024. Inside Mauritius’s Thriving Tech Hub: Startups and Success Stories . NuCamp. [Online] Available at: https://www.nucamp.co/blog/coding-bootcamp-mauritius-mus-inside-mauritiuss-thriving-tech-hub-startups-and-success-stories   Banerjee, A. et al. 2019. Universal Basic Income in the Developing World . National Bureau of Economic Research. [Online] Available at: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25598/w25598.pdf   Bolagsverket. 2023. AI model sorts the agency's inbox. [Online] Available at: https://www.bolagsverket.se/omoss/press/pressmeddelanden/pressmeddelanden2023/aimodellsorterarmyndighetensinkorg.4936.html   Boy, C. et al. 2023. Artificial Intelligence: Revolutionary Potential and Huge Uncertainties . [Online] Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/9040dbbb-8594-4083-a399-24592313f907/content   Brookings. 2024. How AI is impacting policy processes and outcomes in Africa . Brookings Institute. [Online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-ai-is-impacting-policy-processes-and-outcomes-in-africa/   Chui, M. et al. 2024. The state of AI in early 2024: Gen AI adoption spikes and starts to generate value . [Online] Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/quantumblack/our-insights/the-state-of-ai   Cirou, E. 2024.  Say hello to Albert! The new AI in French public services.  [Online] Available at:  https://blog.economie-numerique.net/2024/05/06/say-hello-to-albert-the-new-ai-in-french-public-service/   Cooban, A. 2024. AI will shrink workforces within five years, say company execs . [Online] Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/04/05/business/ai-job-losses/index.html   DCDTa. 2024. AI National Government Summit Discussion Document . Department of Communications and Digital Technologies. [Online] Available at: https://www.dcdt.gov.za/images/phocadownload/AI_Government_Summit/National_AI_Government_Summit_Discussion_Document.pdf   DCDTb. 2024. South Africa National Artificial Intelligence Policy Framework . Department of Communications and Digital Technologies. [Online] Available at: https://techcentral.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/South-Africa-National-AI-Policy-Framework.pdf   Doumi, L. et al. 2023. Reskilling in the age of AI . [Online] Available at: https://hbr.org/2023/09/reskilling-in-the-age-of-ai   European Parliament. 2023. Globalisation's impact on employment and the EU . [Online] Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/2019/8/story/20190712STO56968/20190712STO56968_en.pdf   European Parliament. 2024. The AuroraAI Programme.  [Online] Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/240174/AIDA%20workshop_28052021_Alanko.pdf   Fan, Q. & Qiang, C. 2024. Tipping the scales: AI's dual impact on developing nations. World Bank Blogs. [Online] Available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/digital-development/tipping-the-scales--ai-s-dual-impact-on-developing-nations   Georgieva, K. 2024. AI Will Transform the Global Economy. Let’s Make Sure It Benefits Humanity . [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/01/14/ai-will-transform-the-global-economy-lets-make-sure-it-benefits-humanity#:~:text=The%20IMF%20analysis%20captures%20both,to%20impact%20high%2Dskilled%20jobs .   Geurts, P. 2024. Gemeente Nijmegen zet AI in voor meer zicht op drukte in binnenstad.  [Online] Available at: https://ai-magazine.vngrealisatie.nl/nijmegen/   Goel, S. & Kovács-Ondrejkovic, O. 2023. Your Strategy Is Only as Good as Your Skills . [Online] Available at: https://www.bcg.com/publications/2023/your-strategy-is-only-as-good-as-your-skills   Goldstein, S. & Kirk-Giannini, C. 2023. AI is closer than ever to passing the Turing test for ‘intelligence’. What happens when it does?  [Online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/ai-is-closer-than-ever-to-passing-the-turing-test-for-intelligence-what-happens-when-it-does-214721   Gov.Br . 2024. Alice - Bidding, Contracts and Notices Analyzer.  [Online] Available at:   https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/auditoria-e-fiscalizacao/alice   Gumede, W. 2023. BRICS: Rising de-dollarisation of the world. [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/brics-rising-de-dollarisation-of-the-world   Gumede, W. 2024. Unless Africans elect better leaders, developing continent remains a dream. [Online] Available at: https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2024-04-18-william-gumede-unless-africans-elect-better-leaders-developing-continent-remains-a-dream/   Harvard Business Review. 2023. Reskilling in the Age of AI.  [Online] Available at: https://hbr.org/2023/09/reskilling-in-the-age-of-ai Heaven, W. 2024 . Large language models can do jaw-dropping things. But nobody knows exactly why . [Online] Available at: https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/03/04/1089403/large-language-models-amazing-but-nobody-knows-why/   IBM. 2024. What are large language models (LLMs)?  [Online] Available at: https://www.ibm.com/topics/large-language-models   Jaldi, A. 2024. Artificial Intelligence Revolution in Africa: Economic Opportunities and Legal Challenges. [Online] Available at: https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2023-07/PP_13-23%20(Jaldi%20).pdf   JP Morgan. 2024. How AI can boost productivity and jump start growth. [Online] Available at: https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/nam/en/insights/markets-and-investing/ideas-and-insights/how-ai-can-boost-productivity-and-jump-start-growth   JP Morgan Chase. 2024. Artificial Intelligence Research . [Online] Available at: https://www.jpmorgan.com/technology/artificial-intelligence   Klarna. 2024. Klarna AI assistant handles two-thirds of customer service chats in its first month . [Online] Available at: https://www.klarna.com/international/press/klarna-ai-assistant-handles-two-thirds-of-customer-service-chats-in-its-first-month/   MAIS. 2024. Mauritius Artificial Intelligence Strategy . Government of Mauritius. [Online] Available at: https://ncb.govmu.org/ncb/strategicplans/MauritiusAIStrategy2018.pdf   Moll, B., Lukasz, R., & Pascual, R. 2022. Uneven Growth: Automation’s Impact on Income and Wealth Inequality . [Online] Available at: https://benjaminmoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/UG.pdf   NAIRDSP. 2023. National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan . National Science and Technology Council. [Online] Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/National-Artificial-Intelligence-Research-and-Development-Strategic-Plan-2023-Update.pdf   OECD. 2013. Responsiveness of public services: Timeliness . Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Publishing. [Online] Available at:  https://doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2013-54-en   OECD. 2023. 2023 Digital Government Index . Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Publishing. [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en   Oliveira, T. et al. 2022.  Alice: Desafios, resultados e perspectivas da ferramenta de auditoria contínua de compras públicas governamentais com uso de inteligência artificial . [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.36428/revistadacgu.v14i26.530   OpenAI. 2024a. GPT-4 Technical Report . [Online] Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.08774   OpenAI. 2024b . Moderna and OpenAI partner to accelerate the development of life-saving treatments.  [Online] Available at: https://openai.com/index/moderna/ Ormond, E. 2023. Emergence of Artificial Intelligence in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W4W5d6iYuLc   Paris-Saclay. 2023. Paris-Saclay dévoile TWIN 2030 un jumeau numérique territorial à large échelle pour une politique publique de nouvelle generation . [Online] Available at: https://www.paris-saclay.com/fileadmin/documents/1._L_agglo/Espace_Presse/Paris-Saclay_Twin_2030.pdf   Pomeroy, R. 2023. How AI played an instrumental role in making mRNA vaccines . [Online] Available at: https://bigthink.com/health/ai-mrna-vaccines-moderna/   RFI. 2024. French government will use AI to modernise public services .  [Online] Available at: https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20240423-french-government-will-use-ai-to-modernise-public-services   Rio Tinto. 2016. Rio Tinto outlines new $5 billion productivity push under long-term strategy focused on cash generation. [Online] Available at: https://www.riotinto.com/en/news/releases/2016/5bn-productivity-push-outlined   Scott, M. 2022. SA Budget Review 2022: The Shrinking PIT tax base . [Online] Available at: https://www.ey.com/en_za/insights/tax/the-shrinking-pit-tax-base-what-s-next   Siemens. 2023. AI for Everyone.  [Online] Available at: https://webinars.sw.siemens.com/en-US/mindsphere-analytic-tools-how-does-ai-work-with-iot/   Singh, K. 2023. UBI Financing and Its Long-Term Impacts in Economies with a Large Informal Sector.  [Online] Available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/impactevaluations/ubi-financing-and-its-long-term-impacts-economies-large-informal-sector-guest   SNDGO. 2019. Singapore National Artificial Intelligence Strategy . Smart Nation and Digital Government Office. [Online] Available at: https://www.smartnation.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/national-aistrategy.pdf?sfvrsn=2c3bd8e9_4   Social Income. 2024. World Poverty Statistics 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://socialincome.org/en/int/world-poverty-statistics-2024   Ubaldi, B. & Zapata, R. 2024. Government with Artificial Intelligence: Are Government Ready? Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Publishing. [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/26324bc2-en.pdf?expires=1722873693&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=6DAA28EDC7DB05B28D3531F98746C1AB   Verma, P. & De Vynck, G. 2023. ChatGPT took their jobs. Now they walk dogs and fix air conditioners.  [Online] Available at:   https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/06/02/ai-taking-jobs/   WEF. 2020. Future of Jobs Report 2020 . World Economic Forum. [Online] Available at: https://www.weforum.org/publications/the-future-of-jobs-report-2020/   WEF. 2023. Future of Jobs Report 2023 . World Economic Forum. [Online] Available at: https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs_2023.pdf   Wheeler, T. 2023. The three challenges of AI regulation . [Online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-three-challenges-of-ai-regulation/     WIPO. 2020. Sovereign Wealth Funds and Innovation Investing in an Era of Mounting Uncertainty. World Intellectual Property Organization . [Online] Available at: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2020-chapter5.pdf   Yang, C. 2022. How Artificial Intelligence Technology Affects Productivity and Employment: Firm-Level Evidence from Taiwan . [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j .respol.2022.104536        - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 1/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. J A N U A R Y 2 0 2 5 Prof William Gumede Former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; former Senior Associate Member and Oppenheimer Fellow,   St Antony’s College, Oxford University; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg). Abstract One of the main reasons for post-apartheid South Africa’s low growth, development and peace has been the continued polarisation along ethnic, colour and political affiliation. Colonial and apartheid governments insisted that South Africa is a country with vastly different ethnic communities always on the verge of communal conflict, unless they are separated and run by one group or by a strong central state. Yet, after 350 years of this approach, South African communities are not ‘gated communities’ with fixed borders; often, they overlap meaningfully, with ‘interconnected differences’.  The fact that the country is so ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse should be the central element of a unique South African identity.  The starting point must be the premise that there cannot be one single definition of who is a South African or one sole defining culture that indicates South Africanness.   The best way forward then is not Afrikaner or African nationalism, but rather “civic nationalism”, building a shared citizenship around a common civic identity, trumping individual or group ethnic-based identities. The glue that holds diverse societies together is equal rights and shared democratic cultures, values and institutions, rather than ethnic nationalism. However, this necessitates political leaders who govern and deliver at all times for every South African, not just for one political party, faction or ethnic group. And citizens who support leaders, whether in government, politics, business or traditional affairs, on the basis of democratic values, not colour, ethnicity and culture. Herein lies the challenge of building a common South Africanness and a successful nation.   Introduction   South Africa’s bitter history of more than 350 years of colonialism and apartheid – with its accompanied ethnic division, conflict and state-sponsored economic inequalities – makes the challenge of cobbling together a new South Africanness, from our divided past, so much harder, yet so much more urgent.   Almost three decades after apartheid, it appears that the ethnicisation and Balkanisation of South Africa along ethnic lines set by apartheid continues. Although, this time not by official state policy, but because of the failure of the state to deliver public services equitably; the failure of the democracy to deliver economic dividends. However, some governing party leaders, populist opposition leaders, parties, groups, public figures and online influencers, blame state, economic and democracy failures on ethnic groups different to them (Malema, 2018; Tandwa, 2019; Gumede, 2021).    Former President Jacob Zuma’s mobilisation of specifically isiZulu-speakers in order to become leader of the African National Congress (ANC) in 2007 and South Africa in 2009, the perception, in the period before the 29 May 2024 general elections of rising exclusion of minorities within the then governing ANC and, as a direct result of this, new ethnic-based opposition political parties forming, have contributed to undermining a common South Africanness (Gumede, 2009, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2013).   There has been a rise in incidents where one ethnic, colour or regional group has often been scapegoated for the lack of advancement of another community. A typical example is Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) leader Julius Malema attacking South Africans of Indian ancestry for allegedly dominating affirmative action leadership and management positions in the private sector (Malema, 2018).   Persistent institutional racism, “the systematic distribution of resources, power and opportunity in our society to the benefit of people who are white and the exclusion of people of colour”,  undermines a common South Africa that cuts across race, ethnicity and colour (Dyer, 2002). Racial solidarity, where black and white South Africans support others solely on the basis of their ethnicity or colour, not only undermines a common South Africa, but also undermines common nationhood (West, 1993).   South Africa has no choice but to build a common South Africanness. If the country does not, there will be no future for any single community – or for the country’s collective communities – as South Africa will be plunged into ethnic strife, which will make economic growth, development and prosperity impossible, whether at the individual, community or collective community level (Réaume, 1988; Mason, 2000; Appiah, 2005). Diverse countries with divided pasts need a “civil religion” as an alternative model for common nationhood   Diverse developing countries with a politically divided past, such as South Africa, obviously cannot find a solution in a nationalism based on shared culture or common citizenship or living in a shared space, alone – often assumed in Western models of nationhood (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991; Miller, 1995).   One of the great African scholars of ethnicity, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) observed how the Achilles heel of many African post-independence and liberation movements has been their difficulty in constructing citizenship as an inclusive concept.   Like India, both colonial and apartheid governments have insisted that South Africa is a “society of self-enforced communities, always potentially – and in the absence of the (colonial or apartheid) state, actually – in gruesome conflict with one another” (Khilnani, 2003).   Yet, more than 350 years of colonialism and apartheid has meant that South African identities are not ‘gated communities’ with fixed borders; often, they overlap meaningfully, beyond the occasional shared word or value (Khilnani, 2003; Gumede, 2012) . Our modern South Africanness therefore cannot be but a ‘layered’, plural and inclusive one, and one based on acceptance of our ‘interconnected differences’ ( Khilnani, 2003; Gumede, 2010, 2012).   The fact that South Africa has a multiple identity should be the basis of its shared South Africanness. The country is a melting pot of people with their roots in Africa, the East and the West (Gumede, 2018) . On the face of it, in many cases, at the end of colonialism and apartheid there may have remained distinctly different communities, despite centuries of intermixture.   The challenge for any South African leader or governing party is how to build a common sense of South Africanness and “shared responsibility for a common destiny”, on the basis of our ‘interconnected differences’ (Khilnani, 2003). The fact that we are so ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse should then be the central building block of a unique South African identity. The country’s democracy is based on a compromise between the diverse political groups and acceptance of our differences (Gumede, 2005). A common South African identity and the future will have to be built as a mosaic of the best elements of our diverse pasts and present, histories and cultures.   The best way forward for South Africa is not Afrikaner or African nationalism, but what Michael Ignatieff (1993) described as “civic nationalism”, which aims to build a shared citizenship around a common civic identity (Stilz, 2009), where such a civic identity trumps individual or group ethnic-based identities.    In “civic nationalism” the glue that holds communities together is equal rights and shared democratic cultures, values and institutions, rather than ethnic nationalism, whether Zulu, Indian, Afrikaner or coloured group identities (Gumede, 2012a). In civic nationalism, a nation “ need not be unified by commonalities of language or culture [where ‘culture’ refers to the traditions and customs of a particular national group]” (Stilz, 2009: 257). Citizens of all ethnic, race and religious groups must embrace democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic values and behaviour.   This means the state does not favour one ethnic group, culture or language, but instead, embraces the multiple ethnic groups, cultures and languages within the borders of the country (Habermas, 1998: 228). Jürgen Habermas argues that the different political cultures and identities within a country must be superseded by a shared national democratic political culture (Habermas, 1998: 118). The political culture that becomes the national political culture is not that of one political party or tradition, but is a shared political culture built on democracy, values and an inclusive state.   To do so, a country with South Africa’s diversity has no other alternative but to build what the US sociologist Robert N. Bellah (1967) described – when referring to the US common democratic values, institutions and rituals – as a “civil religion”, which he argues has been crucial to that country’s national identity. Bellah built his case for a “civil religion” – and expands on it beautifully – based on Rousseau’s original description of it, being “the existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance” (Rousseau, 2003: Chapter 8, Book 4).   Clearly, in the South African case, the central tenet of a common South Africanness must be a “civil religion” – based on inclusive democracy, ethnic, colour and political diversity, core shared values, and empathy for the vulnerable – that cut across the racial, colour and political divide (Gumede, 2005, 2012a, 2012b).   Crisis of South Africa’s inclusive non-racial nation-building project   South Africa’s nation-building project has hit a crisis, with many seeming to believe that the country’s diversity is an obstacle to development, growth and peace. Some wrongly say that the country can prosper if led by only one group, excluding others, whether based on ethnic, colour or political lines, while others say that some communities are not African enough (Malema, 2018; Shivambu, 2018; PTI, 2021).    Increasingly there have been public criticisms of a rise in ethnic-based appointments at national, provincial and local government level, and in state-owned entities (Gumede, 2021). Until the establishment of the Government of National Unity, which includes representatives of 11 parties, after the 29 May 2024 general elections, appointments to leadership in the ANC, government departments and state-owned entities (SOEs) have increasingly been criticised for lacking racial diversity.   Furthermore, many Cabinet ministers have often been accused of appearing to only appoint members from their ethnic community to senior positions in their departments and SOEs reporting to them – making some government departments appear to be Bantustans (Gumede, 2021).   Higher Education Minister Blade Nzimande is just one senior government leader who has been accused of favouring individuals from KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) in appointments to his department and its entities – an accusation which he has denied (Head, 2021). There are many SOEs and agencies where there are boards and executives made up of individuals of only one colour, or one ethnic group, making a mockery of South Africa’s diversity, and constitutional obligations to ensure diversity and representation in public appointments (Gumede, 2021).    The appearance of the ethnicisation of the ANC at some levels has led to many of the excluded communities not feeling psychologically safe, meaning they do not believe their interests will be looked after by the party (Delizonna, 2017; Van der Loo and Beks, 2020; Gumede, 2021). Many who feel excluded by the ANC because of ethnicity or colour, find the new ethnic-based and minority parties that have mushroomed appealing – these parties have done well in the 1 November 2021 local government elections (Gumede, 2021) and the 29 May 2024 national and provincial elections, with parties such as the Patriotic Alliance and Cape Coloured Congress gaining significant footholds.   The lack of diversity in national, provincial and municipal governments, and state entities robs the country of ideas, skills and capacity – because the full spectrum of the country’s talents is not used to foster growth, development and public services. It is therefore one of the main reasons for lack of equitable development, poor public services delivery, and failure of the state.   There has been rising scapegoating of minorities by new Africanist and populist parties such as the EFF, and online populists, blaming minorities for all South Africa’s complex problems. Although many of the country’s problems stem from its apartheid past, many have also been created or exacerbated by current government incompetence, corruption and irrational policies.   For example, as mentioned above, EFF leader Julius Malema in a press conference verging on hate speech, attacked South Africans of Indian ancestry for supposedly dominating affirmative action leadership and management positions in the private and public sectors (Malema, 2018). In 2002, playwright Mbongeni Ngema wrote a song in isiZulu that incited South Africans of Indian ancestry (PTI, 2021). Former President Nelson Mandela had to step in to calm tensions between the communities following the song (PTI, 2021).   One of the standouts of the 1 November 2021 local elections has been the dramatic rise and success of ethnic-based parties at the municipal level. Many communities, feeling excluded by the ANC and the state, and frightened by the anti-diversity politics of the EFF, find parties promoting their excluded ethnic group or who defend the cause of minorities in general, appealing (Gumede, 2021).   The ANC’s increasing exclusion of minorities within the party, the rising attacks on minorities by new Africanist and populist parties such as the EFF and the Patriotic Alliance, and the failure of the state to provide public services, benefits and jobs to South Africans of all ethnic communities, have resulted in many communities retreating into ethnic laagers, seeking comfort in clan, tribe and colour kinship ( Gumede, 2021).     New parties such as the Cape Coloured Congress, the Patriotic Alliance repositioning itself to appeal to disillusioned coloured voters, the Al Jama-ah party targeting Muslims, and the Freedom Front Plus refashioning itself as a party not only for whites, but also for other minorities, have made significant electoral inroads (Gumede, 2021). Many politicians have increasingly opportunistically used the race or ethnic card for self-enrichment or to cover up wrongdoing, which undermines the building of a common South African identity (Molefe, 2016; Mantashe, 2016). Others, again, support individuals who are corrupt, do wrong or are incompetent, solely on their colour ( Gumede, 2018) . On occasions when there are incidents of blind racial solidarity, where groups support individuals solely on the basis of their colour, even these individuals undermine the democratic constitution, institutions and values, or behave violently (Gumede, 2018).   In 2021 the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) found that Western Cape Judge President Hlophe was guilty of gross misconduct and should be impeached by Parliament (JSC, 2021). The JSC found that Judge Hlophe tried to influence Justice Bess Nkabinde and Justice Chris Jafta in the case they presided over, in which former President Jacob Zuma was accused of corruption with French armaments company Thint. In 2021, the Black Lawyers Association nominated Judge Hlophe to become Chief Justice, based partially on his blackness, while ignoring the impropriety he was found guilty of by the JSC (Thamm, 2021).   When former President Jacob Zuma was arrested for contempt of court for refusing to answer questions about corruption under his presidency at the Zondo Commission, many of his supporters called on isiZulu-speakers to rally behind him, to defend him in Zulu solidarity, ignoring the poverty, unemployment and public service failures caused by Zuma’s corruption, incompetence and unresponsiveness to all South Africans, including Zulus (Gumede, 2012b).   Zuma explicitly mobilised voters in KZN to support him on the basis of his Zuluness during past elections for the ANC and the country’s presidency (Gumede, 2018). In fact, d uring the Zuma presidency, the ANC transformed into a party made up of something almost akin to ethnic provincial blocs. In ANC provincial branches, the ethnic community that dominated the province often also dominated the leaders and government of the province, to the exclusion of other communities (Gumede, 2021).   Some South Africans doggedly support leaders, views and positions of their “own” ethnic group, colour and political affiliation, no matter if these leaders are corrupt, wrong and violent; and even if supporting their “own” goes against their personal, financial and future interests (Gumede, 2018).  This includes black individuals, political organisations that are predominantly black, and civil society organisations established to focus on issues affecting black communities often supporting leaders, viewpoints and leadership just because they are black, even if they are corrupt, incumbent and dishonest (Gumede, 2021).   Some white South Africans think that competence is reserved for whites, and thus also undermine a common South African identity (Gumede, 2018). Instances of white incompetence cannot be ignored, either. When blacks do well, it should not be dismissed as being because of their ‘political connections’, and so on.   In March 2021, during a session of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Higher Education, Science and Technology, ANC MP Jane Mananiso said that black vice chancellors of universities appear to be less competent than their white peers (Mananiso, 2021). Such blanket statements attributing competence or incompetence based on colour are wrong. Afterwards, Ahmed Bawa, chief executive officer of Universities South Africa, rightly said it is unfair to “lump all black vice chancellors together and simply say that they are all incompetent” (Naidu, 2021).   The American scholar of race, Cornel West (1993), warns against the pitfalls of what he calls a resort to black ‘authenticity’ politics, whereby every issue is reduced to ‘racial reasoning’. He argues rightly that we must “replace racial reasoning with moral reasoning, to understand the black-freedom struggle not as an affair of skin pigmentation and racial phenotype but rather as a matter of ethical principles and wise politics” (West, 1993).   South Africa’s Covid-19 economic downturn has and will continue to increase racial tensions (World Bank, 2021). Some white South Africans who fall into economic difficulties will be tempted to blame a black-dominated ANC government for being ‘against’ them. Poorer black South Africans may also be seduced to turn their anger solely on whites in general, rather than seeing it as a combination of the legacy of apartheid inequities and misguided policies by black-dominated democratic governments.   The ethnicisation of South Africa’s politics undermines social inclusion, common nationhood, and integration of all ethnic communities in the life of the country. It leads to the Bantustanisation of the country. The truth is, no single ethnic community, colour or political group in South Africa can develop by excluding others.   No one single definition of who is African or South African    The starting point for fostering a common South Africanness must be the premise that there cannot be one single definition of who is a South African. The obvious basic building block is identifying oneself as South African. The definition of being South African can never be narrow, it must be inclusive, embracing and democratic (Gumede, 2005, 2012a, 2012b).   The ethnic, language and regional diversity bequeathed by both colonialism and apartheid must mean that modern South Africanness cannot be but a ‘layered’, interwoven mosaic (Gumede, 2021). Former President Nelson Mandela’s 1962 statement in the dock during his political trial for inciting resistance against the apartheid government neatly put it, saying South Africanness cannot be defined in relation to a majority community (Mandela, 2013). At the same token there cannot be one sole defining culture that indicates South Africanness.   Being African, within South Africa’s plural South Africanness, cannot ever take only one form, but should be, because of the country’s unique history, more nuanced, multiple and diverse. Retreating into “nativism”, wanting to seek an exclusive definition of South Africanness or who is an African – which over-rides the Constitution’s core definition arguing for multiple identities, diversity and inclusivity as the pillars of South Africanness – undermines the idea of an inclusive South African identity.   Alarmingly, increasingly, but wrongly, many perceive who or what is African in South Africa very narrowly, either only based on one type of pigmentation, ethnicity of forbearers or level of suffering ( Quintal, 2006; SAPA, 2011; Malema, 2018; Shivambu, 2018). This leads to the misguided phenomenon that some people are perceived as supposedly not African or black enough, because of their skin colour, language or historical ethnic background. This for many South Africans leads to unnecessary trauma and questioning of their sense of identity and sense of belonging.    Africanness or an African identity in the South African context cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be the same as in, say, a Nigerian, Zimbabwean or Ghanian context.   South Africa was not colonised in the same way that many other African countries were colonised. South Africa was colonised in the 1600s by European powers as part of what became known in mainstream history as the “New World”, in a similar way to countries like Brazil, the US and Cuba (Lloyd and Metzer, 2013).   In this New World type of colonialism, indigenous people inhabited these countries prior to colonialism, which brought settlers from colonial countries. In many cases colonialism also brought subjected peoples from other parts of the world, whether as slaves or subjects. These societies over time became ethnically, culturally and pigmentationally mixed.   Even the indigenous communities who were present before colonialism often had mixed to one degree or another. The apartheid project was largely based on preventing any further intermixing of colours, languages and communities.   An African identity in the South African context is therefore more diverse than in most other African countries – and that is also the overwhelming character, uniqueness and strength of Africanness in the South African context. It is the basis of the country’s national identity, its mirror unto itself, and its face to the world.   An African identity in the context of South Africa’s African identity is its diversity – and that is also the individual, collective and the country’s identity.   Accepting diversity also crucial for growth, inclusive developmental and societal peace   Embracing, building on and leveraging South Africa’s diversity is crucial to lifting economic growth, inclusive development and maintaining societal peace (Raz, 1986; Gradstein and Justman, 2018; Rodriguez‑Pose and von Berlepsch, 2019).  In fact, o ne of the reasons for post-apartheid South Africa’s low growth, development and societal peace trajectory has been the rejection of diversity – the continued polarisation along ethnic, colour and political affiliation (Barry, 1993; Laitin and Fearon, 2003; Goodin, 2007).   Many South Africans, whether in the ANC, EFF or among black political parties on the populist left, appear to believe that the country’s diversity is an obstacle and that one ethnic, colour or political group could successfully drive the country’s development, lift economic growth levels and bring societal peace on their own (Malema, 2018; Shivambu, 2018).   But growth, development and peace will not come from one group controlling South Africa at all levels, at the exclusion of others who are different from the dominant group (Goodin, 2007; PTI, 2021).   More recently, appointments to leadership in the ANC, government departments and state-owned entities increasingly have low levels of diversity, which is one reason for the persistent poor performance of these entities. Some South Africans will doggedly support leaders, views and positions of their “own” ethnic group, colour and political affiliation, no matter if these are corrupt, wrong and violent; and even if supporting their “own” goes against personal, financial and future interests (Malema, 2018).   Of course, the reality is that extreme poverty among many of South Africa’s previously disadvantaged communities often prevents them from seeking closer relations with communities from different ethnic, colour or even political affiliations. Having lost political power, fearing black resentment of their apartheid accrued social capital, and black populists often blaming white South Africans for sometimes self-inflicted government failure, have also driven many white South Africans into white laagers.   More importantly, the stunning failure by the ANC government to govern honestly, make decisions in the best interests of the largest number of South Africans, and provide quality public services to all has driven many communities into tribal laagers, seeking safety among those with whom they share ethnicity, language or colour.     Many South African ethnic, language and colour communities wrongly fear that embracing those communities who appear different from them will erode their own ethnic, cultural and language identity. Moreover, some leaders regularly exhort their supporters to marginalise others based on ethnicity, colour and political affiliation; claiming that only if “their” group is in charge, will South Africa see development, growth and societal peace. They are sorely mistaken (Shivambu, 2018).   Former President Jacob Zuma, in 2012, reflected the wrongheaded notion that some South African ethnic communities have more rights than others. “Sorry, we have more rights here because we are a majority. You have fewer rights because you are a minority. Absolutely, that’s how democracy works. So, it is a question of accepting the rules within democracy and you must operate in them” (Zuma, 2012).    The apartheid government tried to have one colour group control South Africa, but that racist experiment failed, because it was not sustainable; the economic growth, development and societal peace was temporary. The inevitable explosion was only postponed. The more ethnically, colour and politically polarised a society, the worse its economic, development and peace performance.   A country is fortunate to be able to draw on the vast networks, social capital, and knowledge of diverse communities ( Gradstein and Justman, 2018; Rodriguez‑Pose and von Berlepsch, 2019). In fact, a prerequisite for South Africa to foster a common nationhood is for the vast talents of all South Africans, not only those of the same colour, party or faction, to be used. If the opposite case prevails, it will undermine nation-building, as it leaves those deliberately marginalised or excluded, whether black or white, shut out.   South Africa has, up to now, not been able to reap the growth, development and peace benefits of its diversity. Its diversity should be South Africa’s competitive advantage, not its curse ( Gradstein and Justman, 2018; Rodriguez‑Pose and von Berlepsch, 2019).   However, this does not mean a national identity based on a singular shared culture, language or ethnicity.   As   Nelson Mandela stated from court docks in 1962, it also should not be defined solely in relation to one majority community (Mandela, 2012).   In times of crisis, whether based on economic collapse, corruption or state failure, in the post-colonial or post-apartheid period, citizens, in countries with diverse roots such as South Africa, may fall back on historical self-identities, groups and divisions of the past – making the forging of a shared new identity much harder, yet so much more urgent. Crucially, building a shared South African common identity must therefore involve economic redress, tackling racism, and a rebalance of apartheid-inherited power relations.   South African common identity based on democracy    Because the nation, termed the ‘imagined political community’ by the scholar of nationalism, Benedict Anderson (1991), is so diverse, creating a new South Africanness will have to be based on politics. What then is the basis of our common political identity? A common South Africanness will have to be weaved around the idea of an inclusive democracy.    South Africa’s founding myth – based on politics – is the fact that the country managed to rise out of the ashes of a civil war, peacefully construct a democratic dispensation based on a new democratic constitution, anchored in South Africa’s ethnic diversity, and a new set of democratic values, rules and political culture. The founding document of our political settlement that ended apartheid and ushered in non-racial democracy is our constitution.   South Africans will have to transform their individual self-identity away from the narrow white, Zulu, Afrikaner, coloured or Indian – or narrow colour or political identities – to a broader South Africanness, which is vested in democracy, democratic values, and ethnic and racial inclusivity. Altogether these would be the basis for common interests and a ‘national consensus’ across the ethnic, political and colour divide. Our common ambition should be to mould a new democratic identity for South Africa.   Because South Africanness is a political construct, there are some obvious pitfalls.  Since democracy and the new Constitution are at the heart of South Africa’s new identity, undermining both cannot but undermine the formation of a new South Africanness. Yet, increasingly, the Constitution has often not been treated as a founding document by some political leaders.   As Larry Diamond, the American democracy scholar, argues, once a departure from the democratic rules and behaviour becomes a ‘recurring and defining feature’ (it does happen to some degree in all democracies), it will remain a hollow democracy. And for our purposes, if the democracy is of low quality, it will be impossible to foster a ‘new national democratic identity’ (Diamond, 1997).  A new democratic South African identity necessitates widespread public trust in the Constitution, democratic institutions and democratic system overall. A prerequisite for developing a common South Africanness is absolute loyalty – not to a party, leader or tribe, but to the country’s Constitution.   The South African Constitution has often not been treated as a founding document by many ANC leaders and members. In many cases, the ANC’s constitution is seen as above the country’s Constitution. But “to survive, a constitution must have more than philosophical or logical appeal; it must be viewed by most citizens as worth defending” (Weingast, 1997).   Because South Africa’s common identity is built on politics, its constitution will have to be continuously motivated for. It is not one that will be enacted by decree or good intentions alone, but rather, it will rely on constantly having a quality democracy, inclusive democratic institutions, and a capable state delivering services equitably (Dahl, 1989, 1990).   South Africa cannot have competing governance systems to the democratic Constitution   There cannot be competing governance systems to the Constitution, either. The organisational culture of the ANC has increasingly also become the national political culture of the country, upstaging the democratic Constitution (Gumede, 2018). The ANC’s seminal March 2007 discussion document on organisational renewal acknowledged there is tension between the “imperatives of the ANC as a national liberation movement with a distinct culture and revolutionary traditions”, and the “demands and obligations” of the government overseeing a democracy (ANC, 2007).   Since it took power in 1994, the more secretive, intolerant and centralised decision-making aspects of its exile, underground military wings, appear to have come to dominate the party’s culture. There is a wrong belief among many ANC leaders and members that the party laws are above those of the country’s Constitution, laws and individual conscience (Mthembu, 2018).   For example, former President Jacob Zuma some time ago warned that ANC MPs should serve the ANC first, before the Constitution, which of course devalues the Constitution (Makinana, Stone and Nhlabathi, 2016). For another, many ANC leaders and members reckon that the ANC and its leadership are above democratic institutions, such as parliament; and that the rules of the party have preference over the Constitution, democratic laws or democratic institutions such as parliament. An ANC leader or member of parliament may do something illegal – but it only becomes illegal if the party says so.   Former President Zuma said: “ ANC leaders in government should not regard South Africa’s Constitution as being ‘more important’ than the ANC because this would land them in trouble.” The leader of the Congress of the People, Patrick Lekota, responding to Zuma’s anti-Constitution statement said that elevating the ANC above the country’s Constitution “is an absolute disaster” for democracy and will “reduce to nil whatever gains of democracy we have cherished and continue to hope will become” (Van Onselen, 2008).   South Africa has other parallel governance systems competing with the Constitution. The governance system of traditional chiefs, leaders and structures, with its guiding ideology of patriarchy, directly challenges and competes with South Africa’s democratic Constitution, laws and values. Pockets of many rural areas have turned into parallel states, where either traditional kings, chiefs or leaders have turned these areas into their quasi-states, which run parallel to South Africa’s constitutional state (Mnisi Weeks, 2015).   South Africa’s former homelands, in particular, have been entrenched, as they were during the apartheid era, with unelected kings, chiefs and traditional leaders and their councils ruling without democracy, controlling communal land and mining rights, with citizens having little rights and where gender equality is a foreign concept.   The system of African traditional chiefs, leaders and structures should be abolished or, if retained, reformed to be in line with constitutional democratic norms, to ensure social, gender and age equality and promote individuals’ freedom of choice.   Former President Jacob Zuma shored up the power of traditional kings, chiefs and leaders, just like many leaders of other African independence and liberation movements, in return for these individuals to compel their “subjects” to vote for the ANC (Gumede, 2012; Mnisi Weeks, 2015; Stoddard, 2017). Although customary law is recognised in democratic South Africa, it is meant to be subject to the Constitution, democratic institutions and laws, not above these.   Organised criminal groups are in some cases also operating as parallel states, handing out their own justice, providing “services” and employment. In many townships, gangs form parallel states, controlling resources, setting “laws” and forcing ordinary citizens to pay “taxes” to them in their “jurisdictions” (Kinnes, 2017; Imray, 2020; Cruywagen, 2021). In these areas the Constitutional rules, values and laws do not apply.     An accountable democratic state crucial for a common democratic South African identity    Because a democratic state is so central in building a new common South Africanness, the legitimacy of the state will hinge on whether it delivers. Herein lies the danger for nation-building, which is premised on an effective, inclusive and caring state.   The nature of South Africa’s transition to a democracy meant that it was always going to be difficult for any democratic government in South Africa to build a national consensus centred on a new democratic state – unless the state delivers.   Because of South Africa’s negotiated compromise, the apartheid state that many black South Africans saw and fought against as illegitimate, was taken over by the new democratic government. The failure of the democratic state to deliver services to black South Africans has undermined many black South Africans’ confidence in the democratic state, just as they lacked confidence in the apartheid state, which did not deliver to them.   A combination of lack of public service delivery, a seemingly indifferent democratic state, and the perceptions that only a few blacks connected to the top ANC leadership and whites, who by virtue of education and pre-1994 policies benefit economically from the democracy, undermine any nation-building efforts.   Trust in the state, public leadership and democratic institutions, and in democracy itself, depends on these institutions being accountable, honest and effective.   Public corruption that appears to go unpunished or only with selective punishment (the perception is that if the person is closely connected to the right faction of the ANC, then wrongdoing is often not punished or the person is just given a slap on the wrist), undermines the democratic legitimacy, credibility and trust of the state.     Leadership that strengthens a common South Africanness   Leadership style matters very much. There is going to be a premium on South Africa’s political leaders to govern at all times for every South African, not just for one political party, faction or ethnic group.   Good public leadership is a pillar of good democratic governance, the way the values of the country, as encompassed within the Constitution, are embedded. Leaders can either foster the underlying values – inclusive nationhood and peaceful co-existence – set out in democratic constitutions, or undermine these.   A case in point is the fact that former President Nelson Mandela, like India’s Mohandas Gandhi, purposefully tried to evoke through his own personality a symbol of all-South African patriotism around which all South Africans could rally, no matter their colour, ethnicity or political allegiance.    People often say South Africa lacks leadership. What they mean is that we need leaders that would govern in the best interests of all. Leadership that is in the widest public interest, aligned with the values of the Constitution and which is compassionate, promotes democratic governance. Leaders must follow the rules applicable to everyone else. Flagrant ignorance of the new democratic laws by post-apartheid leaders won’t do.   Leadership is at a higher premium in societies that are ethnically diverse, have high levels of inequality, and where democratic rules, institutions and governance are not fully embraced by all. Poor leadership prevents the institutionalisation of democratic constitutions, laws and racial inclusivity. It will mean ordinary citizens supporting leaders, whether in government, politics, business or traditional affairs, on the basis of democratic values, not colour, ethnicity and culture.     Solidarity, social justice and caring for the vulnerable    Building commonality on the basis of difference presents a unique challenge. In the South African type of colonial and apartheid history, w hite skins were bestowed with more social, political and economic power. Power was further dispersed based on skin pigmentation.   Race, and the continued legacy of apartheid inequalities, where most blacks are poor and whites better off, is one of the fault lines in the country’s efforts to build a common South Africanness. Therefore, building a shared South African common identity must involve economic redress, tackling racism, and a rebalance of apartheid-inherited power relations.   A common South Africanness must be built on solidarity for the vulnerable across ethnicity, colour and political affiliation. T his means that social justice must underpin governing.    It will be critical that economic development policies focus on genuinely uplifting not only the poor, but the widest number of people at the same time, whatever their race, colour or political affiliation – rather than a small elite, whether white or black or both. If the poor black majority is left out of prosperity, a common South Africanness will remain a fading dream.     Conclusion    The lack of grown-up elected and public leadership, lack of rational thinking in public discourse and lack of knowledge of the diversity, complexity and varied history by many of their own country beyond their immediate village, social and political setting, has contributed to the often-despairing limited view of South Africanness (Gumede, 2012). We need deeper, better-quality discussions, debates and information on what constitutes a new post-apartheid South African identity at the individual, communal and national level.   Nevertheless, a common South African identity cannot ever take only one form, but should be, because of the country’s unique history, more nuanced, multiple and diverse.   The post-apartheid collective identity-building project has to be building a ‘layered’, plural one based on acceptance of our ‘interconnected differences’. A common South African  identity in the context of South Africa is the country’s diversity – and that is also the individual, collective and the country’s identity.   This means that S outh Africans will have to transform their individual self-identity away from the narrow white, Zulu, coloured or Indian, to a more inclusive South Africanness. Being born into the Zulu, white, coloured or Indian “community” should be only one aspect of Africanness or South Africanness, and not the only one – as it alarmingly is, in many instances, the case now.     A South African identity would be taking parts of all communities, adding to those ones born into, and discarding aspects that are discriminatory, impinging on human rights and dignity of others. A common South African identity is partially based on politics. And because of this, South Africanness will have to be continuously motivated for. It is not one that will be enacted by decree or good intentions alone.   South Africanness must be based on self-identities that are vested in the common constitution, democracy, democratic institutions and democratic values. These together with an inclusive state and acceptance of diversity must be the central pillars of a common South Africanness.      References Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.  London: Verso. Appiah, K.A. 2005. The Ethics of Identity. US: Princeton: Princeton University Press. Barry, B. 1993. Culture and Equality.  US: Harvard University Press. Bellah, R.N. 1967. Civil religion in America, Dædalus, Winter, 2005; 134 (4): 40–55. Brown, J.M. 2003. Nehru: A Political Life . US: Yale University Press. Cruywagen, V. 2021. Gangs of the Cape Flats: An alternative form of governance in desperate times . [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-06-18-gangs-of-the-cape-flats-an-alternative-form-of-governance-in-desperate-times/ [accessed: 9 December]. Dahl, R. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. US: Yale University Press. Dahl, R. 1990. After the Revolution. US: Yale University Press. Delizonna, L. 2017. High-Performing Teams Need Psychological Safety. Here’s How to Create It . [Online] Available at: https://hbr.org/2017/08/high-performing-teams-need-psychological-safety-heres-how-to-create-it [accessed: 9 December]. Diamond, L. 1997. Is the third wave of democratisation over? The Imperative of Consolidation . [Online] Available at: https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old_files/documents/237_0.pdf  [accessed: 9 December]. Dyer, R. 2002. The Matter of Whiteness, in Paula S. Rothenberg (ed) White Privilege: Essential Readings on the Other Side , pp.9-14. New York: Worth Publishers. Gandhi, M.K. 1983. An Autobiography: The Story of my Experiments with Truth . Boston: Beacon Press. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism . New York: Cornell University Press. Goodin, R. 2007. Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives, Philosophy & Public Affairs ,   35: 40–68. Gopal, S. 2004. Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (three volumes) . US: Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gorski, P. 2017. American Covenant: A History of Civil Religion from the Puritans to the Present.  Princeton: Princeton: Princeton University Press Gradstein, M. and Justman, M. 2018. Diversity and Growth . [Online] Available at: https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/11553/diversity-and-growth [accessed: 9 December]. Gumede, W . 2005. Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC . Cape Town: Struik Random House. Gumede, W . 2010. The Search for our Shared South Africanness . [Online] Available at: https://sabarometerblog.wordpress.com/archive/volume-eight-2010/the-search-for-our-shared-south-africanness/ [accessed: 9 December]. Gumede, W . 2012a. Restless Nation: Making Sense of Troubled Times . Cape Town: Tafelberg. Gumede, W . 2012b. Zuma strategy for top job stokes fires that may engulf entire country .  [Online] Available at: http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/zuma-strategy-for-top-job-stokes-fires-that-may-engulf-entire-country-1.1440714  [accessed: 9 December]. Gumede, W . 2013. Introduction: Nelson Mandela – No Easy Walk to Freedom . Cape Town: Tafelberg. Gumede, W. 2015. Introduction: Assata – the FBI’s most wanted woman. South Africa: HSRC Press. Gumede, W. 2018. Changing long-held undemocratic beliefs . [Online] Available at: https://www.democracyworks.org.za/policy-brief-25-the-power-of-philanthropy-to-build-resilient-citizens-institutions-democracies/ [accessed: 9 December]. Gumede, W. 2020. Government’s credibility waning after years of corruption and indifference . [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/analysis/william-gumede-governments-credibility-waning-after-years-of-corruption-and-indifference-20200507 [accessed: 9 December]. Gumede, W. 2021. Our strength lies in our diversity . [Online] Available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/2021-06-20-our-strength-lies-in-our-diversity/ [accessed: 9 December]. Gumede, W.  and Dikeni, L. (eds). 2009. The Poverty of Ideas: Democracy and the Retreat of South African Intellectuals . Johannesburg: Jacana. Habermas, J. 1998. Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic State, In Ciaran Cronin and Pablo de Greiff (eds), Inclusion of the Other , p.228. Cambridge: MIT Press. Head, T. 2021. ‘ Suspend Blade Nzimande!’ – More pressure heaped on under-fire minister . [Online] Available at: https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/why-blade-nzimande-suspended-what-accused-of-corruption/ [accessed: 9 December]. Ignatieff, M. 1993. Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism . New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Judicial Service Commission (JSC). 2021. Judicial Conduct Tribunal in the Matter Between: Justices of the Constitutional Court Complainants and Judge President M.J. Hlophe Respondent . [Online] Available at: https://lawlibrary.org.za/akn/za-gp/judgment/zagpjhc/2022/908/eng@2022-05-05 [accessed: 9 December]. Khilnani, S. 2003. The Idea of India . London: Penguin Books. Kinnes, I. 2017. Contested governance: police and gang interactions . [Online] Available at: https://open.uct.ac.za/items/3ca4eb61-5219-4c4f-9b2a-52a4cf6ac0a0 [accessed: 9 December]. Kymlicka, W. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship . US: Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, W. 2001. Politics in the Vernacular. US: Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laitin, D. 1992. Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Laitin, D. and Fearon, J. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, American Political Science Review, 97: 75–90. Lloyd , C. and Metzer , J. (eds). 2013. Settler Colonization and Societies in World History: Patterns and Concepts , Global Economic History Series , 9. Macedo, S. 2000. Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy. US: Harvard University Press. Makinana, A., Stone, S. and Nhlabathi, H. 2016. Zuma tells MPs to vote against motion, or else . [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/zuma-tells-mps-to-vote-against-motion-or-else-20161112 [accessed: 9 December]. Malema, J. 2018. Speech at Youth Day Event, Matlosana Stadium, Klerksdorp, June 17. Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism.  Princeton: Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mananiso, J. 2021. Comments by ANC MP Jane Mananiso at the Oversight Inquiry into the appointment of Professor Peter Mbati as the vice-chancellor of the Sefako Makgatho Health Sciences University . Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Higher Education, Science and Technology. National Assembly, Cape Town, March 5. Mandela, N. 2012. No Easy Walk to Freedom . Cape Town: Tafelberg. Mason, A. 2000. Community, Solidarity, and Belonging. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mnisi Weeks, S. 2015. Of a cruel king and the bitter battle for the soul of South Africa’s democracy.  [Online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/of-a-cruel-king-and-the-bitter-battle-for-the-soul-of-south-africas-democracy-49063 [accessed: 9 December]. Mthembu, J. 2018. Comments by the ANC Chief Whip Jackson Mthembu following the ANC parliamentary caucus meeting , National Assembly, Cape Town, 7 December. Naidu, E. 2021. Politician: Are black vice-chancellors poor leaders?   [Online] Available at: https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20210317133853365  [accessed: 9 December]. Nehru, J. 2003 (reprint). The Discovery of India . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nehru, J. 2004 (new edition). An Autobiography . London: Penguin Books. Press Trust of India (PTI). 2021. ‘Indians have been here for over 100 yrs’: Zulu leader’s impassioned plea to stop anti-Indian sentiment in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.firstpost.com/world/indians-have-been-here-for-over-100-yrs-zulu-leaders-impassioned-plea-to-stop-anti-indian-sentiment-in-south-africa-9827741.html [accessed: 9 December]. Quintal, A. 2006. Native Club 'not a Mbeki initiative' . [Online] Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/native-club-not-a-mbeki-initiative-287579 [accessed: 9 December]. Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Réaume, D. 1988. Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods, The University of Toronto Law Journal, 39: 1–27. Rodriguez‑Pose, A. and von Berlepsch, V. 2019. Does Population Diversity Matter for Economic Development in the Very Long Term? Historic Migration, Diversity and County Wealth in the US, European Journal of Population , 35: 873–911. Rousseau, J. 2003. The Social Contract and other Later Political Writings , Chapter 8, Book 4. Edited by Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. SAPA. 2011. Manyi: ‘Over-supply’ of Coloureds in Western Cape . [Online] Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2011-02-24-coloureds-overconcentrated-in-wcape-says-manyi/ [accessed: 9 December]. Schmidt, R. 2000. Language Policy and Identity Politics in the United States. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Sen, A. 2005. The Argumentative Indian . London: Penguin Books. Shivambu, F. 2018 . Comments to Treasury Deputy Director General Ismail Momomiat . National Assembly, Cape Town, June 6. Stilz, A. 2009. Civic Nationalism and Language Policy, Philosophy & Public Affairs , 37(30): 257-292. Tamir, Y. 1993. Liberal Nationalism.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tandwa, L. 2019. ‘Basis of fact’ to Malema’s comments on Indians, but his delivery is flawed – analyst . [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/basis-of-fact-to-malemas-comments-on-indians-but-his-delivery-is-flawed-analyst-20190327 [accessed: 9 December]. Thamm, M. 2021. Black Lawyers Association comes out to bat for John Hlophe as SA’s Chief Justice . [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-03-black-lawyers-association-comes-out-to-bat-for-john-hlophe-as-sas-chief-justice/ [accessed: 9 December]. Van der Loo, H. and Beks, J. 2020. Psychological Safety: Signpost to fearless performance . Independently Published. Van Onselen, G. 2008. Jacob Zuma, Terror Lekota, and the constitution . [Online] Available at: https://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/jacob-zuma-terror-lekota-and-the-constitutio [accessed: 9 December]. Watson, M. 2019. The Damned Neighbours Problem: Rousseau’s Civil Religion Revisited, Religions , 10: 349. Weingast, B. 1997. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, American Political Science Review , 91(2): 245-263. West, C. 1993. Race Matters . New York: Vintage Books. World Bank. 2021. South Africa Economic Update: South Africa’s Labour Market Benefit from Young Entrepreneurs, Self-Employment?   [Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/south-africa-economic-update-south-africa-s-labor-market-can-benefit-from-young-entrepreneurs-self-employment [accessed: 9 December]. Zuma, J. 2012. President’s Question Time , National Assembly, Cape Town, 13 September.        - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 2/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. J A N U A R Y 2 0 2 5 This paper has been prepared for presentation at the International Conference on “Resource and Environmental Technology Innovation Boosts China-Africa Green and Low-Carbon Development” in Shanghai and Jinhua from 1 – 5 November 2024 Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPAHons, ND: Co. Admin Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University       Abstract   Green energy, low-carbon development and green technology offer economic opportunities for South Africa and African countries, which have abundant potential for renewable energy generation. However, the scale and pace of investment in green energy in Africa is sorely inadequate. Inconsistent policies, inefficient public services, corruption and lack of rule of law all undermine domestic private and international development finance involvement in green projects. Limited access to finance, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient government incentives for the private sector, households and foreign investors, also deter new investors. Thirty of the world’s 40 most climate vulnerable countries are in Africa, yet Africa emits only 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Unless Africa responds effectively to climate change, up to 118 million people will live in abject poverty by 2030.   South Africa and Africa should look to China for lessons on the way forward. China is the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions by volume but now produces most of the world’s renewable energy. China expanded its renewable energy capacity with astonishing speed and scale. The country’s industrial policy – based on a pillar of world-class infrastructure suitable for shipping goods anywhere in the world – turned China into a global giant manufacturer of electric vehicles. Partnering with China would open up many opportunities for both parties to boost their green economies and technologies, and low-carbon development – together preparing for what will surely be more stormy weather ahead.   Introduction   Green energy, low-carbon development and green technology offer economic opportunities for South Africa and African countries.   They can drive economic growth, create jobs and reduce poverty through the creation of new manufacturing industries, the development of new technologies, the development of a green economy, and the expansion of infrastructure, agriculture and ecotourism (Biswas & Yila, 2022). South Africa and Africa have abundant potential for renewable energy generation, and not only for their own consumption.   However, the scale and pace of investment in green energy in Africa is inadequate. South Africa and Africa’s transition to a green economy must be secured in such a way that it lifts inclusive economic growth, increases development and expands industrialisation.   Developed countries such as Denmark – which generates 57% of its power from wind energy – have energy mixes that are dominated by renewable energy, but still rely on fossil fuels, either for baseload power, the transport industry or for heavy export industries.   African countries are also struggling to source funding to address losses and damages linked to climate change. It is estimated that developing countries, including those in Africa, need at least US$100 billion a year to adequately finance a Loss and Damage Fund aimed at compensating them for such losses and damages (Kabukuru, 2023).   Regional power pools, whether through renewable energy or gas, are critical to boost individual country power grids. This will require power to be traded between countries, and so avoid energy shortages or surpluses sitting idle.   But there are many obstacles getting in the way of progress. Inconsistent policies and regulations in South Africa and other African countries, inefficient public services, high levels of corruption and lack of rule of law undermine domestic private and international development finance involvement in green projects.   Limited access to finance and insufficient government incentives for the private sector, households and foreign investors, deter green investments. South Africa and African countries also have inadequate infrastructure for green projects, which hinders delivery and puts off new investors. South Africa and almost all African countries need to upgrade and expand their existing grid infrastructure, while building new renewable energy generation capacity.   Foreign businesses in Africa often do not implement green practices, as there is largely a lack of enforcement in these countries. Whereas local African businesses are often simply not aware of the benefits of green practices, nor do they have the capacity to implement them, nor are there, in many instances, government incentives to do so (UNDP, 2024).   South Africa and Africa could become world leaders in motoring the green economy, if they set appropriate policies and regulations, muster up the political will to push for green energy and secure the requisite investments.   However, South Africa and African countries lack public funds to finance the green economy and low-carbon development. There is also a lack of funding for countries to mitigate against and adapt to climate change. Grant funding is critical for this. Development finance, private finance, and public-private finance is critical to achieve the green economy goals.   James Murombedzi, head of the Addis Ababa-based African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC), says that Africa will have to explore innovative private sector financing structures such as debt-for-nature and debt-for-climate swaps to overcome the climate financial gap. At the African Climate Summit, African leaders expressed their frustrations with the industrialised countries’ inability to honour their commitments to provide adequate climate finance.    