Search

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Prof Dr Melha Rout Biel   Abstract   Slavery is just one major injustice Africa has suffered in its history. The jostling for Africa’s resources by powerful European countries in the late 19th century was also a harbinger of a dark time of exploitation and the destruction of the continent’s social fabric. During the Cold War, Western and European powers again put Africa in a precarious position, having to choose sides. And it seems the continent may be at the centre of a new “Scramble for Africa” – this time, with the emerging powers of China and the United States leading the fight. As a result of all this disempowerment, there have been several military coups on the continent and many African countries are drowning in debt, despite being rich nations in terms of natural resources.   Africa has huge economic potential. However, this opportunity depends on peace, security and stable governance and peaceful transfers of power. The continent must present as a united front, advocating for decoloniality, to gain back its rightful share of power and resources. Already, this can be seen in its mutually beneficial relationship with China, who has shown Africa goodwill with a major investment plan that is boosting various areas of development. Africa and its friends need to work hand in hand, using common interests to ensure that peace and security returns throughout Africa and beyond. This will not only bring wealth to the continent and help fight its colonially inherited issues of unemployment, corruption, underdevelopment and youth migration, but it will also enrich its allies from around the globe.   Introduction   The African continent has faced a number of challenges – such as exploitation of natural resources, slavery of the highest degree and destruction of social cohesion – over the last few hundred years.   Even after the independence of its fifty-four countries between the 1960s and 1970s, the continent is still politically, economically and socially dependent on external powers.   With the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 came the division of the African continent between the European powers – who were much more interested in the wealth and manpower the continent had to offer than in the people who occupied it. This division process is sometimes referred to as the “Scramble for Africa”, which was the beginning of a very dark period for Africa and its people. During this scramble for wealth and power, new boarders were created, and notable African names of states or towns were replaced with new names to suit the new reality on the ground. Foreign languages, such as English, France, and Spanish, were forcefully introduced to the African society. Today, most of the African scholars – with the exception of those from Ethiopia – write their research in one of the above languages.   During the Cold War era, African states and society were forced to align themselves with either the Western powers or with the Soviet Union. This phenomenon is still on course in the post-Cold War era. Today, there is a new development in Africa that could be referred to as the return of the Scramble for Africa, which, if not handled well, could result in the continent once again becoming a battleground between traditional and emerging powers. There have been military takeovers in five countries in West and Central Africa, one after another, in less than two years, executed by junior military officers. It is not clear whether these military officers are being used by external powers to disrupt the current climate on the continent or not; only time will tell.   Many African countries are in over their heads in debt. Some simply cannot afford to pay back what they borrowed from foreign funders, despite being the richest nations in Africa in terms of natural resources such as oil. It is not clear how this situation will be dealt with in the coming years. In some cases, the countries will end up with occupation of some of their key infrastructures, such as airports, or important mineral producing sectors.   According to Professor Lauren A. Johnson, Africa has a “peace deficit, development deficit, security deficit and governance deficit. Therefore, human society in general and in Africa in particular is facing extraordinary challenges. ” Africa now faces the challenge of decoloniality of being, knowledge and power on the continent.   Decoloniality refers to the logic, metaphysics, ontology and matrix of power created by the massive processes and aftermath of colonisation and settler-colonialism. This matrix and its lasting effects and structures are called "coloniality".  More plainly said, decoloniality is a way for us to re-learn the knowledge that has been pushed aside, forgotten, buried or discredited by the forces of modernity, settler-colonialism, and racial capitalism. Decoloniality is not a means to reject the scientific, medical, social and ethical “advances” of the modern era  tout court . It is, rather, a way to explore colonisation, settler-colonialism, racial capitalism (particularly as it grew out, in full racialising force, with the enslavement of black Africans), modernity, and, most recently, neoliberalism and necrocapitalism and the ways in which they have displaced an array of modes of living, thinking and being in our natural world. Decoloniality reveals "the dark side of modernity" and how it is built "on the backs" of "others".   Where does Africa go from here? This paper is an attempt to shed light on this dilemma.   Why Foreign Powers Scrambled for Africa in 1884-1885   As mentioned in the introduction, the phrase “Scramble for Africa” is used by historians to refer to the expansion of European empires into the African continent during 1884 and 1885. This process of European expansion continued from 1870 right up until the First World War started to unfold in 1914. Notable countries who contributed significantly to controlling Africa were Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain. After many attempts by African kings and queens to protect the continent from the invading hostile forces, the European forces finally managed to take control of most of Africa, declared themselves as the colonisers, and subsequently divided Africa among themselves.   It is worth noting that over this period, there were other major events taking place, including European interest in the Suez Canal, the Berlin Conference (1884), the First Moroccan Crisis (1905) and Second Moroccan Crisis (1911), and the European Colonisation of South Africa (1652), as well as the inhuman rule of Leopold II of Belgium in Congo. The causes for the Scramble for Africa are many, however this paper will mention only a few:   Competition among European powers Ethnocentrism To spread Christianity and European languages and culture. To expand new innovation and technology in Africa in order to easily explore and exploit African resources to boost industry in Europe and the United States (US). To increase access to manpower, to use as soldiers, in agriculture and industrialisation, which was taking place in Europe and the US at the time and required a huge amount of cheap labour. To spread the idea of racial superiority, which came to light during the 19th century in Europe. To promote European beliefs and Christianity as a superior religion over the African religions. The missionaries played dirty by coming to Africa as “clean” people, when in fact they were the ones who encouraged European and US government to exploit the resources they noted while exploring the continent.   The Europeans managed to overpower African forces and societies, who resisted colonisation and the exploitation of resources and manpower, with the assistance of new technologies and innovations. The Role of Foreign Powers in Peace, Security and Development in Africa   As far as peace and security in Africa at large is concerned, world powers have a direct or indirect role to play. This is the case in this era of terrorism and violent extremism as well as renewed jostling for resources in Africa. It is evident that most of the powerful nations are once again present and active on the continent. Some scholars are even talking about a “new scramble for Africa”. This would, again, have long-term consequences for the continent’s peace, security and development.   The question is: Why are world powers interested in Africa’s military again? There are many reasons for this development, one of which is the competition for influence in Africa and, of course, there is the issue of resources. Today, many world powers – such as the US, China and Russia as well as certain European nations and economically powerful countries like Japan, India and Brazil – are currently active in Africa. In addition, there are energy-rich Gulf States seeking opportunities on the continent to consolidate their future investments.   The presence of foreign military, for example, in the Horn of Africa has grown due to the increase of terrorist activities in Africa. For instance, Djibouti has agreed to host US naval and drone bases that conduct operations in the Horn of Africa and beyond. Other powers which have established military bases include France, Italy and Japan. The French military base in Djibouti is hosting troops from Germany and Spain. Furthermore, some regional blocs such as Gulf Coordination Council members like Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have also established military bases in Eritrea and Somaliland, while Somalia is hosting Turkish troops. The US also has an active military presence in the Horn, in the Sahel region, that are fighting against “terror” groups and the provision of military training to the governments of the region (Adam, 2018).   Noteworthy, is that since the 9/11 attacks the US has increased their activities in Africa in the fight against what is known as the “War on Terror”. This agenda is important for the US, which is why US humanitarian aid to Africa has been linked to this purpose in the past few years. Since 2007, AFRICOM, or the US Africa Command, has played a vital role in the fight against terror groups throughout the continent. Although, some of the African countries have been reported as being reluctant to host AFRICOM, as these countries are suspicious of its true agenda. They feel that the presence of AFRICOM in their territory might undermine their sovereignty. As a result, AFRICOM is still based in Germany (Adam, 2018).   Military Coups in Africa Since the independence of the African states, there have been a number of military coups. Of the 486 attempted or successful military coups carried out globally since 1950, Africa accounts for the largest number, with 214, of which at least 106 have been successful. Based on data compiled by American researchers Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, at least 45 of the 54 nations across the African continent have experienced at least a single coup attempt since 1950.   Supporters of Niger's military government take part in a demonstration in front of a French army base in Niamey, Niger [Mahamadou Hamidou/Reuters], August, 2023.   Successful Coups in Recent Years   Niger:  On July 26, 2023, Niger’s Bazoum was overthrown by the military.   Burkina Faso:  In January 2022, Burkina Faso’s army removed President Roch Kabore, blaming him for failing to contain violence by Islamist militants. In September of that year, there was  a second coup  by army Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who forcibly deposed Paul Henri-Damiba.   Guinea:  In September 2021, Special Forces commander Colonel Mamady Doumbouya overthrew President Alpha Conde. A year earlier, Conde had changed the constitution to circumvent limits that would have prevented him from standing for a third term, triggering widespread rioting.   Chad:  In April 2021, Chad’s army took power after President Idriss Deby was killed on the battlefield while visiting troops fighting rebels in the north.   Mali:  In August 2020, a group of Malian colonels removed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. The coup followed anti-government protests over deteriorating security, contested legislative elections and allegations of corruption. Nine months later, a  countercoup happened , with Assimi Goita, who was named vice president after the first one, leading the second and becoming head of state.   Sudan:  In October 2021, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led a military takeover in Khartoum, dissolving a ruling council in which the army and civilians had shared power and throwing the country’s democratic transition into turmoil.   The Return of Russia to Africa   Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia’s relationship with African countries, especially those countries that were connected through communism to Russia, came to a standstill. However, in recent years, Russia has returned to Africa, seeing the continent as a market opportunity. In 2018, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov undertook an extensive tour of Africa, where he visited a number of countries, including Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Mozambique. While in Ethiopia, the Foreign Minister attended the meeting of a joint ministerial committee that was established to advance bilateral relations between the two states. He also met with the chairperson of the African Union. It must be noted that the Russian Foreign Minister visited only one country in the Horn of Africa, that is, Ethiopia. The other visits focused on Southern African countries – those which have huge natural resources such as oil, uranium, copper, gold and cobalt, to mention a few.   Some scholars argue that Russia’s main priority in Africa for now is not to revive its Soviet-era prestige and influence, but to extract necessary minerals on the continent.   Apart from investment in natural resources, Russia is also investing in security and military projects in Africa. It is the second-largest arms exporter in the world after the United States and sells billions of dollars in weapons yearly across Africa. During his visit to Africa last year, the Russian Foreign Minister signed a defense cooperation agreement with Mozambique. Due to the imposition of sanctions on Russia by the US and the European Union, the country is currently looking for a new market. Russia is looking forward to making Africa its main export centre. As of now, Russia views Africa as a major trade opportunity and hopes to expand its influence on the continent (Adam, 2018).   China Cooperation with Africa   China, the second-largest economy in the world, has become Africa’s most important and influential development and trade partner over the past two decades. In comparison to other world powers, such as some European Union member states that have colonial history in Africa, China has been a supporter of the African liberation struggle since the mid-20th century. Secondly, China’s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, political equality and mutual trust, promotion of win-win economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and solidarity, and cooperation in international affairs (Stremlau, 2015), make China, in the eyes of Africa, a clean partner.   Such a history has made it possible for China to expand its influence on the continent. With the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, China’s influence on the continent has clearly increased. For instance, by 2000, China-Africa trade volumes were recorded at US$10bn. By 2014, the value of contracts which were awarded to Chinese companies in Africa amounted to $75bn. By 2016, China planned to invest an additional $60bn in the region to cover major collaborative projects on areas such as industrialisation, agricultural modernisation, infrastructure, finance, green development, trade and investment, poverty reduction, public welfare and public health as well as peace and security. No world power has ever put in place such a huge investment plan like China has in Africa.   Despite this good news for Africa, China’s investment in Africa has been harshly criticised by competitors and others such as the US. For instance, Peter Navarro, from the US National Trade Council, accused China of “locking down strategic natural resources, locking up emerging markets and locking out the United States”. Others criticised China for pursuing a “new form of colonialism” and “massive resource grab” in Africa. Furthermore, Chinese programmes have an adverse impact on the environment (Adam, 2018).   Can we speak of a “New Cold War in Africa”?   As a result of the growing economic and military interest in the Horn of Africa, and African continent in general, and the increasing tensions between world powers – like China on one hand and the United States on the other – some scholars such as Mehari Taddele Maru projected that this “will be detrimental to African prosperity and peace” (Maru, 2019).    In 2019, the United States conducted the 12th US-Africa Business Summit in Mozambique’s capital, Maputo. The high-level occasion was attended by eleven African heads of state and government as well as by 1,000 business community leaders. During the three-day occasion, US government representatives disclosed a $60bn investment plan to invest in low- and middle-income countries, especially in Africa. This declaration was made six months after John Bolton, then the US National Security Advisor, presented the Trump administration’s “New Africa Strategy”. The document stated: “Great power competitors, namely China and Russia, are rapidly expanding their financial and political influence across Africa. They are deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States” (Maru, 2019).   The above citation foreshadows that sooner or later, Africa could be another battleground for the escalation of a trade war between superpowers. In this case, between China and the US.   Economic Competition or Economic War   China dealing with Africa has been seen by many Africans as an advantage to both sides. It is clear that China’s approach to Africa has always focused mostly on trade, with Africa becoming one of the top destinations for Chinese investment. This began in 1999, when China introduced the so-called “Go Out” policy, which encouraged private and state-owned companies to seek economic opportunities outside of China.   Since then, Chinese trade with Africa has increased 40-fold over the past two decades. For instance, in 2017 it stood at $140bn. Between 2003 and 2017, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flows jumped by close to 60-fold to $4bn a year. FDI stocks stand at $43bn. Most of those funds were invested in infrastructure and energy development. China has significantly developed African railways. It has invested in various projects in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Angelo as well as in Nigeria. Currently, China is building a massive hydropower plant in Angola. It has already completed the longest railway line between Ethiopia and Djibouti. The headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa and West African Regional Bloc ECOWAS in Abuja were built by China. There is no doubt then that China is contributing towards development on the continent. But, of course, not for free!   As far as the US is concerned, various members of the US administration in Washington see Africa as a continent of wars, underdevelopment and a battlefield where the world power can confront its enemies. This was the case during the Cold War, when the US confronted the Soviet Union. The US returned to the African military after 9/11 and again now to confront China. Development of real economic ties with Africa has never been at the top of the agenda for any administration in Washington.   For this reason, trade between the US and African states has decreased from $120bn in 2012 to only $50bn in 2019. US FDI flows have slumped from $9.4bn in 2009 to around $330m in 2017. For the United States to challenge China as far as investment is concerned, the US needs to do more. The $60bn investment that was presented by the US will not in any way challenge Chinese investment in the continent.   Mehari Taddele Maru had this to say on China, US and Africa Relations: “The US has repeatedly accused China of using ‘debt to hold states in Africa captive to (its) wishes and demands’ and has warned African states to avoid Chinese ‘debt diplomacy’ which is supposedly incompatible with the independence of African nations and civil society and poses ‘a significant threat to US national security interests”. Yet, Africa is only the fourth-largest recipient of Chinese FDI after Europe (mainly Germany, UK and Netherlands), America (mainly the US and Canada), and Asia. The US has also borrowed heavily from China; currently its debt to its rival stands at $1.12tn. By contrast, Africa owes China around $83bn (Maru, 2019).   It is true that high indebtedness, trade imbalances, poor quality of goods coming from China and lower standards of labour and environmental practices are challenges for Africa in relation with China. But a good number of Africans do appreciate the (unconditional) funding from China. Yes, China should work more on issues relating to the environmental impact on big projects in infrastructure and agricultural industrialisation in Africa as well as improving the quality of goods exported to Africa and the rest of the world. This would improve China’s image and help avoid criticism of China’s activities in Africa.   According to the African Development Bank, the US-China trade war is already affecting Africa. It could cause as much as a 2.5% decrease in GDP for resource-intensive African economies and a 1.9% dip for oil-exporting nations (Maru, 2019).   The Presence of Foreign Forces and its Implications for Africa   The motives for the presence of multinational forces in the Horn of Africa are varied. Some came with the aim of fighting terror groups in the Horn, while others have different motives that have yet to be spelt out to the public. Scholars have noted that the escalating tensions between the US and China could in fact end up threatening the security of the whole continent, as the two powers are militarily present in Africa. For the past 15 years or so, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) has been engaged in a number of security missions throughout Africa. For instance, China is involved in peacekeeping operations in Sudan, South Sudan, Liberia, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In addition, China has contributed millions of dollars to the peacekeeping equipment for the African Union Mission in Somalia as well as provided financial support to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediation efforts in South Sudan. Recently, China has supported in kind, South Sudanese Cantonment sides for both the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) and its opposition groups, which are party to the R-RACSS, including the SPLM-IO.   In 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. The base hosted about 400 staff and troops, but it can accommodate about 10,000 people. The purpose of these forces is to carry out ant-piracy operations by the Chinese navy. However, it can also play a role in securing maritime routes. Some observers speculate that this base could be indirectly meant to secure Chinese interests in Africa. The question should really be, why not?   China’s military presence in Africa pales in comparison to that of the US. For example, in the past few years, US Africa Command has carried out about 36 different military operations in 13 different African nations – including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia as well as South Sudan and Tunisia. More than 7,000 troops have been deployed by the US in Africa. The US has one of the largest bases in Djibouti, which is set to be a permanent base in Africa. Apart from this base, it has about 34 other military outposts across the west, east and north of the continent. In addition, the US is supporting the Egyptian, Nigerian, Ethiopian, Malian and Nigerian armies as well as other G5 Sahel forces tasked with counterterrorism.   Observers are of the opinion that there will be no direct confrontation between the US and Chinese forces in Africa in the near future. However, their growing presence in the region is becoming a destabilising factor. The fact is that the US wants to contain the growing Chinese influence over Africa. The globe has already witnessed the fallout of the US-China competition in the strategic Red Sea region, which is an important part of the maritime routes. States in this region are not only feeling the growing US and Chinese pressure to take one side or the other but are also increasingly exposed to outside interference by different regional powers. A case in point is the development in Djibouti, when the country found itself at the centre of US-China diplomatic confrontation, as it is host to military bases of both the US and China. It was difficult for Djibouti to balance this situation (Maru, 2019).   In conclusion, the competition between world powers for resources and influence in Africa offers opportunities and challenges. It could be an advantage to the continent if African leaders present a united front on how Africa should deal with these big partners. China has shown goodwill in working with Africans in various areas of development. This needs to be exploited, including the need for China to transfer technology to Africa using local content provision. China should not leave Africa behind in the area of technology and others.   On the other hand, Africa should be proud of its contribution to the rise of China in terms of resources. It should be proud of helping to make China great again. The competition between the two superpowers – namely, China and the US – in Africa should be in good faith. The US should do more to invest in Africa and Africa should be open to the US’s advice on dealing with China. President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti had this to say about the relationship of the US and China with Africa and in the provision of loans by China: “The reality is that no one but the Chinese offers a long-term partnership” (Maru, 2019). If the US offered the same benefits, it might have more success in winning over some African leaders.   Conclusion   Africa has a lot of potential in terms of economic development. However, this opportunity depends on peace, security and stable governance and peaceful transfers of power. The issue of limited terms for presidents on the continent is a precondition for peaceful transfer of power, security and development. If peace is achieved and kept, the African people and their friends around the world will achieve greater economic prosperity and development.   What is needed today is for Africa and its friends to work hand in hand, using common interests to ensure that peace and security returns throughout Africa and beyond such that citizens concentrate on development. Such a situation will help Africa to fight unemployment, corruption, and underdevelopment and youth migrations to Europe and other parts of the world. An example of inhuman treatment of African people by colonial forces.   A Map of Africa in 1878 indicates far less colonial presence than the 1914 map. At the Congress of Berlin in 1884, 15 European powers divided Africa among them. By 1914, these imperial powers had  fully colonised the continent , exploiting its people and resources (Facing History & Ourselves, 2016).   African valuable resources exploited by colonial invaders References   Adam, A.H. 2018. Are we witnessing a ‘new scramble for Africa’?  [Online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2018/3/27/are-we-witnessing-a-new-scramble-for-africa [accessed: 27 July 2019].   Cooper, F., Isaacman, A.F., Mallon, F.C., Roseberry, W. & Stern, S.J. 1993. Confronting historical paradigms: peasants, labor, and the capitalist world system in Africa and Latin America . US: University of Wisconsin Press.   Facing History & Ourselves. 2016. Colonial Presence in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.facinghistory.org/resource-library/colonial-presence-africa [accessed: 27 October 2023] .   Gann, L.H., Duignan, P. & Turner, V.W. 1969. Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960: Volume 4.  London: Cambridge U.P.   Hoekema, D.A. 2013. African Politics and Moral Vision,  Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal , 96 (2): 121-144.   Kolapo, F.J., & Akurang-Parry, K.O. 2009. The History of Colonialism in Africa—Revisited, Reviewed Work: African Agency and European Colonialism: Latitudes of Negotiation, The Journal of African American History , 94(2): 248-252.   Maru, M.T. 2019. A new cold war in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/7/1/a-new-cold-war-in-africa [accessed: 27 July 2019].   Pardee School of Global Studies. N.d. 19th-20th Century Colonialism and Resistance . [Online] Available at: https://www.bu.edu/africa/outreach/teachingresources/history/colonialism/ [accessed: 27 October 2023] .   Parker , J. &  Rathbone , R. 2007. African History: A Very Short Introduction . US: Oxford University Press.   Schraeder, P. 2020. Understanding Contemporary Africa . US: Lynne Rienner Publishers.   Stremlau, J.J. 2015. China and Africa’s relationship is not yet of “win-win economic cooperation” . [Online] Available at: https://qz.com/africa/570542/china-and-africas-relationship-is-not-yet-one-of-win-win-economic-cooperation [accessed: 27 July 2019].   The New York Times Magazine. 2019. The 1619 Project . [Online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html [accessed: 27 October 2023] . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Nondumiso Alice Sithole   Abstract   Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are the heartbeat of effective public management. Although these systems were often neglected by governments in the past, they have become a critical part of the functioning of a democratic society. And yet, in many developing and emerging countries, M&E systems are underdeveloped and insufficiently institutionalised. A recent study showed that, while 91% of national development strategies approved after 2015 explicitly refer to the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, only 35% of them have the required data and systems to track implementation. The outcome was that there is a lack of a conducive legal and regulatory environment, insufficient capabilities, weak accountability mechanisms, and fragile frameworks to institutionalise the use of M&E. In South Africa, the ill effects are particularly evident at municipal level, where, despite improvements in access to basic services, the outcomes are still well below standard.   This paper investigates the challenges and possibilities M&E systems present. It explains how the stand-alone concepts of monitoring and evaluation are architecturally intertwined. It touches on the various types of M&E systems or methods and explores both the challenges of implementing these systems and the way forward. Finally, the paper offers useful recommendations for actions stakeholders should take with regard to M&E, NGOs, think tanks as well as governments.   Introduction   There is continuous expansion and development of “think tank” structures or systems occurring across the globe. These mechanisms of cross culture are aimed at undertaking important work in terms of an array of critical issues in governance, politics, and research. Or, better put, they are focused on researching and analysing data in their respective sectors or industries, with the aim of shaping policies on all levels. The shaping of these policies is not only regional but can also be used nationally and even on a global scale. However, at the July gathering of the 7th China-Africa People’s Forum and 7th China-Africa Young Leaders Forum, it was established that there seems to be an oversight by think tanks on an important component in measuring the impact and effectiveness of all bilateral work, and work in general, in different countries.   As Valadez and Bamberger (1994) view it, perhaps there is still an absence of a theoretical framework for international and comparative evaluation. That there is currently a lack of a framework probably has a detrimental impact on evaluation as well as on the very processes and outcomes that evaluation, as a measuring tool, hopes to improve and enhance within monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. Without the means to synthesise findings, test hypotheses, develop laws, and cumulate knowledge, international and comparative evaluation of programmes results in disconnected, invalid, and unreliable results in so far as regional, national, and global policy initiatives are concerned.   Lusthaus et al (1999) points out that although there have been significant strides made in terms of technology and economic solutions, not only in South Africa’s context but also globally, there are still countries where there has been inadequate improvement in the conditions for a large number of people. There are still some nations that have difficulty learning how to create appropriate roles for the state in development within their own contexts; how to organise and manage their systems so that they can identify priority problems, formulate policies, and create ways to have these policies implemented in a sustainable way (Hilderbrand & Grindle, 1994).   South Africa falls within this category. Although it has made great strides in many aspects, there still exists a weakness in its monitoring and evaluation systems or mechanisms, particularly when it comes to the local sphere of government.   This paper advocates for an assessment of whether M&E systems are being utilised effectively by government, more specifically by local government, in their partnerships, bilateral relations, and policy implementation, and of what can be done to strengthen the capacity of government. It further recommends a greater focus on M&E systems as a tool to measure the impact of programmes and policy initiatives not only on a local scale but also on a global one. Finally, this paper encourages the implementation of monitoring and evaluation as an oversight mechanism and tracking tool of accountability, which will aid in bridging the gap between the people being governed and the government or administrations that are voted into power. This paper aims to highlight progress and/or weaknesses in key governance areas. The findings of this paper will demonstrate that, thus far, governments have not aggressively made the effort to utilise monitoring and evaluation systems as much as they should.   Monitoring and evaluation deconstructed   Monitoring and evaluation is an important part of public management. Although it was often neglected by governments in the past, it has become a critical part of the functioning of a democratic society. Monitoring and evaluating the outcomes of a project or public campaign allows managers to determine how successful it has been in achieving its desired goals (Wits, N.d.). It is also aligned with accountability, and jointly, monitoring and evaluation activities tend to ensure that projects achieve both upward and downward as well as horizontal accountability demands (Okafor, 2021).   It is essential to understand both the distinct elements of monitoring and evaluation and the relationship between them in order to have a complete or holistic understanding of the combined concept. The World Bank defines monitoring as “a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds" (World Bank, N.d.).   Monitoring is a process of continuous and periodic surveillance of the physical implementation of a programme or policy, through timely gathering of systematic information on work schedules, inputs, delivery, targeted outputs, and other variables of the programme or policy, in order to have the desired effects and impact. It is an integral part of a management support function: it relates to monitoring a programme or policy and its components; managing the use of resources; guiding the progress of the programme or policy towards the desired end; and making sure that planned activities occur. The data gained from monitoring activities feed into and guide the decisions of managers or implementors of policy. Monitoring is also an integral part of the Management Information System; thus, it is a management tool (UWC, N.d.).   Shapiro (N.d.) describes monitoring as the systematic collection and analysis of information as a project or a programme progresses. The aim of which is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of a project or organisation. It is based on targets set and activities mapped out during the planning phase of work. Monitoring helps to keep the work on track and alerts management when things are going wrong. If executed properly, it is an invaluable tool for good management and provides a useful base for evaluation. It enables an organisation, or policy implementors, to determine whether the resources that have been availed are sufficient and are being utilised well, and whether there is appropriate capacity and the project implementors are following through with the original plans (Shapiro, N.d.).   Valadez and Bamberger further add that monitoring is more of a programme activity – its role is to determine whether project activities are implemented as planned. If the finding is negative, it determines the cause of the anomaly and what can be done to address it (Valadez & Bamberger, 1994).   On the other hand, evaluation is defined by the World Bank as "the process of determining the worth or significance of a development activity, policy or programme … to determine the relevance of objectives, the efficacy of design and implementation, the efficiency of resource use, and the sustainability of results. An evaluation should (enable) the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both partner and donor" (World Bank, N.d.).   Evaluation is a process to determine (as systematically and objectively as possible) the extent to which programme needs and results have been or are being achieved and analyse the reasons for any discrepancy (UWC, N.d.). It is the periodic assessment of ongoing and/or completed projects, policies, or programmes using a systematic and objective approach (Noltze et al, 2021). It is important to note that evaluation is the second component or stage of the M&E system process and is supposed to provide responses or answers to be implemented once the situation has been assessed during the first stage or phase of monitoring. The University of the Western Cape (N.d.) describes evaluation as being used for measuring programme effectiveness, and evaluation processes may be used to demonstrate to planners, donors, and other decision-makers that the programme activities have achieved measurable improvements.   Monitoring and evaluation can also indicate whether and where resources are being used efficiently and where strategies for resource allocation may need to be considered or reconsidered. In addition, the following pertinent questions should be asked: Is the programme doing what it set out to do? Or, is the programme succeeding in what it set out to accomplish? Is it providing a useful – or needed – service? Is it providing services to the intended audience? Have there been measurable changes – improvements – in the conditions that the programme set out to address? Have resources been used efficiently?   Evaluations are meant to furnish an objective view through rigorous research methods to inform conclusions about performance, reasons for good performance and poor performance, and to suggest recommendations for improvement in respect of programmes and policies.   Monitoring makes contributory inputs for evaluation, and this makes it an integral part of the overall evaluation process. Nyonje, Ndunge and Mulwa (2012) opined that monitoring in nature is descriptive and provides information on the status of project intervention in relation to the assigned project targets and outcomes. Contrastingly, evaluation is seen as an assessment of ongoing and/or concluded projects in an organised, systematic, and objective way with the aim of providing on a timely basis, the assessment of relevance/importance, the efficiency and effectiveness, as well as the impact, sustainability, and overall progress. Monitoring and evaluation applied as a function, is a fundamental part of project management that involves reflection and communication to support efficient and effective project implementation through informed/evidence-based decision-making (Nuguti, 2009).   When using this definition in the context of policy monitoring, policy refers to a programme of action to give effect to specific goals and objectives aimed at changing (and preferably improving) an existing unsatisfactory situation. Evidence-based policy is an approach to policy analysis and management that helps people make well-informed decisions about policies, programmes and projects by putting the best available evidence at the heart of policy development and implementation (Cloete, 2009).   Policy monitoring itself is the regular, systematic collection of data on the basis of specified indicators to determine levels of progress and achievement of goals and objectives. This is normally a very important project implementation and management tool but has over time been linked to the concept of evaluation. The results of the monitoring process are normally regularly reported in prescribed standardised formats.   In contrast to monitoring, policy evaluation is a systematic judgement or assessment of policy programmes. It can include a systematic assessment of resources, organisational processes to convert such resources into policy outputs or products, and the extent to which these policy programmes have the intended results in the form of outputs, outcomes or impacts, measured against envisaged goals and objectives. Systematic, evidence-based assessment can only be undertaken if the evidence is available to assess. The evidence is collected, stored and processed through systematic, rigorous monitoring and reporting processes. This establishes the link between these processes, which have over time become known as monitoring and evaluation (M&E) (Cloete, 2009).   Governments across the world have specialised institutionalised monitoring and evaluation systems for a variety of reasons, namely: They are essential for effective public policymaking; enable institutions to assess the effectiveness of policy decisions and programmes, and monitor progress towards national goals and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); direct the focus of governments as needed to accelerate progress in policy programmes and initiatives; enhance public accountability for results; and provide opportunities for dialogue between citizens and public institutions.   The 2015 Evaluation Year, along with the United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s adoption of the Agenda 2030 and SDGs, strengthened the movement towards increased governmental awareness and interest in evaluation, while raising expectations about the pace of monitoring and evaluation capacity development at national level. A strong demand for individual evaluation training and capacity development also emerged from this movement and some countries took steps towards the institutionalisation or implementation of evaluation.   Types of M&E systems at a glance   Different countries use different terminology to describe evaluations, but the underlying principles of the evaluation process remain the same. The set of types of evaluation is grounded in the base logic model (cause-effect) – linking inputs to activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts – which is also used in the Framework for Managing Programme Performance Information. It is important to take account of the fact that government interventions are implemented within socio-economic contexts that are complex, dynamic, and structurally inequitable. For example, while South Africa has over the past 25 years made remarkable strides in mitigating patriarchal norms and practices, gender inequalities persist, and many gender gaps remain unaddressed.   According to Rabie and Cloete (2009:11), the ongoing or process performance evaluation is done at different intervals “when a policy project or programme is still being implemented”. This type of evaluation is used to assess what has actually been accomplished at a particular time during the implementation process. Ongoing or process performance evaluation is undertaken to keep track of the timeframe and the spending patterns of the programme.   Secondly, formative evaluation is conducted in order to determine the policy outcomes of a generally unknown future and relies on complex technology-based trend-projection techniques that are not necessarily known to all evaluators. Cloete (2009) argues that formative evaluation is frequently required at a very early stage in the policy planning process to undertake a formal assessment or appraisal of the feasibility of the different policy options that one can choose from (Cloete, 2009:296).   Lastly, summative evaluation takes place after the completion of the policy, project, or programme – for example, at the end of the financial year or the term for which the policy was planned. “Summative evaluation focuses on both the short-term end products (outputs), the medium-term sectoral outcomes, and the long-term intersectoral impacts or changes that the end product brought about” (Cloete, 2009:296). Determining whether an evaluation is ongoing or is conducted at the end of the implementation process requires data both about the status quo ante (so-called baseline data: before the policy project was initiated), and data at the cut-off point, which signals the end of the evaluation period (so-called end or culmination data) (Cloete, 2017).   An important distinction to make here is between outputs and outcomes, as these areas in monitoring and evaluation often overlap. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) definition acknowledges this confusion by saying that an output “may also include changes resulting from [an] intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes”. Even with clearly delineated guidelines on these concepts, an organisation will need to deal with the different interpretations staff may have on a case-by-case basis (Intrac, 2016). Are the South African Government and Global Community Utilising M&E Systems?   