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Measuring Social Cohesion in South Africa

Updated results from the Inclusive Society’s 2022 GovDem survey




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Inclusive Society Institute

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DISCLAIMER


Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.


A P R I L 2 0 2 3


Author: Daryl Swanepoel


Content


Chapter 1: Introduction, background on social cohesion and motivation for survey

1.1. What is social cohesion and why it matters

1.2. What are the elements of social cohesion?

1.3. What drives social cohesion?

1.4. Obstacles to social cohesion

1.5. Systems to achieve social cohesion

1.6. Conclusion and motivation for study


Chapter 2: Survey methodology

2.1. Desktop review

2.2. Survey

2.3. Assessment tools

2.4. Limitations of the study


Chapter 3: Findings

3.1. South Africans remain committed to ‘unity in diversity’

3.2. South Africa has worrying trust issues

3.3. Emigration could reduce South Africa’s skilled workers by 9 percent

3.4. South Africans don’t sufficiently trust immigrants

3.5. South Africans deeply distrust their compatriots from other parties

3.6. Sense of community a solid foundation on which to build social cohesion


Chapter 4: Further discussion, assessment, and conclusions


References


List of tables


Table 3.1.: Reconciliation moving in the right or wrong direction indicated by race

Table 3.2.: Level of everyday life integration indicated by race

Table 3.3.: Trust differentiation between persons known and met for the 1st time

Table 3.4.: Top five emigration destinations

Table 3.5.: Trust in people from other parties – based on gender

Table 3.6.: Comparative chart on giving patterns of the different race groups

Table 4.1.: Assessment of conditions that promote social cohesion

Table 4.2.: Evaluating social cohesion in terms of demographic integration, connectedness, and community


List of figures


Figure 1.1.: Social Cohesion Triangle

Figure 3.1.: Percentage of South Africans who are doubtful one nation can emerge

Figure 3.2: South Africans’ beliefs about race relations

Figure 3.3.: Percentage wanting South Africa to unite

Figure 3.4.: Percentage against association with other racial groups

Figure 3.5.: Differentiation based on gender, education, or income considerations

Figure 3.6.: Trust of neighbours based on race, age, education and income

Figure 3.7.: Trusting those from other religions

Figure 3.8.: Trust for black South Africans

Figure 3.9.: Trust for white South Africans

Figure 3.10.: Comparison with regard to in-group trust

Figure 3.11.: Percentage of population considering emigration – by race

Figure 3.12.: Top 5 reasons for emigrating

Figure 3.13.: Percentage of population considering emigrating – by age

Figure 3.14.: Percentage of South Africans not trusting African immigrants – based on gender

Figure 3.15.: Percentage of South Africans not trusting African immigrants – based on party affiliation

Figure 3.16.: Percentage of South Africans not trusting immigrants – based on provinces

Figure 3.17.: Percentage of South Africans not trusting immigrants from outside of Africa – based on earnings

Figure 3.18.: Percentage of South Africans not trusting non-African immigrants – based on party

Figure 3.19.: Percentage of South Africans not trusting non-African immigrants – based on provinces

Figure 3.20.: Percentage of people willing to trust compatriots from other parties – based on age

Figure 3.21.: Percentage of people willing to trust compatriots from other parties – based on education

Figure 3.22.: Percentage of people willing to trust compatriots from other parties – based on race

Figure 3.23.: Percentage of people trusting supporters of the same party

Figure 3.24.: Percentage of South Africans willing to trust those from other parties

Figure 3.25.: Percentage of South Africans getting involved in the community – based on age

Figure 3.26.: Percentage of South Africans getting involved in the community – based on education

Figure 3.27.: Percentage of South Africans getting involved in the community – based on income

Figure 3.28.: Percentage of South Africans getting involved in the community – based on race

Figure 3.29.: Percentage of South Africans getting involved in the community – based on party support


Chapter 1

Introduction, background on social cohesion and motivation for survey


The struggle for economic, social, and political freedom has reached a defining moment in South Africa. Many who fought for and established a constitutional people’s democracy in 1994 are today, twenty-eight years after the end of apartheid, witnessing a nation that remains largely divided, with a contaminated moral environment. Racial, social and gender discrimination continue to fester and bedevil efforts towards creating ‘unity in diversity’ and a better life for all – the mantra of our current government.


That is not to say there hasn’t been progress post 1994; there is plenty to be hopeful about. To date, approximately 2-3 million government-subsidised homes have been built (CAHF, 2021), 93% of the population has access to water supply services and 76% have access to basic sanitation (Bazaanah & Mothapo, 2023), the once racially segregated schooling system has been dismantled, to name a few.


But from a broader perspective, overall welfare and progressive reform is lagging, with fragmenting social cohesion the consequence. This is of grave concern, as social cohesion is deemed to be a critical ingredient not only for people to co-exist harmoniously and for their personal social progress and well-being; it is also important for the economic growth and stability of a country. In the last ten years or so there has also been growing recognition globally and in South Africa that social cohesion in communities, and regions, can rebuild people’s trust in their political leaders.