The route to climate change mitigation is clear. The International Energy Authority’s (IEA) Roadmap to Net Zero by 2050 , first published in May 2021, outlined how the world can reduce global warming to 1.5°C. It says the world must reduce use of fossil fuels, double energy efficiency, and increase and expand the range of clean energy technologies. The IEA says tripling global installed renewable power capacity, such as solar and wind, by the end of the current decade is the most important lever to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.    Africa disproportionately impacted by climate change   The Paris Agreement’s goal is to curb global warming to 1.5˚C. However, these targets are far off. Africa emits only 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions, and yet, the continent is disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of climate change – with temperature rises higher than the global average (Climate Adaptation Platform, 2024).   A 2024 report by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) shows that 2023 was the warmest year globally on record. The report shows that the three major greenhouse gases – carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide – reached a new record in 2022. It says ocean warming continues to increase, with the ocean heat content at a historic high in 2023.   The report notes that as the ocean absorbs a quarter of annual human-caused emissions, increasing emissions also decreases pH, a process known as “ocean acidification”. This affects organisms and ecosystem services, including food security, by reducing biodiversity, degrading habitats, and endangering fisheries and aquaculture.   As a result, the WMO report reveals that African countries are losing 2-5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to climate change. Many of these countries set aside 9% of their budget to respond to climate extremes. The cost of climate adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa is very high, estimated to be between US$30-50 billion annually over the next decade, representing 2-3% of their GDP.   Unless Africa responds effectively to climate change, up to 118 million people will live in abject poverty – living on less than US$1.90 per day by 2030 – and will be exposed to drought, floods, and other extreme weather conditions, the report says. In fact, “between 1970 and 2021, Africa accounted for 35% of weather, climate, and water-related fatalities” (WMO, 2024).   In 2023, droughts cut North Africa’s cereal production to 10% below a five-year average. In Sudan, sorghum and millet production in 2023 decreased by about 25% and 50%, respectively, compared to 2022 (WMO, 2024).   Thirty of the world’s 40 most climate vulnerable countries are in Africa. A 2022 Mo Ibrahim Foundation report, The Road to COP27: Making Africa’s Case in the Global Climate Debate , emphasised that Africa’s small contribution to CO2 emissions, and the continent’s disproportionate vulnerability to the negative impact of climate change, should necessitate the continent getting climate financing from industrial countries responsible for emissions.   Crucial to consider is that Africa holds 65% of the uncultivated arable land left in the world, and therefore holds the key for the future of food globally. The rising global population makes optimising the productivity of available land even more urgent, since climate change reduces water availability and reduces crop productivity.   “Extreme weather – including droughts, cyclones and heatwaves – is increasing in frequency and intensity, alongside trends of urbanisation, population growth and weak conservation enforcement. Ecosystem damage and biodiversity loss is now having major negative impacts on livelihoods, causing US$7-15 billion in yearly losses (projected to reach US$40 billion by 2030)” (UNDP, 2023: 19).   Research by the ACPC showed “the increasing frequency and severity of climate change impacts resulting in disproportionate effects on African economies and societies, with countries estimated to be losing on average 2-5% of GDP and many countries diverting up to 9% of their budgets into unplanned expenditures on responses to extreme weather events.”   At the same time, over 600 million people in Africa lack electricity. Affordable clean energy sources is therefore critical to plug the power gap. Africa’s collective approach to combat climate change   African countries, at an Africa Climate Summit in September 2023, adopted the “Nairobi Declaration” as a broad approach to combat climate change and facilitate a green transition in the region (African Union, 2023). The Nairobi Declaration called for climate-positive growth, renewable energy expansion, the protection and enhancement of biodiversity and nature; green industrialisation; sustainable agriculture; standards, metrics and market mechanisms to value nature, biodiversity and co-benefits; and African countries to adopt policy and enabling environments to support the development of the green economy.   The Nairobi Declaration outlined some of the opportunities for the African region, including the opportunity emerging from its youthful demographics. They could become new markets for innovative solutions and business models. But there are also formidable challenges such as rapidly urbanising populations; lack of skills, resources, capital and political will; and old economy thinking among African governments, political and business elites.   African countries as a group demand that developed countries provide between US$200-400 billion a year by 2030 for loss and damage because of climate change; and US$400 billion a year for adapting to climate change. This is, on top of funding required to reduce emissions.    In December 2023, the Conference of the Parties 28 (COP28) pledged record funding to climate change transition, including to Africa. However, the pledges to Africa at COP28 deferred major financial decisions to COP29, only contributing US$134 million and US$792 million to the Adaptation Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund respectively (Mbungu, Ogallo & Rudic, 2024).   Also in 2023, an Arab-African initiative was launched to improve agriculture and food systems in both regions. The “Africa and Middle East SAFE Initiative”, a public-private partnership, aims to mobilise US$10 billion in funding to support green agriculture. The idea is that Africa can provide food solutions to the Middle East, “where water stress poses immense challenges for food production, and where the cost of water desalinisation is prohibitive for competitive food production to assure food security” (Adesina, 2023).   The project aims to unlock green investments and promote climate-smart agriculture. The focus will be on irrigating two million hectares of African farmland, enhancing climate resilience for 10 million smallholder farmers, with a focus on women and young people, creating two million green jobs, and exporting two million metric tons of food crops from Africa to the Middle East.   In January 2023, African countries organised the Feed Africa Summit in Dakar – convened by the African Development Bank and the Government of Senegal, under the chairmanship of President Macky Sall – where 34 African Heads of State and Government signed the Dakar Declaration.   They agreed to establish food and agriculture delivery compacts, which are clear roadmaps for fully unlocking the potentials of their food and agriculture sector. The African Development Bank mobilised US$72 billion to implement these food and agriculture delivery compacts. This will allow Africa to take proper advantage of the size of its food and agriculture market, which, if cultivated effectively, could reach US$1 trillion by 2030 (Adesina, 2023).   Back in 2016, the African Development Bank launched its Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT) – a continent-wide initiative designed to boost agricultural productivity by using new technologies. TAAT brings productivity-increasing technologies to crop, livestock and fish smallholder farmers. The TAAT programme transfers resilient agricultural technologies to smallholder farmers.    Africa’s green energy, low-carbon funding needs   Investing in green growth alternatives is expensive. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa calculates that US$2 trillion is needed in the power sector alone by 2050 to drive green economic growth in Africa. And yet, the IEA says less than 2% of global investments in clean energy flows into Africa, with the current annual flow of climate finance to Africa standing at US$29.5 billion.   Africa requires an annual capital commitment of US$277 billion to implement Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and achieve agreed-on climate objectives by 2030. The private sector’s involvement in Africa’s climate finance stands at 14%, equivalent to US$4.2 billion in 2021.    Central and East African countries have the largest climate investment shortage as a percentage of GDP, averaging 26% and 23%, respectively. North African countries have lower climate investment gaps, averaging 3% of GDP – they still require up to six times more green capital than current levels. Southern Africa has the largest financial gap in absolute terms, because of South Africa’s massive green capital requirements, around US$107 billion annually, according to the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP).     The UN Economic Commission for Africa’s Deputy Executive Secretary, Antonio Pedro, said African countries could marshal US$82 billion annually through accessing carbon markets. The United Nations (UN) estimated that combined developing and emerging countries, including Africa, need US$2 trillion annually by 2030 to deal with climate change.   Industrial countries have not delivered on their climate finance promises. African countries have called on industrialised countries to “scale up climate finance to make up for the shortfall caused by [their] failure to deliver US$100 billion per year by 2020 and through 2025” (Kabukuru, 2023). African countries are also asking for between US$200-400 billion a year by 2030 for climate losses and damage; and US$400 billion a year for climate change adaptation.   Industrial countries and emerging powers collectively paid out US$7 trillion in 2022, for producing coal, oil and natural gas, in the form of subsidies such as tax breaks or price caps (Parry, Black & Vernon-Li, 2021). China is the biggest subsidiser of fossil fuels, followed by the US, Russia, India and the European Union (EU) (Parry, Black & Vernon-Li, 2021).   Fossil-fuel subsidies rose during the global increase in energy prices caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the country’s economic reboots following the Covid-19 pandemic. The subsidies were the equivalent of 7.1% of global gross domestic product. The subsidies have risen by US$2 trillion over the past two years.   Following energy shortages because of the Russia-Ukraine war, many industrial countries have returned to the use of coal for power. In October 2023, Germany’s Cabinet approved putting on-reserve lignite-fired power plants back online until the end of March 2024, as a step to replace scarce natural gas this winter and avoid shortages. This happened in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a sudden drop in Russian gas imports to Germany – Berlin reactivated coal-fired power plants and extended their lifespans (Pole, 2022).   Austria, the Netherlands and Italy also, in 2023, started up their coal power stations (Pole, 2022). Previously the Netherlands had limited coal power to just over a third of the country’s power output.   In 2022, in its bid to cut planet-warming  emissions by 55% by 2030  from 1990 levels, the European Commission (EU) proposed a 100% reduction in CO2 emissions from new cars by 2035 (Pole, 2022). That means it would not be possible to sell combustion engine cars from then on. However, the German government refused to accept this ban.    Harnessing Africa’s own resources   African countries could also generate income from the value chains of non-renewable resources – for example, critical minerals – mainly found in Africa and essential for battery production.    African governments have made commitments to contribute US$26.4 billion from domestic public resources for green energy annually. However, given rising government debt, mismanagement and corruption, combined with competing developmental priorities, it is highly unlikely that they will reach these targets. Public-private partnerships to finance climate change and drive green business will be crucial.   The continent has abundant renewable energy resources. It accounts for 40% of global solar irradiation. It has a 20,000MW geothermal power potential; a 30,000MW hydropower potential and a 110,000MW wind power potential. The challenge is to secure a smart transition, growing renewable energy, increase decarbonisation by using gas and gradually easing out coal – or finding clean coal technology.   As for “green recovery”, pledges by industrial countries and multilateral organisations have not only been insufficient, but also not forthcoming. According to the UNDP, for every US dollar spent addressing the climate crisis, four dollars fund fossil-fuel subsidies, perpetuating the crisis (UNDP, 2024: 17).   The UNDP argues an urgent transition into green business is a necessity for Africa to overcome the “dual challenges posed by the increasingly extreme impacts of climate change and the imperatives of continued economic growth”. It argues a green business transition “represents the opportunity to pursue alternative growth models, leapfrog generations of technology and build a more sustainable future” (UNDP, 2024:17).   Many industrial companies have become guilty of “greenwashing” in Africa. They mislead the public by claiming their products, policies and Environment, Sustainability and Governance (ESG) are environmentally friendly. Banks, mining and fossil fuel companies are among the key culprits in greenwashing. United Nations Secretary General António Guterres at COP27 in November 2022, criticised the practice as dishonest and undermining the fight against climate change.   In August 2024, TotalEnergies, the world’s 19th-biggest greenhouse gas emitter, was found guilty of misleading sustainability advertising in South Africa. TotalEnergies was found guilty of greenwashing by the South African Advertising Regulatory Board (ARB). The complaint was filed by campaign group Fossil Free South Africa.   The lawsuit centred on a partnership between TotalEnergies and South Africa National Parks (SANParks), in which the two organisations partnered in a #FuelYourExperience competition, encouraging people to visit South Africa’s parks. In an advertisement, TotalEnergies said: “We’re committed to sustainable development and environmental protection”, which Fossil Ad Ban highlighted as being “false and misleading” and was “greenwashing”.   Fossil Ad Ban cited the energy company’s “response to the 2015 Paris Climate Treaty has been not to cut, but to continue to expand its emissions, by another 14 million tonnes, to 400 million tonnes of carbon dioxide by 2022” (Doris, 2024). The ARB also ruled that there was “no doubt that the core business of the Advertiser is directly opposed to the issue of sustainable development, as the ongoing exploitation of fossil fuels is contra-indicated in this context” (Doris, 2024).   But developed countries also often misrepresent their policies, initiatives and projects in Africa as “green”, while it is totally the opposite. Unfortunately, African countries do not have laws against greenwashing. Some EU and Southeast Asian nations have introduced guidelines of financial practices to prevent greenwashing.   The UNDP has proposed several key recommendations for how Africa could leverage the green economy. The organisation has proposed the establishment of dedicated green investment banks, facilities and funds, with a specific mandate to support the development of green business in the region via green financing products.   The international organisation proposed that Africa create an urban green business and finance platform to help support Africa’s rapidly growing cities to meet the dual challenges of rapid urbanisation and climate change. The UNDP calls on multi-lateral development banks to do more to reduce investment risk in Africa through the creation of new and innovative instruments, funds and facilities.   The UNDP also called for African countries to establish nature as an asset class, leveraging the lessons from carbon markets elsewhere as well as Africa’s nature-rich status, to build robust carbon and biodiversity markets. The UNDP proposes that African countries enhance green value chains and capacity, leveraging Africa’s natural abundance of minerals needed in the green transition, along with the region’s sustainable energy, to ensure greater value addition remains within the communities and areas involved in mineral extraction.     South Africa: energy mix   South Africa’s energy mix in 2023/2024 consists of 82.8% coal, with renewable energy providing 8.8%, amounting to 42 000 MW. Nuclear power makes up 6% of electricity output and gas only contributes 3% of South Africa’s power generation. Upgrades to South Africa’s only nuclear plant, at Koeberg, have seen its two reactors having lifetimes extended to 2045 and 2047.   Coal will remain the main source of energy for the immediate future (ITA, 2024). However, around 8.7GW of non-hydro renewable energy capacity is planned to be installed between 2023 and 2032. Solar energy will be the primary source of expansion.   South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnerships plans to repurpose and decommission coal-fired power plants to decrease emissions – the government is planning to close down seven coal-fired power stations by 2032.   The government has eased restrictions for local content in solar. Renewable energy expansion is slowed by opposition to it by interest groups in the ANC-SACP-Cosatu tripartite alliance, and opposition from populist groups and coal-based trade unions to renewable energy.   It is expected that South Africa’s total power capacity will expand by 4GW (ITA, 2024). The expansion will come from non-hydro renewable energy – increasing from 9.3% to 17% in 2032. The South African government’s revised Integrated Resource Plan makes provision for gas to provide 8% of energy capacity.   South Africa’s Renewable Independent Power Producer Programme is expected to increase the non-hydro renewal, because of the lessening of licence restrictions, allowing more private sector involvement in the sector. The developers of renewable energy are mostly foreign companies that have signed power purchase agreements with Eskom for the electricity they produce.   However, South Africa’s aging, poorly maintained and vandalised network infrastructure undermines the energy distribution network. According to Eskom, the utility needs 8 000km of transmission infrastructure by 2030 to absorb new renewable energy capacity (ITA, 2024). But Eskom’s long-term financial viability is in question, considering its R400 billion debt. Renewable energy companies have already signed purchase agreements with Eskom, agreements which would be compromised should Eskom collapse.   South Africa’s automotive industry contributes 5.3% to South Africa’s GDP and is its biggest manufacturing sector, and supported R270 billion worth of exports in 2023. South Africa’s auto industry was facing headwinds because of the rise in the sales of electric powered vehicles globally, the increased use of fuels with cleaner emissions, and use of new technologies such as autonomous driving vehicles.   In response, South Africa has created the South African Automotive Masterplan, SAAM 2035. It aims to increase the country’s motor vehicle production to 1% of global output. And to increase the yearly exports value of the industry from R200 billion in 2019 to R400 billion in 2035 (IOL, 2024).   Domestically, the country’s declining economy, high fuel prices and high interest rates have compounded the declines in vehicle sales. In 2023 vehicle sales were down 5.8%, exports were down 16.9%, and vehicle production dropped 20%. South Africa’s automotive industry is lagging, and will continue to lag, behind turning its production to new electric vehicles (NEVs), its global competitors.   In fact, Trade and Industry Minister Parks Tau said that South Africa may take 15 to 20 years longer to transition to mass NEVs. To mitigate this, the government is preparing a White Paper on NEVs, which is being put together by the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, the National Treasury, and the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy.   In October 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that the government will introduce tax incentives to make new energy vehicles cheaper for South Africans. The incentives will also cover hybrid vehicles – which use traditional fuels and electricity batteries, and other renewable energy, including hydrogen.   The Government announced NEVs incentives in the Budget in February 2024, providing for a 150% investment allowance for expenses in the initial year of investment, effective from 1 March 2026. Depreciation allowances for new and used machinery and inputs to make NEVs was increased to 40% in the first year and 20% in each of the following three years. “Consideration must be given to incentives for manufacturers as well as tax rebates or subsidies for consumers to accelerate the uptake of electric vehicles,” said Ramaphosa (National Treasury, 2024).    South Africa: green energy and low-carbon development funding   South Africa’s Just Transition Framework focuses on public-private partnerships, foreign investment, and blended finance (PCC, 2022). On 4 November 2021, South Africa announced the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) at COP26.   The JETP is a US$8.5 billion funding package from the European Union, Germany, France, the US, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark, to support South Africa securing a just energy transition. The final amount, following additional pledges, is now more than US$11 billion. Only 4% of the amount was grant financing; the rest is concessional loans.   South Africa introduced the Just Energy Transition Implementation Plan at COP28, the annual climate change conference, held in Dubai in 2023. This is a roadmap for achieving decarbonisation of the economy in a just manner. The Implementation Plan was aimed at outlining how the funding would be structured, the priorities, projects and implementation partners. It covers six portfolios: Electricity; Mpumalanga Just Transition; New Energy Vehicles (NEVs); Green Hydrogen; Skills; and Municipalities.    Reports showed that before the JET Implementation Plan was released in 2023, more than R10 billion of the funds had already been allocated or assigned to projects or spent on projects (Davies, 2024). The pre-plan released spending allocations were outlined in the JET Implementation Plan Grant Mapping Register. The register outlines the priority areas for spending.   “By the time the JET Investment Plan was unveiled by President Cyril Ramaphosa on 4 November 2022, 89 of the 145 projects, worth more than R5.3 billion, had already commenced (before November 2022 when the JET IP was publicly announced). The end dates for 26 of them were before Cabinet formally approved the JET IP in November 2023” (Davies, 2024). Furthermore, more than R8.5 billion had been used for projects that had already finished at the time of funding.   Only two projects, out of 145, had not started by the time the funding became available. This means no public discussion on the kinds of projects that needed funding, the organisations to whom the projects should go, and who the beneficiaries should be that receive help.   It is unclear what the criteria for funding are or whether the projects were growth catalytic ones – for example, whether it is for projects developing new manufacturing or fit within a wider industrialisation plan. The application process, funding oversight and selection governance structures appear unclear. The JET IP framework said a JET Funding Platform would be established in 2024 as a “matchmaking mechanism” between implementing entities and beneficiaries.   On the JET IP register of projects only 24% of the funds went to South African implementing organisations. Most of the funding went to donor country companies. Donor agencies take large proportions of the funding to cover their costs. More than R222 million went to consulting and financial advisory firms. A third of the distributed funding went to German entities: among these, R1.7 billion went to GIZ, the German development agency, R2 billion went to KfW, the German development bank. Essentially, all the financing given by Germany has gone to German entities.   Of the funding from the United States (US) government, R145 million went to consultancy firm Deloitte and R58 million went to the US Department of Energy’s National Labs. The Dutch government funding, among others, went to the Dutch Water Authorities, and the Danish government’s funding, among others, went to the Danish Energy Agency.   Researchers Katrina Lehmann-Grube, Imraan Valodia, Julia Taylor and Sonia Phalatse analysed how the JET IP money was spent. The bulk of the money was directed to green hydrogen, Mpumalanga Just Transition, electricity infrastructure, municipalities, skills development, electricity just transition, and new energy vehicles. However, Lehmann-Grube and her colleagues revealed that most of the funding did not go directly to the assigned priorities.   They report that for funds allocated to electricity infrastructure, none was allocated for building electricity infrastructure, whether to expand the grid or for renewable energy generation. The funds for electricity infrastructure has been spent on technical assistance, project feasibility studies and scenario planning. Around R1.2 billion was spent on technical assistance. Lehmann-Grube et al described the technical assistance as “ long been criticised as a form of aid  for being ineffective, extremely expensive since much of these funds go to foreign ‘experts’, and an outdated form of development”.   Another portion of the funds, around R1.5 billion was spent on green finance, which included refinancing community trust projects, green bods, blended finance to attract the private sector, which is “arguably not where the grants portion of the finance should be focused”. Funds are allocated for stakeholder engagement and capacity building. However, civil society and community organisations are rarely involved. Only 0.4% of the funding was allocated to civil society – around R41 million.   Approximately R1.1 billion was allocated to skills training. However, the researchers show only R453 million went to actual skills training. Astonishingly, none of the allocation went to employees that will lose their jobs, livelihoods and income in the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy.   There are other significant South African public funds established for climate change. The state-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa established the Green Fund in 2011. The fund is a complementary fund, aimed to augment existing fiscal allocations. It particularly focuses on existing projects that require bridging financial gaps. The Green Fund says it has collective investments of R679.8 million.   There are also private funds in South Africa dedicated to climate change. In 2018, Growthpoint Properties, a real estate investment trust, issued a (10-year) corporate green bond. The proceeds from this bond are earmarked for the financing of new and existing environmentally friendly properties.    China: world leader in renewable energy economy manufacturing   China is the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions by volume, burning as much coal as all of the world combined. At the same time, the country now produces most of the world’s renewable energy.   In the 2000s, China changed its development model, based on coal dependence, as it was causing environmental crises and had begun to undermine economic growth. With GDP growth slowing in the mid-2000s, labour costs rising and a housing crisis, China, as part of changing its developmental model, also moved towards renewable energy. The country invested heavily in green energy technology, prioritising becoming the world’s largest supplier of renewable energy technologies, manufacturing products and infrastructure to tap into the world’s need for clean energy.   China now dominates the manufacturing of renewable technologies. “China had largely achieved its goal of dominating not only the production of solar and wind technologies, but it had developed a near monopoly on every aspect of the supply chains, including the mining and processing of the rare-earths and strategic minerals essential for the clean energy revolution” (Hilton, 2024).   China controls 80% of the globe’s solar manufacturing. It dominates wind and battery technology and manufacturing. Its manufacturing of electric vehicles is rising. Its domination of renewable energy technologies, manufacturing and supply chains has brought global prices down.   China expanded its renewable energy capacity with astonishing speed and scale. Fossil fuels now make up under 50% of the country’s power generation capacity, whereas a decade ago, fossil fuels made up two-thirds of its power generation. The International Energy Authority said that the 50% increase in the installation of renewable energy capacity in 2023 was largely attributed to China.   In 2023 China doubled its new solar installations, increased new wind capacity installations by 66%, and quadrupled energy storage capacity. In 2022, its solar photovoltaic capacity installation for that year, was as large as the rest of the world combined.    China has transformed its economic growth model to make high-tech export products to spur growth. The country’s changed industrial policies are outlined in its “Made in China 2025” (MIC 2025) industrial strategy, a multidecade national strategy for the manufacturing sector, which was published in 2015. The strategy sets out its goal to dominate global market share of high-tech manufacturing, prioritising higher valued goods.   China is now also a dominant global manufacturer of plug-in electric vehicles and its associated supply chains. Electric vehicles is a disruptive technology, because it replaces internal combustion engine vehicles, which have dominated vehicle manufacturing (Graham, Belton & Xia, 2021).   China’s industrial policy followed the example of Japan’s Toyota, Germany’s Volkswagen and the US’ General Motors, who dominated global combustion engine vehicles supply chains. China’s industrial policy to turn it into a global giant manufacturer of electric vehicles – and their supply chains – is a lesson for developing countries in cobbling together successful industrial policies.   The country’s electric vehicle global rise has unleashed a trade conflict between China, the EU and the US over electric vehicles. The EU is the largest overseas market for China’s electric car industry.   The EU is planning to impose huge taxes on imports of electric vehicles from China to Europe. It says introducing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles imports aims to protect the European car industry from being undermined by what EU governments say are unfair Chinese-state subsidies on its own cars. Tariffs on electric cars made in China are set to rise from 10% to up to 45% over the next five years (Race, 2024).   The European Commission set individual duties on three large Chinese electric vehicle brands: SAIC, BYD and Geely. The EU fears that European car manufacturers will not be able to compete with Chinese cars. It calculated the charges based on estimates of how much Chinese state aid each manufacturer has received following an EU investigation. Chinese-made electric vehicles account for 19% of Europe’s market, estimated to rise to 25% by the end of 2024.   The US in May 2024 announced that it was quadrupling customs duties on imported Chinese electric vehicles. China has not penetrated the US market as it has the European market. In response, China has lodged a complaint against the US over the tariff penalties at the World Trade Organisation in March 2024, charging that the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) “formulates discriminatory subsidy policies for new energy vehicles”, referencing a classification that includes electric cars and hybrids.   China says the US IRA “distorts fair competition, seriously disrupts global new energy vehicle industrial and supply chains and violates WTO rules”. China has denied that its own industrial policies are unfair and has repeatedly threatened retaliation to safeguard its companies. The US has rejected China’s WTO challenge, saying “China's challenge is particularly hypocritical in light of China's targeting of clean energy sectors for global dominance” (AFP, 2024).   In 2022, the United States announced a giant aid and subsidy programme to support US-based companies operating in the energy transition sector and electric cars manufactured in the US. The US government said the subsidies were to address the climate crisis and “invest in US economic competitiveness”. The US also said its electric vehicle subsidy programme was meant to counter China’s subsidies for electric vehicles and China’s green industry, which has seen China investing vast state funds into domestic firms as well as research and development.    How China can help boost a South African manufacturing boom based on the green economy and technology   South Africa needs a dynamic manufacturing sector that can soak up low skills. A manufacturing sector in the energy sector based on renewable energy and gas, can soak up an army of low and unskilled. It can also reverse the decline of manufacturing in other sectors – which could create desperately needed new jobs, especially for those with low skills.   The inputs, technology and production processes underpinning renewable energy and gas production must be manufactured within South Africa as far as possible. Local communities can set up local cooperatives to generate and sell their own energy. If local renewable energy initiatives are established by local communities in every town; and gas is piped to every household, it would not only stabilise energy supply, but it will also create a much-needed manufacturing explosion.   China is in a tariff dispute with the European Union and the US over electric vehicle imports. The Chinese government has asked its manufacturers to halt expansion plans in Europe over this trade conflict, including stopping active searches for production sites in the region and signing of new deals (Zhang, Lepido & Torsoli, 2024).   This creates an opportunity for South Africa to become a hub for Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers – and serve as a springboard to the rest of Africa, the developing world, and even Europe. China could set up manufacturing plants in South Africa; and co-manufacture with South African companies. However, in such co-manufacturing, there must be an awareness of “political capitalists” – politically connected individuals with no industry experience, but who set up “black economic empowerment” companies to partner with established firms.   Chinese research, technology and development organisations could partner with South African ones to exchange green economy technologies for development purposes. Industrial policy-learning between China and South Africa is critical to help South Africa boost its industrial policy capacity.   China should match Western countries’ financial commitments for climate change to South Africa. However, China’s financial commitments should be different: rather than loans, it should be grant funding, manufacturing, technology, supply chain, and research and innovation exchange partnerships.    How China can partner with Africa to boost green economies and low-carbon development on the continent   African countries lack public funds to finance the green economy and low-carbon development. Grant funding is critical for this. Development finance, private finance, and public-private finance is critical to achieve the green economy goals.   African leaders expressed their frustrations with the industrialised countries’ inability to honour their commitments to providing adequate climate finance. China can partner with Africa in international climate change negotiations to secure better climate change funds for Africa – and to ensure that industrial countries honour their climate change financial commitments. But China could also be a source of grant funding for African countries’ green economy and low-carbon development initiatives.   African countries have inadequate infrastructure for green projects, which undermines delivery and deters new investors. Almost all African countries need to upgrade and expand their existing grid infrastructure, while building new renewable energy generation capacity.   Over 600 million people in Africa lack electricity. Affordable clean energy sources is critical to plug the power gap. China could partner in expanding Africa’s infrastructure, which underpins any green economy and low-carbon development strategy.   Foreign businesses in Africa often do not implement green practices – as there is largely a lack of enforcement in these countries. It is critical that the Chinese government compel Chinese state and private companies to implement genuine green practices in their operations in African countries.   Africa and China can also collaborate on food solutions for China – for example, by helping Africa to boost climate-smart agriculture. In 2016, the African Development Bank in 2016 launched its Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT) – a continent-wide initiative designed to boost agricultural productivity by using new technologies. TAAT brings productivity-increasing technologies to crop, livestock and fish smallholder farmers. China could partner with African countries to boost new agricultural technologies to increase African agricultural productivity.   Moreover, China could establish manufacturing hubs for electric vehicles in African countries, and link African economies into their global manufacturing value chains.    South Africa: policy and regulator reforms needed   South Africa does not have a coherent industrial policy that places the green economy as one of the pillars of economic transformation, industrialisation and economic development. Truth be told, the county’s green economy and low-carbon development initiatives appear to be ad hoc – not part of an overall industrial strategy. South Africa can learn from China’s green economy industrial policy, both in its scope and execution.   For 20 years, China’s government has pursued clear, well-thought-out industrial policies to make it the world’s biggest producer of electric vehicles. China also pursued a focused industrial policy to build renewable energy manufacturing capacity.   In South Africa, whereas the apartheid government had industrial policies that produced disruptive technology, the post-1994 government has lost the ability to pursue industrial policies that can foster disruptive technology. The current South African government can learn from how the Chinese have pursued industrial policies that usher in disruptive technologies.   South Africa can learn from China how to quickly push through renewable energy, which is currently being slowed down by pro-coal proponents and opponents of renewable energy within and outside the ANC tripartite alliance. The Chinese government pushed through renewable energy with steely determination; similar determination is lacking in the South African government.   South Africa should introduce tax incentives to large corporates, SMMEs and households for renewable power generation. Tax systems must offer incentives to low-income households and businesses for deploying renewable energy.   Banks should be compelled to provide affordable finance to households and SMMEs to secure renewable energy generation. Customers should also be allowed to sell excess power back to the grid.   South Africa needs regulations to prevent “greenwashing” by countries and businesses who claim their policies, initiatives and investments are green – when they are not. There are currently no laws in South Africa combating green and sustainability claims. There are only voluntary standards. These standards need to be incorporated into legislation. There are increasing civil society efforts to litigate against companies using greenwashing tactics (Parker, 2023).   South Africa’s collapsing infrastructure undermines any industrial policies – it is critical to reboot these systems. This is made clear by China’s industrial policy, based on a pillar of “world-class infrastructure suitable for shipping goods anywhere in the world” (Graham, Belton & Xia, 2021).   The African continent has not established effective regional power pools to share power, renewable energy or gas, which are critical to boost individual country power grids. South Africa will have to take a leadership role in helping African countries to build regional power pools, to exchange power, and trade power between countries, and so avoid energy shortages or surpluses sitting idle.    References   Adesina, A. 2023. Remarks by Akinwumi A. Adesina African Development Bank President, Group Session: Launch of the Africa and Middle East SAFE Initiative COP 28, UAE, 3 December 2023.   African Development Bank (AfDB). 2023. Private Sector Financing for Climate Action and Green Growth in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/aeo_2023-chap2-en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   African Development Bank (AfDB). 2023. Natural Capital for Climate Finance and Green Growth in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/aeo_2023-chap3-en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   African Union. 2023. The African Leaders Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change and Call to Action . [Online] Available at: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/2023/09/08/the_african_leaders_nairobi_declaration_on_climate_change-rev-eng.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2024. WTO to examine China complaint over US electric vehicle subsidies . [Online] Available at: https://www.barrons.com/news/wto-to-examine-china-complaint-over-us-electric-vehicle-subsidies-91eaa825  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Ahmed, A. and Camp, R. 2023. Accelerating Africa’s Carbon Markets Can Power Sustainable Development . [Online] Available at: https://www.rti.org/insights/accelerating-africas-carbon-markets-can-power-sustainable-development [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Biswas, S. and Yila, O. 2022. Blog: Why transitioning to an Inclusive Green Economy is vital to fulfilling climate goals in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://thecommonwealth.org/news/blog-why-transitioning-inclusive-green-economy-vital-fulfilling-climate-goals-africa#:~:text=A%20green%20economy%20approach%20allows,wind%20energy%20prices%20by%2040%25 . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Blocher, K., Strinati, C., Balm, A. and Meattle, C. 2022. Climate Finance Innovation for Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Climate_Innovation_Finance_for_Africa.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Brookings Institute Africa Growth Initiative. 2020. Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent 2020-2030 . [Online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/foresight-africa-top-priorities-for-the-continent-in-2020/#:~:text=Among%20the%20top%20challenges%20facing,creation%20and%20maintain%20service%20delivery . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Chapman , C.A., Abernathy , K., Chapman , L.J. and Downs , C.T. 2022. The future of sub-Saharan Africa’s biodiversity in the face of climate and societal change, Sec. Conservation and Restoration Ecology , 10   Climate Adaptation Platform. 2024. Climate change in Africa and mitigating its impacts and risks . [Online] Available at: https://climateadaptationplatform.com/climate-change-in-africa-and-mitigating-its-impacts-and-risks/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Cozzi, L., Frankl, P., Wanner, B., Bahar H. and Spencer, T. 2023. Tripling renewable power capacity by 2030 is vital to keep the 1.5°C goal within reach . [Online] Available at: https://www.iea.org/commentaries/tripling-renewable-power-capacity-by-2030-is-vital-to-keep-the-150c-goal-within-reach [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Davies, T. 2024. JET funding fuels concerns . [Online] Available at: https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/opinion/on-my-mind/2024-02-15-tracey-davies-jet-funding-fuels-concerns/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Digital Hub Initiative. 2023. How Agritech transforms African economies . [Online] Available at: https://www.de-hub.de/en/blog/post/how-agritech-transforms-african-economies/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Disrupt Africa. 2023. Africa’s agri-tech revolution – the challenges, the opportunities, and what more needs to be done . [Online] Available at: https://disruptafrica.com/2023/08/04/africas-agri-tech-revolution-the-challenges-the-opportunities-and-what-more-needs-to-be-done/#:~:text=Africa's%20agri%2Dtech%20revolution%20%E2%80%93%20the,more%20needs%20to%20be%20done&text=African%20agriculture%20has%20the%20potential,overseas%2C%20but%20is%20chronically%20underpowered . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Doris, N. 2024. TotalEnergies slapped with historic greenwashing ruling . [Online] Available at: https://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/21348-totalenergies-slapped-with-historic-greenwashing-ruling#:~:text=The%20energy%20company%2C%20the%20world's%2019th%20biggest%20greenhouse%20gas,historic%20first%20for%20the%20country . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   E&E News and Harvey, C. 2022. The World Will Likely Miss 1.5 Degrees C—Why Isn’t Anyone Saying So?  [Online] Available at: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-world-will-likely-miss-1-5-degrees-c-why-isnt-anyone-saying-so/#:~:text=So%20far%2C%20it's%20been%20signed,there's%20still%20time%20to%20act . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   European Investment Bank (EIB). 2023. Investing in nature-based solutions: State-of-play and way forward for public and private financial measures in Europe . [Online] Available at: https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/20230095_investing_in_nature_based_solutions_en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Floyd, R., Yawson, F. and Bayuo, B. 2023. Realising parallel investments in Africa’s green industrialization . [Online] Available at: https://acetforafrica.org/research-and-analysis/insights-ideas/commentary/realizing-parallel-investments-in-africas-green-industrialization/#:~:text=These%20'parallel%20investments'%20are%20at,the%20country%20and%20regional%20levels . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Galal, S. 2023. Renewable Energy in Africa – Statistics and Facts . [Online] Available at: https://www.statista.com/topics/9143/renewable-energy-in-africa/#topicOverview [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Global Green Growth Institute. 2023a. 10 Billion USD Africa and Middle East SAFE Initiative Launched for Food Security . [Online] Available at: https://gggi.org/press-release/10-billion-usd-africa-and-middle-east-safe-initiative-launched-for-food-security/#:~:text=The%20Africa%20and%20Middle%20East,change%2C%20and%20rural%20livelihood%20vulnerability . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Graham, J.D., Belton, K.B. and Xia, S. 2021. How China Beat the US in Electric Vehicle Manufacturing, ISSUES ,   Greenfield, P. 2023. Revealed: more than 90 percent of rainforest carbon offsets by biggest certifier are worthless, analysis shows . [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/18/revealed-forest-carbon-offsets-biggest-provider-worthless-verra-aoe [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Hilton, I. 2024. How China Became the World’s Leader on Renewable Energy . [Online] Available at: https://e360.yale.edu/features/china-renewable-energy [accessed: 28 October 2024] Inamdar, A. 2022. Powering Africa’s Green Growth – beyond adaptation and resilience . [Online] Available at: https://climatechampions.unfccc.int/powering-africas-green-growth-beyond-adaptation-and-resilience/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Independent Expert Group on Climate Finance. 2020. Delivering on the US$100 billion climate finance commitment and transforming climate finance . [Online] Available at: https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2020/12/100_billion_climate_finance_report.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Capital Markets Authority (ICMA). 2019. Sustainability-Linked Loan Principles. [Online] Available at: https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/LMASustainabilityLinkedLoanPrinciples-270919.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Energy Authority (IEA). 2021. Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector . [Online] Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050 [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Energy Authority (IEA). 2023. The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions . [Online] Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2023. Exploring Opportunities for Women Entrepreneurs Driving Climate Solutions: A Discussion Note . [Online] Available at: https://www.ifc.org/en/insights-reports/2023/exploring-opportunities-for-women-entrepreneurs-driving-climate-solutions [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Monetary Fund. 2020. Powering Africa with Solar Energy – IMF F&D . [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2020/03/powering-Africa-with-solar-energy-sy#:~:text=More%20promising%20for%20large%2Dscale,much%20more%20reliable%20than%20elsewhere . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Trade Administration (ITA). 2024. South Africa: Energy Overview . [Online] Available at: https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/south-africa-energy  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   IOL. 2024. Ramaphosa announces plans for additional support for electric and hybrid vehicles in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/ramaphosa-announces-plans-for-additional-support-for-electric-and-hybrid-vehicles-in-south-africa-8700f652-6ea7-4002-b1c4-dd39e2299c61#google_vignette  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Kabujuru, W. 2023. Africa’s top six priorities at COP28 . [Online] Available at: https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2023/africa%E2%80%99s-top-six-priorities-cop28  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Kemp, Y. 2024. How to unlock green business opportunities across Africa – report . [Online] Available at: https://www.esi-africa.com/finance-and-policy/how-to-unlock-green-business-opportunities-across-africa-report/  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Koigi, B. 2023. The Promise and Scepticism Behind Africa’s Carbon Markets Initiative . [Online] Available at: https://www.ncmc.sua.ac.tz/news/the-promise-and-scepticism-behind-africas-carbon-markets-initiative [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Kuyoro, M., Leke, A., White, O., Woetzel, J., Jayaram, K. and Hicks, K. 2023. Reimagining economic growth in Africa: Turning diversity into opportunity.  [Online] Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/mckinsey%20global%20institute/our%20research/reimagining%20economic%20growth%20in%20africa%20turning%20diversity%20into%20opportunity/reimagining-economic-growth-in-africa-v6.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Lehmann-Grube, K., Valodia, I., Taylor, J. and Phalatse, S. 2024. What happened to the Just Energy Transition grant funding?  [Online] Available at: https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/research-news/2024/2024-03/what-happened-to-the-just-energy-transition-grant-funding.html  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Letswalo, N. 2023 . Why the hold on greenwashing policy in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/why-the-hold-on-greenwashing-policy-in-africa/  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Lighting Global. 2019. The Market Opportunity for Productive Use Leveraging Solar Energy (PULSE) in Sub-Saharan Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.lightingglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PULSE-Report.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Mboya, T. 2020. Can Carbon Trading Work in Africa?  [Online] Available at: [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Mbungu, G., Ogallo, E. and Rudic , D. 2024. Falling Short or Following Through? COP 28 Outcomes for Africa . [Online] Available at: https://afripoli.org/falling-short-or-following-through-cop-28-outcomes-for-africa  [accessed: 28 October 2024] McKenzie. 2023. Africa: Increasing demand for the continent’s critical mineral reserves to boost energy transition . [Online] Available at: https://insightplus.bakermckenzie.com/bm/projects/africa-increasing-demand-for-the-continents-critical-mineral-reserves-to-boost-energy-transition [accessed: 28 October 2024]   McKinsey & Company. 2023. Green energy in Africa presents significant investment opportunities . [Online] Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/green-energy-in-africa-presents-significant-investment-opportunities [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Meattle , C., Padmanabhi, R.,   de Aragão Fernandes , P., Balm , A., Wakaba, G., Chiriac, D., Tonkonogy , B. and  Wignarajah , D. 2022. Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/landscape-of-climate-finance-in-africa/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Mo Ibrahim Foundation. 2022. The Road to COP27: Making Africa’s Case in the Global Climate Debate . [Online] Available at: https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/research/data-stories/cop27/africa-climate-debate#:~:text=As%20we%20head%20towards%20COP27,climate%20crisis%20on%20the%20continent . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   National Treasury. 2024. National Budget – 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20Budget/2024/  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Ngila, F. 2023. Carbon Trading Offers Rich Rewards for Africa.  [Online] Available at: https://african.business/2023/10/resources/carbon-trading-offers-rich-rewards-for-africa [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Parker, D. 2023. Zero tolerance for greenwashing to inform future legislation . [Online] Available at: https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/zero-tolerance-for-greenwashing-to-inform-future-legislation-2023-11-29   [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Parry, I.W.H., Black, S. and Vernon-Lin, N. 2021. Still Not Getting Energy Prices Right: A Global and Country Update of Fossil Fuel Subsidies . [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/09/23/Still-Not-Getting-Energy-Prices-Right-A-Global-and-Country-Update-of-Fossil-Fuel-Subsidies-466004   [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Pole, J. 2022. Germany refuses to agree to EU ban on new fossil fuel cars from 2035 . [Online] Available at: https://www.euronews.com/green/2022/06/22/germany-refuses-to-agree-to-eu-ban-on-new-fossil-fuel-cars-from-2035  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Presidential Climate Commission (PCC). 2023. Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP).  [Online] Available at: https://www.climatecommission.org.za/south-africas-jet-ip [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Race, M. 2024. EU hits China with big taxes in electric car sales battle.  [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly20n4d0g9o  [accessed: 28 October 2024] Reuters. 2023. Germany approves bringing coal-fired power plants back online this winter . [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germany-approves-bringing-coal-fired-power-plants-back-online-this-winter-2023-10-04/#:~:text=BERLIN%2C%20Oct%204%20(Reuters),this%20winter%20and%20avoid%20shortages . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   South African Government. 2011. South Africa’s Green Economy Accord . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/south-africas-green-economy-accord-29-nov-2011 [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Todorović, I. 2023. IEA: Demand for critical minerals to spike 3.5 times by 2030 . [Online] Available at: https://balkangreenenergynews.com/iea-demand-for-critical-minerals-to-spike-3-5-times-by-2030/#:~:text=In%20the%20net%20zero%20emissions,cobalt%20and%2040%25%20for%20nickel . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2022. Economic development in Africa: Rethinking the foundations of export diversification in Africa – The catalytic role of business and financial services . [Online] Available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/aldcafrica2022-summary_en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2021. Thematic Bonds 101: Macro Environment, Market Dynamics and Steps to Issuance . [Online] Available at: https://sdgfinance.undp.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/UNDP_Thematic%20Bonds%20101.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2024. Africa Green Business and Financing Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/africa-green-business-and-financing-report  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2016. The State of Biodiversity in Africa: A Mid-term Review of Progress Towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets . [Online] Available at: https://www.unep.org/resources/report/state-biodiversity-africa-mid-term-review-progress-towards-aichi-biodiversity [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2023. Africa’s green business opportunities are abundant, UNEP study shows . [Online] Available at: https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/africas-green-business-opportunities-are-abundant-unep-study-shows#:~:text=Addis%20Ababa%2C%2017%20August%202023,today%20by%20the%20UN%20Environment [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 2023. How a new wave of tech startups is driving development in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://iap.unido.org/articles/how-new-wave-tech-startups-driving-development-africa#:~:text=5%20Taking%20a%20mobile%2Dfirst,e.g%20Opay%20and%20Kuda%20Bank)%2C [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Bank. 2023a. Scaling agriculture science and innovation for a climate-resilient future in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/agfood/scaling-agriculture-science-and-innovation-climate-resilient-future-africa#:~:text=Science%20and%20innovation%20in%20agriculture,the%20evolving%20needs%20of%20farmers . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Bank. 2023b. Lessons from 25 Policies Advancing a Low-Carbon.  [Online] Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/3770b59a-617f-4636-8aa1-adbe6db7db34#:~:text=protects%20the%20poor.-,'Reality%20Check%3A%20Lessons%20from%2025%20Policies%20Advancing%20a%20Low%2D,studies%20across%20sectors%20and%20geographies . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Meteorological Organization. 2023. State of the Climate in Africa. [Online] Available at: https://library.wmo.int/viewer/69000/download?file=1360_State-of-the-Climate-in-Africa-2023_en.pdf&type=pdf&navigator=1  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Meteorological Organization. 2024. Africa Suffers Disproportionately from Climate Change . [Online] Available at: https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/africa-faces-disproportionate-burden-from-climate-change-and-adaptation-costs  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Resources Institute. 2023. Key COP28 Takeaways for Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.wri.org/africa/key-cop28-takeaways-africa [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Zhang, C., Lepido, D. and Torsoli, A. 2024. China asks carmakers to halt Europe expansion over tariff spat . [Online] Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-24/china-asks-carmakers-to-halt-europe-expansion-over-tariff-spat  [accessed: 28 October 2024]          - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