In many developing and emerging economies, M&E systems are somewhat underdeveloped. Furthermore, they are not sufficiently institutionalised. It goes without saying that resources and capabilities to provide quality M&E services are therefore insufficient. A recent study by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) showed that, while 91% of national development strategies approved after 2015 explicitly refer to the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, only 35% of them have the required data and systems to track implementation (OECD, 2019). The outcome of the study alluded to the fact that there is a lack of a conducive legal and regulatory environment to create demand for M&E services on the part of public institutions; insufficient capabilities to procure, provide, and use evaluations; weak accountability mechanisms on the use of evidence and results; and weak frameworks to institutionalise the use of M&E in decision-making.    In the South African context, the creation of a dedicated Ministry of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) within the president’s office in 2009 as a result of concern that, while there was a slight improvement in access to basic services, the outcomes, or the reality on the ground, was still below standard. The quality of services – for example, in education and health – were substandard or poor in many areas across the country. However, massive increases in budget expenditure on services have not always brought the results anticipated. The underlying reasons for this vary from, among others, lack of political will, inadequate leadership, and management weaknesses to inappropriate institutional design and misaligned decision rights  (Engela & Ajam, 2010).   The above remains the status quo, to a certain degree. There are not many municipalities that either have, develop, or consistently maintain adequately operational institutionalised M&E departments within their structures (the choice here of using a scenario involving local authorities is because they are the closest to the citizenry). Therefore, it certainly makes sense that there should be a strong focus on the maintenance of such systems.    There is a general weakness in respect of resources and capacities at national level in governments on the African continent and developing countries in other parts of the world, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The weakness lies in the lack of support for the institutionalisation of evaluation. There is also a demand for greater accountability that is aligned to economic, cultural, and political backgrounds (World Bank, N.d.).   Like other African countries, South Africa faces multiple deeply rooted challenges with regard to transformation. Interconnected crises – including sanitary, geopolitical, economic, humanitarian, migratory, etc. – the development and strengthening  of M&E systems, and capacities of both public actors and local M&E stakeholders remain crucial factors in the achievement of national development goals and the SDGs.  There must be consistent awareness building, advocacy efforts, and the training of M&E stakeholders in all spheres of government. There needs to be fostering and strengthening of efforts, as such is required, in order to promote national evaluation policies and strategies and to build more effective national M&E systems.   The World Bank reported that the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) launched the Global Evaluation Initiative (GEI), a partnership developed with the objective of being a catalyst for M&E systems. Furthermore, its aim was to provide a pool of key actors and experts in the evaluation field to assist governments in developing countries in placing evidence at the heart of decision-making. The Every Newborn Action Plan (ENAP) is one of the key implementation partners of the GEI, as it is ideally positioned to help the GEI achieve its mandate in some parts of the African continent and in the MENA regions.   South Africa has also taken some action, having developed a revised National Evaluation Policy Framework for the period 2019 to 2024, based on a review of the successes and challenges of the first Policy Framework adopted in 2011. The quest to sustain public sector reforms demands sustained and deliberate coordination interventions to foster compliance with and accountability for the implementation of development policies. Policymaking and monitoring is mainly informed by the quest to improve quality. Therefore, any benchmarking that is conducted is meant to contribute to a better perspective on how South Africa compares to other developing countries and the global community at large. It is also aimed at setting above-average standards of improvement – linked to accountability and sound governance is the economical use of resources in compliance with prescriptive management systems (Masombuka & Thani, 2023).   Until 2005, only individual staff performance evaluations were institutionalised and regularly and systematically carried out in the South African government. Policy programme monitoring and evaluation, however, were not undertaken, managed, and coordinated systematically in the South African public service. These activities were undertaken sporadically by line function departments for purposes of their annual departmental reports. Some departments were more rigorous than others in this process, while the Public Service Commission (PSC) undertook to monitor and evaluate the South African government’s adherence to a restricted number of principles of good governance that the PSC derived from the Constitution of 1996 (Cloete, 2009).   The concept of a developmental state has been firmly reflected in almost all policy development and the trajectory of government since 2009. The focus on performance management and critical assessment of outcomes and the impact of government programmes through the results-based approach became the hallmark of then President Jacob Zuma’s administration. Both Netshitenzhe (2015) and Gumede (2017:10) allude to the prominence of improving government performance through the adoption of the NDP by the Cabinet and Parliament in 2012 as a development trajectory for the country. The formalisation of monitoring and evaluation capacity and performance agreements to improve accountability throughout the three spheres of government became a seal of political will.   There seems to be a commitment towards improving the quality of service delivery in South Africa. However, typical or relatively accurate indicators of improvements and success are yet to find expression in terms of measurement of policy outcomes. Masombuka and Thani (2023) state that the government policy reviews that have been conducted on the performance of the South African government over the past 25 years reveal the following: the agility, capability, and responsiveness of the state to socio-economic challenges, among others, is questionable in the 25-year review of government performance; the constant changes in political leadership and corruption have impacted the impetus for accountability; dwindling public trust and poor management of administrative interface, strategic and institutional capacity, technical capacity, and organisational culture are persistent challenges for attention in realising the objectives of a developmental state; the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated the weaknesses in the system in terms of bringing to the forefront shortcomings in governance and accountability that manifested in corruption, besides also showing the glaring inequalities that exist.   The question here is, what has become “practice” or what are essentially deemed as strategies or practical measuring methods of the assessment of monitoring and evaluating performance of policy initiatives or progress by government in line with their mandates? Firstly, reform in respect of public expenditure is meant to be spearheaded by the National Treasury through the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. The National Treasury is tasked with regulating financial management across the three spheres of government. In addition, is the development of the departmental strategic and annual plans for accountability on the commitments within the departments of the three levels of government (Masombuka & Thani, 2023).   Secondly, is the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) through the White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service (1995), which focuses on performance management systems, knowledge management, continuous learning, and introduction of monitoring and evaluation. Strengthening intergovernmental relations and the role of leadership in institutionalising monitoring and evaluation as a strategic management function remains a crucial instrument in respect of the three spheres of government. Clear roles, responsibilities, and adequate investment of resources is another prerequisite to comply with principles and values governing public administration, monitoring, and evaluation (Masombuka & Thani, 2023).   It is still a challenge to compare the implementation experiences of the emerging M&E systems in South Africa (discussed above) with those of other countries, due to the different developmental and governance contexts and dynamics, which are often country specific. Until recently, empirical literature tended to have a donor perspective, rather than a government perspective. Where the literature is related to government, the focus tends to be on the project, programme, or sector level rather than from a government-wide perspective (Engela & Ajam, 2010).   Moreover, the M&E framework is a developed-country framework, and some do not recognise that in a developing country additional layers of complexity for the selection, implementation, and success of a local programme may have a serious impact. How, for example, does global economic penetration affect the selection, implementation, and sustainability of social programmes? Who is measuring “development”, the developing country or an agent of the developed world, such as the World Bank? What weight should be assigned to the values of various stakeholders in the developing country versus the international institutions? What possibly inappropriate assumption is the evaluator making about the selection, implementation, and success of a programme? Under what conditions might it be inappropriate to evaluate a social programme in a developing country?   The uniqueness of African M&E systems is that most of them are still in the early phase of development. Africa has taken lessons from countries, like Chile, that have adopted a whole-of-government approach that is centrally driven, focusing on three dimensions: utilisation of M&E information, sustainability, and good quality M&E information (Mackay, 2007). African countries that have developed their M&E systems have also modelled their systems along these three dimensions. However, the approach has proven to be weak, as there are low levels of ownership, especially by ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) (Chirau et al, 2022; Mackay, 2007).   In some African countries – such as Ghana, South Africa, and Tanzania – M&E systems exist in different MDAs and subnational governments, but they work in silos, therefore they are seldom coordinated (Masuku & Ijeoma, 2015:15). Despite M&E capacity strengthening efforts made by these governments, the M&E infrastructure remains biased towards producing monitoring data as the main performance management input and accountability mechanism. Evaluation remains on the periphery. The accountability and overemphasis on monitoring have led to a culture of malicious compliance. There is too much attention paid to measuring inputs and activities without attention to outcome and impact of programmes (Chirau et al, 2022). The above is seemingly the global position. A common issue faced by all countries is capacity – the capacity of evaluators in a country to conduct evaluations and the capacity in government to commission, undertake, manage, and use evaluations. Until training in evaluation becomes more widespread, this will remain a major constraint.   Can governments, NGOs, think tanks use M&E as a tracking tool for oversight and holding leaders accountable?   Different scholars in the field have laid down key considerations for a monitoring and evaluation plan. These factors complete the M&E plan and give better coverage in terms of providing oversight and direction to the project during implementation. These are some of the considerations: financial resources and human capacity to carry out M&E activities (Brignall & Modell, 2000); feasibility, timeline, and ethical considerations (Armstrong & Baron, 2013). These details tend to ask important questions that require the project teams to provide answers that in turn shape and guide implementation.    An understandable monitoring and evaluation strategy is one of the best ways to help think tanks achieve the greatest impact in the most cost-effective way. Yet, measuring the impact and results of a think tank’s work is challenging, as these are often intangible (e.g., building relationships with policymakers, playing a key role in debates or networks, etc.). The ultimate goal is policy change, but this takes a long time and often cannot be attributed to a specific action or organisation, but rather, it is the result of many factors and actors.   Think tanks have become critical in terms of being key stakeholders in the realm of governance across the globe. Various networks of think tanks have been established, with the aim of assisting and aiding government in terms of research. These research networks can play an integral role in the field of monitoring and evaluation. It is suggested that think tanks should aim to do the following when undertaking or conducting M&E work: ensure that their mission and projects address challenges in their area of focus, by having a crystal clear policy influence objective. Think tanks must select their policy influence strategies or plans of action, and how these strategies and/or plans can and will be measured. Lastly, they should ensure that they not only have the buy-in from the relevant stakeholders, but also that they have the requisite resources to achieve results (MERICS, 2023).   In the event that think tanks establish sound or stable monitoring and evaluation plans, and when they carry out changes and improvements based on the lessons from the M&E work that they conduct, these can both assist in them becoming more effective in achieving their objectives and also serve somewhat as an “oversight” mechanism.   To be effective, think tanks must also communicate their findings to a range of stakeholders. The effectiveness of these communication efforts can be monitored and evaluated, and organisations can learn how to improve their communications to achieve greater impact. Think tanks must be able to package their research in a manner that is useful to their governments or stakeholders and easy for them to disseminate the research findings in order for that research to feed into the policy debates meaningfully (MERICS, 2023).   Organisational M&E systems involve implementing effective communication processes that support various strategies. The importance of communication in M&E lies in ensuring that employees have enough information to provide feedback for progress reports related to service delivery. Effective implementation and sustainability of an M&E system requires the development of institutional capacity, encompassing critical technical and human skills (Kusek, Rist & White, 2005). Communication advances coordination, cooperation, and general support tasks, which are crucial for a successful M&E system (Kadel, Ahmad & Basnet, 2020). In addition, clear performance indicators are essential for monitoring and providing information about progress towards achieving goals.   Efforts to provide the above resources must be spearheaded by governments themselves, as these are the essential tools required. Furthermore, municipalities must ensure that managers and staff align their roles with the priorities and objectives outlined in the municipality’s integrated development plan (Van der Waldt, 2018). The organisational challenges include poor alignment with municipalities’ strategic plans, a lack of coordination, poor management, and limited government M&E of these organisations within their jurisdictions (Ngumbela & Mle, 2019). These challenges are caused by a lack of M&E training opportunities and networks for most personnel in government institutions and municipalities, which is considered a significant drawback (Engela & Ajam, 2010). Adequate training is essential for both the custodians of the system and end users (Ile et al, 2012). Once adequate training has been provided, performance agreements can be designed to address the legacy of institutions underperforming. Specifically, adequate training will reduce the lack of accountability that has become characteristic of South Africa’s local government (Van der Westhuizen, 2016).   M&E systems are important in aiding government MDAs to measure the results (outputs, outcomes, and impact) achieved by their respective development policies, programmes, and projects. In reality, although there is an M&E system at the central level, MDAs and local government tend to have their own M&E systems that co-exist within a broader centralised M&E system (Goldman et al, 2012). Both systems provide information on the performance or non-performance of government policies, projects and programmes at the national, sector and local government levels. Importantly, in the process of measuring the results at various levels of outputs, outcomes and impacts, the M&E system should be able to identify what works and what does not, and why (Mackay, 2012).   Monitoring and evaluation systems help improve government performance and help development programmes to achieve their objectives. In so doing, M&E systems provide vital evidence to ensure accountability to citizens, legislatures, and civil society (Mackay, 2012). Sound evidence is equally critical in improving programme planning, budgeting, policymaking, and decision-making. There is evidence that points to the value of developing a system (both an M&E system and evaluation system) and an M&E policy, although one (an M&E system or evaluation system) can come before the other (an M&E policy or evaluation policy). Chirau, Waller and Blaser-Mapitsa (2018) argue that there is a direct link between national evaluation policies and the development of strong national evaluation systems (NESs). Effective evaluation systems are dependent on evaluation policies for framing the purpose of M&E and a delineation of institutional M&E responsibilities.   M&E should be considered as one of several tools governments can use to assess whether public policies and expenditures are achieving their objectives in the most cost-effective manner. If adequately orchestrated with other tools such as audits, regulatory impact assessments, performance budgeting and spending reviews, M&E can prove to be highly impactful sources of information for sound and smart policy and resource allocation decisions (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2023).   An overview of M&E challenges in the context of local government and governments in general   The Local Government Municipal Structures Act of 1998 outlines the establishment of municipal committees tasked with formulating, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the activities and operations of municipal councils and their service delivery to communities. Likewise, the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 is unambiguous about the importance of M&E in local government to the extent that it includes how a municipal council exercises its legislative and executive authority to implement M&E systems. Concerning M&E, Section 11(3) states that a municipal council exercises its legislative and executive authority by monitoring and regulating municipal services, monitoring the impact and effectiveness of any services, policies, programmes, or plans, and establishing and implementing performance management systems. This policy guideline does not prevent or provide any excuses for municipalities not to implement M&E systems under any circumstances (Yekani et al, 2024).   According to the Auditor-General’s reports, there is a widespread lack of financial controls and project monitoring, an ongoing culture of a lack of accountability and tolerance for transgressions, which results in a further regression in audit outcomes in municipalities, making improvements rare – the general trend over the past three years has remained negative. Eight municipalities could not adequately support the information reported in their financial statements and received disclaimed audit opinions (National Treasury, 2020). This evidence highlights the ongoing challenge of inadequate M&E systems for the effectiveness and efficiency of initiatives and interventions at the local government level (Yekani et al, 2024).   Therefore, there is a need to further investigate the challenges associated with implementing M&E systems within municipalities. However, these investigations must not only be carried out when or if a crisis arises. The assessment for where local governments and governments in the global community at large go wrong, or rather, the collection of data by M&E systems must not be a reactionary response.   The main challenges faced by the local authorities can be attributed to various underlying issues. For one, the knowledge, skills, and competence required for those aspiring to perform and those already performing tasks related to M&E of public projects are limited. Municipal officials of the various projects also fail to understand the importance of M&E at local government level. Ultimately, local governments have failed to develop an appropriate institutional M&E system (including M&E plans, indicators, and tools) (Mthethwa & Jili, 2016).   This demonstrates that although much has been achieved in terms of providing services to the majority of South Africans, much is still required to be done in terms of training, workshops, and dialogue on the manner, when, how and what of M&E systems in terms of suitability and implementation at local government level to enhance service delivery. Moreover, the definition of an M&E system requires that such a system be established across provinces to attain effective and efficient service delivery.    Another challenge is that many organisations at the level of local government need to attract and retain highly skilled workers from an increasingly diverse and mobile labour market. Currently, local municipalities are losing suitably qualified workforce due to a host of issues. Proper and effective planning is a critical aspect; the impact of not having capacity, or rather the human resources department within these organisations not planning adequately to attract and retain a diverse and capable workforce for the benefit of the organisation, cannot be overstressed (Mthethwa & Jili, 2016).   Municipalities must ensure that the right people with the right skills are in the right place at the right time, and that they are able to perform their duties successfully to add value to the organisation, for example, by employing people with skills, knowledge, and experience in monitoring and evaluating a project at local government level.   In addition, inadequate financial planning is and has been a constant systematic weakness facing project management in local governments, including most municipalities in South Africa. Projects continue to be abandoned in local governments due to inadequate funds. Unfortunately, the flow of funds cannot be fully guaranteed, especially as municipalities are confronted with fluctuations in world oil prices, inflation, mismanagement, corruption, and failure to explore internal sources of revenue and to use scarce resources (Mthethwa & Jili, 2016).   Mismanagement of funds and corruption hinder successful M&E and the completion of projects at local government level, which in turn leads to dissatisfaction among residents and culminates in violent service delivery protests. A municipality should involve the local community in the planning, initiation, formulation, and execution of projects to ensure their success. Local communities should be carried along at every stage of a project. They should be consulted first, so that the municipality can deliver services according to the people’s preferences and needs. This way, M&E can be utilised as a critical tool to aid effective monitoring with regard to outputs (Mthethwa & Jili, 2016).   The people’s understanding of the environment and support for a project create a moral basis for its success. Project planning should take a bottom-up approach to bring citizens directly into the process of running projects that will improve their quality of life. To some degree, community participation legitimises projects that are meant for the residents and ensures that there is a nexus between the residents being served and their government. When residents have adequate awareness of what projects are being implemented by their government, a relationship is built between the two parties, which leads to the residents becoming interested in participating in the affairs of the government.   Lastly, one of the most fundamental obstacles to successful M&E of projects and effective policy implementation is a lack of expertise. Clearly, knowledge is power: the standard or level of success in the completion of a project depends to a large extent on the amount of accurate information available to local government project managers.   Recommendations: the way forward for entrenching M&E systems   The guiding principles or recommendations discussed hereunder are general. They are applicable to working with a ministry, department, or agency in any country, but with obvious regard for the context or the socio-economic conditions that exist in different countries. Securing political and administrative buy-in and will is crucial to making sure that M&E becomes a valued practice in governance and development practices. To this effect, raising awareness about the value of M&E among high-ranking political and administrative leaders is paramount. The use of political leaders or “champions” can exert significant influence on ministries, departments, agencies, and subnational government, as they are strategically positioned to promote and advocate for institutionalisation of M&E practice in planning, budgeting, policy design, implementation, and general decision-making within governments. Leadership is an integral component. Instrumental, empirical desktop research findings regarding municipalities reveal a lack of leadership support and institutional readiness for change management in the context of M&E. Municipal employees’ perceptions can be very obstructive in some instances, therefore the issue of implementation of M&E needs much change management. Some officials in governments, especially at local level, are so used to and comfortable with their old ways of operating that they are not evolving and do not align themselves with the changing times. Municipal employees should be exposed to new systems and processes. Effective implementation of critical aspects of governance such as M&E systems becomes challenging due to this resistance to change and the organisational culture (Mthethwa & Jili, 2016). Countries that already have established national M&E evaluation systems are key to M&E work and this factor should be part of the criteria when considering which countries to form a working relationship with. Partnerships with local institutions and individuals that are knowledgeable about the country context should be another key criterion when selecting a country to work with. The approaches used must be unique and must make use of the country’s local entities to strengthen their M&E systems. Evaluation capacity development partnerships with government and development partners is crucial in developing networks for capacity and as support infrastructure. Linking monitoring and evaluation with the budget process is a politically sensitive reform. It requires an interface between administrative practices and political support for a joint effort, to ensure that the supply and demand of monitoring and evaluation are accounted for within the existing budgetary framework. This is evident in the current use of monitoring and evaluation, where findings and results are not used to inform planning and budgeting, departmental plans are still fragmented, and instability is apparent in the administrative leadership within the public services. Legal frameworks constitute the key basis for embedding the practice of evaluations across government in a systematic way. Around two-thirds of responding countries have created a legal basis for requiring and enabling policy evaluation. Policy frameworks can give strategic direction to a specific sector or thematic area and can help to support the implementation of quality evaluation. They also have the potential to provide high-level guidance and clarity. The centre of government is the main actor that provides strategic direction for policy evaluation. There must be operational detail, emanating from the national level, that truncates down to other spheres of government. The overall strategic vision and priorities of the national government, and the criteria and procedures to be followed, must be clear and precise in order to achieve those goals. One useful mechanism to ensure clarity and viability of objectives is to break the policy processes into parts. Organisations should not only focus their goals on driving direct policy change but should also try to affect what happens before, throughout, and afterwards. M&E is closely associated with top management, highlighting the need for a shift in management perception. An ongoing issue is that a lack of M&E training opportunities and networks for M&E personnel in most government institutions and ministries is one of the main drawbacks to achieving an effective M&E system. NGOs and think tanks who form partnerships with governments must be clear about what their policy influence objectives are and make sure that these are realistic, given the work that these stakeholders do. This will be drawn from the organisational mission, project proposals, strategic discussions, and should be informed by research into the problem that these stakeholders are trying to address. Conducting a situation analysis, mapping exercise, or diagnostic analysis could inform these objectives. After this exercise is completed, the NGO, think tank, or stakeholder must align themselves to a department or ministry that is in accord with the work that the stakeholder does.   Conclusion   This paper sought to assess whether M&E systems are being utilised effectively by government, more specifically by local government, in their partnerships, bilateral relations, and policy implementation, and to analyse what can be done to strengthen the capacity of government. Its aim was to highlight progress and/or weaknesses in key governance areas. The findings demonstrate that, thus far, governments have not aggressively made the effort to utilise monitoring and evaluation systems as much as they should.   A good starting point for improving this position is the essential task of fully understanding the current status of M&E in the country. The Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results - Anglophone Africa's situation analysis tool looks at the “wider ecosystem of M&E”, which means it looks at the government itself, higher education institutions, civil society organisations (CSOs), Parliament, and voluntary organisations for professional evaluation (VOPEs). The analysis should zoom in on the supply and demand of M&E information, examining strengths and weaknesses, as well as opportunities and threats. The analysis naturally feeds into an M&E capacity strengthening strategy. This strategy then explains the results that need to be achieved for the country to be able to improve its individual, institutional, and systemic M&E capacities, along with the specific approaches to be followed for achieving these capacities. The strategy further indicates who will do what and when, what resources will be required, and where these will come from (Chirau et al, 2022).   Without a clear theory to guide evaluation in developing countries, selection and application of appropriate research designs and methods becomes situational. Arguably, methods are always somewhat situational in that they are dependent upon the country in question, the quality and availability of the data, and the skill of the evaluator.   M&E can support an evidence-informed policymaking approach by bringing an understanding of how existing policies are performing and if they are effective. As such, strong M&E frameworks can support governments in addressing complex policy challenges by increasing the understanding of policy trade-offs and impacts.   However, an adequate supply of trained personnel (including those with both monitoring and technical evaluations skills) is key for the sustainability of monitoring and evaluation systems (Lahey, 2012). Bits of training is not sufficient and should be supplemented by technical assistance, coaching, and mentoring to ensure knowledge and skills acquired through training are put to suitable use.   This is a holistic approach to developing sustainable M&E systems, ensuring an equilibrium between the supply and demand of M&E information and use thereof across the M&E ecosystem of a country – composed of individual and institutional M&E capacities, demand for M&E information by decision-makers, and ultimately, an evaluative culture.   References   Armstrong, M. & Baron, A. 2013. Performance Management: The New Realities. Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development.   Brignall, S. & Modell, S. 2000. An Institutional Perspective on Performance Measurement and Management in the “New Public Sector”, Management Accounting Research, 11(3):281-306.   Chirau, T.J., Waller, C. & Blaser-Mapitsa, C. 2018. The National Evaluation Policy landscape in Africa: A comparison. Johannesburg: Twende Mbele.   Chirau, T., Dlakavu, A. & Masilela, B. 2022. Strengthening Anglophone Africa M&E systems: A CLEAR-AA perspective on guiding principles, challenges and emerging lessons, African Evaluation Journal, 10(1).   Cloete, F. 2009. Evidence-based policy analysis in South Africa: Critical assessment of the emerging governmentwide monitoring and evaluation system, South African Journal of Public Administration, 44(2): 293-311.   Cloete, F. 2017. Evidence-based Policy Making and Policy Evaluation, 3rd International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP3), Singapore, June 28-30.   Engela, R. & Ajam, T. 2010. Implementing a Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation System in South Africa, ECD Working Paper Series, 21.   Goldman, I., Engela, R., Akhalwaya, I., Gasa, N., Leon, B., Mohamed, H. et al. 2012. Establishing a national M&E system in South Africa (English), PREM Notes; no. 21, Special series on the Nuts and Bolts of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). Washington, DC: World Bank.   Gumede, V. 2017. Presidencies and policy in post-apartheid South Africa. Pretoria: Unisa Press.   Hilderbrand, M.E. & Grindle, M.S. 1994. Building Sustainable Capacity: Challenges for the Public Sector, Paper prepared for the United Nations Development Programme, Pilot Study of Capacity Building (INT/92/676). Cambridge.   Ile, I.U., Allen-ILE, C. & Eresia-Eke, C.E. 2012. Monitoring and Evaluation of Policies, Programmes and Projects. South Africa: Van Schaik Publishers.   Intrac. 2016. Outputs, outcomes and impact. [Online] Available at: https://www.intrac.org/app/uploads/2016/06/Monitoring-and-Evaluation-Series-Outcomes-Outputs-and-Impact-7.pdf [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Kadel, I.M., Ahmad, F. & Basnet, N. 2020.  Rethinking monitoring and evaluation practices: Lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic. [Online] Available at: https://www.icimod.org/article/rethinking-monitoring-and-evaluation-practices-lessons-from-the-covid-19-pandemic [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Kusek, J Z., Rist, R.C. & White, E.M. 2005. How Will We Know the Millennium Development Goal Results When We See Them?: Building a Results-based Monitoring and Evaluation System to Give Us the Answers, Evaluation, 11(1): 7-26.   Lahey, R. 2012. The Canadian M&E system, in G. Lopez-Acevedo, P. Krause & K. Mackey (eds.), Building better policies: The nuts and bolts of monitoring and evaluation systems. Washington, DC: World Bank.   Lusthaus, C., Adrien, M. & Perstinger, M. 1999. Capacity Development: Definitions, Issues and Implications for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Development, 35: 1-21.   Mackay, K. 2007. How to Build Monitoring and Evaluation Systems to Support Better Government. Washington DC: World Bank.   Mackay, K. 2012. The Australian Government M&E system, in G. Lopez-Acevedo, P. Krause & K. Mackey (eds.), Building better policies: The nuts and bolts of monitoring and evaluation systems. Washington, DC: World Bank.   Masombuka, S.S.N. & Thani, X.C. 2023. Challenges and Successes of the Government-wide Monitoring and Evaluation System, Administratio Publica, 31(3).   Masuku, N. & Ijeoma, E. 2015. A Global Overview of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and its Meaning in the Local Government Context of South Africa, Africa’s Public Service Delivery & Performance Review, 3(2).   Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). 2023. Monitoring, evaluation and learning for think tanks: How to match strategy with objectives for different areas of work. [Online] Available at: https://merics.org/en/think-tank-toolbox/monitoring-evaluation-and-learning-think-tanks-how-match-strategy-objectives [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Mthethwa, R.M. & Jili, N.N. 2016. Challenges in implementing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) : the case of the Mfolozi Municipality, African Journal of Public Affairs, 9(4).   National Treasury. 2020. The State of Local Government Finances and Financial Management as at 30 June 2020, 2019/20 financial year, Analysis Document.   Netshitenzhe, J. 2015. Class dynamics and state transformation in South Africa, Journal of Public Administration, 50(3):549–561.   Ngumbela, X. & Mle, T.R. 2019. Assessing the role of civil society in poverty alleviation: A case study of Amathole district in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa, The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 15(1).   Noltze, M., Köngeter, A., Römling, C. & Hoffmann, D. 2021. Monitoring, evaluation and learning for climate risk management, OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, 92.   Nuguti, E.O. 2009. Understanding Project Monitoring and Evaluation. Nairobi, Kenya: EKON Publishing.   Nyonje, R. O., K. D. Ndunge, & A. S. Mulwa. 2012. Monitoring and Evaluation of Projects and Programs - A Handbook for Students and Practitioners. Nairobi, Kenya: Aura Publishers.   Okafor, A. 2021. Influence of Monitoring and Evaluation System on the Performance of Projects, IJRDO - Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research, 6(8): 34-49.   Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2019. Making development co-operation more effective: How development partners are promoting effective, country-led partnerships, Part II of The Global Partnership 2019 Progress Report. [Online] Available at: https://www.effectivecooperation.org/system/files/2020-06/%5BTitle%5D.pdf [accessed: 13 February 2025]. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2023. Public policy monitoring and evaluation. [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/public-policy-monitoring-and-evaluation.html [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Shapiro, J. N.d. Monitoring and evaluation. [Online] Available at: https://civicus.org/view/media/Monitoring%20and%20Evaluation.pdf [accessed: 13 February 2025].   University of the Western Cape (UWC). N.d. Defining Monitoring and Evaluation, Monitoring and Evaluation for Health Services Improvement I, Unit 2.   University of the Witswatersrand (Wits). N.d. M&E for improved decision-making and project planning. [Online] Available at: https://online.wits.ac.za/blogs/me-for-improved-decision-making [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Valadez, J. & Bamberger, M. 1994. Monitoring and evaluating social programs in developing countries: a handbook for policymakers, managers and researchers. Washington DC: World Bank.   Van der Waldt, G. 2018. Local economic development for urban resilience: The South African experiment, Local Economy, 33(7): 694-709.   Van der Westhuizen, E.J. 2016. Human Resource Management in Government: A South African perspective on theories, politics and processes. South Africa: Juta.   World Bank. N.d. What is monitoring and evaluation? [Online] Available at: https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/what-monitoring-and-evaluation [accessed: 13 February 2025].   Yekani, B., Ngcamu, B. & Pillay, S. 2024. Management and leadership considerations for managing effective monitoring and evaluation systems in South African municipalities, Journal of Local Government Research and Innovation, 5: a154. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Dr Pryah Mahabeer   The transformation of South African higher education, catalyzed by the #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall student protests, called for decolonising educational spaces to address historical inequities for inclusiveness. South Africa’s socioeconomic disparities underscored the urgent need for curriculum transformation to address these pressing societal challenges (Blignaut, 2020; Govender & Naidoo, 2023; Padayachee et al., 2018). The student-led movements exposed the complex challenges of deeply entrenched educational paradigms that have long marginalised African knowledge systems and experience and called for the push for conceptualising, planning, and implementing a decolonised curriculum (Govender & Naidoo, 2023; Padayachee et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the perpetuation of Eurocentric paradigms in curriculum development and implementation presents a significant obstacle to achieving educational justice for historically marginalised populations. While scholarly debates on curriculum decolonisation have become increasingly nuanced, reflecting growing awareness of the intricate relationship between education, equity, and social justice essential for student empowerment and creating an inclusive, contextually relevant educational space. Recent scholarships suggest a concerning decline in decolonisation efforts, attributed somewhat to the longstanding dominance of European hegemony in educational sectors (Govender & Naidoo, 2023).    Decolonising South African education represents a critical step in addressing historical injustices and creating more equitable learning environments through valuing diversity, considering multiple experiences, and complicating the narrative of domination, which requires critically interrogating the dominant Westernised and Eurocentric knowledge systems that privilege specific epistemologies over Indigenous ways of knowing (Lowe, 1996; Kumashiro, 2004; Subedi, 2013; Zembylas, 2018). The challenge lies in dismantling and challenging the pervasive Eurocentric ways of knowing, culture and language that have dominated the South African education sector (Padayachee et al., 2018). The decolonisation of education in South Africa transcends cosmetic changes to curriculum content and demands a comprehensive reconstruction of how knowledge is conceived, validated, and transmitted within educational contexts. As Blignaut (2020) argued, meaningful educational transformation must simultaneously address curriculum content and pedagogical approaches that authentically reflect African ways of knowing and learning, recognising that change must extend to how knowledge is conceptualised and delivered and not merely what is taught. Decolonising education in South Africa requires fundamentally rethinking and reconstructing epistemological models, dismantling Eurocentric knowledge systems, and placing African experiences, perspectives and knowledge systems at the core of teaching, learning, and research, as concluded by Heleta (2016). According to Padayachee et al. (2018), implementing a knowledge-based curriculum empowers students to integrate their experiences and understandings while developing critical skills in understanding and appreciating diverse viewpoints and perspectives.   A nuanced approach to decolonised pedagogy requires carefully balancing indigenous knowledge systems with global epistemologies that involve critically examining colonial and apartheid educational legacies while developing culturally responsive teaching methodologies that validate diverse cultural perspectives and African experiences (Govender & Naidoo, 2023; Padayachee et al., 2018). Mampane, Omidire, and Aluko (2018) advocate for a ‘glocal’ approach that strategically foregrounds Indigenous knowledge while thoughtfully incorporating international worldviews. This perspective aligns with scholarly views that see curriculum decolonisation as a process of broader social transformation rather than a wholesale rejection of Western thought (Chilisa, 2012; Le Grange, 2016; Smith, 1999). That is, disturbing undisputed philosophies and ethics while drawing thoughtfully on valuable Western scholarly practices.   Scholars offer various insights into understanding and implementing a decolonised curriculum. Césaire’s (2000) work emphasises the importance of psychological and intellectual liberation from colonial mindsets, focusing on consciousness and denouncing colonial ideals. Meanwhile, Mbembe (2015, 2016) offers a more integrative approach that centres on African perspectives while maintaining a productive dialogue with Western knowledge systems without rejecting Western ideologies entirely. In other words, an effective higher education curriculum must balance both local context and global perspectives by embracing diverse knowledge systems. “For graduates to be locally and globally responsive (as is required for a sustainable future), perhaps what is needed is university curricula that are epistemically diverse and both locally and globally relevant” (Mbembe 2016 cited in Padayachee et al., 2018, p.291). Laenui (2000) and Smith (1999) provide a structured approach to decolonization. Their work describes a comprehensive process moving through phases of rediscovery, recovery, mourning, dreaming, and commitment, ultimately culminating in concrete action. They acknowledge the psychological and emotional dimensions of decolonisation while providing practical guidance for implementation, recognising that true transformation extends beyond mere academic restructuring (Laenui, 2000; Smith, 1999).   