As it stands, South African communities are floundering and being driven apart under the pressure of continued inequality, corruption, and poor service delivery. There is still substantial social conflict, in terms of wealth, ethnicity, race, and gender. According to the World Bank, South Africa – the so-called rainbow nation – is still the most unequal country in the world (Warah, 2021). More than 50 percent (30 million people) of the population are living in poverty and 25 percent are experiencing food poverty (World Bank, 2020), whilst the richest 10% of the population gobble up more than 85% of the wealth (Al Jazeera, 2022). There is also the racial tension that continues to brew, as in the recent rioting and looting in KwaZulu-Natal between the Indian and black communities in Phoenix (Naidoo & Nkosi, 2021), and regular xenophobic incidents, such as the murder of more than 200 foreign truck drivers in recent years (Ryan, 2021). And there has been a significant rise in gender-based violence (Bosch, 2021).


Over the years, many have attempted to measure the socio-economic conditions within the country, but deficient historical data sets that often excluded black South Africans who were severely impoverished and often unemployed, skewed results. More recent attempts, however admirable, evidence a dearth of measuring instruments, bringing all the elements together with specific intent to promote social cohesion, reconciliation, and nation-building.


As discussed in the sections that follow, social cohesion depends on a holistic approach, dealing with all the above factors simultaneously. With this front of mind, the Inclusive Society Institute has committed to generate an extensive Social Cohesion Index or Radar, as a social cohesion progress tracker for policymakers. This annual GovDem report is a prelude to such an index.


The struggle for economic, social and political freedom has reached a defining moment in South Africa. Many South Africans fought for and established a constitutional people’s democracy, but today, we live in a contaminated moral environment. Nevertheless, the struggle for socio-economic and political freedom pursued by the ANC is enshrined in the Constitution and should continue to drive transformation (Fubbs, 2020).


1.1. What is social cohesion and why it matters


“At [the] heart [of social cohesion] is the notion that relationships among members and groups in society are sufficiently good and that all feel a sense of belonging, that they perceive the whole society as greater than the parts, and when differences develop, they can be dealt with peacefully” (Langer et al., 2017).


In socially cohesive societies there is generally an “absence of latent social conflict”, for example conflict based on wealth, ethnicity, race, and gender; and “presence of strong social bonds”, for example civic society, responsive democracy, and impartial law enforcement (SFRI, N.d.).


“Social cohesion involves building shared values and communities of interpretation, reducing disparities in wealth and income, and generally enabling people to have a sense that they are engaged in a common enterprise, facing shared challenges, and that they are members of the same community” (Maxwell in SFRI, N.d.).


The OECD defines a cohesive society as one that works towards the well-being of all in society, “fights [all forms] of exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its people the opportunity of upward mobility” (SFRI, N.d.).


Thus, social cohesion drives long-term prosperity and competitiveness because cohesive societies are politically stable and focus on economic growth. It allows everybody in society to share equitably in its prosperity (Bris, 2014).


1.2. What are the elements of social cohesion?


There are a number of dimensions to social cohesion, namely inequality, trust, and identity.

Inequality – that is the extent of perceived inequalities within and across groups, which can manifest itself in various forms, such as economic, social, political, or cultural disparities. Social cohesion is threatened when there are high levels of inequalities within a society, because it erodes the relationships within that society, which, in turn, may cause conflict.

Trust in others – societal trust is the “glue” that holds societies together. When trust is missing between members of society, it weakens the ability of individuals and groups to cooperate peacefully and to collaborate in order to achieve inclusive economic growth. Mistrust towards state institutions may, for example, fuel violent protests, and similarly, mistrust between individuals and/or groups may cause aggressive behaviour towards each other.

Identity – this relates to whether people have a stronger adherence to their national identity vis-à-vis their group or ethnic identity. This is particularly applicable in multi-ethnic communities, more so in countries with a colonial history, such as South Africa.

(Langer et al., 2017).


Figure 1.1.: Social Cohesion Triangle (Source: Langer et al., 2017)


1.3. What drives social cohesion?


The main determinants that drive social cohesion in society are racial diversity, economic inequality, education, historical events, GDP, subjective well-being, and health.


1.3.1. Racial diversity


Racial diversity offers a very strong group demarcation. Divisions across ethnic and racial lines is often considered as the main obstacle to social cohesion, as it offers a very strong group demarcation, even more so than gender and/or age. It has a tendency of categorising people into groups, to identify with one group and to draw comparisons across groups (Tänzler & Grimalda, 2018).


1.3.2. Economic inequality


Economic inequality generally has the negative impact of income inequality and horizontal trust. This is due to lack of confidence that one will profit from societal progress. As a side note, given the South African environment, there is evidence that immigration has a negative effect on social cohesion in countries with high levels of economic inequality (Tänzler & Grimalda, 2018).


1.3.3. Education


It has been found that there is a positive correlation between education and social cohesion. This is because mutual identity and societal cooperation is one of the principle purposes of public education (Tänzler & Grimalda, 2018).


1.3.4. Historical events


In line with the idea that cultural values may be lasting, there is evidence that historical events have a long-term impact on social cohesion. Trust is, for example, still lower amongst ethnic groups in Africa which were most affected by slave trade and colonialism in the past (Tänzler & Grimalda, 2018). The lasting legacy of apartheid being particularly relevant to South Africa and this study.


1.3.5. GDP


Social cohesion has both a direct positive effect on GDP, as well an indirect effect, through the facilitation of better institutions, systems, or the ability to express and live out one’s freedoms. One may consider huge economic costs of inter-racial conflict and war. Similarly, countries whose GDP was more strongly affected during economic crises, typically do not have cohesive societies (Tänzler & Grimalda, 2018).


1.3.6. Subjective well-being


There exists a positive connection between well-being and overall social cohesion. Increased trust has, for example, the same impact on life satisfaction as a two-thirds increase in household income (Hellwell & Wang, 2011 in Tänzler & Grimalda, 2018).