This report has been enabled through the generous support of Telkom Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   February 2025   Author: Georgi Dragolov and Klaus Boehnke Constructor University, Bremen, Germany Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Table of Contents   Table of Content List of Tables List of Figures Executive Summary 1.   Introduction 2.   Measuring social cohesion 2.1 Data 2.2 Analytical approach 3.   Level and trend of social cohesion 3.1 Social cohesion in South Africa 3.2 Social cohesion in the nine provinces 4.   Structural influences on social cohesion 4.1 Data and method 4.2 Results 5.   Individual experiences of social cohesion 5.1 Data and method 5.2 Four classes of experience 5.3 Socio-demographics of the four classes 6.   Social cohesion and subjective well-being 6.1 Provinces 6.2 Individuals 7.   Discussion and conclusion References               Appendices Appendix A: Indicators of cohesion across time Appendix B: Dimensions of cohesion in the provinces over time Appendix C: Correlations of social cohesion on the province level Appendix D: Latent class analyses               Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:1440750455    List of Tables   Table 2.1 Sample sizes of Khayabus – Waves 1 Table 2.2 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 1, “Social relations” Table 2.3 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 2 “Connectedness” Table 2.4 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 3 “Focus on the common good” Table 3.1 Social cohesion and its dimensions in South Africa across time Table 3.2 The overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time Table 4.1 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table 5.1 Social cohesion and its dimensions in the four classes  Table 5.2 Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents  Table 6.1 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces  Table 6.2 Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents   Table A.1 Indicators of Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” across time  Table A.2 Indicators of Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” across time      Table A.3 Indicators of Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” across time    Table A.4 Indicators of Dimension 2.1 “Identification” across time    Table A.5 Indicators of Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” across time    Table A.6 Indicators of Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” across time      Table A.7 Indicators of Dimension 3.2 “Solidarity and helpfulness” across time  Table A.8 Indicators of Dimensions 3.2 “Respect for social rules” across time    Table A.9 Indicators of Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation” across time  Table A.10 Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” in the provinces across time  Table A.11 Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” in the provinces across time  Table A.12 Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” in the provinces across time   Table A.13 Dimension 2.1 “Identification” in the provinces across time  Table A.14 Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” in the provinces across time  Table A.15 Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” in the provinces across time    Table A.16 Dimension 3.1 “Solidarity and helpfulness” in the provinces across time   Table A.17 Dimension 3.2 “Respect for social rules” in the provinces across time    Table A.18 Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation“ in the provinces across time  Table A.19 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table A.20 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Table A.21 Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Table A.22 Relative class sizes for LCA solutions List of Figures   Figure 1.1 Constitutive elements of social cohesion (Leininger et al., 2021) Figure 1.2 Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar Figure 2.1 Provinces of South Africa Figure 3.1 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces (2023)  Figure 3.2 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time Figure 5.1 Average scores of dimensions in the four classes  Executive Summary   This study provides a comprehensive assessment of social cohesion in South Africa. It is an updated edition of the study published in November 2024, which focused on the development of social cohesion from 2021 to 2023, extending the period of observation to 2024.   Following the measurement concept developed by the authors and their colleagues for the Social Cohesion Radar of Bertelsmann Stiftung, the study assesses social cohesion in three domains: Social relations, Connectedness, and Focus on the common good. Each of these domains encompasses three dimensions of cohesion, namely: the intactness of Social networks, general Trust in people, and Acceptance of diversity within the domain Social relations; Identification with one’s place of residence, Trust in institutions, and Perception of fairness within the domain Connectedness; and Solidarity and helpfulness, Respect for social rules, and Civic participation within the domain Focus on the common good.   The study uses data from Waves 1 of the Khayabus Survey, a population-representative cross-sectional survey conducted annually by Ipsos South Africa. The Bertelsmann concept of defining a country’s level of social cohesion allows scores between 0 (no cohesion) and 100 (maximal cohesion). Which score can be regarded as sufficiently high is a normative, not to say political decision. It has become customary to designate scores below 20 as very low, from 20 to below 40 as low, from 40 to below 60 as moderate, from 60 to below 80 as high, and from 80 to 100 as very high. A very high level of social cohesion has not been reported for any country or other geopolitical entity yet.   In 2024, the overall level of social cohesion in South Africa as a whole was found moderate at 53.3 points. It went through a steady, though slow, decline from 53.5 points in 2021 to 51.7 points in 2023. By 2023, the downward trend in South Africa’s overall level of social cohesion has halted and reversed in an upward direction. The previously accrued decline has been almost overcome by 2024.   In 2024, the highest scores for a single dimension were found for Identification (72.2), followed by Solidarity and helpfulness (61.3), and Social networks (59.9). These dimensions constitute the glue that holds the South African society together. The lowest scores were found for Respect for social rules (36.6) and Perception of fairness (42.7). Although all nine dimensions improved from 2023 to 2024, only three have achieved an overall increase from 2021 to 2024: Trust in people (+2.0), Solidarity and helpfulness (+2.2), and Civic participation (+3.6). All other dimensions have registered an overall decline in the range from -0.2 for Acceptance of diversity to -3.8 for Respect for social rules.   As for the South African provinces, all exhibit moderate levels of social cohesion in 2024. In a comparison, cohesion was found lowest in KwaZulu-Natal (49.6), second lowest in North West (52.0), and third lowest in Free State (52.1). Cohesion was found highest in Limpopo (56.5). Over the period from 2021 to 2024, cohesion has improved only in North West (+1.2) and Eastern Cape (+2.6). All other provinces have registered an overall decline in the range from -0.1 for Gauteng to -4.2 for Northern Cape.   Correlational analyses on the provinces’ overall level of social cohesion and their structural characteristics offer insights on how to strengthen social cohesion: by enabling inclusive (people-centered) economic progress, reducing unemployment, lowering income inequality, providing adequate jobs for the highly qualified, promoting a family-oriented life-style, and bringing the living conditions in rural and urban areas to an equally adequate level.   The study, further, presents results from Latent Class Analysis (LCA), a grouping procedure that isolates distinct subgroups of South Africans who experience different strengths and deficits in social cohesion in their immediate life context. The preferred LCA solution identifies four classes of South Africans: Class 1 (Critics), which is characterized by high Identification but critically low Acceptance of diversity, a critically low perception of Respect for social rules, and low to moderate scores on the other dimensions; Class 2 (Integrated Sceptics), which is characterized by well-knit Social networks, high levels of Trust in people, Acceptance of diversity, Solidarity, and Civic participation, but low scores on the remaining dimensions; Class 3 (Middle South Africa), which is characterized by a high level of Identification with the country but moderate scores on all other dimensions; and Class 4 (Cohesive Communities), which is an ideal-typical model of strong cohesion in South Africa manifesting itself in exceptionally high Identification and high scores on all other dimensions. A series of chi-square tests of independence suggest that these four classes differ along core socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The insights can help identify social groups at risk of experiencing low social cohesion.   Ultimately, the report examines the relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being among South Africans. The evidence supports a core finding that has emerged in essentially all previous studies we have performed on social cohesion elsewhere: The quality of society (social cohesion) translates directly into citizens’ quality of life (subjective well-being). The analyses performed on the level of the provinces show that higher levels of social cohesion lead to a more positive evaluation of life, improved life satisfaction, and stronger optimism for the future. The same picture emerges from the analysis focusing on the four classes of respondents: In Class 4, Cohesive communities, families are predominantly seen as better off than a year ago, life satisfaction has improved for the majority, children are predominantly believed to have a bright future ahead.   It is exactly the strong positive relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being that underscores the necessity of political action to improve South Africa’s level of social cohesion. Whereas conceptual academic work on social cohesion sometimes claims that too high a level of social cohesion can cement the societal status quo and prevent progress, all empirical studies have shown that high levels of cohesion foster peaceful coexistence of various societal groups in respect, dignity, trust, and cooperation. Cohesion translates the social and economic structures (performance and output of the economy, living conditions) into quality of life (happiness, life satisfaction) directly experienced by individual members of society. In case cohesion is neglected, one can expect societal polarization and political instability. 1. Introduction   Since the French Revolution with its famous motto “liberté, égalité, fraternité”, discourse on the cohesion of geopolitical entities (countries, provinces, neighborhoods) has seen waves of greater and lesser intensity, but one thing is clear: A healthy social entity needs fraternité  or, in modern terminol­ogy, social cohesion among its members. Social cohesion stands for the ability of societies to stick together or, as Leininger and colleagues put it, “the glue that holds society together” (Leininger et al., 2021: 2).   In recent years, when social cohesion has been discussed in South Africa, it has been with an increasingly critical undertone. The sentiment that the self-declared Rainbow Nation (Tutu, Mandela) is drifting apart rather than growing together has become stronger. However, research – mainly empirical – on social cohesion in South Africa is scarce. Our search for any available scholarly literature within the past 10 years yielded seven publications, two of which are reviews of a book by Ballantine et al. (2017) included in the count. The book by Ballantine and colleagues is a collection of essays by local academics and public figures about issues related to, amongst others, inequality, xenophobia, safety, gender-based abuse, political leadership, law, education, identity, sport, arts, and South Africa’s position in the world. A paper by Abrahams (2016) tracks the evolution of social cohesion over twenty years in South African politics, criticizing the instrumentalization of cohesion as a social policy concept exclusively towards a form of nation-building that seeks to solidify the hegemony of the ruling party. A brief report by the South African Institute of International Affairs (2021) reviews the status quo and progress in religion, nationality, race and ethnicity, and LGBTQ+ rights. The latter report offers recommendations for improving the situation in these spheres and promotes the role of young people in fostering social cohesion. A paper by Burns and colleagues from the South African Labour and Development Research Unit emphasizes the importance of social cohesion as a social policy concept, also referring to studies conducted by the authors of the present report, critically reviews existing concepts of social cohesion proposed in the academic and policy discourse, and formulates a definition for its assessment in the South African society based on theoretical considerations: “Social Cohesion is the extent to which people are co-operative, within and across group boundaries, without coercion or purely self-interested motivation” (Burns et al., 2018, p. 10). Interestingly, Burns et al. (2018) identify the overlap between social cohesion and ubuntu, arguing that the two have become synonymous regarding nation-building and efforts to close South African society's cultural and racial divides.   To our knowledge, two existing empirical studies have defined and measured social cohesion in South Africa. Langer et al. (2017) define social cohesion in an African context as the interplay of three salient aspects: perceived inequalities, trust (interpersonal and institutional), and identity (national vs ethnic). Their measurement draws on data from 19 countries, including South Africa, from Round 3 (2005 – 2006), Round 4 (2008 – 2009), and Round 5 (2011 – 2013) of the Afrobarometer survey. For each aspect of a country, the authors calculate the proportion of respondents who provide those answers to the selected survey items that point to a stronger expression of cohesion. The resulting proportions for each aspect are then averaged by taking their arithmetic mean into a social cohesion index. According to the findings, overall cohesion in South Africa and its three aspects have recorded only minor ups or downs in the period studied. The level of identification was found to range from 0.612 (2005 – 2006) to 0.700 (2011 – 2013) and can be considered moderately high. The perception of equality was found in the range from 0.328 (2008 – 2009) to 0.469 (2011 – 2013) and can be qualified as low to moderately low. Trust was found in the range from 0.239 (2011 – 2013) to 0.293 (2005 – 2006) and can be qualified as low. From a comparative perspective, South Africa emerged in the middle of the country ranking on the overall level of cohesion and the perceived level of equality, in the lower half of the ranking on trust, and among the top countries on identification.   The second available empirical study (Leininger et al., 2021) similarly compares African countries. According to its authors, “cohesion is characterized by a set of attitudes and behavioural manifestations that includes trust, an inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good” (Leininger et al., 2021, p. 3). These three attributes unfold into two elements, encompassing horizontal or vertical relations among citizens and the state (see Figure 1.1): social trust and institutional trust, group identity and national identity, intergroup cooperation, and state-society cooperation. Leininger and colleagues operationalize their concept with items from the Afrobarometer, covering a varying set of African societies depending on the data availability for the particular element of cohesion: 17 to 18 in Round 3 (2005 – 2006), 20 in Round 4 (2008 – 2009), 28 to 34 in Round 5 (2011 – 2013), 32 to 36 in Round 6 (2014 – 2015). Their methodological approach measures the three attributes on a scale from 0 (low) to 1 (high). South Africa achieved scores in the range from 0.44 (2015) to 0.51 (2011) on trust, 0.3 (2015) to 0.43 (2006) on cooperation, and 0.42 (2015) to 0.74 (2011) on identity. These scores point to a downward trend in cohesion in South Africa for each attribute. In comparing African countries, South Africa ranked in the middle on trust, in the lower half on cooperation, and among the top countries on identity (except for the last year of observation, 2015). The work by Leininger et al. (2021), however, does not produce an overall index of cohesion, does not offer insights for more recent years since 2015, and does not venture into exploring the determinants of the country scores on the cohesion attributes or outcomes of cohesion.   Figure 1.1 Constitutive elements of social cohesion (Leininger)     Source:  Leininger et al. (2021)   The present report attempts to close the gap in the existing research on South Africa. It aims to provide an all-around theoretically founded and methodologically sound empirical assessment of social cohesion in South African society. In particular, our study attempts to:   measure the current degree of social cohesion in South Africa and its nine constituent provinces; track how cohesion has developed in the period from 2021 to 2024; identify structural characteristics from the thematic fields of economic situation, inequality and poverty, demography, diversity, and modernization that promote or hinder social cohesion; explore which social groups experience a high or low level of cohesion; investigate how social cohesion, i.e., the quality of society, relates to citizens’ well-being, i.e., quality of life.   To achieve these aims, we apply the measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar, which was informed by a comprehensive literature review (Schiefer & van der Noll, 2017) and the input of experts on the topic. It defines cohesion as the “quality of social cooperation and togetherness of a collective, defined in geopolitical terms, that is expressed in the attitudes and behaviors of its members. A cohesive society is characterized by resilient social relations, a positive emotional connectedness between its members and the community, and a pronounced focus on the common good” (Dragolov et al., 2016: 6). These three domains unfold into three dimensions. The domain Social relations measures the strength and resilience of individuals’ social ties (Dimension 1.1 – Social networks), the degree to which people trust others (Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people), and the extent to which people accept individuals of different background, lifestyle, and values as equal members of society (Dimension 1.3 – Acceptance of diversity). The domain Connectedness measures the strength of individuals’ identification with the geopolitical entity (Dimension 2.1 – Identification), the degree to which individuals trust the entity’s institutions (Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions), and individuals’ perception that they are treated fairly and that material resources are fairly distributed (Dimension 2.3 – Perception of fairness). The domain Focus on the common good captures the extent to which people feel and demonstrate responsibility for weak others (Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness), people’s willingness to abide by the rules of society (Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules), and their participation in society and political life (Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation). Figure 1.2 depicts the measurement concept of the Social Cohesion Radar (SCR).   Figure 1.2 Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar     Source: Dragolov et al. (2016) A comparison of the SCR to the approaches of Langer et al. (2017) and Leininger et al. (2021) shows that the three concepts overlap in several regards. First, social cohesion is a quantifiable quality of collectives, not individuals. Second, they all cover horizontal and vertical ties. Third, they all suggest that social cohesion should be assessed via a perception-based index, not based on objective socio-demographic indicators. Next, there is a considerable conceptual overlap in the emphasis on specific dimensions (aspects) of social cohesion. As already mentioned above, Langer et al. suggest including the extent of perceived inequalities (SCR: Perception of fairness), the societal level of trust (SCR: Trust in people), and the strength of people’s adherence to their national identity (SCR: Identification). Leininger and colleagues also mention trust and identity, whereas their dimension of cooperation is called Solidarity and helpfulness in the SCR.   The main difference between the three approaches lies in their conceptual scope. Whereas the SCR comprehensively describes the components necessary for a full-fledged assessment of the level of social cohesion in a given society, the two concepts based on the Afrobarometer remain somewhat piecemeal. In addition, one of the main advantages of the SCR approach is its leanness, a necessity also underscored by Leininger et al. (2021). On the one hand, the concept covers the essential components of social cohesion. At the same time, it leaves room for a systematic exploration of determinants (e.g., state of the economy, socio-economic exclusion) and outcomes (e.g., population well-being). For a critical review of the advantages and disadvantages of measurement concepts of cohesion that have been applied in empirical research, we refer readers to Delhey, Dragolov, and Boehnke (2023).   On a final note, the SCR has been utilized to assess social cohesion in 34 Western (EU and OECD) countries (Dragolov et al., 2016), 22 Asian countries (Delhey & Boehnke, 2018), the 16 federal states of Germany (Dragolov et al., 2016), 79 spatial planning regions of Germany (Arant et al., 2017; Boehnke et al., 2024), 78 neighborhoods of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen (Arant et al., 2016), the 32 federal entities of Mexico (Boehnke et al., 2019), and the seven regions of Kyrgyzstan (Larsen & Boehnke, 2016).   2.  Measuring social cohesion   This section details the data and methodological approach employed for measuring social cohesion in South Africa.   2.1  Data   The current report offers empirical evidence from analyses performed on data from the Khayabus Survey. The data were collected by Ipsos South Africa and provided by the Inclusive Society Institute. The Khayabus Survey is a population-representative cross-sectional survey that has been fielded annually in at least two waves among respondents of age 15 and above. The survey covers various topics related to society and politics in South Africa. It initially included the sections Socio-Political Trends (SPT), Government Performance Barometer (GPB), and Party Image (PI). A fourth section, GovDemPol, was added in 2021.   Because the GovDemPol section includes the core set of indicators needed for assessing social cohesion along the concept of the Social Cohesion Radar, our analyses can only start with 2021. Data on three items crucial for the measurement concept, each belonging to the SPT section, had to be taken from the 2020 Khayabus, as they were not included in the 2021 survey. The most recent survey data available to us refer to the year 2024. Our report concentrates on survey respondents aged 18 and above, as several of the needed items were not included in the questionnaire for under-aged South Africans. The analyses performed for this report draw on Waves 1 of the Khayabus survey, typically conducted from late May/early June to mid-July. The overall samples in the employed data encompass 3758 respondents in 2020, 3402 respondents in 2021, 3459 respondents in 2022, 3519 respondents in 2023, and 3172 respondents in 2024.   Table 1.1 Sample sizes of Khayabus – Waves 1     Table 2.1 offers detailed information on sample sizes achieved in Waves 1 of the Khayabus survey from 2020 to 2024. The table provides a breakdown of the samples by province, as the present report also aims to measure social cohesion in the nine constituent provinces of South Africa. We refer readers unfamiliar with the nine provinces' geographic location and administrative borders to Figure 2.1. It is important to note that population sizes vary widely between the mostly urban Gauteng province, where well over a quarter of South Africa's adult population lives, and the mostly desert Northern Cape province, which encompasses less than 3%. The uneven distribution of the South African population across the provinces is reflected in the achieved sample sizes for the provinces, as evident from Table 2.1. The low sample sizes for the least populated provinces, e.g., Northern Cape with typically about 60 respondents per wave, do not necessarily reduce the representativity of the data concerning core socio-demographic characteristics of their population. We address this issue by calibrating the survey data with the population weights provided by Ipsos South Africa. Smaller sample sizes do, however, involve a larger standard error for sample statistics like percentages and means. In practical terms, this means that the precision of the measurements for Gauteng ( NGP,2024  = 1087) is about four times higher than that for Northern Cape ( NNC,2024  = 63) at the same variability in the data. Caution is, therefore, required when interpreting such statistics as estimates of the ‘true’ situation or opinion in the population of provinces for which low sample sizes are available.   Figure 1.3 Provinces of South Africa   Source: Apraku et al. (2018)   In addition to the above-addressed statistical issues, population sizes, and population density are closely related: In the Gauteng province, more than 800 people live per square kilometer, whereas in the Northern Cape province, the density figure is below 4 per square kilometer (Statistics South Africa, 2024a). Considering these stark differences is essential when evaluating our findings on levels and trends of social cohesion in South Africa.   2.2  Analytical approach   Below we elaborate on the methodological approach for assessing social cohesion. We begin with the strategy for selecting Khayabus survey questions, also referred to here as items or indicators, to measure the nine dimensions of social cohesion in line with the Bertelsmann concept. We then turn to the approach for computing scores for the nine dimensions and the overall social cohesion index.   Item selection was conducted using a multi-step procedure. First, members of the research team – independent of each other – identified potential items for measuring the nine cohesion dimensions from the Khayabus questionnaire according to face validity. Members of the research team then jointly prepared a pool of items according to face validity. In the third step, items from the pool were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis for each dimension. Factor analysis is a statistical sorting procedure that analyzes the matrix of item intercorrelations to separate items with a highly similar response pattern from items with a different response pattern and then sort them into distinct subgroups. The various subgroups of items (called factors) allow us to assess whether or not the items were selected appropriately according to their face validity as per the different dimensions of social cohesion. An important selection criterion is the item’s factor loading, which reflects how strongly an item is correlated with the other items sorted into the given factor. Item loadings should typically exceed .40 to be seen as sufficiently high. Items exhibiting sufficiently high factor loadings were retained. In the final step, we assessed the internal consistency of the scales formed by the selected items to measure a pertinent dimension. Cronbach’s α consistency coefficients should reach .90 for an excellent scale, .80 for a very good scale, .70 for a satisfactory scale, and minimally .30, or, in case of short scales, at least .10 times the number of items in the scale.   Several data preparation steps had to be taken before performing factor analyses. Where needed, the response options of the items were reverse coded so that a higher numerical value stands for a more vital expression of the pertinent aspect of cohesion. The response options of all items were rescaled to range from 0 (weakest expression of cohesion) to 100 (strongest expression of cohesion). If present, missing values on an item were substituted with the sample mean as the missingness rate was very low. Tables 2.2 to 2.4 document the selected items' factor loadings and the internal consistencies of the scales these items form for measuring the nine dimensions of social cohesion.   Table 1.2  Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 1 “Social relations”       Table 1.3 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 2 “Connectedness”     Table 1.4 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 3 “Focus on the common good”   Readers will note that not all dimensions of social cohesion were measured equally well. This had several reasons. To begin with, the questionnaire offered a limited choice of indicators for some dimensions. This is why not all dimensions could be measured with at least three items. This pertained to Dimension 2.1 (Identification) and Dimension 3.1 (Solidarity and helpfulness), for which only two items could be included. Moreover, for Dimension 2.1, an item from the 2020 Khayabus had to be included, even with two items, to assess citizens’ identification with South Africa in 2021. Second, not all scales exhibit a high degree of homogeneity (level of intercorrelation) of the included items. This is particularly true for Dimension 2.1 and Dimension 3.3 (Civic participation).   After sorting items via factor analyses, the nine dimension scores were computed by calculating the arithmetic mean of the items determined to belong to a given factor. The overall cohesion index was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the nine dimension scores. Dimension and index scores for the provinces and South Africa were calculated by aggregating the individual-level data to the respective level via the population-weighted arithmetic mean. Scores for the dimensions and the overall index range from 0 (very low cohesion) to 100 (very high cohesion), where scores from 0 to 19.99 can be interpreted as pointing to a very low level of cohesion, 20 to 39.99 – low, 40 to 59.99 – medium, 60 to 79.99 – high, and 80 to 100 – very high.   3.  Level and trend of social cohesion   In this section, we report findings on the level and trend of social cohesion in South Africa and its nine constituent provinces from 2021 to 2024.   3.1    Social cohesion in South Africa   Table 3.1 documents the annual level and trend of social cohesion in South Africa since 2021. We first present the findings for 2024, the most recent year for which data are available, and then proceed to the changes observed over time.   Level in 2024   In 2024, the overall social cohesion index for South Africa was 53.3, slightly above the theoretical midpoint of the measurement scale of 50. As such, the strength of social cohesion in South Africa can be qualified as moderate—neither high nor low. What is behind this result? A look at the single dimensions reveals the strong and weak spots of cohesion in South Africa that jointly produce its moderate overall level.   Table 1.5 Social cohesion and its dimensions in South Africa across time     Dimension 1.1, Social networks, scored 59.9 in 2024. The intactness of citizens’ social networks is currently the third strongest dimension in South Africa. The strength of this dimension can be qualified as moderate to high as it has almost reached the lower bound of the interval of high scores (60). To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: About 52.5 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “I entertain friends from different population groups at home or another place,” 24.8 % disagreed, and 20.7 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.1 of the Appendix). Dimension 1.2, Trust in people, can also be found in 2024 in the upper half of the measurement scale, with a score of 54.4. The level of trust that South Africans place in others qualifies, thereby, as moderate. To exemplify the finding with one indicator for this dimension: 17.7 % of the respondents trust people in their community completely, 64.6 % only somewhat or not very much, and 16.5 % not at all (see Table A.2).   Dimension 1.3, Acceptance of diversity, achieved in 2024 a score of 46.8. The numeric result qualifies the tolerance level in South African society still as moderate. However, it should be noted that it falls within the lower half of the measurement scale, unlike the previous two dimensions from the domain Social relations. To exemplify with one indicator for Acceptance of diversity: 10.8 % of the respondents trust coloured South Africans completely, 58.9 % only somewhat or not very much, and 28.5 % not at all (see Table A.3).   Dimension 2.1, Identification, scored 72.2, the highest among all dimensions in 2024. Identification is the most pronounced aspect of social cohesion in South Africa and the only dimension that can be qualified without any reservations as high. This is manifested, for example, in the responses to the statement “I am proud to be South African”: 75.4 % agreed, 13.9 % disagreed, and 9.2 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.4).   Dimension 2.2, Trust in institutions, achieved in 2024 a score of 47.9. Just like Acceptance of diversity, the extent of trust citizens have in the country's institutions can be considered moderate. However, it falls within the lower half of the measurement scale. To exemplify with one indicator: 48.7 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “Elections are free and fair,” 30.6 % disagreed, and 17.3 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.5).   Dimension 2.3, Perception of fairness, scored in 2024 at 42.7. It is the second weakest aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people perceive the distribution of material resources as fair can be qualified as moderate. However, it should be noted that the result is very close to the upper bound of the interval of low scores (40). To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 29.9 % of the respondents stated the government is doing very well or fairly well at narrowing the income gap between races, whereas 65.3 % stated the government is handling this issue not very well or not at all well (see Table A.6).   Dimension 3.1, Solidarity and helpfulness, achieved in 2024 a score of 61.3. With this result, it is the second most vital aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people help the weak members of society can be qualified as high. To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 60 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “I actively look for ways in which I can support people who are less fortunate than I am”, 18 % disagreed, and 20.4 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.7).   Dimension 3.2, Respect for social rules, achieved in 2024 a score of 36.6. This is the weakest aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people perceive that rules are observed is low. To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 23.5 % of the respondents stated that the government is doing very well or fairly well at reducing the crime rate, whereas 74.9 % stated not very well or not at all well (see Table A.8).   Dimension 3.3, Civic participation, scored at 58.0 in 2024. Citizens’ involvement in society and political life can be qualified as moderate, tending towards high. One indicator for this dimension: 51.4 % of the respondents agreed with “I actively work for the welfare of my community”, 28.5 % disagreed, and 18.2 % were undecided (see Table A.9).   The results for the dimensions form a nuanced profile of cohesion. None of the three domains of social cohesion (Social relations, Connectedness, and Focus on the common good) exhibits either only deficits or only strengths for all its dimensions. Interestingly, the three top-scoring dimensions (Identification, Solidarity and helpfulness, and Social networks) stand out as strong to moderately strong anchors of their respective domains. However, two domains are imbalanced: Connectedness by the moderately low Perception of fairness, and Focus on the common good by the low Respect for social rules. If one should point out the glue that holds South African society together, this would undoubtedly be citizens’ strong identification with the country, their solidarity with their weaker fellow citizens, and the functioning of their social networks. On the other hand, what could destabilize the South African society is the perceived lack of respect for rules and the perceived lack of distributional fairness.   Trend over time   Regarding the trajectory of social cohesion, the results summarized in Table 3.1 present a mix of good and bad developments. To begin with the good, the year 2023 marks an inflection point in the downward trend of the overall index that had been observed since 2021. Following a steady, though slow, decline from its level at 53.5 in 2021 down to 52.4 in 2022 and further down to 51.7 in 2023, the overall index of social cohesion has increased to the current level of 53.5. The overall index has, thereby, recovered by 1.6 points from 2023 to 2024, but not fully yet to the level measured in 2021, as it is still -0.2 points below this benchmark.   The almost full recovery of the overall index of social cohesion should not be overestimated as it masks diverging trajectories among the dimensions. It is indeed the case that all nine dimensions increased from 2023 and 2024. The gains vary considerably from +0.1 points for Acceptance of diversity to +3.6 points for Respect for social rules. For six dimensions, the increase over the past year does not suffice to compensate for the previously accrued decline. The latter issue is most pronounced for Respect for social rules. In 2021, this dimension ranked as moderate with a borderline score of 40.3 but lost -7.3 points over 2022 and 2023 to qualify in the low-level category, where it can still be found despite the halving of the decline from 2023 to 2024. In fact, Respect for social rules in South Africa is approximately back to its level from 2022. A similar trajectory can be observed for Social networks: From an initially high level of 61.3, over 2022 and 2023 it slid down by 2.4 points to the moderate-level category, and is still to be found there in 2024 despite a gain of +1 point up to its current level, which happens to be identical to that from 2022. Other dimensions that are currently still below their starting positions from 2021 are Trust in institutions (-2.8 points), Identification (-1.1 points), Perception of fairness (-0.7 points), and Acceptance of diversity (-0.2 points).   The remaining three dimensions follow the opposite trajectory. By 2024, they have not just made up for declines experienced prior to 2023, but have, moreover, surpassed their starting levels from 2021. The most pronounced increase can be observed for Civic participation (+3.6 points), followed by Solidarity and helpfulness (+2.2 points), and Trust in people (+2.0 points). Further, Solidarity and helpfulness has already made it into the high-level category. We refer readers to Tables A.1 to A.9 of the Appendix for changes over time in the responses to the indicators of the respective dimensions.   3.2  Social cohesion in the nine provinces   Level in 2024   Zooming into the provinces, we find some variation across these administrative units. Figure 3.1 maps the strength of the overall social cohesion index in the nine provinces. Table 3.2 documents the annual level and trend over the four years examined here. In 2024, social cohesion was found relatively lowest in KwaZulu-Natal (49.6), second lowest in North West (52.0), and third lowest in Free State (52.1). Mpumalanga (53.2) comes closest to the country average of 53.3. Cohesion is higher than the result for South Africa as a whole in Gauteng (54.0), Eastern Cape (54.4), Western Cape (54.5), Northern Cape (55.1), and highest in Limpopo (56.5). In fact, all provinces rank in the interval of the measurement scale, referring to a moderate level of cohesion.   Figure 1.4 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces (2024)     Note : The map applies the colour scheme displayed above to visualize the strength of social cohesion in 2024 across the nine provinces.     Table 1.6  The overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time     Tables A.10 to A.18 of Appendix A document the provinces' performance on the single dimensions of cohesion. Interestingly, none of the provinces exhibits a consistent profile. Each province has a distinctive pattern of strengths and weakness which is evident both in an absolute and in a relative comparison of the provinces’ dimension scores. The only exception would be the strength of identification with the country, which is, in absolute terms, high across all provinces. To exemplify the idiosyncrasies of the provinces, we take Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal, the two extremes in the ranking on the overall index of cohesion. Limpopo, achieves the relatively highest scores on altogether five dimensions from the domains Connectedness and Focus on the common good, but shows deficits on two dimensions from the domain Social relations. In particular, Limpopo occupies the second lowest rank on Trust in people, found highest in Eastern Cape (61.0), with a moderate score of 48.1, and the lowest rank on Acceptance of diversity, found highest in Gauteng (49.6), with a low score of 37.9. On the other hand, KwaZulu-Natal occupies bottom ranks on six dimensions across all three domains but achieves the second highest score on Trust in people (57.2).   Trend over time   As evident from Table 3.2, social cohesion in the provinces has followed five different trajectories from 2021 to 2024. The most common trajectory comprises a larger decline in the beginning followed by a smaller increase, which, taken together, result in an overall decline. Readers may recall that this is the trajectory of South Africa as a whole on the overall index of cohesion and all dimensions but Trust in people. It applies to five provinces: Northern Cape (-4.2 points), KwaZulu-Natal (-1.5 points), Free State (-1.4 points), Mpumalanga (-0.8 points), and Gauteng (-0.1 points). The opposite trajectory – a larger increase in the beginning and a later smaller decline – applies only to Eastern Cape (+2.6 points). Two other provinces, Limpopo and North West, have experienced a zig-zag trajectory similar to that of South Africa as a whole on Trust in people: a decline followed by an increase and then another decline. Due to differences in the magnitudes of these ups and downs, the combined effect is an overall decline in Limpopo (-0.4 points) and an overall increase in North West (+1.2 points). Finally, a steady decline characterizes the trajectory of cohesion in Western Cape, resulting in an overall decline of -1 point. Taken together, the five trajectories bring about an overall decline of social cohesion in seven provinces and an overall increase in only two. Figure 3.2 depicts these developments in the overall cohesion index across the provinces.   Readers may notice in Table 3.2 that the divergence of the provinces observed from 2022 to 2023 has reversed to a convergence from 2023 to 2024. The range of the provinces’ scores on the overall index, i.e. the difference between the top ranked and the bottom ranked province, has decreased from 12.2 points in 2023, when it was the largest across all years analyzed, to only 6.9 points in 2024. In fact, the range in 2024 is the smallest observed in the period from 2021 to 2024. The closing gap in the strength of cohesion among the provinces is, however, misleading. Behind it is not a process of upward convergence, i.e. former ‘losers’ catching up, but one of downward convergence, namely the weakening cohesion in Limpopo and Northern Cape.   Figure 1.5 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time   Note : The figure shows the scores of the nine provinces on the overall index of social cohesion in 2021, 2022, and 2023.   As to the trend in the single dimensions, Tables A.10 to A.18 reveal that Social networks, Solidarity and helpfulness, and Civic participation are the only dimensions that have improved for almost all provinces. Social networks have weakened only in KwaZulu-Natal (-1.3 points), and more pronouncedly in Gauteng (-5.1 points) and Mpumalanga (-8.8 points). Solidarity and helpfulness has declined only in Western Cape (-3.1 points), Northern Cape (3.2 points) and more dramatically in Mpumalanga (-12.7 points). The only declines observed on Civic participation affect North West (-0.5 points) and Northern Cape (-1.1 points). It is worrying that the picture is reversed for Identification, which holds the South African society together: Whereas citizens’ strength of identification has improved in Limpopo (+6.5 points) and North West (+6.6 points), it has declined in the remaining seven provinces in the range from -0.2 points (Eastern Cape) to -5.9 points (Free State). Perception of fairness and Respect for social rules – the major weaknesses of social cohesion in South Africa – as well as Trust in institutions also register predominantly declines across the provinces. Respect for social rules has returned to its initial level from 2021 in Limpopo, and has increased only in Northern Cape (+1.4 points) and Western Cape (+1.9 points). We observed the largest decline in Respect for social rules in KwaZulu-Natal (-11.6 points), despite an improvement of +2.6 points from 2023 to 2024. Perception of fairness has improved only in Western Cape (+0.2 points), Gauteng (+1.8 points), and Limpopo (+6.2 points). The extent to which citizens place trust in institutions has improved only in Mpumalanga (+1.2 points), Western Cape (+2.1 points), and Northern Cape (+2.3 points). Following a steady downward trend, Trust in institutions has declined by -11.7 points in KwaZulu-Natal. On a final note, Trust in people and Acceptance of diversity are also characterized by more provinces being on a decline, although the ratio here is rather balanced at 5:4. It is noteworthy, though, that Limpopo has experienced a steady decline across all years both on the extent to which citizens trust others (-9.8 points) and the extent to which citizens accept diversity (-12.9 points). Acceptance of diversity has consistently declined also in Western Cape (-6.5 points). In contrast, we observe a steady increase on Trust in people for Eastern Cape (+11.6 points) and North West (+9.5 points), and a steady increase on Acceptance of diversity in Mpumalanga (+12.3 points).   In the subsequent section, we investigate which structural characteristics of the provinces may be at play in promoting or hindering social cohesion.   4.  Structural influences on social cohesion   This section aims to find evidence on structural determinants of social cohesion. For this purpose, we explore the relationship between the overall level of social cohesion in the nine provinces and selected characteristics of the provinces from the following thematic fields: economic situation, inequality and poverty, demography, diversity, and modernization. The focus on these aspects is not arbitrary: Our studies on Western and Asian societies as well as the federal states and spatial planning regions of Germany demonstrated empirically that aspects from these thematic fields act as determinants rather than outcomes of social cohesion (Dragolov et al., 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Arant, Dragolov & Boehnke, 2017; Boehnke, Dragolov, Arant & Unzicker, 2024).   4.1  Data and method   To touch on the economic situation in the provinces, we use data on the gross domestic product per capita [1] in Rand (Statistics South Africa, 2024a), Human Development Index (Global Data Lab, 2024), and unemployment rates – official and expanded (Statistics South Africa, 2023b). We measure poverty using one subjective indicator – the share of households in a province who perceive themselves as poor (Statistics South Africa, 2024c), and objective indicators concerning three definitions of the poverty line [2] – the share of the population below the food poverty line, the lower-bound poverty line, and the upper-bound poverty line (own calculations based on CRA, 2023). We employ the Gini index of income inequality and the P90/P10 ratio (own calculations based on CRA, 2023) to measure inequality [3] . We draw on data from Census 2022 (Statistics South Africa, 2023a) for the remaining thematic fields. In particular, as to demographics, we consider population density, the share of urban and rural population, the share of singles and married citizens, and the population's median age. To tap into diversity, we use the share of Blacks, Whites, Coloured, Indian/Asian, and Other races; the share of immigrants; as well as ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization [4] (own calculations based on Statistics South Africa, 2023a). To touch on modernization, we use the share of citizens with completed primary, secondary, and post-secondary education, the share of citizens owning a computer and a cell phone, and the share of the population without access to the internet.   For reasons of data availability, all structural indicators refer to the years 2021 or 2022. Thereby, they precede the most recent measurement of social cohesion from 2024 by about two to three years. The intentional time lag—earlier measurement of the provinces’ structural characteristics and later measurement of social cohesion—introduces a certain degree of temporal order in the analyses. It cannot prove the existence of a causal relationship, but it can increase the plausibility of attributing causality.   Each of the above-listed structural characteristics of the provinces was subjected to a correlation test with the level of social cohesion. Two variables are correlated when changes in one are (closely) followed by changes in the other. A correlation can be positive (the more of Variable A , the more of Variable B ) or negative (the more of Variable A , the less of Variable B ). The strength of the association is reflected in the correlation coefficient, which can range from 0 (no correlation) to ±1 (perfect correlation). Typically, a correlation of size below |.10| is very weak and not worth interpreting, between |.10| and |.30| – weak, between |.30| and |.50| – moderate, and above |.50| – strong.   A considerable obstacle arises from the sample size for the correlations on the level of provinces. Of course, the overall sample size in each survey wave is large and has sufficient statistical power. Power (in mathematical-statistical theory) means that a given sample is large enough to corroborate a particular effect as likely ‘true’ about the population from which the sample was drawn – South Africa in this case. On the level of provinces, however, showing that a specific correlation is sizable enough to conclude that it is significant (i.e., likely true in the nine provinces) is problematic due to the number of provinces – only nine, unlike the number of surveyed individuals – over three thousand in each year. This may be surprising at first glance because more people have been surveyed in the provinces, with a minimum of 63 in Northern Cape and a maximum of 1087 in Gauteng in 2024. However, social cohesion is not a characteristic of individuals but of geopolitical entities, and the latter – the provinces of South Africa – are only nine.   The low number of cases (provinces) means that only extremely high correlations can reach statistical significance. Mathematically, significance is a function of sample size (the higher, the more likely it is for a particular coefficient to be significant) and data variability (the higher the variance of the included data, the less likely it is that a specific coefficient is significant). Given these constraints, we disregard the significance of the correlation coefficients in our reporting and interpretation, focusing instead on the tendency in the data. Thus, we follow the appeal of a respectable number of scientific community members to ditch p -values (Wasserstein, Schirm & Lazar, 2019). The results from additionally performed bivariate biserial Pearson correlations, for which the province-level characteristics were disaggregated to the individual-level data set for 2024 ( N  = 3172), show that ten of altogether 31 associations may not be considered significant (see Table A.19 of Appendix C). This finding supports our decision to focus on tendencies instead of discarding associations merely for not meeting a criterion for statistical significance.   Besides significance, the number of provinces is critically low for performing Pearson correlations. As a parametric test, the Pearson correlation involves assumptions that cannot be fulfilled with the data on the level of provinces. We, therefore, resort to Spearman correlations as a non-parametric, assumption-free alternative. A Spearman correlation is, in essence, a Pearson correlation performed on ranked data. The distinction between the two approaches is that a Pearson correlation considers the exact distances among the observations on each variable, whereas a Spearman correlation considers only whether there are differences, disregarding their size. For example, in 2022, the wealthiest province in terms of per capita GDP was Gauteng, with 96,252 Rand, and the poorest was Eastern Cape, with 54,805 Rand. The Pearson correlation will be influenced by the numeric difference of 41,447 Rand between the two provinces, whereas the Spearman correlation will only consider which province has the higher value. One implication is that the Spearman method is not sensitive to outliers in the data – observations (provinces) with an extremely large or extremely low value on a characteristic of interest. Given the critically low sample size of nine provinces, the Spearman method is advantageous compared to a Pearson correlation which may be quickly and heavily biased by an outlier. Because in all our previous studies on cohesion, the data allowed us to apply the Pearson correlation method, we performed Pearson correlations for the present report, too. Interested readers can find those in Table A.19 of Appendix C. In a few instances, we observe great discrepancies – mostly in size but also in direction. As discussed at length above, to stay on the safe side, we report and interpret the findings from the Spearman correlation tests.   On a final note, we performed both bivariate correlations and partial correlations for GDP, because both in our study of 34 Western countries (Dragolov et al., 2016) and our study of 22 Asian countries (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018), GDP was highly positively related to social cohesion: The more prosperous a society, the more cohesive it is. Partialling GDP out of a relationship removes the influence of GDP on both variables involved. This makes it possible to speak of associations between a given structural characteristic of the provinces and social cohesion, independent of their economic prosperity. In the section below, we report and interpret the partial correlations.   4.2  Results   Table 4.1 documents the relationships between the structural characteristics of the nine provinces and social cohesion per thematic field. The empirical findings for South Africa present several surprises concerning what has been previously found for Western and Asian societies.   Economic situation   The bivariate correlation between per capita GDP (in a province) and social cohesion (in the same province) was found at ρ =.00. The relationship is non-existent. It informs that social cohesion is independent of how economically affluent the provinces are. This result is striking as it goes against the positive association between GDP and cohesion that was consistently found in all our previous studies on Western and Asian societies.   The correlation between the Human Development Index and cohesion emerged positive and moderate in size (ρ = .39). People-centered economic progress (Gross National Income coupled with mean years of schooling and life expectancy) appears conducive to social cohesion.   Both measures of unemployment – the official and expanded unemployment rates – exhibited moderately negative associations with social cohesion (ρ = -.42 and ρ = -.32, respectively). Provinces in which more unemployed people reside tend to have weaker social cohesion.   Poverty and inequality   The evidence presents mixed findings on poverty. Whereas the subjective indicator exhibited a strongly negative correlation with social cohesion (ρ = -.55), the three objective indicators were found to correlate positively but only very weakly in the range from ρ = .03 for the upper-bound poverty line to ρ = .10 for the food and lower-bound poverty lines. Social cohesion tends to be lower in provinces where more households perceive themselves as poor. Its level, however, appears to be, by and large, unrelated to objective poverty. Though at first glance puzzling, the results on objective poverty can be explained with the efficiency of social welfare programs targeted at supporting poor citizens.   The correlations of the social cohesion index with both measures of income inequality were found to be consistently negative. Social cohesion tends to be lower in provinces with larger inequality in income. Interestingly, the correlation with the Gini index is moderately negative (ρ = -.44) and insignificant, whereas that with the P90/P10 ratio is strongly negative (ρ = -.65) and marginally significant ( p  ≤ .10). The Gini index considers the entire income distribution. In contrast, the P90/P10 ratio contrasts the income at the top of the distribution (90th percentile) to the income at the bottom (10th percentile). The latter focuses on inequality, which is more visible and more accessible for ordinary citizens to perceive. The top-to-bottom income ratio is 38 in the Free State and 11 in the Northern Cape. These values inform that the top earners' income is 38 times higher than that of poor citizens in the Free State; in Northern Cape – ‘only’ 11 times higher. Vast discrepancies in income emerge as detrimental to social cohesion. Table 1.7 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces     Demography   Population density exhibited a weak negative relationship with social cohesion (ρ = -.22). Social cohesion tends to be lower in more densely populated provinces. This finding corresponds with the associations of the cohesion index with the shares of urban (ρ = -.30) and rural population (ρ = .30). Though the relationships are weak in size, they indicate that social cohesion tends to be lower in more urbanized provinces and, in contrast, higher in provinces with a larger share of rural population.   Marital status was found to correlate strongly with social cohesion. Social cohesion appears to be significantly lower in provinces with a large share of singles (ρ = -.69, p  ≤ .10) and tends to be higher in provinces with a larger share of married citizens (ρ = .47). This finding suggests that families contribute strongly to cohesion in the South African society.   We found a moderately negative association (ρ = -.44) with median age. Social cohesion tends to be lower where the population’s median age is higher. The association was reversed in Asia: Social cohesion was found higher in Asian countries with a higher median age.   Diversity   The composition of the provinces’ population regarding race, migration background, language, and religion seems to be weakly to moderately related to social cohesion. Provinces with larger shares of Blacks (ρ = -.16) tend to have a somewhat weaker level of social cohesion. In contrast, cohesion tends to be somewhat higher in provinces with larger shares of Whites (ρ = .13), Coloured (ρ = .32), and other races (ρ = .12). A negligibly positive association was found between the provinces’ level of social cohesion and their share of Indian/Asian residents (ρ = .09). As to immigration, provinces with more immigrants were found to have a slightly stronger level of cohesion (ρ = .21).   The fractionalization measures offer findings that generally follow the tendencies mentioned above. Ethnic (racial) fractionalization exhibited a positive, though only weak, correlation with social cohesion (ρ = .16). The relationship with linguistic fractionalization emerged as positive and moderate (ρ = .43), whereas that with religious fractionalization was found to be weak and negative (ρ = -.12). Racial and linguistic diversity in the provinces seem to contribute to social cohesion, whereas religious diversity appears to harm it.   Modernization   The evidence is puzzling concerning educational attainment. Whereas the share of citizens with completed primary education exhibited a weakly positive correlation with social cohesion (ρ = .20), the shares of citizens with completed secondary education exhibited a negative, very strong and marginally significant correlation (ρ = -.67, p ≤ .10). Its size is comparable to the correlations of the social cohesion index with income inequality (P90/P10 ratio) and the share of singles. The correlation with the share of citizens with completed post-school education also emerged negative, though only weak (ρ = -.16). Provinces with better and more highly educated citizens seem to have lower levels of cohesion. A possible explanation for these surprising results could be the economy of the country which does not deliver jobs up to the expectations of the better educated citizens.   Access to modern information and communication technology (computers, cell phones, and the internet) poses yet another puzzle. The correlation of the social cohesion index is weakly to negligibly negative with the share of computer owners (ρ = -.10) and cell phone owners (ρ = -.10), but strongly positive with the share of the population without access to the internet (ρ = .62).   What brings social cohesion in the South African provinces forward is people-centered economic progress, rural population, marriages, racial and linguistic diversity, and immigration. As potential hazards to social cohesion emerged: unemployment, felt poverty, income inequality, high population density and urbanization, single life, older population, religious diversity, and access to the internet. [1]      In line with the customary practice in economic research and our previous studies, we transform the raw values by taking their natural logarithm ( ln ). [2]      Individuals below the food poverty line cannot afford enough food to obtain the minimum daily energy requirement for adequate health. Individuals below the lower-bound poverty line are unable to afford both adequate food and non-food items and have to sacrifice food for essential non-food items. Individuals below the upper-bound poverty line can afford adequate food and essential non-food items. In 2022, the food poverty line was at 663 Rand, the lower-bound poverty line at 945 Rand, and the upper-bound poverty line at 1417 Rand, according to the report of the Center for Risk Analysis (CRA, 2023). [3]      The Gini index measures income inequality in the population as a whole. It ranges from 0 (perfect equality among all individuals) to 1 (perfect inequality, where one individual has all income). The P90/P10 ratio contrasts the income at the 90th percentile of the income distribution to the income at its 10th percentile (OECD, 2021). [4]      Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals are not from the same group (ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.; Alesina et al., 2003). The corresponding indices for ethnic/linguistic/religious fractionalization range from 0 (all individuals are from the same ethnic group/speak the same language/are from the same religious group) to 1 (each individual belongs to a separate ethnic/linguistic/religious group).   5.  Individual experiences of social cohesion   The previous sections of the report examined the levels and trends of social cohesion in South Africa and its provinces. Correlational analyses on the level of the provinces offered insights into potential structural characteristics that determine the local level of cohesion. In this section, we go down to the individual level to explore which population groups might be at risk of experiencing low cohesion in South Africa.   5.1  Data and method   There are several methodological approaches for identifying groups at risk of experiencing low cohesion, each involving different assumptions. One possibility is to perform separate analyses relating the individual scores on the overall cohesion index and its nine dimensions to the respondents' relevant socio-demographic and economic characteristics. This approach will likely lead to a plethora of results that are difficult to systematize. In order to reduce the complexity without a substantial loss of information, we prefer to identify classes (distinct groups) of respondents based on the pattern of their scores on the nine dimensions of social cohesion. The resulting classes are characterized by similarities within and dissimilarities across the classes concerning the experience of the nine aspects of cohesion by the respondents who belong to them. In a second step, we relate class membership to socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. In simpler terms, we investigate how the experience of social cohesion is related to individual characteristics. An example could be rich and poor citizens experiencing different levels of social cohesion.   To classify respondents into groups with distinct experiences of cohesion, we employ Latent Class Analysis. To cite from the abstract of a recent overview paper (Weller et al., 2020): “Latent class analysis (LCA) is a statistical procedure used to identify qualitatively different subgroups within populations who often share certain outward characteristics. The assumption underlying LCA is that membership in unobserved groups (or classes) can be explained by patterns of scores across survey questions, assessment indicators, or scales.” We take respondents’ scores on the nine dimensions of social cohesion in 2024 as the basis for the LCAs performed here.   LCAs are typically undertaken sequentially. The statistical procedure is programmed to come up with different numbers of groups, usually starting with two distinct groups (classes) and continuing until several groups (classes) are distinguished that offer plausible pathways of interpretation: Who are the people grouped into Class 1, Class 2, …, Class k ? It is customary to summarize interpretations by labeling the different classes in a way that best characterizes their response patterns. Next to interpretability, specific indices of goodness-of-fit aid the decision of how many groups are most plausible to extract from the available data (Weller et al., 2020). These include the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the (sample-size-adjusted) Bayesian Information Criterion ( BIC , saBIC ), which do not have pre-defined thresholds but inform comparisons of solutions: The solution with the lower AIC  and ( sa ) BIC would be deemed better. Goodness-of-fit indices with pre-defined thresholds include the Entropy coefficient H  and the Average Probability of Class Membership ( APCM ): Each should be greater than .90 for excellent fit or .80 for acceptable fit. Table A.21 of Appendix D documents the goodness-of-fit indices of five different LCA solutions. Table A.22 of Appendix D shows the population-weighted relative sizes of the classes in the total sample ( N  = 3172) from the various LCA solutions.   Based on the resulting goodness-of-fit indices of the LCA models we specified and considering the classes' interpretability, we selected the LCA model producing four classes.   5.2  Four classes of experience   Table 5.1 provides an overview of respondents’ average scores on the nine dimensions of cohesion, which served as the basis for the LCA, and the overall index of social cohesion within each class. Class 1 encompasses 18.6 % of the respondents. It is characterized by low cohesion with an average score of 37.5 out of 100 points. Classes 2 and 3 encompass 29.1 % and 41.8 % of the respondents, respectively. Both exhibit a moderate overall level of social cohesion with an average score of 54.6 in Class 2 and 54.4 in Class 3. Class 4, encompassing only 10.5 % of the respondents, exhibits a high level of social cohesion with an average score on the overall index of 73.3 points.   Table 1.8 Social cohesion and its dimensions in the four classes     A closer look at the average scores of the classes on the nine dimensions reveals the aspects of cohesion along which the classes differ from each other (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). Likely due to the large sample sizes of most classes, a series of Scheffe pairwise comparisons from one-way analyses of variance for each of the dimensions informs of significant differences ( p  ≤ 0.01) among all classes on all dimensions except for Identification between Class 2 ( M  = 72.4) and Class 3 ( M = 72.1).   Respondents within Class 1 (low cohesion) exhibit a high level of identification (67.4). The strength of their social networks (49.6), their solidarity with weak others (54.6), and their involvement in civic life (48.5) is moderate. Members of Class 1 place low trust in others (25.1) and in institutions (30.7), and have a low perception of fairness (27.0). Their tolerance for diversity is very low (15.4). These respondents also have a very low perception that social rules are respected (18.8). Class 1 can be described as Critics.   Members of Class 2 (moderate cohesion) exhibit a mixed profile. They are well-networked socially (67.3), place high trust in others (71.6), and have high levels of tolerance for diversity (63.6), strong identification (72.4) as well as strong solidarity with weak others (66.3). Their involvement in civic life is also high (61.5). However, the trust they place in institutions is low (37.2), and they perceive low levels of fairness (29.9) and respect for rules (22.1). Class 2 can be described as Integrated sceptics. Figure 1.6 Average scores of dimensions in the four classes   Note : The figure visualizes the average scores of the social cohesion dimensions in each of the four classes of respondents.   Members of Class 3 (moderate cohesion) rate most social cohesion aspects on the middle level. The strength of their solidarity with others (58.0) is moderate to high. Moderate are the level of trust they place in institutions (56.5), their involvement in civic life (56.1), the strength of their social networks (56.0), their level of perceived fairness (51.5), and the trust they place in other people (50.2). Further, these respondents have a moderate perception that rules are observed (46.4). Their tolerance for diversity, however, is moderate to low (42.9). Identification with the country (72.1) is the only strong aspect of cohesion in this class of respondents. If these were findings on the US society, we would label this class Middle America, with strong loyalty to the country and below-average acceptance of otherness. Class 3 can be described as Middle South Africa.   Members of Class 4 express a very strong identification with the country (80.3) and high levels of social cohesion in all aspects. Class 4 appears to be South Africa’s ideal-typical model of strong cohesion. It can be described as Cohesive communities.   Across all four classes, Identification with the country was found to be consistently high. In contrast, the deficits in Respect for social rules, particularly in Class 1 and Class 2, emerge yet again as an antithesis to citizens’ loyalty to the country.   5.3  Socio-demographics of the four classes   In this section, we explore which individual characteristics are typical for the four classes with distinct experiences of social cohesion. We do so using the following socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics: biological sex (male, female), age group (18 to 24, 25 to 44, 45 to 64, 65 years and above), race (White, Black, Indian/Asian, Other), primary language (English, Afrikaans, Indigenous), marital status (single, married or living as married, windowed or divorced), community size (rural or village, town or city, metropolitan area), education (post-secondary, secondary, lower or none), employment status (employed, not in workforce, unemployed), and income class [1] (low, lower-middle, upper-middle, high, missing). Data on these characteristics stem from Wave 1 of Khayabus 2024.   The four classes were characterized in the framework of separate chi-square tests of independence between respondents’ class membership and the respective individual characteristics of interest. Table 5.2 documents the population-weighted relative frequencies (%) of the socio-demographic and socio-economic categories in the total sample and in each of the four classes as well as the respective result from the chi-square test of independence and Cramer’s V  coefficient of effect size. Due to the large sample sizes in three of the classes, six out of nine tests emerged as statistically significant, but all effect sizes are small. Insignificant are the relationships between class membership and biological sex, marital status, and level of education. We, therefore, focus rather on the tendencies in the data.   Class 1, the Critics, is characterized by an overproportional representation of women (54.9 %), respondents from the age group 25-44 years (53.1 %), persons of other race (11.4 %), speakers of Afrikaans (17.0 %), singles (60.5 %), dwellers in towns or cities (30.0 %), unemployed (39.3 %), members of the low-income class (23.2 %) and persons who refused to report their household income (43.6 %). Class 1 is further characterized by an underrepresentation of men (45.1 %), respondents from the age group 45-64 years (24.1 %), Blacks (81.3 %), speakers of English (7.6 %), married or living together as married (29.9 %), dwellers in villages or rural areas (28.9 %), employed (40.2 %), and members of the lower-middle (9.4 %), upper-middle (13.2 %), and high-income class (10.6 %).   Class 2, the Integrated sceptics, is characterized by an overproportional representation of Whites (10.4 %) and Indian/Asian (4.1 %), speakers of English (14 %) and Afrikaans (16.7 %), respondents who have completed secondary (50.6 %) and post-secondary education (17.3 %), employed (47.7 %), and members of the high-income class (19.1 %). Conversely, Class 2 is characterized by an underproportional representation of respondents from the age group 18-24 years (13 %), Blacks (76.8 %), speakers of indigenous languages (69.3 %), respondents who have low or no completed education (32.1 %), respondents who are not in the workforce (15.8 %), and members of the low-income class (18.2 %).   Class 3, Middle South Africa, is characterized by an overproportional representation of respondents from the age group 18-24 years (17.2 %), Blacks (87.7 %), speakers of indigenous languages (79.7 %), dwellers in towns and cities (29.0 %), respondents with low or no completed education (38.4 %), respondents who are not in the workforce (21.9 %), and members of the low (25.0 %) and lower-middle income class (12.9 %). In contrast, Class 3 is characterized by an underproportional representation of respondents from the age group 25-44 years (48.7 %), non-Blacks (Whites – 4.3 %, Indian/Asian – 1.4 %, Other – 6.6 %), speakers of Afrikaans (10.3 %), dwellers in metropolitan areas (40.0 %), respondents who have completed secondary education (47.5 %), employed (41.7 %), and respondents who have refused to report their household income (33.4 %).    Table 1.9 Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents     Class 4, the Cohesive Communities, is characterized by an overproportional representation of men (53.1 %), respondents from the age group 45-64 years (28.6 %), Blacks (85.6 %) and Indian/Asian (4.0 %), speakers of indigenous languages (78.9 %), married or living together as married (35.8 %), divorced or widowed (10.7 %), dwellers in metropolitan areas (48.8 %), employed (52.1 %), and respondents who have refused to report their household income (39.7 %). Conversely, Class 4 is characterized by an underrepresentation of women (46.9 %), respondents from the age group 18-24 years (14.0 %), Whites (1.7 %), speakers of Afrikaans (10.7 %), singles (53.5 %), dwellers in towns or cities (20.2 %), respondents who are not in the workforce (18.4 %), unemployed (29.5 %), and members of the low-income class (17.3 %). [1]      Income classes were derived from the reported total household income. The latter was equivalized concerning household size using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Respondents with equivalized household income lower than 60 % of the median belong to the low-income class, from 60 % to 100 % - to the lower-middle income class, from 100 % to 200 % - to the upper-middle income class, greater than 200 % - to the high-income class. Respondents with a missing value on household income are treated as a separate group due to the large share of non-response (41.5 %).   6.  Social cohesion and subjective well-being   In the present section, we inspect the data to determine whether they support the consistent finding from our previous studies on the topic that high levels of social cohesion are related to greater (subjective) well-being. We employ the following five items from the Khayabus survey as proxies of well-being:   Think of the way your family lives, would you say that your family is… better off than a year ago / about the same / worse off than a year ago? And how do you think your family’s lives will be in a year’s time? Do you think your family will be… better off than today / about the same / worse off than today? Please think about your children or the children of family or friends. What do you think the future holds for these children? Do you think that… they have a bright future ahead of them / they have a bleak future ahead of them? And your satisfaction with life? Has it… improved/staying the same/worse compared to a few months ago? On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate whether you (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) agree or (5) strongly agree with the following statement: I am seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so.   