Critical pedagogy also emerged as an important framework for understanding curriculum decolonisation, highlighting the need for students to foster critical thinking skills to engage with diverse knowledge systems, empathy, and question power dynamics and societal structures and injustices, as articulated by Zembylas (2018) and Mbembe (2016). To this effect, Zembylas (2018) offers insights on how humanising pedagogy can be reconstructed with decolonising pedagogy to transform higher education in South Africa, address inequalities, empower students and teachers as agents of change, and create learning environments that challenge existing power structures and promote social consciousness. Further, Mahabeer’s (2018) “re-humanised” approach argues for creating meaningful synergy between Western and Indigenous knowledge systems, prioritising relevance to South African classroom realities while maintaining international academic standards. Her work prioritises local contextual relevance while maintaining global academic competitiveness, positioning curriculum decision-makers as critical change agents. Complementing this approach, the “thinking-feeling entanglement” proposed by Zembylas (2024) offers a promising framework of emotional awareness and analytical thought for nurturing critical thinking skills and social consciousness, enabling students to find their voices as change-makers. As such, facilitating for meaningful transformation through curricula integrating multiple knowledge systems, maintaining academic standards while addressing contextual needs and fostering social awareness.   Implementing a decolonised curriculum requires a comprehensive, interdisciplinary approach that transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries and calls for a more holistic understanding of knowledge that fosters critical thinking and reflects the intricate connections between global issues and local contexts. Maldonado-Torres (2016) emphasised the importance of moving beyond Western epistemological boundaries, while Carvalho & Flórez-Flórez (2014) proposed a decolonial transdisciplinarity that embraces non-Western ways of knowing, feeling, being, and doing. Integrating Indigenous knowledge systems requires transforming the curriculum through critically revising course material to include diverse perspectives, developing and implementing culturally responsive teaching content and methods, acknowledging students’ cultural backgrounds and experiences, preserving and promoting Indigenous languages, challenging power dynamics, and including previously excluded scholarly works (Govender & Naidoo, 2023). This transformative approach would necessitate ongoing collaboration with all stakeholders and continuous professional development for educators to ensure the sustained implementation and evolution of inclusive decolonial practices relevant to the realities of the postcolonial educational context and uncover more improved ways of teaching and learning (Mahabeer, 2021; Padayachee et al., 2018).   Decolonising the curriculum faces practical implementation challenges. As Govender & Naidoo (2023) reveal, critical challenges of implementing decolonised curricula in South Africa are the longstanding European knowledge dominance across educational systems, the limited policy development and implementation of decolonisation strategies, and academic staff’s readiness and resistance to change the curriculum, including the reluctance of some stakeholders to continue the decolonising journey (Govender & Naidoo, 2023). Institutional resistance and stakeholder reluctance often stem from deeply entrenched systems and mindsets, while the need for attitudinal change among academic staff presents ongoing implementation challenges (Govender & Naidoo, 2023; Padayachee et al., 2018). These obstacles are compounded by resource and infrastructure limitations, mainly affecting historically disadvantaged institutions. The complexity of balancing technological integration with cultural sensitivity creates additional layers of challenges, especially in the context of rapid technological advancement and globalisation (Govender & Naidoo, 2023; Padayachee et al., 2018). Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive approach by prioritising professional staff development programmes supported by strong institutional leadership and sustained support systems that facilitate long-term change (Padayachee et al., 2018). Moreover, sustainable development and institutional well-being in implementing an inclusive decolonising process requires a multi-faceted approach that addresses technological integration and fundamental support structures (Mpu & Adu, 2021; Padayachee et al., 2018). Despite calls for decolonising the curriculum in South Africa, Govender and Naidoo (2023) argue that more is necessary at the policy development and implementation level. Regular policy review and adaptation will ensure that decolonial practices remain relevant and practical, while engagement with local communities and stakeholders helps maintain accountability and cultural authenticity (Mpu & Adu, 2021).   Decolonised curriculum development aims to create diverse knowledge and educational experiences that are theoretically rigorous, contextually relevant, and culturally responsive, necessary for sustainable education development for individual, institutional and societal reform and well-being (Padayachee et al., 2018). R ather than merely rejecting Western knowledge, this educational journey requires moving beyond preserving cultural heritage and respecting local knowledge systems, maintaining global competitiveness, helping students understand interconnections between global imperatives and local contexts, and empowering students to share their personal experiences and perspectives in the educational process. It requires empowering students to critically engage and actively respond to emerging complexities such as rising inequalities, disruptions, climate change, global health crises, and perpetuating patriarchal structures (Govender & Naidoo, 2023) . The success of decolonising the curriculum depends on producing graduates who demonstrate theoretical proficiency, are critically aware of social complexities, can contribute to positive social transformation, and actively participate in an increasingly competitive global and changing context. Transforming the curriculum goes beyond mere changes to curriculum content, it represents a fundamental rethinking of how knowledge is produced and implemented, guided by a firm commitment to educational equity and social justice principles. References   Blignaut, S. 2020. Transforming the curriculum for the unique challenges faced by South Africa, Curriculum Perspectives , 41: 27-34.   Carvalho, J.J.D. & Flórez-Flórez, J. 2014. The Meeting of Knowledges: a project for the decolonisation of universities in Latin America, Postcolonial Studies , 17(2): 122-139.   Césaire, A. 2000. Discourse on colonialism . New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.   Chilisa, B. 2012. Indigenous research methodologies . Los Angeles, CA: Sage.   Govender, L. & Naidoo, D. 2023. Decolonial insights for transforming the higher education curriculum in South Africa.  Curriculum Perspectives ,  43 (Suppl 1): 59-71. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41297-023-00200-3   Heleta, S. 2016. Decolonisation of higher education: Dismantling epistemic violence and Eurocentrism in South Africa, Transformation in Higher Education , 1(1):1−8.   Kumashiro, K. K. 2004. Introduction and Part 1. Against Common Sense: Teaching and Learning toward Social Justice . New York, NY: Routledge Falmer.   Le Grange, L. 2016. Decolonising the university curriculum, South African Journal of Higher Education , 30(2): 1-12.   Lowe, L. 1996. Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics . Durham and London: Duke University Press.   Maldonado-Torres, N. 2016. Transdisciplinaridade e decolonialidade, Sociedade E Estado , 31: 75-97.   Mbembe, A. 2015. Decolonising knowledge and the question of the archive . [Online] Available at: https://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/Achille%20Mbembe%20 %20Decolonising%20Knowledge%20and%20the%20Question%20of%20the%20Archive. pdf [accessed: 30 January 2025].   Mbembe, A.J. 2016. Decolonising the university: New directions, Arts and Humanities in Higher Education , 15(1): 29-45.   Mampane, R.M., Omidire, M.F. & Aluko, F.R. 2018. Decolonising Higher Education in Africa: Arriving at a Glocal Solution, South African Journal of Education , 38(4): 1-9.   Mahabeer, P. 2018. Curriculum decision-makers on decolonising the teacher education curriculum, South African Journal of Education , 38(4): 1-13.   Mahabeer, P. 2021. Decolonising the school curriculum in South Africa: Black women teachers’ perspectives, Decolonising curricula and pedagogy in higher education , 97-119.   Mpu, Y. & Adu, E.O. 2021. The challenges of inclusive education and its implementation in schools: The South African perspective, Perspectives in Education , 39(2): 225-238.   Padayachee, K., Matimolane, M. & Ganas, R. 2018. Addressing Curriculum Decolonisation and Education for Sustainable Development through Epistemically Diverse Curricula.  South African Journal of Higher Education  32(6): 288-304. https://doi.org/10.20853/32-6-2986 .   Subedi, B. 2013. Decolonizing the Curriculum for Global Perspectives. Educational Theory , 63 (6): 621–638. doi:10.1111/edth.12045.   Zembylas, M. 2018. Decolonial Possibilities in South African Higher Education: Reconfiguring Humanising Pedagogies As/with Decolonising Pedagogies, South African Journal of Education , 38(4): 1-11. doi:10.15700/saje.v38n4a1699.   Zembylas, M. 2024. Revisiting the notion of critical thinking in higher education: theorizing the thinking-feeling entanglement using affect theory, Teaching in Higher Education , 29(6): 1606-1620. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Dr Wendy Smidt   The call for a decolonised education in South Africa has been a central theme in discussions surrounding the transformation of the country's education system. While the country has made much pr ogress in dismantling the formal structures of apartheid, the effects of colonialism are still present within educational systems (Stein & Andreotti, 2016; Waghid & Meda, 2023). Decolonising education can contribute to a fairer and more inclusive education system, considering the challenges and possibilities involved. But what is the contemporary significance and relevance of decoloniality and how can it foster a more equitable and just learning environment?   In 1996, a wide range of stakeholders, including politicians, civil society organisations, and the general public worked together to establish the South African Constitution, a legal framework outlining the structure and powers of government, as well as the rights and responsibilities of citizens. This marked a significant transition from apartheid to a democratic society. However, despite this new approach, African schools continue to embrace colonial legacies through their policies and practices. To address this issue, Emmanuel et al (2024) argue that it is crucial to decolonise the curriculum and recognise the value of African identities, cultures, and knowledge systems.   This starts with a focus on critical self-awareness, transpersonal growth, and boundary-crossing communication (Smidt, 2023), which also aligns with the goals of decolonisation. Cultivating these inner development skills (Ankrah et al, 2023) can empower individuals to become more effective change agents. In the 21st-century workspace, decolonised education is essential for promoting diversity and inclusion by creating more inclusive and equitable workplaces; fostering innovation by encouraging critical thinking and creativity; building global competence by developing intercultural understanding and communication skills; preparing individuals to address complex global challenges, such as climate change, poverty, and inequality, through education and skill development.   According to Ankrah et al (2023), inner development is a continuous, collective process of inquiry, growth, and learning. It cannot be pursued in isolation but requires a supportive context. By cultivating inner capacities such as wisdom, compassion, and resilience, people can better address the challenges facing them. In this sense, wisdom relates to the quality of having experience, knowledge, and good judgment. It is the ability to make sound decisions based on understanding, insight, and learning from past experiences. It includes a willingness to embrace diversity by perceiving human values and behaviors from multiple perspectives.   ‘Social fields’, which refers to the complex networks of relationships, power dynamics, and cultural practices that shape individual and collective experiences, is a foundational concept (Pomeroy & Herrmann, 2024) helpful both for understanding collective lived experience and for developing methodologies to effect systems change. In the context of decolonising education, social fields are significant because they highlight the interconnectedness of various social, cultural, and political factors that influence educational outcomes. We literally need to know the water we swim in (Pomeroy & Herrmann, 2024).   According to Waghid and Meda (2023) a decolonial approach to global citizenship education (GCE) would enable students to critically analyse their preconceptions, group and individual identities, and perceptions of local and global structures. Their article explores defamiliarisation as a decolonising pedagogical practice in teacher education. By disrupting habitual patterns of cognition, defamiliarisation through art and film encourages pre-service teachers to view the ordinary in new ways, fostering global citizenship.   In her longitudinal arts-based inquiry, performed in a semi-rural South African context, Smidt (2023) advocates for a transpersonal pedagogy – an educational approach that extends beyond individual perspectives to explore multidimensional realities. The inquiry involved nine post-school youths in a non-curricular situation. The evidence (data) consist of semi-structured, open-ended pre-project questionnaires, followed by mid-project reflections, individual short film-productions, artwork and design, and post-project reflections submitted after the community-engaged screening event. Rather than departing from a theoretical framework, this inquiry takes as its starting point a post-qualitative, open methodology, positioning itself in a contested space within academia. Smidt explores the potential of film literacy, as a key component of this pedagogy, and suggests that it involves more than just digital and media skills; it fosters empathy, critical thinking, and a global perspective. ‘Film literacy’ in this inquiry encompasses different dimensions of human communication, transcending language barriers through multimodal media to identify, analyse, interpret, create, and impart information in a clear and powerfully expressive way.   Additionally, as a boundary-crossing competence (Walker & Nocon, 2007:178) within the particular South African context, in this inquiry, film literacy in a non-formal, post-school context is understood to facilitate communication and cooperation across disciplines, culturally defined boundaries, and between communities of practice-members (Wenger, 1998; Fox, 2011:70). By integrating film literacy into education, learners can be equipped with the essential skills and mindset needed to navigate the 21st-century workplace.   The concept of social fields (Pomeroy & Herrmann, 2024) can significantly influence our understanding of decolonisation in both continuous professional development (CPD) and researcher awareness. In the arts-based inquiry, Smidt (2023) deliberately moves away from traditional, often colonial, approaches to knowledge production and analysis. It involves not using terms such as ‘data’, ‘analysis’, and ‘decolonisation’, and finding alternative ways to explore and communicate the findings that have the potential to make sense when implemented in other contexts. A decolonial approach to education and research further relates to often working in contexts that are not receptive to our differences in exploring alternative ways of knowing and doing.   Film literacy can thus be a powerful tool for decolonisation by providing a platform for marginalised voices to be heard and understood. Through storytelling, film-making can challenge dominant narratives and promote alternative perspectives. It helps individuals to become media literate, enabling them to critically evaluate the information they consume and produce. By fostering critical thinking and empathy, film literacy can help individuals develop more nuanced understandings of history and culture.   In practice, implementing a decolonised education to empower South African youth in a rapidly changing world, where foundational knowledge and skills are constantly evolving, requires a systemic transformation (Karsten et al, 2020; Smidt, 2023). This process includes changes in curriculum, pedagogy, and teacher training informed by research and innovation in both formal and informal education (Petranová et al, 2017; Adams et al, 2021; Smidt, 2023). Similarly, in Africa “there are serious difficulties inherent in implementing the comprehensive, multifaceted educational policy reforms being proposed by the international community ... Even if the time, funds, and other resources had been adequate [which they never were] however, it is unlikely the reforms would have been implemented as planned” (Moulton et al, 2002: 2, 210).   Relating these understandings to real-life situations, the potential of film literacy to act as a catalyst for transpersonal growth and societal change is directly relevant to decolonising education due to its potential to challenge dominant narratives by encouraging critical thinking and media literacy, enabling individuals to question and challenge dominant narratives, often rooted in colonial ideologies. Additionally, by analysing and interpreting films, learners can identify and deconstruct power structures and systemic inequalities. It also amplifies marginalised voices by providing a platform for those voices to be heard and understood. Furthermore, by creating and sharing films, marginalised communities can challenge stereotypes, reclaim their narratives, and promote cultural diversity. It fosters empathy and inter-cultural understanding by exposing learners to diverse perspectives and experiences. Also, by engaging with films from different cultures, learners can develop intercultural understanding and challenge ethnocentric views. And lastly, it promotes social justice and activism by raising awareness of social issues and mobilising communities, enabling learners to identify social injustices and develop strategies for addressing them. By integrating film literacy into decolonised education, learners can be empowered to become critical thinkers, active citizens, and agents of social change. Current education in South Africa often reflects colonial influences, such as a Eurocentric curriculum and standardised testing. A decolonised education would prioritise a more inclusive and culturally relevant curriculum. It would also emphasise critical thinking, problem-solving, and creativity. The current South African education model is disconnected from the realities of young people (Smidt, 2023: 79). This disconnect arises from the lack of involvement of stakeholders, policymakers, and curriculum planners in teaching and learning processes.   To address this, it is suggested that critical pedagogy re-imagine power dynamics and the role of continuous learning in the 21st century. By challenging dominant ideologies and practices, critical pedagogy can empower learners to become agents of social change and transformation. In the context of management learning and education, critical pedagogy, which challenges dominant ideologies and power structures, can address this issue. It promotes critical reflection and problem-solving, encouraging students to engage with moral and ethical issues. This approach can help develop responsible and ethical leaders. By focusing on critical reflection and problem-solving, critical pedagogy can empower students to become responsible leaders who can navigate complex social and ethical issues.   The specific meaning and implementation of decolonialisation may vary depending on different perspectives and contexts. Therefore, it is important to engage in open dialogue and collaboration to develop a shared vision for a decolonised education. By addressing these points, a response to the dialogue can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the role of education in decolonisation and the potential of film literacy as a tool for social change. References   Adams, S., Farrelly, T.A. & Holland, J. 2021. Non-formal education for sustainable development: A case study of the ‘Children in the wilderness’ eco-club programme in the Zambezi region, Journal of Education for Sustainable Development , 14(2): 117-139.   Adefila, A., Teixeira, R. V., Morini, L., Garcia, M. L. T., Delboni, T.M.Z.G.F., Spolander, G. & Khalil-Babatunde, M. 2021. Higher education decolonisation: #Whose voices and their geographical locations?  Globalisation, Societies and Education , 20(3): 262-276.   Akinmolayan, E.S., Hingston, C.A., Akpan, U.J. & Arise, O.A. 2024. ‘Towards decolonisation of primary school education in South Africa’, South African Journal of Childhood Education,  14(1): a1440.   Ankrah, D., Bristow, D., Hires, D. & Henriksson, J.A. 2023. Inner Development Goals: from inner growth to outer change, Field Actions Science Reports , Special Issue 25: 82-87.    Fox, N. J. 2011. Boundary objects, social meanings and the success of new technologies, Sociology , 45(1): 70-85.   Karsten, I., van der Merwe, M., & Steenekamp, K. 2020. Empowering accounting students to enhance the self-determination skills demanded by the Fourth Industrial Revolution, South African Journal of Higher Education , 34(2): 36-58.   Moulton, J., Mundy, K., Welmond, M. & Williams, J. 2002. Education Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa: Paradigm Lost? Westport: Praeger.   Petranová, D., Hossová, M. & Velicky, P. 2017. Current development trends of media literacy in European Union Countries, Communication Today , 8(1).   Pomeroy, E. & Herrmann, L. 2024. Social Fields: Knowing the Water We Swim in, The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science .   Smidt, W. 2023. The use of film literacy in the development of critical self-awareness and transpersonal growth amongst a group of post-school youth . Thesis (D.Ed.). Cape Peninsula University of Technology, 328 pages.   Smidt, W. & Waghid, Z. 2024. Making short films is a powerful way to learn job skills: 5 ways it prepares students for work.  [Online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/making-short-films-is-a-powerful-way-to-learn-job-skills-5-ways-it-prepares-students-for-work-224417 [accessed: 30 January 2025].   Stein, S. & Andreotti, V.D.O. 2016. Decolonisation and higher education, In M. Peters (Ed.), Encyclopedia of educational philosophy and theory . Singapore: Springer.   Waghid, Z. & Meda, L. 2023. Defamiliarization in advancing a decolonial approach to global citizenship education, Prospects.   Walker, D. & Nocon, H. 2007. Boundary-crossing competence: Theoretical considerations and educational design, Mind, Culture, and Activity, 14: 178-195.   Wenger, E. 1998. Communities of practice: Learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Articles Click on the article title below to read: Broader challenges in the decoloniality of being, knowledge and power in Africa Prof Dr Melha Rout Biel Crafting urban equality through grassroots critical pedagogies: Weave, sentipensar, mobilize, reverberate, emancipate Adriana Allen, Julia Wesely, Paola Blanes, Florencia Brandolini, Mariana Enet, Rodrigo Faria G. Iacovini, Rosario Fassina, Bahía Flores Pacheco, Graciela Medina, Alejandro Muniz, Soledad Pérez, Silsa Pineda, Marilyn Reina, Luz Amparo Sánchez Medina, and Juan Xavier How China can accelerate an African and South African green economy and technology expansion, and low-carbon development Daryl Swanepoel Monitoring and evaluation systems: An underrated resource in strengthening effectiveness of governance on a global scale Nondumiso Alice Sithole Decolonised education: A collection of Essays   ESSAY 1: Re-framing narratives: Exploring the transformative potential of short film-making Dr Wendy Smidt ESSAY 2: Reimagining Education in South Africa: Decolonising the Curriculum for Equity and Inclusion Dr Pryah Mahabeer ESSAY 3: Decolonising Education in South Africa: Reclaiming the Dustbin of African History Dr Oscar Koopman & Dr Karen Koopman ESSAY 4: Moving the Decolonising Education Imperative Productively Forward: A Framework for Curriculum Knowledge Prof Aslam Fataar

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Dr Oscar Koopman & Dr Karen Koopman Throughout history, two contrasting traditions in education have always unfolded. The first – “instrumental in nature” – positioning education as a tool serving the needs of governance, political influence, and economic demands (Bobbit, 1919; Tyler, 1949). The second – “education” in its purest sense – embracing an open, deep, exploratory engagement between teacher and learner (Murray, 1999).    While pedagogy often focuses on specific outcomes, true education encourages inquiry without a predetermined end. Like a genuine conversation where the direction and outcome remain unknown, the educational experience resists a single measure, allowing learning to unfold naturally through the shared space of teacher and learner. When framed as pedagogy, however, learning becomes something measurable, evaluated by its capacity to fulfil particular social, political, or economic goals. This dynamic suggests an enduring tension, those who advocate for true education must continually defend it against the utilitarian drive of pedagogy.    Historically, proponents of true education – who seek to cultivate free thought that results in inner freedom, critical reflection, self-awareness and personal transformation, who do not see education as a pathway for career readiness or economic gain – faced significant challenges (as seen during the #Fallist movement in 2015). To revive the call for a true educational experience for every learner and to deal with the shadow of hundreds of years of alienating colonialism, today there is a passionate and hopeful call to sweep away the shackles of any remnants of foreign dominance and control over our education system.    Of course, it has not been enough to replace the external and more obvious oppressive institutions the colonisers imposed here. In Koopman and Koopman’s (2023) book titled, Decolonising the South African University: Towards Curriculum as Self-Authentication , Jeffrey Beyer (2023) uses a powerful metaphor in the foreword to caution against the limitations of superficial or symbolic change. He writes, “a struggling business does not hope to renew itself and begin to thrive by replacing the sign on the shop door with the new owner’s name and then proceeding to sell the same goods in the same way” (p. i). This metaphor speaks directly to South Africa’s challenge over the last three decades with its education system post-apartheid.   For decades, South Africa sought to reform its educational institutions by making structural and symbolic changes, such as renaming schools, universities, and departments, or revising curricula to reflect more inclusive, democratic ideals. However, despite these efforts, the underlying content, teaching methods, and philosophical foundations often remained deeply rooted in colonial paradigms.   This approach, while well-intentioned, was like putting a new label on the same old product, without fundamentally transforming the ideas, approaches, and values embedded within the curriculum – which continued to largely emphasise Eurocentric knowledge, prioritising Western theories and perspectives while marginalising African indigenous knowledge systems, languages, and ways of knowing. This limited the ability of South African education to truly “thrive” as a means of self-authentication, as it left students disconnected from their cultural heritage and identities.   To genuinely decolonise the curriculum, South Africa needs more than a new sign on the door; it requires a rethinking of the “goods” themselves. This means developing curricula that draw on African epistemologies, prioritise African languages and histories, and cultivate a sense of belonging and self-worth in students. Revisit and explore the deeper regions of their personal experience and culture – to reimagine and embody a way of being that has greater fidelity to the wisdom of history. This reimagining needs to be carried out in all regions of the personal psyche and the larger social milieu. Only by transforming the essence of what is taught and how it is taught can South African education move from superficial changes to substantive ones that empower students to see themselves authentically reflected in their education.   This leads to the question: If the country’s universities claim to be African Universities, but are subjected to a curriculum and its associated pedagogies that is almost entirely Western in nature, what is African about them?   Where is the cultural capital in their learning spaces or the strong African values, traditions and ethos that have a deeply held interconnectedness with nature from which they derive their epistemologies and ontologies?   According to the decolonial scholar and philosopher Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ndlovu, it lies in the “dustbin of history” with “those crucial thinkers who provided important concepts to understand the world we live in but who, due to epistemic racism, have been ignored and considered ‘inferior thinkers’ in Westernised universities” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ndlovu, 2022).   But where is this “dustbin of history”, and how can the knowledge it contains be accessed? It is one thing to critique the dehumanising legacy of Western colonialism on African education, but it is another challenge altogether to bring forward transformative ideas that disrupt the deep-rooted Western paradigms dominating South Africa’s classrooms. As Mbembe (2016) emphasises, the real work lies here: in creating a meaningful rupture in the current frameworks of knowledge. To effectively pursue decolonisation, he encourages academics to reimagine what alternative models to the Eurocentric academic structures might look like, models that affirm African perspectives, values, and methodologies as foundational rather than peripheral.   Therefore, to disrupt the confines of canonical Western knowledge, there must be a revival and reclamation of what Mbembe calls the “dustbin of history”, where “the West” has discarded the profound ideas of thinkers like Mbembe (1974; 2001), Wa Thiong’o (1986), Nkrumah (1970), Fanon (1967), Nabudere (2011), and other postcolonial scholars and indigenous practitioners. It is the philosophical insights of these scholars, along with the wealth of indigenous knowledge and its practical applications – knowledge that has been deeply inscribed in students’ minds since their “first birth” – that hold the power to decolonise and liberate their minds and bodies.   This “dustbin knowledge” can be rediscovered in the lived experiences and cultural wisdom embedded within the bodies of students during their “first birth” as children, when they were nurtured and taught through the lens of their cultural heritage. This equips them with unique knowledge, creative problem-solving abilities, and the resilience to face future challenges. In this process, children develop adaptive solutions to life’s obstacles in ways that do not rely on set methodologies or rigid procedures. Rather, their learning is absorbed into the very fabric of their beings, becoming inscribed within their connective tissues and traveling through complex neurological pathways. This embodied scientific knowledge – rooted in cultural experience and personal engagement with the world – represents an invaluable resource for decolonisation and offers a pathway to authentic, holistic understanding that Westernised curricula often fail to address.    Colonisation introduced what could be seen as a “second birth”, an imposed identity that sought to overwrite indigenous ways of knowing. However, through decolonisation, it now becomes the responsibility of teachers to facilitate a “third birth”, where learners/students can reconnect with their African identities and affirm the legitimacy of this so-called “dustbin” knowledge. This third birth necessitates the thoughtful integration of Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) into school/university curricula – not as a passing trend, but as an essential rebirth that honours and revitalises African identity. By reclaiming and reinstating what has always held value for learners/students, a process is enacted not rooted in colonial origins, but in a deep reclamation of the self. This journey allows students to rediscover their own meaning and purpose, fostering an understanding of their true existence and becoming. So, how do teachers facilitate this third birth successfully? By using an ubuntu-conscious approach, a teacher seeks to foster an inclusive and reflective classroom environment where learners/students are encouraged to question, resist, and engage in productive opposition to the teacher and/or the content material. This approach goes beyond delivering abstract knowledge from textbooks disconnected from students’ lived realities. Instead, it encourages students to critique materials through their own beliefs and cultural perspectives, engaging their sense of self in the process. By inviting students to explore the values and worldviews rooted in their backgrounds, the teacher sets the foundation for dismantling Western-centric knowledge systems and promotes deep learning anchored in self-awareness and relationality.   To disrupt dominant Western paradigms and their reliance on abstract, predetermined knowledge, the ubuntu-conscious teacher   emphasises self-consciousness, drawing on a student’s connection to the world around them. This includes spiritual awareness, which encompasses both personal beliefs and the broader cultural practices connecting individuals to higher beings, the environment, and community life. Encouraging students to explore concepts such as porosity (how they identify with the world outside themselves) and transluminality (the intersection of internal and external perceptions that shape their consciousness) in order to promote a deeper awareness of their place in the world.   Acknowledging the diverse perspectives within any cultural group, this approach values the unique experiences that students bring of their lives – experiences that resonate with what ethno-cosmologists refer to as cosmological sagacity. This concept considers the insights and wisdom of not only respected sages but also everyday members of indigenous communities, capturing the essence of lived experience that shapes personal understanding within a cultural context.   Encouraging self-consciousness in students is an essential step towards achieving what Mbembe (2016) describes as “restorative epistemic justice”. This deep education requires “deep time” and “deep thinking” and moves away from superficial, standardised knowledge toward engagement with fundamental aspects of life such as joy, sorrow, community, and connection with nature. A critical component of this deep learning is guiding students to reflect on the essence of being human, which includes understanding their own significance and agency within their communities. In essence, the goal of ubuntu-conscious   pedagogy is to create space for students to access and reconnect with culturally grounded knowledge that may otherwise be dismissed in favour of Western dogma.   The cultivation of self-consciousness within ubuntu pedagogy also aims to develop students’ critical, independent thinking by introducing them to multiple perspectives and ideologies. Rather than reinforcing established norms, students are encouraged to question and engage with differing viewpoints. Through discussions that include divergent voices and perspectives, students begin to see beyond their initial assumptions, developing insights into why they believe and act as they do. This reflective practice, known as redemptive cosmology, involves examining personal behaviours and actions in ways that may be beneficial or harmful to others in the community. Such self-reflection can be transformative, opening students to new, culturally resonant ways of understanding and being.   An ubuntu-conscious   teacher must also be familiar with the lived realities and cultural practices of the communities from which their students come. This cultural understanding helps to validate or challenge students' perspectives on critical issues within their communities, contributing to a richer, more informed dialogue in the classroom. A meaningful way to build this cultural knowledge is through university-community partnerships. These partnerships encourage inter-epistemological dialogue, allowing academics to learn from practitioners and community members. Such collaborations and engagements generate deep thinking and renewed perspectives, allowing educators to gain insight into cultural beliefs, traditional practices, and dispel myths that may shape students’ understandings.   These partnerships foster discussions that bring epistemic restorative justice into the classroom. When students see that their lived experiences and cultural practices are respected as valid sources of knowledge, it affirms their identities and promotes a deeper connection with the learning process. This culturally integrated approach allows students to move beyond the imposition of colonial knowledge systems and toward a decolonised, authentic understanding of self and community. Ubuntu-conscious   pedagogy, therefore, serves not only to educate but to heal and empower by valuing the whole person and the cultural wisdom they carry.   References   Fanon, F. 1967.  Black skin, white mask . New York: Grove Press.   Mbembe, A. 2001.  On the postcolony . US: University of California Press.   Mbembe, A. 2016. Decolonising the university: New directions,  Arts and Humanities in Higher Education, 15(1): 29-45.   Nabudere, D.W. 2011. Archie Mafeje: Scholar, activist and thinker . Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa.   Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S.J. & Ndlovu, M. 2022. Introduction – Marxism and decolonisation in the 21st century, In S.J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni & M. Ndlovu (Eds.), Marxism and decolonisation in the 21st century: Living theories and true ideas . UK: Routledge.   Nkrumah, K. 1970.  Consciencism: Philosophy and ideology for decolonisation . Africa: Panaf.   Wa Thiong’o, N. 2009.  Something torn and new: An African renaissance . UK: Routledge. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Prof Aslam Fataar   The movement to decolonise education has become a pressing concern for those critically engaged with the nature and purpose of university and school curricula. The decolonisation call echoes the intellectual currents and shifts of the 1950s and 1960s on the African continent, when many African countries gained independence from European colonial rule.   Those few decades led to a revolution in the understanding of Africa, however its impetus was thwarted by the political authoritarianism and economic decay of the post-independence period, which was particularly destructive for Africa's universities. The movement towards decolonisation has recently gained traction once more in challenging the entrenched dominance of Eurocentric knowledge systems in higher education. At its heart is a call for inclusivity and the centring of decolonial and Africa-centred epistemologies within university and school knowledge frameworks.   Students have advocated for an all-inclusive approach to inform curriculum reform, urging that decoloniality and Africa-centredness should form the foundation of educational knowledge. This impulse to decolonise education has generated significant discourse, reflected in academic scholarship and popular media. The #RhodesMustFall Movement of 2015, where groups of students and staff members mobilised for urgent action against institutional racism, catapulted South Africa’s decolonisation and Africanisation agenda forward and inspired the emergence of allied student movements at other universities and around the world.  However, in order to genuinely and effectively respond to these calls, there first needs to be an exploration of what the epistemological underpinnings of decoloniality are and how its principles can guide curriculum knowledge selection within universities.   Universities and schools are intricate systems comprising diverse knowledge domains – disciplinary, applied, vocational, and professional – all of which have distinct structures and logics. Understanding these structures provides the basis for exploring how a decolonial approach can inform curriculum reform. A conceptual toolkit or ‘educational knowledge approach to curriculum selection’ is useful here. To develop this framework, there are two theoretical resources that have traditionally been seen as incommensurate: the decoloniality literature and social realist approaches to educational knowledge (see Fataar 2022).   Within this framework, there are three interconnected parts. First, decoloniality critiques the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being, emphasising the colonial subjugation of knowledge systems through epistemic violence. This critique underscores the centrality of race in colonial epistemology (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013) and advocates for cognitive justice: the radical expansion and pluralisation of the Western-dominated knowledge canon. This entails recognising and incorporating subaltern and excluded epistemologies (Fataar & Subreenduth, 2015). Decoloniality calls for epistemic openness, fostering intercultural education and embracing the diverse ways of knowing that define humanity.   Decolonialising education favours an intercultural understanding of heterodox forms of being human. All knowledge forms have to be brought into play in an intercultural education that promotes epistemic openness to the knowledge of all human beings. This inclusive approach to knowledge puts paid to the idea that one person’s knowledge system is superior to another’s. Despite accusations of being caught up in 'obsolete' knowledge of the past, decoloniality is in fact focused on the complex challenges that characterise our 'posthuman' condition.   Questions about emerging life forms in the wake of climate change, artificial intelligence, and technological innovation take centre stage in their dynamic interaction with decoloniality. The call for decolonising education is thus nothing less than the full incorporation of all of humanity's knowledge systems, past, present, and in anticipation of future knowledge constellations, into the knowledge selection systems of schools and universities. However, not all knowledge can logically be included in the curriculum. Knowledge selection is required through the contingent curriculum processes of specific university and school programmes, curricula and modules.   The second part of the framework is based on the view that decolonising education advances three essential curriculum claims: centring decolonial epistemology knowledge – a comprehensive ecologies of knowledges approach (Santos, 2014) challenges Eurocentric dominance and fosters epistemic plurality; knowledge and identity – decoloniality seeks to restore the dignity of subjugated peoples, recognise their knowledge traditions and identities and unlock their full human potential; and knowledge relevance and contextualisation – this claim emphasises making epistemological connections between curriculum content and people's contextually contingent lived realities, indigenous knowledge systems, languages, and ways of knowing (Cooper & Morrell, 2014). The third aspect turns to social realist theories, which offer valuable tools for curriculum selection. Social realism emphasises the conceptual schemes that structure disciplines, distinguishing between vertical knowledge structures (e.g., physics and chemistry) with tightly linked concepts and horizontal knowledge structures (e.g., sociology and political science) with more segmental conceptual arrangements. While these structures are distinct, both provide spaces for integrating decolonial principles.   For instance, disciplines with horizontal structures – such as sociology and journalism – can incorporate diverse theoretical perspectives to foster inclusivity and robust social science (Haraway, 1988). Conversely, decolonising vertical structures in science can involve acknowledging the historical contributions of non-Western epistemologies, such as Arab and Indian contributions to mathematics, African contributions to astronomy, and Asian medical traditions. This approach aligns with Santos's (2015) internal and external plurality concepts, emphasising the interplay of scientific and non-scientific knowledge over time.   Decolonising the humanities and social sciences would incorporate insights from figures like Ibn Khaldun, whose concept of ‘asabiyyah’ – an Islamic term referring to the deep sense of group connection and solidarity that can be felt between people in rural and urban contexts – predates Western theories of social structures, social cohesion or ubuntu-inspired philosophies that foreground African cosmologies (Alatas, 2006; Letseka, 2013). Similarly, history curricula could challenge Eurocentric periodisations by exploring multiple models of modernity and their global intersections, drawing on thinkers like Enrique Dussel and his notion of transmodernity, which celebrates epistemic diversity without collapsing into relativism (Grosfoguel, 2013).   In professional and vocational fields, disciplines such as design provide a clear case for contextual relevance. Design curricula can integrate Africa-centred aesthetics, languages, and architectures, demonstrating how knowledge structures can draw meaningfully from lived contexts. Similarly, applied disciplines like engineering and law can incorporate decolonial principles by emphasising their relevance to African contexts while respecting their internal conceptual logics.   