1.3.7. Health


To illustrate the correlation between social cohesion and health, data from 39 US states show that social cohesion fosters both mental and physical health. It has also been demonstrated that a disinvestment in social capital leads to the rise of mortality rates (Kawachi & Berkman, 2001 in Tänzler & Grimalda, 2018).


1.3.8. Religion


On the one hand there is evidence that religious groups and institutions build social cohesion within communities by fostering integration and societal interaction. On the other hand, religious denominations often differ greatly in terms of doctrine, and come into conflict with those in the community beyond their own belief. Often, bonding efforts may have “the opposite effect by increasing group insularity and, in turn, social fragmentation” (Andrews, 2011).


1.3.9. Culture


Here too there are two sides to the coin. On the one hand, “acceptance of diversity and the interaction between cultures foster harmonious relations between people [and] enrich their lives. It is not the denial, but rather, the recognition of differences that keeps a community together”. On the other hand, there needs to be mutual respect for the differences, because without such, “communities may turn in on themselves, ultimately leading to their disintegration, decline or disappearance” (Jensen, 2002).


1.4. Obstacles to social cohesion


In a study of twenty disadvantaged neighbourhoods in London, the researchers found that, across all the areas studied, “lack of community” emerged as a strong theme. A number of key barriers to building communities emerged from the study.


  • Young people. The participants expressed strong anxieties about young people in their communities, many of whom seemed attracted to gangsterism, disrespect for and destructive crevices between them and older persons. The behaviour was driven by young people that “had nothing to do”, that were bored, and who lacked self-respect, needed self-protection, and did not have sufficient community activities to participate in. The breakdown of the family unit was also problematic in that they wanted to feel connected, which need was not satisfied within the family, driving many to gangsterism and untoward behaviour.

  • Lack of safety. Crime emerged as a strong barrier to the development of solid communities. This is because when crime is rampant in society, people are afraid to go out and interact with one another.

  • High levels of transience. Participants identified the high level of community turnover as a barrier, in that people found it difficult to “get to know their neighbours”. In turn, this affects safety and security, as the ability and willingness to “look out for one another” is diminished. So too, as neighbourhoods became increasingly ethnically and culturally diverse, and in areas of high numbers of immigrants, sensitivity as to the safeguarding of their rights emerged.

  • Racism. Tension between ‘cultures’ is a strong force to divide the community along ethnic lines, which often results in racist incidents and behaviour that contributes to ethnic segregation.

  • Language. Being unable to communicate with one another was felt to be a significant barrier to achieving more cohesive communities, since it contributed to mutual suspicion, feelings of isolation, and lack of interaction between different groups.

  • Lack of activities and information about activities. Activities and events are opportunities to get out of the house and interact with one’s local community. The lack of such activities weakens opportunities to build community spirit.

  • Provision of accessible and affordable/free community spaces. Easily accessible and affordable, even free, community spaces are important for promoting community cohesion and inter-cultural communication. In providing these spaces it is important to ensure that they are not hogged by one ethnic or age group to the exclusion of others.

  • Empowerment and community capacity. Community apathy and over-consultation, with no results, leads many to avoid community consultation or engagement. When people feel that they have no influence over the processes, they feel disempowered and then don’t get involved. Efforts therefore need to be made to build local capacity and devolve power to the community to make decisions about their neighbourhood. Similarly, volunteering is important for the development of communities, but a lack of encouragement, resources, and capacity weakens the ability of local organisations to participate in activities that promote community cohesion.

(Bertotti, Adams-Eaton, Sheridan & Renton, 2016).


1.5. Systems to achieve social cohesion


According to the Australian Human Rights Commission there are five elements for achieving social cohesion within a country.


1.5.1. Government needs to be ready


A socially cohesive society is not achieved overnight. It takes time, and therefore requires from government a long-term commitment to build social cohesion and then to sustain its implementation. Key steps include:


  • Establishing a measure or benchmark capable of measuring progress towards social cohesion on a regular basis.

  • Placing social cohesion at the forefront of government priorities by using strategic planning to align the country’s policies and actions therewith.

  • Assessing the country’s readiness and capacity to build social cohesion.

  • Embedding social cohesion objectives in all policies and processes.

(Australian Human Rights Commission, 2015).


1.5.2. Communities need to be regularly engaged in order to understand the issues


Government needs to understand their communities and where there is potential for tensions to arise between different groups. They need to:


  • Know their community in order to understand the characteristics of society and how it may change over time.

  • Engage the community in order to identify the existing or potential areas that can strengthen and build social cohesion.

  • Ensure that all voices are heard.

  • Continually identify issues and tensions that could undermine social cohesion.

(Australian Human Rights Commission, 2015).


1.5.3. Long-term partnerships need to be established


Building social cohesion requires strong partnerships with business, community groups, the police, all spheres of government, and agencies, such as the Constitution’s Chapter 9 institutions. In doing this, government needs to:


  • Identify and understand which partners, across the range of sectors, could help build social cohesion.

  • Develop strategies to make contact and build and engage with the broadest possible range of social cohesion partners.

  • Work collaboratively with partners to identify issues of concern that need to be responded to and demonstrate that they are willing to lead and take action.

  • Ensure sustainable partnerships capable of existing for the long term by keeping in contact with the social cohesion partners and nurturing those relationships.

(Australian Human Rights Commission, 2015).