We perform analyses both on the level of provinces and of individuals.   6.1  Provinces   We aggregate the individual responses to the five items to measure well-being on the level of provinces. For each province, we take the respective share of the positive response option to each of the four items with categorically scaled answers (better off, bright future, improved) and the arithmetic mean of the individual responses to the Likert-scale item tapping on emigration.   We apply the same methodological approach as in Section 4, which explored associations between several structural characteristics of the provinces and the index of social cohesion. Table A.20 of Appendix C documents the biserial bivariate correlations on the individual level and the bivariate and partial Pearson correlations on the level of provinces. As in Section 4, we report and interpret the results from the Spearman correlations partialled for GDP (see Table 6.1).   Table 1.10 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces     The share of respondents evaluating their family’s life as better off today than a year ago exhibits a very strong positive correlation with the level of social cohesion in respondents’ province (ρ = .79). The same was found for the share of respondents evaluating their life satisfaction as improved in comparison to a few months ago (ρ = .77). Further, in more cohesive provinces, there are larger shares of respondents believing that their family’s lives will be better off than today in a year (ρ = .68) and that their children will have a bright future ahead (ρ = .79). The share of respondents who consider emigrating to another country tends to be negligibly lower in the more cohesive provinces (ρ = -.10).   The provinces' results indicate that social cohesion is conducive to a positive life evaluation, higher life satisfaction, and greater optimism. They are entirely in line with our findings from other continents: The higher the level of social cohesion in a geopolitical entity, the more positive people’s outlook on life (see Dragolov et al., 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Arant et al., 2017; Boehnke et al., 2024).   6.2  Individuals   To investigate the association between social cohesion and subjective well-being on the individual level, we relate the individual responses to the well-being items to respondents’ membership in the four distinct classes of experiencing social cohesion. As most of the items on well-being are of categorical measurement quality, we apply the approach from Section 5 to describe the four classes based on respondents’ socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Table 6.2 documents the results. Unlike the very weak relationships found in Section 5, the individual experience of social cohesion exhibits somewhat stronger associations with four of the indicators of subjective well-being.   Table 1.11 Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents     The evidence presents a clear picture. The greatest share of respondents who evaluate their family’s life as better off than a year ago was found in Class 4, Cohesive Communities (46.3 %). The second largest share was found in Class 3, Middle South Africa (22 %). The lowest shares were found in Class 2, Integrated sceptics (18.2 %), and Class 1, Critics (19.6 %). The largest shares of respondents evaluating their family’s life as worse off than a year ago were found in Class 1 (35.5 %) and Class 2 (34 %).   Moving on to the two indicators of optimism, we find similar evidence. The largest share of respondents believing their family’s life would be better off than today in a year was found again in Class 4 (59.1 %). Class 3 appears somewhat reserved, given that most believed life would be about the same (45.3 %). Again, in Class 1 (29.7 %) and Class 2 (27 %), we find the largest shares of respondents who believe their family’s life would be worse off than today. It should be mentioned, though, that within Class 1 and Class 2, the share of pessimists is counterbalanced by an approximately similarly sized share of optimists. Optimism regarding children’s future was found highest in Class 4, followed by Class 3: 71.8 % and 53.6 %, respectively, believe children would have a bright future ahead of them. Pessimism prevails in the other two classes, where about 64 % of the respondents believe children would have a bleak future ahead of them.   The above-described pattern holds for life satisfaction, too. The largest share of respondents evaluating their life satisfaction as improved was found in Class 4 (50.3 %), followed by Class 3 (30.4 %). Life satisfaction has worsened for the majority in Class 1 (41.4 %). Most of the respondents in Class 2 (48.4 %) and Class 3 (46.8 %) reported that their life satisfaction has stayed the same. And yet, in Class 3, the share of respondents for whom life satisfaction has increased (30.4 %) is larger than the share of those for whom it has worsened (22.8 %); this pattern is reversed in Class 2.   Finally, the association between the experience of social cohesion and emigration is rather blurred. An overwhelming majority in each class (65.4% in Class 2 and over 70 % in the other classes) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “I am seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so.” The disagreement rate is highest in Class 4 (75.5 %). Class 2 has the relatively highest rate of agreement with the statement (17.8 %), followed by Class 1 (14.9 %) and Class 4 (12.8 %), whereas only 11.7 % of Class 3 consider emigrating. High social cohesion appears insufficient to discourage people from emigrating. The relationship is, however, very weak in terms of effect size.   7.  Discussion and conclusion   South Africa has debated social cohesion ever since the end of the apartheid regime, especially in light of the Rainbow Nation concept. However, only two empirical studies have assessed South Africa's social cohesion during all these years. The insights that this past research provided are, by and large, piecemeal and outdated by now.   The present study aimed to assess social cohesion in South Africa, tracking its development from 2021 to 2024; to identify structural factors that promote or impede it; to explore social groups at risk of experiencing low cohesion, and to examine the relationship between social cohesion and citizens' well-being. Cohesion was conceptualized and operationalized along the measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar which has been used as a model to quantify societal cohesiveness in altogether over 60 countries across the world. The study drew on the data from Waves 1 of the Khayabus survey, a population-representative cross-sectional survey fielded annually by IPSOS South Africa. Below, we summarize and discuss the results in light of previous evidence but mostly leave the conclusions to the political bodies engaging with the study results.   In 2024, the overall level of social cohesion in South Africa as a whole was found moderate at 53.3 points (of maximum 100). It went through a steady, though slow, decline from 53.5 points in 2021, the starting point of our analysis, to 51.7 points in 2023. In 2023, the downward trend in South Africa’s overall level of social cohesion halted and reversed in an upward direction. The previously accrued decline has been almost overcome. Yet, one needs to consider that our study offers insights on the recent four years only of altogether three decades since apartheid – a new chapter in South Africa’s history whose onset was marked by hope, reconciliation and the vision to create a Rainbow Nation. The current – only moderate – level of cohesion suggests that the South African society is perhaps still far from its ambitious founding goal. The glue that holds the South African society together consists mostly of the high level of identification with the country (72.2) but also of high solidarity with weaker fellow citizens (61.3) and relatively well functioning social networks (59.9). Political attention must, however, be paid to the widely perceived lack of respect for social rules (36.6), as it can spark turmoil. Policy makers may also consider overcoming the perceived lack of distributional fairness (42.7), strengthening acceptance of diversity (46.8) and trust in institutions (47.9).   To put the findings on South Africa in a comparative perspective, we refer to the case of Germany (see Boehnke et al., 2024). Interestingly, Germany’s level of social cohesion in 2023 (52 points) was almost identical to South Africa’s in the same year. Germany also experienced a downward, though much steeper, trend, losing nine points on the overall index between 2020 and 2023. The COVID pandemic is often seen as one of the reasons for dwindling social cohesion. In the authors’ view, which for reasons of data availability is not backed by empirical data, a reversal in the downward trend in Germany is not in sight yet, considering the intensifying societal and political polarization on pressing issues such as the inflation, the Ukraine-Russia military conflict, migration and violent crime, to name a few. A comparison of the results from 2023 further reveals that the two countries do not have identical profiles of cohesion. What they have in common are a similar strength of Social networks, practically the same level of Trust in institutions, and a lacking Perception of fairness. Germany’s profile is much stronger with respect to Acceptance of diversity and, quite stereotypically, Respect for social rules, but weaker with respect to Trust in people, Identification, Civic participation, and particularly Solidarity and helpfulness (34 points). Extending the scope to the comparison of 34 EU and OECD member states (Dragolov et al., 2016), we find considerable similarities in the pattern of strengths and weakness between South Africa and Israel. The society of Israel exhibits similarly strong Identification, moderate Solidarity, Social networks, and Trust in people, as well as pronounced deficits in the Perception of fairness and Respect for social rules. No country among the 22 Asian studied (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018) exhibits this profile. Nevertheless, in light of South Africa’s membership in BRICS, we briefly outline the cohesion profiles of India and China for comparison purposes. India’s profile is characterized by very weak Social networks, low Trust in people, very low Acceptance of diversity, very low Identification, moderate Trust in institutions, very low Perception of fairness, low Solidarity and helpfulness, moderate Respect for social rules, and moderate Civic participation. In contrast, China’s profile is characterized by strong Social networks, very high Trust in people, moderate Acceptance of diversity, moderate Identification, very high Trust in institutions, moderate Perception of fairness, very low Solidarity and helpfulness, high Respect for social rules, and very low Civic participation.   The survey data further allowed us to examine cohesion in the nine South African provinces. In 2024 as well as in all previous years analyzed, all provinces achieved scores on the overall index in the interval designating a moderate level of cohesion. Yet, despite an improvement of +3.5 points from 2023 to 2024, KwaZulu-Natal had (again) the relatively lowest level of social cohesion (49.6). Below the South African average are currently also the provinces of North West (52.0), Free State (52.1), and Mpumalanga (53.2). Limpopo (56.5) had (again) the relatively highest level of social cohesion than the rest of the country, despite a decline of -1.8 points from 2023 to 2024.   The look into people’s subjective experience of social cohesion yielded four groups (classes) with distinctive patterns of strengths and weakness. Class 4, Cohesive communities, emerged in 2024 as an ideal-typical model of strong cohesion but represents only some 10 % of the South African society. In contrast, Class 1, the Critics, did emerge also in 2024 as the segment of the population (18.6 %) that experiences worrying deficits in five of altogether nine aspects of cohesion, most alarming of which are the critically low levels of acceptance of diversity (15.4 points) and respect for social rules (18.8 points). This at-risk population segment encompasses overproportionally more women, respondents from the age group 25-44 years, persons of other race, speakers of Afrikaans, singles, dwellers in towns or cities, unemployed, and members of the low-income class. It would be an overstatement and, moreover, methodologically inappropriate, to conclude that, i.e., all women or all low-income earners are at risk of experiencing low social cohesion. However, some of the above listed social groups and, in particular, combinations thereof, certainly deserve policy makers’ attention.   Next, several surprising results on the associations between the structural characteristics of the provinces and their level of social cohesion need to be highlighted. Previous studies elsewhere have always yielded that geopolitical entities enjoying higher levels of per capita GDP also exhibit higher social cohesion, Scandinavia being the most prominent example. Findings for Asian countries corroborate that result (Delhey et al., 2018). In South Africa, the wealth of the provinces is unrelated to their level of cohesion. Our study, furthermore, finds conflicting results on poverty and inequality. On the one hand, social cohesion is lower in provinces where more households view themselves as poor but not lower in provinces where more people objectively live in poverty. That poverty harms cohesion has been a consistent finding in our studies on Western societies (Dragolov et al., 2016), Asian societies (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018) as well as Germany’s federal states and regions (Arant et al., 2017; Boehnke at al., 2024). On the other hand, though, social cohesion is lower in provinces with larger discrepancies in the income distribution, which is in line with the results on Western countries. Further, a negative link with median age (the younger the people in an area, the higher the level of social cohesion) was discovered, which appears counterintuitive at first glance. Another somewhat puzzling result is the positive correlation with ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. However, evidence on Asian societies shows that ethnic and linguistic diversity are conducive to social cohesion up to a certain extent and harmful beyond it. Another counterintuitive result is the positive association between the level of social cohesion in the provinces and the share of citizens without access to the internet. By no means should the latter finding be interpreted such that wider provision of access to the internet per se harms social cohesion. The internet is merely a tool. It empowers people by facilitating, e.g., economic activity, access to knowledge, and social interactions, but also has its dark sides promoting criminal activity, the spread of fake news and misinformation as well as discursive polarization. Further research is needed to shed more light on the mechanism operating behind the finding at stake, but one thing is for sure: One should not throw the baby out with the dirty bathwater.   Beside the counterintuitive and surprising results discussed above, the analyses of the provinces’ structural characteristics offer insights on how to strengthen social cohesion. To begin with, the provinces’ level of social cohesion was found to correlate positively with the Human Development Index, and negatively with subjective poverty, unemployment, and income inequality. These findings suggest that social cohesion can be enhanced by enabling inclusive (people-centered) economic progress, reducing unemployment, and lowering income inequality. In addition, we found negative associations between the provinces’ level of social cohesion and the shares of citizens with completed secondary and post-secondary degrees. We assume that this is due to an underperformance of the South African economy in providing adequate jobs for the highly qualified. Next, cohesion in the provinces was found to correlate positively with the share of married citizens – conversely, negatively with the share of singles. The latter finding suggests that social cohesion can be fostered by promoting a family-oriented life-style. Finally, we found a positive relationship between the provinces’ level of social cohesion and the share of rural population – conversely, a negative relationship with the share of urban population. It is likely that dwellers in rural areas feel forced to leave their otherwise supportive rural communities in a pursuit of better living conditions and greater economic opportunities in the urban centers, where social cohesion tends to be lower. This could be avoided by efforts to bring the living conditions in rural and urban areas to an equally adequate level.   And yet, what is social cohesion good for? The present study on South Africa corroborates a core finding of essentially all other studies we have performed to measure social cohesion elsewhere: The quality of society (social cohesion) translates directly into citizens’ quality of life (subjective well-being). In more technical terms: The higher social cohesion is, the better and more satisfying life people have, and the more optimistic they are about the future. References   Abrahams, C. (2016). Twenty years of social cohesion and nation-building in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 42 (1), 95–107. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43900558   Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8 , 155–194. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024471506938   Apraku, A., Moyo, P., & Akpan, W. (2018). Coping with climate change in Africa: an analysis of local interpretations in Eastern Cape, SA. Development Southern Africa, 36(3), 295–308. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2018.1482199   Arant, R., Dragolov, G., & Boehnke, K. (2017). Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2017 . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Arant, R., Larsen, M., & Boehnke, K. (2016). Sozialer Zusammenhalt in Bremen . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Ballantine, C., Chapman, M., Erwin, K., & Maré, G. (Eds.) (2017). Living together, living apart? Social cohesion in a future South Africa . University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press. http://www.ukznpress.co.za/?class=bb_ukzn_books&method=view_books&global%5Bfields%5D%5B_id%5D=496   Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.). (2018). What holds Asian societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar . Gütersloh: Bertelsmann-Stiftung.   Boehnke, K., Berrueto, A., Dragolov, G., & Ocampo Villegas, P. (2019). Are value preferences and social cohesion interconnected? The case of Mexico. Acta de Investigación, 9 (2). http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fpsi.20074719e.2019.2.262   Boehnke, K., Dragolov, G., Arant, R., & Unzicker, K. (2024). Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2023. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Burns, J., Hull, G., Lefko-Everett K., & Njozela, L. (2018). Defining social cohesion  (SALDRU Working Paper 216). Cape Town: SALDRU, UCT.   Center for Risk Analysis. (2023). Assets and Incomes. November 2023. Johannesburg: Center for Risk Analysis.   Delhey, J. & Boehnke, K. (2018). Conceptualizing social cohesion in Asia, In Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.), What holds Asian societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar  (pp. 29-48). Gütersloh: Bertelsmann-Stiftung.   Delhey, J., Boehnke, K., Dragolov, G., Ignácz, Z.S., Larsen, M., Lorenz, J., & Koch, M. (2018). Social Cohesion and its Correlates: A Comparison of Western and Asian Societies. Comparative Sociology, 17(3-4), 426–455. https://doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341468   Delhey, J., Dragolov, G. & Boehnke, K. (2023). Social Cohesion in International Comparison: A Review of Key Measures and Findings. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 75 , 95-120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-023-00891-6   Dragolov, G., Ignácz, Z. S., Lorenz, J., Delhey, J., Boehnke, K., & Unzicker, K. (2016). Social cohesion in the Western world. What holds societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar . Springer International. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32464-7   Global Data Lab (2024). Subnational HDI (v8.0) . Retrieved on September 24, 2024 from https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/table/shdi/ZAF/   Langer, A., Stewart, F., Smedts, K., & Demarest, L. (2017). Conceptualising and measuring social cohe-sion in Africa: Towards a perceptions-based index. Social Indicators Research, 131 , 321-343. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1250-4   Larsen, M. M., & Boehnke, K. (2016). Measuring Social Cohesion in the Kyrgyz Republic. Social Cohesion Index . University of Central Asia's Institute of Public Policy and Administration Working Paper No. 36, Bishkek.   Leininger, J., Burchi, F., Fiedler, C., Mross, K., Nowack, D., von Schiller, A., Sommer, C., Strupat, C., & Ziaja, S. (2021). Social cohesion: A new definition and a proposal for its measurement in Africa  (Discussion Paper 31/2021). Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). https://doi.org/10.23661/dp31.2021.v1.1   OECD (2021). Old-age income inequality. In Pensions at a Glance 2021: OECD and G20 Indicators . OECD Publishing, Paris. doi: https://doi.org/10.1787/d1a5a309-en   Schiefer, D. & van der Noll, J. (2017). The essentials of social cohesion: A literature review. Social Indicators Research, 132 (2), 579-603. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1314-5   Statistics South Africa (2023a). Census 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2023b). Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Quarter 4: 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2024a). Estimation of regional gross domestic product for South Africa: Experimental estimates. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2024b). Population Estimates. Pretoria: Stats SA   Statistics South Africa (2024c). Subjective poverty in South Africa. Findings from the General Household Surveys 2019 and 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Wasserstein, R. L., Schirm, A. L., & Lazar, N. A. (2019). Moving to a World Beyond “ p  < 0.05.”  The American Statistician, 73 (sup1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2019.1583913   Weller, B. E., Bowen, N. K., & Faubert, S. J. (2020). Latent Class Analysis: A guide to best practice. Journal of Black Psychology, 46 (4), 287-311. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095798420930932 Appendices   Appendix A: Indicators of cohesion across time   This Appendix documents the population-weighted relative frequencies of the response categories of the indicators used to calculate the social cohesion scores in the report. The reported values pertain to the respective percentage distributions in the total sample for each year of data collection.   Table A.12 Indicators of Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” across time Table A.13 Indicators of Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” across time Table A.14 Indicators of Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” across time Table A.15 Indicators of Dimension 2.1 “Identification” across time Table A.16 Indicators of Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” across time Table A.17 Indicators of Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” across time Table A.18 Indicators of Dimension 3.1 “Solidarity and helpfulness” across time Table A.19 Indicators of Dimensions 3.2 “Respect for social rules” across time Table A.20 Indicators of Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation” across time Appendix B: Dimensions of cohesion in the provinces over time   This Appendix contains results on the level and change over time in the nine single dimensions of social cohesion across the provinces of South Africa.   Domain “Social Relations”   Table A.21 Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” in the provinces across time Table A.22 Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” in the provinces across time Table A.23 Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” in the provinces across time Domain “Connectedness”   Table A.24 Dimension 2.1 “Identification” in the provinces across time Table A.25 Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” in the provinces across time Table A.26 Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” in the provinces across time Domain “Focus on the Common Good”   Table A.27 Dimension 3.1 “Solidarity and helpfulness” in the provinces across time Table A.28 Dimension 3.2 “Respect for social rules” in the provinces across time Table A.29 Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation“ in the provinces across time Appendix C: Correlations of social cohesion on the province level   Table A.30 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table A.31 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Appendix D: Latent class analyses   This Appendix documents goodness-of-fit indices for the various LCA models specified.   Table A.32 Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Table A.33 Relative class sizes for LCA solutions   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   February 2025   Author: Dr Klaus Kotzé Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Table of Contents   1 Introduction 2 Orientation 3 Panellists’ contributions 3.1 Re-framing narratives: Exploring the transformative potential of short film-making 3.2 Afrofuturism in Film: Towards Cultivating Transformative Leadership for Equity and Diversity in Response to Crises 3.3 Decolonising Education in South Africa: Reclaiming the Dustbin of African History 3.4 Reimagining Education in South Africa: Decolonizing the Curriculum for Equity and inclusion 3.5 Decolonised education: Perspectives from Kenya 3.6 Crossing the impasse in the discourse on decolonised education 3.7 A view from civil society: An introduction to Habitat International Coalition 4 Points of convergence 4.1 Comprehensive and critical 4.2 Decentring and emancipatory 4.3 An ubuntu education 5 Significance of the dialogue 6 Conclusion                 Cover photo: istock.com – Stock photo ID: 534575779          1 Introduction   On 20 November, the Inclusive Society Institute hosted a dialogue on the substance and implementation of a decolonised education in South Africa. The dialogue, the first in a planned series that recognises that while South Africa has made significant progress since the achievement of non-racial democracy, much work remains in conceptualising and substantiating the aspirations that are outlined in the national Constitution. Dialogue, which was central to achieving a political breakthrough and in establishing the legitimate South African state, is a powerful process whereby the appropriate means and ways of democratic legitimacy are expressed. Dialogue offers a critical and collaborative approach to uncovering the interests of different sectors of society. Allowing for the cross-pollination of ideas and the fostering of shared understanding. It is this shared understanding that promises to imbue South Africans with the common will required to express people’s power.   Due to its relevance, potential and power, the Inclusive Society Institute chose dialogue as the preferred way to engage with the important, yet complicated issues facing the South African nation in its democratic and developmental processes. The legacies of colonialism and Apartheid have left confounding sets of challenges and opportunities. In the democratic era the government and people have the means to bring about change, the question now regards: what kind of change? The indirect and overarching power of universal (read western) ideological power remains a constraint in the postcolonial period. Due to these stayed power systems, South Africans have yet to pave its own path. Its own identity and ways of looking at the world and shaping it.   The topic of decolonised education was chosen for the first dialogue due to the foundational and determinative effect that education and pedagogy has on South African society. Decoloniality is a space for discussion. It asks for introspection and for the critical assessment of concepts. If South Africa is to pursue and achieve the transformative social justice envisioned in the Constitution, it requires an education system fit for purpose. It's not just the curriculum and how a subject is taught, but whether the people, the economy and the security, even the national interest, is being served. Such a system would neither perpetuate former, colonial mores, nor would it bandwagon on contemporary tropes. It would be one that critically reflects its own reality. One that gives rise to equipped, holistic individuals that together participate in fulfilling the transformative aspirations of the Constitution.   In pursuit of these goals, several experts and practitioners in the fields of education, pedagogy and civil society were invited to present their views as pertaining to the subject matter. The following questions were put to the panellists:   What kind of pedagogy and education is needed to pursue our Constitutional project? What is the meaning and purpose of decolonisation? Does South Africa need to this?   What does decolonised pedagogy and education entail? And, how does it compare with the current form and content of our education?   The panellists included:   Dr Wendy Smidt, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Global Institute for Teacher Education and Society (GITES), Cape Peninsula University of Technology Professor Zayd Waghid, Director, Global Institute for Teacher Education and Society (GITES), Cape Peninsula University of Technology Dr Oscar Koopman, Senior Lecturer, Stellenbosch University Dr Karen Koopman, Senior Lecturer, University of the Western Cape Dr Pryah Mahabeer, Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu Natal Dr Andrew Wambua, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Global Institute for Teacher Education and Society (GITES) Distinguished Professor Aslam Fataar, Sociology of Education, Stellenbosch University Ms Yolande Hendler, Secretary General, Habitat International Coalition    2 Orientation   Thirty years after Apartheid, contestation remains about where South Africa is going and how it will get there. Pedagogy and education lie at the centre of convening and consolidating the South African national project. The approach of our pedagogy and the substance of our education must be designed to strategically pursue the national goals.   While the educational and pedagogical systems have changed since those under Apartheid, many believe these new models are insufficient and problematic. Their substance and approach are seen as alien to the needs and realities of South Africans; a perpetuation of former, imposed models. Recently, the concept of decolonisation has drawn interest from intellectuals and across the scholarship. Decoloniality takes the concepts of European modernity and its imposition of views, norms and mores as its starting point.   Whereas the end of political coloniality was drawn to a close with the adoption of a non-racial, transformative Constitution, the meaning and substance of post-colonial South Africa has not been consolidated. While the decolonial movement seeks to interrogate these questions through stimulated conversations, many questions remain about its meaning, approach and potential outcomes.    As an independent, public benefit organisation, the Inclusive Society Institute has identified the pronouncements and upheaval across university campuses on the topic of decolonisation. The Institute recognises that for South African institutions to function optimally, the knowledge and pedagogy approaches must both be fit for purpose and must speak to the broader South African reality. The Institute is thus not opposed to the need to decolonise education. Rather, as a public benefit organisation that seeks to support Constitutional democracy, the Institute is interested in what a decolonised education will look like. To the Institute, such an approach needs to be nuanced. The Institute convened this meeting so to attain such a broader, more nuanced perception. 3 Panellists’ contributions   3.1 Re-framing narratives: Exploring the transformative potential of short film-making   Dr Wendy Smidt, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Global Institute for Teacher Education and Society (GITES), Cape Peninsula University of Technology   Dr Smidt’s contribution focused on how need to rethink the ways in which education could be decolonised and what that would mean. Using the medium of film and the process of film-making, she spoke to the challenges and opportunities that decolonised education has to create a more equitable and inclusive education system.   She focused on film-making’s transformative potential. In Africa, storytelling has been a very popular way of communicating. This has been the case for generation upon generation. While the media may have changed, the essence have remained. Storytelling has profound impact. Not only on the consumer or audience, but also on the producer or narrator. In modern times, digital storytelling has become ubiquitous. Anyone with a smartphone can become a storyteller. Can create and can capture an audience.   In answering the question that asks what kind of pedagogy and education is needed to pursue the Constitutional project, she suggests that film literacy would be central to the development of critical self-awareness and personal growth.   Through storytelling, film-making can challenge dominant narratives and promote alternative perspectives. Not only by watching films. Creating one’s own films from one’s own histories and personal backgrounds would contribute greatly to the active process of decolonisation. Supplanting gaze, context, framing and content would have a significant role in shaping a more relevant narrative.   In doing so, in applying what is already manifest on the continent and in the country, the contemporary narrative would be inherently more local, as it is crafted by the locals and does not have to be mediated through colonial or external views. This is the value that widely accessible digital tools have. They empower the creators to truly tell their own story. In their own way.  Imbuing it with their own perspectives and visions. By fostering critical thinking and empathy for literacy can help individuals develop more nuanced understanding of history and culture.   By doing to, Smidt said, the education system can aspire towards ‘full literacy’, which the speaker referred to as a boundary-crossing competence. That through interaction, individuals develop the potential to cross boundaries. Whether geographical, linguistic, cultural, and to enable the youth to exchange their ideas in terms of heritage. In terms of culture and in terms of their values and beliefs.   Furthermore, she emphasised that visual communication speak louder than only words. Visuals also speak to culture and heritage. And by disrupting habitual patterns of cognition and defamiliarization that external visual culture has, new ways and new citizenship can be inculcated. This is not an automatic process but one that needs to be developed. Both with students and with the teachers. By actioning the values and cultures embedded.   Looking at implementation of a decolonial system, Smidt suggested that, first, tolerance was needed. While dominant narratives should be challenged, it should not be done by summarily throwing them out. Instead, a critical process needs to be undertaken. Not one that is negative and judgemental. But one that asks about possibilities in a non-linear way. To spread ideas.   This can be done through greater multimodal media literacy. There are different ways of communicating apart from language. People understand images and symbols much better. Particularly in Africa, where the rich tradition of symbols amplifies marginalised voices. This approach is ideally suited in the modern, digital ecosystem. And where more and more people have access to such advanced devices. These platforms are often free-to-use, allowing for abundant creativity. They also allow for the promotion of social justice and activism by raising awareness of social issues and mobilising communities.   Lastly, the speaker suggested that the path towards a decolonial education is not through taking down statues. It is not through ignoring cultures and histories. But through critically engaging. Through promoting cultural identity and heritage. Prioritising a more inclusive and culturally relevant curriculum. A living curriculum. Not one that is set within a rigid form. It is important to be able to recognise mistakes and adapt. In doing so, being flexible, the curriculum itself will encourage a critical thinking. A problem-solving creativity. Encouraging students to engage with moral and ethical issues. Not only by becoming the creators of their own content through their historical and cultural and artistic lenses. But also, to make them aware that they need to be responsible citizens. They need to accept responsibility for their actions. And, with their audiences, to look at their inherent values and then plot a path about how to proceed critically and respectfully. 3.2 Afrofuturism in Film: Towards Cultivating Transformative Leadership for Equity and Diversity in Response to Crises   Professor Zayd Waghid, Director, Global Institute for Teacher Education and Society (GITES), Cape Peninsula University of Technology   Professor Waghid’s contribution focused on what he termed Afrofuturism. Afrofuturism is presented as a phenomenon, but also in terms of a pedagogical approach to be used in educational contexts as a means of cultivating transformative leadership towards addressing the national (and continental) challenges. This was specifically presented to be taken in the context of education in South Africa.   In familiarising the audience with the concepts, Waghid suggested that there are different interpretations of what decolonisation means. His is a critical approach that seeks to do away with imposed norms and tropes, which are outdated or do not serve the people. In essence, there are different understandings around how South Africans position themselves. The process of decolonising includes a need to think beyond a local context, to think more Globally. Where knowledge can be transferred between various contexts.   Afrofuturism is presented, in terms of Franz Fanon’s thinking, as a cleansing force from psychological violence. In other words, people, through this psychological violence, reconstruct themselves. By transcending the notion of a being in a neo-colonial mindset. Following the thinking of Kwame Nkrumah, to decolonise one needs to think beyond. Whether it is in economic, social or cultural aspects.   Afrofuturism can be seen in the film Black Panther. It blends the science-fiction fantasy story with historical significance and in relation to African philosophy. It blends these aspects towards challenging dominant narratives around coloniality. Afrofuturism thus functions as a tool of resistance. Where the idea is to give the creators of these cultural products the ownership in terms of the images and the cultures surrounding it. In so doing, narratives are challenged, democratised and re-envisioned. But it is also looking at how knowledge can be interpreted. It therefore functions as an aesthetic and a critical theoretical framework. Afrofuturism creates fissures in the present by re-imagining what Africa could look like in the absence of coloniality. It replaces the negative perceptions about how Africa is perceived.   Afrofuturism broadens the political, psychological and physical aspects of decoloniality by including the cultural and symbolic realms that aims to enrich discussions around leadership; Afrofuturism attempts to disrupt the neo-colonial mindset. To re-focus decolonial consciousness by challenging narratives and embracing their African identities and culture.   One way of doing so, suggests Waghid, is through the practice of defamiliarization. This he explained using the example of a pencil is when one looks that pencil and look beyond it being a writing tool. Thus, breaking the perception in terms of what one sees as an object. Looking at an object as if it was the first time, not knowing its usual usage or understanding. In other words, it is a way of breaking from the automatic perception and towards reinvention. By incorporating diaspora culture, one creates a new form of culture that could further influence and reshape the type of leadership that one seeks to develop. In other words, by affording the students the opportunity to engage and critique their own cultures. This process can itself create tensions. It is therefore important that students are conscientized into this approach. Cultural reinvention is thus an opportunity for students to come together and to create this new form of culture.   A further but related aspect is narrative reformulations. In other words, affording students the opportunity to create their own stories, as discussed by Dr Smidt in her presentation. This gives the students the opportunity, for instance, to critique the type of leadership that is conventionally found in contemporary society. Moving beyond qualities of race, gender, age, etc. Looking at how students could be seen as leaders by creating spaces for them to take more leadership and thus preparing them for society.   In conclusion, Afrofuturism focuses on the means and ways of building and cultivating communities that are equal and socially just. That can speak to issues, critically. By prompting students to engage with their surroundings, through concepts and narratives that they are familiar with. To be critical and self-reflexive. And to engage in conversations that embrace diverse traditions and knowledges. 3.3 Decolonising Education in South Africa: Reclaiming the Dustbin of African History   Dr Oscar Koopman, Senior Lecturer, Stellenbosch University; and Dr Karen Koopman, Senior Lecturer, University of the Western Cape   Doctors Koopman and Koopman delivered a combined presentation drawing from their co-edited book Decolonising the South African University: Towards Curriculum as Self-Authentication . Theirs, too, was a presentation where re-framing and a critical examination of education in South Africa was central. Much like a conversation, true education has an unknown outcome. The educational experience resists a single measure, allowing learning to unfold naturally through the shared space of teacher and learner. When framed as pedagogy, learning becomes something measurable. Evaluated by its capacity to fulfil particular social, political and economic goals. This dynamic suggests an enduring tension. Those who advocate for true education must continually defend it against the utilitarian drive of pedagogy. Historically, proponents of true education who sought to cultivate free thought that results in inner freedom, critical reflection, self-awareness, and personal transformation, who did not see education as a pathway for career readiness or economic gain, faced significant challenges.   Doctors Koopman’s goal for decolonised education is to revive the call for a true educational experience for every learner. To them, it is not enough to simply replace the external and more obvious oppressive institutions that the colonisers imposed here. For decades, South Africa sought to reform its education system by making structural and symbolic changes, such as renaming schools, renaming universities and departments, or revising curricula to reflect the more inclusive democratic ideals. However, despite these efforts, the underlying content, teaching methods and philosophical foundations too often remained rooted in colonial paradigms. Though well intentioned, these approaches did not address the root causes. Did not fundamentally transform the ideas, approaches and values embedded in the curriculum which continues to advance a Eurocentric knowledge system. It continues to prioritise western theories and perspectives, while marginalising African Indigenous knowledge systems, languages and ways of knowing. This limited South Africans’ ability to truly thrive as a means of self-authentication, as it left students disconnected from their cultural heritage and identities.   To truly decolonise its education, South Africa needs more than just a new sign on the door. It requires a rethinking of the educational goods themselves. This means developing curricula that draw on African epistemologies, prioritise African languages and histories, and cultivate a sense of belonging and self-worth. This must be done by revisiting and exploring the deeper regions of personal experience and culture.   Only by transforming the essence of what is taught, and how it is taught, can South African education move from superficial changes to substantive ones that empower students to see themselves authentically reflected in their education. To decolonise the curricula, South Africans must recover marginalised voices. Or as the presenters stressed: South Africans must recover what was thrown into the dustbin of history. One can not only critique the legacy of western education. One must bring forward transformative ideas that disrupt the deep-rooted western paradigms that still dominate classrooms.   The real work lies in creating a meaningful rupture in the current frameworks of knowledge. To effectively pursue decolonisation, educators must reimagine what alternative models to Eurocentric structures might look like. Models that affirm African perspectives, values, methodologies as foundational rather than peripheral. It is important that this reimagining moves beyond critique and engages in rigorous scholarship that validates and centres African epistemologies, preparing scholars to reshape the intellectual landscape of institutions. Therefore, to rupture and decentre colonial knowledge, Africans must return inward, to its own thinkers, practitioners and leaders.   This is the knowledge that has been inscribed in students, in South Africans, from their birth. The values and perceptions of their lived experience that will help liberate minds and bodies. When a child enters the world, they undergo a first birth in which they are nurtured, taught through the lens of cultural heritage. It is this heritage that needs to be recovered and upon which educational models should be centred. It is through this process that children develop adaptive solutions and are formed in the image of their social and cultural settings. This knowledge represents an invaluable resource for decolonisation. A pathway to authentic, holistic understanding that westernised curricula often do not address. It is in this phase that children are taught belonging, respect, coping strategies, herbal remedies etc. Too often these traditional ways are rejected for cheap and inferior, yet popular alternatives.    Colonial education introduced what could be seen as a second birth. An imposed identity that sought to overwrite indigenous ways of knowing. However, through decolonisation, it becomes the responsibility of teachers to facilitate a third birth. This is where learners reconnect with their African identities and affirm it with legitimacy. This process integrates the indigenous knowledge systems into ways of doing. By reclaiming and reinstating what is indigenous and traditional, the reclamation of ‘self’ takes place.   Lastly, the speakers introduced what they called Ubuntu consciousness. To disrupt the dominant Western paradigms and their reliance on abstract, predetermine knowledge, the Ubuntu-conscious teacher emphasises self-awareness. Drawing on a student’s connection with the world around them. Encouraging students to explore concepts and acknowledging the diverse perspectives of any cultural group. This approach does not only consider the insights some, but also of everyday, ordinary members of society. Capturing the essence of lived experience that shapes personal understanding within a cultural context.   This critical approach encourages and guides students to reflect on their humanity, which includes their significance and agency in their communities. In essence, the goal of Ubuntu-conscious pedagogy is to create space for students to access and reconnect with culturally grounded knowledge that may otherwise be dismissed in favour of Western dogma.   The cultivation of self-consciousness within Ubuntu pedagogy also aims to develop students as critical and independent thinkers by introducing them to multiple perspectives and ideologies. Rather than reinforcing established norms. Students are encouraged to question and engage with differing viewpoints through discussions that include divergent voices and perspectives. Students can now begin to see beyond their initial assumptions, developing insights into why they believe, and why they act the way they do.   When students see that their lived experiences and cultural practices are respected as valid sources of knowledge, it affirms their identities and promotes a deep connection with the learning process. This culturally integrated approach allows students to move beyond the imposition of colonial knowledge systems, and toward an authentic understanding of self and community; a decolonised understanding. Ubuntu-conscious pedagogy, therefore, serves not only to educate, but also to heal and empower by valuing the whole person, and the cultural wisdom they carry. 3.4 Reimagining Education in South Africa: Decolonizing the Curriculum for Equity and inclusion   Dr Pryah Mahabeer, Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu Natal Doctor Mahabeer suggested that indigenous ways of knowing that remain neglected should become un-fixed, and fluid. Instead, conversations should become dynamic processes. She suggested that a decolonised education would see multiple ways of knowing being honoured. Where the story of one student’s grandma would hold weight alongside that of the stories in textbooks.   According to her, mother tongue education should not only be tolerated, but celebrated and promoted. To her, lived experiences enrich academic discourse, rather than simply being anecdotal. This, she said, is the promise of a decolonised curriculum. A radical reimagining of the South African society, and its education system. This radical reimagining took its root from student movements such as ‘Fees must Fall’ and ‘Rhodes must Fall’. They challenged conventional thought. Advancing a different approach to education, arguing that true educational transformation requires more than superficial changes. Demanding a fundamental reconstruction of how knowledge is created, authenticated, and transmitted. Herein, decolonisation is not merely about rejecting western knowledge. But rather creating a balance or an inclusive educational environment that recognises diverse lived experiences.   Mahabeer emphasized the goal of developing graduates who are both academically skilled and critically conscious. She focused on the theme of knowledge as power. In this regard, it matters to ask who decides what knowledge matters. She stressed that the idea of knowledge being objective or universal, too is a specific understanding of knowledge. And if objective or universal knowledge is a construct, it too can be reassessed.   She suggested that a diversity of knowledge, not simply a singular universal perception, can be an intellectual strength. What matters more is how one balances respecting and honouring local knowledge while still maintaining global academic standards. This balance, while tricky, should be pursued. Teaching is not a neutral process, but carries with it loaded perceptions, politics and power structures. In pursuing a more balanced approach, educators must be trained to unlearn deeply embedded colonial mindsets.   In concluding, Mahabeer stressed that decolonisation is not about rejection, but about creating more expansive, inclusive, and meaningful ways of learning and understanding our world. Where success isn’t just measured by grades, but by how deeply students understand themselves, and their place in the world. It is about nurturing graduates who are not only academically skilled but critically conscious. Students who understand the interconnections between global issues and local contexts. Who can think deeply, feel compassionately, and act transformatively. Curricula should not just teach about the world. It should teach students to question how to understand the world. Curricula should balance theoretical rigour with contextual relevance that sees students not only as empty vessels to be filled but as active creators of knowledge.   Decolonisation of education is, therefore, not a destination but a continuous journey. A commitment to creating transformative educational spaces that are more just, more inclusive and more human. Creating spaces where learning is truly liberating. Allowing for a liberated lived experience. This journey, she stressed, is not without its challenges. Institutional resistance runs deep, and many people are comfortable with existing systems. They are reluctant to disturb the status quo. To address this issue, educators should become co-learners. They should be expected to challenge their own assumptions, their own conventions, their own worldviews. To create spaces where students can critically engage with knowledge that is contextual and culturally relevant to the lived experiences of students. 3.5 Decolonised education: Perspectives from Kenya   Dr Andrew Wambua, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Global Institute for Teacher Education and Society (GITES)   Dr Wambua spoke about how teaching and learning methods give expression to real freedom on the continent. Through installing appropriate education systems, the policy objectives of the African Agenda 2063 must be pursued. This cannot remain a distant dream but must be put to practice through critical approaches. He suggested that too often Africans simply copy and paste approaches and solutions from afar. They do so due to the immense complexity and intersectionality of the continent’s concerns. Instead of installing equipped teachers that are well resourced, African education systems are poorly conceived, and teachers are not trained to adjust, to adapt, or employ a contextualised approach. Teachers are not developing the competencies which are needed. The competencies of learning, un-learning and re-learning. This, said Dr Wambua, could be perceived as a decolonising approach.   Collaboration is also an important decolonising approach. Working in a team, implementing different approaches, undertaken by different role players. Teachers must be able to undertake the kind of creative, critical approach expected of the students. If the teachers cannot be creative, nor will the students be.   Diversity is a further strength that is not sufficiently deployed in Africa. Wambua made mention of both Kenya’s and South Africa’s plurality of languages. This, he said, was an inner strength which is used to divide peoples. Multilingualism is not advanced, and English is too dominant. It shows that Africans are neither proud of who they are, nor can they deploy their strategic advantages. Indigenous ways are looked at by Africans not as strengths, but as liabilities. People on the continent have come to see themselves as primitive. They have absorbed negative descriptions, thus giving these descriptions power over themselves. Instead, Africans must be free in their thinking. They must be critical and develop their own approaches and understandings of their environment and the world at large. Culture is a combination of values and belief systems. Unless a balanced, nurturing culture is developed, a decolonised education is not achievable. It must start in the mind. Actions are dictated by values, beliefs and attitudes. 3.6 Crossing the impasse in the discourse on decolonised education   Distinguished Professor Aslam Fataar, Sociology of Education, Stellenbosch University   Professor Fataar’s contribution focused on two concerns. The first is what he referred to as a stagnation in the decolonial discourse. This, he said, has reached an impasse. There is too much argumentation about concepts and epistemologies, and too little action. He reminded the group that since they were curriculum and education scholars, they must attend to education materials from a practical perspective.   The second, he said, is that there is too much focus on the past. There needs to be change, from a past-centred focus, to a future-centred one. To developing a decolonial futures ethics perspective. In other words, the world of today is much more complex than the past focus on decoloniality suggests. This fixed view of the past does not allow for the approaches, the kinds of knowledge, that are required. Knowledge is much more complex. Artificial intelligence and planetary transition are clear suggestions hereof. The conversations about knowledge and how it circulates must be much more complicated and critical. These conversations, which today are too parochial, are critical to giving meaning to peoples’ lived realities.    Professor Fataar then asked: what are the conceptual principles by which decoloniality and decolonial futures can be brought into the curriculum of schools and universities? He suggested the conversation about decolonised education needs to be a practical one, guided by principles. This is the debate that is needed today. Thus far, it has been more about the rhetoric, the discourses, symbolism, the epistemological debates. While these are important, practicality is now needed.   Professor Fataar concluded by addressing the following question: what are the curricula knowledge claims of decolonised education? To him, the following stand out. First, it must be a very careful knowledge claim about how knowledge works, inclusively, across all knowledge systems that could ever have been imagined. Thus, including pre-modern, indigenous, modern, post-modern, and post-colonial. All of them. This is across all ecologies of knowledge, where no knowledge systems are excluded. The decoloniality claim is one that de-centres Eurocentric modern, western-centred knowledge. Not jettisoning it. Not throwing it away. But simply decentring it, as one amongst many. Making space for the re-centring of decolonial knowledge claims.   Looking at knowledge claims in the realms of science and maths. Looking at how one impacts concept-building in the learning of maths or science form a decolonial perspective. If one takes the social structures of Marx, Du Bois, Parsons, Weber, etc., these social structures were already established in the 12th and 13th centuries in the North African context. Called by different names, different concepts, they were absorbed by enlightenment’s structuralist philosophers, without acknowledgement. This is how one engages with the past. One must be careful about how one deals with these knowledge claims.   The second claim is that a decolonial education makes is an identity claim. A knowledge and identity claim. A question is then: how does one de-centre colonial identities, bringing in a sense of inclusiveness. How does one interrogate that identity claim in designing curricula. How does one work with an identity claim in the applied sciences, where people are thinking about the built environment, and about concepts such as artificial intelligence. What people are thinking about data, and so on. How does one bring identity claims into those conceptualisations? How does one design a curriculum that is transdisciplinary in the arts curriculum, where one includes decoloniality as an identity claim?   The final claim on decolonial education is the need for relevance and contextualisation. Fataar stressed that claims should be relevant and contextual. Finding ways of bringing indigenous knowledge systems and indigenous languages into the curricula is not a simple matter. These are the conversations that need to be had. Finding practical ways of application.   Professor Fataar concluded by making two final points. He argued for a social realist lens. Suggesting that there is something real about knowledge. That knowledge has boundaries. When one brings decolonial concepts into curricula, one must observe curriculum boundaries. At present decoloniality is too abstracted, too much of a catch all. It tries to do too much and therefore comes up short. It cannot just be applied willy-nilly. By imposing it everywhere it does damage to both the place where it is applied and to itself. Instead, one must observe boundaries and conceptual coherence. One must observe how things come together in their knowledge systems. Instead, one must have a keen understanding of the fields one is working in and then to understand the concepts one is working with. This will allow for the development of a decolonial education.   Lastly, when one looks at university curricula and their various disciplines, there are exceptionally important, theoretical, and conceptual questions that have to be asked about how one brings decoloniality into the various suites of disciplinary and trans-disciplinary offerings of the university. These are not easy questions. Education and curriculum scholars need to engage with these questions on an urgent, deep and continuous basis. 3.7 A view from civil society: An introduction to Habitat International Coalition   Ms Yolande Hendler, Secretary General, Habitat International Coalition Habitat International Coalition (HIC) is a global civil society coalition that works to promote the right to adequate housing. As a cross-regional coalition, HIC facilitates co-learning processes, predominantly in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East and North Africa regions.   Ms Hendler mentioned that HICs political and strategic priorities are driven by members. All political and strategic decisions the coalition takes is decided by members, through voting. This approach lends to the discussion of the day. To the creative involvement of people in the processes that they are involved in.   Ms Hendler suggested that HIC member organisations all work on either one or more of its thematic areas. In so doing, it replaces the dominant, colonial and post-colonial systems with member-driven systems. The first thematic area relates to defending and promoting of housing and land rights. Work is done to advance alternatives around how housing, land, and habitat related issues are being produced and furthered. This is referred to as social production of habitat. Particularly looking at non-market alternatives and taking a critical view towards privatised and commodified approaches to land. HIC facilitates and builds a cross-regional force to identify what are common, systemic challenges that organisations face, regardless of where they are based in the world. It is here that the ways and practices of learning play a key role in advocacy agendas.   HIC’s approaches to learning, its cross-regional learning, is what Ms Hendler referred to as emancipatory learning. Emancipatory pedagogies are at the heart of what HIC does. The first she mentioned was the South African example of Abahlali baseMjondolo. While they are not affiliated with HIC, they have had a long relationship with the Coalition. Abahlali is steeped in a Fanonian school of conscientisation. They make sense of collective approaches to knowledge and to land management. Theirs is a decolonial approach, one they emerges from the context, the culture and the needs of the place that they work in. Another is the Development Action Group, a civil organisation working on housing and land in Cape Town. They have a training programme called The Active Citizens Training Programme, which starts with the understanding that it is particularly the community leaders in informal settlements and backyards that should steer processes. It starts from the premise of leadership in the very personal sphere. Not an imposed, structural power, but a local, contextual one. This then expands into the community sphere, into the political sphere, and into the legal sphere. This constitutes what it means and looks like to be an active citizen.   Another organisation is the well-known Ndifuna Ukwazi, also a member of HIC. They do a lot of advice assemblies with communities facing evictions. It does a lot of re-enactments of potential eviction situations, using theatre as a way to engage with (and to support) community leaders and communities under the threat of forced eviction.   In Cameroon there is an organisation called Book Lovers Association, also a HIC member. Their methodology of learning is called popular tribunals. This is similar and even more developed than that of Ndifuna Ukwazi. They look at the legal frameworks in Cameroon, around forced evictions. And again, they use theatre and training to be able to fulfil a paralegal function, in terms of representing themselves or communities in court.   In Sierra Leone, the Slum Dwellers Federation uses community-led savings groups, data collection, and community led census. Data collection and community-led census collection serves as learning about one another through savings and sharing.   In Kenya there are two organisations. Pamoja Trust and the Mazingira Institute. These organisations are challenging knowledge formation and epistemologies in terms of planning, which is still largely dominated on the continent by outdated academic planning approaches. This is a space for the community and its residents to become architects and planners of their lived realities. There are further examples in Nairobi where communities are co-producing urban infrastructures. The Mazingira Institute is facilitating training and learning processes with youth groups around urban agriculture, in informal settlements as well. These indeed decolonial practices are challenging existing norms.   Finally, in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe People’s Land Rights movement has found that cooperative systems offer an opportune space for exchanging knowledge and learning in practices related to housing.   Emancipatory learning is about valuing these multiple different forms of knowledge, and particularly in producing a bridge between them. Understanding the close relationship between knowing as well as doing. How one informs the other. Cooperation is central to these approaches and practices. In not being top-down. In recognising difference, these offer substance to the conversation on decoloniality. 4 Points of convergence   While addressing the proposed questions from differing orientations, shared perceptions emerged from the speakers. These perceptions are articulated below, around several points of convergence.    4.1 Comprehensive and critical    The speakers agreed that a process of decolonisation is required in the South African education space. This must be an active and ongoing process that is both comprehensive and critical. No stone must be left unturned; students and educators must be centrally involved in the thinking and execution of such a process. Collaboration is of utmost importance, so to ensure its appropriateness and effect.     While African and South African educators have indicated the need for decolonisation, and have put forward policy programmes, the process has been too slow, with too little real implementation.   Any form of decolonisation takes place in a complex and changing world. The speakers agreed that the decolonisation debate has been overly focussed on historical precedents. By remaining in the past, the matter cannot be sufficiently addressed. Decolonisation must be future-centred.    Bottom line:  Decolonisation is an important process that South Africans need to undertake, together. There is no template of how to do it. Instead, we must start by asking who we are and where we want to move to as a country. 4.2 Decentring and emancipatory   A future-centred approach to decolonisation serves to decentre the perceived Western dominance. The speakers agreed that decolonisation should not simply be about jettisoning a Western (or universal) approach, rather, such an established knowledge and pedagogy should be regarded as one amongst many. In this regard, there was agreement that too much has been made about breaking down established symbols and systems. The extensive attack on the past and the status quo has produced destruction, not the construction that is required to address the perceived problems.   By decentring Western dominance, an inclusive approach, one that privileges co-learning, mutual understanding, co-existence and transformation is advanced. Such an approach allows learning from everywhere and everyone. It allows for Western and traditional approaches to complement each other and lead to a paradigm shift, and an education system that is emancipatory.   In such an emancipatory system, education is not abstract. Education does not simply shape the student – creating cogs in a machine. Education rather serves to empower the individual to shape themselves, so to shape the world around them. By creating a new, purposeful and meaningful way of learning and understanding, the South African education system will move from beyond superficial changes, to one where students see themselves, authentically reflected in their education. Bringing the lived experiences of students, their cultures and values, into their learning environment will liberate and empower them. Instead of enforcing hierarchical, abstract and foreign concepts, a decolonised education which privileges the lived realities of students and educators will allow for the transformation envisioned in the Constitution. A model that does not only recognise and reflect the South African reality, but one that allows for the perception and navigation of its national goals.   