The different academic fields can thoughtfully choose curriculum content. But, to make education relevant and inclusive, two main factors must be considered. First, how closely is the knowledge tied to real-world situations? Second, how well does it connect to other ideas within that field?   For example, subjects like design and fine arts are readily connected to real-world contexts, making them a good fit for including ideas from decolonial thinking. These subjects can integrate diverse perspectives and experiences more easily because they often involve solving practical problems or responding to specific cultural or social needs. In design, students might engage with local traditions, alternative cultural perspectives, or sustainability practices, making bringing in knowledge from different backgrounds and contexts relatively easy. In art, students engage with the imagery and symbols that surround us all, giving them a natural platform from which to mirror and respond to the current status quo visually in new, thought-provoking ways.     On the other hand, subjects like engineering are often focused on technical concepts and high requirements for internal conceptual consistency within the field itself. This does not mean engineering cannot incorporate broader contextual perspectives, but it requires more deliberate adjustments. For example, engineering programmes might include case studies or projects that highlight the social impact of technology or explore solutions relevant to underserved communities. By doing so, they can bring in a sense of context that aligns with decolonial aims without losing the strong conceptual structure needed for working in these applied technical fields.   Ultimately, the idea is to create a curriculum that balances each discipline's specific needs and strengths with a commitment to inclusion. There is value in intentionally selecting content that enriches students' understanding of diverse ways of knowing, even in fields that might initially seem distant from these concerns.   Incorporating a decolonial approach into university curricula requires nuanced, context-sensitive strategies. By understanding the dynamic interplay between context and concepts in specific disciplines, universities can create curricula that embody decoloniality principles and Africa-centred relevance. This process is neither straightforward nor exhaustive, but it is essential for constructing knowledge systems that reflect the richness and plurality of human experience. The work ahead demands intellectual rigour, institutional commitment, and ongoing dialogue across diverse knowledge traditions. References   Alatas, F. 2006. Ibn Khaldun and contemporary Sociology, International Sociology , 21(6): 782-795.   Brennan, M. 2017. Struggles for teacher education in the age of the Anthropocene, Journal of Education , 69: 43-65.   Cooper, D. & Morrell, R. (eds). 2014. Africa-Centred Knowledge: Crossing Fields & Worlds . Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey.   Fataar, A. & Subreenduth, S. 2015. The search for ecologies of knowledge in the encounter with African epistemicide in South African education, South African Journal of Higher Education , 29(2): 106-121.   Fataar, A. 2022, Pursuing decolonial knowledge building in South African higher education. In Hlatswayo, M, Adendorf, H, Blackie, M, Fataar, A, and Maluleke P. (eds), Decoloniality and Knowledge Building in South Africa. (Routledge, London).   Grosfoguel, R. 2013. The Structure of Knowledge in Westernised Universities: Epistemic Racism / Sexism and the Four Genocides / Epistemicides of the Long 16th Century, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge , XI(1): 73–89.   Letseka, M. 2013. Educating for Ubuntu/Botho: Lessons from Basotho Indigenous Education, Open Journal of Philosophy , 3(2): 337-344.   Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2013. Why decoloniality in the 21st century? The Thinker , 48: 10-15.   Santos, B. 2014. Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide . Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JANUARY 2025 by Daryl Swanepoel   Abstract   Green energy, low-carbon development and green technology offer economic opportunities for South Africa and African countries, which have abundant potential for renewable energy generation. However, the scale and pace of investment in green energy in Africa is sorely inadequate. Inconsistent policies, inefficient public services, corruption and lack of rule of law all undermine domestic private and international development finance involvement in green projects. Limited access to finance, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient government incentives for the private sector, households and foreign investors, also deter new investors. Thirty of the world’s 40 most climate vulnerable countries are in Africa, yet Africa emits only 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Unless Africa responds effectively to climate change, up to 118 million people will live in abject poverty by 2030.   South Africa and Africa should look to China for lessons on the way forward. China is the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions by volume but now produces most of the world’s renewable energy. China expanded its renewable energy capacity with astonishing speed and scale. The country’s industrial policy – based on a pillar of world-class infrastructure suitable for shipping goods anywhere in the world – turned China into a global giant manufacturer of electric vehicles. Partnering with China would open up many opportunities for both parties to boost their green economies and technologies, and low-carbon development – together preparing for what will surely be more stormy weather ahead.   Introduction   Green energy, low-carbon development and green technology offer economic opportunities for South Africa and African countries.   They can drive economic growth, create jobs and reduce poverty through the creation of new manufacturing industries, the development of new technologies, the development of a green economy, and the expansion of infrastructure, agriculture and ecotourism (Biswas & Yila, 2022).   South Africa and Africa have abundant potential for renewable energy generation, and not only for their own consumption. However, the scale and pace of investment in green energy in Africa is inadequate. South Africa and Africa’s transition to a green economy must be secured in such a way that it lifts inclusive economic growth, increases development and expands industrialisation.   Developed countries such as Denmark – which generates 57% of its power from wind energy – have energy mixes that are dominated by renewable energy, but still rely on fossil fuels, either for baseload power, the transport industry or for heavy export industries.   African countries are also struggling to source funding to address losses and damages linked to climate change. It is estimated that developing countries, including those in Africa, need at least US$100 billion a year to adequately finance a Loss and Damage Fund aimed at compensating them for such losses and damages (Kabukuru, 2023).   Regional power pools, whether through renewable energy or gas, are critical to boost individual country power grids. This will require power to be traded between countries, and so avoid energy shortages or surpluses sitting idle.   But there are many obstacles getting in the way of progress. Inconsistent policies and regulations in South Africa and other African countries, inefficient public services, high levels of corruption and lack of rule of law undermine domestic private and international development finance involvement in green projects.   Limited access to finance and insufficient government incentives for the private sector, households and foreign investors, deter green investments. South Africa and African countries also have inadequate infrastructure for green projects, which hinders delivery and puts off new investors. South Africa and almost all African countries need to upgrade and expand their existing grid infrastructure, while building new renewable energy generation capacity.   Foreign businesses in Africa often do not implement green practices, as there is largely a lack of enforcement in these countries. Whereas local African businesses are often simply not aware of the benefits of green practices, nor do they have the capacity to implement them, nor are there, in many instances, government incentives to do so (UNDP, 2024).   South Africa and Africa could become world leaders in motoring the green economy, if they set appropriate policies and regulations, muster up the political will to push for green energy and secure the requisite investments.   However, South Africa and African countries lack public funds to finance the green economy and low-carbon development. There is also a lack of funding for countries to mitigate against and adapt to climate change. Grant funding is critical for this. Development finance, private finance, and public-private finance is critical to achieve the green economy goals.   James Murombedzi, head of the Addis Ababa-based African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC), says that Africa will have to explore innovative private sector financing structures such as debt-for-nature and debt-for-climate swaps to overcome the climate financial gap. At the African Climate Summit, African leaders expressed their frustrations with the industrialised countries’ inability to honour their commitments to provide adequate climate finance.    The route to climate change mitigation is clear. The International Energy Authority’s (IEA) Roadmap to Net Zero by 2050 , first published in May 2021, outlined how the world can reduce global warming to 1.5°C. It says the world must reduce use of fossil fuels, double energy efficiency, and increase and expand the range of clean energy technologies. The IEA says tripling global installed renewable power capacity, such as solar and wind, by the end of the current decade is the most important lever to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.   Africa disproportionately impacted by climate change   The Paris Agreement’s goal is to curb global warming to 1.5˚C. However, these targets are far off. Africa emits only 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions, and yet, the continent is disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of climate change – with temperature rises higher than the global average (Climate Adaptation Platform, 2024).   A 2024 report by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) shows that 2023 was the warmest year globally on record. The report shows that the three major greenhouse gases – carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide – reached a new record in 2022. It says ocean warming continues to increase, with the ocean heat content at a historic high in 2023.   The report notes that as the ocean absorbs a quarter of annual human-caused emissions, increasing emissions also decreases pH, a process known as “ocean acidification”. This affects organisms and ecosystem services, including food security, by reducing biodiversity, degrading habitats, and endangering fisheries and aquaculture.   As a result, the WMO report reveals that African countries are losing 2-5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to climate change. Many of these countries set aside 9% of their budget to respond to climate extremes. The cost of climate adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa is very high, estimated to be between US$30-50 billion annually over the next decade, representing 2-3% of their GDP.   Unless Africa responds effectively to climate change, up to 118 million people will live in abject poverty – living on less than US$1.90 per day by 2030 – and will be exposed to drought, floods, and other extreme weather conditions, the report says. In fact, “between 1970 and 2021, Africa accounted for 35% of weather, climate, and water-related fatalities” (WMO, 2024).   In 2023, droughts cut North Africa’s cereal production to 10% below a five-year average. In Sudan, sorghum and millet production in 2023 decreased by about 25% and 50%, respectively, compared to 2022 (WMO, 2024).   Thirty of the world’s 40 most climate vulnerable countries are in Africa. A 2022 Mo Ibrahim Foundation report, The Road to COP27: Making Africa’s Case in the Global Climate Debate , emphasised that Africa’s small contribution to CO2 emissions, and the continent’s disproportionate vulnerability to the negative impact of climate change, should necessitate the continent getting climate financing from industrial countries responsible for emissions.   Crucial to consider is that Africa holds 65% of the uncultivated arable land left in the world, and therefore holds the key for the future of food globally. The rising global population makes optimising the productivity of available land even more urgent, since climate change reduces water availability and reduces crop productivity.   “Extreme weather – including droughts, cyclones and heatwaves – is increasing in frequency and intensity, alongside trends of urbanisation, population growth and weak conservation enforcement. Ecosystem damage and biodiversity loss is now having major negative impacts on livelihoods, causing US$7-15 billion in yearly losses (projected to reach US$40 billion by 2030)” (UNDP, 2023: 19).   Research by the ACPC showed “the increasing frequency and severity of climate change impacts resulting in disproportionate effects on African economies and societies, with countries estimated to be losing on average 2-5% of GDP and many countries diverting up to 9% of their budgets into unplanned expenditures on responses to extreme weather events.”   At the same time, over 600 million people in Africa lack electricity. Affordable clean energy sources is therefore critical to plug the power gap.   Africa’s collective approach to combat climate change   African countries, at an Africa Climate Summit in September 2023, adopted the “Nairobi Declaration” as a broad approach to combat climate change and facilitate a green transition in the region (African Union, 2023). The Nairobi Declaration called for climate-positive growth, renewable energy expansion, the protection and enhancement of biodiversity and nature; green industrialisation; sustainable agriculture; standards, metrics and market mechanisms to value nature, biodiversity and co-benefits; and African countries to adopt policy and enabling environments to support the development of the green economy.   The Nairobi Declaration outlined some of the opportunities for the African region, including the opportunity emerging from its youthful demographics. They could become new markets for innovative solutions and business models. But there are also formidable challenges such as rapidly urbanising populations; lack of skills, resources, capital and political will; and old economy thinking among African governments, political and business elites.   African countries as a group demand that developed countries provide between US$200-400 billion a year by 2030 for loss and damage because of climate change; and US$400 billion a year for adapting to climate change. This is, on top of funding required to reduce emissions.    In December 2023, the Conference of the Parties 28 (COP28) pledged record funding to climate change transition, including to Africa. However, the pledges to Africa at COP28 deferred major financial decisions to COP29, only contributing US$134 million and US$792 million to the Adaptation Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund respectively (Mbungu, Ogallo & Rudic, 2024).   Also in 2023, an Arab-African initiative was launched to improve agriculture and food systems in both regions. The “Africa and Middle East SAFE Initiative”, a public-private partnership, aims to mobilise US$10 billion in funding to support green agriculture. The idea is that Africa can provide food solutions to the Middle East, “where water stress poses immense challenges for food production, and where the cost of water desalinisation is prohibitive for competitive food production to assure food security” (Adesina, 2023).   The project aims to unlock green investments and promote climate-smart agriculture. The focus will be on irrigating two million hectares of African farmland, enhancing climate resilience for 10 million smallholder farmers, with a focus on women and young people, creating two million green jobs, and exporting two million metric tons of food crops from Africa to the Middle East.   In January 2023, African countries organised the Feed Africa Summit in Dakar – convened by the African Development Bank and the Government of Senegal, under the chairmanship of President Macky Sall – where 34 African Heads of State and Government signed the Dakar Declaration.   They agreed to establish food and agriculture delivery compacts, which are clear roadmaps for fully unlocking the potentials of their food and agriculture sector. The African Development Bank mobilised US$72 billion to implement these food and agriculture delivery compacts. This will allow Africa to take proper advantage of the size of its food and agriculture market, which, if cultivated effectively, could reach US$1 trillion by 2030 (Adesina, 2023).   Back in 2016, the African Development Bank launched its Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT) – a continent-wide initiative designed to boost agricultural productivity by using new technologies. TAAT brings productivity-increasing technologies to crop, livestock and fish smallholder farmers. The TAAT programme transfers resilient agricultural technologies to smallholder farmers.   Africa’s green energy, low-carbon funding needs   Investing in green growth alternatives is expensive. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa calculates that US$2 trillion is needed in the power sector alone by 2050 to drive green economic growth in Africa. And yet, the IEA says less than 2% of global investments in clean energy flows into Africa, with the current annual flow of climate finance to Africa standing at US$29.5 billion.   Africa requires an annual capital commitment of US$277 billion to implement Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and achieve agreed-on climate objectives by 2030. The private sector’s involvement in Africa’s climate finance stands at 14%, equivalent to US$4.2 billion in 2021.    Central and East African countries have the largest climate investment shortage as a percentage of GDP, averaging 26% and 23%, respectively. North African countries have lower climate investment gaps, averaging 3% of GDP – they still require up to six times more green capital than current levels. Southern Africa has the largest financial gap in absolute terms, because of South Africa’s massive green capital requirements, around US$107 billion annually, according to the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP).     The UN Economic Commission for Africa’s Deputy Executive Secretary, Antonio Pedro, said African countries could marshal US$82 billion annually through accessing carbon markets. The United Nations (UN) estimated that combined developing and emerging countries, including Africa, need US$2 trillion annually by 2030 to deal with climate change.   Industrial countries have not delivered on their climate finance promises. African countries have called on industrialised countries to “scale up climate finance to make up for the shortfall caused by [their] failure to deliver US$100 billion per year by 2020 and through 2025” (Kabukuru, 2023). African countries are also asking for between US$200-400 billion a year by 2030 for climate losses and damage; and US$400 billion a year for climate change adaptation.   Industrial countries and emerging powers collectively paid out US$7 trillion in 2022, for producing coal, oil and natural gas, in the form of subsidies such as tax breaks or price caps (Parry, Black & Vernon-Li, 2021). China is the biggest subsidiser of fossil fuels, followed by the US, Russia, India and the European Union (EU) (Parry, Black & Vernon-Li, 2021).   Fossil-fuel subsidies rose during the global increase in energy prices caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the country’s economic reboots following the Covid-19 pandemic. The subsidies were the equivalent of 7.1% of global gross domestic product. The subsidies have risen by US$2 trillion over the past two years.   Following energy shortages because of the Russia-Ukraine war, many industrial countries have returned to the use of coal for power. In October 2023, Germany’s Cabinet approved putting on-reserve lignite-fired power plants back online until the end of March 2024, as a step to replace scarce natural gas this winter and avoid shortages. This happened in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a sudden drop in Russian gas imports to Germany – Berlin reactivated coal-fired power plants and extended their lifespans (Pole, 2022).   Austria, the Netherlands and Italy also, in 2023, started up their coal power stations (Pole, 2022). Previously the Netherlands had limited coal power to just over a third of the country’s power output.   In 2022, in its bid to cut planet-warming  emissions by 55% by 2030  from 1990 levels, the European Commission (EU) proposed a 100% reduction in CO2 emissions from new cars by 2035 (Pole, 2022). That means it would not be possible to sell combustion engine cars from then on. However, the German government refused to accept this ban.   Harnessing Africa’s own resources   African countries could also generate income from the value chains of non-renewable resources – for example, critical minerals – mainly found in Africa and essential for battery production.    African governments have made commitments to contribute US$26.4 billion from domestic public resources for green energy annually. However, given rising government debt, mismanagement and corruption, combined with competing developmental priorities, it is highly unlikely that they will reach these targets. Public-private partnerships to finance climate change and drive green business will be crucial.   The continent has abundant renewable energy resources. It accounts for 40% of global solar irradiation. It has a 20,000MW geothermal power potential; a 30,000MW hydropower potential and a 110,000MW wind power potential. The challenge is to secure a smart transition, growing renewable energy, increase decarbonisation by using gas and gradually easing out coal – or finding clean coal technology.   As for “green recovery”, pledges by industrial countries and multilateral organisations have not only been insufficient, but also not forthcoming. According to the UNDP, for every US dollar spent addressing the climate crisis, four dollars fund fossil-fuel subsidies, perpetuating the crisis (UNDP, 2024: 17).   The UNDP argues an urgent transition into green business is a necessity for Africa to overcome the “dual challenges posed by the increasingly extreme impacts of climate change and the imperatives of continued economic growth”. It argues a green business transition “represents the opportunity to pursue alternative growth models, leapfrog generations of technology and build a more sustainable future” (UNDP, 2024:17).   Many industrial companies have become guilty of “greenwashing” in Africa. They mislead the public by claiming their products, policies and Environment, Sustainability and Governance (ESG) are environmentally friendly. Banks, mining and fossil fuel companies are among the key culprits in greenwashing. United Nations Secretary General António Guterres at COP27 in November 2022, criticised the practice as dishonest and undermining the fight against climate change.   In August 2024, TotalEnergies, the world’s 19th-biggest greenhouse gas emitter, was found guilty of misleading sustainability advertising in South Africa. TotalEnergies was found guilty of greenwashing by the South African Advertising Regulatory Board (ARB). The complaint was filed by campaign group Fossil Free South Africa.   The lawsuit centred on a partnership between TotalEnergies and South Africa National Parks (SANParks), in which the two organisations partnered in a #FuelYourExperience competition, encouraging people to visit South Africa’s parks. In an advertisement, TotalEnergies said: “We’re committed to sustainable development and environmental protection”, which Fossil Ad Ban highlighted as being “false and misleading” and was “greenwashing”.   Fossil Ad Ban cited the energy company’s “response to the 2015 Paris Climate Treaty has been not to cut, but to continue to expand its emissions, by another 14 million tonnes, to 400 million tonnes of carbon dioxide by 2022” (Doris, 2024). The ARB also ruled that there was “no doubt that the core business of the Advertiser is directly opposed to the issue of sustainable development, as the ongoing exploitation of fossil fuels is contra-indicated in this context” (Doris, 2024).   But developed countries also often misrepresent their policies, initiatives and projects in Africa as “green”, while it is totally the opposite. Unfortunately, African countries do not have laws against greenwashing. Some EU and Southeast Asian nations have introduced guidelines of financial practices to prevent greenwashing.   The UNDP has proposed several key recommendations for how Africa could leverage the green economy. The organisation has proposed the establishment of dedicated green investment banks, facilities and funds, with a specific mandate to support the development of green business in the region via green financing products.   The international organisation proposed that Africa create an urban green business and finance platform to help support Africa’s rapidly growing cities to meet the dual challenges of rapid urbanisation and climate change. The UNDP calls on multi-lateral development banks to do more to reduce investment risk in Africa through the creation of new and innovative instruments, funds and facilities. The UNDP also called for African countries to establish nature as an asset class, leveraging the lessons from carbon markets elsewhere as well as Africa’s nature-rich status, to build robust carbon and biodiversity markets. The UNDP proposes that African countries enhance green value chains and capacity, leveraging Africa’s natural abundance of minerals needed in the green transition, along with the region’s sustainable energy, to ensure greater value addition remains within the communities and areas involved in mineral extraction.   South Africa: energy mix   South Africa’s energy mix in 2023/2024 consists of 82.8% coal, with renewable energy providing 8.8%, amounting to 42 000 MW. Nuclear power makes up 6% of electricity output and gas only contributes 3% of South Africa’s power generation. Upgrades to South Africa’s only nuclear plant, at Koeberg, have seen its two reactors having lifetimes extended to 2045 and 2047.   Coal will remain the main source of energy for the immediate future (ITA, 2024). However, around 8.7GW of non-hydro renewable energy capacity is planned to be installed between 2023 and 2032. Solar energy will be the primary source of expansion.   South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnerships plans to repurpose and decommission coal-fired power plants to decrease emissions – the government is planning to close down seven coal-fired power stations by 2032.   The government has eased restrictions for local content in solar. Renewable energy expansion is slowed by opposition to it by interest groups in the ANC-SACP-Cosatu tripartite alliance, and opposition from populist groups and coal-based trade unions to renewable energy.   It is expected that South Africa’s total power capacity will expand by 4GW (ITA, 2024). The expansion will come from non-hydro renewable energy – increasing from 9.3% to 17% in 2032. The South African government’s revised Integrated Resource Plan makes provision for gas to provide 8% of energy capacity.   South Africa’s Renewable Independent Power Producer Programme is expected to increase the non-hydro renewal, because of the lessening of licence restrictions, allowing more private sector involvement in the sector. The developers of renewable energy are mostly foreign companies that have signed power purchase agreements with Eskom for the electricity they produce.   However, South Africa’s aging, poorly maintained and vandalised network infrastructure undermines the energy distribution network. According to Eskom, the utility needs 8 000km of transmission infrastructure by 2030 to absorb new renewable energy capacity (ITA, 2024). But Eskom’s long-term financial viability is in question, considering its R400 billion debt. Renewable energy companies have already signed purchase agreements with Eskom, agreements which would be compromised should Eskom collapse.   South Africa’s automotive industry contributes 5.3% to South Africa’s GDP and is its biggest manufacturing sector, and supported R270 billion worth of exports in 2023. South Africa’s auto industry was facing headwinds because of the rise in the sales of electric powered vehicles globally, the increased use of fuels with cleaner emissions, and use of new technologies such as autonomous driving vehicles.   In response, South Africa has created the South African Automotive Masterplan, SAAM 2035. It aims to increase the country’s motor vehicle production to 1% of global output. And to increase the yearly exports value of the industry from R200 billion in 2019 to R400 billion in 2035 (IOL, 2024).   Domestically, the country’s declining economy, high fuel prices and high interest rates have compounded the declines in vehicle sales. In 2023 vehicle sales were down 5.8%, exports were down 16.9%, and vehicle production dropped 20%. South Africa’s automotive industry is lagging, and will continue to lag, behind turning its production to new electric vehicles (NEVs), its global competitors.   In fact, Trade and Industry Minister Parks Tau said that South Africa may take 15 to 20 years longer to transition to mass NEVs. To mitigate this, the government is preparing a White Paper on NEVs, which is being put together by the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, the National Treasury, and the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy.   In October 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that the government will introduce tax incentives to make new energy vehicles cheaper for South Africans. The incentives will also cover hybrid vehicles – which use traditional fuels and electricity batteries, and other renewable energy, including hydrogen.   The Government announced NEVs incentives in the Budget in February 2024, providing for a 150% investment allowance for expenses in the initial year of investment, effective from 1 March 2026. Depreciation allowances for new and used machinery and inputs to make NEVs was increased to 40% in the first year and 20% in each of the following three years. “Consideration must be given to incentives for manufacturers as well as tax rebates or subsidies for consumers to accelerate the uptake of electric vehicles,” said Ramaphosa (National Treasury, 2024). South Africa: green energy and low-carbon development funding   South Africa’s Just Transition Framework focuses on public-private partnerships, foreign investment, and blended finance (PCC, 2022). On 4 November 2021, South Africa announced the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) at COP26.   The JETP is a US$8.5 billion funding package from the European Union, Germany, France, the US, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark, to support South Africa securing a just energy transition. The final amount, following additional pledges, is now more than US$11 billion. Only 4% of the amount was grant financing; the rest is concessional loans.   South Africa introduced the Just Energy Transition Implementation Plan at COP28, the annual climate change conference, held in Dubai in 2023. This is a roadmap for achieving decarbonisation of the economy in a just manner. The Implementation Plan was aimed at outlining how the funding would be structured, the priorities, projects and implementation partners. It covers six portfolios: Electricity; Mpumalanga Just Transition; New Energy Vehicles (NEVs); Green Hydrogen; Skills; and Municipalities.    Reports showed that before the JET Implementation Plan was released in 2023, more than R10 billion of the funds had already been allocated or assigned to projects or spent on projects (Davies, 2024). The pre-plan released spending allocations were outlined in the JET Implementation Plan Grant Mapping Register. The register outlines the priority areas for spending.   “By the time the JET Investment Plan was unveiled by President Cyril Ramaphosa on 4 November 2022, 89 of the 145 projects, worth more than R5.3 billion, had already commenced (before November 2022 when the JET IP was publicly announced). The end dates for 26 of them were before Cabinet formally approved the JET IP in November 2023” (Davies, 2024). Furthermore, more than R8.5 billion had been used for projects that had already finished at the time of funding.   Only two projects, out of 145, had not started by the time the funding became available. This means no public discussion on the kinds of projects that needed funding, the organisations to whom the projects should go, and who the beneficiaries should be that receive help.   It is unclear what the criteria for funding are or whether the projects were growth catalytic ones – for example, whether it is for projects developing new manufacturing or fit within a wider industrialisation plan. The application process, funding oversight and selection governance structures appear unclear. The JET IP framework said a JET Funding Platform would be established in 2024 as a “matchmaking mechanism” between implementing entities and beneficiaries.   On the JET IP register of projects only 24% of the funds went to South African implementing organisations. Most of the funding went to donor country companies. Donor agencies take large proportions of the funding to cover their costs. More than R222 million went to consulting and financial advisory firms. A third of the distributed funding went to German entities: among these, R1.7 billion went to GIZ, the German development agency, R2 billion went to KfW, the German development bank. Essentially, all the financing given by Germany has gone to German entities.   Of the funding from the United States (US) government, R145 million went to consultancy firm Deloitte and R58 million went to the US Department of Energy’s National Labs. The Dutch government funding, among others, went to the Dutch Water Authorities, and the Danish government’s funding, among others, went to the Danish Energy Agency.   Researchers Katrina Lehmann-Grube, Imraan Valodia, Julia Taylor and Sonia Phalatse analysed how the JET IP money was spent. The bulk of the money was directed to green hydrogen, Mpumalanga Just Transition, electricity infrastructure, municipalities, skills development, electricity just transition, and new energy vehicles. However, Lehmann-Grube and her colleagues revealed that most of the funding did not go directly to the assigned priorities.   They report that for funds allocated to electricity infrastructure, none was allocated for building electricity infrastructure, whether to expand the grid or for renewable energy generation. The funds for electricity infrastructure has been spent on technical assistance, project feasibility studies and scenario planning. Around R1.2 billion was spent on technical assistance. Lehmann-Grube et al described the technical assistance as “ long been criticised as a form of aid  for being ineffective, extremely expensive since much of these funds go to foreign ‘experts’, and an outdated form of development”.   Another portion of the funds, around R1.5 billion was spent on green finance, which included refinancing community trust projects, green bods, blended finance to attract the private sector, which is “arguably not where the grants portion of the finance should be focused”. Funds are allocated for stakeholder engagement and capacity building. However, civil society and community organisations are rarely involved. Only 0.4% of the funding was allocated to civil society – around R41 million.   Approximately R1.1 billion was allocated to skills training. However, the researchers show only R453 million went to actual skills training. Astonishingly, none of the allocation went to employees that will lose their jobs, livelihoods and income in the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. There are other significant South African public funds established for climate change. The state-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa established the Green Fund in 2011. The fund is a complementary fund, aimed to augment existing fiscal allocations. It particularly focuses on existing projects that require bridging financial gaps. The Green Fund says it has collective investments of R679.8 million.   There are also private funds in South Africa dedicated to climate change. In 2018, Growthpoint Properties, a real estate investment trust, issued a (10-year) corporate green bond. The proceeds from this bond are earmarked for the financing of new and existing environmentally friendly properties.   China: world leader in renewable energy economy manufacturing   China is the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions by volume, burning as much coal as all of the world combined. At the same time, the country now produces most of the world’s renewable energy.   In the 2000s, China changed its development model, based on coal dependence, as it was causing environmental crises and had begun to undermine economic growth. With GDP growth slowing in the mid-2000s, labour costs rising and a housing crisis, China, as part of changing its developmental model, also moved towards renewable energy. The country invested heavily in green energy technology, prioritising becoming the world’s largest supplier of renewable energy technologies, manufacturing products and infrastructure to tap into the world’s need for clean energy.   China now dominates the manufacturing of renewable technologies. “China had largely achieved its goal of dominating not only the production of solar and wind technologies, but it had developed a near monopoly on every aspect of the supply chains, including the mining and processing of the rare-earths and strategic minerals essential for the clean energy revolution” (Hilton, 2024).   China controls 80% of the globe’s solar manufacturing. It dominates wind and battery technology and manufacturing. Its manufacturing of electric vehicles is rising. Its domination of renewable energy technologies, manufacturing and supply chains has brought global prices down.   China expanded its renewable energy capacity with astonishing speed and scale. Fossil fuels now make up under 50% of the country’s power generation capacity, whereas a decade ago, fossil fuels made up two-thirds of its power generation. The International Energy Authority said that the 50% increase in the installation of renewable energy capacity in 2023 was largely attributed to China.   In 2023 China doubled its new solar installations, increased new wind capacity installations by 66%, and quadrupled energy storage capacity. In 2022, its solar photovoltaic capacity installation for that year, was as large as the rest of the world combined.    China has transformed its economic growth model to make high-tech export products to spur growth. The country’s changed industrial policies are outlined in its “Made in China 2025” (MIC 2025) industrial strategy, a multidecade national strategy for the manufacturing sector, which was published in 2015. The strategy sets out its goal to dominate global market share of high-tech manufacturing, prioritising higher valued goods.   China is now also a dominant global manufacturer of plug-in electric vehicles and its associated supply chains. Electric vehicles is a disruptive technology, because it replaces internal combustion engine vehicles, which have dominated vehicle manufacturing (Graham, Belton & Xia, 2021).   China’s industrial policy followed the example of Japan’s Toyota, Germany’s Volkswagen and the US’ General Motors, who dominated global combustion engine vehicles supply chains. China’s industrial policy to turn it into a global giant manufacturer of electric vehicles – and their supply chains – is a lesson for developing countries in cobbling together successful industrial policies.   The country’s electric vehicle global rise has unleashed a trade conflict between China, the EU and the US over electric vehicles. The EU is the largest overseas market for China’s electric car industry.   The EU is planning to impose huge taxes on imports of electric vehicles from China to Europe. It says introducing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles imports aims to protect the European car industry from being undermined by what EU governments say are unfair Chinese-state subsidies on its own cars. Tariffs on electric cars made in China are set to rise from 10% to up to 45% over the next five years (Race, 2024).   The European Commission set individual duties on three large Chinese electric vehicle brands: SAIC, BYD and Geely. The EU fears that European car manufacturers will not be able to compete with Chinese cars. It calculated the charges based on estimates of how much Chinese state aid each manufacturer has received following an EU investigation. Chinese-made electric vehicles account for 19% of Europe’s market, estimated to rise to 25% by the end of 2024.   The US in May 2024 announced that it was quadrupling customs duties on imported Chinese electric vehicles. China has not penetrated the US market as it has the European market. In response, China has lodged a complaint against the US over the tariff penalties at the World Trade Organisation in March 2024, charging that the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) “formulates discriminatory subsidy policies for new energy vehicles”, referencing a classification that includes electric cars and hybrids.   China says the US IRA “distorts fair competition, seriously disrupts global new energy vehicle industrial and supply chains and violates WTO rules”. China has denied that its own industrial policies are unfair and has repeatedly threatened retaliation to safeguard its companies. The US has rejected China’s WTO challenge, saying “China's challenge is particularly hypocritical in light of China's targeting of clean energy sectors for global dominance” (AFP, 2024).   In 2022, the United States announced a giant aid and subsidy programme to support US-based companies operating in the energy transition sector and electric cars manufactured in the US. The US government said the subsidies were to address the climate crisis and “invest in US economic competitiveness”. The US also said its electric vehicle subsidy programme was meant to counter China’s subsidies for electric vehicles and China’s green industry, which has seen China investing vast state funds into domestic firms as well as research and development.   How China can help boost a South African manufacturing boom based on the green economy and technology   South Africa needs a dynamic manufacturing sector that can soak up low skills. A manufacturing sector in the energy sector based on renewable energy and gas, can soak up an army of low and unskilled. It can also reverse the decline of manufacturing in other sectors – which could create desperately needed new jobs, especially for those with low skills.   The inputs, technology and production processes underpinning renewable energy and gas production must be manufactured within South Africa as far as possible. Local communities can set up local cooperatives to generate and sell their own energy. If local renewable energy initiatives are established by local communities in every town; and gas is piped to every household, it would not only stabilise energy supply, but it will also create a much-needed manufacturing explosion.   China is in a tariff dispute with the European Union and the US over electric vehicle imports. The Chinese government has asked its manufacturers to halt expansion plans in Europe over this trade conflict, including stopping active searches for production sites in the region and signing of new deals (Zhang, Lepido & Torsoli, 2024).   This creates an opportunity for South Africa to become a hub for Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers – and serve as a springboard to the rest of Africa, the developing world, and even Europe. China could set up manufacturing plants in South Africa; and co-manufacture with South African companies. However, in such co-manufacturing, there must be an awareness of “political capitalists” – politically connected individuals with no industry experience, but who set up “black economic empowerment” companies to partner with established firms.   Chinese research, technology and development organisations could partner with South African ones to exchange green economy technologies for development purposes. Industrial policy-learning between China and South Africa is critical to help South Africa boost its industrial policy capacity.   China should match Western countries’ financial commitments for climate change to South Africa. However, China’s financial commitments should be different: rather than loans, it should be grant funding, manufacturing, technology, supply chain, and research and innovation exchange partnerships.   How China can partner with Africa to boost green economies and low-carbon development on the continent   African countries lack public funds to finance the green economy and low-carbon development. Grant funding is critical for this. Development finance, private finance, and public-private finance is critical to achieve the green economy goals.   African leaders expressed their frustrations with the industrialised countries’ inability to honour their commitments to providing adequate climate finance. China can partner with Africa in international climate change negotiations to secure better climate change funds for Africa – and to ensure that industrial countries honour their climate change financial commitments. But China could also be a source of grant funding for African countries’ green economy and low-carbon development initiatives.   African countries have inadequate infrastructure for green projects, which undermines delivery and deters new investors. Almost all African countries need to upgrade and expand their existing grid infrastructure, while building new renewable energy generation capacity.   Over 600 million people in Africa lack electricity. Affordable clean energy sources is critical to plug the power gap. China could partner in expanding Africa’s infrastructure, which underpins any green economy and low-carbon development strategy.   