1.5.4. Take place-based, targeted action


Building social cohesion requires actions that meet the specific needs of the community. This means that:


  • Communities need to be empowered and capacitated to meaningfully participate in both the planning and implementation activities.

  • Government and their partners need to be prepared and ready to respond quickly to situations as they develop.

  • They need to target programmes that meet specific needs.

  • They need to engage and provide safe spaces for young people in order for them to feel connected to their community.

  • They need to support bystanders to effectively respond to racism.

  • Government needs to develop an effective media and communications strategy, with targeted messages to build social cohesion.

(Australian Human Rights Commission, 2015).


1.5.5. Evaluate and share outcomes


Government needs to continually evaluate their social cohesion efforts so as to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently and effectively, and that sufficient progress is being made in their social cohesion-building efforts. This requires them to:


  • Work with the community to develop an evaluation framework to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of their actions.

  • Collect appropriate data that will support the evaluation.

  • Regularly review the outcomes achieved in order to draw conclusions as to whether, and how, social cohesion has been influenced through their efforts.

  • Constantly share experiences so as to help others and to learn from the outcomes and processes deployed to achieve their results.

(Australian Human Rights Commission, 2015).


1.6. Conclusion and motivation for study


Measured against the backdrop of the aforementioned desktop review, it is manifestly clear that there is still a material social cohesion deficit in South Africa, and that the country’s reconciliation and nation-building aspirations remain unfulfilled.


1.6.1. In terms of definition of social cohesion


In terms of the definition, there is still substantial social conflict, in terms of wealth, ethnicity, race, and gender. For example, in the recent rioting and looting in KwaZulu-Natal, racial tension between the Indian and black communities in Phoenix raised its ugly head (Naidoo & Nkosi, 2021). There are also regular xenophobic incidents, such as the murder of more than 200 foreign truck drivers in recent years (Ryan, 2021). And there has been a significant rise in gender-based violence (Bosch, 2021).


1.6.2. In terms of the elements of social cohesion


With regard to the elements of social cohesion – inequality, trust, and identity:


  • With a Gini coefficient of 63, according to the World Bank, South Africa is the most unequal country in the world (Warah, 2021).

  • A 2019 South African Reserve Bank report suggests “South Africans have relatively low levels of trust in the state” (Moosa, N.d.).

  • The dominance of a racial identity has prevented the forging of a truly common identity (Allie, 2021).


1.6.3. In terms of the determinants for social cohesion


South African society is negatively driven by all the determinants required for social cohesion:


  • Racial diversity: The racial segregation caused by apartheid is well-documented.

  • Economic inequality: As previously mentioned, the World Bank has found South Africa to be the most unequal in terms of income inequality.

  • Education: The school drop-out rate is between 37 and 42 percent (BusinessTech, 2020).

  • Historical events: Once again, the history of apartheid and colonialism and its devastating impact on South African society, is well-documented.

  • GDP: The South African economy has been stagnating for a prolonged period, and fails to deliver jobs (RSA, N.d.).

  • Subjective well-being: There is a stark contrast in the subjective well-being of the minority communities, especially the white and Indian communities, versus the black majority. There are also deep intra-community well-being outcomes (Neff, 2005).

  • Health: The disparity in health cover between the various race groups has already been alluded to.


1.6.4. In terms of the obstacles to social cohesion


All the defined obstacles to social cohesion remain in present-day South Africa:


  • Lack of community: A relatively recent study into community participation in Khayelitsha, found a lack of community participation due to impediments such as poverty amongst the community residents, and ineffective police response to crimes (Manaliyo, 2016).

  • Young people: Youth unemployment currently stands at 61 percent (Trading Economics, N.d.).

  • Lack of safety: Crime in South Africa remains at very high levels, with crime statistics showing that South Africa remains a “very violent country” (Gifford, 2021).

  • High levels of transience: Informal settlements have increased from around 300 in 2002 to 3200 in 2020 (Mbanga, 2020) and there are around four million migrant workers in South Africa (Stats SA, 2021).

  • Racism: For example, more than a quarter of a century into the new South Africa and the country has still not been able to shed race-based politics (Cilliers, 2021).

  • Language barriers: Since the post-apartheid desegregation of schools, for example, language continues to create learning challenges in the classroom. Many scholars now struggle with language as a learning barrier in the classroom (Friedman, 2019).

  • Lack of activities and information about activities: The South African president has himself lamented that poor communication between government and communities prevails. Using local government as an example, he said that the refraining complaint from citizens was their inability to make contact with their councillors (Ramaphosa, 2021).

  • Under-utilisation of community space: Shackleton and Gwedla (2021), attached to the Department of Environmental Science at Rhodes University, in their analysis of public green spaces in South Africa, found marked inequalities in its distribution and quality between neighbourhoods designated for different race groups during the colonial and apartheid periods, and that it “continues to be reproduced by the post-colonial (and post-apartheid) state”.

  • Empowerment and community capacity: One point to illustrate this is youth empowerment, which “has long been identified as a catalytic tool for tackling youth unemployment and other youth challenges”. But many factors hinder the expansion of such empowerment (DBSA, 2022). This is further illustrated in a master’s thesis by Phendu (2019), where he assessed the state of public participation in the Western Cape. He found, for example, that most ward committee members do not understand their roles and responsibilities. He proposed that the municipalities facilitated regular capacity building programmes with the view to increase ward committee awareness and understanding of municipal functions, systems, and procedures.