Bottom line: Decolonisation is not simply about rejecting certain ideas and approaches. Instead, it is about considering and then incorporating appropriate knowledge and educational paths that will serve to transform South Africa, so as to ensure personal fulfilment and an inclusive and just nation for all. 4.3 An ubuntu education   An emancipatory education system that critically combines relevant approaches. One that privileges the lived realities of students and educators, realises ubuntu. A human-centred world, which serves both the individual and the community. This is encapsulated in the concept of ubuntu-conscious pedagogy. An approach which allows for both healing and empowering of the individual and the nation.   Instead of focusing on what ‘must fall’, South Africa must build a knowledge economy around the principle of ubuntu. With each individual encouraged to elevate their humanity, while contributing to something bigger than themselves. There is no better way to decolonise. No better way to navigate and transform the world than by recognising one’s inherent and integral part in the global whole.   The goal of an ubuntu education is not about filling individuals with depersonalised knowledge, readying them to become wage slaves. Education is not about career readiness (for an outdated industrial model that is hardly absorbing those exiting the existing education system). Instead, an ubuntu education is one that sees an individual for who they are and where they are from. One that empowers individuals to become self-authenticated. Connected to the environment around them.   More local and relevant subject matter, more hands-on self-creation and self-learning will empower students to write their own stories, mediated through their own cultures and ways. Local impressions and culturally relevant paths must be prioritised, and foreign-mediated lenses and approaches decentred.   Bottom line: The human-centred concept of Ubuntu should guide the decolonisation approach. An education system should be built that serves both the individual and their community. Such a system extends beyond career readiness. It recognises the student as a whole. As coming from and belonging to a community of others. It does not impose upon the student but activates the student to fully embracing and becoming their true self.  5 Significance of the dialogue   The debate around decolonisation is proving to be an important one in the South African context. It is not only an academic debate, but it has greater meaning for the country at large. At its core, it is about how we make sense of who we are and where we are going. While it is clear that more needs to change, so that our identities and cultures are better represented in our schools, it is clear that established scientific knowledge and norms cannot simply be discarded.   Instead, it is important, in the spirit of the scientific pursuit, that we should consider what it is that matters to us as a society and then to move towards that. As it emerged from this dialogue, there is a need to critically incorporate more indigenous knowledge in our education; universal and indigenous knowledges must co-exist. In doing so, we ensure that our education best serves our people. Not simply in the act of producing workers for industry, but capacitating self-reflexive individuals who see themselves as rooted in their community, serving a diverse nation.   By decolonising our education, we are not simply taking away or cancelling certain ideas. Instead, we are incorporating more relevant, authentic approaches and ideas into an expanding educational system. We are bringing in new (and ancient) ideas that allow students to be analytical, self-authenticated individuals who think for themselves. Who see themselves in their educational environment. And who empowered are make the decisions and undertake the journeys that lead a fulfilling and productive life. Decolonisation is about setting free the student, but also about guiding them on their path. It is context and period dependent, and as such there is still a lot that needs to be done to fully understand what it means and what it looks like in the South African context. It is nevertheless a crucial path that we must undertake. To transform our country and to ensure an inclusive and just future for everyone. 6 Conclusion   While several points of convergence detailed what a decolonised education in South Africa will look like, the speakers agreed that too little is being done to make it a reality. There persists an imbalance in the conversation. The focus on breaking down and displacing old approaches and pedagogies does not sufficiently serve the realisation of a South African model. As enumerated across the points of convergence, an expansive, inclusive and constructive conversation is required across all sectors of the education establishment to recentre the South African student and educator. To recognise their environment and their cultures. By looking in, by simplifying, instead of complicating, and by building instead of breaking down, an ubuntu education must be built. Such a fit-for-purpose approach will take time, it is a continuous journey. But when initiated, it will increasingly empower South Africans towards self-authentication. It will shed the disconnected, disembodied knowledge systems that simply prepare individuals for a (largely illusory) world of work.   The dialogue on decolonised education established that by turning inwards, the South African education system should start from the recognition of the individual as a whole, connected to a real and legitimate community of belonging. A community that imbues the individual with legitimacy and value. When starting from such a base, a broader, truly decolonised education system can sprout.       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Adriana Allen, Julia Wesely, Paola Blanes, Florencia Brandolini, Mariana Enet, Rodrigo Faria G. Iacovini, Rosario Fassina, Bahía Flores Pacheco, Graciela Medina, Alejandro Muniz, Soledad Pérez, Silsa Pineda, Marilyn Reina, Luz Amparo Sánchez Medina, and Juan Xavier.   International Institute for Environment and Development   This article was originally published in Environment and Urbanization  and is republished here with permission under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License  ( CC BY 4.0 ). The original article, titled "Social production of habitat in Latin America: breaking the mainstream narratives"  by Allen et al. , was published in Environment and Urbanization  (© 2022 International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)) and is available at   https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/09562478221115334 .   Abstract   How do ordinary citizens, activists and urban practitioners learn to become agents of change for a socially just habitat? The paper explores this question through the experiences of eight grassroots schools of popular urbanism working under the umbrella of the Habitat International Coalition (HIC) in Latin America. Building on a process of self-documentation and collective pedagogic reflection driven by the protagonists of these schools, the analysis explores the core pedagogic practices identified across the schools to enact popular urbanism as a collective and intentional praxis: to weave, sentipensar , mobilize, reverberate and emancipate. We argue that, put in motion, these pedagogic practices transgress the rules and boundaries of the formal classroom, taking participants to and through other sites and modes of learning that host significant potential to stimulate collectivizing and alternative ways of seeking change towards urban equality. I. Introduction   The academy is not paradise. But learning is a place where paradise can be created. … This is education as the practice of freedom  (Hooks, 1994).   In this quote, bell hooks invites us to discover the practice of freedom through learning; not as a practice of individual freedom but as a collective way to transform the world we live in. In this paper, we look at sites of learning other than the academy, where paradise can be created. We reflect collectively on the pedagogic practices of eight schools of popular urbanism working under the umbrella of the Habitat International Coalition (HIC) across Latin America, and on their capacity to activate critical agency to confront urban inequalities and advance habitat-related human rights.   HIC is a global alliance currently constituted by over 350 member organizations (of which about a third are based in Latin America), which struggle collectively for greater social justice, gender equality and environmental sustainability. For over 45 years, the Coalition has brought together social movements, non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations and activist and research institutions with a common political purpose: mobilizing their collective muscle from local to global scales to make visible, defend and produce habitat rights (Allen et al, 2020). In keeping with its collective orientation, the Coalition’s structures (its Board, General Secretariat and Regional Coordination Offices) follow the mandate of HIC’s Members, who are their governing body.   The schools analysed here are not one institution, but rather an assemblage of diverse pedagogic experiences. They are run by HIC members, friends and allies in Latin America, and each school has a high degree of autonomy. Their pedagogic practices are encapsulated in formative processes: in the building of cooperative housing movements in Uruguay, and the capacity-building of Colombian taxi driver associations to become inclusive in their work with people with disabilities; in the learning encounters between Indigenous populations and low-income communities in San Martín de los Andes in Argentina, and the reclaiming of bodies and public spaces from a feminist perspective in Córdoba, Argentina, to name a few. Despite their diversity, the schools have in common the political parity of learners and pedagogues (who include community leaders, cooperative members, youth, women’s groups and local government officials, among others), as well as a commitment to horizontal, counter-hegemonic learning to act in advancing struggles through popular urbanism (Wesely et al. 2021).   Most of the schools analysed here are part of the HIC Latin America (HIC-AL) working group on the social production of habitat. This group encompasses a great diversity of theoretical approaches, from those rooted in a Marxist perspective that ultimately seek to restore the social function of land and housing, to feminist and decolonial perspectives rooted in the assumption that theory, knowledge and practice are constantly re-made through activism and resistance. In this sense, the Coalition has acted over the years as a resonance chamber, enabling member organizations to exchange and mature their practices in critical dialogue with others (Wesely et al. 2021). In a similar vein, HIC-AL’s involvement with the schools is expressed in several ways, from providing inputs into their pedagogies, concepts and content, to nurturing and expanding their regional networking capacity. Since 2003, HIC-AL has also hosted a working group on capacity-strengthening which has spearheaded the consolidation of various pedagogical experiences from its members and articulated some of them into formal education programmes (including the Diploma Course in Participatory Design, one of the experiences analysed in this paper).   How do these diverse pedagogic practices contribute to achieving their transformative and transgressive vocation? Or, in other words: How do participants learn to become agents of change for a socially just habitat? To respond to these questions, in June 2019, the two first-named authors of this paper (one of whom became president of HIC in 2020), embarked on an in-depth pedagogic exploration of the schools under the HIC-AL umbrella as part of the capacity-building and action research programme, Knowledge in Action for Urban Equality (KNOW). The research initially involved 21 extensive conversations with 14 HIC-AL members and affiliates, online and in person in Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Cuba and Mexico (Wesely et al. 2021).  As the COVID-19 pandemic brought the possibility of further face-to-face encounters to a halt, we shifted to a multimodal way of working, which included a process of self-documentation and analysis by schools interested in this reflexive exercise and collective online workshops devoted to identifying the core “pedagogic narrative” underpinning each school, as well as their common practices (see Figure 1 ).     FIGURE 1 Location of HIC-AL members (orange dots) and eight schools (violet dots) analysed in this paper Source:  Authors   The remote phase of engagement evolved around the production of short films by each school and a collective documentary, as entry points to distill the core and common pedagogic practices that have coalesced under the umbrella of HIC-AL. In this context, the short films and documentary acted as catalysts for horizontal conversations on the role of popular urbanism pedagogies in nurturing struggles for habitat rights; that is, articulating critical and political learning processes as pathways towards strategic change to address inequalities. Supported by La Sandía Digital – a feminist collective of filmmakers based in Mexico – this horizontal process involved four online workshops with around 15 participants each, between August and November 2021, in which pedagogues and communication teams from each school developed their story from a pedagogic viewpoint. These exchanges evolved from oral accounts to audiovisual narratives and culminated in a fifth comparative analysis workshop through which all participants identified the practices that make their pedagogic approaches critical and counter-hegemonic. Between the workshops, the pedagogic reflection involved a larger number of participants, as each school engaged in searches through their own archives, focus group discussions, one-to-one interviews, storyboarding and filming.   The following section outlines key contributions and principles of critical pedagogy within the field of popular urbanism in Latin America. We then analyse the five core pedagogic practices collectively identified by the eight schools: to weave, sentipensar (feel-think), mobilize, reverberate and emancipate.   II. The Role of Critical Pedagogy in Popular Struggles for Habitat Rights   Building on historical experiences, such as the Hacedores de Ciudad  in Venezuela and large-scale movements of autogestión in Peru in the 1960s, numerous authors have highlighted the impactful scale and scope of popular urbanization in the context of Latin America. The strategy is recognized as a set of practices and processes through which the hegemonic logics of the market, political regulation and fiscalization in issues of land, housing and territory are contested through bottom-up, citizen-led actions (Pírez, 2016; Schmid et al. 2018; Streule et al. 2020).   While this body of research often refers to “popular urbanization” and “popular urbanism” as interchangeable notions, we argue for recognizing their difference. Popular urbanization pertains to the processes by which low-income and marginalized women and men typically produce and appropriate the urban territory. In contrast, popular urbanism – the arena in which the schools thrive and the focus of the present paper – refers to a domain of practice that contests the institutional power of urbanism as a discipline, and the legitimacy it enjoys in producing knowledge and practices. Thus, popular urbanism encapsulates a collective intentionality to reclaim the authority and legitimacy of other ways of producing and using the city as a commons; the ability to craft a different relationship with state institutions across periods of dictatorship and (re)democratization (Allen, 2021; Castells, 2016;  Ortiz Flores 2017; Turner, 1976) and conscious and explicit efforts to valorize the experiences, pedagogies and principles that have redressed social and environmental inequalities and injustices over time, and that continue to do so.   Within Latin America, historiographic work has highlighted the political and socio-spatial complexity of popular urbanism throughout the 20th and 21st centuries (Castillo-Álvarez, 2021; Rothe, 2017).   Tracing the genealogy of popular urbanism across Latin America has been a central project for many regional activists and academics over the years, with a notable example being the work of the architect Enrique Ortíz Flores, a member of the non-governmental organization COPEVI since 1965, and one of the co-founders of HIC in 1976.   To talk about popular urbanism is thus to recognize other ways of making the city, parallel to the rules established by the institutions of government and academia, and to the logics of capital (Abramo, 2011). In this conception, popular urbanism hosts substantial potential to redress prevalent urban inequalities in four key dimensions: first, by working towards the fair redistribution and commoning of the goods, services and opportunities that are integral to the realization of habitat-related rights; second, by amplifying the voices and claiming recognition for differentiated identities and knowledges, particularly of those engaged in pushing the boundaries for urban equality on an everyday basis; third, by advocating for their parity in political participation, not just in invited spaces, but through claimed spaces of city-making; and last, but not least, by fostering urban practices built on mutual care and solidarity, as well as on state responsibility (Yap et  al.,2021).   Thus, popular urbanism is a conscious political practice; a practice identified by social movements, NGOs, research institutions and other supporting organizations from the eight schools participating in this collective reflection, as well as many others across the region. Although not all these pedagogic experiences call themselves “schools”, many self-identify as such in recognition of their alignment with the foundational work of Paulo Freire (Freire, 2001). It is the practice of critical pedagogy, with its ethical and political intentions, that is key to re-signifying where popular urbanism learning happens and how it works. As critiqued by Giroux (2019) the school, as the main social instrument and space devoted to education, has over time become an instrument of students’ social assimilation rather than a space to engage critically with society and strengthen capacities to change it. Adhering to this critique, the work of the schools discussed in this paper encapsulates a conscious effort towards reclaiming the emancipatory power of popular education.   Although Freirean critical pedagogy has its roots in rural peasant movements in Brazil, it has long been embraced by, and expanded into, urban realities as well as more intersectional and feminist perspectives on popular struggles. Black, Indigenous and feminist scholars, in this context, have brought forward notions of the oppressed in relation to structural racism and patriarchal domination (Gore, 1993 & Hooks, 2003). Freire’s foundational work in critical pedagogy emphasized the dialogical relation between theory and praxis, as well as the importance of giving this praxis a direction towards change for social justice, nurtured by iterative and deep processes of reflexion (Freire, 2001). His conceptualization of critical pedagogy as freedom through learning benefited over the years from contributions from postmodern, feminist, postcolonial and queer theories and, perhaps most importantly, has continued to be a central practice of social movements and organized civil society.   According to Sara Motta, the critical pedagogies underpinning popular urbanism do not aim to create an “alternative monological practice of life” , but rather aim for the “pedagogical [to] become an essential part of creating the openings, possibilities and relationships to enable communities that are often silenced and violently invisibilised to appear as embodied political subjects”  (Motto, 2017). To achieve this end, learning through, with and in struggle, requires a pedagogy that transgresses the rules and boundaries of the classroom as a site of learning and “instead embed[s] educational practice in multiple spaces: the community, the workplace, the co-operative, the home, the self”  (Motto, 2017). Moreover, the content of learning is co-constructed rather than being based on predefined curricula, which is responsive to context-specific urban knowledge of learner-pedagogues as well as to the inequalities and injustices the learning process seeks to confront. As argued by Motta, for learning to become emancipatory, pedagogical practice needs to be the “product of praxis at the collective level of lived experience” , (Motto, 2017) in which counter-hegemonic knowledges and (hi)stories of resistance and hope are cultivated.   While these counter-hegemonic knowledge and ways of knowing ( saberes ) have received attention in discussions on critical pedagogy and popular urbanism, (de Sousa Santos, 2018) relatively little attention has been given to the pedagogic practices ( haceres ) that nurture and sustain them. Thus, this paper centres on how learning activates collective agency for a socially just habitat, aiming to elicit pedagogic practices that stimulate alternative ways of seeing, listening, being and seeking change. We now turn to the five verbs that encapsulate the core pedagogic practices identified by the participating schools as crucial means to foster the articulation of saberes and haceres  underpinning popular urbanism. While not all these verbs are present equally across all schools, they resonated strongly with every participant, as critical practices with profound potential for activating and sustaining change. We explore each verb starting with a vignette from a sequence of the films produced by the schools, followed by a discussion of what each critical pedagogic practice involves in developing key capacities to tackle urban inequality.   a. Weave   On a sunny day, an architect and an Indigenous inhabitant of Barrio Intercultural  stand on an empty lot, holding in their hands a model of one of the planned buildings in the neighbourhood. As their hands move around the model, the light creates shadows that get them to imagine together how the building might be used at different times of the day and what that would mean for different collective uses and members of the community.   In the Barrio Intercultural  (Intercultural Neighbourhood) in the south of Argentina, inter-learning spaces bring together diverse professions, social identities, knowledge and practices in dialogue with each other. Inter-learning, in this context, refers to a process whereby the intentional juxtaposition of different, contrasting and complementary knowledge and practices generates new forms of living and working together. This school emerged from an alliance between Vecinos Sin Techo  (Neighbours without a Roof) and the Curruhuinca lof (community) of the original Mapuche people in San Martín de los Andes (Enet et al., 2021; Enet & Romero, 2019)    Initially unified by their common need for housing, over time the development of their Intercultural Neighbourhood became a means to coexist in a common place rooted in the cosmovision (or worldview) of “buen vivir” . As argued by Eduardo Gudynas, this cosmovision embodies community-centric, ecologically balanced and culturally sensitive conviviality (Gudynas, 2011). It encapsulates perspectives that are a far cry from market-led approaches to housing, land and services and seeks to build new forms of public coexistence, in diversity and in harmony with nature. In this experience and across those of other schools, weaving is the key pedagogic practice that crafts a new material and social fabric by interlacing threads of collective dreams, rights and aspirations.   Weaving is not just about connecting different knowledge and actors, but a process of rooting contemporary struggles in a rich historic trajectory of learning from, for and in political struggle. In the case of the school of Barrio Intercultural , contemporary collective dwelling practices were reimagined with the Mapuche people – and thus re-embedded in their ancestral forms of being part of the territory. Here, the school has been the open space that connected historical and contemporary demands and ways of being in dialogue with Western critiques of capitalism, particularly from the field of feminist thought and environmentalism. This dialogue not only wove together narratives and experiences of oppression but also alternative ways to dwell in the territory as an intercultural community, which over time opened new institutional possibilities for the recognition of social production of habitat processes.   The practice of weaving together historically rooted and contemporary habitat struggles is also present in the pedagogic practices of the Ibero-American Diploma in Participatory Sustainable Habitat Design, a regional experience with 22 organizations that actively engages with the Barrio Intercultural  in its content and pedagogy. The diploma also draws from the pedagogical practices of the so-called Taller Total  in the early 1970s, a model in which architecture was understood as a social practice, and in which “users” or dwellers play the same role as trained professionals (Malecki, 2016).   Taller Total  set a radical precedent across the region, aiming to open up the university and transform the education of urban practitioners through a collective transdisciplinary pedagogical experience. Originally implemented at the National University of Córdoba (Argentina), over time the pedagogic principles and practices of Taller Total  were adopted in other locations and disciplines. While this wave of radical pedagogies was brought to a halt in 1975 by the repressive dictatorship of 1976–1983, its legacy continues to be re-lived by contemporary experiences such as the Barrio Intercultural  and the diploma course. In these experiences, the key tenets of Taller Total  are reactivated under contemporary circumstances, prompting a dissolution of disciplinary boundaries converging in the “habitat” problematic by building a critical history of the habitat and its social production, while weaving in new capacities and possibilities for social transformation.   Hence, weaving as a historical and relational pedagogy generates an inter-learning space that enables the interaction between different saberes  and haceres , rooting them, problematizing them, questioning their assumptions and generating new ways to frame a given problem. Unlike conventional pedagogies, the capacity to act does not rest on having full knowledge and control of the problem and the solution, but rather on the capacity to engage with uncertainty, singularity and conflict, and to recognize and deploy the social production of habitat as long and open-ended processes of dwelling that will continue to change over time.    b. Sentipensar   In a community centre in Córdoba, Fada lies on the floor, the outline of her body being drawn on a big sheet of paper. “Now, let’s think where we locate our emotions, which form they have, and where we want to put them on our drawing of the body”  (CISCSA et al., 2021) Paola guides the group through an exercise of cuerpo-territorio , a feminist methodology often used in the context of violence and inequalities to reflect on the body as “means to diagnose territorial conflicts and to initiate healing of bodies and territory” (Zaragocin & Caretta 2021).   Sentipensar  can be roughly translated in English as the capacity to “feel-think”. Sentipensar refers to pedagogies that cultivate sensibilities and affections that see the human and non-human world as interdependent and in constant flow. It invites us to engage with the energy that flows and interacts between situated minds-bodies and action in their full diversity and highlights the role of the medium and the media in the construction of haceres and saberes  (Escobar, 2020). Sentipensar  offers a transformative pedagogic practice that emphasizes the complementary relationship “between the   sentir   of intuition and the inner life and the   pensar   of intellectualism, between tacit knowledge and wisdom; between Western and non-Western ways of knowing and doing.” (Rendon, 2009). Practised across several of the schools as a way to learn and as a learnt capacity, it departs from our language and affections as sites that actively build the world in which we are immersed in its full complexity. It challenges the Cartesian separation between us humans and nature, as well as the separation between us and others. From this perspective, to co-learn is to develop simultaneous capacities to be, to know, to do and to care.   The potential of sentipensar to confront urban inequalities is multiple and most deeply realized through the way it advances epistemic justice – not just by including typically marginalized saberes  but, more deeply, by awakening new ways of making sense of the world from our senses, affections and positionalities. This critical pedagogy practice adopts feminist and decolonial thought, insisting on the plurality of knowledges, to acknowledge the diverse points of departure and inequalities that, as argued by De Jong and colleagues: “emerge from the intersections of race/ethnicity, class, gender, sexual orientation, age, body ableness and so on”  (De Jong et al., 2019). This pedagogic practice further emphasizes the importance of situating the present in historical perspective in order to unveil the roots of different forms of oppression.   In the above vignette, CISCSA’s feminist school works from the scale of the body to understand the household, the neighbourhood, the city and the wider territory (see Figure 2 ). This engagement with felt and sensed areas of pain and joy, of repression and freedom, allows learners to connect with their own maps of sentipensar  and those of others, and to trace patriarchal and racist genealogies, active in the present way in which women’s bodies can and cannot inhabit the city; aiming, in short, to counteract their disembodiment from the city. FIGURE 2 “Our body, our territory” Source: CISCSA et al. (2021). Like weaving, this approach resonates with Ivan Illich’s work on learning webs, (Illich 1973) through which he argues that learning requires unlearning the ways in which our bodies and minds have been schooled and tamed. The un-taming of the schools under the HIC umbrella in Latin America through sentipensar practices should not be confused with the development of empathy, but rather with radical ways to see the world, to break with deeply learnt forms of oppression and control that inadvertently travel from our bodies into our homes, neighbourhoods, public spaces and cities. Here, sentipensar  practices activate new forms of caring and conviviality. This approach is also clearly expressed in the Barrio Intercultural , where the neighbourhood is conceived, built and lived as a place for mutuality and conviviality. c. Mobilize   In the hillsides of Medellín, members of Fuerza Incluyente , a collective of people with disabilities, wait for a taxi to get to the city centre. As a taxi driver stops, the group engages in a conversation with him, first showing him how to dismantle and store a wheelchair in the taxi boot. Then, Nancy – who has short upper limbs – takes a seat and instructs the taxi driver to put her seatbelt on. On their way, the conversation covers a range of topics – from Nancy sharing her experience with verbal abuse, to the ways in which people with disabilities can be addressed in a dignified manner. At the end of their ride, she hands the taxi driver a sticker to put behind his windshield (see Figure 3 ). It declares him an “inclusive taxi driver”, that is, one of many transport providers across the city who have taken part in a pedagogic experience of learning from people with disabilities and who commit to practising inclusive transport services.   FIGURE 3 “I am an inclusive taxi driver” Source: Corporación Región et al. (2021). In this vignette, the taxi becomes the classroom, the co-learning space where women and men with different disabilities share their experience of the city with taxi drivers and, in the process, build new ways of understanding how their bodies interact in a common territory. The pedagogic practice of “mobilizing”, in a literal sense, fosters the inclusion of marginalized groups in the city, not merely by adapting the city to their particular needs through retrofitted urban design, but by advocating for more pluralistic and intersectional perspectives on urban mobility. In this school, Corporación Región , working together with Fuerza Incluyente , co-developed an experiential pedagogy which opens spaces to encounter diversities, enhancing possibilities for people with disabilities to move around the city, while simultaneously generating a new consciousness among key actors and institutions responsible for enhancing mobility for all.   Another way in which these mobilizing pedagogies address inequalities is through the strategic role that education assumes in social movements for facilitating the transfer and expansion of knowledge over generations, as well as across territories. In the Uruguayan Federation of Mutual Aid Housing Cooperatives (FUCVAM), intergenerational learning has been a strong pillar of its work as a movement. This, on the one hand, concerns the everyday learning through which young people living in cooperatives acquire values of mutual care and solidarity, as well as consciousness of the wider political project within which they are growing up. As Ignacio Lostorto, a young adult in FUCVAM’s cooperative school states: “[mutual care] is the most natural, beautiful, and productive way to advance, and it is the way that promotes values such as conviviality and which gives you tranquillity with yourself and with others”  (FUCVAM et al., 2021).   On the other hand, FUCVAM has evolved and systematized the promotion of intergenerational learning through modular pedagogic systems that can be adapted to specific needs and challenges among cooperative members. For instance, confronted with the challenge that young adults often left the cooperatives after moving out of their parents’ house, the Federation started the so-called “nucleo de promoción juvenil”  (youth educators programme). Javier Vidal, the former coordinator of formative activities at FUCVAM, highlights that this initiative: “did not intend to fill the physical premises of the Federation with hundreds of young people, but rather aimed to work in a decentralized manner across the territory, so that young people can build their own spaces in the cooperatives and, in turn, create new cooperatives when they move out, when they socialize, when they start their families. That worked pretty well, we had many cooperatives originating from this”  (FUCVAM et al., 2021).   Thus, mobilizing pedagogies operate both as a means to enhance everyday mobility from an intersectional perspective and to promote intergenerational learning and mobilization within social movements. To mobilize involves seeking change through moving literally across the city as well as by mobilizing collective agency. Through these practices, mobilizing becomes a means to common the city, and to restore its social function and production, opening the space for sustained and expanded action.   d. Reverberate   Flavia has not missed a single session of Polis’s Citizenship School. Since the start of the pandemic, she felt isolated in her struggles for the right to the city, and overwhelmed by the political neglect with which they are ignored. Fighting isolation, she has become active on social media platforms, where she engages in discussions initiated by the school that resonate with her. In the process and inadvertently, she is expanding the learning process beyond the school, allowing her “aha” moments and reflections to reverberate with a far wider community.   Following its relaunch at the beginning of the pandemic, Polis Institute’s Citizenship School in Brazil provoked unanticipated pathways and practices of learning, as its pedagogies started to reverberate from curated online sessions to social media channels like Instagram (see Figure 4 ). There, stories and observations from the virtual classroom were shared and further debated, while new conversations led to thousands of new followers. Engagement with the activating effects of social media and their political power, for example, through proactive engagement with “influencers”, has since become a strategic leveraging practice for the pedagogues running the school.   FIGURE 4 Snapshot of reverberations of the School of Citizenship on Instagram Source: Authors’ personal communication with Polis Institute based on raw footage shared by them The notion of “reverberation” is widely applied in sound studies (Gershon, 2020), not only with a physical but also a political meaning. In this context, to reverberate means the putting-in-motion of resonance, to amplify diversity perspectives, to grant them a dignity of attention and recognize their value and importance. As a pedagogic practice, reverberating is led by learners as they synthesize their own sense-making of how, for example, a transgender person experiences their right to the city, while provoking further reflections that together build new collective understandings, creating social proximity even in a context of physical distance. As such, to reverberate sets off new possibilities to act across spaces, temporalities and struggles that go beyond those curated by the schools.   Moreover, reverberation provokes, in Gershon’s words, “a collapsing of distance across spacetimes so that the reverberations of resonances come crashing down on individuals, groups”  (Gershon, 2020). Hence, reverberating pedagogies also give rise to the travelling of ideas and practices across the region through relational and translocal learning. For instance, in the online Citizenship School of Polis, one participant from northern Brazil managed to successfully fight an imminent eviction with the tools and capacities acquired from a participant from another region, which resonated with him. In a similar way, the participatory design process undertaken in the Barrio Intercultural  in Argentina generated reverberations through a shared framing of the right to housing as a collective practice embedded in conviviality with one another and with the territory. Moreover, the process of “weaving” pedagogies described before, here reverberates to a large number of learners and organizations, leading to the formation of new collectives working on participatory design in the social production and management of habitat.   e. Emancipate   Amidst laughter and the creation of an unfolding collective manifesto towards a feminist city, Paola reflects on CISCSA’s feminist school: “Something that we seek all the time in this work process is to encourage ourselves to imagine other possible realities that we always had on the horizon. We conduct several exercises to be able to make room to imagine a feminist city in which we would like to live [ Figure 5 ]. This means to give rise to the power of the feminist imagination, to the possibility of imagining and dwelling cities from other more beautiful, fairer, more habitable, more loving places.”  (CISCSA et al., 2021) FIGURE 5 “We want access to dignified housing: The land is for those who inhabit it!” Source: CISCSA et al. (2021).   Across all the schools, pedagogy is critical to the project of emancipation, and emancipation critical to urban equality. As a pedagogy, to emancipate does not just evoke a destination but a journey; a journey through which the capacities to dare and to imagine a different city are activated. This intention counteracts the pursuit of liberal and andragogical theories of learning and brings to the fore the development of a critical consciousness that exposes and confronts the oppressive structures which confine and limit our experience of the urban and of the right to the city.   Drawing on Thompson’s work (1987) while raising the case for critical pedagogy in nursing education, Jane Harden argues that “everyday living as experienced by the majority is characterised by a naive, pre-reflective adherence to ‘established’ versions of the life world. The consequence of this is that ‘factual’ or doxic patterns of living are never challenged, and the question of legitimacy is never raised, because the social world is presented and accepted as a natural phenomenon” . (Harden, 1996) In this sense, a critical parallel can be established between nursing and urban planning education. For a long time, professional education, in this and other fields, has hampered critical awareness and responses from learners, inadvertently turning professions of care into professions of oppression. In the case of nursing education, the dismissal of emancipatory capacities has indeed turned it into a site of oppression for those practising the profession, typically women, who are subordinated to a subservient role.   Critical pedagogy is fundamentally about hope, liberation and equality; (Luke & Gore, 1992) it is about conscientisation  – that is, the process of developing a critical awareness of one’s social reality through reflexion and action – and about counter-hegemonic practices, which are the backbone of emancipatory pedagogies in the full sense of Freire’s educational practice theory. To emancipate thus implies to transform the internal conflict experienced by subordinated or colonized groups in an oppressive society, a conflict defined as “double consciousness”  by W E B Du Bois (1994) This calls for activating a shift from seeing ourselves simultaneously through our own eyes and from the perspective of oppressive systems such as racism, patriarchy, colonialism or neoliberalism to rediscovering and asserting our social identities as crucial sites to imagine more socially just visions for the future of the city.   Activating a new consciousness – one that leads to the very possibility of enacting counter-hegemonic and transgressive visions and practices of inhabiting a more equal city – is at the core of the schools working under the umbrella of HIC-AL. In the school driven by Corporación Región  and Fuerza Incluyente  in Medellín, this translates into the ways in which an inclusive city is approached: not as one that accommodates the needs and experiences of people with disabilities through marginal artefacts and ad hoc interventions such as ramps, but rather by turning accessibility and mobility for all as a default position from which the city is planned and managed. In a similar vein, FUCVAM’s schools of cooperativism do not build houses to be traded as assets in the real estate market, but as homes to be inhabited, as concrete political practices that reclaim the social function of housing and land in cities – where, as expressed in the title of their short film, “the dwelling is not the end, it is the beginning” .   CISCSA’s feminist school explicitly employs emancipatory pedagogies that valorize situated experiences as opportunities to reclaim the city, and align with Sara Motta’s call to “deconstruct subordinated and naturalised social and spatial relations, while looking at gender, race, age, class, sexual orientation and mental and physical ability as one” . (Motto, 2017) These emancipatory pedagogic practices work through power and consciousness-raising, acknowledging the existence of oppression, as well as the possibility of ending it, and foregrounding the desire and capacity for social transformation. These practices manifest through the use of open – non-predetermined – learning strategies that encourage participants to share in a safe space their own intersectional positionalities and experiences with those of others through written, spoken and visual reflections.   V. Creating Paradise Beyond the Classroom   To weave, to sentipensar , to mobilize, to reverberate and to emancipate – these verbs together articulate the grammar of the schools coalescing under HIC in Latin America. The power of these actions should not be underestimated, as together they convey the ways by which critical grassroots pedagogies can activate collective agency and capacities to carve pathways towards urban equality.   Teresa Caldeira (Caldeira, 2017) contends that as ordinary citizens engage in making the urban, they often become fluent in claiming their right to the city. Working through the critical pedagogies examined in this paper, we see that such fluency is not acquired spontaneously or individually, but as the outcome of collective learning processes that turn habitat struggles into sites of transformative change by linking learning with mobilization, advocacy and action.   As argued by Paulo Freire, (Freire, 2001) the main method of critical pedagogy is dialogue, a dialogue adapted to each context, in which everyone can actively participate through the following process: (a) by encouraging women and men to develop their own critical consciousness in order to effect change in their world through social critique and political action; (b) by critically understanding one’s own practice; and (c) by changing our practices in order to tackle common struggles and act upon reality. By collectivizing consciousness, resistance and contestation, as well as possibilities, sensibilities and hope, we are witnessing a contemporary reinvention of popular urbanism, driven by social movements, as a simultaneous practice of what Motta and Esteves call “pedagogising the political and politicising the pedagogical” .(Motto & Esteves, 2014) This double practice challenges the logics of neoliberal capitalism, of patriarchy and of racism and their hegemonic translation into systemic urban inequalities. It does so by subverting the marginalization of ordinary citizens, by embodying learning in their practices and in the everyday life experiences of the urban, by generating spaces to unlearn the oppressor’s logic, by re-signifying the social and the public, and by pluralizing the saberes  and haceres  that make a just city a concrete field of imagination and action.   The five pedagogic practices shape the four dimensions of urban inequality as well as the links between them. Emancipatory pedagogies, for example, have been fundamental in making visible, revalorizing and seeking a social redistribution of the roles of women as carers, particularly pertinent in pandemic times. The experiential pedagogies in Medellín were critical for people with physical disabilities to break away from their isolation in the hillsides of the city, towards actualizing their rights and opportunities in the city. In terms of reciprocal recognition, the practices of sentipensar  in particular provoke profound reflections not only on the question of what and whose knowledge counts in habitat struggles, but how relations between different knowledges, feelings and practices – professional, embodied, experiential and others – are constructed and enacted. Importantly, the pedagogic practices of mobilization and reverberation remind us of the strategic trajectory and political weight of HIC schools in Latin America to advance towards a socially just habitat. For example, FUCVAM’s intergenerational pedagogies are not static practices, but have responded to the Federation’s changing relations to the state over time – building capacities to act in the absence of, against, or with government institutions depending on their (legal) support for cooperative housing models. Finally, the schools have been fertile grounds for learning and acting in solidarity, as witnessed through their provoking of alternative economic, cultural and environmental models and imaginaries of buen vivir , as in the case of the Barrio Intercultural.   This paper is ultimately a call for humility to those of us engaged in academia and professional practice, and for acknowledgement and recognition of and deep engagement with the actual grounded pedagogies that activate transformative change towards urban equality across time and geographies. In simple terms, it is about activating the practice of collective freedom and, in doing so, creating paradise not just in the classrooms of higher education institutions, but through the multiple sites in which urban inequalities are experienced and effectively contested and counteracted. Acknowledgments   We would like to thank the pedagogues, learners and communication teams from all eight schools who contributed to the videos and reflections, as well as Maria Silvia Emanuelli – HIC-AL Regional Coordinator – and Lorena Zárate – HIC President until the end of 2019 – for their insights and willingness to embark on this reflexive journey. Finally, our thanks to the team from La Sandía Digital – especially Suleica Pineda, Ana Salgado and Yetlanezi García – for their support throughout the process to help us find a better way to narrate the stories of the schools beyond words.   Funding   This article draws from the work conducted by the authors as part of the research programme Knowledge in Action for Urban Equality (KNOW), supported by UKRI through the Global Challenges Research Fund GROW Call. Grant Ref: ES/ P011225/1.   References   Abramo, P. (2011) La producción de las ciudades latinoamericanas: mercado inmobiliario y estructura urbana . Quito: Organización Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Centros Históricos.   Allen, A. (2021) ‘Navigating stigma through everyday city-making: Gendered trajectories, politics and outcomes in the periphery of Lima’, Urban Studies , 59(3), pp. 490–508.   Allen, A., Cociña, C. and Wesely, J. (2020) ‘Habitat International Coalition: Networked practices, knowledges and pedagogies for translocal housing activism’, Radical Housing , 2(2), pp. 181–192.   Caldeira, T. (2017) ‘Peripheral urbanization: Autoconstruction, transversal logics, and politics in cities of the global south’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space , 35(1), pp. 3–20.   Castells, M. (2016) De la crisis económica a la crisis política. Una mirada crítica . Madrid: Libros de Vanguardia.   Castillo-Álvarez, R.M. (2021) ‘Procesos de urbanización popular y derecho a la ciudad en el oriente de la zona metropolitana del Valle de México’, Procesos Urbanos , 8(2).   CISCSA, HIC and KNOW (2021) ‘¡Queremos cambiarlo todo! Formación feminista por los derechos a la ciudad’. Escuelas de HIC-AL . [Video].   Corporación Región, Fuerza Incluyente, HIC and KNOW (2021) ‘Por una ciudad accesible’. Escuelas de HIC-AL . [Video]. De Jong, S., Icaza, R. and Rutazibwa, O. (2019) Decolonization and feminisms in global teaching and learning . New York: Routledge.   de Sousa Santos, B. (2018) The end of the cognitive empire: The coming of age of epistemologies of the South . Durham, NC: Duke University Press.   Du Bois, W.E.B. (1994) The souls of Black folk . New York: Gramercy Books.   Enet, M. and Romero, G. (2019) Diseño participativo sustentable del hábitat como herramienta de la producción y gestión social del hábitat y para el ejercicio de derechos . Mexico City: UNAM, HIC-AL.   Enet, M., HIC and KNOW (2021) ‘Fortalecimiento de capacidades para la producción social del hábitat’. Escuelas de HIC-AL . [Video].   Escobar, A. (2020) Pluriversal politics . New York: Duke University Press.   Freire, P. (2001) Pedagogy of the oppressed . New York: Continuum.   FUCVAM, HIC and KNOW (2021) ‘La vivienda es el principio y no el final’. Escuelas de HIC-AL . [Video].   García Alcántar, E.A. and Quiroz Rothe, H. (2017) ‘El urbanismo popular en México. Elementos para una historia pendiente’, URBANA: Revista Eletrônica do Centro Interdisciplinar de Estudos Sobre a Ciudad , 9(1), pp. 47–69.   Gershon, W. (2020) ‘Reverberations and reverb: Sound possibilities for narrative, creativity, and critique’, Qualitative Inquiry , 26(10), pp. 1163–1173.   Giroux, H. (2019) ‘Utopian thinking in dangerous times: Critical pedagogy and the project of educated hope’, in Coté, M., Day, R.J.F. and de Peuter, G. (eds.) Utopian pedagogy: Radical experiments against neoliberal globalization . Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 25–42.   Gore, J. (1993) The struggle for pedagogies: Critical and feminist discourses as regimes of truth . New York: Routledge.   Gudynas, E. (2011) ‘Buen vivir: Germinando alternativas al desarrollo’, América Latina en Movimiento , 462, pp. 1–20.   Habitat International Coalition (2016) Habitat International Coalition and the Habitat Conferences 1976–2016 . Barcelona: HIC.   Harden, J. (1996) ‘Enlightenment, empowerment and emancipation: The case for critical pedagogy in nurse education’, Nurse Education Today , 16(1), pp. 32–37.   hooks, b. (1994) Teaching to transgress: Education as the practice of freedom . New York: Routledge.   hooks, b. (2003) Teaching community: A pedagogy of hope . New York and London: Routledge.   Illich, I. (1973) Deschooling society . Harmondsworth: Penguin.   Luke, C. and Gore, J. (eds.) (1992) Feminisms and critical pedagogy . London: Routledge, Chapman & Hall.   Malecki, J.S. (2016) ‘Crisis, radicalización y política en el Taller Total de Córdoba, 1970–1975’, Prohistoria , 25, pp. 79–103.   Motta, S. (2017) ‘Emancipation in Latin America: On the pedagogical turn’, Bulletin of Latin American Research , 36(1), pp. 5–20.   Motta, S. and Esteves, A.M. (2014) ‘Reinventing emancipation in the 21st century: The pedagogical practices of social movements’, Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements , 6(1), pp. 1–24.   Ortíz Flores, E. (2017) Hacia un hábitat para el Buen Vivir. Andanzas compartidas de un caracol peregrino . Mexico City: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.   Pírez, P. (2016) ‘Las heterogeneidades en la producción de la urbanización y los servicios urbanos en América Latina’, Territorios , 34, pp. 87–112. Rendón, L.I. (2009) Sentipensante (Sensing/thinking) pedagogy: Educating for wholeness, social justice and liberation . Sterling, VA: Stylus Publications.   Schmid, C. et al. (2018) ‘Towards a new vocabulary of urbanisation processes: A comparative approach’, Urban Studies , 55(1), pp. 19–52.   Streule, M. et al. (2020) ‘Popular urbanization: Conceptualizing urbanization processes beyond informality’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research , 44(4), pp. 652–672.   Thompson, J. (1987) ‘Critical scholarship: The critique of domination in nursing’, Advances in Nursing Science , 5(2), pp. 17–25.   Turner, J. (1976) Housing by people: Towards autonomy in building environments . New York: Pantheon Books.   Wesely, J., Allen, A., Zárate, L. and Emanuelli, M.S. (2021) ‘Generative pedagogies from and for the social production of habitat: Learning from HIC-AL School of grassroots urbanism’, plaNext–Next Generation Planning , 11, pp. 26–43.   Yap, C., Cociña, C. and Levy, C. (2021) ‘The urban dimensions of inequality and equality’, GOLD VI Working Paper Series, Working Paper 1 (November 2021) . United Cities and Local Governments, Barcelona.   Zaragocin, S. and Caretta, M.A. (2021) ‘Cuerpo-territorio: A decolonial feminist geographical method for the study of embodiment’, Annals of the American Association of Geographers , 111(5), pp. 1503–1518. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel participated in the   TűRKiYE AFRICA MEDIA FORUM, which was held on 28 February 2025 in Istanbul, Tűrkiye.   Opening speakers included Grégoire Ndjaka, CEO of the African Union of Broadcasting, Walid Ammar Ellafi, Minister for State Communication and Political Affairs of the Government of National Unity Libya, and Professor Fahrettin Altun, Head of Communications, Presidency of the Republic of Tűrkiye.   Three further sessions were held:   Strengthening the Media and Communication Ecosystem in Tűrkiye-Africa Relations Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Exploring Opportunities for Cooperation within a Common Vision Accurate Information Flow and Strategies to Counter Disinformation in Tűrkiye-Africa Media Relations.   The CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute participated as a panellist in Session 2: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Exploring Opportunities for Cooperation within a Common Vision Speech by Daryl Swanepoel, CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute: Public diplomacy and strategic communication: exploring opportunities for cooperation within a common vision   Public diplomacy and strategic communication are crucial in shaping international relations and promoting national interests in our interconnected world.   Public diplomacy goes beyond traditional diplomacy. It engages with foreign publics to foster understanding and build relationships. It utilizes cultural exchange, educational initiatives, and international broadcasting to convey messages in a relatable way.   Authenticity is essential; nations must present themselves honestly to build trust and encourage productive conversations.   The power of narratives also plays a significant role in public diplomacy. Crafting compelling stories that highlight shared values can create emotional connections and dispel misconceptions. On the other hand, strategic communication aligns messaging with national objectives, requiring careful planning and execution. Consistency across all platforms reinforces a unified narrative, necessitating collaboration among governmental departments.   Additionally, responsiveness is vital in today's fast-paced digital age, where public opinion can shift rapidly.   Nations must respond quickly to challenges and crises to maintain credibility, using proactive strategies to mitigate misperceptions.   Technology, particularly social media, has transformed communication, offering new ways for countries to engage with global audiences. However, it also presents challenges, including misinformation. Fake news spreads rapidly, often outpacing the truth and manipulating public opinion.   To address this misuse of social media, it's essential to uphold standards of accuracy and accountability, ensuring that platforms serve their original purpose of fostering connections and shared understanding.   Today, I would like to discuss how a growing cooperation between Türkiye and Africa can ensure more truthful and objective media and social media.   As we navigate an era characterised by rapid information dissemination across borders, the importance of fostering a responsible media landscape is paramount.   The challenges of misinformation and biased reporting pose risks not only to individual nations but to our collective progress as a global community.   Türkiye and African nations share a rich history of collaboration, spanning economic development, cultural exchange, and diplomatic efforts. In this spirit of partnership, we now have a unique opportunity to enhance our cooperation in the media sector.   By working together, we can develop strategies that promote accurate journalism and nurture a more reliable information environment for our citizens.   First and foremost, establishing collaborative frameworks for journalistic standards is crucial. Türkiye and African nations can work hand in hand to create guidelines that prioritize ethical journalism, emphasizing the significance of fact-checking, source verification, and impartial reporting.   Organizations such as the Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Coordination (TIKA) can partner with local media organizations across Africa to facilitate workshops and training sessions, empowering journalists with the tools and skills necessary to uphold high reporting standards.   By sharing best practices and resources, we can collectively cultivate a media landscape that fosters truth and integrity.   Furthermore, fostering partnerships between Turkish media outlets and those across Africa can enrich the diversity of voices and perspectives in news reporting. Joint investigative projects can address issues of common interest, such as climate change, health crises, and economic development, and the priorities of the Global South while promoting transparency and accountability.   Such collaborations will not only strengthen the bonds between Türkiye and African countries but also contribute to a more informed public, willing to engage in dialogue around shared challenges.   Education plays a crucial role in empowering citizens to navigate the complexities of the media landscape. Both Türkiye and African nations must invest in media literacy programs that educate individuals on how to critically evaluate information and recognize biases or misinformation.   By integrating media literacy into school curriculums and public awareness campaigns, we can equip our citizens with the skills needed to engage responsibly with the media.   As informed consumers of information, they will demand quality journalism and contribute to a culture of accountability.   Additionally, addressing the challenges posed by social media is vital. With social platforms often serving as the primary source of news for many, there is a pressing need for collaborative efforts to combat misinformation.   Türkiye and African nations can work together alongside social media companies to develop initiatives aimed at enhancing transparency, implementing fact-checking mechanisms, and promoting responsible content sharing.   By collectively holding platforms accountable, we create an environment where accurate information can thrive.   Regulation can play a significant role in improving the accuracy of information shared on social media. Here are some examples of how regulation can foster a more reliable social media environment:   1. Fact-Checking Requirements : Regulations can mandate that social media platforms implement robust fact-checking mechanisms. This could involve partnering with independent fact-checking organizations to review content that gains significant traction. Posts flagged as false or misleading could be accompanied by corrective information or links to credible sources.   2. Transparency in Algorithms : Governments can require social media companies to disclose how their algorithms determine what content is promoted or demoted on their platforms. By ensuring transparency, users can better understand why they see certain types of content. This can help mitigate the spread of sensationalist or misleading information that thrives in engagement-driven algorithms.   3. User Verification : Implementing regulations that require user identification can help reduce the spread of misinformation. By ensuring that accounts are linked to real individuals, it becomes harder for malicious actors to create fake profiles that spread false narratives. While privacy considerations must be taken into account, verified accounts can increase accountability.   4. Labelling Misinformation : Regulatory frameworks can require social media platforms to label or flag posts that contain misinformation, especially during elections or public health crises. Clear markers can alert users that the content they are encountering may not be trustworthy, allowing them to approach it with caution.   5. Mandatory Reporting : Platforms could be required to report statistics related to the reach and impact of misinformation. For example, a regulatory requirement to disclose the most flagged posts or the volume of misinformation removed can promote accountability and encourage platforms to take proactive steps against harmful content.   6. Content Moderation Standards : Regulations can establish clear guidelines for content moderation practices, ensuring that platforms take action against harmful misinformation while also upholding freedom of expression. This could include the establishment of independent oversight boards to review content moderation decisions, ensuring accountability and fairness.   7. Educational Initiatives : Governments can encourage social media platforms to promote media literacy initiatives. Regulation can mandate that platforms allocate resources to educate users about identifying misinformation and understanding the importance of reliable sources. This could involve partnerships with educational institutions or nonprofit organizations.   8. Collaboration with Civil Society : Regulations can promote collaboration between social media platforms and civil society organizations focused on combating misinformation. By working together, platforms can develop best practices for addressing false information and fostering a more informed public.   9. Penalties for Non-Compliance : Introducing penalties for platforms that fail to comply with misinformation regulations can incentivize adherence to accurate information standards. Fines or other sanctions for repeated violations can encourage companies to prioritize the integrity of the information shared on their platforms.   10. Global Standards and Cooperation : Countries can work together to establish global standards for misinformation regulation, enabling a unified approach that transcends borders. Such cooperation can help create a consistent framework for addressing misinformation across different regions, making it more difficult for false narratives to gain traction internationally.   In essence, thoughtful regulation can help create an environment where accurate information flourishes and misinformation is systematically curtailed, ultimately leading to a more informed and engaged public   Open dialogue between Türkiye and African countries will also play a fundamental role in developing cohesive media strategies. Regular forums and conferences can be established to share insights, celebrate successes, and tackle challenges together. These discussions will help build consensus around best practices for promoting truthful reporting while respecting our distinct cultural and political landscapes.   By strengthening cooperation between Türkiye and Africa in the realm of media, we can pave the way for a future characterized by truthful, objective journalism. This partnership will not only enhance our national interests but also contribute to global understanding and solidarity.   So okay. What I have laid out here is a good academic representation of the topic in hand, namely, public diplomacy and strategic communication.   But let’s now consider the practical implications of when public diplomacy and strategic communication go wrong. And I will cite an example from my home country, South Africa:     Very topical right now is the declining relations between the United States and South Africa. The Trump administration is threatening punishing tariffs against South Africa, the cutting of aid that will have a devastating effect on out fight against aids, and the removal of the country from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which will seriously impact South African manufacturing and exports.   Why?   Because the Trump administration has been misinformed about legislative measures aimed to redress the land injustices of the past. They have been told by certain activists and through social media that land is being and will be taken from the whites at no compensation.   This is simply not true: Yes there is a provision for no compensation, but that is in instances where land has for example been abandoned and the owners cannot be traced, or buildings in the inner cities that have fallen into serious disrepair with huge municipal debts attached to them, or the transfer of land from one government department to another. All imminently reasonable and in any event, challengeable in a Court of Law.   Then social media and certain activists promote the idea of a white genocide taking place on South African farms. The truth is that the murder rate on farms (for both farmers and workers) is considerably lower than in the country as a whole.   Now the Trump administration is offering refugee status to Afrikaners, all based on a false narrative.   Of course South Africa’s position viz-a-viz the Israel-Palestine conflict and relationship with Russia (and BRICS) is also deliberately misinterpreted in order to promote a review of relations with the United States.   This is the direct result of an ineffective government social media response to the accusations, and an ineffective communication strategy to counter the false narrative being spun.   And of course it did not help South Africa’s case by not having an Ambassador in Washington for over a year. A failure of public diplomacy.   Then there is the US threat of 100% tariffs on BRICS countries – and Türkiye is a BRICS applicant country by the way - were these countries dare proceed with some form of de-dollarisation. Where is the counter strategy of those BRICS countries. Where is the challenge on social media seeking a more just and fair international financial system; where is the questioning as to whether the dominance of the US dollar does not in fact amount to anti-competitive behaviour.   The absence of a well thought out strategic communication strategy and effective pubic diplomacy has real consequences for nations. It disrupts the economic order, and feeds polarisation between nations.   This topic we are talking about today is not a soft topic, it is not an add-on function of government. It is crucial component necessary to ensure a country’s wellbeing amongst its own citizens and the international community.   With this in mind, I think Türkiye and South Africa can do  well by strengthening its cooperation in the field of public diplomacy and strategic cooperation. Türkiye is particularly well-placed within the G20 and NATO  to play an important mediating role aimed at bringing the West and Africa into a more constructive, development orientated relationship.   And it is through Türkiye’s strategic communication and public diplomacy functions that it will have do so.