Foreign businesses in Africa often do not implement green practices – as there is largely a lack of enforcement in these countries. It is critical that the Chinese government compel Chinese state and private companies to implement genuine green practices in their operations in African countries. Africa and China can also collaborate on food solutions for China – for example, by helping Africa to boost climate-smart agriculture. In 2016, the African Development Bank in 2016 launched its Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT) – a continent-wide initiative designed to boost agricultural productivity by using new technologies. TAAT brings productivity-increasing technologies to crop, livestock and fish smallholder farmers. China could partner with African countries to boost new agricultural technologies to increase African agricultural productivity.   Moreover, China could establish manufacturing hubs for electric vehicles in African countries, and link African economies into their global manufacturing value chains.   South Africa: policy and regulator reforms needed   South Africa does not have a coherent industrial policy that places the green economy as one of the pillars of economic transformation, industrialisation and economic development. Truth be told, the county’s green economy and low-carbon development initiatives appear to be ad hoc – not part of an overall industrial strategy. South Africa can learn from China’s green economy industrial policy, both in its scope and execution.   For 20 years, China’s government has pursued clear, well-thought-out industrial policies to make it the world’s biggest producer of electric vehicles. China also pursued a focused industrial policy to build renewable energy manufacturing capacity.   In South Africa, whereas the apartheid government had industrial policies that produced disruptive technology, the post-1994 government has lost the ability to pursue industrial policies that can foster disruptive technology. The current South African government can learn from how the Chinese have pursued industrial policies that usher in disruptive technologies.   South Africa can learn from China how to quickly push through renewable energy, which is currently being slowed down by pro-coal proponents and opponents of renewable energy within and outside the ANC tripartite alliance. The Chinese government pushed through renewable energy with steely determination; similar determination is lacking in the South African government.   South Africa should introduce tax incentives to large corporates, SMMEs and households for renewable power generation. Tax systems must offer incentives to low-income households and businesses for deploying renewable energy.   Banks should be compelled to provide affordable finance to households and SMMEs to secure renewable energy generation. Customers should also be allowed to sell excess power back to the grid. South Africa needs regulations to prevent “greenwashing” by countries and businesses who claim their policies, initiatives and investments are green – when they are not. There are currently no laws in South Africa combating green and sustainability claims. There are only voluntary standards. These standards need to be incorporated into legislation. There are increasing civil society efforts to litigate against companies using greenwashing tactics (Parker, 2023).   South Africa’s collapsing infrastructure undermines any industrial policies – it is critical to reboot these systems. This is made clear by China’s industrial policy, based on a pillar of “world-class infrastructure suitable for shipping goods anywhere in the world” (Graham, Belton & Xia, 2021).   The African continent has not established effective regional power pools to share power, renewable energy or gas, which are critical to boost individual country power grids. South Africa will have to take a leadership role in helping African countries to build regional power pools, to exchange power, and trade power between countries, and so avoid energy shortages or surpluses sitting idle. References   Adesina, A. 2023. Remarks by Akinwumi A. Adesina African Development Bank President, Group Session: Launch of the Africa and Middle East SAFE Initiative COP 28, UAE, 3 December 2023.   African Development Bank (AfDB). 2023. Private Sector Financing for Climate Action and Green Growth in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/aeo_2023-chap2-en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   African Development Bank (AfDB). 2023. Natural Capital for Climate Finance and Green Growth in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/aeo_2023-chap3-en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   African Union. 2023. The African Leaders Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change and Call to Action . [Online] Available at: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/2023/09/08/the_african_leaders_nairobi_declaration_on_climate_change-rev-eng.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Agence France-Presse (AFP). 2024. WTO to examine China complaint over US electric vehicle subsidies . [Online] Available at: https://www.barrons.com/news/wto-to-examine-china-complaint-over-us-electric-vehicle-subsidies-91eaa825  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Ahmed, A. and Camp, R. 2023. Accelerating Africa’s Carbon Markets Can Power Sustainable Development . [Online] Available at: https://www.rti.org/insights/accelerating-africas-carbon-markets-can-power-sustainable-development [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Biswas, S. and Yila, O. 2022. Blog: Why transitioning to an Inclusive Green Economy is vital to fulfilling climate goals in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://thecommonwealth.org/news/blog-why-transitioning-inclusive-green-economy-vital-fulfilling-climate-goals-africa#:~:text=A%20green%20economy%20approach%20allows,wind%20energy%20prices%20by%2040%25 . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Blocher, K., Strinati, C., Balm, A. and Meattle, C. 2022. Climate Finance Innovation for Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Climate_Innovation_Finance_for_Africa.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Brookings Institute Africa Growth Initiative. 2020. Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent 2020-2030 . [Online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/foresight-africa-top-priorities-for-the-continent-in-2020/#:~:text=Among%20the%20top%20challenges%20facing,creation%20and%20maintain%20service%20delivery . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Chapman , C.A., Abernathy , K., Chapman , L.J. and Downs , C.T. 2022. The future of sub-Saharan Africa’s biodiversity in the face of climate and societal change, Sec. Conservation and Restoration Ecology , 10   Climate Adaptation Platform. 2024. Climate change in Africa and mitigating its impacts and risks . [Online] Available at: https://climateadaptationplatform.com/climate-change-in-africa-and-mitigating-its-impacts-and-risks/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Cozzi, L., Frankl, P., Wanner, B., Bahar H. and Spencer, T. 2023. Tripling renewable power capacity by 2030 is vital to keep the 1.5°C goal within reach . [Online] Available at: https://www.iea.org/commentaries/tripling-renewable-power-capacity-by-2030-is-vital-to-keep-the-150c-goal-within-reach [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Davies, T. 2024. JET funding fuels concerns . [Online] Available at: https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/opinion/on-my-mind/2024-02-15-tracey-davies-jet-funding-fuels-concerns/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Digital Hub Initiative. 2023. How Agritech transforms African economies . [Online] Available at: https://www.de-hub.de/en/blog/post/how-agritech-transforms-african-economies/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Disrupt Africa. 2023. Africa’s agri-tech revolution – the challenges, the opportunities, and what more needs to be done . [Online] Available at: https://disruptafrica.com/2023/08/04/africas-agri-tech-revolution-the-challenges-the-opportunities-and-what-more-needs-to-be-done/#:~:text=Africa's%20agri%2Dtech%20revolution%20%E2%80%93%20the,more%20needs%20to%20be%20done&text=African%20agriculture%20has%20the%20potential,overseas%2C%20but%20is%20chronically%20underpowered . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Doris, N. 2024. TotalEnergies slapped with historic greenwashing ruling . [Online] Available at: https://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/21348-totalenergies-slapped-with-historic-greenwashing-ruling#:~:text=The%20energy%20company%2C%20the%20world's%2019th%20biggest%20greenhouse%20gas,historic%20first%20for%20the%20country . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   E&E News and Harvey, C. 2022. The World Will Likely Miss 1.5 Degrees C—Why Isn’t Anyone Saying So?  [Online] Available at: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-world-will-likely-miss-1-5-degrees-c-why-isnt-anyone-saying-so/#:~:text=So%20far%2C%20it's%20been%20signed,there's%20still%20time%20to%20act . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   European Investment Bank (EIB). 2023. Investing in nature-based solutions: State-of-play and way forward for public and private financial measures in Europe . [Online] Available at: https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/20230095_investing_in_nature_based_solutions_en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Floyd, R., Yawson, F. and Bayuo, B. 2023. Realising parallel investments in Africa’s green industrialization . [Online] Available at: https://acetforafrica.org/research-and-analysis/insights-ideas/commentary/realizing-parallel-investments-in-africas-green-industrialization/#:~:text=These%20'parallel%20investments'%20are%20at,the%20country%20and%20regional%20levels . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Galal, S. 2023. Renewable Energy in Africa – Statistics and Facts . [Online] Available at: https://www.statista.com/topics/9143/renewable-energy-in-africa/#topicOverview [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Global Green Growth Institute. 2023a. 10 Billion USD Africa and Middle East SAFE Initiative Launched for Food Security . [Online] Available at: https://gggi.org/press-release/10-billion-usd-africa-and-middle-east-safe-initiative-launched-for-food-security/#:~:text=The%20Africa%20and%20Middle%20East,change%2C%20and%20rural%20livelihood%20vulnerability . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Graham, J.D., Belton, K.B. and Xia, S. 2021. How China Beat the US in Electric Vehicle Manufacturing, ISSUES ,   Greenfield, P. 2023. Revealed: more than 90 percent of rainforest carbon offsets by biggest certifier are worthless, analysis shows . [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/18/revealed-forest-carbon-offsets-biggest-provider-worthless-verra-aoe [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Hilton, I. 2024. How China Became the World’s Leader on Renewable Energy . [Online] Available at: https://e360.yale.edu/features/china-renewable-energy [accessed: 28 October 2024] Inamdar, A. 2022. Powering Africa’s Green Growth – beyond adaptation and resilience . [Online] Available at: https://climatechampions.unfccc.int/powering-africas-green-growth-beyond-adaptation-and-resilience/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Independent Expert Group on Climate Finance. 2020. Delivering on the US$100 billion climate finance commitment and transforming climate finance . [Online] Available at: https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2020/12/100_billion_climate_finance_report.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Capital Markets Authority (ICMA). 2019. Sustainability-Linked Loan Principles. [Online] Available at: https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/LMASustainabilityLinkedLoanPrinciples-270919.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Energy Authority (IEA). 2021. Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector . [Online] Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050 [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Energy Authority (IEA). 2023. The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions . [Online] Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2023. Exploring Opportunities for Women Entrepreneurs Driving Climate Solutions: A Discussion Note . [Online] Available at: https://www.ifc.org/en/insights-reports/2023/exploring-opportunities-for-women-entrepreneurs-driving-climate-solutions [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Monetary Fund. 2020. Powering Africa with Solar Energy – IMF F&D . [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2020/03/powering-Africa-with-solar-energy-sy#:~:text=More%20promising%20for%20large%2Dscale,much%20more%20reliable%20than%20elsewhere . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   International Trade Administration (ITA). 2024. South Africa: Energy Overview . [Online] Available at: https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/south-africa-energy  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   IOL. 2024. Ramaphosa announces plans for additional support for electric and hybrid vehicles in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/ramaphosa-announces-plans-for-additional-support-for-electric-and-hybrid-vehicles-in-south-africa-8700f652-6ea7-4002-b1c4-dd39e2299c61#google_vignette  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Kabujuru, W. 2023. Africa’s top six priorities at COP28 . [Online] Available at: https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2023/africa%E2%80%99s-top-six-priorities-cop28  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Kemp, Y. 2024. How to unlock green business opportunities across Africa – report . [Online] Available at: https://www.esi-africa.com/finance-and-policy/how-to-unlock-green-business-opportunities-across-africa-report/  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Koigi, B. 2023. The Promise and Scepticism Behind Africa’s Carbon Markets Initiative . [Online] Available at: https://www.ncmc.sua.ac.tz/news/the-promise-and-scepticism-behind-africas-carbon-markets-initiative [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Kuyoro, M., Leke, A., White, O., Woetzel, J., Jayaram, K. and Hicks, K. 2023. Reimagining economic growth in Africa: Turning diversity into opportunity.  [Online] Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/mckinsey%20global%20institute/our%20research/reimagining%20economic%20growth%20in%20africa%20turning%20diversity%20into%20opportunity/reimagining-economic-growth-in-africa-v6.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Lehmann-Grube, K., Valodia, I., Taylor, J. and Phalatse, S. 2024. What happened to the Just Energy Transition grant funding?  [Online] Available at: https://www.wits.ac.za/news/latest-news/research-news/2024/2024-03/what-happened-to-the-just-energy-transition-grant-funding.html  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Letswalo, N. 2023 . Why the hold on greenwashing policy in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/why-the-hold-on-greenwashing-policy-in-africa/  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Lighting Global. 2019. The Market Opportunity for Productive Use Leveraging Solar Energy (PULSE) in Sub-Saharan Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.lightingglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PULSE-Report.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Mboya, T. 2020. Can Carbon Trading Work in Africa?  [Online] Available at: [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Mbungu, G., Ogallo, E. and Rudic , D. 2024. Falling Short or Following Through? COP 28 Outcomes for Africa . [Online] Available at: https://afripoli.org/falling-short-or-following-through-cop-28-outcomes-for-africa  [accessed: 28 October 2024] McKenzie. 2023. Africa: Increasing demand for the continent’s critical mineral reserves to boost energy transition . [Online] Available at: https://insightplus.bakermckenzie.com/bm/projects/africa-increasing-demand-for-the-continents-critical-mineral-reserves-to-boost-energy-transition [accessed: 28 October 2024]   McKinsey & Company. 2023. Green energy in Africa presents significant investment opportunities . [Online] Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/green-energy-in-africa-presents-significant-investment-opportunities [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Meattle , C., Padmanabhi, R.,   de Aragão Fernandes , P., Balm , A., Wakaba, G., Chiriac, D., Tonkonogy , B. and  Wignarajah , D. 2022. Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/landscape-of-climate-finance-in-africa/ [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Mo Ibrahim Foundation. 2022. The Road to COP27: Making Africa’s Case in the Global Climate Debate . [Online] Available at: https://mo.ibrahim.foundation/research/data-stories/cop27/africa-climate-debate#:~:text=As%20we%20head%20towards%20COP27,climate%20crisis%20on%20the%20continent . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   National Treasury. 2024. National Budget – 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/National%20Budget/2024/  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Ngila, F. 2023. Carbon Trading Offers Rich Rewards for Africa.  [Online] Available at: https://african.business/2023/10/resources/carbon-trading-offers-rich-rewards-for-africa [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Parker, D. 2023. Zero tolerance for greenwashing to inform future legislation . [Online] Available at: https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/zero-tolerance-for-greenwashing-to-inform-future-legislation-2023-11-29   [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Parry, I.W.H., Black, S. and Vernon-Lin, N. 2021. Still Not Getting Energy Prices Right: A Global and Country Update of Fossil Fuel Subsidies . [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/09/23/Still-Not-Getting-Energy-Prices-Right-A-Global-and-Country-Update-of-Fossil-Fuel-Subsidies-466004   [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Pole, J. 2022. Germany refuses to agree to EU ban on new fossil fuel cars from 2035 . [Online] Available at: https://www.euronews.com/green/2022/06/22/germany-refuses-to-agree-to-eu-ban-on-new-fossil-fuel-cars-from-2035  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Presidential Climate Commission (PCC). 2023. Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP).  [Online] Available at: https://www.climatecommission.org.za/south-africas-jet-ip [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Race, M. 2024. EU hits China with big taxes in electric car sales battle. [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly20n4d0g9o  [accessed: 28 October 2024] Reuters. 2023. Germany approves bringing coal-fired power plants back online this winter . [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germany-approves-bringing-coal-fired-power-plants-back-online-this-winter-2023-10-04/#:~:text=BERLIN%2C%20Oct%204%20(Reuters),this%20winter%20and%20avoid%20shortages . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   South African Government. 2011. South Africa’s Green Economy Accord . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/south-africas-green-economy-accord-29-nov-2011 [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Todorović, I. 2023. IEA: Demand for critical minerals to spike 3.5 times by 2030 . [Online] Available at: https://balkangreenenergynews.com/iea-demand-for-critical-minerals-to-spike-3-5-times-by-2030/#:~:text=In%20the%20net%20zero%20emissions,cobalt%20and%2040%25%20for%20nickel . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2022. Economic development in Africa: Rethinking the foundations of export diversification in Africa – The catalytic role of business and financial services . [Online] Available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/aldcafrica2022-summary_en.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2021. Thematic Bonds 101: Macro Environment, Market Dynamics and Steps to Issuance . [Online] Available at: https://sdgfinance.undp.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/UNDP_Thematic%20Bonds%20101.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2024. Africa Green Business and Financing Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/africa-green-business-and-financing-report  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2016. The State of Biodiversity in Africa: A Mid-term Review of Progress Towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets . [Online] Available at: https://www.unep.org/resources/report/state-biodiversity-africa-mid-term-review-progress-towards-aichi-biodiversity [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2023. Africa’s green business opportunities are abundant, UNEP study shows . [Online] Available at: https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/africas-green-business-opportunities-are-abundant-unep-study-shows#:~:text=Addis%20Ababa%2C%2017%20August%202023,today%20by%20the%20UN%20Environment [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 2023. How a new wave of tech startups is driving development in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://iap.unido.org/articles/how-new-wave-tech-startups-driving-development-africa#:~:text=5%20Taking%20a%20mobile%2Dfirst,e.g%20Opay%20and%20Kuda%20Bank)%2C [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Bank. 2023a. Scaling agriculture science and innovation for a climate-resilient future in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/agfood/scaling-agriculture-science-and-innovation-climate-resilient-future-africa#:~:text=Science%20and%20innovation%20in%20agriculture,the%20evolving%20needs%20of%20farmers . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Bank. 2023b. Lessons from 25 Policies Advancing a Low-Carbon.  [Online] Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/3770b59a-617f-4636-8aa1-adbe6db7db34#:~:text=protects%20the%20poor.-,'Reality%20Check%3A%20Lessons%20from%2025%20Policies%20Advancing%20a%20Low%2D,studies%20across%20sectors%20and%20geographies . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Meteorological Organization. 2023. State of the Climate in Africa. [Online] Available at: https://library.wmo.int/viewer/69000/download?file=1360_State-of-the-Climate-in-Africa-2023_en.pdf&type=pdf&navigator=1  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Meteorological Organization. 2024. Africa Suffers Disproportionately from Climate Change . [Online] Available at: https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/africa-faces-disproportionate-burden-from-climate-change-and-adaptation-costs  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Resources Institute. 2023. Key COP28 Takeaways for Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.wri.org/africa/key-cop28-takeaways-africa [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Zhang, C., Lepido, D. and Torsoli, A. 2024. China asks carmakers to halt Europe expansion over tariff spat . [Online] Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-24/china-asks-carmakers-to-halt-europe-expansion-over-tariff-spat  [accessed: 28 October 2024] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Report into the Feasibility, Structure, and Functioning of the Proposed National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council: Striving for a Corruption-Free South Africa Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members, the Stellenbosch University, or the Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership. JULY 2022 Contents LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS ABSTRACT ABOUT THE INCLUSIVE SOCIETY INSTITUTE (ISI) ABOUT THE STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY AND THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC LEADERSHIP (SPL) STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY (SU) SCHOOL OF PUBLIC LEADERSHIP (SPL) THEME 1: PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW AND INSIGHTS INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW: SETTING THE SCENE CONCEPTUALISING CORRUPTION IN CONTEXT: TYPOLOGIES, FORMS, AND ACTS OF CORRUPTION AFRICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION ADVISORY BODIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE RWANDA SEYCHELLES BOTSWANA CONCLUSION THEME 2: RESEARCH METHOD, FINDINGS, AND ANALYSES BRIEF OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH, STRATEGY, AND SAMPLING SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSES CONCLUSION THEME 3: NACAC IN PRACTICE NACAC COMPOSITION AND STAFF SELECTION CRITERIA NACAC’S AUTHORITY, MANDATE, AND RESPONSIBILITIES DESIGN AND FUNCTION OF A COORDINATING BODY RESOURCES AND CAPACITY NEEDS CONCLUSION EXPERTS’ RESPONSES ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCLUSION REFERENCE LIST List of Abbreviations ACCERUS - Anti-corruption Centre for Education and Research of Stellenbosch University ACCS - Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles ACTT - Anti-Corruption Task Team APRM - African Peer Review Mechanism CECA - Corruption and Economic Crime Act 29, 2018 CPI - Corruption Perceptions Index DCEC - Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime GSCID - Governance, State Capacity and Institutional Development Cluster IACAB - International Anti-Corruption Advisory Board ICC - Inter-Agency Coordinating Council ISI - Inclusive Society Institute ICTS - International Cooperation, Trade and Security Cluster JCPS - Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster MFMA - Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 NACF - National Anti-Corruption Forum NACS - National Anti-Corruption Strategy NDPP - National Director of Public Prosecutions NEDLAC - National Economic Development and Labour Council NPA - National Prosecuting Authority NRF - National Research Foundation PDE - Procuring and Disposing Entities PFMA - Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 PPE - Personal Protective Equipment SADC - Southern African Development Community SARS - South African Revenue Service SDGs - Sustainable Development Goals SONA - State of the Nation Address SPL - School of Public Leadership SIU - Special Investigating Unit SU - Stellenbosch University UN - United Nations UNCAC - United Nations Convention against Corruption UNDP - United Nations Development Programme List of Contributors The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) in partnership with the Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership (SPL) hosted a High-Level Dialogue on the Establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa, on 19 October 2021. This dialogue aimed to give direction to the research to be undertaken by the ISI and the Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership. The following experts contributed to the main aim of the dialogue and, in a larger sense, the direction of the feasibility research report: ​ ​ ​ ​Mr Daryl Swanepoel Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) ​Prof Zwelinzima Ndevu Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership (SPL) ​Prof Evangelos Mantzaris Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership (SPL) ​ ​ ​ ​Prof Geo Quinot Stellenbosch University African Procurement Law Unit ​Prof Hanns Bossert Academica University of Applied Sciences – Netherlands ​Mr Johnny Douglas Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership (SPL) ​ ​ KEY WORDS: Corruption South Africa National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council for South Africa; South African Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030 Abstract In his State of the Nation Address on 11 February 2021, the President of the Republic of South Africa announced the establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council (NACAC) for South Africa. The establishment of NACAC confirms South Africa’s commitment to the implementation of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Goal 16, which aims for peace, justice and strong institutions. This report attempts to investigate the feasibility and possible structures of the proposed National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council for South Africa. The first section of the report compares and draws lessons from three African countries internationally recognised to be amongst the least corrupt in the world. It considers the structure and operation of their anti-corruption institutions and includes an assessment of their effectiveness in combating corruption. In the second section, the findings of the qualitative research conducted, which considered South Africa’s unique socio-political context, are presented. Eight expert leaders based in the public sector, business community, and civil society were purposely sampled to participate in open-ended interviews based on key issues related to the structures, processes, realities, and expectations of the proposed new body. Finally, section three presents an informed attempt to chart what NACAC could look like after considering the research findings and best practices from the case studies found on the African continent. It unpacks the practical steps that need to be taken to implement a fully functioning and successful anti-corruption institution that is fit-for-purpose for the South African context. About the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and self-standing institution that functions independently from any other entity. It was founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever-transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. About the Stellenbosch University and the School of Public Leadership (SPL) Stellenbosch University (SU) Stellenbosch University (SU) is home to an academic community of 29 000 students (including 4 000 foreign students from 100 countries) as well as 3 000 permanent staff members (including 1 000 academics) on five campuses. The historical oak-lined university town, which lies amongst the Boland Mountains in the Winelands of the Western Cape, creates a unique campus atmosphere, attracting local and foreign students alike. On the main campus, paved walkways wind between campus buildings – some dating from previous centuries; others just a few years old. Architecture from various eras attests to the sound academic foundation and establishment of an institution of excellence. This, together with the scenic beauty of the area and state-of-the-art, environmentally friendly facilities and technology, as well as visionary thinking about the creation of a sustainable 21st-century institution, makes for the unique character of Stellenbosch University. School of Public Leadership (SPL) The Stellenbosch University, through the School of Public Leadership (SPL), is a leader in learning for sustainable African and global futures. The SPL is unique in the South African context with its combination of Public Governance, Environment and Sustainability as strategic focal points. These three foci also provide the rationale for the three postgraduate programmes in Public Policy and Management, Environmental Management, and Sustainable Development. SPL’s business vision and mission, with “Learning for sustainable African futures” as its slogan, can best be understood and summarised as serving public value in an African context. THEME 1: Preliminary literature review and insights Introduction and Contextual Overview: Setting the Scene In his delivery of the 2021 State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Cyril Ramaphosa identified the government’s focus as concentrating on four pillars decisively dealing with Covid-19, job creation and inclusive financial growth, acceleration of the country’s economic recovery, and the fight against corruption. It became evident in the speech that the fight against corruption is instrumental in achieving the success of the other fundamentals and its realisation at all levels is the key to government’s efforts to revive hope to the people for a better future. His brave acceptance of the fact that the government’s reputation has been dented for years because of widespread corruption at all government and societal levels, led to the announcement of what has been described as a new feasible step forward in the fight against extensive corruption within the public sector ranks. As the Honourable President Mr Cyril Ramaphosa stated: “We will shortly be appointing the members of the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council, which is a multi-sectoral body that will oversee the initial implementation of the strategy and the establishment of an independent statutory anti-corruption body that reports to Parliament.” The indication and belief that such a fight against corruption could only be successful when the whole of society becomes an integral, collective part of the effort leading to a strengthened rule of law, was at the heart of the President’s speech. It was stated that the processes of increasing accountability amongst senior government leaders would be rubber-stamped immediately through the signing of a performance agreement with all ministers before the end of February, a measure that would reach the country’s public. In the announcement of the new National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council, it was characterised as a multi-sectoral body that will oversee the initial implementation of the strategy and establishment of an independent statutory anti-corruption body that reports to Parliament. This was followed by the promise that well planned and decisive investigative action would be undertaken against corruption in the procurement processes and outcomes of Covid-19-based goods and services. The beginning of such an anti-corruption journey was initiated by the authorisation of the SIU (Special Investigating Unit) to commence with and complete the investigations of all allegations and evidence of unlawful conduct that took place at all levels of Covid-19 supply chain and procurement structures and processes – by all government spheres and state bodies – during the national state of disaster. It was officially stated at the time, during SONA, that the SIU had finalised investigations into 164 contracts with a total value of R3.5-billion (Ramaphosa, 2021). These initiatives were supported by the creation of a fusion centre, where representatives of all key law enforcement agencies gather, debate, and share information and resources. It was shown that the establishment has been successful in the fight against corruption, as it has delivered a large number of court cases and achieved the preservation and recovery of millions of Rands in public funds. Beyond this, South Africa as a signatory to intercontinental treaties and conventions on societal aspirations – such as Goal #16 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN), and continental conventions such as the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration – is bound to continually improve its anti-corruption efforts to achieve the planning, designing, and implementation of an honest, transparent, and good governance ethos in running its state affairs. Conceptualising Corruption in Context: Typologies, Forms, and Acts of Corruption Though the phenomenon of corruption is as old as human history, it only received attention after a few years into the democratic dispensation – understandably so, as South Africa was managing the bigger political project of democratic transition and the change of power. The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA, 2002) was the first government department to initiate an anti-corruption strategy. Within it, a number of corrupt acts were identified as types and manifestations of illegal actions (abuse of power and privileged information/insider trading; bribery, conflict of interest; embezzlement; extortion; favouritism; fraud and nepotism). Since then, numerous efforts have been coordinated to rid the country of corruption. Amongst others, a series of reports from the empirical research conducted by the Public Service Commission (PSC, 2008; 2011a) entitled The Most Common Manifestations of Corruption were published. The findings included: Abuse of government resources Appointment irregularities Criminal conduct Fraud and bribery Identity document fraud Mismanagement of government funds Procurement irregularities Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing irregularities Gross negligence Misappropriation, theft, and financial mismanagement; and Social grant fraud. The foregoing list is a stark reminder that corruption is multifaceted in nature. It therefore needs to be dissected if it is to be understood to its core. In the process of continuous empirical research on the subject matter for over a decade, the Anti-Corruption Centre for Education and Research at Stellenbosch University (ACCERUS) has developed a wide range of both specific and ‘general/collective’ types of ‘common’ and ‘sophisticated’ corrupt acts as listed below: Asset misappropriation is associated with theft that comprises a variety of actions such as extraction from cash deposits; asset purchases; theft of tangible assets; cash on hand, from cash deposits received; transactions in foreign currencies; unrecorded cash transactions; inventory and other assets (e.g., stocks); use of organisation’s equipment (or staff); asset transfers; inventory schemes and movement of assets for private purposes. Bribery is one of the world’s most common and serious forms of corruption and is pervasive – in both big and small acts – in the public sector. While it is probably most prevalent in the supply chain and procurement process transactions, it is in fact also found in many other areas of corruption in the public sector (MBPC, 2016) . It entails an act or attempt, by way of a gift of money or other inducements, to dishonestly persuade someone (or a group of persons) to act in one’s favour. Bureaucratic corruption is an act associated with public servants who operate at various organisational and professional levels and abuse their positions for their own personal benefit (Gans-Morse et al., 2018:173-174) , or that of their associates, without overt gifting. Computer/IT fraud/corruption (cyber-crime) is a generic concept used to describe criminal activities carried out by means of computers or the Internet. Creditors’ corruption is consisted of, amongst others, double billing; fraudulent disbursements/payments; overpayments; shell companies; fraudulent credit notes; mispricing; and false refunds (Leuthner, 2016) . Debtors’ corruption acts are related to discounts; false invoices; payment diversions; sales schemes; unrecorded or under-recorded sales; invoice kickbacks; refunds and credit notes; a variety of bribes and short deliveries (Gilander & Neselevska, 2017) . Economic and financial corruption cover a wide spectrum of offenses, inter alia, financial crimes committed by banks, insurance companies, tax evasion, illicit capital havens, money laundering, as well crimes committed by public officials (such as bribery, embezzlement, traffic of influences, etc.) either to benefit unduly personally, or benefit organisations. Employee-related fraud/corruption is characterised by a wide variety of acts such as irregular loans; fake educational qualifications; payroll/remuneration schemes; irregular bonuses; falsified curriculum vitae; irregular promotions and bonuses; duplicated reimbursements; department credit cards for personal use; falsified wages; nepotism; fictitious expenses; patronage use; fraudulent travel and subsidy claims; backdating salary increases; a variety of misrepresentations of relevant personal information; illegal gratuities and expense reimbursement schemes (Woods & Mantzaris, 2012) . Grand corruption occurs at the highest levels of political and administrative leadership and management as well as groups who, in most, if not all cases, use the privileged information at their disposal to take advantage of the laws, rules, and regulations gaps and anti-corruption agencies’ lack of capacity, weaknesses, and structural and functional inadequacies (Bauhr & Charron, 2017:416-417) . Management fraud is perpetrated by a wide range of managers who become directly and indirectly involved with most, if not all, acts of corruption mentioned above purely by having both access to information and power to act and influence the course of events to their favour. Such fraud is also synonymous with “fraudulent financial statements” (Mbaku, 2007) . Petty corruption is generally associated with corrupt practices by lower- and middle-grade public servants who, in most instances, deal with the public on a daily basis (also described as ‘survival corruption’) (Stahl et al., 2017(a)) . Political corruption , inevitably the most debated corruption reality in South Africa, Africa and globally, is associated with politicians’ greed, avarice, irregular and illegal actions at various levels of position and authority, from the president to a municipal councillor. Principal-agent-type corruption is the idea, planning and implementation of actions which provide an opportunity for ‘middlemen’/‘agents’ to facilitate deals/transactions in the public service terrain. The employed agent can either be an internal or external party to the entity but will naturally have the power to sway influence (GAB | the Global Anticorruption Blog, 2015) . Procurement fraud is related to a very wide range of manipulated, inter alia, “preferred and ghost service providers” to direct the procurement processes toward a pre-emptive conclusion; many forms of bribery through mediators; violation of “preferential procurement” and falsified “broad-based black economic empowerment” arrangements; fictitious quotes and invoices; ghost suppliers and purchasing schemes (Mantzaris, 2014(a); Mantzaris, 2014(b)) . “Quiet” service has been described as a low-level form of corruption under circumstances where public servants fail to deliver the service they are paid to deliver, such as medical doctors’ or nurses’ absenteeism or drugs embezzlement from public hospitals (U4, 2017) . Systemic corruption is rooted in inadequacies, weaknesses, and state institutions’ incapacity of organisational systems, structures, and processes. In most instances, it is encouraged by the lack of transparency, integrity, accountability, and acts of impunity as well as authoritarian and/or monopolistic power relations (Laver, 2014) . It is synonymous with state capture. African Anti-Corruption Advisory Bodies: Comparative Perspective In an effort to learn from existing bodies of research and work done in the anti-corruption domain, three African countries that are internationally recognised to be amongst the least corrupt in the world and on the African continent, have been purposively selected as case studies from which to compare and draw lessons that could inform the proposed NACAC. These countries are Rwanda, Seychelles, and Botswana. RWANDA The Rwanda Anti-Corruption Advisory Council was established in 2014 and has played an important role in the fight against corruption in the country. The Council comprises the Chief Ombudsman (the Chairperson), Director General of National Intelligence and Security Service, Minister of Local Government and Justice, two Ombudsman Deputies, the Inspector General of Rwanda National Police, Vice President of the Supreme Court, Prosecutor General, State Finance Auditor General, Executive Secretary of Rwanda Public Procurement Authority, representatives of the Civil Society Platform, and the Chief Executive of the Private Sector Federation. The Rwanda Anti-Corruption Advisory Council was initially based on a continuous initiative communication campaign led by senior ministers, the country’s ombudsman, and highly placed officials. The campaign covered the entire country and was reported daily on radio, television, and social media. Furthermore, all the Council members communicated daily with the media, private sector, and civil society, convincing them to become active against corruption and mobilise their communities and constituencies to grow to be an integral part of the effort. The Council operates at National level but is also decentralised at District, Sector, and Cell levels (Government of Rwanda, N.d.) . These significant initiatives took place in the country at a time when it was already considered amongst the least corrupt globally. In the 2014 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Rwanda was one of Africa’s five least corrupt nations. Consequently, 97.3 per cent of the population expressed confidence in the government’s efforts to fight corruption, according to the 2014 Rwanda Bribery Index, which was conducted by Transparency International Rwanda chapter (Transparency International Rwanda, 2014) . In the Transparency International CPI, Rwanda had a score of 54, ranking as the third-least corrupt country in Africa. The country’s prosecutor general at the time revealed that the prosecution office had filed 155 cases of corruption in courts, of the 225 cases reported in the fiscal year 2013-2014. The Transparency International 2020 results showed that the country’s score increased from 53 to 54 percent, which placed it at 49th on the global ranking (from 51st in 2019), retaining the lead in the East-African region as the least corrupt (Transparency International, 2020) . The country’s civil society leadership was encouraged to cooperate with the Council in an effort to sensitise the general public towards the consequences of corruption, and research and reports of corruption to the police, National Public Prosecution Authority, and the Office of the Ombudsman. The Council’s key responsibilities at the national level include: research and reports/opinions on strategies against corruption; thorough study and research of all reports that emanate from anti-corruption institutions and recommendations to advance the fight against corruption; maintain continuous channels of information exchange on corruption between institutions; research, assess, and evaluate all reports that emanate from organisations regarding corruption in Rwanda and recommendations that are based on their positions, planning, and implementation of all processes resulting in the approval and publication of an annual report of the achievements in the fight against corruption in Rwanda (Sebudubudu, Khatib & Bozzini, 2017) . Members of the National Advisory Council meet on a quarterly basis and report directly to the President of the Republic, and present copies of all meetings, discussions, and decisions to Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the