1.6.5. Motivation for undertaking the survey


To this end, the Inclusive Society Institute has embarked on the project to develop the Social Cohesion Index or Radar for South Africa, as previously mentioned. The previous 2021 and this 2022 GovDem survey covered in this report is a precursor to that index/radar, which will be designed around three main themes:


- Demographic integration


Questions in the survey were designed to test the various demographic groups’ (race, religion, political party support, education, income, gender, and age) attitudes towards integration and trust in their fellow South Africans.


For all the reasons highlighted in the desktop review above, and given the historical context of the demographic segregation actively pursued by apartheid, to build a cohesive nation, the Inclusive Society Institute is of the opinion that breaking down the ‘silo effect’ is important for social cohesion.


- Level of connectedness to the country


This part of the survey aimed at testing various demographic groups’ attitudes towards emigration.


South Africa has a severe shortage of skills and expertise. The economy can simply not afford to lose such skills and expertise on a large scale. In order to understand what social cohesion determinants are at play within the South African environment, the Inclusive Society Institute would like to establish the level of such risk and the drivers behind it.


- Sense of community


This part of the survey aimed at testing various demographic groups’ attitudes towards socialising and working with their fellow citizens from within their communities and from across a range of demographic groups.


The Inclusive Society Institute is of the view that a sense of community is important, not only to bring about reconciliation and to promote nation-building, but equally so for purposes of security, safety, and to counteract destructive damage to community assets during times of protest and unrest.


1.6.6. Parting shot


It is hoped that this updated report will serve to further motivate public policymakers and civil society leaders to promote the building of social cohesion in South Africa to a greater extent, and that they move it up on their lists of priorities. This is equally important for purposes of promoting human fraternity, as it is for the sake of rejuvenating the country’s lagging economy.


Chapter 2

Methodology


The research was undertaken in three parts. The research takes a pragmatic view; a concurrent mixed methods research design is employed in this study. This is an approach that involves the use of quantitative and qualitative methods within a single phase of data collection and analysis. This allows both sets of results to be interpreted together to provide a richer and more comprehensive response to the research questions (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2016). Similarly, Creswell & Creswell (2018) argue that mixed methods research design yields additional insight beyond the information provided by either the quantitative or qualitative data alone. The mixed-method also counterbalances the weaknesses associated with quantitative and qualitative approaches when used separately (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Saunders et al., 2016) and leads to greater confidence in the findings.


2.1. Desktop review


The first part involved a desktop review aimed at building an understanding of social cohesion: To develop a framework as to what it is, why it matters, and what the elements, determinants of obstacles are. Parallel to this, the author attempted to position the current-day South African social cohesion experience within this framework.


2.2. Survey


The second part involved an extensive survey, the Inclusive Society Institute annual GovDem Poll, which is undertaken on behalf of the Institute by IPSOS.


2.2.1. Questionnaire


The questionnaire for this study focused on the three elements of Demographic Integration, Level of Connectedness in the Country, and the Sense of Community.


Questions on these three elements were developed by Ipsos and submitted to the Inclusive Society Institute for approval.


2.2.2. The Ipsos Khayabus


The questionnaire was included in the Ipsos Khayabus questionnaire in 2022. The Khayabus is a syndicated study, undertaken twice a year by Ipsos to provide clients with the ability to pose questions to a large sample of South Africans, without carrying all the daunting fieldwork costs themselves. Whilst each participating client pays for the administering of their own questions and receives their own results and the results of the included demographic questions, results are not shared freely, and the findings are treated confidentially to the client and belong to the client.


This process can be summarised graphically as follows:



2.2.3. Sampling


Stratified random sampling is designed by the Marketing Science team at Ipsos – the sample is firstly stratified by province and then within province by various sizes and types of settlements.


Sampling points are chosen at random, and six interviews are conducted in the vicinity of each sampling point, following the random selection rules as determined by the process of random sampling. On each plot/erf/farm, the household to be included is chosen by applying a prescribed random process and within the selected household the individual to be interviewed is also chosen by applying a random process.


This process is well-documented and conforms to the ISO standards, which are followed at Ipsos and regularly audited. The stringent rules are designed to ensure that all interviewers follow the same process and that interviewers do not have any influence on the eventual choice of respondent.


Marketing Science also produces the maps to enable interviewers to work in the chosen areas. The next graph is a summary of this process:


2.2.4. Interviewing


All interviews for the Ipsos Khayabus are conducted by trained and experienced interviewers. Interviews are conducted face-to-face in the homes and home languages of respondents. As a result of COVID-19, interviewers have to adhere to certain procedures:

This process ensures that results are representative of the views of adult South Africans and the results are projected to this universe/population.


2.3. Assessment tools


To enable an assessment as to the state of social cohesion in South Africa, two tables were developed from the information gathered in the desktop review. The first table allows for a somewhat subjective but informed assessment as to the state of social cohesion in South Africa, as tested against the elements, determinants of, and obstacles to social cohesion within society.


The second table draws from the empirical data gathered from a set of questions in the GovDem Poll survey that were designed to test respondent perceptions with regard to the extent of demographic integration (to what extent do South Africans socialise across racial lines), their level of connectedness (their commitment to South Africa as opposed to seeking a future outside of the country), and sense of community (an important element to ensure social stability and order).


2.4. Limitations of the study


In terms of the elements and determinants of, and obstacles to, social cohesion, whilst in some respects credible secondary data, such as GDP and unemployment, are readily available and adequate for drawing conclusions, in other respects the data are not. Especially as it relates to the obstacles to social cohesion, empirical data collected via the survey would have been more conclusive than having to rely on a subjective conclusion to been drawn from a desktop study. To this end, however, questions were not included in the survey. This can be corrected in future surveys.