On 18 February 2025, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), in partnership with the Inclusive Society Institute, convened a dynamic engagement with students and educators at the Northern Cape Rural TVET College, Upington Campus. This event formed part of the broader Social Harmony through National Effort (SHiNE) Initiative , a flagship programme aimed at nurturing inclusive, respectful, and rights-based educational environments across South Africa.   The Inclusive Society Institute was represented by Ms Mari Harris, who joined officials from the SAHRC in facilitating the session. The engagement brought together a diverse group of participants - including students, lecturers, and college leadership - who actively contributed to open, thoughtful, and interactive dialogues centered on issues of human rights, social justice, and national unity. The SHiNE Initiative seeks to cultivate a culture of social harmony by addressing the root causes of discrimination, prejudice, and systemic inequality. Through initiatives like this one, the programme encourages participants to critically reflect on their own social contexts while exploring practical strategies for fostering inclusivity and mutual respect.   During the session, participants engaged in discussions that highlighted the importance of constitutional values such as dignity, equality, and freedom. They also explored challenges and opportunities specific to educational institutions in the Northern Cape region, sharing insights and experiences that underscored the urgent need for a proactive approach to combating exclusion and marginalisation. Ms Harris emphasised the vital role that educational institutions play in shaping inclusive societies. “Colleges and schools are not only centres of learning but also spaces where future leaders are formed. It is here that we must instil values that reinforce our shared humanity,” she noted.   By equipping students and educators with the tools and understanding necessary to challenge inequality and promote diversity, the SHiNE Initiative contributes meaningfully to the broader national goal of building a socially cohesive and just society.   The Inclusive Society Institute extend their appreciation to the management and staff of the Northern Cape Rural TVET College for their enthusiastic support and commitment to advancing human rights in education. The success of the engagement reaffirms the importance of collaborative efforts in shaping a South Africa that upholds the dignity and rights of all.

The Black Professionals Institute (BPI) held its annual lecture and panel discussion on Tuesday evening, 4 February 2025.   The annual lecture was delivered by Prof. Pali Lehohla (former Statistician General, who spoke on the topic “Whither a democratic dividend or demographic disaster: What is to be done?”   The lecture was followed by a panel discussion moderated by Mr Mike Siluma (Deputy Editor Sunday Times). The panellists were Dr Theuns Eloff (Academic and Director of Companies), Mr Daryl Swanepoel (CEO, Inclusive Society Instiute), Dr Kefiloe Matsineng (National Planning Commission and Dr Nthabiseng Moleko (University of Stellenbosch).   Mr Swanepoel core message was that the current  GDP growth was insufficient to accommodate sufficient job growth to deal with the employment backlogs and population growth. No amount of social engineering without concomitant economic growth will alleviate the inequality or deal with the jobs backlog. A all-of-society focus should be on economic growth ‘uber alles’.

The ISI released the 2024 South African Social Cohesion Index at a function co-hosted by Telkom and themselves at Villa Calatrava in Cape Town on 5 February 2025. SASCI, a multiyear trends analysis of social cohesion in South Africa was developed on cooperation with Constructor University in Bremen, Germany.   The report was officially handed over to Government at the event. In attendance was, amongst others, the Deputy President of the Republic, HE Paul Mashatile and Ministers Hon. Maropene Ramokgopa MP (Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation) and Hon. Gayton McKenzie MP (Sports, Arts and Culture).   The programme included speeches by the aforementioned dignitaries, the CEO of Telkom and the Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute. It was followed by a panel discussion with panellists Commissioner Dr Pulane Molokwane (National Planning Commission), Mari Harris (director of IPSOS and ISI Polling Consultant), Daryl Swanepoel (ISI CEO) and Dr Georgi Dragolov (constructor University).   REPORT: Click on picture for the report PRESENTATION: Click on picture for the presentation

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Prof Dr Melha Rout Biel   Abstract   Slavery is just one major injustice Africa has suffered in its history. The jostling for Africa’s resources by powerful European countries in the late 19th century was also a harbinger of a dark time of exploitation and the destruction of the continent’s social fabric. During the Cold War, Western and European powers again put Africa in a precarious position, having to choose sides. And it seems the continent may be at the centre of a new “Scramble for Africa” – this time, with the emerging powers of China and the United States leading the fight. As a result of all this disempowerment, there have been several military coups on the continent and many African countries are drowning in debt, despite being rich nations in terms of natural resources.   Africa has huge economic potential. However, this opportunity depends on peace, security and stable governance and peaceful transfers of power. The continent must present as a united front, advocating for decoloniality, to gain back its rightful share of power and resources. Already, this can be seen in its mutually beneficial relationship with China, who has shown Africa goodwill with a major investment plan that is boosting various areas of development. Africa and its friends need to work hand in hand, using common interests to ensure that peace and security returns throughout Africa and beyond. This will not only bring wealth to the continent and help fight its colonially inherited issues of unemployment, corruption, underdevelopment and youth migration, but it will also enrich its allies from around the globe.   Introduction   The African continent has faced a number of challenges – such as exploitation of natural resources, slavery of the highest degree and destruction of social cohesion – over the last few hundred years.   Even after the independence of its fifty-four countries between the 1960s and 1970s, the continent is still politically, economically and socially dependent on external powers.   With the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 came the division of the African continent between the European powers – who were much more interested in the wealth and manpower the continent had to offer than in the people who occupied it. This division process is sometimes referred to as the “Scramble for Africa”, which was the beginning of a very dark period for Africa and its people. During this scramble for wealth and power, new boarders were created, and notable African names of states or towns were replaced with new names to suit the new reality on the ground. Foreign languages, such as English, France, and Spanish, were forcefully introduced to the African society. Today, most of the African scholars – with the exception of those from Ethiopia – write their research in one of the above languages.   During the Cold War era, African states and society were forced to align themselves with either the Western powers or with the Soviet Union. This phenomenon is still on course in the post-Cold War era. Today, there is a new development in Africa that could be referred to as the return of the Scramble for Africa, which, if not handled well, could result in the continent once again becoming a battleground between traditional and emerging powers. There have been military takeovers in five countries in West and Central Africa, one after another, in less than two years, executed by junior military officers. It is not clear whether these military officers are being used by external powers to disrupt the current climate on the continent or not; only time will tell.   Many African countries are in over their heads in debt. Some simply cannot afford to pay back what they borrowed from foreign funders, despite being the richest nations in Africa in terms of natural resources such as oil. It is not clear how this situation will be dealt with in the coming years. In some cases, the countries will end up with occupation of some of their key infrastructures, such as airports, or important mineral producing sectors.   According to Professor Lauren A. Johnson, Africa has a “peace deficit, development deficit, security deficit and governance deficit. Therefore, human society in general and in Africa in particular is facing extraordinary challenges. ” Africa now faces the challenge of decoloniality of being, knowledge and power on the continent.   Decoloniality refers to the logic, metaphysics, ontology and matrix of power created by the massive processes and aftermath of colonisation and settler-colonialism. This matrix and its lasting effects and structures are called "coloniality".  More plainly said, decoloniality is a way for us to re-learn the knowledge that has been pushed aside, forgotten, buried or discredited by the forces of modernity, settler-colonialism, and racial capitalism. Decoloniality is not a means to reject the scientific, medical, social and ethical “advances” of the modern era  tout court . It is, rather, a way to explore colonisation, settler-colonialism, racial capitalism (particularly as it grew out, in full racialising force, with the enslavement of black Africans), modernity, and, most recently, neoliberalism and necrocapitalism and the ways in which they have displaced an array of modes of living, thinking and being in our natural world. Decoloniality reveals "the dark side of modernity" and how it is built "on the backs" of "others".   Where does Africa go from here? This paper is an attempt to shed light on this dilemma.   Why Foreign Powers Scrambled for Africa in 1884-1885   As mentioned in the introduction, the phrase “Scramble for Africa” is used by historians to refer to the expansion of European empires into the African continent during 1884 and 1885. This process of European expansion continued from 1870 right up until the First World War started to unfold in 1914. Notable countries who contributed significantly to controlling Africa were Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain. After many attempts by African kings and queens to protect the continent from the invading hostile forces, the European forces finally managed to take control of most of Africa, declared themselves as the colonisers, and subsequently divided Africa among themselves.   It is worth noting that over this period, there were other major events taking place, including European interest in the Suez Canal, the Berlin Conference (1884), the First Moroccan Crisis (1905) and Second Moroccan Crisis (1911), and the European Colonisation of South Africa (1652), as well as the inhuman rule of Leopold II of Belgium in Congo. The causes for the Scramble for Africa are many, however this paper will mention only a few:   Competition among European powers Ethnocentrism To spread Christianity and European languages and culture. To expand new innovation and technology in Africa in order to easily explore and exploit African resources to boost industry in Europe and the United States (US). To increase access to manpower, to use as soldiers, in agriculture and industrialisation, which was taking place in Europe and the US at the time and required a huge amount of cheap labour. To spread the idea of racial superiority, which came to light during the 19th century in Europe. To promote European beliefs and Christianity as a superior religion over the African religions. The missionaries played dirty by coming to Africa as “clean” people, when in fact they were the ones who encouraged European and US government to exploit the resources they noted while exploring the continent.   The Europeans managed to overpower African forces and societies, who resisted colonisation and the exploitation of resources and manpower, with the assistance of new technologies and innovations. The Role of Foreign Powers in Peace, Security and Development in Africa   As far as peace and security in Africa at large is concerned, world powers have a direct or indirect role to play. This is the case in this era of terrorism and violent extremism as well as renewed jostling for resources in Africa. It is evident that most of the powerful nations are once again present and active on the continent. Some scholars are even talking about a “new scramble for Africa”. This would, again, have long-term consequences for the continent’s peace, security and development.   The question is: Why are world powers interested in Africa’s military again? There are many reasons for this development, one of which is the competition for influence in Africa and, of course, there is the issue of resources. Today, many world powers – such as the US, China and Russia as well as certain European nations and economically powerful countries like Japan, India and Brazil – are currently active in Africa. In addition, there are energy-rich Gulf States seeking opportunities on the continent to consolidate their future investments.   The presence of foreign military, for example, in the Horn of Africa has grown due to the increase of terrorist activities in Africa. For instance, Djibouti has agreed to host US naval and drone bases that conduct operations in the Horn of Africa and beyond. Other powers which have established military bases include France, Italy and Japan. The French military base in Djibouti is hosting troops from Germany and Spain. Furthermore, some regional blocs such as Gulf Coordination Council members like Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have also established military bases in Eritrea and Somaliland, while Somalia is hosting Turkish troops. The US also has an active military presence in the Horn, in the Sahel region, that are fighting against “terror” groups and the provision of military training to the governments of the region (Adam, 2018).   Noteworthy, is that since the 9/11 attacks the US has increased their activities in Africa in the fight against what is known as the “War on Terror”. This agenda is important for the US, which is why US humanitarian aid to Africa has been linked to this purpose in the past few years. Since 2007, AFRICOM, or the US Africa Command, has played a vital role in the fight against terror groups throughout the continent. Although, some of the African countries have been reported as being reluctant to host AFRICOM, as these countries are suspicious of its true agenda. They feel that the presence of AFRICOM in their territory might undermine their sovereignty. As a result, AFRICOM is still based in Germany (Adam, 2018).   Military Coups in Africa Since the independence of the African states, there have been a number of military coups. Of the 486 attempted or successful military coups carried out globally since 1950, Africa accounts for the largest number, with 214, of which at least 106 have been successful. Based on data compiled by American researchers Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, at least 45 of the 54 nations across the African continent have experienced at least a single coup attempt since 1950.   Supporters of Niger's military government take part in a demonstration in front of a French army base in Niamey, Niger [Mahamadou Hamidou/Reuters], August, 2023.   Successful Coups in Recent Years   Niger:  On July 26, 2023, Niger’s Bazoum was overthrown by the military.   Burkina Faso:  In January 2022, Burkina Faso’s army removed President Roch Kabore, blaming him for failing to contain violence by Islamist militants. In September of that year, there was  a second coup  by army Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who forcibly deposed Paul Henri-Damiba.   Guinea:  In September 2021, Special Forces commander Colonel Mamady Doumbouya overthrew President Alpha Conde. A year earlier, Conde had changed the constitution to circumvent limits that would have prevented him from standing for a third term, triggering widespread rioting.   Chad:  In April 2021, Chad’s army took power after President Idriss Deby was killed on the battlefield while visiting troops fighting rebels in the north.   Mali:  In August 2020, a group of Malian colonels removed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. The coup followed anti-government protests over deteriorating security, contested legislative elections and allegations of corruption. Nine months later, a  countercoup happened , with Assimi Goita, who was named vice president after the first one, leading the second and becoming head of state.   Sudan:  In October 2021, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led a military takeover in Khartoum, dissolving a ruling council in which the army and civilians had shared power and throwing the country’s democratic transition into turmoil.   The Return of Russia to Africa   Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia’s relationship with African countries, especially those countries that were connected through communism to Russia, came to a standstill. However, in recent years, Russia has returned to Africa, seeing the continent as a market opportunity. In 2018, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov undertook an extensive tour of Africa, where he visited a number of countries, including Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Mozambique. While in Ethiopia, the Foreign Minister attended the meeting of a joint ministerial committee that was established to advance bilateral relations between the two states. He also met with the chairperson of the African Union. It must be noted that the Russian Foreign Minister visited only one country in the Horn of Africa, that is, Ethiopia. The other visits focused on Southern African countries – those which have huge natural resources such as oil, uranium, copper, gold and cobalt, to mention a few.   Some scholars argue that Russia’s main priority in Africa for now is not to revive its Soviet-era prestige and influence, but to extract necessary minerals on the continent.   Apart from investment in natural resources, Russia is also investing in security and military projects in Africa. It is the second-largest arms exporter in the world after the United States and sells billions of dollars in weapons yearly across Africa. During his visit to Africa last year, the Russian Foreign Minister signed a defense cooperation agreement with Mozambique. Due to the imposition of sanctions on Russia by the US and the European Union, the country is currently looking for a new market. Russia is looking forward to making Africa its main export centre. As of now, Russia views Africa as a major trade opportunity and hopes to expand its influence on the continent (Adam, 2018).   China Cooperation with Africa   China, the second-largest economy in the world, has become Africa’s most important and influential development and trade partner over the past two decades. In comparison to other world powers, such as some European Union member states that have colonial history in Africa, China has been a supporter of the African liberation struggle since the mid-20th century. Secondly, China’s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, political equality and mutual trust, promotion of win-win economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and solidarity, and cooperation in international affairs (Stremlau, 2015), make China, in the eyes of Africa, a clean partner.   Such a history has made it possible for China to expand its influence on the continent. With the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, China’s influence on the continent has clearly increased. For instance, by 2000, China-Africa trade volumes were recorded at US$10bn. By 2014, the value of contracts which were awarded to Chinese companies in Africa amounted to $75bn. By 2016, China planned to invest an additional $60bn in the region to cover major collaborative projects on areas such as industrialisation, agricultural modernisation, infrastructure, finance, green development, trade and investment, poverty reduction, public welfare and public health as well as peace and security. No world power has ever put in place such a huge investment plan like China has in Africa.   Despite this good news for Africa, China’s investment in Africa has been harshly criticised by competitors and others such as the US. For instance, Peter Navarro, from the US National Trade Council, accused China of “locking down strategic natural resources, locking up emerging markets and locking out the United States”. Others criticised China for pursuing a “new form of colonialism” and “massive resource grab” in Africa. Furthermore, Chinese programmes have an adverse impact on the environment (Adam, 2018).   Can we speak of a “New Cold War in Africa”?   As a result of the growing economic and military interest in the Horn of Africa, and African continent in general, and the increasing tensions between world powers – like China on one hand and the United States on the other – some scholars such as Mehari Taddele Maru projected that this “will be detrimental to African prosperity and peace” (Maru, 2019).    In 2019, the United States conducted the 12th US-Africa Business Summit in Mozambique’s capital, Maputo. The high-level occasion was attended by eleven African heads of state and government as well as by 1,000 business community leaders. During the three-day occasion, US government representatives disclosed a $60bn investment plan to invest in low- and middle-income countries, especially in Africa. This declaration was made six months after John Bolton, then the US National Security Advisor, presented the Trump administration’s “New Africa Strategy”. The document stated: “Great power competitors, namely China and Russia, are rapidly expanding their financial and political influence across Africa. They are deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States” (Maru, 2019).   The above citation foreshadows that sooner or later, Africa could be another battleground for the escalation of a trade war between superpowers. In this case, between China and the US.   Economic Competition or Economic War   China dealing with Africa has been seen by many Africans as an advantage to both sides. It is clear that China’s approach to Africa has always focused mostly on trade, with Africa becoming one of the top destinations for Chinese investment. This began in 1999, when China introduced the so-called “Go Out” policy, which encouraged private and state-owned companies to seek economic opportunities outside of China.   Since then, Chinese trade with Africa has increased 40-fold over the past two decades. For instance, in 2017 it stood at $140bn. Between 2003 and 2017, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flows jumped by close to 60-fold to $4bn a year. FDI stocks stand at $43bn. Most of those funds were invested in infrastructure and energy development. China has significantly developed African railways. It has invested in various projects in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Angelo as well as in Nigeria. Currently, China is building a massive hydropower plant in Angola. It has already completed the longest railway line between Ethiopia and Djibouti. The headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa and West African Regional Bloc ECOWAS in Abuja were built by China. There is no doubt then that China is contributing towards development on the continent. But, of course, not for free!   As far as the US is concerned, various members of the US administration in Washington see Africa as a continent of wars, underdevelopment and a battlefield where the world power can confront its enemies. This was the case during the Cold War, when the US confronted the Soviet Union. The US returned to the African military after 9/11 and again now to confront China. Development of real economic ties with Africa has never been at the top of the agenda for any administration in Washington.   For this reason, trade between the US and African states has decreased from $120bn in 2012 to only $50bn in 2019. US FDI flows have slumped from $9.4bn in 2009 to around $330m in 2017. For the United States to challenge China as far as investment is concerned, the US needs to do more. The $60bn investment that was presented by the US will not in any way challenge Chinese investment in the continent.   Mehari Taddele Maru had this to say on China, US and Africa Relations: “The US has repeatedly accused China of using ‘debt to hold states in Africa captive to (its) wishes and demands’ and has warned African states to avoid Chinese ‘debt diplomacy’ which is supposedly incompatible with the independence of African nations and civil society and poses ‘a significant threat to US national security interests”. Yet, Africa is only the fourth-largest recipient of Chinese FDI after Europe (mainly Germany, UK and Netherlands), America (mainly the US and Canada), and Asia. The US has also borrowed heavily from China; currently its debt to its rival stands at $1.12tn. By contrast, Africa owes China around $83bn (Maru, 2019).   It is true that high indebtedness, trade imbalances, poor quality of goods coming from China and lower standards of labour and environmental practices are challenges for Africa in relation with China. But a good number of Africans do appreciate the (unconditional) funding from China. Yes, China should work more on issues relating to the environmental impact on big projects in infrastructure and agricultural industrialisation in Africa as well as improving the quality of goods exported to Africa and the rest of the world. This would improve China’s image and help avoid criticism of China’s activities in Africa.   According to the African Development Bank, the US-China trade war is already affecting Africa. It could cause as much as a 2.5% decrease in GDP for resource-intensive African economies and a 1.9% dip for oil-exporting nations (Maru, 2019).   The Presence of Foreign Forces and its Implications for Africa   The motives for the presence of multinational forces in the Horn of Africa are varied. Some came with the aim of fighting terror groups in the Horn, while others have different motives that have yet to be spelt out to the public. Scholars have noted that the escalating tensions between the US and China could in fact end up threatening the security of the whole continent, as the two powers are militarily present in Africa. For the past 15 years or so, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) has been engaged in a number of security missions throughout Africa. For instance, China is involved in peacekeeping operations in Sudan, South Sudan, Liberia, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In addition, China has contributed millions of dollars to the peacekeeping equipment for the African Union Mission in Somalia as well as provided financial support to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediation efforts in South Sudan. Recently, China has supported in kind, South Sudanese Cantonment sides for both the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) and its opposition groups, which are party to the R-RACSS, including the SPLM-IO.   In 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. The base hosted about 400 staff and troops, but it can accommodate about 10,000 people. The purpose of these forces is to carry out ant-piracy operations by the Chinese navy. However, it can also play a role in securing maritime routes. Some observers speculate that this base could be indirectly meant to secure Chinese interests in Africa. The question should really be, why not?   China’s military presence in Africa pales in comparison to that of the US. For example, in the past few years, US Africa Command has carried out about 36 different military operations in 13 different African nations – including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia as well as South Sudan and Tunisia. More than 7,000 troops have been deployed by the US in Africa. The US has one of the largest bases in Djibouti, which is set to be a permanent base in Africa. Apart from this base, it has about 34 other military outposts across the west, east and north of the continent. In addition, the US is supporting the Egyptian, Nigerian, Ethiopian, Malian and Nigerian armies as well as other G5 Sahel forces tasked with counterterrorism.   Observers are of the opinion that there will be no direct confrontation between the US and Chinese forces in Africa in the near future. However, their growing presence in the region is becoming a destabilising factor. The fact is that the US wants to contain the growing Chinese influence over Africa. The globe has already witnessed the fallout of the US-China competition in the strategic Red Sea region, which is an important part of the maritime routes. States in this region are not only feeling the growing US and Chinese pressure to take one side or the other but are also increasingly exposed to outside interference by different regional powers. A case in point is the development in Djibouti, when the country found itself at the centre of US-China diplomatic confrontation, as it is host to military bases of both the US and China. It was difficult for Djibouti to balance this situation (Maru, 2019).   In conclusion, the competition between world powers for resources and influence in Africa offers opportunities and challenges. It could be an advantage to the continent if African leaders present a united front on how Africa should deal with these big partners. China has shown goodwill in working with Africans in various areas of development. This needs to be exploited, including the need for China to transfer technology to Africa using local content provision. China should not leave Africa behind in the area of technology and others.   On the other hand, Africa should be proud of its contribution to the rise of China in terms of resources. It should be proud of helping to make China great again. The competition between the two superpowers – namely, China and the US – in Africa should be in good faith. The US should do more to invest in Africa and Africa should be open to the US’s advice on dealing with China. President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti had this to say about the relationship of the US and China with Africa and in the provision of loans by China: “The reality is that no one but the Chinese offers a long-term partnership” (Maru, 2019). If the US offered the same benefits, it might have more success in winning over some African leaders.   Conclusion   Africa has a lot of potential in terms of economic development. However, this opportunity depends on peace, security and stable governance and peaceful transfers of power. The issue of limited terms for presidents on the continent is a precondition for peaceful transfer of power, security and development. If peace is achieved and kept, the African people and their friends around the world will achieve greater economic prosperity and development.   What is needed today is for Africa and its friends to work hand in hand, using common interests to ensure that peace and security returns throughout Africa and beyond such that citizens concentrate on development. Such a situation will help Africa to fight unemployment, corruption, and underdevelopment and youth migrations to Europe and other parts of the world. An example of inhuman treatment of African people by colonial forces.   A Map of Africa in 1878 indicates far less colonial presence than the 1914 map. At the Congress of Berlin in 1884, 15 European powers divided Africa among them. By 1914, these imperial powers had  fully colonised the continent , exploiting its people and resources (Facing History & Ourselves, 2016).   African valuable resources exploited by colonial invaders References   Adam, A.H. 2018. Are we witnessing a ‘new scramble for Africa’?  [Online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/3/27/are-we-witnessing-a-new-scramble-for-africa [accessed: 27 July 2019].   Cooper, F., Isaacman, A.F., Mallon, F.C., Roseberry, W. & Stern, S.J. 1993. Confronting historical paradigms: peasants, labor, and the capitalist world system in Africa and Latin America . US: University of Wisconsin Press.   Facing History & Ourselves. 2016. Colonial Presence in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/colonial-presence-africa [accessed: 27 October 2023] .   Gann, L.H., Duignan, P. & Turner, V.W. 1969. Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960: Volume 4.  London: Cambridge U.P.   Hoekema, D.A. 2013. African Politics and Moral Vision,  Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal , 96 (2): 121-144.   Kolapo, F.J., & Akurang-Parry, K.O. 2009. The History of Colonialism in Africa—Revisited, Reviewed Work: African Agency and European Colonialism: Latitudes of Negotiation, The Journal of African American History , 94(2): 248-252.   Maru, M.T. 2019. A new cold war in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/7/1/a-new-cold-war-in-africa [accessed: 27 July 2019].   Pardee School of Global Studies. N.d. 19th-20th Century Colonialism and Resistance . [Online] Available at: https://www.bu.edu/africa/outreach/teachingresources/history/colonialism/ [accessed: 27 October 2023] .   Parker , J. &  Rathbone , R. 2007. African History: A Very Short Introduction . US: Oxford University Press.   Schraeder, P. 2020. Understanding Contemporary Africa . US: Lynne Rienner Publishers.   Stremlau, J.J. 2015. China and Africa’s relationship is not yet of “win-win economic cooperation” . [Online] Available at: https://qz.com/africa/570542/china-and-africas-relationship-is-not-yet-one-of-win-win-economic-cooperation [accessed: 27 July 2019].   The New York Times Magazine. 2019. The 1619 Project . [Online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html [accessed: 27 October 2023] . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Nondumiso Alice Sithole   Abstract   Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are the heartbeat of effective public management. Although these systems were often neglected by governments in the past, they have become a critical part of the functioning of a democratic society. And yet, in many developing and emerging countries, M&E systems are underdeveloped and insufficiently institutionalised. A recent study showed that, while 91% of national development strategies approved after 2015 explicitly refer to the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, only 35% of them have the required data and systems to track implementation. The outcome was that there is a lack of a conducive legal and regulatory environment, insufficient capabilities, weak accountability mechanisms, and fragile frameworks to institutionalise the use of M&E. In South Africa, the ill effects are particularly evident at municipal level, where, despite improvements in access to basic services, the outcomes are still well below standard.   This paper investigates the challenges and possibilities M&E systems present. It explains how the stand-alone concepts of monitoring and evaluation are architecturally intertwined. It touches on the various types of M&E systems or methods and explores both the challenges of implementing these systems and the way forward. Finally, the paper offers useful recommendations for actions stakeholders should take with regard to M&E, NGOs, think tanks as well as governments.   Introduction   There is continuous expansion and development of “think tank” structures or systems occurring across the globe. These mechanisms of cross culture are aimed at undertaking important work in terms of an array of critical issues in governance, politics, and research. Or, better put, they are focused on researching and analysing data in their respective sectors or industries, with the aim of shaping policies on all levels. The shaping of these policies is not only regional but can also be used nationally and even on a global scale. However, at the July gathering of the 7th China-Africa People’s Forum and 7th China-Africa Young Leaders Forum, it was established that there seems to be an oversight by think tanks on an important component in measuring the impact and effectiveness of all bilateral work, and work in general, in different countries.   As Valadez and Bamberger (1994) view it, perhaps there is still an absence of a theoretical framework for international and comparative evaluation. That there is currently a lack of a framework probably has a detrimental impact on evaluation as well as on the very processes and outcomes that evaluation, as a measuring tool, hopes to improve and enhance within monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. Without the means to synthesise findings, test hypotheses, develop laws, and cumulate knowledge, international and comparative evaluation of programmes results in disconnected, invalid, and unreliable results in so far as regional, national, and global policy initiatives are concerned.   Lusthaus et al (1999) points out that although there have been significant strides made in terms of technology and economic solutions, not only in South Africa’s context but also globally, there are still countries where there has been inadequate improvement in the conditions for a large number of people. There are still some nations that have difficulty learning how to create appropriate roles for the state in development within their own contexts; how to organise and manage their systems so that they can identify priority problems, formulate policies, and create ways to have these policies implemented in a sustainable way (Hilderbrand & Grindle, 1994).   South Africa falls within this category. Although it has made great strides in many aspects, there still exists a weakness in its monitoring and evaluation systems or mechanisms, particularly when it comes to the local sphere of government.   This paper advocates for an assessment of whether M&E systems are being utilised effectively by government, more specifically by local government, in their partnerships, bilateral relations, and policy implementation, and of what can be done to strengthen the capacity of government. It further recommends a greater focus on M&E systems as a tool to measure the impact of programmes and policy initiatives not only on a local scale but also on a global one. Finally, this paper encourages the implementation of monitoring and evaluation as an oversight mechanism and tracking tool of accountability, which will aid in bridging the gap between the people being governed and the government or administrations that are voted into power. This paper aims to highlight progress and/or weaknesses in key governance areas. The findings of this paper will demonstrate that, thus far, governments have not aggressively made the effort to utilise monitoring and evaluation systems as much as they should.   Monitoring and evaluation deconstructed   Monitoring and evaluation is an important part of public management. Although it was often neglected by governments in the past, it has become a critical part of the functioning of a democratic society. Monitoring and evaluating the outcomes of a project or public campaign allows managers to determine how successful it has been in achieving its desired goals (Wits, N.d.). It is also aligned with accountability, and jointly, monitoring and evaluation activities tend to ensure that projects achieve both upward and downward as well as horizontal accountability demands (Okafor, 2021).   It is essential to understand both the distinct elements of monitoring and evaluation and the relationship between them in order to have a complete or holistic understanding of the combined concept. The World Bank defines monitoring as “a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds" (World Bank, N.d.).   Monitoring is a process of continuous and periodic surveillance of the physical implementation of a programme or policy, through timely gathering of systematic information on work schedules, inputs, delivery, targeted outputs, and other variables of the programme or policy, in order to have the desired effects and impact. It is an integral part of a management support function: it relates to monitoring a programme or policy and its components; managing the use of resources; guiding the progress of the programme or policy towards the desired end; and making sure that planned activities occur. The data gained from monitoring activities feed into and guide the decisions of managers or implementors of policy. Monitoring is also an integral part of the Management Information System; thus, it is a management tool (UWC, N.d.).   Shapiro (N.d.) describes monitoring as the systematic collection and analysis of information as a project or a programme progresses. The aim of which is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of a project or organisation. It is based on targets set and activities mapped out during the planning phase of work. Monitoring helps to keep the work on track and alerts management when things are going wrong. If executed properly, it is an invaluable tool for good management and provides a useful base for evaluation. It enables an organisation, or policy implementors, to determine whether the resources that have been availed are sufficient and are being utilised well, and whether there is appropriate capacity and the project implementors are following through with the original plans (Shapiro, N.d.).   Valadez and Bamberger further add that monitoring is more of a programme activity – its role is to determine whether project activities are implemented as planned. If the finding is negative, it determines the cause of the anomaly and what can be done to address it (Valadez & Bamberger, 1994).   On the other hand, evaluation is defined by the World Bank as "the process of determining the worth or significance of a development activity, policy or programme … to determine the relevance of objectives, the efficacy of design and implementation, the efficiency of resource use, and the sustainability of results. An evaluation should (enable) the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both partner and donor" (World Bank, N.d.).   Evaluation is a process to determine (as systematically and objectively as possible) the extent to which programme needs and results have been or are being achieved and analyse the reasons for any discrepancy (UWC, N.d.). It is the periodic assessment of ongoing and/or completed projects, policies, or programmes using a systematic and objective approach (Noltze et al, 2021). It is important to note that evaluation is the second component or stage of the M&E system process and is supposed to provide responses or answers to be implemented once the situation has been assessed during the first stage or phase of monitoring. The University of the Western Cape (N.d.) describes evaluation as being used for measuring programme effectiveness, and evaluation processes may be used to demonstrate to planners, donors, and other decision-makers that the programme activities have achieved measurable improvements.   Monitoring and evaluation can also indicate whether and where resources are being used efficiently and where strategies for resource allocation may need to be considered or reconsidered. In addition, the following pertinent questions should be asked: Is the programme doing what it set out to do? Or, is the programme succeeding in what it set out to accomplish? Is it providing a useful – or needed – service? Is it providing services to the intended audience? Have there been measurable changes – improvements – in the conditions that the programme set out to address? Have resources been used efficiently?   Evaluations are meant to furnish an objective view through rigorous research methods to inform conclusions about performance, reasons for good performance and poor performance, and to suggest recommendations for improvement in respect of programmes and policies.   Monitoring makes contributory inputs for evaluation, and this makes it an integral part of the overall evaluation process. Nyonje, Ndunge and Mulwa (2012) opined that monitoring in nature is descriptive and provides information on the status of project intervention in relation to the assigned project targets and outcomes. Contrastingly, evaluation is seen as an assessment of ongoing and/or concluded projects in an organised, systematic, and objective way with the aim of providing on a timely basis, the assessment of relevance/importance, the efficiency and effectiveness, as well as the impact, sustainability, and overall progress. Monitoring and evaluation applied as a function, is a fundamental part of project management that involves reflection and communication to support efficient and effective project implementation through informed/evidence-based decision-making (Nuguti, 2009).   When using this definition in the context of policy monitoring, policy refers to a programme of action to give effect to specific goals and objectives aimed at changing (and preferably improving) an existing unsatisfactory situation. Evidence-based policy is an approach to policy analysis and management that helps people make well-informed decisions about policies, programmes and projects by putting the best available evidence at the heart of policy development and implementation (Cloete, 2009).   Policy monitoring itself is the regular, systematic collection of data on the basis of specified indicators to determine levels of progress and achievement of goals and objectives. This is normally a very important project implementation and management tool but has over time been linked to the concept of evaluation. The results of the monitoring process are normally regularly reported in prescribed standardised formats.   In contrast to monitoring, policy evaluation is a systematic judgement or assessment of policy programmes. It can include a systematic assessment of resources, organisational processes to convert such resources into policy outputs or products, and the extent to which these policy programmes have the intended results in the form of outputs, outcomes or impacts, measured against envisaged goals and objectives. Systematic, evidence-based assessment can only be undertaken if the evidence is available to assess. The evidence is collected, stored and processed through systematic, rigorous monitoring and reporting processes. This establishes the link between these processes, which have over time become known as monitoring and evaluation (M&E) (Cloete, 2009).   Governments across the world have specialised institutionalised monitoring and evaluation systems for a variety of reasons, namely: They are essential for effective public policymaking; enable institutions to assess the effectiveness of policy decisions and programmes, and monitor progress towards national goals and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); direct the focus of governments as needed to accelerate progress in policy programmes and initiatives; enhance public accountability for results; and provide opportunities for dialogue between citizens and public institutions.   The 2015 Evaluation Year, along with the United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s adoption of the Agenda 2030 and SDGs, strengthened the movement towards increased governmental awareness and interest in evaluation, while raising expectations about the pace of monitoring and evaluation capacity development at national level. A strong demand for individual evaluation training and capacity development also emerged from this movement and some countries took steps towards the institutionalisation or implementation of evaluation.   Types of M&E systems at a glance   Different countries use different terminology to describe evaluations, but the underlying principles of the evaluation process remain the same. The set of types of evaluation is grounded in the base logic model (cause-effect) – linking inputs to activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts – which is also used in the Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information. It is important to take account of the fact that government interventions are implemented within socio-economic contexts that are complex, dynamic, and structurally inequitable. For example, while South Africa has over the past 25 years made remarkable strides in mitigating patriarchal norms and practices, gender inequalities persist, and many gender gaps remain unaddressed.   According to Rabie and Cloete (2009:11), the ongoing or process performance evaluation is done at different intervals “when a policy project or programme is still being implemented”. This type of evaluation is used to assess what has actually been accomplished at a particular time during the implementation process. Ongoing or process performance evaluation is undertaken to keep track of the timeframe and the spending patterns of the programme.   Secondly, formative evaluation is conducted in order to determine the policy outcomes of a generally unknown future and relies on complex technology-based trend-projection techniques that are not necessarily known to all evaluators. Cloete (2009) argues that formative evaluation is frequently required at a very early stage in the policy planning process to undertake a formal assessment or appraisal of the feasibility of the different policy options that one can choose from (Cloete, 2009:296).   Lastly, summative evaluation takes place after the completion of the policy, project, or programme – for example, at the end of the financial year or the term for which the policy was planned. “Summative evaluation focuses on both the short-term end products (outputs), the medium-term sectoral outcomes, and the long-term intersectoral impacts or changes that the end product brought about” (Cloete, 2009:296). Determining whether an evaluation is ongoing or is conducted at the end of the implementation process requires data both about the status quo ante (so-called baseline data: before the policy project was initiated), and data at the cut-off point, which signals the end of the evaluation period (so-called end or culmination data) (Cloete, 2017).   An important distinction to make here is between outputs and outcomes, as these areas in monitoring and evaluation often overlap. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) definition acknowledges this confusion by saying that an output “may also include changes resulting from [an] intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes”. Even with clearly delineated guidelines on these concepts, an organisation will need to deal with the different interpretations staff may have on a case-by-case basis (Intrac, 2016). Are the South African Government and Global Community Utilising M&E Systems?   In many developing and emerging economies, M&E systems are somewhat underdeveloped. Furthermore, they are not sufficiently institutionalised. It goes without saying that resources and capabilities to provide quality M&E services are therefore insufficient. A recent study by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) showed that, while 91% of national development strategies approved after 2015 explicitly refer to the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, only 35% of them have the required data and systems to track implementation (OECD, 2019). The outcome of the study alluded to the fact that there is a lack of a conducive legal and regulatory environment to create demand for M&E services on the part of public institutions; insufficient capabilities to procure, provide, and use evaluations; weak accountability mechanisms on the use of evidence and results; and weak frameworks to institutionalise the use of M&E in decision-making.    In the South African context, the creation of a dedicated Ministry of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) within the president’s office in 2009 as a result of concern that, while there was a slight improvement in access to basic services, the outcomes, or the reality on the ground, was still below standard. The quality of services – for example, in education and health – were substandard or poor in many areas across the country. However, massive increases in budget expenditure on services have not always brought the results anticipated. The underlying reasons for this vary from, among others, lack of political will, inadequate leadership, and management weaknesses to inappropriate institutional design and misaligned decision rights  (Engela & Ajam, 2010).   The above remains the status quo, to a certain degree. There are not many municipalities that either have, develop, or consistently maintain adequately operational institutionalised M&E departments within their structures (the choice here of using a scenario involving local authorities is because they are the closest to the citizenry). Therefore, it certainly makes sense that there should be a strong focus on the maintenance of such systems.    There is a general weakness in respect of resources and capacities at national level in governments on the African continent and developing countries in other parts of the world, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The weakness lies in the lack of support for the institutionalisation of evaluation. There is also a demand for greater accountability that is aligned to economic, cultural, and political backgrounds (World Bank, N.d.).   Like other African countries, South Africa faces multiple deeply rooted challenges with regard to transformation. Interconnected crises – including sanitary, geopolitical, economic, humanitarian, migratory, etc. – the development and strengthening  of M&E systems, and capacities of both public actors and local M&E stakeholders remain crucial factors in the achievement of national development goals and the SDGs.  There must be consistent awareness building, advocacy efforts, and the training of M&E stakeholders in all spheres of government. There needs to be fostering and strengthening of efforts, as such is required, in order to promote national evaluation policies and strategies and to build more effective national M&E systems.   The World Bank reported that the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) launched the Global Evaluation Initiative (GEI), a partnership developed with the objective of being a catalyst for M&E systems. Furthermore, its aim was to provide a pool of key actors and experts in the evaluation field to assist governments in developing countries in placing evidence at the heart of decision-making. The Every Newborn Action Plan (ENAP) is one of the key implementation partners of the GEI, as it is ideally positioned to help the GEI achieve its mandate in some parts of the African continent and in the MENA regions.   South Africa has also taken some action, having developed a revised National Evaluation Policy Framework for the period 2019 to 2024, based on a review of the successes and challenges of the first Policy Framework adopted in 2011. The quest to sustain public sector reforms demands sustained and deliberate coordination interventions to foster compliance with and accountability for the implementation of development policies. Policymaking and monitoring is mainly informed by the quest to improve quality. Therefore, any benchmarking that is conducted is meant to contribute to a better perspective on how South Africa compares to other developing countries and the global community at large. It is also aimed at setting above-average standards of improvement – linked to accountability and sound governance is the economical use of resources in compliance with prescriptive management systems (Masombuka & Thani, 2023).   Until 2005, only individual staff performance evaluations were institutionalised and regularly and systematically carried out in the South African government. Policy programme monitoring and evaluation, however, were not undertaken, managed, and coordinated systematically in the South African public service. These activities were undertaken sporadically by line function departments for purposes of their annual departmental reports. Some departments were more rigorous than others in this process, while the Public Service Commission (PSC) undertook to monitor and evaluate the South African government’s adherence to a restricted number of principles of good governance that the PSC derived from the Constitution of 1996 (Cloete, 2009).   The concept of a developmental state has been firmly reflected in almost all policy development and the trajectory of government since 2009. The focus on performance management and critical assessment of outcomes and the impact of government programmes through the results-based approach became the hallmark of then President Jacob Zuma’s administration. Both Netshitenzhe (2015) and Gumede (2017:10) allude to the prominence of improving government performance through the adoption of the NDP by the Cabinet and Parliament in 2012 as a development trajectory for the country. The formalisation of monitoring and evaluation capacity and performance agreements to improve accountability throughout the three spheres of government became a seal of political will.   There seems to be a commitment towards improving the quality of service delivery in South Africa. However, typical or relatively accurate indicators of improvements and success are yet to find expression in terms of measurement of policy outcomes. Masombuka and Thani (2023) state that the government policy reviews that have been conducted on the performance of the South African government over the past 25 years reveal the following: the agility, capability, and responsiveness of the state to socio-economic challenges, among others, is questionable in the 25-year review of government performance; the constant changes in political leadership and corruption have impacted the impetus for accountability; dwindling public trust and poor management of administrative interface, strategic and institutional capacity, technical capacity, and organisational culture are persistent challenges for attention in realising the objectives of a developmental state; the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated the weaknesses in the system in terms of bringing to the forefront shortcomings in governance and accountability that manifested in corruption, besides also showing the glaring inequalities that exist.   The question here is, what has become “practice” or what are essentially deemed as strategies or practical measuring methods of the assessment of monitoring and evaluating performance of policy initiatives or progress by government in line with their mandates? Firstly, reform in respect of public expenditure is meant to be spearheaded by the National Treasury through the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. The National Treasury is tasked with regulating financial management across the three spheres of government. In addition, is the development of the departmental strategic and annual plans for accountability on the commitments within the departments of the three levels of government (Masombuka & Thani, 2023).   Secondly, is the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) through the White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service (1995), which focuses on performance management systems, knowledge management, continuous learning, and introduction of monitoring and evaluation. Strengthening intergovernmental relations and the role of leadership in institutionalising monitoring and evaluation as a strategic management function remains a crucial instrument in respect of the three spheres of government. Clear roles, responsibilities, and adequate investment of resources is another prerequisite to comply with principles and values governing public administration, monitoring, and evaluation (Masombuka & Thani, 2023).   It is still a challenge to compare the implementation experiences of the emerging M&E systems in South Africa (discussed above) with those of other countries, due to the different developmental and governance contexts and dynamics, which are often country specific. Until recently, empirical literature tended to have a donor perspective, rather than a government perspective. Where the literature is related to government, the focus tends to be on the project, programme, or sector level rather than from a government-wide perspective (Engela & Ajam, 2010).   Moreover, the M&E framework is a developed-country framework, and some do not recognise that in a developing country additional layers of complexity for the selection, implementation, and success of a local programme may have a serious impact. How, for example, does global economic penetration affect the selection, implementation, and sustainability of social programmes? Who is measuring “development”, the developing country or an agent of the developed world, such as the World Bank? What weight should be assigned to the values of various stakeholders in the developing country versus the international institutions? What possibly inappropriate assumption is the evaluator making about the selection, implementation, and success of a programme? Under what conditions might it be inappropriate to evaluate a social programme in a developing country?   The uniqueness of African M&E systems is that most of them are still in the early phase of development. Africa has taken lessons from countries, like Chile, that have adopted a whole-of-government approach that is centrally driven, focusing on three dimensions: utilisation of M&E information, sustainability, and good quality M&E information (Mackay, 2007). African countries that have developed their M&E systems have also modelled their systems along these three dimensions. However, the approach has proven to be weak, as there are low levels of ownership, especially by ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) (Chirau et al, 2022; Mackay, 2007).   In some African countries – such as Ghana, South Africa, and Tanzania – M&E systems exist in different MDAs and subnational governments, but they work in silos, therefore they are seldom coordinated (Masuku & Ijeoma, 2015:15). Despite M&E capacity strengthening efforts made by these governments, the M&E infrastructure remains biased towards producing monitoring data as the main performance management input and accountability mechanism. Evaluation remains on the periphery. The accountability and overemphasis on monitoring have led to a culture of malicious compliance. There is too much attention paid to measuring inputs and activities without attention to outcome and impact of programmes (Chirau et al, 2022). The above is seemingly the global position. A common issue faced by all countries is capacity – the capacity of evaluators in a country to conduct evaluations and the capacity in government to commission, undertake, manage, and use evaluations. Until training in evaluation becomes more widespread, this will remain a major constraint.   Can governments, NGOs, think tanks use M&E as a tracking tool for oversight and holding leaders accountable?   Different scholars in the field have laid down key considerations for a monitoring and evaluation plan. These factors complete the M&E plan and give better coverage in terms of providing oversight and direction to the project during implementation. These are some of the considerations: financial resources and human capacity to carry out M&E activities (Brignall & Modell, 2000); feasibility, timeline, and ethical considerations (Armstrong & Baron, 2013). These details tend to ask important questions that require the project teams to provide answers that in turn shape and guide implementation.    An understandable monitoring and evaluation strategy is one of the best ways to help think tanks achieve the greatest impact in the most cost-effective way. Yet, measuring the impact and results of a think tank’s work is challenging, as these are often intangible (e.g., building relationships with policymakers, playing a key role in debates or networks, etc.). The ultimate goal is policy change, but this takes a long time and often cannot be attributed to a specific action or organisation, but rather, it is the result of many factors and actors.   Think tanks have become critical in terms of being key stakeholders in the realm of governance across the globe. Various networks of think tanks have been established, with the aim of assisting and aiding government in terms of research. These research networks can play an integral role in the field of monitoring and evaluation. It is suggested that think tanks should aim to do the following when undertaking or conducting M&E work: ensure that their mission and projects address challenges in their area of focus, by having a crystal clear policy influence objective. Think tanks must select their policy influence strategies or plans of action, and how these strategies and/or plans can and will be measured. Lastly, they should ensure that they not only have the buy-in from the relevant stakeholders, but also that they have the requisite resources to achieve results (MERICS, 2023).   In the event that think tanks establish sound or stable monitoring and evaluation plans, and when they carry out changes and improvements based on the lessons from the M&E work that they conduct, these can both assist in them becoming more effective in achieving their objectives and also serve somewhat as an “oversight” mechanism.   To be effective, think tanks must also communicate their findings to a range of stakeholders. The effectiveness of these communication efforts can be monitored and evaluated, and organisations can learn how to improve their communications to achieve greater impact. Think tanks must be able to package their research in a manner that is useful to their governments or stakeholders and easy for them to disseminate the research findings in order for that research to feed into the policy debates meaningfully (MERICS, 2023).   Organisational M&E systems involve implementing effective communication processes that support various strategies. The importance of communication in M&E lies in ensuring that employees have enough information to provide feedback for progress reports related to service delivery. Effective implementation and sustainability of an M&E system requires the development of institutional capacity, encompassing critical technical and human skills (Kusek, Rist & White, 2005). Communication advances coordination, cooperation, and general support tasks, which are crucial for a successful M&E system (Kadel, Ahmad & Basnet, 2020). In addition, clear performance indicators are essential for monitoring and providing information about progress towards achieving goals.   Efforts to provide the above resources must be spearheaded by governments themselves, as these are the essential tools required. Furthermore, municipalities must ensure that managers and staff align their roles with the priorities and objectives outlined in the municipality’s integrated development plan (Van der Waldt, 2018). The organisational challenges include poor alignment with municipalities’ strategic plans, a lack of coordination, poor management, and limited government M&E of these organisations within their jurisdictions (Ngumbela & Mle, 2019). These challenges are caused by a lack of M&E training opportunities and networks for most personnel in government institutions and municipalities, which is considered a significant drawback (Engela & Ajam, 2010). Adequate training is essential for both the custodians of the system and end users (Ile et al, 2012). Once adequate training has been provided, performance agreements can be designed to address the legacy of institutions underperforming. Specifically, adequate training will reduce the lack of accountability that has become characteristic of South Africa’s local government (Van der Westhuizen, 2016).   M&E systems are important in aiding government MDAs to measure the results (outputs, outcomes, and impact) achieved by their respective development policies, programmes, and projects. In reality, although there is an M&E system at the central level, MDAs and local government tend to have their own M&E systems that co-exist within a broader centralised M&E system (Goldman et al, 2012). Both systems provide information on the performance or non-performance of government policies, projects and programmes at the national, sector and local government levels. Importantly, in the process of measuring the results at various levels of outputs, outcomes and impacts, the M&E system should be able to identify what works and what does not, and why (Mackay, 2012).   Monitoring and evaluation systems help improve government performance and help development programmes to achieve their objectives. In so doing, M&E systems provide vital evidence to ensure accountability to citizens, legislatures, and civil society (Mackay, 2012). Sound evidence is equally critical in improving programme planning, budgeting, policymaking, and decision-making. There is evidence that points to the value of developing a system (both an M&E system and evaluation system) and an M&E policy, although one (an M&E system or evaluation system) can come before the other (an M&E policy or evaluation policy). Chirau, Waller and Blaser-Mapitsa (2018) argue that there is a direct link between national evaluation policies and the development of strong national evaluation systems (NESs). Effective evaluation systems are dependent on evaluation policies for framing the purpose of M&E and a delineation of institutional M&E responsibilities.   M&E should be considered as one of several tools governments can use to assess whether public policies and expenditures are achieving their objectives in the most cost-effective manner. If adequately orchestrated with other tools such as audits, regulatory impact assessments, performance budgeting and spending reviews, M&E can prove to be highly impactful sources of information for sound and smart policy and resource allocation decisions (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2023).   An overview of M&E challenges in the context of local government and governments in general   The Local Government Municipal Structures Act of 1998 outlines the establishment of municipal committees tasked with formulating, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the activities and operations of municipal councils and their service delivery to communities. Likewise, the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 is unambiguous about the importance of M&E in local government to the extent that it includes how a municipal council exercises its legislative and executive authority to implement M&E systems. Concerning M&E, Section 11(3) states that a municipal council exercises its legislative and executive authority by monitoring and regulating municipal services, monitoring the impact and effectiveness of any services, policies, programmes, or plans, and establishing and implementing performance management systems. This policy guideline does not prevent or provide any excuses for municipalities not to implement M&E systems under any circumstances (Yekani et al, 2024).   