Cabinet. The Council’s Technical Committee comprises technicians from institutions led by members of the Advisory Council at the national level. The Office of the Ombudsman is responsible for the Advisory Council Secretariat at the national level. Thus, in its structure, the Secretary of the National Advisory Council fights corruption and injustice. International comparative research has conclusively revealed that the success of Rwanda’s government against corruption cannot be underestimated and the key reasons for such a reality lies in the government’s anti-corruption initiatives, plans, and action at all levels (Baez-Camargo et al., 2017; Sebudubudu, Khatib & Bozzini, 2017) . Baez-Camargo and Tharcisse (2018:26) recently postulated that empirical research and evidence overwhelmingly suggests that petty corruption as a normalised practice has been eliminated in Rwanda. Such observations highlight the fact that Rwanda’s trajectory is being widely and globally recognised. Moreover, the country is on par with a very small number which have achieved a substantial reduction in levels of corruption in the last 30-40 years (Mungiu-Pippidi & Hartmann, 2019) . In fact, empirical research has further conclusively shown that in less than 20 years of high levels of corruption, Rwanda has achieved successes and brought the country on par with ‘middle income’ countries. During this 20-year period, the anti-corruption efforts concentrated on the reduction of administrative corruption – the primary terrain of the scourge in a society struggling to overcome a destructive genocide and civil war of major proportions. The success achieved under a seriously coordinated effort has been instrumental in increasing the developmental levels of the economy and the country’s fiscal stability. Such a success against a grave economic and social pandemic does not imply that administrative corruption does not exist at all. However, the relentless advancements at all levels (careful investigations, persistent public servants training, community communication and support structures, committed alliances with civil society, highly skilled anti-corruption methods, and punishment of the guilty) has moved the country’s public sector forward. Rwanda’s law-abiding public sector, which is rooted in solid and diversified legislation, is the reward of a journey along an arduous road. Internationally, it is recognised as a significant developmental achievement which can be utilised as a guide going forward for countries facing substantial struggles in their efforts to defeat corruption. For this aspiration to be realisable for many countries, the fight against corruption can only succeed through honesty, accountability, transparency, education, effectiveness and efficiency, strong public sector authority and competency, and cooperation, synergy and a persuasive understanding between public and private sectors, civil society, and all sectors of the country’s population (World Bank, 2020) . SEYCHELLES The Advisory Council of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles was established in 2016 and comprises four members. Its primary aim is to oversee the Commission’s administrative policy and review provisions of laws contributing to the prevention of corruption. The Council has the authority to investigate, detect, and inhibit corrupt practices and, according to its founding law, it is a neutral, independent, and self-governing entity, which is not subject to the direction or control of any person or authority. The body also makes recommendations to the President for effective implementation of existing and new legislation. The founding four members of the Council were appointed following a thorough and detailed interview process. The new group members of the Council were announced in September 2021 (Sedrick, 2021) . The Advisory Council derives its work from its independent ability to investigate, detect, and inhibit corrupt practices. The work encompasses a wide variety of multi-dimensional research initiatives and direct assistance at all levels of operations undertaken by the primary anti-corruption body; the Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles (ACCS), which was also established under the Anti-Corruption Act in 2016. In this process, the Council is responsible to provide research, analysis, and recommendations which facilitate the Commission’s functions, processes, and operations in terms of: Filing cases on the basis of enquiry or investigation Conducting investigation of offences Conducting cases Performing functions assigned to the Commission by the existing Acts Holding enquiry into allegations of corruption Reviewing and recognising laws for the prevention of corruption and submitting recommendations to the Commission Raising awareness and promoting the values of honesty and integrity amongst all communities, with a view to prevent corruption Organising seminars, symposiums, and workshops on the subjects falling within the Commission’s functions and duties Identifying causes of corruption in the context of the country’s socio-economic conditions Determining the procedures of enquiry, investigation, and filing of cases Investigating a public officer’s conduct that the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe is connected with corrupt practices Coordinating and cooperating with other institutions authorised to investigate, prosecute, prevent, and combat corrupt practices Guiding implementation of an integrated approach leading to the eradication of corruption Consulting, cooperating, and exchanging information with appropriate bodies internationally that are authorised to conduct inquiries or investigations in relation to corruption Adopting and strengthening mechanisms for educating the public to respect the public good and public interest Developing educational and other programmes in collaboration with the media Promoting an environment for upholding ethics in governance; and Disseminating information and sensitising the public about the negative effects of corruption. Members of the Advisory Council travel regularly to attend international conferences that address anti-corruption state issues, to network, draw insights, and share knowledge. Furthermore, their strategy and tactics, in terms of examination of complaints and evidence in their duties, have been described as slow, complex, and meticulous, leading to an appropriate assessment for submission to the main body. Though it has been mentioned that such a process has been successful, on occasion, external pressures exert a strong influence, resulting in fear of failure. By ensuring appropriate procedures are adhered to despite pressures, at the end of the process the evidence is often much stronger. This goes beyond the national context. Following the correct international protocols has been described as the best guarantor of being on the correct path towards the next stage of an investigation. One of the body’s acknowledged achievements has been the launching and development of a comprehensive educational and awareness campaign to rally society behind the efforts. Such initiatives have a direct multidimensional impact on all sectors of the country, including the youth, civil society, private sector, and the public sector. Utilisation of all media to strengthen public relations in order to educate the public about corruption has been considered successful. One of the leading factors that contributed to this success is the active cooperation, coordination, and synergy of the Advisory Council with all the government departments, entities, independent bodies as well as civil society and the private sector. It is believed that the country’s existing legislation provides sufficient opportunities and access to authority for members of the Council when the need arises, to scrutinise confidential agreements as well as records, books, reports, returns, and other documents that relate to the work of any public or private body (U4, 2020) . Seychelles has a score of 66 and is in position 27 on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 – and is recorded as the number one least corrupt African country. BOTSWANA The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), the most important anti-corruption body in Botswana, bears similarities with the future South African National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council, as it also initially begun as an advisory state entity before a fully-fledged body with necessary institutional authority. It was established in 1994 to combat corruption through thoroughly researched investigations, prevention, and education. The entity operates under the President's Office and is not formally independent; though its staff are subject to public service regulations and independent of citizen oversight committees (Isbell, 2017) . Its founding was based on a government decision to turn the tide, described as a very decisive moment by observers, following a well-publicised series of high-level corruption events in the country, which had a reputation for solid governance. The events created a public outcry amongst Botswana’s citizenry to the point where it was impossible not to act. The outcries coincided with the outcomes of the 1994 Corruption and Economic Crime Act (CECA), which re-categorised new forms of corruption, and passed most of the anti-corruption responsibility to the new DCEC from the hands of the country’s police force (Isbell, 2017) . An analysis of the Directorate’s anti-corruption philosophy has revealed that the unit, since its establishment and inauguration, has morphed into a highly efficient institution with mixed results. The educational programmes have reached the country’s population, including those in the far-flung corners of the rural lands, while its investigative efforts are widely criticised for a number of reasons after high-profile corruption cases were unsuccessfully prosecuted in court – as opposed to the successes involving petty corruption. This is attributed to the fact that prosecution evidence presented was purely based on advice without rigorous legal analysis, and that the entity was, in its ‘first level’ phase, seriously understaffed. The subsequent legislative reforms – transformation of the entity’s role which began in 2010 and beyond – changed the institution’s path to anti-corruption success (Kuris, 2013) . At first the key responsibilities of the DCEC were related to the promotion of ethical behaviour in public service organisations based on codes of conduct, maintenance of transparency, rule of law, and good governance at all levels of corruption prevention interventions. They were later expanded to encompass wide-ranging responsibilities, duties, powers, and operational independence. These were concentrated on three key strategies: investigation, prevention, and public education. Its members had the power to search, extradite suspects, seize, and freeze assets, arrest, confiscate travel documents, and recommend prosecutions to the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, which controlled all prosecutions (Nwokorie & Viinamäki, 2017) . As time passed, these initiatives proved instrumental and decisive in the fight against corruption because of the close relations of the body with a wide variety of stakeholders won through the activities of the DCEC leadership. This fact of a societal united front proved to be a key element as NGOs, community watchdog bodies, whistle-blowers in both the public and the private sectors, and citizens became allies of the state institution; assisted by a number of specialist anti-corruption units set up in all ministries involved with preliminary investigations of possible offences in their domains (Sebudubudu, 2003:126-127) . In the latter years of the 21st century, international organisations considered DCEC to be the best anti-corruption agency in Africa. It was successful in both the prevention, education as well as positive outcome in the alliance with all anti-corruption state institutions to strengthen accountability and transparency in the country. One of the differences between the Botswana anti-corruption public leaders and those in many African countries has been the open and transparent connection and collaboration with intellectual and research-based think tanks such as BIDPA (Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis), instrumental in the designing and development of a national anti-corruption policy framework (Kuris, 2013) . The planning and implementation of its three-pronged strategy starts with the prevention of corruption, which is preceded by a process of thorough investigation of existing loopholes and their detection; investigation of suspicious transactions and economic crimes at all levels; and finally, the file/s submission to the DPP when sufficient and irrefutable evidence has been collected. Public education is a complementary strategy but is as vital as the others. To achieve these, the DCEC has been well-resourced and works meticulously with all judicial institutions (Jones, 2017:213-214) . The organisation’s new staff develops extra skills and expertise through highly recognised training courses, and performance management training through highly qualified "performance improvement coordinators”, including the Basel Institute of Governance. The latter institute developed an internal training framework and new investigative manual, as well as regular classes for all investigators. Its performance indicators included several investigations; launched a number of completed investigations; ratio of number of investigations to numbers of staff; as well as conviction rate and levels of implementation of recommendations derived from preventive work and public opinion surveys (Sebudubudu, 2003:130) . Much significance is given to assignment studies that deal with existing systems and procedures and their weaknesses in terms of systems and processes. The DCEC has been instrumental in promoting an anti-corruption culture in all state agencies – due to many of its officers having been seconded to other ministries in their effort to establish “corruption prevention committees” – as well as all oversight bodies operating in the President’s Office, including the Procurement Department and the State Auditor, Customs, Ombudsman, Immigration Department, Police Service, and international organisations such as Interpol (Anti-Corruption Authorities, 2020). Conclusion The above case studies provide an opportunity for comparative analysis and learning. However, South Africa, like any people, is unique in some respects and therefore differences are bound to exist that have a bearing on how anti-corruption in South Africa works, and the realities informing it. As a result, while drawing lessons about best practices from the above is essential, it will be short-sighted not to consider the socio-political context that characterises South Africa. The following research findings and discussion accounts for this complementary element to ensure that the formation and functioning of NACAC is based on a solid structural and operational foundation. That is fit-for-purpose for the South African context. THEME 2: Research method, findings and analyses Brief Overview of Methodological Approach, Strategy, and Sampling A total of ten (10) expert leaders based in the public sector, business community, and civil society were purposely sampled to participate in the qualitative interviews. Two (2) declined the offer due to prior commitments that were unworkable with the interview scheduling irrespective of the researcher’s attempts to reschedule. Therefore, eight (8) leaders responded to the set standard open-ended questions that were based on key issues related to the structures, processes, realities, and expectations of the new body: NACAC. To ensure anonymity, as agreed upon by the researcher and the expert leaders, no names are used to attribute views expressed, to any of the leaders. Instead, numbers (1 to 8) have been assigned to each interview participant as follows: Expert Leader 1: Retired Senior Member of Chapter 9 Institution, Cape Town. Expert Leader 2: Senior Researcher, NGO, Durban. Expert Leader 3: Senior Researcher, NGO, Cape Town. Expert Leader 4: Senior Public Servant, Provincial Government, KwaZulu-Natal. Expert Leader 5: Senior Public Servant, Chapter 9 Institution, Gauteng. Expert Leader 6: Businessperson, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. Expert Leader 7: Senior Academic Researcher, Gauteng. Expert Leader 8: Senior Administrator, Provincial Government, Gauteng. Summary of Research Findings and Analyses A preliminary briefing took place as a means to confirm that the expert leaders are sensitised to the envisioned NACAC and recent developments in the subject matter, in addition to their existing in-depth knowledge. As it would later emerge, while there is consensus on a few issues, equally, questions and opinions are divergent on other issues of interest. For example, while it is debatable that some anti-corruption agencies and bodies are riddled with corrupt elements that undermine the fight against corruption, there is consensus on “Scorpions’ days when corruption was certain to have repercussions.” Four of the leaders (number 2, 4, 5, and 8) highlighted the complete lack of effort to put in place and use scientific integrity pre-screening processes to maximise prospects of ensuring that the top leadership of anti-corruption bodies comprises competent and ethical leaders, especially in the supply-chain and procurement management, investigations and prosecution services, internal audits, and risk management offices. These offices are integral to the integrity of the anti-corruption bodies’ ability to function effectively and efficiently and to build public trust – without which it will be virtually impossible to mobilise stakeholders in anti-corruption efforts. Interestingly, leader 3 suggested that NACAC could face the same fate as the Scorpions, as it may neither enjoy sufficient legal status nor guarantee security of tenure of office. He further opined: “It is consistent with the ANC’s NEC decision in 2020 to establish a single, permanent, and independent agency with the capacity to deal with corruption decisively. When one considers the Glenister litigation cases, it suggests that poor political advice was rendered without significant acknowledgement of the thrust of the findings.” Amongst other factors, incapacity and illegality could see the agency dissipating, unless duly addressed from inception. This means that, for the new body to exist and operate, it is inescapable that a new law will have to be enacted and passed – a process that is unpredictable. He points to the strong belief that, with support from civil society and the business community, the Democratic Alliance is prepared to present a ‘Private Members Bill’ that could compete with the plans, and the growing ‘look to private prosecution’ view expressed by some – including Eskom’s leadership recently – when there are delays and failures in the state’s anti-corruption agencies. Legitimacy, representability, and trust are intricately linked and crucial to the success of NACAC. This is according to expert leader 5, who emphasised that the structure could assume the representative character of NEDLAC (the National Economic Development and Labour Council) to ensure that it mobilises all stakeholders of society against corruption. However, as she cautioned, members of the public need to feel a sense of institutional trust so that they can report, collaborate, and support it. Ideally, she elaborated, the proposed NACAC must have a witness protection programme that falls under the control of retired Constitutional Court judges who are no longer interested in political power. Besides, retired judges, especially of an apex court such as the Constitutional Court, command moral and ethical respect. It would, all matters considered, be likely that they will be trusted by many, if not all, stakeholders. It is common cause that experience triumphs anything, in many fields. This is a reminder by leader 1, who noted the importance of ensuring that the selection of the NACAC body is more informed by meritocracy than anything else. In particular, according to him, “… the selected members [must] have a developed understanding of the subject matter [that] they will be dealing with. Their knowledge and experience, beyond the technical, should include knowledge on internal workings and systems of public sector organisations, and how corruption manifests itself within the sector.” In addition to the technical know-how and sectoral knowledge, there is consensus on a number of considerations that will ensure that NACAC succeeds in its mandate as per the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) 2020-2030: NACAC is authorised to issue relevant directives and oversee their implementation. Without such a drastic step forward, any hope for NACAC’s success would easily be inhibited by pedantic bureaucratic layers put down by those who do not want to account (leaders 1, 5, 7, and 8) . That these instructions are considered mandatory by the entire security cluster (leaders 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7) . That all Cabinet Ministers actively support NACAC and its mandate (leaders 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7) . That the Accounting Officers and Accounting Authorities (as per PFMA/MFMA) actively support and oversee NACAC directives – and account for the effective implementation and ongoing application (leaders 1, 4, and 7) . That NACAC directives are incorporated within the internal control regime of each, and every public sector organisation stipulated – including the PFMA/MFMA – internal audit function, the risk management function, and prescribed procurement practices (leaders 1, 4, 5, and 7) . That every public official involved in the running of the entity must undergo serious essential training, covering the nature of public sector corruption and NACAC prescribed anti-corruption practices (leaders 1, 4, and 7) . That various members possessing different expertise and industry knowledge will add respective value to the body. This implies, for example, that NACAC senior representatives would need to establish and lead different subcommittees or working groups based on their skill sets and knowledge. It cannot be expected for each member to be conversant in all aspects of corruption. Two of the expert leaders (4 and 6) highlighted the indisputable fact that the forthcoming report emanating from the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture would open additional avenues of challenges at all levels of the State and, possibly, result in new relations and actions undertaken by anti-corruption agencies. Such new decisions and outcomes were already described as opening novel paths in the relationship between the new body with organisations such as the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and Special Investigating Unit (SIU), as seen by the collaboration between the entities on a number of high-profile cases. Therefore, it is important for NACAC to not be rigidly formed in the beginning but rather to allow the structure to emerge and mature with time in the first two to three years of its operation (added leaders 2 and 5) . It was widely acknowledged by some of the leaders (3 and 6) that the challenges associated with NACAC’s planning and operations as described in the NACS will be extremely difficult, due to the vast expansion and complex composition and dimensions of a public sector characterised by structures and functions of separate autonomous institutions across the three spheres. Considering that NACAC has the responsibility to deal with each one of these equally and comprehensively, it is a foregone conclusion that the establishment of a supportive Secretariat is crucial for it to fulfil its mandate (leaders 1, 5, and 8) . While the NACAC leadership should be the “brains trust” of the body, members of the Secretariat should be attuned to the subject matter and goals of the NACAC to constructively execute the instructions of the body and manage the daily operations. This would require the Secretariat members to possess a sound understanding of the internal workings and legal frameworks of all state institutions as well as report writing, events and meetings management, and other administrative abilities that would be necessary for the comprehensive and successful operational duties and responsibilities needed. For instance, one expert leader (3) referred to their knowledge of how the interplay between the National Prosecuting Authority and Department of Justice’s leadership limits resources to restrict meaningful prosecution in certain cases. South African government and state machinery is characterised by fragments. Leaders 1, 4, and 6 warned that the configuration of NACAC should not carry the same fragmented character, because there is great potential for conflicting responsibilities and duplication of areas of competencies. This could stifle the effectiveness of the overall anti-corruption intentions of the government at many levels, as observed from some of the challenges encountered by the Anti-Corruption Task Team. This implies that clear formalised areas of responsibility and authority that exist within a single coherent anti-corruption strategy and action plan are crucial to its success. There were reservations regarding the proposed term of office for the interim body, which is two years, by some of the participants. Leaders 1, 5, and 6 were concerned that with a change of leadership soon after its establishment, NACAC could lose momentum and the necessary sense of urgency. Furthermore, as expert leader 7 added, corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon to be unravelled within a short space of time. The intricate details of grand corruption, as revealed, for example, at the Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, and complex vast networks to disentangle take a great deal of time and resources. Resourcing, staffing, and financing of NACAC was also a common theme. Given the shrinking tax base due to unemployment and a stagnant economic growth rate amidst expanding service delivery mandates, leader 7 recommends that, to supplement operational budget, the body could use additional funds from the Criminal Asset Recovery Accounts to ensure that it has enough funds to meet its financial needs, including hiring of competent staff and the ability to retain them, especially in the investigating unit and the Secretariat. Conclusion The above findings bring a few salient factors to light that must be taken into consideration when formalising NACAC. While it is generally accepted that it is impossible to attend to all issues raised by the expert leaders at once, it is worth sieving through them and deciding on the critical ones, those which have the potential to direct the structure, operation, and mandate of the body to ensure that it is fit-for-purpose at inception stage. The following section gives a detailed overview of how the researcher, in consultation with the reference group from the School of Public Leadership and Inclusive Society Institute, understands NACAC as conceived by the NACS document. THEME 3: NACAC in practice This section represents an informed attempt to chart what NACAC could look like after considering the research findings (theme 2) and best practices from the case studies found on the African continent (theme 1). The establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council is the beginning of a two-year process, leading to the creation of a permanent entity that will lead the fight against corruption in South Africa. This process concentrates on, particularly, the management of the initial transitional matters of the new permanent organisation that will later emerge. The key mandate of NACAC is strategy implementation of research and conceptual development, culminating in a draft proposal for Cabinet that will ultimately inform the establishment of the overarching body. The foundation upon which the new body is built should be informed by a sound legal basis governing the institution, which should elaborate especially on financial, personnel, procedural, and operational issues related to the agency. Preparation of internal organisational structures and regulations including the internal code of conduct; initiating the process of recruitment of staff; working out internal administrative, operational, and reporting procedures, and establishing manageable work plans and benchmarks to assess progress should form part of the initial stage. NACAC Composition and Staff Selection Criteria During the first transitional period, between 7 and 10 senior representatives from government, the private sector, and civil society appointed by the President will comprise the body, and they will be supported by a full-time dedicated Secretariat. Government Minister/s who have participated in the Clusters of Directors General and Clusters of Ministers established by the Presidency in line with Section 85 of the Constitution of the Republic are considered to be the appropriate government representatives to be prioritised to represent government. This is because they have sufficient experience and knowledge of issues associated with coordination and integration of government priorities and programmes, the study and processing of Cabinet memoranda, draft bills, policies, documents, and strategic decisions for consideration and approval by Cabinet. The incumbents of the Governance, State Capacity, and Institutional Development Cluster (GSCID); Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS); or the International Cooperation, Trade and Security Cluster (ICTS) could be candidates to represent the government. The National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF) – a coalition formed by the government, business, and civil society sectors – could potentially serve as a ready-forum from which to choose non-governmental representatives, as it already serves as a forum to discuss corruption challenges. It could be considered along with NEDLAC. Other civil society and organised interest bodies such as Business Unity South Africa offer third-level options. In terms of civil society organisations, the existence of a wide variety and diversified anti-corruption entities makes the choice challenging on a number of levels, but inevitably a critical, open, and democratically undertaken debate can lead to an appropriate decision. If the government needs to tap into existing structures, the National Development Commission, and National Governing Council on APRM (African Peer Review Mechanism), for example, offers access to a wide range of civil society bodies at an apex level. In terms of the Secretariat, the key elements for selection should prioritise the knowledge and understanding that exists within all relationships NACAC has with other anti-corruption bodies. The Secretariat members employed after a successful transparent and participatory interview will be well educated, skilful, and capable employees executing daily administrative tasks for the organisation. The existence of soft and hard skills is to be supplemented with important professional aspects such as technological knowledge, systems design, and database management, South Africa’s anti-corruption legislation, rules and regulations, and agreements with African and international bodies. The importance of NACAC means that members of the Secretariat should be attuned to the subject matter and goals of the body so as to constructively carry out the instructions of the organisation – especially as it will be the main daily conduit of communications between NACAC and government departments, anti-corruption bodies, public enterprises, etc. This would require that the Secretariat has a good understanding of the internal workings and the legal frameworks of all these organisations – as well as all the report writing, meeting organising, and other administrative abilities that would be necessary to achieve day-to-day operational goals. NACAC’s Authority, Mandate, and Responsibilities NACAC derives its key primary mandate from the fact that it is the entity that oversees the processes, structures, plans, and implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and all anti-corruption programmes as envisioned by NACS. In this process, NACAC could then become an organisation that periodically reviews the NACS; and could call for public hearings and/or submissions and recommend changes to Parliament if and when deemed necessary. That is, the body will have the power, authority, influence, and responsibility to ensure cooperation, coordination, synergy, monitoring, and evaluation of all anti-corruption projects and programmes in all societal sectors, including compliance with all international and multilateral institutions and conventions. The research, policy formulation, and advisory roles are integral to the existence of the entity. Research activities on anti-corruption led to the creation and development of new knowledge that is instrumental to the processes of analysing and dissecting operational, regulatory, and legislative inadequacies and devising proposals of relevant interventions. Such initiatives and outcomes give rise to the formulation of new initiatives, measures, and policies aimed at preventing corruption. While in the process of researching the necessity and/or suitability of a single anti-corruption agency, the management of stakeholder relations and partnerships – their engagement and development – ultimately generates a deeper understanding of sectoral and industry forum coordination. Within such a functional and structural reality, hosting regular anti-corruption summits amongst representatives of all anti-corruption bodies becomes inevitable, as such undertakings could prompt further development of relevant interfaces or engagement mechanisms. Therefore, one of the key responsibilities of NACAC is the continuous liaison and collaboration with other anti-corruption agencies and bodies, including but not limited to constitutional institutions such as Chapter Nine institutions and the Public Service Commission, law enforcement agencies, the NPA, the SIU, the intelligence services, specialised units in departments, and any coordinating mechanism for reactive and law-enforcement activities (currently the ACTT). Within the same operational terrain, the importance of highlighting failure or any undue, unconstitutional, political, and/or other interference in the operation of these bodies and bringing it to the attention of Parliament, cannot be overstated. In fact, calling attention to deficiencies related to capacitation, impediments, funding, and resources for anti-corruption bodies is a significant functional objective. It is necessary for NACAC to prioritise raising the alarm on any unethical or integrity-deficient conduct of the head or senior management of any anti-corruption body, as an early warning system for attempts at state capture or any action that could result in state capture. Design and function of a coordinating body Anti-corruption agencies in South Africa are poorly coordinated due to overlapping mandates, diversity, and institutional lack of clarity. NACAC can achieve effective inter-agency cooperation as a coordinating body through sufficient capacity, resources, authority, and political will. A number of well-defined measures could create effective cross-agency cooperation, which might lead to proactive information and communication, joint training initiatives, and evaluating and monitoring the planning processes and implementation of anti-corruption efforts by the existing bodies. In many countries, the effective coordination of anti-corruption work is greatly undermined by the failure to consider cooperation issues from the design stage of the anti-corruption institutional arrangements. This results in inadequate or non-existent coordination mechanisms that lack resources, capacity, and political backing. Empirical research has shown that on many occasions coordination of anti-corruption bodies is weak and inconsistent, even non-existent. Although the mandates of such bodies are defined by laws, rules, and regulations, these entities exist more on paper than in practice and therefore lack a pro-active approach, powers, and political leverage to act in a way that enables them to fulfil their mandates efficiently. Political and legal support across the board is a necessity if NACAC is to succeed in effectively implementing inter-agency cooperation (U4, 2005) . Immediate and continuous planning, together with operational and political attention, is required from the onset. Coordination issues need to be debated and planned from the design stage of the anti-corruption policy making. In addition, integration in the overall anti-corruption architecture is important. A coordinating body’s success is based on a strong understanding of how and where the various mandates and responsibilities meet and interact. A new anti-corruption architecture enables the reallocation of responsibilities and roles whereby institutional hierarchies, mandates are clarified, and competencies are readjusted. This means that respective institutions are given clear lines of responsibility, as clear rules of engagement guide the collaboration and interaction of the existing bodies (Meagher, 2005) . Coordination can be the solution to the primary concern in the anti-corruption fight in South Africa, as research has shown inadequate networking between different entities with different tasks. At present, South Africa has fourteen anti-corruption bodies struggling to do their work. The poor state of the economy, in part due to the continuing impact of COVID-19, and the reality of a continuous fiscal austerity calls for a prudent approach to the reform of the country’s regulatory landscape. Any reforms should be considered and decided upon based on maximum value on expenditure. A suitable point of departure could be the adoption of a well-coordinated and networked approach that brings together the heads of all the existing entities. These include the Chapter Nine institutions mandated with anti-corruption work, including the Public Service Commission, all the law enforcement agencies in all their various forms and guises, and the intelligence sector. Cross-cutting reforms – especially those associated with corruption and the anti-corruption fight – depend on valuable information and communication-sharing between the public and the implementing agencies in addition to access and dissemination of supporting anti-corruption documents and policies. The developments in information technology have opened increasing opportunities in this field and are instrumental in providing innovative tools to promote information and data-sharing across agencies. The design and implementation of a systematic and proactive strategy of information-sharing amongst all agencies will be crucial to help build and sustain trusting relationships which will ultimately bring about longer-term cooperation. This means that NACAC is designed to take the lead in crucial information exchange as a strategy to gain the confidence of all other agencies (De Sousa, 2010). Resources and Capacity Needs The existing official National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030 states that, in terms of budget and resourcing, and given the fact that the NACAC will exist for a maximum of two years, this structure can explore the use of funds from the Criminal Asset Recovery Accounts. This is a separate account within the National Revenue Fund (NRF) into which property and monies are deposited after a judicial confiscation, forfeiture, or order – a process rooted in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998 (Act No. 121 of 1998) . The hypothesis behind asset forfeiture legislation is that, by forfeiting or confiscating the proceeds or profits of crime, the incentive for committing specific crimes is reduced, while the state uses the proceeds to strengthen its anti-corruption efforts. It is important that a legal opinion should be sought as to the authority of the National Treasury to redirect the distribution of these funds. It is a natural cause that, if found to be legally permissible, funding of NACAC (and its Secretariat) could produce a considerable politico-societal return by way of reduced corruption – reduced loss of public funds in public sector institutions – which in turn further justifies its funding and increases the pool of resources government needs to deliver services. Beyond resources, institutional capacities needed include: A Research and Policy Unit that is responsible for researching anti-corruption initiatives. Its key responsibility is to facilitate and conduct research and analytical studies on issues pertaining to the development of anti-corruption initiatives locally, regionally, and internationally. While researchers employed in the unit can be directly involved in staff training throughout the anti-corruption institutional terrain, contacts, meetings, and digital conferences can connect the staff with colleagues and academic researchers on the African continent to exchange ideas, research, and insights. Potential staff members of such a unit should be university graduates with at least a master’s degree in the social, law or economic sciences, preferably with knowledge and/or exposure to anti-corruption realities. The unit might be strengthened by the success of the innovative model currently being developed by the University of Pretoria together with the Presidency, which aspires to create a highly networked governance method that will link up existing researchers in a very lean organisational sense. Such thinking could influence the future development of the notion of applying higher levels of coordination and focus to the fight against corruption. Important to note is that the unit does not make recommendations. It presents its final reports to its leadership, its sister organisations, and finally to the anti-corruption bodies and the National Parliament. A Project Management Office that will operationalise the existing policies, strategies, and procedures together with the existing multilateral initiatives on governance and anti-corruption; identify the dynamics and realities for risk analysis and institutional assessments; governance and anti-corruption project design measures; supervision monitoring and evaluation, and similar operational matters. An Education Office that will operate at two levels: the institutional and the public. The institutional level will focus on training all members of NACAC as well as those in all anti-corruption agencies. This will involve an ‘induction training programme’ providing basic training to new employees, all of whom spend the first few months of their service in the Research and Policy Unit in order to improve their knowledge on corruption and anti-corruption realities, investigations, successes, processes, structures, and challenges, before being considered for the final posting. The new recruits’ training could last at least a year, while the trainees work and learn at the Research and Policy Unit. During the process the courses include corruption prevention, communication skills, rules of evidence, law, computer forensics, financial investigation skills, and cognitive interview techniques, amongst others. Throughout the period of employment, the training continues at higher levels. The public pillar is for awareness campaigns and educational programmes in order to mobilise society in the fight against corruption. A Whistle-blower Protection Unit that is responsible for considering the circumstances under which suspicions of wrongdoing can be reported inside and outside the organisation; has the knowledge and means to provide legal and physical protection to the whistle-blowers; ensures that the existing reporting channels, such as information hotlines, also exist for individuals working in the private sector, who are involved in the provision of local and regional public services; encourages positive attitudes towards whistle-blowing amongst citizens by promoting whistle-blowing policies and publicising post-reporting follow-ups, to ensure that individuals considering reporting suspected cases of wrongdoing have access to advice that is confidential and free of charge; forms part of external bodies such as NGOs and national associations; and introduces periodic assessments of the effectiveness of rules and regulations on the protection of whistle-blowers. The treatment of whistle-blowers in South Africa has led to proposals for a reform of the Protected Disclosure Act (PDA) after representative organisations of those who speak up voiced their frustrations. According to the organisations, the PDA does not protect whistle-blowers since whistle-blowing still leads to job losses. The value of whistle-blowing for the public good has increased worldwide over the last 40 years. In many countries, both state and federal statutes have been put in place to protect whistle-blowers from employers and institutions. This is a direct result of the fear public employees face when exposing corruption. New strict laws, rules, and regulations have been introduced worldwide to protect whistle-blowers, and so doing help the fight against corruption by encouraging more people to expose misconduct or illegal and dishonest activity (Lee & Kleiner, 2011:342) . A recommended amendment to the PDA is to afford the complete protection of all government employees and especially the whistle-blowers. The amendment should prohibit the government from taking any personnel action against an employee after they have disclosed information that they believe exposes gross mismanagement, corruption, waste of funds, or the abuse of authority. Conclusion To gain protection from the amendment, a public employee needs to show that a protected disclosure was made, the nature of which the accused official was aware of, and that a connection exists between the retaliation from the official and the actions of the employee which induced the retaliation (US Department of Labour, N.d.). Click here to continue to Part 2 of this report