Chapter 3

Findings


3.1. South Africans remain committed to ‘unity in diversity’


Almost 50 percent of the South African population harbour doubts about the feasibility of various groups within the country coming together to form a cohesive nation. However, they expressed a strong desire for a unified South Africa where everyone can join forces and coexist as equal fellow citizens. This was the first principal finding of the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem survey.


3.1.1. Doubt as to whether one nation can be formed from amongst the different groups


47,18 percent (previous poll: 47,96 percent) of adult South Africans either agreed or strongly agreed with the notion that it is not possible to form one nation out of all the different groups in the country. This finding held true across all race groups, with Indians now being slightly more inclined to believe it possible and coloureds being the most doubtful. 35,86 percent (previous poll: 54,55 percent) of Indians thought it is not possible to form one nation, as opposed to 42,55 percent (previous poll: 42,7 percent) of whites, who were the most positive in the last poll. 43,63 percent (previous poll: 47,45 percent) of blacks and 51,48 percent (previous poll: 55,77 percent) of coloureds also thought so. The change in Indian sentiment may be explained by a lapse in time since the July riots in KwaZulu-Natal in 2021 (during which period the first GovDem Poll was carried out), where the Indian community proved exceptionally vulnerable.


On the opposite side of the divide, 20,11 percent (previous poll: 31,44 percent) of adult South Africans disagreed with the notion that it is impossible to form one nation out of the different groups in the country. Stated otherwise: these respondents, therefore, believed that it is possible to form one nation in South Africa.


17,13 percent (previous poll: 15,36 percent) of the surveyed South Africans did not express an opinion either way.


Overall, therefore, there is a marginally more positive sentiment than reflected in the previous poll.


Figure 3.1.: Percentage of South Africans who are doubtful one nation can emerge


Based on the level of South Africans' education, there was little differentiation to be made. 46,64 percent (previous poll: 40,45 percent) of those South Africans with higher education are of the opinion that it is impossible to form one nation, whilst this hovered at around 50 percent for less educated South Africans – no schooling: 45,45 percent (previous poll: 49,85 percent), some high schooling: 49,62 percent (previous poll: 50,95 percent), and those with Matric: 46,21 percent (previous poll: 51,09 percent).


Similarly, there was little differentiation between gender and age groups.


However, this does not mean that various race groups were not willing or did not want to come together within a diverse but unified country. Indeed, a minority of South Africans were of the view that race relations in the country were getting worse. Only 28,07 percent (previous poll: 29,63 percent) of South Africans were of the view that the relationships between the different races in the country were getting worse. 71,93 percent (previous poll: 70,37 percent) of South Africans were of the view that the relationships either remained the same (48,87 percent – previously 47,64 percent) or were improving (23,06 percent – previously 22,37 percent).


In this regard, 72,64 percent (previous poll: 73,55 percent) of whites believed that the relationships either remained the same (46,73 percent – previously 47,04 percent) or were improving (25,91 percent – previously 26,51 percent). 71,46 percent (previous poll: 70,57 percent) of black South Africans believed that the relationships either remained the same (49 percent – previously 47,76 percent) or were improving (22,46 percent – previously 22,81 percent). And amongst Indians, it was 77,11 percent (previous poll: 67,66 percent) of the view that relationships were either remaining the same (50,54 percent – previously 50,77 percent) or improving (26,57 percent – previously 16,89 percent). 73,77 percent (previous poll: 66,11 percent) of coloured South Africans said that relationships either remained the same (49,51 percent – previously 46,38 percent) or were improving (24,26 percent – previously 19,73 percent).


Here too, it appears that the previous poll’s more negative Indian community sentiment has recovered to be more or less in line with the other communities.


Figure 3.2.: South Africans’ beliefs about race relations


Therefore, the survey seems to suggest that whilst across all races two-thirds or more of South Africans did not suggest a regression in race relations, they were also not convinced that race relations were improving.


3.1.2. But most agree South Africa must unite


Most were of the opinion that it was important for all South Africans to unite. 65,76 percent (previous poll: 70,53 percent) of South Africans either agreed or strongly agreed with this notion, whilst only 12,69 percent (previous poll: 13,15 percent) of South Africans either disagreed or strongly disagreed. 4,94 percent (previous poll: 2,75 percent) did not know how they felt.


In this regard it was the Indian (75,74 percent – previous poll: 80,75 percent) and coloured (74,80 percent – previous poll: 80,76 percent) South Africans that, in terms of agreeing or strongly agreeing, registered the highest need therefore, followed by whites at 69,76 percent (previous poll: 75,65 percent) and trailed by blacks at 63,91 percent (previous poll: 68,24 percent).


Figure 3.3.: Percentage wanting South Africa to unite


3.1.3. More agree than disagree that reconciliation is moving in the right direction


Whilst the majority of South Africans do not yet believe that reconciliation is moving in the right direction, it is encouraging that those that do agree do outnumber those that don’t by a significant margin. 43,47 percent (previous poll: 44,97 percent) of South Africans agree or strongly agree that it is moving in the right direction, as opposed to 22,57 percent (previous poll: 27,54 percent) that disagree or strongly disagree. 24,31 percent (previous poll: 21,27 percent) neither agreed nor disagreed, and 9,65 percent (previous poll: 6,22 percent) did not know how they felt about it.