According to the Auditor-General’s reports, there is a widespread lack of financial controls and project monitoring, an ongoing culture of a lack of accountability and tolerance for transgressions, which results in a further regression in audit outcomes in municipalities, making improvements rare – the general trend over the past three years has remained negative. Eight municipalities could not adequately support the information reported in their financial statements and received disclaimed audit opinions (National Treasury, 2020). This evidence highlights the ongoing challenge of inadequate M&E systems for the effectiveness and efficiency of initiatives and interventions at the local government level (Yekani et al, 2024).   Therefore, there is a need to further investigate the challenges associated with implementing M&E systems within municipalities. However, these investigations must not only be carried out when or if a crisis arises. The assessment for where local governments and governments in the global community at large go wrong, or rather, the collection of data by M&E systems must not be a reactionary response.   The main challenges faced by the local authorities can be attributed to various underlying issues. For one, the knowledge, skills, and competence required for those aspiring to perform and those already performing tasks related to M&E of public projects are limited. Municipal officials of the various projects also fail to understand the importance of M&E at local government level. Ultimately, local governments have failed to develop an appropriate institutional M&E system (including M&E plans, indicators, and tools) (Mthethwa & Jili, 2016).   This demonstrates that although much has been achieved in terms of providing services to the majority of South Africans, much is still required to be done in terms of training, workshops, and dialogue on the manner, when, how and what of M&E systems in terms of suitability and implementation at local government level to enhance service delivery. Moreover, the definition of an M&E system requires that such a system be established across provinces to attain effective and efficient service delivery.    Another challenge is that many organisations at the level of local government need to attract and retain highly skilled workers from an increasingly diverse and mobile labour market. Currently, local municipalities are losing suitably qualified workforce due to a host of issues. Proper and effective planning is a critical aspect; the impact of not having capacity, or rather the human resources department within these organisations not planning adequately to attract and retain a diverse and capable workforce for the benefit of the organisation, cannot be overstressed (Mthethwa & Jili, 2016).   Municipalities must ensure that the right people with the right skills are in the right place at the right time, and that they are able to perform their duties successfully to add value to the organisation, for example, by employing people with skills, knowledge, and experience in monitoring and evaluating a project at local government level.   In addition, inadequate financial planning is and has been a constant systematic weakness facing project management in local governments, including most municipalities in South Africa. Projects continue to be abandoned in local governments due to inadequate funds. Unfortunately, the flow of funds cannot be fully guaranteed, especially as municipalities are confronted with fluctuations in world oil prices, inflation, mismanagement, corruption, and failure to explore internal sources of revenue and to use scarce resources (Mthethwa & Jili, 2016).   Mismanagement of funds and corruption hinder successful M&E and the completion of projects at local government level, which in turn leads to dissatisfaction among residents and culminates in violent service delivery protests. A municipality should involve the local community in the planning, initiation, formulation, and execution of projects to ensure their success. Local communities should be carried along at every stage of a project. They should be consulted first, so that the municipality can deliver services according to the people’s preferences and needs. This way, M&E can be utilised as a critical tool to aid effective monitoring with regard to outputs (Mthethwa & Jili, 2016).   The people’s understanding of the environment and support for a project create a moral basis for its success. Project planning should take a bottom-up approach to bring citizens directly into the process of running projects that will improve their quality of life. To some degree, community participation legitimises projects that are meant for the residents and ensures that there is a nexus between the residents being served and their government. When residents have adequate awareness of what projects are being implemented by their government, a relationship is built between the two parties, which leads to the residents becoming interested in participating in the affairs of the government.   Lastly, one of the most fundamental obstacles to successful M&E of projects and effective policy implementation is a lack of expertise. Clearly, knowledge is power: the standard or level of success in the completion of a project depends to a large extent on the amount of accurate information available to local government project managers.   Recommendations: the way forward for entrenching M&E systems   The guiding principles or recommendations discussed hereunder are general. They are applicable to working with a ministry, department, or agency in any country, but with obvious regard for the context or the socio-economic conditions that exist in different countries. Securing political and administrative buy-in and will is crucial to making sure that M&E becomes a valued practice in governance and development practices. To this effect, raising awareness about the value of M&E among high-ranking political and administrative leaders is paramount. The use of political leaders or “champions” can exert significant influence on ministries, departments, agencies, and subnational government, as they are strategically positioned to promote and advocate for institutionalisation of M&E practice in planning, budgeting, policy design, implementation, and general decision-making within governments. Leadership is an integral component. Instrumental, empirical desktop research findings regarding municipalities reveal a lack of leadership support and institutional readiness for change management in the context of M&E. Municipal employees’ perceptions can be very obstructive in some instances, therefore the issue of implementation of M&E needs much change management. Some officials in governments, especially at local level, are so used to and comfortable with their old ways of operating that they are not evolving and do not align themselves with the changing times. Municipal employees should be exposed to new systems and processes. Effective implementation of critical aspects of governance such as M&E systems becomes challenging due to this resistance to change and the organisational culture (Mthethwa & Jili, 2016). Countries that already have established national M&E evaluation systems are key to M&E work and this factor should be part of the criteria when considering which countries to form a working relationship with. Partnerships with local institutions and individuals that are knowledgeable about the country context should be another key criterion when selecting a country to work with. The approaches used must be unique and must make use of the country’s local entities to strengthen their M&E systems. Evaluation capacity development partnerships with government and development partners is crucial in developing networks for capacity and as support infrastructure. Linking monitoring and evaluation with the budget process is a politically sensitive reform. It requires an interface between administrative practices and political support for a joint effort, to ensure that the supply and demand of monitoring and evaluation are accounted for within the existing budgetary framework. This is evident in the current use of monitoring and evaluation, where findings and results are not used to inform planning and budgeting, departmental plans are still fragmented, and instability is apparent in the administrative leadership within the public services. Legal frameworks constitute the key basis for embedding the practice of evaluations across government in a systematic way. Around two-thirds of responding countries have created a legal basis for requiring and enabling policy evaluation. Policy frameworks can give strategic direction to a specific sector or thematic area and can help to support the implementation of quality evaluation. They also have the potential to provide high-level guidance and clarity. The centre of government is the main actor that provides strategic direction for policy evaluation. There must be operational detail, emanating from the national level, that truncates down to other spheres of government. The overall strategic vision and priorities of the national government, and the criteria and procedures to be followed, must be clear and precise in order to achieve those goals. One useful mechanism to ensure clarity and viability of objectives is to break the policy processes into parts. Organisations should not only focus their goals on driving direct policy change but should also try to affect what happens before, throughout, and afterwards. M&E is closely associated with top management, highlighting the need for a shift in management perception. An ongoing issue is that a lack of M&E training opportunities and networks for M&E personnel in most government institutions and ministries is one of the main drawbacks to achieving an effective M&E system. NGOs and think tanks who form partnerships with governments must be clear about what their policy influence objectives are and make sure that these are realistic, given the work that these stakeholders do. This will be drawn from the organisational mission, project proposals, strategic discussions, and should be informed by research into the problem that these stakeholders are trying to address. Conducting a situation analysis, mapping exercise, or diagnostic analysis could inform these objectives. After this exercise is completed, the NGO, think tank, or stakeholder must align themselves to a department or ministry that is in accord with the work that the stakeholder does.   Conclusion   This paper sought to assess whether M&E systems are being utilised effectively by government, more specifically by local government, in their partnerships, bilateral relations, and policy implementation, and to analyse what can be done to strengthen the capacity of government. Its aim was to highlight progress and/or weaknesses in key governance areas. The findings demonstrate that, thus far, governments have not aggressively made the effort to utilise monitoring and evaluation systems as much as they should.   A good starting point for improving this position is the essential task of fully understanding the current status of M&E in the country. The Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results - Anglophone Africa's situation analysis tool looks at the “wider ecosystem of M&E”, which means it looks at the government itself, higher education institutions, civil society organisations (CSOs), Parliament, and voluntary organisations for professional evaluation (VOPEs). The analysis should zoom in on the supply and demand of M&E information, examining strengths and weaknesses, as well as opportunities and threats. The analysis naturally feeds into an M&E capacity strengthening strategy. This strategy then explains the results that need to be achieved for the country to be able to improve its individual, institutional, and systemic M&E capacities, along with the specific approaches to be followed for achieving these capacities. The strategy further indicates who will do what and when, what resources will be required, and where these will come from (Chirau et al, 2022).   Without a clear theory to guide evaluation in developing countries, selection and application of appropriate research designs and methods becomes situational. Arguably, methods are always somewhat situational in that they are dependent upon the country in question, the quality and availability of the data, and the skill of the evaluator.   M&E can support an evidence-informed policymaking approach by bringing an understanding of how existing policies are performing and if they are effective. As such, strong M&E frameworks can support governments in addressing complex policy challenges by increasing the understanding of policy trade-offs and impacts.   However, an adequate supply of trained personnel (including those with both monitoring and technical evaluations skills) is key for the sustainability of monitoring and evaluation systems (Lahey, 2012). Bits of training is not sufficient and should be supplemented by technical assistance, coaching, and mentoring to ensure knowledge and skills acquired through training are put to suitable use.   This is a holistic approach to developing sustainable M&E systems, ensuring an equilibrium between the supply and demand of M&E information and use thereof across the M&E ecosystem of a country – composed of individual and institutional M&E capacities, demand for M&E information by decision-makers, and ultimately, an evaluative culture.   References   Armstrong, M. & Baron, A. 2013. Performance Management: The New Realities. Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development.   Brignall, S. & Modell, S. 2000. An Institutional Perspective on Performance Measurement and Management in the “New Public Sector”, Management Accounting Research, 11(3):281-306.   Chirau, T.J., Waller, C. & Blaser-Mapitsa, C. 2018. The National Evaluation Policy landscape in Africa: A comparison. Johannesburg: Twende Mbele.   Chirau, T., Dlakavu, A. & Masilela, B. 2022. Strengthening Anglophone Africa M&E systems: A CLEAR-AA perspective on guiding principles, challenges and emerging lessons, African Evaluation Journal, 10(1).   Cloete, F. 2009. Evidence-based policy analysis in South Africa: Critical assessment of the emerging governmentwide monitoring and evaluation system, South African Journal of Public Administration, 44(2): 293-311.   Cloete, F. 2017. Evidence-based Policy Making and Policy Evaluation, 3rd International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP3), Singapore, June 28-30.   Engela, R. & Ajam, T. 2010. Implementing a Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation System in South Africa, ECD Working Paper Series, 21.   Goldman, I., Engela, R., Akhalwaya, I., Gasa, N., Leon, B., Mohamed, H. et al. 2012. Establishing a national M&E system in South Africa (English), PREM Notes; no. 21, Special series on the Nuts and Bolts of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). Washington, DC: World Bank.   Gumede, V. 2017. Presidencies and policy in post-apartheid South Africa. Pretoria: Unisa Press.   Hilderbrand, M.E. & Grindle, M.S. 1994. Building Sustainable Capacity: Challenges for the Public Sector, Paper prepared for the United Nations Development Programme, Pilot Study of Capacity Building (INT/92/676). Cambridge.   Ile, I.U., Allen-ILE, C. & Eresia-Eke, C.E. 2012. Monitoring and Evaluation of Policies, Programmes and Projects. South Africa: Van Schaik Publishers.   Intrac. 2016. Outputs, outcomes and impact. [Online] Available at: https://www.intrac.org/app/uploads/2016/06/Monitoring-and-Evaluation-Series-Outcomes-Outputs-and-Impact-7.pdf [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Kadel, I.M., Ahmad, F. & Basnet, N. 2020.  Rethinking monitoring and evaluation practices: Lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic. [Online] Available at: https://www.icimod.org/article/rethinking-monitoring-and-evaluation-practices-lessons-from-the-covid-19-pandemic [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Kusek, J Z., Rist, R.C. & White, E.M. 2005. How Will We Know the Millennium Development Goal Results When We See Them?: Building a Results-based Monitoring and Evaluation System to Give Us the Answers, Evaluation, 11(1): 7-26.   Lahey, R. 2012. The Canadian M&E system, in G. Lopez-Acevedo, P. Krause & K. Mackey (eds.), Building better policies: The nuts and bolts of monitoring and evaluation systems. Washington, DC: World Bank.   Lusthaus, C., Adrien, M. & Perstinger, M. 1999. Capacity Development: Definitions, Issues and Implications for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Development, 35: 1-21.   Mackay, K. 2007. How to Build Monitoring and Evaluation Systems to Support Better Government. Washington DC: World Bank.   Mackay, K. 2012. The Australian Government M&E system, in G. Lopez-Acevedo, P. Krause & K. Mackey (eds.), Building better policies: The nuts and bolts of monitoring and evaluation systems. Washington, DC: World Bank.   Masombuka, S.S.N. & Thani, X.C. 2023. Challenges and Successes of the Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation System, Administratio Publica, 31(3).   Masuku, N. & Ijeoma, E. 2015. A Global Overview of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and its Meaning in the Local Government Context of South Africa, Africa’s Public Service Delivery & Performance Review, 3(2).   Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). 2023. Monitoring, evaluation and learning for think tanks: How to match strategy with objectives for different areas of work. [Online] Available at: https://merics.org/en/think-tank-toolbox/monitoring-evaluation-and-learning-think-tanks-how-match-strategy-objectives [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Mthethwa, R.M. & Jili, N.N. 2016. Challenges in implementing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) : the case of the Mfolozi Municipality, African Journal of Public Affairs, 9(4).   National Treasury. 2020. The State of Local Government Finances and Financial Management as at 30 June 2020, 2019/20 financial year, Analysis Document.   Netshitenzhe, J. 2015. Class dynamics and state transformation in South Africa, Journal of Public Administration, 50(3):549–561.   Ngumbela, X. & Mle, T.R. 2019. Assessing the role of civil society in poverty alleviation: A case study of Amathole district in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa, The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 15(1).   Noltze, M., Köngeter, A., Römling, C. & Hoffmann, D. 2021. Monitoring, evaluation and learning for climate risk management, OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, 92.   Nuguti, E.O. 2009. Understanding Project Monitoring and Evaluation. Nairobi, Kenya: EKON Publishing.   Nyonje, R. O., K. D. Ndunge, & A. S. Mulwa. 2012. Monitoring and Evaluation of Projects and Programs - A Handbook for Students and Practitioners. Nairobi, Kenya: Aura Publishers.   Okafor, A. 2021. Influence of Monitoring and Evaluation System on the Performance of Projects, IJRDO - Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research, 6(8): 34-49.   Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2019. Making development co-operation more effective: How development partners are promoting effective, country-led partnerships, Part II of The Global Partnership 2019 Progress Report. [Online] Available at: https://www.effectivecooperation.org/system/files/2020-06/%5BTitle%5D.pdf [accessed: 13 February 2025]. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2023. Public policy monitoring and evaluation. [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/public-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation.html [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Shapiro, J. N.d. Monitoring and evaluation. [Online] Available at: https://civicus.org/view/media/Monitoring%20and%20Evaluation.pdf [accessed: 13 February 2025].   University of the Western Cape (UWC). N.d. Defining Monitoring and Evaluation, Monitoring and Evaluation for Health Services Improvement I, Unit 2.   University of the Witswatersrand (Wits). N.d. M&E for improved decision-making and project planning. [Online] Available at: https://online.wits.ac.za/blogs/me-for-improved-decision-making [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Valadez, J. & Bamberger, M. 1994. Monitoring and evaluating social programs in developing countries: a handbook for policymakers, managers and researchers. Washington DC: World Bank.   Van der Waldt, G. 2018. Local economic development for urban resilience: The South African experiment, Local Economy, 33(7): 694-709.   Van der Westhuizen, E.J. 2016. Human Resource Management in Government: A South African perspective on theories, politics and processes. South Africa: Juta.   World Bank. N.d. What is monitoring and evaluation? [Online] Available at: https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/what-monitoring-and-evaluation [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Yekani, B., Ngcamu, B. & Pillay, S. 2024. Management and leadership considerations for managing effective monitoring and evaluation systems in South African municipalities, Journal of Local Government Research and Innovation, 5: a154. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Dr Pryah Mahabeer   The transformation of South African higher education, catalyzed by the #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall student protests, called for decolonising educational spaces to address historical inequities for inclusiveness. South Africa’s socioeconomic disparities underscored the urgent need for curriculum transformation to address these pressing societal challenges (Blignaut, 2020; Govender & Naidoo, 2023; Padayachee et al., 2018). The student-led movements exposed the complex challenges of deeply entrenched educational paradigms that have long marginalised African knowledge systems and experience and called for the push for conceptualising, planning, and implementing a decolonised curriculum (Govender & Naidoo, 2023; Padayachee et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the perpetuation of Eurocentric paradigms in curriculum development and implementation presents a significant obstacle to achieving educational justice for historically marginalised populations. While scholarly debates on curriculum decolonisation have become increasingly nuanced, reflecting growing awareness of the intricate relationship between education, equity, and social justice essential for student empowerment and creating an inclusive, contextually relevant educational space. Recent scholarships suggest a concerning decline in decolonisation efforts, attributed somewhat to the longstanding dominance of European hegemony in educational sectors (Govender & Naidoo, 2023).    Decolonising South African education represents a critical step in addressing historical injustices and creating more equitable learning environments through valuing diversity, considering multiple experiences, and complicating the narrative of domination, which requires critically interrogating the dominant Westernised and Eurocentric knowledge systems that privilege specific epistemologies over Indigenous ways of knowing (Lowe, 1996; Kumashiro, 2004; Subedi, 2013; Zembylas, 2018). The challenge lies in dismantling and challenging the pervasive Eurocentric ways of knowing, culture and language that have dominated the South African education sector (Padayachee et al., 2018). The decolonisation of education in South Africa transcends cosmetic changes to curriculum content and demands a comprehensive reconstruction of how knowledge is conceived, validated, and transmitted within educational contexts. As Blignaut (2020) argued, meaningful educational transformation must simultaneously address curriculum content and pedagogical approaches that authentically reflect African ways of knowing and learning, recognising that change must extend to how knowledge is conceptualised and delivered and not merely what is taught. Decolonising education in South Africa requires fundamentally rethinking and reconstructing epistemological models, dismantling Eurocentric knowledge systems, and placing African experiences, perspectives and knowledge systems at the core of teaching, learning, and research, as concluded by Heleta (2016). According to Padayachee et al. (2018), implementing a knowledge-based curriculum empowers students to integrate their experiences and understandings while developing critical skills in understanding and appreciating diverse viewpoints and perspectives.   A nuanced approach to decolonised pedagogy requires carefully balancing indigenous knowledge systems with global epistemologies that involve critically examining colonial and apartheid educational legacies while developing culturally responsive teaching methodologies that validate diverse cultural perspectives and African experiences (Govender & Naidoo, 2023; Padayachee et al., 2018). Mampane, Omidire, and Aluko (2018) advocate for a ‘glocal’ approach that strategically foregrounds Indigenous knowledge while thoughtfully incorporating international worldviews. This perspective aligns with scholarly views that see curriculum decolonisation as a process of broader social transformation rather than a wholesale rejection of Western thought (Chilisa, 2012; Le Grange, 2016; Smith, 1999). That is, disturbing undisputed philosophies and ethics while drawing thoughtfully on valuable Western scholarly practices.   Scholars offer various insights into understanding and implementing a decolonised curriculum. Césaire’s (2000) work emphasises the importance of psychological and intellectual liberation from colonial mindsets, focusing on consciousness and denouncing colonial ideals. Meanwhile, Mbembe (2015, 2016) offers a more integrative approach that centres on African perspectives while maintaining a productive dialogue with Western knowledge systems without rejecting Western ideologies entirely. In other words, an effective higher education curriculum must balance both local context and global perspectives by embracing diverse knowledge systems. “For graduates to be locally and globally responsive (as is required for a sustainable future), perhaps what is needed is university curricula that are epistemically diverse and both locally and globally relevant” (Mbembe 2016 cited in Padayachee et al., 2018, p.291). Laenui (2000) and Smith (1999) provide a structured approach to decolonization. Their work describes a comprehensive process moving through phases of rediscovery, recovery, mourning, dreaming, and commitment, ultimately culminating in concrete action. They acknowledge the psychological and emotional dimensions of decolonisation while providing practical guidance for implementation, recognising that true transformation extends beyond mere academic restructuring (Laenui, 2000; Smith, 1999).   Critical pedagogy also emerged as an important framework for understanding curriculum decolonisation, highlighting the need for students to foster critical thinking skills to engage with diverse knowledge systems, empathy, and question power dynamics and societal structures and injustices, as articulated by Zembylas (2018) and Mbembe (2016). To this effect, Zembylas (2018) offers insights on how humanising pedagogy can be reconstructed with decolonising pedagogy to transform higher education in South Africa, address inequalities, empower students and teachers as agents of change, and create learning environments that challenge existing power structures and promote social consciousness. Further, Mahabeer’s (2018) “re-humanised” approach argues for creating meaningful synergy between Western and Indigenous knowledge systems, prioritising relevance to South African classroom realities while maintaining international academic standards. Her work prioritises local contextual relevance while maintaining global academic competitiveness, positioning curriculum decision-makers as critical change agents. Complementing this approach, the “thinking-feeling entanglement” proposed by Zembylas (2024) offers a promising framework of emotional awareness and analytical thought for nurturing critical thinking skills and social consciousness, enabling students to find their voices as change-makers. As such, facilitating for meaningful transformation through curricula integrating multiple knowledge systems, maintaining academic standards while addressing contextual needs and fostering social awareness.   Implementing a decolonised curriculum requires a comprehensive, interdisciplinary approach that transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries and calls for a more holistic understanding of knowledge that fosters critical thinking and reflects the intricate connections between global issues and local contexts. Maldonado-Torres (2016) emphasised the importance of moving beyond Western epistemological boundaries, while Carvalho & Flórez-Flórez (2014) proposed a decolonial transdisciplinarity that embraces non-Western ways of knowing, feeling, being, and doing. Integrating Indigenous knowledge systems requires transforming the curriculum through critically revising course material to include diverse perspectives, developing and implementing culturally responsive teaching content and methods, acknowledging students’ cultural backgrounds and experiences, preserving and promoting Indigenous languages, challenging power dynamics, and including previously excluded scholarly works (Govender & Naidoo, 2023). This transformative approach would necessitate ongoing collaboration with all stakeholders and continuous professional development for educators to ensure the sustained implementation and evolution of inclusive decolonial practices relevant to the realities of the postcolonial educational context and uncover more improved ways of teaching and learning (Mahabeer, 2021; Padayachee et al., 2018).   Decolonising the curriculum faces practical implementation challenges. As Govender & Naidoo (2023) reveal, critical challenges of implementing decolonised curricula in South Africa are the longstanding European knowledge dominance across educational systems, the limited policy development and implementation of decolonisation strategies, and academic staff’s readiness and resistance to change the curriculum, including the reluctance of some stakeholders to continue the decolonising journey (Govender & Naidoo, 2023). Institutional resistance and stakeholder reluctance often stem from deeply entrenched systems and mindsets, while the need for attitudinal change among academic staff presents ongoing implementation challenges (Govender & Naidoo, 2023; Padayachee et al., 2018). These obstacles are compounded by resource and infrastructure limitations, mainly affecting historically disadvantaged institutions. The complexity of balancing technological integration with cultural sensitivity creates additional layers of challenges, especially in the context of rapid technological advancement and globalisation (Govender & Naidoo, 2023; Padayachee et al., 2018). Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive approach by prioritising professional staff development programmes supported by strong institutional leadership and sustained support systems that facilitate long-term change (Padayachee et al., 2018). Moreover, sustainable development and institutional well-being in implementing an inclusive decolonising process requires a multi-faceted approach that addresses technological integration and fundamental support structures (Mpu & Adu, 2021; Padayachee et al., 2018). Despite calls for decolonising the curriculum in South Africa, Govender and Naidoo (2023) argue that more is necessary at the policy development and implementation level. Regular policy review and adaptation will ensure that decolonial practices remain relevant and practical, while engagement with local communities and stakeholders helps maintain accountability and cultural authenticity (Mpu & Adu, 2021).   Decolonised curriculum development aims to create diverse knowledge and educational experiences that are theoretically rigorous, contextually relevant, and culturally responsive, necessary for sustainable education development for individual, institutional and societal reform and well-being (Padayachee et al., 2018). R ather than merely rejecting Western knowledge, this educational journey requires moving beyond preserving cultural heritage and respecting local knowledge systems, maintaining global competitiveness, helping students understand interconnections between global imperatives and local contexts, and empowering students to share their personal experiences and perspectives in the educational process. It requires empowering students to critically engage and actively respond to emerging complexities such as rising inequalities, disruptions, climate change, global health crises, and perpetuating patriarchal structures (Govender & Naidoo, 2023) . The success of decolonising the curriculum depends on producing graduates who demonstrate theoretical proficiency, are critically aware of social complexities, can contribute to positive social transformation, and actively participate in an increasingly competitive global and changing context. Transforming the curriculum goes beyond mere changes to curriculum content, it represents a fundamental rethinking of how knowledge is produced and implemented, guided by a firm commitment to educational equity and social justice principles. References   Blignaut, S. 2020. Transforming the curriculum for the unique challenges faced by South Africa, Curriculum Perspectives , 41: 27-34.   Carvalho, J.J.D. & Flórez-Flórez, J. 2014. The Meeting of Knowledges: a project for the decolonisation of universities in Latin America, Postcolonial Studies , 17(2): 122-139.   Césaire, A. 2000. Discourse on colonialism . New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.   Chilisa, B. 2012. Indigenous research methodologies . Los Angeles, CA: Sage.   Govender, L. & Naidoo, D. 2023. Decolonial insights for transforming the higher education curriculum in South Africa.  Curriculum Perspectives ,  43 (Suppl 1): 59-71. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41297-023-00200-3   Heleta, S. 2016. Decolonisation of higher education: Dismantling epistemic violence and Eurocentrism in South Africa, Transformation in Higher Education , 1(1):1−8.   Kumashiro, K. K. 2004. Introduction and Part 1. Against Common Sense: Teaching and Learning toward Social Justice . New York, NY: Routledge Falmer.   Le Grange, L. 2016. Decolonising the university curriculum, South African Journal of Higher Education , 30(2): 1-12.   Lowe, L. 1996. Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics . Durham and London: Duke University Press.   Maldonado-Torres, N. 2016. Transdisciplinaridade e decolonialidade, Sociedade E Estado , 31: 75-97.   Mbembe, A. 2015. Decolonising knowledge and the question of the archive . [Online] Available at: https://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/Achille%20Mbembe%20 %20Decolonising%20Knowledge%20and%20the%20Question%20of%20the%20Archive. pdf [accessed: 30 January 2025].   Mbembe, A.J. 2016. Decolonising the university: New directions, Arts and Humanities in Higher Education , 15(1): 29-45.   Mampane, R.M., Omidire, M.F. & Aluko, F.R. 2018. Decolonising Higher Education in Africa: Arriving at a Glocal Solution, South African Journal of Education , 38(4): 1-9.   Mahabeer, P. 2018. Curriculum decision-makers on decolonising the teacher education curriculum, South African Journal of Education , 38(4): 1-13.   Mahabeer, P. 2021. Decolonising the school curriculum in South Africa: Black women teachers’ perspectives, Decolonising curricula and pedagogy in higher education , 97-119.   Mpu, Y. & Adu, E.O. 2021. The challenges of inclusive education and its implementation in schools: The South African perspective, Perspectives in Education , 39(2): 225-238.   Padayachee, K., Matimolane, M. & Ganas, R. 2018. Addressing Curriculum Decolonisation and Education for Sustainable Development through Epistemically Diverse Curricula.  South African Journal of Higher Education  32(6): 288-304. https://doi.org/10.20853/32-6-2986 .   Subedi, B. 2013. Decolonizing the Curriculum for Global Perspectives. Educational Theory , 63 (6): 621–638. doi:10.1111/edth.12045.   Zembylas, M. 2018. Decolonial Possibilities in South African Higher Education: Reconfiguring Humanising Pedagogies As/with Decolonising Pedagogies, South African Journal of Education , 38(4): 1-11. doi:10.15700/saje.v38n4a1699.   Zembylas, M. 2024. Revisiting the notion of critical thinking in higher education: theorizing the thinking-feeling entanglement using affect theory, Teaching in Higher Education , 29(6): 1606-1620. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Dr Wendy Smidt   The call for a decolonised education in South Africa has been a central theme in discussions surrounding the transformation of the country's education system. While the country has made much pr ogress in dismantling the formal structures of apartheid, the effects of colonialism are still present within educational systems (Stein & Andreotti, 2016; Waghid & Meda, 2023). Decolonising education can contribute to a fairer and more inclusive education system, considering the challenges and possibilities involved. But what is the contemporary significance and relevance of decoloniality and how can it foster a more equitable and just learning environment?   In 1996, a wide range of stakeholders, including politicians, civil society organisations, and the general public worked together to establish the South African Constitution, a legal framework outlining the structure and powers of government, as well as the rights and responsibilities of citizens. This marked a significant transition from apartheid to a democratic society. However, despite this new approach, African schools continue to embrace colonial legacies through their policies and practices. To address this issue, Emmanuel et al (2024) argue that it is crucial to decolonise the curriculum and recognise the value of African identities, cultures, and knowledge systems.   This starts with a focus on critical self-awareness, transpersonal growth, and boundary-crossing communication (Smidt, 2023), which also aligns with the goals of decolonisation. Cultivating these inner development skills (Ankrah et al, 2023) can empower individuals to become more effective change agents. In the 21st-century workspace, decolonised education is essential for promoting diversity and inclusion by creating more inclusive and equitable workplaces; fostering innovation by encouraging critical thinking and creativity; building global competence by developing intercultural understanding and communication skills; preparing individuals to address complex global challenges, such as climate change, poverty, and inequality, through education and skill development.   According to Ankrah et al (2023), inner development is a continuous, collective process of inquiry, growth, and learning. It cannot be pursued in isolation but requires a supportive context. By cultivating inner capacities such as wisdom, compassion, and resilience, people can better address the challenges facing them. In this sense, wisdom relates to the quality of having experience, knowledge, and good judgment. It is the ability to make sound decisions based on understanding, insight, and learning from past experiences. It includes a willingness to embrace diversity by perceiving human values and behaviors from multiple perspectives.   ‘Social fields’, which refers to the complex networks of relationships, power dynamics, and cultural practices that shape individual and collective experiences, is a foundational concept (Pomeroy & Herrmann, 2024) helpful both for understanding collective lived experience and for developing methodologies to effect systems change. In the context of decolonising education, social fields are significant because they highlight the interconnectedness of various social, cultural, and political factors that influence educational outcomes. We literally need to know the water we swim in (Pomeroy & Herrmann, 2024).   According to Waghid and Meda (2023) a decolonial approach to global citizenship education (GCE) would enable students to critically analyse their preconceptions, group and individual identities, and perceptions of local and global structures. Their article explores defamiliarisation as a decolonising pedagogical practice in teacher education. By disrupting habitual patterns of cognition, defamiliarisation through art and film encourages pre-service teachers to view the ordinary in new ways, fostering global citizenship.   In her longitudinal arts-based inquiry, performed in a semi-rural South African context, Smidt (2023) advocates for a transpersonal pedagogy – an educational approach that extends beyond individual perspectives to explore multidimensional realities. The inquiry involved nine post-school youths in a non-curricular situation. The evidence (data) consist of semi-structured, open-ended pre-project questionnaires, followed by mid-project reflections, individual short film-productions, artwork and design, and post-project reflections submitted after the community-engaged screening event. Rather than departing from a theoretical framework, this inquiry takes as its starting point a post-qualitative, open methodology, positioning itself in a contested space within academia. Smidt explores the potential of film literacy, as a key component of this pedagogy, and suggests that it involves more than just digital and media skills; it fosters empathy, critical thinking, and a global perspective. ‘Film literacy’ in this inquiry encompasses different dimensions of human communication, transcending language barriers through multimodal media to identify, analyse, interpret, create, and impart information in a clear and powerfully expressive way.   Additionally, as a boundary-crossing competence (Walker & Nocon, 2007:178) within the particular South African context, in this inquiry, film literacy in a non-formal, post-school context is understood to facilitate communication and cooperation across disciplines, culturally defined boundaries, and between communities of practice-members (Wenger, 1998; Fox, 2011:70). By integrating film literacy into education, learners can be equipped with the essential skills and mindset needed to navigate the 21st-century workplace.   The concept of social fields (Pomeroy & Herrmann, 2024) can significantly influence our understanding of decolonisation in both continuous professional development (CPD) and researcher awareness. In the arts-based inquiry, Smidt (2023) deliberately moves away from traditional, often colonial, approaches to knowledge production and analysis. It involves not using terms such as ‘data’, ‘analysis’, and ‘decolonisation’, and finding alternative ways to explore and communicate the findings that have the potential to make sense when implemented in other contexts. A decolonial approach to education and research further relates to often working in contexts that are not receptive to our differences in exploring alternative ways of knowing and doing.   Film literacy can thus be a powerful tool for decolonisation by providing a platform for marginalised voices to be heard and understood. Through storytelling, film-making can challenge dominant narratives and promote alternative perspectives. It helps individuals to become media literate, enabling them to critically evaluate the information they consume and produce. By fostering critical thinking and empathy, film literacy can help individuals develop more nuanced understandings of history and culture.   In practice, implementing a decolonised education to empower South African youth in a rapidly changing world, where foundational knowledge and skills are constantly evolving, requires a systemic transformation (Karsten et al, 2020; Smidt, 2023). This process includes changes in curriculum, pedagogy, and teacher training informed by research and innovation in both formal and informal education (Petranová et al, 2017; Adams et al, 2021; Smidt, 2023). Similarly, in Africa “there are serious difficulties inherent in implementing the comprehensive, multifaceted educational policy reforms being proposed by the international community ... Even if the time, funds, and other resources had been adequate [which they never were] however, it is unlikely the reforms would have been implemented as planned” (Moulton et al, 2002: 2, 210).   Relating these understandings to real-life situations, the potential of film literacy to act as a catalyst for transpersonal growth and societal change is directly relevant to decolonising education due to its potential to challenge dominant narratives by encouraging critical thinking and media literacy, enabling individuals to question and challenge dominant narratives, often rooted in colonial ideologies. Additionally, by analysing and interpreting films, learners can identify and deconstruct power structures and systemic inequalities. It also amplifies marginalised voices by providing a platform for those voices to be heard and understood. Furthermore, by creating and sharing films, marginalised communities can challenge stereotypes, reclaim their narratives, and promote cultural diversity. It fosters empathy and inter-cultural understanding by exposing learners to diverse perspectives and experiences. Also, by engaging with films from different cultures, learners can develop intercultural understanding and challenge ethnocentric views. And lastly, it promotes social justice and activism by raising awareness of social issues and mobilising communities, enabling learners to identify social injustices and develop strategies for addressing them. By integrating film literacy into decolonised education, learners can be empowered to become critical thinkers, active citizens, and agents of social change. Current education in South Africa often reflects colonial influences, such as a Eurocentric curriculum and standardised testing. A decolonised education would prioritise a more inclusive and culturally relevant curriculum. It would also emphasise critical thinking, problem-solving, and creativity. The current South African education model is disconnected from the realities of young people (Smidt, 2023: 79). This disconnect arises from the lack of involvement of stakeholders, policymakers, and curriculum planners in teaching and learning processes.   To address this, it is suggested that critical pedagogy re-imagine power dynamics and the role of continuous learning in the 21st century. By challenging dominant ideologies and practices, critical pedagogy can empower learners to become agents of social change and transformation. In the context of management learning and education, critical pedagogy, which challenges dominant ideologies and power structures, can address this issue. It promotes critical reflection and problem-solving, encouraging students to engage with moral and ethical issues. This approach can help develop responsible and ethical leaders. By focusing on critical reflection and problem-solving, critical pedagogy can empower students to become responsible leaders who can navigate complex social and ethical issues.   The specific meaning and implementation of decolonialisation may vary depending on different perspectives and contexts. Therefore, it is important to engage in open dialogue and collaboration to develop a shared vision for a decolonised education. By addressing these points, a response to the dialogue can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the role of education in decolonisation and the potential of film literacy as a tool for social change. References   Adams, S., Farrelly, T.A. & Holland, J. 2021. Non-formal education for sustainable development: A case study of the ‘Children in the wilderness’ eco-club programme in the Zambezi region, Journal of Education for Sustainable Development , 14(2): 117-139.   Adefila, A., Teixeira, R. V., Morini, L., Garcia, M. L. T., Delboni, T.M.Z.G.F., Spolander, G. & Khalil-Babatunde, M. 2021. Higher education decolonisation: #Whose voices and their geographical locations?  Globalisation, Societies and Education , 20(3): 262-276.   Akinmolayan, E.S., Hingston, C.A., Akpan, U.J. & Arise, O.A. 2024. ‘Towards decolonisation of primary school education in South Africa’, South African Journal of Childhood Education,  14(1): a1440.   Ankrah, D., Bristow, D., Hires, D. & Henriksson, J.A. 2023. Inner Development Goals: from inner growth to outer change, Field Actions Science Reports , Special Issue 25: 82-87.    Fox, N. J. 2011. Boundary objects, social meanings and the success of new technologies, Sociology , 45(1): 70-85.   Karsten, I., van der Merwe, M., & Steenekamp, K. 2020. Empowering accounting students to enhance the self-determination skills demanded by the Fourth Industrial Revolution, South African Journal of Higher Education , 34(2): 36-58.   Moulton, J., Mundy, K., Welmond, M. & Williams, J. 2002. Education Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa: Paradigm Lost? Westport: Praeger.   Petranová, D., Hossová, M. & Velicky, P. 2017. Current development trends of media literacy in European Union Countries, Communication Today , 8(1).   Pomeroy, E. & Herrmann, L. 2024. Social Fields: Knowing the Water We Swim in, The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science .   Smidt, W. 2023. The use of film literacy in the development of critical self-awareness and transpersonal growth amongst a group of post-school youth . Thesis (D.Ed.). Cape Peninsula University of Technology, 328 pages.   Smidt, W. & Waghid, Z. 2024. Making short films is a powerful way to learn job skills: 5 ways it prepares students for work.  [Online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/making-short-films-is-a-powerful-way-to-learn-job-skills-5-ways-it-prepares-students-for-work-224417 [accessed: 30 January 2025].   Stein, S. & Andreotti, V.D.O. 2016. Decolonisation and higher education, In M. Peters (Ed.), Encyclopedia of educational philosophy and theory . Singapore: Springer.   Waghid, Z. & Meda, L. 2023. Defamiliarization in advancing a decolonial approach to global citizenship education, Prospects.   Walker, D. & Nocon, H. 2007. Boundary-crossing competence: Theoretical considerations and educational design, Mind, Culture, and Activity, 14: 178-195.   Wenger, E. 1998. Communities of practice: Learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Articles Click on the article title below to read: Broader challenges in the decoloniality of being, knowledge and power in Africa Prof Dr Melha Rout Biel Crafting urban equality through grassroots critical pedagogies: Weave, sentipensar, mobilize, reverberate, emancipate Adriana Allen, Julia Wesely, Paola Blanes, Florencia Brandolini, Mariana Enet, Rodrigo Faria G. Iacovini, Rosario Fassina, Bahía Flores Pacheco, Graciela Medina, Alejandro Muniz, Soledad Pérez, Silsa Pineda, Marilyn Reina, Luz Amparo Sánchez Medina, and Juan Xavier How China can accelerate an African and South African green economy and technology expansion, and low-carbon development Daryl Swanepoel Monitoring and evaluation systems: An underrated resource in strengthening effectiveness of governance on a global scale Nondumiso Alice Sithole Decolonised education: A collection of Essays   ESSAY 1: Re-framing narratives: Exploring the transformative potential of short film-making Dr Wendy Smidt ESSAY 2: Reimagining Education in South Africa: Decolonising the Curriculum for Equity and Inclusion Dr Pryah Mahabeer ESSAY 3: Decolonising Education in South Africa: Reclaiming the Dustbin of African History Dr Oscar Koopman & Dr Karen Koopman ESSAY 4: Moving the Decolonising Education Imperative Productively Forward: A Framework for Curriculum Knowledge Prof Aslam Fataar

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Dr Oscar Koopman & Dr Karen Koopman Throughout history, two contrasting traditions in education have always unfolded. The first – “instrumental in nature” – positioning education as a tool serving the needs of governance, political influence, and economic demands (Bobbit, 1919; Tyler, 1949). The second – “education” in its purest sense – embracing an open, deep, exploratory engagement between teacher and learner (Murray, 1999).    While pedagogy often focuses on specific outcomes, true education encourages inquiry without a predetermined end. Like a genuine conversation where the direction and outcome remain unknown, the educational experience resists a single measure, allowing learning to unfold naturally through the shared space of teacher and learner. When framed as pedagogy, however, learning becomes something measurable, evaluated by its capacity to fulfil particular social, political, or economic goals. This dynamic suggests an enduring tension, those who advocate for true education must continually defend it against the utilitarian drive of pedagogy.    Historically, proponents of true education – who seek to cultivate free thought that results in inner freedom, critical reflection, self-awareness and personal transformation, who do not see education as a pathway for career readiness or economic gain – faced significant challenges (as seen during the #Fallist movement in 2015). To revive the call for a true educational experience for every learner and to deal with the shadow of hundreds of years of alienating colonialism, today there is a passionate and hopeful call to sweep away the shackles of any remnants of foreign dominance and control over our education system.    Of course, it has not been enough to replace the external and more obvious oppressive institutions the colonisers imposed here. In Koopman and Koopman’s (2023) book titled, Decolonising the South African University: Towards Curriculum as Self-Authentication , Jeffrey Beyer (2023) uses a powerful metaphor in the foreword to caution against the limitations of superficial or symbolic change. He writes, “a struggling business does not hope to renew itself and begin to thrive by replacing the sign on the shop door with the new owner’s name and then proceeding to sell the same goods in the same way” (p. i). This metaphor speaks directly to South Africa’s challenge over the last three decades with its education system post-apartheid.   For decades, South Africa sought to reform its educational institutions by making structural and symbolic changes, such as renaming schools, universities, and departments, or revising curricula to reflect more inclusive, democratic ideals. However, despite these efforts, the underlying content, teaching methods, and philosophical foundations often remained deeply rooted in colonial paradigms.   This approach, while well-intentioned, was like putting a new label on the same old product, without fundamentally transforming the ideas, approaches, and values embedded within the curriculum – which continued to largely emphasise Eurocentric knowledge, prioritising Western theories and perspectives while marginalising African indigenous knowledge systems, languages, and ways of knowing. This limited the ability of South African education to truly “thrive” as a means of self-authentication, as it left students disconnected from their cultural heritage and identities.   To genuinely decolonise the curriculum, South Africa needs more than a new sign on the door; it requires a rethinking of the “goods” themselves. This means developing curricula that draw on African epistemologies, prioritise African languages and histories, and cultivate a sense of belonging and self-worth in students. Revisit and explore the deeper regions of their personal experience and culture – to reimagine and embody a way of being that has greater fidelity to the wisdom of history. This reimagining needs to be carried out in all regions of the personal psyche and the larger social milieu. Only by transforming the essence of what is taught and how it is taught can South African education move from superficial changes to substantive ones that empower students to see themselves authentically reflected in their education.   This leads to the question: If the country’s universities claim to be African Universities, but are subjected to a curriculum and its associated pedagogies that is almost entirely Western in nature, what is African about them?   Where is the cultural capital in their learning spaces or the strong African values, traditions and ethos that have a deeply held interconnectedness with nature from which they derive their epistemologies and ontologies?   According to the decolonial scholar and philosopher Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ndlovu, it lies in the “dustbin of history” with “those crucial thinkers who provided important concepts to understand the world we live in but who, due to epistemic racism, have been ignored and considered ‘inferior thinkers’ in Westernised universities” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ndlovu, 2022).   But where is this “dustbin of history”, and how can the knowledge it contains be accessed? It is one thing to critique the dehumanising legacy of Western colonialism on African education, but it is another challenge altogether to bring forward transformative ideas that disrupt the deep-rooted Western paradigms dominating South Africa’s classrooms. As Mbembe (2016) emphasises, the real work lies here: in creating a meaningful rupture in the current frameworks of knowledge. To effectively pursue decolonisation, he encourages academics to reimagine what alternative models to the Eurocentric academic structures might look like, models that affirm African perspectives, values, and methodologies as foundational rather than peripheral.   Therefore, to disrupt the confines of canonical Western knowledge, there must be a revival and reclamation of what Mbembe calls the “dustbin of history”, where “the West” has discarded the profound ideas of thinkers like Mbembe (1974; 2001), Wa Thiong’o (1986), Nkrumah (1970), Fanon (1967), Nabudere (2011), and other postcolonial scholars and indigenous practitioners. It is the philosophical insights of these scholars, along with the wealth of indigenous knowledge and its practical applications – knowledge that has been deeply inscribed in students’ minds since their “first birth” – that hold the power to decolonise and liberate their minds and bodies.   This “dustbin knowledge” can be rediscovered in the lived experiences and cultural wisdom embedded within the bodies of students during their “first birth” as children, when they were nurtured and taught through the lens of their cultural heritage. This equips them with unique knowledge, creative problem-solving abilities, and the resilience to face future challenges. In this process, children develop adaptive solutions to life’s obstacles in ways that do not rely on set methodologies or rigid procedures. Rather, their learning is absorbed into the very fabric of their beings, becoming inscribed within their connective tissues and traveling through complex neurological pathways. This embodied scientific knowledge – rooted in cultural experience and personal engagement with the world – represents an invaluable resource for decolonisation and offers a pathway to authentic, holistic understanding that Westernised curricula often fail to address.    Colonisation introduced what could be seen as a “second birth”, an imposed identity that sought to overwrite indigenous ways of knowing. However, through decolonisation, it now becomes the responsibility of teachers to facilitate a “third birth”, where learners/students can reconnect with their African identities and affirm the legitimacy of this so-called “dustbin” knowledge. This third birth necessitates the thoughtful integration of Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) into school/university curricula – not as a passing trend, but as an essential rebirth that honours and revitalises African identity. By reclaiming and reinstating what has always held value for learners/students, a process is enacted not rooted in colonial origins, but in a deep reclamation of the self. This journey allows students to rediscover their own meaning and purpose, fostering an understanding of their true existence and becoming. So, how do teachers facilitate this third birth successfully? By using an ubuntu-conscious approach, a teacher seeks to foster an inclusive and reflective classroom environment where learners/students are encouraged to question, resist, and engage in productive opposition to the teacher and/or the content material. This approach goes beyond delivering abstract knowledge from textbooks disconnected from students’ lived realities. Instead, it encourages students to critique materials through their own beliefs and cultural perspectives, engaging their sense of self in the process. By inviting students to explore the values and worldviews rooted in their backgrounds, the teacher sets the foundation for dismantling Western-centric knowledge systems and promotes deep learning anchored in self-awareness and relationality.   To disrupt dominant Western paradigms and their reliance on abstract, predetermined knowledge, the ubuntu-conscious teacher   emphasises self-consciousness, drawing on a student’s connection to the world around them. This includes spiritual awareness, which encompasses both personal beliefs and the broader cultural practices connecting individuals to higher beings, the environment, and community life. Encouraging students to explore concepts such as porosity (how they identify with the world outside themselves) and transluminality (the intersection of internal and external perceptions that shape their consciousness) in order to promote a deeper awareness of their place in the world.   Acknowledging the diverse perspectives within any cultural group, this approach values the unique experiences that students bring of their lives – experiences that resonate with what ethno-cosmologists refer to as cosmological sagacity. This concept considers the insights and wisdom of not only respected sages but also everyday members of indigenous communities, capturing the essence of lived experience that shapes personal understanding within a cultural context.   Encouraging self-consciousness in students is an essential step towards achieving what Mbembe (2016) describes as “restorative epistemic justice”. This deep education requires “deep time” and “deep thinking” and moves away from superficial, standardised knowledge toward engagement with fundamental aspects of life such as joy, sorrow, community, and connection with nature. A critical component of this deep learning is guiding students to reflect on the essence of being human, which includes understanding their own significance and agency within their communities. In essence, the goal of ubuntu-conscious   pedagogy is to create space for students to access and reconnect with culturally grounded knowledge that may otherwise be dismissed in favour of Western dogma.   The cultivation of self-consciousness within ubuntu pedagogy also aims to develop students’ critical, independent thinking by introducing them to multiple perspectives and ideologies. Rather than reinforcing established norms, students are encouraged to question and engage with differing viewpoints. Through discussions that include divergent voices and perspectives, students begin to see beyond their initial assumptions, developing insights into why they believe and act as they do. This reflective practice, known as redemptive cosmology, involves examining personal behaviours and actions in ways that may be beneficial or harmful to others in the community. Such self-reflection can be transformative, opening students to new, culturally resonant ways of understanding and being.   An ubuntu-conscious   teacher must also be familiar with the lived realities and cultural practices of the communities from which their students come. This cultural understanding helps to validate or challenge students' perspectives on critical issues within their communities, contributing to a richer, more informed dialogue in the classroom. A meaningful way to build this cultural knowledge is through university-community partnerships. These partnerships encourage inter-epistemological dialogue, allowing academics to learn from practitioners and community members. Such collaborations and engagements generate deep thinking and renewed perspectives, allowing educators to gain insight into cultural beliefs, traditional practices, and dispel myths that may shape students’ understandings.   These partnerships foster discussions that bring epistemic restorative justice into the classroom. When students see that their lived experiences and cultural practices are respected as valid sources of knowledge, it affirms their identities and promotes a deeper connection with the learning process. This culturally integrated approach allows students to move beyond the imposition of colonial knowledge systems and toward a decolonised, authentic understanding of self and community. Ubuntu-conscious   pedagogy, therefore, serves not only to educate but to heal and empower by valuing the whole person and the cultural wisdom they carry.   References   Fanon, F. 1967.  Black skin, white mask . New York: Grove Press.   Mbembe, A. 2001.  On the postcolony . US: University of California Press.   Mbembe, A. 2016. Decolonising the university: New directions,  Arts and Humanities in Higher Education, 15(1): 29-45.   Nabudere, D.W. 2011. Archie Mafeje: Scholar, activist and thinker . Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.   Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. & Ndlovu, M. 2022. Introduction – Marxism and decolonisation in the 21st century, In S.J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni & M. Ndlovu (Eds.), Marxism and decolonisation in the 21st century: Living theories and true ideas . UK: Routledge.   Nkrumah, K. 1970.  Consciencism: Philosophy and ideology for decolonisation . Africa: Panaf.   Wa Thiong’o, N. 2009.  Something torn and new: An African renaissance . UK: Routledge. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Prof Aslam Fataar   The movement to decolonise education has become a pressing concern for those critically engaged with the nature and purpose of university and school curricula. The decolonisation call echoes the intellectual currents and shifts of the 1950s and 1960s on the African continent, when many African countries gained independence from European colonial rule.   Those few decades led to a revolution in the understanding of Africa, however its impetus was thwarted by the political authoritarianism and economic decay of the post-independence period, which was particularly destructive for Africa's universities. The movement towards decolonisation has recently gained traction once more in challenging the entrenched dominance of Eurocentric knowledge systems in higher education. At its heart is a call for inclusivity and the centring of decolonial and Africa-centred epistemologies within university and school knowledge frameworks.   Students have advocated for an all-inclusive approach to inform curriculum reform, urging that decoloniality and Africa-centredness should form the foundation of educational knowledge. This impulse to decolonise education has generated significant discourse, reflected in academic scholarship and popular media. The #RhodesMustFall Movement of 2015, where groups of students and staff members mobilised for urgent action against institutional racism, catapulted South Africa’s decolonisation and Africanisation agenda forward and inspired the emergence of allied student movements at other universities and around the world.  However, in order to genuinely and effectively respond to these calls, there first needs to be an exploration of what the epistemological underpinnings of decoloniality are and how its principles can guide curriculum knowledge selection within universities.   Universities and schools are intricate systems comprising diverse knowledge domains – disciplinary, applied, vocational, and professional – all of which have distinct structures and logics. Understanding these structures provides the basis for exploring how a decolonial approach can inform curriculum reform. A conceptual toolkit or ‘educational knowledge approach to curriculum selection’ is useful here. To develop this framework, there are two theoretical resources that have traditionally been seen as incommensurate: the decoloniality literature and social realist approaches to educational knowledge (see Fataar 2022).   Within this framework, there are three interconnected parts. First, decoloniality critiques the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being, emphasising the colonial subjugation of knowledge systems through epistemic violence. This critique underscores the centrality of race in colonial epistemology (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013) and advocates for cognitive justice: the radical expansion and pluralisation of the Western-dominated knowledge canon. This entails recognising and incorporating subaltern and excluded epistemologies (Fataar & Subreenduth, 2015). Decoloniality calls for epistemic openness, fostering intercultural education and embracing the diverse ways of knowing that define humanity.   Decolonialising education favours an intercultural understanding of heterodox forms of being human. All knowledge forms have to be brought into play in an intercultural education that promotes epistemic openness to the knowledge of all human beings. This inclusive approach to knowledge puts paid to the idea that one person’s knowledge system is superior to another’s. Despite accusations of being caught up in 'obsolete' knowledge of the past, decoloniality is in fact focused on the complex challenges that characterise our 'posthuman' condition.   Questions about emerging life forms in the wake of climate change, artificial intelligence, and technological innovation take centre stage in their dynamic interaction with decoloniality. The call for decolonising education is thus nothing less than the full incorporation of all of humanity's knowledge systems, past, present, and in anticipation of future knowledge constellations, into the knowledge selection systems of schools and universities. However, not all knowledge can logically be included in the curriculum. Knowledge selection is required through the contingent curriculum processes of specific university and school programmes, curricula and modules.   The second part of the framework is based on the view that decolonising education advances three essential curriculum claims: centring decolonial epistemology knowledge – a comprehensive ecologies of knowledges approach (Santos, 2014) challenges Eurocentric dominance and fosters epistemic plurality; knowledge and identity – decoloniality seeks to restore the dignity of subjugated peoples, recognise their knowledge traditions and identities and unlock their full human potential; and knowledge relevance and contextualisation – this claim emphasises making epistemological connections between curriculum content and people's contextually contingent lived realities, indigenous knowledge systems, languages, and ways of knowing (Cooper & Morrell, 2014). The third aspect turns to social realist theories, which offer valuable tools for curriculum selection. Social realism emphasises the conceptual schemes that structure disciplines, distinguishing between vertical knowledge structures (e.g., physics and chemistry) with tightly linked concepts and horizontal knowledge structures (e.g., sociology and political science) with more segmental conceptual arrangements. While these structures are distinct, both provide spaces for integrating decolonial principles.   For instance, disciplines with horizontal structures – such as sociology and journalism – can incorporate diverse theoretical perspectives to foster inclusivity and robust social science (Haraway, 1988). Conversely, decolonising vertical structures in science can involve acknowledging the historical contributions of non-Western epistemologies, such as Arab and Indian contributions to mathematics, African contributions to astronomy, and Asian medical traditions. This approach aligns with Santos's (2015) internal and external plurality concepts, emphasising the interplay of scientific and non-scientific knowledge over time.   