Click here to go back to Part 1 of this report Expert’s responses analysis There were mostly similar as well as a number of diversified opinions in the responses to questions structured in order to receive, assess, and absorb expert opinions of interviewees belonging to all three categories of the first leadership group of the new body in its ‘first stage’ of two years. The questions dealt with key issues of structures, processes, realities, and expectations associated with the body. There were mostly agreements in respect of key issues but also queries and additions based primarily on the deep knowledge of the interviewees as well as their viewpoints and beliefs guided by it. In the preliminary introduction of the topic and the explanation of the structure of the open-ended questions to be answered the researcher had the opportunity to ask the prospective interviewees’ opinions on the conditions and realities of the anti-corruption agencies and the existing law enforcements in the country at present. The general response was rooted on the belief that such agencies and anti-corruption bodies were an integral part of a corruption-ridden public system, a small part of which still ‘remember with nostalgia the Scorpions,’ possibly the only such system in the world that has faced the reality that every single Commissioner of police has been removed from his/her position facing charges for corruption. Such an undisputed fact points to the vital significance of senior appointments of well trained, highly educated, and ethical leadership. Four of the interviewees (No 2, 4, 5 and 8) pinpointed to what they described as ‘complete lack of efforts to corrupt prevention’ in terms of what was described lack of clear cut scientific examination of anti-corruption personnel integrity tests through instruments such as lie-detectors and newly established testing tools, especially in key corruption-ridden or corruption- creating public sector functions such as supply chain management and procurement, risk management and internal audits amongst others. Interestingly, similar positions have been expressed by a highly experienced and knowledgeable former head of the NPA (National Prosecuting Authority) who has publicly mentioned that ‘the focus in the country’s law enforcement entities had been on violent crimes and sexual offences’ due to the public outrage. ’Such a position, it was stated, points to the significance of the support of an anti-corruption agency that only focuses on anti-corruption, not rape or murder. The proposed anti-corruption agency on his part should have the “vital power” to allow answers to self-incriminating questions “like the Scorpions.” Such important positions on the part of the retired anti-corruption leader were demystified as follows: “If there is no cost to them changing their version when evidence comes up, it drags on and on. The Investigating Directorate does this, but its 30 or 40 people will not make a difference. Self-incriminating questions cannot be used against the confessor in his own trial but can be used against others.” He also favoured a “proper whistle-blower mechanism” that fell under the control of retired Constitutional Court judges, as he believed that such a step would make whistle-blowers feel safe (Hofmeyr, 2021). The gist of responses to the questions set appears below: Question 1: The National Anti-Corruption Strategy has indicated that the number of persons in NACAC should be senior representatives from government, civil society and business, consisting of between seven (7) and ten (10) members. Do you consider the composition of the body appropriate and according to NACAC’s principles, duties and responsibilities? If NOT please state your reasons. There was one interviewee who was from the beginning against the very existence of the proposed new body (Interviewee No 3). The interviewee begun the describing the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030 as a ‘detailed document rooted on good sense’ and an agreement with the ANC’s NEC urgent resolution in 2020 that ‘instructed’ the Cabinet to establish a single, permanent, and independent agency with the capacity to deal with corruption decisively. This ‘instruction’ was ‘echoed’ in the President’s announcement on February the 21st of the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council. The interviewee’s belief that ‘the President has been ‘poorly advised’ by politicians who have no understanding or knowledge of the crucial significance in law of the thrust of the findings in the Glenister litigation case (Glenister 2 and 3) that are binding. It was stated that the findings of the case that was centred on the inadequacy of the Hawks were based on the fact that a statutory body as described in the Presidential State of the Nation Address cannot enjoy the legally required security of tenure of office. This means that the body is illegal and will face the fate of the Scorpions, an organisation that disbanded after the ex-President Jacob Zuma replaced then President Thabo Mbeki. The interviewee’s position was clearly based on the belief that the new body described by the President in SONA will be immediately very vulnerable and will face the same ending as the Scorpions. This is, because it is not legally a Chapter 9 institution, an entity that is structurally and operationally independent, one that cannot be legally terminated by a simple majority. On the other hand, it was believed that a ‘real new Chapter 9 institution’ that has the mandate to investigate, prosecutor and answer to Parliament is needed. There was a strong belief that the new independent anti-corruption body described the President was ‘unconstitutional’ and such a position was in fact a negation of the ANC’s National Executive Committee’s resolution in August 2020 as it was mostly in accordance with the Glenister 2 and 3 binding findings. It was felt that the fact that the advisory body’s initial composition has not been announced by the President yet points to the reality of deep misunderstanding of the complexities of laws, corruption realities, as well as the Zondo Commission outcomes. Following SONA there was the expectation that the appointment of the members of the new body would be the first priority. The delay of such an appointment was described by the interviewee as a lack of planning and implementation of key decisions announced publicly which aim at ‘filling the gaps in the fight against corruption’ in South Africa. Such gaps can be only filled by a lawful anti-corruption advisory body that will enable a new successful path for the government. This could only be a body rooted on the clear findings of the Glenister 2 and 3 cases. The introduction of such a body would be the beginning of a road leading the country far away from corruption and ‘state capture’ through carefully executed efficient steps against the corrupt elements throughout the public service and beyond. There was a strong belief that the Democratic Alliance, through an alliance with non- governmental organisations was prepared to present private members’ bills supporting a new anti-corruption investigative body, while non-governmental organisations had already prepared in legally based plans for a ‘one-stop shop’ Chapter Nine organisation that when established would be able and capable to investigate and prosecute all forms of serious corruption at all societal levels. Finally, it was stated that for the new body to exist and operate ‘a new law needs to be passed’’. This meant that given the ‘procrastination of the President’ to establish the new body a court case was prepared to have such a ‘plan’ nullified (Interviewee 3). There was a general acceptance on the number of members elected by the President as the first leading group of the body (between seven and ten) and despite the almost general acceptance of the suggested sectoral representation there was a somewhat diversified opinion. Interviewee No 5 believed that a ‘community member’ should be included in the group and such a position was justified by the example of NEDLAC (the National Economic Development and Labour Council), where there is a community and a worker/labour union contingent. While the equal representation of the groups was generally agreed upon by the interviewees there was a belief that the diversification of the groups, especially those from the ranks of labour and civil society was important (Interviewees No 2, 4, 5 and 6, 7, and 8). A critical issue raised by I nterviewee No 1 initially and agreed upon by the majority of the rest was that the most essential element instrumental in the success of the body is that the chosen members have a developed understanding of the subject matter they will be dealing with. It was felt that knowledge that includes the internal workings and systems of public sector organisation, how corruption manifests itself within such organisations, as well as what is to be learnt from the international literature on corruption in the public sectors and the established best practices towards combating is essential. It was strongly felt that without such understanding and experience the NACAC would be ineffective - as previous anti-corruption initiatives have shown conclusively . A number of interviewees indicated that given the existing realities evident within the political and organisational structures of the ruling party, the President’s selection of the body’s members from government should be based on clear criteria of credibility, honesty, existing historical background and serious knowledge of the realities, laws, rules, and regulations regarding corruption (Interviewees No 1,2, 4, 6 ,7) . An interviewee emphasised the importance of the proposed number of the initial leadership core, especially in terms of the importance of labour representation. It was felt that more people in the leadership of NACAC ‘would spoil the broth as the saying goes’ (Interviewee No 8) . Question 2: It is stated in the Anti-Corruption Strategy Document that ‘ This body will be responsible for the managing of the initial transitional matters of strategy implementation, including research, conceptual development and drafting of a proposal to Cabinet for the establishment of the overarching body’. Is it viable that all these matters of strategy implementation can be undertaken by the NACAC senior representatives? If not, what do you feel are the alternatives and the reasons for your response? Given the knowledge of all interviewees, especially in relation to the SOUTH AFRICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY 2020-2030, it was not a surprise that the possibility that an appropriately staffed NACAC would be able to manage the necessary and successful implementation of the responsibilities stated in the Anti-Corruption Strategy Document was very viable at all levels. Despite the general acceptance that the proposed planned and implemented new body could be capable in managing the necessary and successful implementation of the responsibilities as outlined in the Anti-Corruption Strategy Document it was strongly felt that there were a number of ‘particularly important’ prerequisites for such a success to become a reality: The NACAC is given the necessary authority to issue relevant directives and oversee their implementation. Without such a step forward any hope for success is lost (Interviewees No 1, 5, and 7, 8). That these instructions are regarded as mandatory (Interviewees No 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7). That all Cabinet Ministers actively support the NACAC and its mandate (Interviewees No 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7). That the Accounting Officers and Accounting Authorities (as per PFMA/MFMA) actively support and oversee NACAC directives – and must account for their effective implementation and ongoing application (Interviewees No 1, 4 and 7). That the NACAC directives are incorporated within the internal control regime of each and every public sector organisation – including the PFMA/MFMA stipulated internal audit function, the risk management function and the laid down procurement practices (Interviewees No 1, 4, 5, and 7) . That every public official involved in the requirement as the above necessities outlined above must undergo serious essential education covering the nature of public sector corruption and the NACAC prescribed anti-corruption practices (Interviewees No 1, 4, and 7) . That the various members could introduce various strengths to the table and would not all, for example, have to be researchers although research is an inevitable element of the body . This means that NACAC senior representatives could need to have subcommittees for some of the work as not all elements or decisions are research orientated and might be strong on a particular strategy element but not all of it. It was felt that there could not be expectations for each member to be conversant in all aspects of the corruption realities, meaning that such undertakings would be outsourced to specialised, ad hoc committees (Interviewee No 8). A number of such statements were seen as important in the context of future challenges facing the key operations of the new body and its members as two interviewees (No 4 and 6) pinpointed the undoubted fact that the forthcoming report emanating from the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture would open new avenues of challenges at all levels leading to new relations and actions undertaken by anti-corruption agencies. Such new decisions and outcomes were also described as opening new paths in the relations between the new body with organisations such as the South African Revenue Services (SARS) and the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) that have been decisive in their road to new, forward-looking, and positive directions ( Interviewees No 2, 5 and 8). There could be the possibilities of difficulties in future relations leading to the necessity of fresh paths of collaboration between the new body’s leadership with group/s of politicians as well the leaderships of central, provincial and district municipal leaderships associated with corruption still under investigation as well as state-owned companies such as the Airports Company South Africa, Transnet, Denel, and ESCOM. These realities demand unity of purpose, common understanding of existing realities and openness as vital ingredients of success (Interviewees No 3 and 6). Question 3: It is stated that ‘The NACAC must be supported by a full-time dedicated secretariat to facilitate any practical arrangements, to consolidate and record its work and reports, and to ensure that it can deliver on its mandate’. How important is the composition of such a body and what skills, knowledge, and experience and sector background (public or private) the potential secretariat members should possess. Provide reasons. It was widely acknowledged by the interviewees that the challenges associated with NACAC’s planning and operations as described in the Anti-Corruption Strategy document will be extremely difficult because of the vast expansion and complex composition and dimensions of a public sector that is characterised by the existence, structures and functions of separate institutions and entities. Bearing in mind the reality that NACAC has the responsibility to deal with each one of them equally and comprehensively, it is inevitable that the establishment of a supportive secretariat is crucial to the fulfilment of its mandate (Interviewees No 1, 5, and 8). While the NACAC leadership should be the “brains trust” of the body, members of the secretariat should be attuned to the subject matter and goals of the NACAC to constructively carry out the instructions of the body – especially as it will be the main daily conduit of communications between the NACAC, anti-corruption bodies, Government Departments, Public Enterprises etc. This would require the secretariat members to possess a good understanding of the internal workings and the legal frameworks of all these organisations – as well as all the report writing, meeting organising and other administrative abilities that would be necessary for the comprehensive and successful operational duties and responsibilities. While it has been widely accepted that strong organisational skills and meticulous treatment of existing technical and other existing challenges and problems within the entity, it was felt that that research capacity and skills experience would be beneficial at this this level especially when dealing with confidential information (Interviewees No 2,4,6 and 7). These realities mean that from the beginning the NACAC leadership should recruit highly qualified staff, with skills that are the foundation of future success. It needs to be noted that the commitment to effectiveness of the leadership functions in the process of fighting corruption should be integrated into the duties and responsibilities of the secretariat that could be diversified in terms of operations as follows: The key duties and responsibilities of a secretariat involve a good number of individuals executing daily administrative tasks for an organization, mainly but not exclusively the handling human resources and personnel issues; the organisational finances; practical arrangements for the meetings; planning, implementing, and maintaining a forward plan of agenda items and liaising with the Chair to prepare agendas, and preparing, checking, and issuing accurate minutes. Such a group of professionals needs to be practitioners with a wide variety of qualities associated with the individual’s positions, duties and responsibilities. The combination of hard and soft skills in terms of qualities include deep knowledge of the incumbents’ duties, responsibilities as well as the subject/s associated with the operational roles, such as high technological skills, and deep understanding of the issues related to the communication channels of all anti-corruption agencies, authorities, and state institutions at all levels (Interviewees No 1, 3, 6 and 8). It was felt that the members of the Secretariat could become important in the effort to upgrade existing realities both within government departments and entities as well as upgrading the knowledge of anti-corruption agencies staff in issues as important as an advanced understanding of the Treasury rules and regulations in regard of public procurement, through a careful dissection of first operational stages of the processes involved in supply chain management. Such a process could be based on setting standards and regulations in regard to the procurement and disposal activities of Procuring and Disposing Entities (PDEs) such as Government ministries, District Municipalities, Local Municipalities, and all other public bodies engaged in the procurement and disposal activities. Such processes and mechanisms comprise of compliance inspections of PDEs in terms of establishing whether the legally based structures of all relevant contract and procurement committees and their composition are functional, and that the disposal units are in place and functional and according to the rules, laws and regulations. Such a process compliance inspection could lead to the identification of structural and/or functional weaknesses, challenges and problems that could ultimately lead to further investigation. Such initiatives will make a real positive difference in performance at many organizational levels (Interviewee No 5). In order to dissect the real significance of the secretariat’s understanding of the realities and dynamics facing anti-corruption agencies, an interviewee set up the example of the relationships of ministers associated with such institutions. This was done through the utilisation of the position and attitudes of the Department of Justice leadership, the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) and the financial independence of the NPA. It was stated that existing relations between these state institutions in regard to NPA’s financial position are in need to be solved, as the existing situation does not allow the entity to pursue meaningful prosecutions. This means that the secretariat employees need to understand the administrative and financial condition of anti-corruption agencies as well all state institutions in general in order to be able to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. It was felt strongly that as the communication with all anti-corruption bodies is considered of paramount importance, both the leadership and the secretariat should plan, design, and implement strategies and tactics as the first key priority (Interviewee No 3). Question 4: It is stated that in terms of accountability and reporting that is recommended NACAC should report to the President and its reports tabled in Parliament. According to your own understanding, experience and knowledge does such a reality mean that possible debates and majority decisions can become instrumental in changing or/and modifying existing decisions of NACAC? Can you provide the reasons and your own ideas on such a possibility? The difficulty of this question that can be justified as legally and politically challenging attracted only two responses from the interviewees. The fact that both interviewees who tackled the issue have experiences both in government institutions, academia and research at a number of levels, indicate both the significance and dilemmas associated with the challenges associated with such decisions. The first position based on the interviewee’s experience both within government institutions, legislative roles, academic research and teaching and political oversight is rooted on the belief that it would be important for NACAC to be given scope within its prescribed mandate to make changes to its decisions should this be seen as necessary to further improve the effectiveness of its anti-corruption efforts. It was felt strongly that such changes should always be made within existing administrative laws and not in conflict with executive directives. It was felt strongly that it would be advisable that the stance of the Cabinet, Parliament, the Accounting Officers, the Accountant General and the Auditor General should be invited and taken into account prior to any significant changes being proposed. Depending on the legal mandate of the NACAC and the degree of independence it is given, it could be subjected to Executive and Parliamentary prescribed changes. However, it was strongly felt that such impositions are not likely (Interviewee No 1). On the other hand, Interviewee No 8 felt that given the importance of NACAC as evident in both the Presidential announcement as well as the content of the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030, it was felt that new and innovative rules and/or regulations should be structured from the relevant bodies so that the possibility of confusion, misunderstandings that could lead to political and/or legalistic dilemmas could be avoided. The interviewee felt that the final decision would depend on the level of the debates and their constructive nature. Decisions, it was said, should be commonly agreed upon rooted on the common belief that the best interests of the country are of paramount importance (Interviewee No 8). Question 5: It is stated that ‘a transitional interactive strategic relationship will have to be maintained with the Anti-Corruption Task Team (ACTT) and all law enforcement agencies. Similarly, the work of the NACACS steering committee and NACS reference group should be incorporated into the interim advisory body’. Which section of the Advisory Council do you feel will maintain such relationships, the 7 to 10 of senior representatives from government, civil society and business or by the full-time dedicated secretariat to facilitate any practical arrangements, to consolidate and record its work and reports, and to ensure that it can deliver on its mandate. Provide the reasons for your answer. The responses can be characterised as similar in most cases, but with a small number of diversions that need to be explored for comments. The general agreement was related to the common belief that any relationship of NAPAC with anti-corruption bodies and other state institutions should be well defined. It is believed that in such relationships the significance of the ‘detailed realities’ is of paramount importance, a fact that will lead to the avoidance of repetitions of past experiences. There was an agreement amongst most interviewees that it was the responsibility of the 7 to 10-member Advisory Council body to communicate with other bodies its policy and action, which will also be presented to the President and Parliament. The member of the Secretariat facilitates such communications at the administrative level. There were also a small number of different positions on the issue. It was mentioned, however, that experiences of conflicting responsibilities and authorities between various bodies have been instrumental in undermining the effectiveness of the overall anti-corruption intentions of the Government at many levels. This means that the best way forward depends clearly on formalised areas of responsibility and authority which all work within a single coherent anti-corruption/strategy and action plan. It was felt that such a need does not exist at present (Interviewees No 1, 4, and 6). The role of the Secretariat and its knowledgeable staff was said to be a key in creating an environment leading to success. Hence the body needs to be enabled to play a key role in providing the functions and processes of an ‘educational enforcement mechanism’ that could prove instrumental in the fight against corruption in terms of dissecting procurement audits within both government entities as well as the anti-corruption agencies. This is because audit reports throughout the years have been very important sources in analysing the functionalities and dysfunctionalities of procurement and risk management structures and functions as well the relationships between politicians, administrators, and business operators. This means that in the final analysis the comprehensive examination of specified disposal or procurement cases that have given wide negative publicity to the people, a fact leading to public controversy, lack of trust, suspicion of corruption or malpractice leads to well planned, investigation of the relevant anti-corruption agencies. Such an understanding and analysis within this context leads to a belief that at a time when suspicion of a corrupt act in public supply chain and procurement areas are reported to the appropriate anti-corruption authorities, the rule of law demands criminal investigation and prosecution with integrity. In such cases the investigative powers leading to prosecution are in need of capability and excellence on the part of the state employees responsible to deal with such issues and challenges (Interviewee No 5). Such a position by the one interviewee was supported by a business person whose opinion was based on the fact that the realities of corruption and anti-corruption have not slowed down, especially during the period of the Covid-19 pandemic and the continuous Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) corruption had devastating effects on the lives of millions of the poorest of the poor throughout South Africans. This reality was perpetrated for months despite the fact that the Special Investigating Unit was seriously activated, and a large number of such cases were investigated, and culprits were discovered and punished. Such anti-corruption initiatives were also active through the Fusion Centre (Interviewee No 6). On the other hand, there was a belief that the ACT has not proven much success in matters relating to their core activities, while the same applies to the division and duplication among the law enforcement agencies. This was said, to leads to the conclusion that in the end, there is the need for a process leading to substantial transformation within the parameters of the Criminal Justice Cluster. Once such an effort succeeds there is an open opportunity for all stakeholders and role players to begin a constructive and useful debate in respect of all important matters in the fight against corruption at all levels. In the end, it was believed, the responsibility lies with the leadership of the NACAC Advisory Council while the Secretariat will mostly provide professional and support services. The NACS Reference group at least represents all sectors involved in the fight against corruption (Interviewee No 7). Interviewee No 8 believed that the Secretariat in collaboration and direct communication with the main body would provide the ‘guidance of how issues would be resolved after following the administrative processes’ that include direct communications with all government clusters, the DPSA and the National Treasury. The final decision, it was believed, rested with the President and the Department of Justice. Question 6: It is proposed in the National Strategy document that their term of office should be two years’ maximum or until the overarching body is established and operational. Do you feel that the term is well thought given the existing circumstances? Please justify the answer. There were two basic positions regarding this question with 3 interviewees stating that given the existing circumstances it was extremely difficult for them to comment on the issue. Three interviewees ( No 1, No 5 and No 6) believed that those two years should be an adequate period for the overarching body to establish the necessary functionality and to go through the learning curve in order for it to establish an adequate modus operandi for the permanent body (i.e., phase 2). For the interim body to extend beyond two years would lead to the loss of necessary urgency and impetus of the NACAC initiative. Two interviewees, however, who based their opinion on what they called ‘a clear understanding of the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030’ (Interviewees No 2 and No 4) , believed that the realities facing South Africa, Africa and the world during the Covid 19 pandemic have led to devastating human, social and health challenges. Such realities, it was believed, have led them to the conclusion that the present and future decisive battles against corruption can only be led and guided by groups of political leaders, politicians, administrators and future leaders and employees of NACAC who themselves are honest, committed, transparent, independent-minded, well - educated and trained specialists in a number of scientific disciplines associated with corruption in all its sides and angles. Their belief was even if the leadership and the Secretariat of the new body were widely accepted because of their own credentials, history and background, the dynamics, realities, challenges, complications, and existing circumstances are so diverse and multi- dimensional that this period is not enough for the completion of the target. It was felt that the term is most likely too short given the fact of all the existence of the technicalities involved and especially the realities of the existing bureaucratic system in which this body will function. It can also be seen with Councillors in local government-they barely have their internal aspects sorted, started with work (especially when taking over from another political party) and then their time has expired (Interviewee No 7) . Interviewee No 8 believed that the success or failure of such a plan could depend on the reality of setting up the appropriate aims and objectives as well a ‘business plan’ consisting of the realities of the mandate, the roles, structures and membership of the body, the existing and future resources, the priorities, the performance measures and annual targets,the functionalities of the systems, audit realities, risk assessment and mitigation, policy and priorities agendas. Question 7: It is stated that in terms of budget and resourcing and given the fact that the NACAC will exist for a maximum of two years, this structure can explore the use of funds from the Criminal Asset Recovery Accounts. Do you think that such a possibility exists? Provide the reasons for your answer. A proposed alternative is welcome. It was stated that this proposed source of funding for the NACAC is certainly worth exploring.It was felt that a legal opinion should be sought as to the authority of National Treasury to redirect the distribution of these funds.Failing this, it should be possible to convince the Minister of Finance that funding of the NACAC (and its Secretariat) should produce a considerable return by way of reduced corruption i.e., reduced loss of public funds in Public Sector institutions – which in turn justifies its funding (Interviewee No 1) . It was felt that such a decision that could lead to a reality in the end of the process will literally depend on all of the costs that the Council will incur.While the allocation of a budget during the period of the operations could be considered a ‘done deal’, additional funds could come from the Criminal Asset Recovery Accounts. However, it was believed, one should keep in mind what the Criminal Asset Recovery Accounts are actually supposed to do with for example the recovered funds. If the Advisory Council should find their own financial means it will not work (Interviewee 7). Question 8: What do you consider the best ways and channels used by the various anti-corruption agencies to coordinate and interact? This was basically a ‘general question’ set with the hope that the knowledge of the interviewees even from a variety of different angles would or could provide new knowledge or original ideas and alternatives suited to the new entity. The majority of interviewees (Interviewees No 1, 2, 4, 5,6 and 8) mentioned that this was a ‘very difficult question’ for a number of reasons, the most important been the multiplicity of anti-corruption laws, rules, regulations and anti-corruption bodies as well as what was described as the difficulty of South African people, including members of Parliament and senior public servants at all government levels to really know and understand of specific duties and responsibilities of each of these bodies. The name of the Scorpions that do not really exist anymore cropped up a number of times as an almost ‘generic’ belief emerged that ‘perhaps a new body can be the only carefully selected conclusion.’ The new body NACAC was mentioned by four of the respondents as a possibility, although it was stated that knowing the problems and challenges facing the political realities associated with such decisions, a final answer was difficult (No 4, 5,6 and 7). Interestingly a similar position to a point, albeit with an addition, was provided by one of the most distinguished international corruption and anti-corruption researcher Professor Drago Kos, who is the Chairperson of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, as well as the co-chair of Mena – the OECD Business Integrity Network, and a member of International Anti-Corruption Advisory Board (IACAB), among others. He questioned whether South Africa has an anti-corruption fatigue because of the fact that the country has 14 anti-corruption agencies. He pointed out that although political will and the right personnel are key to success, any new proposed entity would also need clearly defined powers and resources. Because of these realities, it was stated, ‘South Africa does not need an agency number 15’ (Kos 2021). An almost similar position was proposed by Interviewee No. 7 as follows: “I have always thought that, considering the least corrupt countries in the world, that the South African system has too many pieces of legislation and various bodies. My first suggestion would be to streamline these and then, basically on a similar basis to the intergovernmental relations framework, coordinate, and work together. It would be best to have ONE central reporting point (where there would not be any undue influence) and where information can be compared, verified, and acted on.” One interviewee with attention to detail indicated that a ‘new, fairly radical approach’ might be needed based on the successes of both international, but also African governments. His point was based on all countries’ choice, including South Africa, what is more important in the fight against corruption, punishment or prevention? He provided the examples of South Africa and Botswana. The point was that the South African people and government have been facing the fight against corruption been only successful when the corrupt are arrested and punished in accordance with the corrupt acts, while the prevention initiatives were considered weak or non- existent. The examples of the Hawks, the National Prosecutor and the SIU were mentioned, and the question arose how their successes, their functions and the reasons of successes or failures were communicated to the people who could learn. The conclusion emanating from such realities pointed to the possibility or probability of a new trend that has been now considered as ‘the foundation’ of anti-corruption success, diagnosis, thorough investigation, widespread education, effectiveness. New operational dynamics planned, structured and implemented through a deep study of the best practices across the world (Interviewee No 8). Conclusions and recommendations The key question marks in the minds of anti-corruption leaders, activists, researchers, throughout the public and the private sectors, civil society and the country’s people at large has been revolving since the evening of the 21st of February 2021 around the proposed development of a new anti-corruption entity, the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council. This is due to the fact that South Africa has 14 fully operational anti-corruption agencies and bodies it was inevitable that serious research was needed in order to assess whether the existing realities were in need of a ‘a gap analysis’ able to assess the necessity of an additional entity /entity, its nature, structures, functions and future responsibilities, planning and implementation imperatives and above it its benefit. This meant that the benefits and/or challenges of a new agency and its leading/guiding/ organising /supervising role, in short its ‘operational mode’ should be clearly identified and detailed as most cases at such new entities tend to be multi-layered and complex. Key questions are developing while the processes, realities, future structures, leaderships, relationships, co-operations, planning for efficiency and effectiveness and possible challenges and problems are unfolding. Debates and decisions have continued or will continue on the issue even during a period when even the real need for such an initiative is urgent, mainly because of the fact that there is a multiplicity of anti-corruption bodies and a widely acknowledged solid anti-corruption legislation, rules, and regulations. Those who have questioned and debated the need of a new institution have used legalistic, legal, financial, functional/structural, personal/professional knowledge and experience and comparisons associated with the effectiveness, successes, or failures of the country’s existing anti-corruption institutions. Such debates can only be based on comparisons, empirical evidence, analysis and dissection of existing realities, relationships, planning, leadership, functions, structures, success, and failures as well as their foundations. It is such a thoughtful analysis that can lead the government and society at large to trust or not such entities and identify the existing gaps that can move the anti-corruption struggles to the future. The research upon which the present document is based utilised primary and secondary sources in South Africa and internationally and included the analysis of the fundamental structures and functions of three successful anti-corruption bodies in African states that incorporate education at all societal levels as integral components of societies based on ethics. The key findings pinpointed the fact that the two basic foundations of a successful anti-corruption agency or council, are strong political will and well trained, highly educated and ethical personnel. It was agreed that there could be no successful fight against corruption without the strong support of society, communities and the government and all its institutions. This means that the combination of a political will and the appropriate and careful selection of new people in the proposed agency who undergo regular integrity testing and lifestyle audits can lead to success. Within this context a careful analysis of the structures, functions, processes, relationships, mechanisms, leadership, political will, independence, priorities, challenges, and problems at all operational and institutional levels can be described as an important lesson for the future. The ethical culture through education to public service personnel at all levels as well as wider society is included in this effort. Such a team with the characteristics as described above, comprising of a variety of committed members can be instrumental in creating the foundations of a common group understanding, cohesion, commitment and dedication based on ethics that can play an important role not only exposing, but also through planning, designing, preparing, and opening the appropriate path forward. Such a path is the way forward in the process of defeating the culture, planning and actions related to corruption in the public and private sectors and society at large. This is a process leading to the destruction of grand and petty corruption, tackled by a team that can become the key ingredient leading to the transformation, reformation, and re-shaping of an already advanced and multiple administration of justice against corruption, a multi-faced crime against South Africa and its people. Corruption is not only a national threat, but also the root of a daily refutation of the country’s Constitutional aspirations and the vision of the National Development Plan. We need to have a second legal opinion included to either validate this or venture an alternative position. Should there be an alternative position, then we make the point thatthe issue be workshopped by the legal fraternity before finalising legislation because it needs to stay out of the courts. A highly interesting position regarding the functions of the new council in terms of the ‘non-trial resolutions’ (NTRs) has appeared recently, a reality that has been described by international research of anti-corruption as a ‘possibility of been critical to the country’s proposed anti-corruption council’, despite the indisputable fact that there would be resistance, mainly because of the harsh reality that South Africa has been stripped of an estimated trillion rand as a result of graft. Within this context an expert researcher on the issue Dr Abiola Makinwa, MICA, a Principal Lecturer in Commercial Law/Anti-Corruption Law, and Policy at the Law Department in The Hague University of Applied Sciences, has indicated that ‘traditional criminal prosecutions are time-consuming and susceptible to lack of political will and the influence of elites. The sentence was completed with the belief that ‘even when in a traditional court prosecution is successful, it may fail to take the money out of the crime, so the poverty trap continues.’ Inevitably such statements could sound and/or considered as both ‘generic’ and ‘ideological’ in nature but they are founded on scientific analysis and dissection of a multiplicity of legal and court reports internationally and in Africa. It has been shown empirically that throughout the world in the case of global powerful companies, out-of-court settlements would often take place. As official reports have shown leniency has been granted ‘upon the extent to which the company self-reports on acts of corruption and foreign bribery that an anti-corruption agency would not have discovered on its own. It was thought that as ‘non-trial resolutions’ could be thought to be and escribed as the ‘new kids on the block’, and were being used successfully globally, an analysis of their processes could be useful for the new entity to study (Makinwa, A., 2021a; Makinwa, A., 2021b) . The success of NACAC can only become a reality under seriously and meticulously planned and implemented strategic, tactical and action steps that enable the creation of transparency and accountability. These attitudes and behaviour can guarantee the prevention of corruption risks in the public and the private sectors beginning with the careful and well-researched improvements in public finance, including serious attendance to supply chain and procurement realities at all government levels, political and private sector corruption, attention to corruption risks in all parastatals, as well as the police, intelligence, defences, and the health sectors. One of the key steps leading to the success of NACAC is the creation and actions of an Inter-Agency Coordinating Council (IACC) organising the inter-agency sharing of strategic intelligence with the active participation of the police and national intelligence, and all anti-corruption agencies themselves. The effective cross-agency cooperation should be based on sufficient authority and resources, capacity and political backing to perform its mandates. (Koranteng, 2020) . Two Progress Reports per financial year will be instrumental in streamlining the monitoring process with the main aim to assess the appropriate planning, designing and implementation process of all 14 anti-corruption entities and the priority areas identified in the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030 the existing Action Plans. Such a report will be the basis of identifying the achieved outcomes, the existing and future as well as existing challenges and gaps (Quah, 2015) . The relationship between the Monitoring Tool and the Progress Report will include the following realities: The Monitoring Tool identifies the targets, activities, the responsible agency, specific timeframes, partner/s and budget. It should be filled twice a year by the responsible agencies, including the non-governmental organisations who could be participants. The ratings take two stages of assessments of the activities undertaken: 1. ​Stage 1: Assessment Rating: 1.1. activity is implemented to completion 1.2. activity implemented to a large extend 1.3. activity implemented only partially and activity not implemented at all. ​2. Stage 2: Status Assessment Rating: 2.1. no finalisation in the implementation process 2.2. implementation is ongoing till completion 2.3. partial or complete suspension of implementation 2.4. termination or finalisation of implementation. Closure of the two stages . ​ 3. Stage 3: Report and Process 3.1. Stage 3.1: Progress report and Monitoring Tool: 3.2. Final assessment is made by Secretariat and Progress Report is prepared 3.3. Progress Report is submitted to the ACC and adopted ​ 4. Stage 4: Monitoring Report 4.1. The Report will be prepared annually by the ACC Secretariat so that the assessment of the implementation processes of the Action Plan activities and achieved results can be prepared 4.2. The Report will be based on the Progress Reports and Monitoring Tool submitted by the agencies that have the key responsibility biannually; consideration to the ratings will be paid attention to and studied thoroughly 4.3. Monitoring Report will be submitted to the ACC for adoption, to the President and Parliament. (Recanatini, 2011) ​ 5. Stage 5. Evaluation Report 5.1. The Evaluation Report’s most important objective is the assessment of the achieved results prioritising the levels of efficiency, effectiveness, as well as the thorough analysis of the existing situation, the identification of problems, gaps, and challenges in the Action Plan implementation process. 