In terms of racial breakdown of the responses, 43,35 percent (previous poll: 43,39 percent) of whites felt positive about the direction, 43,31 percent (previous poll: 46,06 percent) of blacks felt positive, and 46,41 percent (previous poll: 40,51 percent) of coloureds felt that reconciliation was moving in the right direction. At 38,37 percent (previous poll: 35,62 percent), Indian South Africans trailed somewhat in this regard.


Apropos reconciliation moving in the wrong direction, at 18,54 percent (previous poll: 27,48 percent) and 22,94 percent (previous poll: 26,92 percent) for white and black South Africans, respectively, there was not much between them. Indian and coloured South Africans, who in the previous poll were slightly more negative, were now more or less in line with their white and black compatriots. They registered 22,53 percent (previous poll: 33,05 percent) and 23,63 percent (previous poll: 31,00 percent), respectively.


Table 3.1.: Reconciliation moving in the right or wrong direction indicated by race


3.1.4. High level of racial integration in everyday life


The survey suggests that there is a relatively high level of integration between the various race groups in the country when it comes to everyday life activities. Moreover, the integration appears not to be forced integration but rather of a voluntary nature, as can be deduced from the table below, where there was a high level of enjoyment flowing from such integration and friendships being formed.


Table 3.2.: Level of everyday life integration indicated by race


The table shows that across the various activities, the majority of the population is starting to integrate as it relates to everyday life activities. Even more encouraging is the trend that largely replicates itself across all racial groups. It tells us that the majority of South Africans have commenced the journey towards reconciliation, nation-building and social cohesion, even though there is still a long way to go.


3.1.5. But, whilst on the decline, racial bias is still alive and kicking


Nearly a third (33,12 percent – previous poll: 33,44 percent) of all South Africans still do not like associating themselves with people from other population groups. This would suggest that the country still has some way to go before it can consider itself to be fully reconciled. It is a high percentage that cannot be left unchecked, lest it festers to the detriment of the vast majority that the survey statistics suggest are committed to building a united, non-racial South Africa.


30, 99 percent (previous poll: 28,3 percent) of whites indicated that they do not like associating with people from other population groups. Similarly, 33,44 percent (previous poll: 33,88 percent) of blacks, 24,01 percent (previous poll: 41,73 percent) of Indians and 35,22 percent (previous poll: 33,05 percent) of coloureds indicated that they do not like to associate with people from other population groups. The softening of attitudes amongst the Indian community is probably the result of a recovery of relationships in KwaZulu-Natal in the wake of the July 2021 riots in the province.


Figure 3.4.: Percentage against association with other racial groups


3.1.6. Conclusion


South Africa still has a long way to go on its journey towards full reconciliation. The result from this survey, in line with the previous survey, shows, however, that much progress has been made, with more in the country committed to uniting the country, as opposed to dividing it. There has, however, been a slight hardening of attitudes amongst people from different population groups since the last survey.


Most striking is the disconnect between the general negative political racial narrative which drives division, and the realities of everyday South Africans going about their daily business. Whilst many in the political establishment seem to be fuelling division to some effect, citizens, in turn, are finding each other at the human level. Politicians would be well advised to focus equal energy on a narrative that aims to build the nation.


What still appears unresolved is a national understanding as to the concept of Unity in Diversity and how it relates to the nation we wish to build. Can one nation with undefined racial identity be formed out of the different population groups, or will it be a nation of cultural cooperation? This question is central to understanding the dichotomy of the survey results, which point to both doubt that one nation can be formed out of different groups and the overwhelming desire to unite the nation. This is a concept worthy of finding national consensus in order to develop a unified path for all in the country.


3.2. South Africa has worrying trust issues


The trust needed to underpin social cohesion in South Africa is largely absent. Among South Africans, there is a notable lack of trust in their fellow citizens that spans various dimensions such as race, gender, age, education, and income. The only exception seems to be the family unit, which appears to maintain a high sense of trust. This was found in an extensive poll commissioned by the Inclusive Society Institute late last year.


3.2.1. High trust in family


It is safe to say that South Africans trust their families. 86,18 percent of South Africans (slightly down from 87,42 percent last year) trust other members of their family. This holds true across all racial groups, with more than 85 percent of respondents of all racial groups indicating that they completely trust or somewhat trust members of their family. There is little differentiation to be made between the various race groups: 87,78 percent (previous poll: 85,47 percent) of coloured respondents, 86,52 percent (previous poll: 90,68 percent) of white respondents, 85,64 percent (previous poll: 88,19 percent of Indian respondents and 85,98 percent (previous poll: 87,21 percent) of black respondents indicated that they either completely of some what trusted their family members.


There was little differentiation based on gender, education or income considerations.


  • 85,68 percent (previous poll: 87,82 percent) of men completely or somewhat trust their family members, whereas 86,64 percent (previous poll: 87,04 percent) of women do.

  • 87,22 percent (previous poll: 83,14 percent) of those with no schooling, 86,04 percent (previous poll: 83,97 percent); 85,28 percent (previous poll: 89.93 percent) of those with matric and 88,76 percent (previous poll: 85,55 percent) completely trusted or somewhat trusted their family.

  • Those respondents with no income were slightly less trusting of their family than those with income. 74,89 percent (previous poll: 82,54 percent) of those respondents with no income indicated that they completely or somewhat trusted their family members, 86,64 percent (previous poll: 86,89 percent) of respondents in the lowest income band indicated that they completely trusted or somewhat trusted their family, for the mid-income group it was 88,66 percent (previous poll: 87,75 percent), and for the highest income group 88,53 percent (previous poll: 86,73 percent).