Decolonising the humanities and social sciences would incorporate insights from figures like Ibn Khaldun, whose concept of ‘asabiyyah’ – an Islamic term referring to the deep sense of group connection and solidarity that can be felt between people in rural and urban contexts – predates Western theories of social structures, social cohesion or ubuntu-inspired philosophies that foreground African cosmologies (Alatas, 2006; Letseka, 2013). Similarly, history curricula could challenge Eurocentric periodisations by exploring multiple models of modernity and their global intersections, drawing on thinkers like Enrique Dussel and his notion of transmodernity, which celebrates epistemic diversity without collapsing into relativism (Grosfoguel, 2013).   In professional and vocational fields, disciplines such as design provide a clear case for contextual relevance. Design curricula can integrate Africa-centred aesthetics, languages, and architectures, demonstrating how knowledge structures can draw meaningfully from lived contexts. Similarly, applied disciplines like engineering and law can incorporate decolonial principles by emphasising their relevance to African contexts while respecting their internal conceptual logics.   The different academic fields can thoughtfully choose curriculum content. But, to make education relevant and inclusive, two main factors must be considered. First, how closely is the knowledge tied to real-world situations? Second, how well does it connect to other ideas within that field?   For example, subjects like design and fine arts are readily connected to real-world contexts, making them a good fit for including ideas from decolonial thinking. These subjects can integrate diverse perspectives and experiences more easily because they often involve solving practical problems or responding to specific cultural or social needs. In design, students might engage with local traditions, alternative cultural perspectives, or sustainability practices, making bringing in knowledge from different backgrounds and contexts relatively easy. In art, students engage with the imagery and symbols that surround us all, giving them a natural platform from which to mirror and respond to the current status quo visually in new, thought-provoking ways.     On the other hand, subjects like engineering are often focused on technical concepts and high requirements for internal conceptual consistency within the field itself. This does not mean engineering cannot incorporate broader contextual perspectives, but it requires more deliberate adjustments. For example, engineering programmes might include case studies or projects that highlight the social impact of technology or explore solutions relevant to underserved communities. By doing so, they can bring in a sense of context that aligns with decolonial aims without losing the strong conceptual structure needed for working in these applied technical fields.   Ultimately, the idea is to create a curriculum that balances each discipline's specific needs and strengths with a commitment to inclusion. There is value in intentionally selecting content that enriches students' understanding of diverse ways of knowing, even in fields that might initially seem distant from these concerns.   Incorporating a decolonial approach into university curricula requires nuanced, context-sensitive strategies. By understanding the dynamic interplay between context and concepts in specific disciplines, universities can create curricula that embody decoloniality principles and Africa-centred relevance. This process is neither straightforward nor exhaustive, but it is essential for constructing knowledge systems that reflect the richness and plurality of human experience. The work ahead demands intellectual rigour, institutional commitment, and ongoing dialogue across diverse knowledge traditions. References   Alatas, F. 2006. Ibn Khaldun and contemporary Sociology, International Sociology , 21(6): 782-795.   Brennan, M. 2017. Struggles for teacher education in the age of the Anthropocene, Journal of Education , 69: 43-65.   Cooper, D. & Morrell, R. (eds). 2014. Africa-Centred Knowledge: Crossing Fields & Worlds . Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey.   Fataar, A. & Subreenduth, S. 2015. The search for ecologies of knowledge in the encounter with African epistemicide in South African education, South African Journal of Higher Education , 29(2): 106-121.   Fataar, A. 2022, Pursuing decolonial knowledge building in South African higher education. In Hlatswayo, M, Adendorf, H, Blackie, M, Fataar, A, and Maluleke P. (eds), Decoloniality and Knowledge Building in South Africa. (Routledge, London).   Grosfoguel, R. 2013. The Structure of Knowledge in Westernised Universities: Epistemic Racism / Sexism and the Four Genocides / Epistemicides of the Long 16th Century, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge , XI(1): 73–89.   Letseka, M. 2013. Educating for Ubuntu/Botho: Lessons from Basotho Indigenous Education, Open Journal of Philosophy , 3(2): 337-344.   Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2013. Why decoloniality in the 21st century? The Thinker , 48: 10-15.   Santos, B. 2014. Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide . Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Daryl Swanepoel   Abstract   Green energy, low-carbon development and green technology offer economic opportunities for South Africa and African countries, which have abundant potential for renewable energy generation. However, the scale and pace of investment in green energy in Africa is sorely inadequate. Inconsistent policies, inefficient public services, corruption and lack of rule of law all undermine domestic private and international development finance involvement in green projects. Limited access to finance, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient government incentives for the private sector, households and foreign investors, also deter new investors. Thirty of the world’s 40 most climate vulnerable countries are in Africa, yet Africa emits only 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Unless Africa responds effectively to climate change, up to 118 million people will live in abject poverty by 2030.   South Africa and Africa should look to China for lessons on the way forward. China is the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions by volume but now produces most of the world’s renewable energy. China expanded its renewable energy capacity with astonishing speed and scale. The country’s industrial policy – based on a pillar of world-class infrastructure suitable for shipping goods anywhere in the world – turned China into a global giant manufacturer of electric vehicles. Partnering with China would open up many opportunities for both parties to boost their green economies and technologies, and low-carbon development – together preparing for what will surely be more stormy weather ahead.   Introduction   Green energy, low-carbon development and green technology offer economic opportunities for South Africa and African countries.   They can drive economic growth, create jobs and reduce poverty through the creation of new manufacturing industries, the development of new technologies, the development of a green economy, and the expansion of infrastructure, agriculture and ecotourism (Biswas & Yila, 2022).   South Africa and Africa have abundant potential for renewable energy generation, and not only for their own consumption. However, the scale and pace of investment in green energy in Africa is inadequate. South Africa and Africa’s transition to a green economy must be secured in such a way that it lifts inclusive economic growth, increases development and expands industrialisation.   Developed countries such as Denmark – which generates 57% of its power from wind energy – have energy mixes that are dominated by renewable energy, but still rely on fossil fuels, either for baseload power, the transport industry or for heavy export industries.   African countries are also struggling to source funding to address losses and damages linked to climate change. It is estimated that developing countries, including those in Africa, need at least US$100 billion a year to adequately finance a Loss and Damage Fund aimed at compensating them for such losses and damages (Kabukuru, 2023).   Regional power pools, whether through renewable energy or gas, are critical to boost individual country power grids. This will require power to be traded between countries, and so avoid energy shortages or surpluses sitting idle.   But there are many obstacles getting in the way of progress. Inconsistent policies and regulations in South Africa and other African countries, inefficient public services, high levels of corruption and lack of rule of law undermine domestic private and international development finance involvement in green projects.   Limited access to finance and insufficient government incentives for the private sector, households and foreign investors, deter green investments. South Africa and African countries also have inadequate infrastructure for green projects, which hinders delivery and puts off new investors. South Africa and almost all African countries need to upgrade and expand their existing grid infrastructure, while building new renewable energy generation capacity.   Foreign businesses in Africa often do not implement green practices, as there is largely a lack of enforcement in these countries. Whereas local African businesses are often simply not aware of the benefits of green practices, nor do they have the capacity to implement them, nor are there, in many instances, government incentives to do so (UNDP, 2024).   South Africa and Africa could become world leaders in motoring the green economy, if they set appropriate policies and regulations, muster up the political will to push for green energy and secure the requisite investments.   However, South Africa and African countries lack public funds to finance the green economy and low-carbon development. There is also a lack of funding for countries to mitigate against and adapt to climate change. Grant funding is critical for this. Development finance, private finance, and public-private finance is critical to achieve the green economy goals.   James Murombedzi, head of the Addis Ababa-based African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC), says that Africa will have to explore innovative private sector financing structures such as debt-for-nature and debt-for-climate swaps to overcome the climate financial gap. At the African Climate Summit, African leaders expressed their frustrations with the industrialised countries’ inability to honour their commitments to provide adequate climate finance.    The route to climate change mitigation is clear. The International Energy Authority’s (IEA) Roadmap to Net Zero by 2050 , first published in May 2021, outlined how the world can reduce global warming to 1.5°C. It says the world must reduce use of fossil fuels, double energy efficiency, and increase and expand the range of clean energy technologies. The IEA says tripling global installed renewable power capacity, such as solar and wind, by the end of the current decade is the most important lever to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.   Africa disproportionately impacted by climate change   The Paris Agreement’s goal is to curb global warming to 1.5˚C. However, these targets are far off. Africa emits only 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions, and yet, the continent is disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of climate change – with temperature rises higher than the global average (Climate Adaptation Platform, 2024).   A 2024 report by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) shows that 2023 was the warmest year globally on record. The report shows that the three major greenhouse gases – carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide – reached a new record in 2022. It says ocean warming continues to increase, with the ocean heat content at a historic high in 2023.   The report notes that as the ocean absorbs a quarter of annual human-caused emissions, increasing emissions also decreases pH, a process known as “ocean acidification”. This affects organisms and ecosystem services, including food security, by reducing biodiversity, degrading habitats, and endangering fisheries and aquaculture.   As a result, the WMO report reveals that African countries are losing 2-5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to climate change. Many of these countries set aside 9% of their budget to respond to climate extremes. The cost of climate adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa is very high, estimated to be between US$30-50 billion annually over the next decade, representing 2-3% of their GDP.   Unless Africa responds effectively to climate change, up to 118 million people will live in abject poverty – living on less than US$1.90 per day by 2030 – and will be exposed to drought, floods, and other extreme weather conditions, the report says. In fact, “between 1970 and 2021, Africa accounted for 35% of weather, climate, and water-related fatalities” (WMO, 2024).   In 2023, droughts cut North Africa’s cereal production to 10% below a five-year average. In Sudan, sorghum and millet production in 2023 decreased by about 25% and 50%, respectively, compared to 2022 (WMO, 2024).   Thirty of the world’s 40 most climate vulnerable countries are in Africa. A 2022 Mo Ibrahim Foundation report, The Road to COP27: Making Africa’s Case in the Global Climate Debate , emphasised that Africa’s small contribution to CO2 emissions, and the continent’s disproportionate vulnerability to the negative impact of climate change, should necessitate the continent getting climate financing from industrial countries responsible for emissions.   Crucial to consider is that Africa holds 65% of the uncultivated arable land left in the world, and therefore holds the key for the future of food globally. The rising global population makes optimising the productivity of available land even more urgent, since climate change reduces water availability and reduces crop productivity.   “Extreme weather – including droughts, cyclones and heatwaves – is increasing in frequency and intensity, alongside trends of urbanisation, population growth and weak conservation enforcement. Ecosystem damage and biodiversity loss is now having major negative impacts on livelihoods, causing US$7-15 billion in yearly losses (projected to reach US$40 billion by 2030)” (UNDP, 2023: 19).   Research by the ACPC showed “the increasing frequency and severity of climate change impacts resulting in disproportionate effects on African economies and societies, with countries estimated to be losing on average 2-5% of GDP and many countries diverting up to 9% of their budgets into unplanned expenditures on responses to extreme weather events.”   At the same time, over 600 million people in Africa lack electricity. Affordable clean energy sources is therefore critical to plug the power gap.   Africa’s collective approach to combat climate change   African countries, at an Africa Climate Summit in September 2023, adopted the “Nairobi Declaration” as a broad approach to combat climate change and facilitate a green transition in the region (African Union, 2023). The Nairobi Declaration called for climate-positive growth, renewable energy expansion, the protection and enhancement of biodiversity and nature; green industrialisation; sustainable agriculture; standards, metrics and market mechanisms to value nature, biodiversity and co-benefits; and African countries to adopt policy and enabling environments to support the development of the green economy.   The Nairobi Declaration outlined some of the opportunities for the African region, including the opportunity emerging from its youthful demographics. They could become new markets for innovative solutions and business models. But there are also formidable challenges such as rapidly urbanising populations; lack of skills, resources, capital and political will; and old economy thinking among African governments, political and business elites.   African countries as a group demand that developed countries provide between US$200-400 billion a year by 2030 for loss and damage because of climate change; and US$400 billion a year for adapting to climate change. This is, on top of funding required to reduce emissions.    In December 2023, the Conference of the Parties 28 (COP28) pledged record funding to climate change transition, including to Africa. However, the pledges to Africa at COP28 deferred major financial decisions to COP29, only contributing US$134 million and US$792 million to the Adaptation Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund respectively (Mbungu, Ogallo & Rudic, 2024).   Also in 2023, an Arab-African initiative was launched to improve agriculture and food systems in both regions. The “Africa and Middle East SAFE Initiative”, a public-private partnership, aims to mobilise US$10 billion in funding to support green agriculture. The idea is that Africa can provide food solutions to the Middle East, “where water stress poses immense challenges for food production, and where the cost of water desalinisation is prohibitive for competitive food production to assure food security” (Adesina, 2023).   The project aims to unlock green investments and promote climate-smart agriculture. The focus will be on irrigating two million hectares of African farmland, enhancing climate resilience for 10 million smallholder farmers, with a focus on women and young people, creating two million green jobs, and exporting two million metric tons of food crops from Africa to the Middle East.   In January 2023, African countries organised the Feed Africa Summit in Dakar – convened by the African Development Bank and the Government of Senegal, under the chairmanship of President Macky Sall – where 34 African Heads of State and Government signed the Dakar Declaration.   They agreed to establish food and agriculture delivery compacts, which are clear roadmaps for fully unlocking the potentials of their food and agriculture sector. The African Development Bank mobilised US$72 billion to implement these food and agriculture delivery compacts. This will allow Africa to take proper advantage of the size of its food and agriculture market, which, if cultivated effectively, could reach US$1 trillion by 2030 (Adesina, 2023).   Back in 2016, the African Development Bank launched its Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT) – a continent-wide initiative designed to boost agricultural productivity by using new technologies. TAAT brings productivity-increasing technologies to crop, livestock and fish smallholder farmers. The TAAT programme transfers resilient agricultural technologies to smallholder farmers.   Africa’s green energy, low-carbon funding needs   Investing in green growth alternatives is expensive. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa calculates that US$2 trillion is needed in the power sector alone by 2050 to drive green economic growth in Africa. And yet, the IEA says less than 2% of global investments in clean energy flows into Africa, with the current annual flow of climate finance to Africa standing at US$29.5 billion.   Africa requires an annual capital commitment of US$277 billion to implement Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and achieve agreed-on climate objectives by 2030. The private sector’s involvement in Africa’s climate finance stands at 14%, equivalent to US$4.2 billion in 2021.    Central and East African countries have the largest climate investment shortage as a percentage of GDP, averaging 26% and 23%, respectively. North African countries have lower climate investment gaps, averaging 3% of GDP – they still require up to six times more green capital than current levels. Southern Africa has the largest financial gap in absolute terms, because of South Africa’s massive green capital requirements, around US$107 billion annually, according to the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP).     The UN Economic Commission for Africa’s Deputy Executive Secretary, Antonio Pedro, said African countries could marshal US$82 billion annually through accessing carbon markets. The United Nations (UN) estimated that combined developing and emerging countries, including Africa, need US$2 trillion annually by 2030 to deal with climate change.   Industrial countries have not delivered on their climate finance promises. African countries have called on industrialised countries to “scale up climate finance to make up for the shortfall caused by [their] failure to deliver US$100 billion per year by 2020 and through 2025” (Kabukuru, 2023). African countries are also asking for between US$200-400 billion a year by 2030 for climate losses and damage; and US$400 billion a year for climate change adaptation.   Industrial countries and emerging powers collectively paid out US$7 trillion in 2022, for producing coal, oil and natural gas, in the form of subsidies such as tax breaks or price caps (Parry, Black & Vernon-Li, 2021). China is the biggest subsidiser of fossil fuels, followed by the US, Russia, India and the European Union (EU) (Parry, Black & Vernon-Li, 2021).   Fossil-fuel subsidies rose during the global increase in energy prices caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the country’s economic reboots following the Covid-19 pandemic. The subsidies were the equivalent of 7.1% of global gross domestic product. The subsidies have risen by US$2 trillion over the past two years.   Following energy shortages because of the Russia-Ukraine war, many industrial countries have returned to the use of coal for power. In October 2023, Germany’s Cabinet approved putting on-reserve lignite-fired power plants back online until the end of March 2024, as a step to replace scarce natural gas this winter and avoid shortages. This happened in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a sudden drop in Russian gas imports to Germany – Berlin reactivated coal-fired power plants and extended their lifespans (Pole, 2022).   Austria, the Netherlands and Italy also, in 2023, started up their coal power stations (Pole, 2022). Previously the Netherlands had limited coal power to just over a third of the country’s power output.   In 2022, in its bid to cut planet-warming  emissions by 55% by 2030  from 1990 levels, the European Commission (EU) proposed a 100% reduction in CO2 emissions from new cars by 2035 (Pole, 2022). That means it would not be possible to sell combustion engine cars from then on. However, the German government refused to accept this ban.   Harnessing Africa’s own resources   African countries could also generate income from the value chains of non-renewable resources – for example, critical minerals – mainly found in Africa and essential for battery production.    African governments have made commitments to contribute US$26.4 billion from domestic public resources for green energy annually. However, given rising government debt, mismanagement and corruption, combined with competing developmental priorities, it is highly unlikely that they will reach these targets. Public-private partnerships to finance climate change and drive green business will be crucial.   The continent has abundant renewable energy resources. It accounts for 40% of global solar irradiation. It has a 20,000MW geothermal power potential; a 30,000MW hydropower potential and a 110,000MW wind power potential. The challenge is to secure a smart transition, growing renewable energy, increase decarbonisation by using gas and gradually easing out coal – or finding clean coal technology.   As for “green recovery”, pledges by industrial countries and multilateral organisations have not only been insufficient, but also not forthcoming. According to the UNDP, for every US dollar spent addressing the climate crisis, four dollars fund fossil-fuel subsidies, perpetuating the crisis (UNDP, 2024: 17).   The UNDP argues an urgent transition into green business is a necessity for Africa to overcome the “dual challenges posed by the increasingly extreme impacts of climate change and the imperatives of continued economic growth”. It argues a green business transition “represents the opportunity to pursue alternative growth models, leapfrog generations of technology and build a more sustainable future” (UNDP, 2024:17).   Many industrial companies have become guilty of “greenwashing” in Africa. They mislead the public by claiming their products, policies and Environment, Sustainability and Governance (ESG) are environmentally friendly. Banks, mining and fossil fuel companies are among the key culprits in greenwashing. United Nations Secretary General António Guterres at COP27 in November 2022, criticised the practice as dishonest and undermining the fight against climate change.   In August 2024, TotalEnergies, the world’s 19th-biggest greenhouse gas emitter, was found guilty of misleading sustainability advertising in South Africa. TotalEnergies was found guilty of greenwashing by the South African Advertising Regulatory Board (ARB). The complaint was filed by campaign group Fossil Free South Africa.   The lawsuit centred on a partnership between TotalEnergies and South Africa National Parks (SANParks), in which the two organisations partnered in a #FuelYourExperience competition, encouraging people to visit South Africa’s parks. In an advertisement, TotalEnergies said: “We’re committed to sustainable development and environmental protection”, which Fossil Ad Ban highlighted as being “false and misleading” and was “greenwashing”.   Fossil Ad Ban cited the energy company’s “response to the 2015 Paris Climate Treaty has been not to cut, but to continue to expand its emissions, by another 14 million tonnes, to 400 million tonnes of carbon dioxide by 2022” (Doris, 2024). The ARB also ruled that there was “no doubt that the core business of the Advertiser is directly opposed to the issue of sustainable development, as the ongoing exploitation of fossil fuels is contra-indicated in this context” (Doris, 2024).   But developed countries also often misrepresent their policies, initiatives and projects in Africa as “green”, while it is totally the opposite. Unfortunately, African countries do not have laws against greenwashing. Some EU and Southeast Asian nations have introduced guidelines of financial practices to prevent greenwashing.   The UNDP has proposed several key recommendations for how Africa could leverage the green economy. The organisation has proposed the establishment of dedicated green investment banks, facilities and funds, with a specific mandate to support the development of green business in the region via green financing products.   The international organisation proposed that Africa create an urban green business and finance platform to help support Africa’s rapidly growing cities to meet the dual challenges of rapid urbanisation and climate change. The UNDP calls on multi-lateral development banks to do more to reduce investment risk in Africa through the creation of new and innovative instruments, funds and facilities. The UNDP also called for African countries to establish nature as an asset class, leveraging the lessons from carbon markets elsewhere as well as Africa’s nature-rich status, to build robust carbon and biodiversity markets. The UNDP proposes that African countries enhance green value chains and capacity, leveraging Africa’s natural abundance of minerals needed in the green transition, along with the region’s sustainable energy, to ensure greater value addition remains within the communities and areas involved in mineral extraction.   South Africa: energy mix   South Africa’s energy mix in 2023/2024 consists of 82.8% coal, with renewable energy providing 8.8%, amounting to 42 000 MW. Nuclear power makes up 6% of electricity output and gas only contributes 3% of South Africa’s power generation. Upgrades to South Africa’s only nuclear plant, at Koeberg, have seen its two reactors having lifetimes extended to 2045 and 2047.   Coal will remain the main source of energy for the immediate future (ITA, 2024). However, around 8.7GW of non-hydro renewable energy capacity is planned to be installed between 2023 and 2032. Solar energy will be the primary source of expansion.   South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnerships plans to repurpose and decommission coal-fired power plants to decrease emissions – the government is planning to close down seven coal-fired power stations by 2032.   The government has eased restrictions for local content in solar. Renewable energy expansion is slowed by opposition to it by interest groups in the ANC-SACP-Cosatu tripartite alliance, and opposition from populist groups and coal-based trade unions to renewable energy.   It is expected that South Africa’s total power capacity will expand by 4GW (ITA, 2024). The expansion will come from non-hydro renewable energy – increasing from 9.3% to 17% in 2032. The South African government’s revised Integrated Resource Plan makes provision for gas to provide 8% of energy capacity.   South Africa’s Renewable Independent Power Producer Programme is expected to increase the non-hydro renewal, because of the lessening of licence restrictions, allowing more private sector involvement in the sector. The developers of renewable energy are mostly foreign companies that have signed power purchase agreements with Eskom for the electricity they produce.   However, South Africa’s aging, poorly maintained and vandalised network infrastructure undermines the energy distribution network. According to Eskom, the utility needs 8 000km of transmission infrastructure by 2030 to absorb new renewable energy capacity (ITA, 2024). But Eskom’s long-term financial viability is in question, considering its R400 billion debt. Renewable energy companies have already signed purchase agreements with Eskom, agreements which would be compromised should Eskom collapse.   South Africa’s automotive industry contributes 5.3% to South Africa’s GDP and is its biggest manufacturing sector, and supported R270 billion worth of exports in 2023. South Africa’s auto industry was facing headwinds because of the rise in the sales of electric powered vehicles globally, the increased use of fuels with cleaner emissions, and use of new technologies such as autonomous driving vehicles.   In response, South Africa has created the South African Automotive Masterplan, SAAM 2035. It aims to increase the country’s motor vehicle production to 1% of global output. And to increase the yearly exports value of the industry from R200 billion in 2019 to R400 billion in 2035 (IOL, 2024).   Domestically, the country’s declining economy, high fuel prices and high interest rates have compounded the declines in vehicle sales. In 2023 vehicle sales were down 5.8%, exports were down 16.9%, and vehicle production dropped 20%. South Africa’s automotive industry is lagging, and will continue to lag, behind turning its production to new electric vehicles (NEVs), its global competitors.   In fact, Trade and Industry Minister Parks Tau said that South Africa may take 15 to 20 years longer to transition to mass NEVs. To mitigate this, the government is preparing a White Paper on NEVs, which is being put together by the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, the National Treasury, and the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy.   In October 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that the government will introduce tax incentives to make new energy vehicles cheaper for South Africans. The incentives will also cover hybrid vehicles – which use traditional fuels and electricity batteries, and other renewable energy, including hydrogen.   The Government announced NEVs incentives in the Budget in February 2024, providing for a 150% investment allowance for expenses in the initial year of investment, effective from 1 March 2026. Depreciation allowances for new and used machinery and inputs to make NEVs was increased to 40% in the first year and 20% in each of the following three years. “Consideration must be given to incentives for manufacturers as well as tax rebates or subsidies for consumers to accelerate the uptake of electric vehicles,” said Ramaphosa (National Treasury, 2024). South Africa: green energy and low-carbon development funding   South Africa’s Just Transition Framework focuses on public-private partnerships, foreign investment, and blended finance (PCC, 2022). On 4 November 2021, South Africa announced the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) at COP26.   The JETP is a US$8.5 billion funding package from the European Union, Germany, France, the US, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark, to support South Africa securing a just energy transition. The final amount, following additional pledges, is now more than US$11 billion. Only 4% of the amount was grant financing; the rest is concessional loans.   South Africa introduced the Just Energy Transition Implementation Plan at COP28, the annual climate change conference, held in Dubai in 2023. This is a roadmap for achieving decarbonisation of the economy in a just manner. The Implementation Plan was aimed at outlining how the funding would be structured, the priorities, projects and implementation partners. It covers six portfolios: Electricity; Mpumalanga Just Transition; New Energy Vehicles (NEVs); Green Hydrogen; Skills; and Municipalities.    Reports showed that before the JET Implementation Plan was released in 2023, more than R10 billion of the funds had already been allocated or assigned to projects or spent on projects (Davies, 2024). The pre-plan released spending allocations were outlined in the JET Implementation Plan Grant Mapping Register. The register outlines the priority areas for spending.   “By the time the JET Investment Plan was unveiled by President Cyril Ramaphosa on 4 November 2022, 89 of the 145 projects, worth more than R5.3 billion, had already commenced (before November 2022 when the JET IP was publicly announced). The end dates for 26 of them were before Cabinet formally approved the JET IP in November 2023” (Davies, 2024). Furthermore, more than R8.5 billion had been used for projects that had already finished at the time of funding.   Only two projects, out of 145, had not started by the time the funding became available. This means no public discussion on the kinds of projects that needed funding, the organisations to whom the projects should go, and who the beneficiaries should be that receive help.   It is unclear what the criteria for funding are or whether the projects were growth catalytic ones – for example, whether it is for projects developing new manufacturing or fit within a wider industrialisation plan. The application process, funding oversight and selection governance structures appear unclear. The JET IP framework said a JET Funding Platform would be established in 2024 as a “matchmaking mechanism” between implementing entities and beneficiaries.   On the JET IP register of projects only 24% of the funds went to South African implementing organisations. Most of the funding went to donor country companies. Donor agencies take large proportions of the funding to cover their costs. More than R222 million went to consulting and financial advisory firms. A third of the distributed funding went to German entities: among these, R1.7 billion went to GIZ, the German development agency, R2 billion went to KfW, the German development bank. Essentially, all the financing given by Germany has gone to German entities.   Of the funding from the United States (US) government, R145 million went to consultancy firm Deloitte and R58 million went to the US Department of Energy’s National Labs. The Dutch government funding, among others, went to the Dutch Water Authorities, and the Danish government’s funding, among others, went to the Danish Energy Agency.   Researchers Katrina Lehmann-Grube, Imraan Valodia, Julia Taylor and Sonia Phalatse analysed how the JET IP money was spent. The bulk of the money was directed to green hydrogen, Mpumalanga Just Transition, electricity infrastructure, municipalities, skills development, electricity just transition, and new energy vehicles. However, Lehmann-Grube and her colleagues revealed that most of the funding did not go directly to the assigned priorities.   They report that for funds allocated to electricity infrastructure, none was allocated for building electricity infrastructure, whether to expand the grid or for renewable energy generation. The funds for electricity infrastructure has been spent on technical assistance, project feasibility studies and scenario planning. Around R1.2 billion was spent on technical assistance. Lehmann-Grube et al described the technical assistance as “ long been criticised as a form of aid  for being ineffective, extremely expensive since much of these funds go to foreign ‘experts’, and an outdated form of development”.   Another portion of the funds, around R1.5 billion was spent on green finance, which included refinancing community trust projects, green bods, blended finance to attract the private sector, which is “arguably not where the grants portion of the finance should be focused”. Funds are allocated for stakeholder engagement and capacity building. However, civil society and community organisations are rarely involved. Only 0.4% of the funding was allocated to civil society – around R41 million.   Approximately R1.1 billion was allocated to skills training. However, the researchers show only R453 million went to actual skills training. Astonishingly, none of the allocation went to employees that will lose their jobs, livelihoods and income in the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. There are other significant South African public funds established for climate change. The state-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa established the Green Fund in 2011. The fund is a complementary fund, aimed to augment existing fiscal allocations. It particularly focuses on existing projects that require bridging financial gaps. The Green Fund says it has collective investments of R679.8 million.   There are also private funds in South Africa dedicated to climate change. In 2018, Growthpoint Properties, a real estate investment trust, issued a (10-year) corporate green bond. The proceeds from this bond are earmarked for the financing of new and existing environmentally friendly properties.   China: world leader in renewable energy economy manufacturing   China is the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions by volume, burning as much coal as all of the world combined. At the same time, the country now produces most of the world’s renewable energy.   In the 2000s, China changed its development model, based on coal dependence, as it was causing environmental crises and had begun to undermine economic growth. With GDP growth slowing in the mid-2000s, labour costs rising and a housing crisis, China, as part of changing its developmental model, also moved towards renewable energy. The country invested heavily in green energy technology, prioritising becoming the world’s largest supplier of renewable energy technologies, manufacturing products and infrastructure to tap into the world’s need for clean energy.   China now dominates the manufacturing of renewable technologies. “China had largely achieved its goal of dominating not only the production of solar and wind technologies, but it had developed a near monopoly on every aspect of the supply chains, including the mining and processing of the rare-earths and strategic minerals essential for the clean energy revolution” (Hilton, 2024).   China controls 80% of the globe’s solar manufacturing. It dominates wind and battery technology and manufacturing. Its manufacturing of electric vehicles is rising. Its domination of renewable energy technologies, manufacturing and supply chains has brought global prices down.   China expanded its renewable energy capacity with astonishing speed and scale. Fossil fuels now make up under 50% of the country’s power generation capacity, whereas a decade ago, fossil fuels made up two-thirds of its power generation. The International Energy Authority said that the 50% increase in the installation of renewable energy capacity in 2023 was largely attributed to China.   In 2023 China doubled its new solar installations, increased new wind capacity installations by 66%, and quadrupled energy storage capacity. In 2022, its solar photovoltaic capacity installation for that year, was as large as the rest of the world combined.    China has transformed its economic growth model to make high-tech export products to spur growth. The country’s changed industrial policies are outlined in its “Made in China 2025” (MIC 2025) industrial strategy, a multidecade national strategy for the manufacturing sector, which was published in 2015. The strategy sets out its goal to dominate global market share of high-tech manufacturing, prioritising higher valued goods.   China is now also a dominant global manufacturer of plug-in electric vehicles and its associated supply chains. Electric vehicles is a disruptive technology, because it replaces internal combustion engine vehicles, which have dominated vehicle manufacturing (Graham, Belton & Xia, 2021).   China’s industrial policy followed the example of Japan’s Toyota, Germany’s Volkswagen and the US’ General Motors, who dominated global combustion engine vehicles supply chains. China’s industrial policy to turn it into a global giant manufacturer of electric vehicles – and their supply chains – is a lesson for developing countries in cobbling together successful industrial policies.   The country’s electric vehicle global rise has unleashed a trade conflict between China, the EU and the US over electric vehicles. The EU is the largest overseas market for China’s electric car industry.   The EU is planning to impose huge taxes on imports of electric vehicles from China to Europe. It says introducing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles imports aims to protect the European car industry from being undermined by what EU governments say are unfair Chinese-state subsidies on its own cars. Tariffs on electric cars made in China are set to rise from 10% to up to 45% over the next five years (Race, 2024).   The European Commission set individual duties on three large Chinese electric vehicle brands: SAIC, BYD and Geely. The EU fears that European car manufacturers will not be able to compete with Chinese cars. It calculated the charges based on estimates of how much Chinese state aid each manufacturer has received following an EU investigation. Chinese-made electric vehicles account for 19% of Europe’s market, estimated to rise to 25% by the end of 2024.   The US in May 2024 announced that it was quadrupling customs duties on imported Chinese electric vehicles. China has not penetrated the US market as it has the European market. In response, China has lodged a complaint against the US over the tariff penalties at the World Trade Organisation in March 2024, charging that the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) “formulates discriminatory subsidy policies for new energy vehicles”, referencing a classification that includes electric cars and hybrids.   China says the US IRA “distorts fair competition, seriously disrupts global new energy vehicle industrial and supply chains and violates WTO rules”. China has denied that its own industrial policies are unfair and has repeatedly threatened retaliation to safeguard its companies. The US has rejected China’s WTO challenge, saying “China's challenge is particularly hypocritical in light of China's targeting of clean energy sectors for global dominance” (AFP, 2024).   In 2022, the United States announced a giant aid and subsidy programme to support US-based companies operating in the energy transition sector and electric cars manufactured in the US. The US government said the subsidies were to address the climate crisis and “invest in US economic competitiveness”. The US also said its electric vehicle subsidy programme was meant to counter China’s subsidies for electric vehicles and China’s green industry, which has seen China investing vast state funds into domestic firms as well as research and development.   How China can help boost a South African manufacturing boom based on the green economy and technology   South Africa needs a dynamic manufacturing sector that can soak up low skills. A manufacturing sector in the energy sector based on renewable energy and gas, can soak up an army of low and unskilled. It can also reverse the decline of manufacturing in other sectors – which could create desperately needed new jobs, especially for those with low skills.   The inputs, technology and production processes underpinning renewable energy and gas production must be manufactured within South Africa as far as possible. Local communities can set up local cooperatives to generate and sell their own energy. If local renewable energy initiatives are established by local communities in every town; and gas is piped to every household, it would not only stabilise energy supply, but it will also create a much-needed manufacturing explosion.   China is in a tariff dispute with the European Union and the US over electric vehicle imports. The Chinese government has asked its manufacturers to halt expansion plans in Europe over this trade conflict, including stopping active searches for production sites in the region and signing of new deals (Zhang, Lepido & Torsoli, 2024).   This creates an opportunity for South Africa to become a hub for Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers – and serve as a springboard to the rest of Africa, the developing world, and even Europe. China could set up manufacturing plants in South Africa; and co-manufacture with South African companies. However, in such co-manufacturing, there must be an awareness of “political capitalists” – politically connected individuals with no industry experience, but who set up “black economic empowerment” companies to partner with established firms.   Chinese research, technology and development organisations could partner with South African ones to exchange green economy technologies for development purposes. Industrial policy-learning between China and South Africa is critical to help South Africa boost its industrial policy capacity.   China should match Western countries’ financial commitments for climate change to South Africa. However, China’s financial commitments should be different: rather than loans, it should be grant funding, manufacturing, technology, supply chain, and research and innovation exchange partnerships.   How China can partner with Africa to boost green economies and low-carbon development on the continent   African countries lack public funds to finance the green economy and low-carbon development. Grant funding is critical for this. Development finance, private finance, and public-private finance is critical to achieve the green economy goals.   African leaders expressed their frustrations with the industrialised countries’ inability to honour their commitments to providing adequate climate finance. China can partner with Africa in international climate change negotiations to secure better climate change funds for Africa – and to ensure that industrial countries honour their climate change financial commitments. But China could also be a source of grant funding for African countries’ green economy and low-carbon development initiatives.   African countries have inadequate infrastructure for green projects, which undermines delivery and deters new investors. Almost all African countries need to upgrade and expand their existing grid infrastructure, while building new renewable energy generation capacity.   Over 600 million people in Africa lack electricity. Affordable clean energy sources is critical to plug the power gap. China could partner in expanding Africa’s infrastructure, which underpins any green economy and low-carbon development strategy.   Foreign businesses in Africa often do not implement green practices – as there is largely a lack of enforcement in these countries. It is critical that the Chinese government compel Chinese state and private companies to implement genuine green practices in their operations in African countries. Africa and China can also collaborate on food solutions for China – for example, by helping Africa to boost climate-smart agriculture. In 2016, the African Development Bank in 2016 launched its Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT) – a continent-wide initiative designed to boost agricultural productivity by using new technologies. TAAT brings productivity-increasing technologies to crop, livestock and fish smallholder farmers. China could partner with African countries to boost new agricultural technologies to increase African agricultural productivity.   Moreover, China could establish manufacturing hubs for electric vehicles in African countries, and link African economies into their global manufacturing value chains.   South Africa: policy and regulator reforms needed   South Africa does not have a coherent industrial policy that places the green economy as one of the pillars of economic transformation, industrialisation and economic development. Truth be told, the county’s green economy and low-carbon development initiatives appear to be ad hoc – not part of an overall industrial strategy. South Africa can learn from China’s green economy industrial policy, both in its scope and execution.   For 20 years, China’s government has pursued clear, well-thought-out industrial policies to make it the world’s biggest producer of electric vehicles. China also pursued a focused industrial policy to build renewable energy manufacturing capacity.   In South Africa, whereas the apartheid government had industrial policies that produced disruptive technology, the post-1994 government has lost the ability to pursue industrial policies that can foster disruptive technology. The current South African government can learn from how the Chinese have pursued industrial policies that usher in disruptive technologies.   South Africa can learn from China how to quickly push through renewable energy, which is currently being slowed down by pro-coal proponents and opponents of renewable energy within and outside the ANC tripartite alliance. The Chinese government pushed through renewable energy with steely determination; similar determination is lacking in the South African government.   South Africa should introduce tax incentives to large corporates, SMMEs and households for renewable power generation. Tax systems must offer incentives to low-income households and businesses for deploying renewable energy.   Banks should be compelled to provide affordable finance to households and SMMEs to secure renewable energy generation. Customers should also be allowed to sell excess power back to the grid. South Africa needs regulations to prevent “greenwashing” by countries and businesses who claim their policies, initiatives and investments are green – when they are not. There are currently no laws in South Africa combating green and sustainability claims. There are only voluntary standards. These standards need to be incorporated into legislation. There are increasing civil society efforts to litigate against companies using greenwashing tactics (Parker, 2023).   South Africa’s collapsing infrastructure undermines any industrial policies – it is critical to reboot these systems. This is made clear by China’s industrial policy, based on a pillar of “world-class infrastructure suitable for shipping goods anywhere in the world” (Graham, Belton & Xia, 2021).   The African continent has not established effective regional power pools to share power, renewable energy or gas, which are critical to boost individual country power grids. South Africa will have to take a leadership role in helping African countries to build regional power pools, to exchange power, and trade power between countries, and so avoid energy shortages or surpluses sitting idle. References   Adesina, A. 2023. Remarks by Akinwumi A. Adesina African Development Bank President, Group Session: Launch of the Africa and Middle East SAFE Initiative COP 28, UAE, 3 December 2023.   African Development Bank (AfDB). 2023. Private Sector Financing for Climate Action and Green Growth in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/aeo_2023-chap2-en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   African Development Bank (AfDB). 2023. Natural Capital for Climate Finance and Green Growth in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/aeo_2023-chap3-en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   African Union. 2023. The African Leaders Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change and Call to Action . [Online] Available at: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/2023/09/08/the_african_leaders_nairobi_declaration_on_climate_change-rev-eng.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2024. WTO to examine China complaint over US electric vehicle subsidies . [Online] Available at: https://www.barrons.com/news/wto-to-examine-china-complaint-over-us-electric-vehicle-subsidies-91eaa825  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Ahmed, A. and Camp, R. 2023. Accelerating Africa’s Carbon Markets Can Power Sustainable Development . [Online] Available at: https://www.rti.org/insights/accelerating-africas-carbon-markets-can-power-sustainable-development [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Biswas, S. and Yila, O. 2022. Blog: Why transitioning to an Inclusive Green Economy is vital to fulfilling climate goals in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://thecommonwealth.org/news/blog-why-transitioning-inclusive-green-economy-vital-fulfilling-climate-goals-africa#:~:text=A%20green%20economy%20approach%20allows,wind%20energy%20prices%20by%2040%25 . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Blocher, K., Strinati, C., Balm, A. and Meattle, C. 2022. Climate Finance Innovation for Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Climate_Innovation_Finance_for_Africa.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Brookings Institute Africa Growth Initiative. 2020. Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent 2020-2030 . [Online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/foresight-africa-top-priorities-for-the-continent-in-2020/#:~:text=Among%20the%20top%20challenges%20facing,creation%20and%20maintain%20service%20delivery . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Chapman , C.A., Abernathy , K., Chapman , L.J. and Downs , C.T. 2022. The future of sub-Saharan Africa’s biodiversity in the face of climate and societal change, Sec. Conservation and Restoration Ecology , 10   Climate Adaptation Platform. 2024. Climate change in Africa and mitigating its impacts and risks . [Online] Available at: https://climateadaptationplatform.com/climate-change-in-africa-and-mitigating-its-impacts-and-risks/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Cozzi, L., Frankl, P., Wanner, B., Bahar H. and Spencer, T. 2023. Tripling renewable power capacity by 2030 is vital to keep the 1.5°C goal within reach . [Online] Available at: https://www.iea.org/commentaries/tripling-renewable-power-capacity-by-2030-is-vital-to-keep-the-150c-goal-within-reach [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Davies, T. 2024. JET funding fuels concerns . [Online] Available at: https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/opinion/on-my-mind/2024-02-15-tracey-davies-jet-funding-fuels-concerns/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Digital Hub Initiative. 2023. How Agritech transforms African economies . [Online] Available at: https://www.de-hub.de/en/blog/post/how-agritech-transforms-african-economies/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Disrupt Africa. 2023. Africa’s agri-tech revolution – the challenges, the opportunities, and what more needs to be done . [Online] Available at: https://disruptafrica.com/2023/08/04/africas-agri-tech-revolution-the-challenges-the-opportunities-and-what-more-needs-to-be-done/#:~:text=Africa's%20agri%2Dtech%20revolution%20%E2%80%93%20the,more%20needs%20to%20be%20done&text=African%20agriculture%20has%20the%20potential,overseas%2C%20but%20is%20chronically%20underpowered . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Doris, N. 2024. TotalEnergies slapped with historic greenwashing ruling . [Online] Available at: https://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/21348-totalenergies-slapped-with-historic-greenwashing-ruling#:~:text=The%20energy%20company%2C%20the%20world's%2019th%20biggest%20greenhouse%20gas,historic%20first%20for%20the%20country . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   E&E News and Harvey, C. 2022. The World Will Likely Miss 1.5 Degrees C—Why Isn’t Anyone Saying So?  [Online] Available at: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-world-will-likely-miss-1-5-degrees-c-why-isnt-anyone-saying-so/#:~:text=So%20far%2C%20it's%20been%20signed,there's%20still%20time%20to%20act . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   European Investment Bank (EIB). 2023. Investing in nature-based solutions: State-of-play and way forward for public and private financial measures in Europe . [Online] Available at: https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/20230095_investing_in_nature_based_solutions_en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Floyd, R., Yawson, F. and Bayuo, B. 2023. Realising parallel investments in Africa’s green industrialization . [Online] Available at: https://acetforafrica.org/research-and-analysis/insights-ideas/commentary/realizing-parallel-investments-in-africas-green-industrialization/#:~:text=These%20'parallel%20investments'%20are%20at,the%20country%20and%20regional%20levels . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Galal, S. 2023. Renewable Energy in Africa – Statistics and Facts . [Online] Available at: https://www.statista.com/topics/9143/renewable-energy-in-africa/#topicOverview [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Global Green Growth Institute. 2023a. 10 Billion USD Africa and Middle East SAFE Initiative Launched for Food Security . [Online] Available at: https://gggi.org/press-release/10-billion-usd-africa-and-middle-east-safe-initiative-launched-for-food-security/#:~:text=The%20Africa%20and%20Middle%20East,change%2C%20and%20rural%20livelihood%20vulnerability . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Graham, J.D., Belton, K.B. and Xia, S. 2021. How China Beat the US in Electric Vehicle Manufacturing, ISSUES ,   Greenfield, P. 2023. Revealed: more than 90 percent of rainforest carbon offsets by biggest certifier are worthless, analysis shows . [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/18/revealed-forest-carbon-offsets-biggest-provider-worthless-verra-aoe [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Hilton, I. 2024. How China Became the World’s Leader on Renewable Energy . [Online] Available at: https://e360.yale.edu/features/china-renewable-energy [accessed: 28 October 2024] Inamdar, A. 2022. Powering Africa’s Green Growth – beyond adaptation and resilience . [Online] Available at: https://climatechampions.unfccc.int/powering-africas-green-growth-beyond-adaptation-and-resilience/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Independent Expert Group on Climate Finance. 2020. Delivering on the US$100 billion climate finance commitment and transforming climate finance . [Online] Available at: https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2020/12/100_billion_climate_finance_report.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Capital Markets Authority (ICMA). 2019. Sustainability-Linked Loan Principles. [Online] Available at: https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/LMASustainabilityLinkedLoanPrinciples-270919.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Energy Authority (IEA). 2021. Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector . [Online] Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050 [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Energy Authority (IEA). 2023. The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions . [Online] Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2023. Exploring Opportunities for Women Entrepreneurs Driving Climate Solutions: A Discussion Note . [Online] Available at: https://www.ifc.org/en/insights-reports/2023/exploring-opportunities-for-women-entrepreneurs-driving-climate-solutions [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Monetary Fund. 2020. Powering Africa with Solar Energy – IMF F&D . [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2020/03/powering-Africa-with-solar-energy-sy#:~:text=More%20promising%20for%20large%2Dscale,much%20more%20reliable%20than%20elsewhere . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Trade Administration (ITA). 2024. South Africa: Energy Overview . [Online] Available at: https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/south-africa-energy  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   IOL. 2024. Ramaphosa announces plans for additional support for electric and hybrid vehicles in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/ramaphosa-announces-plans-for-additional-support-for-electric-and-hybrid-vehicles-in-south-africa-8700f652-6ea7-4002-b1c4-dd39e2299c61#google_vignette  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Kabujuru, W. 2023. Africa’s top six priorities at COP28 . [Online] Available at: https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2023/africa%E2%80%99s-top-six-priorities-cop28  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Kemp, Y. 2024. How to unlock green business opportunities across Africa – report . [Online] Available at: https://www.esi-africa.com/finance-and-policy/how-to-unlock-green-business-opportunities-across-africa-report/  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Koigi, B. 2023. The Promise and Scepticism Behind Africa’s Carbon Markets Initiative . [Online] Available at: https://www.ncmc.sua.ac.tz/news/the-promise-and-scepticism-behind-africas-carbon-markets-initiative [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Kuyoro, M., Leke, A., White, O., Woetzel, J., Jayaram, K. and Hicks, K. 2023. Reimagining economic growth in Africa: Turning diversity into opportunity.  [Online] Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/mckinsey%20global%20institute/our%20research/reimagining%20economic%20growth%20in%20africa%20turning%20diversity%20into%20opportunity/reimagining-economic-growth-in-africa-v6.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Lehmann-Grube, K., Valodia, I., Taylor, J. and Phalatse, S. 2024. What happened to the Just Energy Transition grant funding?  [Online] Available at: https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/research-news/2024/2024-03/what-happened-to-the-just-energy-transition-grant-funding.html  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Letswalo, N. 2023 . Why the hold on greenwashing policy in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/why-the-hold-on-greenwashing-policy-in-africa/  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Lighting Global. 2019. The Market Opportunity for Productive Use Leveraging Solar Energy (PULSE) in Sub-Saharan Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.lightingglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PULSE-Report.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Mboya, T. 2020. Can Carbon Trading Work in Africa?  [Online] Available at: [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Mbungu, G., Ogallo, E. and Rudic , D. 2024. Falling Short or Following Through? COP 28 Outcomes for Africa . [Online] Available at: https://afripoli.org/falling-short-or-following-through-cop-28-outcomes-for-africa  [accessed: 28 October 2024] McKenzie. 2023. Africa: Increasing demand for the continent’s critical mineral reserves to boost energy transition . [Online] Available at: https://insightplus.bakermckenzie.com/bm/projects/africa-increasing-demand-for-the-continents-critical-mineral-reserves-to-boost-energy-transition [accessed: 28 October 2024]   McKinsey & Company. 2023. Green energy in Africa presents significant investment opportunities . [Online] Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/green-energy-in-africa-presents-significant-investment-opportunities [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Meattle , C., Padmanabhi, R.,   de Aragão Fernandes , P., Balm , A., Wakaba, G., Chiriac, D., Tonkonogy , B. and  Wignarajah , D. 2022. Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/landscape-of-climate-finance-in-africa/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Mo Ibrahim Foundation. 2022. The Road to COP27: Making Africa’s Case in the Global Climate Debate . [Online] Available at: https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/research/data-stories/cop27/africa-climate-debate#:~:text=As%20we%20head%20towards%20COP27,climate%20crisis%20on%20the%20continent . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   National Treasury. 2024. National Budget – 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20Budget/2024/  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Ngila, F. 2023. Carbon Trading Offers Rich Rewards for Africa.  [Online] Available at: https://african.business/2023/10/resources/carbon-trading-offers-rich-rewards-for-africa [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Parker, D. 2023. Zero tolerance for greenwashing to inform future legislation . [Online] Available at: https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/zero-tolerance-for-greenwashing-to-inform-future-legislation-2023-11-29   [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Parry, I.W.H., Black, S. and Vernon-Lin, N. 2021. Still Not Getting Energy Prices Right: A Global and Country Update of Fossil Fuel Subsidies . [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/09/23/Still-Not-Getting-Energy-Prices-Right-A-Global-and-Country-Update-of-Fossil-Fuel-Subsidies-466004   [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Pole, J. 2022. Germany refuses to agree to EU ban on new fossil fuel cars from 2035 . [Online] Available at: https://www.euronews.com/green/2022/06/22/germany-refuses-to-agree-to-eu-ban-on-new-fossil-fuel-cars-from-2035  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Presidential Climate Commission (PCC). 2023. Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP).  [Online] Available at: https://www.climatecommission.org.za/south-africas-jet-ip [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Race, M. 2024. EU hits China with big taxes in electric car sales battle. [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly20n4d0g9o  [accessed: 28 October 2024] Reuters. 2023. Germany approves bringing coal-fired power plants back online this winter . [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germany-approves-bringing-coal-fired-power-plants-back-online-this-winter-2023-10-04/#:~:text=BERLIN%2C%20Oct%204%20(Reuters),this%20winter%20and%20avoid%20shortages . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   South African Government. 2011. South Africa’s Green Economy Accord . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/south-africas-green-economy-accord-29-nov-2011 [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Todorović, I. 2023. IEA: Demand for critical minerals to spike 3.5 times by 2030 . [Online] Available at: https://balkangreenenergynews.com/iea-demand-for-critical-minerals-to-spike-3-5-times-by-2030/#:~:text=In%20the%20net%20zero%20emissions,cobalt%20and%2040%25%20for%20nickel . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2022. Economic development in Africa: Rethinking the foundations of export diversification in Africa – The catalytic role of business and financial services . [Online] Available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/aldcafrica2022-summary_en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2021. Thematic Bonds 101: Macro Environment, Market Dynamics and Steps to Issuance . [Online] Available at: https://sdgfinance.undp.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/UNDP_Thematic%20Bonds%20101.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2024. Africa Green Business and Financing Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/africa-green-business-and-financing-report  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2016. The State of Biodiversity in Africa: A Mid-term Review of Progress Towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets . [Online] Available at: https://www.unep.org/resources/report/state-biodiversity-africa-mid-term-review-progress-towards-aichi-biodiversity [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2023. Africa’s green business opportunities are abundant, UNEP study shows . [Online] Available at: https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/africas-green-business-opportunities-are-abundant-unep-study-shows#:~:text=Addis%20Ababa%2C%2017%20August%202023,today%20by%20the%20UN%20Environment [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 2023. How a new wave of tech startups is driving development in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://iap.unido.org/articles/how-new-wave-tech-startups-driving-development-africa#:~:text=5%20Taking%20a%20mobile%2Dfirst,e.g%20Opay%20and%20Kuda%20Bank)%2C [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Bank. 2023a. Scaling agriculture science and innovation for a climate-resilient future in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/agfood/scaling-agriculture-science-and-innovation-climate-resilient-future-africa#:~:text=Science%20and%20innovation%20in%20agriculture,the%20evolving%20needs%20of%20farmers . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Bank. 2023b. Lessons from 25 Policies Advancing a Low-Carbon.  [Online] Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/3770b59a-617f-4636-8aa1-adbe6db7db34#:~:text=protects%20the%20poor.-,'Reality%20Check%3A%20Lessons%20from%2025%20Policies%20Advancing%20a%20Low%2D,studies%20across%20sectors%20and%20geographies . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Meteorological Organization. 2023. State of the Climate in Africa. [Online] Available at: https://library.wmo.int/viewer/69000/download?file=1360_State-of-the-Climate-in-Africa-2023_en.pdf&type=pdf&navigator=1  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Meteorological Organization. 2024. Africa Suffers Disproportionately from Climate Change . [Online] Available at: https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/africa-faces-disproportionate-burden-from-climate-change-and-adaptation-costs  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Resources Institute. 2023. Key COP28 Takeaways for Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.wri.org/africa/key-cop28-takeaways-africa [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Zhang, C., Lepido, D. and Torsoli, A. 2024. China asks carmakers to halt Europe expansion over tariff spat . [Online] Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-24/china-asks-carmakers-to-halt-europe-expansion-over-tariff-spat  [accessed: 28 October 2024] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za