5.2. The Evaluation Report will be prepared once in two years. 5.3. The Assessment of local and international organisation, international ratings, assessment of international and local organisations, research-based, official documents and relevant publications, in-depth interviews, meetings, and debates with representatives from responsible agencies, NGOs or experts will be used in this process. 5.4. The Evaluation Report will be submitted to the ACC, NACAC, the South African Parliament and the President (UNDP United Nations Development Programme 2011) . ​ The planning, development and implementation of the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework is the foundation upon which NACAC will be enabled will to integrate effectiveness in the overall management framework, a positive way forward to success. In the process of seeking continuous success in the fight against corruption, NACAC’s leadership and Secretariat should see as one of the key priorities from the beginning the creation, development, and continuation of a set of objectives, well-thought, comprehensive and reliable indicators enabling the assessment and measurement levels as the most important guide to the fulfilment pf the entity’s aims and objectives. Given the existing Pan-African guidelines, laws, rules, regulations, and memoranda of anti-corruption agreements the participation of all organisations and entities the direct and continuous communication with key anti-corruption agencies and organisations is compulsory including the African Development Bank, the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption, the anti-corruption bodies of Sub-Saharan and Southern African countries and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Common meetings, debates, exchange of ideas, conferences, and regular communication are or could be serious contributors in the development of effectiveness indicator/s. The key institution in such processes is the African Development Bank whose leadership is considered vital in the development and continuation of an African common effectiveness agenda (OECD 2017; NCPA 2019) . NACAC in collaboration with all key anti-corruption agencies are the foundations of the developmental path leading to strategies and tactics opening the paths of improved collaboration and coordination among all law enforcement agencies at country level and at regional level through multilateral cooperation. Such initiatives can be achieved through the introduction of regular meetings and follow-ups that are instrumental in ensuring one of the most important tools in understanding the dynamics of corruption and its types through the sharing of experiences and best practices against them. Contact with regional organisations and networks including civil society entities lead to expanded and useful relations and exchanges of research, ideas, realities, and knowledge and are instrumental in enriching new planning developments and ways forward to increasing innovation and effectiveness at all levels (World Economic Forum 2018; UNODC 2019). In fact, one of the interviewees who considered himself very lucky to be a participant in regional conference and an integral part of the processes leading to formal resolutions after crucial debates, indicated that as NACAC will be an integral part of the African Union Summit, the SADC (Southern African Development Community) Summit and the Conference of States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the possibilities for success and effectiveness multiply. The creation of a new establishment like NACAC will inevitably create the hopes and aspirations for a new entity enabled to achieve results where others have failed and to meet all expectations raised by the country’s senior political and administrative leadership. It is within this context that it is the sheer responsibility of the leadership and Secretariat of the agency not only to achieve the effectiveness expected through its functions, but also the processes of evaluation that is the assessment of the processes and outcomes at all levels of institutional operations. The outcomes of such an exercise are rooted on the comprehensive pre-execution method of the measurements of achievements leading to excellence against goals, aims, objectives, milestones, and objectives. The processes leading to unsuccessful outcomes to be thoroughly researched in the effort to analyse and dissect the reasons which determine the causes and effects of the failure of operations, as well the policy implementation and tactics in terms of effective outcomes. Thus, eradicating corruption remains a very difficult and complicated challenge despite all sophisticated means provided by the state finance but can nevertheless be brought under control (Barrett, et.al 2020:75-76; Camperle, 2018:158-159) . The existing realities associated with countries throughout the world that are not as corrupt as the vast majority such as Singapore, New Zealand, Sweden, or Finland that are on the top of the widely acknowledged Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), a reality pointing to the truth that despite the success against corruption at least a minimal percentage of it will exist always. To be ‘thoroughly effective’ in the fight against corruption is always considered a very important achievement because everything in life relies on existing comparisons. This is due to the fact that the lack of objectivity in comparisons has its own boundaries when it comes to functional, organisational, and institutional effectiveness in the fight against corruption (Schütte, 2017). This means that it is relatively easy to compare countries in relation to their own economic and financial development, because such analyses and dissection are directly related with issues that can be scientifically calculated such as a country’s Gross National Product, growth rate realities or per capita income. ‘Successes within the parameters and the purpose of this study related directly and indirectly with NAPAC can be considered as ‘synonymous with effectiveness,’ a reality of the present and the future destined to be a new struggle for those involved (Kuris, 2015:127). Conclusion However, it needs to be said that while effectiveness indicators are synonymous with realities and parameters that pinpoint success or/and the extent to which the expected outcomes or pre-determined goals have been reached, such success is difficult if not impossible to achieve without strong and uncompromising political will steeped in honest and ethical leadership and the well-selected, honest, ethical, and trained personnel at all operational levels. Reference List A Anti-Corruption Authorities. 2020. About the DCEC: History and Mandate . The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime, Botswana. [Online] Available at: https://www.acauthorities.org/country/bw [Accessed March 15, 2021]. B Baez-Camargo, C. & Tharcisse, G. 2018. Informal Governance and Corruption – Transcending the Principal Agent and Collective Action Paradigms in Rwanda, Rwanda Country Report. Basel, Switzerland: Basel Institute on Governance. Baez-Camargo, C., Gatwa, T., Dufitumukiza, A., Stahl, C. & Kassa, K. 2017. Behavioural Influences on Attitudes towards Petty Corruption: A Study of Social Norms, Automatic Thinking and Mental Models in Rwanda. Basel, Switzerland: Basel Institute on Governance. Barrett, E.D., Murray, A., Polvi, J. & Burge, R. 2020. Evaluating anti-corruption agencies: learning from the Caribbean, Journal of Development Effectiveness , 12(1):74-88. Bauhr, M. & Charron, N. 2017. Insider or Outsider? Grand Corruption and Electoral Accountability, Journal of Comparative Political Studies, 51(4):415-446. Bonnelame, B. 2021. Council members of Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles appointed . [Online] Available at: http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/15467/Council+members+of+Anti-Corruption+Commission+of+Seychelles+appointed [Accessed September 10, 2021]. Bryman, A. 2015. Social research methods . New York, Aljazeera News. C Camperle, S.M. 2018. Comparing anti-corruption agencies: a new cross-national index, International Review of Public Administration , 23:3(156-175). CMI. 2008. Anti-Corruption policy making in practice: what can be learnt for implementing Article V of UNCAC? [Online] Available at: https://www.cmi.no/publications/2914-anti-corruption-policy-making-in-practice [Accessed September 15, 2021]. Corruption Watch. 2017. Corruption News – Osisa Report: Efficacy of SADC’S anti-corruption bodies . [Online] Available at: http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/osisa-report-effectiveness-southern-africas-anti-corruption-bodies/ [Accessed September 15, 2021]. D David-Barrett, E., Burge, R., Polvi, J. & Murray, A. 2020. Evaluating anti-corruption agencies: learning from the Caribbean . [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/19439342.2020.1745869 [Accessed September 10, 2021]. Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA). 2002. Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy . Pretoria: Government Printer. Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA). 2020. Reviving the OGP Process in South Africa – OGP 4th National Action Plan 2020-2022. [Online] Available at: https://www.opengovpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/South-Africa_Action-Plan_2020-2022.pdf [Accessed September 20, 2021]. De Sousa, L. 2010. Anti-Corruption Agencies: Between Empowerment and Irrelevance, Crime Law and Social Change , 53(1). E ENCA. 2020. Eskom: Corruption is being dealt with . [Online] Available at: https://www.enca.com/news/eskom-face-questions-scopa [Accessed September 20, 2021]. G GAB | The Global Anticorruption Blog. 2015. Corruption is BOTH a “Principal-Agent Problem” AND a “Collective Action Problem” . [Online] Available at: https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2015/04/09/corruption-is-both-a-principal-agent-problem-and-a-collective-action-problem/ [Accessed October 5, 2021]. Gans-Morse, J., Borges, M., Makarin, A., Mannah-Blankson, T., Nickow, A. & Dong Zhang, A. 2018. Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works, World Development Review, 105(1):171-188. Gemperle, S.M. 2017. Comparing anti-corruption agencies: a new cross-national index . [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/12294659.2018.1518002 [Accessed October 5, 2021]. Gerber, J. 2020. NPA ready with Bosasa prosecutions . [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/npa-ready-with-bosasa-prosecutions-20200522 [Accessed October 5, 2021]. Gilander, R. & Neselevska, O. 2017. Public Sector Corruption and Trust in the Private Sector, Journal of International Development. [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3306 [Accessed October 5, 2021]. Government of Rwanda. N.d. Corruption prevention Units: Duties and responsibilities . [Online] Available at: https://www.ombudsman.gov.rw/en/about-us/units/corruption-prevention-unit [Accessed October 8, 2021]. Government of Seychelles. 2021 . Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Bill, 2021 (Bill No. 11 of 2021). [Online] Available at: https://gazettes.africa/archive/sc/2021/sc-government-gazette-dated-2021-03-24-no-25.pdf [Accessed October 12, 2021]. Grobler, R. 2020. Former Gautrain IT technician gets 10 years for using spyware to steal millions . [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/former-gautrain-it-technician-gets-10-years-for-using-spyware-to-steal-millions-20200512 [Accessed October 12, 2021]. H Hendricks, C. 2019. Ramaphosa sets out a bold vision for South Africa. But can he pull it off? [Online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/ramaphosa-sets-out-a-bold-vision-for-south-africa-but-can-he-pull-it-off-109784 [Accessed October 12, 2021]. Hofmeyr, W. 2021. Presentation in High-Level Dialogue on the Establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa . Presentation at Webinar organised by the Inclusive Society Institute, October 19. I Isbell, T. 2017. Efficacy for fighting corruption: Evidence from 36 African countries, Afrobarometer Policy Paper , No. 41. [Online] Available at: https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Documents%20de%20politiques/ab_r6_policypaperno41_efficacy_for_fighting_corruption.pdf [Accessed August 4, 2021]. J Jones, D.S. 2017. Combating corruption in Botswana: lessons for policy makers, Asian Education and Development Studies , 6(3):213-226. K Koranteng, D. 2020. Coordination Mechanisms for Inter-Agency Cooperation in Combatting Corruption. [Online] Available at: https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Interagency-coordination-mechanisms_2019_PR.pdf [Accessed August 23, 2021]. Kos, D. 2021. Presentation in High-Level Dialogue on the Establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa . Presentation at Webinar organised by the Inclusive Society Institute, October 19. Kuris, G. 2013. Managing Corruption Risks: Botswana Builds an Anti-graft Agency, 1994-2012 . [Online] Available at: https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/managing-corruption-risks-botswana-builds-anti-graft-agency-1994-2012 [Accessed August 26, 2021]. Kuris, G. 2015. Watchdogs or guard dogs: Do anti-corruption agencies need strong teeth?, Policy and Society , 34(2):125-135. [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2015.04.003 [Accessed August 26, 2021]. Kwibuka, E. 2015. Anti-Corruption Council calls for efforts against graft. [Online] Available at: https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/187966 [Accessed August 26, 2021]. L Langendorf, George. 2015. The Map is Not the Territory: How South Africa Followed the Anti-Corruption Roadmap and Got Lost Along the Way, University of Baltimore Journal of International Law, 3(3). [Online] Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjil/vol3/iss2/3 [Accessed October 1, 2021]. Laver, R. 2014 . Systemic Corruption: Considering Culture in Second-Generation Reforms, Edmond J. Safra Working Papers , No. 45. Lee, K. & Kleiner, B. 2011. Whistle-blower Retaliation in the Public Sector, Public Personnel Management , 40(4):341–348. Leuthner, M. 2016. The Fraud Matrix: Corruption, Asset Misappropriation and Financial Statement Fraud . [Online] Available at: https://crosswater-job-guide.com/archives/56670 [Accessed September 10, 2021]. M Makinwa, A. 2021(a). Non-trial resolutions are the primary vehicle today of foreign anti-bribery enforcement. [Online] Available at: https://www.riskcompliance.biz/news/dr-abiola-makinwa-non-trial-resolutions-are-the-primary-vehicle-today-of-foreign-anti-bribery-enforcement/ [Accessed September 10, 2021]. Makinwa, A. 2021(b). Presentation in High-Level Dialogue on the Establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa . Presentation at Webinar organised by the Inclusive Society Institute, October 19. Mantzaris, E. & Pillay, P. 2019. Corruption: consequences for Socio-economic Well-being in South Africa, Alternation , 26(1):40-62. [Online] Available at: http://alternation.ukzn.ac.za/Files/articles/volume-26/issue-1/03-Mantzaris.pdf [Accessed September 19, 2021]. Mantzaris, E.A. 2014(a). Public procurement, tendering and corruption: Realities, challenges and tangible solutions, African Journal of Public Affairs , 7(2):67-79. Mantzaris, E.A. 2014(b ). Municipal financial management to fight corruption and enhance development: A holistic approach, African Journal of Public Affairs , 7(2):80-92. Mathekga, R. 2017. Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Southern Africa: A review by Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) . [Online] Available at: https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/osisa_acc_text_29mar1130_web2.pdf [Accessed September 19, 2021]. Matshediso , M. 2018. Council established to root out corruption. [Online] Available at: https://www.vukuzenzele.gov.za/book/export/html/4187 [Accessed September 10, 2021]. Mbaku, J.M. 2007. Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences, and Cleanups . United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. MBPC. 2016. Financial Statement Fraud: A rare but costly scheme . [Online] Available at: https://www.mlrpc.com/articles/financial-statement-fraud-a-rare-but-costly-scheme/ [Accessed September 11, 2021]. McLaughlin, D. 2015. Erosion of Independence: The National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa: 1996 – 2013 . The FW de Klerk Foundation: Pretoria. Meagher, G. 2005. Anti-Corruption Agencies: Rhetoric versus reality . [Online] Available at: http://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/jpolrf/v8y2005i1p69-103.html [Accessed September 10, 2021]. Mohale, B. 2021. Introduction to the Proceedings of the High-Level Dialogue on the Establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa. Presentation at Webinar organised by the Inclusive Society Institute, October 19. Morse, J.M. 2010. How different is qualitative health research from qualitative research? Do we have a subdiscipline? Qualitative Health Research , 20(11):1459-1464. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. & Hartmann, T. 2019. Corruption and Development: A Reappraisal, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance . Oxford: Oxford University Press. N NCPA. 2019. Technical Guide to Corruption Prevention Instruments: Codes of Conduct . [Online] Available at: https://rm.coe.int/technical-guide-to-corruption-prevention-instruments/168098d06a [Accessed September 5, 2021]. News24. 2020. Merafong Municipality's former acting CFO appears in court for VBS 'bank heist' . [Online] Available at: https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/just-in-former-merafong-municipality-cfo-appears-in-court-over-vbs-bank-heist-after-hawks-arrest-20200625 [Accessed September 5, 2021]. Ntshidi, E. 2020. NPA Probe into Alleged Unlawful Payment of R3.2m from UIF Covid-19 Fund Continue . [Online] Available at: https://ewn.co.za/2020/06/21/npa-probe-into-alleged-unlawful-payment-of-r3-2m-from-uif-covid-19-fund-continue [Accessed September 8, 2021]. Nwokorie, E.C. & Viinamäki, O-P. 2017. Legitimacy building of anti-corruption agencies in five countries, OECD Global Anti-corruption and Integrity Forum. [Online] Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316039710_Legitimacy_building_of_Anti-Corruption_Agencies_in_five_countries [Accessed September 10, 2021]. O OECD. 2017. OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity, OECD, Paris . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/recommendation-public-integrity/ [Accessed September 10, 2021]. OECD. N.d. The Governance of Regulators: Creating a Culture of Independence. [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/creating-a-culture-of-independence_9789264274198-en [Accessed September 10, 2021]. Oktay, J.S. 2012. Grounded Theory. Oxford University Press: Midrand, Johannesburg. P Pillay, P. 2018. Ethics, Public Trust and Corruption: Reflections on South African Realities, Administratio Publica, 26(4): 22-39. Public Service Commission (PSC). 2008. Overview on financial misconduct for the 2006/2007 financial year . [Online] Available at: http://www.psc.gov.za/documents/2008/PSC%20Report-Financial%20Misconduct.pdf [Accessed September 10, 2021]. Public Service Commission (PSC). 2011(a). Report on financial misconduct for the 2009/2010 financial year . [Online] Available at: http://www.psc.gov.za/documents/2011/Report%20on%20Financial%20Misconduct%20for%20the%20%202009and2010%20Financial%20Year.pdf [Accessed September 24, 2021]. Public Service Commission (PSC). 2011(b). Profiling and analysis of the most common manifestations of corruption and its related risks in the public service . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/public-service-commission-psc-releases-report-profiling-and-analysis-most-common-manifestations [Accessed September 24, 2021]. Q Quah, J. 2015. Anti-Corruption Agencies Strengthening Initiative: Research Implementation Guide . Berlin: Transparency International. R Ralph, N., Birks, M. & Chapman, Y. 2015. The methodological dynamism of grounded theory, International Journal of Qualitative Methods , 14(4), 160940691561157. [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/1609406915611576 [Accessed September 24, 2021]. Ramaphosa, C. 2021. President Cyril Ramaphosa: 2021 State of the Nation Address . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2021-state-nation-address-11-feb-2021-0000 [Accessed September 26, 2021]. Recanatini, F. 2011. Anti-Corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to Curb Corruption?, International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption , Vol. 2, 528-69. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Republic of South Africa. 2020. National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030 . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202105/national-anti-corruption-strategy-2020-2030.pdf [Accessed November 25, 2021]. Rubin, H. J. & Rubin, I. S. 2011. Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data . London: Sage. S Schütte, S.A. 2017. Bespoke monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption agencies, U4 . [Online] Available at: https://www.cmi.no/publications/6236-bespoke-monitoring-and-evaluation-of-anti [Accessed November 25, 2021]. Sebudubudu, D. 2003. Corruption and its control in Botswana, Botswana Notes and Records , 35(1):125-139. [Online] Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40980345 [Accessed November 25, 2021]. Sebudubudu, D., Khatib, L. & Bozzini, A. 2017. The Atypical Achievers: Botswana, Qatar and Rwanda, Transitions to Good Governance: Creating Virtuous Circles of Anti-Corruption . Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. Sedrick, N. 2021. Council members of Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles appointed. [Online] Available at: http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/15467/Council+members+of+Anti-Corruption+Commission+of+Seychelles+appointed [Accessed November 28, 2021]. Stahl, C., Kassa, S. & Baez-Camargo, C. 2017. Drivers of Petty Corruption and Anti-Corruption Interventions in Developing Countries – a Semi-Systematic Review . Basel: Basel Institute on Governance. T TimesLive. 2020. Court orders Gupta-linked businessman Kuben Pillay not to handle R232m in assets. [Online] Available at: https://www.therep.co.za/2020/06/22/court-orders-gupta-linked-businessman-kuben-moodley-not-to-handle-r232m-in-assets/ [Accessed November 25, 2021]. The Presidency of South Africa. 2021. The State of the Nation Address, 11 Feb 2021. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-2021-state-nation-address-11-feb-2021-0000 [Accessed November 25, 2021]. The World Bank. 2019. S trengthening Budgeting and Monitoring to Improve the Lives of Seychellois . [Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2019/11/11/strengthening-budgeting-and-monitoring-to-improve-the-lives-of-seychellois [Accessed November 4, 2021]. The World Bank. 2020. Rwanda’s Anti-Corruption Experience: Actions, Accomplishments, and Lessons . [Online] Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/34564 [Accessed November 4, 2021]. The World Bank. 2021. Worldwide Governance Indicators . [Online] Available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/source/worldwide-governance-indicators [Accessed November 4, 2021]. Thomas, I. 2017. Efficacy for fighting corruption: Evidence from 36 African countries, Afrobarometer Policy Paper , No.41. [Online] Available at: https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Documents%20de%20politiques/ab_r6_policypaperno41_efficacy_for_fighting_corruption.pdf [Accessed November 25, 2021]. Tracy, S.J. 2019. Qualitative research methods: Collecting evidence, crafting analysis, communicating impact. John Wiley & Sons: New Jersey. Transparency International Rwanda. 2014. The Rwanda Bribery Index 2014 . [Online] Available at: https://www.tirwanda.org/IMG/pdf/rbi2014.pdf [Accessed November 3, 2021]. Transparency International. 2020. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2020 . [ Online] Available at: https://www.tirwanda.org/spip.php?article206 [Accessed November 4, 2021]. U U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. 2005. Measuring ‘success’ in five African Anti-corruption Commissions . [Online] Available at: https://www.u4.no/publications/measuring-success-in-five-african-anti-corruption-commissions [Accessed November 4, 2021]. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. 2017. Corruption Aid Red Flag Tools . [Online] Available at: http://www.u4.no/themes/corruption‐aid/red‐flag‐tool/AAA%20Start.cfm [Accessed November 4, 2021]. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. 2020. Sub-Saharan Africa: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption . [Online] Available at: https://www.u4.no/publications/sub-saharan-africa-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption [Accessed November 4, 2021]. UNCAC Coalition. 2020. Anti-Corruption Platforms: Seychelles . [Online] Available at: https://uncaccoalition.org/anti-corruption-platforms/africa/seychelles/ [Accessed November 4, 2021]. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2011. Practitioner’s Guide: Capacity Assessment of Anti-Corruption Agencies . [Online] Available at: https://www.undp.org/publications/practioners-guide-capacity-assessment-anti-corruption-agencies [Accessed November 4, 2021]. UNODC. 2019. Lessons learned on the development, evaluation and impact of anticorruption strategies (article 5 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption). Background paper prepared by the Secretariat for the Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group on the Prevention of Corruption, Vienna, 4-6 September 2019. [Online] Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup4/2019-September-4-6/V1902764e.pdf [Accessed November 4, 2021]. United States Department of Labour. N.d. OSHA Whistleblower Protection Programme . [Online] Available at: www.whistleblowers.gov [Accessed November 4, 2021]. W Wong, J.Y. 2008. Theory of ground vehicles . John Wiley & Sons: New Jersey. Woods, G. & Mantzaris, E.A. 2012. Anti-Corruption Reader . ACCERUS, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. World Economic Forum. 2018. The Future of Trust and Integrity, White Paper by the Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI). [Online] Available at: www.psc.gov.za/documents/2011/PSC%20Report%212,www.psc.gov.za/documents/2011/PSC%20Report-%20 [Accessed November 7, 2021]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deep ening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) attended and presented its electoral reform proposals to the Electoral Reform Consultation Panel (ERCP) on Wednesday, 4 December 2024. The ERCP public consultations was held at the Imbizo Centre in Parliament.   In short, the ISI is proposing a Multi-Member Constituency system, where between 3 and 7 MPs are elected in 69 Constituencies, using the District municipality borders as the basis for the constituencies. In metro areas the sub-council borders will be the basis therefor. The proportional system will remain a feature under the ISI proposal, with 300 members elected from the MMCs, and 100 members from a compensatory list used to establish overall proportionality. To simplify the electoral process, only two ballots (one for national, and one for provincial) will be required.   The ISI cautioned against retaining the current pure PR system and a single-seat constituency system. The current system has proved that MPs are not accountable to the electorate – hardly anyone knows who their local MPs are – and under a single-seat constituency system there is a real danger of diversity being undermined.   Click here for the full ISI electoral reform proposal.

The National Planning Commission (NPC), under the office of the Presidency of the Republic of South Africa hosted a dialogue on social cohesion in South Africa. The workshop was hosted at the Union Buildings on the 26th of November 2024, wherein various organizations were invited. The dialogue was chaired by NPV Commissioner, Dr Abba Omar. Several other NPC Commissioners were also present.   Inclusive Society Institute, CEO Mr Daryl Swanepoel, and Advisory Council Member Ms Nondumiso Sithole were present to represent the Institute. The institute has been collaborating with Prof. Klaus Boehnke and Dr Georgi Dragolov from Constructor University in Bremen, Germany, in developing a South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI). This Index was officially launched at the dialogue. Click here to view the SASCI report   Various organizations such as, amongst many others, SALGA, Brand SA, The Center for Human Rights, and PanSALB, attended the event. The message from the dialogue was clear: There must be coordinated efforts and synergy in working collectively with the government, civil society and labour to address the challenges that may have weakened “Ubuntu” and social cohesion in South Africa, since it is crucially important for ensuring economic growth and social stability.  The current state of affairs is less than optimal, and therefore, if it is left to degenerate it will pose a serious risk to the country’s future development.

On 20 November, the Inclusive Society Institute hosted its first in a series of dialogues that seek to examine the cardinal underpinnings of South African society, and to pave the way to a transformed and just nation. The dialogue took place under the theme: Dialogue on the substance and implementation of a decolonised education. Several experts and practitioners on the topic of decolonisation were invited to present their views in the hybrid, in-person and digital seminar. Panelists present represented some of South Africa’s premier universities, including the University of Cape Town, Stellenbosch University, the University of KwaZulu-Natal and the Cape Peninsula University of Technology. Civil society was also represented at the event. Panelists were asked to prepare remarks on the following questions: What kind of pedagogy and education is needed to pursue our Constitutional project? What is the meaning and purpose of decolonisation? Does South Africa need to this?    What does decolonised pedagogy and education entail? And, how does it compare with the current form and content of our education?   Following the prepared remarks, a lively and dynamic conversation ensued that delved deep into the meaning and nature of education and pedagogy in South Africa. While speakers spoke from different disciplines and presented different views, it was clear that South African education must undergo a necessary process that will not only deliver on contemporary requirements, but will imbue the future generation with the true spirit of South Africa. A holistic spirit of personal and societal responsibility; giving expression to ubuntu and the Constitutional principles.  Vast challenges remain before the appropriate reformation of the education system is ensured, but by working together, recognising the past and working together, a system fit for purpose and one that serving the national goals must be pursued. An event report will now be compiled and will in time be circulated by the Institute.

On Friday, 1 November 2024, the Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated a thought-provoking workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Mapenane High School, delving deep into the history, structure, and practical applications of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. This timely workshop was perfectly aligned with the learners' Life Orientation and History curriculum, providing a valuable opportunity to move beyond the textbook and explore the real-world relevance of this seminal document. Throughout the workshop, Morathi skillfully guided the learners through a comprehensive examination of the Constitution's Preamble, as well as the nation's revered symbols, such as the National Anthem and Flag. By fostering an engaging and interactive environment, Morathi empowered the learners to actively participate, asking insightful questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues at hand. This dynamic exchange not only deepened the learners' understanding of the Constitution but also instilled in them a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities as young citizens of South Africa. The workshops, which are currently being rolled out in schools across Gauteng's Tshwane West District, aim to teach, motivate, inspire, and encourage learners, while also building and supporting them in the areas of Values in Education and Social Cohesion. Morathi's facilitation was marked by his ability to navigate these sensitive discussions with care and sensitivity, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns without fear of judgment or repercussion. The Inclusive Society Institute extends its heartfelt gratitude to the district officials, teachers, and learners of the various high schools visited so far, for their invaluable cooperation and support. As the learners prepare for their upcoming exams, the institute wishes them the very best in their academic endeavors, confident that the insights gained from this transformative workshop will serve as a solid foundation for their continued growth and success as engaged and informed citizens of South Africa.

The Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated an impactful and engaging workshop for 168 Grade 11 learners at Setlalentoa High School on Monday, 4 November 2024. This workshop was specifically designed to empower these young students with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document – the Constitution. Going beyond the textbook, the workshop provided valuable real-world context and relevance, delving into the Preamble, National Symbols like the Anthem and Flag, and the importance of key civic values and social cohesion. As the session progressed, the learners grew increasingly captivated, actively participating by asking thoughtful questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues highlighted. The facilitator skillfully navigated these discussions, ensuring each student felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns. By the end, the learners left with a heightened sense of awareness regarding their rights and responsibilities as young citizens of South Africa. This workshop is part of a broader initiative by the Inclusive Society Institute to roll out similar sessions across the Tshwane West District of Gauteng, with the ultimate goal of instilling a profound appreciation for the Constitution and fostering proud, engaged citizens. The institute has observed that many schools no longer regularly hold assemblies that include the singing of the National Anthem, the raising of the National Flag, and the recitation of the Constitution's Preamble. They are therefore encouraging all schools to reinstate these practices, as they believe these simple yet powerful acts can go a long way in cultivating a deep sense of national pride and civic responsibility among the learners. As the Inclusive Society Institute looks ahead to the new academic year of 2025, they remain committed to building on the success of this workshop and continuing to empower South Africa's youth to become active, informed, and engaged citizens who uphold the values enshrined in the country's foundational document.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, was invited to participate and speak at the 22nd Conference on International Exchange of Professionals, which was held in Shanghai from 1 to 3 November 2024.   The CEO spoke during the session on ‘Promoting Green and Low-Carbon Development in China and Africa through Scientific and Technological Innovation in Resource and Environment’. The title of his contribution was ‘How China can Accelerate Africa’s Green economy’ [Click here to view the PowerPoint presentation] .   Included in the conference itinerary was an academic exchange hosted by the Zheijiang Normal University’s Institute of African Studies (ZJNU IAS) and attendance of the 5th meeting of the Abuja Forum, a co-organised event between the ZJNU IAS and the Gusau Institute, Nigeria. The CEO participated in the panel discussion on the role of security cooperation in prioritizing devlopment.   The third element of the visit was the attendance of the forum themed ‘Exchanges and Mutual Learning, People-to-people Bond, Win-win Cooperation’, which was hosted by The People’s Government of Zheijiang Province.   And lastly, he attended the Forum on 2024 China-Africa Industrial Cooperation and Cross-borderr E-commerce Development’, which was organised by the College of Economics and Management, ZJNU.   At an appointment ceremony on 6 November 2024, Swanepoel was appointed as a Distinguished Visiting Professor of the IAS for a five year term

The Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated a dynamic and engaging workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Kgatoentle Secondary School on Thursday, 17 October 2024. The workshop was designed to empower these young students with a deeper, more nuanced understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. Aligning perfectly with the learners' Life Orientation and History curriculum, the workshop went beyond the textbook, exploring the real-world relevance and practical applications of this seminal document. The facilitator, Patrick Morathi, skillfully guided the learners through key aspects of the Constitution, including an in-depth look at the Preamble and the nation's official symbols, such as the national anthem and flag. This interactive exploration not only enhanced the students' knowledge but also inspired them to think critically about the Constitution's role in shaping their identities as young South African citizens. As the workshop progressed, the learners grew increasingly engaged, asking thoughtful questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues highlighted by the facilitator. Morathi navigated these lively discussions with aplomb, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns. By the end of the workshop, the students left with a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities, better equipped to navigate the complexities of civic engagement and social cohesion. The Inclusive Society Institute is currently rolling out these transformative workshops across the Gauteng province, with a particular focus on the Tshwane West District of the Department of Education. One key observation from these workshops is that many schools no longer hold or conduct regular school assemblies, where the singing of the national anthem and the hoisting of the national flag, coupled with the recitation of the Constitution's Preamble, would typically take place. The Inclusive Society Institute strongly encourages schools to reinstate these important rituals, as they play a vital role in instilling a sense of national pride and fostering a deeper understanding of South Africa's democratic foundations among the learners. By ensuring that students regularly engage with these symbolic representations of their country, the institute aims to cultivate a new generation of proud, engaged, and socially conscious citizens, who will shape the future of their beloved nation.

On Tuesday, 15 October 2024, the Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated an engaging and enlightening workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Modiri Secondary School. The workshop was designed to empower these young students with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. Going beyond the textbook, this interactive session explored the real-world relevance and practical applications of this pivotal document, delving into its history, structure, and core components such as the Preamble and the country's National Symbols, including the National Anthem and Flag.   The workshop was perfectly aligned with the learners' Life Orientation and History curricula, providing a valuable opportunity to enrich their knowledge and critical thinking. As the session progressed, the students grew increasingly captivated, actively participating by asking thought-provoking questions and sharing their own insightful perspectives on the issues highlighted by the skilled facilitator. Morathi skillfully navigated these engaging discussions, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns, ultimately leaving the workshop with a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities as young citizens.   This transformative workshop is part of a broader initiative being rolled out in Gauteng schools, with a specific focus on the Tshwane West District of the Department of Education. As schools across the province approach and prepare for their final exams, the Inclusive Society Institute has planned a series of additional engagements to continue this important work.   On 17 October 2024, the team will visit Kgantoentle Secondary School in Zone 2, Ga-Rankuwa, followed by sessions at Setlalentoa High School in Zone 5, Ga-Rankuwa on 4 November 2024, and finally, Mapenane High School in Zone 16, Ga-Rankuwa on 6 November 2024. Through these impactful workshops, the institute aims to inspire and empower learners, fostering a deeper understanding of the Constitution and its role in shaping a more just, equitable, and socially cohesive South Africa.

The Inclusive Society Institute together with Koinonia and the Athlone Parliamentary Constituency Office hosted its yearly Youth Leadership Camp, from 4 – 6 October. Under the theme Active Citizens Serving South Africa , the camp brought together more than 50 youths from across the Cape Metro and the Cape Winelands.   Over two, busy and exciting days, the youngsters were not only taught about the Constitution, leadership skills, critical thinking and effective communication, but they were also given the opportunity to share their thoughts, their passions and their concerns for South Africa.   The camp started with former Parliamentarian Faiez Jacobs, who set the scene in South Africa. He shared how South Africa is on a path of transformative change. How the government and the citizens must together build a more equal and just future for everyone. After dinner, Klaus Kotzé from the Institute introduced the participants to critical thinking and effective communication. This workshop asked participants to think about and to construct arguments for a better South Africa. It advanced the idea of active and participative democracy, assisting the youth to activate their agency constructively, through debate.   Saturday morning started with the entire camp taking part in a mental health awareness walk in the beautiful Paarl Arboretum. The outing was followed by the Institute’s flagship Constitutional training programme: Taking the Constitution to the People . Here the participants were introduced to the meaning of the Constitution, its values and aspirations. The participants were asked to critically engage with the substance of the Constitution, and to find ways where they can activate its transformational intentions in their daily lives. After an engaging session, the youngsters had a well-deserved break at the pool.   The afternoon’s workshop was hosted by Amanda Rinquest and Thandi Henkeman from Black Sash who graciously gave up their Saturday afternoon to talk about how the Constitution guides leadership and active citizenry in South Africa. The participants were taken through practical examples and thoroughly enjoyed the engaging session. After some more fun, team-building activities, Eddie Williams from Koinonia hosted the very popular Potjie-kos competition. Each group was given the same ingredients, and around a massive fire, laughter and new-born friendship welcomed in the night. The last activity of the evening saw the local filmmaker Nadine Cloete showcase some of her documentaries, shot on location in the Cape. It was a great opportunity for the youngsters to engage with films that they could relate to.   Sunday morning was spent re-capping the substance and intentions of the camp. Participants were asked to reflect on their experiences and develop strategic plans detailing how they will apply their new skills in their community as active citizens. Each group was asked to compile a list of commitments that they could pledge to and with their paint-covered hands everyone involved at the camp pledged their intentions on large papers, provided.   The very successful second Youth Leadership Camp was concluded with a certificate ceremony and a boisterous rendition of the national anthem which left this writer not only with goosebumps but with unmitigated hope for the future of South Africa.

Ms. Buyelwa Sonjica, the Deputy Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute, recently represented the Institute at a high-level roundtable event hosted by the Centre for International Policy-Africa (CIP-Africa) in collaboration with the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, South Africa. The event, which took place on September 24th, 2024 at the Johari Rotana Hotel in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, brought together a distinguished group of experts to engage in a closed-door discussion on regional peace and security, with a particular focus on the role that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) can play during this pivotal time.   As Tanzania prepares to assume the chairpersonship of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security, this roundtable provided a strategic platform for high-level dialogue and critical thinking. The organizers recognized the pressing need to create a forum where government representatives, think tanks, and key security sector stakeholders could come together to discuss the regional peace and security architecture and identify priority areas for Tanzania to address during its leadership tenure.   The discussions aimed to assess the current security landscape, particularly in the volatile regions of Northern Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Northern Mozambique's Cabo Delgado area, where ongoing conflicts and instability have posed significant challenges to regional stability.   By facilitating this constructive dialogue, the event sought to provide valuable insights and recommendations that could inform Tanzania's approach to strengthening SADC's role in restoring peace and security in the region, ultimately contributing to the overall well-being and prosperity of the Southern African community.