Figure 3.5.: Differentiation based on gender, education, or income considerations


3.2.2. Reasonable trust in neighbours


From the results of the survey, it is apparent that people have a reasonable level of trust in people within their own neighbourhoods. Overall 65,89 percent (previous poll: 62,27 percent) of respondents indicated that they either completely or somewhat trusted their neighbours. However, there were sharp differences amongst the various demographic groups.


Racial demographics


Whites have a higher level of trust in their neighbours as measured against their black, Indian and coloured compatriots. In this regard 83,96 percent (previous poll: 72,95 percent) of white respondents indicated that they completely trusted or somewhat trusted their neighbours. This against 65,39 percent (previous poll: 60,6 percent) of black respondents, 63,31 percent (previous poll: 77,54 percent) of Indians and 71,06 percent (previous poll: 60,1 percent) of coloureds indicated such.


Age demographics


The older people get, the more they trust their neighbours. Whereas 61,79 percent (previous poll: 58,33 percent) of those respondents in the age group 18 - 24 indicated that they completely or somewhat trusted the people in their neighbourhoods, this rose sharply to 70,05 percent (previous poll: 67,74 percent) for those respondents in over fifty years of age. For the respondents within the age groups 25 - 34 and 35 - 49, the percentages came in at 62,95 percent and 66,01 percent (previous poll: 59,84 percent and 63,44 percent) respectively.

Education demographics


In general, there is little difference in the level of trust of neighbours whether the respondents are educated or not. For those respondents with no schooling 73,19 percent (previous poll: 64,63 percent) indicated that they either completely or somewhat trusted their neighbours. Whilst for those with some high schooling it came down quite sharply to 63,56 percent (previous poll: 56,75 percent), it again rose to 65,10 percent (previous poll: 63,6 percent) amongst those respondents with matric and 66,74 percent (previous poll: 63,56 percent) amongst those respondents with a higher education.


Income demographics


68,57 percent (previous poll: 59,5 percent) of lower income earners trust their neighbours somewhat or completely. For those in the middle-income and higher income groupings, it was 67,73 (previous poll: 61,48 percent) and 69,48 percent (previous poll: 65,58 percent) respectively. The outliers were those in the low-income group where only 51,25 percent (previous poll: 55,17 percent) of respondents indicated that they either completely or somewhat trusted their neighbours.


Figure 3.6.: Trust of neighbours based on race, age, education, and income


3.2.3. Trust improves as people get to know each other


From the results of the survey indicated in the table below, it is apparent that South Africans do not trust people at first sight. It is only after relationships are built, and people have gotten to know one another, that trust develops.


There is little differentiation to be made amongst the gender and education demographic groups, but there is quite a stark difference based on race and income. Younger people also take somewhat longer to trust their fellow compatriots than do older people.


Table 3.3.: Trust differentiation between persons known and met for the 1st time


3.2.4. Distrust high amongst religious groups


Less than half of the respondents continued to indicate that they completely or somewhat trusted people from religious groups other than their own. Overall, only 46,65 percent (previous poll: 47,1 percent) indicated that they did – 46,63 percent of males (previous poll: 48,68 percent) and 46,66 percent of female (previous poll: 45,70%).


Figure 3.7.: Trusting those from other religions


3.2.5. Distrust between races still worryingly high


Just over 50 percent of those respondents from the minority communities indicated that they completely or somewhat trusted people from the black community. For those from the white and coloured communities trust in their black compatriots was 54,53 percent (previous poll: 50,69%) and 53,03 (previous poll: 51,21% ) respectively.


The distrust was alarmingly higher amongst the Indian respondents, where only 23,83 percent (previous poll: 43,92 percent) indicated that they completely or somewhat trusted black South Africans. It should be noted that the tensions between the Indian and black communities in Kwazulu-Natal could still be lingering post the looting and rioting in 2021. This stark differences may require some deeper investigation.


More alarmingly was the high level of distrust that the black respondents have for their compatriots from the minority communities. In this instance, only 39,74 percent (previous poll: 41,07 percent) of the black respondents completely or somewhat trusted their white compatriots, which deepened to only 38,37 percent (previous poll: 38,93 percent) completely or somewhat trusting their coloured compatriots, and a mere 35,51 percent (previous poll: 34,84 percent) their fellow Indian South Africans.


Complete or somewhat trust for black South Africans from:


Figure 3.8.: Trust for black South Africans


Complete or somewhat trust for white South Africans from:


Figure 3.9.: Trust for white South Africans


It is worth noting that the trust-deficit between the minority communities are also not at an optimal level.


Similarly, it is worth mentioning that the in-group level of trust is not at optimum levels either. For example, black respondents, when asked to what extent they trust their fellow black South Africans, only 55,50 percent (previous poll: 54,46 percent) indicated that they completely or somewhat trusted their fellow black compatriots.


Indian and coloured respondents were somewhat more trusting of people from their group. In this regard 55,07 percent (previous poll: 59,97 percent) of the Indian respondents indicated that they completely or somewhat trusted their fellow Indian compatriots, whilst this grew to 64,46 percent (previous poll: 62,97 percent) within the coloured group.


The biggest change since the previous poll was registered within the white community, since only 57,92 percent (previous poll: 74,51 percent) of white respondents indicated that they completely or somewhat trusted their fellow white South Africans.


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